COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing an entry/exit system to register entry and exit data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union
Date: 2013-02-28
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Schengen Information System, border control, data collection, exchange of information, external border of the EU, foreign national, traveller

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 28.2.2013  
SWD(2013) 47 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL  

establishing an entry/exit system to register entry and exit data of third-country 
nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union 

{COM(2013) 95} 
{SWD(2013) 48} 
{SWD(2013) 49}

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL  

establishing an entry/exit system to register entry and exit data of third-country 
nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union 

1 

 
 
 
 
1.  

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

1.4. 

1.5. 

2. 

Procedural issues and consultations of interested parties ............................................ 4 

Background .................................................................................................................. 4 

Consultation of interested parties................................................................................. 5 

Data gathering .............................................................................................................. 8 

Inter-service steering group.......................................................................................... 9 

Impact Assessment Board ............................................................................................ 9 

Problem definition........................................................................................................ 9 

2.1.  Why the creation of an EES is being examined........................................................... 9 

2.1.1.  Border control aspects................................................................................................ 10 

2.1.2.  Law enforcement aspects ........................................................................................... 16 

2.2. 

Problem: how to design an EES? ............................................................................... 18 

2.2.1.  The core features of an EES....................................................................................... 18 

2.2.2.  Could these features be provided through existing systems?..................................... 20 

2.2.3. 

Implementation issues................................................................................................ 21 

2.3. 

2.4. 

3. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

4.4. 

4.5. 

Baseline scenario – how would things evolve without new EU intervention? .......... 23 

Subsidiarity ................................................................................................................ 24 

Objectives of the Entry/Exit System .......................................................................... 25 

Policy options............................................................................................................. 26 

Policy option 1: Core system ..................................................................................... 26 

Policy option 2: Core system + biometric data .......................................................... 27 

Policy option 3: Core system + law enforcement purposes ....................................... 27 

Policy option 4: Core system + biometrics + law enforcment purposes.................... 28 

Other issues linked to the four policy options............................................................ 28 

4.5.1.  Transfer of data to third-country authorities .............................................................. 28 

4.5.2.  The retention period of the personal data in relation to each policy option............... 29 

4.5.3.  Technical implementation.......................................................................................... 30 

5. 

Analysis of impacts .................................................................................................... 31 

5.1. 

Policy option 1: Core system ..................................................................................... 31 

2 

 
 
 
 
5.2. 

5.3. 

5.4. 

5.5. 

6. 

6.1. 

6.2. 

6.3. 

6.4. 

6.5. 

6.6. 

6.7. 

7. 

Policy option 2: Core system + biometric data .......................................................... 33 

Policy option 3: Core system + law enforcement purposes ....................................... 35 

Policy option 4: Core system + biometrics + law enforcment purposes.................... 36 

Assessment of costs ................................................................................................... 37 

Comparison of options and identification of the preferred policy option.................. 38 

Comparison of options ............................................................................................... 38 

Technical implementation.......................................................................................... 40 

Preferred option.......................................................................................................... 42 

Costs of the preferred option...................................................................................... 44 

Risks........................................................................................................................... 45 

European added value and proportionality ................................................................ 46 

Legislative implications ............................................................................................. 47 

Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 47 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
1.  

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATIONS OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

1.1.  Background 

The present impact assessment report and the legislative proposal it accompanies1 should be 
seen  in  the  context  of  the  progressive  establishment  of  a  European  model  of  integrated 
management of the external borders. The legislative proposal is part of the "next generation of 
border checks" package which is a strategic initiative in the Commission's work programme 
for  20122.  This  package  responds  to  two  major  and  interconnected  challenges:  how  to 
efficiently monitor travel flows and movements of third-country nationals across the external 
border for the Schengen area as a whole, and how to ensure that border crossings are fast and 
simple for the growing number of regular travellers that constitute the vast majority of border 
crossers,  i.e.  those  fulfilling  all  entry  conditions.  This  report  addresses  the  first  challenge:  a 
separate  report3  and  legislative  proposal  address  the  second  one.  The  two  reports  and 
proposals are not dependent on each other as regards their implementation but the setting up 
of  an  entry/exit  system  is  a  condition  for  providing  fully  automated  border  crossings  for 
certain groups of third-country nationals, as further analysed in the second report; hence the 
entry/exit system strongly influences to which extent a Registered Traveller Programme can 
meet its objectives of facilitating travel flows. 

In its Communication of 13 February 2008 preparing the next steps in border management in 
the  European  Union4  the  Commission  suggested  the  establishment  of  an  entry/exit  system 
(EES).  Such  a  system  would  entail  the    registration  of  the  personal  data  together  with  the 
dates  of  entry  and  exit  of  each  third-country  national  admitted  for  a  short  stay    when  they 
cross  the  external  borders.  The  2008  Communication  was  accompanied  by  an  impact 
assessment report5. 

The  proposals  were  subsequently  endorsed  in  the  Stockholm  Programme6  agreed  by  the 
European Council in December 2009, which reaffirmed the potential for an entry/exit system 
allowing  Member  States  to  share  data  effectively  while  safeguarding  data  protection.  The 
proposal to set up an EES was therefore also included in the Action Plan Implementing the 
Stockholm Programme7.      
A  Commission  Communication  in  July  2010  on  information  management  in  the  area  of 
freedom,  security  and  justice  presented  an  overview  of  the  EU-level  measures  in  place  or 
planned that regulate the collection, storage or cross-border exchange of personal information 
for  the  purpose  of  law  enforcement  or  migration  management8.  It  set  out  the  conditions  the 
Commission  will  apply  in  future  when  assessing  any  new  system  in  this  area  including  the 

1  
2  
3  
4 
5 

6  

Add ref when known 
COM(2011) 777 final 
[RTP Add ref when known ] 
COM (2008) 69 final. 
SEC(2008) 153 and Preparatory study to inform an Impact Assessment in relation to the creation of an automated 
entry/exit system at the external borders of the EU and the introduction of a border crossing scheme for bona fide 
travellers  ('Registered  Traveller Programme')  made  by  GHK  and  Entry/Exit  Technical  Feasibility  study  made  by 
Unisys. Studies are published on the website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm 
 'An  open  and  secure  Europe  serving  and  protecting  the  citizens',  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Union  of 
4.5.2010, C 115/1. 

7              COM(2010)171 final. 
8  
COM(2010)385 final. 

4 

 
 
                                                 
 
approach of ‘privacy by design’.9 It also drew the lessons of the development of other major 
systems  in  this  area  such  as  VIS  and  SIS  II  and  concluded  that    'as  a  possible  safeguard 
against cost overruns and delays resulting from changing requirements, any new information 
system in the area of freedom, security and justice, particularly if it involves a large-scale IT 
system, will not be developed before the underlying legal instruments setting out its purpose, 
scope, functions and technical details have been definitively adopted.' It emphasised too that 
particular attention must be paid to the initial design of governance structures and pointed to 
the role that the new IT agency10 could have in providing technical advice. 

Strengthening security through border management is one of the  five  strategic  objectives of 
the Internal Security Strategy11  and includes the enhanced use of new technology for border 
checks, citing an entry-exit system. 

The  Visa  Information  System  (VIS),  which  manages  the  exchange  of  short-stay  visa  data 
between the Schengen and Schengen Associated States, started operations on 11 of October 
2011 at the consulates in North Africa, the Near East and the Gulf Region and 20 days after 
go-live of the VIS also at the border crossing points (verification of visas against the VIS). 

The Conclusions of the European Council of 23 and 24 June 2011 called for work on "smart 
borders" to be moved forward rapidly. In response, the Commission adopted on 25 October 
2011 a new Communication on the various options and the way ahead.12 It concluded that the 
implementation of an EES would provide the Union with accurate data on travel flows in and 
out of the Schengen area at all parts of its external borders and on overstayers. 

Against  this  background,  the  present  impact  assessment  examines  different  implementation 
options in order to find the best possible way to implement the entry/exit system. However, the 
impacts of the whole EES are analysed based on the specific options. 

The  present  report  constitutes  both  the  ex-ante  evaluation  required  for  programmes  or 
activities occasioning expenditure from the EU Budget, and the impact assessment that will 
accompany the legislative proposal for the EES.13 

1.2.  Consultation of interested parties 

The  Commission  considered  that  before  proposing  any  new  initiative,  an  in-depth  technical 
assessment and debate with all relevant stakeholders on the future architecture of the EES was 
necessary.  

9  

10  

Privacy by design means embedding personal data protection in the technological basis of a 
proposed instrument, limiting data processing to that which is necessary for a proposed 
purpose and granting data access only to those entities that ‘need to know.’ 
Regulation  (EU)  No 1077/2011  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25 October  2011 
establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice 

11              COM (2010) 673 final 
12  
COM(2011) 680 final 
13 
Article  21  of  Commission  Regulation  (EC,  EURATOM)  No  2342/2002  of  23.12.2002  laying  down 
detailed  rules  for  the  implementation  of  Council  Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  No  1605/2002  on  the 
Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the EU, OJ L 357, 31.12.2002. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Based  on  the  discussions  with  and  positions  received  from  different  stakeholders  on  2008 
impact  assessment  and  communication,  the  Commission  identified  the  following  interest 
groups  as  the  most  relevant  stakeholders  for  consultation:  Member  States,  the  European 
Parliament,  the  European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  (EDPS),  civil  society  and  the  private 
sector. Third-country nationals travelling to the EU are not as such represented in any given 
interest  group  in  an  organised  way  and  it  is  therefore  by  definition  difficult  to  obtain  their 
views. The consultation was carried out in several ways: 

•  publishing the 2008 Impact Assessment and Communication; 

•  presenting  a  comprehensive  technical  assessment  and  compilation  of  Member  States' 
responses  (three  meetings  with  the  Committee  on  Immigration  and  Asylum  and  two 
meetings  with  two  different  working  groups  of  the  European  Security  and  Research 
Innovation Forum (ESRIF)); 

•  distributing questionnaires to Member States; 

•  organising  seminars  and  meetings  including  specific  expert  meetings  and  stimulating 

debate with discussion papers; 

•  meeting stakeholders bilaterally; 

•  publishing the 2011 Communication;  

•  giving presentations on the EES at different fora. 

Member States 

The  entry/exit  system  has  been  under  discussion  at  meetings  with  Member  States'  experts 
since  2008.  Discussions  with  Member  States  were  held  in  the  Council  on  the  basis  of  two 
questionnaires  prepared  by  the  French  and  Czech  Presidencies.  According  to  the  replies 
submitted by Member States there is a consensus on the added value of the system and on the 
purpose of storing the information, namely to detect overstayers and to calculate the length of 
stay. 

Further  consultations  with  Member  States  both  at  expert  and  ministerial  level  took  place  in 
2011 and early 2012.  

In preparation for the conference on Innovation Border Management organised by the Danish 
presidency  and  the  Netherlands  on  2  and  3  February  2012  in  Copenhagen,  Member  States 
replied  to  the  Presidency's  questionnaire  on  the  RTP  and  the  EES14.  According  to  these 
replies, a majority of Member States support the establishment of the EES but most of them 
did not indicate their implementation preferences. 

The summary of the conference prepared by the Presidency15 concluded that the EES would 
bring  significant  benefits  for  the  border  check  procedure  and  the  management  of  migration 

14 

15  

States 

Member 
http://eu2012.dk/en/Meetings/Conferences/Feb/Konference-om-innovativ-graenseforvaltning 
Council document 7166/12, Presidency summary of findings 

published 

following 

replies 

the 

are 

on 

website: 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
and migration policy as such. However, it was considered that answers still need to be found 
to some technical and political questions such as the storage of the data, the use of biometric 
data from the start, access for law enforcement authorities, the abolition of the obligation to 
stamp the passports and last but not least the full respect of privacy of the traveller including 
data protection. In particular, the summary points out that "the definition and purpose of the 
EES must be clear from the start as these set out the terms for data protection." 

European Parliament 

In  its  resolution  on  the  February  2008  Communication,  the  European  Parliament,  while 
accepting  that  the  proposed  system  might  help  to  deter  third  country  nationals  from 
overstaying, underlined that the correct functioning of the entry/exit system will depend both 
materially and operationally on the success of the VIS and SIS II. 

The European Parliament (EP) did not submit its opinion on the 2011 communication16. 

At the high level conference on Innovation Border on 2 and 3 February 2012 in Copenhagen, 
Members of the European Parliament expressed the view that the SIS II and the other IT tools 
currently  under  development  should  be  in  place  and  evaluated  before  work  on  the  EES  can 
start. 

European Data Protection Supervisor 

In  his  opinion  of  7  July  2011  on  the  Communication  of  the  Commission  on  Migration  the 
European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  (EDPS)  stressed  the  need  to  assess  first  the  possible 
better  use  of existing  systems  and  to  prove  the  necessity  and  proportionality  of  an  EES  in 
particular.  The  EDPS  was  also  consulted  informally  on  the  2011  Communication  on  smart 
borders before its adoption. He stressed in particular the need to obtain evaluation results of 
existing systems – notably the VIS – and that the use of biometrics should be contingent on 
conclusive proof that the use of alphanumeric data only is not effective. He also questioned 
the evidence available for assessing the problem of irregular migration and overstays, that the 
main purpose of the system must be set out clearly and exhaustively, that the retention period 
must be the shortest possible and only what is necessary in relation to the main purpose, and 
to carefully assess whether and to what extent access should be granted for law enforcement 
authorities. The EDPS provided comments on a draft of this impact assessment as well on a 
draft of the legislative proposal by letter of 10 August 2012. While welcoming the attention 
paid to data protection he considered that access for law enforcement purposes should not be 
granted  and  that  biometric  data  should  not  be  collected.  As  to  specific  comments  he 
highlighted among other things the need to clearly define the purpose and the benefits of an 
entry/exit system. 

Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 

16 

European  Parliament  resolution  of  10  March  2009  on  the  next  steps  in  border  management  in  the 
European Union and similar experiences in third countries (2008/2181(INI)). Resolution is published on 
the  following  website:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-
2009-0085&language=EN 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The Working Party addressed a letter to Commissioner Malmström on 12 June 2012 reacting 
to the 2011 Communication. It expressed doubts on the necessity of an EES and stressed that 
the reasoning needed to be appropriately explained, addressing comprehensively its impact on 
all  fundamental  rights.  The  Working  Party  considered  that  in  any  case  the  system  should 
initially  operate  without  biometric  data,  that  the  necessity  of  access  for  law  enforcement 
purposes  would  need  to  be  established  separately,  and  that  the  retention  period  should  be 
assessed against the main purpose of the system, ie detecting and preventing overstay. 

Civil society and the private sector  

Civil society (academia, think tanks and NGOs)  and the private sector participated actively in 
the debate and organised several relevant conferences. Civil society provided input in various 
conferences and academic papers published on the subject. Most were critical of the setting up 
of  an  EES,  considered  that  the  added  value  was  not  proven  and  that  it  would  not  be 
proportionate to collect such amounts of personal data in relation to the aims pursued. At the 
conference in Copenhagen a representative of IATA expressed support for an EES provided 
the  system  does  not  have  negative  impacts  on  travel  flows  or  lead  to  additional  costs  or 
burdens for airlines or airports.  

The present report takes into account the questions and challenges raised by the stakeholders. 
Further details of the results of the consultations have been integrated in the description of the 
options  and  in  the  assessment  of  impacts.  By  presenting  two  communications  opening  for 
input for all stakeholders during a period of four years, the Commission has done its utmost in 
seeking the views of all stakeholders concerned. 

1.3. 

Data gathering 

Data-gathering  and  consultations  with  relevant  authorities  in  the  Member  States  and  other 
stakeholders were undertaken by the Commission with the support of FRONTEX. 

The following types of data were of principal interest: 

• 

Information on current and future size of travel flows at the external border, distinguishing 
between  types  of  borders  (air/land/sea)  and  groups  of  travellers  (EU  citizens  and  visa 
exempt/required third country nationals); 

•  Time currently needed for border checks; 

•  Number  of  irregularly  staying  third-country  nationals  within  the  Schengen  area,  broken 
down  by  Member  State,  nationality,  and  causes  for  the  irregular  stay  (irregular  border 
crossing or overstay). 

Data  was  collected  through  questionnaires17  as  well  as  case  studies,  pilot  projects  and 
literature  reviews  and  was  used  in  particular  for  describing  the  context,  defining  problems, 
specifying  the  most  important  implementation  options  and  finally  analysing  the  impacts. 
Comparable data were gathered on entries and exits and also on the time needed to carry out 
border  checks  on  different  categories  of  travellers  at  different  types  of  external  borders. 

17 

Council  document  7226/1/09  REV  1  FRONT  12  COMIX  200  and  the  Commission  document  JLS 
D(2009) 8729. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
However, shortcomings in the availability and/or comparability of existing statistical data and 
the fact that many aspects (customs check, security check, infrastructure, etc.) affect the time 
needed  for  border  crossings  has  made  comparison  and  analysis  difficult.  With  regard  to 
numbers and forecasts of traffic of passengers it is important to note a wide disparity in the 
information available according to the different means of transport. If the information on air 
transport is reliable due to the particular challenges for this sector, it is much more reduced in 
relation to other modes of transport and it is obviously lacking in the case of people travelling 
by  their  own  means  of  private  transport.  Most  importantly  the  data  collection  showed  that 
Member  States  were  not  able  to  provide  data  or  any  reliable  estimates  on  the  number  of 
overstayers  on  their  territory,  and  as  a  consequence  neither  on  nationalities  or  reasons  for 
irregular  stays.  Estimates  of  such  data  could  only  be  found  via  one  research  project18, 
aggregated for the Union as a whole. 

1.4. 

Inter-service steering group 

An inter-service steering group was set up on 29 September 2009 involving the Legal Service 
(SJ),  the  Secretariat-General  (SG),  DG  Taxation  and  Customs  Union  (TAXUD),  DG 
Enterprise and Industry (ENTR) and DG External  Relations  (RELEX).  The  group  met  on  2 
October 2009 and, joined by DG Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship (JUST), on 2 
December  2010,  on  16  February  2011  and  on  31  January  2012.  The  last  meeting  was  also 
attended by representatives of DG Mobility and Transport (MOVE) and of the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC). Communication between the members of the group was also conducted via e-
mail and telephone.  

1.5. 

Impact Assessment Board 

The Impact Assessment Board (IAB) reviewed the draft impact assessment and delivered its 
opinions on 14 March 2012 and (on a revised version) on 8 June 2012. The recommendations 
for  improvement  were  accommodated  in  the  revised  version  of  the  report.  In  particular,  the 
following  changes  were  made:  further  information  is  provided  on  the  consultation  of 
interested  parties;  the  overall  intervention  logic  has  been  reviewed  and  streamlined;  the 
problem definition has been further developed and made more detailed, both in relation to the 
overall  problem  of  irregular  migration  and  in  relation  to  specific  implementation  problems; 
the  baseline  scenario  has  been  extended  to  better  describe  how  it  would  involve  without 
further  EU  action;  the  options  have  been  restructured  and  simplified;  the  assessment  of  the 
options  have  been  refined  and  done  in  a  more  logical  manner  showing  which  options  are 
linked  and  which  are  not;  the  explanation  of  the  method  used  for  calculating  the  costs  was 
expanded; the analysis and description of the preferred option have been revised and linked 
more directly to data that will become available in the future. 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1.  Why the creation of an EES is being examined 

The  2008  impact  assessment  identified  and  examined  irregular  immigration,  including  the 
lack of data for identifying overstayers, and terrorism and serious crime as the main problems 
to be addressed through the creation of an EES. As explained in the 2011 communication: 

18  

The Clandestino project; see further under section 2.1.1.3. 

9 

 
 
 
                                                 
 'An EES would allow the accurate and reliable calculation of authorised stay as well as the 
verification of the individual travel history for both visa holders and visa exempted travellers 
as an essential part of first line risk-assessment. It would do so by replacing the current 
system of stamping passports with an electronic registry of the dates and places of third 
country national admitted for short stays. While the main purpose of the system would be to 
monitor respect of the authorised stay of third country nationals, the system would also 
contribute to optimising border check procedures and enhance the security at the moment of 
the crossing of the external borders. '19 

The 2008 impact assessment assessed a wide range of policy options and identified the setting 
up of an entry/exit system as the preferred option. This impact assessment looks again at the 
overall problem definition as relevant for that conclusion in the light of developments since 
2008  with  regard  to  border  control  aspects,  irregular  migration,  and  technological 
developments,  at  European  as  well  as  national  level.  In  particular,  the  following  sections 
address difficulties related to monitoring the authorised stay of third country nationals, delays 
in  border  checks,  the  lack  of  information  on  irregular  immigration,  and  use  of  entry/exit 
systems  at  national  level  in  the  Member  States  as  well  as  in  third  countries.  Based  on  the 
overall problem definition it then looks in more detail at the more specific problems related to 
how such a system should be designed.  

2.1.1.  Border control aspects 

2.1.1.1.  The  difficulties  of  monitoring  the  authorised  stay  of  third  country  nationals  at  the 

external border 

According to the Schengen Borders Code, EU citizens and other persons enjoying the Union 
right  of  free  movement  (e.g.  family  members  of  EU  citizens)  crossing  the  external  border 
shall be subject to a minimum check, both at entry and exit, consisting of the verification of 
the travel document in order to establish the identity of the person. Third-country nationals, 
however,  must  be  subject,  at  entry,  to  a  thorough  check  which,  in  addition  to  a  travel 
document check, implies a check of their purpose of stay, possession of sufficient means of 
subsistence,  as  well  as  a  search  in  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  and  in  national 
databases.    

Third-country  nationals  who  do  not  have  a  residence  permit  or  long-stay  visa  issued  by  a 
Member State are admitted for a short stay of maximum three months per six month period. 
This applies both for those who are subject to the visa obligation and those that are not. There 
are  no  provisions  however  in  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  on  the  recording  of  travellers' 
movements into and out of the Schengen area. Currently, stamping the travel document is the 
sole method to indicate the dates of entry and exit which can be used by border guards and 
immigration  authorities  to  calculate  the  duration  of  the  stay  of  a  third-country  national, 
thereby allowing authorities to verify that the third-country national is in compliance with the 
rules  on  short  stays.  Other  measures  and  tools  available  at  border  crossing  points  (such  as 
databases, whose consultation is compulsory at entry, but not at exit) are not intended for the 
purpose  of  recording  border  crossings  and  do  not  provide  for  this  functionality.  Therefore 
there are no centralised electronic means to check if a third-country national has entered the 
Schengen area in one Member State and left via another. 

19  

COM(2011) 680 final 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The calculation of the exact time spent in the Schengen area of third-country nationals coming 
for a short stay based solely on stamps in the travel documents is both time-consuming and 
difficult. Checking a traveller who has been making 10 visits to the Schengen area during the 
last  months  means  verifying  20  stamps.  Maintaining  the  quality  and  security  of  the  stamps 
requires  both  resources  and  efforts,  as  they  can  be  subject  to  counterfeiting  and  forgery.  In 
addition, there is no stored record available indicating that a third-country national has entered 
the Schengen area or of the time he/she has spent within it. 

For  these  reasons,  there  are  currently  no  reliable  means  to  determine  if  a  third-country 
national has exceeded his/her lawful right to stay and there is no consistent record of entries 
and exits of travellers to and from the Schengen area. Furthermore in-depth verification of the 
authorised  stay  is  time  consuming  and  can  lead  to  tensions  between  border  guards  and 
travellers who, for example, need to catch a flight.  

Difficulties affecting the legibility of the stamps as well as the absence of entry stamps were 
highlighted  by  the  Member  States  in  their  replies  to  the  questionnaire  carried  out  by  the 
Commission prior to the report on the operation of the provisions on the stamping of travel 
documents  of  third-country  nationals.20  The  report  also  highlighted  further  problems 
encountered by third-country nationals crossing the external border frequently, such as lorry 
drivers  or  cross-border  commuters,  due  to  the  need  to  use  separate  sheets  for  affixing  the 
entry or exit stamps when there are no free pages left in the passport. 

The  setting  up  an  entry/exit  system  would  leave  the  current  legislation  and  border  checks 
unchanged  except  for  the  stamping  of  passports  of  third-country  nationals,  which  would  be 
replaced  with  the  obligation  to  electronically  record  entry  and  exit  dates  in  the  entry/exit 
system and an automatic calculation of the authorised stay. 

2.1.1.2.  Increased border crossings and delays in border checks 

According to the most recent comprehensive data provided by the Member States, there were 
669 million external border crossings in 2009, 675 million in 2010, and 700 million in 2011, 
including  EU  citizens  and  third-country  nationals.  The  number  of  border  crossings  did  not 
increase  significantly  during  the  past  few  years,  presumably  because  of  the  economic 
downturn.  However, based on discussions with Member States, it can be assumed that border 
crossings at the largest and busiest border crossing points have been generally increasing and 
will continue to  do so in the  future21.  Further  predictions  by  Member  State  cannot  be  made 
with any precision; main third country nationality vary greatly between Member States eg due 
to their geographical situation and historical ties, and the development of those flows will be 
greatly influenced by the economic development in each third country in question.  

20  

21 

COM(2009) 489 final. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the  operation 
of the provisions on stamping of the travel document of third-country nationals in accordance with Article 10 and 
11  of  Regulation  (EC) No 562/2006  establishing  a  Community  Code  on  the  rules  governing  the  movement  of 
persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) 
See 
vision, 
the  World 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e(ser_e/omt.ppt  and  the  travel  forecast  of  the  Office  of  Travel  and  Tourism 
Industries (OTTI), http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/view/f-2000-99-001/index.html. 

Organisation 

forecast: 

Tourism 

(WTO) 

Trade 

2020 

also 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
To gather comparable data on border crossings, the Czech and Swedish Presidencies together 
with  the  Commission  organised  a  data  collection  exercise  at  all  external  border  crossing 
points between 31 August to 6 September 2009.22 Based on this data, it is estimated that 73.5 
% of travellers crossing the border are EU citizens or persons enjoying the Union right of free 
movement  (9,1  million/week),  15,2  %  are  third-country  nationals  without  a  visa  (2,1 
million/week) and 11,3 % are third-country nationals holding a visa (1,4 million/week). On a 
yearly basis this means around 109 million third-country nationals without a visa and around 
73 million with a visa. Most third-country nationals cross the border via land, the next largest 
number by air and the smallest number via sea borders. The number of third-country nationals 
crossing  the  border  varies  significantly  between  Member  States  and  also  between  border 
crossing points.  

Taking into account the size of travel flows and the principle of a thorough border check on 
all third-country nationals, queuing time at the border is a problem for many Member States. 
This problem is influenced by the time needed under current rules for systematic stamping of 
passports and the need to verify a sometimes long travel history based on previous stamps to 
calculate  the  authorised  stay  at  entry  and  exit  as  described  in  the  previous  section.  The 
implementation  of  the  Visa  Information  System  and  the  resulting  obligation  to  verify  the 
identity  of  all  visa  holders  using  fingerprints  may  further  slow  down  border  crossing  times. 
The options for facilitating and speeding up border crossings is further assessed in the parallel 
impact assessment on  the  setting  up of a Registered Traveller Programme,  but  this problem 
must be kept in mind when assessing the design of an entry/exit system also. 

Differences  between  Member  States  in  this  regard  are  obvious  due  to  geographical  location 
(with or without an external land border) or size (with major airports). Future developments 
are linked to economic developments but also to developments in visa policy, where a lifting 
of  the  visa  obligation  with  a  neighbouring  third  country  would  most  likely  lead  to  a  major 
increase  in  the  travel  flows  to,  in  particular,  the  Member  State(s)  directly  bordering  that 
country. 

2.1.1.3.  Lack  of  reliable  information  on  irregular  immigration,  in  particular  on  overstayers, 

and problems of return 

Reliable  data  on  the  number  of  irregular  immigrants  currently  staying  in  the  EU  does  not 
exist,  a  point  emphasised  by  the  EDPS  in  his  preliminary  comment  on  the  draft  2011 
Communication. Conservative estimates of the number of irregular immigrants within the EU 
vary between 1.9 and 3.8 million according to the results of Clandestino23, an EU-sponsored 
project  implemented  by  the  International  Centre  for  Migration  Policy  Development. 
Assessing how individual Member States are affected by this phenomena is therefore equally 
difficult and can only be a matter of estimates. It is generally assumed that the Member States 
most  affected  by  irregular  migration  (including  irregular  border  crossings  as  well  as 
overstays)  are  those  at  the  southern  external  border  of  the  EU  as  well  as  the  biggest 
economies  of  the  EU.  Future  developments  in  this  regard  are  hard  to  predict  as  they  are 
influenced  by  the  political  situation  in,  especially,  the  wider  European  neighbourhood  (cf 

22  
23            Accumulated total at the time of the study, 2008 (EU 27) http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/ 

See annex 7 for further details. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Arab spring) and the economic situation in that region as well as in the EU, both in absolute 
and relative terms. 

It  is  generally  agreed  that  a  clear  majority  of  irregular  immigrants  are  'overstayers',  i.e. 
persons who have entered legally for a short stay, with a valid visa when required, and then 
remained in the EU beyond the limit of their authorised stay. 

In terms of apprehensions of irregular immigrants24 in the EU, the total for 2011 was 351 000 
which shows, in comparison to the above estimate, that a very small share of overstayers are 
actually apprehended. 

The lack of reliable data is confirmed by the replies of Member States to the questionnaires 
mentioned in section 1.2. Only 14 Member States were able to provide data on the estimated 
number of irregular immigrants within their territory and the number of overstayers detected 
at the border. An additional four Member States were able to provide data for one of the two 
categories. The total number for the two categories was 76,669 persons, although it should be 
noted that three Member States accounted for 51,543 persons in total. 

As  a  consequence  of  this  lack  of  reliable  data,  no  breakdown  can  be  provided  concerning 
overstayers per third country or per category of traveller25.  

As a result of the absence of any electronic recording of travel movements it is not possible at 
any given time to know who, among the millions of third-country nationals admitted legally 
for  a  short  stay  every  year,  has  actually  complied  with  the  obligation  to  leave  the  territory 
after  a  maximum  of  three  months.  This  means  also  that  there  is  no  information  on  the 
nationalities of overstayers or whether they are from countries subject to the visa obligation or 
not.  The  risk  of  overstay  should  be  assessed  by  Member  States  authorities  when  assessing 
whether  to  grant  a  visa  and  whether  to  allow  entry  at  the  border,  but  there  is  thus  limited  
feedback on which nationalities present a higher risk than others in this respect, as well as to 
whether the visa obligation is imposed on the third countries with a high overstay rate. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  not  all  overstayers  who  voluntarily  leave  the  territory  are 
detected  at  the  exit  border  check  due  to  the  problem  of  stamping  as  described  above.  Such 
overstays  can  therefore  not  be  sanctioned  (i.e.  with  a  fine)  or  taken  into  account  for  a 
subsequent decision on allowing a new entry. 

In  turn  this  contributes  to  the  difficulty  in  detecting  those  that  do  overstay  in  each  Member 
State.  Member  States  carry  out  random  checks  within  the  territory  for  this  purpose,  for 
example, at major transport hubs or workplaces suspected of hiring irregular migrants.  

The  low  number  of  detections  of  irregular  migrants  taken  together  with  problems  of 
identifying them (as many will have no identification document) and in ensuring cooperation 
of third countries explain the low number of returns carried out by Member States each year 
compared to the overall estimate of the total number of irregular migrants on EU territory. 

24  
territory. 
25  

Frontex annual risk analysis 2012. Including both persons apprehended within the territory and when exiting the 

E.g. holding a visa or not, by purpose of stay, by nationality, etc. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
A major obstacle to effective return is uncertainty concerning the identity of the person and/or 
his or her lack of necessary travel documents, which may make it impossible to either issue a 
return  decision  or  to  enforce  such  a  decision.  Countries  of  origin  often  delay  or  deny  the 
issuing of return travel documents because of missing information on nationality or identity. 
In  order  to  avoid  removal,  irregular  residents  may  therefore  hide  or  destroy  their  travel 
documents and often claim a completely false identity and/or nationality. Figures provided for 
the  follow  up  of  the  Return  Directive  show  that  over  the  last  years,  an  average  of  only 
200,000  out  of  500,000  return  decisions  could  be  carried  out,  however,  this  data  includes 
situations  in  which  returnees  could  not  be  returned  also  due  to  other  reasons,  such  as  non-
refoulement or because no third-country would accept them. 

2.1.1.4.  National EES systems and experiences with EES in third countries 

There  are  several  Member  States  and  third  countries  implementing  their  own  national 
entry/exit  systems.  13  Member  States26  currently  have  such  a  system  in  place  and  the  only 
data  collected  are  alphanumeric.  The  main  purpose  of  these  systems  is  to  give  law 
enforcement  authorities  the  opportunity  to  store  travel  records  of  certain  third-country 
nationals  in  accordance  with  security-related  national  legislation.  Therefore  these  Member 
States  give  access  to  their  national  systems  not  only  to  border  authorities  but  also  to  law 
enforcement  authorities  for  the  purpose  of  investigating  crime.  As  for  non-Schengen 
countries, part of the UK's e-Borders programme aimed, among other things, to record entry 
and  exit  data  based  on  the  advance  passenger  information  transmitted  to  government 
authorities by carriers transporting persons to the UK.  

If a person lawfully exits the same Member State through which he or she entered, then any 
overstayer would be detected by the relevant national EES systems. Beyond that, there are no 
possibilities for using such systems to detect overstayers as entry and exit records cannot be 
matched  when  persons  leave  the  Schengen  area  via  a  different  Member  State  from  the  one 
through which they entered and in which their entry was recorded. 

As regards  third countries, the US-VISIT programme was implemented in the wake of 9/11 
in  the  United  States.  The  objectives  of  this  system  go  considerably  beyond  those  of  an 
entry/exit  system  and  are  achieved  by  collecting,  maintaining  and  sharing  information  on 
individuals who enter and exit the United States to detect fraudulent travel documents, verify 
traveller  identity,  and  determine  traveller  admissibility  through  the  use  of  biometrics27.  The 
matching of entry and exit records for the purpose of identifying overstayers is currently done 
based on alphanumeric data, although pilot projects incorporating the use of biometrics have 
been carried out recently. While the number of overstayers remains significant, the creation of 
the exit part of an entry/exit system based on biometrics has been repeatedly postponed. The 
US-Congress  has  long  pushed  and  is  still  pushing  for  a  biometric  exit  system.The  US 
Department  of  Homeland  Security  (DHS)  stated  that  several  more  years  are  still  needed  to 
implement the technology because of the high costs, manpower and the scope of the issue due 
to  the  variety  and  number  of  ways  to  exit  the  United  States,  in  particular  through  its  land 
borders.  The  ultimate  impediment  to  biometric  exit  is  that  highway  lanes  and  other 

26  

27  

Finland,  Estonia,  Spain,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Hungary,  Romania,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Portugal, 
Malta. 
Intrinsic physical or behavioral characteristics uniquely recognizing individual persons.  

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
architecture have been designed for entry only28. This is the main reason why implementation 
problems are not transferable or applicable to the Schengen area, because there exists a full 
and  complete  developed  architecture  and  sufficient  human  recources  at  all  border  crossing 
points in both directions. 

Arrival  and  departure  records  of  travellers  to  and  from  Australia  are  contained  within  the 
Movements  Reconstruction  database,  set  up  in  1981.  In  Japan,  a  biometric  border  control 
programme for all non-Japanese citizens was introduced in 2007 as a measure for preventing 
terrorism and irregular immigration, while a system for recording biographical entry and exit 
data has been in place for several years. 

At  the  high  level  conference  on  2  and  3  February  2012  in  Copenhagen  (see  footnote  15),  
representatives from the responsible authorities in the USA and Australia described the new 
systems  as  a  success  and  as  an  effective  tool  for  the  authorities  to  detect  irregular  migrants 
and  to  fight  serious  cross  border  crime.  However  precise  figures  on  the  number  of 
apprehended irregular migrants were not presented. 

2.1.1.5.  Summary of overall problems related to border control and irregular migration 

The overall problems related to border crossings, stamping, irregular migration, overstays and 
returns have remained fairly constant since the impact assessment report of 2008 was carried 
out.  There  has  not  been  any  technological  developments  either  that  would  influence  the 
problems. These can be summarised as follows based on what was described in the preceding 
sections: 

28  

Hearing  of  Homeland  Security  Secretary  Janet  Napolitano  at  the  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  on  25 
April 2012 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
•  Absence of any electronic means for recording travel movements of third-country 

nationals admitted for a short stay; 

•  The  very  limited  value  of  national  systems  for  such  purposes  in  an  area  without 

internal border control between 26 countries; 

•  The absence of means for identifying persons detected within the territory without 

travel documents who cannot be identified using the VIS; 

•  The absence of any information of who is on EU territory and who complies with 

the maximum allowed short stay of three months per six months; 

•  The  complexity  and  slowness  of  the  current  stamping  obligation,  which  does  not 
guarantee that the border guard can assess the authorised stay at the border check of 
the traveller; 

•  The  absence  of  information  on  nationalities  and  groups  (visa  exempt/required)  of 

travellers overstaying; 

•  The absence of information that can support random checks within the territory to 

detect irregularly staying persons. 

2.1.2.  Law enforcement aspects 

Border  controls  play  an  important  role  in  combating  terrorism  and  serious  crime.  Europol's 
EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2011 (OCTA 2011) points out that most organised 
crime involves international travel, including trafficking in human beings or the trafficking of 
illicit drugs, weapons and other illicit goods into the EU. Information about the travel record 
of  persons  who  are  suspects  of  these  serious  crimes  can  be  necessary  for  criminal 
investigations. 

Controls  of  third-country  nationals  at  external  borders  involve  identity  checks  and  searches 
against various databases of known persons or groups posing a threat to public security that 
should be either apprehended or denied entry to the territory. Currently, all verifications are 
carried out based only on the travel documents. Even though the alerts on these persons may 
have  been  recorded  in  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS),  or  other  national  and 
international databases, they can only be identified on the basis of the alphanumeric data that 
was  introduced  with  the  alert.  This  makes  it  difficult  for  the  authorities  to  detect  a  person 
using different identities to cross the borders. 

In  general,  identification  is  essential  for  law  enforcement  authorities  in  their  mission  to 
prevent  and  combat  terrorism  and  other  serious  crime.    However,  in  the  event  that  a  third 
country  national  destroys  his/her  official  documentation  once  having  entered  the  Schengen 
area,  it  can  be  very  difficult  for  law  enforcement  authorities  to  identify  that  person  in  case 
he/she  is  suspected  of  a  crime  or  is  a  victim  of  crime.  While  data  on  EU  citizens  exists  in 
different  databases  in  Member  States  that  are  in  general  accessible  to  law  enforcement 
authorities, there is an information and verification gap concerning third country nationals that 
are not covered by the Visa Information System (VIS). 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.2.1.  Summary of overall problems related to law enforcement aspects 

The overall problems related to identifying and detecting terrorist and criminal suspects have 
also  remained  fairly  constant  since  the  impact  assessment  report  of  2008  was  carried  out. 
There has not been any technological developments either that would influence the problems. 
These can be summarised as follows: 

•  Lack of information on the travel and cross-border movements of suspect persons; 

•  Difficulties  in  detecting  persons  subject  to  an  alert  who  use  different  identities  to 

cross the borders; 

•  Difficulties identifying a suspect having destroyed his or her travel documents. 

2.1.3. Fundamental rights issues 

An EES would, due to the personal data involved, in particular have an impact on the right to 
the protection of personal data, enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union. An EES would need to guarantee the right to an effective remedy before 
a tribunal (Article 47 of the Charter) for challenging a notification of an overstay, for example 
in cases of forced overstay, errors or when a migrant has a legal right to stay. 

Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data29 and the Regulation (EC) 45/2001 would apply 
to the processing of personal data carried out for the purpose of an EES respectively by the 
Member States and by the EU institutions, bodies and agencies involved. Negative impacts of 
sharing  personal  data  have  to  be  minimised  by  appropriate  technical  safeguards  against 
misuse,  clear  legal  limitations  for  access,  including  purpose  limitations  and  data  retention 
periods which are as short as possible. 

Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JAI30 on the protection of personal data processed in 
the framework of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, the Europol Decision 
2009/371/JHA and the Regulation (EC) 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free 
movement  of  such  data  would  apply  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  if  access  would  be 
given for law enforcement purposes. 

According  to  the  Commission  Communication  of  July  2010  on  information  management31, 
data  protection  rules  should  be  embedded  in  any  new  instruments    relying  on  the  use  of 
information  technology.    This  implies  the  inclusion  of  appropriate  provisions  limiting  data 
processing to what is necessary for the specific purpose of that instrument and granting data 

29   
30  
31  

OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p.31 
JO L 350 of 30.12.08, p.60 
See footnote 8. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
access  only  to  those  entities  that  ‘need  to  know.’  It  also  implies  the  choice  of  limited  data 
retention  periods  depending  solely  on  the  objectives  of  the  instrument  and  the  adoption  of 
mechanisms ensuring an accurate risk management and effective protection of data subjects' 
rights.  

The  system  would  have  to  comply  with  data  protection  principles  and  the  requirements  of 
necessity,  proportionality,  purpose  limitation  and  quality  of  data.  All  safeguards  and 
mechanisms  should  be  in  place  for  the  effective  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of 
travellers  particularly  the  protection  of  their  private  life  and    personal  data.  Third-country 
nationals must be made aware of these rights.  

In accordance with data protection legislation, access should be given to the data stored in the 
entry/exit  system  only  for  specified,  explicit  and  legitimate  purposes.  This  means  that  the 
authorities  who  should  have  access  to  the  entry/exit  system  have  to  be  designated  for  a 
specific  limited  purpose.  The  EDPS  raised  this  concern  in  his  preliminary  comment  on  the 
2011 Communication as well as in his letter of 10 August 2012, stressing that the  purposes 
and modalities of access to EES data have to be closely circumscribed.  Therefore, access for 
consulting the data should be reserved exclusively to duly authorised staff of the authorities of 
each Member State who are competent for the specific purposes of the entry/exit system and 
limited to the extent the data are required for the performance of the tasks in accordance with 
these purposes.  

2.2. 

Problem: how to design an EES? 

2.2.1.  The core features of an EES 

An EES would need to allow the accurate and reliable calculation of authorised stay as well as 
the  verification  of  the  individual  travel  history  for  both  visa  holders  and  visa  exempted 
travellers as an essential part of border checks. It would do so by replacing the current system 
of stamping passports with an electronic registry of the dates and places of border crossings of 
third  country  nationals  admitted  for  short  stays.  As  part  of  the  preferred  option,  the  2008 
impact asessment identified a "core" entry/exit system, that is, the common minimum features 
which are needed to develop the system in the first place, without prejudicing any choices on 
how  it  should  be  implemented.  These  core  features  are  still  valid  in  the  light  of  the  overall 
problem  definition  as  described  in  section  2.1.  There  have  been  no  technological 
developments since 2008 influencing these core features. They can be defined as follows:  

•  a  system  which  records  and  stores,  as  a  minimum,  the  basic  alphanumeric  data 
(equivalent to the biographic data in the passport) of a third-country national admitted for 
a short stay, together with the date and place of entry and exit, upon each crossing of the 
external border of the Schengen area, with a defined retention period for the storage of the 
data;  

•  a system that would automatically calculate the authorised stay and issue an alert to the 
authorised competent national authorities when there is no exit record on the expiry of the 
authorised stay; 

•  access to the data in the system would be given to the national authorities responsible for 
immigration and border control, at the external border and within the Schengen territory.  

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of safeguards would be integral to the core system, in particular for complying with 
fundamental rights: 

•  If there were errors on the identity checks of passengers, facilities would need to be made 
available for carrying out manual checks and for amending the data on entry and exit at 
all border crossing points. Regarding such facilities, the Schengen Borders Code currently 
requires that thorough second line checks for third-country nationals shall be carried out 
in a private area where the facilities exist and if requested by the third-country national.  

•  Individuals should have the right to access information held on them and to challenge and 
correct it, if the processing of this data does not comply with the provisions of Directive 
95/46  and  Regulation  45/2001,  in  particular  because  of  the  incomplete  or  inaccurate 
nature  of  the  data.  In  case  the  information  is  held  by  law  enforcement  authorities 
following  access  to  the  EES,  such  rights  shall  be  granted  under  Framework  Decision 
2008/977. 

•  Individuals  should  have  the  right  to  lodge  a  complaint  with  a  data  protection  authority 
regarding  the  processing  of  their  personal  data  and  they  should  also  have  the  right  to 
effective administrative and judicial remedies (Article 47 of the Charter). 

•  Guarantees  ensuring  an  effective  remedy  (Article  47  of  the  Charter)  for  third-country 
nationals  that  would  enable  them  to  challenge  a  notification  of  an  overstay  by  the 
entry/exit  system  must  be  in  place,  for  example  in  situations  when  they  were  forced  to 
overstay,  particularly  if  it  appears  that  they  overstayed  for  a  valid  reason  (e.g. 
hospitalization, change in travel arrangements), when errors were made in recording dates 
of entry or exit or to show that they have a legal right to stay (e.g. based on a new visa, 
marriage  to  an  EU  citizen,  application  for  asylum,  refugee  status).  Given  the  large 
numbers  of  new  travellers  affected  and  the  new  requirement  for  them  to  provide 
information,  safeguards  for  data  protection  and  mechanisms  for  ensuring  an  effective 
remedy would need to be visible and evident. 

•  In  case  the  entry/exit  system  notifies  an  overstay,  this  indication  should  not  lead 
automatically  to  detention,  removal  or  a  sanction  for  the  third-country  national.  Third-
country nationals should have access to effective remedies in such proceedings in order to 
protect the right to liberty and security (Art. 6 of the Charter), right to asylum (Art. 18 of 
the  Charter),  respect  for  family  life  (Art.  7  of  the  Charter)  and  the  obligation  of  non-
refoulement (Art. 19(2) of the Charter). A decision to detain, remove or sanction a third-
country national shall not be based solely on a nofitication of overstay by the entry/exit 
system. In addition the safeguards of Directive 2008/115/EC have to be respected. 

•  The supervision of all data processing activities should be carried out by Member States 
data protection authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor which should be 
conferred  with  all  the  necessary  powers  to  intervene  and  enforce  compliance  with  data 
protection rules. 

•  The measures protecting rights of travellers, including right to an effective remedy, must 
also take into account the privileged position of non-EU family members of EU citizens 
whose  right  to  enter  and  to  stay  depend  on  the  right  of  the  respective  EU  citizen  in 
accordance with Directive 2004/38/EC. 

19 

 
 
2.2.2.  Could these features be provided through existing systems? 

A number of Member States raised the issue of whether the Visa Information System (VIS) 
could be expanded to incorporate the features of an EES. 

The main purpose of the VIS is to permit the verification of the visa application history and, 
at entry, to verify whether the person presenting the visa at the border is the same person to 
whom  the  visa  has  been  issued.  It  concerns  only  those  third-country  nationals  who  are 
required to hold a visa.  

The VIS was not developed to keep track of entries and exits of third-country nationals nor is 
it  meant  to  allow  checking  whether  a  person,  after  entering  the  EU  legally,  has  or  has  not 
complied with the authorised stay according to the visa. The VIS feasibility study, carried out 
in  2003  before  the  development  of  the  VIS,  suggested  that  it  would  not  be  beneficial  to 
develop several large-scale IT systems as one, nor to use VIS to record entry and exit data. It 
would need substantial changes to the nature and capacity of the VIS if entry/exit data were 
also to be recorded in it. The workflow of the VIS is optimised to deal with 10 million visa 
applications per year. Adding around 200 million records of entries and exits would require 
significant  investments  especially  in  hardware,  software,  data  storage  and  communication 
infrastructure.  

Moreover,  there  would  be  significant  data  protection  implications  if  the  system  were  to 
include both visa holders and visa-exempt persons. The principle of purpose limitation needs 
to be adhered to and the risk of function creep has to be prevented as highlighted by the EDPS 
in his opinion on the Communication on Migration.  

Therefore the possibility of including entry/exit functionality in the VIS itself and the storage 
related  to  non-visa  holders  in  the  VIS  can  be  discarded.  However,  there  would  be  major 
technical and functional links between the Visa Information System (VIS) and the entry/exit 
system. Besides the same technical features and common matching functionality, VIS is the 
repository of the biometric identifiers of visa holders who will be registered in the entry/exit 
system. It must be checked systematically upon entry of the visa holders. 

The  technical  development  of  an  EES  should  therefore  exploit  technical  synergies, 
organisational  simplification  and  economies  of  scale  to  the  maximum  by  using  the  same 
technical  platform  as  VIS.  Biometric  matching  functionality  could  be  performed  by  the 
existing Biometric Matching System, which already provides such a functionality in the VIS. 
Furthermore, the fingerprints of the visa holders would not be stored in the entry/exit system, 
as  they  already  exist  in  the  VIS.  Duplication  of  data  would  be  subsequently  avoided.  This 
would  allow  also  for  cost  savings  by  building  on  the  technical  platform  of  the  VIS.  
Therefore,  storing  fingerprints  of  visa  holders  in  VIS  only  and  not  in  the  entry/exit  system 
would  create  economies  of  scale  and  avoid  storing  the  fingerprints  of  visa  holders  twice. 
Indeed, building the EES on the same technical platform as the VIS (but not on the VIS itself) 
would  mean  that  the  EES  would  take  advantage  of  the  biometric  matching  functionality 
already built for VIS and would optionally re-use the visa holder fingerprints already captured 
for the benefits of VIS, without duplicating the effort or the data.  

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4 summarizes the other main EU level systems (SIS, Eurodac and the Prüm Decisions) 
that  are  currently  used  at  the external  border  or  which  are  relevant  for  internal  security  and 
migration  management,  the  future  plans  for  the  systems  and  their  possible  link  to  the 
entry/exit system. Annex 6 summarizes the current and future management of those systems. 

None  of  these  instruments  are,  however,  a  pre-condition  for  the  setting  up  of  an  entry/exit 
system, nor is there any potential overlap with the functions that an entry/exit system would 
carry out. Other developments in the EU's policy on border management are not relevant here, 
such  as  changes  to  the  legal  framework  of  Frontex,  the  development  of  Eurosur,  or  other 
amendments to the Schengen Borders Code. Likewise, no other initiatives to combat irregular 
immigration32
  or  to  combat  serious  crime  and  terrorism  are  relevant  either  for  reducing  the 
number of overstayers or the possibilities of  identifying or detecting them. 

2.2.3. 

Implementation issues 

There are a number of key choices that need to be made when designing an entry/exit system 
and that will influence to what extent it will solve the overall problems described in section 
2.1. These choices must maximise the overall usefulness and efficiency of the system while 
respecting fundamental rights. By maximising only usefulness and/or efficiency of the system 
there is a risk of contravening fundamental rights. For example, an EES could be designed so 
that it would store the largest possible amounts of data, any search criteria used would give 
access to all information (alphanumeric and biometric data) and flexible access rights would 
be  given  for  all  relevant  authorities,  even  third  countries.  However,  all  this  would  cause 
exorbitant data protection implications and would not be proportionate against the objectives 
of the EES.  

This  involves  choices  both  with  regard  to  the  overall  architecture  of  the  system  and  to 
additional  features,  including  possible  adaptations  of  the  basic  purpose  of  the  system,  in 
relation to the "core" system as described in section 2.2.1. 

In summary the choices involve deciding the data to be collected and processed; defining with 
precision  the  purpose  of  the  system;  deciding  the  retention  period  of  the  data  taking  into 
account  the  purpose;  and  finally  deciding  on  how  to  technically  implement  the  system  in 
practice. 

2.2.3.1.  What type of personal data should be included in the entry/exit system? 

As  mentioned  above  a  minimum  amount  of  alphanumeric  personal  data33  on    third-country 
nationals  admitted  for  a  short  stay  is  required  to  make  the  system  functional.  The  question 
arises, however, as to whether biometric data should also be stored on these travellers (taking 
into account that such data is used for the VIS) in addition to alphanumeric data. While the 
use  of  biometric  data  helps  in  identifying  people,  it  would  present  a  negative  impact  on 
privacy and data protection. It would also require more resources for processing and storing 
additional data. This is a recurring issue that was widely discussed especially in the context of 
the VIS. 

32  

33  

Cf. "EU Action on Migratory Pressures – A Strategic Response" adopted by the Council on 26 April 
2012 (8714/12) for an overview of on-going and planned EU measures in this field. 
The surname, first names, birth date, sex, nationality as well as the number and expiry date of the travel 
document 

21 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
The impact on the time taken for the border check process would also need to be taken into 
account given that biometric data for third-country nationals not requiring a visa, who make 
up approximately 15% of all travellers, is currently neither collected nor stored in any other 
system.  

The  question  of  which  type  of  biometrics  to  use  is  not  addressed  further  in  this  impact 
assessment as existing EU law already stipulates the use of fingerprints as concerns the VIS, 
e-passport, and residence permits.34 This legislation also stipulates that children under the age 
of  twelve  and  persons  physically  unfit  to  give  fingerprints  should  be  exempted  from  that 
requirement,  so  for  these  categories  alphanumeric  data  only  will  always  be  used.  Using  the 
same  biometric  data  (fingerprints)  under  the  same  conditions  in  an  EES  would  therefore  be 
consistent  with  previous  policy  choices  at  EU  level  and  also  allow  for  the  use  of  the  same 
infrastructure and equipment as used for the VIS.   

2.2.3.2.  For which purpose(s) and by which authorities could entry/exit data be accessed? 

One  of  the  problems  in  enforcing  returns  of  irregularly  staying  third-country  nationals  is 
linked  to  proving  the  identity  and  nationality  of  the  person  in  order  for  the  third  country  in 
question  to  accept  to  readmit  him/her.  For  that  reason  Member  States  have  the  right  under 
certain conditions to share data stored in the VIS with third countries. Data generated by the 
entry/exit system could be shared in a similar way for the same purpose. However, the sharing 
of personal data with third countries raises important questions related to data protection and 
under what conditions such data could be shared. 

Moreover,  the  data  generated  by  the  entry/exit  system  could  support  law  enforcement 
authorities in the fight against terrorism and serious crime both as an identity verification tool 
and as a criminal intelligence tool. The use of such data for identity verification would reduce 
the  above  mentioned  identification  and  verification  gap  concerning  third  country  nationals 
that  are  not  covered  by  the  Visa  Information  System  (VIS).  The  use  of  biometric  data,  and 
more specifically fingerprints, would substantially increase the added value of the entry/exit 
data in establishing the identity of a person who is suspected of a crime or a crime victim such 
as victim of trafficking in human beings. Biometric information provides a reliable means to 
establish  the  identity  of  a  person  and  the  comparison  of  fingerprints  is  generally 
acknowledged as an important source of information for fighting crime. This is both in cases 
where  the  third-country  national  has  destroyed  his/her  documents,  but  also  where  law 
enforcement authorities are investigating a crime through the use of fingerprints and wish to 
establish an identity. 

The data generated by the entry/exit system could also be used as a criminal intelligence tool 
for investigations and prosecutions of terrorism and serious crime. The data could be used to 
construct evidence by tracking the travel routes of a person suspected of having committed a 
crime.  However, as law enforcement authorities would need to go back sufficiently in time in 
their analysis of travel routes, an effective use of the data generated by the entry/exit system 
as a criminal intelligence tool requires a commensurate period of retention of that data. 

34 

See also the Justice and Home Affairs Council Conclusions on 4-5.6.2010. The Council invited the Member States 
to move on a voluntary basis to a more extensive use of automated border control systems on the basis of the new 
passport i.e. passport which contains facial image and fingerprints stored in the chip. 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2.2.3.3.  For how long should entry/exit data be stored? 

The conditions set for the retention of the collected personal data would have to be precisely 
defined on the basis of the system’s objectives fully respecting data protection requirements. 
Whatever  option  is  considered,  the  data  retention  period  would  have  to  be  restricted  to  the 
minimum  length  required  for  the  system  to  serve  its  purpose  fully  and  effectively,  while 
limiting the need for data from the same person to be enrolled several times over a short time-
span. It should be ensured that the data in the record should be automatically erased after the 
retention  period  has  expired.  Conditions  would  also  have  to  be  defined  for  the  possible 
advance deletion of data (e.g. in case the third-country national marries an EU citizen).  

According  to  the  information  provided  by  Member  States  in  2009  concerning  the  existing 
national entry-exit systems, retention periods were ten years minimum in six Member States. 
For existing EU IT systems, the retention period is 2-10 years for Eurodac, 1-3 years for SIS, 
and 5 years for the VIS.35 Member States did not provide concrete feedback on their preferred 
retention period for an EU EES. 

This choice is directly dependent on the choices made with regard to the data to be stored and 
the precise purpose for storing the data. A table on the data retention period of the existing EU 
systems is in Annex 5. 

2.2.3.4.  Centralised vs decentralised storage of entry/exit data 

This  last  implementation  choice  is  essentially  a  technical  one,  independent  of  the  previous 
choices,  concerning  how  the  system  should  be  implemented  technically  to  ensure  reliable 
functioning  as  the  system  needs  to  be  continuosly  available  at  border  crossing  points,  data 
security  to  prevent  unauthorised  access  to  the  data  stored  in  the  system,  and  limit  costs  for 
developing and running the system. The system would eventually collect and store millions of 
records of third-country nationals personal data, which would need to be stored in a database 
to allow for matching of entry and exit records and the generation of alerts in case of overstay. 
A choice will therefore have to be made whether to set up a new centralised database at EU 
level, or whether the data could be stored at national level, with a connection for the exchange 
of  data  between  the  national  databases.  Lessons  learnt  from  the  development  of  other  IT 
systems at EU level must be taken into account when making that choice. 

2.3. 

Baseline scenario – how would things evolve without new EU intervention? 

Currently  there  are  some  700  million  external  border  crossings  every  year.  The  tendency  at 
least for the air borders is clearly leading upwards. For 2030 the figures of border crossings at 
the airports are expected to rise from 400 million in 2009 to some 720 million, an increase of 
80%. As far as the expected development of irregular migration and overstay is concerned, it 
is difficult to estimate how figures for these phenomena will develop: Member States have not 
able  to  provide  information  on  this  issue.  Both  regular  travel  flows  and  irregular  migration 
will be influenced by future economic development in the EU as well as in third countries.  

The EU border management policy has to keep pace with this development. The optimisation 
of the existing instruments like the Schengen borders code and the role of the Frontex agency 
has  continued  but  cannot  address  further  this  specific  challenge.  New  instruments  and 
possibilities to optimise the border management systems have to be found.  

35  

See annex 5 for further details. 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
To  cope  with  the  increasing  cross  border  travel  and  for  the  sake  of  speeding  up  and 
facilitation of border crossing procedures, IT technologies and new instruments are the most 
promising options.  

It is reasonable to assume that the existing national entry/exit systems will continue to exist 
insofar they comply with EU law, in particular data protection rules. No other Member State 
has announced the development of a national system, awaiting the policy choices to be made 
at EU level concerning a European EES. In any case, national systems functioning in isolation 
will  remain  of  little  consequence  as  they  cannot  provide  a  response  to  the  overall  problems 
described in section 2.1.1.  

In summary therefore the baseline scenario can be expected to develop as follows: 

- Border checks will be carried in the same way as they are today, except that the biometrics 
of all visa holders will be verified at entry against the VIS as of 2014; this may contribute to 
preventing the legal entry of potential overstayers as this check will prevent identity fraud at 
the border; it may also increase the processing time of visa holding travellers at the border; 

- The VIS will also give the possibility to identify overstayers within the territory who have 
entered legally with a valid short-stay visa and who are no longer in possession of their travel 
documents; 

- The EU will continue its efforts towards further visa liberalisation with third countries based 
on the visa dialogues on-going for that purpose; however it can not be predicted when and for 
which third country the visa obligation will be lifted in the future; any such development will 
lead to an increase of the share of travellers who are not registered in the VIS when entering 
the EU; 

- No tools exist or will be developed concerning visa exempt travellers with the exception of 
SIS/SIS II; 

- In terms of overall irregular immigration, it is not possible to predict how the problem will 
evolve taking into account the influence of a number of economic and social factors as well as 
relations  with  and  the  situation  in  third  countries;  however,  it  can  be  assumed  that  the  full 
roll-out and implementation of the VIS will have a positive impact in this respect; 

- For the reasons outlined in section 2.1, different Member States may be affected differently 
by changes in travel flows and in irregular migration, but this cannot be predicted. 

-  The  introduction  of  a  Registered  Travellers  Programme  could  have  a  positive  impact  on 
reducing  queuing  time  at  the  border,  but  this  does  not  form  part  of  the  baseline  as  it  is 
assessed in the parallel impact assessment report. 

2.4. 

Subsidiarity 

Under Articles 74 and 77(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
the Union has the power to adopt measures relating to the crossing of the external borders of 
the Member States. Under Articles 82 (1)(d) and 87(2)(a) TFEU the Union also has the power 
to  adopt  measures  to  strengthen  police  and  judicial  cooperation  by  collecting,  storing, 
processing, analysing and exchanging relevant information. 

24 

 
 
 
No  Member  State  alone  is  able  to  cope  with  irregular  immigration  and  with  combating 
international terrorism and serious crime. A person may enter the Schengen area at a border 
crossing point in a Member State where a national register of entry/exit data is used, but exit 
through a border crossing point where no such system is used. The monitoring of compliance 
with EU rules on authorised stays can therefore not be done by Member States acting alone. 
Third-country nationals who enter the Schengen area are able to travel freely within it. In an 
area  without  internal  borders,  action  against  irregular  immigration  should  in  principle  be 
undertaken  on  a  common  basis.  Considering  all  this  the  EU  is  better  placed  than  Member 
States to take the appropriate measures. 

Although Member States may retain their national systems in accordance with security-related 
national legislation, an EU entry/exit system would allow Member State authorities to access 
data on third-country nationals who crossed the EU external border in one country and exited 
via another Schengen country.  

Better information on cross border movements of third-country nationals at EU level would 
also  facilitate  the  negotiation  and  conclusion  of  visa  agreements  between  the  EU  and  third 
countries  and  contribute  to  a  common  understanding  of  immigration  issues  with  third 
countries of origin. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES OF THE ENTRY/EXIT SYSTEM 

The general policy objectives are, in order of priority:  

•  To counteract irregular immigration; 

•  To contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious crime and ensure a high level of 

internal security; 

The specific objectives are: 

•  To enhance the efficiency of border checks through monitoring of the rights to authorised 

stay at entry and exit, and to improve the assessment of the risk of overstay; 

•  To monitor compliance with the authorised stay of persons within the territory;  

•  To  generate  reliable  information  to  allow  the  EU  and  Member  States  to  make  informed 

policy choices concerning visa and migration; 

•  To  identify  and  detect  irregular  immigrants,  especially  overstayers,  also  within  the 

territory and to increase the possibilities for return; 

•  To identify and apprehend terrorist and criminal suspects crossing the external borders; 

•  To  generate  information  that  would  reduce  the  identification  and  verification  gap 
concerning  third  country  nationals  that  are  not  covered  by  the  Visa  Information  System 
(VIS) and that would contribute to the apprehension of terrorist and criminal suspects; 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The operational objectives are: 

•  To create entry and exit records of third country nationals crossing the external borders; 

•  To  automatically  calculate  the  authorised  stay  and  issue  an  alert  when  there  is  no  exit 

record on the expiry of the third country national's authorised stay; 

•  To delete the EES data upon expiry of the retention period; 

•  To generate information on the size and trends of movements across the external borders, 

especially with regard to irregular immigration; 

•  To  inform  third  country  nationals  of  their  rights  and  to  implement  effective  appeal 

procedures. 

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

The problem definition and the consultation of stakeholders show that the key issues to decide 
are which data are to be processed in the system and for which precise purpose. The retention 
period needs to be chosen as a function of the choices made with regard to these two issues, 
that  is,  the  shortest  possible  retention  period  needed  to  fulfill  the  purpose.  The  four  policy 
options, in addition to the baseline (policy option 0), are therefore the following:  

1)  An  entry/exit  system  with  alphanumeric  data  for  the  purpose  of  border  control  and 
migration  management;  this  option  reflects  essentially  the  "core  features"  of  an 
entry/exit system as presented in section 2.2.1; 

2)  Same as policy option 1, with the addition of biometric data; 

3)  Same as policy option 1, with the purpose of the system extended to also include the 

fight against terrorism and serious crime; 

4)  Same as policy option 1, with the addition of biometric data and with the purpose of 
the system extended to also include the fight against terrorism and serious crime (so a 
combination of policy options 2 and 3). 

Once the preferred policy option has been identified – in other words, what the system will do 
– a choice needs to be made how to implement the system technically.  

4.1. 

Policy option 1: Core system 

The alphanumeric data would include the surname, first names, birth date, sex, nationality as 
well  as  the  number  and  expiry  date  of  the  travel  document.  Only  an  alphanumeric  check 
would be made against the alphanumeric entry record upon exit.  

In  order  to  identify  and  return  irregular  immigrants,  full  access  to  the  data  stored  in  the 
entry/exit  system  should  as  a  minimum  be  given  to  the  competent  border  and  immigration 
authorities carrying out checks at external border crossing points or within the territory of the 
Member States in order to determine whether the conditions for entry to or stay in the territory 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of  the  Member  States  are  fulfilled.  Such  access  corresponds  to  the  basic  purpose  of  border 
control and migration management. 

This  option  would  as  such  have  the  support  of  a  large  majority  of  Member  States  as  it 
involves  the  setting  up  of  an  entry/exit  system  per  se,  but  many  Member  States  would 
consider it insufficient in view of that only alphanumeric data would be stored and no access 
would be given for law enforcement purposes. The concerns expressed by members of the EP 
and the EDPS related to overall proportionality and added value of an entry/exit system are 
valid  also  for  this  policy  option,  but  to  a  more  limited  extent  taken  into  account  that  this 
option represents the most limited set of data and the most limited purpose that is possible. 

4.2. 

Policy option 2: Core system + biometric data 

An entry/exit system with biometrics would in addition contain fingerprints of third-country 
nationals. For visa-exempt third-country nationals, fingerprints would need to be enrolled on 
first entry at an EU external border crossing point. When the individual exits, his fingerprints 
would be verified against his/her entry record. For third-country nationals requiring a visa, the 
fingerprints enrolled at a consular post and stored in the VIS when applying for a Schengen 
visa would be verified on entry and exit at an EU external border crossing point. This option 
is in particular linked to the problem of identifying irregular migrants within the territory who 
are no longer in possession of their travel documents, and the specific objective of identifying 
and increasing the possibilities for return of those persons.  

The  results  of  discussions  on  the  2011  Communication  showed  that  a  large  majority  of 
Member  States  support  the  introduction  of  biometrics  from  the  start  of  the  system.  In  his 
preliminary comment on the Communication, the EDPS considered that the use of biometric 
data should only be considered if there is conclusive proof that the use of alphanumeric data 
only  is  not  effective  and  that  the  impacts  of  the  use  of  biometrics  on  privacy  should  be 
thoroughly examined. 

4.3. 

Policy option 3: Core system + law enforcement purposes  

In addition to the authorities mentioned under option 1 this sub-option would foresee access 
to  the  alphanumeric  data,  under  specific  conditions,  to  be  given  to  national  authorities  and 
Europol for the purpose of fighting terrorism and serious crime, mirroring the solution for the 
VIS according to Council Decision 2008/63336.  

Member  States'  designated  law  enforcement  authorities  and  Europol  would  consult  the 
entry/exit  data  in  a  specific  case,  e.g.  to  establish  the  travel  route  of  a  person  suspected  of 
having  committed  a  terrorist  offence  or  another  serious  criminal  offence,  when  there  are 
reasonable  grounds  to  consider  that  the  consultation  of  the  entry/exit  data  will  substantially 
contribute to the detection or investigation of this offence.  

Under this policy option, compared to the "core features" described in section 2.2.1, special 
data protection rules could be added to the extent necessary. For instance, the system could be 
developed in such a way that only specific data sets would be accessible and/or modifiable by 
specific authorities and data sets could be unlinked at the back-end. The database could also 

36  

Council  Decision  2008/633/JHA  of  23 June  2008  concerning  access  for  consultation  of  the  Visa 
Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by Europol for the purposes 
of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences 
OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 129–136  

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
be designed to only provide a summary of events after a certain length of time or indeed to 
certain authorities. Such a 'privacy by design' approach limits the possibilities of abuse from 
the outset. The 2008 Framework Decision requires Member States in particular to lay down 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement of data 
protection  provisions,  including  criminal  sanctions  for  particularly  serious  and  intentionally 
committed infringements. Such safeguards would minimise the impact on fundamental rights 
and  entry  and  exit  data  on  travellers  would  automatically  be  deleted  after  the  end  of  the 
retention period.  

This  is  relevant  for  the  problems  described  in  relation  to  law  enforcement  aspects  and  the 
specific objectives of identifying and verifying terrorist and criminal suspects. 

The  results  of  discussions  following  the  adoption  of  the  Communication  on  smart  borders 
showed that a large majority of Member States support the use of the information stored in the 
system  not  only  for  the  purpose  of  border  control  but  also  by  other  immigration  and  law 
enforcement authorities. 

4.4. 

Policy option 4: Core system + biometrics + law enforcment purposes 

This is a combination of policy options 2 and 3: in addition to the core system biometric data 
would  be  stored  as  described  under  policy  option  2,  and  access  would  be  given  to  law 
enforcement purposes as described under policy option 3. 

Member  States'  designated  law  enforcement  authorities  and  Europol  would  consult  the 
entry/exit data in a specific case for the purpose of establishing the identity of a person who is 
a crime victim or of a person who is suspected of having committed terrorist offences or other 
serious criminal offences if there are reasonable grounds to consider that this consultation will 
substantially contribute to this purpose.  

This  is  likely  to  be  the  policy  option  most  supported  by  the  Member  States,  and  the  least 
supported by the EP and the EDPS. 

4.5. 

Other issues linked to the four policy options 

4.5.1.  Transfer of data to third-country authorities 

The transfer of data stored in the entry/exit system to border and immigration authorities of 
certain third countries could be authorised in compliance with fundamental rights and, subject 
to conditions, for the fight against irregular immigration. This would mirror the solution for 
the VIS where transfers of certain specified alphanumeric data are possible for the purpose of 
assisting  the  identification  of  a  third-country  national  in  relation  to  his/her  return.  This  is 
linked to the specific objective of increasing the possibilities of returning irregularly staying 
third-country nationals. The validity of authorising such transfers is wholly dependent on the 
use of biometric data as the purpose of sharing data with a given third country would be to 
provide  proof  of  the  identity  and  nationality  of  a  given  individual  to  be  returned  to  that 
country.  This  issue  will  therefore  not  be  further  assessed  but  taken  as  directly  linked  to  the 
overall choice of the policy options, ie if policy options 2 or 4 would be chosen such transfers 
would be authorised for the purpose as described above.  

Moreover, should access be given to law enforcement authorities of the Member States and 
Europol  (cf  policy  options  3  and  4),  transfers  of  data  to  the  law  enforcement  authorities  of 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
certain  third  countries  for  the  purpose  of  fighting  terrorism  and  serious  crime  could  be 
envisaged.  However,  access  for  certain  third  countries  for  law  enforcement  purposes  would 
have significant negative implications for data protection having regard to the potentially vast 
amounts  of  data  that  could  be  shared  and  the  risk  of  "data  mining".  It  would  require  the 
negotiation and conclusion of an extensive agreement with selected third countries to ensure, 
to the greatest possible extent, that the EU can regulate how and for what purpose such data 
would  be  used,  and  how  long  it  would  be  stored.  Certain  third  countries  may  also  misuse 
access  to  data  on  their  citizens  (e.g.  political  dissidents)  for exercising  repercussions  on  the 
members of their families still present in that third country, which requires a serious analysis 
into  which  countries  could  potentially  gain  such  access  and  under  what  strict  conditions. 
Transfers  of  data  for  this  specific  purpose  is  therefore  discarded  regardless  of  which  policy 
option is chosen. 

4.5.2.  The retention period of the personal data in relation to each policy option 

For the determination of the retention period it has to be considered that for reasons of data 
protection as guaranteed by Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, personal data should not be kept any longer 
than it is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected. This principle was also 
stressed  by  the  EDPS  in  his  preliminary  comments  on  the  2011  Smart  Borders 
Communication.  It  should  be  ensured  that  the  data  in  the  record  should  be  automatically 
erased after the retention period has expired. Conditions would also have to be defined for the 
possible  advance  deletion  of  data  (e.g.  in  case  the  third-country  national  marries  an  EU 
citizen). 

The  shortest  possible  retention  period  would,  as  a  minimum,  be  the  time  that  the  data  is 
required for the calculation of the authorised stay, meaning a minimum of six months. Once 
the  person  has  exited  the  Schengen  area  the  need  to  store  his  or  her  personal  data,  and  the 
entry/exit record, is significantly reduced. In other words, the data has served its purpose to 
monitor  the  respect  of  the  authorised  stay  and  should  only  be  stored  for  a  maximum  of 
another  6  months  to  allow  the  correct  calculation  of  the  permitted  stay  of  90  days  within  a 
period of 180 days. However, the period cannot be set the same for all travellers, since for an 
overstayer who has not exited the territory it would be necessary to store the data for a longer 
period.  This  period  can  be  set  at  5  years,  to  ensure  that  data  are  available  long  enough  to 
support  the  identification  and  return  process,  while  remaining  proportionate  by  setting  an 
upper  limit.  It  would  also  be  coherent  with  the  retention  periods  for  the  VIS  and  that 
envisaged for the RTP, and support applicants for a multiple-entry visa or to the Registered 
Traveller  Programme,  both  in  proving  a  travel  history  without  overstays  when  applying  for 
the first time as well as when applying for renewing their multiple-entry visa and/or access to 
the RTP. For a person who has exited within the authorised period of stay, and only visited 
the Schengen area once for a maximum of three months during a six month period, the data 
can  be  deleted  after  six  months.  To  be  effective  and  to  benefit  Member  State  authorities  as 
regards future visa and entry decisions, statistical data in a fully anonymous form would have 
to be retained for a longer period on the history of cross border movements of third-country 
nationals, by nationality and visa required/exempt.  

However, from a law enforcement point of view, and especially for the use of this data as a 
criminal  intelligence  tool,  a  travel  record  of  a  suspect  of  crime  would  need  to  cover  a 
commensurate period of retention, possibly with several entries and exits, in order to have any 
added  value  as  a  source  of  information  for  law  enforcement  authorities.  Hence  should  the 

29 

 
 
 
 
purpose of the system be extended to include the fight against terrorism and serious crime, a 
retention period  of, as a general rule, six months would be too  short to allow the system to 
meet its purpose. In order to construct evidence in criminal cases by analysing data on travel 
routes, law enforcement authorities have to be able to track the travel routes back for a period 
of several years. 

Consequently the retention period in relation to the policy options would be the following: 

•  For an entry/exit system set up on the basis of either policy options 1 or 2, as a general 
rule 6 months, while for travellers who have not exited the territory within the authorised 
stay the period would be 5 years, and for participants in the RTP a period equivalent to the 
time they are granted access to the system; 

•  For an entry/exit system set up on the basis of either policy options 3 or 4, the retention 

period would be five years for all travellers. 

4.5.3.  Technical implementation  

Two  possibilities  for  the  technical  implementation  can  be  identified.  These  will  be  further 
assessed in the light of the preferred policy option. 

National databases running regular crosschecks 

Member States would be responsible for the storage of data in a national system as well as for 
the  acquisition  and  maintenance  of  those  systems.  At  EU  level,  the  setting  up  of  a  secure 
communication  infrastructure  for  the  exchange  of  data  would  be  required,  as  the  entry  and 
exit  data  could  be  stored  in  different  Member  States  for  the  same  person  (e.g.  entering  the 
Schengen area via one Member State and exiting through another).  

This  could  involve  obliging  each  Member  State  to  set  up  a  national  EES.  However,  from  a 
technical  perspective,  stand-alone  national  systems  operating  on  a  small  scale  as  they 
currently exist in some Member States (cf section 2.1.3.) would not be of use or adapted to 
this  solution.  Despite  their  autonomy,  such  national  systems  should  be  built  on  the  same 
technical  platform  and  adopt  interoperable  technical  specifications  to  communicate  with  the 
central infrastructure.  

Central database with national interfaces 

This would mirror the solution for the VIS with central storage (at EU level) of the data, with 
the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  a  central  database  and  a  secure  communication 
infrastructure  between  the  central  database  and  Member  States,  including  the  national 
interfaces.  Member  States  would  be  responsible  for  establishing  the  national  systems  and 
transmitting  data  according  to  defined  parameters  and  specifications.  The  development  and 
operational management of the central database and the communication infrastructure would 
be  handled  by  the  Management  Authority,  which  would  be  the  Agency  for  the  operational 
management of large-scale IT systems established by Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 (the Agency)37 set up to manage 
existing systems (SIS II, VIS, Eurodac) as well as to develop and operationally manage any 
future large-scale IT-systems in the area of justice, freedom and security. This approach was 

37  

OJ L 286 of 1.11.2011. Detailed information on the Agency can be found in Annex 6 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
clearly  favoured  by  Member  States  during  the  consultations  in  terms  of  cost-benefits  and 
synergies with other systems. 

5. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS  

This  section  considers  each  of  the  four  policy  options  described  in  section  4  against  the 
assessment  criteria.  The  options  have  been  rated  on  a  nine-point  scale  with  respect  to  their 
likely  performance  relative  to  the  general  and  specific  objectives.  The  options  are  assessed 
against the baseline. All options are also assessed against other relevant criteria, in this case 
criteria belonging to the general economic and social criteria:  

•  The  border  management  process,  in  particular  ensuring  a  fast  processing  of  travellers 

without compromising security. 

•  Protection of fundamental rights, particularly protection of personal data (Article 8 of the 
Charter),  right  to  liberty  and  security  (Article  6),  respect  for  private  and  family  life 
(Article 7), right to asylum (Article 18), protection in the event of removal, expulsion or 
extradition (Article 19) and right to an effective remedy (Article 47).. 

•  The  total  one-time  development  costs  of  the  system  related  to  the  expected  duration  of 
three years and the total yearly operational costs for the ensuing period of five years, split 
into central (EU) and national (Member States) costs; the tables in annex 2 contain more 
detailed  information  on  cost  categories  and  costs  per  item;  a  breakdown  and  further 
description of administrative costs is provided in this annex also.  

The impacts have been indicated graphically with symbols: 

- √√√√ 

Highest negative impact/cost  

- √√√ 

Significant negative impact/cost 

- √√ 

- √ 

0 

√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

Medium negative impact/cost 

Small negative impact/cost  

No impact 

Small positive impact/savings 

Medium positive impact/savings 

Very significant positive impact/savings 

√√√√ 

Highest positive impact/savings 

5.1. 

Policy option 1: Core system 

•  To counteract irregular immigration √√ 

The  efficiency  of  border  checks  will  be  enhanced  compared  to  the  baseline.  Replacing  the 
stamping obligation will speed up the border checks, as alphanumeric data can be entered into 

31 

 
 
 
the system in a matter of seconds by scanning the passport using already existing equipment 
at the border crossing points. Likewise the automatic calculator will immediately provide the 
border guard – and the traveller - with precise information of the authorised stay, which is of 
particular importance when, for example, a traveller is returning for multiple entries and exits 
during  the  6  month  period.  This  also  means  that  the  border  guard  will  have  immediate  and 
precise information at exit whether the traveller has complied with the maximum authorised 
stay. 

Compared  to  the  baseline  precise  information  will  be  available  on  the  structure  and 
composition of irregular migrants overstaying, meaning that visa and border authorities will 
have information on the nationalities and type of travellers (visa exempt or not) most at risk 
for not complying with the rules. This will support the application of the Visa Code, which in 
its Article 21 refers to the assessment of the risk of illegal immigration as part of assessing the 
visa application. This information can also help to better understand the overall phenomenon 
of irregular migration and influence  visa policy,  where a  low  rate of overstays would be an 
important factor in considering whether to lift the visa obligation for nationals of a given third 
country. 

The  core  system  would  also  provide  the  EU  with  a  precise  overall  understanding  of  who  is 
crossing  the  borders  and  who  is  on  the  territory,  something  which  can  be  seen  as  a  core 
responsibility of the state in managing access to its territory. 

A positive impact can be assumed as the information can be used together with other data on 
the  presumed  place  of  stay  of  the  person  and  other  information  indicating  where  the 
possibilities  of  apprehending  irregularly  staying  migrants  are  the  highest  and  hence  help  in 
deciding where to carry out spot checks. The information provided by the system on persons 
whose identity is known can contribute to enforcing a return decision. The system would thus 
have  a  positive  impact  in  reducing  the  current  gap  between  return  decisions  issued  and 
decisions actually enforced.38  

A further positive impact comes from the capacity to monitor voluntary returns. Information 
on  persons  subject  to  a  return  decision  who  subsequently  decide  to  return  voluntarily  (for 
which preference should be given according to the return directive) are often not available to 
Member  States'  authorities  today  as  no  information  is  registered  at  exit  when  the  person 
crosses  the  external  border.  The  EES  would  ensure  that  such  information  is  available  to 
Member  States'  authorities,  thus  avoiding  that  persons  are  considered  not  to  have  complied 
with  the  return  decision  and  in  turn  risks  being  imposed  with  an  entry  ban,  although  the 
person may have complied with the decision within the prescribed period of time. 

In terms of actually detecting persons within the territory the impact compared to the baseline 
is more uncertain. Information that a given person has overstayed will by no means lead to an 
automatic  apprehension  as  the  person  can  at  that  time  be  in  any  of  the  26  countries  of  the 
Schengen area.  

•  To fight against terrorism and serious crime 0 

The impact of this policy option on this criterion can be regarded as close to zero taking into 
account that no access to the system is given for the purpose of investigating serious crime or 

38 Cf section 2.1.1.3. 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
terrorism under this option. A small indirect impact may occur due to more effective border 
checks on typical cross-border crimes such as trafficking in human beings or the trafficking of 
illicit goods. 

•  Border management process 0 

The impact on the border management process of an entry/exit system based on alphanumeric 
data at entry would be positive, as the only process required is to swipe the machine-readable 
zone of the passport, which is already done today; adding this process at exit would add only 
10  seconds  (max)  to  the  process,  so  the  negative  impact  would  be  negligible.  A  positive 
impact will result from abolishing the manual stamping of the passport of travellers and need 
to manually calculate the authorised stay. Annex 3 provides further information on the impact 
of the entry/exit system in the border processing. 

However, a certain number of false hits and mistaken identities could be expected due to the 
use of alphanumeric data only to match entry and exit records. For example, this could mean 
that a traveller registered as having entered on a given date is registered in another name on 
exit and as a result the system would signal the person as an "overstayer" although he or she 
has effectively left the Schengen area. This could occur, for example, for persons travelling 
with two equally valid passports. The effects will need to be mitigated by a careful scrutiny of 
the responses given by the system, especially at exit, where a missing entry record should be 
immediately checked and clarified before the traveller passes the border check. 

•  Protection of fundamental rights, particularly privacy and data protection -√ 

The  recording  of  the  border  crossings  would  create  a  'track  record'  of  the  cross-border 
movements of any individual and in order to guarantee the respect of fundamental rights the 
safeguards  listed  under  section  2.2.1  and  the  purpose  limitation  must  always  be  fully 
complied with. However, this recording can also have positive impacts as it could also be in 
the  interest  of  the  individual  traveller  e.  g.  in  case  he  or  she  applies  for  the  RTP  or  for  a 
multiple entry visa, and by generating a reliable travel history and proof of compliance with 
the existing rules regarding the right to stay. While the storage of data is vast compared to the 
baseline, taking into account the limited retention period the overall impact on data protection 
can be regarded as limited under this option, and proportionate in relation to the objectives. 

5.2. 

Policy option 2: Core system + biometric data 

•  To counteract irregular immigration √√√ 

This  policy  option  would  have  a  significant  effect  on  reducing  irregular  immigration 
compared to the baseline. The biometric identifiers of third-country nationals holding a visa 
will  be  stored  in  the  VIS  (part  of  the  baseline)  and  it  will  therefore  be  possible  to  identify 
them biometrically at border crossing points or within the Schengen area even without travel 
documents. Conversely, this would not be possible in the case of third-country nationals not 
holding a visa, if the entry/exit system were to be implemented without biometrics. Therefore, 
if biometrics are captured and stored also from third-country nationals not holding a visa, this 
policy option is likely to have a significant impact on reducing irregular immigration as it will 
allow for identifying any undocumented third-country national found within the territory. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
It should nevertheless be recalled that compared to the baseline – which includes the VIS – 
the added value cannot be assessed with precision due to the absence of reliable data on the 
share of overstayers who entered legally with and without a visa respectively. The greater the 
share of overstayers who are visaholders, the lesser the impact of using biometric data in the 
EES. That share may change – in any direction – due to a possibly evolving baseline in the 
future, where the visa obligation is gradually lifted for further third countries. 

A further positive impact on border control of this policy option would be the possibility to 
prevent identity fraud: as long as the data is stored, it would be impossible for an individual to 
cross  a  second  time  using  another  travel  document  with  another  identity,  as  his/her 
fingerprints  can  be  compared  with  those  stored  at  the  first  entry.  It  would  also  make  it 
impossible for different individuals to use the same travel document. 

•  To fight against terrorism and serious crime 0 

Same as for policy option 1. 

•  Border management process 0 

As  noted  under  the  baseline,  with  the  integration  of  the  VIS  into  border  check  processes, 
border  control  procedures  have  become  more  complex. Visa holders will all be subject to a 
biometric verification against the VIS at the border, once the transition phase of three years 
(started on 31 October 2011) will have expired.  

An entry/exit system with biometrics would introduce, in addition, the capturing of biometrics 
at  the  first  entry  and  the  subsequent  biometric  verification  of  the  visa-exempt  third-country 
nationals, who make up approximately 17% of all travellers. This will affect the time it takes 
to conduct a border check in comparison with a traditional check. Member States will need to 
ensure that their border crossing points take into account the possible increase in queuing time 
for  third-country  nationals,  and  adjust  their  procedures  at  border  crossing  checkpoints 
accordingly.  This  negative  impact  will  concern  all  Member  States  with  significant  travel 
flows  at  the  external  borders,  and  in  particular  those  with  long  land  borders.  However,  this 
negative  impact  of  biometrics  should  be  nuanced  by  the  fact  that  the  process  of  recording 
biometrics  of  visa  exempted  third-country  nationals  will  be  done  only  at  the  first  entry  and 
will not need to be repeated as long as the data is still stored in the system. 

Positive impacts on border control would occur due to the use of biometric data as the risk of 
mismatches  would  be  minimised,  as  with  biometric  data  entry  and  exit  records  can  be 
matched using a unique identifier, ie fingerprints, of each traveller. 

Transitional provisions as in the VIS for the compulsory use by Member States of biometrics 
could  be  considered  for  an  entry/exit  system  also.  However,  also  in  that  case  it  would  be 
necessary to decide whether to use biometrics from the start taking into the overall impact of 
that choice. Moreover, there is a risk of uneven levels of security at the external borders, as 
persons  not  subject  to  the  visa  obligation  could  effectively  chose  whether  their  fingerprints 
will  be  recorded  or  not  by  choosing  to  enter  the  Schengen  area  via  a  Member  State  that  is 
making use of such transitional provisions. Consequently any transitional period must provide 
for one common approach for all Member States, instead of allowing an individual Member 
State not to use biometrics. 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The introduction of a Registered Traveller Programme would help to mitigate these effects, in 
particular at air borders, as further analysed in the respective impact assessment. 

The exact impact on  the  border  management  process, including how that  impact may  differ 
between land, sea and air borders, can only be fully assessed after the full implementation and 
rollout of the VIS as of 2014, both with regard to adapting the processes and travel flows at 
the border crossing points as well as with regard to the use of mobile equipment for verifying 
fingerprints during the border check process (e.g. at land borders). 

•  Protection of fundamental rights, particularly privacy and data protection -√√ 

Fundamental  rights  are  clearly  negatively  impacted  by  the  use  of  biometric  identifiers  in 
combination with the systematic recording of border crossings of third-country nationals. Use 
of biometric identifiers would at the same time however reduce the instances of identity fraud 
and safeguard the identities of travellers. Otherwise the same considerations as raised under 
policy option 1 are relevant here also.  

5.3. 

Policy option 3: Core system + law enforcement purposes 

•  To counteract irregular immigration √√ 

Given the longer retention period (5 years) for this policy option consulates and border guards 
would  have  better  means  for  assessing  the  risk  of  future  overstays  on  the  basis  of  solid 
evidence  in  relaton  to  a  given  individual,  i.e.  a  person  who  has  travelled  to  the  EU  several 
times over the last five years and has never overstayed presents a practically non-existent risk 
of overstaying, and vice versa. Beyond this the impact is the same as for policy option 1. 

•  To fight against terrorism and serious crime √√ 

The entry/exit system would provide a record of travel histories of travellers including those 
who are suspects of crime. It would thus complement the information in the SIS. 

The  data  generated  by  the  entry/exit  system  could  be  used  in  specific  cases  as  a  criminal 
intelligence tool for investigations and prosecutions of terrorism and serious crime. The data 
could  be  used  by  law  enforcement  authorities  to  construct  evidence  by  tracking  the  travel 
routes of a person suspected of having committed a terrorist offence or another serious crime. 
There would therefore be a positive impact on this objective. 

Without biometric information, the data generated by the entry/exit system could not be used 
to establish the identity of person who is suspected of a crime or a crime victim in case that 
person  no  longer  holds  any  official  documentation.  However,  law  enforcement  authorities 
could still consult the system in order to check the documents presented by a suspect or found 
with a victim against the alphanumeric data in the system. 

It  should  be  noted  that  also  without  access  for  law  enforcement  purposes  to  an  EU  EES, 
Member States could continue to operate their national EES (where existing) and to provide 
for such access at national level. 

•  Border management process 0 

Same as for policy option 1. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Protection of fundamental rights, particularly privacy and data protection -√√ 

It can be seen as stigmatising to store the data of a traveller due to the simple fact that he/she 
has crossed the external border, and a risk of abuse certainly exists as that data would allow 
retracing the movements of an individual over a long period of time. The large amount of data 
that would be stored in the system should also be taken into account (cf size of travel flows in 
chapter 2) in relation both to the core purpose (border and migration management) and to the 
more extended purpose of law enforcement: the system would store hundreds of millions of 
records  for  5  years  although  only  a  very  small  –  and  based  on  existing  data,  impossible  to 
quantify  -  share  of  those  records  would  be  of  interest  in  order  for  the  system  to  meet  its 
purposes. The resulting increase in the retention period would also lead to that the cumulative 
size of the database, at any given moment, would be 10 times bigger compared to options 1 
and  2.  The  proportionality  of  this  option  compared  to  the  baseline  can  therefore  be  put  in 
question.  

5.4. 

Policy option 4: Core system + biometrics + law enforcment purposes 

•  To counteract irregular immigration √√√ 

Identical to a cumulation of the impacts described in relation to policy options 1, 2 and 3. 

•  To fight against terrorism and serious crime √√√ 

The impact is the same as for policy option 3 but in addition, the inclusion of biometric data 
in  the  entry/exit  system  will  also  enable  law  enforcement  authorities  in  specific  cases  to 
consult the system in the event a third country national who is suspected of a serious crime no 
longer  holds  his  official  documentation  and  where  there  are  no  other  reliable  means  of 
establishing the identity of the individual. 

The comparison of fingerprints is both a reliable and rapid means to check a suspect's identity. 
Timely  availability  of  information  on  a  suspect  is  particularly  relevant  to  avert  harm  to 
persons  or  goods,  or  to  prevent  damage  to  critical  infrastructures.  Rapid  access  is  also 
necessary  to  forestall  destruction  of  evidence  of  a  serious  crime  or  attempt  to  commit  a 
serious crime. Moreover, a fast check of the exact identity of a detained suspect is required if 
there are serious grounds to believe that the person is a member of a criminal organisation that 
is  about  to  carry  out  a  serious  crime.  Precise  information  about  the  identity  of  the  detained 
suspect  increases  the  chances  to  identify  the  other  members  of  the  organisation.  Such 
information is also necessary to ensure that criminal investigation focuses on the right person.  

•  Border management process 0 

The same as for policy option 2. 

•  Protection of fundamental rights, particularly privacy and data protection -√√√√ 

Same  as  for  policy  options  1,  2  and  3  combined,  while  taken  together,  even  more  serious 
questionmarks  can  be  raised  with  regard  to  the  proportionality  of  storing  alphanumeric  and 
biometric  data  for  5  years,  when  the  share  of  that  data  that  would  justify  the  necessity  for 
doing  so  both  in  relation  to  border  and  migration  management  and  in  relation  to  law 
enforcement cannot be quantified. 

36 

 
 
 
 
5.5. 

Assessment of costs 

The  costs  in  the  IA  2008  were  taken  from  the  technical  feasibility  study  performed  earlier, 
where  the  minimum  technically  feasible  option,  a  web-based  application  for  both  EES  and 
RTP, was chosen as the option to for which costs would be estimated. The pure development 
costs for both systems together remained, therefore, relatively low and the cost estimation did 
not include other required costs, as for example a secure network. The costs for a web-based 
communication  network  for  both  EES  and  RTP  in  the  2008  IA  were  estimated  at  €100.000 
per  year,  compared  to  €  13  Mio  per  year  (based  on  the  current  market  prices)  for  a  secure 
network only for the EES. 

This was the main reason why it was decided to prepare a separate detailed cost study of the 
different implementation options presented in this impact assessment in 2010 with the help of 
an external contractor. Costs were calculated for numerous different scenarios. However, only 
the  most  relevant  cost  scenarios  are  presented  in  this  impact  assessment.  All  the  cost 
parameters were established so that the costs were calculated on the basis of 'maximum value' 
estimates within a reasonable range meaning that the cost were calculated so that they should 
not overrun the budget in any circumstances (details on the cost study are in Annex 2). 

The table below sets out the total one-time development costs and the yearly recurring costs, 
and  accumulated  total  costs  for  this  period  (one-time  costs  and  5  years  of  yearly  recurring 
costs). Costs for the EU budget to develop the entry/exit system would range between 24 and 
38  million  euro  depending  on  whether  biometric  data  are  included  (cf  policy  options)  and 
whether a centralised or decentralised approach is chosen (to be assessed under the preferred 
option).  

The  overall  costs  for  the  Member  States  to  develop  their  national  infrastructures  would  be 
approximately  between  142  and  191  million  euro.  Annual  costs  for  maintenance  and 
operation would range between 70 and 80 million euro. 

Adding biometrics plays a part in the variations of the costs described above. In the case of a 
centralised  system,  total  development  costs  increase  by  approximately  8  million  euro.  This 
limited difference is explained by the possibility to leverage synergies with the VIS at central 
level and due to the fact that certain investments made in the Member States to prepare for the 
VIS can also be used for the entry/exit system, e.g. fingerprint scanners. 

In  the  case  of  a  decentralised  system,  total  development  costs  would  increase  by 
approximately  33  million  euro  if  biometrics  are  added.  The  very  substantial  difference  is 
explained  by  the  need  for  each  Member  State  to  develop  a  biometric  matching  capability, 
while with a centralised approach this needs to be done only once. 

In general, for the centralised option, costs are higher at EU level and correspondingly lower 
for  Member  States,  and  vice  versa  –  but  significantly  higher  -  for  the  decentralised  option. 
Member States' development costs increase about 50 million euro for a decentralised system 
with  biometrics,  while  EU  development  costs  increase  by  10  million  euro  for  a  centralised 
system with biometrics. On the other hand, the latter system increases Member States' yearly 
costs by approximately 7 million euro, while EU level costs increase with 6 million euro. 

Table 1 – Comparative assessment of costs  

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One time development 
cost at central and 
national level. 
(3 years of development)  
(in EUR million) 
180 
(MS 142 EU 38) 

Yearly operational cost 
at central and national 
level 
(5 years of operation) 
(in EUR million) 
100 
(MS 80 EU 20) 

172 
(MS 146 EU 26) 

219 
(MS 191 EU 28) 

186 
(MS 162 EU 24) 

88 
(MS 74 EU 14) 

87 
(MS 73 EU 14) 

84 
(MS 70 EU 14) 

Total costs at central and 
national level 
 (in EUR million) 

ANNEX 2 

680 
(MS 542 EU 138) 

612 
(MS 516 EU 96) 

654 
(MS 556 EU 98) 

606 
(MS 512 EU 94) 

Table 1 

Table 2 

Table 3 

Table 4 

Centralised system with 
biometrics 
(options 2 and 4) 
Centralised system 
without  biometrics 
(options 1 and 3) 
Decentralised system 
with biometrics 
(options 2 and 4) 
Decentralised system 
without biometrics 
(options 1 and 3) 

6. 

COMPARISON  OF  OPTIONS  AND  IDENTIFICATION  OF  THE  PREFERRED  POLICY 
OPTION    

6.1. 

Comparison of options 

Table 2 – Comparative assessment of the policy options 

Objective/policy 
option 

Baseline  
(Policy option 0) 

Policy option 1 

Policy option 2 

Policy option 3 

Policy option 4 

Policy objective: To 
counteract irregular 
immigration  

Policy objective: To 
fight against 
terrorism and 
serious crime 

Impact on 
fundamental rights 

Impact on  border 
management  

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

-√ 

0 

√√ 

√√√ 

√√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

√√√ 

0 

-√√ 

-√√ 

-√√√√ 

0 

0 

0 

Table 2 summarises the assessment of impacts done in chapter 5. The following comparison 
and identification of the preferred option will also take into account the following criteria: 

•  Effectiveness – the extent to which options achieve the objectives of the proposal; 

•  Efficiency – the extent to which objectives can be achieved at least cost; 

•  Coherence – the extent to which options are coherent with overarching objectives of 

EU policy. 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A  difficulty  revealed  by  the  assessment  of  the  impacts  of  each  policy  option  is  the  lack  of 
available  data,  which  notably  influences  the  possibility  for  comparing  the  effectiveness  of 
policy options 1-4. The assumption that a system with biometrics will have a higher impact on 
counteracting irregular migration, and that as a consequence policy options 2 and 4 would be 
more  effective,  is  influenced  by  the  share  of  persons  not  subject  to  the  visa  obligation  that 
overstay, and this exact number is not known. The negative impact on the border management 
process of verifying biometrics of this group of travellers can only be fully assessed when the 
VIS  is  fully  implemented.  Equally  for  assessing  the  impact  of  giving  access  for  law 
enforcement purposes comprehensive data is yet missing, as the input provided  by Member 
States'  experts  so  far  has  mainly  remained  general  and  experiences  of  access  for  law 
enforcement purposes to the VIS are not yet available. It can be noted that entry/exit data can 
be necessary for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or other serious 
offences  in  case  they  involve  international  travel.  Furthermore,  the  positive  impact  on  the 
objective  of  detecting  and  identifying  terrorist  and  criminal  suspects  is  higher  for  a  system 
with biometrics. 

Assessing the preferred option with regard to the inclusion of biometric data must start from 
the core purpose of the system, related to border control and migration management. On that 
basis  option  2  has  the  highest  positive  impact  on  counteracting  irregular  migration.  The 
potential  negative  impacts  on  the  border  management  process  could  be  managed  through  a 
transitional  period,  whereby  the  system  would  operate  based  on  alphanumeric  data  for  the 
first three years and subsequently on the basis of alphanumeric and biometric data. 

On that basis, with regard to access for law enforcment purposes, the total negative impact on 
fundamental rights of option 4 could be seen as potentially disproportionate, also taking into 
account the need for a much longer retention period.  

An  evaluation  after  a  period  of  2  years,  taking  also  into  account  the  experiences  of  the 
implementation  of  the  VIS  with  regard  to  access  for  law  enforcment  purposes  and  overall 
experiences  with  regard  to  operating  the  EES,  would  allow  for  returning  to  the  question  of 
law  enforcement  access  on  the  basis  of  more  complete  data  and  information  to  assess  the 
impacts in more detail.  

The need to give access for law enforcement purposes to the system as well as the retention 
period could therefore be reconsidered when the entry/exit system is evaluated after a period 
of  2  years.  This  assessment  will  be  able  to  take  into  account  experiences  with  the  VIS  as 
regards the access of law enforcement authorities to that system both in terms of added value 
in fighting serious crime and with regard to fundamental rights.  

On this basis, the system would in the short run not contribute to the objectives related to the 
fight against crime, nor parts of the specific objectives that relate to identifying undocumented 
persons within the territory, but is open for doing so in the future. 

In  summary,  the  preferred  option  is  therefore  policy  option  2,  with  an  evaluation  to  be 
foreseen  after  two  years  of  operation,  after  which  an  assessment  will  be  made  whether  to 
move  to  policy  option  4.  Any  such  change  (i.e.  to  policy  option  4)  with  regard  to  law 
enforcement  purposes,  and/or  changing  the  retention  period  will  require  a  new  legislative 
proposal from the Commission. 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2. 

Technical implementation 

A  decentralised  approach  with  national  databases  running  regular  crosschecks  would  have 
several  negative  consequences  on  the  capacity  of  the  system  to  deliver  on  its  purpose  and 
objectives. There would be an increased risk of mismatches of entry and exit records as there 
would be one file for each Schengen country a person has entered and exited, with the ensuing 
higher probability that data is recorded and stored is a different way for the same person (eg. 
name spelled differently). 

More  specifically,  even  if  all  Member  States  develop  national  EES  in  order  to  interconnect 
them  at  European  level,  if  they  keep  the  entry/exit  data  at  national  level,  three  fundamental 
problems  would  arise:  a)  the  interconnection  would  bring  together  more  than  25  disparate 
legacy  systems,  built  on  diverse  technical  infrastructures  trying  to  communicate  with  each 
other; such an exercise has proven extremely challenging in the case of SIS II; b) even if the 
interconnection took place, if the data are kept only in national databases, then for every exit 
from the border-crossing point of a Member State, the relevant national system would have to 
query  more  than  25  other  national  systems  in  order  to  match  the  exit  record  with  the 
corresponding  entry  record  and  to  calculate  the  duration  of  stay;  and  c)  the  communication 
infrastructure would thus become extremely critical and costly; failure of any segment of the 
network  would  mean  that  exit  records  might  not  be  matched  with  corresponding  entry 
records; in addition, every MS would have to be able to match not only its own exit records 
but  provide  processing  and  network  capacity  to  match  all  the  exit  records  in  the  Schengen 
area. 

In  order  to  avoid  any  disruption  of  the  border  control  process  when  using  the  EES,  border 
guards should have data from previous entries and exits immediately displayed on the screen, 
in such a way that they could directly take this information into consideration when assessing 
the traveller's right to entry. 

Because  the  border  guard  would  need  to  request  relevant  data  for  each  traveller  entering  or 
exiting the Schengen area from all of the other Schengen countries, to be able to calculate the 
authorised  period  of  stay  (on  entry)  and  to  verify  any  overstay  (on  exit),  the  decentralised 
approach would be time-consuming and slow down the border process significantly.   

Moreover,  there  would  be  for  each  traveller  different  files  in  the  entry  and  exit  Member 
States, with the ensuing higher probability that data is recorded and stored in a different way 
for  the  same  person  (eg.  name  spelled  differently  or  a  person  holding  and  using  different 
passports (national passports, service passports, diplomatic passports, which can not be linked 
to the same person, as would be possible with a centralised architecture). 

Due to the risk of mismatching entry and exit records, the risk of false hits will also increase, 
i.e.  that  a  person  is  indicated  as  having  overstayed  although  he  has  in  fact  not  done  so  and 
vice  versa.  On  the  other  hand,  the  data  protection  implications  of  this  sub-option  are  more 
limited as no single database containing the records of all travellers to and from the Schengen 
area would be stored. Further implications would need to be assessed based on access rules, 
i.e. how would other Member States be authorised to search and access the data stored in the 
national systems of other Member States. 

40 

 
 
 
 
 
Finally, a decentralised approach would not achieve all the objectives. On the one hand, the 
unavailability  of  a  centralised  and  continously  maintained  status  of  third  country  nationals 
would not allow reliable reporting on overstayers, thus impeding policy decisions concerning 
visas and migration. On the other hand, a decentralised architecture would be detrimental for 
the efficiency of border checks, in that the calculation and assessment of the duration of stay 
would require querying all national systems in order to retrieve all possible individual entry 
and  exit  dates;  conversely,  with  a  centralised  and  continuously  maintained  status,  the 
information could be displayed immediately to the border guard. Therefore, the decentralised 
option must be discarded. 

A central database with national interfaces could use the same technical infrastructure as the 
VIS. It should be noted that border authorities will have access to the biometric data of visa 
holders stored in the VIS for the purpose of verifying their identity and this could be exploited 
for  the  entry/exit  system;  in  case  the  biometric  functionality  would  be  activated  at  a  later 
stage, there would thus be no need to enrol the biometrics of visa holders at the border for the 
purposes of the entry/exit system. It must be recalled that for legislative and data protection 
reasons  (purpose  limitation,  etc.)  VIS  data  shall  not  be  accessed  and  used  for  any  purposes 
other than laid down in the VIS Regulation.39 

As the  matching  of  entry/exit records can  be done in relation  to one file on  each  individual 
(instead of one file for each Schengen country the person has entered or exited) there would 
thus be a small risk of mismatch due to the technical architecture of the system itself. 

The  response  times  of  a  central  system,  i.e.  the  same  as  the  VIS  (5-15  seconds),  would  be 
such that no major negative impact on the border management process would occur. 

The development of the national systems and the central database must take place at the same 
time  for  technical  and  financial  reasons.  To  ensure  the  possible  connection  of  the  national 
systems to a central database, the first step must be to define the interface. If this is not the 
case, Member States might face serious difficulties with connecting their national systems to a 
central  system  later  on.  Furthermore,  developing  first  the  national  systems  and  later 
connecting  them  with  a  central  database,  would  increase  the  costs  on  the  national  side 
significantly:  initially  Member  States  would  need  to  store  the  entry  and  exit  records  at 
national  level,  which  would  still  remain  incomplete  due  to  the  possibility  of  exiting  via 
another Schengen State; later, when the central system would be available for interconnection, 
the entire national infrastructure for storing the data would become obsolete and a migration 
of  the  national  data  might  become  difficult  due  to  the  need  to  integrate  different  national 
interfaces.  

The only approach to implementing an EES would be to first define the technical standard of 
the  interface  as  an  implementing  measure  and then start the development of the systems on 
both  national  and  central  levels  at  the  same  time.  This  guarantees  a  lean  and  cost  effective 
development  with  clear  comprehensive  testing  and  full  compliance  of  the  separated  and 
distributed tasks on both national and central levels. 

In conclusion, the limited benefits of national storage of data from a data protection point of 
view  cannot  outweigh  the  benefits  of  a  centralised  system  in  meeting  the  objectives  of  the 

39 

Regulation (EC) 767/2008. 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
system.  Moreover,  the  cost  savings  from  a  decentralised  system  are  negligible  as  shown  in 
section 5.5; looking at total costs savings over the initial eight-year period they amount to 5 
million euro per year with biometrics and less than 2 million euro per year without. Overall 
the centralised approach  is  therefore the most efficient and cost-effective solution. It is also 
coherent with the development and management of other IT systems in the field of migration, 
ie Eurodac, the VIS, and the SIS/SIS II. 

6.3. 

Preferred option 

According to the comparison of options made under 6.1, the preferred solution for an EES is 
to  start  with  a  system  based  on  policy  option  2  and  assessing  the  need  to  change  to  policy 
option 4 after two years of operation: 

•  The  EES  would  at  first  operate  as  a  centralised  database  containing  alpha 
numeric data only and without access by law enforcement authorities. The data 
retention period for ordinary cases would be 6 months and in case of overstay 
5 years.  

•  After three years of operations, the EES would operate with alphanumeric and 
biometric  data  (the  latter  as  concerns  persons  not  subject  to  the  visa 
obligation). 

•  After  two  years  of  operations,  the  EES  would  be  evaluated.  At  this  time  the 
issue of the access for law enforcement purposes as well as the retention period 
would be considered.  

•  However,  in  order  to  grant  law  enforcement  authorities  access  to  the  data 
generated by the entry/exit system, the necessity and proportionality of the use 
of  this  data  must  be  clearly  demonstrated  with  solid  evidence  and  the  access 
must be combined with appropriate safeguards and limitations.  

The advantages of the preferred option can be summarised as follows: 

− 

− 

It  will  provide  precise  information  on  the  number  of  persons  crossing  the  external 
border  of  the  EU  each  year,  further  broken  down  by  nationality  and  place  of  border 
crossing. The same detailed information will be provided specifically on overstayers, 
which will provide a much stronger evidence base as to whether nationals of a given 
third country should be subject to the visa obligation or not. 

It will generate precise information on overstayers for all competent authorities in the 
Member  States,  which  will  help  to  apprehend  and  return  irregular  immigrants  and 
thereby  counteract  irregular  immigration  in  general.  It  is,  however,  impossible  to 
quantify  how  many  overstayers  would  be  apprehended  and  returned  each  year. 
However,  the  combination  of  the  data  generated  by  the  entry/exit  system  and  other 
relevant information on irregular migration will assist Member States to target identity 
controls within the territory and support the return process of those found to be staying 
irregularly. 

−  The  transitional  period  for  the  use  of  biometrics  will  allow  Member  States  to  adapt 
their  border  crossing  points  both  in  terms  of  processes  and  equipment,  drawing  on 
experiences  of  the  VIS,  to  ensure  that  the  use  of  biometrics  will  not  cause  longer 
waiting times for travellers. 

42 

 
 
− 

It  will  allow  for  identification  of  persons  found  within  the  territory  without 
documentation and who cannot be identified using the VIS. 

−  For the retention period it would be sufficient and coherent with the main purpose of 
the system to keep the entry and exit records no longer than six months, which is the 
minimum  period  the  system  would  require  to  fulfill  its  specific  purposes.  A  longer 
retention  period  of  five  years  should  be  set  in  case  of  overstayers.  This  will  make  it 
possible  to  facilitate  the  identification  of  the  third  countries  whose  nationals  have 
records of overstay  when  defining  the  visa policy towards these third countries. The 
short  retention  period  would  not  prevent  producing  aggregate,  anonymised  statistics 
on, for example, travels flows at different sections of the external borders or from each 
third country. 

−  A 5-year retention period for overstayers would also support the implementation of the 
Registered Traveller Programme, as applicants for this programme could clearly and 
easily demonstrate an absence of previous overstays, and be coherent with the launch 
of such a system. 

− 

It will provide key data for the purposes of examining the applications of third-country 
nationals  for  the  RTP  (new  and  subsequent  ones).  In  addition,  it  will  give  the 
competent  authorities  the  information  needed  to  ensure  that  third-country  nationals 
benefitting  from  access  to  the  RTP  comply  fully  with  all  the  necessary  conditions, 
including the respect for the duration of the authorised stay. A reliable travel history 
would also be needed to renew access to the RTP. 

−  There will be a positive impact on the border management process, simplifying and 

speeding up each border check as the manual stamping of passports will be abolished. 

− 

It  minimises  the  potential  impact  on  fundamental  rights,  notably  privacy  and  data 
protection: Firstly authorities will not be entitled to execute searches in the database 
for  third  country  nationals  who  are  still  within  the  limits  of  the  authorised  period  of 
stay.  Secondly  the  preferred  option  provides  for  a  thorough  review  following  two 
years of experience of running the system. Third, there will be a number of safeguards 
which are detailed in section 2.2.1. In addition, the system should be designed so that 
it  takes  into  account  the  rights  of  third-country  nationals  who  are  members  of  the 
family of Union citizens. 

− 

It  is  coherent  with  overall  EU  policy  objectives  on  border  management,  irregular 
migration and fundamental rights, taking into account previous policy choices and the 
overall objectives laid down by the European Council. 

The  preferred  option  allows  for  launching  a  system  which  is  not  dependent  on  the 
implementation  of  the  VIS.  The  experiences  of  the  latter  will  be  available  in  time  for  the 
switch  to  biometrics  as  well  as  for  the  evaluation,  two  years  after  operating  the  EES.  This 
approach therefore partially takes into account the opinion of the EP and the EDPS in relation 
to  evaluating  existing  systems  before  launching  new  ones,  and  it  takes  into  account  the 
opinion  of  the  Article  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party  with  regard  to  the  choice  of 
implementation options. It should in this context be recalled that a fully sequential launch of 
IT systems in practice – meaning that no proposals should even be presented to establish the 
EES  until  the  VIS  (and  SIS  II)  are  fully  operational  and  implemented,  including  any 

43 

 
 
transitional periods – effectively would mean postponing the coming into operation of an EES 
with  a  further  2-3  years,  which  can  be  seen  as  too  long  taking  into  account  the  pressing 
problem  of  irregular  migration.  Such  a  postponement  would  also  prevent  the  use  of  fully 
automated border control for the purposes of a Registered Traveller Programme in the same 
way. 

While the total costs are substantial, economies of scale can be achieved as described above in 
order  to  reduce  them  as  much  as  possible.  It  deserves  also  to  be  recalled  that  the  system  is 
designed for the whole Schengen area currently consisting of 26 countries. The average cost 
per Member State of the development of the whole system is around 7 million euro. Overall 
costs for the system must therefore be seen as proportionate. 

Based on  lessons  learnt  from the  development of the  VIS,  the  technical development of  the 
system at EU and national levels would only commence once the legislative proposals have 
been adopted by the EP and the Council, to allow a stable specification of exact requirements. 
In practice, depending on the time needed to adopt the proposals, the start of the development 
of the system could be envisaged for 2015 at the earliest. The Commission would develop the 
technical  specifications  and  adopt  them  with  Member  States  as  an  implementing  measure, 
handing them off to the Agency for development.40 

6.4. 

Costs of the preferred option 

Taking into account the relatively small cost differences between policy options 1-4 there is 
not  a  marked  difference  between  them  in  terms  of  the  efficiency  of  each  option.  Costs  for 
developing  an  entry/exit  system  with  a  gradual  implementation  of  biometrics  would  be 
slightly more costly for Member States than developing a system with or without biometrics. 
These  costs  would  be  approximately  €37  million  at  central  level  in  both  cases,  and  €146 
million at Member State level, as compared to €142 million for a central system that would 
use biometrics from the start; total one-time development costs would thus increase from 180 
million  to  183  million  euro  due  to  the  phased  approach.  On  the  other  hand,  average  yearly 
operational  costs  are  lower,  resulting  in  lower  total  costs  for  the  whole  period  compared  to 
including biometrics from the start. Taking into account the need to evaluate the necessity of 
biometrics  and  the  impact  on  the  border  management  process  this  approach  is  therefore  the 
most efficient one. 

Table 3 – Costs for the preferred option 

One time development cost at 
central and national level. 
(3 years of development)  

Yearly operational cost at 
central and national level 
(5 years of operation) 

Total costs at central and 
national level 
 (in EUR million) 

ANNEX 2 

Centralised system 
biometrics added later 

(in EUR million) 
183 
(MS 146 EU 37) 

(in EUR million) 
88 
(MS 74 EU 14) 

623 

Table 5 

The Commission's proposal for the next multi-annual financial framework (MFF) includes a 
proposal of 4,6 billion EUR for the Internal security Fund (ISF) for the period 2014-2020. In 

40  

The implementing measures would follow the same general principles as with the VIS meaning that for 
example the design of the physical architecture of the system including its communication infrastructure 
and  the  specifications  for  the  resolution  and  use  of  fingerprints  for  biometric  verification  in  the  RTP 
would be decided in a comitology procedure. 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the proposal, 1,1 billion EUR is set aside as an indicative amount for the development of an 
EES and an RTP assuming development costs would start from 2015, and covering 4 years of 
operation. Moreover, outside the scope of the ISF, a separate amount of 822 million EUR is 
set  aside  for  the  management  of  existing  large  scale-IT  systems  (Schengen  Information 
System II, Visa Information System and EURODAC). 

The  Commission  envisages  entrusting  the  implementation  tasks  for  these  systems  to  the 
Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT-Systems in the area of Freedom, 
Security  and  Justice  established  by  Regulation  (EU)  N°  1077/2011  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council.41  Providing  financial  support  for  national  development  costs 
would  ensure  that  difficult  economic  circumstances  at  national  level  do  not  jeopardise  or 
delay the projects.  

This is different from the approach under the current MFF where the EU has funded from its 
budget  the  central  costs  related  to  the  development  of  VIS  and  SIS  II,  while  the  External 
Borders Fund has co-financed up to 75% of the costs incurred by Member States as part of 
their national programmes.  

Once  the  new  systems  would  be  operational,  future  operational  costs  in  the  Member  States 
could be supported by their national programmes. It is proposed that Member States may use 
50%  of  the  allocations  under  the  national  programmes  to  support  operating  costs  of  IT 
systems used for the management of migration flows across the external borders of the Union. 
These costs may include the cost for the management of VIS, SIS and new systems set up in 
the period, staff costs, service costs, rental of secure premises etc. Thus, the future instrument 
would ensure continuity of funding, where appropriate.  

Member States are responsible for the development and the integration into their national IT-
systems as well as into their national border control processes. It is therefore not possible to 
calculate or to assume the proportion of costs that is likely to be borne by the Member States, 
because  the  concrete  implementation  in  each  Member  State  will  depend  on  the  specific 
situation  there.  The  main  cost  factors  on  the  side  of  the  Member  States  are  the  costs  for 
human ressources in the border control and for the operation of the national systems. These 
costs are not included in the cost tables. 

Cost  savings  would  also  be  achieved  if  the  entry/exit  system  is  built  together  with  the 
registered  traveller  programme,  compared  to  the  situation  in  which  both  systems  would  be 
built  totally  independently.  The  main  cost  savings  come  at  the  central  level  (EU)  from 
reduced  costs  for  hardware,  software  and  infrastructure  and  at  Member  States'  level  from 
administrative and office space cost savings.  

6.5. 

Risks  

The  most  likely  risk  relates  to  possible  technical  failures  or  breakdowns  of  the  EES,  which 
would negatively impact the entry and exit process of third-country nationals. To reduce this 
risk and the negative impacts, contingency plans should be in place and these plans should be 
made clear to the travellers, airlines/carriers and all authorities working at the border crossing 
point. In case of any failure of the system(s), the easiest and clearest contingency plan would 
be  to  ensure  the  electronic  registration  of  the  data  using  alternative  backup  facilities  at 

41 

OJ L 286, 1.11.2011, p.1. 

45 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
national  or  European  level  and  subsequently  enter  the  data  into  the  central  EES  as  soon  as 
possible.  

As  with  any  large  scale  IT-system,  there  are  always  risks  with  implementation.  Therefore, 
proper  implementation  of  the  EES  can  only  be  ensured  if  all  relevant  actors  fulfil  their 
obligations,  completely  respect  the  lessons  learnt  from  previous  large-scale  IT  systems  and 
take  advantage  of  the  adopted  legal  basis  and  the  technical  possibilities  for  performing 
optimised border checks. Common technical processes, using the system in the same way all 
around the external borders and a consistent implementation combined with solid overall data 
quality would ensure the expected results are reached. Mitigating the implementation risks by 
entrusting the Agency to develop a common technical platform and a standard national client 
which  is  fully  tested  and  fulfils  all  legal  requirements  for  its  use  by  Member  States  would 
ensure  that  all  Member  States  could  cope  with  the  EES  without  having  any  major 
implementation problems.  

Furthermore,  a  strong  monitoring  mechanism  with  clear  milestones,  benchmarks  and 
advanced  compliance  testing  are  needed  to  ensure  a  coordinated  development  and 
implementation phase throughout all Member States. 

6.6. 

European added value and proportionality  

The preferred option would create an instrument providing to the European Union the basic 
information on how many third country nationals enter and leave the territory of the EU. This 
information is indispensibly needed for sustainable and reasonable policy making in the field 
of migration and visa.  

Furthermore the preferred option would have significant added value in providing all Member 
States with clear and unambiguous data on overstayers and access to alerts on each individual, 
greatly  contributing  to  the  possibility  of  apprehending  those  persons  and  launching,  where 
required, a return process. Compared to the baseline, with its reliance on the manual stamping 
of passports, and taking into account the size of the problem of overstayers at European level, 
the added value is apparent. 

The preferred option will, compared to the national entry/exit systems currently in operation, 
bring benefits in terms of counteracting irregular immigration by providing border authorities 
with  more  reliable  and  modern  tools  for  carrying  out  border  checks.  The  investments  made 
into  hardware  and  software  for  their  national  systems  might  not  be  lost  –  some  of  the 
equipment and system software may be reused in the centralised solution. Member States will 
have the opportunity to discuss the specifications of the system in comitology procedures, and 
can argue to use a certain platform that they might have already proven useful. In any case, 
the  national  entry/exit  systems  may  be  maintained  for  national  security  purposes  in 
accordance with Member States' own security-related legislation.  

The preferred option is proportionate in terms of the right to protection of personal data in that 
it  does  not  require  the  collection  and  storage  of  more  data  for  a  longer  period  than  is 
absolutely necessary to allow the system to function and meet its objectives. 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No further processes or harmonisation will be necessary at EU level to make the system work; 
thus the envisaged measure is proportionate in that it does not go beyond what is necessary in 
terms of action at EU level to meet the defined objectives. 

The preferred option is also proportionate in terms of costs, taking into account the benefits 
the system will provide to  all Member  States  in  managing  the  common  external  border  and 
progressing towards a common EU migration policy. 

6.7. 

Legislative implications 

An EU Regulation would be required to implement the entry/exit system, to provide a legal 
basis for the development and implementation of the technical system, rules on the storage of 
data  and  data  protection  safeguards,  and  monitoring  and  evaluation.  The  Schengen  Borders 
Code  would  need  to  be  amended  regarding  the  use  of  the  system  as  part  of  the  border 
management process, and to eliminate the stamping obligation. 

The    Regulation  establishing  the  Agency  already  foresees  that  the  Agency  may  be  made 
responsible for the preparation, development and operational management of new large-scale 
IT systems but this text will need to be amended to reflect the new tasks entrusted to it.   

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The  Commission  shall  ensure  that  systems  are  in  place  to  monitor  the  functioning  of  the 
entry/exit  system  and  evaluate  them  against the main policy objectives. Two years after the 
system  starts  operations  and  every  two  years  thereafter,  the  Management  Authority  should 
submit to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission a report on the technical 
functioning  of  the  system.  Moreover,  two  years  after  the  entry/exit  system  starts  operations 
and every four years thereafter, the Commission should produce an overall evaluation of the 
system  including  on  fundamental  rights  impacts  and  on  examining  results  achieved  against 
objectives  and  assessing  the  continuing  validity  of  the  underlying  rationale  and  any 
implications for future options. The first evaluation should focus on  whether  access  for  law 
enforcement purposes should be granted and whether the retention period should be extended 
and would be accompanied by legislative proposals as appropriate.  The Commission should 
submit the reports on the evaluation to the European Parliament and the Council.  

Monitoring and evaluation indicators could be the ones listed below, in relation to each of the 
specific objectives and based on the preferred option. None of this data is available without an 
entry/exit system, which will allow not only to monitor and evaluate the system, including the 
possible  phasing  in  of  biometric  data,  but  also  to  feed  it  into  other  relevant  policy  issues 
related to borders and visas.  

Specific objective 
To  enhance  the  efficiency  of 
border 
through 
checks 
monitoring  of  the  rights  to 
authorised  stay  at  entry  and 
exit,  and 
the 
assessment  of  the  risk  of 

improve 

to 

Indicator 

Processing time at the border crossing points 

Numbers  of  overstayers  identified  at  border 
crossing points 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
overstay; 

System availability 

Error rates e.g. Failure to Enrol (FTE) rates, False 
Acceptance Rates (FAR), false hits, etc. 

To  monitor  compliance  with 
the authorised stay of persons 
within the territory;  

Number of alerts on overstayers 

generate 

To 
reliable 
information  to  allow  the  EU 
and  Member  States  to  make 
choices 
informed 
policy 
concerning 
and 
migration; 

visa 

Number of alerts on overstayers by category visa-
border 
by 
required/visa-exempt, 
land/sea/air,  by  Member  State,  by  country  of 
origin/nationality 

type 

of 

identify 

and 
detect 
To 
irregular 
immigrants, 
especially  overstayers,  also 
within  the  territory  and  to 
increase  the  possibilities  for 
return; 

To safeguard the fundamental 
rights,  especially  protection 
of  personal  data  and  right  to 
privacy,  of 
third  country 
nationals. 

Numbers of alerts leading to the apprehension of 
overstayers 

Number of incorrect alerts on overstayers 

Number of false matches of entry/exit records 

Number  of  complaints  by  individuals  to  national 
data protection authorities 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXES 

Annex 1 

List of acronyms 

Annex 2 

Costs  

Annex 3 

Border processing data 

Annex 4 

Databases and systems at EU level 

Annex 5 

Data retention periods in EU IT systems  

Annex 6 

Existing systems linked to the EES and management of the systems 

Annex 7 
2009  

Final results of the data collection held from 31 August to 6 September 

49 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 1 

LIST OF ACRONYMS 

EBF 

External Borders Fund 

EDPS   

European Data Protection Supervisor 

EES 

ISF 

RTP 

SIS 

TCN 

VIS 

PNR 

API 

IATA   

Frontex 

Entry/Exit System 

Internal Security Fund 

Registered Traveller Programme 

Schengen Information System 

Third-country national 

Visa Information System 

Passenger Name Record 

Advanced Passenger Information 

International Air Transport Association 

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders 

ESRIF 

European Security and Research Innovation Forum 

IAB 

SBC 

Impact Assessment Board 

Schengen Borders Code 

EU OCTA 

European Organised Crime Threat Assessment 

EURODAC  European Dactyloscopie (EU Fingerprint Database for Identifying Asylum 

Seekers 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 

Introduction 

ANNEX 2 - COSTS 

This  Annex  provides  the  cost  estimates  for  the  different  options  that  are  described  in  the 
present impact assessment. 

Due  to  the  fact  that  the  variables  for  each  option  are  numerous  and  some  of  them  are  not 
relevant  in  terms  of  costs,  this  annex  only  presents  the  cost  estimates  for  the  following 
possible options: 

•  Centralised/decentralised architecture  
•  Biometrics/no biometrics/biometrics added later 

An external contractor carried out the cost study in 201042, aimed at getting an objective cost 
estimation, comparing various options and sub-options in search of the most cost-effective 
ones, while evaluating the different business alternatives. The assessment of cost effectiveness 
was related both to the one-time costs for the development and to the yearly recurring costs, 
which can decrease or invert savings in development costs in a very short period of time. 

Based  on  the  scenario-driven  approach  of  the  cost  study  and  the  cost  models  developed 
therein, it was possible to update the scenarios with modified options.  

2.   METHODOLOGY 

The cost analysis study began by defining detailed scenarios and border-related specifications. 
MS were involved in the preparation of the definition of the parameters in the cost study43.  

The IT-related cost factors were taken from current market prices. 

To calculate the costs accurately, the following techniques were used: 

(cid:190)  Sizing  

– 

– 

– 

Hardware  sizing  based  on  simplified  process  models  and  forecasted  numbers 
of RT travel events. Sizing in this context comes down to actually determine 
which of building blocks are required for which scenarios, thus calculating the 
actual "horsepower" needed to meet the required performance. 

Software development sizing based on information in the Feasibility Study and 
completed with Function Point Analysis when necessary. 

Network sizing based on predictions of the expected system load. 

(cid:190)  Costing  

42  

43  

is 

1.30) 

Final report on the cost analysis of entry/exit and RTP systems done by the external contractor on 19 of April 2010 
(version 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/doc_centre/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm#studies 
E.g. through the exercise undertaken by the Swedish Presidency in the Frontiers Working Group at the 
end  of  August/beginning  of  September  2009  to  count  numbers  of  border  crossings  per  category  of 
traveller, etc. 

published 

following 

website: 

the 

on 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
– 

– 

– 

– 

Parametric cost analysis techniques were used to estimate development efforts 
and maintenance costs to support the introduction of a new software product. 

Parametric cost estimation is based on the functional size of the solution, the 
level of re-usability of existing products and the proportion of "commercial of 
the shelf" (COTS) products that are used. Additional parameters are the hourly 
rates and skill levels of the development team as well as parameters associated 
with the development environment and project governance. 

Estimates of the costs of third party hardware, software and network products 
were based on list prices of popular and appropriate COTS products. 

For  estimating  operational  costs  a  harmonised  model  was  assumed,  in  which 
the average rates were used across the Member States. The same approach was 
chosen regarding the business hours throughout the European Union as well as 
the same number of holidays. 

(cid:190)  Planning  

– 

The initial planning was produced by the parametric costing tool "CostXpert". 
This includes in a first automated run specification, design, realisation, testing 
and implementation and the first phase of deployment, where any defects have 
been detected. 

–  Manual  intervention  and  adjustment  of  the  schedule  became  necessary,  as 
"CostXpert" assumes unlimited resources to be available, which means that the 
planning needs to be adjusted to align it with the expected situation. 

Based on these techniques for cost modelling, the different scenarios were established and 
calculated for the central side (Management Authority; EU budget) and the national side 
(Member States' authorities, national budget) 

(cid:190)  Moreover,  the  gathered  experiences  and  lessons  learnt  from  the  development  of 
EURODAC, VIS and SIS II were also used to evaluate the cost calculations and the 
scenarios to improve the reliability of the cost calculation as mentioned on page 36. 

3. FACTS AND FIGURES USED 

General Parameters 

For the cost calculation, a complete range of parameters (business parameters, technical 
parameters, cost parameters, data specifications, and parameters on the side of the MS44) were 
used: 

(cid:190)  Development three years and five years of operation  
(cid:190)  Both EES and RTP should, as far as possible, take advantage of the existing and fully 

rolled out VIS (e.g. fingerprints of visa holders are stored only in the VIS) 

(cid:190)  Maintenance rate of hardware (8 %) and software (20 %) 

44  

The parameters and the values used can be found in the final report of the available cost study. 

52 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(cid:190)  Hourly rates for contractors,  management authority staff  and EU (27) and Schengen 

associated country staff, working hours per year 

Entry/Exit System 

For the Entry/Exit System, the following core parameters were used for the sizing of the 
system: 

EES Parameter 

Border Crossings 

TCNVH Crossings IN 

(million) 

TCNVE Crossings IN 

Total Crossings IN 

(million) 

(million) 

TCNVH Crossings OUT 

(million) 

TCNVE Crossings OUT 

(million) 

Total Crossings OUT 

Total Crossings 

(million) 

(million) 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

67 

100 

167 

67 

100 

167 

334 

 74 

 110 

 184 

  74 

 110 

 184 

 367 

  81 

 121 

 202 

  81 

 121 

 202 

 404 

   89 

  133 

  222 

   89 

  133 

  222 

  445 

   98 

  146 

  245 

   98 

  146 

  245 

  489 

  108  

   119  

  161  

   177  

  131 

  195 

  269  

296  

  325 

  108  

   119  

  161  

   177  

  269  

   296  

  538  

592  

  131 

  195 

  325 

  651 

(cid:190)  For  the  network,  the  costs  of  the  sTESTA  network  for  the  VIS  were  used  +  50%  to 

accommodate the higher volume of network traffic. 

4. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 

The cost study defines the underlying assumptions as well as the parameters to establish the 
cost model in a bottom – up approach.  

The most sensitive parameters and assumptions were identified as   

(cid:190)  the  anticipated  system  load  (number  of  expected  entries  and  exits  per  traveller 

category);  

(cid:190)  the  number  of  fingerprint  searches  (identification  mode)  to  be  performed  by  the 

system;  

(cid:190)  the footprint of the installed hardware especially in the case of a distributed scenario;  
(cid:190)  the retention period; 
(cid:190)  the time factor;  

The  assumption  on  the  system  load  was  based  on  the  data  collection  exercise  in  September 
2009 during the Swedish Presidency. Based on this empirical data gathered as an initial value, 
an annual increase of 10% was used in order to avoid any underestimation of the system load 
and to make the system capacity-proof at least for the first decade. 

The  number  of  fingerprint  searches  is  the  most  time-consuming  operation  among  the 
messages  sent  to  the  system.  In  relation  to  the  policy  options,  the  retention  period  is  the 
relevant factor, because fingerprint searches are used on the one hand to identify individuals 
within the Schengen territory, who are no longer in possession of their travel documents; on 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the other hand the fingerprint searches must be used during the enrolment of the first entry at 
an EU external border crossing point (4.1.2, pg 19). In case of a very short retention period, 
biometric data would need to be enrolled anew each time the person enters the Schengen area 
and the retention period is shorter since the last exit. 

The  footprint  of  the  installed  hardware  is  sensitive,  especially  in  the  case  of  a  distributed 
scenario. In this case, instead of one set of central hardware at least in every Member State the 
installation  of  a  partial  hardware  set  is  necessary.  Improving  the  capacity  of  the  installed 
hardware  will  be  much  more  costly  in  case  of  a  decentralised  solution  as  in  case  of  a 
centralised architecture. 

The retention period is sensitive, especially if it is volatile. With a fixed retention period the 
required  data  storage  and  the  related  operations  can  be  calculated  based  on  the  forecasted 
system  load.  The  necessary  capacity  planning  can  also  take  place  on  the  basis  of  the 
operational system monitoring. If the retention period is variable, this must be implemented in 
the  underlying  business  logic.  In  addition,  the  possible  variations  with  the  retention  period 
need to be respected in the capacity planning (the size of the data storage but also the capacity 
of  the  hardware  to  process  all  the  necessary  operations).  As  described  above  (under 
fingerprint searches) the length of the retention period affects the number of time consuming 
processes significantly. 

In  order  to  make  the  IA  sensitive  to  time,  discounting  has  been  used,  i.e.  the  discounted 
impact  of  a  policy  option  was  evaluated  by  calculating  its  present  "value",  be  it  benefit  or 
cost. In practice, the real discount rate was used, in the sense of a long-run average of the real 
"value". 

The  costs  calculated  represent  a  'maximum  value'  within  a  reasonable  range  not  only 
assuming the best case scenarios regarding the sensitive parameters but also a wider range of 
possible scenarios. 

5. COSTS OF A PHASED APPROACH 

In order to calculate the cost differences for a phased approach, ie where after the operation of 
an EES after a period of three years there would be a switch to an EES processing biometric 
data and/or with a purpose extended to fighting terrorist offences and serious crime, two main 
aspects  were  relevant:  the  impact  on  the  development  costs  and  the  impact  on  the 
maintenance costs.  

For  the  development  costs  the  possibility  of  the  activation  /  deactivation  of  the  use  of 
biometrics  and  two  different  sets  of  messages  (one  with  biometrics  and  one  without 
biometrics)  were  considered.  Some  costs  increased  especially  for  the  development.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  costs  for  hardware  and  storage  were  reduced  due  to  the  smaller  size  of  the 
initial configuration. The total costs for the central development decreased by 240.688 €. 

On the MS side the development increased by 2.8 Mio €. The main reason is the higher effort 
for  the  development  of  the  national  systems  (+  2.1  Mio  €)  and  to  a  smaller  extent  the 
administrative  costs  for  additional  testing.  As  the  MS  do  not  store  biometric  data  and  it  is 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
assumed  that  the  VIS  fingerprint  scanners  will  be  re-used,  no  further  decreasing  cost  effect 
was identified. 

For the maintenance costs the phased approach has the following impact: Due to the smaller 
data storage and reduced personnel effort to maintain the system, the maintenance costs both 
on the central and the national side are reduced. Costs increase with the size of the system, 
however, with a delay due to the time of the deactivation of the biometrics. Due to the fact 
that the yearly costs for the maintenance of the system during the operational phase have been 
averaged, the differences are not directly obvious in the cost tables but they are respected.  

55 

 
 
 
 
 
1. Central EES with  biometrics   

Yearly operational costs 

Total one time development costs 

Required action 

Management Authority 

MA Hardware 

MA Other (training, meetings) 

MA Infrastructure 

MA software 

MA Admin 

MA Office Space 

MA Contractor Development 

Subtotal MA 

Member States *) 

MS Hardware 

MS Other (training, meetings) 

MS Infrastructure 

MS software 

MS Admin 

MS Office Space 

MS Contractor Development 

Subtotal MS 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

EU 

MS 

3.748.000

503.687

13.872.390

11.490.000

2.504.941

27.000

5.360.274

37.506.292

0

0

23.070.000

1.158.521

0

41.159.100

37.567.248

34.074.720

5.758.592

142.788.181

430.000 

503.687 

12.062.948 

5.800.000 

924.685 

9.000 

536.027 

20.266.347 

24.000 

115.852 

0 

836.000 

64.135.354 

14.102.800 

575.859 

79.789.865 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*) Member States means the Schengen area as of 19.12.2011 plus Bulgaria and Romania and was calculated as one entity. 

57 

 
 
2. Central EES no biometrics 

Yearly operational costs 

Total one time development costs 

Required action 

Management Authority 

MA Hardware 

MA Other (training, meetings) 

MA Infrastructure 

MA software 

MA Admin 

MA Office Space 

MA Contractor Development 

Subtotal MA 

Member States 

MS Hardware 

MS Other (training, meetings) 

MS Infrastructure 

MS software 

MS Admin 

MS Office Space 

MS Contractor Development 

Subtotal MS 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

EU 

MS 

2.764.000

502.226

13.872.390

3.168.000

2.694.657

27.000

3.236.690

26.264.963

0

0

23.070.000

1.570.747

0

41.159.100

38.067.738

34.074.720

7.807.615

145.749.920

28.000 

502.226 

12.062.948 

970.000 

557.914 

9.000 

323.669 

14.453.757 

24.000 

157.075 

0 

815.000 

57.804.916 

14.002.800 

780.762 

73.584.553 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Distributed EES with biometrics 

Yearly operational costs 

Total one time development costs 

Required action 

Management Authority 

MA Hardware 

MA Other (training, meetings) 

MA Infrastructure 

MA software 

MA Admin 

MA Office Space 

MA Contractor Development 

Subtotal MA 

Member States 

MS Hardware 

MS Other (training, meetings) 

MS Infrastructure 

MS software 

MS Admin 

MS Office Space 

MS Contractor Development 

Subtotal MS 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

EU 

MS 

873.200

506.772

13.872.390

1.164.000

1.603.614

27.000

9.846.948

27.893.924

0

35.748.000

11.769.115

1.782.000

67.500.000

27.000.000

36.499.680

10.578.668

0

190.877.463

161.200 

506.772 

12.062.948 

116.000 

436.023 

9.000 

584.695 

13.876.638 

54.000 

1.176.912 

0 

880.000 

56.602.308 

14.002.800 

357.867 

73.073.887 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 

 
 
 
 
4. Distributed EES no biometrics 

Yearly operational costs 

Total one time development costs 

Required action 

Management Authority 

MA Hardware 

MA Other (training, meetings) 

MA Infrastructure 

MA software 

MA Admin 

MA Office Space 

MA Contractor Development 

Subtotal MA 

Member States 

MS Hardware 

MS Other (training, meetings) 

MS Infrastructure 

MS software 

MS Admin 

MS Office Space 

MS Contractor Development 

Subtotal MS 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

EU 

MS 

816.400

1.087.828

13.872.390

1.164.000

1.174.966

27.000

6.385.058

24.527.642

0

30.213.000

15.485.352

1.782.000

37.800.000

28.507.887

34.074.720

13.865.036

0

161.727.995

67.600 

1.008.783 

12.062.948 

440.000 

379.313 

9.000 

238.506 

14.206.150 

40.500 

1.548.535 

0 

0 

53.184.504 

14.002.800 

1.086.504 

69.862.843 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Central EES biometrics added later  

Yearly operational costs 

Total one time development costs 

Required action 

Management Authority 

MA Hardware 

MA Other (training, meetings) 

MA Infrastructure 

MA software 

MA Admin 

MA Office Space 

MA Contractor Development 

Subtotal MA 

Member States 

MS Hardware 

MS Other (training, meetings) 

MS Infrastructure 

MS software 

MS Admin 

MS Office Space 

MS Contractor Development 

Subtotal MS 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

EU 

MS 

2.764.000

503.874

13.872.390

11.990.000

2.475.776

27.000

5.632.564

37.265.604

0

0

23.070.000

1.105.665

0

41.159.100

38.367.738

34.074.720

7.807.615

145.584.838

14.000 

503.874 

12.062.948 

300.000 

757.854 

9.000 

563.256 

14.210.932 

24.000 

110.567 

0 

815.000 

58.244.916 

14.102.800 

549.586 

73.846.869 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 

 
 
 
ANNEX 3 – Border processing data 

1. BORDER CHECKS 

To find out the time needed to cross the external border the Czech Presidency together with 
the  Commission  launched  a  questionnaire.  According  to  the  Member  States'  replies  to  the 
questionnaire, currently the average time for a border check for visa holders on entry at the 
land border is 2 minutes 17 seconds, for visa-exempt nationals 1 minute 12 seconds and for 
EU  citizens  20  seconds.  The  average  time  on  exit  at  the  land  border  is  for  visa  holders  1 
minute 34 seconds, for visa-exempt nationals 58 seconds and for EU citizens 18 seconds.  

The  average  time  at  air  borders  on  entry  for  visa  holders  is  1  minute  44  seconds,  for  visa-
exempt nationals 1 minute 3 seconds and for EU citizens 15 seconds. The average time at air 
borders on exit is for visa holders 1 minute 11 seconds, for visa-exempt nationals 52 seconds 
and for EU citizens 15 seconds.  

The time spent on a border check at the sea border is not reported because the results are quite 
similar  to  checks  carried  out  at  land  borders.  The  aforementioned  times  do  not  include 
anything else but basic first-line border checks (verification of the identity of the person and 
checking  of  travel  document(s)  and  necessary  databases)  in  a  situation  where  everything 
seems to be in order concerning the traveller.  

As  can  be  seen,  the  longest  time  is  needed  for  border  checks  on  entry  at  the  land  and  sea 
borders for visa holders. However, visa holders represent only a small minority of travellers at 
sea borders.  

Below an estimate is made of the additional time that would be needed to verify the identity 
of each person using biometrics under the assumption that the stamping obligation would be 
replaced with an entry/exit system, which would allow certain time savings. However, these 
estimates  must  be  considered  on  the  low  side  as  well  as  mainly  relevant  for  air  border 
crossings. 

2. VISA-EXEMPT TCN (TCNVE) - ENTRY 

The  following  diagram  highlights  the  timing  of  the  different  operations  performed  during  a 
normal  border  crossing  process  for  TCNVE  travellers  entering  the  Schengen  area.  The 
situation  before  and  after  the  introduction  of  an  EES  are  compared.  The  "Status  Quo”  or 
baseline scenario denotes the state of affairs after VIS is fully implemented and operational at 
all border crossing points.  

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timeline (seconds)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

Status Quo

E/E (Manual)

4

2

3

5

Traveller move from queue head to border officer

Traveller hands-over travel document to border 
officer

Border officer scans passport

Wait time from SIS and national databases 
search

4

2

3

5

Traveller move from queue head to border officer

Traveller hands-over travel document to border 
officer

Border officer scans passport

Wait time from 
SIS and national 
database 
searches

Wait time from 
Entry/Exit 
database 
search

Traveller 
scans fingers

5

Analysis of SIS and national databases search 
result

5

Analysis of SIS, national 
databases and entry/exit 
searches results.

Fingerprint local 
processing

2

1.5

1

Eligibility questions

Record Entry-Exit (asynchronous)

Total: 21.5 seconds

1.5

2.5

3

Eligibility questions

Calculate eligibility

Passport stamping

Total: 26 seconds

The assumptions taken on the timeline above are: 
- 

Eligibility questions (regarding the right to enter) are put to 10% of the travellers, on a 
random basis. An average of 15 seconds is presumably needed for the border officer 
and the traveller to interact. So, for the average population of travellers, we consider 
that the time necessary for eligibility questions is 10/100 * 15 = 1,5 seconds. 

- 

The time necessary to manually calculate the maximum duration of the stay based on 
previous  travels  is  estimated  on  the  basis  of  taking  around  five  (5)  seconds  per 
traveller who has previously travelled to the Schengen area. We estimate that in 50% 
of cases, it is the first journey of the TCNVE on this travel document. So, this is an 
average of 50/100 * 5 = 2,5 seconds per traveller. 

- 

Photo capture is not considered, as this is an optional component of the EES. 

65 

 
 
 
 
The assumptions above are also valid for the other timing cases below. 

The introduction of an EES does not increase the time to process a TCNVE, as the fingerprint 
scan can be performed during the wait time required to get the results from the interrogation 
of the required databases. On the contrary, the processing time is slightly reduced due to the 
replacement of physical stamping by electronic entry recording, and also due to the automated 
calculation of the eligibility and maximum duration of stay. 

3. THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONAL VISA HOLDERS (TCNVH) – ENTRY 

The following diagram highlights the timing of the different operations performed during a 
normal border crossing process for TCNVH travellers entering the Schengen area. The 
situations before and after the introduction of an EES are compared. 

66 

 
 
 
 
The introduction of an EES does not increase the time to process a traveller, as roughly the 
same operations are performed in both cases. 
On  the  contrary,  the  processing  time  is  slightly  reduced  due  to  the  replacement  of  physical 
stamping  by  electronic  entry  recording,  and  also  due  to  the  automated  calculation  of  the 
eligibility and maximum duration of stay. 

4. TCNVH AND TCNVE EXIT 

The  following  diagram  highlights  the  timing  of  the  different  operations  performed  during  a 
normal border crossing process for TCN travellers leaving the Schengen area. The situations 
before  and  after  the  introduction  of  an  EES  are  compared.  Both  types  of  TCN  travellers 
(TCNVE and TCNVH) are processed in the same way, and therefore, they are treated together 
in this section. 

67 

 
 
 
The time necessary to manually calculate whether a traveller has overstayed is estimated on 
the basis of five (5) seconds per traveller. This calculation needs to be made for all TCN. 
As  can  be  seen,  the  introduction  of  an  EES  considerably  increases  the  time  to  process  a 
TCNVE leaving Schengen. This is due to the introduction of fingerprint capture and remote 
database interrogation. 
The process is identical for all TCN, as the travel document ID has been selected as the key 
for searches in the EES. 

68 

 
 
 
ANNEX 4 - DATABASES AND SYSTEMS AT EU LEVEL 

Centralised  databases  containing  alerts  on  persons  and  other  categories  of  data  for  law 
enforcement and border check purposes (SIS), visa applicants (VIS) and asylum applicants in 
addition to other categories of persons (Eurodac) have been set up and/or are being developed 
at  EU  level.  Furthermore,  a  police  co-operation  mechanism  for  exchanging  information  on 
DNA,  fingerprints  and  vehicle  registration  data  has  been  established  through  the  Prüm 
Decisions.  

None of these systems address the administrative requirements for managing the right to stay 
in the EU and the gaps that can be filled by an entry/exit system as regards identifying and 
preventing irregular immigration, especially as regards overstayers.  

SIS 

The  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  is  a      centralised  information  system.    The  SIS, 
together  with  the  cooperation  of  the  SIRENE  bureaux,  set  up  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of 
Title  IV  of  the  Convention  implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement  of  14  June  1985  on  the 
gradual  abolition  of  checks  at  common  borders  (Schengen  Convention)  (15)  constitutes  an 
essential tool for the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis as integrated into 
the framework of the European Union. 

The main categories of data contained in the SIS are: 
•  Persons wanted for arrest for extradition purposes; 
•  Third-country nationals to be refused entry to the Schengen territory; 
•  Missing persons (minors and adults); 
•  Witnesses and persons required to appear before the judicial authorities in connection with 

criminal proceedings; 

•  Person or vehicles to be put under discreet surveillance or for specific checks;  
•  Certain categories of objects (e.g. stolen identity cards, vehicles, firearms, bank notes). 

The Schengen Information System (SIS) provides access to alerts on persons and objects to 
the following authorities: 
•  authorities responsible for border checks; 
•  authorities  carrying  out  and  coordinating  other  police  and  customs  checks  within  the 

country; 

•  national  judicial  authorities,  inter  alia,  those  responsible  for  the  initiation  of  public 
prosecutions  in  criminal  proceedings  and  judicial  inquiries  prior  to  indictment,  in  the 
performance of their tasks, as set out in national legislation; 

•  authorities responsible for issuing visas, the central authorities responsible  for examining 
visa  applications,  authorities  responsible  for  issuing  residence  permits  and  for  the 
administration of legislation on third-country nationals in the context of the application of 
the Union acquis relating to the movement of persons; 

•  authorities responsible for issuing vehicle registration certificates. 

It  is  up  to  each  Member  State  to  decide  which  national  authorities  are  competent  and  shall 
have access to some or all categories of SIS alerts depending on that competence.  

69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Europol and Eurojust also have access to certain categories of alerts (16). Europol may access 
data entered for alerts for arrest, alerts for discreet surveillance or specific check and  alerts on 
objects  for  seizure  or  use  as  evidence  in  criminal  proceedings.  Eurojust  may  access  data 
entered for alerts for arrest and alerts for a judicial procedure. 

The  SIS  operates  on  the  principle  that  the  national  systems  cannot  exchange  computerised 
data directly between themselves, but instead only via the central system.  The SIS enables the 
users  to  check  persons  and  objects  both  at  external  borders  and  within  the  territory  of  the 
Schengen  States.  The  SIS  provides  law  enforcement  authorities  with  information  on  why  a 
certain individual is wanted, what action is to be taken and whether the person is presumed 
violent and armed.   

However, as the information contained in the SIS is only sufficient for the authorities on the 
ground to take the  correct  initial actions it is necessary for the Member States to be  able to 
exchange supplementary information, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as required for 
implementing  certain  provisions of the Schengen Convention,  and to ensure full application 
of Title IV of the Schengen Convention for the SIS as a whole. 

Article 92(4) of the Schengen Convention provides that Member States shall, in accordance 
with  national  legislation,  exchange  through  the  authorities  designated  for  that  purpose 
(SIRENE), all information necessary in connection with the entry of alerts and for allowing 
the appropriate action to be taken in cases where persons in respect of whom, and objects in 
respect of which, data have been entered in the Schengen Information System, are found as a 
result of searches made in this System. 

The  Schengen  States  are  the  owners  of  the  data  they  introduce  into  the  SIS  and  bear  the 
responsibility for their legality and accuracy. 

Annual statistics on the number of alerts are collated and  published by the Council, not only 
on the total number of alerts but also the different categories of alert. 
•  By the start of 2011 (01.01.11), the total of valid records in the SIS reached 35.69 million 

which means an increase by 12.9% compared to the start of 2010..  

•  Nearly  30  million  records  existed  on  that  date  on  lost,  stolen,  misappropriated  identity 

documents (passports, identity cards, driving licence);  

•  More than 1.2 million records existed on that date on wanted persons  
•  The  vast  majority  of  alerts  on  persons  are  about  third-country  nationals  who  shall  be 

denied entry to the Schengen area; 

•  The SIS currently stores only alphanumeric data (letters and numbers), comprising data as 

regards individuals on45: 
•  names, including aliases; 
•  sex ; 
•  objective physical characteristics not subject to change”; 
•  date and place of birth; 
•  nationality; 
•  whether the persons are  armed or violent; 
•  the reason for the alert; and 

45 

Article 94(3) of the Schengen Convention. 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
•  the action to be taken. 

In  the  context  of  EU  enlargement,  the  technological  platform  needed  to  be  upgraded  and 
additional  features  were  desired.  For  these  reasons,  the  second-generation  Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) is being developed.  

SIS  II  has  been  designed  to  function  in  an  enlarged  Europe,  but  also  to  deal  with  new 
challenges  and  use  biometrics  to  aid  in  the  verification  of  a  person's  identity.  SIS  II  will 
provide the following new functionalities: 
•  The  addition  of  new  categories  of  alerts  (aircrafts,  boats,  boat  engines,  containers, 

industrial equipment, vehicle number plates, vehicle registration documents); 

•  The  addition  of  new  categories  of  data,  including  biometric  data  (biometric  data  such  as 
fingerprints  and  digital  facial  images  may  be  stored  for  the  purposes  of  confirming 
identity; 

•  The interlinking of alerts. 

On  20  December  2006  two  Regulations  and  a  Council  Decision46  were  adopted  on  the 
establishment, operation and use of SIS II47.  

VIS 

The  Visa  Information  System  (VIS)  is  a  system  for  the  exchange  of  short-stay  visa  data 
between  the  Schengen  and  the  Schengen  Associated  States  that  was  initially  established  in 
200448. All functionalities of the VIS are based on visa applications or visa decisions attached 
to applications. After a first registration, a visa application can be amended, until a decision is 
made whether or not a Schengen visa should be issued. After visa issuance, further decisions 
can  be  made,  for  example,  an  issued  visa  can  be  revoked  or  annulled,  or  a  visa  can  be 
extended. The VIS supports the storage, maintenance and retrieval of this information. 

The main objectives of the VIS are: 
•  to facilitate the visa application procedure;  
•  to  prevent  the  bypassing  of  the  criteria  for  the  determination  of  the  Member  State 

responsible for examining the application ("visa shopping"); 

•  to facilitate the fight against fraud; 
•  to  facilitate  checks  at  external  border  crossing  points  and  within  the  territory  of  the 

Member States; 

•  to  assist  in  the  identification  of  any  person  who  may  not,  or  may  no  longer  fulfil  the 

conditions for entry to, stay or residence on the territory of the Member States; 

•  to facilitate the application of Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 ("Dublin II" Regulation); 
•  to  contribute  to  the  prevention  of  threats  to  the  internal  security  of  any  of  the  Member 

States. 

According to the text of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 9 July 2008, the VIS will store personal data from visa applicants: 
•  Data on the applicant (i.e. name, address, occupation); 

46 
47 
48 

Council Decision 2007/533/JHA. 
Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006. 
Council Decision (EC) 512, 8.6.2004.  

71 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
•  Data on the visa application process (date and place of the application, visas requested, 

issued, refused, annulled, revoked or extended); 

•  Biometrics (photographs and fingerprints). 
According to Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008, law enforcement authorities 
from Member States and Europol will have a restricted and indirect access to the VIS data. 
Each  Member  State  will  have  to  designate  an  authority  responsible  for  controlling  law 
enforcement  access  to  the  database  and  the  police  will  have  to  provide  evidence  that  their 
query is necessary for criminal investigations.   

Transfer  of  data  to  third  countries  or  international  organisations  is  in  principle  not  allowed. 
By  way  of  derogation,  certain  data  may  be  transferred  or  made  available  if  necessary  in 
individual cases for proving the identity of a third-country national, including for the purpose 
of  return,  providing  that  specific  conditions  are  met.  Data  obtained  pursuant  to  Decision 
2008/633/ JHA may only be transferred or made available in an exceptional case of urgency 
and  only  for  the  purpose  of  the  prevention  and  detection  of  terrorists  and  serious  crime 
offences  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Member  State  that  entered  the  data.  Furthermore,  a 
permanent  Management  Authority  (the  Agency)  will  be  responsible  for  maintenance  and 
operations of the VIS database and the visa application data will be stored for a maximum of 
five years.  

The  VIS  started  operations  in  the  first  region  on  11  October  2011  on  the  basis  of  the 
Commission  implementing  decision  of  21  September  2011  (2011/636/EU)  and  Commission 
Decision of 30 November 2009 (2009/49/EC). The operations started first at the consulates in 
North  Africa  and  20  days  after  go-live  of  the  VIS  also  at  the  border  crossing  points 
(verification of visas against the VIS). On 10 May 2012, the VIS was successfully launched in 
the second region, the Near East (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). Further, the VIS on 2 
October 2012 started operations in a third region, the Gulf (Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen). 

BMS 

The  Biometric  Matching  System  (BMS)  developed  for  the  VIS  is  an  information  search 
engine  that  can  match  biometric  data  from  visa  applications,  identity  management  systems 
and policing systems. The BMS is designed to enable justice and immigration authorities to 
deal  with  security  and  other  issues  related  to  terrorism,  organized  crime,  irregular 
immigration, visa shopping, identity theft and fraud. 

The BMS database will be able to store the fingerprints of up to 70 million people and process 
more than 100,000 verification and identification requests per day. The system will perform 
one-to-one  comparisons  for  biometric  verifications  and  one-to-many  searches  for  biometric 
identifications. 

The  BMS  is  developed  using  a  service-oriented  architecture  approach,  has  the  capability  to 
connect  with  a  number  of  IT  systems  and  manage  functions  related  to  visas,  immigration, 
border control and police cooperation. In addition, the technical architecture will be flexible 
enough to accommodate new developments in EU policy as immigration and border control 
procedures evolve. 

Eurodac 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eurodac  is  a  fingerprint  database  that  stores  and  compares  the  fingerprints  of  asylum 
applicants  and  irregular  immigrants  and  allows  Member  States  to  determine  the  State 
responsible  for  examining  an  asylum  application  in  accordance  with  the  Dublin  II 
Regulation49. The Eurodac central unit operates a central database comparing fingerprints, an 
automated  fingerprint  identification  system  (AFIS)  and  a  secure  communication  system  for 
data  transmission  from  and  towards  the  national  units  (National  Access  Points)  in  Member 
States.  

Data collected for any asylum applicants over 14 years of age include: 
•  Fingerprint and control images; 
•  Date of the asylum application; 
•  The Member State where the asylum application was filed; 
•  The gender of the applicant. 

Data are collected according to three categories: 

Category  1:  data  of  asylum  applications.  Fingerprints  of  asylum  applicants  are  sent  to  the 
Central  Unit  for  comparison  against  fingerprints  of  other  asylum  applicants  who  have 
previously  lodged  their  application  in  another  Member  State.  This  data  is  retained  for  10 
years, but is deleted when an individual obtains the nationality of one of the Member States.  

Category  2:  data  of  aliens  apprehended  in  connection  with  irregular  crossing  of  an  external 
border and where not repatriated. Fingerprint of these individuals are sent to the  Central Unit 
for storage only, in order to be compared against the data of any asylum application submitted 
subsequently  to  the  Central  Unit.  This  data  is  retained  for  two  years,  but  is  deleted  if  the 
individual receives a residence permit, departs the territory of a Member State or obtains the 
nationality of one of the Member States.  

Category 3: data of aliens found irregularly present in a Member State. This data is not stored 
but  is  searched  against  the  data  of  asylum  applicants  stored  in  the  central  database.  The 
transmission of this category is not mandatory but optional for Member States.  

However, there is limited possibility to use Eurodac data for internal security purposes. In the 
revision of the Eurodac Regulation, the possibility to extend the scope of Eurodac with the 
view to use the data for law enforcement purpose and as a means to contribute to the fight 
against irregular migration will be explored.50 

In 2010, EURODAC processed: 
•  215,463  fingerprints  of  asylum  seekers  (Category  1),  an  9%  decrease  compared  to  the 

previous year (236,936),  

•  11,156 fingerprints of people crossing the borders irregularly (Category 2), a 64% decrease 

compared to the previous year (31,071), and  

•  72,840  fingerprints  of  people  apprehended  while  illegally  residing  on  the  territory  of  a 
Member State (Category 3). This figure has decreased by 14,86 % from the previous year 

49  
50 

Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003  
COM (2007) 299 final. 

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(85,554), demonstrating a growing interest from Member States to make use of this search 
possibility.  

The  increase  in  transactions  may  be  due  to  the fact  that  most  Member States  have  installed 
fingerprint scanning devices at their external borders.  

EURODAC data also provide information on multiple asylum applications. In 2010, 24,16 % 
of  aliens  applying  for  asylum  had  already  lodged  one  or  more  applications  in  the  same 
Member  State  or  in  another  Member  State.  Out  of  a  total  of  215,463  asylum  applications, 
52,064 were ‘multiple applications”. See Table 1 for a comparison with previous years.  

Table 1 EURODAC information on multiple applications. 
Number of asylum applications 
recorded by EURODAC (Category 
1) 

Year 

2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 

197,284 
219,557 
236,936 
215,463 

Sources: EURODAC annual reports51.  

At least one asylum 
application lodged previously 
(in the same or in another 
Member State) 
31,910 (16,17%) 
38,445 (17,5%) 
55,226 (23.3%) 
52,064 (24,16%) 

Prüm Decisions 

The Prüm Convention was signed between Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, 
the  Netherlands  and  Austria  in  May  2005  on  the  stepping  up  of  cross-border  cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and irregular migration. In June 2007, 
important  provisions  of  the  Prüm  Treaty  dealing  with  police  co-operation  and  information 
exchange  on  DNA-profiles,  fingerprint  reference  data  and  vehicle  registration  data  were 
incorporated  into  the  legislative  framework  of  the  EU  by  the  Prüm  Council  Decisions  and 
were scheduled to be fully implemented in all Member States by August 2011. More than half 
of  the  Member  States,  however,  were  significantly  lagging  behind  this  deadline  in  2011. 
Considerable implementation progress is now expected in the course of 2012. 

The  Prüm  Decisions  do  not  establish  a  central  database  containing  personal  data,  but  allow 
law enforcement authorities direct access to databases in other Member States in the case of 
vehicle  registration  data  and  access  on  a  'hit'/'no  hit'  basis  in  the  case  of  DNA  and 
dactyloscopic  data.  Neither  do  they  authorise  the  sharing  of  data  on  individuals  who  have 
been  found  irregularly  staying  in  a  Member  State  or  who  have  remained  beyond  their 
authorised length of stay in the Schengen area. 

Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record  

Information collected on travellers via Advanced Passenger Information (API) and Passenger 
Name  Record  (PNR)  applies  to  air  travel  only.  It  is  therefore  not  directly  relevant  for  the 
entry/exit system or the Registered Traveller Programme (RTP). In addition, due to the fact 

51 

SEC(2009) 96, 26.1.2009, SEC(2009) 1246/6, 25.9.2009, SEC(2010) 954/10, 2.9.2010. .  

74 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
that these data are normally collected from airlines, travel agencies or entered by the traveller 
himself, the quality of the data is often not sufficient to use this information for border check 
purposes. 

According to Article 26 of the Schengen Convention, carriers are responsible for the checking 
of documents of the passengers they transport into the Member States and may be penalised 
when third country nationals are found at the borders without the necessary travel documents.  
Following  the  decision  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  Schengen  in  1994  which  considered 
the advanced transmission of passenger data as a valuable tool for enhancing border security, 
Member  States  gradually 
implemented  API  practices  reflecting  diversified  national 
approaches.  In  order  to  harmonise  these  practices  and  introduce  common  standards  on  the 
information  to  be  transmitted  as  well  as  on  the  data  protection  safeguarding  clauses,  Spain 
presented in 2003 an Initiative that led to the adoption of the Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 
29 April 2004on the obligation of carriers to transmit passenger information (API Directive). 
The  explicit  purposes  of  this  Directive  are  to  improve  border  control  and  combat  illegal 
immigration  by  the  transmission  of  advance  passenger  data  by  air  carriers  to  the  competent 
national authorities. 

Whilst the initial proposal aimed for the inclusion of all carriers, the version finally adopted 
limits  its  scope  to  air  carriers  given  their  key  role  in  controlling  immigration  flows  from 
distant places of origin and since they alone had the necessary registration system. In any case 
the Directive does not prevent Member States from imposing obligations on other carriers. 
On  the  other  hand  the  Directive  does  not  introduce  a  general  obligation  for  air  carriers  to 
transmit  passenger  information  since  data  is  only  transmitted  at  the  request  of  border 
authorities, depending on MS appreciation of the risks involved.   

Moreover the information concerns only passengers who are carried from third countries into 
EU territory. The information shall be transmitted electronically (or in case of failure by any 
appropriate means), in advance of departure, to the authorities of the first authorised border 
crossing point. 

Information shall comprise 

•  The number and type of travel document used; 
•  Nationality; 
•  Full names; 
•  The date of birth; 
•  The border crossing point of entry into the territory of the Member States; 
•  Mode of transport; 
•  Departure and arrival time of the transportation; 
•  Total number of passengers carried on that transport; 
•  The initial point of embarkation. 

Article 4 of the Directive foresees an obligation on MS to impose dissuasive penalties on 
carriers, which, as a result of fault, have not transmitted the data required or have transmitted 
incomplete or false data (maximum amount not less than 5 000 €, minimum amount not less 
than 3 000 €) 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The transmission, use and storage of such data are subject to strict compliance with Directive 
95/46/EC on data protection by the authorities of the Member States and carriers.  Data must 
be  deleted  by  carriers  within  24  hours  after  the  arrival  and  also  by  the  border  authorities 
unless data is needed as evidence in proceedings aiming at the enforcement of legislation on 
entry and immigration.  

The  deadline  to  transpose  the  Directive  was  5  September  2006.  All  Member  States  have 
adopted national measures to comply with the Directive since then. 

However, according to the information available in most Member States no systematic use of 
the advanced passenger information is made yet. 

PNR 

PNR data is unverified information provided by passengers, and collected by and held in air 
carriers'  reservation  and  departure  control  systems  for  their  own  commercial  purposes.  It 
contains several different types of information, such as travel dates, travel itinerary or ticket 
information.  In  February  2011,  the  Commission  presented a proposal for a  Directive on the 
use  of  PNR  data  for  the  prevention,  detection,  investigation  and  prosecution  of  terrorist 
offences and serious crime (COM(2011)32 final). 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX  5 - DATA RETENTION PERIODS IN EU IT SYSTEMS 

Instrument 

Purpose(s) 

Personal data coverage 

Data retention 

Visa Information System 
(VIS) 

Schengen Information 
System (SIS) 

To help implement a 
common visa policy and 
prevent threats to internal 
security. 

To maintain public security, 
including national security, 
within the Schengen area and 
facilitate the movement of 
persons using information 
communicated via this 
system. 

Visa applications, 
fingerprints, photographs, 
related visa decisions and 
links between related 
applications. 
Names and aliases, physical 
characteristics, place and date 
of birth, nationality and 
whether a person is armed or 
violent. SIS alerts relate to 
several different groups of 
persons. 

Schengen Information 
System II 
(SIS II) 

To ensure a high level of 
security in the area of 
freedom, security and justice 
and facilitate the movement 
of persons using information 
communicated via this 
system. 

The data categories in SIS 
plus fingerprints and 
photographs, copies of 
European Arrest Warrant, 
misused identity alerts and 
links between alerts. SIS II 
alerts relate to several 
different groups of persons. 

EURODAC 

To assist in determining 
which Member State should 
assess an asylum application. 

Fingerprint data, sex, the 
place and date of the 
application for asylum, the 
reference number used by the 
Member State of origin and 
the date on which the 
fingerprints were taken, 
transmitted and entered in the 
system. 

5 years. 

Personal data entered in SIS 
for the purpose of tracing 
persons may be kept only for 
the time required to meet the 
purpose for which they were 
supplied, and no longer than 
three years. Data on persons 
subject to exceptional 
monitoring on account of the 
threat they pose to public or 
national security must be 
deleted after one year. 
Personal data entered in SIS 
for the purpose of tracing 
persons may be kept only for 
the time required to meet the 
purpose for which they were 
supplied, and no longer than 
three years. Data on persons 
subject to exceptional 
monitoring on account of the 
threat they pose to public or 
national security must be 
deleted after one year. 
10 years for asylum-seekers’ 
fingerprints; 2 years for those 
of third country nationals 
apprehended in connection 
with the irregular crossing of 
an external border. 

77 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 6 

EXISTING SYSTEMS LINKED TO THE EES AND MANAGEMENT OF EU IT 
SYSTEMS 

When a third-country national enters the Schengen area it is obligatory for border authorities 
to  consult  the  data  and  alerts  on  persons  and, where  necessary,  objects  included  in  the  SIS. 
When a third-country national exits the Schengen area, the SIS may be consulted. This means 
that  due  to  the  current  use  of  the  SIS,  the  border  crossing  points  are  connected  to  the  data 
network  and  equipped  with  travel  document  readers.  The  SIS  check  is  carried  out 
automatically when the machine readable zone of the travel document is read.  

A second EU system, the VIS, forms an important part of the border check process. In order 
to  facilitate  border  checks  and  fight  against  visa  fraud,  visas  are  checked  at  the  external 
borders against the VIS by using  the visa sticker number. Verification of fingerprints at the 
external  border  crossing  points  will  also  become  mandatory  after  a  three  year  transitional 
period from the start of operations ie in 2016. 

The same document readers that are used for the SIS checks and the same fingerprint readers 
that are used for the VIS checks may also be used for the EES.  

With  the  EES  in  mind,  the  above  means  that  consulates  and  border  crossing  points  should 
have  already  been  connected  to  the  data  network  (VIS  and  SIS)  and  fingerprint  readers  on 
entry  will  have  been  procured  by  2013/2014  at  the  latest  to  fulfil  the  requirements  for  the 
obligatory use of the VIS.  

Management  

As regards large scale IT systems, only EURODAC and the VIS are operational and managed 
by  DG  HOME  of  the  Commission  with  the  support  of  DG  DIGIT  in  the  case  of 
EURODAC52. The EURODAC system is located in Luxembourg and Brussels. SIS II is and 
VIS was developed by the Commission and, based on the legal instruments establishing and 
governing SIS II and VIS, the systems shall be located in Strasbourg (central unit) and near 
Salzburg (back-up unit). The VIS already started operations and the development of the SISII 
is ongoing. 

Following an impact assessment carried out to study the different options for performing the 
task  of  "Management  Authority"  for  SIS  II,  VIS  and  EURODAC  in  the  long  term,  a  new 
Regulatory  Agency  (the  Agency  for  the  operational  management  of  large-scale  information 
systems) was found to be the best solution as compared with entrusting Member States with 
operational  tasks  for  part  or  all  of  the  systems,  FRONTEX  with  the  three  systems  or 
EUROPOL with SIS II and the Commission with VIS and EURODAC.  

The Agency Regulation was published in the Official Journal53 and entered into force on 21 
November 2011. The Agency will become fully operational on 1 December 2012.  

52 
53 

In the management context, the SIS 1+ is not discussed as migration form SIS 1+ to SIS II is ongoing. 
OJ L 286, 1.11.2011. 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The  Agency  is  funded  from  the  general  budget  of  the  European  Union.  The  budget  of  the 
Agency  mainly  covers  investments  in  the  site,  security  and  operational  management  of  the 
SIS II, the VIS and EURODAC and administrative expenses.  

According  to  the  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  establishing  an 
Agency  for  the  operational  management  of  large-scale  systems  in  the  area  of  freedom, 
security and justice, the Agency will be in charge of the operational management of the SIS 
II,  the  VIS,  EURODAC  and  of  developing  and  managing  other  large-scale  information 
technology  systems  in  the  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice  if  so  provided  by  relevant 
legislative instruments.  

An  EES  would  be  developed  and  managed  by  the  Agency.  Member  States  would  be 
responsible  for  the  development  and  management  of  their  national  components  and  their 
adaptation  to  the  central  system.  Existing  equipment  installed  at  the  borders  and  at  the 
consulates  could  be  exploited.  A  legal  basis  for  the  EES  needs  to  be  adopted  prior  to  any 
technical development and the agency's legal basis amended. 

79 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 7 

FINAL RESULTS OF THE DATA COLLECTION HELD FROM 31 AUGUST TO 6 
SEPTEMBER 2009 

The tables in this annex details the results of the data collection exercise carried out under the coordination of the 
Czech  and  Swedish Presidencies,  where all  entries  and  exits  at  the  external  border  of  the  Schengen  area  were 
recorded by the Member States during one week for the purpose of estimating the total size of travel flows at the 
external  border,  in  total  and  divided  by  type  of  border  (air/sea/land)  and  by  traveller  (EU  citizens,  and  visa 
exempt/required third-country nationals).  

AIR 

Total 

Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Total 
Total entry AIR 
Total exit AIR 

EU 
81.096 
78.372 
43.531 
40.764 
2.745 
17.662 
405.109 
343.836 
216.316 
20.347 
4.348 
94.293 
12.946 
3.899 
4.000 
15.255 
265.066 
20.838 
97.900 
50.208 
14.316 
7.522 
661.325 
43.177 
75.048 
2.538.823 
3.327.473 
3.190.483 

Entry 
Non 
VISA 
17.781
14.295
9.100
9.924
78
5.128
91.773

VISA 
EU 
11.671
64.799
15.432
68.132
11.365
42.386
4.894
52.139
126
2.532
4.042
19.497
64.266
340.832
106.716 106.242
296.300
19.745
213.467
3.294
18.706
92
5.223
17.517
58.347
911
12.096
300
4.352
51
4.220
793
16.729
30.906
413.315
1.628
24.042
2.460
102.379
5.558
44.584
108
11.946
2.597
6.253
36.080
661.387
4.436
45.416
75.249
18.639
437.168 351.482 2.539.529

33.475
4.002
2.658
23.353
1.850
44
111
864
45.454
2.298
4.493
11.436
405
1.219
29.184
4.165
35.143

VISA 
9.109 
8.955 
9.121 
3.354 
141 
2.901 

Exit 
Non 
VISA 
16.134 
10.028 
7.442 
8.454 
87 
4.703 
77.555 
91.998 
34.135 
3.313 
3.318 
19.087 
1.660 
250 
183 
865 
46.139 
2.167 
5.496 
11.269 
262 
955 
24.609 
4.560 
29.075 

Air 
200.590
195.214
122.945
119.529
5.709
53.933
43.853  1.023.388
69.345  1.014.437
536.611
19.473 
52.250
2.588 
15.787
148 
224.514
11.917 
30.581
1.118 
9.112
267 
62 
8.627
35.484
978 
830.646
29.766 
52.425
1.452 
214.659
1.931 
126.895
3.840 
27.091
54 
20.454
1.908 
31.290  1.443.875
3.542 
105.296
248.494
15.340 
387.610  263.344  6.517.956

80 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
SEA 

Entry 

EU 

Non VISA  VISA 
0
0
321
94
0
0
12
11
137
287
45
15
18.948
1.019
12.249
0
0
5.012
464
496
0
43
5.334
0
751
623
0
439
63.919
653
0

0
6.128
0
1.881
262
461
2.148 236.231
12.813
9.542
49.695
3.228
0
0
0
0
10.417
3.826
424
322
495
0
0
0
138
42
27.358
1.060
0
0
865
121
4.418
1.567
0
0
1.083
70
67.934
7.459
2.198
729
0
0
110.358 30.724 422.705

Exit 

Non VISA  VISA 
0
0 
363 
96
0 
0
20
26 
230 
300
23 
19
2.581 
9.771
7.376 
658
3.833 
12.439
0 
0
0 
0
1.714 
1.077
307 
544
0 
504
0
0 
111 
20
1.084 
7.196
0
0 
137 
839
1.477 
504
0 
0
95 
902
24.199 10.226 
717 
0 
61.510 30.300 

2.422
0

Total 

Sea 

0
12.038
0
2.887
1.482
1.145
444.527
47.023
129.787
0
0
45.620
2.510
1.713
0
669
67.208
0
3.435
14.345
0
3.153
309.567
8.840
0
1.095.949

Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Total 
Total entry SEA 
Total exit SEA 

EU 

0 
5.036 
0 
937 
266 
582 
174.848 
15.615 
48.343 
0 
0 
23.574 
449 
218 
0 
315 
25.176 
0 
722 
5.756 
0 
564 
135.830 
2.121 
0 
440.352 
581.434 
514.515 

81 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
Entry 
Non 
VISA 

LAND 

Total 

Exit 
Non 
VISA 

EU 

VISA 

Land 

0
0
0
0
755
528
15.678
0
25.854
27.229
0
0
124
1.502
0
0
0
154

VISA 
0
0
0
0
4.515
46.441
3.170
0
42.206
75.445
0
0
4.862
33.921
0
0
0
637
1.266 118.474
0
3.777
78.480
5.629
0
0

0
21.686
0
0
38.051
21.733
186.855
0
129.486
247.051
0
0
20.397
24.642
0
0
0
257
83.852
0
15.895
324.828
415.409
0
0
585.633 417.557 1.530.142

0
440
187.379
324.724
0
0

0 
848 
0 
0 
5.030 
45.606 
3.855 

0 
2.301 
0 
0 
841 
514 
13.087 
0 
16.612 
22.208 
0 
0 
112 
1.413 
0 
0 
0 
199 

0
24.835
0
0
88.832
135.872
373.498
0
375.423
744.381
0
0
52.647
120.942
0
0
0
2.174
404.356
0
41.135
51.867  1.197.740
5.048  1.476.048
0
0
545.395  341.403  5.037.883

34.702 
41.033 
0 
0 
5.609 
32.472 
0 
0 
0 
672 
1.264  112.190 
0 
2.471 

0 
477 
161.713 
324.654 
0 
0 

0 
0 

Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Total 
Total entry LAND 
Total exit LAND 

EU 

0 
0 
0 
0 
39.640 
21.050 
150.853 
0 
126.563 
331.415 
0 
0 
21.543 
26.992 
0 
0 
0 
255 
87.310 
0 
18.075 
393.473 
400.584 
0 
0 
1.617.753 
2.620.943 
2.416.940 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
EU 

Entry EU 
81.096 
83.408 
43.531 
41.701 
42.651 
39.294 
730.810 
359.451 
391.222 
351.762 
4.348 
117.867 
34.938 
31.109 
4.000 
15.570 
290.242 
21.093 
185.932 
55.964 
32.391 
401.559 

Exit EU 
64.799
95.946
42.386
54.020
40.845
41.691
763.918
309.113
392.648
265.757
5.223
68.764
32.917
29.489
4.220
16.771
440.673
24.299
187.096
49.002
27.841
332.164
1.197.739  1.144.730
47.614
75.249
4.596.928  4.492.376

45.298 
75.048 

Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Total 

Passenger category 
Non VISA 

Entry Non 
VISA 

Exit non 
VISA 

17.781
14.389
9.100
9.936
1.120
5.671
126.399
107.735
71.578
31.231
2.658
28.365
2.438
2.042
111
907
50.788
2.452
6.510
12.059
845
189.037
417.827
4.818
35.143
1.133.159

16.134 
12.425 
7.442 
8.474 
1.228 
5.236 
100.413 
92.656 
63.186 
25.521 
3.318 
20.164 
2.316 
2.167 
183 
885 
53.335 
2.366 
7.599 
11.773 
739 
163.570 
373.462 
6.982 
29.075 
994.515 

VISA 

Entry 
VISA 

11.671
15.753
11.365
4.905
4.778
50.528
69.584
115.784
65.179
78.739
92
21.343
6.095
34.221
51
931
31.966
2.265
121.055
7.125
3.885
81.147
49.168
5.165
18.639
799.763

Exit 
VISA 

9.109
10.166
9.121
3.380
5.401
48.530
50.289
76.721
58.008
43.621
148
13.631
7.034
32.739
62
1.089
30.850
2.124
114.258
5.317
2.525
53.870
46.564
4.259
15.340
635.047

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Total 

Total 
Passenger category 
Non 
VISA 
33.915
26.814
16.542
18.410
2.348
10.907
226.812
200.391
134.764
56.752
5.976
48.529
4.754
4.209
294
1.792
104.123
4.818
14.109
23.832
1.584
352.607
791.289
11.800
64.218

Exit 
Entry 
90.042 
110.548
118.537 
113.550
58.949 
63.996
65.874 
56.542
47.474 
48.549
95.457 
95.493
914.620 
926.793
478.490 
582.970
513.842 
527.979
334.899 
461.732
8.689 
7.098
102.559 
167.575
42.267 
43.471
64.395 
67.372
4.465 
4.162
18.745 
17.408
524.858 
372.996
28.789 
25.810
308.953 
313.497
66.092 
75.148
31.105 
37.121
549.604 
671.743
95.732 1.664.734 1.564.756 
58.855 
55.281
119.664 
128.830
9.089.304  2.127.674 1.434.810 6.529.850 6.121.938 

EU 
145.895 
179.354 
85.917 
95.721 
83.496 
80.985 
1.494.728 
668.564 
783.870 
617.519 
9.571 
186.631 
67.855 
60.598 
8.220 
32.341 
730.915 
45.392 
373.028 
104.966 
60.232 
733.723 
2.342.469 
92.912 
150.297 

VISA 
20.780
25.919
20.486
8.285
10.179
99.058
119.873
192.505
123.187
122.360
240
34.974
13.129
66.960
113
2.020
62.816
4.389
235.313
12.442
6.410
135.017

9.424
33.979

Total 
200.590
232.087
122.945
122.416
96.023
190.950
1.841.413
1.061.460
1.041.821
796.631
15.787
270.134
85.738
131.767
8.627
36.153
897.854
54.599
622.450
141.240
68.226
1.221.347
3.229.490
114.136
248.494

12.651.788

Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Total 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
EU 
79.034 
78.238 
109.944 

Entry 
Non VISA 
5.448 
6.037 
1.532 

Bulgaria 
Romania 
Cyprus 

AIR 

Total 

VISA 

11.407
1.146
18.863

EU 
96.899
79.597
108.887

Exit 
Non VISA

VISA 

Air 

5.943 16.206  214.937 
1.071  171.879 
5.790
9.402  249.941 
1.313

Entry 
Non VISA 
106 
782 
39 

EU 
1.351 
570 
2.558 

Bulgaria 
Romania 
Cyprus 

SEA 

VISA 

2.284
8
315

LAND 

Exit 
Non VISA
2
661
51

EU 
1.329
632
2.484

VISA 
2.532 
2 
281 

Total 

Sea 
7.604 
2.655 
5.728 

Total 

EU 
213.298 
293.755 
0 

Entry 
Non VISA 
2.454 
6.675 
0 

Bulgaria 
Romania 
Cyprus 

VISA 

43.172
30.410
0

EU 
206.926
340.900
0

Exit 
Non VISA

VISA 

Land 

2.461 32.473  500.784 
2.752 39.830  714.322 
0 

0 

0

Passenger category 

EU 

Non VISA 

VISA 

Total 
Passenger category 

EU 

Exit 
VISA 

Entry 
VISA 
56.863 51.211  598.837  16.414 108.074
72.467
31.564 40.903  793.692  22.697
28.861
2.935
9.683  223.873 
19.178

Non 
VISA 

VISA 

Entry 
EU 

Exit EU 

Bulgaria 
Romania 
Cyprus 

293.683 
372.563 
112.502 

305.154 
421.129 
111.371 

Entry Non 
VISA 

8.008
13.494
1.571

Exit 
non 
VISA 

8.406
9.203
1.364

Bulgaria 
Romania 
Cyprus 

Entry 
358.554 
417.621 
133.251 

Total 

Exit 
364.771 
471.235 
122.418 

Total 
723.325  
888.856  
255.669  

85