COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying document to the PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ESTABLISHING A REGISTERED TRAVELLER PROGRAMME
Date: 2013-02-28
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Schengen Information System, biometrics, border control, data collection, exchange of information, external border of the EU, foreign national, traveller

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 28.2.2013  
SWD(2013) 50 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying document to the 

PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL  

ESTABLISHING A REGISTERED TRAVELLER PROGRAMME 

{COM(2013) 97} 
{SWD(2013) 51} 
{SWD(2013) 52}

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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying document to the 

PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL  

ESTABLISHING A REGISTERED TRAVELLER PROGRAMME 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

1.4 

1.5 

2. 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties...............................................5 

Background...................................................................................................................5 

Consultation of interested parties .................................................................................6 

Data gathering.............................................................................................................10 

Inter-service steering group ........................................................................................11 

Impact Assessment Board...........................................................................................11 

Problem Definition .....................................................................................................11 

2.1.  Why the creation of an RTP is being examined?........................................................11 

2.1.1.  Legislative and technical aspects................................................................................12 

2.1.2.  Operational and practical aspects ...............................................................................15 

2.1.3 

Fundamental right issues ............................................................................................16 

2.2. 

Problem: how to design an RTP? ...............................................................................17 

2.2.1.  The core features of an RTP .......................................................................................17 

2.2.2.  Could these features be provided through existing systems? .....................................17 

2.3. 

Design issues ..............................................................................................................19 

2.3.1.  Lodging an application for an RTP ............................................................................19 

2.3.2.  Data storage ................................................................................................................20 

2.3.3.  Vetting criteria ............................................................................................................21 

2.3.4.  Automation of border control for registered travellers...............................................21 

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2.3.5.  Application fee............................................................................................................21 

2.4. 

Baseline scenario - how will the situation evolve if no new action is taken at 
EU level? ....................................................................................................................21 

2.5. 

Subsidiarity .................................................................................................................24 

3. 

4. 

Objectives of the RTP.................................................................................................24 

Policy options .............................................................................................................25 

4.1. 

Policy option 2: Data storage......................................................................................25 

4.1.1.  An RTP based on data stored in a separate token (sub-option 2a) .............................25 

4.1.2.  An RTP based on data stored in a centralised database (sub-option 2b)....................26 

4.1.3.  An RTP based on data stored in a separate token combined with a central 

repository (sub-option 2c)...........................................................................................27 

4.2. 

Policy option 3: Vetting criteria .................................................................................28 

4.2.1.  Same as for multiple-entry visa holders (based on current EU law) (sub-

option 3a) ....................................................................................................................28 

4.2.2.  More thorough vetting procedure (sub-option 3b) .....................................................28 

4.2.3.  Discarded sub-option: Involvement of third countries in the vetting (sub-

option 3c) ....................................................................................................................28 

4.3. 

Policy option 4: Automation of border control for registered travellers ....................29 

4.3.1.  Fully automated (sub-option 4a).................................................................................29 

4.3.2.  Semi-automated (sub-option 4b) ................................................................................29 

4.4. 

Policy option 5: Application fee .................................................................................29 

4.4.1.  Fee of 20 EUR (sub-option 5a)...................................................................................29 

4.4.2.  No fee (sub-option 5b)................................................................................................30 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

analysis of impacts......................................................................................................30 

Policy option 1: Lodging an application for an RTP ..................................................31 

Policy option 2: Data storage......................................................................................31 

5.2.1.  Data stored in a token (sub-option 2a)........................................................................31 

5.2.2  Data stored in a centralised database (sub-option 2b) ................................................32 

5.2.3  Data (unique identifier i.e. application number) stored in a token and (unique 
identifier, biometrics and data from applications) in a central repository (sub-
option 2c) ....................................................................................................................33 

5.2.4  Costs (all sub-options) ................................................................................................34 

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5.2.5 

Protection of fundamental rights, particularly privacy and data protection ...............35 

5.3 

Policy options 3 and 4: Vetting criteria and automation of border control ................36 

5.3.1  Costs ...........................................................................................................................39 

5.3.2 

Protection of fundamental rights, particularly privacy and data protection ...............39 

5.4 

Policy option 5: Application fee .................................................................................41 

5.4.1 

Fee of 20 EUR (sub-option 5a)...................................................................................41 

5.4.2  No fee (sub-option 5b)................................................................................................41 

5.4.3  Costs (both sub-options) .............................................................................................41 

6. 

6.1. 

6.2. 

6.3. 

Comparison of options and identification of preferred policy option ........................42 

Comparison of options................................................................................................42 

Preferred policy option ...............................................................................................46 

Assessment and considerations of EU added value, proportionality and 
legislative implications ...............................................................................................51 

6.3.1.  European value-added and proportionality.................................................................51 

6.3.2.  Legislative implications..............................................................................................51 

6.3.3.  Measures to ensure data protection and protection of the rights of travellers ............52 

7. 

Monitoring and evaluation..........................................................................................53 

ANNEX 1..................................................................................................................................57 

ANNEX 2..................................................................................................................................58 

ANNEX 3..................................................................................................................................63 

ANNEX 4..................................................................................................................................65 

ANNEX 5..................................................................................................................................66 

ANNEX 6..................................................................................................................................75 

ANNEX 7..................................................................................................................................77 

ANNEX 8..................................................................................................................................83 

ANNEX 9..................................................................................................................................85 

ANNEX 10................................................................................................................................86 

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1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

1.1. 

Background 

The  present  impact  assessment  report  and the  legislative  proposal  it  accompanies1  are  to  be 
seen in the context of the progressive establishment of a European model of integrated border 
management of the external borders. The legislative proposal is part of the "next generation of 
border checks" package which is a strategic initiative in the Commission's Work Programme 
for  20122.  This  package  responds  to  two  major  and  interconnected  challenges:  how  to 
efficiently monitor travel flows and movements of third-country nationals across the external 
border for the Schengen area as a whole, and how to ensure that border crossings are fast and 
simple for the growing number of regular travellers that constitute the vast majority of border 
crossers, i.e. those fulfilling all entry conditions. This report addresses the second challenge: a 
separate report3 and legislative proposal address the first one. The two reports and proposals 
are  not  dependant  on  each  other  as  regards  their  implementation  but  a  solution  needs  to  be 
found  to  calculate  the  time  spent  in  the  Schengen  area  if  fully  automated  border  crossings 
would be provided for third-country nationals. An Entry/Exit System (EES) which is reflected 
in the second report and proposal would be a solution for that. 

In its Communication of 13 February 2008 preparing the next steps in border management in 
the European Union4 the Commission suggested the establishment of a Registered Traveller 
Programme  (RTP5)  for  frequent  and  pre-vetted  third-country  national  travellers.  Such  a 
programme  essentially  entails  that  certain  groups  of  third-country  nationals  would  benefit 
from  facilitated  border  checks  when  entering  the  Schengen  area,  checks  which  are  at  least 
partly  automated  through  the  use  of  Automated  Border  Control  (ABC)  technology.  The 
Communication was accompanied by an impact assessment report6. 

The RTP was endorsed in the "Stockholm Programme"7 agreed by the European Council in 
December 2009, which highlighted that the Union must continue to facilitate legal access to 
the  territory  of  the  Member  States.  The  RTP  was  included  in  the  overview  among  the 
initiatives announced in the Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme8. 

1 
2 

3 
4 
5 
6 

7 

8 

COM(2013) 97 final (RTP). 
COM(2011)  777  final,  15.11.2011.  The  work  programme  is  published  on  the  following  website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/index_en.htm 
COM(2013) 95 final (EES). 
SEC(2008) 154, 13.2.2008. 
A list of acronyms is provided in Annex 1. 
SEC(2008)  153;  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/SECMonth.do?year=2008&month=01,  as  well  as  the  "Preparatory  study 
to inform an Impact Assessment in relation to the creation of an automated entry/exit system at the external borders 
of  the  EU  and  the  introduction  of  a  border  crossing  scheme  for  bona  fide  travellers  ('Registered  Traveller 
Programme')" carried out by GHK and the "Entry/Exit Technical Feasibility study" carried out by Unisys. These 
studies 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/doc_centre/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm#studies  
OJ  C  115/1,  4.5.2010.  The  Stockholm  Programme  is  published  on  the  following  website: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/jl003
4_en.htm 
COM(2010)  171  final,  20.4.2010.  The  action  plan  is  published  on  the  following  website: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/jl003
6_en.htm 

following 

published 

website: 

the 

are 

on 

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A  Commission  Communication  in  July  2010  on  information  management  in  the  area  of 
freedom,  security  and  justice9  presented  an  overview  of  the  EU-level  measures  in  place  or 
planned that regulate the collection, storage or cross-border exchange of personal information 
for  the  purpose  of  law  enforcement  or  migration  management.  It  set  out  the  conditions  the 
Commission  will  apply  in  future  when  assessing  any  new  system  in  this  area  including  the 
approach of "privacy by design"10. It also drew the lessons of the development of other major 
systems in this area such as VIS and SIS II and concluded that 'as a possible safeguard against 
cost overruns and delays resulting from changing requirements, any new information system 
in the area of freedom, security and justice, particularly if it involves a large-scale IT system, 
will not be developed before the underlying legal instruments setting out its purpose, scope, 
functions  and  technical  details  have  been  definitively  adopted.'  It  emphasised  too  that 
particular attention must be paid to the initial design of governance structures and pointed to 
the role that the new IT agency11 could have in providing technical advice. 

The  Visa  Information  System  (VIS),  which  manages  the  exchange  of  short-stay  visa  data 
between  the  Schengen  and  Schengen  Associated  states,  started  operations  on  11  of  October 
2011 at the consulates in North Africa and 20 days after go-live of the VIS also at the border 
crossing points (verification of visas against the VIS).  

The Conclusions of the European Council of 23 and 24 June 2011 called for work on "smart 
borders" to be moved forward rapidly. In response, the Commission adopted on 25 October 
2011 a new Communication on the various options and the way ahead12. It concluded that the 
RTP would speed up the border crossings of 4-5 million travellers per year and lay the basis 
for enhanced investments in automated border control technologies at major border crossing 
points. 

Against  this  background,  the  present  impact  assessment  examines  different  implementation 
options in order to find the best possible way to implement the RTP. However, the impacts of 
the whole RTP are analysed based on the specific options. 

The  present  report  constitutes  both  the  ex-ante  evaluation  required  for  programmes  or 
activities occasioning expenditure from  the EU  Budget, and  the impact assessment  that  will 
accompany the legislative proposal for the RTP.13 

1.2. 

Consultation of interested parties 

The  Commission  considered  that  before  proposing  any  new  initiative,  an  in-depth  technical 
assessment and debate and with all relevant stakeholders on the future architecture of the RTP 
was necessary.  

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

COM(2010) 385 final, 20.7.2010. The Communication is published on the following website: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0385:FIN:EN:PDF 
Privacy by design means embedding personal data protection in the technological basis of a proposed 
instrument, limiting data processing to that which is necessary for a proposed purpose and granting data 
access only to those entities that "need to know". 
Regulation  (EU)  No  1077/2011  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25  October  2011 
establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice. 
COM(2011)  680  final,  25.10.2011.  The  Communication  is  published  on  the  following  website: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0680:FIN:EN:PDF  
Article  21  of  Commission  Regulation  (EC,  EURATOM)  No  2342/2002  of  23.12.2002  laying  down 
detailed  rules  for  the  implementation  of  Council  Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  No  1605/2002  on  the 
Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the EU, OJ L 357, 31.12.2002. 

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Based  on  the  discussions  and  positions  received  from  different  stakeholders  on  the  2008 
impact  assessment  and  communication,  the  Commission  identified  the  following  interest 
groups  as  the  most  relevant  stakeholders  for  consultation:  Member  States,  the  European 
Parliament,  the  European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  (EDPS),  civil  society  and  the  private 
sector.  

The consultation was carried out in several ways: 

•  publishing the 2008 impact assessment and communication; 

•  presenting  a  comprehensive  technical  assessment  of  the  system  and  compilation  of 
Member States' responses (three meetings with the Committee on Immigration and Asylum 
and  two  meetings  with  two  different  working  groups  of  the  European  Security  and 
Research Innovation Forum (ESRIF); 

•  distributing questionnaires to Member States; 

•  organising seminars and meetings including specific expert meetings and stimulating them 

with the discussion papers; 

•  meeting stakeholders bilaterally; 

•  publishing the 2011 Communication;  

•  giving presentations on the RTP and automation of border control at different fora. 

Stakeholders views 

Member States 

The RTP has been under discussion at meetings with Member States' experts since 2008. A 
majority of Member States support the establishment of the RTP. During the consultations on 
the Commission's communication adopted in 2011, five Member States had doubts about the 
benefits of the RTP. Based on them the administrative burden should not be higher compared 
to  the  normal  border  check  process.  Furthermore,  the  high  costs,  solid  cost-benefit  analysis 
and the low number of travellers crossing their part of the external border were mentioned. 

Member  States  are  in  favour  of  collecting  a  fee  from  the  applicants  for  participation  in  the 
RTP. A large majority of Member States prefer to store information on Registered Travellers 
in  a  centralised  database  and  consider  that  the  implementation  of  ABC  should  be  voluntary 
for them. However, there are concerns especially regarding the costs, vetting criteria/vetting 
procedure  and  lodging  and  examining  of  applications.  Slightly  divergent  views  exist  on 
whether a fully automated or semi-automated system should be used, where applicable. Many 
third  countries  are  also  taking  forward  similar  initiatives  in  this  field,  as  shown  through 
several meetings at the level of ministers and with senior officials from countries such as the 
USA and Canada. 

In preparation for the conference on Innovation Border Management organised by the Danish 
presidency  and  the  Netherlands  on  2  and  3  February  2012  in  Copenhagen,  Member  States 

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replied  to  the  Presidency's  questionnaire  on  the  RTP  and  the  EES14.  According  to  these 
replies, a majority of Member States support the establishment of the RTP but most of them 
did not indicate their practical or technical implementation preferences. 

The summary of the conference prepared by the Presidency15 concluded that the RTP would 
bring  significant  benefits  for  the  border  check  procedure,  providing  a  possible  means  for  a 
more  effective  deployment  of  border  management  resources  from  'low-risk'  to  'high-risk' 
passengers.  This  could  help  enhance  security  and  reduce  illegal  migration,  while  providing 
travellers and business with cost-effective border passage services. However, some technical 
and political questions need to be discussed such as the storage of the data and the possible 
use  of  a  token,  the  abolition  of  the  obligation  to  stamp  the  passports  and  the  full  respect  of 
privacy of the traveller including data protection. The Presidency conclusions were presented 
at the JHA Council on 8 March 2012. 

During the consultations Member States commented on the specific options of the RTP (for 
example data storage)  only at a  very general level asking the Commission  to  come forward 
with the legislative proposals. 

European Parliament 

In  its  resolution  on  the  February  2008  Communication,  the  European  Parliament  (EP) 
supported  in  principle  the  concept  of  the  RTP  and  advocated  a  harmonised  approach.  The 
Parliament  expressed  doubts  about  establishing  a  new  centralised  database  and  was  also 
concerned about the costs of the proposed system(s), stressing that all investments should be 
economically justified on the basis of benefits, and should produce mission value.16  

The EP did not submit its opinion on the 2011 communication. 

At  the  conference  on  Innovation  Border  Management  on  2  and  3  February  2012  in 
Copenhagen, Members of the European Parliament expressed the view that the SIS II and the 
other IT tools actually under development should be in place and evaluated before the work 
on the RTP can be started. 

European Data Protection Supervisor 

On  7  July  2011  the  European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  (EDPS),  in  his  opinion17  on  the 
communication  of  the  Commission  on  Migration18,  stressed  the  need  to  assess  the  use  of 
existing systems before proposing any new ones. The EDPS was not fully convinced that the 
RTP is really necessary.  

14 

15 
16 

17 

18 

on 

are 

the 

States 

replies 

following 

website: 
published 
Member 
http://eu2012.dk/en/Meetings/Conferences/Feb/Konference-om-innovativ-graenseforvaltning.  See  also 
Council document 7166/12, presidency summary of findings. 
Council document 7166/12, Presidency summary of findings. 
European  Parliament  resolution  of  10  March  2009  on  the  next  steps  in  border  management  in  the 
European Union and similar experiences in third countries (2008/2181(INI)). Resolution is published on 
the  following  website:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-
2009-0085&language=EN. 
C(2011)-0445. 
the 
http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/Consultation/OpinionsC/OC2011 
COM(2011)  248  final,  4.5.2011.  The  Communication  is  published  on  the  following  website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/1_EN_ACT_part1_v11.pdf 

following  website: 

published 

opinion 

EDPS 

The 

on 

is 

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The  EDPS  was  also  consulted  informally  on  the  2011  Communication  on  smart  borders 
before its adoption. In his informal comments, the EDPS highlighted that the RTP proposal 
has  to  be  supported  by  clear  proof  of  its  necessity  and  effective  evaluation  of  current 
measures. He stressed: a) the principle of "privacy by design" e.g. designing the system in a 
way that limits its data protection impact, b) that only a one to one verification of biometrics 
should be possible, c) that no record on border crossings should be stored in the RTP, d) that 
data protection rights have to be ensured and e) that measures are taken to prevent "positive 
discrimination" from turning into "negative discrimination" of persons who are  for example 
infrequent or first-time travellers. Furthermore, he asked to clarify which sources of data will 
be used for vetting.19  

The EDPS provided comments on a draft of this impact assessment as well on a draft of the 
legislative proposal by letter of 10 August 2012. While welcoming the attention paid to data 
protection he considered inter alia that the transparency and legal certainty should be ensured, 
retention period should be limited in certain cases and Member States should not be allowed 
to store the data in national files.  

Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 

The Working Party addressed a letter to Commissioner Malmström on 12 June 2012 reacting 
to the 2011 Communication. It stressed that convincing evidence should be provided that the 
RTP would significantly facilitate access to the EU for registered travellers without placing an 
extra control burden on non-registered travellers. The Working Party also asked to consider 
all possible options for limiting the storage of personal data to the smallest amount possible. 
Furthermore,  the  Working  Party  highlighted  that  the  vetting  criteria  should  be  clear  and 
transparent,  and  that  the  final  decision  to  grant/refuse  access  to  the  RTP  would  have  to  be 
made by a human being. 

Civil society and the private sector  

Civil  society  (academia,  think  tanks  and  NGOs),  the  private  sector  and  FRONTEX20 
participated  actively  in  the  debate  and  organised  several  relevant  conferences.  Civil  society 
provided  input  in  various  conferences  and  academic  papers  published  on  the  subject.  Civil 
society  and  the  private  sector  support  the  establishment  of  the  RTP21.  The  industry  dealing 
with  biometrics  and  manufacturing  border  control  equipment  asked  for  a  harmonised 
approach to the RTP and minimum technical standards for equipment.  

19 
20 

21 

C2011-0860, 4.10.2011.  
Frontex is a European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of 
the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union.  More  information  on  Frontex  can  be  found: 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/ 
See  for  example  ACI  EUROPE  Position  on  the  use  of  automated  means  for  border  control  in  the 
airports, 
http://kpi.aci-europe.org/upload/ACI%20EUROPE%20-
%20position%20paper%20on%20USE%20OF%20AUTOMATED%20MEANS%20FOR%20BORDE
R%20CONTROL%20AT%20EUROPEAN%20%20AIRPORTS%20[06%202009].pdf, 
Roma/Lyon 
Migration  Experts  Sub-Working  Group:  G8  Best  Practices  of  Biometric  Usage  in  Travel  Continuum 
and the position statement of the American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union on the Smart 
Borders, 23 of March 2012. 

2009. 

June 

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At  the  conference  in  Copenhagen  a  representative  of  IATA  expressed  support  for  an  RTP. 
However, he stressed that the RTP should not lead to additional costs or burdens for airlines 
or airports. 

The present report takes into account the questions and challenges raised by the stakeholders. 
Further  details  of  the  results  of  these  consultations  have  been  integrated  in  the  choice  of 
options and in the assessment of impacts. By organising series of meetings and presenting one 
impact  assesment  and  two  communications  opening  for  input  for  all  stakeholders  during  a 
period  of  four  years,  the  Commission  has  done  its  utmost  in  seeking  the  views  of  all 
stakeholders concerned. Minimum standards for consultation were met. 

1.3. 

Data gathering 

Data-gathering  and  consultations  with  relevant  authorities  in  the  Member  States  and  other 
stakeholders  were  undertaken  by  the  Commission.  The  2008  impact  assesment  showed  the 
lack of data especially as regards exact travel flows and the time needed to cross the external 
border. 

Therefore, the following types of data were of principal interest: 

• 

• 

Information  on  current  and  future  size  of  travel  flows  at  the  external  border; 
distinguishing  between  types  of  borders  (air/sea/land)  and  groups  of  travellers  (EU 
citizens and visa exempt/required third-country nationals); 

Time currently needed for border checks. 

Data  used  was  collected  through  questionnaires22  as  well  as  case  studies,  pilot  projects  and 
literature  reviews  and  was  used  in  particular  for  describing  the  context,  defining  problems, 
specifying  the  most  important  implementation  options  and  finally  analysing  the  impacts. 
Comparable data were gathered on entries and exits and also on the time needed to carry out 
border  checks  on  different  categories  of  travellers  at  different  types  of  external  borders. 
However, shortcomings in the availability and/or comparability of existing statistical data and 
the fact that many aspects (customs check, security check, infrastructure, etc.) affect the time 
needed  for  border  crossings  has  made  comparison  and  analysis  difficult.  With  regard  to 
numbers and forecasts of traffic of passengers it is important to note a wide disparity in the 
information available according to the different means of transport. If the information on air 
transport is reliable due to the particular challenges for this sector, it is much more reduced in 
relation to other modes of transport and it is obviously lacking in the case of people travelling 
by their own means of private transport.  

With  the  help  of  FRONTEX  the  existing  national  ABCs  based  on  Electronic  Machine 
Readable Travel Documents in the EU as well as in third countries were analysed23.  

22 

23 

Council  document  7226/1/09  REV  1  FRONT  12  COMIX  200  and  the  Commission  document  JLS 
D(2009) 8729. 
See draft reports "ABC solutions based on Electronic Machine Readable Travel Documents (eMRTD) 
in EU Member States" and "ABC solutions based on Electronic Machine Readable Travel Documents 
(eMRTD) in third countries" prepared by Frontex in September 2011. 

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1.4 

Inter-service steering group 

An inter-service steering group (ISG) was set up on 29 September 2009 involving the Legal 
Service (SJ), the Secretariat-General (SG), DG Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD), DG 
Enterprise and Industry (ENTR) and DG External  Relations  (RELEX).  The  group  met  on  2 
October 2009 and, joined by DG Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, on 2 December 
2010, on 16 February 2011 and on 31 January 2012. The last ISG meeting was also attended 
by  the  representatives  of  DG  Mobility  and  Transport  (MOVE)  and  of  the  Joint  Research 
Centre (JRC). Communication between the members of the group was also conducted via e-
mail and telephone. 

1.5 

Impact Assessment Board 

The Impact Assessment Board (IAB) reviewed the draft impact assessment and delivered its 
opinion  on  14  March  2012.  The  recommendations  for  improvement  were  accommodated  in 
the  final  version  of  the  report.  In  particular,  the  following  changes  were  made:  baseline 
scenario  was  sharpened  and  clarified;  problem  definition  was  widened  including  lessons 
learnt  from  the  development  of  other  large  scale  IT-systems  and  lessons  learnt  from 
Automated  Border  Control  systems  and  national  RTPs  implemented  in  Member  States  and 
non-EU  states;  links  to  the  Annexes  and  to  the  2008  impact  assessment  were  improved; 
stakeholders  views  were  reported  as  widely  as  possible  taking  into  account  that  views 
expressed  by  the  stakeholders  were  quite  general;  the  explanation  of  method  used  for 
calculating  the  costs  was  expanded  and  the  expected  costs  and  benefits  for  different 
stakeholders  were  more  rigorously  reported;  re-affectation  of  border  guards  taking  into 
account the expected increase in travel flows was clarified; and finally a clear overview on the 
European Data Protection Supervisor's views was added. 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1. 

Why the creation of an RTP is being examined?  

The  2008  impact  assessment  identified  and  examined  the  main  problems  for  a  better 
management  of  migration  flows.  That  impact  assessment  concluded  that  an  RTP  for  third-
country nationals should be established in the future, but did not discuss comprehensively all 
the  relevant  and  important  issues  for  the  implementation  of  the  EU  wide  RTP  such  as 
implementation  options,  costs  and  fundamental  right  aspects.  As  explained  in  the  2011 
communication: 

A  RTP  would  significantly  facilitate  border  crossings  for  frequent,  pre-vetted  and  pre-
screened  third-country  travellers  at  the  Schengen  external  border.  It  would  reduce  the  time 
spent at the border crossing points and facilitate travel and cross-border contacts. As far as 
possible, it would make use of new technologies such as Automated Border Control systems 
(used also for EU travellers) moving towards EU smart borders. 

It is now time to assess the exact design of the system based on the specific implementation 
options  identified  during  the  consultations.  Before  discussing  how  best  to  design  such  a 
system,  it  is  useful  to  recall  the  main  aspects  of  the  problems  it  will  address  because  the 
nature  and  scope  of  these  problems  have  direct  implications  for  design  choices.  In  the 
continued  absence  of  an  EU  RTP  for  third-country  nationals  the  basic  problem  remains  the 
same  as  in  2008.  Therefore  the  current  problem  definition  is  built  on  the  previous  impact 

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assessment.  However,  the  data  gaps  identified  in  2008  were  solved  by  organising  data 
collection exercises at the external border and collecting information from Member States via 
questionnaires.  The  baseline  scenario  (status  quo  in  2008  impact  assessment)  is  almost  the 
same  in  the  2008  and  2011  impact  assessments.  The  main  differences  between  the  two  are 
that the VIS started operations and more ABC systems are implemented for EU citizens at the 
external border crossing points. 

The  following  issues  are  not  included  in  the  selection  and  definition  of  implementation 
problems  to  be  assessed,  taking  into  account  policy  choices  already  made,  input  during  the 
stakeholder  consultation,  and  in  view  of  the  need  to  focus  on  the  main  implementation 
problems. 

The scope of the RTP (only visa-exempt or all third-country nationals) and the use of different 
types of biometrics are not discussed in this impact assessment as they were discussed in the 
previous  impact  assessment  and  in  the  February  2008  Communication.  First,  current  border 
checks do not distinguish between persons holding a visa and those that do not. A programme 
that  aims  at  facilitating  border  checks  for  third-country  nationals  should  therefore  also  not 
distinguish  between  these  groups.  Secondly,  the  same  biometric  identifier  –  fingerprints  - 
should be used in the RTP as already decided at EU level with regard to the VIS, e-passports 
and residence permits. 

Based  on  the  evaluation  carried  out  by  Frontex,  there  has  not  been  any  major  changes  in 
technology  or  functioning  of  ABC  systems  since  the  2008  impact  assessment  was  carried 
out24. The forms of national RTPs have also followed the same approach as in 2008. They are 
developed  for  EU  citizens  and  require  enrolment  of  biometric  data.  The  continued  use  and 
possible  small  increase  of  national  RTP  is  not  relevant  in  the  selection  and  definition  of 
implementation problems to be assessed, as the basic scope is different: a national RTP is for 
EU citizens, while a EU RTP will be for third-country nationals.  

2.1.1.  Legislative and technical aspects 

EU law requires that systematic checks are carried out at the Schengen external borders on all 
travellers  (both  on  entry  and  exit).  The  Schengen  area  without  internal  border  controls 
currently includes all Member States except Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, UK and Ireland and 
four  other  European  countries  (Norway,  Iceland,  Switzerland  and  Liechtenstein).  Schengen 
states are committed to maintaining common EU borders and  common standards for  border 
controls.  

Thorough checks are normally carried out on third-country nationals, and minimum checks on 
EU  citizens  and  persons  enjoying  the  right  of  free  movement25.  As  illustrated  in  Annex  2, 
current rules for third-country nationals could be described as "one-size-fits-all" as the same 
checks  apply  regardless  of  any  differences  in  risk  between  different  travellers  or  their 
frequency  of  travel.  This  is  because  current  legislation  does  not  allow  for  exceptions  to  the 
principle of thorough border checks except for those categories of third-country nationals that 

24 

25 

See draft reports "ABC solutions based on Electronic Machine Readable Travel Documents (eMRTD) 
in EU Member States" and "ABC solutions based on Electronic Machine Readable Travel Documents 
(eMRTD) in third countries" prepared by Frontex in September 2011. 
OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004. 

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are  specifically  mentioned  in  the  Schengen  Border  Code26  or  in  the  Local  Border  Traffic 
Regulation27 such as Heads of States and border residents. 

Only a very small minority of persons crossing the external border are able to benefit from the 
above-mentioned  exceptions:  approximately  two  million  equivalent  to  0,2  %  of  total 
passenger  flows.  This  number  can  be  expected  to  remain  largely  constant,  with  a  marginal 
increase due to an increased take up of local border traffic regimes. By the end of 2010, 110 
000 local border traffic permits were issued by Member States. 

While the Visa Code allows frequent travellers to be issued with a multiple-entry visa, thereby 
avoiding the situation where those travellers would need to apply for a visa for each journey 
into  the  Schengen  area  during  a  five  year  period,  multiple-entry  visa  holders  do  not  benefit 
from any facilitation at the actual border crossing. 

Border checks on EU citizens can be automated, based on the current legislation, if they hold 
an e-passport (also called biometric passport) which stores biometric data of its holder (facial 
image and, as of 2009, fingerprints). Several Member States have already implemented such 
ABC  systems  at  their  airports.  Only  Portugal  has  implemented  ABC  systems  at  all 
international  airports  and  the  UK  several  airports  as  can  be  seen  from  Annex  3.  Other 
Member  States  have  implemented  them  only  at  their  biggest  airports.  The  ABC  process  is 
described in Annex 2, chapter 2 but in principle it is the same as in the manual border check 
booth but, in this case, is carried out by a machine.  

Although ABC systems are widely used by Member States and non-EU Member States alike 
as illustrated in Annexes 3 and 428, they still follow the same principles as they did in 2008. 
The main lessons learnt and the main rationale behind the ABC systems are to improve the 
accuracy  and  efficiency  of  border  checks  by  enabling  the  accurate  verification  of  travel 
documents  and  identification  of  travellers  with  biometric  data.  Automated  border  controls 
have  a  positive  effect  on  deterring  forged  or  stolen  passports  and  improving  identity 
verification.   Furthermore,  they  increase  throughput  capacity  at  border  crossing  points  and 
border efficiency by allowing border guards to focus on higher risk travellers or serve other 
travellers not using ABC. A majority of ABC systems rely on an e-passport. 

Some Member States have implemented a form of national RTP for EU citizens29. The main 
feature  of  national  RTPs  is  that  they  do  not  rely  on  the  e-passport.  Therefore  the  traveller 
needs to be pre-enrolled before being granted access to the RTP i.e. biometric data must be 
captured and stored in a database or in a token.  

Many  non-EU  countries  such  as  the  US,  Canada,  Australia  and  Singapore  have  also 
automated their border check procedures based on the same type of  technology.  The access 
granted for these programmes are limited. They are established only for their own citizens or 
their  own  citizens  and  neighbouring  country  citizens.  However,  as  the  figures  in  Annex  4 
demonstrate some of the programmes have numerous participants; Singapore eIACS system 

26 
27 
28 

29 

OJ L 105, 13.4.2006. 
OJ L 405, 30.12.2006. 
Based  on  the  International  Air  Transport  Association  the  ABC  systems  are  used  at  83  airports  in  31 
states. 
For example, the Netherlands (Privium), France (PARAFES), the United Kingdom (Iris) and Germany 
(ABG) have this kind of programme. 

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has  three  million  users  and  the  US  systems  have  one  million  users.  The  average  processing 
time at the gate is 12 seconds for all the systems described in Annex 4.  

The rationale behind the national RTPs and the main implementation choices made have not 
changed since 2008 impact assessment. The essential elements of the implemented RTPs are: 

•  Ensuring that registered travellers do not present a risk in terms of irregular immigration or 

internal security. This is generally done by: 

–  Undertaking  a  risk  assessment  prior  to  the  registration.  For  instance  people  are 
checked  against  watch  lists  and  other  police  databases.  Biometrics  may  also  be 
collected for undertaking security searches in police databases (i.e. biometrics are 
collected,  stored  and  used  to  run  security  checks  in  the  US,  Canada,  the 
Netherlands, Germany and France). 

–  Restricting  the  eligibility  of  participants.  For  instance,  in  France  and  the 
Netherlands  only  EU,  EEA  and  Swiss  nationals  can  participate;  in  the  APEC 
countries the scheme  is  open only to business people that are frequent travellers 
and national of countries participating into the scheme. 

–  Eligibility  might  be  extended  to  non-nationals  providing  that  certain  security 
conditions  are  met.  For  example,  participants  to  the  APEC  business  Card  are 
checked against watch lists of all participant countries and the US/NL citizens can 
join the FLUX programme after vetting is done by both parties and green/red light 
exchanged. 

•  Ensuring faster border checks. This is done by creating ABC systems or self-service kiosks 

and creating separated lanes. 

•  Ensuring the integrity of border checks by undertaking random checks. 

•  Verification of travellers’ identities with biometric checks. All the schemes use biometrics. 

However,  under  current  EU  law,  this  kind  of  automated  process  cannot  be  used  for  third-
country nationals. The thorough border check requires border guards to interview a traveller 
and manually stamp his/her travel document and to calculate the time spent in the Schengen 
area, processes which cannot be automated, and, as described above, the legislation limits the 
exceptions that can be made to this rule. 

At  the  moment,  several  systems  such  as  the  SIS,  the  VIS,  EURODAC  and  API  (Advanced 
Passenger  Information)  are  used  at  the  external  borders.  These  systems,  their  legal  basis, 
objectives and some statistics are described in Annex 5. Some of the existing systems such as 
the VIS and the SIS would have a strong managerial, technical and border check procedural 
link with the RTP as explained in Annex 6. As a summary, the same technical solutions and 
equipment already used for the VIS and the SIS at consulates and at external border crossing 
points could also be used for the RTP purposes.  

In summary, the current legal and technical context present the following problems: 

–  only a very minor share of third-country nationals can benefit from any kind of facilitated 
or  simplified  border  check,  and  Member  states  border  guard  authorities  have  no 

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possibilities  to  distinguish  between  travellers  presenting  a  lower  level  of  risk  or  an 
unknown level of risk, 

–  existing technical means, in the form of automated border control and registered traveller 
programmes, can only be used for EU citizens and at national level, not for third-country 
nationals or for the Schengen area as a whole. 

2.1.2.  Operational and practical aspects 

Current travel flows at the EU external border and potential target group for the RTP 

According to the most recent comprehensive data provided by the Member States, there were 
669 million external border crossings in 2009, 675 million in 2010 and 700 million in 2011, 
including  EU  citizens  and  third-country  nationals.  The  number  of  border  crossings  did  not 
increase  significantly  during  the  past  few  years,  presumably  because  of  the  economic 
downturn.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  passengers are travellers who comply with all the 
existing rules. At the busiest and largest border crossing points Member States have problems 
managing existing passenger flows and therefore they have started using ABC systems for EU 
citizens. 

To gather comparable data on border crossings, the Czech and Swedish Presidencies together 
with  the  Commission  organised  a  data  collection  exercise  at  all  external  border  crossing 
points  from  31  August  to  6  September  200930.  Based  on  the  data  collected  during  this 
exercise, 73,5 % of travellers crossing the border are EU citizens or persons enjoying the right 
of free movement (9,1 million/week), 15,2 % are third-country nationals without a visa (2,1 
million/week) and 11,3 % are third-country nationals holding a visa (1,4 million/week).  

It would, however, be wrong to assume that all third-country nationals are a potential target 
group  for  an  RTP,  as  several  factors  must  be  taken  into  account.  Not  all  third-country 
nationals are frequent travellers and thus not willing or eligible to join the RTP. An important 
element to highlight is that, based on some Member States' estimates, 10 % of travellers can 
make up 70-80 % of overall border crossings at certain border crossing points. In other words, 
the  share  of  the  total  travel  flows  made  up  of  frequent  travellers  is  more  interesting  and 
relevant  than  the  share  of  persons  crossing  the  border.  Fluidity  of  border  crossings  and 
throughput  capacity  of  border  crossing  points  can  be  greatly  improved  even  if  only  a  small 
percentage  of  third-country  nationals  were  to  join  the  RTP.  Moreover,  the  number  of  third-
country  nationals  crossing  the  border  differs  significantly  among  Member  States  and  also 
among border crossing points. As an illustration: during the one week period of the 2009 data 
collection  exercise,  over  three  million  travellers  crossed  the  borders  of  Spain  whereas  the 
figure was 8 000 to Luxembourg. Most third-country nationals, including visa-holding third-
country  nationals,  cross  the  border  via  land  borders,  the  next  largest  number  by  air  borders 
and the smallest via sea borders.  

Nevertheless,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  many  third-country  nationals  cross  the  borders 
several  times  a  year.  For  example,  business  travellers,  workers  on  short-term  contracts, 
researchers, students, third-country nationals with close family connections to EU citizens and 
third-country  nationals  living  in  regions  bordering  the  EU  are  all  likely  to  make  multiple 
border crossings in a given year. These third-country nationals are the main target group for 

30 

Final results of the data collection exercise are in Annex 7. 

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the  RTP.  Approximately  11  million  Schengen  visas  are  issued  every  year31.  On  average 
around 20 %32 of visa applications are for multiple-entry visas, which could entail around 2.2 
million third-country nationals among visa holders crossing the external borders several times 
per  year.  Considering  the  needs  of  business  and  economic  cooperation  including  constant 
international travel, the demand should, at least, be similar among non visa holders. Based on 
the above reasoning, it is estimated that maximum of 5 million new applications for the RTP 
would  be  submitted  by  third-country  nationals  every  year.  As  statistics  on  third-country 
nationals'  border  crossings  per  nationality  and/or  statistics  on  the  reasons  for  applying  a 
multiple-entry  visa  do  not  exist  at  the  EU  level,  more  detailed  evidence  on  the  expected 
breakdown of potential candidates by region or professional status cannot be provided.  

During the above-mentioned one week period 6,5 million travellers crossed the border via air 
borders. 2,6 million of them (40%) crossed the air border via the 10 busiest airports of the EU 
and 3,7 million (57%) via the 20 busiest airports33.  

It is important to know the existing border check time, as even small change in it per traveller 
could remarkable affect the overall time needed to cross the border. According to the Member 
States'  replies  to  the  questionnaire  prepared  by  the  Czech  Presidency  together  with  the 
Commission,  average  time  for  a  border  check  for  visa  holders  on  entry  at  air  borders  is  1 
minute  44  seconds,  for  visa-exempt  third-country  nationals  1  minute  3  seconds  and  for  EU 
citizens 15 seconds. The average time at air borders on exit is for visa holders 1 minute 11 
seconds,  for  visa-exempt  nationals  52  seconds  and  for  EU  citizens  15  seconds.  Average 
border check for third-country nationals last at land borders 10-30 seconds longer than at air 
borders. Average border check times at land borders are reported in Annex 2. At sea borders 
the average times are quite similar than at land borders. 

In summary, the operational and practical context presents the following problems: 

–  an  already  massive  travel  flow  at  the  EU  external  border  can  be  expected  to  further 

increase, 

–  border  checking  times  is  significantly  longer  for  third-country  nationals  compared  to  EU 
citizens, and can be expected to further increase due to the implementation of the VIS. 

2.1.3 

Fundamental right issues 

Data protection is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and has to be protected accordingly. 

Initiatives in the area of freedom, security and justice for the purpose of border management 
or law enforcement which include the collection, storage and use of personal information pose 
significant  challenges  in  terms  of  achieving  the  right  balance  between  the  legitimate  aim  of 
maintaining internal security or managing migration and the individuals’ right to privacy and 
data  protection.  Interference  with  the  right  to  privacy  should  be  considered  necessary  if  it 
answers a social need and if it is proportionate and justified with regard to the aim pursued.  

31 
32 
33 

http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/borders/borders_visa_en.htm 
The per cent varies remarkable from one year to another. 
Excluding the UK airports as it did not participate in the data collection exercise. 

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With  the  RTP  the  Data  Protection  Directive  95/46  applies  and  mechanisms  shall  be 
established  for  the  effective  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  third-country  travellers 
who are willing or who have been accepted to the programme.  

In addition, the basic instruments need to be complemented by laying down specific rules on 
certain aspects of the protection of personal data i.e. specify the purposes for collecting and 
accessing  the  relevant  personal  data,  the  competent  authorities  which  have  access  to  these 
data, to the extent of the access, the retention of the data, the rights of the data subjects, which 
personal data shall be processed in the system and the competence of the supervisory bodies 
for  monitoring  the  processing  of  data,  both  as  regards  the  Member  States  and  Community 
institutions  and  bodies;  for  the  supervision  of  the  latter  the  European  Data  Protection 
Supervisor is the competent authority. 

2.2. 

Problem: how to design an RTP? 

2.2.1.  The core features of an RTP 

The common features of an RTP which would be necessary in order to develop it in the first 
place need to be defined without prejudice to any choice on how it should be implemented. 
These  core  features,  which  formed  part  of  the  preferred  option  of  the  impact  assessment 
carried  out  in  2008,  can  be  defined  as  follows:  a  programme  which  allows  certain  third-
country nationals to benefit from a facilitated border check (as opposed to the current rules on 
a thorough border check for all third-country nationals), during a given period of validity, and 
which  involves  using  new  technology  to  either  semi-automate  or  fully  automate  the  border 
check  process.  Participation  in  the  programme  would  be  subject  to  a  pre-screening  which 
would involve the vetting against certain criteria and the enrolment of personal data, including 
biometrics.  The  RTP  would  not  change  the  requirement  of  obtaining  a  visa,  if  applicable. 
Finally, the RTP and all processes involved (data on application, pre-screening etc.) would be 
designed so that they adhere to data protection rules and do not decrease the level of border 
check security compared to the baseline situation.  

Taking  into  account  that  border  checks  are  currently  fully  harmonised  at  EU  level,  an  EU 
RTP must be implemented in a harmonised way in the whole Schengen area with regard to 
the above criteria. The third-country nationals participating in the RTP would benefit from the 
same facilitated border checks at all parts of the external borders of the EU (of all Schengen 
Member States) and can use ABC systems wherever available.  

2.2.2.  Could these features be provided through existing systems? 

The existing systems, the SIS, the VIS or EURODAC, cannot be used for the RTP purposes 
as they are developed for distinct and different purposes, namely, to enhance security of the 
Schengen area, to manage visa applications and to manage asylum applications whereas the 
RTP would facilitate travel. To expand the functionalities of the VIS and/or the SIS and/or the 
EURODAC  would  require  a  complete  change  of  the  legal  basis  and  current  capacity 
limitations  could  only  be  overcome  by  significant  further  investments.  The  VIS  feasibility 
study, carried out in 2003 before the development of the VIS, suggested that it would not be 
beneficial  to  develop  several  large-scale  IT  systems  as  one.  The  workflow  of  the  VIS  is 
optimised  to  deal  with  10  million  visa  applications  per  year.  Adding  5  million  RTP 
applications  to  top  of  that  would  require  significant  investments  especially  with  hardware, 
software,  data  storage  and  communication  infrastrucure.  Furthermore,  working  processes 
should be changed as the VIS would cover both visa holders and visa exempted. Moreover, 

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there would be significant data protection implications if the system were to include both visa 
holders and visa-exempt persons. 

Border guards' work at the external border crossing points would be more difficult and time-
consuming if the security and facilitation tools (for example the SIS/VIS/EURODAC and the 
RTP) were to be mixed. The different types of alerts and information would be delivered by 
one  system  and  border  guards  would  every  time  need  to  verify  very  carefully  whether  the 
information received concerns security or facilitation aspects. At the moment, border guards 
know  immediately  that  there  is  an  important  issue  with  the  traveller  and  a  more  thorough 
check is required, if an alert is distributed by the SIS. 

Moreover,  the  principle  of  purpose  limitation  needs  be  adhered  to  and  the  risk  of  "function 
creep"  has  to  be  prevented  as  highlighted  by  the  EDPS  in  his  opinion  on  the  Commission 
Communication  on  migration34.  With  regard  to  Advanced  Passenger  Information  (API)  and 
Passenger  Name  Record  (PNR)  the  situation  is  even  more  difficult  as  the  API  directive  is 
implemented  differently  in  Member  States,  no  central  component  exists,  data  submitted  by 
carriers  is  limited  and  the  quality  of  data,  even  though  reliable,  does  not  meet  the 
requirements of the RTP. The same applies to the PNR. Therefore the possibility of including 
the  RTP  functionality  in  the  VIS/SIS/EURODAC/API/PNR  itself/themselves  can  be 
discarded.  Nevertheless,  intelligent  use  could  be  made  of  possible  synergies  with  technical 
equipment already in place as described in Annex 6.  

In  addition,  there  would  be  major  technical  and  functional  links  between  the  VIS  and  the 
RTP. The technical development of an RTP should exploit technical synergies, organisational 
simplification and economies of scale to the maximum by using the same technical platform 
as  the  VIS.  Biometric  matching  functionality  could  be  performed  by  the  existing  Biometric 
Matching  System,  which  already  provides  such  a  functionality  for  the  VIS.  However,  the 
biometric  data  stored  in  the  VIS  could  not  be  legally  exploited  by  the  RTP  as  the  VIS  is 
systematically  checked  only  on  entry  wheras  the  ccess  granted  to  the  RTP  (and  biometrics) 
should be checked both on entry and exit.Although some Member States have implemented a 
national form of the RTP, those RTPs cannot be expanded or used as a platform for the EU 
wide RTP. National RTPs are developed mainly for EU citizens based on the national needs 
and  technical  specifications  and  they  are  not  interoperable.  Furthermore,  already  existing 
national RTPs neither store the data of entries or exits nor do they calculate the duration of 
stay  within  the  Schengen  area.  Therefore,  the  Smart  Borders  Package  (i.e.  RTP  and  EES) 
specifically complements the required elements to attain the objectives.  

Finally, building a new system upon existing national systems would contradict essentially the 
lessons  learnt  from  the  development  of  other  large-scale  IT  systems,  which  were  already 
presented in the 2010 Communication: 

it  might  lead  to  unpredictable  technical  problems  and  delays,  especially  for  the 
adaptation of national systems and the migration of data;  

the development of the RTP shall not be started before the legal basis is in place, in 
order to avoid developing premature functional specifications;  

(a) 

(b) 

34

http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/O

pinions/2011/11-07-07_Migration_EN.pdf 

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(c) 

(d) 

the Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice shall be entrusted to develop and operationally manage 
the centralised part of the system including uniform interfaces in Member States;  

the processes established with the new IT system shall follow the same principles as 
for  VIS  to  make  the  process  as  easy  as  possible  for  border  guards  and  consular 
authorities. 

2.3. 

Design issues  

There  are  a  number  of  key  choices  that  need  to  be  made  when  designing  an  RTP.  These 
choices  must  strike  the  right  balance  between  maximising  the  overall  usefulness  and 
efficiency  of  the  system  in  addressing  the  overall  problem  as  described  in  section  2.1  and 
minimising  its  impact  on  fundamental  rights.  This  involves  choices  both  with  regard  to  the 
overall architecture of the system and additional features in relation to the "core" system as 
described in section 2.2.1. 

By  maximising  only  usefulness  and/or  efficiency  of  the  system  there  is  a  risk  for  ignoring 
other  important  aspects  such  as  fundamental  rights  and  vice  versa.  For  example,  the  RTP 
could  be  designed  so  that  it  would  be  easy  to  use  for  border  and  consular  authorities,  any 
search  criteria  used  would  give  access  to  all  information  (alphanumeric  and  biometric  data) 
and  flexible  access  rights  would  be  given  for  all  relevant  authorities,  even  third  countries. 
However,  all  this  would  cause  huge  data  protection  implications  and  would  not  be 
proportionate  against  the  objectives  of  the  RTP.  The  best  possible  balance  must  be  found 
taking into account usefulness, efficiency, security and fundamental rights.  

In summary the choices involve deciding the data to be collected and processed; defining with 
precision  the  purpose  of  the  system;  deciding  the  retention  period  of  the  data  taking  into 
account  the  purpose;  and  finally  deciding  on  how  to  technically  implement  the  system  in 
practice. 

2.3.1.  Lodging an application for an RTP 

The  actual  application  process  will  need  to  be  designed  i.e.  determining  where  should 
applications be submitted in practice. The overall take-up for participation in the programme 
will determine how many travellers will in practice be able to benefit from a facilitated check 
at  the  border  and  consequently  directly  impact  on  queuing  times.  The  interest  in  the  RTP 
among third-country nationals will greatly depend on how difficult or easy it will be to join 
the  RTP.  From  the  traveller's  point  of  view  one  key  issue  is  how  convenient  it  will  be  for 
him/her  to  reach  the  office  where  (s)he  will  be  able  to  lodge  an  application  for  the  RTP. 
Generally,  travellers  are  not  willing  to  journey  hundreds  of  kilometres  to  sign  up  to  a 
voluntary system. This decision will also have an effect on the authorities obliged to receive 
and process the applications. 

There  would  be  three  sub-options  for  lodging  an  application:  a)  at  any  external  border 
crossing point, b) at any Member State consulate35 and c) at both places.  

Sub-options 1a and 1b would have a negative effect on the number of the RTP applications 
and thus would limit the advantages of the RTP. Sub-option 1a would require visa holders to 

35 

Consulates include also Common Application Centres. 

EN 

19 

   EN 

                                                 
submit two set of applications including supporting documents; first at the consulate for a visa 
and then at the external border for an RTP. This would require extra time and work from visa 
holders and one could estimate that 1/3 of potential registered travellers among visa holders 
equivalent to 800 000 third-country nationals per year would not be willing to do it i.e. would 
not apply for access to the RTP. 

On the other hand, sub-option 1b would include extra costs and loss of time for visa-exempt 
nationals since this category of travellers would have to travel to the consulate to lodge their 
application  for  the  RTP  and  have  their  biometric  data  captured.  One  could  estimate  that  at 
least  half  of  potential  RTs  among  visa-exempt  third-country  nationals  equivalent  to  1,3 
million third-country nationals per year would not apply for the RTP in the consulate.  

Implementation costs for EU and Member States would only be between 1 to 5 million EUR 
more in case of the sub-option 1c – allowing the lodging of applications at the border crossing 
points as well as at the consulates – than either sub-option 1a or 1b. Comparing the costs and 
the effects of the sub-options against the number of the RTP applications sub-option 1c would 
clearly be the most cost-effective sub-option to meet the objectives "to facilitate the crossing 
of EU external borders and to promote access to the RTP". Furthermore, it would be coherent 
with  the  existing  border  and  visa  policy.  Therefore,  the  chosen  sub-option  is  1c  without 
further analysis. At Member States level all the implementation costs would fall on visa and 
border  authorities.  Allowing  the  traveller  to  choose  the  best  place  for  him/her  to  lodge  an 
application would guarantee a larger number of participants in the programme, thus helping 
Member States to manage their passenger flows at the external border crossing points.  

It can be predicted that the applications would be directed to the most appropriate authorities: 
travellers requiring a visa would most probably lodge their applications at the consulates and 
visa-exempt travellers would do so at the border crossing points. 

2.3.2.  Data storage 

The  pre-screening  will  involve  the  enrolment  of  the  applicants'  personal  data,  including 
biometrics  (fingerprints).  The  design  of  this  part  of  the  process  is  important  for  the  overall 
security of the system, the potential impact on the fundamental rights of RTs, and the actual 
functioning  of  a  facilitated  check  at  the  border.  Persons  without  fingerprints  or  with 
unreadable fingerprints would need to be excluded from the RTP36. Alphanumeric data from 
the application file as well as biometrics specified in Annex 8 need to be stored somewhere, 
so  border  guards  can  verify  at  the  border,  whether  the  person  is  a  registered  traveller.  The 
question therefore arises how and where that data should be stored and for how long, taking 
into  account  that  it  must  be  available  to  the  border  guard  of  any  Member  State  where  the 
person  is  physically  crossing  the  border.  Whenever  new  information  systems  and  different 
ways of storing information are at stake, the respect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU, particularly the right to respect for private life and right to the protection of personal 
data, and the cost of the systems require a careful assessment before any final decisions are 
made.  

The  need  for  real-time  information  exchange  between  Member  States  will  need  to  be 
considered,  taking  into  account  that  one  Member  State's  decision  to  grant/revoke/extend 
access to the RTP will determine whether a person will benefit from facilitated border checks 

36 

However,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  person  cannot  travel  to  the  EU.  He/she  could  use  the  manual 
border check booth as nowadays. 

EN 

20 

   EN 

                                                 
at  the  external  border  of  another  Member  State.  Integration  with  existing  processes  at  the 
external  border  and/or  at  the  consulates  should  be  ensured. Furthermore,  security aspects of 
data storage need to be highlighted.  

Whatever the system used to store the data, the effective implementation and enforcement of 
data  protection  rules  must  be  ensured.  Personal  data  should  be  protected  against  any 
unauthorised  use.  The  right  to  access  and  verify  the  data,  purpose  limitation,  etc.  must  be 
monitored.  

2.3.3.  Vetting criteria 

The  RTP  requires  that  all  participants  are  pre-vetted  and  pre-screened.  The  criteria  for  that 
process must therefore be defined, to ensure that the same criteria are applied by all Member 
States and that they meet the requirements in terms of preventing irregular immigration and 
ensuring security.  

Vetting criteria should be proportionate in relation to both the internal security of the EU and 
the  objectives  of  the  RTP,  as  their  definition  will  influence  the  take-up  of  the  programme. 
Also, the time needed for examining and processing the applications as well as related costs 
should be taken into consideration.  

2.3.4.  Automation of border control for registered travellers 

A  key  question  involves  defining  how  facilitated  border  checks  should  be  implemented  in 
practice  at  the  border  crossing  points.  In  other  words,  as  concerns  RTs,  how  the  current 
thorough border checks should be adapted for this specific group of travellers. Directly linked 
to  the  definition  of  "facilitation"  is  the  question  of  automating  border  checks.  To  fully 
automate third-country nationals' border checks, a solution has to be found for calculating the 
period of authorised stay in the Schengen area at entry and exit or this requirement needs to be 
abolished as regards RTs. At the moment, the calculation is based on the stamps affixed on 
the third-country nationals' travel document. 

Automation  will  significantly  impact  many  issues,  for  example,  the  throughput  capacity  of 
border  crossing  points  and  hence  the  impact  on  border  crossing  times.  It  will  also  have  an 
impact on the required space and human resources needed at the border crossing point, and 
naturally,  it  will  significantly  impact  the  traveller's  border  crossing  experience.  The  overall 
benefits  that  will  be  derived  from  how  facilitated  border  checks  will  be  defined  can 
subsequently be assessed against the costs for setting up the system (cf section 2.3.2. on data 
storage). 

2.3.5.  Application fee 

Whether  an  application  fee  should  be  paid  by  the  applicant  would  need  to  be  decided.  An 
application  fee,  if  any  could  follow  the  same  logic  as  the  visa  fee  according  to  current  EU 
legislation  (60  EUR)  i.e.  the  fee  would  be  calculated  so  that  it  covers  Member  States' 
administrative costs for examining applications.  

2.4. 

Baseline scenario - how will the situation evolve if no new action is taken at EU 
level? 

Doing  nothing  at  the  EU  level  would  mean  that  third-country  nationals'  border  crossings 
could not be facilitated except those specifically mentioned in the SBC and the Local Border 

EN 

21 

   EN 

Traffic  Regulation  meaning  that  thorough  checks  would  be  applicable  for  third-country 
nationals  and  no  access  to  ABC  could  be  given  for  them.  Taking  into  account  that  border 
crossings  at  the  largest  and  busiest  border  grossing  points  have  been  increasing  and  will 
continue  to  do  so  in  the  future37,  Member  States  with  problems  managing  queues  already 
today  would  have  no  other  tool  than  hiring  more  staff  and  rebuilding  infrastructure  if  at  all 
feasible;  any  future  increase  in  travel  flows  would  lead  to  more  problems  of  this  kind. 
Furthermore,  the  full  roll-out  of  the  VIS  will  worsen  the  situation  at  the  external  border 
crossing points and thefore longer queues are expected. All third-country nationals holding a 
visa will be verified against the VIS on entry by using the visa sticker number in combination 
with verification of fingerprints. The fingerprint verification against the VIS will start in 2014 
and it will inevitably slow down the border check procedure by some tens of seconds per visa 
holder.  To  cope  with  the  forecasted  80%  increase  of  travel  flows  at  the  air  borders  and  the 
verification  of  visa  holders'  fingerprints  at  entry,  Member  States  would  need  to  hire 
approximately 17 500 border guards more equivalent to costs of 542,5 million Euro per year 
across  the  EU.  Any  increase  in  travel  flows  at  sea  and  land  borders  would  require  a 
proportionate increase of staff level. All the costs would fall on border guard administrations. 

This impact assessment is prepared in parallel with the impact assessment on the creation of 
an EES. An EES would replace the current system of stamping passports with the electronic 
registration  of  the  dates  and  place  of  entry  and  exit  of  third-country  nationals  admitted  for 
short stays to the Schengen area to allow for accurate and reliable calculation of authorised 
stays. In order to fully meet its purpose, such a system should record visa holders' and non-
visa  holders'  movements  alike  and  be  applied  consistently  at  all  border  crossing  points.  An 
EES would be integrated into the ABC and would allow for fully automated border crossings 
for  third-country  nationals  replacing  current  manual  calculation  of  authorised  stay  based  on 
the  stamps  in  the  passport.  Without  the  EES  fully  automated  systems  could  not  be 
implemented for third-country nationals.  

However, the RTP could be implemented without an EU-wide EES, but Member States would 
then  have  to  implement  a  semi-automated  border  control  for  RTs  meaning  that  after 
successfully  passing  through  the  automated  part  of  the  border  control  procedure  (i.e.  ABC 
gate), the RT would be guided to the border guard who would stamp the travel document and 
calculate the length of stay in the Schengen area. This would remarkable diminish the added 
value and attractiveness of the RTP. 

The  EES  does  not  as  such  form  part  of  the  baseline  for  this  impact  assessment  -  the  two 
systems (EES and RTP) are not dependent on each other as regards their implementation – but 
the potential development of an EES has to be taken into account in relation to automation of 
border control for third-country nationals.  

In terms of national developments, a continued further introduction of ABC for EU citizens 
by Member States at major airports is likely, as is the further development of national RTPs. 
However, these developments are not relevant, as they only concern EU citizens, except with 
regard to the automated gates installed at border crossing points. Those same gates installed 

37 

EN 

See  Eurocontrol's  "long-term  forecast  for  the  next  20  years"  published  on  17  of  December  2010, 
http://www.eurocontrol.int/statfor/gallery/content/public/forecast. Eurocontrol expects an increase from 
400 million in 2009 to 720 million border crossings at the air borders in 2030. See also the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) forecast: Tourism 2020 vision, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e(ser_e/omt.ppt 
and 
(OTTI), 
forecast 
http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/view/f-2000-99-001/index.html. 

and  Tourism 

of  Travel 

of  Office 

Industries 

travel 

the 

22 

   EN 

                                                 
for  EU  citizens  could  largely  be  also  used  by  third-country  nationals  if  the  EU  RTP  is 
implemented.  

Currently, only one Schengen country  has  a  project running at the air border crossing point 
with a third country based on semi-automated border controls both in the Member State and 
the  third  country38.  Some  other  Member  States  may  develop  an  RTP  for  third-country 
nationals based on this model. The overall impact of such systems with regard to facilitating 
travel flows of third-country nationals to the EU can however be assumed to be limited: they 
only  involve  a  minimum  facilitation  of  the  border  check  (a  semi-automated  system). 
Moreover,  such  programmes  can  only  operate  on  a  bilateral  basis  based  on  an  agreement 
between one Member State and one specific third country. The target group for this type of 
RTP  is  therefore  also  effectively  limited  to  third-country  nationals  who  cross  the  external 
border  of  the  two  countries  at  the  same  location  each  time.  A  widespread  take  up  of  such 
programmes  will  also  be  hampered  by  the  exponentially  increasing  number  of  bilateral 
agreements  needed  should  they  involve  several  Member  States  and  several  third  countries, 
with travellers obliged to carry out multiple registrations with each programme individually.  

While  the  continued  use  and  possible  small  increase  of  national  RTPs  described  in  section 
2.1.1 forms part of the baseline for this impact assessment, it is not relevant for the problem 
definition or the assessment of the options, as the basic scope is different: a national RTP is 
for EU citizens, while a EU RTP will be for third-country nationals. Member States can thus 
continue to use their "national RTPs" also in the future39, and these national RTPs would not 
affect the implementation of the EU-wide RTP discussed in this impact assessment. The EU 
RTP  needs  to  be  developed  based  on  the  common  technical  standards  and  it  should  be 
interoperable  with  the  existing  and  future  processes  and  workflows  at  the  consulates  and  at 
the  external  border.  Furthermore,  synergies  with  the  existing  EU-wide  systems  should  be 
exploited.  

In  general,  no  significant  change  is  expected  in  the  current  situation  with  regard  to  third-
country nationals' border checks. Therefore, the baseline for this impact assessment consists 
of  the  existing  SIS40,  the  successful  roll-out  of  the  VIS  as  well  as  the  establishment  of  an 
Agency  for  the  operational  management  of  large-scale  IT  systems  in  the  area  of  freedom, 
security  and  justice  (the  Agency)41.  Other  developments  in  the  EU's  policy  on  border 
management are not relevant here, such as changes to the legal framework of FRONTEX, the 
development of Eurosur, or other amendments to the Schengen Borders Code. 

In summary, the baseline scenario can be described as the following: 

–  the  current  one-size-fits  all  approach  to  border  checks  of  third-country  nationals  will 
continue with no possibility to distinguish between different travellers based on risk and no 
possibilities to provide a facilitated border check for low-risk, frequent travellers, 

38 

39 
40 

41 

The  Netherlands  and  the  US  have  this  kind  of  scheme  called  FLUX.  See  Annex  3  and  also 
http://www.schiphol.nl/Travellers/AtSchiphol/Privium/Flux.htm. 
Including the FLUX scheme. 
The switch from SIS to SISII is not relevant as the implementation of the SISII will not bring any new 
elements to the border check procedure when implemented. 
OJ L 286, 1.11.2011. 

EN 

23 

   EN 

                                                 
–  assuming limited  expansion of  personnel numbers in the Member States, border crossing 
times will increase due to the higher passenger flows, use of larger passenger aircrafts and 
ferries/cruise ships, and the implementation of the VIS, 

–  border  crossing  times  for  EU  citizens  will  decrease  due  to  a  continued  take-up  of  ABC 

systems. 

2.5. 

Subsidiarity 

Under  Articles  74,  77(2)(b)  and  77(2)(d)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European 
Union,  the  Union  has  the  power  to  adopt  measures  relating  to  checks  on  persons  and  the 
efficient monitoring of the crossing of external borders.  

The need for intervention at European level is clear. No Member State alone is able to build 
up  an  RTP  providing  facilitated  border  checks  across  the  Schengen  Member  States.  One 
individual Member State's decision to grant access to an EU-wide RTP would have an impact 
on all Schengen countries and must therefore be regulated at EU level. Any measures related 
to border control would have to apply to the Schengen area without internal border controls 
which  currently  includes  all  the  Member  States  except  Romania,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  UK  and 
Ireland and four other European countries (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). 
Schengen  states  are  committed  to  maintaining  common  EU  borders  and  common  standards 
for  border  controls.  Checks  are  carried  out  only  at  the  external  border,  after  which  the 
traveller can travel freely within the Schengen area. 

It  is  vital  for  the  internal  security  of  the  Schengen  area  that  all  the  binding  rules  linked  to 
border control are decided at EU level.  

Therefore, the objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting alone 
but can be better achieved at EU level.  

3. 

OBJECTIVES OF THE RTP  

The general objectives of the RTP are: 

•  To facilitate the crossing of EU external borders by third-country nationals; 

•  To maintain the current level of security. 

The specific objectives are: 

•  To promote access to the RTP for certain categories of frequent, pre-vetted third-country 

nationals; 

•  To ensure protection of registered traveller's fundamental rights, in particular their personal 

data; 

•  To avoid discrimination between different groups of travellers. 

The operational objectives are: 

EN 

24 

   EN 

•  To decrease the time and costs of border crossings for frequent travellers and to increase 
the  throughput  capacity  of  border  crossing  points.  Border  checks  of  registered  travellers 
should not take more than 20-40 seconds on average.  

•  To  free  up  border  control  resources  by  25%  from  checking  cross  border  movements  of 
frequent  and  pre-vetted  travellers  and  to  enable  better  focus  on  checking  higher  risk 
travellers42 and/or serve other travellers. 

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

In addition to the baseline, five policy options linked to the implementation of the RTP were 
identified  during  the  consultation  with  stakeholders.  Because  stakeholders  had  diverging 
views  on  their  implementation  and  in  order  to allow  for  a  cost-benefit  analysis,  for  each  of 
these five policy options real practical implementation options have been defined.  

The five policy options and their sub-options are independent implementation options for the 
RTP  in  the  sense  that  the  choice  of  one  sub-option  does  not  influence  the  choice  of  sub-
options in relation to the other policy options. In total, there are 13 sub-options which could 
be combined into a large number of equally feasible combinations or "packages" which would 
have  been  impractical  to  analyse.  For  this  reason,  each  sub-option  has  been  analysed 
individually. It should be noted, however, that the impacts of policy options 3 and 4 and their 
sub-options  are  linked.  Furthermore,  as  the  best  choice  for  the  Policy  option  1  "lodging  an 
application for an RTP" is clearly the lodging of applications at both border crossing points 
and consulates (cf 2.3.1.), it is not discussed again in this section. 

4.1. 

Policy option 2: Data storage 

4.1.1.  An RTP based on data stored in a separate token43 (sub-option 2a) 

Under  this  sub-option,  the  personal  data  (alphanumeric  and  biometric  data)44  enrolled  from 
each  successful  RTP  applicant  would  be  stored  on  a  chip  on  a  plastic  card  ("token"),  to  be 
issued by the Member State having approved the application. The alphanumeric data (but not 
biometric)  would  be  stored  by  the  Member  State  in  question  in  a  national  database.  No 
European database would be set up nor any information exchanged at European level.  

When crossing the border, using automated gates, the document reader incorporated into the 
gate  would  read  the  traveller's  passport,  the  visa  sticker  if  applicable,  and  the  token.  The 
traveller's  fingerprints  would  be  read  by  the  fingerprint  reader  incorporated  into  the  gate. 
Checks  against  databases  (such  as  SIS  and  national  databases)  would  be  run  using  the  data 
from the passport. The validity of the visa, if applicable, would be checked against the VIS. 
The traveller's identity and the access granted to the RTP would be verified against the data 
stored on the token (alphanumeric data and biometrics).  

42 

43 

44 

Travellers who have decided not to join the RTP are not and shall not be considered, due to their non-
participation in the RTP, as higher risk travellers.  
In the context of an RTP, a token can be described as a physical device given to the authorised user to 
prove his/her identity electronically. The token acts like an electronic key to access something, in this 
case to the ABC system. 
See annex 8 for the data to be stored. 

EN 

25 

   EN 

                                                 
This sub-option would involve defining common technical standards for the token including 
security  and  layout  aspects  to  guarantee  interoperability  and  security  across  the  Member 
States and visibility across the Schengen area. On the basis of the prior definition of business 
requirements for the token to be adopted by the Commission in a comitology procedure, the 
European  Agency  for  the  operational  management  of  large-scale  IT  systems  in  the  area  of 
freedom,  security  and  justice  established  by  Regulation  (EU)  No  1077/2011  of  25  October 
2011 (the Agency) would be responsible for the definition of the technical specifications for 
the  token.  The  technical  specifications  would  be  agreed  with  Member  States  by  the 
Commission in a Comitology procedure. It can be noted in this regard that the option of using 
an e-passport held by the third-country national as a token can be discarded from the start; not 
all third-country nationals are issued with e-passports, most if not all third countries issue e-
passports  with  only  the  facial  image  as  biometric  identifier,  and  full  access  to  the  third-
country  national's  data  on  the  chip  for  all  Member  States'  border  guard  authorities  is  not 
feasible within the short- to medium-term. 

During the consultations on the Commission's communication adopted in 2011, one Member 
State was clearly in favour of a token-based system. The majority of Member Sates preferred 
a centralised system. 

4.1.2.  An RTP based on data stored in a centralised database (sub-option 2b) 

Under this sub-option, a centralised database would be developed, in the form of a Registered 
Traveller System (RTS). Biometrics (fingerprints) and alphanumeric data from the application 
file on all registered travellers would be stored in the RTS45.  

When crossing the border, using automated gates, the document reader incorporated into the 
gate  would  read  the  traveller's  passport  and  the  visa  sticker,  if  applicable.  The  traveller's 
fingerprints would be read by the fingerprint reader incorporated into the gate. Checks against 
databases (such as SIS and national databases) would be run using the data from the passport. 
The  validity  of  the  visa,  if  applicable,  would  be  checked  against  the  VIS.  The  traveller's 
identity  and  the  access  granted  to  the  RTP  would  be  verified  against  the  data  stored  in  the 
RTS (alphanumeric and biometric data). 

It is assumed (based on the technical studies and the consultations) that the centralised system 
could be based on a similar technical platform as the VIS. Functionalities and responsibilities 
for  the  RTS  would  be  established.  On  the  basis  of  implementing  measures  adopted  by  the 
Commission in a comitology procedure, the Agency would develop and operationally manage 
the RTS46. 

During  the  consultations  on  the  Commission's  communication  adopted  in  2008  and  2011, 
Member  States  expressed  a  clear  preference  for  a  centralised  system.  The  European 
Parliament expressed doubts about the setting up of a new centralised database and was of the 
opinion that no new instruments and systems should be launched until the existing tools are 
fully operational, safe and realiable. 

45 
46 

See annex 8 for the data to be stored. 
The implementing measures would follow the same general principles as with the VIS meaning that for 
example the design of the physical architecture of the system including its communication infrastructure 
and  the  specifications  for  the  resolution  and  use  of  fingerprints  for  biometric  verification  in  the  RTP 
would be decided in a comitology procedure. 

EN 

26 

   EN 

                                                 
4.1.3.  An RTP based on data stored in a separate token combined with a central repository 

(sub-option 2c) 

Under this sub-option, only the unique identifier (application number) would be stored on the 
token, while biometric data together with the unique identifier and data from the application 
would  be  stored  in  a  central  repository.  A  link  (unique  identifier  e.g.  application  number) 
between the repository and the token is needed to verify the validity of the access granted to 
the RTP. The token is needed in order to carry out a verification (1:1) against the repository47 
at the border check. A verification takes only seconds.  

The  main  difference  between  a  central  database  and  a  central  repository  is  that  in  a  central 
database, the alphanumeric and the biometric data are stored together and accessed together. 
In  the  repository,  the  alphanumeric  data  and  the  biometric  data  are,  from  a  technical 
perspective, stored  in  separate  sections. In  this case, the biometric verification at the border 
check  can  only  be  performed  by  physically  producing  the  token  (unique  identifier).  This 
verification produces only a hit/no hit result. However, the visa and border authorities should 
use the central repository for examining applications, for the examination whether to revoke 
or extend access granted to the RTP, in case of lost or stolen token and if any problems occur 
with  facilitating  registered  travellers'    border  crossing.  Since  for  these  purposes  all 
information stored in the central repository may be relevant, the competent authority should 
have access either to the complete application file including biometric data of the applicant or 
only to the separate section of central repository containing alphanumeric data. Access shall 
be given to the competent authorities only if the specific search criteria are met.  

The same principles as in the two sub-options above would apply, with regard to the issues 
related  to  the  token  as  well  as  the  issues  related  to  the  centralised  database.  The  Agency 
would be responsible for the development and management of the central repository and for 
the definition of the technical specifications for the token whereas Member States would be 
responsible for management of tokens. The technical specifications would be agreed with the 
Member States by the Commission in a Comitology procedure. 

When crossing the border, using automated gates, the document reader incorporated into the 
gate  would  read  the  traveller's  passport,  the  visa  sticker  if  applicable,  and  the  token  of  the 
traveller. The traveller's fingerprints would be read by the fingerprint reader incorporated into 
the gate. Checks against databases (such as SIS and national databases) would be run using 
the data from the passport. The validity of the visa, if applicable, would be checked against 
the VIS. The travellers' identity and the access granted to the RTP would be verified against 
the  data  (alphanumeric  and  biometric  data)  stored  in  the  central  repository.  However,  any 
verification would not be possible without physically producing the token at the border. The 
link between the token and the repository would be the unique identifier stored on the token. 

During the consultations on the Commission's communication adopted in 2011, two Member 
States were in favour of a token/central repository system. However, these Member States did 
not provide concrete reasoning why they prefer this option.  

47 

Verification  means  the  process  of  comparing  a  submitted  biometric  sample  against  the  biometric 
reference template of a single enrolee whose identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches 
the enrolee's template. 

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4.2. 

Policy option 3: Vetting criteria 

4.2.1. 

Same as for multiple-entry visa holders (based on current EU law) (sub-option 3a) 

Under  this  sub-option,  vetting  criteria  would  be  aligned  with  the  criteria  for  multiple-entry 
visa  holders48.  As  can  be  seen  from  Annex  9  vetting  would  be  performed  to  verify  that  the 
entry  conditions  are  met.  Vetting  would  be  done  using  the  same  data  sets  as  used  when 
examining  multiple-entry  visa  applications  (application  form,  supporting  documents,  EU-
wide databases such as the SIS and VIS, if applicable and national databases). 

The  EDPS  in  his  informal  comments  on  the  draft  2011  communication  highlighted  that  the 
sources of data used for the vetting of applicants must be clarified. 

4.2.2.  More thorough vetting procedure (sub-option 3b) 

A  few  Member  States  have  raised  the  issue  of  having  as  thorough  a  vetting  procedure  as 
possible.  For  them,  the  vetting  done  for  visas  is  insufficient  to  give  access  to  the  RTP  and 
especially  to  move  to  a  full  automation  of  border  control.  Fully  automated  border  control 
would therefore, in their opinion, require stricter vetting procedures.  

This sub-option involves therefore adding the following procedural steps: 

•  a consultation between Member States would always be compulsory before a decision on 

an RTP application is made, 

•  a third-country national should choose the Member States at whose external borders he/she 
would like to benefit from a facilitated border check. Each of the  Member States chosen 
would  check  the  third-country  national's  data  from  their  own  databases  (border  guard, 
police,  etc.)  and  verify  watch  lists  before  the  third-country  national's  access  to  the  RTP 
would be granted/refused. 

4.2.3.  Discarded sub-option: Involvement of third countries in the vetting (sub-option 3c) 

Some  Member  States  considered  that  the  country  of  origin  of  a  traveller  should  also  be 
involved in the pre-screening by carrying out a check of their databases (border guard, police, 
etc.) and watch lists and deliver a "green light/red light" message, or grant a certificate on the 
traveller's good behaviour in the country of origin. This possibility is discarded from the start, 
for  several  reasons.  A  vetting  by  a  third  country  would  effectively  give  a  third  country  a 
decisive influence on whether (or not) a third-country national should benefit from facilitated 
checks to enter the EU. Some third countries may not be willing to do any kind of vetting on 
their  own  citizens  for  several  reasons;  one  being  that  it  would  cause  additional  burden  for 
them without bringing any concrete benefits. Certain third countries, especially those with a 
poor  human  rights  record,  could  delay  the  vetting  procedure  or  postpone  the  delivery  of  a 
certificate, particularly with regard to specific individuals (journalists, rights defenders etc.). 
In the worst situation access to the RTP could be given only to persons having a "privileged 
status" in their country. For its practical implementation it would also require the exchange of 
personal data using technical means between each Member State and each third country. This 
kind  of  vetting  would  neither  be  proportionate  in  light  of  the  objectives  of  the  RTP  nor 
feasible  within  the  short-  to  medium-term,  and  this  sub-option  is  therefore  not  further 

48 

As resulted by the Visa Code; OJ L 243, 15.9.2009.  

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assessed. This option also raises serious data protection concerns as it requires the exchange 
of  personal  data  with  third  countries  which  may  not  provide  adequate  safeguards  and 
protections for processing personal data. Furthermore, this sub-option would not be coherent 
with the EU's policy on information exchange with third countries. 

4.3. 

Policy option 4: Automation of border control for registered travellers 

4.3.1.  Fully automated (sub-option 4a) 

Under this  sub-option the facilitated border check  for registered  travellers would essentially 
be identical to the minimum check currently applied to EU citizens, although for third-country 
nationals  the  consultation  of  databases  (such  as  SIS)  would  have  to  be  systematic  and 
compulsory.  Registered  travellers'  border  checks  could  thus  be  fully  automated  and  under 
normal  circumstances  no  human  intervention  would  be  required,  using  largely  the  same 
automated gates as currently used for EU citizens. Verification of the identity of the traveller 
would  be  made  against  biometric  data  (stored  according  to  one  of  the  sub-options  under 
policy option 2). However, human intervention should be provided immediately if a traveller 
is "refused" by the system or any malfunction occurs. 

This  sub-option  would  require  that  a  solution  is  found  to  calculate  the  time  spent  in  the 
Schengen area. The EES would be a solution for that. 

The majority of Member States were in favour of fully automated border control system for 
registered travellers. However, some of them asked the Commission to launch a study on the 
usefulness of the ABC systems for third-country nationals and expressed doubts on demand 
for an RTP and ABC as they have only few entries/exits outside the Schengen area. 

4.3.2. 

Semi-automated (sub-option 4b) 

Under  this  sub-option,  the  facilitated  check  would  be  defined  as  a  minimum  check  with 
certain additional elements. Registered travellers' border checks would include as a first step 
the same process as in sub-option 4a; passing through an automated gate for the verification 
of the identity, access granted to the RTP, and checks against databases (such as SIS). As a 
second  step,  human  intervention  would  still  be  required;  the  automated  process  would  be 
followed by an individual decision, by the border guard, to authorise or refuse entry or exit, 
and the passport could be manually stamped as today.  

Only  very  few  Member  States  supported  a  semi-automated  border  control  for  registered 
travellers considering that it would better guarantee security aspects. 

4.4. 

Policy option 5: Application fee 

4.4.1.  Fee of 20 EUR (sub-option 5a) 

Under  this  sub-option,  a  fee  of  20  EUR  would  be  introduced.  The  fee  is  calculated  on  the 
basis of the administrative cost to Member States for examining applications. It is estimated 
that  5  million  third-country  nationals  would  apply  for  access  to  the  RTP  each  year.  Half  of 
them  would  be  visa  exempted  and  half  third-country  nationals  requiring  a  visa.  The 

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29 

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examination of one application would take 45 minutes, on average49, including checking the 
supporting documents, capturing biometric data and conducting interviews, if applicable. If a 
multiple-entry  visa  application  were  examined  at  the  same  time  as  a  RTP  application  and 
based  on  the  same  supporting  documents,  then  the  time  needed  for  examining  a  RTP 
application would be reduced by half. In the abstract, the total time needed for examining and 
granting/refusing access to the RTP would be 2,81 million hours per year equivalent to 73,1 
million EUR or 1 705 persons50 across Member States. The fee could therefore be set at 20 
EUR per each individual application. However, the fee could be reduced to 10 EUR if a visa 
and a RTP appliation were examined at the same time. The fee would not cover any additional 
costs  for  issuing  a  token  and  sending  the  token  to  the  applicant  by  mail.51  All  the  Member 
States which expressed their views during the consultations were in favour of collecting a fee 
from the registered travellers. 

4.4.2.  No fee (sub-option 5b) 

This sub-option would involve imposing no fee whatsoever on applicants.  

5. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

This section considers each of the sub-options described in section 4 against the assessment 
criteria.  The  sub-options  have  been  rated  on  a  nine-point  scale  with  respect  to  their  likely 
performance relative to the general objectives. The options are assessed against the baseline. 
All options are also assessed against other relevant criteria, in this case criteria belonging to 
the general economic and social criteria: 

•  The total one-time development cost of the system related to the expected duration of three 
years  and  the  total  yearly  operational  costs  for  the  ensuing  period  of  five  years,  divided 
into  central  (EU)  and  national  (Member  States)  costs;  the  tables  in  annexes  10.1-10.3. 
contain more detailed information on cost categories and costs per item; a breakdown and 
more detailed description of the administrative costs is provided in annex 10.4. 

•  Protection of fundamental rights, particularly privacy and data protection.  

Only the criteria relevant for each sub-option have been analysed, and otherwise omitted. 

The impacts have graphically been indicated with symbols: 

- √√√√ 

Highest negative impact/cost  

- √√√ 

Significant negative impact/cost 

- √√ 

- √ 

Medium negative impact/cost 

Small negative impact/cost  

49 

50 
51 

Based on  replies  of  the  three  Member  States  that provided data  the  examination of  a (multiple-entry) 
visa  application  lasts  on  average  45  minutes.  This  time  includes  capturing  the  biometric  data.  The 
procedures with a RTP application and a visa application are almost the same. A starting point for the 
calculation is that all multiple-entry visa holders submit an RTP application and a visa application at the 
same time. 
Assuming that one person works 7,5 hour/day and 220 days in a year.  
The cost for a token would vary between 1 and 5 euro and has been taken into account in relation to the 
costs for the relevant sub-options under policy option 2. 

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0 

√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

No impact 

Small positive impact/savings 

Medium positive impact/savings 

Very significant positive impact/savings 

√√√√ 

Highest positive impact/savings 

As explained at the start of section 4, all policy options and their sub-options are independent 
implementation  options.  However,  the  impacts  of  the  sub-options  with  regard  to  policy 
options 3 and 4 (vetting criteria and automation of border control) are directly linked, in the 
sense  that  the  impact  of  the  sub-options  with  regard  to  vetting  cannot  be  assessed  without 
knowing  which  is  the  preferred  option  with  regard  to  automation,  and  vice  versa. 
Consequently the available four sub-options (3a, 3b, 4a, 4b) from the two policy options have 
been combined in the assessment into the four variations possible, and the impact of all four 
variations is assessed in an integrated way.  

As the preferred sub-option of policy option 1 is clear (cf 2.3.1.) and the sub-options of policy 
options  2  (data  storage)  and  5  (application  fee)  are  purely  technical  implementation  options 
which  are  not  linked  to  other  policy  options,  they  have  not  been  presented  and  analysed  in 
combination with the other policy options.  

It must be noted that in the impact assessment it was very difficult to estimate the impact in 
practice  of  the  RTP  on  the  number  of  border  guards  needed  at  the  external  border  and  on 
travellers´  waiting  time  as  these  depend  almost  entirely  on  the  individual  border  crossing 
point. 

There are very big differences between the traveller profiles at different border crossing points 
at the external border as described in section 2.1.2. and Annex 2 (for example, the number of 
third-country nationals vs. EU citizens differs greatly). Also, the current capacity to manage 
passenger flows at a specific border crossing point (infrastructure, data transmission system, 
customs and security checks, etc.) has a significant effect on travellers´ waiting time and also 
on border guard resources needed. As a result of the above factors, precise estimates of the 
impact of each sub-option on border crossing times and the need for human resources would 
only be possible based on a detailed analysis of the current situation at each and every border 
crossing point (over 1800) of the Schengen area, which is not practically feasible. 

5.1. 

Policy option 1: Lodging an application for an RTP 

Sub-options are not analysed as the preferred option is clearly 1c; lodging an application for 
an RTP at the external border and at consulates (cf 2.3.1.). 

5.2. 

Policy option 2: Data storage 

As regards all the sub-options, the EDPS highlighted the privacy by design, only a one to one 
verification of biometrics should be possible, data protection rights should be ensured and no 
record should be stored in the RTP database/token. 

5.2.1.  Data stored in a token (sub-option 2a) 

•  To facilitate the crossing of EU external borders by third-country nationals √√√ 

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31 

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A token-based system would significantly facilitate border crossings compared to the baseline 
situation. A token-based system would guarantee facilitated border crossings as any technical 
break down or failure of the system would not have effects on Member States' other systems. 

However, a token-based system adds one step to the automated border control process, as a 
token  needs  to  be  physically  placed  on  a  document  reader  (integrated  in  the  gate)  and 
"opened", and the identity of the registered traveller should be verified against the data stored 
in a token. This additional verification step would increase somewhat (a few seconds) the time 
needed for a border check. From the travellers point of view the experience will therefore be a 
bit  more  complicated  and  cumbersome  compared  to  a  centralised  system,  as  not  only  the 
passport and the visa sticker (if applicable) needs to be put on the reader but also the token. 

A  token  as  such  would  give  more  visibility  to  the  EU  RTP.  However,  a  traveller  who  has 
forgotten  to  bring  the  token  cannot  make  use  of  his/her  access  to  the  RTP.  Furthermore,  a 
renewal of access to the RTP could not be made centrally, as the person would need to appear 
in person to have a new token issued. This is likely to reduce the attractiveness of the RTP to 
persons who do not travel often but, as already indicated before, these do not constitute the 
main target group of the programme. 

The EU could consider promoting the token-based system – based on existing and future EU 
technical standards – at a global level following its full implementation in the EU. 

•  To maintain the current level of security √√ 

The  overall  impact  will  increase  security  due  to  the  verification  of  the  identity  of  travellers 
using biometrics, as concerns non-visa holders. 

However, a token-based system could be exploited for "Registered Traveller shopping", as no 
data is stored from any previous applications which can be accessed by the authority assessing 
the  application.  Nothing  would  prevent  a  person  from  repeatedly  lodging  applications  at 
several locations to increase his/her chance of success, although a uniform application of the 
vetting criteria would minimise this risk.  

Multiple  tokens  could  be  issued  for  the  same  registered  traveller  not  subject  to  the  visa 
requirement:  it  would  be  possible  to  lodge  multiple  applications  and  obtain  several  tokens 
linked to the same person travelling with different travel documents. This risk is not, however, 
relevant for visa holders as their identity can be biometrically verified in the VIS. For persons 
not holding a visa the risk of identity fraud could be reduced by requiring an applicant to hold 
a biometric passport. 

Access  to  the  RTP  cannot  be  revoked  centrally,  in  case  a  person  no  longer  fulfils  the 
conditions.  As  long  as  a  token  holder  presents  his  token  at  the  border  within  the  validity 
period  marked  on  the  token,  assuming  ABC  is  used,  he/she  can  use  the  RTP  even  if  there 
would be reasons to cancel his/her "membership" (he/she could be flagged in the SIS but only 
for  one  of  the  legally  possible  categories  of  alerts).  Access  granted  to  the  RTPcan  only  be 
revoked by physically cancelling (destroying) the token.  

5.2.2  Data stored in a centralised database (sub-option 2b) 

•  To facilitate the crossing of EU external borders by third-country nationals √√√√ 

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32 

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A centralised RTP would not require travellers to carry any additional document besides the 
passport. The traveller would however not receive any physical confirmation or "proof" that 
he or she is a registered traveller; this would be dependent on verification against the records 
in the RTS. 

Border  guards  would  always  be  able  to  check  whether  a  person  is  a  registered  traveller  by 
searching  in  the  centralised  database.  During  ABC,  biometric  verification  against  the  RTS 
could  be  done  simultaneously  with  other  processes  and  can  easily  be  integrated  into  the 
automated process.  

Member  States  were  in  favour  of  centralised  system  whereas  the  European  Parliament 
expressed doubts on establishing it. 

•  To maintain the current level of security √√√ 

Overall the impact on security is positive compared to the baseline due to the verification of 
the identity of travellers using biometrics, as concerns non-visa holders. 

A centralised system would be more secure than a token-based system as there would be no 
token which could be falsified. Having a reliable, accessible record of the registered travellers 
would help to examine a subsequent application wherever the application is lodged. Problems 
related 
fraud  and  central 
revocation/renewal  of  access  granted  to  the  RTP  are  effectively  solved  by  a  centralised 
database. However, a centralised system could be hacked, just as any other data storage which 
is connected to a network. 

to  Registered  Traveller 

shopping,  multiple 

identity 

5.2.3  Data  (unique  identifier  i.e.  application  number)  stored  in  a  token  and  (unique 
identifier, biometrics and data from applications) in a central repository (sub-option 
2c) 

•  To facilitate the crossing of EU external borders by third-country nationals √√√ 

In terms of the border management process, this sub-option involves the introduction of two 
new factors compared to the baseline – travellers carrying tokens and a new central repository 
to which all border crossing points and consulates must be connected. 

In this sub-option there is a need to read the token as well as to search the central repository, 
in order to verify the identity of the traveller and that he is the rightful holder of the token. 
The automated process may therefore be marginally slower (a few seconds) compared to the 
other sub-options. The traveller must carry the token to benefit from the RTP membership at 
the border, but appearance in person is not necessary for renewal or revocation. 

The visibility of the programme is achieved, but the feasibility of promoting it at global level 
is reduced, as the functioning of the system depends on centralised storage of personal data. 

•  To maintain the current level of security √√√ 

Overall the impact on security is positive due to the verification of the identity of travellers 
using biometrics, as concerns non-visa holders. 

This  sub-option  allows  for  preventing  identity  fraud  and  for  revoking  or  renewing  RTP 
membership centrally. "Registered traveller shopping" would be prevented if the fingerprints 

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of  rejected  applicants  are  also  stored  in  the  repository  together  with  the  date  of  previous 
application(s) and the reasons for rejection.  

5.2.4  Costs (all sub-options) 

The  costs  in  the  2008  impact  assessment  were  taken  from  the  technical  feasibility  study 
performed  earlier,  where  the  minimum  technically  feasible  option,  a  web-based  application 
for  both  the  EES  and  the  RTP,  was  chosen  as  the  option  for  cost  calculation.  The  pure 
development costs for both systems together remained, therefore, relatively low and the cost 
estimation did not include other required costs, as for example a secure network. The costs for 
a  web-based  communication  network  for  both  the  EES  and  the  RTP  in  2008  impact 
assessment were 100.000 EUR per year, compared to 13 million EUR per year (based on the 
current market prices) for a secure network only for the one system now.  

This was the main reason why it was decided to prepare a separate detailed cost study in 2010 
with  the  help  of  an  external  contractor52.  Costs  were  calculated  for  numerous  different 
scenarios.  However,  only  the  most  relevant  cost  scenarios  are  presented  in  this  impact 
assessment. All the cost parameters were established so that the costs were calculated on the 
basis  of  'maximum  value'  estimates  within  a  reasonable  range  meaning  that  the  cost  were 
calculated so that they should not overrun the budget in any circumstances (details on the cost 
study are in Annex 10). 

The  table  below  sets  out  the  total  development  costs,  the  yearly  operational  costs,  and 
accumulated total costs for development and operation (one-time costs and 5 years of yearly 
operational  costs)  for  each  of  the  three  sub-options.  As  there  is  no  central  technical 
development  in  the  token-based  sub-option  there  are  no  EU  costs  for  that  sub-option.  The 
costs  below  do  not  include  the  costs  for  examining  applications,  which  are  described  under 
policy option 5. The sub-option 2c is clearly the most expensive one. The development costs 
would be 164 million EUR for Member States (MS) and 43 million EUR for the EU. Yearly 
operational costs would be for 81 million EUR for Member States and 20 million EUR for the 
EU.  During  the  consultations  on  the  Commission's  communication  adopted  in  2011,  the 
majority  of  Member  States  were  concerned  about  the  high  costs  of  the  systems  (RTP  and 
EES) and asked for a cost-benefit analysis and the EU's financial support.  

Table 1 – Costs, policy option 2 

Suboptions 

One time development 
cost at central and 
national level  
(3 years of development) 
(in EUR million ) 

Yearly operational cost 
at central and national 
level 
(5 years of operation)  
(in EUR million)  

Total costs at central 
and national level 
(8 years) 

(in EUR million) 

ANNEX 

Data stored in a token 

151 

95 

626 

Annex 10.1  

(Member States (MS) 
151) 

(MS 95) 

(MS 626) 

stored 

Data 
in 
centralised database 

a 

190 

94 

660 

Annex 10.2  

(MS 152, EU 38) 

(MS 76, EU 18) 

(MS 532, EU 128) 

52 

Final report on the cost analysis of entry/exit and RTP systems done by the external contractor on 19 of 
April  2010  (version  1.30)  is  published  on  the  following  website:  http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/doc_centre/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm#studies 

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207 

101 

712 

Annex 10.3 

(MS 164, EU 43) 

(MS 81, EU 20) 

(MS 569, EU 143) 

and 

Data  (unique  identifier 
in  a 
number)  stored 
(unique 
token 
biometrics 
identifier, 
and 
from 
data 
application)  in  a  central 
repository  

In Member States the costs would fall on the ministry responsible for managing the system. 
Every  Member  State  would  be  free  to  choose  the  best  possible  one  and  it  could  be  for 
example  the  Ministry  of  Interior  as  is  the  case  in  many  Member  States  with  the  SIS  or  the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as is the case in many Member States with the VIS.  

5.2.5 

Protection of fundamental rights, particularly privacy and data protection 

A centralised system would have significant impacts on fundamental rights, particularly data 
protection  and  protection  of  privacy.  The  data  would  be  stored  in  a  form  that  could  be 
manipulated and there is a potential risk, as with any data of this type, that it could be used 
inappropriately. The RTP should follow the requirements set in existing EU law for the VIS 
as to privacy, data protection and fundamental rights of travellers, including establishing clear 
rules on access rights, purpose limitation, monitoring and supervision of data processing, data 
security, etc.  

A token-based system excludes the need for establishing a new EU level IT-system and a new 
centralised  database.  A  token-based  system  would  therefore  have  less  of  an  impact  on 
fundamental  rights,  privacy  and  data  protection  than  establishing  a  centralised  system. 
Personal  data  on  travellers  is  stored  only  on  a  token  and  no  centralised  register  or  database 
would exist. The authorities would have access only to one individual's data. A one-to-many 
search using biometrics becomes technically impossible. However,  the same  data protection 
rules as for the centralised system would be needed.  

On  the  other  hand,  a  missing,  lost  or  stolen  token  is  a  de  facto  risk  that  will  require  high 
demands on preventing the misuse of tokens and ensuring their security. Furthermore, there 
would  also  be  a  risk  of  cloning  the  token  (electronic  chip)  or  of  unauthorised  access  to  the 
token, especially as regards the alphanumeric data which is not normally as well-secured as 
biometrics.  To  minimise  the  risks  above  the  token  would  need  to  follow  the  same  security 
requirements  as  residence  permits  or  e-passports.  The  main  risk  with  a  purely  token-based 
system  would  be  "Registered  traveller  shopping"  as  no  data  is  stored  from  any  previous 
application which could be accessed by the visa or border authority assessing the application. 

In  a  token-based  system,  data  protection  benefits  would  need  to  be  safeguarded  so  that 
Member States could store the registered travellers' alphanumeric data but not biometric data 
in their national databases. This would mean that instead of having a single EU database for 
registered  travellers,  all  Member  States  could  establish  their  own  database  containing  only 
alphanumeric data.  

In the sub-option combining a token with a central repository, the drawbacks related to data 
protection of the two other sub-options are present but with clear limitations. A one-to-many 
search  in  the  central  repository  to  establish  a  person's  identity  is  impossible  at  the  border 
check,  and  the  risk  of  cloning  or  accessing  the  data  on  the  token  is  minimised.  As  regards 
biometrics,  border  guards  would  have  only  hit/no  hit  responses  at  the  border  check. 
Alphanumeric and biometric data from the application file stored in the repository would be 
accessible  to  duly  authorised  staff  of  border  control  and  visa  authorities  when  assessing 

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35 

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applications,  renewing/revoking  access  to  the  RTP,  in  case  of  lost  or  stolen  token  or  any 
problems occur with facilitating registered travellers' border crossings subject to the specific 
search  criteria.  The  AMCHAM  EU  supports  a  token  with  a  central  repository  approach  as 
separating  the  storage  of  anonymised  data  may  allow  for  the  use  of  advanced  and  secure 
mechanism to protect the most sensitive data at a lower cost. 

As regards all sub-options, the scope of access to RTP data should be limited exclusively to 
duly  authorised  staff  of  border  control  and  visa  authorities,  as  far  as  access  to  the  data  is 
necessary for the performance of their tasks namely assesing RTP applications and facilitating 
third country nationals' travel. No access to the information stored in the RTP should be given 
to any other authorities or third countries.  

The RTP shall respect the fundamental rights of all travellers and comply with the principles 
laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and in particular Articles 7 and 8 
thereof. Furthermore, in addition to the intervention of national data protection authorities to 
require  correction  or  deletion  of  erroneous  data,  a  review  procedure  for  challenging  or 
correcting potential errors in accordance with the right to an effective remedy (Article 47(1) 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) would have to be laid down.  

Table 2 - Assessment of policy option 2 

Sub-options 

To facilitate the 
crossing of EU 
external borders 

To maintain the 
current level of 
security 

Data stored in a token 

Data stored in a centralised database 

Data  (unique  number)  stored  in  a  token  and 
(biometrics  and  data  from  applications)  in  a 
repository 

√√√ 

√√√√ 

√√√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

√√√ 

Cost 

-√√ 

-√√ 

-√√√ 

Protection of 
fundamental rights 

-√ 

-√√√ 

-√ 

5.3 

Policy options 3 and 4: Vetting criteria and automation of border control 

As explained in the beginning of this section,  the available four sub-options (3a, 3b, 4a, 4b) 
from  the  two  policy  options  have  been  combined  into  the  four  variations  possible,  and  the 
impact of all four variations is assessed in an integrated way. The variations are: 

•  Same  vetting  as  for  multiple-entry  visa  holders  (3a),  fully  automated  border 

crossing (4a) 

•  Same  vetting  as  for  multiple-entry  visa  holders  (3a),  semi-automated  border 

crossing (4b) 

•  More thorough vetting procedure (3b), fully automated border crossing (4a) 

•  More thorough vetting procedure (3b), semi-automated border crossing (4b) 

•  To facilitate the crossing of EU external borders by third-country nationals 

Vetting  criteria  and  procedures  should  be  proportionate  to  the  objectives  of  the  RTP. 
Multiple-entry visas have already been issued for years and the criteria for their issuance have 
been  tested.  Travellers  subject  to  the  visa  requirement  would  not  have  to  deliver  several 
different  supporting  documents.  This  would  enable  simultaneous  processing  of  a  visa 

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36 

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application and an RTP application and hence minimise the increase of work at the consulates 
and  maximise  the  number  of  RTP  applications  submitted  by  visa-required  third-country 
nationals.  

Based  on  the  Member  States'  analysis  the  border  processing  time  using  a  fully  automated 
ABC system is significantly shorter compared to the baseline (manual checks). For example, 
in  Portugal's  RAPID  and  Germany's  EasyPass,  e-passport  based  systems,  automated  border 
crossings  based  on  facial  recognition  take  15-20  seconds,  in  Germany's  iris-based  ABG 
system  using  a  conventional  passport  and  template  stored  in  a  database,  automated  border 
crossings take 10-15 seconds and in France's fingerprint based PARAFE system, it takes 20 
seconds. With the traditional border check procedure a border guard can perform an average 
of six EU citizens' border checks per minute whereas the same border guard can supervise 26 
border  checks  by  using  the  RAPID  system.  At  Lisbon  airport,  one  border  guard  monitors 
seven  automated  border  check  gates.  In  theory,  RAPID  increases  the  capacity  of  border 
checks during peak hours by around 430 % with the same number of border guards. Based on 
the presentation given by the Netherlands in the Innovation Border Management Conference 
held  in  Copenhagen  on  2  and  3  of  February  2012  36  e-gates,  with  12  border  guards 
supervising them, can process 5,7 million passengers per year. To process the same number of 
travellers with manual border control process 48 border guards would be needed. At Schipol 
airport, passengers' waiting time is reduced by 15 million minutes per year. 

By  comparison,  according  to  the  Member  States'  replies  to  the  Czech  Presidency  and  the 
Commission's  questionnaire,  currently  (baseline)  the  average  time  for  a  (manual)  border 
check is roughly between one and two minutes, depending on the type of border and whether 
the  traveller  is  required  to  hold  a  visa  or  not.  Based  on  these  examples,  the  RTP  with  full 
automation would reduce significantly the border crossing time for third-country nationals at 
the  busiest  external  border  crossing  points.  As  illustrated  in  section  2.1.2,  57%  of  border 
checks at air borders are performed at the 20 busiest air border crossing points in the EU. 

In  semi-automated  border  control,  part  of  the  process  would  be  automated  but  border 
authorities would still carry out part of the border check manually (for example stamping of 
passport to calculate the time spent in the Schengen area). Time savings for border crossings 
for this sub-option would be limited compared to the baseline (manual checks). The interest 
for  the  traveller  is  also  significantly  reduced,  as  there  will  be  a  need  to  pass  through  two 
processes – the automated gate and appearing at the control booth – which can certainly be 
perceived as a step backwards compared to the baseline (manual check going directly to the 
control booth). The Netherlands conducted a survey from 9 May till 16 May 2011 in which a 
total of 242 of the US participants in the FLUX programme responded. The FLUX is a semi-
automated  programme.  All  respondents  with  an  American  passport  indicated  that  their 
passports are stamped. 84% of the respondents were either  outspoken negative (40%) about 
this  requirement  or  regarded  it  as  bureaucratic  red  tape  (44%).  Many  comments  which  the 
respondents volunteered to give addressed this issue.  

An automated system would allow for more efficient use of border control resources, the best 
use of available space at the border crossing points, and at the same time enable more efficient 
service  for  travellers53,  especially  at  busy  border  crossing  points.  As  the  experience  of 
Member  States'  national  ABC  systems  show,  a  substantial  number  of  border  guards  can  be 

53 

The  Privium  program  in  Netherlands  has  processed  millions  of  border  crossings  for  its  46  000 
members; Flux pilot programme report, February 2010. 

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37 

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freed up for other duties and thus facilitate also those travellers' border crossings who do not 
use  the  ABC  system.  Based  on  the  final  report  on  the  cost  analysis  on  Entry/Exit  and  RTP 
systems made by the external contractor54, 7,68 border guards are needed per manual lane per 
million  travellers  to  perform  border  checks  whereas  the  rate  using  an  ABC  system  is  2,73 
persons. In a semi-automated system, these savings would largely be absent as each traveller 
would still need to be checked by a border guard. 

Most  travellers  are  already  familiar  with  different  types  of  e-services  and  are  ready  to  use 
them. Approximately 90% of them are willing to use ABC systems as surveys conducted in 
the Netherlands, in the United Kingdom and in Australia show. The details of the surveys are 
reported in Annex 2.  

During the consultations, several Member States recalled that the travel flows at the external 
borders are increasing constantly and all Member States are facing the same problem i.e. how 
to manage them  efficiently  and  cost-effectively. The only answer for them is  automation of 
border  controls  to  the  largest  extent,  also  including  for  third-country  nationals.  Big 
investments would be needed in technology but "investing" only in human resources and old-
fashioned border check procedures with stamping is the most expensive solution. In the long 
term, technical solutions will lead to savings. Some Member States saw an EES as a condition 
for  the  RTP  and  especially  for  full  automation  of  border  control.  Common  standards  were 
pleaded  as  quickly  as  possible  on  the  ABC  and  the  RTP.  Full  automation  of  border  control 
should  be  made  available  not  only  for  business  travellers  but  also,  for  example,  for  tourists 
travelling often to the EU. 

Moreover, the American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union (AMCHAM EU) on 
its position statement on the Smart Borders of 23 of March 2012 highlights the use of ABC 
wherever  possible  to  ensure  more  efficient  border  checks  and  a  positive  experience  for  the 
traveller. 

By  the  end  of  2010,  over  200  automated  border  control  gates  have  been  installed  at  border 
crossing points. In addition to that, several Member States are planning to install them55. 

•  To maintain the current level of security 

With  the  use  of  fully  automated  border  control,  the  same  checks  against  databases  (such  as 
SIS)  would  be  carried  out  as  in  the  baseline  situation  (manual  checks).  Furthermore,  the 
identity  of  the  traveller  would  be  verified  using  biometrics,  which  is  not  the  case  in  the 
baseline situation as regards non-visa holders. 

However,  a  few  Member  States  proposed  to  have  a  more  thorough  vetting.  For  them,  the 
vetting done for visas is insufficient to give access to the RTP and especially to move to a full 
automation of border control. The precise gains in security arising from stricter criteria are not 
easy  to  identify.  If  national  databases  of  several  Member  States  were  to  be  checked,  this 
would  raise  the  level  of  security,  but  at  the  same  time  it  would  require  additional  time  and 

54 

55 

Final report on the cost analysis of entry/exit and RTP systems done by the external contractor on 19 of 
April  2010  (version  1.30)  is  published  on  the  following  website:  http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/doc_centre/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm#studies 
Several  Member  States  have  indicated  in  the  External  Borders  Fund's  Annual  Programmes  that  they 
will start using the Automated Border Control systems at  their external border crossing points. These 
Member States are reported in Annex 3 and in the Frontex's draft report on "ABC solutions based on 
eMRTD in EU Member States". 

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38 

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effort  from  Member  States,  thus  reducing  the  positive  impacts  of  the  RTP.  All  data  on  the 
applicant would need to be sent to other Member States. Furthermore, awaiting replies from 
all  Member  States  would  be  a  time-consuming  process.  Notably,  such  a  process  would  be 
inconsistent with the current process for the issuance of visas as well as the border checks, for 
which only the Member State carrying out the check consults its own national databases, the 
SIS  and  the  VIS,  if  applicable.  It  would  therefore  be  disproportionate  to  introduce  such  a 
requirement for registered travellers.  

It  is  true  that  there  could  be  some  negative  effects  when  using  ABC  for  third-country 
nationals.  Border  guards  are  accustomed  to  observing  even  the  faintest  cues,  for  example, 
reading the unusual behaviour of a human being. This human factor is removed if the checks 
of  the  registered  travellers  are  fully  automated.  It  is  possible  to  spoof  fingerprints  using 
modern techniques and materials; fingerprints can even be bought or stolen. However, the use 
of  "liveness"  detection  built  into  fingerprint  readers  help  mitigate  this  risk.  Furthermore, 
border guards need  to  monitor  ABC  gates and could always check the traveller manually if 
any  reason  arises  (e.g.  random  checks).  Notably,  these  "weaknesses"  of  the  ABC  process 
cannot be addressed by introducing stricter vetting procedure, which shows that the impact on 
the level of security of stricter vetting procedure is in fact virtually non-existent. 

5.3.1  Costs  

Stricter  vetting  with  a  compulsory  consultation  mechanism  between  Member  States  would 
require  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  a  communication  network  between  Member  States 
that would enable sending confidential information from one Member State to another, similar 
to  the  VIS  Mail  application,  the  consultation  mechanism  used  in  the  VIS.  The  costs  for  the 
Agency  to  develop  and  create  such  a  communication  network  would  be  approximately  1 
million EUR at  EU  level and approximately 3 million EUR for  Member  States. In Member 
States  the  development  costs  for  such  consultation  mechanism  would  fall  on  the  ministry 
responsible for managing the system and operating costs would need to be paid by border and 
visa authorities.  

Furthermore,  stricter  vetting  procedure  would  significantly  increase  administrative  costs  for 
the Member States with an estimated 182 million EUR per year (see Annex 10.4). Half of the 
costs would fall on border authorities and half on visa authorities. 

The  costs  for  automation  would  vary  between  Member  States  depending  on  the  number  of 
ABC systems installed. All the costs for automation would fall on border authorities. 

5.3.2 

Protection of fundamental rights, particularly privacy and data protection 

Although the RTP is voluntary for third-country nationals, stricter vetting procedure using a 
consultation  mechanism  between  Member  States  would  have  a  significant  effect  on  the 
protection of fundamental rights, particularly privacy and data protection. Personal data would 
have  to  be  sent  through  a  network  between  Member  States.  This  would  require  adeguate 
technical  and  security  measures  to  ensure  the  protection  of  information  processed  and 
exchanged.  The  EDPS  stressed  in  his  informal  comments  on  the  2011  communication  that 
data protection rights have to be ensured irrespective of whether data subjects take part in a 
programme voluntarily or not. 

The potential issue of discrimination through assuming that travellers who are not registered 
or  accepted  by  a  Member  State  are  suspicious  needs  to  be  addressed.  This  issue  was  raised 
also by the EDPS in his informal comments on the 2011 communication. He highlighted that 

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39 

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measures should be taken to prevent positive discrimination from turning into a negative one 
of persons who do not have a strong track record of reliability, for example infrequent or first-
time  travellers.  This  issue  arises  especially  if  the  vetting  is  too  strict.  This  important  topic 
should  therefore  be  incorporated  into  the  training  programme  on  fundamental  rights  which 
Frontex organises for border guards. In order to raise awareness with the general public, this 
issue  should  also  be  covered  during  the  information  campaigns  organised  before  the  RTP 
starts operations. The leaflets and posters should clearly state that travellers are free to choose 
whether to apply for the RTP and use the ABC. Those not using the ABC are not considered 
as more risky travellers. 

Detailed  provisions  would  be  required  to  provide  third-country  national  applicants  with  the 
reasons why they have not been granted access to the programme. A system of review of the 
refusal  and  revocation  of  membership,  and  for  challenging  or  correcting  potential  errors  in 
accordance with the right to an effective remedy (Article 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU), would have to be put in place.  

As technical failures or breakdowns can always happen, contingency plans should be in place 
and  these  plans  should  be  made  clear  to  the  travellers,  airlines/carriers  and  all  authorities 
working at the border crossing point. If a registered traveller  is unable, for example, for any 
reason, to use the ABC, and is redirected toward a manual border check, due attention should 
be paid to ensure that the ensuing procedures are in full compliance with fundamental rights, 
in particular with human dignity, and are conducted without stigmatisation.  

As regards a centralised RTP in which the data is stored in a centralised database, supervision 
by the EDPS and cooperation between National Supervisory Authorities and the EDPS should 
be  guaranteed  and  facilitated.  As  regards  a  token-based  system  without  any  centralised 
database or data exchange between Member States, National Supervisory Authorities would 
mainly be responsible for supervising and monitoring the access rights and purpose limitation. 
Data  protection  authorities  should  have  the  means  necessary  to  access  to  the  information 
processed and intervene and enforce compliance with data protection rules. 

During  the  consultations,  Member  States  highlighted  the  importance  of  data  protection 
aspects in general. 

Table 3 - Assessment of policy options 3 and 4 

Sub-options and variations 

To facilitate the crossing 
of EU external borders 

To  maintain 
current 
security 

the 
level  of 

Costs  

Protection  of  fundamental 
rights 

Same vetting as for multiple-entry 
visa  holders, 
fully  automated 
border crossing  

Same vetting as for multiple-entry 
semi-automated 
holders, 
visa 
border crossing  

More 
thorough  vetting, 
automated border crossing  

fully 

thorough  vetting,  semi-

More 
automated border crossing  

√√√√ 

√ 

√√√ 

√ 

EN 

-√ 

-√ 

-√√ 

-√√√ 

0 

0 

--√√ 

--√√ 

√ 

√√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

40 

   EN 

5.4 

Policy option 5: Application fee 

5.4.1 

Fee of 20 EUR (sub-option 5a) 

•  To facilitate the crossing of EU external borders by third-country nationals √√ 

As described in section 4.4, this sub-option would allow to neutralise the costs incurred by the 
RTP  as  far  as  the  examination  of  applications  is  concerned,  which  is  approximately  73,1 
million  EUR.  It  would  be  consistent  with  the  approach  chosen  for  the  treatment  of  visa 
applications, and also consistent with the fact that a registered traveller is effectively buying 
an additional service, on which he/she is not dependent in terms of his/her rights to cross the 
external  border  of  the  Schengen  area,  a  service  which  will  only  be  of  interest  to  a  certain 
category  of  travellers.  From  the  travellers  perspective,  the  additional  cost  of  20  EUR 
(independent  application)  or  10  EUR  (a  registered  traveller  application  together  with  a 
multiple-entry visa application) is not likely to be considered discouraging in a context where 
the  main  target  group  are  persons  who  travel  to  the  EU  several  times  per  year.  It  is  also 
relatively minor compared to the normal visa fee (60 EUR). There is broad consensus among 
stakeholders that a fee should be collected from the applicant for participation in the RTP. 

5.4.2  No fee (sub-option 5b) 

•  To facilitate the crossing of EU external borders by third-country nationals √√√ 

This  sub-option  would  undoubtedly  have  a  bigger  impact  in  attracting  as  many  persons  as 
possible to the programme, also in the sense of making the programme and its benefits known 
more quickly, as people who hesitate about the benefits would be more willing to "give it a 
try" if it were free. This impact is however limited, considering that any traveller will be able 
to observe the use of automated gates when crossing the external border and thus also observe 
the benefits in terms of shorter queues.  

There is a risk that many ineligible applications would be submitted, thus increasing Member 
States authorities' workload and administrative costs. 

5.4.3  Costs (both sub-options) 

The cost of examining applications is fully taken into account when assessing the impact of 
these  sub-options.  This  brings  the  net  cost  of  sub-option  5a  to  zero  taking  into  account  the 
revenue from the fee, while the cost for sub-option 5b is equivalent to the full (estimated) cost 
for  examining  applications,  that  is,  73.1  million  EUR.  Half  of  the  full  cost  for  examining 
applications  (i.e.  36,6  million  EUR)  would  fall  on  visa  authorities  and  half  on  border 
authorities. 

Table 4 - Assessment of policy option 5 

Sub-options  

To facilitate the 
crossing of EU 
external borders 

To maintain the 
current level of 
security 

Costs for MSs 

Protection of 
fundamental rights 

Application fee 20/10 EUR  

No application fee  

√√ 

√√√ 

- 

- 

0 

-√√ 

- 

- 

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41 

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6. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS AND IDENTIFICATION OF PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

6.1. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 

Table 5 – comparison of policy options  

Policy options and sub-options 

To  facilitate 
the 
crossing  of  EU 
borders 
external 
third-country 
by 
nationals 

To  maintain 
current 
level 
security 

the 
of 

Costs  

Protection  of  fundamental 
rights 

Option 0 

Baseline 

Option 2 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Data stored in a token (2a) 

√√√ 

Data  stored 
database (2b) 

in  a  centralised 

√√√√ 

√√√ 

Data  (unique  identifier  number) 
stored  in  a  token  and  (unique 
identifier,  biometrics  and  data 
from  application)  in  a  central 
repository (2c) 

Options 3 and 4*) 

Same  vetting  as  for  multiple-
entry 
fully 
holders, 
automated border crossing 

visa 

√√√√ 

Same  vetting  as  for  multiple-
entry 
semi-
automated border crossing  

holders, 

visa 

thorough  vetting, 
More 
automated border crossing  

fully 

thorough  vetting,  semi-

More 
automated border crossing  

Option 5 

Application fee 20/10 euro (5a)  

No application fee (5b) 

√ 

√√√ 

√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

√√√ 

√ 

√√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

- 

- 

-√√ 

-√√ 

-√√√ 

-√ 

-√ 

-√√ 

-√√√ 

0 

-√√√ 

-√ 

-√√√ 

-√ 

0 

0 

-√√ 

-√√ 

- 

- 

*) the impacts of sub-options with regard to the policy options 3 and 4 (vetting criteria and automation of border 
control)  are  directly  linked,  in  the  sense  that  the  impact  of  the  sub-options  with  regard  to  vetting  cannot  be 
assessed without knowing which is the preferred option with regard to automation, and vice versa. Consequently 
the  available  four  sub-options  (3a,  3b,  4a,  4b)  from  the  two  policy  options  have  been  combined  into  the  four 
possible variations, and the impact of all four variations is assessed in an integrated way. 

Table  5  summarises  the  assessment  of  impacts  done  in  chapter  5.  The  three  sub-options  of 
policy option 1 (lodging an application for an RTP) are not included in the table as the best 
choice is described already in chapter 2.3.1. The following comparison and identification of 
the preferred option will also take into account the following criteria: 

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42 

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• 

• 

• 

Effectiveness – the extent to which options achieve the objectives of the proposal; 

Efficiency  –  the  extent  to  which  objectives  can  be  achieved  with  the  proportionate 
cost; 

Coherence – the extent to which options are coherent with overarching objectives of 
EU policy. 

Data storage 

All three sub-options contribute significantly to the objectives as defined and are notably fully 
coherent  with  EU  border  policy:  security  and  prevention  of  irregular  immigration  is  not 
diminished during the border crossing, while the EU's openness to the world and its capacity 
to  facilitate  cross-border  people-to-people  contacts,  trade  and  cultural  exchange  is  boosted. 
Furthermore, innovation and development of high-tech technology is accelerated. An RTP for 
all third-country nationals travelling frequently will show the EU's determined ambition to be 
open for legitimate travel. The programme would be the first in the world which is open to all 
third  countries,  and  which  is  operable  across  several  states,  in  this  case  across  the  whole 
Schengen area. In this context, Europe can be seen as a pacesetter for the rest of the world. 

A  drawback  of  all  three  sub-options  is  that  the  benefits  are  nowadays  mainly  related  to  air 
border  crossing  points.  This  is  reflected  in  the  data  available  from  the  benefits  in  terms  of 
processing  times  which  are  all  based  on  the  experiences  from  airports.  However,  at  land 
border crossing points that are organised in such a way that passengers are checked outside 
their vehicles, an ABC system can also be used56. Furthermore, at sea borders ABC systems 
could  be  easily  implemented,  especially  in  cruise  and  ferry  terminals.  Some  Member  States 
have already planned to do so57. 

The token-based sub-option allows for visibility and limits data protection concerns. The sub-
option based on a centralised RTP is more secure and easier to implement in practice at the 
border crossing point. The latter is, however, counterbalanced by the need to develop a new 
centralised system in which all the data is available and subject to search.  

The sub-option based on a token/central repository can be seen as a hybrid between the above 
two sub-options, combining their respective advantages. It minimises the use of personal data 
in an EU system and it avoids the main of the security drawbacks of the token-based system. 
It provides, however, for the most complicated integration into the border control process as it 
introduces both a verification of the token as well as a verification against a central repository.  

Vetting criteria and automation of border control 

The assessment showed that stricter vetting procedure does not have any real impact on the 
security of the border check itself, and also that the facilitation of border crossings of semi-
automated  border  controls  is  too  limited  to  bring  added  value.  Furthermore,  stricter  vetting 
procedure would increase significantly Member States' administrative costs and would have a 
significant  effect  on  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights.  Therefore,  stricter  vetting  criteria 

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Finland has a pilot project running an ABC at the land border crossing point and Norway will launch a 
pilot. 
For example, Portugal has a plan to implement ABC systems at its sea borders. 

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and  semi-automated  border  control  would  not  be  effective  and/or  efficient.  Furthermore, 
stricter vetting criteria would not be coherent with the EU border policy.  

Member States having implemented an ABC system reported that the system is the most cost-
effective solution for them as it saves cost in terms of staff, increase throughput capacity of 
border crossing point and it enables border guards to focus more on the most risky travellers 
and/or serve other travellers. 

Application fee 

By  introducing  a  fee  of  20  EUR,  Member  States  administrative  costs  for  examining 
applications would be neutralised. It would also be consistent and coherent with the approach 
chosen  for  the  treatment  of  visa  applications.  However,  no  fee  sub-option  would  better 
guarantee large number of participants in the programme. Downside of this option would be 
that  many  ineligible  applications  would  be  submitted  and  the  cost  for  visa  and  border 
authorities would be 73,1 million EUR.  

Costs-benefit analysis 

Data storage 

The two sub-options on a token-based system and a centralised database are almost equal as 
concerns  total  costs,  but  this  hides  important  differences  between  them:  the  token-based 
system puts effectively all costs on the Member States, as all technical implementation will be 
done by them.  

An important difference between the token-based and the token/central repository sub-options 
is in the different costs for tokens: in the former case, biometric data needs to be stored on the 
token, in a secured chip, which brings the cost of one token to 5 EUR. In the latter case, no 
data other than the unique identifier (application number) needs to be stored on the token, in 
the  form  of  a  barcode,  which  limits  the  price  to  1  EUR.  The  cost  for  tokens  would  fall  on 
Member States i.e. border and visa authorities. 

Most  importantly  however,  the  costs  for  the  sub-option  with  a  token/central  repository  are 
clearly the highest of all sub-options as can be seen from the table 1.  

Automation of border control 

The use of ABC is most efficient and cost-effective at those border crossing points where the 
number  of  travellers  is  the  highest  and  where  it  is  most  challenging  to  manage  passenger 
flows.  However,  there  are  border  crossing  points  which  would  not  gain  any  benefits  on 
automation due to the small number of travellers.  

An  estimate  would  be  that  Member  States  in total  would  invest  in  175  automated  gates  per 
year, to gradually expand their capacity for handling travel flows in this way as the number of 
travellers and also registered travellers increase.  

The costs of automation would therefore greatly vary depending on the number of automated 
gates  that  would  be  implemented.  Automation  of  border  controls  would  introduce  extra 
implementation  costs  for  the  Member  States,  but  it  would  also  guarantee  more  efficient 
management of passenger flows, release border check resources for checking on higher-risk 

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travellers and/or serve other travellers, and would generate cost savings in the long run due to 
a reduced need for personnel per million of traveller crossing the border.  

As  part  of  the  baseline  the  required  resources  for  border  checks  today  in  terms  of  border 
guards  can  be  estimated  at  around  40  000  persons  at  a  salary  cost  of  1  240  million  EUR58, 
equivalent to 1,65 EUR per passenger on each entry and exit.  

At the moment, it is not possible to calculate the exact benefits of the automation and/or the 
RTP in quantitative and monetary terms as it would require at least the following information 
to be available in addition to the number of border crossings and the border crossing time per 
category of travellers (EU citizens, visa holders and non-visa holders): number of manual and 
automated  lanes  and  number  of  registered  travellers  (visa  holders  and  visa  exempted)  per 
border  crossing  point.  However,  some  very  general  calculations  can  be  done  based  on  the 
Member States experiences. Together with automation, the RTP could reduce border control 
resources  needed  by  around  40  %  i.e.  in  theory  16,000  border  guards  (equivalent  to  500 
million  EUR/year59)  who  can  focus  on/serve  other  travellers  and  cope  with  the  expected 
increase  of  traveller  flows.  Even  if  more  modest  savings  were  to  be  the  starting  point  for 
calculation  (i.e.  250  million  EUR/year),  Member  States  would  have  net  cost  savings  (+81 
million EUR) already after the second year of operation of the RTP60.  

The release of around 40% of border guards includes the possibility to cope with an increase 
of 62% of travel flows, which means that 40.000 border guards would be able to check 1.125 
million  travellers  instead  of  675  million  travellers61.  With  the  introduction  of  the  RTP,  it 
would be possible to manage the largest part of the expected increase of 80% of travel flows 
at the air borders with the current number of personnel. 

A further estimate was done in the external cost study where, compared to the costs incurred 
in the baseline, the need to invest in automated gates would increase Member States' one-time 
costs by 38 %, but would in the long run reduce their total costs by 64 %.62 

Based on the general calculations above, the conclusion can be drawn that the personnel and 
the investment costs for establishing and maintaining the RTP system would be compensated 
within  a  reasonable  timeframe  in  the  form  of  a  lower  unit  price  per  border  check  and 

58 

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60 

61 

62 

This estimate is based upon data from Member States. 18 Member States answered the question "how 
many border guards/police officers in total are performing border checks at the external border". There 
are an estimated 700-750 million passengers who enter or exit Member States per annum. In 2006, the 
average salary in EU-27 was 31 000 euro per year (Eurostat).  
500  million  would  be  applicable  if  all  Member  States  would  use  ABC  systems  at  all  their  border 
crossing points. 
Savings 250 million euro/year – one time costs 207 million euro (the most expensive option; token with 
repository) – yearly recurring costs 101 million euro – costs of automation 5 million euro= -63 million 
euro after the first year of operation. 
Second year: cost savings 250 million euro – first year -63 million – yearly recurring costs 101 million 
euro – cost of automation 5 million euro= + 81 million euro. 
40.000  border  guards  check  per  year  675  million  travellers  (entry  and  exit).  One  border  guard  is 
therefore able to check 16.875 travellers per year. With the release of 40% only 24.000 border guards 
are needed to check the flow of 675 million travellers equivalent to 28.125 travellers per border guard 
per year. Based on this new performance value per border guard, the existing and trained border guards 
will be able to check yearly a new total of 1.125 million travellers, which is an increase by 62%.  
Final report on the cost analysis of entry/exit and RTP systems done by the external contractor on 19 of 
April  2010  (version  1.30)  is  published  on  the  following  website:  http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/doc_centre/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm#studies 

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personnel  resources  who  are  able  to  focus  on  other  tasks  and/or  cope  with  the  increasing 
travel flows. .  

Risks 

As  technical  failures  or  breakdowns  can  always  occur  with  one  or  another  system, 
contingency plans should be in place and these plans should be made clear to the travellers, 
airlines/carriers and all authorities working at the border crossing point. In case of any failure 
of the system(s), the easiest and clearest contingency plan would be to return to the existing 
process i.e. manual border check procedure. This would apply to any situation where the RTP 
is  down  with  regard  to  all  three  sub-options.  In  this  regard  the  token-based  system  can  be 
regarded  as  less  risky,  in  that  it  does  not  rely  on  the  functioning  of  a  central  component  to 
function. 

As  with  any  large  scale  IT-system,  there  are  always  risks  with  implementation.  Therefore, 
proper  implementation  of  the  RTP  can  only  be  ensured  if  all  relevant  actors  fulfil  their 
obligations,  respect  the  lessons  learnt  from  establishing  the  previous  large-scale  IT  systems 
and  take  advantage  of  the  adopted  legal  basis  and  the  technical  possibilities  for  performing 
facilitated  border  checks  on  registered  travellers.  Common  technical  processes,  using  the 
system  in  the  same  way  all  around  the  external  borders  and  a  consistent  implementation 
combined  with  solid  overall  data  quality  would  ensure  the  expected  results  are  reached. 
Mitigating the implementation risks by entrusting the Agency to develop a common technical 
platform and a standard national client which is fully tested and fulfils all legal requirements 
for its use by Member States would ensure that all Member States could cope with the RTP 
without having any major implementation problems.  

Furthermore,  a  strong  monitoring  mechanism  with  clear  milestones,  benchmarks  and 
advanced  compliance  testing  are  needed  to  ensure  a  coordinated  development  and 
implementation phase throughout all Member States. 

6.2. 

PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

Lodging an application for an RTP 

For policy option 1 it is clear that allowing the traveller to choose the best place for him/her 
to  lodge  an  application  would  guarantee  a  larger  number  of  participants  in  the  programme, 
thus helping Member States to manage their passenger flows at the external border crossing 
points. Therefore, the preferred sub-option is lodging an application for an RTP at any border 
crossing point and at any Member States consulate. The cost-effectiveness of this sub-option 
is clearly the best and it is fully coherent with existing border and visa policy. 

Data storage 

To  identify  the  preferred  option  with  regard  to  policy  option  2  is  more  complex  as 
demonstrated in chapter 6.1. The total scoring of each sub-option in relation to policy option 2 
is almost equal, but each sub-option displays distinctly different weaknesses: the token-based 
sub-option  displays  significant  security  issues,  the  central  database  sub-option  displays 
significant  fundamental  rights  issues,  and  the  token/central  repository  sub-option  significant 
cost issues. However, the cost benefit analysis shows that even the higher one-time costs and 
yearly operational costs of the token/central repository sub-option will be fully compensated 
in the long run by the economic benefits of the RTP as a whole for the Member States. This is 

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therefore the preferred sub-option with regard to policy option 2. This sub-option provides for 
a proportionate balance between security, facilitation and data protection. The data stored in a 
central  repository  would  be  available  for  border  guards  only  when  assessing  application, 
renewing/revoking access to the RTP, the token is lost or stolen or any problems occur with 
facilitating  registered  travellers'  border  crossings.  While  performing  border  checks  a  border 
guard  would  receive  only  hit/no  hit  information.  With  this  option  "privacy  by  design"  is 
implemented. 

Vetting criteria and automation of border control 

For  policy  options  3  and  4  it  is  clear  that  the  total  impact  of  combining  the  same  vetting 
criteria as for multiple-entry visas with fully automated border control has the highest impact 
on  facilitating  registered  travellers'  border  crossings.  Furthermore,  it  offers  a  balanced 
approach  to  security  and  protection  of  fundamental  rights.  It  is  also  the  least  expensive 
approach  taking  into  account  the  costs  associated  with  stricter  vetting  procedure  and  semi-
automated  border  control.  Full  automation  would  be  a  cost-effective  tool  especially  at  the 
busiest border crossing points where capacity problem and queues exist already nowadays.  

It should however be noted that the implementation of fully automated border control requires 
that an Entry/Exit System is developed and implemented in parallel, which would allow for 
replacing the stamping obligation with an electronic registering of entry and exit dates of all 
travellers including those having access to the RTP. 

Application fee 

For policy option 5 it is reasonable to accompany the RTP with a fee of 20 EUR that would 
cover the administrative  costs  of examining  applications, which would be set at a level that 
should not discourage potential applicants. The fee could be reduced to 10 EUR if a multiple-
entry  visa  application  and  an  RTP  application  are  examined  at  the  same  time  based  on  the 
same supporting documents. 

Impacts on relations with third countries 

There would be positive impacts on relations with third countries as all third-country nationals 
whether  requiring  a  visa  or  not  could  apply  for  access  to  the  RTP.  The  RTP  would  allow 
moving from a country-centric approach to a person-centric approach in which the country of 
origin does not play an important role. The main criteria to grant or refuse access to the RTP 
would be the security risk posed by an individual. 

Impacts  on  other  stakeholders  such  as  operators,  carriers  and  other  authorities  working  at 
the external border 

There  would  not  be  any  direct  impacts  on  other  stakeholders.  However,  positive  impacts 
could  be  achieved  for  operators  and  carriers  as  the  throughput  capacity  of  border  crossing 
point  would  increase  thus  giving  more  flexibility  for  operators  and  carriers  to  plan  their 
actions  such  as  connection  flights.  This  is  especially  of  interest  at  airport  hubs  where 
connection times are often between 30 and 60 minutes as it would offer attractive connections 
from outside the EU into the Schengen area and vice versa.  

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47 

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Costs of the preferred option 

Examining applications 

The costs for examining the applications based on the preferred sub-option under the policy 
option 1 amount to 73.1 million EUR per year for the Member States. 

The administrative fee would cover this part of the costs. The total maximum revenue of the 
administrative fee, which would cover the examination of applications, would be 75 million 
EUR/year.  

Data storage 

The  estimated  total  one-time  costs  of  the  preferred  option  of  the  RTP  for  the  Agency  to 
develop  a  centralised  part  would  be  43  million  EUR,  spread  out  over  3  years  and  annual 
average  costs  for  maintenance/operations  would  be  20  million  EUR/annum.  The  total  one-
time  costs  for  Member  States  to  develop  and  set-up  their  national  infrastructures  would  be 
164  million  EUR, 
for 
maintenance/operations would be 81 million EUR/annum. The above-mentioned costs include 
also administrative costs except the costs for examining applications. These are however only 
the costs related to the development and running of the system itself. The following elements 
need to be added to this. 

spread  out  over  3  years  and  annual  average  costs 

Automation of border control 

ABC system costs will vary greatly from one Member State to another. For that reason, the 
cost  cannot  be  calculated  in  advance.  Member  States  can  choose  the  border  crossing  points 
where they would implement the ABC system. Each Member State would inevitably have to 
make  a  precise  assessment  for  each  individual  border  crossing  point,  whether  ABC  would 
bring  enough  added-value  to  the  throughput  capacity  of  the  border  crossing  point  and  thus 
decrease or limit travellers’ border crossing time.  

Information campaign 

To  raise  awareness  with  the  general  public,  the  information  campaign  should  be  organised. 
The  estimated  costs  for  a  campaign  based  on  those  for  the  VIS  would  be  80  000  EUR 
including video and printed materials such as posters and leaflet. These cost would be covered 
by the EU budget.  

Cost  for  third  countries  and  other  stakeholders  such  as  operators,  carriers  and  other 
authorities working at the external border 

For  third  countries  and  other  stakeholders,  no  costs  would  be  incurred  due  to  the 
implementation  of  the  RTP.  After  possible  adoption  of  the  RTP,  third  countries  and  other 
stakeholders  will  be  informed  accordingly  of  the  facilitation  mechanism  and  especially  that 
third-country nationals could apply for access to the RTP. 

Financial support 

The Commission's proposal for the next multi-annual financial framework (MFF) includes a 
proposal of 4,6 billion EUR for the Internal security Fund (ISF) for the period 2014-2020. In 
the proposal, 1,1 billion EUR is set aside as an indicative amount for the development of an 

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EES and an RTP assuming development costs would start from 2015, and covering 4 years of 
operation. Moreover, outside the scope of the ISF, a separate amount of 822 million EUR is 
set  aside  for  the  management  of  existing  large  scale-IT  systems  (Schengen  Information 
System II, Visa Information System and EURODAC). 

The  Commission  envisages  entrusting  the  implementation  tasks  for  these  systems  to  the 
Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT-Systems in the area of Freedom, 
Security  and  Justice  established  by  Regulation  (EU)  N°  1077/2011  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council.63  Providing  financial  support  for  national  development  costs 
would  ensure  that  difficult  economic  circumstances  at  national  level  do  not  jeopardise  or 
delay the projects.  

This is different from the approach under the current MFF where the EU has funded from its 
budget  the  central  costs  related  to  the  development  of  VIS  and  SIS  II,  while  the  External 
Borders Fund has co-financed up to 75% of the costs incurred by Member States as part of 
their national programmes.  

Once  the  new  systems  would  be  operational,  future  operational  costs  in  the  Member  States 
could be supported by their national programmes. It is proposed that Member States may use 
50%  of  the  allocations  under  the  national  programmes  to  support  operating  costs  of  IT 
systems used for the management of migration flows across the external borders of the Union. 
These costs may include the cost for the management of VIS, SIS and new systems set up in 
the period, staff costs, service costs, rental of secure premises etc. Thus, the future instrument 
would ensure continuity of funding, where appropriate.  

Member States are responsible for the development and the integration into their national IT-
systems as well as into their national border control processes. It is therefore not possible to 
calculate or to assume the proportion of costs that is likely to be borne by the Member States, 
because  the  concrete  implementation  in  each  Member  State  will  depend  on  the  specific 
situation  there.  The  main  cost  factors  on  the  side  of  the  Member  States  are  the  costs  for 
human ressources in the border control and for the operation of the national systems. These 
costs are not included in the cost tables. 

Significant  cost  savings  could  also  be  achieved  if  the  RTP  is  built  together  with  the  EES, 
compared  to  the  situation  in  which  both  systems  would  be  built  totally  independently.  The 
main cost savings come at the central level (EU) from reduced costs for hardware, software 
and  infrastructure  and  at  Member  States'  level  from  administrative  and  office  space  cost 
savings.  

Conclusion 

In summary, the preferred option consists of 

•  The lodging of applications at consulates as well as border crossing points; 

•  The combination of a token and a centralised storage of anonymized biometric data of each 
applicant  and  the  data  from  an  application.  The  comprehensive  list  of  data  which  would 
need to be stored is in Annex 8; 

63 

OJ L 286, 1.11.2011, p.1. 

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49 

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•  Applying the same vetting criteria as currently defined in EU law for multiple-entry visas; 

•  Giving registered travellers access to a fully automated border control process; 

•  Charging a fee of 20 EUR per RT application. However, a reduced fee (10 EUR) would be 
introduced in cases where a visa application and an RTP application are examined at the 
same time based on the same supporting documents. 

The  preferred  option  should  be  designed  so  that  it  takes  into  account  privileged  position  of 
non-EU family members of EU citizens who have a right to obtain a visa and move freely64. 
Furthermore, no entry and/or exit data should be stored in the central repository. 

The advantages of the preferred option can be summarised as follows: 

•  It  will  significantly  facilitate  registered  travellers'  border  crossings  regardless  of  whether 
automation is used. Based on Member States but also other countries experiences, the RTP 
together with automation can reduce waiting times at the border crossing point by up 70 % 
-  85  %65.  Even  without  automation,  registered  travellers'  border  crossing  times  will  be 
reduced from two minutes to 20 – 40 seconds. 

•  Based on the very general calculation, it will considerably release border control resources 
to  focus  more  on  higher-risk  travellers  and/or  serve  other  travellers.  Together  with 
automation the RTP could reduce border control resources needed by maximum of 40 % 
i.e. in theory 16 000 border guards, equivalent to 500 million EUR per year across Member 
States. The re-affectation of border guards would be very important noting the forecasted 
increase of travel flows especially at the air borders. 

•  It will give a tool for Member States to manage increasing passenger flows cost-efficiently 

using new technologies without decreasing the level of security. 

•  It  will  increase  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  border  checks  and  offer  flexibility  for 

operators and carriers to organise their tasks and actions. 

•  It will boost economy and cultural exchange especially at the local level. 

•  It will show the EU's determination to be open for legitimate travel. 

•  It will introduce a person-centric approach to border checks. 

•  It  will  minimise  the  potential  impact  on  fundamental  rights,  notably  privacy  and  data 
protection.  Different  sensitive  data  will  be  stored  separately  and  any  search  against  the 
repository  at  the  first  line  control  will  not  be  possible  without  presenting  a  token.  As 
regards  biometrics,  border  guards  will  have  only  hit/no  hit  responses  at  the  first  line 
control.  Furthermore,  a  one  to  many  search  using  biometrics  at  first  line  control  will  be 
technically impossible.  

64 
65 

OJ L 158/77, 30.4.2004. 
Border crossing time by using the existing automated system is compared against the time needed for 
third-country national holding a visa to cross the external border via airport by using the manual booth. 
At the land borders waiting time can be reduced even more. 

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6.3. 

Assessment  and  considerations  of  EU  added  value,  proportionality  and 
legislative implications 

6.3.1.  European value-added and proportionality  

The preferred option needs to be implemented at all EU external border crossing points and 
will have implications on the border guard resources of all Schengen countries. The preferred 
option ensures that the EU has a common approach to the RTP based on common legislation 
and thus it guarantees that rules continue to be the same at all Schengen borders. For third-
country  national  travellers,  this  means  that  the  RTP  is  available  to  them  at  all  Schengen 
border  crossing  points  without  separate  vetting.  In  other  words,  a  person  vetted  by  one 
Member State may benefit from facilitation when crossing the external borders of any other 
Member State. Without common rules this would not be possible. 

In  terms  of  proportionality,  an  RTP  implemented  based  on  the  preferred  option  builds  to  a 
large extent on existing processes, investments and technical equipment, including: the same 
document  readers  and  fingerprint  scanners  as  used/installed  today  at  all  Member  States' 
border crossing points, for the purposes of SIS and VIS; the same automated border control 
gates used/installed today for EU citizens could be used to a large extent also for third-country 
nationals; use of the same biometric identifiers as for the EU e-passport, for the VIS and for 
the  residence  permits  (but  only  fingerprints);  the  same  criteria  for  access  to  the  RTP  as  for 
multiple-entry  visa  according  to  current  EU  legislation;  a  facilitated  check  practically 
identical to the current "minimum check" for EU citizens. 

Based on the consultations, the preferred option was clearly supported only by two Member 
States. Majority of Member States were in favour of a centralised system without giving any 
statements of the reasons. Although the preferred option is not a preferred option for Member 
States, it provides for a balanced approach between security, facilitation and data protection as 
evidenced  in  this  impact  assessment.  In  this  respect,  the  preferred  option  meets  the 
requirement of proportionality. 

A  key  issue  to  consider  for  proportionality  is  one  of  costs,  as  the  development  of  the  RTP 
entails  significant  costs  for  the  Member  States  and/or  the  EU  budget.  This  consideration 
should  take  into  account  that  no  other  measure  currently  exists  that  could  provide  for 
facilitated  border  crossings  for  third-country  nationals,  that  no  such  alternative  exists  that 
could be developed in the future, and that the RTP will allow significant savings for Member 
States in the medium- to long term. It should also take into account unquantifiable benefits in 
signalling to third-country nationals, from any third country, that the EU does not consider it 
necessary to impose a thorough border check for each individual, but is ready to facilitate the 
border  crossings  for,  potentially,  millions  of  persons;  a  measure  of  openness  unequalled  by 
any  other  country  in  the  world.On  this  basis  the  preferred  option  therefore  constitutes  a 
proportionate  mechanism  to  deliver  on  the  objectives  of  facilitating  third-country  nationals' 
border  crossings  across  the  Schengen  area  and  of  countering  the  lack  of  tools  to  manage 
increasing passenger flows. 

6.3.2.  Legislative implications 

New  EU  legislation  would  be  required  to  implement  the  RTP.  Furthermore,  the  Schengen 
Borders Code and the Agency regulation would need to be amended.  

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51 

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6.3.3.  Measures to ensure data protection and protection of the rights of travellers 

It  is  important  that  the  preferred  option  fully  complies  with  the  relevant  legislation  on  the 
protection of personal data, in particular the data protection principles and the requirements of 
necessity,  proportionality,  purpose  limitation  and  quality  of  data;  and  that  safeguards  and 
mechanisms  are  in  place  for  the  effective  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  the 
individual  travellers  and  in  particular  the  protection  of  their  private  life  and  their  personal 
data. Staff and third-country nationals must be made aware of these rights.  

The data would be stored in a form that could be manipulated and there is a potential risk, as 
with  any  data  of  this  type,  that  it  could  be  used  inappropriately.  According  to  Article  6  of 
Directive  95/46/EC  Member  States  shall  provide,  inter  alia,  that  personal  data  must  be 
processed fairly and lawfully, and that they are collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes.  Furthermore,  the  processing  of  personal  data  must  be  adequate,  relevant  and  not 
excessive in relation to purposes for which they are collected and processed. 

The  application  of  the  same  data  protection  provisions  as  for  the  VIS  and  the  status  quo 
including  the  retention  of  information  for  a  maximum  of  five  years  would  be  necessary  to 
ensure adequate data protection provisions for the preferred option. The personal data stored 
in the central repository (biometrics and alphanumeric data from applications) should be kept 
for no longer than is necessary for the purposes of the RTP. It is appropriate to keep the data 
for  a  maximum  period  of  five  years,  in  order  to  enable  data  on  previous  applications  to  be 
taken  into  account  for  the  assessment  of  the  subsequent  RTP  applications,  renewal  of  the 
access  to  the  RTP  and  also  taking  into  account  the  re-use  of  fingerprints  stored  in  the 
repository (59 months). Furthermore, a five year retention period would allow granting access 
to the RTP for five years without a new application. This would be in line with the issuance of 
a multiple-entry visa for trusted travellers (maximum period 5 years) whose data is kept in the 
VIS for 5 years. The data should be deleted automatically after the period of five years, unless 
there are grounds to delete it earlier. Data on refused applications should be kept five years 
whereas data from inadmissible applications should not be stored in the central repository at 
all.  No  personal  data  is  stored  in  the  token  but  only  a  unique  identifier  number  (e.g. 
application number). A new application would need to be submitted to renew this access once 
the period of validity has expired. In addition, provisions would be necessary to ensure that: 

•  The data stored66 is only accessible and used by duly authorised staff of responsible border 
and  visa  authorities,  as  far  as  necessary  for  the  performance  of  their  tasks.  These 
authorities  would  also  be  responsible  for  correcting  and/or  deleting  the  data  stored  in  a 
repository or in a token (biometrics and alphanumeric data). 

•  The registered traveller can opt out of the system at any time. 

•  Individuals are properly informed and have the right to access information held on them. A 
system  for  review  of  the  refusal  and  revocation  of  membership  in  the  RTP  and  a  review 
procedure  for  challenging  or  correcting  potential  errors,  by  recourse  to  data  protection 
authorities  and  by  judicial  review,  in  accordance  with  the  right  to  an  effective  remedy 
(Article  47(1)  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU)  and  Directive  95/46/EC 

66 

All the data fields listed in Annex 8 would be needed as the vetting criteria would be the same as for 
multiple-entry  visa  holders.  Furthermore,  this  would  guarantee  consistency  between  the  VIS  and  the 
RTP and facilitate examination of a visa and a RTP application at the same time.  

EN 

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   EN 

                                                 
would  have  to  be  laid  down.  Reasons  for  refusal  and  revocation  shall  be  given  to  the 
applicant. 

•  There is no potential issue of discrimination through assuming that travellers who are not 

registered or accepted by a Member State are suspicious.  

•  The data processing is to be supervised by the EDPS as far as EU institutions and bodies 
are  involved,  and  by  national  data  protection  authorities,  as  far  as  Member  States' 
authorities  are  involved.  This  supervision  and  cooperation  between  National  Supervisory 
Authorities and the EDPS should be guaranteed and facilitated. Data protection authorities 
should  have  the  intervention  powers  necessary  to  ensure  the  respect  of  compliance  with 
data protection rules. The EDPS and the National Supervisory Authority shall ensure that 
an audit of the personal data processing activities is carried out in accordance with relevant 
international  auditing  standards.  Access  to  information  and  all  relevant  documents  and 
records  shall  be  given  to  the  EDPS  by  the  Agency  and  by  the  Member  State  for  the 
National Supervisory Authority.  

•  Data security needs to be ensured to avoid unauthorised access or destruction or alteration 
of  data  and  security  breaches.  Moreover,  mechanisms  to  ensure  effective  monitoring  of 
data processing need to be in place, such as logs of processing operations and access to the 
system. 

Given  the  large  numbers  of  new  travellers  affected  and  the  need  to  process  their  biometric 
data  the  travellers  would  need  to  be  well  informed  on  the  data  protection  aspects  and 
complaints/appeals mechanisms in line with the right to an effective remedy, with indication 
of data protection authorities competent to deal with their complaints and requests.  

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The Management Authority (the Agency) would ensure that systems are in place to monitor 
the  functioning  of  the  RTP  against  the  main  policy  objectives.  Two  years  after  the  RTP  is 
brought  into  operation  and  every  two  years  thereafter,  the  Agency  would  submit  to  the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, a report on the technical functioning 
of the RTP including the security thereof. 

Three  years  after  the  RTP  is  brought  into  operation  and  every  four  years  thereafter,  the 
Commission  would  produce  an  overall  evaluation  of  the  RTP  including  examining  results 
achieved against objectives, assessing the continuing validity of the underlying rationale, the 
application of the legal basis for the RTP, the implementation and the collection and use of 
biometric  data,  compliance  with  data  protection  rules  and  other  fundamental  rights,  and  the 
organisation  of  the  procedures  related  to  applications.  The  Commission  would  submit  the 
reports  on  the  evaluation  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  accompanied,  where 
necessary, by appropriate proposals to amend the Regulation establishing the RTP.  

Member  States  should  provide  the  Agency  and  the  Commission  with  the  information 
necessary to draft the reports referred above. The information should be provided according to 
the quantitative parametres predefined by the Agency and the Commission respectively. The 
cost  for  reporting,  monitoring,  evaluating  and  organising  periodical  data  gatherings  are 
included in the Management authority/Member States admininistrative costs in Annexes 10.1 
– 10.3. 

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Examples of monitoring and evaluation indicators: 

General objective 

Indicator 

To  facilitate  the  crossing  of  EU  external 
borders by third-country nationals. 

Number of persons in the programme. 

To maintain the current level of security. 

Time needed for registered travellers to cross 
an external border. 

System availability. 

Number of persons crossing the border using 
ABC systems. 

Number of persons whose access to the RTP 
is revoked or refused. 

Error  rates  e.g.  false  hits,  Failure  to  Enrol 
Rate  (FTE)  and  False  Acceptance  Rate 
(FAR). 

Specific and operational objectives 

Indicator 

To  promote  access  to  the  RTP  for  certain 
third-
categories  of 
country nationals. 

frequent,  pre-vetted 

To  ensure  protection  of  registered  travellers' 
fundamental 
their 
personal data. 

in  particular 

rights, 

To  avoid  discrimination  between  different 
groups of travellers. 

To  decrease  the  time  and  costs  of  border 
crossings  for  frequent 
to 
increase  the  throughput  capacity  of  border 
crossing  points.  Border  checks  of  registered 
travellers  should  not  take  more  than  20-40 
seconds on average.  

travellers  and 

Number  of  persons  in  the  programme  by 
category  (visa  required/visa  exempt)  and  by 
grounds  of  access 
(business 
persons/students/workers etc). 

requested 

Average  time  of  enrolment  at  the  border 
crossing point and at the consulate. 

Number  of  complaints  by  individuals  to  the 
national 
(data 
protection authority). 

Supervisory  Authority 

Error  rates  e.g.  false  hits,  Failure  to  Enrol 
Rate  (FTE)  and  False  Acceptance  Rate 
(FAR). 

Number  of  complaints  lodged  against  the 
authorities  on  wrong  decisions  and/or 
discrimination.  

Time needed for registered travellers to cross 
an 
using  ABC 
border 
systems/manual lanes. 

external 

by 

The  throughput  capacity  of  border  crossing 
point increased by XX per cent. 

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To  free  up  border  control  resources  by  25% 
from  checking  cross  border  movements  of 
frequent  and  pre-vetted  travellers  and  to 
enable  better  focus  on  checking  higher  risk 
travellers and/or serve other travellers. 

Average  time  of  enrolment  at  the  border 
crossing point and at the consulate. 

guard 

Border 
replaced/made 
resources 
available  by  the  RTP  to  focus  on  checking 
higher  risk  travellers  and/or  carrying  out 
other relevant tasks. 

Most of this information would be generated automatically (repository and ABC). However, 
Member States would need to organise information gathering excercises on the time needed 
for  registered  travellers  to  cross  an  external  border,  average  time  of  enrolment  and  border 
guard  resources  replaced/made  available  by  the  RTP.  Furthermore,  Member  States  should 
keep  records  on  the  complaints  lodged  against  them.  These  information  could  be  gathered 
from  Member  States'  yearly  reports  and/or  based  on  samples  taken  periodically.  Periodical 
samples on the time needed to cross the border and on the enrolment time would need to be 
taken once per year. 

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ANNEXES 

Annex 1 

List of acronyms 

Annex 2 

Complementary information on problem definition 

Annex 3 

Annex 4 

Current and planned Automated Border Control systems in the Member 
States based on e-passport, FLUX pilot programme 

Number of participants participating in some programmes and 
processing times 

Annex 5 

Databases and systems at EU level 

Annex 6 

Existing systems link to the RTP and management of the systems 

Annex 7 

Final results of the data collection held form 31 August to 6 September 

Annex 8 

Data to be stored  

Annex 9 

Vetting criteria 

Annex 10  Costs  

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ANNEX 1 

LIST OF ACRONYMS 

ABC   

Automated Border Control 

Agency 

Agency  for  operational  management  of  large-scale  IT  systems  in  the 
area of freedom, security and justice 

API 

Advanced Passenger Information  

BMS   

Biometric Matching System 

EBF   

External Borders Fund 

EDPS  

European Data Protection Supervisor 

ESRIF 

European Security and Research Innovation Forum 

EES   

Entry/Exit System 

EURODAC  European  Dactyloscopie  (EU  Fingerprint  Database  for  Identifying 

Asylum Seekers 

Frontex 

European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the 
external borders of the Member States of the European Union 

IAB 

Impact Assessment Board 

IATA 

International Air Transport Association 

ISF 

Internal Security Fund 

MRZ  

Machine Readable Zone (of the travel document) 

PNR   

Passenger Name Record  

RTP   

Registered Traveller Programme 

RTS   

Registered Traveller System 

SBC   

Schengen Borders Code 

SIS 

VIS 

Schengen Information System 

Visa Information System 

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ANNEX 2 

COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON PROBLEM DEFINITION 

1. 

Legislative aspects 

While  EU  citizens'  and  third-country  nationals'  border  crossing  lanes  are  separated  and 
respective border checks differ i.e. thorough checks are normally carried out on third-country 
nationals  and  minimum  checks  on  EU  citizens  and  persons  enjoying  the  right  of  free 
movement, current rules could be described as "one-size-fits-all" regardless of any differences 
in risk between different travellers or their frequency of travel. The  main reason behind the 
current approach has been to ensure a consistent and high level of security with regard to all 
travellers, taking into account that from the perspective of the border guard carrying out the 
actual  checks,  virtually all  travellers  are  anonymous,  with  few  if  any  tools  available  for  the 
border  guard  to  distinguish  between  the  travellers  posing  no  risk  whatsoever  (the  vast 
majority) and those that do pose such a risk. 

Consequently, all third-country nationals need to go through a manual border check procedure 
carried  out  by  border  authorities  which  requires  time  and  human  resources.  In  accordance 
with the Schengen Border Code, at entry, a thorough border check for third-country nationals, 
in  addition  to  a  travel  document  check,  implies  a  check  to  determine  their  purpose  of  stay, 
whether they possess sufficient means of subsistence etc, as well as a search in the Schengen 
Information  System  (SIS)  and  in  national  databases  to  verify  that  they  are  not  a  threat  to 
public policy, internal security, public health and the international relations of the Schengen 
States. Furthermore, a search in the Visa Information System (VIS) is obligatory at entry. 

Current legislation allows only minor exceptions to the principle of thorough border checks. 
The Schengen Borders Code regulates the facilitated border checks for Heads of State; aircraft 
pilots  and  other  crew  members;  seamen;  holders  of  diplomatic,  official  or  service  passports 
and  members  of  international  delegations;  and  cross-border  workers.  The  Local  Border 
Traffic Regulation concerns facilitated border checks for border residents who provide proof 
of legitimate reasons to frequently cross an external land border under the local border traffic 
regime.  

As a result, beyond these limited exceptions, the current legal framework does not allow for 
differentiating  between,  for  example,  a  traveller  coming  to  Europe  for  the  first  time  and  a 
traveller arriving for 50th time, having travelled regularly every month for the past years.  

2. 

Technical aspects 

The  ABC  process  starts  with  passport  scanning.  The  traveller  inserts  the  data  page  of  the 
passport into the passport reader. The reader technically checks the physical security features 
of the passport, reads the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and communicates with the chip in 
the passport to verify the authenticity of the document. A live facial image (or fingerprints) of 
the  traveller  is  then  compared  to  the  one  stored  in  the  chip  to  verify  the  identity  of  the 
traveller. Random checks are carried out against the SIS and national databases. This process 
is in principle the same as in the manual border booth but, in this case, is done by a machine. 
If the match is successful and the travel document is found to be genuine, the automated gate 

EN 

58 

   EN 

 
 
opens  and  the  traveller  can  enter  the  territory  of  the  Member  States;  if  not,  the  traveller  is 
referred  to  a  manual  check.  Border  authorities  monitor  the  whole  process  including  the 
matching of the facial image, but they can monitor several gates at once. 

Some Member States have implemented a form of RTP for EU citizens. The main difference 
between this type of RTP and ABC is that a traveller needs to be pre-enrolled before being 
granted  access  to  the  RTP  i.e.  biometric  data  should  be  captured.  The  automated  process  at 
the border is the same with both programmes. However, in a RTP, a traveller's information is 
often stored in and retrieved from a database or in a token instead of the e-passport.  

One  Schengen  country  has  a  project  running  at  the  air  border  crossing  point  with  a  third 
country  giving  access  to  ABC  both  in  the  Member  State  and  the  third  country.  For  third-
country  nationals,  this  programme  involves  a  semi-automated  border  check  to  ensure  that 
border  guards  can  comply  with  the  requirements  in  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  including 
stamping the travel document of the third-country national.  

Based on Member States' experiences (but also on those of other countries such as the US), 
the  use  of  an  ABC  system  can  drastically  decrease  waiting  times,  increase  the  throughput 
capacity  of  border  crossing  points  and  provide  an  effective  tool  with  which  to  manage 
passenger  flows.  The  US  conducted  a  statistical  analysis  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  Global 
Entry pilot programme based on data for 1 575 flights from November 19, 2008 to January 9, 
2009.  That  analysis  indicates  that  "participation  in  Global  Entry  may  reduce  a  passenger's 
waiting  time  by  up  to  70  %.  It  also  reduces  the  variability  of  waiting  time67".  Equally  the 
Portuguese RAPID system has decreased both the border crossing time and human resources 
needed  for  managing  passenger  flows.  RAPID  was  used  between  May  2007  and  October 
2009  by  612  066  travellers  which  is  18  %  of  the  total  amount  of  border  crossings  made  in 
Portugal's  external  air  borders  by  EU  citizens  and  persons  enjoying  the  right  of  free 
movement. The biggest group of users were men and travellers aged 26-35 years. 

3. 

Operational and practical aspects 

Current travel flows at the EU external border 

To gather comparable data on border crossings the Czech and Swedish Presidencies together 
with  the  Commission  organised  a  data  collection  exercise  at  all  external  border  crossing 
points  from  31  August  to  6  September  2009.  Based  on  the  data  collected  during  the  above 
mentioned  exercise,  73,5  %  of  travellers  crossing  the  border  are  EU  citizens  or  persons 
enjoying  the  right  of  free  movement  (9,1  million/week),  15,2  %  are  third-country  nationals 
without a visa (2,1 million/week) and 11,3 % are third-country nationals holding a visa (1,4 

67 

also 

accepted 

The  US  Federal  Register  Vol.  74  No.  222,  November  19,  2009.  US  citizens,  US  nationals,  and  US 
permanent residents who are at least 14 years of age are eligible for participation in the Global Entry 
pilot.  On  April  23,  2009  citizens  of  the  Netherlands  who  participate  in  Privium  (Dutch  programme) 
were 
also 
in 
http://www.thetransnational.travel/news.php?cid=international-trusted-traveler-program-
permanent.Nov-09.24. "The US Department of Homeland Security estimates that the average customs processing wait time 
for participants upon their arrival on international flights is seven minutes, a 70 percent reduction compared with non-members-
though it varies by airport, airline, time of day and flight origin. Less than 1 percent of Global Entry passengers are waiting longer 
than 20 minutes compared with approximately 10 percent of all U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents waiting longer than 
20  minutes." The US has several other Trusted Traveller Programmes, for example SENTRI at the land 
borders  and  NEXUS  together  with  Canada.  The  US  Customs  and  Border  Protection  (CBP)  receives 
about 800 applications a day equivalent to 300 000 per year for its Trusted Traveller Programmes.  

programme. 

See 

the 

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million/week).68 Based on this exercise, in theory 26,5 % would qualify as a potential target 
group for a RTP.  

The  number  of  third-country  nationals  crossing  the  border  differs  significantly  among 
Member  States  and  also  among  border  crossing  points.  Most  of  the  third-country  nationals 
and  also  third-country  nationals  holding  visas  cross  the  border  via  land  borders,  the  next 
largest number by air borders and the smallest via sea borders. For example, in Finland 58 % 
of travellers are third-country nationals (52 % of them visa holders), whereas in Slovakia the 
number is 12 % (9 % of them visa holders). In Lithuania, 55 % of travellers crossing the land 
borders are visa holders whereas the proportion at some countries' air borders is quite small; 1 
% in Luxembourg, 7 % in Portugal and 11 % in France.  

Also, the total amount of travellers differs a lot between Member States. During the one week 
period, over three million travellers crossed the borders in Spain69 and almost two million in 
France whereas the figures were only 8 000 in Luxembourg and 36 000 in Malta. Based on 
the  figures  above,  one  cannot  estimate  for  the  Schengen  area  as  a  whole  how  many  third-
country nationals would join a RTP and use it at a certain border crossing point. 

Border processing times  

To find out the time needed to cross the external border, the Czech Presidency together with 
the  Commission  launched  a  questionnaire.  According  to  the  Member  States'  replies  to  the 
questionnaire, currently the average time for a border check for visa holders on entry at the 
land border is 2 minutes 17 seconds, for visa-exempt nationals 1 minute 12 seconds and for 
EU  citizens  20  seconds.  The  average  time  on  exit  at  the  land  border  is  for  visa  holders  1 
minute 34 seconds, for visa-exempt nationals 58 seconds and for EU citizens 18 seconds.  

The  average  time  at  air  borders  on  entry  for  visa  holders  is  1  minute  44  seconds,  for  visa-
exempt nationals 1 minute 3 seconds and for EU citizens 15 seconds. The average time at air 
borders on exit is for visa holders 1 minute 11 seconds, for visa-exempt nationals 52 seconds 
and for EU citizens 15 seconds.  

The time spent on a border check at the sea border is not reported because the results are quite 
similar  to  checks  carried  out  at  land  borders.  The  aforementioned  times  do  not  include 
anything  else  but  basic  borders  check  at  first-line  (verification  of  the  identity  of  the  person 
and checking of travel document(s) and necessary databases) in a situation where everything 
seems to be in order concerning the traveller.  

As  can  be  seen,  the  longest  time  is  needed  for  border  checks  on  entry  at  the  land  and  sea 
borders for visa holders. However, visa holders represent only a small minority of travellers at 
sea borders.  

From a practical point of view it should also be noted that at air borders and sea borders the 
sizes of airplanes70 and ships are growing and airplane/ship timetables are very tight. On the 
other hand, at land borders, border checks take longer than at air borders, and they are more 
complex to manage in instances when individuals arrive in groups at a land border crossing 

68 

69 
70 

Data were collected from all Schengen Member States, Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus. Final results of 
the data collection exercise are in Annex 7. 
Border crossings in Ceuta and Melilla are included. 
For example, new aircraft types like BOEING Dreamliner and AIRBUS A 380 increase the pressure to 
manage passenger flows more efficiently at the airports. 

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point in cars, busses or trains71. It should also be noted that at the land border, border guards 
do not have any advance information on passengers before they arrive at the external border 
which  means  that  it  is  not  possible  to  perform  any  pre-arrival  checks  on  the  travellers. 
Normally this is not the case with other border types72.  

At the largest border crossing points there are often long queues; it can take hours to cross the 
external  border.  All  passengers,  including  those  who  travel  frequently  and  have  always 
complied  with  all  the  rules,  are  negatively  affected  by  the  queues.  EU  citizens'  and  third-
country nationals' border crossing lanes are separated, but this has not and will not solve the 
problem of queuing.  

Given the very large number of border crossings, even small changes in the border crossing 
time are potentially very significant. However, also many other factors contribute to overall 
time  spent  at  borders  ,  including:  check  in  times;  customs  checks;  time  spent  waiting  for 
luggage; air traffic delays and security checks.  

Other factors influencing border processing times 

Taking  the  current  legislative  framework  as  given  and  setting  aside  the  use  of  new 
technology, possibilities to influence border processing times are very limited. Increasing the 
number of border guards working at the external border or adding new, traditional lanes and 
manual  border  control  booths  is  not  a  workable  solution  for  both  practical  and  financial 
reasons  as  discussed  already  in  the  previous  impact  assessment.  At  many  border  crossing 
points  additional  traditional  lanes  and/or  manual  control  booths  cannot  be  added  without 
undertaking  extensive  construction  works;  therefore  some  Member  States  are  already  using 
ABC/semi-automated systems at their external border crossing points.  

From  an  EU  perspective  it  should  also  be  recalled  that  it  is  not  possible  to  harmonize  all 
factors  influencing  border  crossing  times  at  the  border  crossing  points  (infrastructure,  exact 
border  check  procedure,  number  of  border  guards,  use  of  ABC  etc.)  through  legislation. 
Border crossing points and their passenger flows can differ significantly. This is also reflected 
in  Article  14  of  the  Schengen  Border  Code:  "Member  States  shall  deploy  appropriate  staff 
and  resources  in  sufficient  numbers  to  carry  out  border  control  at  the  external  borders,  in 
accordance with Articles 6 to 13, in such a way as to ensure an efficient, high and uniform 
level of control at their external borders".73 

Some survey results 

Many  people  crossing  the  border  are  already  familiar  with  e-services  and  are  capable  of 
dealing  with  different  matters  without  outside  assistance.  Among  the  e-services  most 
commonly  used  are,  for  example,  e-invoices,  e-banking,  flight  check-in  via  internet  or 
automated kiosk and internet shopping. Also, government services are increasingly provided 
to  citizens  online.  The  general  trend  is  to  gradually  move  towards  online  and  automated 

71 
72 
73 

Cars onboard ferries undergo similar checks as at the land border. 
For example, Advanced Passenger Information (API) is available at the airports. 
See also EU Schengen Catalogue on External borders control, Return and Readmission updated version 
of 19 March 2009. On page 24, the Catalogue refers to the infrastructure at border crossing points (lanes 
and  booths)  and  number  of  personnel  needed.  "Adequate  number  of  officers  and  border  check 
equipment  should  be  deployed  to  control  passenger  flows  and  respond  to  actual  risk  assessment. 
Adequate number depends inter alia: on constant control of passenger flow, night time, border situation 
and threat level, available equipment, environment". 

EN 

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services. Taking into account the experiences of Member States having introduced ABC for 
EU citizens, the interest and readiness of travellers in using new technology can therefore be 
assumed to be high. Most travellers are willing to use ABC systems as a survey conducted in 
the  UK  shows.  Based  on  the  survey,  around  90  %  of  UK  air  travellers  support  the  use  of 
biometric  scanning  and  ABC  systems74.  The  Netherlands  conducted  a  survey  from  9  May 
2011  till  16  May  in  which  a  total  of  242  of  the  US  participants  in  the  FLUX  programme 
responded.  95  %  of  respondents  considered  the  programme  excellent  or  good.  82  %  will 
renew their membership and 17 % are considering it. Some of the respondents (20 persons) 
asked for an expansion of the programme to other European countries. The main reason for 
joining the programme was a fast border crossing (98 %); not priority parking or availability 
of a lounge (17 %).  

Australian Customs and Border Protection Service launched an independent survey involving 
face-to-face interviews at several airports during the last ten days of each month from October 
2009 to January 2011. By almost all the respondents were generally satisfied with the service 
provided.  More  than  two  thirds  of  the  respondents  highlighted  that  SmartGate  was  an 
efficient,  prompt  and  quick  option.  Over  80  %  did  not  mention  any  negative  aspects  when 
questioned about SmartGate75. 

74 

75 

Survey was conducted in 2006. Misense pilot started in October 2006 at Heathrow airport. UK survey is 
used as any other Member State has not carried out such a study for their citizens. 
See draft report "ABC solutions based on Electronic Machine Readable Travel Documents (eMRTD) in 
third countries" prepared by Frontex. 

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ANNEX 3 

CURRENT AND PLANNED AUTOMATED BORDER CONTROL SYSTEMS IN THE 
MEMBER STATES 

Locations 

Biometrics 

Country 

Austria 

Belgium 

Vienna airport 

Brussels airport 

Czech Republic 

Prague airport 

Face 

Face 

Face 

Estonia 

Finland 

Tallinn airport 

Face and fingerprints 

Helsinki-Vantaa Airport 

Face 

Vaalimaa  land  border  crossing 
point 

France 

Orly airport 

Fingerprints 

Paris-Charles-de-Gaulle airport 

Germany 

Frankfurt Airport 

Netherlands 

Schipol airport 

Face 

Face/iris 

Norway 

Portugal 

Oslo  airport.  Plans  to  expand  to 
the land border crossing points 

Face 

International  airports.  Plans  to 
expand to the seaports 

Face 

Spain 

Madrid and Barcelona airports 

Facie and fingerprints  

United Kingdom 

Several airports 

Face/iris 

Furthermore,  at  least  Denmark,  Bulgaria,  Latvia,  Romania  and  Hungary  have  preliminary 
plans to start using ABCs. 

FLUX PILOT PROGRAMME 

FLUX  (Fast  Low  Risk  Universal  Crossing)  is  the  official  name  for  the  pilot 
programme between the US and the NL which started on 23 April 2009. FLUX aim 
is  to  facilitate  and  speed  up  border  checks  for  pre-approved,  trusted  travellers  by 
providing them with automated processes at the border. 

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A single, web-based application is submitted simultaneously to both governments by 
the  applicant.  All  applicants  are  subject  to  comprehensive  Government  background 
checks,  collection  of  biometric  data  (Iris  in  NL  and  fingerprints  in  US)  and 
interviews  by  both  countries'  officers.  Each  country  conducts  its  own  vetting  and 
only  for  its  own  programme.  Based  on  the  agreed  vetting  criteria,  several  database 
checks  are  made  but  only  "green  light/red  light"  information  is  exchanged.  In 
addition to that, travellers are checked every time when crossing the border against 
national databases (and the SIS in EU). 

FLUX participants become a member of both Global Entry in the US and Privium in 
the NL. Membership is fee-based and the fee depends on the chosen option i.e. the 
traveller can choose a higher fee and then use preferential parking, ClubLounge etc. 

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ANNEX 4 

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS PARTICIPATING IN SOME PROGRAMMES AND 
PROCESSING TIMES 

Country 

Participants 

Processing time 

Note 

Australia and New 
Zealand- SmartGate 

All e-passport 
holders – 2 million 
processed/year 

38 seconds (17 
seconds at the 
automated gate) 

AUS and NZ citizens 

Germany - ABG 

24 000  

10-15 seconds 

EU/EEA/CH citizens 

Hong Kong – 
eChannel (all BCPs) 
and Vehicular 
eChannel (land) 

Netherlands - 
PRIVIUM 

Singapore - eIACS 

Malaysia – Autogate 
(at air and land 
border) 

United Kingdom - 
IRIS 

United States – 
Global Entry, 
NEXUS, SENTRI, 
and FAST 

All Smart Identity 
Card holders 

12 seconds 

46 000 

12 seconds 

3 million users (70 
000 transactions per 
day) 

8-12 seconds  

Hong Kong and 
Macao 
citizens/residents + 
certain frequent 
visitors 

EU/EEA/CH citizens. 
US citizens via 
FLUX 

Singapore and 
Malaysian citizens 

300 000 

9-12 seconds 

Malaysian citizens 

250 000 

15 seconds 

over 1 million in 
Global Entry 

Depends on the 
programme 

EU/EEA/CH + third-
country nationals 
under certain 
conditions 

US citizens, US 
nationals, US lawful 
permanent residents. 
For example, Dutch 
citizens via FLUX. 

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ANNEX 5 

DATABASES AND SYSTEMS AT EU LEVEL 

Centralised  databases  containing  alerts  on  persons  and  other  categories  of  data  for  law 
enforcement and border control purposes have been set up and/or are being developed at EU 
level.  Furthermore,  a  police  co-operation  mechanism  for  exchanging  information  on  DNA, 
fingerprints and vehicle registration data has been established through the Prüm Treaty/Prüm 
Decisions.  

SIS 

The  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  is  a  centralised  information  system.  The  SIS, 
together  with  the  cooperation  of  the  SIRENE  bureaux,  set  up  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of 
Title  IV  of  the  Convention  implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement  of  14  June  1985 
(Schengen Convention) on the gradual abolition of checks at common borders constitutes an 
essential tool for the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis as integrated into 
the framework of the European Union. 

The main categories of data contained in the SIS are: 

•  Persons wanted for arrest for extradition purposes; 

•  Third-country nationals to be refused entry to the Schengen territory; 

•  Missing persons (minors and adults); 

•  Witnesses and persons required to appear before the judicial authorities in connection with 

criminal proceedings; 

•  Person or vehicles to be put under discreet surveillance or for specific checks;  

•  Certain categories of objects (e.g. stolen identity cards, vehicles, firearms, bank notes). 

The SIS provides access to alerts on persons and objects to the following authorities: 

•  authorities responsible for border checks; 

•  authorities  carrying  out  and  coordinating  other  police  and  customs  checks  within  the 

country; 

•  national  judicial  authorities,  inter  alia,  those  responsible  for  the  initiation  of  public 
prosecutions  in  criminal  proceedings  and  judicial  inquiries  prior  to  indictment,  in  the 
performance of their tasks, as set out in national legislation; 

•  authorities responsible for issuing visas, the central  authorities  responsible  for examining 
visa  applications,  authorities  responsible  for  issuing  residence  permits  and  for  the 
administration of legislation on third-country nationals in the context of the application of 
the Union acquis relating to the movement of persons; 

•  authorities responsible for issuing vehicle registration certificates. 

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It  is  up  to  each  Member  State  to  decide  which  national  authorities  are  competent  and  shall 
have access to some or all categories of SIS alerts depending on that competence.  

Europol and Eurojust also have access to certain categories of alerts. Europol may access data 
entered  for  alerts  for  arrest,  alerts  for  discreet  surveillance  or  specific  check  and  alerts  on 
objects  for  seizure  or  use  as  evidence  in  criminal  proceedings.  Eurojust  may  access  data 
entered for alerts for arrest and alerts for a judicial procedure. 

The  SIS  operates  on  the  principle  that  the  national  systems  cannot  exchange  computerised 
data directly between themselves, but instead only via the central system. The SIS enables the 
users  to  check  persons  and  objects  both  at  external  borders  and  within  the  territory  of  the 
Schengen  States.  The  SIS  provides  law  enforcement  authorities  with  information  on  why  a 
certain individual is wanted, what action is to be taken and whether the person is presumed 
violent and armed.  

However, as the information contained in the SIS is only sufficient for the authorities on the 
ground to take the correct initial actions  it is necessary for the Member States to be able to 
exchange supplementary information, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as required for 
implementing certain provisions of the Schengen Convention, and to ensure full application of 
Title IV of the Schengen Convention for the SIS as a whole. 

Article 92(4) of the Schengen Convention provides that Member States shall, in accordance 
with  national  legislation,  exchange  through  the  authorities  designated  for  that  purpose 
(SIRENE), all information necessary in connection with the entry of alerts and for allowing 
the appropriate action to be taken in cases where persons in respect of whom, and objects in 
respect of which, data have been entered in the Schengen Information System, are found as a 
result of searches made in this System. 

The  Schengen  States  are  the  owners  of  the  data  they  introduce  into  the  SIS  and  bear  the 
responsibility for their legality and accuracy. 

Annual statistics on the number of alerts are collated and published by the Council, not only 
on the total number of alerts but also the different categories of alert. 

•  By  the  start  of  2011  (01.01.2011),  the  total  of  valid  records  in  the  SIS  reached  35.69 

million which means an increase by 12.9% compared to the start of 2010.  

•  Nearly 30 million records existed on that date on lost, stolen and misappropriated identity 

documents (passports, identity cards, driving licence);  

•  More than 1.2 million records existed on that date on wanted persons; 

•  The  vast  majority  of  alerts  on  persons  are  about  third-country  nationals  who  shall  be 

denied entry to the Schengen area; 

•  The SIS currently stores only alphanumeric data (letters and numbers), comprising data as 

regards individuals on76: 

•  names, including aliases; 

76 

Article 94(3) of the Schengen Convention. 

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•  sex; 

•  objective physical characteristics not subject to change; 

•  date and place of birth; 

•  nationality; 

•  whether the persons are armed or violent; 

•  the reason for the alert; and 

•  the action to be taken. 

In  the  context  of  EU  enlargement,  the  technological  platform  needed  to  be  upgraded  and 
additional  features  were  desired.  For  these  reasons,  the  second-generation  Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) is being developed.  

SIS  II  has  been  designed  to  function  in  an  enlarged  Europe,  but  also  to  deal  with  new 
challenges  and  use  biometrics  to  aid  in  the  verification  of  a  person's  identity.  SIS  II  will 
provide the following new functionalities: 

•  The  addition  of  new  categories  of  alerts  (aircrafts,  boats,  boat  engines,  containers, 

industrial equipment, vehicle number plates, vehicle registration documents); 

•  The  addition  of  new  categories  of  data,  including  biometric  data  (biometric  data  such  as 
fingerprints  and  digital  facial  images  may  be  stored  for  the  purposes  of  confirming 
identity; and 

•  The interlinking of alerts. 

On  20  December  2006  two  Regulations77  and  a  Council  Decision78  were  adopted  on  the 
establishment, operation and use of SIS II.  

VIS 

The  Visa  Information  System  (VIS)  is  a  system  for  the  exchange  of  short-stay  visa  data 
between  the  Schengen  and  the  Schengen  Associated  States  that  was  initially  established  in 
200479. All functionalities of the VIS are based on visa applications or visa decisions attached 
to applications. After a first registration, a visa application can be amended, until a decision is 
made whether or not a Schengen visa should be issued. After visa issuance, further decisions 
can  be  made,  for  example,  an  issued  visa  can  be  revoked  or  annulled,  or  a  visa  can  be 
extended. VIS supports the storage, maintenance and retrieval of this information. 

The main objectives of the VIS are: 

•  to facilitate the visa application procedure;  

77 
78 
79 

Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006. 
Council Decision 2007/533/JHA. 
Council Decision (EC) No 512/2004, 8.6.2004.  

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•  to  prevent  the  bypassing  of  the  criteria  for  the  determination  of  the  Member  State 

responsible for examining the application ("visa shopping"); 

•  to facilitate the fight against fraud; 

•  to  facilitate  checks  at  external  border  crossing  points  and  within  the  territory  of  the 

Member States; 

•  to  assist  in  the  identification  of  any  person  who  may  not,  or  may  no  longer  fulfil  the 

conditions for entry to, stay or residence on the territory of the Member States; 

•  to facilitate the application of Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 ("Dublin II" Regulation); 

•  to  contribute  to  the  prevention  of  threats  to  the  internal  security  of  any  of  the  Member 

States. 

According to the text of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 9 July 2008, the VIS will store personal data from visa applicants: 

•  Data on the applicant (i.e. name, address, occupation); 

•  Data  on  the  visa  application  process  (date  and  place  of  the  application,  visas  requested, 

issued, refused, annulled, revoked or extended); 

•  Biometrics (photographs and fingerprints). 

According to Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008, law enforcement authorities 
from  Member  States  and  Europol  will  have  restricted  and  indirect  access  to  the  VIS  data. 
Each  Member  State  will  have  to  designate  an  authority  responsible  for  controlling  law 
enforcement  access  to  the  database  and  the  police  will  have  to  supply  evidence  that  their 
query is necessary for criminal investigations. 

Transfer of data to third countries or international organisations is in principle not allowed. By 
way  of  derogation,  certain  data  may  be  transferred  or  made  available  if  necessary  in 
individual cases for proving the identity of a third country national, including for the purpose 
of  return,  providing  that  specific  conditions  are  met.  Data  obtained  pursuant  to  Decision 
2008/633/ JHA may only be transferred or made available in an exceptional case of urgency, 
only for the purpose of the prevention and detection of terrorists and serious crime offences 
and  with  the  consent  of  the  Member  State  that  entered  the  data.  Furthermore,  a  permanent 
Management  Authority  (the  Agency)  will  be  responsible  for  the  VIS  database  and  the  visa 
application data will be stored for a maximum of five years.  

The  VIS  started  operations  in  the  first  region  on  11  October  2011  on  the  basis  of  the 
Commission  implementing  decision  of  21  September  2011  (2011/636/EU)  and  Commission 
Decision of 30 November 2009 (2009/49/EC). The operations started first at the consulates in 
North  Africa  and  20  days  after  go-live  of  the  VIS  also  at  the  border  crossing  points 
(verification of visas against the VIS). On 10 May 2012, the VIS was successfully launched in 
the second region,  the Near East (Israel,  Jordan, Lebanon and Syria).  Further,  the VIS on 2 
October 2012 started operations in a third region, the Gulf (Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen).  

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BMS 

The  Biometric  Matching  System  (BMS)  developed  for  the  VIS  is  an  information  search 
engine  that  can  match  biometric  data  from  visa  applications,  identity  management  systems 
and policing systems. The BMS is designed to enable justice and immigration authorities to 
deal  with  security  and  other  issues  related  to  terrorism,  organized  crime,  irregular 
immigration, visa shopping, identity theft and fraud. 

The BMS database will be able to store the fingerprints of up to 70 million people and process 
more than 100,000 verification and identification requests per day. The system will perform 
one-to-one  comparisons  for  biometric  verifications  and  one-to-many  searches  for  biometric 
identifications. 

The  BMS  is  developed  using  a  service-oriented  architecture  approach,  has  the  capability  to 
connect  with  a  number  of  IT  systems  and  manage  functions  related  to  visas,  immigration, 
border control and police cooperation. In addition, the technical architecture will be flexible 
enough to accommodate new developments in EU policy as immigration and border control 
procedures evolve. 

EURODAC 

Eurodac  is  a  fingerprint  database80  that  stores  and  compares  the  fingerprints  of  asylum 
applicants  and  irregular  immigrants  and  allows  Member  States  to  determine  the  State 
responsible  for  examining  an  asylum  application  in  accordance  with  the  Dublin  II 
Regulation81. The EURODAC central unit operates a central database comparing fingerprints, 
an automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) and a secure communication system for 
data  transmission  from  and  towards  the  national  units  (National  Access  Points)  in  Member 
States.  

Data collected for any asylum applicants over 14 years of age include: 

•  Fingerprint and control images; 

•  Date of the asylum application; 

•  The Member State where the asylum application was filed; 

•  The gender of the applicant. 

Data are collected according to three categories: 

•  Category 1: data of asylum applications. Fingerprints of asylum applicants are sent to the 
Central  Unit  for  comparison  against  fingerprints  of  other  asylum  applicants  who  have 
previously  lodged  their  application  in  another  Member  State.  Fingerprint  of  these 
individuals are s deleted when an individual obtains the nationality of one of the Member 
States.  

80 
81 

Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000, 11.12.2000 and (EC) 407/2002, 28.2.2002. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003, 18.2.2003. 

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•  Category 2: data of aliens apprehended in connection with irregular crossing of an external 
border  and  where  not  repatriated.  Fingerprints  of  these  individuals  are  sent  to  the 
EURODAC Central Unit for storage only, in order to be compared against the data of any 
asylum  application  submitted  subsequently  to  the  Central  Unit.  This  data  is  retained  for 
two years, but is deleted if the individual receives a residence permit, departs the territory 
of a Member State or obtains the nationality of one of the Member States.  

•  Category 3: data of aliens found illegally present in a Member State. This data is not stored 
but  is  searched  against  the  data  of  asylum  applicants  stored  in  the  central  database.  The 
transmission of this category is not mandatory but optional for Member States.  

In 2010, EURODAC processed: 

•  215,463  fingerprints  of  asylum  seekers  (Category  1),  an  9%  decrease  compared  to  the 

previous year (236,936),  

•  11,156 fingerprints of people crossing the borders irregularly (Category 2), a 64% decrease 

compared to the previous year (31,071), and  

•  72,840  fingerprints  of  people  apprehended  while  illegally  residing  on  the  territory  of  a 
Member State (Category 3). This figure has decreased by 14,86 % from the previous year 
(85,554), demonstrating a growing interest from Member States to make use of this search 
possibility.  

The  increase  in  transactions  may  be  due  to  the fact  that  most  Member  States  have  installed 
fingerprint scanning devices at their external borders.  

EURODAC data also provide information on multiple asylum applications. In 2010, 24,16 % 
of  aliens  applying  for  asylum  had  already  lodged  one  or  more  applications  in  the  same 
Member  State  or  in  another  Member  State.  Out  of  a  total  of  215,463  asylum  applications, 
52,064 were ‘multiple applications”. See Table 1 for a comparison with previous years.  

Table 1 EURODAC information on multiple applications. 

Year 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

Number  of  asylum  applications 
recorded by EURODAC (Category 
1) 

one 

least 

At 
asylum 
application  lodged  previously 
(in  the  same  or  in  another 
Member State) 

197,284 

219,557 

236,936 

215,463 

31,910 (16,17%) 

38,445 (17,5%) 

55,226 (23.3%) 

52,064 (24,16%) 

Sources: EURODAC annual reports82.  

82 

SEC(2009) 96, 26.1.2009, SEC(2009) 1246/6, 25.9.2009, SEC(2010) 954/10, 2.9.2010.  

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Prüm Treaty 

The Prüm Convention was signed between Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, 
the  Netherlands  and  Austria  in  May  2005  on  the  stepping  up  of  cross-border  cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and irregular migration. In June 2007, 
important  provisions  of  the  Prüm  Treaty  dealing  with  police  co-operation  and  information 
exchange  on  DNA-profiles,  fingerprint  reference  data  and  vehicle  registration  data  were 
incorporated  into  the  legislative  framework  of  the  EU  by  the  Prüm  Council  Decisions  and 
were scheduled to be fully implemented in all Member States by August 2011. More than half 
of  the  Member  States,  however,  were  sigificantly  lagging  behind  this  deadline  in  2011. 
Considerable implementation progress is now expected in the course of 2012.  

In  addition  to  the  above,  the  Treaty  contains  provisions  for  the  deployment  of  armed  air 
marshals on intra-Schengen flights, joint police patrols, and entry of armed police forces into 
another state.  

The Prüm Decisions does not establish a central database containing personal data, but allow 
law enforcement authorities direct access to databases in other Member States in the case of 
vehicle registration data and access on a 'hit'/'no hit' basis to databases in the case of DNA and 
dactyloscopic  data.  Neither  do  they  authorise  the  sharing  of  data  on  individuals  who  have 
been found illegally staying in a Member State or who have remained beyond their authorised 
length of stay in the Schengen area. 

API 

According to Article 26 of the Schengen Convention, carriers are responsible for the checking 
of documents of the passengers they transport into the Member States and may be penalised 
when third country nationals are found at the borders without the necessary travel documents.  

Following  the  decision  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  Schengen  in  1994  which  considered 
the advanced transmission of passenger data as a valuable tool for enhancing border security, 
implemented  API  practices  reflecting  diversified  national 
Member  States  gradually 
approaches.  In  order  to  harmonise  these  practices  and  introduce  common  standards  on  the 
information  to  be  transmitted  as  well  as  on  the  data  protection  safeguarding  clauses,  Spain 
presented in 2003 an Initiative that led to the adoption of the Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 
29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to transmit passenger information (API Directive). 

The  explicit  purposes  of  this  Directive  are  to  improve  border  control  and  combat  illegal 
immigration  by  the  transmission  of  advance  passenger  data  by  air  carriers  to  the  competent 
national authorities. 

Whilst the initial proposal aimed for the inclusion of all carriers, the version finally adopted 
limits  its  scope  to  air  carriers  given  their  key  role  in  controlling  immigration  flows  from 
distant  places  of  origin  and  since  they  alone  had  the  necessary  registration  system.  In  any 
case,  the  Directive  does  not  prevent  Member  States  from  imposing  obligations  on  other 
carriers. 

On  the  other  hand  the  Directive  does  not  introduce  a  general  obligation  for  air  carriers  to 
transmit  passenger  information  since  data  is  only  transmitted  at  the  request  of  border 
authorities,  depending  on  Member  States  appreciation  of  the  risks  involved.  Moreover  the 
information concerns only passengers who are carried from third countries into EU territory. 

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The  information  shall  be  transmitted  electronically  (or  in  case  of  failure  by  any  appropriate 
means),  in  advance  of  departure,  to  the  authorities  of  the  first  authorised  border  crossing 
point. 

Information shall comprise: 

•  the number and type of travel document used, 

•  nationality,  

•  full names,  

•  the date of birth,  

•  the border crossing point of entry into the territory of the Member States, 

•  code of transport, 

•  departure and arrival time of the transportation, 

•  total number of passengers carried on that transport, 

•  the initial point of embarkation. 

Article  4  of  the  Directive  foresees  an  obligation  on  Member  States  to  impose  dissuasive 
penalties on carriers, which, as a result of fault, have not transmitted the data required or have 
transmitted  incomplete  or  false  data  (maximum  amount  not  less  than  5  000  €,  minimum 
amount not less than 3 000 €). 

The transmission, use and storage of such data are subject to strict compliance with Directive 
95/46/EC on data protection by the authorities of the Member States and carriers. Data must 
be  deleted  by  carriers  within  24  hours  after  the  arrival  and  also  by  the  border  authorities 
unless data is needed as evidence in proceedings aiming at the enforcement of legislation on 
entry and immigration.  

The  deadline  to  transpose  the  Directive  was  5  September  2006.  All  Member  States  have 
adopted national measures to comply with the Directive since then. 

However, according to the information available in most Member States no systematic use of 
the advanced passenger information is made yet. 

PNR 

PNR data is unverified information provided by passengers, and collected by and held in air 
carriers'  reservation  and  departure  control  systems  for  their  own  commercial  purposes.  It 
contains several different types of information, such as travel dates, travel itinerary or ticket 
information.  In  February  2011,  the  Commission  presented  a  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  the 

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use  of  PNR  data  for  the  prevention,  detection,  investigation  and  prosecution  of  terrorist 
offences and serious crime83. 

83 

SEC(2011) 132 final and SEC(2011) 133 final, 2.2.2011. 

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ANNEX 6 

EXISTING SYSTEMS LINK TO THE RTP AND MANAGEMENT OF THE 
SYSTEMS 

When a third-country national enters the Schengen area it is obligatory for border authorities 
to  consult  the  data  and  alerts  on  persons  and, where  necessary,  objects  included  in  the  SIS. 
When a third-country national exits the Schengen area, the SIS may be consulted. This means 
that  due  to  the  current  use  of  the  SIS,  the  border  crossing  points  are  connected  to  the  data 
network  and  equipped  with  travel  document  readers.  The  SIS  check  is  carried  out 
automatically when the MRZ of the travel document is read.  

A second EU system, the VIS, forms an important part of the border check process. In order 
to  facilitate  border  checks  and  fight  against  visa  fraud,  visas  are  checked  at  the  external 
borders against the VIS by using the visa sticker number. Verification of  fingerprints  at  the 
external  border  crossing  points  will  also  become  mandatory  after  a  three  year  transitional 
period from the start of operations. 

The same document readers that are used for the SIS checks and the same fingerprint readers 
that are used for the VIS checks may also be used for the RTP. Furthermore, ABC systems 
already implemented at the border may be used in the future for automation of third-country 
nationals´  border  crossings  through  the  integration  of  fingerprint  readers.  In  some  ABC 
systems fingerprint readers already exist.  

With  the  RTP  in  mind,  the  above  means  that  consulates  and  border  crossing  points  should 
have  already  been  connected  to  the  data  network  (VIS  and  SIS)  and  fingerprint  readers  on 
entry  will  have  been  procured  by  2013/2014  at  the  latest  to  fulfil  the  requirements  for  the 
obligatory use of the VIS.  

Management  

As regards large scale IT systems, only EURODAC and the VIS are operational and managed 
by  Directorate  HOME  of  the  Commission  with  the  support  of  DG  DIGIT  in  the  case  of 
EURODAC84. The EURODAC system is located in Luxembourg and Brussels. SIS II is and 
VIS was developed by the Commission and based on the legal instruments establishing and 
governing SIS II and VIS the systems shall be located in Strasbourg (central unit) and near 
Salzburg (back-up unit). The VIS already started operations and the development of the SISII 
is ongoing. 

Following an impact assessment carried out to study the different options for performing the 
task  of  "Management  Authority"  for  SIS  II,  VIS  and  EURODAC  in  the  long  term,  a  new 
Regulatory  Agency  (the  Agency  for  the  operational  management  of  large-scale  information 
systems) was found to be the best solution as compared with entrusting Member States with 
operational  tasks  for  part  or  all  of  the  systems,  FRONTEX  with  the  three  systems  or 
EUROPOL with SIS II and the Commission with VIS and EURODAC.  

84 

In the management context, the SIS 1+ is not discussed as migration form SIS 1+ to SIS II is ongoing. 

EN 

75 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
The Agency Regulation was published in the Official Journal85 and entered into force on 21 
November  2011.  The  Agency  will  become  fully  operational  on  1  December  2012.  The 
selection procedure of its staff has started. 

The Agency is funded from the general budget of the European Union. The budget foreseen 
for start-up activities of the Agency between 2011 and 2013 is 94,5 million EUR. The budget 
of the Agency mainly covers investments in the site, security and operational management of 
the SIS II, the VIS and EURODAC and administrative expenses. This amount is covered by 
the financial framework 2007-2013.  

According  to  the  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  establishing  an 
Agency  for  the  operational  management  of  large-scale  systems  in  the  area  of  freedom, 
security and justice, the Agency will be in charge of the operational management of the SIS 
II,  the  VIS,  EURODAC  and  of  developing  and  managing  other  large-scale  information 
technology  systems  in  the  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice  if  so  provided  by  relevant 
legislative instruments.  

A RTP, whether fully centralised or based on a token/central repository, would be developed 
and managed by the Agency. Member States would be responsible for the development and 
management  of  their  national  components  and  their  adaptation  to  the  central  system.  For  a 
token based system, the same standards could be used as for residence permits to guarantee 
that  the  information  stored  in  a  token  could  be  used  across  Schengen  States,  and  existing 
equipment  installed  at  the  borders  and  at  the  consulates  could  be  exploited.  A  token  based 
system would be developed by the Member States based on the standards mentioned above. A 
legal basis for the RTP needs to be adopted prior to any technical development.  

85 

OJ L 286, 1.11.2011. 

EN 

76 

   EN 

                                                 
ANNEX 7 

FINAL RESULTS OF THE DATA COLLECTION HELD FROM 31 AUGUST TO 6 
SEPTEMBER 2009 

The tables in this annex details the results of the data collection exercise carried out under the 
coordination of the Czech and Swedish Presidencies, where all entries and exits at the external 
border  of  the  Schengen  area  were  recorded  by  the  Member  States  during  one  week  for  the 
purpose of estimating the total size of travel flows at the external border, in total and divided 
by type of border (air/sea/land) and by traveller (EU citizens, and visa exempt/required third-
country nationals).  

AIR 

Total 

Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Total 
Total entry AIR 
Total exit AIR 

EU 
81.096 
78.372 
43.531 
40.764 
2.745 
17.662 
405.109 
343.836 
216.316 
20.347 
4.348 
94.293 
12.946 
3.899 
4.000 
15.255 
265.066 
20.838 
97.900 
50.208 
14.316 
7.522 
661.325 
43.177 
75.048 
2.538.823 
3.327.473 
3.190.483 

Entry 
Non 
VISA 
17.781
14.295
9.100
9.924
78
5.128
91.773

EU 
VISA 
64.799
11.671
68.132
15.432
42.386
11.365
52.139
4.894
2.532
126
19.497
4.042
340.832
64.266
296.300
106.716 106.242
213.467
19.745
18.706
3.294
5.223
92
58.347
17.517
12.096
911
4.352
300
4.220
51
16.729
793
413.315
30.906
24.042
1.628
102.379
2.460
44.584
5.558
11.946
108
6.253
2.597
661.387
36.080
45.416
4.436
75.249
18.639
437.168 351.482 2.539.529

33.475
4.002
2.658
23.353
1.850
44
111
864
45.454
2.298
4.493
11.436
405
1.219
29.184
4.165
35.143

VISA 
9.109 
8.955 
9.121 
3.354 
141 
2.901 

Exit 
Non 
VISA 
16.134 
10.028 
7.442 
8.454 
87 
4.703 
77.555 
91.998 
34.135 
3.313 
3.318 
19.087 
1.660 
250 
183 
865 
46.139 
2.167 
5.496 
11.269 
262 
955 
24.609 
4.560 
29.075 

Air 
200.590
195.214
122.945
119.529
5.709
53.933
43.853  1.023.388
69.345  1.014.437
536.611
19.473 
52.250
2.588 
15.787
148 
224.514
11.917 
30.581
1.118 
9.112
267 
62 
8.627
35.484
978 
830.646
29.766 
52.425
1.452 
214.659
1.931 
126.895
3.840 
27.091
54 
20.454
1.908 
31.290  1.443.875
105.296
3.542 
248.494
15.340 
387.610  263.344  6.517.956

EN 

77 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
SEA 

Entry 

EU 

Non VISA  VISA 
0
0
321
94
0
0
12
11
137
287
45
15
18.948
1.019
12.249
0
0
5.012
464
496
0
43
5.334
0
751
623
0
439
63.919
653
0

0
6.128
0
1.881
262
461
2.148 236.231
12.813
9.542
49.695
3.228
0
0
0
0
10.417
3.826
424
322
495
0
0
0
42
138
27.358
1.060
0
0
865
121
4.418
1.567
0
0
1.083
70
67.934
7.459
2.198
729
0
0
110.358 30.724 422.705

Exit 

Non VISA  VISA 
0
0 
363 
96
0 
0
20
26 
230 
300
23 
19
2.581 
9.771
7.376 
658
3.833 
12.439
0 
0
0 
0
1.714 
1.077
307 
544
0 
504
0
0 
111 
20
1.084 
7.196
0
0 
137 
839
1.477 
504
0 
0
95 
902
24.199 10.226 
717 
0 
61.510 30.300 

2.422
0

Total 

Sea 

0
12.038
0
2.887
1.482
1.145
444.527
47.023
129.787
0
0
45.620
2.510
1.713
0
669
67.208
0
3.435
14.345
0
3.153
309.567
8.840
0
1.095.949

Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Total 
Total entry SEA 
Total exit SEA 

EU 

0 
5.036 
0 
937 
266 
582 
174.848 
15.615 
48.343 
0 
0 
23.574 
449 
218 
0 
315 
25.176 
0 
722 
5.756 
0 
564 
135.830 
2.121 
0 
440.352 
581.434 
514.515 

EN 

78 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
Entry 
Non 
VISA 

LAND 

Total 

Exit 
Non 
VISA 

EU 

VISA 

Land 

0
0
0
0
755
528
15.678
0
25.854
27.229
0
0
124
1.502
0
0
0
154

VISA 
0
0
0
0
4.515
46.441
3.170
0
42.206
75.445
0
0
4.862
33.921
0
0
0
637
1.266 118.474
0
3.777
78.480
5.629
0
0

0
21.686
0
0
38.051
21.733
186.855
0
129.486
247.051
0
0
20.397
24.642
0
0
0
257
83.852
0
15.895
324.828
415.409
0
0
585.633 417.557 1.530.142

0
440
187.379
324.724
0
0

0 
848 
0 
0 
5.030 
45.606 
3.855 

0 
2.301 
0 
0 
841 
514 
13.087 
0 
16.612 
22.208 
0 
0 
112 
1.413 
0 
0 
0 
199 

0
24.835
0
0
88.832
135.872
373.498
0
375.423
744.381
0
0
52.647
120.942
0
0
0
2.174
404.356
0
41.135
51.867  1.197.740
5.048  1.476.048
0
0
545.395  341.403  5.037.883

34.702 
41.033 
0 
0 
5.609 
32.472 
0 
0 
0 
672 
1.264  112.190 
0 
2.471 

0 
477 
161.713 
324.654 
0 
0 

0 
0 

Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Total 
Total entry LAND 
Total exit LAND 

EU 

0 
0 
0 
0 
39.640 
21.050 
150.853 
0 
126.563 
331.415 
0 
0 
21.543 
26.992 
0 
0 
0 
255 
87.310 
0 
18.075 
393.473 
400.584 
0 
0 
1.617.753 
2.620.943 
2.416.940 

EN 

79 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
EU 

Entry EU 
81.096 
83.408 
43.531 
41.701 
42.651 
39.294 
730.810 
359.451 
391.222 
351.762 
4.348 
117.867 
34.938 
31.109 
4.000 
15.570 
290.242 
21.093 
185.932 
55.964 
32.391 
401.559 

Exit EU 
64.799
95.946
42.386
54.020
40.845
41.691
763.918
309.113
392.648
265.757
5.223
68.764
32.917
29.489
4.220
16.771
440.673
24.299
187.096
49.002
27.841
332.164
1.197.739  1.144.730
47.614
75.249
4.596.928  4.492.376

45.298 
75.048 

Passenger category 
Non VISA 

Entry Non 
VISA 

Exit non 
VISA 

17.781
14.389
9.100
9.936
1.120
5.671
126.399
107.735
71.578
31.231
2.658
28.365
2.438
2.042
111
907
50.788
2.452
6.510
12.059
845
189.037
417.827
4.818
35.143
1.133.159

16.134 
12.425 
7.442 
8.474 
1.228 
5.236 
100.413 
92.656 
63.186 
25.521 
3.318 
20.164 
2.316 
2.167 
183 
885 
53.335 
2.366 
7.599 
11.773 
739 
163.570 
373.462 
6.982 
29.075 
994.515 

VISA 

Entry 
VISA 

11.671
15.753
11.365
4.905
4.778
50.528
69.584
115.784
65.179
78.739
92
21.343
6.095
34.221
51
931
31.966
2.265
121.055
7.125
3.885
81.147
49.168
5.165
18.639
799.763

Exit 
VISA 

9.109
10.166
9.121
3.380
5.401
48.530
50.289
76.721
58.008
43.621
148
13.631
7.034
32.739
62
1.089
30.850
2.124
114.258
5.317
2.525
53.870
46.564
4.259
15.340
635.047

Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Total 

EN 

80 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
  
Total 

Total 
Passenger category 
Non 
VISA 
33.915
26.814
16.542
18.410
2.348
10.907
226.812
200.391
134.764
56.752
5.976
48.529
4.754
4.209
294
1.792
104.123
4.818
14.109
23.832
1.584
352.607
791.289
11.800
64.218

Exit 
Entry 
90.042 
110.548
118.537 
113.550
58.949 
63.996
65.874 
56.542
47.474 
48.549
95.457 
95.493
914.620 
926.793
478.490 
582.970
513.842 
527.979
334.899 
461.732
8.689 
7.098
102.559 
167.575
42.267 
43.471
64.395 
67.372
4.465 
4.162
18.745 
17.408
524.858 
372.996
28.789 
25.810
308.953 
313.497
66.092 
75.148
31.105 
37.121
549.604 
671.743
95.732 1.664.734 1.564.756 
58.855 
55.281
119.664 
128.830
9.089.304  2.127.674 1.434.810 6.529.850 6.121.938 

EU 
145.895 
179.354 
85.917 
95.721 
83.496 
80.985 
1.494.728 
668.564 
783.870 
617.519 
9.571 
186.631 
67.855 
60.598 
8.220 
32.341 
730.915 
45.392 
373.028 
104.966 
60.232 
733.723 
2.342.469 
92.912 
150.297 

VISA 
20.780
25.919
20.486
8.285
10.179
99.058
119.873
192.505
123.187
122.360
240
34.974
13.129
66.960
113
2.020
62.816
4.389
235.313
12.442
6.410
135.017

9.424
33.979

Total 
200.590
232.087
122.945
122.416
96.023
190.950
1.841.413
1.061.460
1.041.821
796.631
15.787
270.134
85.738
131.767
8.627
36.153
897.854
54.599
622.450
141.240
68.226
1.221.347
3.229.490
114.136
248.494

12.651.788

Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Total 

EN 

81 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
AIR 

Total 

EU 
79.034 
78.238 
109.944 

Entry 
Non VISA 
5.448 
6.037 
1.532 

VISA 

11.407
1.146
18.863

EU 
96.899
79.597
108.887

Exit 
Non VISA

VISA 

Air 

5.943 16.206  214.937 
1.071  171.879 
5.790
9.402  249.941 
1.313

Bulgaria 
Romania 
Cyprus 

Entry 
Non VISA 
106 
782 
39 

EU 
1.351 
570 
2.558 

Bulgaria 
Romania 
Cyprus 

SEA 

VISA 

2.284
8
315

LAND 

Exit 
Non VISA
2
661
51

EU 
1.329
632
2.484

VISA 
2.532 
2 
281 

Total 

Sea 
7.604 
2.655 
5.728 

Total 

EU 
213.298 
293.755 
0 

Entry 
Non VISA 
2.454 
6.675 
0 

Bulgaria 
Romania 
Cyprus 

VISA 

43.172
30.410
0

EU 
206.926
340.900
0

Exit 
Non VISA

VISA 

Land 

2.461 32.473  500.784 
2.752 39.830  714.322 
0 

0 

0

Passenger category 

EU 

Non VISA 

VISA 

Total 
Passenger category 

Entry 
EU 

Exit EU 

Bulgaria 
Romania 
Cyprus 

293.683 
372.563 
112.502 

305.154 
421.129 
111.371 

Entry Non 
VISA 

8.008
13.494
1.571

Exit 
non 
VISA 

8.406
9.203
1.364

Bulgaria 
Romania 
Cyprus 

Entry 
358.554 
417.621 
133.251 

Total 

Exit 
364.771 
471.235 
122.418 

Total 
723.325  
888.856  
255.669  

EU 

Exit 
VISA 

Entry 
VISA 
56.863 51.211  598.837  16.414 108.074
72.467
31.564 40.903  793.692  22.697
28.861
2.935
9.683  223.873 
19.178

Non 
VISA 

VISA 

EN 

82 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 8 

DATA TO BE STORED  

The  following  alphanumeric  data  and  biometrics  would  be  stored  either  in  a  token  or  in  a 
centralised database or in a Member States' national database to guarantee that border and visa 
authorities  can  always  verify  whether  the  person  really  is  a  registered  traveller  and  whether 
(s)he still fulfils the requirements of the programme. For example, if the registered traveller 
does  not  have  sufficient  means  of  subsistence,  the  data  in  a  token/central  database/national 
database/central repository confirms that there is a person liable to pay applicant's subsistence 
costs during the stay. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

the unique application number (unique identifier); 

status information, indicating that access to the RTP has been requested; 

the authority with which the application has been lodged, including its location; 

the following data to be taken from the application form: 

(a) 

(b) 

surname(s); first name(s); date of birth, place of birth, nationality(ies); country 
of birth and gender; 

type, number (and in case of a fully centralised system three letter code of the 
issuing country) of the travel document(s), the authority which issued it and the 
date of issue and of expiry; 

(c) 

place and date of the application; 

(d) 

if applicable, details of the person liable to pay the applicant's subsistence costs 
during the stay, being: 

(i) 

(ii) 

in the case of a natural person, the surname and first name, address of 
the person and telephone number; 

in the case of a company or other organisation, the name and address 
of  the  company/other  organisation,  surname  and  first  name  of  the 
contact person in that company/organisation and telephone number; 

(e) 

main purposes of the journeys; 

(f) 

the applicant's home address,  

(g) 

(h) 

(i) 

the applicant's telephone number and e-mail address, if available; 

if applicable, the visa sticker number; 

if applicable, the residence permit number (and in the case of a fully centralised 
system the three letter code of the issuing country) ; 

EN 

83 

   EN 

 
(j) 

in the case of minors, surname(s) and first name(s) of the applicant's parental 
authority or legal guardian, 

5. 

fingerprints. 

EN 

84 

   EN 

ANNEX 9 

VETTING CRITERIA86  

In  the  examination  of  an  application,  visa  or  border  authorities  should  verify  that  the 
following entry conditions are fulfilled:  

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

(h) 

the  applicant  does  not  present  a  risk  of  illegal  immigration  or  a  risk  to  the 
security of the Member States and the applicant intends to leave the territory of 
the Member States in due time; 

the  applicant's  travel  document,  visa  or  residence  permit  presented,  if 
applicable, are valid and not false, counterfeited or forged; 

the applicant proves the need for or justifies the intention to travel frequently 
and/or regularly; 

the applicant has not previously exceeded the maximum duration of authorised 
stay in the territory of the Member States and he/she proves his/her reliability, 
in particular a genuine intention to leave the territory in due time; 

the applicant's justification of the purpose and conditions of the intended stays, 

the  applicant  proves  his/her  financial  situation  in  the  country  of  origin  or 
residence and possesses sufficient means of subsistence both for the duration of 
the intended stay(s) and for the return to his/her country of origin or residence, 
or he/she is in a position to acquire such means lawfully; 

the applicant is not a person for whom an alert has been issued in the Schengen 
Information System (SIS); 

the applicant is not considered to be a threat to public policy, internal security, 
public  health  or  the  international  relations  of  any  of  the  Member  States,  in 
particular where no alert has been issued in Member States’ national databases 
on the same grounds. 

86 

Vetting for family members of citizens of the Union shall be done by using the same criteria as used 
when examining their visa applications (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004 and OJ L 243, 15.9.2009). 

EN 

85 

   EN 

 
                                                 
ANNEX 10 

TOTAL COSTS  

1. 

Cost Assessments 

This  Annex  provides  the  cost  estimates  for  the  different  options  that  are  described  in  the 
present impact assessment. 

An  external  contractor  carried  out  the  cost  study  in  201087,  which  aimed  at  getting  an 
objective  cost  estimation,  comparing  various  options  and  sub-options  in  search  of  the  most 
cost-effective  ones,  while  evaluating  the  different  business  alternatives.  The  assessment  of 
cost  effectiveness  was  related  to  the  one-time  costs  for  the  development  and  to  the  yearly 
operational costs, which can decrease or invert savings in development costs in a very short 
period of time. 

Based  on  the  scenario-driven  approach  of  the  cost  study  and  the  cost  models  developed 
therein,  it  was  possible  to  update  the  scenarios  with  modified  options  in  line  with  ongoing 
discussions internally and with Member States.  

2. 

Methodology 

The cost analysis study began by defining detailed scenarios and border-related specifications. 
Member States were involved in the preparation of the definition of the parameters in the cost 
study88. The IT-related cost factors were taken from current market prices. 

To calculate the costs accurately, the following techniques were used: 

• 

Sizing  

– 

– 

– 

Hardware  sizing  based  on  simplified  process  models  and  forecasted  numbers 
of  registered  travellers'  travel  events.  Sizing  in  this  context  comes  down  to 
actually determine which of building blocks are required for which scenarios, 
thus  calculating  the  actual  "horsepower"  needed  to  meet  the  required 
performance. 

Software development sizing based on information in the Feasibility Study and 
completed with Function Point Analysis when necessary. 

Network sizing based on predictions of the expected system load. 

• 

Costing  

87 

88 

Final report on the cost analysis of entry/exit and RTP systems done by the external contractor on 19 of 
April  2010  (version  1.30)  is  published  on  the  following  website:  http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/doc_centre/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm#studies 
E.g. through the exercise undertaken by the Swedish Presidency in the Frontiers Working Group at the 
end  of  August/beginning  of  September  2009  to  count  numbers  of  border  crossings  per  category  of 
traveller, etc. 

EN 

86 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
– 

– 

– 

– 

Parametric cost analysis techniques were used to estimate development efforts 
and maintenance costs to support the introduction of a new software product. 

Parametric cost estimation is based on the functional size of the solution, the 
level of re-usability of existing products and the proportion of "commercial of 
the shelf" (COTS) products that are used. Additional parameters are the hourly 
rates and skill levels of the development team as well as parameters associated 
with the development environment and project governance. 

Estimates of the costs of third party hardware, software and network products 
were based on list prices of popular and appropriate COTS products. 

For  estimating  operational  costs  a  harmonised  model  was  assumed,  in  which 
the average rates were used across the Member States. The same approach was 
chosen regarding the business hours throughout the European Union as well as 
the same number of holidays. 

• 

Planning  

– 

The initial planning was produced by the parametric costing tool "CostXpert". 
This includes in a first automated run specification, design, realisation, testing 
and implementation and the first phase of deployment, where any defects have 
been detected. 

–  Manual  intervention  and  adjustment  of  the  schedule  became  necessary,  as 
"CostXpert" assumes unlimited resources to be available, which means that the 
planning needs to be adjusted to align it with the expected situation. 

Based  on  these  techniques  for  cost  modelling,  the  different  scenarios  were  established  and 
calculated  for  the  central  side  (Management  Authority;  EU  budget)  and  the  national  side 
(Member States' authorities, national budget) 

Moreover, the gathered experiences and lessons learnt from the development of EURODAC, 
VIS and SIS II were also used to evaluate the cost calculations and the scenarios to improve 
the reliability of the cost calculation. 

3. 

Facts and Figures used 

General Parameters 

For  the  cost  calculation,  a  complete  range  of  parameters  (business  parameters,  technical 
parameters,  cost  parameters,  data  specifications,  and  parameters  on  the  side  of  the  Member 
States89) were used: 

• 

• 

Development of three years and five years of operation. 

Both  the  EES  and  the  RTP  should,  as  far  as  possible,  take  advantage  of  the 
existing and fully rolled out the VIS and the SIS. 

89 

The parameters and the values used can be found in the final report of the cost analysis prepared by the 
external contractor.. 

EN 

87 

   EN 

                                                 
•  Maintenance rate of hardware (8 %) and software (20 %). 

• 

• 

• 

Hourly  rates  for  contractors,  management  authority  staff  and  EU  (27)  and 
Schengen associated country staff, working hours per year. 

Costs for the token 1 EUR (without biometrics). 

For the network costs, the costs of the sTESTA network for the VIS were used. 

Registered Traveller Programme 

For the RTP, the following core parameters were used for the sizing of the system: 

RTS Parameter 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

Yearly Registrations 

(million) 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

Registered traveller IN 

(million) 

Registered traveller OUT 

(million) 

30 

30 

60 

60 

90 

90 

120 

150 

150 

150 

150 

120 

150 

150 

150 

150 

Applications 
Posts 

Consular 

(million) 

Applications  at  external 
BCP 

(million) 

2.8 

2.8 

2.8 

2.8 

2.8 

2.8 

2.8 

2.8 

2.3 

2.3 

2.3 

2.3 

2.3 

2.3 

2.3 

2.3 

BCP Enrolments 

(%) 

45% 

45% 

45% 

45% 

45% 

45% 

45% 

45% 

Percentage 
revocations/extensions 

of 

(%) 

5% 

5% 

5% 

5% 

5% 

5% 

5% 

5% 

Average 
Rregistered 
travels per yr 

number 

or 
travellers 

(n) 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6  

6  

6 

The cost per hour is based on a weighted average of the cost in EU27 administrations and the 
cost in Associated countries and has been rounded.90  

The amount of human resources released by the RTP at the external borders is not taken into 
account  due  to  the  fact  that  it  cannot  be  exactly  calculated  nor  estimated.  It  varies  a  lot 
between Member States and indeed between individual border crossing points. In the longer 
term,  Member  States  will  have  net  cost  savings  especially  if  Automated  Border  Control 
Systems  are  used  at  the  busiest  border  crossing  points.  Immediately  after  the  start  of 
operations of the RTP, the real administrative burden for border authorities will be positive. In 
the  consulates  the  administrative  cost  will  be  real,  as  acceptance  of  applications  will  not 
release any human resources there. On the other hand, an application for a multiple-entry visa 

90 

Average employment costs in the associated countries public administration: Eurostat: Average hourly 
labour  costs,  defined  as  total  labour  costs  divided  by  the  corresponding  number  of  hours  worked  (32 
EUR in 2005). The 2005 figure has been increased by 5 % (= 34 EUR). Average employment costs in 
the  EU-27  public  administration:  Eurostat:  Average  hourly  labour  costs,  defined  as  total  labour  costs 
divided by the corresponding number of hours worked (20,35 EUR in 2005). The 2005 figure has been 
increased  by  5  %  (=  22  EUR)  based  on  Eurostat  statistics  "Unit  labour  Cost  –  Annual  data". 
http://epp.Eurostat.ec.Europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/database. 
Average  employment  costs  in  the  European  Commission  is  122  000  EUR  per  year  equivalent  to  74 
EUR per hour (220 working days, 7,5 hour/day). 

EN 

88 

   EN 

 
  
  
  
  
  
   
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
   
  
                                                 
 
and an application for RTP can be processed at the same time which will diminish the amount 
of extra work. 

EN 

89 

   EN 

EU Cost Model: 

Token-Based RTP  

No 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

 19 

20 

Management Authority 

Management Authority Hardware 

Management Authority Other (training, meetings) 

Management Authority Infrastructure 

Management Authority software 

Management Authority Admin 

Management Authority Office Space 

Management Authority Contractor Development 

Subtotal MA 

Member States *) 

Member States Hardware 

Member States Other (training, meetings) 

Member States Infrastructure 

Member States software 

Member States Admin 

Member States Office Space 

Member States Contractor Development 

Costs of tokens 

Subtotal MS 

ANNEX 10.1 

Yearly operational costs 

Total one time development costs 

European Union (EU) 

Member States (MS) 

32.000 

273.916 

- 

978.200 

53.450.881 

14.541.600 

811.725 

25.000.000 

95.088.322 

23.094.000 

2.739.162 

- 

41.874.100 

40.205.855 

35.385.840 

8.117.246 

151.416.203 

*) Member States means the Schengen area as of 19.12.2011 plus Bulgaria and Romania and was calculated as one entity.

EN 

90 

EN 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
EU Cost Model: 

Centralised RTP 

No 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

Management Authority 

Management Authority Hardware 

Management Authority Other (training, meetings) 

Management Authority Infrastructure 

Management Authority software 

Management Authority Admin 

Management Authority Office Space 

Management Authority Contractor Development 

Subtotal MA 

Member States 

Member States Hardware 

Member States Other (training, meetings) 

Member States Infrastructure 

Member States software 

Member States Admin 

Member States Office Space 

Member States Contractor Development 

Subtotal MS 

EN 

ANNEX 10.2 

Yearly operational costs 

Total one time development costs 

European Union (EU) 

Member States (MS) 

4.152.000 

502.145 

9.248.260 

19.250.000 

1.311.734 

27.000 

3.118.105 

37.609.244 

1.032.000 

502.145 

8.041.965 

4.748.000 

2.960.641 

9.000 

311.811 

17.605.562 

24.000 

285.756 

- 

1.878.200 

58.906.097 

14.541.600 

845.876 

76.481.529 

91 

23.094.000 

2.857.555 

- 

41.874.100 

40.375.430 

35.385.840 

8.458.763 

152.045.688 

EN 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
EU Cost Model: 

ANNEX 10.3 

Token together with central repository 

Yearly operational costs 

Total one time development costs 

No 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

 19 

20 

Management Authority 

Management Authority Hardware 

Management Authority Other (training, meetings) 

Management Authority Infrastructure 

Management Authority software 

Management Authority Admin 

Management Authority Office Space 

Management Authority Contractor Development 

Subtotal MA 

Member States 

Member States Hardware 

Member States Other (training, meetings) 

Member States Infrastructure 

Member States software 

Member States Admin 

Member States Office Space 

Member States Contractor Development 

Costs of tokens 

Subtotal MS 

EN 

1.032.000 

502.145 

8.041.965 

8.398.000 

1.960.641 

9.000 

372.801 

20.316.552 

24.000 

285.756 

- 

1.878.200 

58.106.097 

14.541.600 

845.876 

5.000.000 

80.681.529 

92 

European Union (EU) 

Member States (MS) 

7.474.000 

502.145 

9.248.260 

19.250.000 

2.658.448 

27.000 

3.728.008 

42.887.861 

23.094.000 

2.857.555 

- 

41.874.100 

53.830.027 

35.385.840 

7.417.173 

164.458.695 

EN 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ANNEX 10.4 – Administrative costs 

The Agency's administrative costs correspond to the categories 3 and 6 of the total one time 
development  cost  (EU)  in  Annexes  10.1-10.3.  and  to  the  same  categories  of  total  yearly 
operational costs (EU).  

Member States' administrative costs correspond to the categories 13 and 16 of the total one 
time  development  cost  (MS)  in  Annexes  10.1-10.3.  and  to  the  same  categories  of  the  total 
yearly operational costs (MS). 

Policy option 1 

•  Administrative costs for Member States 

The administrative costs related to the examination of applications which are not included in 
the  Annexes  10.1.  –  10.3.  will  be  tangible.  It  is  estimated  that  5  million  third-country 
nationals would apply for access to the RTP each year. Examination of one application would 
last  45  minutes,  on  average91,  including  checking  the  supporting  documents,  capturing 
biometric data and conducting interviews, if applicable. In the abstract, the total time needed 
for  examining  and  granting/refusing  access  to  the  RTP  would  be  2,81  million  hours 
equivalent to 73,1 million EUR or 1 705 persons92 across Member States. This cost is equal 
for both sub-options 1a (applications lodged at the border) and 1b (applications lodged at the 
consulates), and would therefore be borne entirely by either the border crossing points or the 
consulates. However, these costs would be covered by the fee (20 or 10 EUR). 

In sub-option 1c - allowing the lodging of applications at the border crossing points as well as 
at the consulates – these costs, and the need for extra staff, would have to be borne roughly 
equally by the consulates and the border crossing points. 

Policy option 2 

•  Administrative cost for the Agency: 

Administrative costs for the Agency caused by a centralised system would be approximately 
1,893  million  EUR  for  establishing  the  system  and  3,5  million  EUR  for  the  annual 
maintenance/operating the system.  

Administrative costs for the Agency caused by a token/repository system would be around 
the  annual 
3,2  million  EUR 
maintenance/operating the system. 

the  system  and  2,7  million 

for  establishing 

for 

•  Administrative cost for Member States: 

91 

92 
93 

Based on the three Member States answers the examination of a (multiple-entry) visa application lasts 
on  average  45  minutes.  This  time  includes  capturing  the  biometric  data.  The  procedures  with  a  RTP 
application and a visa application are almost the same. 
Assuming that one person works 7,5 hour/day and 220 days in a year.  
See Annex 10.2. The 1,8 million corresponds to the summary of Management Authority total one time 
costs  in  categories  3  and  6.  The  same  calculation  rule  is  applicable  for  all  the  options  and  for  yearly 
recurring costs. 

EN 

93 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Administrative  costs  for  Member  States  created  by  a  token-based  system  would  be 
approximately  4394  million  EUR  for  establishing  the  system  and  54  million  EUR95  for  the 
annual maintenance/operating the system.  

Administrative  costs  for  Member  States  arising  from  the  development  of  a  centralised 
system would be approximately 43 million EUR for establishing the system and 59 million 
EUR for the annual maintenance/operating of the system96.  

Administrative costs for Member States arising from the development of a token/repository 
system would be approximately 57 million EUR for establishing the system and 58 million 
EUR for the annual maintenance/operating of the system. 

Policy options 3 and 4 

•  Administrative cost for the Member States: 

With  stricter  vetting  procedure  all  Member  States  would  face  a  noticeable  extra  workload 
with these checks. One could estimate that a compulsory consultation would require 1 million 
background  checks  per  each  Member  States  per  year.  To  check  one  person  would  take 
approximately 15 minutes (database checks, supporting documents etc) equivalent to 250 000 
hours  per  Member  States  and  7  million  hours  around  the  EU  per  year.  This  would  be 
equivalent to 182 million EUR.  

94 

95 

96 

See Annex 10.1. The 43 million corresponds to the summary of MS total one time costs in categories 13 
and 16. The same calculation rule is applicable for all the options and for yearly recurring costs. 
See  Annex  10.1.  The  54  million  corresponds  to  the  summary  of  MS  total  yearly  recurring  costs  in 
categories 13 and 16. The same calculation rule is applicable for all the options. 
See Annex 10.2. 

EN 

94 

   EN