Special Report No 24/2012 ‘The European Union Solidarity Fund’s response to the 2009 Abruzzi earthquake: The relevance and cost of operations’
Date: 2013-02-27
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: Abruzzi, Italy, aid to disaster victims, earthquake, emergency aid, fund (EU)

EUROPEAN
COURT OF AUDITORS

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THE EUROPEAN UNION SOLIDARITY 
FUND’S RESPONSE TO THE 2009 ABRUZZI 
EARTHQUAKE: THE RELEVANCE AND 
COST OF OPERATIONS

EN

 
 
 
 
Special Report No 24 

 2012

THE EUROPEAN UNION SOLIDARITY 
FUND’S RESPONSE TO THE 
2009 ABRUZZI EARTHQUAKE: 
THE RELEVANCE AND COST OF 
OPERATIONS

(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS
12, rue Alcide De Gasperi
1615 Luxembourg
LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-1
Fax +352 4398-46410
E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu
Internet: http://eca.europa.eu

Special Report No 24 

 2012

A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet.
It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu).

Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013

ISBN 978-92-9241-071-1
doi:10.2865/53557

© European Union, 2012
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Printed in Luxembourg

3

CONTENTS

Paragraph

GLOSSARY

I–V 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1–6 

INTRODUCTION

7–8 

AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

9–49 

OBSERVATIONS

9–20 

IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT AND THE EUSF REGULATION

9–20 

 THE EUSF REGULATION DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR SOLUTIONS SUCH AS THE CASE PROJECT

21–28 

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CASE PROJECT

21–23 

THE STRATEGY UNDERLYING THE CASE PROJECT WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND, BUT …

24–26 

… THERE WERE SHORTCOMINGS IN THE NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND …

27–28 

 … MOST OF THE APARTMENTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE BEFORE WINTER

29–49 

THE COST OF THE CASE APARTMENTS

29–32 

 THE CASE APARTMENTS WERE RELATIVELY COSTLY

33–36 

IMPACT OF THE EMERGENCY AND SEISMIC ISOLATION

37–41 

 THE NUMBER OF BIDDERS WAS LIMITED

42–49 

 PRICE WAS A SECONDARY CRITERION FOR AWARDING CONTRACTS

Special Report No 24/2012 – The European Union Solidarity Fund’s response to the 2009 Abruzzi earthquake: the relevance and cost of operations 

 
4

50–58 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNEX I  — 

 EU SOLIDARITY FUND INTERVENTIONS SINCE 2002

ANNEX II  —  AUDIT COVERAGE

ANNEX III  —  SEISMIC RISK IN ITALY

REPLY OF THE COMMISSION

Special Report No 24/2012 – The European Union Solidarity Fund’s response to the 2009 Abruzzi earthquake: the relevance and cost of operations

 
 
 
GLOSSARY 

5

CASE: The acronym for Complessi Antisismici Sostenibili Ecocompatibili, i.e. seismically isolated and environ-
mentally  sustainable  housing. The  CASE  project  was  announced  by  the  Italian  Council  of  Ministers  on 
23  April  2009.  On  28  April  2009  the  Italian  Government  issued  Decree  Law  No 39,  known  as  the  Decreto 
 Abruzzo , which required the Department of Civil Protection to ensure the construction of CASE housing that 
could be used in a durable manner. The buildings are built on special pillars to isolate them from horizontal 
earthquake movements. In addition, they are energy efficient and include renewable energy systems, such as 
photovoltaic panels and solar water heaters.

Department  of  Civil  Protection: The  I talian  Civil  Protection  is  an  integrated  system  that  allows  the 
co ordinated use of all available state and private resources. It is a Department of the Prime Minister’s office and 
includes, by law, a number of authorities, administrations and private and public bodies (including the army, 
navy, air force, many ministries and regional governments) and members of the academic community involved 
in research activities. The budget for the year 2012 is 1,67 billion euro, out of which 72 % covers loans related 
to previous years’ disasters, 21 % operations envisaged by law and 7 % the Department’s internal expenses, 
including the cost of the air fleet. 

EUSF: The European Union Solidarity Fund was set up by Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11  Novem-
ber  2002 to respond to major natural disasters and express European solidarity with disaster-stricken regions 
in Europe. It has been used for disasters covering a range of different catastrophic events such as floods, for -
est fires, earthquakes, storms and drought. The EUSF can be mobilised only where the damage caused by the 
national disaster exceeds the threshold of 3 billion euro (in 2002 prices) or 0,6 % of national GNI. The Fund has 
an annual budget of 1  billion  euro. As of November 2011, almost 2,5 billion euro in aid was financed from the 
Fund (see Annex I).

Implementation agreement: Agreement No C(2009)9138 signed between the Commission and the Depart -
ment of Civil Protection on 11  November  2009, laying down the amount of the grant and the interventions 
financed by the EUSF following the Abruzzi earthquake.

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L’Aquila: Capital of the Abruzzi region; in 2009 it had a registered population of 73 150 inhabitants, but a daily 
presence of 100 000 people for study, tertiary activities, jobs and tourism. It is positioned at an altitude of 
721 metres, wedged between four mountain peaks above 2 000 metres. The climate is cool in comparison with 
most of central Italy.

FIGURE 1 — GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF L’AQUILA

Firenze

!(

l'Aquila

l'Aquila

!(

Abruzzo

Roma

!(

Napoli

!(

Source: Eurostat.

MAP: The acronym for Moduli Abitativi Provvisori, i.e. provisional accommodation modules.

MUSP: The acronym for Moduli ad Uso Scolastico Provvisori, modules for temporary schooling use. These mod-
ules are temporary replacements for the schools damaged by the earthquake.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

IV.
The Court found that the financed projects, except 
the CASE project, were eligible according to the EUSF 
regulation. They had all been implemented according 
to the implementation agreement and responded to 
many immediate needs of the earthquake-affected 
population. The strategy chosen by the Italian authori-
ties to construct CASE apartments was easy to under-
stand, but the project did not succeed in accommo-
dating  all  the  displaced  population  before  winter. 
The CASE apartments turned out to be unnecessarily 
costly and accommodated too few people and there 
were shortcomings in the planning of the project and 
in ensuring economy in the implementation of the 
project. 

V.
With a view to learning from the Abruzzi experience 
and taking the specific emergency situation and its 
impact into due consideration, the Court recommends 
that the Commission should: (i) consider adapting 
the EUSF regulation to the recent developments in 
 disaster-response strategies, (ii) encourage Member 
States  to  improve  their  emergency  preparedness 
to achieve timely and cost-effective assistance and 
(iii) promote due regard to economy in the design and 
implementation of emergency projects.

I.
The aim of the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 
is to help Member States and countries in the process 
of negotiating their accession to the European Union 
to respond to major natural disasters by complement-
ing their public expenditure on essential emergency 
operations. Operations to be financed include the 
immediate restoration to working order of infrastruc-
ture and plant in the fields of energy, water, waste 
water,  transport,  telecommunications,  health  and 
education, and the provision of temporary accom-
modation and rescue services to meet the immediate 
needs of the population.

II.
In  early  April  2009,  an  ear thquake  hit  the  I talian 
 Abruzzi region and its capital city of L’Aquila, causing 
direct damage estimated at more than 10 billion euro. 
In November 2009, the European Union contributed 
half a billion euro to the Italian emergency operations 
from its Solidarity Fund. According to the implementa-
tion agreement, this contribution was to be used for 
(i) first emergency operations (indicative EUSF con-
tribution 50 million euro), (ii) MAP (temporary hous -
ing modules for 7 000 people) and MUSP (temporary 
schools for 15 000 schoolchildren) projects (indicative 
EUSF contribution 94 million euro) and (iii) the CASE 
housing project for 15 000 people (indicative EUSF 
contribution 350 million euro).

III.
The Court’s audit examined whether (i) the expendi-
ture provided for in the implementation agreement 
was compliant with the EUSF regulation, (ii) whether 
the CASE project was well planned and rapidly imple-
mented and (iii) whether the CASE project was imple-
mented with due regard to economy. 

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INTRODUCTION

8

1. 

On 6 April 2009, a 6,3 magnitude earthquake struck the Italian region of 
Abruzzi. The earthquake caused severe damage to basic infrastructure 
and brought serious harm to the population. The areas hit by the event 
included the whole province of L’Aquila, most of the Abruzzi Region and 
some bordering areas. This strong seismic event had its epicentre in the 
regional capital L’Aquila, which was particularly hard hit in its historical 
centre. 

Photo 1 — Damage to L’Aquila Cathedral

© European Court of Auditors. 

Special Report No 24/2012 – The European Union Solidarity Fund’s response to the 2009 Abruzzi earthquake: the relevance and cost of operations 

9

2. 

3. 

4. 

Out of a total population of approximately 300 000 affected by the dis -
aster, more than 300 people died and 1 500 were injured. Thousands lost 
their houses and/or businesses, and up to 67 500 people were placed 
in tented camps, hotels and private houses. A significant proportion of 
the buildings surveyed after the earthquake were found to be entirely 
unsafe1 (see Table 1). 

According to the application for assistance from the European Solidarity 
Fund, the total direct damage was estimated at more than 10 billion euro, 
which represented 0,67 % of Italy’s GNI and over three times the thresh -
old of 3 billion euro for mobilising the EU Solidarity Fund 2. The Italian 
authorities applied for financial assistance relating to the earthquake 
within the 10-week deadline set for applications to the EUSF. The Com-
mission issued a decision dated 8  June 2009 proposing that the Coun-
cil and European Parliament, which together constitute the European 
 Union’s budgetary authority, should mobilise 494 million euro for finan -
cial assistance3. 

1  COM(2011) 136 final of 
23 March 2011, ‘Report from 
the Commission — European 
Union Solidarity Fund —
Annual report 2009’, p. 5.

2  COM(2011) 136 final, p. 5.

3  COM(2011) 136 final, p. 6.

4  Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2012/2002 of 
11 November 2002 
establishing the European 
Union Solidarity Fund 
(OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3).

5  COM(2009) 448 final of 
28 August 2009, ‘Preliminary 
draft amending budget No 9 
to the general budget 2009’.

In its request to mobilise 494 million euro, the Commission stated that 
the cost of essential emergency operations eligible under Article 3(2) 
of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 4 had been estimated by the Italian au-
thorities at 2 004 million euro, the largest share being due to rescue ser -
vices and, in particular, provisional housing. The Commission also stated 
that the Italian authorities declared that they were exploring possibilities 
with a view to financing part of the reconstruction beyond emergency 
operations through relevant operational programmes co-financed by 
the Structural Funds5. 

TABLE 1

EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS

Result of the survey

Safe (A)

Partially or temporarily unsafe (B, C)

Totally unsafe (E) or unsafe because of external 
risks (F)

Number of items tested

Source: Department of Civil Protection.

Private buildings

Public buildings

Cultural heritage

52,0 %

15,9 %

32,1 %

71 302

53,6 %

25,2 %

21,2 %

2 219

24,1 %

22,2 %

53,7 %

1 800

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5. 

6. 

The implementation agreement6 was concluded on 11  November 2009 
and the grant was paid out on 30 November 2009 7. 

6 

Implementation 

Agreement No C(2009)9138.

7  COM(2011) 136 final, p. 6.

8  Final implementation 
report, ‘Relazione di 
esecuzione delle spese 
sostenute a valere sul 
contributo del Fondo di 
Solidarietà dell’Unione 
Europea (FSUE)’, Protezione 
Civile Nazionale, p. 11.

9 

ibid.

10  ibid.

According to the implementation agreement, the 494 million euro grant 
(see Table 2) was to be used for:

 — initial emergency operations; the total cost of initial assistance to 
the population was 653 million euro 8, out of which the indicative 
amount of 50 million euro was financed by the EUSF;

 — the MAP project (covering the provision of smaller temporary hous-
ing units for up to 7  000 people) and the MUSP project (covering 
the provision of temporary schools for some of the over 15 000 
schoolchildren affected by the earthquake); the total cost of the 
MAP and MUSP projects was 321 million euro 9, of which the indica-
tive amount of 94 million euro was financed by the EUSF;

 — the  CASE  housing  project,  consisting  of  temporar y  houses  for 
at  least  15 000  residents  of  L’Aquila;  the  total  cost  of  this  pro -
ject  was  810 million  euro 10,  of  which  the  indicative  amount  of 
350 million euro was financed by the EUSF.

Table 2

acTiviTies  To be financed by The eUsf  (million eUro)

First emergency operations

MAP and MUSP projects

CASE project

Source: EUSF implementation agreement.

National budget

EUSF contribution

603

227

460

1 290

50

94

350

494

Total

653

321

810

1 784

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AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH

11

7. 

The audit set out to answer three specific audit questions:

(1)  Were the operations provided for in the implementation agreement 

compliant with the EUSF regulation?

(2)  Was the CASE project well planned and designed? 

(3)  Was the CASE project implemented with due regard to economy? 

8. 

For audit questions (2) and (3) the audit focused on the CASE project, 
which absorbed most of the EUSF grant (see paragraph 6). The audit 
took  place  in  the  period  November  2011  to  February  2012  and  cov-
ered a  sample of five procurement procedures and 12 contracts for the 
construction of buildings and supply of furniture, concrete, pillars and 
seismic isolators. The sample covered 35 % of the amounts contracted 
for  the  CASE  project  (see  Annex II ). The  documentary  analyses  were 
complemented by interviews with and observations at the Department 
of Civil Protection, project sites and relevant stakeholders in the earth-
quake zone.

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OBSERVATIONS

12

IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT AND THE EUSF 
REGULATION

THE EUSF REGULATION DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR SOLUTIONS SUCH AS 
THE CASE PROJECT

9. 

The purpose of the EUSF is to help Member States and countries in the 
process of negotiating their accession to the EU respond to major natural 
disasters and to complement their public expenditure on the following 
essential emergency operations11: 

 — immediate restoration to working order of infrastructure and plant 
in the fields of energy, drinking water, waste water, transport, tele-
communications, health and education;

 — providing temporary accommodation and emergency services to 

meet the immediate needs of the population concerned;

 — immediate securing of preventive infrastructures and measures for 

the immediate protection of the cultural heritage;

 — immediate cleaning up of disaster-stricken areas, including natural 

zones.

10. 

11. 

The Commission has interpreted12 this to mean that the amount financ-
ing emergency operations may not exceed what is regarded as immedi-
ately necessary (restoration to working order) and will not, as a general 
rule, cover the cost of full reconstruction.

All the operations were implemented according to the implementation 
agreement. However, whereas the EUSF regulation provided for oper-
ations such as the first emergency relief operations, assistance to the 
population and the MAP and MUSP projects, this was not the case for 
the CASE project.

11  Article 3(2) of Regulation 
(EC) No 2012/2002.

12  Report from the 
Commission — European 
Union Solidarity Fund — 
Annual Report 2002–2003 
and Report on the experience 
gained after one year of 
applying the new instrument.

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13

12. 

13. 

14. 

ELIGIBILITY OF THE INITIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE POPULATION

Following the earthquake, the Department of Civil Protection provided 
first emergency relief operations and assistance to around 67 000 people, 
who were, at the end of April 2009, accommodated in hotels and private 
houses (almost 32 000) and in tented camps (more than 35 000). 

The Fund’s resources for first emergency relief operations and assistance 
to the population were spent in accordance with the provisions of the 
EUSF regulation, as these consisted of essential emergency operations 
providing emergency services to meet the immediate needs of the popu-
lation concerned.

ELIGIBILITY OF THE MAP AND MUSP PROJECTS

The  implementation  agreement  provided  for  the  construction  of 
2 300 temporary houses (MAP) and 34 temporary schools (MUSP). Ac -
cording to the final implementation report, the Department of Civil Pro-
tection built 3 313 MAP houses and 33 temporary schools. In addition, 59 
damaged schools were repaired and reinforced. The achievements of the 
MUSP project were especially relevant, because the rapid construction 
of schools enabled families with schoolchildren to remain in the L’Aquila 
area. 

Photo 2 — MAP project houses

© European Court of Auditors. 

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14

15. 

16. 

The MAP and MUSP projects were implemented in line with the provi-
sions of the EUSF regulation. Thus the MAP project provided the popula-
tion with temporary accommodation and the MUSP project addressed 
the  need  for  immediate  restoration  to  working  order  in  the  field  of 
education.

13  ‘Norme Tecniche per 
le Costruzioni 2008’, 
a document signed by 
the Italian Department of 
Civil Protection, refers to 
a maximum duration of 
10 years for provisional works, 
but a minimum of 50 years 
for permanent works.

ELIGIBILITY OF THE CASE PROJECT

The  implementation  agreement  provided  for  the  construction  of 
160  temporary housing blocks13 containing 4 000 to 4  500 apartments 
to accommodate more than 15 000 people. Altogether, 185 apartment 
blocks were constructed in less than a year after the earthquake.

Photo 3 — CASE project building

© European Court of Auditors. 

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15

14  Municipality decision of 
29 December 2011, verbale 
No 172.

15  In the explanatory 
memorandum to the 
Commission ‘Proposal 
for a Council Regulation 
establishing the European 
Union Solidarity Fund’ 
(COM(2002) 514 final), the 
Commission states that the 
longer-term reconstruction of 
infrastructure and businesses 
must be left to other 
instruments.

17. 

18. 

19. 

Instead of providing temporary accommodation, as envisaged by the 
EUSF regulation, the project erected new permanent structures suitable 
for housing people during the years needed for reconstruction, which 
created a lasting impact on the landscape and housing stock of L’Aquila 
municipality. 

Although the Commission and the Italian authorities had stated in the 
implementation agreement that operations going beyond what was im-
mediately necessary should not be financed (see paragraph 10), the CASE 
apartments are, with their high energy efficiency and seismic isolation, 
much better equipped than traditional temporary houses and many of 
the pre-existing buildings. 

After completing all CASE apartments, the Department of Civil Protection 
handed them over to L’Aquila municipality, which is currently manag-
ing them. In the future, the municipality plans to sell some of the CASE 
apartments on the free market14. Others would be used to address social 
housing needs and for letting to university students and others. Thus, 
the apartments are expected to generate revenue. Unlike the Structural 
Funds regulations, however, the EUSF regulation does not include provi-
sions for such eventualities. This suggests that the regulation did not en-
visage the possibility of financing such new longer-term constructions15.

20. 

According to the EUSF regulation, the scope of the EUSF is limited to 
the most urgent needs, while longer-term reconstruction must be left 
to other instruments. Therefore, as the CASE project aimed at providing 
durable accommodation, it did not comply with the EUSF objectives.

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PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CASE 
PROJECT 

THE STRATEGY UNDERLYING THE CASE PROJECT WAS EASY TO 
UNDERSTAND, BUT …

21. 

For  the  temporar y  accommodation  of  people  who  lived  in  L’Aquila 
 municipality, the Italian authorities followed a  different strategy from 
those implemented in past disasters. In past disasters, the strategy con-
sisted of short-term accommodation in tented camps, followed by the 
construction of provisional dwellings and then the construction of per-
manent new buildings. The strategy chosen following the L’Aquila earth-
quake consisted of longer than usual accommodation in tented camps, 
which the Italian authorities deemed possible because the earthquake 
happened before the summer, and the simultaneous rapid construc-
tion of high-quality apartment blocks. The aim was to provide, if pos-
sible before winter, fully equipped apartments, suitable for immediate 
 occupation, including for people who had lost all their belongings dur-
ing the earthquake. Figure 2 shows the strategy adopted by the Italian 
authorities.

FIGURE 2

TRADITIONAL AND CASE STRATEGIES

Traditional
strategy

IMMEDIATE
Tents

PROVISIONAL
Barracks

DEFINITIVE
New buildings

CASE
strategy

IMMEDIATE
Tents

Source: Department of Civil Protection.

PROVISIONAL
High-quality
standard homes

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16  The European Civil 
Protection Mechanism’s 
technicians participated 
in the assessment. They 
were satisfied with the 
quality of the assessment 
of buildings. See 
Community Civil Protection 
Mechanism, ‘Technical 
Report — Community Civil 
Protection Mechanism 
Assessment Mission — Italy 
Earthquake 2009’, April 2009.

17  The choice was between 
CASE or lump sum grants 
for people who found 
accommodation by 
themselves.

18  The number of blocks was 
initially increased from 150 to 
166 and, after the census, to 
185.

22. 

The Italian authorities considered that the choice of the strategy was 
justified for the following reasons:

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

the large number of people who lived in the damaged buildings, 
especially in the city of L’Aquila;

the L’Aquila landscape is mountainous and it is not easy to find 
enough land for the construction of a sufficient number of one-
storey houses;

the expected long duration of the reconstruction work on the his-
torical centre, which implied that accommodation would be re-
quired for a long period;

(d)  extreme climate conditions with very cold weather during the win-

ter and very high temperatures in summer.

23. 

24. 

25. 

In the Court’s opinion, the CASE project did not comply with specific 
provisions of the EUSF regulation, even though the Italian authorities 
considered the strategy to be justified. 

… THERE WERE SHORTCOMINGS IN THE NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND … 

The Department of Civil Protection, assisted by international experts, 
including an  EU civil protection team of Member States’  experts, as-
sessed the damage to buildings rapidly after the event. One month after 
the earthquake, the Department of Civil Protection considered that its 
estimate of the total number of unsafe buildings was reliable16. 

The local authorities’ records were not suitable for an assessment of the 
actual accommodation needs of displaced people. In order to implement 
the CASE project sufficiently quickly, procurement therefore had to start 
before this information became available. The actual accommodation 
needs were finally identified on the basis of a census carried out at the 
beginning of August 2009, i.e. four months after the earthquake and 
more than two months after the contracts for the construction of CASE 
housing had been awarded. The census provided reliable information 
on the actual needs of the population, as it also provided information 
on the people’s preferences concerning temporary accommodation ar-
rangements17 and led to the subsequent construction of 19 additional 
apartment blocks18. 

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26. 

As  the  data  concerning  displaced  population  were  not  available  on 
a timely basis, it was only on the basis of the census in August 2009 that 
it became clear that the housing needs exceeded the planned number 
of apartments, which had to be assigned on the basis of priority criteria. 
Table 3  shows the number of families requesting temporary housing 
and the number of available CASE apartments. According to these data, 
requests for a CASE apartment could not be met for 4  294 families, or 
around 8 800 people. Although the number of CASE blocks was increased 
from 150 to 185, in April 2012 there were still 11 292 people receiving 
lumps  sums  for  rent  at  a monthly  cost  of  more  than  3  million  euro, 
162 people living in hotels and 142 in Guardia di Finanza barracks 19.

19  Il Commissario delegato 
per la Ricostruzione, 
Presidente della Regione 
Abruzzo, ‘Report sulla 
situazione della popolazione 
post sisma al 10 aprile 2012’.

TABLE 3

FAMILIES REQUESTING AND HOUSED IN CASE APARTMENTS

Families assessed

With more than 6 members

With 6 members

With 5 members

With 4 members

With 3 members

With 2 members

With 1 member

Source: Department of Civil Protection.

Total

15 752

69 

202

708

2 407

3 046

3 883

5 437

Requesting CASE  
accommodation

Assigned a CASE   
apartment

8 715

49

168

536

1 750

1 998

2 203

2 011

4 421

26

120

408

1 309

1 486

935

137

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27. 

28. 

… MOST OF THE APARTMENTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE BEFORE WINTER

The aim of accommodating the population in apartments before the 
winter (see paragraph 21) was not completely achieved. Even though 
the first apartments were ready by the end of September 2009 (less than 
six months after the earthquake) and the apartment blocks were con-
structed according to plan, only around 6 300 of the 15 000 people envis -
aged in the implementation agreement could be housed before the end 
of November. The last apartments were made available in March 2010 
(see Table 4 ). Therefore, additional accommodation costs could not be 
avoided as, in the meantime, people in need of accommodation spent 
the winter in hotels.

20  Recently, the Department 
of Civil Protection drafted 
technical specifications for 
different solutions to be 
procured via framework 
contracts. An ad hoc 
agreement for this purpose 
was signed on 13 March 2012 
with CONSIP, a public stock 
company acting as central 
purchasing body for the 
Italian public administration.

This delay was a consequence of the time needed to launch the neces-
sary procurement procedures and of the need to identify suitable con-
struction sites, which had to be analysed with regard to their seismic, 
hydrological and geological safety. Although Italy is at high seismic risk 
(see Annex III), it was the first time that the Department of Civil Pro-
tection adopted such a strategy. Thus, the technical specifications and 
tender documents for the CASE houses were only prepared after the 
earthquake20. Nevertheless, it was possible to launch the first procure-
ment procedures on 22 May 2009, only one and a half months after the 
earthquake. 

TABLE 4

PROGRESSION IN THE DELIVERY OF CASE APARTMENTS

Date

Apartments delivered

People accommodated

29.9.2009

30.10.2009

30.11.2009

31.12.2009

31.1.2010

28.2.2010

10.3.2010

Source: Department of Civil Protection.

300

825

1 694

2 941

3 588

4 357

4 415

1 042

2 973

6 328

10 625

12 772

14 554

14 649

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20

THE COST OF THE CASE APARTMENTS 

THE CASE APARTMENTS WERE RELATIVELY COSTLY

29. 

For the CASE project, the Department of Civil Protection signed contracts 
for a total amount of 710  million euro (excluding VAT ) 21, including civil 
works, green areas, furniture and other costs. A breakdown of the costs 
that are relevant for the calculation of the cost of the CASE apartments 
per square metre, i.e. excluding costs for furniture, civil works, demoli-
tion, electro-mechanic works and green areas (amounting to 112,5 mil -
lion euro, see Annex II ), is shown in Table 5.

21  In addition, there were 
costs amounting to 9 million 
euro for connecting the 
apartments to the electricity 
and gas grids and 11 million 
euro in technical costs 
that were not relevant 
for the calculation of the 
construction cost.

30. 

The average construction cost of each of the 185 apartment blocks was 
3 230 629  euro, giving a construction cost for each of the 4 449 apart -
ments of 134 337 euro.

TABLE 5

CASE CONSTRUCTION COSTS IN EURO

Type of works

Elevators

Buildings

Casting/concrete 
reinforcement

Concrete

Welded steel mesh

Pillars

Seismic isolators

Excavations

TOTAL

Contracted

9 810 023

425 305 706

55 160 175

27 344 339

15 927 758

37 562 778

12 013 512

14 542 086

597 666 377

% of total

1,6

71,2

9,2

4,6

2,7

6,3

2,0

2,4

100,0

Source: European Court of Auditors’ analysis based on documents delivered by the Department 
of Civil Protection. 

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31. 

32. 

The Court compared the cost of the CASE houses with standard costs 
applied in Italy (see Figure 3) on the basis of a commonly used refer -
ence manual 22. Thus, the number of square metres was calculated in 
accordance with the calculation method used in that manual. The basis 
for calculating the cost per square metre was 1 960 square metres per 
apartment block23. The unit cost was 1 648  euro/square metre of living 
area24, including the cost of parking spaces. 

The reference manual establishes, for social housing, a base price of 
around 1 153  euro/square metre, including parking spaces25, compared 
to  which  the  CASE  blocks  were,  on  average,  43 %  more  expensive. 
However, for prefabricated apartments the standard cost was around 
640 euro/square metre 26 for 5 964 square metre blocks, against which 
the CASE housing was, on average, 158 % more expensive 27 28.

IMPACT OF THE EMERGENCY AND SEISMIC ISOLATION

33. 

According to the Department of Civil Protection, the requirement to im-
plement the project rapidly had an impact on the selection of construc-
tion materials, working methods and contractors. The Court quantified 
the impact of these factors to have been around 27 million euro:

(a) 

The  pillars  for  the  construction  of  the  CASE  houses  were  made 
of steel because these could be delivered more rapidly than the 
concrete pillars used under normal circumstances. However, they 
were also more than twice as expensive as the price negotiated 
for concrete pillars29, which implied additional costs amounting to 
more than 21 million euro. 

(b)  The concrete needed to be workable under all possible weather 
conditions and had to dry rapidly, which necessitated the use of 
very high-quality concrete with expensive chemical additives that 
implied a supplement of around 16 %, or 4 million euro 30. 

21

22  Prezzi Tipologie Edilizie, 
Collegio degli Ingegneri 
e Architetti di Milano, 2010, 
Edizione Dei.

23  The reference manual 
refers to the total walkable 
surface. Thus, the Court 
took the average of 
1 834 square metres offered 
by the successful bidders, 
which included 30 % of 
around 180 square metres in 
balconies and staircases, and 
added the remaining 70 % of 
those areas.

24  The cost calculated 
by the Court differs from 
the cost declared by the 
Italian Department of Civil 
Protection (1 314 euro/square 
metre) mainly because of 
a different calculation of the 
square metres of surface 
area. The Department of 
Civil Protection based its 
calculation on a surface of 
2 333 square metres, which 
differs from the method used 
by the reference manual. 
Therefore, the cost declared 
by the Department of Civil 
Protection is not comparable 
with the cost reported in the 
manual.

25  Social housing (edificio 
in edilizia convenzionata); 
the cost without 
parking was reported at 
1 066 euro/square metre. 

26  Industrialised building for 
civil accommodation (edificio 
di civile abitazione 
industrializzato), Prezzi 
Tipologie Edilizie, Collegio 
degli Ingegneri e Architetti di 
Milano, 2010, Edizione Dei.

27  The reported cost of the MAP houses was 733 euro/square metre, close to the standard cost reported in the reference manual.

28  A higher-standard residential building of a similar size (1 754 square metres), including a large number of more expensive garages instead of parking 
spaces, costs 1 294 euro/square metre of living area (including parking and garages), against which the cost of the CASE apartments was still 27 % 
higher.

29  The average unit price for steel pillars was 6 061,45 euro, whereas the final unit price of concrete pillars was 2 743,23 euro.

30  This difference corresponds to the average price difference between concrete class XC4 (Rck 30 N/mm2), used for the seismically isolated platform, or 
class XF1 (Rck 40 N/mm2) used for the basement platform, and cheaper types of concrete (respectively class XC1 or Xf2).

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22

(c)  Because  only  a few  companies  offered  to  construct  more  than 
one of the 30 lots within the short deadlines, the contracts were 
awarded to 16 different bidders. Had it been possible to award the 
contracts to the nine highest-ranked bidders, savings of around 
2 million euro could have been achieved. 

(d)  Because the contractors had to implement a big project within 
a short time, they also had to pay more for materials and labour, 
as works were carried out in three shifts. These additional costs are 
not precisely quantifiable.

31  This cost includes 
12 million euro for 
seismic isolators, around 
3,5 million euro for the 
additional lifts (19 000 each), 
and 7,5 million euro for the 
additional staircases and lift 
frames (40 000 each).

34. 

35. 

Part of the additional cost is due to the choice of seismically isolated 
building structure, which required not only seismic isolators, but also 
additional lifts and staircases connecting the isolated platform with the 
non-isolated basement. The Court has estimated this additional cost at 
around 23 million euro 31.

The revised price per square metre, without the cost due to the emergen-
cy situation and the additional cost for seismic isolation, was 1 510 euro 
(see Table 6), still considerably higher than for standard constructions 
(see Figure 3 ).

TABLE 6

RECTIFIED COST OF THE CASE APARTMENTS

Description

Total construction cost

Minus: cost of urgent working methods

Minus: cost of seismic isolation

Rectified cost

Unit cost for 185 apartment blocks

Unit cost for 4 449 apartments

Price per m2 total surface (1 960 m 2)

Source: European Court of Auditors’ own calculations.

Amount (euro)

597 666 377

– 27 000  000

– 23 000  000

547 666 377

2 960 358

123 098

1 510

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23

32  Article 70(12) of Decreto 
Legislativo of 12 April 2006, 
No 163 (the Italian Public 
Procurement Law), provides 
that whenever urgency 
situations make it impossible 
to comply with the minimum 
time limits envisaged by 
the law, the administration 
establishes the limits possibly 
taking due account of the 
complexity of the works and 
of the time necessary for 
preparing the bids.

36. 

The cost incurred because of the emergency and the choice of equipping 
the buildings with seismic isolation could explain part of the additional 
cost of the CASE apartments. However, it was also partly due to the lim-
ited number of bidders, short time limits and low importance accorded 
to the price when awarding contracts.

THE NUMBER OF BIDDERS WAS LIMITED

EXTREMELY SHORT TIME LIMITS FOR THE RECEIPT OF TENDERS

37. 

Despite the possibilities offered by emergency procurement rules, the 
time limits for the receipt of tenders and requests to participate should 
be  sufficiently long to allow interested parties  a reasonable and  ap -
propriate period to prepare and submit their tenders, taking particular 
account of the complexity of the contract32. Longer deadlines facilitate 
broader competition and a higher quality of tenders, thus favouring the 
project’s success and the due consideration of economy factors. 

FIGURE 3

COST COMPARISON OF CASE WITH STANDARD HOUSING

Euro per
square metre

1 800
1 600
1 400
1 200
1 000
800
600
400
200
0

Industrialised
house

Social
housing

Residential
building

CASE house

total cost

excluding emergency

excluding emergency and seismic isolation

Source: European Court of Auditors.

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24

38. 

39. 

On the day of the earthquake, the Italian Government declared a state 
of emergency, which conferred the powers of ‘delegated commissioner 
for the emergency in Abruzzi’ upon the Head of the Department of Civil 
Protection. The  state  of  emergency  act  empowered  the  Head  of  the 
 Department of Civil Protection to issue ordinances derogating from exist-
ing laws, which enabled the implementing authority partly to disregard 
normal procurement procedures. The Decreto Abruzzo33, gave the pos-
sibility of procurement through negotiated procedures without prior 
advertising.

33  Decreto-legge 
28 Aprile 2009, n. 39.

Despite  the  possibilities  offered  by  the Decreto Abruzzo,  the  Depart-
ment of Civil Protection adopted more transparent open tendering pro-
cedures for the construction of buildings and supply of furniture, which 
ac counted for more than 70  % of the total expenditure on the CASE 
project. Negotiated procedures were used for only 30 % of the expendi-
ture, i.e. for the supply of pillars, concrete and seismic isolators. However, 
given the initial delay in launching the procurement procedures, the 
Department of Civil Protection considerably reduced the time available 
for the submission of bids for all procedures (see Table 7 ). 

TABLE 7

DEADLINES FOR SUBMISSION OF BIDS

Procurement

Call for tenders

Buildings

Furniture

Pillars

Concrete

Seismic isolators

26.5.2009

8.7.2009

22.5.2009

22.5.2009

28.5.2009

Deadline

3.6.2009

16.7.2009

28.5.2009

29.5.2009

4.6.2009

Days

Standard days

8

8

6

7

7

52

52

20

20

20

Source: European Court of Auditors’ analysis based on procurement notices and invitation letters.

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25

40. 

According to the Department of Civil Protection there were only a few 
companies capable of delivering the desired quantities and quality in 
a short time (details in  Table 8). Therefore, the Department of Civil Pro-
tection invited a relatively low number of companies to take part in 
negotiated procedures and received a low number of bids. However, 
many bids were inadmissible, mainly because of the short time available 
for the receipt of tenders, which led to poor quality bids (see Box 1). This 
indicates that, when setting the time limits for the submission of tenders, 
the implementing authority could have given greater consideration to 
the high complexity of the contracts due to the large scale of the works 
and the short time for implementation. Table 8 shows that the difference 
between the number of companies invited and the number of admissible 
bids was especially high for the supply of concrete (see paragraph 41) 
and seismic isolators (see Box 1). 

TABLE 8

BIDS RECEIVED, REJECTED AND ADMITTED

Procurement

Buildings

Furniture

Pillars

Concrete

Seismic isolators

Companies 
invited to 
negotiated 
procedures

N/A

N/A

5

7

5

Bids received

Bids admitted

Bids rejected

Percentage of 
bids rejected

58

19

5

4

3

44

18

4

1

2

14

1

1

3

1

24,1 %

5,3 %

20,0 %

75,0 %

33,0 %

Source: European Court of Auditors’ analysis based on tender documents.

BOX 1

REASONS FOR THE REJECTION OF BIDS

Among the five inadmissible bids for negotiated procedures, there was one company that requested postpone-
ment of the deadlines for the submission of tender documents (supply of pillars). In addition, two bids were 
rejected because they did not include an offer for the first lot (concrete) or because of missing documents 
(concrete and seismic isolators). For the open tenders for buildings, one bid arrived too late, five offers did not 
comply with the rules relating to the envelopes and in four cases there were some documents missing — in 
two cases the bids did not specify which labour contract was applied, and in another two cases the ‘antimafia’ 34 
certificate was missing.

34  Certificate of non-involvement in organised crime issued by the Italian Chamber of Commerce.

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26

INADEQUATE SPLITTING OF CONTRACTS INTO LOTS

41. 

Breaking down tenders into lots of reasonable size also increases com-
petition. However, unlike the procurement of buildings, which was split 
into a high number of lots in order to guarantee a sufficient number of 
bidders and better success, negotiated procedures were not adequately 
split into lots. This was especially evident for the supply of concrete, 
where one of the three lots was so big that two of the four bidders did 
not include a financial offer for the first lot because it exceeded their 
production capacity35 and were therefore excluded from the procure-
ment of the remaining lots.

35  As declared by one bidding 
company and recorded in the 
tender evaluation committee 
minutes.

BOX 2

PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES

The EU financial regulation and the public procurement directive specify that tenders can be awarded by using 
either the ‘lowest price’ criterion or the ‘best-value-for-money’ criterion. Tendering procedures set minimum 
criteria (selection criteria) that companies willing to participate in a tender have to comply with. The bids 
clearing this first hurdle are then evaluated against the award criteria (lowest price or best value for money). 

Tenders for the CASE project were awarded according to the best-value-for-money criterion. This criterion 
envisages that bidders present their offers in two different envelopes, one describing the characteristics of the 
works/goods/services offered (technical offer) and one indicating the price (financial offer). 

The merits of the technical offers are evaluated against the technical criteria and given points up to the maxi-
mum laid down in the procurement documents. The financial offer is evaluated mathematically with the lowest 
acceptable bid receiving the highest points according to the weighting specified for each tender. The cumula-
tive weighting always equals 100.

In Italy, the financial offer is evaluated in terms of a discount granted on a pre-defined price, known as the ‘base 
price’, which is specified in the procurement documents. Thus, the price in the financial offer cannot be higher 
than the base price, but tends to be near the base price if a low weighting is given to it.

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27

36  This good practice 
is expressed also in 
Article 138(3) of Commission 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 2342/2002 of 
23 December 2002 laying 
down detailed rules for 
the implementation of 
Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No 1605/2002 on 
the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general 
budget of the European 
Communities (OJ L 357, 
31.12.2002, p. 1).

37  Guidelines issued by the 
AVCP (Autorità per la vigilanza 
sui contratti pubblici di 
lavori, servizi e forniture), the 
Italian supervisory authority 
on public procurements, 
envisage that the tender 
notice should detail all 
criteria and scores in such 
a way to provide the tender 
evaluation committee 
with extremely reduced 
discretionality margins — 
Autorità per la vigilanza sui 
contratti pubblici di lavori, 
servizi e forniture, Linee guida 
per l’applicazione del criterio 
dell’offerta economicamente 
più vantaggiosa negli appalti 
di servizi e forniture.

42. 

43. 

44. 

45. 

PRICE WAS A SECONDARY CRITERION FOR AWARDING CONTRACTS

A VERY LOW WEIGHTING WAS GIVEN TO PRICE

In the case of best-value-for-money procurement procedures, the award 
criteria should be those best suited to the tender in question, and the 
weighting applied to the price in relation to the other criteria should 
not result in the neutralisation of the price in the choice of contractor36.

The supply and works contracts for the CASE project were awarded on 
the basis of the best-value-for-money criterion. During the evaluation 
process, the tenderers were awarded points for the merits of their tech-
nical and financial offers and the weighting accorded to the financial 
offers varied from 25 to 55 points out of 100.

For  the  most  important  contract,  the  construction  of  buildings,  the 
weighting accorded to the financial offer was 25/100, which was very 
low as it resulted in the neutralisation of the effect of price in the choice 
of contractor. Despite the large number of admissible bids (see Table 8), 
in practice the weighting applied to price was so low that all prices were 
close to the base price and contracts were awarded at prices that were 
not lower than the average price offered by all bidders. By comparison, 
for the supply of furniture, the weight of the financial offer was 40/100 
and the competition was more based on price, i.e. the rebates offered 
were higher and the tendered prices more variable.

The awarding of the contracts for the buildings and the supply of furni-
ture were influenced more by discretionary than by objectively verifiable 
criteria. For the buildings contracts, the most important award criteria 
within the technical offer was aesthetic/architectonic features of the 
buildings, which is per se a discretionary criterion, as there is no ob -
jectively verifiable indicator for it. The tender notice defined this award 
criterion in a rather broad manner, thus giving the tender evaluation 
committee considerable discretionary power37. Best practices suggest, in 
such cases, giving additional information to justify the assigned scores.

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28

AWARD CRITERIA LED TO AN INCREASED COST PER SQUARE METRE

46. 

The award criteria and weightings used for procurement had as a conse -
quence that, to win, the bidders offered more than the standard content, 
such as controlled mechanical ventilation38, solar shields or exclusive 
finishing materials. These devices, which may have increased comfort 
levels and may have contributed to better energy efficiency, increased 
the cost per square metre of the apartments and reduced the financial 
resources available for constructing more apartments to accommodate 
more people. 

38  One of the four offers 
audited included such 
a device, which was claimed 
to be for ‘reaching an ideal 
micro-climate inside the 
apartments, which favours 
thermal and hygrometric 
wellness and natural air 
ionisation’.

BOX 3

AWARD CRITERIA AND WEIGHTING FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF BUILDINGS

For the construction of the CASE buildings, the Department of Civil Protection followed an open tender. The 
award criterion was the ‘best value for money’. For the financial offer the weighting was 25 out of 100 points, and 
for the technical offer 75 out of 100 points. Within the technical offer, the weighting factors were the following:

(a)  architectonic quality of the buildings and external aspects: 15 points

(b)  energy efficiency and quality of the equipment: 10 points

(c)  improvement of the parameters for environmental sustainability: 10 points

(d)  architectonic quality of the internal accommodations and the quality of their finishes: 10 points

(e)  size of surface offered: 5 points

(f )  number of people housed: 5 points

(g)  flexibility and variability of design of the accommodation: 5 points

(h)  flexibility of the buildings in relation to the specific platform length: 5 points

(i)  construction time: 10 points.

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29

39  Without the scores for 
the architectural criteria, 
the final ranking of the bids 
would have changed and the 
price for the construction of 
185 buildings would have 
been 11 million euro cheaper.

40  Despite all selected 
buildings receiving very 
high scores for energy 
efficiency (thus heating 
needs should be similar), the 
cost for the most expensive 
heating system was almost 
140 000 euro, whereas the 
cost for the cheapest one 
was 67 000 euro. The cost for 
the two remaining buildings 
was 79 000 euro and 
128 000 euro.

41  One of the sampled 
constructors installed two 
lift frames for each of his 
22 buildings at a cost of 
almost 55 000 euro per 
frame, i.e. 110 000 euro per 
building, whereas two other 
constructors produced 
lift frames at a unit cost of 
23 000 euro.

47. 

48. 

49. 

Under  the  post-earthquake  circumstances,  the  criteria  should  have 
aimed, among other things, at maximising the number of people ac-
commodated. The criteria used, however, were more suitable for long-
term investments than for the specific emergency situation, as they gave 
a high weighting to increasing the architectonic qualities and maximis -
ing energy efficiency, but a low weighting to the number of people ac -
commodated and the habitable surface offered (see Box 3). As a result, 
the surface of the apartments actually procured was less than the aver-
age surface of the offers received. Furthermore, the number of people 
actually accommodated was less than the average number in the offers 
received. These factors contributed to an increase in the cost per square 
metre and per person accommodated. Furthermore, without the use of 
architectural criteria, the procurement would have resulted in savings 
of around 11 million euro 39.

DIRECT AGREEMENTS WERE USED FOR ADDITIONAL WORKS

In order to save time, new procurement procedures for additional works 
were avoided and direct deals were used instead. For example, the heat-
ing systems, which were not included in the original contracts, were 
purchased from the same contractors that constructed the buildings. 
In the addenda to the contracts the prices were calculated by applying 
the same low rebates from the base prices as were used for the build-
ings (see paragraph 44). Because the building contracts were awarded 
on the basis of discretionary criteria (see paragraph 45), the prices paid 
for heating systems were higher than necessary40. 

Considerable differences were also observed for the construction of lift 
frames, which, for some buildings, cost 100 % more than for other build -
ings 41. The final cost of some buildings increased by more than 13 % 
because  of  these  works  and  the  total  cost  for  the  same  kinds  of  ad-
ditional works varied from less than 128 000  euro per building to more 
than 280  000 euro per building, i.e. from 6  % of the original cost of the 
building to more than 13  % (see Table 9). Thus, the building which, ac-
cording to the original contract, was 34 500  euro more expensive than 
the cheapest building, became almost 189 000  euro more expensive 
after the additional works.

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30

TABLE 9

COST OF ADDITIONAL WORKS FOR SELECTED BUILDINGS

Cost/building

Contract 1

Contract 2

Contract 3

Contract 4

Original contract (euro)

2 152 476,20

2 124 913,27

2 140 101,82

2 117 980,95

Difference compared to cheapest (euro)

34 495,25

6 932,31

22 120,87

Difference compared to cheapest (%)

+ 1,6 %

+ 0,3 %

+ 1,0 %

0,00

0,0 %

Additional works

282 307,78

201 954,75

151 235,25

127 811,34

Difference compared to cheapest (euro)

154 496,44

74 143,41

23 423,91

Difference compared to cheapest (%)

+ 120,9 %

+ 58,0 %

+ 18,3 %

In % of building cost

13,1 %

9,5 %

7,1 %

0,00

0,0 %

6,0 %

Final cost

2 434 783,98

2 326 868,02

2 291 337,07

2 245 792,29

Difference compared to cheapest (euro)

188 991,69

81 075,73

45 544,78

Difference compared to cheapest (%)

+ 8,4 %

+ 3,6 %

+ 2,0 %

Number of buildings

221 

7

12

0,00

0,0 %

22

1  For this contract, the number of buildings equals 20,53 standard-sized buildings because a number of these were smaller. The unit 
price for the additional costs are, however, calculated for each of the 22 buildings because the cost for heating systems and lift frames 
did not take this difference into account, whereas the calculation of the unit price of the buildings was based on the standardised 
figure.

Source: European Court of Auditors’ analysis based on official documents.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

31

WERE THE OPERATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT COMPLIANT WITH 
THE EUSF REGULATION?

50. 

The EUSF regulation states that the Fund can only be used for essen-
tial emergency operations, including temporary accommodation. The 
regulation does not envisage financing real reconstruction or revenue-
generating projects. Furthermore, according to the EUSF regulation, the 
scope of the Fund is limited to the most urgent needs, whereas longer-
term reconstruction must be left to other instruments. Therefore, in the 
Court’s opinion, the CASE project, which provided lasting and sustain-
able acccommodation, did not comply with the objectives of the EUSF. 
Furthermore, the CASE apartments are expected to generate consider-
able revenue in the future, although there are no provisions in the EUSF 
regulation for such eventualities. 

51. 

Expenditure on initial aid and assistance and on the MAP houses and 
MUSP buildings was compliant with the EUSF regulation. The projects 
addressed the immediate needs of the population through emergency 
operations expressly foreseen in the regulation.

RECOMMENDATION 1

The Commission should clarify the provisions of the EUSF regulation in 
the light of the recent developments in disaster-response strategies, 
and consider if changes are needed in particular in relation to address-
ing temporary accomodation needs by means of permanent construc-
tions, and concerning revenue-generating projects. Furthermore, when 
revenue is expected, the Commission should ensure that such revenue 
is reimbursed to the EU budget. The Commission should also re-analyse 
the application for the assistance by the Italian authorities in the light 
of the eligible criteria in the regulation. 

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32

52. 

53. 

54. 

55. 

WAS THE CASE PROJECT WELL PLANNED AND 
DESIGNED?  

Despite the discrepancy with the EUSF regulation, the strategy addressed 
the housing needs of the earthquake-affected population. Alternative 
solutions appeared to be less effective at accommodating the high num-
ber of people given the difficult circumstances in the Abruzzi region.

The damage to buildings were assessed rapidly and reliably, but the 
actual accommodation needs of the displaced people were available 
only two months after the contracts had already been awarded. Thus, 
despite L’Aquila being located in the high seismic risk area, there were 
no  adequate  arrangements  in  place  to  make  the  information  on  the 
population available early enough to tailor the project accordingly. In 
addition, the potential construction sites had not been identified and 
assessed in advance.

Despite the lack of adequate information on the earthquake-affected 
population, the technical specifications called for high-quality and ex-
pensive three-storey blocks, which absorbed the available resources and 
reduced the possibilities for adapting the project to the higher than fore-
seen demand. Thus, the CASE project provided an insufficient number 
of apartments to address the finally identified needs of the displaced 
population.

The technical specifications for CASE housing were not prepared until 
after the earthquake. Therefore, although the CASE apartments were 
constructed rapidly, the project did not meet the target of accommodat-
ing all the affected people before the winter.

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33

RECOMMENDATION 2

In  general,  and  with  a view  to  improving  the  benef its  of  the  EUSF-
financed projects, the Commission should, using the available forums 
and means (e.g. Structural Funds and dissemination of best practices), 
promote the Member States’ preparedness to act rapidly and effectively 
in emergencies. The aim of the Commission and the Member States at 
risk should be to:

(a) 

have up-to-date disaster management plans, which would also 
ensure the availability of timely and reliable information on the 
population affected by a natural disaster and the timely iden -
tif ication  of  sites  to  be  used  for  temporar y  accommodation 
purposes;

(b)  have pre-identified strategies and solutions that aim to maximise 
the number of people accommodated in an adequate manner 
with the limited resources available; 

(c) 

have arrangements in place to ensure timely emergency pro-
curement (emergency procedures ensuring reasonable economy, 
technical specifications, framework contracts and lists of poten-
tial contractors).

Special Report No 24/2012 – The European Union Solidarity Fund’s response to the 2009 Abruzzi earthquake: the relevance and cost of operations 

34

56. 

57. 

58. 

WAS THE CASE PROJECT IMPLEMENTED WITH DUE 
REGARD TO ECONOMY? 

Not much attention was paid to economy. Although the comparison 
with standard construction costs is only indicative, the CASE apartments 
were clearly more expensive than apartments on the market. The high 
cost could be partly explained by the use of high-quality materials and 
seismic isolators and the need to implement the project rapidly. A part 
of the additional cost could, however, have been avoided if more bid-
ders had participated in tenders and more attention had been paid to 
economy when evaluating the bids.

Because of the late start of the procurement procedures, time limits for 
the submission of tenders were much shorter than normal, to the detri-
ment of the quality of tenders and competition. The lots concerned by 
negotiated procedures, especially for the supply of concrete, were too 
big, which contributed to a reduced number of bidders. The direct nego -
tiations used for awarding additional works helped to save precious time 
during project implementation, but did not pay sufficient consideration 
to economy factors and resulted, for some of the audited contracts, in 
considerably higher costs for similar results. 

The low weighting accorded to the financial offers for the construction 
of buildings, the use of ineffective technical award criteria and the high 
weighting accorded to discretionary criteria (e.g. architectonic quality 
of the buildings and external aspects, energy efficiency and quality of 
equipment) increased the cost of the apartments. 

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35

RECOMMENDATION 3 

In order to improve the economy of future EUSF-financed operations, 
the Commission should:

(a) 

(b) 

review Member States’ procurement procedures following nat ural 
disasters, in order to identify and disseminate best practices and 
lessons learnt with regard to emergency procurement;

assess whether EUSF grants were used in accordance with the 
principles of sound financial management, including economy, 
in order to identify and disseminate best practices and lessons 
learnt with regard to economy aspects.

This Report was adopted by Chamber II, headed by Mr Harald NOACK, 
Member  of  the  Cour t  of  Auditors,  in  Luxembourg  at  its  meeting  of 
12 December 2012.

For the Court of Auditors

Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA
President

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36

ANNEX I

EU SOLIDARITY FUND INTERVENTIONS SINCE 2002 (NOVEMBER 2002 – SEPTEMBER 2012)

Beneficiary 
State

Occurrence 

Nature of disaster

Category

Damage 
(million euro)

Aid granted 
(million euro)

Total aid granted 
(million euro)

AUSTRIA

August 2002

Floods

August 2005

Floods (Tyrol, Vorarlberg)

BULGARIA

May 2005

August 2005

CROATIA

May 2010

September 2010

Floods

Floods

Floods

Floods

CYPRUS

CZECH  
REPUBLIC

ESTONIA

April 2008

Drought

August 2002

May 2010

August 2010

January 2005

Floods

Floods

Floods

Storm

September 2002

Floods (Gard)

December 2003

Floods (Vallée du Rhône)

FRANCE

February 2007

Cyclone Gamède (la Réunion)

August 2007

Hurricane Dean (Martinique)

January 2009

Storm Klaus

February 2010

Storm Xynthia

GERMANY

August 2002

January 2007

GREECE

March 2006

August 2007

HUNGARY

April 2006

IRELAND

May 2010

November 2009

Floods

Storm Kyrill

Floods (Evros)

Forest fires

Floods

Floods

Floods

October 2002

Earthquake (Molise) 

October 2002

Eruption of Etna Volcano

ITALY

April 2009

Earthquake (Abruzzo)

October 2010

Flooding in Veneto

October 2011

Flooding in Liguria & Tuscany

major

regional

major

major

neighbouring country

neighbouring country

major

major

neighbouring country

regional

major

regional

regional

regional

regional

major

regional

major

major

regional

major

major

major

regional

regional

regional

major

regional

regional

May 2012

Earthquakes Emilia-Romagna

major

2 900

592

222

237

153

47

165

2 300

205

437

48

835

785

211

509

3 806

1 425

9 100

4 750

372

2 118

519

719

521

1 558

894

10 212

676

722,5

13 274

134,0

14,8

9,7

10,6

3,8

1,2

7,6

129,0

5,1

10,9

1,3

21,0

19,6

5,3

12,8

109,4

35,6

444,0

166,9

9,3

89,8

15,1

22,5

13,0

30,8

16,8

493,8

16,9

18,1

670,2

148,8

20,3

5,0

7,6

145,0

1,3

203,7

610,9

99,1

37,6

13,0

1 246,6

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37

Occurrence 

Nature of disaster

Category

Damage 
(million euro)

Aid granted 
(million euro)

Total aid granted 
(million euro)

Beneficiary 
State

LATVIA

LITHUANIA

MALTA

POLAND

SPAIN

SWEDEN

UNITED 
KINGDOM

January 2005

Storm

major

January 2005

Storm

neighbouring country

September 2003

Storm and floods

major

May 2010

Floods

PORTUGAL

July 2003

Forest fires

February 2010

Madeira floods and landslides

April 2005

ROMANIA

July 2005

July 2008

June 2010

Spring floods

Summer floods

Floods

Floods

SLOVAKIA

November 2004

Storm (Tatras)

May 2010

SLOVENIA

September 2007

September 2010

Floods

Floods

Floods

major

major

major

major

major

regional

major

major

major

major

major

November 2003

Oil spill (Prestige)

regional

August 2003

Forest fires (PT border)

neighbouring country

May 2011

Earthquake in Lorca

regional

January 2005

Gudrun storm

major

2 297

193

15

30

2 994

1 228

1 080

489

1 050

471

876

203

650

233

251

436

53

843

9,5

0,4

9,5

0,4

0,96

0,96

105,6

105,6

48,5

31,3

18,8

52,4

11,8

25,0

5,7

20,4

8,3

7,5

8,6

1,3

21,1

81,7

79,8

108,0

26,1

15,8

31,0

81,7

June 2007

Floods

major

4 612

162,3

162,3

Source: European Commission.

Grand total of aid approved since 2002

EUR 3 160,0 million

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38

ANNEX II

AUDIT COVERAGE

Works/supplies

Contracted amount 
excluding VAT
(million euro)

Checked amount 
excluding VAT
(million euro)

Coverage
(%)

Laying of concrete, welded steel mesh, realisation of 
concrete pillars

Supply of concrete

Supply of steel mesh

Supply of steel pillars

Supply of seismic isolators

Excavations

Buildings

Furniture

Civil works (total)

Demolition

Electro-mechanic works

Lifts

Green areas

TOTAL

Note: Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.

55,2

27,3

15,9

37,6

12,0

14,5

425,3

55,7

41,2

0,1

0,2

9,8

15,2

710,2

0,0

27,3

0,0

37,6

11,3

0,0

145,0

28,5

0,0

0,0

0,0

0,0

0,0

249,7

0,0

100,0

0,0

100,0

94,0

0,0

34,1

51,2

0,0

0,0

0,0

0,0

0,0

35,2

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39

ANNEX III

SEISMIC RISK IN ITALY

Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri

< Double-click to enter map title >
Classificazione sismica al 2012
Recepimento da parte delle Regioni e delle Province autonome dell'Ordinanza PCM 20 marzo 2003, n. 3274.

Dipartimento della protezione civile

Ufficio rischio sismico e vulcanico

Atti di recepimento al 31 marzo 2010. Abruzzo: DGR 29/3/03, n. 438. Basilicata: DCR 19/11/03, n. 731. Calabria: DGR 10/2/04, n. 47. Campania: DGR 7/11/02, n. 5447. 
Emilia Romagna: DGR 21/7/03, n. 1435. Friuli Venezia Giulia: DGR 6/5/2010, n. 845. Lazio: DGR 22/5/09, n. 387. Liguria: DGR 24/10/08, n. 1308. Lombardia: DGR 7/11/03, n. 14964. 
Marche: DGR 29/7/03, n. 1046. Molise: LR 20/5/04, n. 13. Piemonte: DGR 19/01/10, n. 13058-790. Puglia: DGR 2/3/04, n. 153. Sardegna: DGR 30/3/04, n. 15/31. 
Sicilia: DGR 19/12/03, n. 408. Toscana: DGR 16/6/03, n. 604. Trentino Alto Adige: Bolzano, DGP 6/11/06, n. 4047; Trento, DGP 23/10/03, n. 2813. Umbria: DGR 18/9/12, n. 1111. 
Veneto: DCR 3/12/03, n. 67. Valle d'Aosta: DGR 30/12/03, n. 5130.

SVIZZERA

BOLZANO
!

AOSTA

!

TORINO
!

MILANO

!

VENEZIA

!

GENOVA

!

BOLOGNA

!

AUSTRIA

Zone sismiche
(livello di pericolosità)

SLOVENIA

TRIESTE

!

CROAZIA

1

1-2A

2

2A

2A-2B

2B

2A-3A-3B

2B-3A

3

3s

3A

3A-3B
BOSNIA
3B
ERZEGOVINA
3-4

4

MARE
LIGURE

!
FIRENZE

ANCONA

!

PERUGIA

!

!

L'AQUILA

ROMA

!

CAMPOBASSO

!

MARE
ADRIATICO

BARI

!

!

NAPOLI

POTENZA
!

MARE
TIRRENO

MARE
IONIO

CAGLIARI

!

CATANZARO

!

PALERMO

!

TUNISIA

ALGERIA

FB 2012

MALTA

0

100

kilometri

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40

REPLY OF THE 
COMMISSION

Finally, concerning the economy principle, the Commission 
regularly assesses the implementation of all EUSF grants 
based on the implementation reports and validity state-
ments  submitted  by  beneficiary  countries  as  well  as  by 
own-monitoring and audit missions. Where appropriate it 
draws the necessary conclusions which are presented in its 
annual reports. Moreover, the Commission has presented 
a major assessment of the Solidarity Fund in its commu -
nication on the future of the Solidarity Fund presented in 
October 2011, which serves as a  basis for the current revi-
sion of some provisions of the regulation.

INTRODUCTION

6.
The  total  cost  of  the  eligible  operations  amounted  to 
EUR 1,785 billion, i.e. four times more than the actual EUSF 
grant of EUR 494 million. 

6. First indent
The initial emergency assistance to the population alone 
amounted  to  EUR  653  million,  thus  it  was  sufficient  to 
cover the EUSF grant of EUR 494 million. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

II.
The implementation agreement lays down  — upon a pro -
posal from the beneficiary country — the types of oper-
ations for which the EUSF may be used. The allocation of 
funding to the selected types of operations thus reflects 
the uncertainty and possible need for adjustment inherent 
to an emergency situation.

IV.
The Commission considers that the CASE project under the 
given circumstances fully corresponded to the conditions 
and objectives of the EUSF regulation as it responded to 
an urgent need of thousands of people made homeless 
by the earthquake by providing temporary accommoda-
tion for them until they could return to their own homes. 
The construction of the CASE blocks for so many people 
in  such  shor t  time  under  the  given  circumstances  was 
a major achievement and most were available by the end 
of  the  year.  It  was  never  intended  to  accommodate  the 
entire homeless population. The project’s total cost was 
influenced by enormous time pressure, the great number 
of people to cater for and difficult climatic and geological 
conditions. 

V.
The Commission will use the opportunity of the forthcom-
ing review of the regulation to clarify the formulation of 
‘temporary accommodation’ and address the question of 
revenue generation.

The  European  Commission  proposals  to  revise  existing 
European civil protection legislation promote the devel-
opment  of  planning  instruments  prepared  by  Member 
States in order to adapt to and mitigate the risks and their 
impacts  cost-effectively. The  Commission  shall  support 
Member States in addressing the capacity gaps and in fill-
ing these gaps in the most appropriate and cost-effective 
way.

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41

OBSERVATIONS

9.
The European Parliament regularly stresses the regulation’s 
call for a flexible application of the EUSF. For instance, the 
resolution on natural disasters of 4 September 2007 of the 
European Parliament1 ‘asks the Commission to mobilise the 
current EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) in the most flexible man-
ner possible and without delay, avoiding time-consuming 
procedures or administrative obstacles’.

In  its  special  report  on  the  Solidarity  Fund  of  20082  the 
Court examined especially how rapid, efficient and flexible 
the Fund was applied in practice. In doing so the Court 
acknowledged the importance of applying the Fund flex-
ibly and in a way adapted to the specific circumstances of 
a given disaster as set out in Article 1 of the EUSF regula -
tion. The Court concluded that ‘the Fund is working effi-
ciently.  As  regards  flexibility,  the  Court  found  no  cases 
where the Fund showed a lack of flexibility in its treatment 
of applications for aid’.

10.
The Commission interpretation relates to the reconstruc-
tion of infrastructure and plant referred to in the first and 
third indents only. The provision of temporary accommo-
dation and emergency services is considered fully eligible 
and has not been narrowed down in any way.

11.
The Commission welcomes the Court’s finding that all the 
operations were implemented according to the implemen-
tation agreement. The Italian authorities thus met the con-
ditions imposed on them for receiving the grant.

1  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference 
=P6-TA-2007-0362&language=EN

2  Special Report No 3/2008, ‘The European Union Solidarity Fund: how 
rapid, efficient and flexible is it?’ (OJ C 153, 18.6.2008)

The Commission considers that the CASE project under the 
given circumstances fully corresponded to the conditions 
and objectives of the EUSF regulation as it responded to 
an urgent need of thousands of people made homeless 
by the earthquake by providing temporary accommoda-
tion for them until they could return to their own homes. 
In  the  Commission’s  view  the  term ‘temporar y ’  used  by 
the regulation has to be applied with due regard to the 
specific  circumstances  of  a  given  disaster  and  take  into 
consideration  inter  alia  the  expected  time  needed  for 
reconstruction until the displaced population can return 
to their own homes. In the case of L’Aquila, this time frame 
was estimated at 10 years or more. Climatic and geologi-
cal conditions  — which are particularly difficult at L’Aquila 
— are other factors to be taken into account. Moreover, it 
is the limited duration of the accommodation that should 
be decisive, not the nature of the structures in which the 
accommodation takes place.

The Commission wishes to stress that the total cost of the 
eligible operations amounted to EUR 1,785 billion, includ-
ing the initial emergency assistance to the population for 
EUR  653  million. These  first  emergency  expenses  alone 
were sufficient to justify the EUSF grant of EUR 494 million, 
therefore the inclusion of the CASE project had no impact 
on the EU budget.

16.
The  implementation  agreement  describes  the  type  of 
operations to be carried out. The specific details (number 
of apartments, etc.) are given indicatively.

The  Commission  considers  that  the  construction  of  the 
CASE blocks was a major achievement and extremely rapid.

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REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION42

17.
The  regulation  provides  no  definition  of  the  term ‘tem-
porary accommodation’. Article 1 of the EUSF regulation 
however calls for a flexible manner in responding to major 
disasters. Therefore the Commission takes the view that 
the  adjective ‘temporar y ’  refers  to  the  objective  of  the 
intervention, namely the accommodation of people, and 
not to the nature of the buildings. Moreover, ‘temporary’ 
should be assessed in the specific context of a  situation. 
At  L’Aquila  the  high  number  of  people  to  be  accommo-
dated, the expected long duration of the reconstruction 
works  and  the  bad  experience  of  the  Italian  authorities 
with more provisional solutions following earlier disasters, 
led the Commission to consider that the CASE project fully 
met the intentions of the regulation. 

18.
The Commission takes the view that ‘immediately neces-
sary’ should be interpreted in the light of the specific cir-
cumstances. The CASE project  — of which the EUSF cov-
ered less than half of the cost (43 %) — responded to the 
urgent of need of providing shelter to some 15  000 people 
for an expected reconstruction period of many years. The 
specificities of the project  — for which the implementa-
tion agreement imposes no detailed conditions — corres-
pond with the strategy chosen by the Italian authorities. 
Higher energy efficiency is an investment that would help 
reduce future energy bills. 

19.
The Commission does not share the view that the absence 
of a specific provision for revenue generation in the EUSF 
regulation  would  suggest  the  non-eligibility  of  longer-
term  projects.  The  Commission  would  however  agree 
that revenue generation should be addressed by includ-
ing a specific provision in the regulation at the time of its 
future revision.

20.
The  Commission  agrees  with  the  Cour t  that  the  EUSF 
should not normally be used for longer-term reconstruc-
tion. The CASE project however does not fall in this cat-
egory. The CASE buildings are not reconstruction nor are 
they intended to replace destroyed structures but serve 
the purpose of providing temporary accommodation for 
the population until they can return to their own homes. 
The CASE project therefore complies with the regulation.

21.
The EUSF was created as an instrument enabling the EU to 
demonstrate (financial) solidarity with countries suffering 
from major disasters. Unlike most financial EU instruments 
it  has  no  other  policy  objectives  and  is  not  intended  to 
interfere with the disaster-response policy, strategies and 
choices of a beneficiary country in responding to a disas -
ter. The EUSF regulation expressly leaves the implemen-
tation of the grant to the beneficiary state. This is all the 
more true as the responsible authorities have to develop 
and implement their strategy to a specific disaster long 
before they actually know whether their application for 
EUSF aid is accepted and what the aid amount will be.

M oreover,  while  there  is  no  co -financing  obligation, 
the  EUSF  usually  covers  only  a small  part  of  the  cost  of 
 disaster-response operations. In the case of L’Aquila, the 
EUSF contributed only 27  % to the cost of the operations 
laid down in the agreement. 

23.
In  the  Commission’s  view  the  EUSF  must  be  applied  in 
a rapid, efficient and flexible manner as called for in Art -
icle 1 of the EUSF regulation. It considers that flexibility in 
this context means in particular that the operations sup-
ported by the Fund respond to the specific circumstances 
of a given disaster. The CASE project did that particularly 
well albeit in an innovative way. According to the Commis-
sion, the strategy was appropriate and met the conditions 
and objectives of the regulation. 

25.–26. Common reply
The  Commission  shares  the  Court’s  analysis  that  a high 
degree of preparedness is key to the success of   disaster- 
response operations and should therefore be promoted. 

27.
The construction of the CASE blocks for so many people 
in  such  shor t  time  under  the  given  circumstances  was 
a major achievement and most were available by the end 
of the year. 

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REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION43

28.
The adoption of a new strategy by the Italian authorities 
results from the assessment of earlier strategies which in 
their  view  proved  to  be  inadequate  as  they  resulted  in 
thousands of victims of earlier disasters having to dwell 
in unacceptable conditions for many years. The experience 
gained  in  implementing  this  new  strategy  has  already 
been mainstreamed by the Department of Civil Protection, 
as shown in footnote 26.

31.–32. Common reply
The Commission considers that the comparison with aver-
age  social  housing  standards  should  be  adapted  to  the 
specific  circumstances  at  L’Aquila:  the  great  number  of 
people to be catered for, the time pressure, the climatic 
and the geological conditions, the expected duration of 
reconstruction, etc. These specific conditions necessarily 
had an influence on cost and made the construction more 
expensive.

35.
See the Commission reply to paragraphs 31 and 32.

36.
The CASE project was necessarily prepared and procured 
under extremely tight time constraints and with complex 
technical requirements which had a justifiable impact on 
the cost.

The Italian authorities were confronted with a number of 
challenges: speedy implementation, meeting specific tech-
nical standards, minimising the environmental impact, etc. 
These factors cannot be seen in isolation and necessar-
ily had an influence on price. Had they given priority to 
keeping the costs low, the prime purpose of the operation 
would have failed.

The choices made by the Italian authorities in the procure-
ment  had  no  impact  on  the  EU  budget  for  the  reasons 
explained in the Commission’s reply to paragraph 11. 

37.
The implementation of the grant is the responsibility of 
the beneficiary state in compliance with the regulation. 
The responsibility of the Italian authorities was to comply 
with the applicable procurement rules. 

39.
See also the Commission reply to paragraph 37.

If  the  conditions  set  out  in  Article  31(1)(c)  of  Directive 
2004/18/EC  are  met,  the  contracting  authority  (i.e.  the 
Department of Civil Protection) is entitled to reduce the 
time available for submission of bids.

40.
See also the Commission reply to paragraph 37.

As explained by the Italian authorities, ‘the existence of 
inadmissible bids is not linked to the short time available 
for  submission. The  reasons  for  inadmissibility,  as  faith-
fully reported in the tender reports, should be analysed. 
The inadmissibility is more likely to be related to rigorous, 
meticulous compliance with all the conditions set by the 
tenders, which was the case despite the obvious urgency. 
Moreover, fulfilment of the conditions set by the tenders 
was necessary in order to ensure the success of the project 
in general, which was characterised by the highly unusual 
completion times.’3

41.
The directive does not oblige the contracting authority to 
split contracts into lots. 

The Member State replied to the Court’s comments that 
‘the  amount  of  concrete  in  the  tender  required  the  on-
site  presence  of  concrete  plant  with  an  extremely  high 
capacity (264  000 m3 by the end of the works, equivalent 
to  around  3  500  m 3  per  day).  Only  one  bidder  could  do 
this. The Member State also underlined that ’the tem poral, 
logistical,  production  and  economic  implications  were 
considered’.4

The  Commission accepts the reply given by the Member States' 

3 
authorities.

 4  The  Commission accepts the reply given by the Member States' 
authorities.

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REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION44

42.
For the purpose of EUSF grants, the provisions of the EU 
directives on public procurement apply, except for con-
tracts covered only by national legislation. As set out in 
Article 53 of the quoted directive, ‘when the award is made 
to the tender most economically advantageous from the 
point of view of the contracting authority, various criteria 
linked to the subject-matter of the public contract in ques-
tion, for example, quality, price, technical merit, aesthetic 
and functional characteristics, environmental characteris-
tics, running costs, cost-effectiveness, after-sales service 
and technical assistance, delivery date and delivery period 
or period of completion’. 

47.
See also the Commission reply to paragraph 42.

The  award  criteria  to  be  used  in  a  given  tender  are  the 
choice of the contracting authority, under the conditions 
set out in the directive.

48.
See the Commission replies to paragraph 37 and paragraph 
45.

49.
See the Commission reply to paragraph 37. 

In the context of this provision, there is no obligation to 
give more weight to price in relation to any other criteria.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

44.
See also the Commission reply to paragraph 42.

The Member State reply on this matter was the following:

‘[…] clearly, giving a higher weighting to the financial offer 
would  have  led  to  cheaper  bids;  it  is  also  clear  that  the 
type of works to be carried out, the complexity created by 
the timescale and the juxtaposition of works meant that 
a vast number of parameters other than price needed to 
be taken into consideration.’

The Member State also indicated that ‘the presence of cri-
teria other than financial aspects in evaluating the bids is 
not the reason for the price increase, as stated, but rather 
a key factor in the implementation of the project, ensuring 
that no contracts were awarded to technically or organisa-
tionally unsuitable contractors. These factors would indeed 
have led to uncontrollable cost increases.’5

45.
The  tender  documents  or  tender  notice  should  provide 
a sufficient description of all the selection and/or award 
criteria.

46.
See the Commission reply to paragraph 44.

50.
The Commission considers that the CASE project complied 
with the conditions and objectives of the regulation.

The CASE project responded in a flexible and very effective 
manner that was well adjusted to the specific situation to 
the urgent need to provide temporary accommodation for 
thousands of people. The Commission considers that the 
term ‘temporary’ used by the regulation must be applied 
in a way that reflects the specific circumstances of a given 
disaster. Temporary thus means ‘for the time needed until 
the population concerned can return to their own homes’. 
The fact that in the case of L’Aquila this period will take 
many years is part of the characteristics of this dramatic 
disaster.

The Commission will use the opportunity of the forthcom-
ing review of the regulation to clarify the formulation of 
‘temporary accommodation’ and address the question of 
revenue generation.

Furthermore, the Commission notes that, given that the 
declared expenditure for the other emergency operations 
exceeded by far the amount of the aid, the Court’s findings 
would not have any impact on the EU budget. 

5  The  Commission  accepts  the  reply  given  by  the  Member  States' 
authorities.

Special Report No 24/2012 – The European Union Solidarity Fund’s response to the 2009 Abruzzi earthquake: the relevance and cost of operations

REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION45

51.
Th e   Co m m i s s i o n   we l c o m e s   t h e   Co u r t ’s   f i n d i n g   t h a t 
expenditure  on  initial  aid  and  assistance  and  on  MAP 
houses  and  MUSP  buildings  was  compliant  with  the 
EUSF regulation. The total cost of these operations alone 
exceeded by far the total amount of EUSF aid. 

Recommendation 1
T h e   C o m m i s s i o n   p a r t i a l l y   a g r e e s   w i t h   t h i s 
recommendation.

55.
The adoption of a new strategy results from the assess -
ment  of  earlier  strategies  which,  as  in  the  case  of  Italy, 
proved to be inadequate as they have resulted in thou-
sands of people having to dwell in unacceptable condi-
tions. The  experience  gained  in  implementing  this  new 
strategy has already been mainstreamed by the Depart-
ment of Civil Protection, by drafting technical specifica-
tions for different solutions to be procured via framework 
contracts.

The Commission will use the opportunity of the forthcom-
ing review of the regulation to clarify the formulation of 
‘temporary accommodation’ and address the question of 
revenue generation. However, the Commission does not 
accept  the  recommendation  to  re-analyse  the  applica-
tion, as it considers that the CASE project is eligible and, 
in  any  case,  the  question  of  the  eligibility  of  the  CASE 
project or any possible savings in its execution would not 
have had any impact on the EU budget as the expenditure 
declared for first emergency operations alone amounted to 
EUR  653  million, and was therefore sufficient to justify the 
EUSF grant of EUR 494 million.

52.
The Commission refers to its reply to paragraph 50.

53.
The Commission shares the Court’s view that a high degree 
of preparedness is key to the success of disaster-response 
operations and should therefore be promoted. 

Nevertheless, the identification and assessment of appro-
priate construction sites has to be carried out on a propor -
tionate basis.

54.
The number of apartments was significantly increased in 
the process but it was never intended that the CASE blocks 
should accommodate the entire homeless population. The 
CASE project was rather part of a much wider strategy con -
sisting of a multitude of actions. 

The  CASE  blocks  responded  to  specific  needs  and  cir-
cumstances  that  could  hardly  have  been  known  before 
the earthquake. A large number of people could indeed 
move in before the winter. The Commission considers that 
given the circumstances the progress of construction was 
a major achievement.

Recommendation 2
The  Commission  shares  the  Court’s  analysis  that  a high 
degree of preparedness is key to the success of disaster- 
response operations and should therefore be promoted. 
Over  the  past  years  the  Commission  has  considerably 
stepped up its activities in the field and will continue to do 
so through the civil protection mechanism. On 20  Decem-
ber  2011, the European Commission proposed legislation 
to  strengthen  European  cooperation  in  civil  protection 
which  will  provide  a more  efficient,  effective  and  rapid 
response to disasters as well as enhanced prevention and 
preparedness actions.

In October 2011, the Commission presented new pro posals 
for the period 2014–20 which include strengthened provi-
sions regarding disaster management. A general require -
ment  to  address  disaster  resilience,  risk  prevention  and 
management  in  all  programmes  has  been  introduced. 
A requirement to disaster- (and climate-)proof infrastruc -
ture investments to be supported by EU funding has also 
been introduced.

Special Report No 24/2012 – The European Union Solidarity Fund’s response to the 2009 Abruzzi earthquake: the relevance and cost of operations 

REPLY OF THE  COMMISSION46

58.
The regulation leaves the weighting of the different criteria 
for procurement to the assessment of the Member State.

Recommendation 3 (a)
Public procurement is addressed during ex post audit mis-
sions on EU grants carried out on a risk-based sample. The 
Commission will examine whether there are lessons to be 
drawn from this for general application.

Recommendation 3 (b)
The Commission regularly assesses the implementation of 
all EUSF grants based on the implementation reports and 
validity statements submitted by the beneficiary countries 
as well as by own monitoring and audit missions. Where 
appropriate it draws the necessary conclusions which are 
presented in its annual reports. Moreover, the Commission 
has presented a major assessment of the Solidarity Fund 
in its communication on the future of the Solidarity Fund 
presented in October 2011, which serves as a basis for the 
current revision of some provisions of the regulation.

Recommendation 2 (a)
The European Commission proposal to revise existing Euro-
pean civil protection legislation introduces a new chapter 
on prevention with a view to enhancing the importance of 
the EU prevention framework and effectively linking it to 
the preparedness and prevention actions. 

Building on the ongoing work on risk assessment to ensure 
effective  cooperation  within  the  mechanism,  the  pro-
posal includes a framework for the development of risk- 
management plans at national level, taking into account 
and  coherent  with  other  risk-management  plans  in  the 
country.

Recommendation 2 (b)
The Commission plans to promote and support the devel-
opment  and  implementation  of  M ember  States’  risk- 
management plans, including guidelines on their content 
where such aspects could be considered.

Recommendation 2 (c)
The provisions of the directives and their transposition into 
national law apply, including the specific provisions that 
allow derogation from normal procedures in cases of an 
emergency, namely the one expressed in Article 31(1)(c) of 
Directive 2004/18/EC.

56.
Economy is only one of several competing objectives. In 
a major emergency situation the focus must be on rapid 
and effective response operations whose specific condi-
tions will necessarily have a bearing on price. While econ -
omy is to be sought, it has to be considered in the specific 
context of an emergency situation.

57.
Longer and more detailed tendering procedures may pos-
sibly have saved some money but would have led to delays 
in the construction of the CASE apartments. The Commis-
sion considers that rapidity and economy are to a degree 
competing objectives. Giving priority to speed over econ-
omy was in the Commission’s view a justified choice by the 
Italian authorities.

Special Report No 24/2012 – The European Union Solidarity Fund’s response to the 2009 Abruzzi earthquake: the relevance and cost of operations

REPLY OF THE  COMMISSIONEuropean Court of Auditors

Special Report No 24/2012
The European Union Solidarity Fund’s response to the 2009 Abruzzi earthquake: the relevance and cost of operations 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union

2013 — 46 pp. — 21 × 29.7 cm

ISBN 978-92-9241-071-1
doi:10.2865/53557

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FOLLOWING THE  EARTHQUAKE  IN  ABRUZZI  REGION  IN  APRIL 2009, THE 

EUROPEAN UNION SOLIDARITY FUND CO-FINANCED WITH THE AMOUNT OF 

494 MILLION EURO THE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO THE POPULATION AND 

THE CONSTRUCTION OF TEMPORARY HOUSES AND SCHOOLS. THE COURT 

ANALYSED THE RELEVANCE AND COST OF THE OPERATIONS AND IN PAR-

TICULAR OF THE CASE PROJEC T. IT CONCLUDES THAT THE EUSF REGULA-

TION DID NOT ENVISAGE SOLUTIONS SUCH AS THE CASE PROJECT, WHICH 

ERECTED PERMANENT HOUSES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE TEMPORARY ACCOM-

MODATION TO THE EARTHQUAKE-AFFECTED POPULATION. FURTHERMORE, 

THE COURT FOUND THAT THESE HOUSES RESPONDED TO MANY IMMEDIATE 

NEEDS OF THE POPULATION, ALTHOUGH WITH INSUFFICIENT CAPACIT Y, 

AND THAT THERE WERE SHORTCOMINGS IN THE PLANNING AND IN ENSUR-

ING ECONOMY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT. 

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS