COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing an Entry/Exit system (EES) to register entry and exit data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union
Date: 2013-02-28
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Schengen Information System, border control, data collection, exchange of information, external border of the EU, foreign national, traveller

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 28.2.2013  
SWD(2013) 48 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL  

establishing an Entry/Exit system (EES) to register entry and exit data of third-country 
nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union 

{COM(2013) 95} 
{SWD(2013) 47} 
{SWD(2013) 49}

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL  

establishing the entry/exit system to register entry and exit data of third-country 
nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union 

1. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

1.1. 

Background 

In its Communication of 13 February 2008 preparing the next steps in border management in 
the  European  Union1  the  Commission  suggested  the  establishment  of  an  entry/exit  system 
(EES). Such a system would entail the registration of the personal data together with the dates 
of entry and exit of each third-country national admitted for a short stay when they cross the 
external  borders.  The  2008  Communication  was  accompanied  by  an  impact  assessment 
report2. 

The Conclusions of the European Council of 23 and 24 June 2011 called for work on "smart 
borders" to be moved forward rapidly. In response, the Commission adopted on 25 October 
2011 a new Communication on the various options and the way ahead.3 It concluded that the 
implementation of an EES would provide the Union with accurate data on travel flows in and 
out of the Schengen area at all parts of its external borders and on overstayers. 

1.2.  Why the creation of an EES is being examined 

The  2008  impact  assessment  identified  and  examined  irregular  immigration,  including  the 
lack of data for identifying overstayers, and terrorism and serious crime as the main problems 
to be addressed through the creation of an EES. As explained in the 2011 communication: 

'An EES would allow the accurate and reliable calculation of authorised stay as well as the 
verification of the individual travel history for both visa holders and visa exempted travellers 
as  an  essential  part  of  first  line  risk-assessment.  It  would  do  so  by  replacing  the  current 
system  of  stamping  passports  with  an  electronic  registry  of  the  dates  and  places  of  third 
country national admitted for short stays. While the main purpose of the system would be to 

1 
2 

3 

COM (2008) 69 final. 
SEC(2008) 153 and Preparatory study to inform an Impact Assessment in relation to the creation of an automated 
entry/exit system at the external borders of the EU and the introduction of a border crossing scheme for bona fide 
travellers  ('Registered  Traveller Programme')  made  by  GHK  and  Entry/Exit  Technical  Feasibility study  made  by 
Unisys. Studies are published on the website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm 
COM(2011) 680 final 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
 
monitor  respect  of  the  authorised  stay  of  third  country  nationals,  the  system  would  also 
contribute to optimising border check procedures and enhance the security at the moment of 
the crossing of the external borders. '4 

The 2008 impact assessment assessed a wide range of policy options and identified the setting 
up of an entry/exit system as the preferred option. This impact assessment looks again at the 
overall problem definition as relevant for that conclusion in the light of developments since 
2008  with  regard  to  border  control  aspects,  irregular  migration,  and  technological 
developments, at European as well as national level.  

1.3. 

Summary of overall problems related to border control and irregular migration 

•  Absence of any electronic means for recording travel movements of third-country 

nationals admitted for a short stay; 

•  The very limited value of national systems for such purposes in an area without 

internal border control between 26 countries; 

•  The absence of means for identifying persons detected within the territory without 

travel documents who cannot be identified using the VIS; 

•  The absence of any information of who is on EU territory and who complies with 

the maximum allowed short stay of three months per six months; 

•  The complexity and slowness of the current stamping obligation, which does not 
guarantee that the border guard can assess the authorised stay at the border check 
of the traveller; 

•  The absence of information on nationalities and groups (visa exempt/required) of 

travellers overstaying; 

•  The absence of information that can support random checks within the territory to 

detect irregularly staying persons. 

1.4. 

Summary of overall problems related to law enforcement aspects 

•  Lack of information on the travel and cross-border movements of suspect persons; 
•  Difficulties in detecting persons subject to an alert who use different identities to 

cross the borders; 

•  Difficulties identifying a suspect having destroyed his or her travel documents. 

1.5. 

Fundamental rights issues 

An EES would, due to the personal data involved, in particular have an impact on the right to 
the protection of personal data, enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union. An EES would need to guarantee the right to an effective remedy before 
a tribunal (Article 47 of the Charter) for challenging a notification of an overstay, for example 
in cases of forced overstay, errors or when a migrant has a legal right to stay.  

Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data5 and the Regulation (EC) 45/2001 would apply to 
the  processing  of  personal  data  carried  out  for  the  purpose  of  an  EES  respectively  by  the 
Member States and by the EU institutions, bodies and agencies involved. Negative impacts of 
sharing  personal  data  have  to  be  minimised  by  appropriate  technical  safeguards  against 

4 
5 

COM(2011) 680 final 
OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p.31 

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
                                                 
misuse,  clear  legal  limitations  for  access,  including  purpose  limitations  and  data  retention 
periods which are as short as possible. 

According  to  the  Commission  Communication  of  July  2010  on  information  management6, 
data  protection  rules  should  be  embedded  in  any  new  instruments  relying  on  the  use  of 
information  technology.  This  implies  the  inclusion  of  appropriate  provisions  limiting  data 
processing to what is necessary for the specific purpose of that instrument and granting data 
access  only  to  those  entities  that  ‘need  to  know.’  It  also  implies  the  choice  of  limited  data 
retention  periods  depending  solely  on  the  objectives  of  the  instrument  and  the  adoption  of 
mechanisms ensuring an accurate risk management and effective protection of data subjects' 
rights.  

The  system  would  have  to  comply  with  data  protection  principles  and  the  requirements  of 
necessity,  proportionality,  purpose  limitation  and  quality  of  data.  All  safeguards  and 
mechanisms  should  be  in  place  for  the  effective  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of 
travellers  particularly  the  protection  of  their  private  life  and  personal  data.  Third-country 
nationals must be made aware of these rights.  

1.6. 

Subsidiarity 

Under Articles 74 and 77(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
the Union has the power to adopt measures relating to the crossing of the external borders of 
the Member States. Under Articles 82 (1)(d) and 87(2)(a) TFEU the Union also has the power 
to  adopt  measures  to  strengthen  police  and  judicial  cooperation  by  collecting,  storing, 
processing, analysing and exchanging relevant information. 

No  Member  State  alone  is  able  to  cope  with  irregular  immigration  and  with  combating 
international terrorism and serious crime. A person may enter the Schengen area at a border 
crossing point in a Member State where a national register of entry/exit data is used, but exit 
through a border crossing point where no such system is used. The monitoring of compliance 
with EU rules on authorised stays can therefore not be done by Member States acting alone. 
Third-country nationals who enter the Schengen area are able to travel freely within it. In an 
area  without  internal  borders,  action  against  irregular  immigration  should  in  principle  be 
undertaken  on  a  common  basis.  Considering  all  this  the  EU  is  better  placed  than  Member 
States to take the appropriate measures. 

2. 

OBJECTIVES OF THE ENTRY/EXIT SYSTEM 

The general policy objectives are, in order of priority:  

•  To counteract irregular immigration; 
•  To  contribute  to  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  serious  crime  and  ensure  a  high  level  of 

internal security. 

The specific objectives are: 

•  To enhance the efficiency of border checks through monitoring of the rights to authorised 

stay at entry and exit, and to improve the assessment of the risk of overstay; 
•  To monitor compliance with the authorised stay of persons within the territory;  

6 

COM(2010) 385 final. 

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
                                                 
•  To  generate  reliable  information  to  allow  the  EU  and  Member  States  to  make  informed 

policy choices concerning visa and migration; 

•  To identify and detect irregular immigrants, especially overstayers, also within the territory 

and to increase the possibilities for return; 

•  To identify and apprehend terrorist and criminal suspects crossing the external borders; 
•  To  generate  information  that  would  reduce  the  identification  and  verification  gap 
concerning  third  country  nationals  that  are  not  covered  by  the  Visa  Information  System 
(VIS) and that would contribute to the apprehension of terrorist and criminal suspects. 

The operational objectives are: 

•  To create entry and exit records of third country nationals crossing the external borders; 
•  To  automatically  calculate  the  authorised  stay  and  issue  an  alert  when  there  is  no  exit 

record on the expiry of the third country national's authorised stay; 

•  To delete the EES data upon expiry of the retention period; 
•  To generate information on the size and trends of movements across the external borders, 

especially with regard to irregular immigration; 

•  To  inform  third  country  nationals  of  their  rights  and  to  implement  effective  appeal 

procedures. 

3. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

The problem definition and the consultation of stakeholders show that the key issues to decide 
are  which  data  to  be  processed  in  the  system  and  for  which  precise  purpose.  The  retention 
period needs to be chosen as a function of the choices made with regard to these two issues, 
that  is,  the  shortest  possible  retention  period  needed  to  fulfill  the  purpose.  The  four  policy 
options are therefore the following:  

1) 

2) 
3) 

4) 

An  entry/exit  system  with  alphanumeric  data  for  the  purpose  of  border  control  and 
migration management;  
Same as policy option 1, with the addition of biometric data; 
Same as policy option 1, with the purpose of the system extended to also include the 
fight against terrorism and serious crime; 
Same as policy option 1, with the addition of biometric data and with the purpose of 
the system extended to also include the fight against terrorism and serious crime (so 
a combination of policy options 2 and 3). 

Once the preferred policy option has been identified – in other words, what the system will do 
– a choice needs to be made how to implement the system technically.  

The retention period in relation to the policy options would be the following: 

•  For an entry/exit system set up on the basis of either policy options 1 or 2, as a general 
rule 6 months, while for travellers who have not exited the territory within the authorised 
stay the period would be 5 years, and for participants in the RTP a period equivalent to the 
time they are granted access to the system; 

•  For an entry/exit system set up on the basis of either policy options 3 or 4, the retention 

period would be five years for all travellers. 

EN 

5 

   EN 

 
4. 

COMPARISON  OF  OPTIONS  AND  IDENTIFICATION  OF  THE  PREFERRED  POLICY 
OPTION  

4.1. 

Comparison of options 

Table 1 – Comparative assessment of the policy options 

Baseline  

Policy option 1 

Policy option 2 

Policy option 3 

Policy option 4 

Objective/policy 
option 

Policy  objective:  To 
counteract  irregular 
immigration  

Policy  objective:  To 
against 
fight 
terrorism 
and 
serious crime 

Impact 
fundamental rights 

on 

Impact  on  border 
management  

(Policy option 0) 

√√ 

√√√ 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

-√ 

0 

√√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

√√√ 

0 

-√√ 

-√√ 

-√√√√ 

0 

0 

0 

Table 1 summarises the assessment of impacts. The following comparison and identification 
of the preferred option will also take into account the following criteria: 

•  Effectiveness – the extent to which options achieve the objectives of the proposal; 
•  Efficiency – the extent to which objectives can be achieved at least cost; 
•  Coherence  – the extent to which options are coherent with overarching  objectives  of  EU 

policy. 

A  difficulty  revealed  by  the  assessment  of  the  impacts  of  each  policy  option  is  the  lack  of 
available  data,  which  notably  influences  the  possibility  for  comparing  the  effectiveness  of 
policy options 1-4. The assumption that a system with biometrics will have a higher impact on 
counteracting irregular migration, and that as a consequence policy options 2 and 4 would be 
more  effective,  is  influenced  by  the  share  of  persons  not  subject  to  the  visa  obligation  that 
overstay, and this exact number is not known. The negative impact on the border management 
process of verifying biometrics of this group of travellers can only be fully assessed when the 
VIS  is  fully  implemented.  Equally  for  assessing  the  impact  of  giving  access  for  law 
enforcement  purposes comprehensive  data is yet  missing,  as  the  input  provided  by  Member 
States'  experts  so  far  has  mainly  remained  general  and  experiences  of  access  for  law 
enforcement purposes to the VIS are not yet available. It can be noted that entry/exit data can 
be necessary for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or other serious 
offences  in  case  they  involve  international  travel.  Furthermore,  the  positive  impact  on  the 
objective  of  detecting  and  identifying  terrorist  and  criminal  suspects  is  higher  for  a  system 
with biometrics. 

Assessing the preferred option with regard to the inclusion of biometric data must start from 
the core purpose of the system, related to border control and migration management. On that 

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
basis  option  2  has  the  highest  positive  impact  on  counteracting  irregular  migration.  The 
potential  negative  impacts  on  the  border  management  process  could  be  managed  through  a 
transitional  period,  whereby  the  system  would  operate  based  on  alphanumeric  data  for  the 
first three years and subsequently on the basis of alphanumeric and biometric data. 

On that basis, with regard to access for law enforcment purposes, the total negative impact on 
fundamental rights of option 4 could be seen as potentially disproportionate, also taking into 
account the need for a much longer retention period. 

An  evaluation  after  a  period  of  2  years,  taking  also  into  account  the  experiences  of  the 
implementation  of  the  VIS  with  regard  to  access  for  law  enforcement  purposes  and  overall 
experiences  with  regard  to  operating  the  EES,  would  allow  for  returning  to  the  question  of 
law  enforcement  access  on  the  basis  of  more  complete  data  and  information  to  assess  the 
impacts in more detail.  

The need to give access for law enforcement purposes to the system as well as the retention 
period could therefore be reconsidered when the entry/exit system is evaluated after a period 
of 2 years. In summary, the preferred option is therefore policy option 2, with an evaluation to 
be foreseen after two years of operation, after which an assessment will be made whether to 
move  to  policy  option  4.  Any  such  change  (i.e.  to  policy  option  4)  with  regard  to  law 
enforcement  purposes,  and/or  changing  the  retention  period  will  require  a  new  legislative 
proposal from the Commission. 

4.2. 

Technical implementation 

Overall  the  centralised  approach  is  the  most  efficient  and  cost-effective  solution.  It  is  also 
coherent with the development and management of other IT systems in the field of migration, 
ie Eurodac, the VIS, and the SIS/SIS II. 

4.3. 

Preferred option 

The  preferred  solution  for  an  EES  is  to  start  with  a  system  based  on  policy  option  2  and 
assessing the need to move to policy option 4 after two years of operation: 

•  The  EES  would  at  first  operate  as  a  centralised  database  containing  alpha  numeric  data 
only  and  without  access  by  law  enforcement  authorities.  The  data  retention  period  for 
ordinary cases would be 6 months and in case of overstay 5 years.  

•  After three years of operations, the EES would  operate  with  alphanumeric  and  biometric 

data (the latter as concerns persons not subject to the visa obligation). 

•  After two years of operations, the  EES  would  be  evaluated.  At  this  time  the  issue  of  the 
access for law enforcement purposes as well as the retention period would be reconsidered. 
•  However, in order to grant law enforcement authorities access to the data generated by the 
entry/exit system in a second phase, the necessity and proportionality of the use of this data 
must be clearly demonstrated with solid evidence and the access must be combined with 
appropriate safeguards and limitations.  

4.4. 

Costs of the preferred option 

Table 2 – Costs for the preferred option 

One time development cost at 
central and national level. 
(3 years of development)  

Yearly operational cost at 
central and national level 
(5 years of operation) 

Total costs at central and 
national level 
 (in EUR million) 

EN 

7 

   EN 

 
 
(in EUR million) 

(in EUR million) 

Centralised 
biometrics added later 

system 

183 

88 

623 

(MS 146 EU 37) 

(MS 74 EU 14) 

The Commission's proposal for the next multi-annual financial framework (MFF) includes a 
proposal of 4,6 billion EUR for the Internal security Fund (ISF) for the period 2014-2020. In 
the proposal, 1,1 billion EUR is set aside as an indicative amount for the development of an 
EES and an RTP assuming development costs would start from 2015, and covering 4 years of 
operation. Moreover, outside the scope of the ISF, a separate amount of 822 million EUR is 
set  aside  for  the  management  of  existing  large  scale-IT  systems  (Schengen  Information 
System II, Visa Information System and EURODAC). 

The  Commission  envisages  entrusting  the  implementation  tasks  for  these  systems  to  the 
Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT-Systems in the area of Freedom, 
Security  and  Justice  established  by  Regulation  (EU)  N°  1077/2011  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council.7  Providing  financial  support  for  national  development  costs 
would  ensure  that  difficult  economic  circumstances  at  national  level  do  not  jeopardise  or 
delay the projects.  

Cost  savings  could  also  be  achieved  if  the  entry/exit  system  is  built  together  with  the 
registered  traveller  programme,  compared  to  the  situation  in  which  both  systems  would  be 
built  totally  independently.  The  main  cost  savings  come  at  the  central  level  (EU)  from 
reduced  costs  for  hardware,  software  and  infrastructure  and  at  Member  States'  level  from 
administrative and office space cost savings.  

5. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The  Commission  shall  ensure  that  systems  are  in  place  to  monitor  the  functioning  of  the 
entry/exit  system  and  evaluate  them  against the main policy objectives. Two years after the 
system  starts  operations  and  every  two  years  thereafter,  the  Management  Authority  should 
submit to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission a report on the technical 
functioning  of  the  system.  Moreover,  two  years  after  the  entry/exit  system  starts  operations 
and every four years thereafter, the Commission should produce an overall evaluation of the 
system  including  on  fundamental  rights  impacts  and  on  examining  results  achieved  against 
objectives  and  assessing  the  continuing  validity  of  the  underlying  rationale  and  any 
implications for future options. The first evaluation should focus  on  whether access for law 
enforcement purposes should be granted and whether the retention period should be extended 
and would be accompanied by legislative proposals as appropriate. The Commission should 
submit the reports on the evaluation to the European Parliament and the Council.  

7 

OJ L 286, 1.11.2011, p.1. 

EN 

8 

   EN