COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2013-02-28
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU programme, European Union Satellite Centre, environmental impact, exchange of information, security services, space navigation, space research, waste, waste management

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 28.2.2013  
SWD(2013) 55 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
space surveillance and tracking support programme 

{COM(2013) 107 final} 
{SWD(2013) 54 final} 

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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
space surveillance and tracking support programme 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

1.4. 

2. 

3. 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties .............................................. 5 

Identification ................................................................................................................ 5 

Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 5 

Consultation and expertise ........................................................................................... 5 

Scrutiny by the Commission Impact Assessment Board ............................................. 9 

Context ....................................................................................................................... 10 

Problem definition...................................................................................................... 11 

3.1. 

The problems that require action................................................................................ 11 

3.1.1.  Security of critical European space infrastructure is not ensured .............................. 11 

3.1.1.1.  Current situation in Europe ........................................................................................ 12 

3.1.1.2.  Situation at international level ................................................................................... 13 

3.1.1.3.  Other actions to mitigate collision risks..................................................................... 14 

3.1.2. 

Increased collision risks due to space debris.............................................................. 15 

3.1.3.  Collision avoidance manoeuvres shorten the lifetime of satellites ............................ 17 

3.1.4.  Re-entry of debris or of controlled spacecraft to Earth threaten the security of EU 

citizens........................................................................................................................ 19 

3.1.5.  Overview of estimated annualised losses due to hazards from space debris: ............ 21 

3.2. 

Underlying drivers of the problem............................................................................. 22 

3.3.  Who is affected, in what ways and to what extent? ................................................... 24 

3.4. 

3.5. 

4. 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

5.4. 

Foreseen evolution of the problem............................................................................. 24 

EU right to act ............................................................................................................ 25 

Objectives................................................................................................................... 25 

Policy options............................................................................................................. 27 

Option 1: Baseline scenario: No EU financial involvement in SST .......................... 30 

Option 2: Partnership approach – EU funding for the European SST front desk 
function ...................................................................................................................... 31 

Option 3: Partnership approach – EU funding for networking and operation of 
sensor, processing and front desk functions............................................................... 35 

Option 4: EU-led SST development and exploitation (risk reduction factor of 3 to 5)
.................................................................................................................................... 36 

5.5. 

Option 5: EU-led SST development and exploitation (risk reduction factor of 10) .. 37 

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5.6. 

Summary of the options ............................................................................................. 38 

5.6.1.  Governance ................................................................................................................ 38 

5.6.2.  Data policy ................................................................................................................. 38 

5.6.3.  Service provision........................................................................................................ 38 

5.6.4.  Funding ...................................................................................................................... 38 

5.7. 

Summary of stakeholder views on the options .......................................................... 39 

6. 

6.1. 

6.2. 

6.3. 

7. 

7.1. 

7.2. 

8. 

8.1. 

8.2. 

8.3. 

Analysis of impacts .................................................................................................... 40 

Impacts of option 1: baseline scenario ....................................................................... 41 

Impacts of options 2, 3 and 4 ..................................................................................... 43 

Impacts of option 5: EU-led SST development and exploitation .............................. 46 

Comparing the options and conclusions .................................................................... 49 

Summary of strengths and weaknesses of the options ............................................... 49 

Comparison in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence with agreed policies
.................................................................................................................................... 50 

Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 52 

Evaluation .................................................................................................................. 52 

Monitoring.................................................................................................................. 53 

Anti-fraud measures ................................................................................................... 54 

ANNEX I: Glossary ................................................................................................................. 55 

ANNEX II: Stakeholder consultations and results................................................................... 57 

ANNEX III: Overview of existing SSA/SST capabilities ....................................................... 62 

ANNEX IV: INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON DEBRIS MITIGATION..................... 67 

ANNEX V: Calculation methodology ..................................................................................... 70 

ANNEX VI: Reference studies and documents ....................................................................... 75 

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1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  

1.1. 

Identification 

Lead DG: DG Enterprise and Industry 

Other involved DGs: 

Agenda Planning/WP Reference: 2012/ENTR/021 

1.2. 

Organisation and timing 

This impact assessment builds on an earlier impact assessment on the future EU involvement 
in space which accompanied the Communication on "Elements for an EU strategy in space for 
the benefit of EU citizens" adopted by the College on 4 April 20111. 

This second and more detailed impact assessment focuses exclusively on options concerning 
EU involvement in the setting up of a European service to avoid collisions between spacecraft 
and between spacecraft and debris and to monitor uncontrolled re-entry of spacecraft which 
forms the basis for the protection of critical European space infrastructure. 

The Impact Assessment Steering Group (IASG) set up to accompany the preparation of this 
impact assessment met on 26 November 2010, 8 February 2011, 8 July 2011, 5 March 2012 
and  15  March  2012.  The  following  Commission  services  were  invited  to  participate  in  the 
IASG:  DG  SANCO,  DG  RTD,  DG  MOVE,  DG  ENER,  DG  BUDG,  DG  ECFIN,  DG 
RELEX, DG JRC, DG INFSO, DG ENV, DG ECHO, DG EMPL, DG EAC, DG HOME, the 
Secretariat-General as well as the European External Action Service (EEAS).  

1.3. 

Consultation and expertise 

Over  the  past  years,  DG  Enterprise  and  Industry  consulted  different  parties  interested  and 
involved  in  space  affairs  on  various  areas  of  potential  future  EU  activities  in  space  and 
notably  on  the  development  of  a  European  Space  Surveillance  and  Tracking  (SST)  service. 
The  development  of  such  service  has  also  been  the  subject  of  political  debate  among  EU 
Ministers  responsible  for  space.  The  conclusions  of  those  debates  are  reflected  in  several 
Council resolutions2.  

1 
2 

COM (2011) 152 final 
The  Space  Council  is  the  concomitant  meeting  of  the  EU  Council  (competitiveness)  and  the  ESA 
Ministerial Council. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EU Council's (competitiveness) 
responsibilities  were  enlarged  to  address  space  policy  matters  in  2010.  The  Space  Council  or  EU 
Council Resolutions or Conclusions referring to the need to set up an SSA capability at European level 
are: Council Resolution "Taking forward the European Space Policy" of 26 September 2008 (Council 
document  13569/08);  Council  Resolution  on  "The  contribution  of  space  to  innovation  and 
competitiveness in the context of the European Economic Recovery Plan, and further steps of 29 May 
2009  (10500/09);  Council  Resolution  "Global  challenges:  Taking  full  benefit  of  European  space 
systems" of 25 November 2010 (16864/10); Council conclusions "Towards a space strategy for the EU 
that  benefits  its  citizens"  of  31  May  2011;  and  the  Council  conclusions  "Orientations  concerning  the 
added  value  and  benefits  of  space  for  the  security  of  European  citizens"  of  6  December  2011 
(18232/11). 

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The main conclusions of these consultations can be summarised as follows: 

–  There is a consensus amongst Member States, satellite operators and other stakeholders on 
the  need  to  protect  space  infrastructure,  and  notably  to  protect  it  against  the  risk  of 
collision; 

–  There is a political consensus among Member States that the setting up of a European SST 
service should be led by the EU, which has competence to coordinate the exploitation of 
space systems and has also the competence and the mechanisms in place to deal with the 
security dimension of such a service; Member States consider that ESA should support the 
EU in this endeavour (and is doing so through its SSA preparatory programme3) but, as an 
R&D organisation, does not have the competence and the mechanisms necessary to set up 
and run a European SST service on its own. 

–  There  is  a  consensus  among  EU  and  ESA  Member  States  and  experts  that  a  future 
European SST service should link and build on existing sensor capacity and develop it with 
new  sensors;  Member  States  possessing  sensor  capacity  and  those  willing  to  develop  it 
should play a key role in the setting up of the European SST service; 

–  There is a consensus that the development of a European SST service should be done in 

close cooperation with the United States of America; 

–  Public opinion is aware of and supports the need to protect space infrastructure. 

These consultations are explained in detail below. 

Consultations of national space agencies, ministries and industry representatives 

In 2009, a series of bilateral meetings were held with national space agencies and ministries in 
charge of space matters in Member States more actively involved in space activities as well as 
with  representatives  of  the  European  space  industry.  From  these  bilateral  meetings  the 
following conclusions could be drawn: 

–  The  European  Union  has  a  very  important  role  to  play  in  space  matters.  Together  with 
Member  States and  ESA,  the  EU  is  one of the three main players in the European space 
field,  each  of  them  having  a  specific  and  distinct  role.  The  EU  has  a  political  role  and  a 
political responsibility and must aggregate and represent the interest of all, when deciding 
its involvement in space; 

–  Stakeholders  agree  that  the  most  urgent  priorities  for  the  EU  are  the  completion  of  the 
Galileo  and  Copernicus  (new  name  for  GMES)  programmes  (the  latter  including 
reinforced  security  and  climate  change  dimensions),  in  order  to  start  benefiting  from  the 
services they provide; 

–  The next priority for stakeholders, notably Member States, is the protection  of our space 
infrastructure. Our economy and the well being of our citizens are increasingly dependent 

3 

In the framework of its SSA preparatory programme launched in 2009 with a budget of around 55 M€, 
ESA conducts a number of technical studies to define SSA user requirements, system requirements as 
well  as  technical  architecture  options.  This  work  provided  useful  indications  concerning  the  assets 
needed  in  order  to  respond  to  civil  user  requirements.  Furthermore,  the  programme  included  the 
development of 2 surveillance demonstrator radars. 

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on  space-based  applications  and  we  need  to  acquire  the  capacity  to  protect  them.  Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA)4 and notably SST is instrumental to ensuring such protection; 

–  There is also a consensus that the EU, ESA and their Member States need to work together 

on all of the above. 

In addition, under the Spanish EU Presidency in 2009, a conference on space and security was 
held  to  contribute  to  defining  the  role  of  European  institutions  and  centres  in  security 
programmes.  In  2011,  a  conference  on  SSA  under  the  Polish  EU  Presidency  examined  the 
current situation with regard to SSA in Europe and led to some first discussions on possible 
governance options. 

Furthermore,  the  Communication  "Towards  a  space  strategy  for  the  European  Union  that 
benefits the citizen"5 aimed at triggering a debate amongst stakeholders on future EU action in 
space  policy.  The  Council  Conclusions  adopted  on  31  May  2011  in  response  to  this 
Communication  confirmed  space  and  security  as  a  priority  for  EU  action  after  ensuring  the 
implementation and sustainable exploitation of Galileo and Copernicus. 

In  2010,  relevant  target  stakeholders  were  interviewed  by  an  external  contractor6,  in  the 
context of a study to support the preparation of the previous impact assessment accompanying 
the  Communication  the  EU  strategy  for  space  adopted  in  April  2011.  A  further  study  was 
commissioned  at  the  end  of  2010  in  support  of  the  preparation  of  this  current  impact 
assessment7. It included a series of stakeholder interviews with ESA, national space agencies, 
national ministries responsible for space and industry representatives with the aim to get input 
on  the  potential  implication  of  the  EU  in  the  setting  up  of  a  European  SSA  capability.  The 
results  of  the  study  launched  in  2010,  in  particular  the  risks  related  to  space  debris  and  the 
related  estimated  losses,  have  been  presented  to  and  discussed  with  Member  States  in  late 
Spring 2011. 

An ex-post evaluation of the European space policy is ongoing. However, its results will not 
have  any  impact  on  this  impact  assessment,  as  the  EU  did  so  far  not  take  any  action  in  the 
field of space surveillance and tracking apart from the prospective studies referred to below. 

Finally,  in  general  terms  the  policy  options  defined  in  chapter  5  of  this  impact  assessment 
report have been discussed with Member States representatives on a number of occasions over 
the  past  two  years.  In  these  discussions,  Member  States  expressed  a  clear  preference  for  an 
approach to the setting up of European SST services along option 3 or an EU-led programme 
along  options  4  or  5.  Most  recently,  SST  governance  options  have  been  discussed  with 
Member States in the framework of the Enterprise and Industry DG led group of EU Member 
States space policy experts on 23 March 2012 where all Member States signalled readiness to 
support  option  3.  SSA  data  policy  has  been  subject  to  discussion  with  the  Council's  space 

4 

5 
6 

7 

Space Situational Awareness (SSA) refers to the protection of space infrastructure from collision with 
space  objects  (which  would  be  a  satellite  or  space  debris)  or  asteroids  or  meteoroids  (summarised  as 
Near Earth Objects) and from solar radiation (the so called space weather). While these threats are often 
discussed  together  –  and  for  this  reason  this  report  refers  in  some  cases  to  SSA  –  the  present  impact 
assessment report concerns only the threats from space debris. 
COM(2011) 152 final of 4.4.2011 
“Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. 
SI2.541751. 
Evaluation  of  options  for  an  EU  space  programme  2014-2020,  Booz  &  Company,  Final  report  of  16 
May 2011, contract no; 30-CE-036363/00-01 

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working party in autumn 2011 where Member States broadly agreed with the Commission's 
Staff Working Document setting out the key elements for the future SSA data policy8. 

Consultations of the broad public 

As  concerns  the  consultation  of  the  broad  public  on  space  issues  in  general  and  SSA  more 
specifically, two surveys have been carried out over the past three years:  

•  A Eurobarometer survey on the space activities of the European Union was conducted by 
Gallup  in  July  2009  in  order  to  examine  EU  citizens’  opinions  and  to  assess:  a)  their 
awareness of space activities of Europe and the European Union, and b) their perception 
of  these  activities.  The  majority  of  European  Union  citizens  regard  European  space 
activities  as  important  from  the  perspective  of  the  EU’s  future  global  role:  one  in  five 
citizens considered such activities very important (20%) and a further 43% felt that space 
activities are important in this respect. In total, almost two-thirds of Europeans share the 
view  that  space  activities  are  important  for  the  future  international  position  of  the 
European Union9. Overall, 67% of the survey respondents consider it important to develop 
space based applications to improve citizens’ security. 

•  A  second  public  consultation  was  carried  out  via  the  Commission's  Interactive  Policy 
Making (IPM) tool from 3 January to 15 March 2011. The survey focused on the public's 
opinion on possible EU action in the domain of SSA and space exploration. In total, 608 
contributions were received from 25 Member States. The majority of respondents (around 
38  %)  identified  themselves  as  individuals.  Around  14  %  of  the  respondents  were 
representatives of larger or smaller businesses or business associations. SME participation 
as well as the participation of public authorities (at European, national or regional level) 
amounted  to  around  8  %  each.  The  consultation  also  prompted  a  number  of  separate 
position papers from industry provided in addition to questionnaire replies10. As concerns 
SSA,  a  large  majority  of  respondents  (86%)  were  aware  of  and  felt  concerned  by 
hazards  caused  by  space  debris,  space  weather  phenomena,  or  Near  Earth  Objects 
(NEOs)  to  a  wide  range  of  space-based  and  ground-based  critical  infrastructures  and 
services.  At  the  same  time,  32%  of  the  respondents  indicated  that  they  had  no  dealings 
with space or the space sector. A large majority of respondents (83%) felt that the EU 
should have its own capacities to protect critical European satellites either in order to 
complement  third  country  capacities  (57%)  or  to  be  autonomous  from  third  country 
capacities (26%). 89% expressed the opinion that the EU should play a role in building a 
European  SSA  capability,  which  the  EU  should  either  set  up  alone  or  together  with  its 
Member States. Only 5% of the respondents expressed the opinion that the EU should not 
get involved in such capability building.  

External expertise used 

Two studies carried out by external contractors in 2010 (Ecorys) and end 2010/beginning of 
2011  (Booz  &  Company)  provided  input  alongside  other  sources  to  the  preparation  of  this 

8 

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Commission  Staff  Working  Paper  "Discussion  note  on  space  situational  awareness  data  policy", 
SEC(2011)  1246  final  of  12  October  2011.  This  document  is  currently  discussed  within  the  Council 
Security  Committee  and  will  serve  the  basis  for  the  Committee’s  concrete  recommendations  for  SST 
data policy. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfm?lang=fr&item_id=3749. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=5307&tpa=141&tk=&lang=en 

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impact  assessment11.  The  Ecorys  study  underlined  that  EU  action  in  space  situational 
awareness should be given priority to any future EU action in space going beyond Galileo and 
Copernicus. The Booz & Company study provided valuable qualitative and quantitative input 
to refine the problem definition related to the protection of European space infrastructure and 
critical ground infrastructure, and helped defining policy options and their impacts. 

Furthermore, the definition of the various policy options and their effect relies also heavily on 
ESA expertise. In the framework of its ongoing SSA preparatory programme, ESA conducted 
a  number  of  technical  studies  to  define  SSA  system  requirements  which  led  to  useful 
preliminary  indications  concerning  the  assets  needed  in  order  to  respond  to  civil  user 
requirements defined in 2010 in collaboration with potential SSA user communities and ESA 
Member States12. 

1.4. 

Scrutiny by the Commission Impact Assessment Board 

The  Impact  Assessment  Board  of  the  European  Commission  assessed  a  draft  version  of  the 
present  impact  assessment  and  issued  its  opinion  on  20/04/2012.  The  Impact  Assessment 
Board  made  several  recommendations  and,  in  the  light  of  the  latter,  the  final  impact 
assessment report: 

•  Describes in a clearer way the problems that need to be addressed, the nature and scope of 
the  initiative  proposed  to  address  these  problems,  the  current  situation  with  regard  to 
space  surveillance  and  tracking  activities  in  Europe  (including  an  overview  of  existing 
SST relevant assets owned by EU Member States) and elsewhere, and explains what other 
long-term mitigation measures exist at international or multilateral level. 

•  Strengthens  the  baseline  scenario  by  describing  in  more  detail  how  the  situation  is 
expected  to  evolve  in  absence  of  any  EU  initiative  in  the  SST  domain,  including 
cooperation  amongst  Member  States,  and  why  the  baseline  scenario  would  leave  the 
problems unchanged. It also clarifies the value-added of EU action in SST. 

•  Describes  more  clearly  and  in  a  more  structured  way  the  policy  options  proposed,  their 
differences  in  terms  of  governance,  data  policy,  the  difference  in  performance  of  the 
services provided, the new SST assets needed to achieve the targeted service performance 
level, and the related funding needs. A new chapter has been added to explain the position 
and views of stakeholders on the options set out in the report. Two tables have been added 
to facilitate the comparison between the options. 

•  Assesses  in  more  detail  the  impacts  of  the  options,  in  particular  the  expected  economic 
and social impacts (by looking in particular into impacts on citizen's health and security). 

The Impact Assessment Board issued a second opinion on the re-submitted impact assessment 
report  on  20  June  2012  (written  procedure).  In response,  the  report  was  further  amended  to 
take into account the last remaining recommendations: 

11 

12 

“Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. 
SI2.541751. 
ESA  SSA  Mission  Requirements  Document  (SS-MRD)  Revision  3;  final  version  as  presented  to  the 
ESA SSA Programme Board in its meeting on 2 May 2011. 

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•  The impact analysis chapter describes in more detail how the proposed governance of the 
European SST service will address concerns related to the relationship between Member 
States involved in the SST service provision and those benefiting from the service. 

•  As  concerns  funding  aspects,  the  report  better  explains  that  the  performance  of  the 
planned SST service is incremental and that risks related to budgetary constraints at EU 
and Member States level could be offset by down-scaling the system, for example in terms 
of sensors to be included in the sensor function of the system, or in terms of new sensors 
to  be  developed  by  Member  States.  Financial  contributions  from  both  the  public  and 
private sector in form of service fees could be envisaged at a later stage. 

•  The analysis of the safety impacts of all options has been strengthened. Option 3 has been 
identified as the preferred option in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence with 
Member States' political will and with other EU policies. 

2. 

CONTEXT 

The  Commission's  Communication  "Towards  a  space  strategy  for  the  European  Union  that 
benefits its citizens" adopted in April 2011 defines priorities for the future involvement of the 
EU in space and sets out options for EU action. With relevance to this impact assessment it 
underlines that: 

(1) Space infrastructure is critical infrastructure on which services that are essential to 
the  smooth  running  of  our  societies  and  economies  as  well  as  our  citizens's 
security  depend.  The  protection  of  this  infrastructure  was  underlined  as  a  major 
issue  for  the  EU  going  beyond  the  individual  interests  of  individual  satellite 
owners; 

(2) In view of ensuring such protection, it underlines that the Union should define the 
organisation  and  governance  of  a  European  Space  Situational  Awareness  (SSA) 
system  taking  into  account  its  dual  nature  and  the  need  to  ensure  its  sustainable 
exploitation  as  highlighted  in  the  Industrial  Policy  Communication  adopted  in 
October 2010.13 

The need for European action in the domain of SSA has been supported by Member States in 
several  Council  Resolutions  and  orientations  on  the  European  Space  Policy  (ESP)  jointly 
adopted by the EU and the European Space Agency (ESA) at the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Space 
Council  meetings  held  in  2007,  2008  and  2009,  2010  and  2011as  well  in  EU  Council 
conclusions  adopted  on  31  May  2011.  These  views  are  also  shared  by  the  European 
Parliament in its report on the space strategy for the EU adopted on 30 November 201114. 

If the policy choice leads to EU intervention, this impact issessment (IA) will accompany a 
proposal  establishing  a  space  surveillance  and  tracking  support  programme  supporting  the 
setting up and operation of a European service to prevent collisions in space and monitor un-
controlled re-entry of spacecraft or parts thereof, which could come into force during the next 

13 

14 

Commission  Communication  "An  integrated  industrial  policy  for  the  globalisation  era  –  putting 
competitiveness and sustainability at centre stage", COM(2010) 614 final of 27.10.2010 
For references to the Space Council and EU Council (competitiveness) Resolutions and Conclusions see 
footnote 2. On 30 November 2011, the European Parliament adopted a report on the Commission's on a 
a space strategy for the European Union that benefits its citizens (2011/2148(INI)). 

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EU  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  from  2014-2020.  This  service  will  provide  alerts  to 
satellite operators and public authorities to avoid collision during launch, in-orbit operations, 
and  will  also  inform  relevant  authorities  of  any  potential  danger  for  citizens  and  ground 
infrastructure  derived  from  uncontrolled  re-entries  of  inactive  spacecraft  or  their  debris  into 
the Earth’s atmosphere. 

This  initiative  builds  on  past  achievements  in  space  research  under  the  R&D  framework 
programmes. It is also closely linked to two other European space flagship projects (Galileo 
and Copernicus) and will benefit other EU policies such as security and defence, environment 
or health. 

3. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION  

3.1. 

The problems that require action 

3.1.1. 

Security of critical European space infrastructure is not ensured 

Space-based systems enable a wide spectrum of applications which play a fundamental role in 
our everyday reality (TV, Internet or GPS), are critical to key areas of the economy, and help 
ensuring our security15.  

Space infrastructures and derived services as well as space research have also become critical 
for  the  implementation  of  EU  policies16,  such  as  transport,  environment,  climate  change, 
the 
maritime  policies,  development,  agriculture,  security  related  policies 
CFSP/CSDP,  as  well  as  the  furthering  of  technical  progress  and  industrial  innovation  and 
competitiveness.  

including 

With  increasing  dependance  on  space-based  services,  the  ability  to  protect  space  assets  and 
infrastructures has become essential to our society. Any shutdown of even a part of the space 
infrastructure  could  have  significant  consequences  for  citizens’  safety  and  for  the  well-
functioning  of  economic  activities,  and  would  impair  the  organisation  of  emergency 
services17. 

With  Galileo  and  EGNOS,  the  EU  itself  has  become  owner  of  a  growing  fleet  of  satellites 
with  related  ground  based  infrastructure.  Furthermore,  the  EU  is  responsible  for  the  overall 
coordination  of  the  ongoing  GMES  Initial  Operations  Programme  including  its  satellite 
segment and can be expected to continue to have such role in the future. Thus, the EU will 
soon become one of the largest satellite operators in Europe.  

However,  space  infrastructures  are  increasingly  threatened  by  the  risk  of  collision  between 
sapcecraft  and,  more  importantly,  between  spacecraft  and  space  debris.  Space  debris  has 
become the most serious threat to the sustainability of space activities. 

15 

16 

17 

As regards space applications: GPS, Internet services routed by satellite, TV broadcast by satellite. For 
examples of spin-offs from Space R&D activities to applications used in everyday life, consult 
http://www.esa.int/esaCP/GGGIPLH3KCC_Improving_0.html 
http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/Spinoff2009/pdf/spinoff2009.pdf 
Applications from Earth observation, navigation and telecommunication satellites are important for 
issues such as transport, agriculture, fishery, science, environment, health and security. 
For example, communication systems, electrical power grids, and financial networks all rely on satellite 
timing for synchronisation. The provision of satellite-based rapid mapping services is indispensible for 
today's crisis management. 

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In order to mitigate the risk of collision it is necessary to indentify and monitor satellites and 
space  debris,  cataloguing  their  positions,  and  tracking  their  movements  (trajectory)  when  a 
potential risk of collision has been identified so that satellite operators can be alerted to move 
their satellites. This activity is known as space surveillance and tracking (SST). 

A SST service comprises three basic functions: 

–  Sensor  function,  which  through  a  network  of  instruments  such  as  radars  and  telescopes 

allows to identify and track spacecraft and debris; 

–  Processing  function,  through  which  the  relative  orbit  of  spacecraft  and  debris  can  be 
catalogued  and  analysed  to  determine  the  probability  of  collision  or  to  determine  the  re-
entry path of space objects; 

–  Front desk function, which is responsible for the actual provision of the SST services (such 
as  collision  or  re-entry  alerts)  to  satellite  operators  and  relevant  authorities.  At  the  same 
time, the front desk will be the entry point for user requests for SST information which it 
relays to the processing and sensor function.  

It should be noted that SST is a dual-use activity which can serve both civil and military user 
communities. Both civil and military sensors can be used to provide SST services that respond 
to both civil and military user needs18 - which are to a large degree identical. 

Surveillance and tracking information is highly security-sensitive. Uncontrolled dissemination 
of SST information (revealing for example the existance and position of a sensitive military 
satellite)  could  jeopardise  national  security  interests.  Cooperation  amongst  actors  within 
Europe (Member States, ESA and EU entities) requires a data policy and a governance that 
takes into account these national security concerns. It was for this reason, that Member States 
through  the  Space  Council  turned  to  the  EU  with  the  request  to  play  an  active  role  in  the 
development of an SSA capability at European level, and to define its governance scheme and 
its data policy. 

The  fact  is  that  Europe  has  today  no  SST  service:  existing  sensors  do  not  have  adequate 
capacity to identify and track objects in space, they are not linked so that they can be used as a 
network, there is no adequate processing capacity in place and there is no front desk function. 

3.1.1.1.  Current situation in Europe 

The current situation in Europe with regard to surveillance and tracking can be described as 
follows:  

Sensor function 

–  The French space agency CNES and the French Army own radars and telescopes that can 
survey/observe  space  objects  in  the  low  earth  orbit  region  up  to  2000  km  used  for  Earth 
Observation satellites such as the future Copernicus/GMES sentinels (GRAVES system) as 

18 

Common civil and military SSA user requirements have been set out in the document “European Space 
Situational  Awareness  high-level  civil-military  user  requirements”  jointly  prepared  by  the  European 
Commission  services  and  the  European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS),  SEC  (2011)  1247  of 
12.10.2011  and  approved  by  the  Council’s  Political  and  Security  Committee  (PSC)  in  its  plenary 
meeting on 18 November 2011. 

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well  as  to  survey  higher  orbits  used  mainly  for  navigation  satellites  such  as  Galileo  or 
communication  satellites  (TAROT  telescope).  UK's  Chilbolton  meteorological  radar 
allows to survey space objects in low earth orbit; its Starbrook optical telescope is designed 
for  surveying  higher  orbits.  Germany  owns  radars  that  would  allow  to  track  and 
characterise  specific  space  objects  both  in  lower  and  higher  orbits  (TIRA  and  Effelsberg 
radiotelescope). Spain's optical observatory in La Sagra could support space surveillance 
activities.  Italy's  Croce  del  Nord  radiotelescope  and  antenna  could  support  tracking 
activities. In addition some R&D, design and pre-development activities have been carried 
out  in  the  framework  of  the  ESA  "SSA  preparatory  programme";  these  include  the 
development  of  two  demonstrator  SST  radars.  All  of  these  existing  sensors  have 
significant shortcomings. Some were developed developed during the 1960s or 1970s 
for  military  purposes  such  as  horizon  monitoring  in  view  of  potential  launches  of 
ballistic missiles. Some were developped for research purposes. Most need substantial 
refurbishing  and  upgrading  to  become  operational  and  others  are  too  limited  in 
operational  availability  despite  potential  high  technical  performance.  None  of  them 
operate  as  a  network  and  even  if  they  would  their  combined  capacity  would  not  be 
sufficient to deliver a significant collision risk reduction. 

Processing function 

–  France and Germany have set up operational national centres for surveillance and tracking 
that allow for analysis of collision and re-entry risks. There is an early stage of European 
cooperation  and  sharing  of  data  as  exemplified  by  the  Fanco-German  cooperation  in  the 
operation of the French GRAVES surveillance radar and the German TIRA tracking radar, 
or  the  coordinated  cooperation  of  the  ESA  optical  surveillance  telescope  at  Tenerife  and 
the  Swiss  ZIMLAT  telescope  at  Zimmerwald.  These  initiatives  are  the  result  of  the 
discussion  on  future  development  of  a  European  SST  service.  However,  no  broader 
cooperation  among  Member  States  emerged  from  these  bilateral  cooperation 
arrangements.  They  also  did  not  lead  to  the  provision  of  operational  SST  services 
available to satellite operators in Europe. 

Front desk function 

–  There is no SST front desk function. 

3.1.1.2.  Situation at international level 

The overall situation of SST services at international level is the following: 

–  While all major space faring nations have their own SSA systems to some extent, there is 
currently no operational global system for space surveillance and tracking. However, 
the  USA  has  today  the  most  extended  sensor  network,  processing  capacity  and  provides 
alerts (front desk). The US SST system is owned and operated by the US Air Force. Most 
public and commercial satellite operators in Europe depend today on collision alerts 
provided  by  the  US  SST.  However,  these  alerts  often  require  verification  and 
refinement  through  further  analysis  by  the  spacecraft  operator  to  avoid  risky  or 
unnecessary  mitigation  measures 
(collision  avoidance  manoeuvres).  US  SST 
information is not accurate enough and it could not prevent a major catastrophe in 

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terms  of  debris  creation  which  was  the  collision  between  two  satellites  in  200919.  In 
view of this and given that not all Member States and satellite operators have the capacity 
to  carry  out  the  verification  of  US  SST  alerts,  unnecessary  anticollision  maneuvers  are 
often required as a precaution.  

–  The  US  system  which  has  been  operational  since  the  1960's  is  aging.  Therefore,  in  its 
space policy issued in June 201020, the US recognised that its system requires updating and 
refurbishing  to  address  the  increasing  need  for  SST  information.  As  this  requires 
international 
substantial 
cooperation  in  this  domain  with  actors  that  can  actively  contribute  to  improve  the 
quality of SST information. The setting up of a European SST capability would allow 
the EU to collaborate with and influence developments in the US as an equal partner 
with a view to mutually enhancing SST performance. 

investments,  the  US  signalled  openness  to  stengthen 

–  Russia,  China,  Japan  and  India  have  surveillance  systems  with  limited  geographical 
coverage and undisclosed performance capacity. Russia and China are known to work on 
strengthening  their  capacities.  However,  none  of  these  systems  are  today  open  to 
cooperation with other space-faring nations21. 

3.1.1.3.  Other actions to mitigate collision risks 

In  addition  to  avoidance  manoeuvers  there  are  other  complementary  measures  that  can  be 
undertaken to mitigate the increasing risk of collision or the consequences of collisions: 

–  Protecting  satellites:  Satellites  can  be  hardened  or  shielded  against  the  impact  of  space 
debris. Research activities in this domain are ongoing. However, even the most state of the 
art hardening or shielding technologies cannot prevent satellites from being damaged from 
space debris; 

–  Removal of space debris: Research and development efforts also focus on technologies to 
remove  space  debris.  However,  work  in  this  domain  is  at  a  very  early  stage,  and  it  is 
generally accepted that debris removal can only be an effective solution in decades to come 
and cannot be expected to resolve the problem at hand; 

–  Prevent the creation of space debris: The international community widely recognises the 
proliferation  of  space  debris  as  the  current  biggest  threat  to  the  sustainability  of  space 
activities.  There  are  several  initiatives  seeking  to  ensure  the  commitment  of  space-faring 
nations  to  reducing  the  production  of  space  debris  when  conducting  space  activities 
through international instruments (see annex IV). The International Space Code of Conduct 
proposed  by  the  EU  currently  under  negotiation  has  received  so  far  wide  international 
support.  However,  important  as  these  instruments  may  be  if  their  provisions  are 

19 

20 
21 

Since the 2009 Cosmos-Iridium, satellite collision which the US system did not detect in time, there has 
been an increased push in the U.S. to strengthen its capability for conjunction analysis — e.g. the ability 
to accurately predict high-speed collisions between two orbiting objects. A new Space Fence, currently 
under development, is expected to cost more than 1 billion US$ to design and procure. The system, with 
a target completion date of 2015, will likely include a series of S-band radars in at least three separate 
locations; Space Security 2011Report (complement reference) 
United States of America, National Space Policy, 28 June 2010 
This analysis relies on the study carried out by Booz & Company which provides a broad overview of 
SSA systems in space faring nations. 

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implemented, they will not eliminate the problem that existing and future debris pose, they 
will just reduce the exponential growth of space debris in the future22. 

Therefore the most viable way for spacecraft operators to mitigate collision risks is today to 
undertake collision avoidance manoeuvres. 

3.1.2. 

Increased collision risks due to space debris 

During the past half century objects have been launched into space regularly, reaching a peak 
of 140 items per year during the Cold War. Every time a launch vehicle boosts a satellite into 
space, some debris is produced. Examples of space debris are: discarded rocket bodies, fuel 
tanks,  satellite  components,  non-functional  satellites  and  debris  from  collisions  and 
explosions23.  This  material,  orbiting  the  Earth  at  very  high  speed  and  in  an  uncontrolled 
manner,  poses  an  ever  increasing  potential  risk  for  the  launch  of  spacecrafts  and  of  their 
exploitation due to collision with other debris or other spacecrafts in orbit.  

As a result of the current limitations of space surveillance systems, a large proportion of the 
overall population of the debris population is neither tracked or catalogued and is estimated 
by using mathematical models with different results. According to latest estimates, there are 
16 000 objects orbiting Earth larger than 10 cm, which are catalogued and between 300 000 
and 600 000 objects larger than 1 cm, not catalogued. According to ESA, the population of 
objects  larger  than  1  cm  will  continue  to  grow,  and  will  reach  a  total  of  approximately  1 
million  debris  in  2020.  Furthermore,  it  is  estimated  that  there  are  more  than  300  million 
objects larger than 1 mm24. 

The vast majority of these space objects are not in deep space, but in the commercially most 
exploitable  areas  of  the  outer  space  region.  These  include  the  Geostationary  Earth  Orbit 
(GEO)  at  36  000  km  altitude  which  is  mainly  used  for  satellite  telecommunications  (and 
EGNOS),  the  Medium  Earth  Orbit  (MEO)  at  around  20  000  km  altitude  where  all  satellite 
navigation constellations orbit including the Galileo satellites, and the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
(from around 600 to more than 2 000 km altitude) that is mostly used for Earth Observation 
satellites such as the future European Copernicus/GMES satellites. 

At a speed of 10 km/s, space objects can cause serious harm to operational spacecraft, from 
total  destruction  (which  would  inevitably  be  the  consequence  of  a  collision  with  a  space 
object  larger  than  10  cm)  to  permanent  damage  to  sub-systems  or  instruments  on-board 
spacecraft (which will be the minimum impact of a collision with a space object larger than 1 
cm).  

22 

23 

24 

According to UN and NASA research, space debris will continue to grow, even if all activities in space 
would be stopped. Source: Ecorys study which quotes NASA researcher Donald Kessler: "The future 
debris environment will be dominated by fragments resulting from random collisions between objects in 
orbit,  and  that  environment  will  continue  to  increase,  even  if  we  do  not  launch  any  new  objects  into 
orbit." 
On  February  11  2009  about  800  pieces  of  debris  were  generated  by  a  collision  between  a  US  and  a 
defunct Russian satellite. A similar number of debris was generated by a Chinese anti-satellite test in 
2007. Such 'accidents' can generate a chain reaction that would destroy most satellites in a given orbit, 
knowing that the speed of a satellite and debris is 10 km/second. 
“Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. 
SI2.541751 and Study "evaluation of options for a space programme in 2014-2020", Booz & Company., 
Final report, 16 May 2011, contract n. ENTR/2009/050 lot 1. 

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The  table  below  provides  a  synthesis  of  NASA,  ESA  and  Booz  &  Company  estimates  on 
debris and possible damage to satellites. 

Category 

Definition 

Estimated population 

Potential risk to 
satellites 

Traceable 

Greater than 10 cm in 
diameter 

16,000 catalogued; 
20,000 in total 

Complete destruction 

Potentially Traceable 

Greater than 1 cm in 
diameter 

up to 600,000  

Untraceable 

Between 1 mm and 1 cm  

More than 300 million 

Complete to partial 
destruction 

Degradation, loss of 
certain sensors or 
subsystems 

Table 1 – NASA, ESA and Booz & Company estimates on debris and possible damage to 
satellites25. 

According  to  data  analysed  by  Booz  &  Company,  approximtely  950  active  satellites  were 
orbiting  the  Earth  in  January  2011  as  well  as  a  handful  of  additional  spacecrafts  such  the 
International Space Station (ISS) or vehicles to ferry to and from the space station. More than 
19 % of the active satellites are of European origin. 

A  particular  and  increasing  source  of  concern  is  the  LEO  region  where  the  satellites  of  the 
European Copernicus programme will be. For this region, NASA modelling estimates a risk 
of 8-9 collisions between catalogued objects over the next 40 years (that means one collision 
every 5 years). Approximately 50% of these collisions are predicted to lead to the complete 
distruction of the satellite26. This view is commonly accepted and shared by UK analyses as 
well as by experts of the French space agency CNES 27.  

The collision risk with partially traceable space debris (between 1 cm and 10 cm), is estimated 
at 1 every 3 years28. Collision with space debris of this size is likely to lead to a complete or 
partial loss of the satellite. 

In  addition,  taking  into  account  debris  smaller  than  1  cm  and  under  the  same  assumptions 
made above, the risk of collision with a satellite could rise drastically up to 500 every 3 years 
(i.e.  around  170  per  year).  This  kind  of  collisions  may  lead  just  to  minor  failures  which, 
nonetheless, can have the effect of shortening the lifetime of a satellite29.  

Booz & Company, taking the lowest risk assumption of 1 collision every 3 years for partically 
catalogued debris globally in LEO as a basis, estimated Europe's economic risk in the LEO 
region at a minimum indicative of 2.5 M€ per year over the next decade 30. This estimte takes 

25 
26 
27 
28 
29 

30 

http://www.esa.int/esaMI/Space_Debris/SEM2D7WX3RF_0.html. 
NASA Orbital Debris, Quarterly News, Vol. 14, issue of January 2010. 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf. 
2011 Study of Booz & Co. 
The satellite Jason 1 was hit twice by untracked small debris (2002 and 2005) leading to minor failures. 
CNES,  Presentation  "French  Policy  for  Space  Sustainability"  at  the  ISU  Symposium,  21st  February 
2012 
The Booz & Company estimates are based on the following assumptions (see also annex V): Average 
satellite manufacturing costs are around 99 Million €; a launch to LEO costs indicatively 8 Million € 

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into account the satellite's destruction and the income shortfall generated by a 3 month service 
outage following the destruction. 

Nonetheless, these estimates - already defined as conservative by their authors - do not take 
into account the consequences over the long term of collisions with debris smaller than 1 cm. 

Geogra
phical 
scope 

Satellites 
in LEO 

Satellite 
Loss 
probability 

Potential 
Satellite 
Losses 

(years)  

(10 years)  

Indicative 
damage 

economic 

Annualized 

(10 years in Mln Euro) 

Asset  

Service 
Outage  

Economic 
damage  

(Mln Euro)  

Global  

470 

Europe 

6831 

~1  every  3 
years 

~1  every  20 
years  

3 satellites 

~ 150 to 180   ~ 5 to 6  

~ 15 Million Euro 

0.5 satellite  

~ 25  

~ 1 

~ 2.5 Million Euro 

Table 2: European and global economic risk of debris in LEO; source: Booz & Company 

3.1.3.  Collision avoidance manoeuvres shorten the lifetime of satellites 

As collision risks for potentially traceable or untraceable debris is difficult to predict, satellite 
operators tend to carry out avoidance manoeuvres on the basis of alerts of close approaches of 
space  debris.  Modelling  work  at  global  level  has  suggested  that  close  approaches  will  rise 
from  13,000  a  week  in  2009  to  20,000  by  2019  and  more  than  50,000  by  2059,  meaning 
satellite operators will have to make four times as many avoidance manoeuvres in 2059 as in 
2019.  

As  stated  above,  space  agencies  in  Europe  as  well  as  ESA  rely  on  automated  conjunction 
assessments  and  alerts  from  the  US  SST  system.  On  this  basis  the  French  space  agency 
CNES, for example, perfoms its own estimates and analysis, where necessary complemented 
by  measures  from  its  own  surveillance  and  tracking  system  GRAVES,  and  performs  a 
collision avoidance manoeuvre in case of elevated risks.  

For  the  year  2010,  CNES,  operating  a  fleet  of  17  satellites  in  LEO,  reports  almost  1 
conjunction  assessment  risk  per  day,  and  1  collision  alert  on  average  every  4  days.  To 
mitigate  collision  risks  it  had  to  perform  more  than  1  collision  avoidance  manouvre  per 
month.  

Similar evidence is given by ESA sources and the German space agency DLR. In 2010, ESA 
had  on  average  16  conjunction  risks  per  satellite32  and  performed  on  average  3  collision 

per satellite; the satellite loss will occur in the middle of its lifetime; economic damage due to service 
outage has been calculated on the assumption that the replacement of the satellite could lead to 3 month 
service outage (rather conservative scenario) and data available concerning the global market for Earth 
observation  data  sales  and  mobile  satellite  services  which  can  be  considered  to  be  the  most  common 
satellites in LEO. 
68 European satellites out of a total of 470 globally in LEO. Being the number of European satellites 
one seventh of the total number, the probability of an impact for them is considered as seven times less 
than the total.  
Using the ESA operated Envisat, ERS-1 and ERS-2 satellites as a reference 

31 

32 

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avoidance manoeuvres per satellite. DLR reports more than 2 conjuction asessment risks per 
satellite and performed 1 collision avoidance manoeuvre per satellite a year33. 

Combined  data  from  CNES,  the  German  space  agency  DLR  and  ESA  suggest  1.5  collision 
avoidance manoeuvres per satellite per year in LEO. Considering that around 14% of the 470 
satellites in LEO are European, this would imply around 100 collision avoidance manoeuvres 
per  year  in  LEO  perfomed  by  European  satellite  operators  or  EU  Member  States  space 
agencies.  

Collision  risk  avoidance  manoeuvres  are  also  a problem in the GEO region, not necessarily 
related to the need to avoid collision with debris, but due to the quantity of satellites in this 
very  confined  area  of  outer  space.  Stakeholder  interviews  carried  out  by  Booz  &  Company 
revealed that an average GEO satellite operator with a fleet of 20 satellites performs up to 50 
collision avoidance manoeuvres per year. 

Each  avoidance  manoeuvre  requires  fuel,  which  shortens  the  active  life  of  satellites,  or 
requires  additional  fuel  to  be  carried  into  orbit  thus  increasing  the  cost  of  launch34. 
Furthermore, due to the inaccuracy of data related to the position of the objects in question, it 
can be assumed that a good number of manoeuvres may not be indispensible but have to be 
made as a precaution generating extra costs.  

The  table  below  shows  the  estimated  annualised  costs  of  collision  avoidance  manoeuvres 
which result in the shortening of satellites' lifetime. The table also indicates the costs linked to 
the  interruption  of  Earth  observation  data  collection  and  distribution  which  occurs  during 
avoidance maneouvers of Earth observation satellites in LEO35 36: 

Europe 

Total  68  satellites 
in LEO  

32 
in 
satellites 
LEO  are  Earth 
Observation 
satellite 

~  120  satellites  in 
GEO 

Collision 
Avoidance 

(yearly) 

~ 9037 

~ 45 

Impact over time 

(10 years)  

Indicative 
economic effect 

Annualized 
economic effect  

(10 years) 

Life time shortening  

~ 1.2 billion Euro 

~ 120 Million Euro 

~ 2900 weeks  

Days  of  EO  loss  of 
data 

~ 450 days 

~ 8 Million Euro 

~ 0,8 Million Euro 

~ 2538 

Life time shortening  

~ 700-750 weeks  

~  150  –  200  million 
Euro 

~ 15-20 Million Euro 

Table 3 – Annualised costs of collision avoidance manoeuvres in LEO and GEO39. 

33 
34 
35 
36 

37 

38 

39 

Using the DLR operated TerraSAR-X, TanDEM-X, GRACE 1 and GRACE 2 as a reference. 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf. 
In general, there is no interruption of services during avoidance manoeuvres for satellites in GEO. 
Detailed rationale and calculations can be found in the annex V "Calculation methodology" or at page 
123 to 125 of the Booz & C. report 
Not  all  (but  90  % of)  avoidance  manoeuvres  in  LEO  lead  to  a  significant  consumption  of propellant. 
Therefore,  Booz  &  Company  calculated  the  annualised  economic  effects  of  collision  avoidance 
manoeuvres on the basis of 90 manoeuvres per year instead of 100. 
Only 10 % of the avoidance manoeuvres in GEO lead to a significant consumption of propellant (e.g. 
only in case of large fly-bys). Therefore, Booz & Company calculated the annualised economic effects 
of collision avoidance manoeuvres on the basis of 25 manoeuvres per year instead of 250. 
Source: Booz & Company 

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Accurate, timely and complete space surveillance and tracking information is instrumental for 
the  protection  of  critical  European  infrastructures  in  space  and  for  the  secure  and  safe 
operation of space-based services, as well as for the protection of the population in case of re-
entry events40. 

3.1.4.  Re-entry  of  debris  or  uncontrolled  spacecraft  to  Earth  threaten  the  security  of  EU 

citizens 

Re-entries of spacecraft and debris to Earth form an increasing hazard for the security of the 
Earth population. Whilst active spacecraft re-entries into the dense layers of the atmosphere 
are  controlled  (e.g.  the  US  space  shuttle,  the  Russian  Soyuz,  and  the  European  Automated 
Transfer  Vehicle),  inactive  satellites  and  debris  regularly  re-enter  the  atmosphere  in  an 
uncontrolled  manner.  These  uncontrolled  re-entries  account  for  more  than  90%  of  all  re-
entries41.  

According  to  the  Aerospace  Corporation  Center  for  Orbital  Debris  studies,  since  the 
beginning  of  space  activities  in  1957,  more  than  20,000  catalogued  objects  re-entered  the 
atmosphere, equivalent to more than one object per day on average42. However, most debris 
have  hit  the  Earth  far  from  inhabited  areas  due  to  the  fact  that  75%  of  the  Earth  surface  is 
covered with water and only 25% of the Earth's land mass is inhabited. 

Nevertheless, the ability to predit the trajectory of an object (which is highly dependant on the 
survey  and  tracking  capability  of  a  space  surveillance  system)  is  essential  to  mitigate  risks 
related  to  re-entries.  In  controlled  re-entry  situations,  this  may  include  the  evacuation  of  a 
certain area of the ocean by stopping air and sea traffic or boosting a spacecraft to remain on 
trajectory  to  a  defined  impact  footprint.  In  uncontrolled  re-entry  situations,  trajectory 
information is vital to alert local authorities of the impact assessment, or to take in extreme 
cases measures such as the US shooting of a missile in February 2008 to destroy their own 
military satellite. 

According to Booz & Company a total of 27 space debris have been found on the ground and 
identified. Except for a few lightweight debris, the mass of these identified debris vary from 
10 kg to a maximum of 270 kg. Debris are estimated to hit the ground at a speed of 30 km/h 
for  lightweight  debris  and  up  to  300  km/h  for  the  heaviest  ones.  Fortunately,  in  the  last  20 
years the damages to property caused by debris hitting the Earth have been marginal and no 
casualties have occurred. 

However, uncontrolled re-entries can become a particularly serious hazard to citizens' security 
and  health  when  they  involve  nuclear  powered  satellites.  The  most  dangerous  un-controlled 
re-entry  in  the  history  of  space  missions  in  terms  of  the  actual  damages  caused  on  Earth 
occurred in January 1978, when the former USSR military nuclear powered satellite Cosmos 
954 hit the Canadian territory. When impacting with the denser layers of the atmosphere the 
satellite broke up and a large number of radioactive debris crashed on the Canadian regions of 
Northwest Territories, Alberta and Saskatchewan. Almost all debris found of the ground were 
radioactive, some of it proved to be of lethal radioactivity. The Canadian authorities in charge 
of  locating,  recovering  and  cleaning-up  the  affected  areas  performed  these  activities  in  two 
phases  over  8  months.  The  total  cost  of  these  activities  incurred  by  various  Canadian 

40 

41 
42 

There could be significant negative economic, environmental and social impact generated if debris from 
spacecraft fall on the surface of the Earth, notably if the spacecraft are powered by nuclear fuel, as is the 
case with a small number of them today. 
Aerospace Corporation, Center for Orbital Debris Studies 
US Stratcom Fact Sheet Re-entry Assessment, February 2008 

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departments and agencies was reported at $ 13.970.000 (at 1978 economic conditions). A few 
dozens of nuclear powered satellites of similar design remain in orbit.43 

Examples  of  unctrolled  re-entries  over  the  past  15  years  compiled  by  Booz  &  Company44 
illustrate the risks. Three of the cases shown concern debris from European origin: 

Date 

Debris and event characteristics 

Source of debris 

Country 
of origin 

Jan 1997 

A  lightweight  fragment  of  a  debris  (10  x  13  cm) 
grazed  the  shoulder  of  Mrs.  L.  Williams,  whilst 
walking in Turley, Oklahoma, USA 

Probably originating from a 2nd 
stage of a Delta II launcher 

USA 

April 2000  A 270 Kg debris was found 20 km from the nuclear 
power plant of Koeberg, South Africa 

2nd stage of Delta II launcher 

USA 

Jan 2001 

A 70 kg debris was found 1km from the motorway 
linking Riyadh to the city of Taef in Saudi Arabia 

Rocket  motor  of  Delta 
launcher 

II 

USA 

March 
2002 

August 
2002 

March 
2008 

A  49  kg  debris  landed  in  a  house  in  Kasambya, 
Uganda 

A 10 Kg debris landed near the village of Manzau, 
Angola 

3rd stage of Ariane 3 launcher 

Europe 

3rd stage of Ariane 4 launcher 

Europe 

A  10  kg  debris  landed  on  a  farm  in  Montividiu, 
Brazil 

Probably 
launcher 

from  Atlas  V 

USA 

Sept 2011  The UARS (Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite) 
breaks apart and lands in the Pacific Ocean far off 
the  U.S.  coast.  Twenty-six  satellite  components, 
weighing a total of about 1,200 pounds, could have 
survived  the  re-entry  and  reach  the  surface  of 
Earth. 

The  US  NASA  owned  UARS 
(about  12  by  5  meters)  was 
among  the  largest  spacecraft 
to re-enter Earth’s atmosphere 
and  make  an  uncontrolled 
descent. 

USA 

October 
2011 

Satellite  weighing  1.7 
the 
atmosphere  over  the  Bay  of  Bengal;  not  clear 
whether  space  debris  reached  the  Earth's  surface 
and no damage to property has been reported. 

re-enters 

tons 

December 
2011 

Re-entry with fireball observed above Belgium, the 
Netherlands,  France  and  Germany;  no  damage 
reported; 

German  DLR  owned  X-Ray 
Observatory satellite ROSAT 

Europe 

Third  stage  of 
rocket 
Dutch 
Kuipers to the ISS. 

astronaut 

that 

transported 

the  Soyuz 
the 
André 

Russia 

January 
2012 

The  Russian  Marsian  probe  Phobos-Grunt 
threatens  to  re-enter  the  Earth's  atmosphere  over 
Europe;  

Satellite  experiencing  failure 
during the launch phase 

Russia 

Table 4: Examples of debris hitting land in dangerous circumstances;  
source: Booz & Company 

With  increasing  population  of  satellites  in  orbit,  the  number  of  uncontrolled  re-entry  events 
can  be  assumed  to  increase  over  the  coming  years.  Over  the  past  12  months,  over  fourty 

43 
44 

Booz and Company and HTTP://WWW.SPACE4PEACE.ORG/IANUS/NPSM3.HTM 
The non-comprehensive list of examples provided by Booz and Company were updated with recent re-
entry examples; sources include: www.dlr.de; http://earthsky.org/space/where-will-nasas-uars-satellite-
land; http://news.discovery.com/space/santa-soyuz-reentry-europe-sighting-111226.html 

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satellites  and  upper  stages  of  launchers  have  re-entered  the  atmosphere45  and  in  the  last  6 
months  the  US  STRATCOM  system  issued  three  re-entry  alerts:  one  for  the  US  satellite 
UARS, another for the German ROSAT satellite and the third for the Russian Mars mission 
Phobos-Grunt. The three "threatening" probes eventually fell safely in the seas. 

While  there  is  no  doubt  about  the  serious  risks  posed  by  uncontrolled  re-entries,  it  is  not 
possible to estimate the annualised losses that they may cause. This is because, among other 
considerations, it is not possible to establish a statistic risk of uncontrolled re-entry and it is 
also not possible to predict whether the re-entry, if it happens, will cause or not damage on the 
ground. 

3.1.5.  Overview of estimated annualised losses due to hazards from space debris: 

Section  3.1.2  estimates  the  annaulised  economic  impact  for  Europe  resulting  from  collision 
risks due to space debris. Section 3.1.3 estimates the annalised economic impact of collision 
avoidance manoeuvres. The table below brings together these figures46.  

The table also includes an estimation of the possible annualised economic loss in light of the 
future evolution of satellite market growth. According to Euroconsult47, the satellite industry 
launched an average of 76 satellites per year over the last ten years, ranging between 60 and 
90 units per year. Since the market is expected to grow by 50% in the coming decade, with a 
total of 1,145 satellites to be built for launch over 2011-2020, the launch rate for satellites will 
increase approximately at the same level.  

The table below gives only a non-exhaustive overview of quantifiable estimated losses48. As 
indicated above, it is not possible to estimate the annualised losses provoked by un-controlled 
re-entries. 

Loss type 

Annualised loss 

Actual 

Actual + growth 
forecast (+50 %) 

Direct loss of satellite due to collision 

~€ 2.5 Million 

~€ 3,75 Million 

Life-time  shortening  of  satellites  in  LEO  due  to 
collision avoidance 

~€ 120 Million 

~€ 180 Million 

Loss  of  Earth  Observation  data  in  LEO  due  to 
collision avoidance manouevres 

~€ 0.8 Million 

~€ 1,2 Million 

Life  time  shortening  in  GEO  due  to  collision 
avoidance manouevres 

~€ 15-20 Million 

~€ 22,5 -30 Million 

Total minimum annualised loss 

~€ 140 Million 

~€ 210 Million 

Table 5 – Estimated loss due to space debris. 

45 
46 

47 
48 

Aerospace Corporation, Centre for Orbital Debris Studies, http://reentrynews.aero.org/past.html 
The calculation is explained in detail in annex V and is based on the estimated annual revenue of Earth 
Observation Satellites and the risk of destruction of a European EO satellite. 
Satellites to be Built & Launched by 2020 
Detailed explanation in the annex "Calculation Methodology". 

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These costs are almost certainly just a small fraction of possible non-quantified costs and, to 
some  extent,  the  non-quantifiable  consequences  that  may  result  from  the  absence  of  a 
European space surveillance and tracking capability. For example the loss of a satellite may 
result  in  the  loss  of  critical  satellite  communication  capacity  in  an  emergency  situation 
resulting  in  loss  of  life.  Destruction  or  complete  failure  of  a  satellite  can  result  in  serious 
disruption of economic activity (banking relies increasingly on satellite communications) and 
could have an impact on client business through loss of service. The loss of Earth observation 
capacity could also have serious consequences in emergency and non-emergency situations.  

3.2. 

Underlying  policy  considerations  regarding  the  problem  and  the  design  of  the 
solutions 

From discussions with stakeholders over the past years, it became clear that the setting up of 
operational European SST services will require the intervention of the EU. 

3.2.1. 

SST development must be led by the EU 

There  is  a  consensus  among  EU  and  ESA  Ministers  responsible  for  space  that  the 
development of this service is to be led by the EU and not by the European Space Agency. 
This  consensus  is  reflected  in  several  Space  Council  Resolutions  mentioned  in  the  impact 
assessment.  In  particular,  Member  States  asked  the  EU  to  define  the  governance  and  data 
policy  for  a  European  SST  service,  to  play  an  active  role  in  the  setting  up  of  the  European 
service,  and  to  make  best  use  of  sensors  and  expertise  that  already  exists  at  national  and 
European level. Member States were also very explicit as to how security concerns should be 
taken into account: SST sensors need to remain under national control. Confidentiality of SST 
information was defined as the key principle for the SST data policy (e.g. all information is to 
be classified, to be declassified on a case by case basis only). 

The reason for such position is not formally recorded but emerged in numerous discussions: 
European  SST  service  has  a  security  dimension  (it  allows  gathering  intelligence  on  States' 
civil  and  military  space  infrastructure  and  operations)  which  the  EU,  unlike  ESA,  has 
competence and is equipped to deal with. The TFEU grants the EU competence to coordinate 
the  exploitation  of  space  activities  and  the  TEU  confers  the  EU  competence  over  security 
issues  such  as  those  that  arise  in  the  context  of  SST.  The  EU  has  the  necessary  legislative 
capacity to put in place governance mechanisms and a data policy for SST. 

ESA,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  world-class  R&D  agency  designed  to  define  and  implement 
scientific,  technology  and  space  application  development  programmes.  ESA  is  neither 
conceived to do the sort of complex policy and legislative work necessary to set up an SST 
system  where  assets  are  largely  in  the  hands  of  the  military,  nor  has  it  been  designed  to 
operate space-based services (a fact which ESA itself underlines in its policy documents). 

Arguably,  Member  States  could  set  up  a  new  organisation  to  deal  with  SSA.  Such 
organisation would have to have many of the features that the EU already has. Therefore such 
new  organisation  would  generate  duplications  and  inefficiency.  In  addition,  some  Member 
States  have  expressed  concerns  that  any  solution  outside  the  EU  framework  may  be 
dominated  by  those  Member  States  that  already  possess  today  some  sensor  capacity 
preventing others from developping their own in the framework of a truly European service.  

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3.2.2.  Future SST must build on exisitng assets and completed with new ones 

There  is  a  consensus  among  Member  States  and  experts  that  any  SST  development  should 
capitalise  and  build  on  existing  assets  which  should  be  linked  and  operated  as  a  network. 
There  is  also  convergence  regarding  the  fact  that  current  assets  are  insufficient  to  ensure  a 
minimum  desirable  level  of  performance.  To  reach  this  minimum  desirable  level  of 
performance  new  assets  need  to  be  built  and  integrated  in  an  SST  system.  These  assets  are 
primarily sensors such as tracking and surveillance radars and telescopes. 

3.2.3.  Governance: assets must remain under the control of Member States 

Over the years-long discussion regarding the setting up of a European SST service, Member 
States  possessing  assets  have  insisted  on  one  crucial  governance  aspect:  due  to  security 
concerns the sensor and processing functions must, in any scenario, remain under the control 
of the national competent authories (i.e. military authorities). The majority of Member States 
possesing assets support the idea of that, for the purpose of setting up a European SST service 
could form a consortium to run, Member States possessing existing or new assets should form 
consortium to run, as a network, both sensor and processing functions.  

Member  States  are  of  the  view  that  the  fornt  desk  funcion  should  be  run  either  by  the 
consortium itself or by another body with adequate security credentials, such as the European 
Union Satellite Center49. 

3.2.4.  Data policy: SST information is classified 

Under  any  scenario,  SST  data  policy  must  upheld  the  principle  that  information  is  by 
definition classified and it should only be declassified on a case by case basis when the need 
arises. 

3.2.5.  Funding 

Member  States  are  willing  to  make  their  assets  available  for  the  setting  up  of  the  European 
SST service. They are of the view that, in return, the development of the SST should involve 
EU funding and should, as a minimum, cover operations directly linked to the setting up of 
the  European  SST  service.  In  addition  to  making  their  assets  available,  Member  States  are 
open to contributing to it financially. 

Although the overall benefits from the proposed initiative are estimated to exceed the costs, 
SST services are mainly of a public and precautionary nature which do not lend themselves to 
commercial activity. While the introduction of a fee for both public and private/commercial 
SST service users could be considered at a later stage to cover operational costs, SST is not 
likely to be an activity to be started of through private/commercial actors. Furthermore, those 
Member States owning assets, for reasons of national security, would not collaborate with a 
commercial actor in this sensitive domain. 

49 

The European Union Satellite Center (EUSC) is an agency of the EU Council that currently provides 
geospatial imagery information services and products with various levels of classification to a variety of 
users,  both  civil  and  military,  at  the  EU  Council,  the  Commission  and  in  EU  Member  States.  EUSC 
services are based on data stemming from existing national public satellite systems, private/commercial 
systems, or systems owned by third countries or international organisations. 

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3.3.  Who is affected, in what ways and to what extent? 

The most affected groups include: 

–  The  EU,  and  more  precisely  the  European  Commission,  which  is  about  to  become  a 

significant European operator of space-based infrastructure; 

–  Public/government  entities  and  administrations  with  legal  and  policy  responsibilities 
related  to  the  management  of  public  space  activities  and  those  responsible  for  space 
security issues; 

–  Public  (national,  European)  and  private/commercial  satellite  operators  having  the 

legal responsibility and effective control over operational or experimental satellites; 

–  Launch  companies  share  the  same  concerns  as  the  satellite  operators  for  the  launch  of 

satellites or other spacecraft; 

–  Space  insurance  companies  will  need  space  surveillance  data  to  improve  their  risk 

analysis and propose better tailored products; 

–  Public  authorities  and  private/commercial  entities  responsible  for  the  operations  of 
ground  based 
infrastructure 
infrastructures  with  a  satellite  or  space-based 
component  (such  as  financial  transaction  networks,  telecom  networks  or  energy  supply 
networks); 

–  Public/governmental entities and administrations with legal and policy responsibilities for 
civil protection early warning, mitigation and response actions for situations where the re-
entry of space objects into the Earth's atmosphere threatens the property and life of citizens 
or the security of critical ground infrastructure. 

While  the  primary  concern  in  setting  up  a  European  SST  service  lies  with  the  categories 
outlined  above,  the  service  may  also  help  international  partners  that  do  not  possess  such 
service.  It  has  already  been  mentioned  earlier  how  the  development  of  a  European  SST 
system can be carried out in collaboration with the US. 

3.4. 

Foreseen evolution of the problem 

As previously described (section 3.1.5), the number of active satellites in orbit is deemed to 
increase by 50% in the next ten years. This would imply a simple raise of 50% of satellites in 
orbit  only  if  the  current  operational  satellites  that  will  have  reached  their  end-of-life  in  that 
laps  of  time  will  be  discarded  (de-orbited  or  re-orbited  following  debris  mitigation 
guidelines). Taking into account the fact that this assumption seems quite optimistic and that, 
for  example,  additional  launcher  upper  stages  may  be  left  in  orbit  after  the  launch  of  a 
satellite,  it  is  clear  that  the  orbits'  crowding  will  keep  growing,  raising  further  the  level  of 
risks assessed in the previous sections. 

Moreover, the number of tracked and catalogued objects in orbit has increased by 100 % over 
the last 20 years (from 8,000 to 16,000 in 2012). As there is no visible sign for this trend to be 
reduced,  with  current  capabilities,  the  number  of  tracked  and  catalogued  objects  can  be 
estimated  to  be  around  32,000  by  2032.  The  level  of  risk  can  be  expected  to  increase 

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24 

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accordingly.  The  2011  space  security  report  states  that  although  there  were  no  major 
fragmentations  (events  creating  space  debris)  in  2010,  the  number  of  catalogued  objects 
increased  by  800,  mostly  due  to  continued  discovery  and  cataloguing  of  debris  from  major 
fragmentation  events  in  2007  and  2009.  A  significant  number  of  debris  will  not  reenter  the 
Earth's  athmosphere  and  disintregrate  in  a  relatively  short  period  of  time  due  to  the 
athmospheric  drag  and  will  remain  a  threat  for  decades  and  even  centuries  to  operational 
satellites and thus to the long-term sustainability of space activities.50 

3.5. 

EU right to act 

Article 189 TFEU introduces a right for the EU to act in drawing up a European Space Policy, 
while  building  on  past  achievements  at  the  level  of  ESA  and  Member  States,  and  gives  the 
European  Commission  a  clear  mandate  to  exercise  its  right  of  initiative.  Space  policy  is 
defined as a shared competence between the EU and its Member States. 

Under  section  3.2  there  is  a  detailed  explanation  of  the  reasons  why  the  EU  is  asked  to 
exercise its comptence in the specific domain of SST. 

The  EU  does  not  seek  to  replace  initiatives  taken  by  Member  States  individually  or  in  the 
framework  of  ESA.  It  seeks  to  complement  actions  taken  at  their  level  and  reinforce 
coordination where such coordination is necessary to achieve common objectives. 

The EU involvement would be necessary to aggregate the investment required to fund certain 
space  projects,  set  in  place  governance  arrangements,  define  a  data  policy  and  ensure  that 
existing  and  future  capacities  are  broguht  to  work  in  a  coordianted  and  efficient  manner 
ensuring a robust and interoperable system benefiting all relevant European stakeholders. 

Furthermore, the proposed EU action does not seek to replace or duplicate existing mitigation 
measures  at  international  or  multi-lateral  level,  such  as  the  UN  guidelines  for  space  debris 
mitigation or the EU proposal for an international Code of Conduct on outer space activities. 
These measures will not solve the problem at hand, but will reduce the growth of space debris 
in the long-term (see the detailed description of this measures in annex IV). 

4. 

OBJECTIVES  

4.1. 

General policy objectives 

The general objective of the proposed initiative is to safeguard the long-term availability and 
security of European and national space infrastructures and services essential for the smooth 
running of Europe’s economies and societies and for European citizens’ security.  

4.2. 

Specific policy objectives 

More specifically, the initiative aims at increasing the EU’s capacity to: 

– 

– 

Reduce the risks related to the launch of European spacecrafts; 

Assess and reduce the risks to in-orbit operations of European spacecrafts in terms of 
collisions, and to enable spacecraft operators to more efficiently plan and carry out 

50 

Space Security Report 2011 

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mitigation measures (e.g. more accurate collision avoidance manoeuvres; avoidance 
of unnecessary manoeuvres which are risky in itself and reduce a satellite’s lifetime); 

– 

Survey  uncontrolled  re-entries  of  spacecraft  or  their  debris  into  the  Earth’s 
atmosphere  and  provide  more  accurate  and  efficient  early  warnings  to  national 
security  and  civil  protection/disaster  management  administrations  with  the  aim  to 
reduce the potential risks to the security and health of European citizens and mitigate 
potential damage to critical terrestrial infrastructure. 

4.3. 

Operational objectives 

In  order  to  realise  the  specific  objectives,  the  continuous  and  sustainable  provision  of  SST 
information  to  European  and  national  public  and  private/commercial  users  needs  to  be 
ensured through: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

The  setting  up  of  an  operational  space  surveillance  and  tracking  capability  at 
European  level  building  on  existing  European  and  national  assets  and  capable  of 
intregrating  future  new  assets  as  well  as  the  implementation  of  an  appropriate 
governance structure; 

The definition and implementation of data policy principles for the handling of SST 
information through the European SST capability; 

The definition and delivery of SST services open to all European and national public 
and  private/commercial  actors  who  need  SST  information;  the  services  should 
respond to defined and agreed user requirements. 

Ensuring  the  necessary  quality  of  SST  services  and  their  efficient  and  sustainable 
operational provision: 

Supervising the implementation and efficient functioning of the proposed operational 
SST  capability  and  the  operational  SST  services  and  by  ensuring  a  sustainable  EU 
funding contribution; 

4.4. 

Consistency with other policies and objectives 

The  objectives  are  coherent  with  Member  States  political  will  expressed  in  Council 
conclusions  as  well  as  the  objectives  of  the  ongoing  (and  planned  future)  European  GNSS 
programmes  and  the  GMES  initial  operations  programme  which  aim  at  ensuring  the 
sustainable  provision  of  European  satellite  navigation  services  or  services  for  environment 
monitoring  or  in  support  of  security  related  activities.  They  are  also  coherent  with  the 
objectives of space research activities carried under the current EU framework programme for 
research  and  development  (FP7)  as  well  as  the  planned  Horizon  2020  programme. 
Furthermore, the proposed initiative's objectives are consistent with the objectives set in the 
EU's policy related to the protection of European critical infrastructure and the European Civil 
Protection Mechanism. 

As concerns activities beyond the EU framework, the objectives of the proposed initiative are 
complementary with the ongoing ESA SSA preparatory programme as well as national SSA 
activities. 

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5. 

POLICY OPTIONS  

This impact assessment identifies five options which - apart from the baseline scenario – seek 
to  deliver  the  same  output:  establishing  a  European  service  to  avoid  collisions  in  space  and 
monitor uncontrolled re-entries. However, they differ in terms of governance, funding and the 
degree of performance that the service can deliver. 

The selection  of the options is based on the following considerations some of  which  have 
been outlined in previous sections and which can be summarised as follows: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

European  SST  services  should  build  on  existing  European  and  national  assets 
and competences and would entail the development of additional ones; 

SST  capacity  is  incremental:  SST  is  an  activity  that  can  be  developed  in  an 
incremental  and  modular  way.  New  sensors  or  assets  added  to  a  European  SST 
network can improve the system's overall performance and the quality of the data and 
information it provides; 

Without prejudice of on-going budgetary discussions, funding for a European SST 
service  would  come  from  redeployment  of  budget  from  existing  programmes 
foreseen  for  the  next  MFF  provided  that  such  redeployment  is  compatible  with  the 
legal base of the proposed programmes51;  

No  risk  of  cost-overruns:  SST  performance  is  incremental  and  improvement  of 
performance  can  be  achieved  with  relatively  (compared  with  other  space 
programmes)  modest  investments.  Any  unlikely  cost-overruns  would  be  offset  by 
down-scaling the system (for example with regard to number of sensors included in 
SST sensors function or new sensors to be developed by Member States), which can 
still  guarantee  enhanced  performance  compared  with  the  current  situation.  In 
addition,  to  safeguard  EU  budget,  EU  funding  provided  under  any  of  the  options 
would take the form of fixed contributions; 

Strengthened  cooperation  with  US  on  SSA:  The  US  SST  technology  and 
architecture is old (with assets dating back to the 60ies) and needs modernising. As 
part  of  its  space  policy,  the  US  has  publicly  stated  its  desire  to  collaborate 
internationally  in  this  domain.  Collaboration  between  the  US  and  the  EU  could 
improve the accuracy and quality of SST overall and generate efficiency and savings. 
This two-way collaboration is obviously only possible in so far as the EU develops 
SST capacity of its own. 

(6) 

The  performance  of  the  service  allows  reducing  the  risk  of  collision  by  a  certain 
factor; the potential economic loss caused by collision will be reduced by the same 

51 

The  Commission’s  proposal  for  the  future  EU  budget  under  the  next  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework  (MFF)  2014-2020  does  not  foresee  a  specific  budget  support  to  the  setting  up  of 
operational  European  SST  services.  As  the  protection  of  space  infrastructure  during  launch  and  in-
orbit operations is to be considered an integral part of the operator's responsibilities, the Commission’s 
proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  the  implementation  and  exploitation  of  European  satellite  navigation 
systems (COM(2011) 814 final of 30.11.2011) includes provisions for a limited funding contribution to 
the  proposed  activity.  Redeployment  of  budget  under  other  possible  future  EU  financing  instruments 
could be examined. Taking into account this constraint, the EU funding contribution to a European SST 
activity would have to be limited. 

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factor. As options 2, 3 and 4 are variations of the same option and based on expert 
advice,  the  performance  of  the  service  proposed  in  these  options  suggests  a  risk 
reduction  by  a  factor  of  3  to  5.  Option  5  which  proposes  a  more  performing 
service suggests a risk reduction by a factor of 10. 

(7) 

Any  enhancement  of  SST  capacity  will  result  in  improved  ability  to  predict  and 
monitor uncontrolled re-entries but we can not establish a target for this. Therefore, 
the options are designed considering only the target reduction of collision risk.  

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1. PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2. SOLUTION 

3. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING 
THE DESIGN OF THE SOLUTION 

4. THE DESIGN Of THE SOLUTION: THE 
OPTIONS 

FROM PROBLEM DEFINITION TO OPTIONS 

Increasing  number  of  sapcecraft  and  debris 
generate an increasing risk of collision. Collision 
can destroy or damage satellites. There is direct 
economic  loss  due  to  destruction  or  damage. 
There  is  indirect  loss  of  revenue.  There  is 
unquantified indirect damage due to disruption of 
satellite service. 

Incraesing  risk  of  uncontrolled  re-entries  that 
may cause damage on the ground. 

In  Europe  there  is  at  present  no  adequate 
capacity  to  survey  and  track  space  objects  and 
to  alert  stellite  operators  of  the  risk  of  collision. 
The  capacity  that  exists  allows  to  survey  and 
track limited number of objects. The alerts given 
are  inaccurate  and  often  demand  unecessary 
avoidance  maneouvres  that  shorten  the  life  of 
satellite. 

There  is  also  no  adequate  capacity  to  monitor 
uncontrolled re-entries. 

The  baseline  scenario  would  not  make  the 
problem go away, on the contrary it can only get 
worse.  The  problem  cannot  be  solved  through 
debris  mitigation  measures  which  can  only 
prevent 
becoming 
exponentially worse. 

problem 

from 

the 

The solution to the problem is to have the means 
to  survey  and  track  space  objects  to  determine 
the risk of collision and provide alerts when such 
risk arises. These means will also serve to better 
predict  and  monitor  the  uncontrolled  re-entry  of 
space objects in order to alert if necessary public 
authorities of any potential danger that these re-
entries may generate. 

These  means  is  what  the  report  refers  to  as 
Surveillance  and  Tracking  Service  which 
consists of three functions: 

–  Sensor function, which through a network of 
instruments  such  as  radars  and  telescopes 
allows  to  identify  and  track  spacecraft  and 
debris; 

–  Processing 

function, 

through  which 

the 
relative orbit of spacecraft and debris can be 
catalogued  and  analysed  to  determine  the 
probability of collision or to determine the re-
entry path of space objects; 

–  Front desk function, which is responsible for 
the  actual  provision  of  the  SST  services 
(such  as  collision  or  re-entry  alerts) 
to 
satellite  operators  and  relevant  authorities. 
At  the  same  time,  the  front  desk  will  be  the 
entry  point 
for  SST 
information  which it relays to the processing 
and sensor function. 

for  user  requests 

Discussions  on  the  potential  development  of 
SST  have  revealed  that  Member  States  have 
converging  strong  views  on  the  fact  that  SST 
must  be  developed  in  the  framework  of  the  EU 
and on the following issues: 

Architecture: A SST service must be developed 
building  on  existing  assets  owned  by  Member 
States and by adding new assets. 

Governance:  The  European  SST  service  has  a 
highly  sensitive  security  dimension  as  it  allows 
gathering intelligence on States' civil and military 
space  infrastructure  and  operations.  Member 
States  have  made  clear  that  due  to  security 
concerns  the  sensor  and  processing  functions 
must,  in  any  scenario,  remain  under  the  control 
of  the  national  competent  authories  (i.e.  military 
authorities).  Given  such  security  concerns,  front 
desk function must be entrusted to an entity that 
has solid security credentials. 

Data  policy:  There  is  a  consensus  among 
Member  States  that  SST  information  is  by 
definition classified and can only be declassified 
on a case by case basis where the need arises. 

Funding: Member States are of the view that the 
development  of  the  SST  should  involve  the  EU 
funding,  but  they  are  open  to  contributing  to  it 
financially. 

There  are  basically  two  broad  options:  status 
quo  and  the  developing  of  a  European  SST 
service.  There  are  however  possible  variations 
on the latter. 

In  column  number  3,  a  number  of  policy 
considerations are idenitfied. In this light, any  of 
the  options  will  build  on  the  combination  of 
existing  and  new  assets  and  will  have  identical 
governance and data policy. 

Against  this  backdrop,  the  design  of  the  options 
is guided by the degree of performance that they 
seek,  i.e.  the  quantifiable  reduction  of  collistion 
risk,  and  the  way  the  funding  contributions 
necessary  for  the  setting  up  and  operations  of 
the  European  SST  service  are  shared  between 
the EU and the Member States. 

Following  expert  advice,  for  the  purpose  of  this 
report two targets have been identified: 

–  a reduction by a factor of 3 to 5 (options 2, 3 

and 4) and  

–  a reduction of 10 (option 5). 

Achiving  these  targets  requires  the  addition  of 
new  assets  to  the  existing  ones  and  a  certain 
investment:  60  M€  to  achieve  the  factor  3  to  5 
target,  and  120  M€  to  achieve  the  factor  10 
target. 

Options  2  and  3  propose  EU  funding  as  an 
incentive for Member States to invest in the new 
European SST service.  

Options 4 and 5 propose EU funding for all costs 
linked  to  the  setting  up  and  operation  of  the 
European SST service. 

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5.1. 

Option 1: Baseline scenario: No EU financial involvement in SST 

Under  the  baseline  scenario  the  EU  would  not  engage  in  any  action  or  provide  any  support 
(legal or financial) to the setting up and operational provision of European SST services. 

The reasons underlying the need for EU intervention have been outlined under Section 3.2 of 
this impact assessment. 

Without  the  preparation  of  an  organisational  framework  setting  out  how  the  provision  of 
operational  SSA  services  would  be  organised  and  without  an  agreed  data  policy  that  would 
ensure the EU Member States that information related to sensitive satellites or their existing 
sensors is handled with the necessary level of confidentiality, there are no indications that EU 
Member States on their own initiative would come to a broader cooperation on SST outside 
the EU framework.  

The  fact  that  the  need  for  setting  up  of  European  SSA  services  was  highlighted  in  Space 
Council  Resolutions  since  2007,  but  no  initiative  was  taken  by  EU  Member  States  so  far 
underpins the likelihood of this scenario. 

Existing sensors and expertise at Member States level, such as radars and telescopes or SST 
data  centres,  that  could  form  building  blocks  for  a  European  SST  system,  will  remain 
fragmented  and  not  inter-connected.  Bilateral  cooperation  as  described  in  the  problem 
definition may continue, but there are no indications today that this may lead to more formal 
cooperation  arrangements  apart  from  the  cooperation  between  France  and  Germany  which 
announced  to  interconnect  their  existing  sensors  and  data  centres  (GRAVES,  TIRA),  but 
which is still not an operational reality.  

Cooperation in the SSA domain between a number of EU Member States (in their capacity of 
ESA  Member  States)  in  the  framework  of  ESA  may  continue.  However,  such  cooperation 
emerged  in  the  context  of  a  several  year-long  policy  discussion  for  the  setting  up  of  a 
European  SST  that  is  supposed  to  be  led  by  the  EU.  If  the  EU  does  not  take  action,  the 
continued cooperation on SST amongst EU Member States in the ESA framework is highly 
unlikely. 

So  far  ESA  has  carried  out  a  number  of  preparatory  studies  to  define  civil  SSA  user 
two 
requirements,  SSA  system  requirements,  architecture  options,  and 
demonstrator  radars.  The  proposal  for  actions  in  2013-2015  currently  under  discussion 
indicates  that  the  focus  will  be  on  space  weather  and  NEO  monitoring,  which  are  typical 
R&D  activities  and  have  no  significant  security  dimension.  As  concerns  space  surveillance 
and  tracking,  the  current  draft  programme  proposal  suggests  continuing  the  development, 
testing and validation of SST sensors (the already launched development of two demonstrator 
radars  as  well  as  three  telescopes),  the  development  of  a  secured  network  between  existing 
sensors and the testing of pre-cursor SST services. These activities must be seen as technical 
support within the overall framework of an EU-led development of a European SST service to 
which assets developed through ESA will also contribute. 

to  develop 

Taking  into  account  the  fact  that  Member  States  do  not  see  the  development  of  a 
European  SST  service  as  a  mission  to  be  entrusted  to  ESA  as  explained  in  section  3.2, 
the setting up of operational SST services at European level under the baseline scenario 
cannot be expected.  

Cooperation  between  EU  Member  States  and  third  countries  is  expected  to  remain  at  the 
current  status:  The  US  are  expected  to  remain  the  only  space-faring  nation  that  shares  SST 

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30 

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information with public and private/commercial European satellite operators on an individual 
basis.  However,  as  set  out  in  the  problem  definition  chapter  of  this  report,  the  information 
provided  by  the  US  is  not  accurate  enough  to  efficiently  plan  and  carry  out  collision 
avoidance manoeuvres. Operators that do not have the means to refine such information, or 
cannot get help in time from Member States that do possess such means, are forced to carry 
out sometimes unnecessary avoidance manoeuvres as a precaution. 

The EU in its role as owner and operator of the EGNOS and Galileo would have to rely on the 
US  SST  and  make  arrangements  with  those  Member  States  that  have  SST  assets  to  ensure 
refined assessments of collision risks and to accompany collision avoidance manoeuvres. 

Even  in  the  absence  of  EU  intervention,  the  US  is  likely  to  improve  its  SST  capacity. 
However,  it  is  not  possible  to  predict  whether,  on  what  basis  and  with  which  degree  of 
accuracy the US will continue to provide SST information to third parties. It is certain that the 
US will take such decision as a function, first and foremost, of US own national interests. 

As  concerns  other  mitigation  measures  to  reduce  collision  risks  for  satellites,  a  number  of 
actions  may  be  taken  including  action  at  international  level  with  the  objective  to  limit  the 
growth of space debris as illustrated under chapter 3.1.1.3.  

These international mitigation measures seek to prevent the exponential growth of debris and 
may  only  be  effective  in  the  long-term,  if  indeed  they  are  implemented.  However,  these 
actions  cannot  replace  short-term  mitigation  measures  such  as  collision  avoidance 
manoeuvres. 

5.2. 

Option 2: Partnership approach – EU funding for the European SST front desk 
function 

This option would seek a reduction of the collition risk by a factor of 3 to 5 and therefore a 
reduction of economic loss due to satellite failure or destructions by the same factor. There is 
convergence among experts that in order to achieve such reduction the sensor function must 
be developped linking and operating as a netwok existing assets and adding to this network 1 
tracking radar, 1 surveillance radar and 8 telescopes. These assets should be linked by secured 
lines. The processing function must be set up including in particular a robust data center. A 
front desk must also be set up. 

This would require an overall investement, coming from EU and Member States, of some 60 
M€  per  annum  (for  details  see  annex  V  on  th e  calculation  method).  According  to  the  most 
conservative  estimate  the  current  anualised  estimated  loss  of  140  M€  would  be  reduced  to 
between 28 to 46 M€. 

In  this  option,  operational  European  SST  services  would  be  set  up  in  partnership  with  EU 
Member  States  owning  relevant  assets.  The  EU  would  define  the  legal  framework  for  the 
setting  up  and  operations  of  European  SST  services  on  the  basis  of  existing  sensors  and 
capacities as well as those Member States may decide to develop (for instance in the follow-
up  programme  to  the  ongoing  ESA  SSA  preparatory  programme  to  be  decided  at  the  ESA 
Ministerial Council in November 2012).  

This  option  is  based  on  the  so-called  small  option  in  the  study  carried  out  by  Booz  & 
Company.  Further  discussions  and  verifications  with  experts  from  ESA  and  national  space 
agencies  led  to  converging  views  on  the  new  infrastructure  elements  needed  to  reach  the 
targeted  performance  levels  of  the  European  SST  service  indicated  above  and  the  cost 
estimates.  

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31 

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5.2.1.  Governance 

The EU, through an appropriate legal instrument, would define the roles and responsibilities 
of each actor in the implementation and operation of the proposed European SST capability 
which comprises of three functions:  

–  the sensor function (consisting of a network of existing and new SST sensors connected 

amongst each other and with the SST data processing centres),  

–  the  processing  function  (consisting  of  a  combination  of  existing  SST  data  centres  and 
analytical expertise to process the data captured by the SST sensors, merge it with US SST 
data, build a European catalogue of space objects, analyse collision risks and re-entry risks 
etc), and  

–  a  front  desk  function  (handles  the  dissemination  of  SST  information,  e.  g.collision  risk 
alerts during launch and in-orbit operations and re-entry early warning alerts, to European 
users through defined SST services). 

The governance framework would also define the services to be provided in accordance with 
defined  user  requirements,  set  out  data  policy  principles,  and  define  coordination  and 
monitoring  mechanisms  to  ensure  the  overall  functioning  of  the  European  SST  service,  the 
implementation of the services and the agreed data policy, as well as the contacts with service 
users. 

As  explained  under  section  3.2,  Member  States  have  made  clear  that  the  sensor  and 
processing  function  must  remain  under  the  control  of  competent  national  authorities  (i.e. 
military authorities). Therefore, a consortium set up by competent authorities of Member 
States would be responsible for the sensor and the processing functions of the European 
SST capability. The consortium should be open to all EU Member States and European actors 
that  are  ready  to  contribute  SST  sensors  or  other  relevant  capacities  or  expertise.  The 
consortium members will retain the full control over their assets, and will be responsible for 
their operation, maintenance and upgrading/further development. The consortium will also be 
responsible for the implementation and the operation of the secured network interconnecting 
sensors  and  the  processing  function.  The  processing  function  will  consist  of  centres  at 
Member  States  level  (both  France  and  Germany  have  set  up  such  “precursor”  national 
centres) and a central data center. In line with the role of the processing function explained 
above,  the  consortium  would  build  and  operate  a  European  catalogue  of  space  objects  and 
provide  analytical  support  to  the  front  desk  function.  The  interior  organisation  of  the 
consortium  would  be  the  responsibility  of  the  Member  States  constituting  it  on  the  basis  of 
broad terms of reference to be provided by the European Commission. France and Germany 
declared  readiness  to  form  the  nucleus  for  such  a  consortium  on  the  basis  of  their  existing 
assets.  

The  front  desk  function  would  be  entrusted  to  an  existing  operational  entity/agency  with 
suitable  security  credentials  and  a  proven  capacity  to  handle  SST  information  in  a  secured 
environment (for example the EU Satellite Centre provided that it will be given an appropriate 
mandate by its Member States52). The front desk ensures the provision of SST services open 
to all European and national public and private/commercial users. 

52 

Recent discussions within EUSC Board reveal openness to go in this direction. 

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32 

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The  European  Commission  would  not  engage  in  any  day  to  day  operational  activity,  but 
would ensure the overall coordination of the SST functional elements. To this end, it would 
set up and chair a board consisting of the members of the Consortium and the European SST 
front desk.  

5.2.2. 

Service provision 

The  services  to  be  provided  would  be  defined  by  the  European  Commission  based  on  the 
civil-military  SSA  user  requirements  approved  by  Member  States  in  October  2011(see 
footnote 18): 

SST service groups 

Users 

Collision  avoidance:  Services  related  to  the  risk 
assessment  of  a  collision  between  spacecraft  or 
between  spacecraft  and  space  debris  and 
the 
generation of collision avoidance alerts; 

Detection  and  characterisation  of  on-orbit 
fragmentations:  Services  to  detect  and  assess  the 
risks  of  on-orbit  fragmentation  events  (explosions  or 
break-ups that lead to the creation of space debris) or 
collisions, and to issue alerts where required; 

Re-entry predictions for hazardous space objects: 
Services  to  assess  risky  re-entries  of  space  objects 
into  the  Earth's  atmosphere,  predict  the  time  and 
location  of  impact,  and  initiate  alert  procedures  to 
predefined points of contact  

•  Operators  of  public/governmental,  scientific  and 
third 

the  EU  and 

commercial  spacecraft  within 
countries; 

•  Military spacecraft operators; 

•  Launch service providers; 

•  Government  services  that  have  legal  and  policy 
responsibilities  related  to  the  management  of  public 
space activities; 

•  Space  insurance  companies  and  banks  that  provide 

financing for space actors; 

•  ESA, EU 

•  Public  (civil  or  military)  and  commercial  spacecraft 

operators and launch service providers;  

•  Government  services  that  have  legal  and  policy 
responsibilities  related  to  the  management  of  public 
space activities; 

•  Space  insurance  companies  and  banks  that  provide 

financing for space actors; 

• 

International scientific community interested in orbital 
debris population; 

•  Defence/governmental  community 

in  case  such 
collisions  could  have  an  intentional  nature  (such  as 
so  called  anti-satellite  (ASAT)  tests  which  aim  at 
intentionally destroy a satellite); 

•  ESA, EU 

•  Public  (civil  or  military)  and  commercial  spacecraft 

operators and launch service providers; 

•  Government  services  that  have  legal  and  policy 
responsibilities  related  to  the  management  of  public 
space activities; 

•  Space  insurance  companies  and  banks  that  provide 

financing for space actors; 

•  Governmental civil protection services 

•  ESA, EU 

5.2.3.  Data policy  

The  Commission  in  cooperation  with  EEAS  and  Member  States  is  already  working  on 
principles  for  the  SST  data  security  policy.  The  SST  data  security  policy  will  define  the 
framework for the acquisition, handling, processing and distribution of SST data derived from 

EN 

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the  observation  of  space  objects,  information  related  to  the  SSA  systems  and  its  various 
components  (functioning,  availability,  precision  etc)  as  well  as  information  related  to  the 
users. 

The  most  stringent  requirements  on  confidentiality  of  SST  information  are  imposed  by  the 
defence  community53  in  order  to  protect  sensitive  governmental  space  assets  of  Member 
States  and  allies.  Uncontrolled  disclosure  of  information  related  to  these  assets  (including 
information  concerning  their  existence,  orbital  parameters,  space  manoeuvres  in  view  of 
military  or  intelligence  operations),  as  well  as  information  revealing  interest  expressed  for 
specific assets or systems or information related to the characteristics of military SST sensors, 
could jeopardise national security.  

In accordance with these needs, SST related information concerning objects detected through 
the  SST  sensors  will  be  considered  classified  by  default.  Information  about  an  object  may 
only be declassified if it is cleary identified as a non-sensitive object. At any time, when there 
is a risk of collision or a hazardous re-entry involving a classified object, an ad-hoc decision 
shall  be  taken  on  the  risk  of  declassification.  The  processing  function  of  the  proposed 
European SST system will be reponsible for taking such decisions based on the agreed data 
policy. No declassification decision will be taken without involving the actor responsible for 
the object. 

5.2.4.  Funding 

The overall costs of the setting up and operation of the European SST capability would be co-
funded  by  the  Member  States  constituting  the  consortium  and  the  EU  in  the  manner 
describe below.  

The Member States participating in the consortium would provide funding for: 

–  all  capital  investments  related  to  the  setting  up  of  the  sensor  function  including  the 

development of new assets and its full operation; 

–  the capital investment for the setting up of the processing function; 

–  the secured network to inter-connect sensors and the processing function 

–  The maintenance and operational costs of the sensors and processing functions necessary 

for the Europan SST service; 

The  costs  for  the  acquisition  of  new  assets  (1  surveillance  radar,  1  tracking  radar  and  8 
telescopes, the required equipment to network existing assets and the processing function and 
a data center) necessary  to  guarantee the targeted collision risk reduction factor of 3 to  5 is 
estimated at 50 M€ per annum. Costs for the op erations of sensors and processing functions 
can be estimated at 8 M€ per annum 54. 

The total contribution of Member States participating in the consortium would be around 58 
M€. 

53 

54 

See  footnote  18  on  the  common  civil-military  SSA  user  requirements  approved  by  Member  States  in 
2011. 
See details in annex V. 

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34 

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The EU would provide funding for: 

–  the  setting  up  and  operation  of  the  front  desk  function,  namely  the  staff  required  to  run 
such service (estimated at 6 FTE) the acquisition of the necessary hardware and software, 
the maintenance of such equipement and overheads55. 

Funding  of  the  SST  front  desk  function  can  be  estimated  at  an  average  of  2  M€  per  year. 
Therefore, the total contribution of the EU would be 2 M€. 

As explained on page 24, the provision of SSA services is not likely to be an activity to be 
started through private or commercial actors. Member States owning relevant SST assets are 
not  willing  to  collaborate  with  a  commercial  actor  in  this  sensitive  domain  as  commercial 
actors  do  not  meet  the  security  requirements  identified  to  protect  national  security  interests. 
However, similar to ongoing US STRATCOM reflections, the generation of revenues through 
the  introduction  of  service  fees  for  both  public  SST  service  users  (who  are  not  part  of  the 
consortium)  and  private/commercial  users  could  be  envisaged  in  the  longer  run  –  once  the 
planned  European  SST  services  have  reached  a  stable  operational  stage  and  the  necessary 
quality  level.  The  introduction  of  service  fees  could  be  examined  in  the  context  of  the 
evaluation of the initative's implemementation. 

5.3. 

Option 3: Partnership approach – EU funding for networking and operation of 
sensor, processing and front desk functions 

This option is identical to option 2 in all respects except as regards the distribution of funding 
provided by the consortium of Member States and the EU. 

Under this option Member States participating in the consortium would fund: 

–  the  capital  investments  related  to  the  setting  up  of  the  sensor  function  including  the 

development of new assets and its full operation; 

–  the capital investment for the setting up of the processing function; 

–  The  capital  investments  for  the  secured  network  to  inter-connect  sensors  and  the 

processing function;  

As  in  option  2,  the  acquisition  of  new  assets  (1  surveillance  radar,  1  tracking  radar  and  8 
telescopes, the required equipment to network existing assets and a data centre) necessary to 
guarantee  the  targeted  collision  risk  reduction  factor  of  3  to  5  is  estimated  at  50  M€  per 
annum. 

The  total  contribution  from  Member  States  in  the  consortium  would  be  some  50  M€  per 
annuum(see also annex V on the calculation method). 

The EU would fund: 

–  The  operational  costs  of  the  sensors  and  processing  functions  necessary  for  the  Europan 

SST service; 

55 

Operational  costs  the  EU  front  desk  function  have  been  estimated  on  the  basis  of  current  EUSC 
man/hour costs for Earth Observation imagery analysts and the assumption that 6 analysists would be 
required to man the front desk. . 

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35 

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–  the  setting  up  and  operation  of  the  front  desk  function,  namely  the  staff  required  to  run 
such service (estimated at 6 FTE), the acquisition of the necessary hardware and software, 
the maintenance of such equipement and overheads. 

The EU funding contribution would amount to 10 M€ per annum (8 M€ for maintenance and 
operation of the sensor and processing function and 2 M€ for the front desk function).  

As  in  option  2,  the  introduction  of  service  fees  could  be  examined  in  the  context  of  the 
evaluation of the initative's implementation. 

5.4. 

Option 4: EU-led SST development and funding (risk reduction factor of 3 to 5) 

As in option 2 and 3, this options assumes the development of 1 surveillance radar, 1 tracking 
radar,  8  telescopes  for  both  surveillance  and  tracking  and  a  data  centre.  The  risk  reduction 
factor  would  be  identical  to  that  under  options  2  and  3,  but  there  would  be  differences  in 
terms of governance and funding because the EU would be the system owner and would fund 
the totality of the costs directly linked to the European SST service. 

The  EU  defines  the  related  legal  framework  (including  data  policy),  and  takes  the  full 
responsibility for the development  of  the  structures needed to federate existing national and 
European sensors and capacities and to ensure the provision of SST services. 

The Commission would engage in public procurement processes and would become owner of 
SST infrastructure elements where necessary.  

5.4.1.  Governance 

The  sensor  function  would  be  a  shared  responsibility  of  Member  States  and  the  EU  as  it 
would  comprise  existing  assets  remaining  under  the  control  and  responsibility  of  Member 
States  and  European  assets  developed  and  owned  by  the  EU.  For  the  same  reasons,  the 
processing function would be largely the responsibility of Member States, but it would have 
to involve the EU to a larger extent than options 2 and 3. 

Following the same logic as in previous options, e. g. to entrust the sensor function and the 
processing  function  to  a  consortium  of  Member  States  to  meet  Member  States'  security 
concers, the management of the new EU-funded assets would be entrusted to the consortium, 
and  the  front  desk  function  to  an  entity  with  adequate  security  credentials  such  as  the  EU 
Satellite Centre (EUSC). 

The European Union would be the owner of any new assets procured for the setting up of the 
European SST service, would be responsible for the overall political supervision and would 
oversee the execution of the programme. Given that the EU would be the main architect and 
source  of  funding  for  the  European  SST  service,  it  would  have  greater  responsibility  than 
under options 2 and 3. 

5.4.2.  Data policy 

Data security policy would be identical as in the options 2 and 3. 

5.4.3. 

Service provision 

Service provision would be identical as in options 2 and 3. 

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5.4.4.  Funding 

Under this option the EU would fund: 

–  the  capital  investments  related  to  the  setting  up  of  the  sensor  function  including  the 

development of new assets; 

–  the capital investment for the setting up of the processing function; 

–  The secured network to inter-connect sensors and the processing function;  

–  The  operational  costs  of  the  sensors  and  processing  functions  necessary  for  the  Europan 

SST service; 

–  the  setting  up  and  operation  of  the  front  desk  function,  namely  the  staff  required  to  run 
such service (estimated at 6 FTE) the acquisition of the necessary hardware and software, 
the maintenance of such equipement and overheads. 

As in option 2 and 3, the acquisition of new assets (1 surveillance radar, 1 tracking radar and 
8 telescopes, the required equipment to network existing assets and a data centre) necessary to 
guarantee the target collision risk reduction factor of 3 to 5 is estimated at 50 M€ per annum. 

The  EU  funding  contribution  towards  maintenance  and  operation  costs  of  sensors  and 
processing funcion would amount to 8 M€ for  maintenance and operation of the sensor and 
processing function; the EU funding of the front desk function would amount to 2 M€. 

Total contribution from the EU would amount to some 60 M€ per annum (see also annex V 
on calculation method). 

5.5. 

Option 5: EU-led SST development and exploitation (risk reduction factor of10) 

Option  5  follows  the  same  logic  as  option  4,  but  seeks  to  reduce  the  risk  of  collision  by  a 
factor  of  10  and  consequently  of  the  estimated  losses  above  a  factor  of  10.  This  option 
requires the acquisition of 2 surveillance radars, 2 tracking radars and 14 telescopes. 

The development of new sensors to complement existing national sensors would increase the 
system's capacity to detect space objects in terms of geographic coverage and size of objects. 
As  a  consequence,  this  option  would  improve  the  quality  and  accuracy  of  the  SST  services 
provided. 

This option is based in the medium option in the study carried out by Booz & Company. As 
all the previuos options, option 5 would also leverage on existing sensors in Europe. 

5.5.1.  Funding 

Funding would follow the same logic as in option 4 but with double the number of new assets 
(2  surveillance  radars,  2  tracking  radars  and  14  telescopes)  which  also  implies  enhanced 
processing capacity as well as a higher performing service.  

EU  funding  can  be  estimated  at  some  120  M€
annex V on the calculation method). 

  per  year  for  the  period  2014-2020  (see  also 

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5.6. 

Summary of the options 

Option 1: Baseline 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 4 

Option 5 

5.6.1.  Governance 

Non existent 

EU provides the legal framework  

Consortium of Member States own and operate sensor and processing 
function 

EU entity entrusted with front desk function 

EU  ensures  overall  running  of  the  system  in  partnership  with  Member 
States 

EU provides the legal framework  

EU funds and owns new assets 

Consortium of Member States own exisiting assets 

Consortium  operates  sensor  and  processing  fucntion,  including  those 
owned by EU 

EU entity entrusted with front desk function 

EU has a much stronger grip of the development of SST than in options 
2 & 3 

EU  ensures  overall  running  of  the  system  in  partnership  with  Member 
States. It has greater responsibility than in options 2 and 3 

5.6.2.  Data policy 

Non existent 

5.6.3. 

Service provision 

Developed as part of the EU framework 

Non existent 

24/7 service -Risk collision reduction by factor 3 to 5 

24/7  service  –  Collision 
reduction by factor 10 

risk 

5.6.4.  Funding 

Undetermined 

Consortium 
processing 
assets – 58 M€/year 

funds  sensor  and 
funcions  and  new 

EU funds front desk – 2 M€/year 

Consortium  funds  new  assets  – 
50 M€/year 

EU  funds  operations  of  sensor, 
desk 
and 
precessing 
functions – 10 M€/year 

front 

EU 
funds  new  assets  and 
operations  of  sensor,  processing 
and 
function  –  60 
M€/year 

front  desk 

EU 
funds  new  assets  and 
operations  of  sensor,  processing 
and  front  desk  function  –  120 
M€/year 

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EN 

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5.7. 

Summary of stakeholder views on the options 

There are two broad categories of stakeholders: public authorities and industry. 

The  idea  of  developing  a  European  SST  service  has  been  under  discussion  for  a  number  of 
years. The building blocks of the options presented have all been discussed with stakeholders 
either bilaterally or multilaterally on numerous occasions. 

Industry could be roughly grouped in two categories: manufacturing industry and commercial 
satellite  operators.  Both  groups  are  strongly  in  favour  of  the  setting  up  of  a  European  SST 
capacity. Manufacturing industry is clearly in favour of the option that guarantees the highest 
investment and therefore the highest industrial return. Satellite operators are concerned with 
the  performance  of  the  system  and  favour  the  highest  possible  performance.  They  are 
however concerned that high performance would not result in any additional costs imposed on 
them. 

Industry  has  not  expressed  particular  views  on  governance,  which  is  understood  to  be  a 
political issue, or data policy. As regards, service provision, satellite operators underline the 
need for accurate and timely information, which is the objective under any of the suggested 
options. 

As far as Member States are concerned, some of them have far clearer and stronger position 
on these matters than others. 

All Member  states  agree  on the need  to  set  up a European SST service. They all agree that 
such service should build on existing assets and this is foreseen in options 2 to 5. All Member 
States  are in  agreement with the governance suggested in the options: e. g. a consortium of 
Member States being entrusted with the operation of the sensor and processing functions. One 
Member  State  has  indicated  on  a  number  of  occasions  that  it  would  prefer  that  a  European 
entity  be  set  up  to  to  handle  these  functions  but  accepts  the  governance  arrangements 
proposed  in  the  suggested  options  provided  that  the  consortium  is  not  reserved  to  Member 
States  that  currently  possess  relevant  assets  and  that  it  guarantees  the  involvement  of  all 
Member States willing to contribute to these functions, which will indeed be the case. 

All  Member  States  agree  on  the  proposed  data  policy,  which  is  identical  for  all  the  options 
and, in brief, foresees that data on space objects is by definition classified information and it 
is only disclosed on a case by case basis when required. A data policy based on this guiding 
principle and involvement of Member States owning existing SST sensors in the governance 
of the planned European SST service, would in particular meet the security concerns of those 
Member States where existing assets are under military control. No further trade-offs would 
be  needed  to  ensure  military  participation  in  a  European  SST  service  open  to  both  public 
(civil and military) and private/commercial operators and authorities. 

As far as service provision is concerned, all Member States are open to the idea that a front 
desk  function  be  strongly  linked  but  differentiated  from  the  sensor  and  processing  function 
and entrusted to an organisation with a record as service provided and suitable credentials in 
the  security  domain,  such  as  the  European  Union  Satellite  Centre.  One  particular  Member 
State is strongly in favour of such idea. 

As regards the target performance of the system, this issue was put to Member States during 
the presentation of the study carried out by Booz & Company. It is clear from the discussions 

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that  were  held  in  that  context  and  elsewhere  that  they  are  rather  in  favour  on  building  on 
existing  assets  and  adding  the  minimum  necessary  to  guarantee  an  improvement  in  relation 
with  the  current  situation.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  developments  being  suggested  in  the 
context of ESA's SSA preparatory programme. Member States are therefore in favour of an 
improved performance of the order suggested in options 2 to 4.  

Ideally, all Member States would like the EU to fund the totality of a European SST service. 
However,  for  some  Member  States,  the  interest  in  developing  an  SST  capability  is  closely 
linked  with  the  desire  to  support  national  industry  active  in  this  domain.  The  EU  can  not 
guarantee geo-return and therefore, from some Member States' perspective, there would be a 
drawback in the options suggesting the EU fully funding European SST service. 

Notwithstanding the above, Member States understand budgetary constraints and are aware of 
the possible difficulties in redeploying the budget necessary to secure full EU funding of the 
European SST service. In this context, Member States have made clear that, as a minimum, 
the  EU  should  cover  the  operations  of  the  sensor,  processing  and  front  desk  functions 
necessary  to  establish  a  European  SST  service,  and  have  shown  willingness  to  fund  the 
development additional capacities that could contribute to it. 

As  concerns  other  space  faring  nations,  in  particular  the  US  signalled  openness  to 
strengthened  cooperation  with  other  space-faring  nations  provided  that  the  international 
partner has the appropriate credentials to ensure the confidentiality of the SST data received.  

Taken all of the above into account, while Member States would potentially be open to any 
the options proposed, their most favoured options are 3 and 4. 

6. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS  

The methodology applied for assessing the impacts of the options set out in chapter 5 is based 
on the following: 

•  Space  activities  undertaken  by  space  faring  nations  are  often  driven  by  strategic  and 
security  considerations.  These  considerations  are  particularly  relevant  for  space 
surveillance and tracking activities. Furthermore, governance and funding issues can have 
a strategic impact. Therefore, options will also be assessed in view of their strategic and 
governance  impacts.  The  strategic  impacts  section  will  focus  on  whether  the  option 
provides  strategic  independence  and  knowledge,  whether  it  provides  significant  political 
"currency"  for  Europe  to  be  seen  as  a  credible  partner  which  can  contribute  to 
international cooperation, whether the options contribute to overcoming fragmentation of 
efforts. 

•  The  economic  impacts  section  will  focus  on  the  industrial  return  of  the  options,  and  to 

which level the option contributes to reducing risks that have an economic impact. 

•  As  concerns  social  impacts  two  aspects  will  be  considered:  the  creation  of  jobs  and  the 
impact  of  the  threats  that  can  be  monitored  via  an  SSA  system  on  citizens'  security  and 
health. 

•  Finally, the assessment of environmental impacts will focus on the proliferation of space 

debris. 

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•  The  problem  definition  section  of  this  impact  assessment  report  underlined  the  lack  and 
fragmentation of available information, (case) studies or statistics which made it in many 
cases difficult to quantify the risks and potential losses linked to the problems identified. It 
is possible to quantify the minimum economic losses linked the risk of collision which can 
be estimated on the basis of object that can be tracked today. However it is not possible to 
quantify  risks  related  to  uncontrolled  re-entries,  which  can  only  be  illustrated  through 
anecdotal  evidence.  Consequently,  the  assessment  of  the  impacts  of  the  various  options 
will be a mix of qualitative and quantitative impacts. 

6.1. 

Impacts of option 1: baseline scenario 

6.1.1. 

Strategic and governance impact 

Under  the  baseline  scenario,  the  EU  would  take  no  action  to  promote  the  setting  up  of 
operational  SST  services  at  European  level.  This  would  have  no  impact  on  the 
implementation of the EU flagship programmes Galileo and Copernicus, but their long-term 
security and sustainable exploitation could be affected. 

SST  activities  in  Europe  would  remain  limited  and  fragmented  –  apart  from  some  bilateral 
cooperation  (e.g.  between  France  and  Germany)  which,  incidentally,  has  emerged  in  the 
context of the discussion of an EU-led development of a European SST service. In absence of 
any  incentive  or  European  framework,  it  is  quite  unlikely  that  any  broader  cooperation 
between  Member  States  with  a  view  to  the  setting  up  of  a  European  SST  capability  would 
develop.  Without  EU  involvement,  there  are  no grounds  to  believe  that Member  States  will 
take  the  necessary  steps  to  set  up  of  adequate  coordination  mechanisms  and  operating 
structures necessary for SST services. 

However, should some form of cooperation emerge including assets owned by Member States 
other  than  France  and  Germany,  there  is  a  consensus  among  SST  experts  that  this  will  not 
reduce the current level of collision risk. 

European  cooperation  with  the  US  would  remain  at  current  bilateral  level.  A  substantial 
number  of  European  spacecraft  operators  as  well  as  civil  protection  authorities  at  EU  and 
Member States level may remain dependant solely on the, for now, freely available (but not 
accurate enough) US SST information in a critical area of their space activities. 

6.1.2.  Economic impact 

The problems identified in section 3 would not be addressed and are likely to aggravate over 
the coming years. With increasing space activity and increasing space debris, economic losses 
due to launch failures, satellite loss or damage, and service outages are expected to increase. 

Industrial  activity  in  SST  in  Europe  would  stay  at  current  limited  level.  In  absence  of  EU 
involvement,  and  in  the  light  of  years  of  political  discussion  on  the  development  of  a 
European SST service, there is no ground to believe that ESA could undertake the actions that 
are described  under  options 2 to 4 and spur  some industrial activity in this domain. For the 
reasons spelled out throughout this impact assessment, this appears rather unlikely to happen. 

6.1.3. 

Social impact 

In absence of EU action and the fact that Member States do not seem to be ready to engage in 
major SST development activities in the framework of ESA, the impact on job creation of this 
option is negligible.  

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As  operational  European  SST  services  (including  re-entry  warning  services)  do  not  exist 
today and are not likely to be set up without any EU support, Europe would not increase its 
capacity  to  survey  controlled  or  uncontrolled  re-entries  of  space  debris  into  the  Earth's 
atmosphere.  Re-entry  warnings  and  alerts  would  continue  to  be  provided  in  a  sporadic  and 
uncoordinated manner. Security threats from uncontrolled re-entries of space debris into the 
Earth's atmosphere as explained in the problem definition section would not be addressed or 
mitigated.  With  increasing  space  activity,  the  risks  to  the  security  and  health  of  European 
citizens or the security of critical ground-based infrastructure risks to increase. 

6.1.4.  Environmental impact 

The main environmental benefit of building a European SST capability is related to the outer 
space  environment  and  the  ability  to  monitor  the  evolution  of  debris  and  debris  clouds.  As 
described  in  more  detail  in  the  problem  definition,  a  large  proportion  of  the  space  debris 
population  (around  95%  overall)  is  currently  not  catalogued.  The  population  of  'potentially 
traceable'  debris  (e.g.  1  cm  to  10  in  diameter)  is  estimated  using  different  mathematical 
models which lead to large differences in results with estimates varying by a factor of 2 to 3. 
However, all estimates agree on the constant and significant growth of the debris population 
in the future (in fact each collision between space objects leads to an exponential growth of 
the debris population56) and the need for action to preserve the space environment. 

Recent  theories  concerning  the  generation  of  space  debris  clouds  resulting  from  in-orbit 
collisions  which  significantly  contribute  to  the  growth  of  the  debris  population  and  which 
may, in the long-term prevent the scientific and commercial exploitation of "crowded" orbits 
such as LEO have to some extent been confirmed by the Iridium 33 collision. This collision 
produced  a  debris  cloud  of  1875  catalogued  debris,  and  an  undefined  number  of  un-
catalogued debris which is likely to be in the order of some thousand.  

Recent UN and NASA studies underlined the risk of growth of debris in LEO which would 
continue to grow even if all launch activities (and thus the further use of space) would stop. 
Space  debris  presents  particular  characteristics  in  the  GEO  region  which  are  not  yet  fully 
understood (why, for example, there is a tendency of debris concentration close to positions 
occupied by satellites). These phenomena can be better understood through SST. It is worth 
noting  that  the  members  of  the  International  Telecommunication  Union  recently  agreed  to 
consider  GEO  as  a  unique  natural  resource  with  an  economic  value  of  approximately  70 
Billion US$ per year. 

International  mitigation  measures  have  been  approved  at  UN  level.  In  addition,  in  2009  the 
EU presented a proposal for an international Code of Conduct proposing a set of transparency 
and  confidence-building  measures  with  the  aim  of  preventing  the  creation  of  space  debris. 
These measures will have a long-term effect by influencing spacecraft operators' behaviour. 
However, improved capacity to monitor the debris population is considered the most effective 
short-term effort to mitigate the risk of space debris creation and thus contribute to preserve 
space as a natural resource. While under the baseline scenario, the EU would continue to act 
on long-term measures through its proposal for an international Code of Conduct, it would not 
make  any  efforts  with  a  short-term  effect  to  preserve  the  usability  of  certain  orbits  such  as 
LEO.  Ultimately  this  could  jeopardise  the  sustainable  provision  of  public  services  based  on 
Earth  observation  satellites  which  are  relevant  for  the  implementation  of  European  and 
national policies in various policy domains including environment or climate change policies. 

56 

ESA estimates the number of 'potentially traceable' debris to grow to almost 1 million by 2020. 

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Another aspect to consider is linked to the problem of un-controlled re-entries of space debris 
which  has  been  analysed  in  the  problem  definition.  Incidences  involving  space  debris  from 
nuclear  powered  satellites  or  satellites  with  dangerous  substances  on  board  (such  as 
hydrazine) can become seriously harmful events for the environment as well as for the health 
of citizens. An example may illustrate the scale of the problem: In 1978, the nuclear powered 
Cosmos 954 satellite hit the Canadian soil. Radioactive debris was found over a large territory 
throughout  several  Canadian  provinces.  Cleaning-up  operations  lasted  8  months  at  reported 
costs of around 14 Million US$ at the time (equivalent to 40-50 Million US$ today). While 
SST systems cannot prevent such incidences, they are the basis for taking mitigating measures 
based  on  state  of  the  art  early  warning  services  and  responding  as  efficiently  as  possible  to 
potential (catastrophic) events on the ground. 

6.2. 

Impacts of options 2, 3 and 4  

Options  2,  3  and  4  all  seek  a  target  reduction  of  risk  collision  of  a  factor  of  3  to  5  (as 
explained in chapter 6.2.2) through a similar architecture, and data policy. They all envisage 
the same level of funding for the establishment of a European SST service. The difference lies 
in  the  split  between  EU  and  Member  States  contributions  which  implies  differences  in  the 
governance for option 4 (see summary table 5.6.4). 

As impacts are a direct consequence of the performance of the system (i.e. reduction of the 
risk  of  collision)  and  the  investment  which  are  the  same  for  the  three  options,  the  three 
options would in principle deliver the same impacts. 

However, the options may not be equally likely to materialise. The strengths and weaknesses 
of the options is analysed under section 7.1.  

6.2.1. 

Strategic impact 

Data security policy principles would be identical to all options. A key principle of the data 
policy  applied  for  the  handling  of  SST  data  in  the  proposed  organisational  framework  is  to 
consider  all  space  objects  confidential  from  the  outset.  Information  about  space  objects 
detected  will  only  be  declassified  on  a  case  by  case  basis  and  distributed  only  when  it  has 
been identified as a non-sensitive object. 

The  proposed  governance  scheme  will  allow  Member  States  to  actively  contribute  and 
safeguard  their  national  security  interests.  Furthermore,  Member  States  would  under  any  of 
these options be responsible for operating the sensor and processing functions, including the 
establishment  and  maintenance  of  a  European  catalogue  of  space  objects  which  will  allow 
them to control the classification/declassification process. 

The involvement of the EU in the governance of the European SST service (through an EU 
entity acting as an SST service front desk), and the fact that the consortium will be open to 
Member States owning relevant assets and capacities should disperse concerns expressed by 
those Member States that have no such capacities today (see also pages 23 and 40). 

These options would build on existing international cooperation with the US. The US system 
requires updating and refurbishing to address the increasing need for SST information. As this 
requires  substantial  investments,  the  US  signalled  openness  to  stengthen  international 
cooperation in this domain with actors that can actively contribute to improve the quality of 
SST  information.  The  setting  up  of  a  European  SST  capability  would  allow  the  EU  to 
collaborate  with  the  US  as  an  equal  partner  with  a  view  to  mutually  enhancing  SST 
performance. 

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Furthermore,  these  options  would  strengthen  Europe's  independent  access  to  space  (an 
objective of the European space policy and highlighted by Member States in several Council 
Resolutions)  and  its  capacity  to  make  independent  decisions  concerning  the  safety  of 
spacecraft operations. Europe currently strongly relies on information from the US to obtain 
clearance to launch and gain access to space (e.g. Arianespace confirmed that it is dependant 
on information from the US to obtain to determine the viability of its launch path with regard 
to risks of collisions with satellites or space debris57). 

The EU's financial contribution foreseen in options 2 and 3 would provide a different level of 
incentive  for  the  Member  States  consortium  to  engage  in  the  necessary  capital  investments 
related to the setting up of the European SST capability (e.g. investments necessary to create a 
secured sensor network, to refurbish and modernise existing sensors and develop new ones).  

The  assumption  that  Member  States  are  willing  to  develop  such  assets  is  based  on  bilateral 
discussions  and  on  the  current  proposals  for  the  second  phase  of  the  ESA  SSA  preparatory 
programme 2013-2015, which makes proposals in this direction. 

Option 4 suggests that the EU would fund all the costs linked to the European SST service. 
This would still require the participation of Member States with existing assets, though they 
would not incur in any of the extra cost of a European SST service.  

Any  of  these  options  would  ensure  a  truly  European  SST  service  which  would  respond  to 
defined  and  agreed  European  SST  user  requirements  and  needs  and  be  available  to  all 
European public and private/commercial users. However the different options have different 
strengths and weaknesses and present different risks in terms of effectiveness and efficiency 
which are compared under sections 7.1 and 7.2 respectively. 

6.2.2.  Economic impact 

The proposed initiative would improve the European SST service's ability to detect hazardous 
situations  and  provide  more  accurate  SST  information  (conjunction  assessments  and 
trajectory data) for the launch and in-orbit operation of satellites. It would imply a reduction 
of the risk of satellite losses and the number of collision avoidance manoeuvres leading to a 
reduction of economic losses (see problem definition section). 

According  to  ESA  expertise  one  can  assume  a  linear  correlation  between  the  increase  in 
tracking  capacity  and  the  reduction  of  risks  and  potential  quantified  annual  losses  (as 
identified  in  chapter  3  and  summarised  in  chapter  3.1.5.).  The  SST  capability  under  these 
options  would  target  a  reduction  of  collision  risk  by  a  factor  of  3  to  5  and  would  therefore 
lead to a reduction of losses due to collisions by a factor 3 to 5 by 202058 implying a possible 
reduction of the estimated annual losses of 93-112 M€. 

As  pointed  out  in  the  problem  definition  section,  European  operators  of  spacecraft  in  LEO 
face  around  13  conjunction  assessment  risks  per  satellite  a  year.  Leading  space  agencies  in 
Europe, such as CNES, DLR and ESA, rely on initial data from the US surveillance system to 
estimate  conjunction  assessment  risks  for  their  own  satellites  which  needs  to  be 
complemented with measurements based on their own surveillance assets as the information 
the US is ready to share without jeopardizing national and military security interests. While 
the  SST  capability  proposed  in  the  options  2,  3  and  4  would  not  preclude  continued 
cooperation with the US, which can result in even higher performance through the pooling of 

57 
58 

Booz & Company, stakeholder interviews; 
See also Booz & Company based on stakeholder interviews. 

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resources, they would significantly improve the ability and quality of European operators to 
carry out their own complementary risk assessments.  

These  options  would  build  on  existing  SST  sensors  and  human  expertise  and  foresee  the 
development of new SST sensors. Using as reference the defence sector from which ground 
based  technology  used  for  SST  (e.g.  radars)  originates,  Booz  &  Company  suggests  that  the 
development of new sensors foreseen in these options is likely to have a multiplier effect in 
terms of industrial activity of 2.3. Considering only that the investment in new assets would 
amount to roughly 50 M€ per annum (which do not take into account ICT for processing and 
front desk functions), i.e. 350 M€ over the  seven year period 2014-2020, the total industrial 
return can be estimated at 805 M€ which is a  rather conservative estimate. Would we apply 
the multiplier effect usually applied for investments in space programmes (4.8), the industrial 
return could be estimated at 1680 M€ 59. SMEs in the sector are expected to benefit from this 
industrial activity as the development of SST sensors often requires niche technologies often 
produced by SMEs. SME participation does not require specific measures and is not expected 
to imply specific burdens. 

6.2.3. 

Social impact 

Using  the  Booz  &  Company  study  as  a  reference,  the  estimated  number  of  permanent  staff 
generated  by  options  2,  3  or  4  would  be  around  50.  On  the  basis  of  their  own  experience, 
national and ESA experts consider this a very conservative estimate, but will nevertheless be 
used here due to the lack of a more precise estimate. 

The proposed action will lead to an improvement of Europe's ability to predict and survey re-
entries  of  space  debris  into  the  Earth’s  atmosphere,  and  thus  help  reducing  the  risks  to  the 
security and health of European citizens and the security of terrestrial critical infrastructures. 
The problem definition section of this report highlighted that on average 1 debris per day hits 
the  Earth  (and  the  trend  is  rising).  While  these  incidences  have  so  far  not  led  to  casualties, 
debris from inactive satellites or rockets varying between 10 kg to 270 kg can cause severe 
material  damage  and should  be  considered a security and health hazard. Due  to  lack of any 
quantitative  data  and  studies  on  material  damage  caused  by  un-controlled  re-entries  it  is 
unfortunately not possible at this point of time to quantify this positive impact. 

6.2.4.  Environmental impact 

These  options  would  increase  Europe's  capacity  to  monitor  uncontrolled  re-entries  of  space 
debris  and  to  put  in  place  a  coherent  and  clear  procedure  to  issue  meaningful  and  timely 
warnings to national security authorities.  

A  recent  re-entry  event  may  illustrate  the  improvements  that  could  be  achieved  through  a 
more coordinated approach to re-entry warnings at European level: In mid-January 2012, the 
Russian Marsian probe Phobos-Grunt, which encountered a failure during the launch phase, 
re-entered  the  Earth's  atmosphere  in  an  un-controlled  way.  For  the  first  time,  the  US  State 
Department provided the EU with Tracking and Impact Prediction (TIP) Alert Messages. The 
Crisis Management and Planning Department (CMPD) within the European External Action 

59 

2.3 corresponds to the multiplier effect usually applied to investments made in the defence sector; 4.8 
corresponds  to  the  multiplier  effect  usually  applied  to  investments  made  in  the  space  sector  for 
programmes  with  scientific  content;  the  see  Booz  &  Company,  page  247  on  the  basis  of  Oxford 
economics,  the  economic  case  for  investing  in  the UK  defence  industry, September  2009  and Danish 
agency  for  science  and  innovation,  Evaluation  of  Danish  Industrial  Activities  in  the  European  Space 
Agency, March 2008. 

EN 

46 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Service  (EEAS)  acting  as  contact  point  relayed  the  information  to  other  EU  actors  and  to 
Member  States'  national  security  authorities  via  the  Council's  Political  and  Security 
Committee (PSC). The US also alerted ESA. In parallel, the Russian authorities alerted some 
EU  Member  States  space  agencies  including  the  German  space  agency  DLR  which  relayed 
the information  to other  national  space agencies. None of the actors involved was informed 
about  others  being  contacted.  As  a  result,  national  authorities  received  partly  diverging 
warnings from different sources through different channels. 

6.3. 

Impacts of option 5: EU-led SST development and exploitation 

6.3.1. 

Strategic impact 

In addition to the strategic impacts outlined for the previous options, option 5 could clearly 
increase the EU's strategic potential to strengthen and intensify cooperation in SST with other 
space-faring nations (notably the US) through established political channels. 

In  this  option,  the  EU  would  have  the  full  control  over  the  setting  up  of  the  European  SST 
capability, and that the initiative is open to all EU Member States that wish to participate. It 
would also ensure that the operational SST services to be set up would correspond to agreed 
European user requirements and that they are open to all European users.  

6.3.2.  Economic impact 

The  EU  SST  programme  proposed  in  this  option  implies  the  development/procurement  of 
new SST assets for the amount of 810 M€. Booz  & Company suggests that investments made 
in the development of ground-based infrastructure as suggested in this option is likely to have 
a  multiplier  effect  in  terms  of  industrial  activity  of  2.3.  This  would  result  in  a  direct  and 
indirect industrial turnover between 1.9 billion € and 3.9 M€ depending on the multiplier used 
(see chapter 6.2.2.).  

Applying the same approach to estimate the reduction of economic losses likely to be brought 
about by option 3, it could be estimated that option 5 could reduce the risks identified in the 
problem  definition  by  a  factor  of  10  or  above.  This  would  imply  a  possible  reduction  of 
estimated annual losses due to collisions of 126 M€. 

6.3.3. 

Social impact 

The  EU  SST  programme  foresees  the  development  of  a  number  of  new  SST  assets  and  the 
setting up of a new or the extension of existing SST data centres which will require permanent 
staffing to ensure operations on a 24/7 basis. Based on estimates from Booz & Company, the 
potential for the creation of permanent jobs in the engineering and data analyst domain would 
be around 100 new jobs across Europe.  

As option 2, 3 and 4, this option would lead to an improvement of Europe's ability to predict 
re-entries of space debris into the Earth’s atmosphere. Option 5 provides a potential to reduce 
risks to the security of European citizens and critical terrestrial infrastructure even further. 

6.3.4.  Environmental impact 

As in options 2, 3 and 4, this option would strengthen Europe's capacity to monitor the debris 
population, avoid collisions, and thus to mitigate the risk of further space debris creation. 

EN 

47 

   EN 

 
According to Booz & Company option 5 would allow the detection of debris up to 3 to 5 cm 
which are today not catalogued. This would significantly increase Europe's capacity the risk 
of debris clouds and their long-term proliferation in Low Earth Orbit. 

EN 

48 

   EN 

 
6.3.5.  Overview of impacts 

Strategic impacts 

Economic impacts 

Social impacts 

Environmental impacts 

Option 1: 
Baseline 

SST  activities  in  Europe  remain  fragmented 
from  some  bilateral  cooperation;  no 
apart 
European SST service to emerge in absence of 
EU action. 

Cooperation  with  US 
remains  at  current 
bilateral  level;  continued  high  dependency  of 
European operators on US SST information. 

to 

related 

collisions 

Risks 
and 
re-entries  will  not  be 
uncontrolled 
addressed  and  are  likely  to  increase  as 
space  activities 
increase  of 
economic  losses  due  to  launch  failures, 
satellite  loss  or  damage,  and  service 
outages expected. 

increase; 

Industrial  activity 
expected to stay at current limited level. 

in  SST 

in  Europe 

Options  
2, 3 and 4 

Proposed  governance  and  data  policy  allows 
MS to actively  contribute in the European SST 
service  and  safeguard  national  security 
interests. Option 2 and 3 provide incentives for 
MS  to  invest  in  setting  up  of  European  SST 
service and develop new assets. Option 4 also 
builds on MS contributions, but funding for new 
assets is ensured by the EU. 

Setting  up  of  European  SST  service  allows  to 
collaborate  with EU as an equal partner  with a 
view to mutually enhance SST performance. 

Europe's  independent  access  to  space  would 
be  strengthened 
(e.g.  proper  and  more 
accurate information to clear launches). 

these  options 
SST  capability  under 
targets  a  collision  risk  reduction  by  a 
factor  3  to  5  by  2020.  This  suggests  a 
reduction  of  the  losses  by  the  same 
factor,  meaning  a 
the 
estimated  annual  economic  losses  of  93 
to 112 M€. 

reduction  of 

Industrial  activity  due  to  development  of 
new  assets  (350  M€  in  2014-2020)  is 
expected  to  have  a  multiplier  effect  of  at 
least  2.3  leading  to  a  total  industrial 
turnover of 805 M€. 

Option 5  Governance:  EU  has  full  control  over  the 

setting up of the European SST service. 

Option  5  would  further  strengthen  Europe's 
potential  to  strengthen  cooperation  with  other 
space-faring nations on SST (notably US). 

SST capability under this option targets a 
collision risk reduction by a factor 10. This 
implies a reduction of estimated economic 
annual losses of 126 M€. 

Industrial  activity  of  810  M€  during  2014-
2020  can  be  expected  to  lead  to  total 
industrial turnover of at least 1900 M€. 

Impact on job creation is negligible. 

Services  for  survey  of  re-entries  are 
not  likely  to  emerge  in  absence  of  EU 
action; alerts and warnings are likely to 
continue  to  be  issued  in  a  sporadic  + 
uncoordinated manner; risks to security 
and  health  of  citizens 
from  un-
controlled  re-entries  are  expected  to 
increase with increasing space activity; 

Creation  of  around  50  jobs  in  Europe 
estimated; 

Europe's  ability  to  predict  and  survey 
re-entries  would  be 
improved  and 
reduce  the  risks  to  the  security  and 
health  of  citizens  and  the  security  of 
infrastructure 
critical 
(increase  and  positive 
impact  not 
quantifiable). 

terrestrial 

to  monitor 

Europe's  capacity 
the 
evolution  of  space  debris  and  debris 
clouds  would  not  improve;  also  its 
capacity  to  avoid  the  creation  of  new 
space debris would not increase. 

Risk related to re-entries that may have 
serious  impacts  on  environment  are 
likely to increase. 

Options  increase  Europe's  capacity  to 
detect  debris  not  catalogued  today, 
monitor  the  evolution  of  space  debris 
and predict un-controlled re-entries. 

Setting  up  of  European  SST  service 
allows  putting  in  place  a  coherent 
procedure  for  re-entry  warnings  and 
alerts 
thus 
for  public  authorities, 
increasing the effectiveness of re-entry 
warning and alert services. 

Creation  of  around  100  new  jobs  in 
Europe expected. 

Europe's  ability  to  predict  and  survey 
re-entries  would  be  improved  further 
than  in  options  2,  3  and  4  and  further 
reduce  the  risk  to  the  security  and 
health  of  citizens  and  the  security  of 
infrastructure 
critical 
impact  not 
(increase  and  positive 
quantifiable). 

terrestrial 

further 

As  in  option  2,  3  and  4,  this  option 
would 
increase  Europe's 
capacity  to  monitor  the  evolution  of 
space  debris  and  predict  un-controlled 
re-entries. 

SST  service  would  allow  detecting 
debris  up 
(today  not 
to  3-5  cm 
catalogued). 

EN 

49 

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7. 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 

7.1. 

Summary of strengths and weaknesses of the options 

Strengths 

Weakness 

Option 1: 
Baseline 

A limited service is provided by the US at no 
cost.  Public  funds  may  be  diverted  to  other 
priorities. 

Option 2 

A collision risk reduction of 3 to 5 is targeted. 
Positive  strategic,  economic,  social  and 
environmental impacts. 

have 

given 
Several  Member  States 
indications  of  their  willingness  to  develop 
additional SST assets in the framework of an 
EU-led  SST  initiative.  This  option  comforts 
Member  States'  perception  that  developing 
their  own  assets  guarantees 
their 
investment benefits national industry. 

that 

Option 3 

As in option 2, a collision risk reduction of 3 to 
5  is  targeted.  Positive  strategic,  economic, 
social and environmental impacts. 

have 

Several  Member  States 
given 
indications  of  their  willingness  to  develop 
additional SST assets in the framework of an 
EU-led  SST  initiative.  This  option  comforts 
Member  States'  perception  that  developing 
their  own  assets  guarantees 
their 
investment benefits national industry. 

that 

The  risk  of  collision  remains  and  will  get 
worse.  EU  unable  to  protect  critical  space 
infrastructure.  Negative  strategic,  economic, 
social and environmental impacts. 

It  does  not  meet  either  Member  States  or 
industry expectations. 

This  option  requires  significant  funding  from 
both  the  EU  and  from  Member  States  willing 
to  develop  new  assets.  Although  there  is 
evidence 
that  some  Member  States  are 
indeed  supportive  of  this  idea  and  willing  to 
develop  new  assets,  the  EU  does  not  have 
full control over the funding required to set up 
a European SST service. 

The  EU 
investment  does  not  cover  an 
important part of the costs directly linked with 
the  setting  up  of  a  European  SST;  i.e.  the 
operations  of  the  sensor  and  processing 
function.  It  does  not  meet  Member  States' 
expectations that as a minimum the EU would 
cover  the  operational  costs  of  the  European 
SST  service  and  therefore  may  not  provide 
sufficient  incentive  for  Member  States  to 
invest. 

As in option 2, this option requires significant 
funding  from  both  the  EU  and  from  Member 
to  develop  new  assets. 
States  willing 
Although 
that  some 
Member  States  are  indeed  supportive  of  this 
idea  and  willing  to  develop  new  assets,  the 
EU does not have full control over the funding 
required to set up a European SST service. 

is  evidence 

there 

This 
States 
option  meets  Member 
expectations that as a minimum the EU would 
cover  the  operational  costs  of  the  European 
SST service. 

EN 

50 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Option 4 

A collision risk reduction of 3 to 5 is targeted. 
Positive  strategic,  economic,  social  and 
environmental impacts. 

As  sole  contributor,  the  EU  has  a  higher 
responsibility  for  the  overall  system  and  in 
particular it has to supervise the acquisition of 
new assets.  

It gives the EU practically full control over the 
funding  required  to  set  up  a  European  SST 
service. 

Some Member States  would welcome higher 
funding  from  the  EU  as  this  guarantees  the 
setting  up  of  an  EU  SST  service  and  would 
give tem the choice of either invest further in 
SST or in other space projects. 

funding 

the  EU 

As 
to  be 
redeployed  from  other  sources,  the  amount 
required  under  this  option  would  impose  a 
non-negligible burden on those sources. 

for  SST 

is 

Option 5 

A  collision  risk  reduction  of  10  is  targeted. 
This  option  provides 
the  most  positive 
strategic, economic, social and environmental 
impacts. 

As  sole  contributor,  the  EU  has  a  higher 
responsibility  for  the  overall  system  and  in 
particular it has to supervise the acquisition of 
new assets.  

It gives the EU practically full control over the 
funding  required  to  set  up  a  European  SST 
service. 

Some Member States  would welcome higher 
funding  from  the  EU  as  this  guarantees  the 
setting  up  of  an  EU  SST  service  and  would 
give tem the choice of either invest further in 
SST or in other space projects. 

is 

funding 

the  EU 

for  SST 

As 
to  be 
redeployed  from  other  sources,  the  amount 
required  under  this  option  can  only  be  made 
available through very significant cuts in other 
programmes  and  would  require  very  difficult 
trade offs. 

7.2. 

Comparison  in  terms  of  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence  with  agreed 
policies 

The table below provides an overview of the various options in terms of their effectiveness, 
their  efficiency  and  their  coherence  with  agreed  policy  objectives  expresses  in  Council 
conclusions or other policy documents: 

Options 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Option 1 

Baseline  scenario:  would  not 
achieve  specific  objectives  of 
this action. 

resources 

No 
improvement 
of 
problem situation; 

needed; 
the 

no 
current 

This  option  is  not  consistent  with 
Member  States  political  will 
in  several  Council 
expressed 
conclusions  which  ask  the  EU  to 
take  an  active  role  in  the  setting 
up  of  an  operational  SSA 
capability  at  European  level.  It  is 
the 
also  not  consistent  with 
objectives  of  the  European  space 
policy. 

Option 2 

This  option  could  achieve  the 
specific  objectives.  It  would 
allow  diminishing  risks  related 
to the loss of satellites as  well 
as  domino  effects  due 
to 
spacecraft  destruction.  The 
option  would  bring  about 
important  strategic,  economic, 

Option  2  involves  minimum  EU 
expenditure  of  2  M€  and  Member 
States  would  contribute  50  M€. 
From  a  purely  EU  budgetary 
perspective  could  be  the  most 
efficient. 

Member  States  expectations  is 

This  option  would  meet 
objectives  set 
conclusions  and 
space policy. 

the 
in  past  Council 
the  European 

the 
is  also  coherent  with 
It 
EU2020  strategy.  SSA  does 
for 
represent  certain  potential 

EN 

51 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
and 

resulting 

environmental 
social 
benefits 
from 
reducing  the  risk  of  disruption 
of satellite based services, and 
better control of spacecraft re-
entries. 

However  it  may  not  provide  a 
sufficient incentive for Member 
States  to  invest  in  additional 
assets  and  the  target  collision 
risk  reduction  may  not  be 
achieved. 

Option 3 

This  option  could  achieve  the 
specific  objectives 
the 
manner described in option 2. 

in 

Unlike  option  2 
it  does 
provides  a  solid  incentive  for 
Member  States  to  invest  in 
additional  assets  necessary  to 
reach  the  target  collision  risk 
reduction. 

Option 4 

European  SST  would  be  fully 
funded  by  the  EU  and  does 
not  depend  on  MS  funding. 
The  EU  would,  in  principle, 
guarantee 
the  specific 
objectives  –  as  described  in 
option 2 - are achieved. 

that 

is 
to  be 
redeployment 

funded 
As  SST 
through 
of 
existing  funding  instruments, 
finding  60  M€  represents  a 
much  higher  burden  than  the 
amounts under options 2 or 3. 
This is a significant risk for the 
effectiveness of this option.  

that,  as  a  minimum,  EU  funding 
covers  all 
the  operation  costs 
the  European  SST 
linked  of 
service,  which  is  not  the  case 
this  option.  This  may 
under 
discourage  Member  States 
to 
invest  in  new  assets.  Discussions 
in 
over 
inefficiencies and in the European 
SST not being implemented. 

issue  may  result 

this 

innovation  and  growth.  Its  main 
purpose is the protection of space 
infrastructure  that  represents  the 
basis 
for  downstream  services 
that  may  generate  innovation  and 
growth  as  well  as  to  reduce  risks 
the  security  of  European 
to 
terrestrial 
citizens  and  critical 
infrastructure 
extent 
possible. 

the 

to 

development 

The  EU  would  not  be  involved  in 
SST 
the 
of 
infrastructure, 
it  would  not  be 
responsible  or  own  SST  assets, 
and  would  not  be  involved  in 
operational activities. 

Option  3  entails  an  estimated 
expenditure  of  10  M€  per  year  on 
average  for  a  system  whose  total 
cost would be 50 M€. From an EU 
budgetary  perspective 
efficient option. 

is  an 

Same as option 2. 

funding 

This option meets Member States 
expectations  that,  as  a  minimum, 
the 
EU 
operation  costs 
the 
European  SST  service.  It  offers  a 
strong  incentive  for  the  European 
SST service to be set up. 

covers  all 
linked  of 

As  in  option  2,  the  EU  would  not 
be involved in the development of 
SST infrastructure, it would not be 
responsible  or  own  SST  assets 
and  would  not  be  involved  in 
operational activities. 

Same as option 2. 

Option  4  entails  annual  EU 
funding  of  60  M€.  From  an  EU 
budgetary  perspective 
less 
efficient than either options 2 or 3. 
However, 
option 
success  does  not  depend  on  MS 
contribution.  

under 

this 

is 

Under 
this  option  new  assets 
would  be  fully  funded  by  the  EU, 
which  implies  that  the  EU  would 
be  the  owner  of  such  assets.  In 
addition,  as  the  sole  contributor 
and  even  if  most  of  the  tasks  are 
externalised, the EU would bear a 
the 
higher 
system  than  in  options  2  and  3, 
where  the  responsibility  would  be 
largely shared with MS. 

responsibility 

for 

This imposes a burden on the EU 
which  renders  this  option 
less 
efficient than options 2 and 3. 

EN 

52 

   EN 

 
 
Option 5 

in 
This  option  guarantees, 
principle  achieving  all 
the 
objectives.  In  addition  it  would 
allow 
the  setting  up  of  a 
European  SST  service  whose 
performance  would  be  better 
than  that  under  options  2,  3 
and  4  leading  to  higher  risk 
reduction, and more significant 
economic and social impacts. 

However  the  problem  related 
to 
redeployment  would  be 
aggravated  under  this  option 
as  the  amount  required  would 
be  120  M€.  This  would  be  a 
risk  for  the  effectiveness  of 
this option. 

Option  5  entails  annual  EU 
funding  of  120  M€.  From  an  EU 
budgetary  perspective 
less 
efficient  than  any  of  the  other 
options.  However,  as  in  option  4, 
under  this  option  success  does 
not depend on MS contribution. 

is 

related 

to 
issues 
The  same 
ownership  of  assets  and  higher 
responsibility 
under 
option  4  arise  under  option  5  and 
would be aggravated by the larger 
investment required. 

identified 

However,  under  option  4 
this 
drawback  would  be  compensated 
by  the  gains  in  terms  of  reduction 
loss  as  well  as 
of  economic 
positive  economic  and  social 
impacts. 

The  coherence  with  European 
Space  Policy  and 
the  Europe 
2020  agenda  is  guaranteed  as  in 
the previous options. 

Under  option  5  the  impacts  in 
terms  of  industrial  return  and  job 
creations  are  higher  than  in  the 
other  options  given  the  higher 
investment involved. 

While option 2 would be the most efficient in view of the EU financial involvement required, 
there is a risk that it may not lead to the envisaged performance of the European SST service 
and,  as  a  result,  to  a  reduced  effectiveness  of  the  proposed  initiative.  A  relatively  modest 
increase of EU financial involvement (compared to other EU space programmes) as suggested 
in option 3 would provide a far better basis to achieve the objectives set and reach the targeted 
collision risk reduction. Option 5 would be the most effective one in terms of the reduction of 
collision  risks.  However,  it  lacks  efficiency  as  it  would  not  make  use  of  existing  Member 
States assets and capacities, and may be difficult to implement in the short-term. Therefore, 
option 3 has been identified as the preferred option in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and 
coherence with Member States political will and other EU policies. 

8. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

8.1. 

Evaluation 

The proposed action to be taken by the EU will have to be defined through a legal proposal. In 
accordance  with  provisions  made  therein,  ongoing  evaluation  of  the  implementation  of  the 
proposed initiatives and the achievement of objectives set will be undertaken by: 

– 

A Board which will oversee and advise on the implementation and operation of the 
functional elements of the European SST capability to be set up. The Board shall be 
composed  of  the  Member  States  constituting  the  consortium  to  operate  the  sensor 
and processing segments of the SST capability, the Commission and other EU actors 
concerned, the entity representing the EU front desk responsible for the SST service 
segment. 

– 

The Commission through regular meetings with the SST user communities; 

A mid-term and ex-post evaluation will be carried out on the basis of the above indicators 

– 

The  impact  of  the  proposed  initiative  could  be  measured  on  the  basis  of  the 
widespread use of the SST services through European and national users; the actual 

EN 

53 

   EN 

 
 
reduction  of  loss  of  satellites  and  unnecessary  collision  avoidance  manoeuvres,  the 
increased  efficiency  of  collision  avoidance  manoeuvres  or  re-entry  early  warnings. 
The evaluation of these impacts would mainly be based on feedback provided by the 
SST user communities. 

8.2.  Monitoring 

The Commission will ensure that grant agreements or contracts under the framework of the 
proposed  initiative  provide  for  supervision  and  financial  control  by  the  Commission,  if 
necessary by means of on-the-spot checks, sample checks, and audits by the Court of Auditors 
On  the  basis  of  the  results  of  the  on-the-spot  checks,  the  Commission  will  ensure  that,  if 
necessary,  the  scale  or  the  conditions  for  allocation  of  the  funding  contribution  originally 
approved as well as the timetable for payments are adjusted. 

In  addition  to  the  financial  supervision,  the  Commission  will  put  in  place  mechanisms  to 
ensure  the  continuous  quality  of  the  SST  services  provided.  This  will  be  realised  by 
measuring users' satisfaction on one side and by technical audits on the other side. Finally, as 
stated above, the Commission will organise regular meetings with user communities to ensure 
that services respond to user needs. 

Indicators to monitor the achievement of the objectives could be: 

Objectives 

General objective: 

Indicators 

Safeguard  the  long-term  availability  and  security  of 
European  and  national  space 
infrastructures  and 
services  essential  for  the  smooth  running  of  Europe’s 
economies  and  societies  and  for  European  citizens’ 
security 

•  Absence of collision 

•  No disruption of satellite or launch operations due 

to difficulties in risk analysis 

Specific objectives: 

•  Reduce the risks related to the launch of European 

•  No  disruption  of  launches  due  to  uncertainty  of 

spacecrafts; 

collision risk. 

•  Assess  and  reduce  the  risks  to  in-orbit  operations 
of European spacecrafts in terms of collisions, and 
to  enable  spacecraft  operators  to  more  efficiently 
plan and carry out mitigation measures (e.g. more 
accurate 
avoidance  manoeuvres; 
avoidance  of  unnecessary  manoeuvres  which  are 
risky in itself and reduce a satellite’s lifetime); 

collision 

•  Existence  of  necessary  and  properly  operational 
sensor  and  processing  capacity  to  asses  and 
reduce collision risks. 

•  Positive 

feedback 

from  operators 

mitigation  measures  collected 
surveys. 

regarding 
through  regular 

•  Survey  uncontrolled  re-entries  of  spacecraft  or 
their  debris  into  the  Earth’s  atmosphere  and 
provide more accurate and efficient early warnings 
to  national  security  and  civil  protection/disaster 
management  administrations  with 
to 
reduce  the  potential  risks  to  the  security  of 
European  citizens  and  mitigate  potential  damage 
to critical terrestrial infrastructure. 

the  aim 

•  Established  and  properly  operating  sensor  and 

processing capacity to monitor re-entries. 

•  Existence  of  a 

fully  operational  service  and 
establishment  of  an  agreed  procedure  to  provide 
early  warnings  to  civil  protection  and  disaster 
management authorities. 

Operational objectives: 

• 

The setting up of an operational space surveillance 
and  tracking  capability  at  European  level  building 

•  All  relevant  existing  national  assets  and  future 
the 

assets  are  effectively 

integrated  within 

EN 

54 

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on  existing  European  and  national  assets  and 
capable of integrating future new assets as well as 
the  implementation  of  an  appropriate  governance 
structure; 

The  definition  and  implementation  of  data  policy 
principles  for  the  handling  of  SST  information 
through the European SST capability; 

The definition and delivery of SST services open to 
all  European 
and 
private/commercial  actors  who  need  SST 
information; 
to 
the  services  should 
defined and agreed user requirements. 

respond 

national 

public 

and 

governance structure. 

•  Data  policy  is  actually  defined  and  effectively 
implemented  within  the  three  functions  of  the 
European SST service. 

•  All  services  are  formally  defined.  The  SST  front 
desk  function  is  set  up,  manned  and  operational 
according to defined requirements. 

•  Definition  of  quality  standards.  Mechanisms  are 
established  to  collect  feedback  from  operators  on 
the  quality  of  the  SST  service.  Positive  feedback 
received from operators. 

• 

• 

•  Ensuring  the  necessary  quality  of  SST  services 
and  their  efficient  and  sustainable  operational 
provision: 

•  Effective supervision mechanisms are in place with 

clear tasks, timetables and milestones 

•  Supervising 

the 

implementation  and  efficient 
the  proposed  operational  SST 
functioning  of 
capability and the operational SST services and by 
ensuring a sustainable EU funding contribution. 

8.3. 

Anti-fraud measures 

The setting up of the operational SST capability and SST services will take place through the 
Commission's partners: The consortium of Member States owning relevant SST assets which 
will  be  responsible  for  setting  up  and  operating  the  SST  sensor  network  and  the  SST 
information processing segment as well as the EU entity that will act as the EU front desk and 
be responsible for the provision of the SST services (possibly the EU satellite centre provided 
that it is given a mandate by the EU Member States). 

EU  funding  is  proposed  to  be  provided  through  grant  agreements  which  will  allow  for 
appropriate  financial  control  through  the  Commission.  The  proposed  EU  initiative  to  set  up 
and  operate  European  SST  services,  stipulates  that  the  Commission  will  ensure  that,  when 
actions financed under this initiative are implemented, financial interests are protected by the 
application  of  preventive  measures  against  fraud,  corruption  and  any  other  illegal  activities, 
by means of effective checks and by the recovery of amounts unduly paid and, if irregularities 
are detected, by effective, proportional and dissuasive penalties. 

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ANNEX I: GLOSSARY 

CNES, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales: 

The French Space Agency 

ESA, European Space Agency 

Inter-governmental  organisation  established  in  1975  to  provide  for  and  to  promote,  for 
exclusively  peaceful  purposes,  co-operation  among  European  States  in  space  research  and 
technology  and  their  space  applications.  Today,  18  European  Countries  are  ESA  Member 
States:  Austria,  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece, 
Ireland,  Italy,  Luxemburg,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland  and 
United Kingdom. 

GMES, Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (now called Copernicus) 

European initiative for the implementation of information services dealing with environment 
and  security.  Copernicus  is  based  on  observation  data  received  from  Earth  Observation 
satellites  and  ground  based  information.  These  data  are  coordinated,  analysed  and  prepared 
for  end-users.  It  develops  a  set  of  services  for  European  citizens  helping  to  improve  their 
quality  of  life  regarding  environment  and  security.  Copernicus  plays  a  strategic  role  in 
supporting major EU policies by its services. 

Launchers 

Rocket-based systems that deliver payloads (satellites, manned vehicles, etc.) into space. They 
can be heavy, medium and small, according to the relative weight of payloads that a particular 
launcher can carry into space. 

LEO, Low Earth Orbit 

Generally considered to be an orbit at an altitude of 400 to 1000 km. 

Meteor 

Brief streak of light seen in the night sky when a speck of dust burns up as it enters the upper 
atmosphere. Also known as a shooting star or falling star. 

Meteorite 

A fragment of rock that survives its fall to Earth from space. Usually named after the place 
where it fell. 

Meteoroid 

A piece of rock or dust in space with the potential to enter Earth's atmosphere and become a 
meteor or meteorite. 

NEO, Near Earth Objects 

Asteroids or comets whose orbit brings them into close proximity with the Earth (less than 1.3 
astronomical unit a unit defined by the Earth – Sun distance). 

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Payload 

Equipment carried by a spacecraft. A product becomes a payload once it is intended to fly on 
board a spacecraft. 

Satellite 

A man-made object (such as a spacecraft) placed in orbit around the Earth, another planet or 
the Sun. 

Soyuz Launcher 

A  launcher  system  developed  by  the  Soviet  Union,  also  used  as  a  medium-lift  launcher  for 
Europe. 

Spacecraft 

Artificial satellite. Term often used before a satellite is placed in orbit around the Earth, when 
it is transporting something or when it is being sent into deep space. 

Space weather 

The changing conditions in interplanetary space caused by fluctuations in the solar wind. 

SSA, Space Situational Awareness 

Comprehensive  knowledge,  understanding  and  maintained  awareness  of  the  population  of 
space objects (spacecraft such as satellites or space debris), of the space environment, and of 
the  existing  threats/risks  to  space  operations.  SSA  systems  rely  on  ground  or  space  based 
tracking and monitoring sensors. 

The Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Preparatory Programme is a new initiative of ESA, 
accepted 
in  The  Hague. 
SSA  includes  activities  in  three  main  domains:  space  surveillance,  space  weather  and  Near 
Earth Objects (NEOs). 

2008  Ministerial  Conference 

the  November 

at 

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ANNEX II: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND RESULTS 

(1) 

List of stakeholders consultations 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

Bilateral  meetings  held  in  2009  by  DG  ENTR  with  MS  actively 
involved  in  the  space  sector:  Germany,  France,  UK,  Spain,  Italy; 
industry association; 

Interviews  of  relevant  stakeholders,  conducted  by  Ecorys  in  the 
context  of  the  “Study  on  the  EU  Space  Programme  2014-2020” 
(December 2009-January 2010); 

Eurobarometer  survey  on  the  space  activities  of  the  European  Union 
conducted by Gallup in July 2009; 

Contributions  and  speeches  of  the  conference  “Space  policy:  a 
powerful ambition for the EU”, Brussels, 15-16 October 2009; 

Stakeholder  consultation  in  the  framework  of  the  "Study  on  the  EU 
Space  Programme  2014-2020"  carried  out  by  Ecorys  in  cooperation 
with  TNO  on  behalf  of  the  European  Commission;  final  report  of  4 
July 2010; 

(f) 

Events under Spanish EU Presidency: 

(g)  Workshop on Space and Security, 10-11 March 2010, Madrid, Spain; 

(h) 

(i) 

(j) 

(k) 

Conference on governance of European Space programmes, 3-4 May 
2010 Segovia, Spain; 

ESA contribution to the definition of future EU space activities; 

Public  consultation  via  the  Commission's  Interactive  Policy  Making 
(IPM) tool from 3 January to 15 March 2011; 

Stakeholder consultation in the framework of the study on "Evaluation 
of options for a space programme in 2014-2020" carried out by Booz 
& Company on behalf of the European Commission; final report of 16 
May 2011; 

(l) 

Seminar on Space Situational Awareness (SSA) under the Polish EU 
Presidency on 29 September 2011 in Warsaw; 

(2) 

Conclusions  Conference  on  Space  and  Security,  Madrid  10-11  March 
2011 

The Workshop emphasised the relevance of space to security users as a tool with the potential 
to address specific needs, in particular that of timely response. Being one tool of many, space 
can  provide  the  most  added-value  when  seamlessly  integrated  with  others.  To  achieve  this, 
effective integration of space technologies such as Earth observation (and especially GMES), 
satellite communication and navigation (Galileo with its PRS) will be required. In parallel, the 

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way the space systems interact and network with ground based and airborne platforms needs 
to be further looked into. 

Services  of  the  EU  Council  and  the  European  Commission,  the  European  Defence  Agency 
(EDA)  and  the  European  Space  Agency  (ESA)  have  been  working  together  on  the 
identification  of  security  related  user  requirements  under  the  umbrella  of  the  Structured 
Dialogue on Space and Security. The new Crisis Management and Planning Directorate of the 
Council  offers  the  potential  for  genuine  synergies  between  civilian  and  military  effort,  and 
will continue to contribute to the ongoing developments in space and security. The expertise 
of  the  EUSC  in  analyzing  EO  data  and  disseminating  geospatial  products  for  security 
applications should be taken in due account in the implementation of GMES security services. 

Concerning the security dimension of GMES, workshop participants recognised the progress 
made to date. Recommendations have been made on how GMES should support EU border 
surveillance (in particular EUROSUR), while work on the identification of user requirements 
for GMES to support EU External Action has begun. GMES security services to be developed 
on  the  basis  of  these  requirements  will  complement  the  support  provided  by  GMES  to 
Emergency Response. 

The complexity of integrating both civil and military requirements has been illustrated by the 
cooperation  on  Space  Situational  Awareness  (SSA),  which  is  the  first  European  space 
initiative to consider dual use dimensions from the outset. ESA, in the framework of its SSA 
preparatory  programme,  has  been  mandated  to  gather  civilian  SSA  user  requirements  and 
design  the  technical  architecture  of  what  could  become  a  European  capacity.  The  European 
Defence  Agency  is  currently  drafting  military  requirements  for  SSA.  The  EU  Council  and 
European  Commission,  together  with  potential  SSA  contributors,  will  have  to  define  the 
governance model and the related data policy for an operational European SSA system. The 
EUSC data model could be considered in this context. 

Discussions  on  effective  synergies  and  the  governance  of  GMES  and  SSA  highlighted  the 
importance  of  national  assets  as  essential  components  of  any  European  Space  system 
responding to security objectives. These national assets could be complemented by European 
capabilities  when  needed,  while  avoiding  unnecessary  duplication.  As  an  example,  Spain 
presented its National Earth Observation Satellite Programme consisting of an optical and a 
radar satellite (PAZ) that will be operated together and have been designed to serve the needs 
of  security  and  non-security  users  both  at  national  and  international  level  in  the  context  of 
GMES and other cooperation programmes. 

The  European  Space  Policy  highlights  the  need  for  the  European  Union,  ESA  and  their 
Member States to increase synergies between their security and defence space activities and 
programmes. The Structured Dialogue has started this process. The Workshop highlighted the 
need  to  increase  and  expand  this  coordination.  It  also  suggested  the  setting  up  of  an 
appropriate coordination platform with Member States owning relevant assets. 

These  issues  should  be  further  explored  during  a  dedicated  follow-up  seminar  planned  for 
summer  2010  with  a  view  to  provide  input  for  a  discussion  at  ministerial  level  in  an 
appropriate setting. 

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(3) 

Conclusions  Conference  on  Governance  of  European  Space 
Programmes, Segovia, Spain, 3-4 May 2010 

Europe needs space. It needs strategic space capabilities and efficient space-based services to 
ensure the wellbeing of our citizens and as a tool to support public policies. It needs to exploit 
these capabilities and services to their maximum potential. 

Europe needs a range of activities and organisations to meet its wide range of objectives for 
space.  How  these  interact  in  the  short-  and  longer-term  will  be  the  key  determinant  of 
Europe’s continuing success in space. 

The  Conference  has  recognised  that  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty  presents  an 
opportunity to further develop the institutional framework for Space activities in Europe. The 
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)  provides  a  legal  basis  and  an 
explicit competence in Space for the EU. This competence, which is shared with the Member 
States, calls upon the EU “to coordinate the effort needed for the exploitation and exploration 
of  space”  and  to  “establish  any  appropriate  relations  with  the  European  Space  Agency”.  It 
then consolidates the triangle of European space actors i.e. the EU, ESA and their respective 
Member States. 

Governance  arrangements  are  a  tool  to  deliver  objectives.  Clarity  of  vision  and  objectives 
must come first. 

The  current  institutional  set-up  for  the  European  Space  Policy  –  the  EC/ESA  Framework 
Agreement  which  entered  into  force  in  2004  –  has  provided  a  solid  foundation  for 
coordinating  and  aligning  the  space  activities  of  the  EU  and  ESA.  This  arrangement  works 
well but may have to evolve at the end of the current analysis, in view of Art. 189 TFEU and 
in order to expand the opportunities for Space in Europe. 

The  Conference  recognised  that  the  existing  institutional  asymmetries  between  the  two 
organisations  (supranational  v.  intergovernmental)  pose  a  number  of  challenges  which  will 
have  to  be  addressed.  Along  with  the  growing  EU  role  in  space,  Member  States  also  value 
intergovernmental  ways  of  working  within  ESA  as  a  research  and  development  agency. 
Efficient  collaboration  will  require  adaptation,  including  possibly  through  continued 
institutional convergence between the EU and ESA. ESA, its Member States and the EU have 
to explore the different scenarios for the evolution of this collaboration. 

Industrial  policy  and  technology  policy  are  inextricably  linked.  The  Conference  recognised 
the  importance  of  a  coherent  framework  for  Space  Industrial  policy  in  Europe.  The 
peculiarities of the space sector call for a combination of measures at EU, ESA and Member 
States level in order to create the right environment that will  nurture  a competitive  industry 
and  ensure  a  fair  and  balanced  participation  of  all  industrial  actors,  including  in  particular 
SMEs. These measures must and will continue to evolve. 

The  Conference  identified  procurement  as  the  major  but  not  the  only  instrument  driving 
industrial  policy.  Other  instruments  should  continue  to  be  promoted.  At  the  EU  level, 
examples include instruments such as FP7, CIP and structural funds, as well as EIB loans and 
EIF  guarantees.  While  taking  full  advantage  of  the  existing  EU,  ESA  and  Member  States 
industrial  policy  instruments,  other  instruments  could  be  designed  as  incentives  for  the 
European  space  industry  to  maintain  and  improve  its  competitiveness  and  develop 
technologies,  applications  and  services  which  are  innovative,  sustainable,  reliable,  cost-
effective and efficiently respond to growing societal needs in Europe. 

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The Conference widely recognized the technical expertise of ESA in designing and procuring 
European  Space  Programmes.  Despite  difficulties,  the  first  EU  flagship  projects  in  Space, 
GMES and Galileo, are moving closer to fruition. Future industrial policy should allow for the 
development  of  mechanisms  to  enable  EU-ESA  cooperation  in  Space.  Past  experiences,  in 
these programmes and also in ESA-EUMETSAT programmes, provide valuable lessons in the 
governance of future endeavours. 

In  future  programmes,  governance  arrangements  will  have  to  be  put  in  place  from  the 
beginning,  which  should  guarantee  the  efficiency  of  public  investments  in  Space,  the  long-
term  sustainability  of  the  programmes  and  their  optimum  utilisation  as  well  as  ensuring 
motivation  of  Member  States  to  continue  their  volunteer  investments  in  space.  Continuity 
between the research and development and exploitation phases will have to be ensured. While 
it  will  be  impossible  to  find  ‘one-size-fit-all’  solution  for  all  the  programmes  that  could  be 
conceived in the future, a degree of coherence will be necessary. 

The  EU  identity  in  security  and  defence  matters  has  been  reinforced.  Security  and  defence 
policy is in an evolutionary period. The EU has a competence in foreign and security policy, 
including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in conformity with the TEU. 
Space actions may serve foreign and security (including defence) policy goals. 

Governance of space activities related to security and defence needs will have to reflect that 
evolution. 

(4) 

Polish  EU  Presidency  seminar  on  Space  Situational  Awareness  
Warsaw  29  September  2011  –  Summary  of  Presidency  conclusions 
presented at the meeting 

• 

• 

Seminar  participants  reiterated  the  need  to  ensure  the  protection  of 
European  space  infrastructure  against  hazards  from  space  debris  and 
space weather phenomena. They also underlined the need for Europe to 
develop  proper  capabilities  to  ensure  such  protection,  notably  the 
development  of  an  SSA  capability  at  European  level  to  provide  more 
reliable information to European satellite operators. 

Recognising  the  dual-use  nature  of  SSA  and  taking  into  account  its 
particular security dimension, Member States reiterated that a future SSA 
capability  at  European  level  should  make  the  widest  possible  use  of 
existing  national  and  European  assets,  capacities  and  expertise,  and 
ensure  a  balanced  involvement  and  development  of  SSA  competences 
and capacities in Europe (important point for PO Presidency). 

•  Member  States  underlined  that  the  definition  of  an  SSA  data  policy 
scheme  as  well  as  an  SSA  governance  scheme  are  a  pre-condition  for 
their  willingness  to  engage  in  the  development  of  an  SSA  capability  at 
European  level,  in  particular  for  those  Member  States  owning  national 
assets which could form part of a European SSA capability. 

• 

In  that  context,  Member  States  welcomed  the  work  done  so  far  by  the 
European  Commission  and  the  EU  External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  in 
collaboration  with  ESA,  EDA,  and  Member States to define aggregated 
civil-military  SSA  user  requirements  to  be  endorsed  by  Member  States 

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through the EU Council's Political and Security Committee (PSC) as the 
basis for future discussions on SSA governance. 

• 

They welcomed the intention to involve the national security agencies – 
assembled  in  the  EU  Council's  Security  Committee  (CSC)  –  in  the 
definition  of  the  SSA  data  policy  scheme,  in  particular  by  seeking  their 
advice  on  data  security  aspects.  Data  security  aspects  need  to  be  taken 
into  account  in  all  stages  of  the  development  of  a  European  SSA 
capability, as well as in all preparatory activities such as the data policy 
schemes  to  be  developed  for  the  exploitation  of  the  breadboard  radars 
and  pre-operational  SSA  services  to  be  developed  in  the  framework  of 
the ESA SSA preparatory programme. 

•  With regard to the forthcoming ESA Ministerial Council, Member States 
called  on 
to  exploit  synergies  and  ensure 
complementarity  in  the  planning  and  implementation  of  current  and 
future SSA related activities. 

the  EU  and  ESA 

•  Member States urged the European Commission and the EEAS to swiftly 
advance  with  the  work  on  defining  an  SSA  governance  scheme  and  an 
SSA data policy scheme with the aim to come forward with first concrete 
proposals  in  view  of  a  decision  to  be  made  on  an  ESA  SSA  follow-on 
programme at the ESA Ministerial scheduled for end of 2012. 

• 

International cooperation in SSA is essential to ensure the reliability and 
improve  the  completeness/quality  of  SSA  information  available  to 
satellite  and  space  system  operators,  and  ultimately  to  strengthen  the 
protection of space infrastructure. Member States welcomed discussions 
launched with the US - by ESA at technical level and by the EEAS and 
the  European  Commission  at  political  level  -  to  explore  areas  for 
cooperation  in  SSA  including  the  sharing  of  SSA  service  products,  the 
sharing of SSA observation data in medium term, as well as the potential 
inter-operability  of  systems  and  the  sharing  of  real-time  data  and 
products as a potential long-term objective. These discussions should be 
reinforced  and  extended  to  address  issues  related  to  data  protection  and 
security  needs  as  compatibility  in  these  domains  will  be  essential  for 
future cooperation. 

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ANNEX III: OVERVIEW OF EXISTING SSA/SST CAPABILITIES 

(5) 

European assets 

Activities  in  the  area  of  Space  Situational  Awareness  (SSA)  are  being  conducted  both  at 
European and national level. A number of Member States have developed SSA capabilities, 
many  of  which  –  in  particularly  tracking  and  satellite  imaging  facilities  –  are  owned  and 
operated  by  national  defence  agencies.  In  Europe,  such  facilities  are  available  in  France, 
Germany,  Norway  and  the  UK,  the  latter  two  being  part  of  the  US  anti  missile  defence 
network.  Some  facilities  are  also  operated  by  space  agencies,  e.g.  optical  telescopes  for 
surveying the Geostationary orbit (GEO). An overview of existing space surveillance assets in 
Europe  prepared  by  ONERA60  in  2007  on  behalf  of  ESA61  found  that  more  than  65  %  of 
existing  sensors  for  the  Low-Earth  orbit  (LEO)  area  are  partially  or  fully  operated  by 
ministries of defence-related institutions. 

Existing  radar  capabilities  such  as  the  GRAVES  system  or  the  Armor  radar  in  France  (see 
description  below)  are  owned  and  operated  by  the  Air  Force.  Operational  since  December 
2005, the GRAVES radar produces surveillance and tracking data used for cataloguing space 
objects in the framework of a dominant military interest. More specific radars such as Armor 
(under the responsibility of the French Navy) have direct military uses and may contribute to 
the  surveillance,  tracking  and  characterisation of  space  objects.  In  Germany,  the  main  radar 
equipment FGAN-TIRA is run by research teams from the High Frequency Physics and radar 
Techniques  (FHR)62,  with  a  special  partnership  with  the  German  Ministry  of  Defence,  a 
dominant user of the radar capability for space imagery. The list attached at the end provides 
an overview of the main European space surveillance and tracking resources. 

Since  January  1,  2009  ESA  has  been  implementing  a  preparatory  SSA  Programme  as  an 
optional  programme  with  13  participating  Member  States  at  present  (Austria,  Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, 
the UK). The programme, which is running since 2008 and for which the next phase should 
be approved in November 2012, should lay the groundwork of a future European SSA system. 
Its primary focus has been mainly on the definition of user requirements, a series of studies to 
design  system  requirements  and  architecture  options,  the  development  of  demonstrator 
sensors  (notably  2  demonstrator  tracking  radars),  and  preparatory  work  towards  pre-cursor 
services in the domains of surveillance and tracking, space weather and NEO monitoring. 

(6) 

The US Space Surveillance Network 

The  US  Department  of  Defence  established  a  space  surveillance  network  as  early  as  1957. 
The system was built up progressively by networking different observation capabilities, some 
of which were initially developed for ballistic missile detection. Access to this database has 
subsequently been made available to any (registered) user. Today, the US Space Surveillance 
Network  (SSN)  represents  the  reference  for  all  space  surveillance  information  across  the 
world. ESA, EU and ESA Member States authorities and space agencies acting as operators 
of space systems as well as European commercial operators today rely to a large extent on the 
US SSN. 

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62 

Office national d'études et recherches aérospatiales. 
Study on capability gaps concerning Space Situational Awareness, ONERA, 2007. 
Under the auspices of the Research Establishment for Applied Science – FGAN. 

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However,  the  US  system  has  some  aging  capabilities  and  faces  new  challenges  with  the 
increasing orbital population. The US, while planning investments for the modernization of its 
capabilities, recognises today the need to widen international cooperation and in the different 
fields covered by SSA, and looks at earmarking potential domains for increased trans-Atlantic 
cooperation on SSA, in support of common civil, commercial and military requirements. The 
new US national space policy adopted on 28.06.2010 makes specific reference to the need for 
international measures to promote safe and responsible operations in space through improved 
information collection and sharing for space object collision avoidance. 

(7)  Other space surveillance activities 

The  Russian  federation,  via  the  Russian  military  space  forces,  operates  space  surveillance 
capabilities independent of its ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) assets. These systems 
have performed various military and civil roles, including the analysis of the surface impact 
point of the Mir Space Station and identification of space debris63. Russian companies are in a 
position to offer or sell space surveillance data to external entities. 

China, since joining the Inter-Agency Debris Committee (IADC) in 1995, also maintains its 
own  catalogue  of  space  objects.  Space  surveillance  is  an  area  of  growth  for  China  with 
reported  investments  in  phased-array  radar  technology  and  optical  telescopes  for  debris 
monitoring since 2003. In 2005, the Chinese Academy of Sciences established a Space Object 
and  Debris  Monitoring  and  Research  Center  at  Purple  Mountain  Observatory  that  employs 
researchers to develop a debris warning system for China’s space assets. 

(8) 

International cooperation 

For  SSA  international  cooperation  plays  a  very  important  role.  Today  international 
cooperation efforts in the area of space surveillance for debris monitoring and awareness are 
largely dominated by the existence of the US space surveillance network. This system makes 
non-sensitive  information  freely  available  over  the  internet  (a  subset  of  the  US  space 
surveillance catalogue of orbiting objects.) There is also bilateral cooperation between the US 
and some European states, between US agencies (NASA, NOAA) and ESA, as well as ad hoc 
cooperation with commercial and national satellite operators in case the US system detects a 
collision threat. 

There is today a growing awareness of the desirability of enhanced cooperation between the 
US  system  and  a  future  autonomous  European  SSA  system.  Both  sides  have  expressed 
willingness  to  take  the  existing  cooperation  further  during  recent  high-level  meetings, 
including, for instance, a EU-US space dialogue held in April 2010 in Washington, DC. 

To facilitate such cooperation,  the  EU is already  making  funding available through the FP7 
Space Theme: e.g. a number of projects have been selected in 2010 which include US partners 
(as well as partners from the Ukraine, South Africa and India). These projects address, among 
others, space surveillance and anti-collision issues. 

At  the  level  of  space  agencies,  cooperation  takes  place  in  the  context  of  the  Inter-Agency 
Space  Debris  Co-ordination  Committee  established  in  1993.  IADC  comprises  12  national 
major  space  agencies  including  NASA,  Roscosmos,  Jaxa,  ESA  and  some  of  the  European 

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space  agencies  (CNES,  UK  Space  Agency,  ASI,  and  DLR).  Its  primary  purposes  are  to 
exchange information on space debris research activities between member space agencies, to 
facilitate  opportunities  for  cooperation  in  space  debris  research,  to  review  the  progress  of 
ongoing cooperative activities, and to identify debris mitigation  options. In 2002, the  IADC 
adopted  a  set  of  recommendations  for  debris  mitigation,  which  has  achieved  wide 
international  recognition  (Space  Debris  Mitigation  Guidelines,  IADC,  2002).  The  UN 
Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space  (UNCOPUOS)  developed  these 
recommendations  into  a  set  of  guidelines,  which  were  adopted  by  the  UN  in  2008.  These 
guidelines  for  good  conduct  in  space  are  voluntary  and  non-binding.  At  technical  and 
commercial  level,  the  recommendations  are  translated  into  international  engineering 
standards,  such  as  International  Organisation  for  Standardisation  (ISO)  or  European 
Cooperation for Space Standardisation (ESS). 

(9) 

Examples  of  existing  European  capabilities  for  space  surveillance  and 
tracking 

Optical sensors64: 

Tenerife: ESA operates a space debris telescope on Tenerife that covers a sector of 120° of 
the  GEO  ring.  From  single  observations,  initial  orbits  can  be  derived  which  are  generally 
adequate  for  re-acquisition  of  the  object  within  the  same  night,  and  which  can  then  be 
successively improved. The Optical Ground Station (OGS), installed in the Teide observatory 
2400 m above the sea level, was built as part of ESA long-term efforts for research in the field 
of inter-satellite optical communications. The original purpose of the station, equipped with a 
telescope (1m aperture), is to perform the in-orbit test of laser telecommunications terminals 
on  board  of  satellites  in  Low  Earth  Orbit  and  Geostationary  Orbit.  Since  2001,  the  ESA 
survey  of  Space  Debris  in  the  Geostationary  Orbit  and  the  Geostationary  Transfer  Orbit  is 
also being carried out with a devoted wide field camera to determine the orbital parameters of 
debris  objects.  The  Optical  Ground  Station  was  inaugurated  in  1995.  The  Instituto  de 
Astrofísica de Canarias participated in the integration of the station instruments and has since 
then been in charge of the station operation. This is the contribution of ESA to the worldwide 
common  efforts  on  this  task  with  NASA  and  NASDA  (National  Aerospace  and  Defence 
Agency of Japan). 

TAROT: CNES uses observation time of the TAROT telescope (Télescope à Action Rapide 
pour les Objets Transitoires) in France to survey the GEO ring. TAROT’s primary mission is 
to detect the optical afterglow of gamma-ray bursts. A companion telescope, TAROT-S has 
been deployed in Chile. Since 2004, CNES observes satellites in the geostationary orbit with 
this network of robotic ground based fully automated telescopes. The system makes real time 
processing and its wide field of view is useful for detection, systematic survey and tracking 
both catalogued and uncatalogued objects. 

Starbrook: The then British National Space Centre (now UK Space Agency) has sponsored 
the Starbrook wide-field telescope as an experimental survey sensor since 2006. The telescope 
is  located  at  Troodos/Cyprus,  It  can  detect  GEO  objects  down  to  1.5  m  sizes  (visual 
magnitude of +14). 

64 

Optical telescopes suitable for observation of the Geostationary (GEO) ring at 36000 km altitude and 
(Medium Earth Orbit) MEO at 23000 km where Galileo satellites will be placed. 

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ZIMLAT/ZimSMART:  The  Astronomical  Institute  of  the  University  of  Bern  (AIUB) 
operates  a  ZIMLAT  telescope.  From  its  location  in  Zimmerwald/Switzerland,  the  telescope 
covers a sector of 100° of the GEO ring. The primary applications of ZIMLAT are astrometry 
and laser ranging. However, up to 40% of its night-time observations are used for follow-ups 
of GEO objects discovered by the ESA telescope at Tenerife. ZIMLAT was complemented in 
2006 by the 20 cm ZimSMART telescope (Zimmerwald Small Aperture Robotic Telescope). 

SPOC  and  ROSACE:  SPOC  (Système  Probatoire  d’Observation  du  Ciel)  is  part  of  the 
French DGA network of target  tracking  systems.  The  ROSACE and TAROT telescopes are 
used  by  CNES  for  observation  of  GEO  objects  >  50  cm.  TAROT  detects  the  objects, 
ROSACE determines their orbit. 

PIMS: The PIMS telescope (Passive Imaging Metric Sensor) is owned by the UK Ministry of 
Defence.  They  monitor  objects  in  GEO  >  1m.  They  are  stationed  in  Gibraltar,  Cyprus  and 
Herstmonceux (East Sussex, UK). 

Radar sensors65: 

Fylingdales:  A  most  powerful  space  surveillance  sensor  located  in  Fylingdales  (UK)  and 
operated  by  the  British/US  armed  forces.  Most  of  the  activities  are  geared  to  the  US  Space 
Surveillance Network (SSN) early warning and space surveillance mission. 

Globus II: A second facility associated with the US SSN is the Norwegian Globus II radar. It 
is  located  in  Vardø,  at  the  northernmost  tip  of  Norway.  Due  to  special  bilateral  agreements 
between  the  US  SSN  and  the  operators  of  Fylingdales  and  Globus  II,  data  from  these  sites 
have so far not been available for unclassified use within Europe. 

GRAVES:  The  French  GRAVES  system  (Grand  Réseau  Adapté  à  la  Veille  Spatiale)  is 
presently  the  only  European  installation  outside  the  US  SSN  that  can  perform  space 
surveillance in the classical sense. GRAVES is owned by the French Ministry of Defence and 
operated  by  the  French  air  force.  GRAVES  started  operational  tests  in  2001.  Routine 
operations  started  in  2005.  The  system  produces  a  ‘self-starting’  catalogue  which  can  be 
autonomously built up and maintained. It is limited to objects of typically 1 m size and larger 
in  low  Earth  orbits  (LEO)  up  to  an  altitude  of  1000  km.  The  object  catalogue  contains 
currently about 2500 objects. Object data of GRAVES are used for target allocation of other 
radars. 

TIRA: The German FGAN Radar belongs to the Research Establishment for Applied Science 
at Wachtberg (organisational arrangements are currently changed to create a legal position, to 
be able to use the radar operationally for SSA and not only for research). In its tracking mode, 
the  TIRA  system  determines  orbits  from  direction  angles,  range,  and  Doppler  for  single 
targets. The modes include target tracking and imaging (for identification). The detection size 
threshold is about 2 cm at 1000 km range, 40 cm  in  GEO  orbit.  For  statistical observations 
this  sensitivity  can  be  enhanced  to  about  1  cm,  when  operating  TIRA  and  the  nearby 
Effelsberg 100 m radio telescope in a bistatic beam-park mode with TIRA as transmitter and 
Effelsberg as receiver. 

65 

Radar stations suited for observation of the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) region up to 2000 km. 

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FS Monge: DGA/DCE, the Systems Evaluation and Test Directorate of the French Ministry 
of  Defence,  is  operating  several  radar  and  optical  sensors  throughout  France.  The  most 
powerful of these systems, Armor, is located on the tracking ship Monge. The two radars are 
dedicated  to  tracking  tasks,  based  on  high  resolution  angular  and  range  data.  Other  less 
powerful radars are the Atlas, the Bearn and the Savoie. 

Chilbolton:  The  Chilbolton  radar  is  located  in  Winchester,  UK,  operated  by  the  Radio 
Communications Research Unit (RCRU) of the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (RAL). It is 
mainly used for atmospheric and ionospheric research. With a planned upgrade the radar will 
be able to track LEO objects down to 10 cm sizes at 600 km altitude. 

In-situ sensors66: 

SODAD  (Orbital  System  for  the  Active  Detection  Of.  Debris)  are  French  space  debris 
detectors  currently  in  orbit  (1  on  ISS  and  3  on  satellite  SAC-D)  measuring  the  flux  of 
micrometeriods (natural) and microorbital debris (manmade). 

66 

Sensors that measure flow of small objects such as micrometeriods and microdebris. Such sensors are 
mounted on space craft (ISS, Space shuttle, satellites) 

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ANNEX IV: INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON DEBRIS MITIGATION 

This Annex provides details on initiatives related to the mitigation of space debris which have 
been developed at international level. The impact assessment report refers to these initiatives 
in pages 23 and 40 of the main report as well as in pages 59 and 60 of Annex III. 

(10) 

Initiative of general scope 

Name of the initiative: International Space Code of Conduct on outer space activities 

Forum: International negotiations led by the European Union. The Council Working Group 
on  Global  Disarmament  and  Arms  Control  (CODUN) is  in  charge  of  the  discussions  at  EU 
institutional level. 

Objective:  The  objective  of  this  initiative  is  to  design  a  comprehensive  international  code 
which  is  revised  and  negotiated  following  discussions  between  the  EU  with  third  countries, 
with a view to it being ratified by as many countries as possible. The initiative was proposed 
UN Resolution 61/75 of 6 December 2006 on transparency and confidence-building measures 
in outer space activities. 

Content: The draft code covers the full range of space objects and activities, whether civilian 
or  military  and  contains  commitments  based  on  transparency  and  confidence-building 
measures  (such  as  a  general  commitment  to  advance  adherence  to  international  law 
instruments on space activities), measures on space debris control and mitigation as well as 
cooperation  mechanisms  in  the  domain  of  space  activities.  As  regards  debris  mitigation, 
negotiations have show fluctuations as to the extent of the mention of space debris control and 
mitigation  measures.  The  last  version  of  2011,  following  the  comments  of  the  US,  merely 
includes a one sentence commitment "to take appropriate measures to limit the generation of 
long-lived debris", whereas the 2010 version also included a mention of the non-binding UN 
General Assembly Resolution 62/217 adopting the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the 
UNCOPUOS (see below). 

Developments and expected evolution:  A first draft was published in December 2008 and 
led  to  a  first  round  of  international  consultations  in  2009,  its  revision  in  2010,  and  in 
September  2010  the  Council  invited  the  High  Representative  to  pursue  consultations  with 
third countries on the basis of this revised draft, which are still ongoing. Upon finalization, all 
States  will  be  invited  to  adhere  on  a  voluntary  basis.  The  current  perspective,  confirmed  at 
Council  level,  is  the  possibility  of  opening  the  Code  for  signature  at  an  ad  hoc  diplomatic 
conference  to  take  place  possibly  mid-2013.  In  order  to  get  to  this  diplomatic  conference, 
there will be a series of multilateral experts meetings, open to the participation of all States, 
the fist one of which is foreseen to take place in Vienna on 5 June 2012. 

(11) 

Initiatives exclusively related to debris mitigation measures 

Name of the initiative: The IADC and the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, 2002 

Forum:  Inter-Agency  Space  Debris  Co-ordination  Committee  (IADC)  The  IADC  is  an 
international  agency  level  forum  for  the  worldwide  coordination  of  activities  related  to  the 
issues of man-made and natural debris in space. It is worth highlighting the fact that the IADC 
is  internationally  recognised  as  a  space  debris  centre  of  competence.  It  includes  member 

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agencies  from  Italy,  France,  China,  Canada,  Germany,  ESA,  India,  Japan,  the  US,  Ukraine, 
Russia and the UK. The IADC meetings take place in different Member States.  

Objective: The main purpose of the IADC itself is to exchange information on space debris 
research activities between member space agencies, to facilitate opportunities for cooperation 
in  space  debris  research,  to  review  the  progress  of  ongoing  cooperative  activities,  and  to 
identify debris mitigation options. In this context, it feeds the work of the UNCOPUOS with 
its  presentations  and  findings.  The  IADC  has  developed  the  Space  Debris  Mitigation 
Guidelines  in  2002  upon  invitation  of  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Subcommittee  of  the 
UNCOPUOS.  These  guidelines  are  not  mandatory  for  States  or  manufacturers,  although  in 
many  cases  they  have  become  a  commonly  accepted  practice  in  the  space  manufactory 
industry. 

Content:  The  IADC  Debris  Mitigation  Guidelines  are  a  comprehensive  document  that 
describes best existing practices for limiting of space debris, includes the proposals on debris 
mitigation  and  contains  technical  information  to  help  establish  mission  requirements  for 
planned  and  existing  space  systems.  As  an  example,  the  IADC  guidelines  include,  among 
others, guidelines on limiting debris released during normal operations or on minimising the 
potential for on-orbit break-ups.  

Developments  and  expected  evolution:  the  IADC  guidelines  have  been  complemented  by 
Support  Documentation  in  2004  and  amended  in  2007.  The  guidelines  are  translated  into 
international  engineering  standards  at  technical  and  commercial  level,  such  as  International 
Organisation  for  Standardisation  (ISO)  or  European  Cooperation  for  Space  Standardisation 
(ESS). Moreover, as explained below, the UNCOPUOS has developed its own version on the 
basis of the IADC Guidelines that was later adopted by the UN General Assembly. 

Name of the initiative: UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines 

Forum: United Nations – General Assembly - UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space  (UNCOPUOS).  This  committee  was  set  up  by  the  UN  General  Assembly  in  1959  to 
review  the  scope  of  international  cooperation  in  peaceful  uses  of  outer  space,  to  devise 
programmes  in  this  field  to  be  undertaken  under  UN  auspices,  to  encourage  continued 
research on legal and scientific problems linked to space exploration and exploitation. 

Objective:  similar  to  the  IADC  guidelines,  which  have  served  as  inspiration  to  the 
UNCOPUOS, the UN guidelines intend to curtail the generation of potentially harmful space 
debris and prevent further pollution of the space environment. 

Content:  The  Scientific  and  Technical  Subcommittee  of  the  UNCOPUOS  developed  the 
IADC  Guidelines  into  its  own  set  of  guidelines.  The  IADC  Guidelines  are  the  basis  for  the 
UNCOPUOS guidelines and therefore the content is similar.  

Developments  and  expected  evolution:  The  guidelines  were  approved  in  2007  by  the  63 
Member  nations  of  the  UNCOPUOS  as  voluntary  high-level  mitigation  measures  and  then 
were  endorsed  by  the  UN  General  Assembly  in  2008  in  its  Resolution  62/217  on  the 
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Further to this endorsement there 
has  been  no  major  development  in  this  forum  in  the  following  years.  The  fact  that  the  UN 
guidelines have been adopted by the General Assembly could be interpreted as an attempt to 
raise awareness of the importance of the issue at international level, although resolutions of 
the UN General Assembly are not binding to UN Member States. 

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Name of the initiative: European Code of Conduct 

Forum: National space agencies in Europe including ESA. This initiative is another has been 
developed by space agencies in Europe since the mid-1990s and referred to as the "European 
Code of Conduct." The Code has been signed by ASI (Italian Space Agency), BNSC (British 
National  Space  Centre),  CNES  (French  Space  Agency),  DLR  (German  Space  Agency)  and 
ESA in 2006. 

Objective: In line with the other initiatives listed in this section, the objective these guidelines 
is to help to technically manage the space debris hazard, namely in the design and operation 
of space systems that will avoid or minimise the generation of space debris.  

Content: The European Code of Conduct is another set of guidelines that has been developed 
to be used by projects to assist in the early consideration of measures to reduce space debris 
while also giving an insight into necessary future practices. The core elements of this Code of 
Conduct  are  in  line  with  the  IADC  Guidelines  and  UN  COPUOS  guidelines  seen  above. 
Nonetheless, the Code of Conduct provides greater detail and rationale.  

Developments  and  expected  evolution:  Besides  the  signature  of  the  Code  by  the  above 
national  space  agencies,  ESA  has  developed  their  own  "Requirements  on  Space  Debris 
Mitigation for Agency Projects" in order to tailor the Code of Conduct to the specific needs of 
ESA projects. These instructions came into force in 2008 and are applicable to procurements 
of  space  systems  (launchers,  satellites  and  inhabited  objects)  by  ESA.  Compliance  with  its 
provisions is voluntary, although recommended. 

Other  conferences  and  fora  active  in  the  research  of  debris  mitigation:  other  instances  deal 
with the issue of debris mitigation and foster discussion from a more theoretical perspective. 
Research initiatives and studies are presented at the quadrennial series of the ESA-organised 
European  Conferences  on  Space  Debris  and  at  dedicated  sessions  of  IAC  (International 
Astronautical Congress) and COSPAR (Committee on Space Research) congresses. 

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ANNEX V: CALCULATION METHODOLOGY 

The  impact  assessment  provides  quantitative  estimates  of  the  impact  of  proposed  SSA/SST 
activities on the basis of available data. This annex explains the methodology followed. 

The parameters taken into consideration are the following: 

–  On January 2011, there were approximately 950 satellites in orbit around the Earth (GEO, 
LEO, MEO and elliptical orbits). 68 out of 470 satellites in LEO (14.46%) and ~120 out of 
390 satellites in GEO (30.76%) had EU contractors/owners67; 

–  According  to  Euroconsult,  the  average  satellite  price  over  the  next  decade  will  be  $99 
million and the satellite launch average price is predicted to remain flat, at $51 million68; 
for launches in LEO, the average price is estimated at $8 million69. 

–  The average number of catastrophic collisions with catalogued objects in LEO during the 
next 40 years is one every 5 years70; for partially traceable debris the average number of 
collisions raises up to 1 every 3 years71. 

–  The  average  number  of  catastrophic  collisions  at  GEO  is  1  every  155  years72,  therefore 
negligible  for  the  purpose  of  our  calculations;  the  risk  in  Medium  Earth  Orbits  is  also 
considered negligible; 

–  For  the  purpose  of  calculation  we  assume  that  collisions  take  place  at  satellite's  mid  life 
and  its  cost  at  this  stage  would  be  50%  of  its  average  cost  ($99  million),  namely  $49,5 
million; 

–  For the purpose of this calculation $1 = € 1; 

Calculation of annual direct loss due to collision (satellite's loss) in LEO: 

Number  of  collisions  concerning  the  total  satellite population over 10 years  in LEO (at one 
collision every 3 years) ~= 3.3 collisions; 

Number of EU satellites affected by collisions in the next 10 years [3.3 collisions x 14.46% of 
EU satellites over the total satellite population] ~= 0.5; 

Annualised cost of satellite loss over a 10 year period in LEO [0.5 x (satellite cost at midlife, 
i.e. $49.5 million + cost of launch, i.e. $8 million)/10 years] = ~$2.9 million. However, in its 

67 

68 

69 
70 
71 
72 

Booz  &  C.  figures  based  on:  Satellite  database  of  the  Union  of  Concerned  Scientists  available  at 
HTTP://WWW.UCSUSA.ORG/NUCLEAR_WEAPONS_AND_GLOBAL_SECURITY/SPACE_WEAPONS/TECHNI
CAL_ISSUES/UCS-SATELLITE-DATABASE.HTML. 
These figures have negligibly evolved in one year's time: 1st January 2012, 67 out of 471 for LEO and 
123  out  of  420  for  GEO.  Nonetheless,  the  2011  figures  are  used  for  consistency  with  the  rest  of  the 
information collected in the timeframe taken into consideration by the study of Booz & C. 
“Satellites 
http://www.euroconsult-ec.com/research-reports/space-industry-reports/satellites-to-be-built-launched-
by-2018-38-29.html 
Euroconsult and Futron data, Booz & Co analysis 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf Page 2 Chart 2 
Booz & C. report 
http://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/Session_5_William_Ailor.pdf 

to  be  Built  &  Launched  by  2018,  World  Market  Survey”,  Euroconsult, 

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study Booz and Company retains an approximated figure of ~$2.5 million in order to take into 
account the most conservative estimates at each intermediate stage of the calculation. 

Calculation of annual indirect loss due to collision (service outage) in LEO: 

–  Annual average value of satellite services/year for an EO satellite ~= 6M€ 73 

–  Annual average value of satellite services/year for a Mobile Satellite services satellite ~= 

8M€ 74 

–  The minimum service outage considered is 3 months. This leads to a yearly loss between 

(6M€/12 months)*3 months~=1,5 M€ et (8

 M€/12 months)*3 months~=2 M€/year 

The economic loss for LEO satellites over 10 years is then approximately between 5 M€ [1,2 
M€/year x (3.3 probability of co llision over 10 years)] and more than 6 M€ [2M€/year x (3.3 
probability of collision over 10 years)]. 

For Europe, only 68 satellites out of 470 have to be considered in the calculation: 14,46% of 
the amount between 5 and 6 M€ that the Booz  report approximated to 1M€ over 10 years.  

Calculation  of  annual  indirect  loss  (shortening  of  satellites'  lifetime)  due  to  avoidance 
manoeuvres in LEO75: 

–  For  a  satellite  in  general,  the  average  lifetime  shortening  of  a  collision  avoidance 

manoeuvre is 3 weeks; 

–  1.5 avoidance collision manoeuvres per satellite/year are considered; 

–  90% of avoidance manoeuvres in LEO lead to significant consumption of propellant. 

–  Average lifetime for a LEO satellite is 3 to 5 years 

Lifetime  shortening  over  10  years  for  European  satellites  [(68  European  satellites  x  1.5 
avoidance  collision  manoeuvres  per  satellite/year  x  3  weeks  of  lifetimes  shortening  per 
manoeuvre)  x  10  years  x  0.9]  ~=  ~2700/2900  weeks  in  order  to  take  into  account  the  most 
conservative estimates at each intermediate stage of the calculation. 

73 

74 
75 

Report of Booz & Company: "It has been also considered that the most common satellites in LEO (i.e. 
the ‘typical victim’ of a collision) are either Earth Observation (EO) or Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) 
satellites. Since the global market of EO data sales/year is approximately 830 Mln Euro, and the global 
market of MSS services/year is approximately 1800 Mln Euro*; a conservative estimate (assuming the 
ratio  of  market  value  of  satellite  services  per  satellite  will  not  change  in  the  coming  years**)  would 
suggest that the value of the service outage/disruption of the ‘typical victim’ is an hypothetical average 
service value of a LEO satellite over a year (i.e. indicatively 7 to 8 M€ in service revenues, averaging 
between a EO and an MSS considering number of satellites) and scaled that value down to the assumed 
3  months  service  outage  period  (i.e.  indicatively  1.5  to  2  Million  Euro  per  satellite  loss)."  *Satellite 
Industry  Association,  State  of  the  Satellite  Industry  Report,  June  2010;  **The  Booz  &  Company 
analysis  based  on  current  market  data  shows  an  indicative  ~  6  Million  Euro  as  an  average  value  of 
satellite  services  per  satellite  a  year  for  an EO  satellite,  and  ~  8  Million  Euro  as  an  average value  of 
satellite services for an MSS satellite. 
Report of Booz & Company; see footnote 73. 
Report of Booz & Company, pages 123 to 125. 

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Equivalent in additional satellites needed to compensate the lifetime shortening over 10 years 
[(2700/2900  weeks  /  52  weeks  per  year)/  5  years  lifetime  of  a  LEO  satellite]  ~=10  to  11 
satellites 

Indicative  economic  impact  over  10  years  [(99  M€   cost  of  a  satellite  +  8  M€  cost  for  the 
launch) x 10 to 11 satellites] ~=1.2 B€ or 120 M€ per year 

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Calculation  of  annual  indirect  loss  due  to  Earth  observation  loss  of  data  due  to 
avoidance manoeuvres in LEO76: 

–  32 out of 68 European satellites are Earth Observation satellites 

–  24 hours are necessary after each avoidance manoeuvre to recalibrate the optical devices 

and instruments; 

Lack of data acquisition over 10 years [(32 satellites x 1.5 avoidance collision manoeuvres per 
satellite/year x 1 day x 10 years] ~= 450 days (=1.23 years) 

–  6 M€ is the estimated value in terms of sales over a year for Earth Observation's data for 1 

satellite 

Economic impact of lack of data acquisition over 10 years [6 M€ x 1.23 years] ~= 8 M€ or 0.8 
M€ per year 

Calculation of annual indirect loss due to avoidance manoeuvres in GEO77: 

–  For  a  fleet  of  20  satellites  in  GEO,  a  European  satellite  operator  performs  3  to  5  large 

manoeuvres per year (large fly-by), i.e. 0.21 manoeuvres per satellite per year. 

Lifetime shortening over 10 years for European satellites [(120 European satellites in GEO x 
0.21 avoidance collision manoeuvres per satellite/year x 3 weeks of lifetimes shortening per 
manoeuvre) x 10 years] ~= 700-750 weeks 

Equivalent in additional satellites needed to compensate the lifetime shortening over 10 years 
[(700/750 weeks / 52 weeks per year)/ 10 to 15 years lifetime of a GEO satellite] ~=1 satellite 

Indicative economic impact over 10 years is then of 150 to 200 M€ (average cost of a GEO 
telecom satellite launch included) or 15-20 M€ per year. 

Costing of the European SST service 

The  costing  is  based  on  combined  information  from  several  sources,  notably  the  European 
Space  Agency  and  information  gathered  by  Booz  &  Company  and  contained  in  the  Space 
Situational  awareness  section  of  its  study  "Evaluation  of  options  for  a  space  programme  in 
2014".  Information  was  also  received  from  experts  in  space  national  agencies  and  other 
entities on a confidential basis which have helped in elaborating the estimates below.  
On this basis, for options 2, 3 and 4 the following assumptions have been made regarding new 
assets would be as follows: 

•  A  new  surveillance  radar  would  cost  between  150  and  200  M€;  for  the  purpose  of 

calculation we use 175 M€;  

•  A new tracking radar would cost 40 M€;   

•  A telescope for surveillance and tracking would cost 10 M€

•  A data centre for surveillance and tracking would cost 50 M€   

76 
77 

Ibid. 
Ibid. 

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Experts estimate that in order to achieve a target reduction of risk collision by a factor of 3 to 
5, it would be necessary to acquire 1 new tracking radar and 1 new surveillance radar, 8 new 
telescopes for surveillance and tracking and one data centre. This represents a total of 345 M€ 
and an annualised cost of some 49 M€. 

As the costs figures are estimates and include a certain margin for error, for simplicity sake 
the total figure for new assets has been rounded to 50 M€ in the impact assessment. 

The secured networking, operations and maintenance of existing and new assets for the sole 
purpose of European SST service can be estimated at annual cost of 8 M€. This amount has 
been estimated including information provided on a confidential basis and takes into account 
the shared use of assets for the European SST service and for Member States own purposes. 

The setting up (ICT equipment), operation (6 FTE) and maintenance of a front desk function 
has been estimated at an average annual cost of 2 M€. 

The total cost in options 2, 3 and 4 would amount to an estimated annual amount of 60 M€. 

Option 5 corresponds broadly to the "Medium option" of Booz & Company which estimates 
de annual cost at 124 M€. Again, for the sake of  simplicity we have rounded this figure to 120 
M€ in the impact assessment. 

EN 

75 

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ANNEX VI: REFERENCE STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS 

External studies performed by contractors:  

(8) 

(9) 

(10) 

Study  on  the  EU  Space  Programme  2014-2020,  Ecorys  Nederland  BV  for  the 
European Commission, final report of 4 July 2010; contract no. SI2.541751 

Study "Evaluation of options for a European space programme in 2014-2020; Booz 
& Company, final report of May 2011; contract no. 30-CE-036363/00-01 

Commission Staff Working Paper "European Space Situational Awareness high-level 
civil-military user requirements, SEC (2011) 1247 of 12.10.2011. The document was 
jointly  prepared  by  the  European  Commission  services  and  the  European  External 
Action  Service  and  approved  by  the  Council’s  Political  and  Security  Committee 
(PSC) on 18 November 2011. 

(11) 

Commission  Staff  Working  Paper  "Discussion  note  on  space  situational  awareness 
data policy, SEC(2011) 1246 final of 12.10.2011 

References to the EU policy documents: 

(12) 

(13) 

(14) 

(15) 

(16) 

(17) 

4th Space Council Resolution, “Resolution on the European Space Policy”, 22 May 
2007;  
HTTP://REGISTER.CONSILIUM.EUROPA.EU/PDF/EN/07/ST10/ST10037.EN07.PDF  

5th  Space  Council  Resolution,  “Taking  forward  the  European  Space  Policy”,  26 
September 
2008; 
HTTP://WWW.CONSILIUM.EUROPA.EU/UEDOCS/CMS_DATA/DOCS/PRESSDATA/EN/IN
TM/103050.PDF  

6th  Space  Council  Resolution,  “The  contribution  of  Space  to  innovation  and 
competitiveness in the context of the European Economic Recovery Plan and further 
2009; 
steps”, 
HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/ENTERPRISE/POLICIES/SPACE/FILES/POLICY/6TH_SPACE_CO
UNCIL_EN.PDF  

May 

29 

7th  Space  Council  Resolution,  ''  Global  challenges:  taking  full  benefit  of  European 
space 
2010; 
25 
HTTP://REGISTER.CONSILIUM.EUROPA.EU/PDF/EN/10/ST16/ST16864.EN10.PDF  

November 

systems'', 

Council  Resolution  "Orientations  concerning  added  value  and  benefits  of  space  for 
the security of European citizens" of 6 December 2011; Council document 18232/11; 
HTTP://REGISTER.CONSILIUM.EUROPA.EU/PDF/EN/11/ST17/ST17828-RE01.EN11.PDF  

''Towards  a  space  strategy  for  the  European  Union  that  benefits  its  citizens'' 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions 
final); 
(Sec(2011) 

381 

EN 

76 

   EN 

 
HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/ENTERPRISE/POLICIES/SPACE/FILES/POLICY/COMM_NATIVE
_COM_2011_0152_6_COMMUNICATION_EN.PDF  

Surveys and consultations conducted/commissioned by the EU: 

(18) 

(19) 

Eurobarometer survey on the space activities of the European Union, 272, Gallup in 
July 
2009; 
HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/ENTERPRISE/NEWSROOM/CF/_GETDOCUMENT.CFM?DOC_ID
=5333  

Public  consultation  carried  out  via  the  Commission's  Interactive  Policy  Making 
2011; 
tool, 
(IPM) 
HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/ENTERPRISE/NEWSROOM/CF/ITEMDETAIL.CFM?ITEM_ID=53
07&TPA=141&TK=&LANG=EN  

Other sources: 

(20) 

(21) 

(22) 

(23) 

(24) 

(25) 

(26) 

(27) 

(28) 

AGI  -  Center  for  Space  Standards  and  Innovation,  Iridium  collision  report; 
HTTP://CELESTRAK.COM/EVENTS/COLLISION/  

Characterizing  the  Space  Debris  Environment  with  a  variety  of  SSA  sensors, 
presentation NASA Orbital debris program office, G. Stansbery July 2010 

International  Academy  of  Astronautics,  Position  Paper  on  orbital  debris,  2001 
HTTP://WWW.ESA.INT/ESAPUB/SP/SP1301/SP1301.PDF  

NASA Orbital Debris Quarterly News, volume 14 & 15 of January 2010 and January 
2011, 
Office 
HTTP://WWW.ORBITALDEBRIS.JSC.NASA.GOV/INDEX.HTML 

Program 

Orbital 

NASA 

Debris 

NASA 
Data 
HTTP://NSSDC.GSFC.NASA.GOV/NMC/SPACECRAFTDISPLAY.DO?ID=1995-033B" 

Science 

Master 

Center 

Space 

Catalogue, 

NASA  Wide-field  Infrared  Survey  Explorer  –  WISE-  fact  sheet,  September  2009; 
HTTP://WWW.NASA.GOV/MISSION_PAGES/WISE/MAIN/INDEX.HTML  

Presentation  "French  Policy  for  Space  Sustainability"  at  the  ISU  Symposium,  21st 
February 2012, CNES 

Recovered  debris  list,  Aerospace,  Centre  for  Orbital  and  Re-entry  Debris  Studies 
HTTP://REENTRYNEWS.AERO.ORG/RECOVERED.HTML  

Requirements  for  Candidate  Assets  and  SSA  Gap  Analysis  of  2007,  EADS;  
HTTP://WWW.ESA.INT/ESAPUB/SP/SP1301/SP1301.PDF  

(29) 

Satellites to be Built & Launched by 2020, Report, Euroconsult 2011 

(30) 

EN 

Space 
HTTP://WWW.ESA.INT/ESAMI/SPACE_DEBRIS/SEM2D7WX3RF_0.HTML . 

debris- 

ESA, 

77 

2009; 

   EN 

 
(31) 

(32) 

(33) 

(34) 

(35) 

(36) 

(37) 

(38) 

(39) 

Space  debris,  Parliamentary  Office  of  Science  and  Technology 
(UK); 
HTTP://WWW.PARLIAMENT.UK/DOCUMENTS/DOCUMENTS/UPLOAD/POSTPN355.PDF. 

Space 
HTTP://WWW.SPACESECURITY.ORG/SPACE.SECURITY.2010.REDUCED.PDF  

Security 

Security 

Report 

Space 

2010, 

Organisation; 

Space  debris  and  the  cost  of  Space  Operations,  in  Proceedings  of  Fourth  IAASS 
Conference 
''Making  Safety  Matter'',  Huntsville,  Alabama,  USA,  Aerospace 
Corporation 19-21 May 2010 

Stratcom 

US 
Fact 
HTTP://REENTRYNEWS.AERO.ORG/PAST.HTML 

Sheet  Re-entry  Assessment, 

February 

2008; 

USC 
Satellite 
HTTP://WWW.UCSUSA.ORG/NUCLEAR_WEAPONS_AND_GLOBAL_SECURITY/SPACE_
WEAPONS/TECHNICAL_ISSUES/UCSSATELLITE-DATABASE.HTML. 

database; 

Description of the ESA "Space Situational Awareness Preparatory Programme (SSA-
PP)", 
ESA;  
HTTP://WWW.ESA.INT/ESAMI/SSA/SEMYTICKP6G_0.HTML 

The  impact  of  space  environment  on  space  systems,  6th  Spacecraft  Technology 
Conference, Aerospace Corporation, 2000 

Active  debris  removal  -  An  essential  Mechanism  for  ensuring  the  safety  and 
sustainability of outer space; report of the international interdisciplinary congress on 
space  debris  remediation  and  on-orbit  satellite  servicing;  UN  Committee  on  the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; Vienna, 6-17 February 2012; 

Space debris - on collision course for insurers? The implications of debris colliding 
with  operational  satellites  from  a  technical,  legal  and  insurance  perspective;  study 
2011; 
Ltd., 
prepared 
HTTP://MEDIA.SWISSRE.COM/DOCUMENTS/PUBL11_SPACE+DEBRIS.PDF 

Reinsurance 

Company 

Swiss 

by 

EN 

78 

   EN