FRAN Quarterly. Quarter 2, April–June 2013.
Date: 2013-02-10
Institutions: Frontex
Subjects: EU migration policy, European security, Frontex, border control, external border of the EU, human rights, illegal migration, illicit trade, serial publication, trafficking in human beings

FRAN Quarterly

Quarter 2  •  April–June 2013

Q1
Q2
Q3 Q4

FRAN Quarterly

Quarter 2  •  April–June 2013

1 of 64

Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations 
and  research,  each  marked  with  a  distinct  graphic  identifier.  Risk  analysis  publications 
bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. 
Metaphorically,  the  arrow  represents  the  cyclical  nature  of  risk  analysis  processes  and  its 
orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal 
proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive 
analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where 
information  from  diverse  sources  converges  to  be  processed,  systematised  and  shared  as 
analytical  products.  Thus,  Frontex  risk  analysis  is  meant  to  be  at  the  centre  and  to  form 
a reliable basis for its operational activities.

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation  
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

Rondo ONZ 1 
00-124 Warsaw, Poland
T +48 22 205 95 00 
F +48 22 205 95 01 
frontex@frontex.europa.eu 
www.frontex.europa.eu

Warsaw, September 2013 
Risk Analysis Unit 
Frontex reference number: 16506/2013

DISCLAIMERS
This is a Frontex staff working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the 
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of 
any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers 
or boundaries.
All maps and charts included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised 
use is prohibited. Frontex disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and 
designations used on the maps.
The  contents  of  open-source  boxes  are  unverified  and  presented  only  to  give  context  and 
media representation of irregular-migration phenomena.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The FRAN Quarterly has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course 
of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their 
assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

2 of 64

Table of contents

Executive summary  #5

1.

Introduction  #7

2. Methodology  #8

3. Summary of FRAN indicators  #10

4. Situational picture in Q2 2013  #12

4.1.  Detections of illegal border-crossing  #12
4.2. Routes  #16
4.3.  Clandestine entry  #31
4.4. Detections of facilitators  #31
4.5. Detections of illegal stay  #32
4.6. Refusals of entry  #33
4.7.  Asylum claims  #35
4.8. Document fraud  #37
4.9. Returns  #39
4.10. Other illegal activities at the border  #40

5. Statistical annex  #50

3 of 64

List of abbreviations used

AQIM 
BCP    
CARA 
CETI   
CIRCA  
CIREFI 
EASO  
EC  
ECID   

EDF-RAN 
EPN 
EU  
EUR    
EURODAC   
FARC  
FRAN  
fYROM   
IBSS     
ICJ  
ICONet   
ID  
IOM   
ISO  
JO  
MS 
PPP 
RAU   
SAC 
SIS  
THB   
UK  
UNODC  
UNSCR   
UN 
USD   
WHO  

 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
 border-crossing point
 Centri di Accoglienza Richiedenti Asilo [Italian Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers]
 Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes [Spanish Temporary Stay Centre for Immigrants]
 Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator
 Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration
 European Asylum Support Office
 European Commission
 Expertisecentrum Identiteitsfraude en Documenten [Dutch Identity Fraud and Documents 
Centre of Expertise]
 European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
 European Patrols Network
 European Union 
 euro
 European Dactyloscopy
 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
 Frontex Risk Analysis Network 
 former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
 Integrated Border Surveillance System
 International Court of Justice
 Information and Coordination Network for Member States’ Migration Management Services
 identity document
 International Organization for Migration
 International Organization for Standardization
 Joint Operation
 EU Member State
 Pakistan People’s Party
 Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
 Schengen Associated Country
 Schengen Information System
 Trafficking in human beings
 United Kingdom
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
 United Nations Security Council Resolution
 United Nations
 United States dollar
 World Health Organization

Note
As some Member States do not distinguish between the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa) 
and Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) in their reporting, ‘Congo’ and ‘Congolese’ are used as collective terms for 
these two countries throughout this report unless otherwise indicated

4 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive summary

Overall  in  Q2  2013  there  were  24  805  de-
tections of illegal border-crossing along the 
external borders of the EU. In comparative 
terms,  this  figure  represented  a  7.4%  in-
crease  in  relation  to  the  same  quarter  in 
2012 and a 155% increase compared to the 
previous  quarter.  This  is  the  sharpest  in-
crease  between  two  consecutive  quar-
ters ever recorded since 2008, highlighting 
the rapidly evolving situation at the exter-
nal border.

The strong increase was linked to two factors:
(1)  better weather conditions in the Mediter-
ranean  Sea,  which  triggered  an  increase 
at the sea border;

(2)  a sharp increase in detections at the land 
border between Serbia and Hungary.

On  the  Central  Mediterranean  route,  the 
vast majority of migrants were from Eritrea 
and Somalia departing from Libya near Trip-
oli.  Increasing  detections  continued  to  be 
reported in July 2013 in the Central Mediter-
ranean, indicating a resurgence of the irreg-
ular  migration  flow  between  North  Africa 
(mostly Libya) and Italy.

The increase on the Western Balkan route 
which  started  in  Q1  2013  coincided  with  a 
change in the asylum policy of Hungary as 
a measure to harmonise it with EU stand-
ards. From January 2013, asylum applicants 
were no longer sent to closed centres but 
to open centres. Migrants detected cross-
ing  the  border  illegally  applied  for  asylum 
and  soon  afterwards  absconded  to  con-
tinue their travel to other Member States. 
The peak was reached in June and the flow 
decreased  in  July.  The  decrease  coincided 
with Hungary organising a media campaign 
in Kosovo* and the return of migrants from 

Kosovo*, on two charter flights to Pristina. 
Also in July, further amendments were in-
troduced  in  the  Hungarian  asylum  policy, 
in  particular  detailing  the  specific  list  of 
grounds for detention of asylum applicants 
in closed centres.

At the Greek border with Albania, in Q2 2013 
Greece reported the first significant increase 
since visa liberalisation status was granted to 
Albanian citizens in December 2010. This in-
crease concerned Albanian migrants moving 
to Greece as temporary workers.

In  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  area,  detec-
tions were much lower (by nearly 70%) than 
in the second quarter of 2012, i.e. before the 
strengthening of operational activities im-
plemented a year ago. The decrease is even 
more  remarkable  taking  into  account  the 
volatile  situation  that  prevails  in  the  Mid-
dle East during the past 12 months, in par-
ticular in Syria.

Nevertheless, comparing the situation in Q1 
and Q2 2013, detections in the Aegean Sea, 
i.e. the main area of detections on the East-
ern Mediterranean route, increased signifi-
cantly and there are reports of an increasing 
number of migrants stranded in Turkey and 
wishing to enter the EU. An example of this 
pressure  was  revealed  in  July  2013,  subse-
quent to the reporting period, with the first 
detection on the Black Sea in Romania of two 
groups of Syrian migrants who had set sail 
from a small port near Istanbul.

In  the  Western  Mediterranean,  the  overall 
number  of  detections  in  Q2  2013  showed  a 
decrease compared to last year, even though 
diverging trends were observed at the land 
(Ceuta and Melilla) and sea borders. In Melilla, 

*  This designation is 
without prejudice to 
positions on status, and is 
in line with UNSCR 1244 
and the ICJ Opinion on 
the Kosovo declaration of 
independence.

5 of 64

*  This designation is 
without prejudice to 
positions on status, and is 
in line with UNSCR 1244 
and the ICJ Opinion on 
the Kosovo declaration of 
independence.

there were increasing attempts to cross the 
fence,  with  the  Spanish  and  Moroccan  au-
thorities having to step up their surveillance 
measures. By contrast, detections at the sea 
were decreasing.

In terms of nationalities, migrants from Kos-
ovo* recorded the highest increase between 
Q1 and Q2 2013, with virtually all detections 
reported  from  the  green  border  between 
Hungary and Serbia.

As in 2012, the number of Syrians detected 
for illegal border-crossing increased strongly 
between the first and the second quarter, 
totalling 2 784 in Q2 2013. This represented 
an  increase  of  123%  compared  to  the  pre-
vious quarter, though the detections were 
still lower than at their peak (3 923) in Q3 
2012.  In  Q2  2013,  Syrians  were  mostly  re-
ported from the Aegean Sea, where for the 
first time they outnumbered Afghans, fol-
lowed  distantly  by  detections  at  the  Bul-
garian land border with Turkey. Following 
the  Greek  operation  Aspida  implemented 
at  the  land  border  between  Greece  and 
Turkey,  most  detections  of  Syrian  nation-
als shifted from the land border to the sea 
border with Turkey.

As  was  the  case  in  2012,  detections  of  Af-
ghans increased between the first and sec-
ond quarters; nevertheless, their total figure 
in the second quarter of 2013 was lower than 
in any other second quarter since 2008.

In Q2 2013 there were 33 216 refusals of en-
try  at  the  external  border,  an  increase  of 
over  19%  compared  to  the  previous  quar-
ter.  The  increase  was  due  to  an  extremely 
large  number  of  Russians  of  Chechen  ori-
gin refused entry because of lack of visas at 
the train BCP on the Polish border with Be-
larus. Immediately after being refused entry, 
they applied for asylum in Poland, but then 
travelled  to  Germany  where  they  also  ap-
plied for asylum. The phenomenon started in 
March and reached its peak in May 2013, and 
mostly concerned migrants travelling in fam-
ily units. This sudden flow could have been 
triggered by rumours spreading in Chechnya 
about Germany granting asylum to Russians 
of Chechen origin.

Regarding  other  cross-border  crimes,  cig-
arette  smuggling  remained  the  most  often 
reported  criminal  activity  in  Q2  2013.  It  re-
gained  momentum  with  the  end  of  winter 
and  the  season-related  better  accessibility 
of areas close to the green border.

As regards the impact of the Syrian conflict, 
in April 2013 the EU Counter-terrorism Co-
ordinator warned that around 500 persons 
from  EU  countries  were  already  fighting 
on the side of the insurgents. Their poten-
tial radicalisation and training in the use of 
weapons and explosives could make them 
a  substantial  threat  upon  return  to  their 
home countries.

6 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 20131.  Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the 
Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and provide a reg-
ular  overview  of  irregular  migration  at  the 
EU external borders, based on the irregular-
migration data exchanged among Member 
State border-control authorities within the 
cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk 
Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, 
the  European  Union  Document-Fraud  Risk 
Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies 
is to provide:
1. 

 feedback to the FRAN community in the 
context of information exchange;

2.   a  periodic  update  to  the  situational  pic-
ture of irregular migration at the EU level; 
and

3.   material for constructive discussion on re-
porting protocols and related trends and 
patterns.

This  report  is  intended  to  simultaneously 
serve two objectives: first, to provide a clear 
summary of the situation at the external bor-
der of the EU, and second, to serve as an ar-
chive for future reference  and comparative 
analyses. Consistent with standard archival 
techniques,  some  information  is  repeated 
among sections to serve as context.

Harmonising complex, multi-source migra-
tion data among Frontex and Member States 
is  an  ongoing  process.  Therefore  some  of 
the  more  detailed  data  and  trends  in  this 
report  should  be  interpreted  with  caution 
and,  where  possible,  cross-referenced  with 
information from other sources. The statis-
tics should be understood in the context of 
the different levels of passenger flows passing 
through different border sections, the activ-
ities  undertaken  by  Member  State  border-
control authorities to secure different border 
sections, and widespread variation in report-
ing and data-collection practices.

FRAN members and Member State risk analy-
sis experts and border-control authorities are 
considered the primary customers of these 
reports. In addition to the discussions taking 
place during FRAN meetings, Member State 
experts are invited and actively encouraged 
to examine and comment upon the data and 
analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of 
the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and Member 
State experts involved in data exchange and 
analyses, it is conceivable that minor errors 
will occur in these reports due to very chal-
lenging  timelines,  and  the  growing  volume 
and complexity of data and other informa-
tion exchanged within the FRAN community.

7 of 64

2. Methodology

This, the 20th issue of the FRAN Quarterly, 
is a comparative analysis of FRAN data col-
lected  between  April  and  June  2013,  and 
exchanged between 30 Member State bor-
der-control  authorities  within  the  frame-
work of the FRAN. The report presents the 
results of statistical analysis of quarterly var-
iations in eight irregular-migration indicators 
and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the 
level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical re-
ports  exchanged  by  Member  States  were 
also  used  for  interpretative  purposes  and 
to provide qualitative information, as were 
other available sources of information, such 
as Frontex Joint Operations.

Precise definitions of Indicators 1 to 6, aimed 
at  harmonising  the  data  exchanged  at  EU 
level, were presented in the annexes of the 
Q1  and  Q2  reports  in  2009  and  so  are  not 
repeated here.

During the June 2010 FRAN meeting, a pro-
posal for a harmonised definition of the re-
turn  indicator  was  outlined  and  several 
questions  were  presented  in  order  to  mo-
tivate discussion among FRAN members in 
view  of  establishing  the  regular  collection 
of monthly return data by Frontex. Subse-
quently, an online survey of FRAN members 
was  conducted  to  gather  information  and 
further motivate discussion to fine-tune the 
proposal for the indicator. The 11th FRAN re-
port (Q1 2011) was the first to include analysis 
of Indicators 7A and 7B, and the definitions 
of these indicators are included in an annex 
to that report. Data collection commenced 
in January 2011.

**  http://www.iso.org

The FRAN data-exchange has been in place 
since September 2007. Data are exchanged 
through the ICONet Internet platform, an 

8 of 64

interest  group  of  the  European  Commis-
sion’s CIRCA server. Member State monthly 
data are based on a country template pre-
pared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. The 
deadline for submitting data for each month 
is  the  25th  day  of  the  subsequent  month, 
with the exception of the end of year data, 
which are requested by 15 January each year. 
For this 20th issue of the FRAN Quarterly, 
the target for Member States to upload the 
monthly data was thus 25 July 2013. In princi-
ple, data submitted subsequent to this date 
will  be  reflected  in  the  next  FRAN  Quar-
terly, except in cases where clarification is 
needed  in  order  to  proceed  with  compre-
hensive analysis.

Following the closure of the CIREFI working 
group in April 2010, most of its mandates and, 
of particular relevance, the exchange of data 
were transferred to the FRAN. Fortunately, 
most  CIREFI  indicators  already  overlapped 
with  the  monthly  data  exchange  of  FRAN 
members.  The  exception  was  the  indicator 
on returns, which was added as part of the 
regular  data  exchange  within  the  FRAN  at 
the beginning of 2011.

In  January  2012,  the  European  Union 
Document-Fraud  Risk  Analysis  Network 
(EDF-RAN)  was  formed  as  a  specialist  fo-
rum to oversee the exchange and analyses 
of detections of document fraud to illegally 
cross the external borders, and on all inter-
national flights.

The EDF-RAN data are checked for inconsist-
encies, and corrections are made to reported 
totals  to  bring  them  in  line  with  reported 
breakdowns.  Corrections  are  also  made  to 
any three-letter nationality codes not present 
in the reference ISO list of nationality codes.*

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013External  borders  refer  to  the  borders  be-
tween  Member  States  and  third  countries. 
The borders between the Schengen Associ-
ated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzer-
land) and third countries are also considered 
as external borders. The borders between the 
Schengen Associated Countries and Schen-
gen Member States are considered as inter-
nal borders. For the indicators on detections 
of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statis-
tics  are  also  reported  for  detections  at  the 
land borders between the Schengen Mem-
ber States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, 
Romania) or non-Schengen Member States 
(the UK, Ireland), so that a total for EU Mem-
ber States and Schengen Associated Countries 
as a whole can be presented. It was not pos-
sible to make this distinction for air and sea 
borders because Member States do not ha-
bitually differentiate between extra-EU and 
intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to 
aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-
country  nationalities,  a  large  percentage 
usually falls under the category ‘Other (not 
specified)’ or ‘Unknown’. It is expected that 
the  percentage  reported  under  these  cat-
egories  will  decrease  with  time  as  Mem-
ber  States  improve  the  quality  and  speed 
of  their  identification,  data  collection  and 
reporting  practices;  nationalities  are  often 
reported as ‘Unknown’ if an individual’s na-
tionality  cannot  be  established  before  re-
ports are submitted.

This issue of the FRAN Quarterly also includes 
main  findings  of  Frontex-coordinated  Joint 
Operations active for at least a proportion of 
Q2 2013. Namely, for sea borders they were JO 
Poseidon Sea 2013, Focal Points Sea 2013, JO 
EPN Hermes 2013, JO EPN Indalo 2013 and JO 
EPN Aeneas 2013; for land borders – JO Nep-
tune  2013,  JO  Poseidon  Land  2013,  JO  Focal 
Points Land 2013, JO Focal Points Land 2013 
and Project Coordination Points 2013; for the 
air border – JO Focal Points Air 2013 and JO 

Monthly  data  on  the  following  indicators  were  exchanged 
among the FRAN community:
1A  detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs
1B  detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
2   detections of suspected facilitators
3  detections of illegal stay
4   refusals of entry
5   asylum applications
6   document fraud (EDF-RAN)
7A return decisions for illegally staying third-country nationals
7B  effective returns of illegally staying third-country nationals

FRAN and EDF-RAN data used in the tables and charts are as of 1 August 
2013

Flexi Force 2013; and the return-related Pro-
ject Attica 2013.

Both primary data sources, such as interviews 
with irregular migrants, and secondary data 
sources, such as reports of intelligence ana-
lysts, daily reports of deployed officers and 
analytical  products  (weekly  and  bi-weekly 
analytical reports for each abovementioned 
operation), were used to provide an exhaus-
tive overview of the situation at the external 
borders of the EU. Additionally, open-source 
data were researched as background infor-
mation for the present analysis.

Acknowledgements

The  Frontex  Risk  Analysis  Unit  would  like 
to  express  its  gratitude  to  all  FRAN  and 
EDF-RAN  members  and  their  associates  in 
Member  States’  statistical,  migration  and 
document-fraud units who collect, aggregate 
and exchange monthly data, and to the an-
alysts  who  compile  the  bi-monthly  analyt-
ical reports, on which much of the detailed 
analyses presented here are based.

We are also grateful to Member State rep-
resentatives who responded to requests for 
additional  information  on  key  topics  and 
emerging trends.

9 of 64

3. Summary of FRAN indicators

Table 1.  Summary of FRAN indicators

Detections or cases as reported by Member States

FRAN indicator

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

% change on

prev. year prev. qtr

2012

2013

2013 Q2

7.4

-6.3

-4.5

-5.6

18

43

-21

-1.7

155

-9.2

5.1

3.9

19

17

-3.1

4.0

1A Illegal entries between BCPs 13 636

23 095

22 093

13 613

9 717

24 805

1B Clandestine entries at BCPs

103

126

167

203

130

2

3

4

5

Facilitators

Illegal stay

2 105

1 785

1 712

2 118

1 622

88 461

84 891

86 759

84 817

77 127

80 104

Refusals of entry

24 826

28 237

31 993

31 036

27 911

33 216

Applications for asylum

56 857

59 576

73 721

86 158

72 864

85 362

118

1 705

7A Return decisions issued

69 904

67 891

71 129

61 025

55 285

53 586

7B Effective returns

38 644

40 431

38 258

42 157

38 219

39 741

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

10 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Figure 1.  Evolution of FRAN indicators

Detections reported by Member States, thousands of persons

Line sections in lighter blue mark changes between first and second quarters

1A   Illegal entries between BCPs

2   Facilitators

45 

40 

35 

30 

25 

20 

15 

10 

5 

0 

120 

110 

100 

90 

80 

70 

90 

85 

80 

75 

70 

65 

60 

55 

50 

45 

40 

3.5 

3.0 

2.5 

2.0 

1.5 

1.0 

Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

3   Illegal stay

Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

5   Applications for asylum

Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

36 

34 

32 

30 

28 

26 

24 

22 

44 

42 

40 

38 

36 

34 

32 

4   Refusals of entry

Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

7B  Effective returns

Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

11 of 64

4. Situational picture in Q2 2013

4.1.  Detections of illegal 
border-crossing

Overall in Q2 2013 there were 24 805 detec-
tions of illegal border-crossing made at the 
EU  level.  In  comparative  terms,  this  figure 
represented  a  7.4%  increase  in  relation  to 
the same quarter in 2012 and a 155% increase 
compared to the previous quarter. This is the 
sharpest increase between two consecutive 
quarters ever recorded since 2008, highlight-
ing the rapidly evolving situation at the ex-
ternal border.

The strong increase compared to the previ-
ous quarter was linked to two factors. Firstly, 
the better weather conditions in the Medi-
terranean Sea, which triggered an increase 
in illegal border-crossing detected at the sea 
border from 3 700 in Q1 to 10 223 in Q2 2013. 
Secondly, a sharp increase in detections of mi-
grants detected at the land border between 
Serbia  and  Hungary.  The  increase  was  so 
strong at the Hungarian land border that for 
the first time since systematic data exchange 

was introduced in 2008 a non-Mediterranean 
Member  State  ranked  first  in  detections  of 
illegal border-crossing.

Figure 2 shows the evolution of FRAN Indi-
cator 1A – detections of illegal border-cross-
ing, and the proportion of detections at the 
land and sea borders of the EU per quarter 
since the beginning of 2008. In Q2 2013, de-
tections were distributed almost equally be-
tween the land (59%) and sea border (41%).

Considering the main year-on-year changes 
by  Member  State  as  presented  in  Figure  3, 
Hungary reported the largest volume of de-
tections in Q2 2013, which was the first such 
event for a non-Mediterranean Member State 
since systematic data collection began. Nearly 
all  detections  reported  by  Hungary  were 
made at its land border with Serbia.

This exceptional increase, one of the sharp-
est  observed  within  the  FRAN  after  the 
surge  reported  in  the  Mediterranean  Sea 
in the wake of the Arab spring in 2011, was 

Figure 2.  In Q2 2013, detections recorded their sharpest increase between two consecutive 

quarters, with a relatively equal distribution between land and sea detections

Total quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, split between detections and the land and sea border

Land 

Sea 

60 000  

50 000  

40 000  

30 000  

20 000  

10 000  

 0  

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1 

Q2 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

12 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013due  to  large  numbers  of  migrants  from 
Kosovo*  or  those  undertaking  secondary 
movements after having entered illegally in 
Greece. Most migrants applied for asylum 
after  upon  detection  but  soon  absconded 
from the centres.

Figure 3.  In Q2 2013, Hungary recorded 

the strongest increase compared to the 

situation a year previously

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q2 2012 and 
Q2 2013 for the top ten Member States shown by size 
of circles; gradient of the lines indicate the percentage 
change

*  This designation is 
without prejudice to 
positions on status, and is 
in line with UNSCR 1244 
and the ICJ Opinion on 
the Kosovo declaration of 
independence.

Italy also reported a strong increase from Q2 
2012 to Q2 2013, mostly due to large arrivals 
during Q2 2013 in the islands of Lampedusa 
and Sicily and near the coast of Calabria. The 
increase continued in July 2013, subsequent 
to the reporting period of this report, which 
suggests  the  resurgence  of  the  flow  from 
North Africa (mostly Libya) to Italy.

In Bulgaria, the displacement brought about 
by operational activities in the Eastern Med-
iterranean area and, in particular, at the land 
border between Greece and Turkey, signifi-
cantly increased detections from Q2 2012 to 
Q2 2013. Similarly, the impact of operational 
activities  was  also  noticeable  in  detections 
reported by Greece, which strongly decreased 
between Q2 2012 and Q2 2013 in Q2 2013(in-
cluding  detections  at  the  land  border  with 
Albania, which, in contrast to the decrease 
at the land border with Turkey, actually dou-
bled between these two quarters).

Apart from analysing the changes in terms of 
Member State distributions, it is also inform-
ative to consider these trends by nationality 
of migrants. Figure 4 illustrates the number 
of detections of illegal border-crossing of the 
top ten nationalities during the second quar-
ters of 2012 and 2013 (size of circles) and the 
degree of change between these reporting 
periods (slopes).

In terms of nationalities, migrants from Kos-
ovo* recorded the highest increase between 
Q2 2012 and Q2 2013, with virtually all detec-
tions  reported  from  the  green  border  be-
tween  Hungary  and  Serbia.  At  this  border 
section, migrants from Kosovo* represented 
half of all the detections.

HUN 

BGR 

ITA 

SVN 

ESP 

LTU 

GRC 

MLT 

POL 

ROU 

2012 Q2

2013 Q2

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

13 of 64

Figure 4.  In Q2 2013, nationals from 

Kosovo* ranked first in detections of illegal 

border-crossing

Detections of illegal border-crossing in Q2 2012 and Q2 
2013 for the top ten nationalities in Q2 2013 shown 
by the size of circles; gradient of the lines indicates the 
percentage change

*  This designation is 
without prejudice to 
positions on status, 
and is in line with 
UNSCR 1244 and the 
ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo declaration of 
independence.

KOS 

MLI 

ERI 

ALB 

SYR 

EGY 

PAK 

SOM 

DZA 

AFG 

2012 Q2

2013 Q2

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

14 of 64

Although  from  a  low  base,  migrants  from 
Mali registered a very strong increase in Q2 
compared with the year previously, from 110 
to 635. In Q2 2013 they were mostly detected 
in the Pelagic Islands having departed from 
Libya. Using predominantly the same route, 
migrants from Eritrea also increased sharply 
from 461 to 1 948 by quarter a year on.

The  number  of  Syrians  detected  for  illegal 
border-crossing increased from 2 024 in Q2 
2012 to 2 784 in Q2 2013, but detections were 
still lower than at their peak (3 923) in Q3 2012. 
In Q2 2013, Syrians were mostly reported from 
the Aegean Sea, where for the first time they 
outnumbered Afghans, followed at a distance 
by  detections  at  the  Bulgarian  land  border 
with Turkey. Following the Greek operation 
Aspida, most detections of Syrian nationals 
shifted from the land border to the sea bor-
der with Turkey.

Detections of Afghans crossing the border il-
legally decreased compared to the situation a 
year ago. As was the case in 2012, detections 
of Afghans increased between the first and 
second quarters; nevertheless the total in Q2 
2013 was the lowest for any second quarter 
since 2008. As shown in Figure 5, detections 
of Afghans crossing the border illegally have 
fluctuated in the past and are likely to rise in 
the third quarter 2013. In fact, since 2008 de-
tections of Afghans crossing the border ille-
gally have always peaked in the third quarter. 
The volume of the increase, however, varied 
widely from year to year and so is difficult to 
predict. Indeed, the situation has been very 
volatile in Afghanistan for several years, and 
Iran,  hosting  a  large  community  of  Afghan 
refugees, has been less and less accommo-
dating for Afghan refugees over the past sev-
eral months.

There were important variations in the extent 
to which several nationalities were detected 
at specific border sections between the sec-
ond quarters of 2012 and 2013. The most no-

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Figure 5.  In Q2 2013, detections of Afghans crossing the border illegally were lower than ever 

before in the second quarter

Detections of Afghans crossing the border illegally by quarter since the beginning of 2008; the second quarter of each 
year is marked with small blue circles

1 200

1 000

800

600

400

200

0

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

Q3  Q4 

Q1  Q2 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

table  one  was  that  migrants  from  Kosovo* 
detected at the land border between Hungary 
and Serbia by far outnumbered detections of 
any other nationality at a single border sec-
tion. Detections of illegal border-crossing by 
migrants  from  Kosovo*  represented  nearly 
20% of all detections reported at the exter-
nal border in the second quarter 2013.

At the same border section, detections of il-
legal border-crossing of Pakistanis also rose 
sharply. As was the case for increased detec-
tions of migrants from Kosovo.*

Detections of illegal border-crossing at the land 
border between Greece and Albania, 99% of 
which concerned Albanians, also rose sharply 
compared to the situation a year previously, 
and also compared to the situation in the first 
quarter of 2013. While the number of detections 
remained much lower than in 2010, when they 
ranged between 6 000 and 12 000 per quar-
ter, this increase may be an indication of fur-
ther increases to come in the future.

The following is a list of border sections re-
porting  more  than  1  000  detections  in  Q2 
2013  with  an  indication  of  the  most  com-
monly reported nationalities:

1. 

 Land border between Hungary and Serbia, 
where migrants from Kosovo* represented 
about half of the detections, followed by 
a wide range of nationalities, most nota-
bly Pakistanis;

2.   The Greek Aegean Sea, which in the past 
12  months  saw  an  increasing  displace-
ment of illegal border-crossings from the 
Greek land border with Turkey. For the 
first time at this border section, Syrians 
were  reported  in  larger  numbers  than 
Afghans;

3.   The  Italian  Pelagic  Islands,  including 
Lampedusa,  with  detections  of  a  wide 
range of illegally crossing African nation-
als, mostly those coming from the Horn 
of Africa (Eritrea and Somalia);

*  This designation is 
without prejudice to 
positions on status, 
and is in line with 
UNSCR 1244 and the 
ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo declaration of 
independence.

15 of 64

4.   The Greek land border with Albania with 
a  significant  trend  of  Albanian  circular 
migrants;

5.   The Italian island of Sicily with most de-
tections being of Eritreans who left from 
Libya;

6.   The Bulgarian land border with Turkey, 
where  Syrians,  as  in  the  Aegean  Sea, 
were the top ranking nationality;

7.   The  Italian  sea  border  near  Calabria  , 
where  Egyptians  and  Syrians  were  the 
most detected migrants. Most migrants 
detected  crossing  the  border  illegally  in 
this region had sailed from Egypt or Turkey.

4.2. Routes

For more detailed analyses, detections of il-
legal border-crossing are frequently classified 
into major irregular migration routes, relat-
ing to regions of detection rather than linear 
routes taken. As illustrated in Figure 6, dur-
ing the second quarter of 2013 detections of 
illegal  border-crossing  in  the  Western  Bal-
kans ranked first among the main irregular 
migration routes. Detections in the Central 
Mediterranean  area  ranked  second,  as  the 
detections  on  this  route  reported  a  more 

pronounced increase between the first and 
second quarters of the year than it was the 
case  for  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  route. 
The figure also shows the steady increase in 
detections  of  illegal  border-crossing  at  the 
land border between Greece and Albania.

Compared to the situation a year ago, sub-
stantial  increases  (more  than  10%)  were 
reported  in  the  Western  Balkans,  Central 
Mediterranean  area,  including  an  increase 
in Calabria, and at the land border between 
Greece and Albania.

4.2.1. Western Balkan route

Detections of illegal border-crossing strongly 
increased on the Western Balkan route, from 
2 776 in Q1 to 8 937 in Q2, reaching a record 
high since data collection began in 2008. The 
increase on the Western Balkan route started 
in Q1 2013, coinciding with a change in the asy-
lum policy of Hungary as a measure to har-
monise  it  with  EU  standards.  From  January 
2013, asylum applicants were no longer sent to 
closed centres but to open centres. Migrants 
detected crossing the border illegally applied 
for asylum and soon afterwards absconded to 
continue their travel to other Member States. 
The peak was reached in June and in July the 
flow decreased, coinciding with Hungary or-

Figure 6.  In Q2 2013, detections in the Western Balkans ranked top, while detections on the 

Central Mediterranean rose faster than detections in the Eastern Mediterranean

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main irregular migration route

16 000 

14 000 

12 000 

10 000 

8 000 

6 000 

4 000 

2 000 

0 

Western Balkan 

Central Med 

Eastern Med 

Albania to Greece 

Western Med 
Apulia & Calabria 

2012 Q1 

2012 Q2

2012 Q3 

2012 Q4 

2013 Q1 

2013 Q2

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

16 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Figure 7.  The strongest increase between Q1 and Q2 was reported for nationals from 

Kosovo*, who were not previously detected in large numbers

Quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing on the Western Balkan route (mostly between Hungary and Serbia) for 
nationals of Kosovo* and all other nationalities

Kosovo*

All others (58 nationalities)

5 000

4 500

4 000

3 500

3 000

2 500

2 000

1 500

1 000

500

0

Q1 

Q2 

Q3 

Q4 

Q1 

Q2 

Q3 

Q4 

Q1 

Q2 

2011 

2012 

2013 

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

ganising  a  media  campaign  in  Kosovo*  and 
the return of migrants from Kosovo*, on two 
charter flights to Pristina. Also in July, further 
amendments were introduced in the Hungar-
ian asylum policy, in particular detailing the 
specific list of grounds for detention of asy-
lum applicants in closed centres.

Virtually all detections were reported from the 
border section between Hungary and Serbia. 
In fact, detections of illegal border-crossing at 
the neighbouring border sections of Romania-
Serbia, Hungary-Croatia and Slovenia-Croa-
tia, all decreased to almost negligible levels in 
Q2 2013, indicating a clear motivation of mi-
grants  for  crossing  illegally  the  land  border 
between Hungary and Serbia.

The  land  border  section  between  Hungary 
and  Serbia  is  approximately  150-kilometre-
long, cut by the expressway linking Belgrade in 
Serbia and Budapest in Hungary through the 
BCP of Röszke. This is one of the main transit 
points for traffic from the Western Balkans 
to Member States. Most detections of illegal 
border-crossing were reported from the area 
around BCP Röszke, as it provides the easi-
est opportunity for migrants to continue their 
journey onwards to Member States.

In  previous  quarters,  the  Western  Balkan 
route was mostly used for secondary move-
ments of migrants who had originally illegally 
entered the EU from Turkey to Greece. De-
tections of illegal border-crossing associated 
with such secondary movements indeed in-
creased markedly in Q2 2013, with increas-
ing detections of nationals from Pakistan and 
Algeria in particular.

This secondary flow across the Western Bal-
kans  includes  persons  who  have  stayed  in 
Greece for a long period, but increasingly also 
those  who  have  recently  arrived  on  Greek 
Islands from Turkey and are on their way to 
other  Member  States.  The  growing  detec-
tions  of  persons  from  the  regions  of  North 
and West Africa probably also indicates an in-
crease in the use of flight connections from 
their origin countries to Turkey.

The sharpest increase was reported for na-
tionals  of  Kosovo*  who  had  not  been  de-
tected in large numbers before January 2013 
(see Fig. 7). From Kosovo* migrants travel by 
public transport to Serbia, which they en-
ter  using  Kosovo*  ID  cards,  and  then  they 
immediately  try  to  reach  Subotica  at  the 
border with Hungary. In Subotica, local fa-

*  This designation is 
without prejudice to 
positions on status, 
and is in line with 
UNSCR 1244 and the 
ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo declaration of 
independence.

17 of 64

Figure 8.  In Q2 2013, compared to the situation a year ago, detections of illegal border-crossing increased in the Western 

Balkans, in the Central Mediterranean (including Calabria) and at the land border between Greece and Albania

Detections of illegal border-crossing in Q2 2013 by route and percentage change in relation to Q2 2012

cilitators and taxi drivers take the migrants 
to the vicinity of the border and then they 
continue towards Hungary on foot.

Consequently, detections of Kosovo* citizens 
staying illegally in other Member States re-
corded a marked increase in Germany and 
Austria.  Similarly,  detections  of  Pakistanis 
and Algerians, the main other nationalities 
detected  at  the  border  between  Hungary 
and Serbia in Q2, were also increasingly de-
tected staying illegally in Germany, Austria, 
France and Italy.

in closed centres (see Section 4.7. Asylum 
claims). Information received from the Hun-
garian authorities and within Frontex Joint 
Operations  active  at  the  land  border  be-
tween  Hungary  and  Serbia  showed  that 
the  number  of  detections  of  illegal  bor-
der-crossing fell markedly in the first few 
weeks of July. It is thus expected that the 
flow  of  migrants  detected  crossing  the 
border illegally will further decrease in the 
third quarter 2013.

4.2.2. Central Mediterranean route

In  July,  further  amendments  were  intro-
duced  in  the  Hungarian  asylum  policy, 
in  particular  detailing  the  specific  list  of 
grounds for detention of asylum applicants 

Irregular migration in the Central Mediter-
ranean  area  increased  massively  back  in 
2011, largely due to the political and civil un-
rest across North Africa, particularly in Tu-

*  This designation is 
without prejudice to 
positions on status, 
and is in line with 
UNSCR 1244 and the 
ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo declaration of 
independence.

18 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Source: FRAN data as of 5 August 2013Western  Africa 33 31 +6% 1 384 1 549 -13% Western  Med Central  Med Apulia  Calabria 3 013 1 751 +72% Albania 8 937 1 402 +537% Western Balkans 338 552 -39% Eastern land border 4 532 14 125 -68% Q2 2013 Q2 2012 % change Eastern  Med5 311 2 548 +108% 1 288 1 137 +13% Land borderSea borderTable 2.  In Q2 2013, for the second consecutive quarter, the largest number of detections were reported from 

the Western Balkans

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main irregular migration route

2012

2013

2013 Q2

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

% change on

prev. year prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Western Balkan route

1 472

1 402

2 028

1 489

2 776

Kosovo*

Pakistan

Algeria

Other

Central Mediterranean route

Eritrea

Somalia

Egypt

Other

186

122

287

877

928

39

548

0

341

197

151

234

820

2 548

215

1 085

408

840

271

389

155

1 213

3 427

411

854

287

1 875

Eastern Mediterranean route

8 220

14 125

11 073

288

199

102

900

3 476

1 224

907

135

1 210

3 806

971

1 111

52

1 672

1 357

1 307

28

3

19

567

388

340

1 481

1 124

3

271

216

634

2 734

951

524

133

1 126

1 174

1 117

21

3

33

8 937

4 439

1 496

491

2 511

5 311

1 824

1 141

411

1 935

4 532

2 043

1 213

217

1 059

3 013

2 985

10

10

8

1 911

3 739

430

8 045

1 751

1 729

2

0

20

3 543

3 328

266

3 936

1 203

1 196

1

1

5

1 549

2 002

1 879

1 175

1 348

487

575

21

466

524

859

60

559

464

411

109

895

1 137

1 896

1 078

112

64

270

691

552

130

56

14

352

31

0

0

0

31

0

0

0

0

0

131

313

414

1 038

423

79

58

22

264

40

0

9

0

31

1

0

0

0

1

3

91

401

583

437

90

30

103

214

91

5

6

2

78

0

0

0

0

0

595

226

86

268

502

4

58

285

155

220

40

13

33

134

12

4

5

1

2

0

0

0

0

0

632

319

120

277

1 288

353

339

292

304

338

81

42

33

182

33

19

5

3

6

5

2

2

1

0

537

2 153

891

110

206

108

748

5.2

0.7

130

-68

6.9

-68

-50

-87

72

73

400

 n.a.

-60

-13

30

-45

471

-41

13

215

430

8.1

-56

-39

-38

-25

136

-48

6.5

 n.a.

 n.a.

 n.a.

-81

 n.a.

 n.a.

 n.a.

 n.a.

 n.a.

222

683

286

44

70

373

60 700

321

90

205

66

115

131

63

-6.0

157

167

-52

233

-76

15

6.2

41

395

3.4

157

8 725

484

2.5

96

54

103

223

0

36

175

375

0

200

200

 n.a.

 n.a.

 n.a.

 n.a.

 n.a.

36

50

17

5.5

28

21

34

21

7.7

36

18

45

27

4.8

23

12

99

0.3

0.3

0.3

5.4

47

24

8.9

21

5.2

27

26

23

24

1.4

24

12

10

54

0.1

58

15

9.1

18

0

40

40

20

0

Syria

Afghanistan

Somalia

Other

Circular route from Albania to Greece

Albania

Kosovo*

Georgia

Other

Western Mediterranean route

Not specified

Algeria

Mali

Other

Apulia and Calabria

Egypt

Syria

Pakistan

Other

Eastern borders route

Georgia

Moldova

Vietnam

Other

Western African route

Mali

Senegal

Guinea

Other

Other

Turkey

Guinea

Morocco

Other

Total

697

1 388

401

5 734

1 191

1 166

3

3

19

967

297

170

4

496

661

178

4

71

408

185

29

27

19

110

12

0

0

0

12

0

0

0

0

0

13 636 23 095 22 093 13 613

9 717 24 805

7.4

155

100

*    This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration 

of independence.

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

19 of 64

nisia and Libya. Since the end of that year, 
irregular migration in the region has been 
more  stable,  but  detections  of  illegal  bor-
der-crossing markedly increased from 1 124 
detections in Q1 2013 to 5 311 in Q2. The in-
crease started in May, as a result of better 
weather  conditions.  According  to  reports 
subsequent to the reporting period, detec-
tions further increased in July 2013, indicat-
ing a resurgence of irregular migration flow 
along this route.

In the second quarter of 2013, most arrivals 
were  recorded  in  Lampedusa  and  in  Sicily  . 
In  addition,  Malta  reported  208  detections 
of illegal border-crossing.

Launched  on  6  May  ,  the  JO  Hermes  2013 
took  over  the  JO  Hermes  2012.  The  opera-
tion was established to support the Italian 
authorities  in  tackling  irregular  maritime 
migration on the coasts of Sicily, Pantelleria 
and the Pelagic Islands (Lampedusa, Linosa, 
Lampione).  Compared  to  2012,  the  opera-
tional area has been enlarged to the south-
east coast of Sicily.

Most  migrants  departed  from  Libya,  from 
the coastal area near Tripoli. According to 
various  sources,  many  more  migrants  are 
waiting  on  the  Libyan  coast  to  travel  to-
wards Italy.

Most migrants detected for illegal border-
crossing  on  the  Central  Mediterranean 
route  were  from  Eritrea  (1  824)  or  Soma-
lia (1 141), together representing 56% of all 
detections  on  this  route  in  Q2  2013.  West 
Africans (1 088) represented another large 
group of migrants, coming mostly from the 
Gambia and Mali.

During interviews of migrants conducted in 
the framework of the JO Hermes, most Eri-
treans and Somalis indicated that they had 
left their country due to security concerns 
rather than economic reasons. Apparently 

they  were  threatened  by  regional  author-
ities or by members of different clans. So-
malis and Eritreans reported using the same 
route  through  Ethiopia  and  Sudan.  Khar-
toum in Sudan was often mentioned as an 
important gathering point, where facilita-
tion services can be easily found. The fare 
for transportation from Khartoum to Libya 
was mentioned to be at around USD 500, 
on Toyota pick-up trucks driven by armed 
Chadian nationals. However, once in Libya, 
they  were  requested  to  pay  an  additional 
fare (USD 200) for the final leg of the jour-
ney to Sabha. From there, they had to find 
their  way  to  Tripoli.  From  Tripoli,  the  sea 
crossing  to  Lampedusa  was  reported  to 
cost another USD 500–1 500. All together, 
the journey from the Horn of Africa to Trip-
oli lasted between one and three months, 
and the migrants paid between USD 2 000 
and USD 4 000, depending on their nego-
tiation skills. In most cases Italy was indi-
cated as the destination country, although 
in a few cases, Scandinavian countries were 
also mentioned.

Compared to the journey from the Horn of 
Africa,  the  trip  from  West  Africa  to  Tripoli 
was reported as much less costly, at about 
USD  1  000.  One  of  the  reasons  is  that  mi-
grants from West African countries often find 
their own way to Agadez in Niger, using avail-
able public transportation. Some claimed to 
have paid as little as USD 45 to get from Aga-
dez to the Libyan border. Many reported to 
have taken their journey in stages, stopping 
over in different cities doing menial jobs to 
finance the next leg of their travel.

Egyptians  were  also  reported  on  the  Cen-
tral Mediterranean route, with 411 detections 
in Q2 2013. In this way, Egyptians intend to 
avoid being returned to Egypt, as the return 
agreement between Egypt and Italy does not 
include  minors.  These  cases  show  that  fa-
cilitation networks are well aware of Italian 
immigration law and use this knowledge to 

20 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013contour it as part of their modus operandi to 
smuggle migrants into the EU.

Some Syrians (163) were also detected, but 
during the interviews they mentioned they 
had  left  Turkey  on  a  sailing  boat  with  the 
assistance of facilitators. On their way to It-
aly they stopped to pick up additional mi-
grants.  In Q2 2013, a relatively large number 
of Pakistani migrants arrived in Lampedusa. 
This is rather unusual as Pakistani migrants 
are usually detected on the Eastern Medi-
terranean route. In contrast to most other 
migrants who mentioned to have departed 
from Tripoli, the Pakistani migrants reported 
having left Libya from Zuwarah.

4.2.3. Apulia and Calabria

In  Apulia  and  Calabria  in  southern  Italy, 
detections tend to be associated with dif-
ferent  movements  of  irregular  migration. 
Most of the detections in the area of Apulia 
are  linked  to  secondary  movements  from 
Greece  to  Italy,  while  most  of  the  detec-
tions  in  Calabria  are  associated  with  mi-
grants who departed from Turkey or Egypt, 
sailed  across  the  Aegean  Sea,  often  near 
Crete, towards Italy.

In this area, the JO EPN Aeneas 2013 started 
on 3 June and is scheduled to run until 30 Sep-
tember  2013.  The  Operational  Plan  defines 
two operational areas (Apulia and Calabria) 
covering the shore of the Ionian Sea and part 
of the Adriatic Sea. As in previous quarters, 
detections in the second quarter of the year 
in Apulia (288) were much lower than detec-
tions in Calabria (1 000).

With  regard  to  detections  in  Apulia,  re-
ports  from  the  JO  Poseidon  Sea  indicated 
many departures from the Greek island of 
Corfu. As in previous years, most migrants 
were nationals from Asian and Middle East-
ern countries who had previously entered 
Greece visa the land and sea border. Accord-

a
r
e

i

i
t
s
o
C
a
d
r
a
u
G
©

Figure 9.  Italian coast guards help immigrants out 

of their boat off the coast of Lampedusa – most 

migrants departed from Libya and were from the 

Horn of Africa

ing to migrant statements, Athens remains 
the  main  place  for  migrants  to  organise 
their trip, with facilitation networks offer-
ing various options according to the budget 
of the migrants.

Reports from JO EPN Aeneas 2013 show that 
the number of migrants illegally crossing the 
Ionian Sea from Greece to Italy was decreas-
ing  in  the  recent  months.  This  decrease  in 
secondary movements is linked to the prefer-
ence of migrants to travel from Greece across 
the Western Balkans to their final destina-
tion in the EU.

Interestingly, some migrants were detected 
near Bari, in Apulia, and maintained that they 
had arrived after leaving Greece and making 
the land journey across the Western Balkans. 
They made this long journey to Bari follow-
ing  facilitators’  recommendations  to  pre-
sent themselves at the CARA Centre on the 
grounds that the likelihood for them to ob-
tain asylum was higher there than elsewhere. 
These incidents indirectly reveal the ease for 
irregular migrants to travel across the West-
ern Balkans from Greece to Italy.

Detections in Calabria were mostly associ-
ated with departures from Turkey and Egypt, 
and  the  main  nationality  detected  there 

21 of 64

 
 
was  Syrians.  Information  provided  by  the 
Intelligence Officer of the JO Hermes 2013 
showed that, as in 2012, the modus operandi 
involved Egyptian facilitators and Asian ir-
regular migrants. The Egyptian facilitators 
using Egyptian fishing vessels departed from 
an Egyptian port heading to Crete. Once in 
Crete, the migrants were transferred to an-
other fishing vessel to continue their jour-
ney towards Calabria in Italy. According to 
information provided by migrants, Alexan-
dria continues to be the main hub for mi-
grants  wanting  to  reach  Italy.  The  price 
requested  by  facilitators  varies  from  USD 
3 000 to 5 000.

Many  migrants  reported  transhipment  in 
high seas from large fishing boats to smaller 
wooden  boats  to  reach  the  shores.  In  July 
2013, for the first time, evidence of this mo-
dus operandi was obtained from the camera 
of an Icelandic airplane deployed in the con-
text of the JO Aeneas.

The facilitation networks operating in Egypt 
and Italy maintain contact via satellite tele-
phones. In one case, the facilitators onboard 
faced technical difficulties with one boat and 
were able to request another vessel to con-
tinue the trip to Italy.

The number of Egyptians detected in Apulia 
and Calabria reached a record level during Q2 
2013. Most of the migrants were single males, 
indicating that so far facilitators are still tar-
geting mostly economic migrants rather than 
entire family units fleeing violence. Little in-
formation  could  be  gathered  during  inter-
views, but the migrants did not represent a 
particular religious community.

This  increase  might  be  a  sign  that  estab-
lished  facilitation  networks  are  taking 
advantage  of  the  difficult  economic  and 
political  conditions  in  Egypt  to  offer  their 
services  to  an  increasing  number  of  mi-
grants. Nevertheless, the return agreement 

between Italy and Egypt continued to be in 
force  and  most  detected  adult  Egyptians 
were  eventually  returned.  However,  com-
paring returns and detections of illegal bor-
der-crossing, the gap between detections of 
illegal border-crossing and return was wid-
ening in Q2 2013.

The  quick  and  effective  return  of  migrants 
who have crossed the border illegally is seen 
as an important measure to prevent would-
be migrants in Egypt from embarking into a 
perilous sea crossing. If the return capacity 
would  be  saturated,  for  example  due  to  a 
sudden and large wave of migrants, it is likely 
that  the  news  will  spread  quickly  among 
would-be migrants in Egypt and trigger fur-
ther arrivals.

4.2.4. Eastern Mediterranean route

Since 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean route 
has been a major hotspot of irregular migra-
tion into the EU, mostly associated with ille-
gal border-crossings from Turkey. However, 
since  early  August  2012  detections  on  this 
route have been at much lower levels. In Q2 
2013 there were 4 532 detections of illegal bor-
der-crossing  on  the  Eastern  Mediterranean 
route,  which  constitutes  a  decrease  of  68% 
compared  to  the  same  period  in  2012.  De-
tections on the Eastern Mediterranean route 
represented 18% of the EU total in Q2 2013.

The marked decrease in detections observed 
since  August  2012  is  due  to  a  range  of  op-
erational  activities  taking  place  at  different 
border  sections  on  the  Eastern  Mediterra-
nean route:

1. 

 The  Greek  operation  Aspida  deployed 
additional manpower, assets and equip-
ment to the Evros region in order to curb 
the  flow  of  irregular  border-crossing. 
The  fourth  phase  of  this  operation  was 
launched in April 2013. In addition to the 
operation  Aspida,  the  operation  Xenios 

22 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Figure 10.  On 24 July 2013, a transhipment of 83 migrants (Syrians, Egyptians, Palestinians 

and Iraqis) in the Ionian Sea was the first documented evidence of this modus operandi; their 

places of departure were Alexandria (Egypt) and Latakia (Syria). The video footage (left) was 

recorded from an Icelandic aircraft deployed in the framework of the JO Aeneas 2013

Zeus  focused  on  detecting  migrants  in 
land in urban areas around Athens.

2.   A Specialised Police Operation at the Bul-
garian-Turkish land border and enhanced 
air surveillance have been ongoing since 
1 October 2012. Since 1 July 2012, the Bul-
garian authorities have implemented an 
Integrated  Border  Surveillance  System 
(IBSS)*  at  the  border  section  between 
the  BCPs  of  Kapitan  Andreevo  and  Les-
ovo, covering 58 km. Regular bilateral joint 
meetings for preventing and resolving bor-
der incidents take place under an agree-
ment signed between Bulgaria and Turkey.

3.   The JO Poseidon Land 2013 that was ac-
tive during Q2 2013 at the land border with 
Turkey.  Regular  meetings  between  the 
Greek and Turkish authorities take place 
on a monthly basis with the exchange of 
relevant data and information.

As can be seen in Figure 11, this range of op-
erational  activities  led  to  a  rapid  and  sus-
tained  decrease  in  detections.  Detections 
at  the  borders  with  Turkey  have  remained 
lower  since  the  activation  of  these  opera-
tional measures. In the second quarter 2013, 
detections in the Aegean Sea were the larg-
est on this route, but overall detections were 
much lower than a year ago.

With  2  043  detections  in  Q2  2013,  Syrians 
were  by  far  the  most  detected  nationality 
on this route. More than half of these detec-
tions were in the Eastern Aegean Sea region, 
with significant numbers also at the Bulgar-
ian land border with Turkey. Interviews are 
not routinely performed in Bulgaria, but na-
tionality swapping was confirmed by a Fron-
tex  screening  team.  Nationality  swapping 
may have artificially inflated numbers of de-
tected Syrians at the Bulgarian land border 
with Turkey.

4.   The JO Poseidon Sea 2013 was also ac-
tive during the reporting period in order 
to tackle the flow of irregular migrants 
penetrating the external EU sea borders 
in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  mainly 
from Turkey and, to a lesser extent, from 
Egypt.

For  much  of  the  last  few  years  migrants 
from Afghanistan have been detected in very 
high  numbers  on  the  Eastern  Mediterra-
nean route; in Q2 2013 far fewer (just 1 213) 
were detected although they were still the 
second most commonly detected national-
ity on this route.

*  The system consists 
of stationary posts with 
long-range 360-degree 
cameras triggered by 
movement-detection 
sensors. It is currently 
operative along a 
58-kilometre stretch of the 
Bulgarian-Turkish border 
plus a short section of the 
Greek-Bulgarian border. 
It is planned to cover the 
whole Bulgarian-Turkish 
border by mid-2015.

23 of 64

Figure 11.  Since August 2012, detections in the Eastern Mediterranean have shown a marked decrease following enhanced 

operational activity in the area

Monthly detections of irregular migration at the border with or on entry from Turkey

Illegal border-crossing and document fraud

8 000 

7 000 

6 000 

5 000 

4 000 

3 000 

2 000 

1 000 

0 

Increased operational activities  

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Flights from Turkey
(fraudsters)
353 

Bulgarian land 
border with Turkey 
1 059 

Greek land border 
with Turkey 
249  

Istanbul 

East Aegean Sea 
3 097 – Q2 2013 

Detections of:

Document fraudsters 
on ﬂights from Turkey

Illegal border-crossing across 
the blue border

Illegal border-crossing across 
the green border to Bulgaria

Illegal border-crossing across 
the green border to Greece

Source: FRAN, EDF-RAN and JO data as of 1 August 2013

Greek land border with Turkey

During  the  first  half  of  2012,  the  Greek 
land  border  with  Turkey  was  the  undis-
puted hotspot for illegal border-crossings 
into  the  Schengen  area.  However,  since 
August 2012 detections at the Greek land 
border  with  Turkey  have  been  much  re-
duced  following  the  launch  of  the  Greek 
operation Aspida.

While detections of illegal border-crossing 
have much reduced, the Greek authorities 
also regularly reported observing migrants 
on  the  Turkish  territory.  The  Turkish  au-
thorities themselves reported on their web-
site the detections of several hundreds of 
migrants in areas close to the Greek land 
border. These reports are indicative of sus-
tained  pressure  of  irregular  migration  on 
this route.

24 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the reporting period, the Greek au-
thorities reported several facilitation cases 
on roads close to the border, including mi-
grants  detected  hiding  in  vehicles  on  the 
Egnatia highway which allows for rapid con-
nection from the Turkish border to the bor-
der  with  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of 
Macedonia. One of these cases involved a 
Bulgarian facilitator in a vehicle carrying 11 
migrants. Another case involved migrants 
hiding  in  a  lorry  that  had  just  crossed  the 
border. The migrants started the journey in 
Istanbul and left the lorry before the bor-
der. They crossed through the green border 
while  the  lorry  crossed  the  border  empty. 
They went back on the same lorry once in 
Greek  territory  and  were  detected  on  the 
Egnatia highway.

These  recent  cases  suggest  that,  in  con-
trast  to  the  situation  in  early  2012  when 
migrants  were  actually  waiting  to  be  de-
tected by the police, they now try to avoid 
detections  when  crossing  the  border  ille-
gally  and  during  their  journey  inland.  It  is 
also reasonable to assume that with more 
migrants hiding, the number of undetected 
migrants may also be increasing, although 
so far no evidence to suggest that it would 
be in significant number.

Bulgarian land border with Turkey

Detections at the Bulgarian land border with 
Turkey began to increase almost immediately 
after the beginning of the Greek operation 
Aspida,  but  the  Bulgarian  authorities  were 
quick in strengthening their surveillance.

In the second quarter, information gathered 
during  JO  Poseidon  showed  that  migrants 
were  increasingly  detected  in  the  area  not 
covered by the Integrated Border Surveillance 
System (IBSS). Indeed, during interviews, mi-
grants indicated that facilitators were aware 

of the border areas under IBSS and advised 
migrants to avoid these areas.

The  interviews  carried  out  with  migrants 
apprehended  in  the  Bulgarian  operational 
area lead to the conclusion that most crossed 
the land border with the help of local resi-
dents from the area of Edirne who were ei-
ther  working  for  the  facilitation  networks 
based  in  Istanbul  or  were  just  working  on 
their own.

Migrants  tended  to  arrive  in  Edirne  using 
either  public  transportation  or  transport 
provided by facilitators, and then they were 
handed over to local smugglers with expe-
rience  in  facilitating  the  border-crossing. 
Many were instructed to claim false nation-
alities, but their fingerprints were recorded 
electronically  and  sent  to  the  EURODAC 
database.

Like in neighbouring border sections (the 
Greek land border with Turkey and the Ae-
gean Sea), Syrians were the most commonly 
detected migrants at this border section. 
Based on screening of migrants performed 
in  Bulgaria,  it  was  established  that  they 
come from different ethnic groups, includ-
ing Kurds and Palestinians.

The main pull factor for migrants to cross il-
legally the Bulgarian land border with Turkey 
is the relatively cheap price (about EUR 100 
to EUR 300) compared to crossing to Greece. 
The  cheap  price  may  also  be  an  indication 
that  for  many  migrants,  Bulgaria  is  not  an 
option and does not simplify their access to 
the  Schengen  area.  Except  Syrian  families 
applying for asylum in Bulgaria with the in-
tention to stay there due to cheaper living 
conditions  than  in  Turkey,  most  other  mi-
grants  prefer  to  enter  the  Schengen  area 
through Greece and then further on to other 
EU Member States.

25 of 64

East Aegean Sea

This border section was ranked second at the 
EU level in Q2 2013. For the first time, Syrians 
outnumbered Afghans at this border section.

The  JO  Poseidon  Sea  2012  was  operational 
throughout the reporting period, focussed on 
tackling the flow of irregular migrants pen-
etrating the external EU sea borders in the 
Eastern Mediterranean mainly from Turkey 
and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt.

In the vast majority of cases, the migrants 
were given instructions on how to reach the 
Greek  Islands.  The  migrants  were  always 
given a reference point on the Greek Islands 
(lights of a tourist complex or city, airport 
lights,  etc.)  and  were  advised  to  maintain 
a steady course towards the lights. Hence 
many vessels tended to depart during hours 
of darkness rather than during the day.

Based  on  the  information  gathered  from 
interviews  it  is  thought  that  a  considera-
ble  number  of  migrants  were  arriving  un-
detected on the Greek Aegean Islands. Once 
the migrants arrive on the islands, most of 
them turn themselves in to the local author-
ities while a smaller number of migrants try 
to leave the islands undetected.

Most  of  migrants  targeted  the  islands  of 
Lesvos  and  Samos.  However,  detections 
were  reported  also  elsewhere  in  the  Ae-
gean Sea, covering a large area from Samo-
thrace Island in the north, reporting its first 
detections, and Megisti Island in the south. 
The  increase  in  detections  in  islands  that 
were  previously  not  considered  as  main 
targets  may  ultimately  reduce  the  effec-
tiveness  of  the  deployed  maritime  assets 
due  to  the  increasing  length  of  the  area 
to be covered.

In  May,  a  two-week  Turkish  Naval  exer-
cise  was  carried  out  in  the  Aegean  Sea. 

This exercise had a direct impact in reduc-
ing the number of detections of illegal bor-
der-crossing. Soon after it ended, on 3 June, 
the number of arrivals of irregular migrants 
increased in the operational area of JO Po-
seidon Sea. 

As in previous years, with the beginning of 
the tourist season on the Greek Islands, ir-
regular migrants were trying to reach other 
EU destinations aboard charter flights, tar-
geting  in  particular  destinations  such  as 
Bergamo,  Brussels  and  Stockholm  by  us-
ing false documents and mixing amongst 
the EU citizens returning home after their 
holidays.

Syrians have been the most commonly de-
tected migrants during the JO Poseidon Sea 
so  far  in  2013.  Most  were  men  travelling 
alone but there were some family units, and 
all  were  heading  for  Sweden  or  Germany 
to  claim  asylum.  Once  they  entered  Tur-
key, those intending to enter the EU trav-
elled to Istanbul in order to make contact 
with facilitation networks. They stayed in 
Istanbul for between 1–12 weeks before be-
ing taken by van to the west coast of Tur-
key  to  depart  towards  the  Greek  eastern 
Aegean Islands.

Afghans  were  also  detected  in  this  region. 
Most were previously resident in Iran. During 
interviews conducted during JO Poseidon Sea, 
many Afghans stated that they departed from 
Iran as a result of the measures implemented 
by the government aiming to decrease the 
number of Afghan refugees in Iran. The Af-
ghan community in Iran can easily find net-
works that can smuggle them to Turkey and 
then to Greece. Once in Turkey, the Afghan 
migrants were transported by public trans-
port  to  Istanbul  and  from  there  mainly  by 
private transportation directly to departure 
area on the western coast of Turkey, where 
they boarded rubber boats destined for the 
Greek Eastern Aegean Islands.

26 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Figure 12.  There has been increased detections of migrants, particularly Syrians, using 

fraudulent documents on flights from Turkey since the beginning of the Greek operation 

Aspida in August 2012

Number of travellers detected using fraudulent documents on flights arriving in the EU or Schengen area from all Turkish 
airports, by quarter since January 2011

Other 

Syrians 

 450 

 400 

 350 

 300 

 250 

 200 

 150 

 100 

 50 

 0 

2011 Q1 

2011 Q2 

2011 Q3 

2011 Q4 

2012 Q1 

2012 Q2 

2012 Q3 

2012 Q4 

2013 Q1 

2013 Q2 

Source: EDF-RAN data as of 1 August 2013

Information gathered during the interviews 
conducted  in  the  framework  of  the  JO  Po-
seidon Sea, revealed that a large number of 
irregular migrants, mainly from Syria and Af-
ghanistan, are waiting in Istanbul and Izmir 
to enter the EU illegally.

Somalis ranked third on this route and of the 
Somali migrants interviewed during JO Posei-
don Sea, the majority were males aged 20–30 
years, Muslims belonging to the Hawiya, Da-
roud and Digli tribes. They spoke Somali, Ar-
abic  and  English.  They  claimed  Greece  was 
their final destination.

According to information gathered during the 
interviews, Ankara is a hub for Somalis due 
to the presence of a strong diaspora in the 
city. In Ankara, migrants are assisted by fel-
low  nationals  that  provide  them  with  food 
and shelters as well as assistance in contact-
ing facilitators for their illegal border-cross-
ing to Greece.

Flights from Turkey

Since  the  beginning  of  the  Greek  opera-
tion Aspida, there has been an increase in 
the number of migrants detected arriving 
on  flights  from  Turkey  using  fraudulent 
documents,  particularly  Syrians  as  well 
as  other  nationalities  usually  associated 
with  illegal  border-crossing  into  Greece 
from Turkey including Iranians, Iraqis and 
Palestinians.

Figure 12 shows the number of detections of 
document fraudsters arriving in all EU Mem-
ber  States/Schengen  Associated  Countries 
during  each  quarter  since  the  beginning  of 
2011, according to data exchanged under the 
EDF-RAN. The number of detections nearly 
doubled between the third and fourth quar-
ters of 2012, coinciding exactly with the launch 
of the Greek operation Aspida and in the cur-
rent reporting period detections have reached 
unprecedented levels.

27 of 64

By far the most commonly detected doc-
uments on flights from Turkey in Q2 2013 
were  authentic  Swedish  passports  which 
were  used  as  impostors  mostly  detected 
at  Stockholm  Arlanda  Airport.  Follow-
ing recent increases, in Q2 2013 Copenha-
gen Airport detected the most document 
fraudsters  arriving  from  Turkish  Airports 
(34), followed by Düsseldorf (33) and Fiu-
micino (32).

4.2.5.  Circular migration from Albania to 

Greece

In Q2 2013, Greece reported a 157% increase 
(compared to the previous quarter) in de-
tections of illegal border-crossing at its land 
borders  with  Albania  and  the  former  Yu-
goslav Republic of Macedonia, which rep-
resented  a  72%  increase  in  relation  to  the 
second quarter a year previously.

This  substantial  increase  broke  the  stable 
situation in place since the first quarter 2011, 
when visa liberalisation was granted for Al-
banians. Prior to visa liberalisation, detec-
tions  ranged  between  6  000  and  12  000 
per quarter. However, since Q1 2011, quar-
terly  detections  of  illegal  border-crossing 
were under 2 000 detections.

The introduction of visa liberalisation went 
together  with  a  small  increase  in  refus-
als  of  entry  as  more  Albanians  crossed 
the border at BCP. In Q2 2013, refusals of 
entry remained stable, as can be seen on 
the  graph.  The  same  graph  also  shows 
the strong seasonal variations, with sum-
mer-peak corresponding to the period of 
temporary  work  in  Greece  for  migrants 
from Albania.

Albanians were also detected in large num-
bers at their land border with Greece us-
ing counterfeit border-crossing-stamps in 
their passports in order to fabricate travel 
histories  and  extend  periods  of  stay.  This 

phenomenon was so extensive that Alba-
nians  are  ranked  top  for  document  fraud 
at the EU level (see Section 4.8. Document 
fraud for more details).

4.2.6. Western Mediterranean route

In  Q2  2013  there  were  over  1  000  detec-
tions of illegal border-crossing in the West-
ern Mediterranean region, which consists of 
several areas of the southern Spanish coast 
as well as the land borders of Ceuta and Me-
lilla from where three-quarters of all detec-
tions were reported.

Since Q2 2012, detections on this route have 
remained fairly stable – between 1 500 and 
2 000 detections per quarter. However, di-
verging trends are noticeable in detections 
at land and sea borders, probably associ-
ated with more prevention of departures 
at sea by the Moroccan authorities, as well 
as strengthened measures in the Mediter-
ranean Sea, including through JO EPN In-
dalo. Migrants’ preference for avoiding sea 
crossings is further supported by the fact 
that, unlike in the Central Mediterranean 
area, the improvement of weather condi-
tions  in  June  did  not  result  in  significant 
increase in detections at sea.

Since Q1 2012, detections at the land bor-
der (mostly along the fence in Melilla) far 
outnumbered detections at the sea border. 
The Spanish authorities have been report-
ing for several months the growing num-
ber  of  migrants  established  near  Melilla. 
In Q2 2013, but mostly in July 2013, subse-
quent to the reporting period, attempts to 
cross the fence in Melilla have increased to 
such an extent that the Spanish authori-
ties  have  had  to  reinforce  the  number  of 
police  officers  and  additional  equipment 
devoted to border surveillance.

At the end of June, the government repre-
sentative  in  Melilla,  Abdelmalik  El  Barkani, 

28 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013s
e

.

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said at a press conference that the migrants 
had  attacked  the  fence  ‘very  aggressively’ 
and  had  thrown  rocks  at  Moroccan  secu-
rity forces which, in addition to Guardia Civil, 
have  detained  migrants  who  had  not  yet 
made it to the autonomous city. There have 
been many sightings of sub-Saharan Africans 
who had not yet reached the fence, accord-
ing to the Spanish Authorities. For the last 
few months, the government has warned of 
the permanent threat of migration to Melilla. 
Once in Melilla, migrants are turned over to 
Police  Headquarters  for  identification,  and 
many are transferred to the Temporary Stay 
Centre  for  Immigrants  (CETI  –  Centro  de 
Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes).

In  Q2  2013,  most  of  the  detections  at  the 
sea border on the Western Mediterranean 
route were from Mali and Algeria. Sub-Sa-
harans  often  stage  their  journeys,  some-
times for years, to work in low-paid jobs to 
finance  their  travel.  As  for  Algerians,  they 
often  mentioned  having  relatives  in  Spain 
or France.

Analysing the nationalities detected on this 
route  is  problematic  as  half  the  detections 
from Ceuta and Melilla land border were re-
ported by the Spanish authorities as being of 
unknown nationality. However open sources 
suggest that there have been increased re-
ports of African migrants storming the bor-
der fence in Melilla.

4.2.7. Western African route

Figure 13.  The CETI in Melilla can accommodate up to 480 migrants

tained high level of surveillance ensuring early 
detections and collaboration with third-coun-
try authorities are key to maintaining the low 
level of detections at the border.

4.2.8. Eastern land borders route

The eastern land borders route is, in effect, 
an amalgam of detections of illegal border-
crossing reported by Lithuania, Slovakia, Ro-
mania, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Finland and 
Latvia. Despite the total length of all the bor-
der sections, detections tend to be lower than 
on other routes possibly due to the long dis-
tances  between  major  hubs  and  countries 
of  origin.  Visa  fraud  and  counterfeit  bor-
der-crossing stamps tend to predominate on 
this route, as opposed to detections of ille-
gal border-crossing (see Section 4.8. Docu-
ment fraud).

In the second quarter of 2013, there were only 
few  detections  of  illegal  border-crossing  in 
this region, consistent with the level reported 
during the same period in 2012. Compared to 
last  year,  there  were  much  fewer  migrants 
from Morocco but more from Mali.

Irregular migration pressure on the West Af-
rican  route  continued  to  be  much  reduced 
compared  the  situation  before  2010.  Sus-

In Q2 2013, there were just 338 detections of 
illegal border-crossing at the eastern land 
borders of the EU, which more than the pre-
vious quarter but less compared to a year 
previously. Since 2009, detections of illegal 
border-crossing  ranged  between  100  and 
600  per  quarter.  Typically,  detections  on 
the Eastern land border are lowest during 
the  winter  months,  when  weather  condi-
tions prevent most of illegal border–cross-

29 of 64

 
o
r
.

i

x
a
f
a
d
e
M
©

Figure 14.  In July 2013, the Romanian Border Police detected two groups of Syrians who had 

illegally crossed the border from Turkey to Romania across the Black Sea. It is the first time 

that such incidents were reported in the Black Sea. In both cases, the migrants relied on the 

services of Turkish facilitators

ing  along  the  green  border,  and  gradually 
increase  to  reach  a  peak  during  the  sum-
mer months.

In Q2 2013, about one third of the detections 
were reported from the land border between 
Slovakia  and  Ukraine  ,  and  nearly  as  many 
from the land border between Lithuania and 
Belarus. Since 2008, these two border sec-
tions  often  reported  the  most  detections. 
Since 2010, the land border between Estonia 
and the Russian Federation has often been 
on the top three border sections for detec-
tions of illegal border-crossing on the East-
ern land border.

The  top  ranking  nationality  was  Georgian, 
mostly  detected  crossing  illegally  the  land 
border between Lithuania and Belarus, fol-
lowed by Moldovans and Vietnamese.

In their bi-monthly analytical report, the Es-
tonian authorities mentioned the continued 
report of incidents of irregular migration as-
sociated with Vietnamese nationals in areas 
outside  of  BCPs.  According  to  intelligence 
obtained during investigation, there are sig-
nificant  numbers  of  Vietnamese,  including 
minors,  waiting  in  the  Russian  Federation 
to illegally enter the EU. Most of these mi-
grants left Vietnam several months or even 

years ago. They worked in the Russian Fed-
eration  in  the  construction  industry  and  in 
clothing manufacturers. In neighbouring Lith-
uania,  Vietnamese  migrants  continued  to 
be among the most often detected for ille-
gal border-crossing at the land border with 
Belarus. Poland also reported the existence 
of Vietnamese migrants organising their il-
legal entry to the EU via the Russian Feder-
ation.  Many  Vietnamese  were  detected  on 
secondary  movements  while  entering  Po-
land from Lithuania.

4.2.9. Black Sea route

Detections of illegal border-crossing on the 
Black Sea are extremely rare, but Bulgaria 
reported one attempt of clandestine entry 
at Varna sea port in June, and subsequent 
to the reporting period, in July 2013, Roma-
nia  reported  two  incidents  involving  the 
detection of 59 Syrians aided by four Turk-
ish facilitators attempting to reach the Ro-
manian coast.

Subsequent to the reporting period, on 6 July 
2013, a sailing boat carrying Syrians was de-
tected by the Romanian Border Police close 
to Mangalia and two Turkish facilitators were 
apprehended.  On  27  July,  another  group  of 

30 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013 
Syrians was detected, again with two Turk-
ish facilitators, close to Costinesti.

These two incidents still constitute isolated 
cases,  but  they  reveal  possible  increasing 
pressure of irregular migration from Turkey 
across the Black Sea. They are possibly linked 
to  the  increased  surveillance  on  the  East-
ern  Mediterranean  route  and  the  increas-
ing number of migrants waiting in Turkey to 
reach the EU illegally.

4.3. Clandestine entry

Restricting the FRAN indicator on detections 
of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (1B) to the 
external land and sea borders of the EU and 
to  detections  confirmed  to  be  clandestine 
entries  (e.g.  hiding  in  means  of  transport), 
results  in  extremely  low  detections  for  the 
whole  of  the  EU  especially  compared  with 
other  indicators,  such  as  detections  of  ille-
gal  border-crossing  between  BCPs.  For  ex-
ample,  in  Q2  2013  only  118  detections  were 
reported from the whole FRAN community, 
down by nearly 10% compared to the previ-
ous quarter and down 6% compared to the 
second quarter of 2012.

In the case of Slovenia, from where most of 
the detections were reported in each quar-
ter for the last year, detections at the border 
with  Croatia  actually  fell  compared  to  Q1, 
but the total was similar to Q2 2012. Most 
of the migrants detected hiding at the Slo-
venian border with Croatia were Algerians.

Detections increased markedly at the land 
border between Hungary and Serbia, and 
mostly included Afghans. Nearly all of these 
Afghan  migrants  were  making  second-
ary movements after initially entering the 
Schengen area in Greece.

In Bulgaria the increased detections of clan-
destine  entries  at  BCPs  were  due  to  more 

migrants from Syria, who were increasingly 
detected  at  the  land  border  with  Turkey  – 
probably as a displacement effect from the 
Greek land border with Turkey.

In contrast to the low number of detections 
of clandestine entry at the external border, 
there were more detections within the EU/
Schengen area (349). Although higher than 
for the external border, this figure was a re-
duction of around 15% compared to the pre-
vious quarter. The geographical distribution 
of these ‘internal’ detections sheds important 
light  on  the  direction  of  secondary  move-
ments  and  the  final  destination  countries 
selected  by  each  nationality.  For  example, 
the UK and Italy reported the greatest num-
ber of internally detected clandestine irreg-
ular migrants.

4.4. Detections of facilitators

Notwithstanding a small increase compared 
to the previous quarter (+5%), detections of 
facilitators of irregular migration have been 
falling steadily for the last two years. Accord-
ing to some reports, this long-term decline 
may in part be due to a widespread shift to-
wards the abuse of legal channels and doc-
ument fraud to mimic legal entry to the EU, 
which results in facilitators being able to op-
erate  remotely  and  inconspicuously  rather 
than  accompanying  migrants  during  high-
risk activities such as border-crossing.

The long-term decreasing trend in detections 
of facilitators is roughly consistent with the 
decreasing trend in detections of illegal stays, 
as can been seen in Figure 15. This is also an 
indication that a large number of facilitation 
cases in the EU are linked with facilitation of 
illegal stay rather than with facilitation of il-
legal border-crossing. Indeed, a large share of 
detections of facilitators corresponds to de-
tections in Member States that have limited 
or no land or sea external borders, like France.

31 of 64

Figure 15.  The long-term decreasing trend in detections of facilitators is also consistent with 

the decreasing trend in detections of illegal stay

Quarterly detections of facilitators and illegal stay since the beginning of 2008

Illegal stay

Facilitators

120 000

110 000

100 000

90 000

80 000

70 000

60 000

3 000

2 800

2 600

2 400

2 200

2 000

1 800

1 600

1 400

1 200

1 000

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

Q3  Q4 

Q1  Q2 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

Consistent  with  this  long-term  decline,  in 
Q2 2013, there were 1 705 detections of fa-
cilitators  of  irregular  migration,  down  4.5% 
compared to the second quarter of 2012. The 
same group of five Member States (France, 
Italy,  Spain,  Greece  and  Hungary)  continue 
to share the bulk; together they accounted 
for more than 80% of all detections of facil-
itators at the EU level.

The biggest increase in detections in Q2 2013 
was observed in Hungary. Most of these de-
tections  were  of  Hungarian  nationals  and 
were  associated  with  illegal  border-cross-
ings from Serbia, which increased in the sec-
ond half of 2013.

Member States tend to detect more domes-
tic facilitators than any other nationality; very 
often most of the top reporting countries for 
this indicator tend to report their own citi-
zens as facilitators more frequently than any 
other single nationality. In line with this ten-
dency, the top three nationalities of facilita-
tors detected in specific Member States were 
Italians detected in Italy, French detected in 
France, and Spanish detected in Spain.

4.5. Detections of illegal stay

In  Q2  2013,  there  were  over  80  000  de-
tections of illegal stay in the EU, which is a 

slight increase of 4% compared to the pre-
vious  quarter  but  a  decrease  of  6%  com-
pared to the same quarter in 2012. Except 
for  the  previous  quarter,  this  figure  was 
among the lowest ever reported for this in-
dicator*,  and  is  consistent  with  the  previ-
ously reported slightly declining long-term 
trend since 2008 (Fig. 1). However, this long-
term decline masks much variation among 
Member States.

The  vast  majority  of  migrants  staying  ille-
gally  were  detected  inland  and  so  are  pre-
sumed to be long-term illegal stayers as, at 
the time of detection, they were making no 
attempt  to  leave.  The  next  most  common 
location for detections of illegal stayers was 
those exiting at the air followed by the land 
borders  whereby  illegally  staying  migrants 
were  leaving  the  EU  or  Schengen  area  and 
may have included those that were over stay-
ing by short periods.

The  largest  increase  between  Q1  and  Q2, 
both  in  terms  of  volume  and  in  relative 
terms, was reported by Hungary. This in-
crease was associated with the increase in 
detections of illegal border-crossing at the 
land border between Hungary and Serbia. 
After detection most migrants applied for 
asylum and then absconded. Four nation-
alities  showed  significant  increases  be-

*  Some of this decline 
was due to changes in 
reporting practices in the 
Netherlands

32 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Figure 16.  Migrants from Chechnya travelled to Moscow and then by train to Poland and 

further on to Germany

tween Q1 and Q2: from Kosovo*, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and Algeria.

For  the  fourth  consecutive  quarter,  Ger-
many  reported  by  far  the  most  detections 
of  migrants  staying  illegally.  In  Q2,  detec-
tions  of  illegal  stay  in  Germany  increased 
by  14%  compared  to  the  previous  quarter, 
mostly due to increase of Russians (mostly 
of Chechen origin) . This increase in Russians 
staying illegally was associated with a large 
number of Chechens initially refused entry 
in Poland then applying for asylum in Poland, 
but  whose  final  destination  was  Germany 
(see Fig. 16). The reason for this increase is 
not  yet  fully  understood  but  is  apparently 
linked to a rumour that spread in Chechnya 
about Germany granting asylum to Russians 
of Chechen origin.

In Q2, Moroccans remained the most com-
monly detected as illegal stayers in the EU, 
mostly reported by Spain and France. Rus-
sians replaced Afghans on the second rank in 
Q2. Ranking fifth, Afghans actually recorded 
their  lowest  number  since  2008,  mostly  in 
France.

*  This designation is 
without prejudice to 
positions on status, 
and is in line with 
UNSCR 1244 and the 
ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo declaration of 
independence.

4.6. Refusals of entry

In Q2 2013 there were 33 216 refusals of en-
try at the external border, an increase of over 
19%  compared  to  the  previous  quarter  and 
the quarter a year ago. In fact, in the context 
of recent years this figure is one of the larg-
est ever recorded (with the exception of Q3 
2009 totalling 34 365). Most of the increase 
was at the land border and thus refusals of 
entry  at  the  land  border  represented  more 

33 of 64

Source: FrontexMoscow Grozny Rostov Berlin Warsaw  Terespol train BCP than 60% of all refusals compared to about 
half of the total in previous quarters.

The  increase  was  due  to  extremely  large 
number of Russians of Chechen origin re-
fused entry because of lack of visas at the 
train BCP on the Polish border with Bela-
rus.  Immediately  after  being  refused  en-
try, they applied for asylum in Poland, but 
then travelled to Germany where they also 
applied for asylum. Other Member States, 
notably Austria, France, Sweden and Bel-
gium,  also  reported  an  increase  in  asy-
lum  application  of  Chechens,  although  in 
smaller numbers.

The  phenomenon  started  in  March  and 
reached  its  peak  in  May  2013,  and  mostly 
concerned  migrants  travelling  in  family 
units.  Virtually  all  refusals  of  entry  took 
place at the train BCP of Terespol through 
which trains travel between Minsk and War-
saw. Upon applying for asylum, fingerprints 
were taken and the migrants were provided 
with travel documents to reach asylum cen-
tres in Poland, mostly in Biała Podlaska at 30 
km from Terespol. However, most migrants 
continued their journey to Germany by train, 
relying on facilitation services that provided 
them transport by roads to Germany.

In  Germany,  most  migrants  applied  again 
for asylum. They were also registered and 
their  fingerprints  found  in  the  EURODAC 
database.  They  were  thus  ordered  to  re-
turn  to  Poland,  their  first  place  of  asylum 
application.

As  of  June  the  trends  on  all  three  indica-
tors went down, indicating a clear decreas-
ing trend that was confirmed by information 
received in July. It can thus be assumed that 
this phenomenon was temporary.

The reasons behind this sudden and large in-
crease are not fully understood. There was 
no  particular  security  or  political  incidents 

in  Chechnya  immediately  before  and  dur-
ing that period, and the economic situation, 
while relatively poor, did not change drasti-
cally either. This sudden flow could have been 
triggered by rumours spreading in Chechnya 
about Germany granting asylum to Russians 
of Chechen origins.

Indeed, Russian newspapers have published 
several articles commenting on the German 
Constitutional Court’s decision mandating all 
federal  units  in  Germany  to  calculate  basic 
benefits under the Asylum Seekers Benefits 
Act based on general provisions applicable to 
all persons who receive social benefits. These 
articles were mentioning significant financial 
benefits  for  asylum  seekers  and  their  fam-
ilies.  In  addition  to  these  press  announce-
ments,  rumours  have  also  spread  among 
Russian nationals from Chechnya that they 
have high chance of obtaining residence per-
mit in Germany.

In Germany, most Russians claiming asylum 
received negative outcomes. In 2012, the rec-
ognition rate of asylum applications of Rus-
sians was 22% at the EU level and only 17% 
in Germany.

On their side, the Belarusian authorities ap-
peared  to  do  minimum  efforts  to  prevent 
exit  of  migrants  transiting  through  Bela-
rus.  In  its  bi-monthly  analytical  report,  Es-
tonia pointed to the fact that since October 
2012, due to the freezing in EU assistance to 
Belarusian border-control authorities, Bela-
rus  has  suspended  the  identification  of  ir-
regular  migrants  moving  to  EU  countries. 
The minimum collaboration from the Bela-
rusian counterpart probably also contributed 
to the development of this phenomenon at 
the Polish border.

It is not the first time that a similar outbreak 
of  illegal  entry  occurred  at  the  land  border 
between  Poland  and  Belarus,  comprised  of 
the  same  combination  of  refusals  of  entry 

34 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013followed by asylum applications in order to 
stay  illegally  in  the  EU.  In  2009,  from  June 
to September, a large number of Georgians 
were refused entry at the same border sec-
tion, who then applied for asylum before ab-
sconding to other Member States.

These  random  surges  of  migrants  are  very 
difficult to predict and even more difficult to 
prevent.  Indeed,  border-control  authorities 
alone  cannot  prevent  these  kinds  of  flows 
and so at least part of the solution requires 
the coordination of efforts with asylum au-
thorities and national police authorities at a 
national and EU level.

Elsewhere, refusals of entry were relatively 
stable compared to previous quarters. The 
main grounds for refusals of entry was the 
lack of visas (13 891) followed by the lack of 
justification for the purpose of stay. Albani-
ans continued to rank first at the air border 
where  they  were  mostly  refused  at  Italian 
airports.

4.7. Asylum claims

Compared to the previous quarter, the num-
ber  of  asylum  claims  reported  within  the 
FRAN increased by 17% to a total of 85 362 
applications in Q2 2013. This was also an in-
crease of 43% compared to the second quar-
ter  of  2012.  (Note:  the  FRAN  data  do  not 
include  asylum  applications  submitted  in-
land in France or the Netherlands).

Much of the increase was due to more asy-
lum applications submitted by Russians of 
Chechen origin in Poland and then again in 
Germany (see Section 4.6. Refusals of en-
try).  In  total,  the  number  of  applications 
of Russians increased from 7 010 applica-
tions in the first quarter 2013 to 15 453 ap-
plications  in  the  second  quarter.  Most  of 
these applications are of the same individ-
uals who first applied in Poland and then 
in Germany.

Hungary also reported a staggering increase 
in asylum applications, one of the most spec-
tacular increases recorded in the FRAN. This 
increase coincided with the change in legis-
lation in the Hungary asylum policy that en-
tered into force in January 2013. According to 
this amendment, the lodging of an asylum ap-
plication and the start of an asylum procedure 
constitutes an explicit ban on expulsion and 
removal from the territory. Asylum-seekers 
who immediately ask for asylum upon being 
apprehended by the police (before the end of 
their  first  interview),  between  January  and 
June  2013,  were  not  detained.  Instead,  pur-
suant to the modifications that entered into 
force  in  January,  in  order  to  harmonise  the 
Hungarian asylum policy with EU standards, 
first-time asylum applicants were all accom-
modated in an open facility.

The  migrants  who  used  this  modus  oper-
andi  to  enter  the  EU  can  be  classified  into 
two categories: first, those making second-
ary  movements  through  the  Western  Bal-
kans after entering illegally the EU in Greece, 
mostly Afghans, Pakistanis and Syrians. Sec-
ond  were  those  from  the  Western  Balkan 
region, mostly from Kosovo.* For both cate-
gories of migrants, the number of detections 
of illegal border-crossing and asylum appli-
cations sharply increased after January 2013.

Subsequent to the reporting period, in July 
2013 further amendments were introduced 
in the Hungarian asylum policy, in particular 
detailing the specific list of grounds for de-
tention of asylum applicants in closed cen-
tres.  Grounds  for  asylum  detention  under 
the new rules include: (a) For the verifica-
tion of the applicant’s identity and nation-
ality; (b) The asylum-seeker absconded or 
hinders the processing of the asylum pro-
cedure  in  any  other  way;  (c)  In  order  to 
obtain  the  information  necessary  for  the 
processing of the asylum claim, if there are 
serious  grounds  to  presume  that  the  asy-
lum-seeker would delay or hinder the pro-

*  This designation is 
without prejudice to 
positions on status, 
and is in line with 
UNSCR 1244 and the 
ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo declaration of 
independence.

35 of 64

Swiss back tighter asylum rules

Almost  80%  of  voters  approved 
changes  made  to  the  asylum  law 
last September, final results of a ref-
erendum  said.  Under  the  new  rules 
military desertion is no longer a rea-
son for granting asylum, and people 
cannot now apply through Swiss for-
eign embassies. About 48 000 people 
are  in  the  process  of  seeking  asy-
lum  in  Switzerland,  twice  the  Eu-
ropean average per head 
of population.

Source: BBC News, 9 June 2013

cedure  or  would  abscond;  (d)  In  order  to 
protect  the  public  order  and  national  se-
curity; (e) If the claim has been submitted 
at the airport; (f) The applicant has repeat-
edly failed to fulfil his/her obligation to at-
tend procedural acts and thus hinders the 
processing of a Dublin procedure. It should 
be noted that asylum-seeking unaccompa-
nied minors cannot be detained.

Information received from the Hungarian au-
thorities and Frontex Joint Operations active 
at the land border between Hungary and Ser-
bia showed that the number of detections of 
illegal  border-crossing  fell  markedly  in  the 
first  few  weeks  of  July.  It  is  thus  expected 
that the flow of migrants detected crossing 
the border illegally will decrease in the third 
quarter 2013. In Bulgaria, the number of asy-
lum applications also rose sharply, although 
from a lower base, which was mostly due to 
Syrian nationals.

The  number  of  Syrians  applying  for  asy-
lum in the EU as a whole decreased slightly 
compared to the previous quarter, by 5.5%. 
In Q2 2013, a total of 7 917 Syrians applied 
for asylum, mainly in Sweden.

New Greek asylum service

An important step in the reform of the Greek 
asylum system was reached on 7 June with 
the opening of the Asylum Service and the 

On 8 July 2013, EASO released its sec-
ond  Annual  Report  on  the  Situation 
of Asylum in the EU, covering the year 
2012. The report aims to provide com-
prehensive overview of the situation of 
asylum in the EU, looking at the flows 
of applicants for international protec-
tion in the EU, analysing application and 
decision data, and focusing on some of 
the most important countries of origin 
of applicants for international protec-
tion in 2012. The report underlines the 
wildly different characteristics of asy-
lum applicants in the EU, notably among 
applicants from Afghanistan, Syria and 
the Western Balkan countries. 

In 2013, there were 335 365 asylum ap-
plications  in  the  EU,  of  these  260  575 
were ‘new’ applicants for international 
protection. Afghanistan continued to be 
the  most  numerous  overall  in  the  EU, 
and included large number of unaccom-
panied minors. Syria showed the larg-
est increase in applications due to the 
deteriorating security situation in Syria 
over the course of the year. The report 
underlines that when summed together, 
applicants from the six Western Balkan 
countries,  continued  to  represent  the 
highest number of applications made in 
the EU for asylum (more than Afghan-
istan and Syria combined), despite the 
fact  that  Member  States  judged  such 
applications  to  well-founded  in  only 
4% of cases overall. EASO will publish a 
comprehensive report on the Western 
Balkans in the second half of 2013.

Source: easo.europa.eu

36 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013setting  up  of  19  Appeal  Committees  under 
the  new  Appeals  Authority,  managing  the 
backlog  of  pending  appeals.  The  First  Re-
ception Centre in Fylakio has been fully op-
erational  on  the  same  day.  Two  additional 
centres with a capacity of 200 and 120 places, 
respectively, are under construction in Les-
vos  and  Attiki  and  will  be  fully  operational 
by the end of 2013.

The reform of the asylum system in Greece 
is currently in a transitional stage, during 
which the asylum-procedure continued to 
be carried out by the police and the transfer 
to the new services is being prepared. Un-
der the new system, the Ministry of Public 
Order  and  Citizen  Protection  and  its  ser-
vices as well as the Directorate for Social 
Perception  and  Solidarity  of  the  Ministry 
of Labor, will be competent for the recep-
tion  of  asylum-seekers  and  unaccompa-
nied children.

Dublin III

On 29 June 2013, the EC Regulation 343/2003, 
known as Dublin II, was recast. The new reg-
ulation, Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, known 
as Dublin III, was jointly adopted by the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the European Coun-
cil. It entered into force 19 July 2013 and shall 
apply to applications lodged six months fol-
lowing its entry into force.

This  recast  is  part  of  the  development  of 
the Common European Asylum System. This 
new regulation will contribute to harmonis-
ing  practices  in  place  in  Member  States.  It 
contains a new right to information for asy-
lum applicants, introduces a personal inter-
view and put an obligation on the European 
Commission  to  produce  a  common  infor-
mation leaflet. It also contains a new provi-
sion on judicial remedies for asylum seekers 
to  challenge  Dublin  decisions  where  trans-
fers would  not be in compliance with their 
fundamental rights.

4.8. Document fraud

In  Q2  2013  there  were  just  over  2  300  de-
tections of document fraud on entry to the 
EU/Schengen  area  from  third  countries, 
which  is  an  increase  of  8%  compared  to  a 
year previously in Q2 2012. However, France 
exchanged usable data for the first time in 
2013, which inevitably inflated the figures to 
a certain degree, particularly on entry from 
third countries; omitting the French data ac-
tually resulted in a slight decrease in detec-
tions at the external border compared to a 
year previously.

Spain, France, Greece and Germany reported 
the most detections on entry at the exter-
nal border together accounting for around 
half of all detections at the EU level. Spain 
reported more detections than ever before, 
but this increase was difficult to analyse as 
it was mostly due to unknown nationalities 
arriving at Madrid Barajas Airport from un-
known airports.

Royal  Netherlands  Marechaussee 
Identity Documents (ID) Desk(s)

On 31 May 2013 four Royal Netherlands 
Marechaussee  ID  Desks  were  opened 
at Eindhoven, Rotterdam, Schiphol and 
Zwolle. They will provide document ex-
pertise on the highest level to the Na-
tional Police in the fight against identity 
fraud. The information collected by the 
ID  desks  and  future  desks  of  the  Na-
tional  Police  will  be  gathered  at  the 
Identity  Fraud  and  Documents  Cen-
tre  of  Expertise  (ECID).  This  coop-
eration  adds  significant  value  to 
trends and analyses in the search 
of suspects of fraud.

37 of 64

At least 2 000 [Pakistani] blue 
passports*  were  allegedly  ei-
ther sold to influential  people 
at a hefty price … or issued to 
undeserving officials between July 2010 
and February 2013

Sources said a powerful ‘gang’ compris-
ing of at least one former federal minis-
ter, many senior officials of the Ministry 
of Interior and Directorate General of 
Immigration  and  Passports  allegedly 
made billions out of the sale of diplo-
matic Pakistani passports.

Director  General  of  the  Directorate 
General of Immigration and Passports 
Zulfiqar Cheema said, ‘At this point in 
time I can confirm that investigations 
are underway into the case and we have 
recommended in writing to the interior 
division  to  cancel  2  000  passports  is-
sued to private individuals by the [for-
mer] PPP regime.’

It is generally believed that a vast ma-
jority of those who purchased the blue 
passports have already left Pakistan and 
the cancellation of their passports is 
a futile exercise.

Source: tribune.com.pk, 20 May 2013

As  well  as  at  the  external  border,  also  im-
portant at the EU level were the detections 
of  document  fraud  between  the  Schengen 
area and non-Schengen EU Member States. 
As is normally the case, many of these were 
reported  on  entry  to  the  UK,  a  common 
destination  country  for  irregular  migrants 
travelling from the Schengen area.

The  EDF-RAN  data  exchange  also  consid-
ers detections of document fraud on intra-
Schengen flights whereby no border checks 
are systematically performed. In Q2 2013 there 
were  775  detections  of  document  fraud  on 
flights between Schengen airports, which is 

Cypriot police struggling with 
bogus marriages

Larnaca  District  Court  sentenced  in 
May  four  people  in  connection  with 
the charges in a fictitious marriage. Two 
women from Bulgaria at the age of 24 
and 30 years, respectively, the 27-year-
old  man  from  the  Republic  of  Bang-
ladesh  and  the  37-year-old  man  from 
Sri Lanka are accused of conspiring to 
commit a crime, as well as aiding and 
abetting illegal entry and stay in the Re-
public of Cyprus. The four were arrested 
in Larnaca, where they had gathered for 
the wedding of Bulgarian women and 
men from Bangladesh.

Source: cyplive.com, 31 May 2013

a  slight  increase  following  the  lowest  ever 
level  during  the  previous  quarter.  The  de-
crease  during  the  first  few  months  of  2013 
was widely recognised to be associated with 
the Greek operation Aspida at the Greek land 
border with Turkey, which prevented many 
migrants from entering Greece from Turkey 
and  then  boarding  intra-Schengen  flights 
in Athens.

Migrants from Albania

In  Q2  2013  some  725  Albanians  were  de-
tected using more than 900 fraudulent doc-
uments,  which  is  a  decrease  compared  to 
other reporting periods over the last year. 
Nevertheless, Albanians still represent the 
biggest  proportion  of  document  fraud  at 
the EU level.

Albanians were mostly detected on entry to 
the Schengen area from a third country (253) 

 * Blue passports are 
official passports issued 
to Pakistani nationals 
who are Senators, 
Members of the National 
Assembly, Provincial 
Ministers, Judges of the 
Supreme/High Courts, 
Officers serving with the 
Government on official 
assignment abroad etc.

38 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013but  also  travelling  between  the  Schengen 
area and non-Schengen EU Member States 
(138). The latter flow was almost exclusively 
between  the  Schengen  area  and  the  UK, 
sometimes via Ireland.

Overall Greece detected more Albanians than 
any other Member State, mostly on entry at 
the Greek BCPs Kakavia and Kristalopigi, but 
at a much reduced rate compared to a year 
previously in Q2 2012.

Migrants from Syria

Overall, some 557 Syrians were detected us-
ing fraudulent documents in Q2 2013, which 
is  one  of  the  highest  ever  recorded  num-
bers for this nationality and more than dou-
ble  the  number  reported  a  year  ago  in  Q2 
2012. Syrians were mostly detected on en-
try to the Schengen area from third countries 
(278),  which  is  in  contrast  to  a  year  previ-
ously  when  they  were  mostly  detected  on 
intra-Schengen flights. Following continued 
increases over the last year, their most com-
mon embarkation point in Q2 2013 was Is-
tanbul (173), particularly on flights to a range 
of  Germany  airports.  Hence,  Germany  de-
tected more Syrians than any other Mem-
ber State, followed by Greece, where in both 
countries detections were distributed among 
several airports.

Legal channels

Although lacking a systematic data exchange 
among Member States, many reports con-
clude that the abuse of legal channels to il-
legally enter the EU is increasing.

4.9. Returns

4.9.1. Return decisions

In Q2 2013 there were 53 586 third-country 
nationals subject to an obligation to leave the 
EU as a result of an administrative or judicial 

decision, which is a decrease of a fifth com-
pared to during the same period in 2012. The 
UK reached more decisions to leave than any 
other  Member  State,  but  there  were  more 
Pakistanis that were subject to a decision to 
leave  in  Greece  (1  694)  than  any  other  na-
tionality in a single Member State.

Most  of  the  overall  decrease  was  due  to 
fewer  decisions  being  made  in  Greece, 
where  throughout  2012,  more  decisions 
to  leave  were  reached  than  in  any  other 
Member State. Most of these decisions to 
leave were handed to migrants after they 
were  detected  illegally  crossing  the  land 
border between Greece and Turkey. Dur-
ing the first half of 2012 detections of ille-
gal border-crossing in this region were very 
significant at the EU level, but have subse-
quently fallen to very low levels (see Sec-
tion  4.2.4  Eastern  Mediterranean  route); 
correspondingly the number of return de-
cisions  reached  in  Greece  also  fell  down, 
affecting figures for the EU as a whole.

Note  that  the  absolute  total  number  of 
migrants subject to return decisions is still 
underestimated by this indicator, as data 
on  decisions  were  unavailable  from, inter 
alia, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, 
where it is assumed that high numbers of 
decisions were reached.

Notwithstanding return decisions reached in 
Greece,  there  was  very  little  change  in  the 
number  of  decisions  made  by  other  Mem-
ber  States.  The  UK  for  instance  reported 
little  change  in  the  number  of  return  deci-
sions reached, and while some other Member 
States reported changes of between -20 and 
+20%, these changes were within the range 
of previous reporting periods.

More  Albanians  were  subject  to  decisions 
to leave than any other nationality (4 588), 
followed  by  Pakistanis  (4  034),  Moroccans 
(3  242)  and  Indians  (2  624).  Albanians  and 

39 of 64

Figure 17.  The most commonly returned migrants were from Albania, Pakistan and Morocco 

Effective returns and return decision issued for top 20 nationalities in Q2 2013

7 000  

6 000  

5 000  

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2 000  

1 000  

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Effective returns – Voluntary 

Effective returns – Forced 

Return decisions issued 

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Source: FRAN data as of 1 August 2013

Pakistanis  were  mostly  issued  decision  to 
leave in Greece.

this case down by 3% compared to the pre-
vious quarter. Greece, ranking second, mostly 
reported the effective return of Albanians.

At the Member State level there is often a dis-
crepancy between the number of return de-
cisions reached and the number of effective 
returns carried out. Some of the differences 
may be due to time lags between judicial de-
cisions  and  actual  returns,  while  other  dif-
ferences  may  due  to  the  disappearance  of 
migrants once a decision has been reached.

4.9.2. Effective returns

In  Q2  2013,  there  continued  to  be  a  steady 
trend in the number of third-country nationals 
effectively returned to outside the EU com-
pared to most previous quarters in 2012 and 
2013. The total number of 39 741 was in the 
range that varied between 38 000 and 42 000 
per quarters, showing a small increase of 4% 
compared to the previous quarter.

As has been the case during every quarter of 
data exchange so far for this indicator, the UK 
conducted the largest number of returns, in 

4.10.  Other illegal activities at 

the border

Information gathered through Frontex Joint 
Operations and Member State bi-monthly re-
ports in Q2 2013 shows a continuously high 
level of criminal activities at the EU external 
borders  and,  in  the  case  of  stolen  vehicles  
detected on exit and cigarette smuggling, a 
substantial increase.

At the EU eastern borders, cigarette smug-
gling  remained  the  most  often  reported 
criminal activity in Q2 2013. It regained mo-
mentum  with  the  end  of  winter  and  the 
season-related higher accessibility of areas 
along  the  land  border.  Recent  detections 
show  that  some  criminal  groups  involved 
in this illicit trade used their large proceeds 
to invest in technical solutions such as an 
unmanned raft equipped with an electronic 
navigation system.

40 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the EU external borders to the Western 
Balkans, law-enforcement operations in Q2 
2013  confirmed  that  some  criminal  groups 
from that region continued to use their ex-
isting smuggling infrastructure to gradually 
move into the cocaine trade.

In  Q2  2013,  with  the  season-related  re-
sumption  of  Frontex  Joint  Operations  in 
the Mediterranean, more consistent infor-
mation on the smuggling of excise goods 
and  drugs  fed  into  the  quarterly  analysis 
of illegal activities along the southern sea 
borders of the EU.

4.10.1.  Trafficking in human beings (THB)

The Spanish Cuerpo Nacional de Policia de-
veloped a plan against trafficking in human 
beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation, 
which entered into force in April. In consider-
ation of the EU Strategy towards the Eradica-
tion of THB (2012–2016), the plan is based on 
the following priorities: enhancing the pre-
vention of THB; enhancing the identification 
and detection of potential victims; increasing 
the prosecution of traffickers; in depth ex-
amination and analysis of all aspects of THB; 
adjusting and optimising software tools for 
the analysis of THB; and strengthening na-
tional and international cooperation for the 
eradication of THB.

At the beginning of July, the Spanish author-
ities disrupted an organised crime group and 
arrested six of its Nigerian members. The or-
ganisation was responsible for transporting 
Nigerian women from deprived areas in Benin 
City to Spain for the purpose of sexual exploi-
tation. The whole journey took between four 
and five months. They were usually recruited 
on  African  soil  through  partial  deception, 
which  means  that  they  presumably  knew 
they were going to work in the sex business, 
but were deceived by false promises of good 
working conditions and large earnings. After 
their overland travel to the Moroccan coast, 

they were smuggled in small boats across the 
Strait of Gibraltar into Spain (mainly Cataluña 
and Málaga). The investigation revealed the 
use  of  physical  coercion  and  psychological 
pressure, e.g. through ‘juju’ rituals.

In  June,  the  French  authorities  dismantled 
a Nigerian criminal organisation, which had 
forced more than 100 Nigerian women into 
prostitution.  The  arrested  traffickers  were 
responsible  for  performing  different  tasks, 
such  as  the  organisation  of  activities,  the 
facilitation of travel, the accommodation of 
victims and the forgery of documents. Less 
typical of Nigerian groups dealing with THB 
was the involvement of a priest who kept in 
touch  with  the  victims  and  provided  them 
with fraudulent documents supporting their 
asylum applications. Already in May 2012, one 
of the heads of the organisation had been ar-
rested in the UK.

4.10.2. Smuggling of tobacco products

Eastern borders

Large differences in cigarette taxes between 
the  EU  countries  and  their  eastern  neigh-
bours  maximised  the  proceeds  from  this 
illegal  trade,  which  is  conducted  on  sev-
eral organisational levels from small smug-
glers crossing the border with cigarettes in 
their  private  vehicles  to  large  criminal  or-
ganisations  that  systematically  transport 
large amounts in commercial lorries. While 
a  pack  of  cigarettes  currently  costs  be-
tween EUR 2.60 and 2.90 in Estonia and up 
to EUR 11.50 in Norway, it would only cost 
between  EUR  1.30  and  1.50  in  the  Russian 
Federation.

If the Russian Ministry of Finance raises the 
tax on tobacco by 50% as planned at the be-
ginning of 2014, these price differences will 
decrease. This measure would raise the price 
of an average pack of cigarettes to approx-
imately  EUR  2.10,  which  would  reduce  the 

41 of 64

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sian excise stamps affixed. Eight persons, one 
Russian and seven Lithuanians, aged between 
29 and 45 were arrested. The cigarettes had 
been  previously  smuggled  from  the  Kalin-
ingrad Oblast through the BCP of Kybartai. 
The  record  amount  seized  in  this  case  is  in 
line with a recent upward trend registered by 
the local authorities. According to the Lith-
uanian Ministry of the Interior, in compari-
son to the same period in 2012, the amount 
of smuggled cigarettes seized by authorities 
between January and mid-May 2013 rose by 
87%, thus exceeding one million packs.

Also in June, Romanian authorities made their 
largest  discovery  of  smuggled  cigarettes  in 
the last three years. In the town of Vicsani, 
more than two million cigarettes were found 
on  a  freight  train  from  Ukraine.  The  con-
traband was hidden within thoroughly hol-
lowed wood logs. The logs were filled with 
packs of cigarettes connected by a rope for 
easy retrieval and placed on two of the sev-
eral railway cars. The contraband could only 
be detected after a careful examination and 
fragmentation of the logs.

The border authorities of third countries sub-
stantially  contributed  to  the  fight  against 
the smuggling of excise goods into the EU. 
At  the  end  of  June  2013,  Ukrainian  border 
guards detected suspicious activities at the 
Polish border near the BCP of Dorohusk. Af-
ter a closer examination, they found several 
persons unloading boxes from two minivans 
into a rubber boat. The boxes were supposed 
to be transported across the river Bug to Po-
land (see Fig. 18). Eventually, authorities ar-
rested seven persons and seized more than 
1.24 million cigarettes produced in the Rus-
sian Federation and Ukraine.

Western Mediterranean and West 
African routes

The  Western  Mediterranean  Sea  showed 
to  be  significantly  affected  by  the  smug-

Figure 18.  Ukrainian border guards detected 

more than 1.24 million cigarettes about to 

be smuggled across the River Bug to Poland

profits of smugglers. In order to fight health 
hazards and to adapt taxation levels in the 
Russian Federation to the European average, 
the WHO even proposes a sevenfold hike in 
excise  duties  on  tobacco  until  2020.  How-
ever,  cigarettes  in  Belarus  and  Kazakhstan 
continue to be considerably cheaper, so the 
existing  Customs  Union  with  these  coun-
tries  will  ensure  a  steady  flow  of  tobacco 
products to the Russian Federation. For this 
reason, the amount of tobacco products ille-
gally brought into the EU is not expected to 
decrease considerably as long as the excise 
tax  policies  in  the  Customs  Union  of  Bela-
rus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation 
and in other countries in the region such as 
Ukraine and Moldova are not harmonised.

Most  seized  contraband  passing  through 
BCPs was found in luggage compartments of 
private vehicle, often those with tinted win-
dows. Double walls, spare wheels and secret 
compartments in doors or other parts of the 
cars were also used to hide cigarettes. Pas-
senger trains were regularly used to smuggle 
comparably  smaller  amounts  of  cigarettes, 
which were hidden under seats and beds or 
in the ceiling.

In April, Lithuanian authorities raided a farm 
building near Kaunas, where they found 6.9 
million cigarettes of the brands ’Jin Ling‘, ’New 
Line‘,  ’Bayron‘  and  ’Bayron  Light‘  with  Rus-

42 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013 
 
 
 
gling  of  tobacco  products  during  the  re-
porting period.

In  Q2  2013,  law-enforcement  authori-
ties performed an operation to tackle the 
smuggling  of  tobacco  products  in  Spain, 
Portugal,  France  and  Belgium.  This  was 
considered to be one of the largest oper-
ations of the current year and it resulted in 
2 668 250 packs of cigarettes being seized 
and 13 persons arrested in the Spanish cit-
ies  of  Seville,  Algeciras  and  Valencia,  and 
also  in  France  and  Portugal.  The  criminal 
network,  which  was  composed  of  Span-
ish, Belgian, Irish and British citizens, had 
the  capacity  to  act  on  a  global  scale  and 
it is believed that the organisation had the 
ability to smuggle at least ten containers 
of tobacco per month. The criminal group 
reportedly gained 1.1 million in profits per 
container of the contraband.

The tobacco products were mainly produced 
in Asia and then shipped to Europe via Afri-
can countries to the ports of Algeciras, Va-
lencia, Antwerp and Lisbon. In order to hide 
and distribute the contraband, the criminal 
organisation  created  a  business  structure 
composed  of  several  front  companies  re-
sponsible for performing business transac-
tions and false tax returns. Therefore, once 
the tobacco was in EU territory it was dis-
tributed to several EU countries through the 
logistics network of the companies.

4.10.3. Drug trafficking

Western Balkans

leased in June 2013 by the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime highlights a growing number of 
cocaine seizures conducted in countries all 
along  the  Balkan  route,  including  Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Albania, Hungary 
and  Austria.  Criminal  organisations  in  Tur-
key originally smuggling heroin increasingly 
added cocaine trafficking to their repertoire, 
and reports from the Western Balkans show 
that groups in other countries are following 
suit. According to UNODC, criminal groups 
from West Africa are often involved in this 
trade as a large part of the substance tran-
sits Africa before its arrival on the Balkans 
route. In other cases, the cocaine arrives on 
container ships from South American coun-
tries such as Brazil. However, the amount of 
cocaine  arriving  in  the  EU  from  the  West-
ern Balkans is by far outnumbered by quan-
tities  entering  the  EU  through  the  Iberian 
Peninsula.

In the second quarter of 2013, several crim-
inal  networks  involved  in  the  smuggling  of 
cocaine  and  heroin  were  disrupted  in  the 
Balkans. On 8 May, the fYROM, German and 
Austrian police arrested five persons in the 
course of the joint operation ‘Dirigent’. The 
crime group, which was known as the ‘Frank-
furt Mafia’, trafficked heroin from Afghani-
stan along the Balkan route to major cities in 
the EU. The criminal organisation was com-
posed  of  decentralised  cells  with  different 
roles  assigned,  ranging  from  transporting, 
receiving  and  selling  the  drugs  to  launder-
ing  the  proceeds,  which  was  done  by  fast 
money transfers to the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia.

Western Balkan countries play a significant 
role as the main entry point of heroin from 
Afghanistan to Europe. As the supply of her-
oin from Afghanistan and demand in West-
ern  Europe  has  been  decreasing,  criminal 
groups appear to be trying to compensate for 
their losses by expanding the scope of their 
business.  The  World  Drug  Report  2013  re-

At  the  end  of  May  2013  an  international 
police  operation  was  simultaneously  con-
ducted in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Montenegro and the Netherlands. 
It led to the arrest of several persons of dif-
ferent nationality who smuggled and sold 
large amounts of cocaine from Latin Amer-
ica. The group was also involved in the pro-

43 of 64

duction of marijuana, as police confiscated 
over  1  500  cannabis  plants.  Around  EUR  1 
million was seized during the operation.

Western Mediterranean and West 
African routes

Earlier in May, Kosovo* police arrested the 
head of a transnational criminal organisa-
tion which was involved in drug trafficking 
and distribution for many years. The arrest 
was based on an international warrant is-
sued by Bosnia and Herzegovina. The sus-
pect reportedly started his criminal business 
through the smuggling of tobacco products 
and gradually became involved in the traf-
ficking of heroin and cocaine through Turkey, 
Albania,  Kosovo*,  Montenegro,  Serbia  and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. His family mem-
bers  own  numerous  companies  in  these 
countries,  through  which  the  proceeds  of 
crime were allegedly laundered.

The  Western  Balkans  continue  to  play  an 
important role in cannabis trafficking both 
as a region of transit and origin. Firstly, this 
route  is  used  to  smuggle  cannabis  from 
Afghanistan  to  the  EU.  According  to  the 
UNODC  World  Drug  Report  2013,  global 
seizures of Afghan cannabis increased be-
tween  2002  and  2011,  but  production  re-
mained rather stable since 2009. Secondly, 
the increasing production of cannabis in Al-
bania makes the region an important sup-
plier of the EU market.

In Q2 2013, assets deployed through Fron-
tex Joint Operations uncovered numerous 
attempts  to  smuggle  cannabis  products 
from  Western  Balkan  countries  into  the 
EU. Border guards seized more than 205 kg 
of marijuana in 17 different cases. The sub-
stance was hidden in luggage, behind dou-
ble  walls  or  in  secret  compartments  of 
private vehicles, e.g. in the steering wheel 
or under the dashboard. In some cases, mi-
nor amounts were hidden on the person, 
in  luggage  compartments  or  under  seats 
of public buses.

The Iberian Peninsula, due to its geographical 
proximity to North Africa and a long coast-
line,  represents a major entry point of illicit 
drugs smuggled into the EU. Seizures in Q2 
2013 confirmed that Spain plays a major role 
in the transit of drugs which are subsequently 
distributed to the whole European market.

According to the UNODC World Drug Report 
2013, Spain accounted for 34% of the global 
seizures  of  hashish  in  2011.  Hashish,  which 
mainly arrives in the Iberian Peninsula from 
Morocco, is the drug that is most frequently 
seized through police operations (see Fig. 19). 
Cocaine is either smuggled to Spain directly 
by sea and air from Latin America, or trans-
ited  through  West  or  North  African  coun-
tries. From Spain, large quantities of these 
drugs are transported in lorries to the rest of 
Europe for street distribution. The traffick-
ers use several different routes and sophis-
ticated  concealment  methods  making  the 
detection of these activities difficult.

To avoid detection traffickers usually use rub-
ber speedboats, fishing boats and jet skies to 
smuggle narcotics from North Africa to the 
Spanish  coast.  However,  to  transport  large 
amounts  of  drugs  on  longer  distances,  e.g. 
from South America, commercial cargo ships 
are usually used.

On 2 May, agents of Guardia Civil conducted 
an operation in the provinces of Málaga and 
Cádiz,  which  led  to  the  seizure  of  almost 
500 kg of hashish and the arrest of 30 sus-
pects of Spanish, Moroccan and Italian nation-
ality. The drug was transported on fishing and 
pleasure boats from Morocco to selected loca-
tions in the area of Costa del Sol and the Strait 
of Gibraltar, where the smugglers handed the 
drugs  over  to  couriers  to  be  smuggled  on-
shore and stored in several safe places with 
easy access from the sea.

*  This designation is 
without prejudice to 
positions on status, and is 
in line with UNSCR 1244 
and the ICJ Opinion on 
the Kosovo declaration of 
independence.

44 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Figure 19.  For smuggling hashish, most detections along the external borders were reported between Morocco and 

Spain on a wide variety of vehicles

Main routes and hubs of hashish smuggling to Spain in Q2 2013 and the most prevalent means of transportation used

Hungary

Moldova

Cities

Airports

High speed jet skis

Lorries

Inﬂatable rubber boats

Cargo ships

Ultra light helicopters

Commercial planes

Sea route

Land route

Air route

from South America

Source: JORA data

Air routes are also used to smuggle narcotics 
from Morocco to Spain. On 23 April, an ultra 
light helicopter heading to Málaga and carry-
ing 110 kg of hashish from Moroccan suppli-
ers was intercepted during a joint operation 
of the Spanish police and Guardia Civil. This 
means of transport is relatively easy to obtain 
and its use is a way of avoiding the tight se-
curity controls at commercial airports.

Eastern borders

In  Q2  2013,  narcotic  drugs  were  crossing 
the EU external eastern border from both 

sides.  Whereas  most  detected  cases  in-
volved individuals trying to cross the bor-
der with small amounts meant mainly for 
personal consumption, border authorities 
estimate  that  Europe  is  not  only  a  des-
tination  country  for  Afghan  heroin,  but 
also a major transit region of various types 
of  narcotics  smuggled  eastwards.  In  sev-
eral cases, criminals were caught while at-
tempting to cross the EU eastern borders 
with  cannabis  originating  from  Morocco 
or  cocaine  originating  from  Latin  Amer-
ica destined for the Russian Federation or 
other countries of Central Asia.

45 of 64

In  late  May  2013,  Spanish  authorities 
performed the Operation Albatros, re-
sulting in the seizure of 3 400 kilos of 
cocaine  and  the  arrest  of  21  persons. 
The  fishing  boat,  carrying  a  Senega-
lese flag, was intercepted in the Atlan-
tic Ocean in the area between South 
America and the archipelago of Azores. 
The  boat  departed  from  Venezuela 
heading  to  Vigo  (northwest  Spain), 
mainly  with  Korean  and  Indonesian 
nationals onboard.

This organised network consisted of a 
supplier in Venezuela, a second group 
in  Galicia  (Spain),  responsible  for  re-
ceiving  the  drug  and  the  land  distri-
bution, and a third cell in charge of all 
logistical aspects of the operation to 
transport  the  drugs  from  the  high 
seas  to  the  coast  in  speedboats 
or fishing boats.

4.10.4. Exit of stolen motor vehicles

Eastern Borders

Frontex Joint Operations reported a signifi-
cant increase in the number of stolen vehi-
cles detected at the EU’s eastern borders in 
Q2 2013. A total of 132 stolen vehicles were 
prevented  from  crossing  the  border  in  Q2 
2013, whereas 96 were detected in the same 
period of 2012 and only 53 in the first quarter 
of 2013. As in previous quarters, the largest 
number of cars were detected on exit from 
Poland  to  Ukraine  (see  Fig.  20),  although 
only 52 vehicles were identified in Q2 2013, 
compared to 58 in the same period of 2012. 
Since 2012, the number of detections at the 
Polish-Belarusian  and  Slovakian-Ukrain-
ian  borders  has  been  rather  low  but  rela-
tively stable.

The most commonly detected brand at the 
eastern border in Q2 2013 was Mercedes Benz, 
with 23 detections, followed by Volkswagen 
and BMW cars, which were prevented from 
leaving the EU in 15 and 13 cases, respectively. 
Audis and Fords were identified as stolen in 
seven incidents each. The single model most 
often  smuggled  across  EU  eastern  borders 
was  BMW  X5,  which  was  detected  by  bor-
der authorities in eight cases.

Western Balkans

The Joint Operation Focal Points Land re-
ported  the  detection  of  23  stolen  vehicles 
at  the  EU’s  external  borders  to  the  West-
ern  Balkan  countries.  Most  of  the  stolen 
cars  were  prevented  from  leaving  the  EU 
between Slovenia and Croatia. Nine stolen 
motor  vehicles  were  stopped  in  attempts 
to enter Serbia.

Western Mediterranean and West 
African route

In Q2 2013, 17 incidents involving stolen ve-
hicles were reported through Frontex Joint 
Operations  in  the  Western  Mediterranean 
Sea.  As  a  result,  23  persons  of  Moroccan 
and  other  nationalities  were  caught  dur-
ing  the  attempted  exit  of  these  stolen  ve-
hicles, in many cases presenting forged car 
documents.

4.10.5. Fuel smuggling

The smuggling of fuel from Libya to the EU 
has become a major issue for law-enforce-
ment  authorities  in  the  central  Mediterra-
nean Sea. At the beginning of April, a Libyan 
patrol  boat  stopped  a  Panamanian-regis-
tered ship called Levante on its way to Malta, 
which was loaded with contraband fuel. Af-
ter the vessel was ordered to return to Trip-
oli, seven Egyptians and one Maltese national 
were  arrested.  The  crew  members  admit-
ted that they had already made four trips in 

46 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Figure 20.  Most stolen cars were detected on exit at the Polish and Lithuanian borders to 

Belarus and Ukraine

Stolen vehicles detected in Q2 2013 on exit along the EU eastern borders

Detections of stolen
 vehicles in Q2 2013

Norway

RAJA-JOOSEPPI

!s

!s
!s
!s

>15 

5-15

<5

Sweden

Finland

Lithuania

Lithuania

!s

!w
!s

Russian Fed.

BEZLEDY

LAVORISKES

MEDININKAI

!s
!w
!s
!w

GRZECHOTKI

RAIGARDAS

!s

Poland

TERESPOL

DOROHUSK

!s
!s

!w

Belarus

Belarus

!s
!s

VAALIMAA

NARVA

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Belarus

Ukraine

!s

GALATI

Romania

Russian Fed.

Poland

Slovakia

Czech Republic

Austria

Hungary

taly

Serbia

Bulgaria

LESOVO

FYROM

KAPITAN 
ANDREEVO

KIPI

Greece

Source: JORA and open sources

!s!s

!s

KORCZOWA
MEDYKA

Ukraine

!s
!s
!s
!s

Slovakia

Slovakia

VYSNE NEMECKE

ZAHONY

Hungary

Russian Federation

Turkey

Turkmenistan

47 of 64

 
g
r
o
.
s
u
c
a
w
w
w
©

.

which they illegally imported fuel to Malta. 
According to Libyan media sources, the 400 
tonnes of diesel on the ship cost around EUR 
36 000 in Libya, whereas Maltese consum-
ers would have to pay around EUR 620 000 
for the same amount.

At  the  beginning  of  July,  the  Armed  Forces 
of Malta foiled another attempt to smuggle 
fuel  from  Libya.  A  Maltese  maritime  patrol 
aircraft detected the vessel MV Alice trans-
ferring Libyan fuel to four Maltese vessels on 
the high seas. After being ordered to enter 
the  port  in  Valletta,  the  authorities  estab-
lished that the MV Alice had 80 000 litres of 
contraband fuel onboard. Large amounts of 
the fuel were spilled into the sea during the 
ship to ship transfers, thus creating damage 
to  the  environment.  The  law-enforcement 
operation eventually led to the arrest of 28 
persons  of  Maltese,  Indonesian  and  Egyp-
tian nationality.

4.10.6. Terrorism

On 21 June, the Spanish police arrested eight 
people accused of funding and facilitating the 
travel  of  potential  foreign  fighters  to  Syria. 
The Spanish citizens operated from the Span-
ish enclave of Ceuta and the Moroccan city 
of Fnideq. According to a statement made by 
the Spanish Ministry of Interior, the al-Qaeda-
linked  group  managed  to  recruit  dozens  of 
persons  from  Spain  and  Morocco  and  ar-
ranged their travel via Turkey to Syria, where 
they were allegedly trained and involved in 
insurgent warfare and terrorist attacks.

The  participation  of  Europeans  in  rebel  ac-
tivities  in  Syria  is  of  major  concern  for  po-
lice  authorities  and  intelligence  agencies  in 
the EU. In an interview with the BBC given 
on  24  April  2013,  the  EU  Counter-terrorism 
Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove warned that 
around 500 EU nationals were already fight-
ing  with  the  insurgents.  German  law-en-
forcement authorities recently reported that 

Figure 21.  In April 2013, EU Counter-terrorism 

Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, warned 

that around 500 persons from EU countries 

are already fighting with the insurgents

around 120 Germans joined the insurgency. 
Authorities are striving to prevent potential 
fighters from leaving the country and man-
aged  to  convince  around  a  dozen  of  them 
to stay. A small number of German fighters 
are known to have already returned to Ger-
many, others have died in combat. One Ger-
man national in Syria has recently called for 
suicide attacks against civilians in his internet 
video post. Although authorities are appar-
ently not aware of any specific plans of re-
turning foreign fighters to conduct attacks 
within the EU, both their potential radical-
isation  and  weapons  and  explosives  train-
ing could make them a substantial threat in 
their home country.

Turkey thwarts Belgians’ attempt to 
join the fighting in Syria

Four Belgian citizens were returned to 
Belgium in June 2013 after they were ar-
rested by the Turkish Army before try-
ing  to  illegally  enter  Syria.  Would-be 
foreign fighters probably entered Tur-
key legally via air or land routes and 
then infiltrated into Syria.

48 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013 
Another  law-enforcement  operation  in  Q2 
2013 revealed connections between the global 
illicit drug trade and terrorism. The Spanish 
newspaper El País reported in April that an 
internationally coordinated police operation 
showed a certain extent of cooperation be-
tween alleged members of the Revolutionary 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In March, two 

Colombian  nationals  were  arrested  in  Al-
geria along with three alleged members of 
AQIM.  The  Colombians,  who  later  showed 
to be affiliated to the FARC, were about to 
deliver a shipment of cocaine. In exchange, 
they would receive cash and arms deriving 
from  Libyan  arsenals.  According  to  the  re-
ports,  the  drugs  were  destined  for  the  Eu-
ropean market.

49 of 64

5. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations:  n.a.  not applicable

: 

  data not available

Source:   FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 1 August 2013, unless otherwise indicated

Note:  

 ‘Member States’ in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 
27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

50 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 1.  Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

203

1 177

715

1 045

270

2 153

1 017

1 275

246

321

199

1 797

2 024

1 650

461

4 529

1 673

2 000

626

525

272

1 254

3 923

1 491

575

4 518

1 283

1 494

458

771

316

1 423

1 241

691

1 298

1 969

1 065

710

152

496

2013

Q1

588

1 199

1 248

755

123

1 082

481

622

243

655

4 456

3 098

2 784

1 990

1 948

1 892

1 466

998

818

673

All Borders

Kosovo*

Albania

Syria

Pakistan

Eritrea

Afghanistan

Somalia

Algeria

Egypt

Not specified

Others

5 214

7 611

6 054

4 252

2 721

4 682

Total All Borders

13 636

23 095

22 093

13 613

9 717

24 805

Land Borders

Kosovo*

Albania

Pakistan

Syria

Algeria

Not specified

Afghanistan

Morocco

Bangladesh

Palestine

Others

203

1 176

915

676

1 227

307

1 775

425

1 392

267

2 840

199

1 736

1 189

1 918

1 481

463

3 963

570

2 348

363

3 575

272

1 214

1 006

3 321

878

554

3 584

227

959

309

316

1 334

588

1 158

234

501

495

493

516

200

52

256

403

591

505

643

473

150

46

121

4 449

3 042

1 512

960

794

664

498

259

221

177

2 237

1 217

1 338

2 006

Sea Borders

Eritrea

Syria

Afghanistan

Somalia

Egypt

Pakistan

Mali

Gambia

Algeria

Tunisia

Others

39

39

378

553

186

130

4

21

48

357

678

223

106

566

1 106

533

461

22

36

519

685

1 033

434

602

934

862

422

485

100

153

616

1 008

1 916

1 246

740

1 453

959

142

457

296

304

215

233

1 954

10

657

609

364

226

352

150

251

117

79

886

1 891

1 824

1 394

1 336

775

478

471

333

204

194

1 323

Total Sea Border

2 433

5 290

7 532

7 999

3 701

10 223

Total Land Border

11 203

17 805

14 561

5 614

6 016

14 582

-18

2 139

72

38

21

323

-58

-12

-50

31

28

-38

7.4

2 136

75

27

-50

-46

43

-87

-55

-91

-51

-44

1 621

146

21

45

3.7

2 041

825

-61

-72

28

93

658

158

123

164

1 484

75

205

60

237

2.7

72

18

12

11

8.0

7.9

7.6

5.9

4.0

3.3

2.7

19

155

100

657

163

275

62

57

3.3

5.3

73

380

46

50

142

178

129

267

243

36

214

33

74

146

49

31

21

10

6.6

5.4

4.6

3.4

1.8

1.5

1.2

14

100

18

18

14

13

7.6

4.7

4.6

3.3

2.0

1.9

13

176

100

748

18 810

*    This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo 

declaration of independence.

51 of 64

Annex Table 2.  Clandestine entries at BCPs

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2013

Q1

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Border Type

Land

Sea

Top Ten Nationalities

Afghanistan

Syria

Algeria

Kosovo*

Pakistan

Iraq

Ghana

Morocco

Croatia

Serbia

Others

Total

67

36

50

1

8

4

0

4

0

3

0

4

29

103

106

20

151

16

160

43

117

13

105

13

52

4

10

6

11

3

1

10

1

10

18

126

47

9

15

2

1

5

0

7

8

6

41

28

28

0

12

2

4

4

2

3

33

24

12

7

3

2

5

8

4

2

29

15

13

9

8

8

7

5

4

3

67

167

79

203

30

130

17

118

-0.9

-35

-44

275

30

50

-27

167

600

-50

300

-70

-5.6

-10

0

-12

-38

8.3

29

167

300

40

-38

0

50

-43

89

11

25

13

11

7.6

6.8

6.8

5.9

4.2

3.4

2.5

14

-6.3

-9.2

100

*  This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo 

declaration of independence.

52 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Annex Table 3.  Facilitators

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

1 489

1 254

1 019

1 424

215

129

138

81

53

202

88

88

90

73

48

95

40

140

59

1 182

177

116

122

70

46

94

77

101

95

37

41

99

29

144

82

986

272

117

96

97

111

98

146

61

91

65

53

70

37

77

62

223

109

142

110

110

149

168

66

185

68

23

88

53

137

83

2013

Q1

1 142

186

98

93

80

23

112

156

59

77

60

26

81

37

70

48

Place of Detection

Inland

Land

Sea

Land Intra EU

Air

Not specified

Top Ten Nationalities

Italy

Not specified

China

Morocco

Albania

Poland

France

Bulgaria

Spain

Pakistan

Others

Total

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

1 199

168

105

104

65

64

177

141

103

79

72

68

61

60

58

49

-4.4

-5.1

-9.5

-15

-7.1

39

88

83

2.0

-17

95

66

-38

107

-60

-40

-15

5.0

-9.7

7.1

12

-19

178

58

-9.6

75

2.6

20

162

-25

62

-17

2.1

-6.6

5.1

70

9.9

6.2

6.1

3.8

3.8

10

8.3

6.0

4.6

4.2

4.0

3.6

3.5

3.4

2.9

49

100

952

1 098

896

837

2 105

1 785

1 712

2 118

1 622

1 705

-4.5

Annex Table 4.  Illegal stay

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2013

Q1

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Place of Detection

Inland*

Air

Land

Land Intra EU

Sea

Between BCP

Top Ten Nationalities

Morocco

Russian Federation

Not specified

Pakistan

Afghanistan

Albania

Algeria

Syria

Tunisia

Ukraine

Others

Total

72 520

68 906

68 696

68 316

64 071

67 975

8 693

4 731

1 347

1 040

130

6 047

2 363

1 159

3 752

6 345

3 167

4 247

1 396

4 705

3 202

8 493

4 766

1 427

1 084

212

5 683

2 419

1 253

5 088

6 179

3 627

4 077

2 020

4 442

3 036

9 752

5 632

1 393

1 090

187

4 724

3 531

2 653

4 989

6 252

2 856

3 747

4 004

3 239

3 655

8 472

4 754

1 665

1 371

195

4 814

3 173

4 142

4 505

5 619

3 614

3 705

4 547

2 825

3 188

7 779

4 117

377

380

166

4 933

3 189

3 985

3 779

4 077

3 388

3 445

3 848

2 818

2 867

7 179

3 721

554

461

193

5 294

4 150

4 146

4 092

4 058

3 949

3 726

3 616

2 934

2 853

52 078

47 067

47 109

44 685

40 798

41 286

-1.4

-15

-22

-61

-57

-9.0

-6.8

72

231

-20

-34

8.9

-8.6

79

-34

-6.0

-12

88 461

84 891

86 759

84 817

77 127

80 104

-5.6

*  For the Netherlands, detections of illegal stay inland in 2012 and Q1 2013 are not available at this moment.

6.1

-7.7

-9.6

47

21

16

7.3

30

4.0

8.3

-0.5

17

8.2

-6.0

4.1

-0.5

1.2

3.9

85

9.0

4.6

0.7

0.6

0.2

6.6

5.2

5.2

5.1

5.1

4.9

4.7

4.5

3.7

3.6

52

100

53 of 64

Annex Table 5.  Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

1 945

3 788

2 261

568

1 389

1 106

1 058

1 032

1 012

475

2 325

3 994

3 737

1 692

1 222

1 116

1 081

1 048

859

509

2 978

5 840

2 837

3 282

1 487

1 386

708

977

563

569

2 864

4 484

3 201

3 304

1 542

1 425

1 087

792

608

508

2013

Q1

2 597

3 745

2 781

1 578

1 991

1 105

1 290

1 197

734

503

6 977

4 299

2 688

2 456

1 613

1 230

1 052

882

629

609

All Borders

Russian Federation

Ukraine

Albania

Georgia

Serbia

Belarus

Morocco

Croatia

Brazil

United States

Others

10 192

10 654

11 366

11 221

10 390

10 781

Total All Borders

24 826

28 237

31 993

31 036

27 911

33 216

Land Borders

Russian Federation

Ukraine

Georgia

Albania

Serbia

Belarus

Croatia

Morocco

fYROM

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Others

1 290

3 503

493

1 192

1 200

1 080

979

666

400

347

920

1 620

3 723

1 620

2 587

1 034

1 086

1 002

708

506

346

2 185

5 500

3 214

1 684

1 265

1 350

925

295

472

385

2 211

4 281

3 208

1 915

1 311

1 396

728

747

403

454

1 953

3 535

1 498

1 576

1 769

1 080

1 142

943

441

615

6 370

4 041

2 363

1 474

1 429

1 209

847

706

470

373

1 021

2 024

1 507

1 046

1 143

Total Land Border

12 070

15 253

19 299

18 161

15 598

20 425

Air Borders

Albania

Brazil

United States

Algeria

Not specified

Russian Federation

China

Nigeria

Turkey

India

Others

617

1 003

461

269

435

373

305

374

355

203

638

841

484

356

458

389

258

435

352

286

581

540

534

299

453

510

345

477

322

231

853

596

487

406

612

378

287

423

393

232

724

724

492

430

512

401

268

340

336

165

747

615

590

565

466

393

382

380

272

262

6 828

6 368

6 349

6 667

6 409

6 524

Total Air Border

11 223

10 865

10 641

11 334

10 801

11 196

Sea Borders

Albania

Philippines

Russian Federation

Morocco

India

Not specified

Tunisia

Syria

Turkey

Serbia

Others

452

208

282

138

26

40

28

7

18

33

512

371

316

114

89

117

26

56

30

33

572

241

283

168

51

43

39

55

65

42

433

252

275

101

92

51

35

11

26

26

481

251

243

99

34

29

36

11

29

19

467

275

214

129

71

47

39

36

36

28

301

455

494

239

280

253

Total Sea Border

1 533

2 119

2 053

1 541

1 512

1 595

54 of 64

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

200

7.6

-28

45

32

10

-2.7

-16

-27

20

1.2

18

293

8.5

46

-43

38

11

-15

-0.3

-7.1

7.8

12

34

17

-27

22

59

1.7

1.0

48

-13

-23

-8.4

2.4

3.0

-8.8

-26

-32

13

-20

-60

50

-36

20

-15

-44

-25

169

15

-3.3

56

-19

11

-18

-26

-14

21

3.8

19

226

14

58

-6.5

-19

12

-26

-25

6.6

-39

9.3

31

3.2

-15

20

31

-9.0

-2.0

43

12

-19

59

1.8

3.7

-2.9

9.6

-12

30

109

62

8.3

227

24

47

-9.6

5.5

21

13

8.1

7.4

4.9

3.7

3.2

2.7

1.9

1.8

32

100

31

20

12

7.2

7.0

5.9

4.1

3.5

2.3

1.8

5.6

100

6.7

5.5

5.3

5.0

4.2

3.5

3.4

3.4

2.4

2.3

58

100

29

17

13

8.1

4.5

2.9

2.4

2.3

2.3

1.8

16

100

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Annex Table 6.  Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

Refused  
persons  
Total

Top Ten nationalities

2013 Q2 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

n.a.

Russian Federation

Ukraine

Albania

Georgia

Serbia

Belarus

Morocco

Croatia

Brazil

United States

Others

Total

6 977

4 299

2 688

2 456

1 613

1 230

1 052

882

629

609

10 781

177

10

226

0

26

2

769

247

5

25

826

3

29

49

2

4

0

43

1

10

0

6 032

1 604

138

2 344

98

531

168

6

53

5

22

9

4

0

1

2

15

0

0

0

273

1 972

550

43

344

357

133

47

205

12

508

2 912

251

2 810

6

30

80

1

218

11

6

185

38

21

280

202

420

385

13

415

219

104

68

43

6

708

177

179

1 101

52

469

67

128

131

95

9

561

82

16

62

5

31

47

105

183

11

5

36

40

115

8

9

8

10

16

242

528

287

2 022

11 165

33 216

2 313

649

13 891

304

6 746

876

2 583

2 969

834

3 034

34 199

Total  
Reasons

7 010

4 309

2 710

2 468

1 615

1 244

1 481

884

702

611

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:
A  has no valid travel document(s);
B  has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
C  has no valid visa or residence permit;
D  has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
E  has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
F  has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the EU;
G  does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
H 
I 

is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
 is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the EU.

55 of 64

Annex Table 7.  Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and reasons for refusal

All Borders

C) No valid visa

E) No justification

Reason not available

H) Alert issued

G) No subsistence

A) No valid document

F) Over 3 month stay

I) Threat

B) False document

D) False visa

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

6 033

6 109

2 540

3 354

2 507

1 863

1 479

762

913

380

8 313

5 704

2 693

3 281

3 400

1 998

1 142

816

1 004

374

11 381

10 202

6 728

3 031

5 099

2 651

2 021

1 531

886

798

511

6 765

2 863

3 961

2 457

1 961

1 212

806

1 049

572

2013

Q1

7 799

6 357

2 655

3 413

2 804

2 095

1 210

999

675

356

13 891

6 746

3 034

2 969

2 583

2 313

876

834

649

304

Total All Borders

25 940

28 725

34 637

31 848

28 363

34 199

Land Borders

C) No valid visa

E) No justification

H) Alert issued

G) No subsistence

A) No valid document

F) Over 3 month stay

I) Threat

B) False document

D) False visa

Reason not available

3 646

2 185

2 167

1 725

912

1 221

475

310

81

0

5 521

2 259

2 183

2 484

896

925

529

464

110

0

8 389

3 875

3 996

1 750

906

1 336

609

328

192

0

7 498

3 530

2 912

1 527

784

1 036

460

305

257

0

5 474

2 810

2 439

1 938

1 043

975

706

100

81

101

11 251

3 256

2 094

1 661

1 303

682

486

111

38

0

Total Land Border

12 722

15 371

21 381

18 309

15 667

20 882

Air Borders

E) No justification

Reason not available

C) No valid visa

G) No subsistence

A) No valid document

H) Alert issued

B) False document

I) Threat

D) False visa

F) Over 3 month stay

3 815

2 466

1 991

731

600

721

568

276

277

257

3 317

2 568

2 050

822

589

644

518

267

246

213

2 590

2 901

2 389

852

629

634

441

259

295

191

3 085

2 778

2 221

892

794

698

712

319

308

173

3 352

2 461

1 913

807

708

638

562

260

259

223

3 229

2 903

2 141

858

647

561

455

306

250

187

Total Air Border

11 702

11 234

11 181

11 980

11 183

11 537

Sea Borders

C) No valid visa

A) No valid document

H) Alert issued

E) No justification

Reason not available

G) No subsistence

I) Threat

B) False document

D) False visa

F) Over 3 month stay

396

351

466

109

74

51

11

35

22

1

742

513

454

128

125

94

20

22

18

4

603

486

469

263

130

49

18

29

24

4

483

383

351

150

85

38

27

32

7

3

412

344

336

195

93

59

33

13

16

12

483

359

291

197

128

64

42

13

11

7

Total Sea Border

1 516

2 120

2 075

1 559

1 513

1 595

56 of 64

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Highest share

Nationality

Russian Fed. (43%)

Ukraine (29%)

United States (17%)

Albania (37%)

Ukraine (16%)

Morocco (33%)

Serbia (25%)

Croatia (22%)

Unknown (14%)

Russian Fed. (7.2%)

Nationality

Russian Fed. (51%)

Ukraine (58%)

Albania (32%)

Ukraine (24%)

Morocco (56%)

Serbia (31%)

Croatia (38%)

Albania (38%)

Russian Fed. (34%)

Nationality

Algeria (9.4%)

United States (18%)

Russian Fed. (9.1%)

Albania (9.3%)

Unknown (38%)

Albania (36%)

Unknown (15%)

Suriname (14%)

Côte d’Ivoire (6.4%)

Brazil (18%)

Nationality

Philippines (46%)

Russian Fed. (45%)

Albania (81%)

Albania (58%)

Afghanistan (13%)

Albania (94%)

Albania (86%)

Unknown (38%)

Morocco (82%)

Turkey (57%)

41

20

8.9

8.7

7.6

6.8

2.6

2.4

1.9

0.9

100

54

16

10

8.0

6.2

3.3

2.3

0.5

0.2

0

100

28

25

19

7.4

5.6

4.9

3.9

2.7

2.2

1.6

100

30

23

18

12

8.0

4.0

2.6

0.8

0.7

0.4

100

78

6.1

14

-13

-7.9

10

-28

-17

-3.9

-15

21

106

16

-14

-14

25

-30

-31

11

-53

n.a.

33

-3.7

18

12

6.3

-8.6

-12

-19

18

-3.5

-16

3.2

17

4.4

-13

1.0

38

8.5

27

0

-31

-42

5.4

67

18

13

-9.5

-24

16

-23

2.2

-35

-19

19

104

44

-4.1

-33

45

-26

-8.1

-76

-65

n.a.

36

-2.7

13

4.4

4.4

9.8

-13

-12

15

1.6

-12

2.7

-35

-30

-36

54

2.4

-32

110

-41

-39

75

-25

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Annex Table 8.  Applications for asylum

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Top Ten Nationalities

Russian Federation

Syria

Kosovo*

Afghanistan

Pakistan

Somalia

Iran

Not specified

Nigeria

Serbia

Others

Total

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2 697

2 447

906

6 306

3 126

2 820

2 488

3 881

1 773

3 352

2 993

3 591

1 045

6 881

3 539

4 073

2 769

2 295

1 913

1 691

4 660

7 595

1 027

7 343

3 964

3 742

3 470

3 127

2 005

4 576

6 414

9 146

1 642

7 652

4 783

4 152

3 894

5 540

2 194

6 321

2013

Q1

7 010

8 375

1 912

5 791

3 422

3 460

3 019

3 758

2 452

2 465

15 453

7 917

6 487

5 458

4 840

4 046

2 891

2 728

2 478

2 258

27 061

28 786

32 212

34 420

31 200

30 806

56 857

59 576

73 721

86 158

72 864

85 362

416

120

521

-21

37

-0.7

4.4

19

30

34

7.0

43

120

-5.5

239

-5.8

41

17

-4.2

-27

1.1

-8.4

-1.3

17

18

9.3

7.6

6.4

5.7

4.7

3.4

3.2

2.9

2.6

36

100

 For the Netherlands, due to modifications of the national information system, the breakdown by nationality of inland asylum 
applications is not available from the reporting period January 2012 to April 2012. 
For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications.
 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo 
declaration of independence.

* 

57 of 64

 
 
Annex Table 9.  Document fraud

False documents detected at BCPs reported by border type and top ten nationalities

Border Type

Air

Land

Sea

Not specified

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

1 241

 740

 103

 0

1 207

1 060

 98

 1

1 222

 819

 134

 0

1 822

 654

 84

 4

Top Ten Nationalities Claimed

Syria

Unknown

Albania

Morocco

Iran

Nigeria

Ukraine

Senegal

Bangladesh

Pakistan

Others

Total

 31

 78

 353

 197

 79

 109

 151

 26

 21

 64

 60

 58

 909

 82

 68

 75

 72

 27

 50

 94

 92

 37

 498

 56

 80

 58

 75

 26

 62

 44

 412

 76

 391

 115

 64

 74

 55

 28

 108

 75

2013

Q1

2 168

 574

 68

 0

 406

 360

 325

 89

 119

 87

 50

 48

 86

 35

2 030

 464

 119

 2

 378

 378

 263

 141

 94

 79

 71

 66

 62

 61

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Highest share

Nationality Claimed

68

-56

21

100

530

552

-71

72

38

5.3

-1.4

144

24

-35

17

11

-6.4

-19

75

n.a.

-6.9

5.0

-19

58

-21

-9.2

42

38

-28

74

-15

78

18

4.6

0.1

14

14

10

5.4

3.6

3.0

2.7

2.5

2.4

2.3

39

-6.9

100

Unknown (18%)

Albania (41%)

Morocco (75%)

Iran

Nationality Document

Greece (20%)

France (16%)

Greece (72%)

Spain (35%)

Germany (24%)

Nigeria (27%)

Poland (52%)

Senegal (50%)

Italy (55%)

Greece (38%)

France (15%)

 975

 871

1 147

1 166

1 205

1 022

2 084

2 366

2 175

2 564

2 810

2 615

58 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Annex Table 10.  Document fraud

False documents detected at BCPs reported by type of document and type of fraud

Document Type

Passports

Forged

Authentic

Counterfeit

No more details

Stolen blank

Pseudo

Id cards

Counterfeit

Authentic

Forged

Stolen blank

No more details

Pseudo

Visa

Counterfeit

Forged

No more details

Authentic

Stolen blank

Pseudo

Residence permits

Counterfeit

Authentic

Stolen blank

Forged

No more details

Pseudo

Stamps

Counterfeit

Forged

No more details

Other

Counterfeit

Authentic

Forged

Pseudo

No more details

Stolen blank

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2013

Q1

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Highest share

Nationality Document

 706

 269

 192

 98

 133

 14

 0

 238

 131

 71

 11

 12

 12

 1

 183

 118

 28

 17

 8

 11

 1

 345

 172

 71

 59

 27

 16

 0

 577

 502

0

 75

 35

 16

 9

 2

 2

 0

 6

 647

 288

 151

 99

 98

 11

 0

 247

 112

 47

 44

 18

 25

 1

 768

 327

 241

 74

 108

 18

 0

 217

 102

 52

 13

 7

 42

 1

 170

 167

 95

 22

 27

 10

 16

 0

 308

 142

 49

 67

 34

 15

 1

 959

 931

 27

 1

 35

 17

 9

 5

 3

 1

 0

 83

 41

 23

 13

 7

 0

 330

 161

 67

 56

 25

 21

 0

 630

 583

 42

 5

 63

 47

 12

 3

 0

 1

 0

1 050

1 261

1 283

 456

 270

 179

 75

 69

 1

 242

 134

 47

 37

 13

 11

 0

 242

 111

 79

 17

 13

 22

 0

 387

 159

 66

 98

 50

 14

 0

 509

 470

 35

 4

 134

 101

 23

 7

 3

 0

 0

 447

 480

 149

 150

 32

 3

 290

 148

 67

 25

 25

 22

 3

 318

 189

 61

 27

 25

 16

 0

 461

 154

 111

 124

 45

 26

 1

 409

 366

 34

 9

 71

 39

 23

 4

 4

 1

 0

 521

 421

 176

 139

 24

 2

 275

 139

 73

 47

 10

 6

 0

 259

 144

 58

 30

 21

 6

 0

 385

 122

 95

 85

 54

 28

 1

 350

 315

 32

 3

 63

 36

 10

 8

 7

 2

 0

 98

81

179

78

42

118

n.a.

 11

24

55

6.8

-44

-76

1.7

17

-12

18

-7.3

-25

-33

-5.2

-6.1

9

88

-60

-73

-100

-100

 52

52

164

11

110

-63

n.a.

 25

-14

94

27

59

87

0

-64

-66

19

200

 80

112

11

60

133

100

n.a.

 11

- 19

-24

-4.9

11

-16

-63

n.a.

-16

-21

-14

-31

20

7.7

0

-14

-14

-5.9

-67

-11

-7.7

-57

100

75

100

n.a.

-6.9

France (9.7%)

Turkey (6.5%)

France (16%)

Turkey (24%)

France (13%)

Germany (92%)

Argentina (50%)

Italy (24%)

Italy (24%)

Spain (36%)

Italy (45%)

Italy (70%)

Belgium (67%)

France (24%)

France (26%)

Italy (53%)

France (43%)

Italy (24%)

Greece (33%)

Greece (32%)

Italy (31%)

France (37%)

Greece (68%)

Greece (65%)

Germany (43%)

Luxembourg (100%)

Greece (58%)

Greece (63%)

Hungary (25%)

Italy (67%)

Italy (37%)

Italy (36%)

Italy (80%)

Sweden (25%)

Maldives (71%)

Italy (50%)

49

41

33

14

11

1.9

0

11

51

27

17

3.6

2.2

0

10

56

22

12

8.1

2.3

0

15

32

25

22

14

7.3

0

13

90

9.1

0.9

2.4

57

16

13

11

3.2

0

Total

2 084

2 366

2 175

2 564

2 810

2 615

In Greece, the discontinuity between 2011 and 2012 is due to the introduction of reporting of counterfeit stamps used by Albanian nationals at the land border 
between Greece and Albania.
Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit.
2012 Q1 data for Sweden only include fraudulent documents detected in March.
Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France have been excluded from this table in 2012.

59 of 64

Annex Table 11A.  Document fraud

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2013

Q1

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Highest share

Nationality Claimed

 647

 768

1 050

1 261

1 283

 13

 10

 9

 8

 23

 2

 4

 25

 7

 6

 540

 247

 46

 20

 9

 7

 5

 4

 12

 2

 16

 3

 123

 170

 44

 10

 14

 0

 8

 3

 9

 3

 5

 2

 27

 16

 14

 8

 17

 5

 0

 23

 6

 6

 33

 44

 56

 16

 20

 4

 10

 34

 17

 18

 55

 78

 38

 16

 26

 7

 15

 21

 31

 16

 68

 55

 42

 34

 33

 31

 27

 24

 24

 22

 646

 217

 798

 242

 958

 290

 923

 275

 19

 16

 3

 8

 14

 10

 13

 4

 10

 7

 113

 167

 27

 23

 22

 1

 3

 9

 5

 0

 3

 0

 21

 19

 15

 11

 4

 6

 7

 47

 2

 2

 108

 242

 24

 46

 27

 12

 9

 9

 8

 8

 7

 3

 51

 12

 11

 12

 5

 19

 11

 20

 15

 8

 33

 26

 21

 19

 18

 15

 14

 10

 10

 7

 126

 318

 102

 259

 34

 30

 36

 21

 7

 32

 10

 8

 16

 2

 37

 31

 26

 14

 13

 12

 11

 9

 8

 7

 91

 72

 74

 89

 122

 98

423

450

367

325

43

1450

575

-4

243

267

71

 11

-28

30

133

171

260

275

17

400

-38

133

-17

 52

-16

210

86

n.a.

63

300

22

200

60

250

26

1.7

24

-29

11

113

27

343

80

14

-23

38

-3.7

-5.2

-35

117

91

58

260

-21

27

-50

-33

-13

-19

-19

8.8

3.3

-28

-33

86

-63

10

13

-50

250

-25

 49

5.3

4.3

3.3

2.7

2.6

2.4

2.1

1.9

1.9

1.7

72

 11

12

9.5

7.6

6.9

6.5

5.5

5.1

3.6

3.6

2.5

37

 10

14

12

10

5.4

5.0

4.6

4.2

3.5

3.1

2.7

35

Unknown (21%)

Unknown (37%)

Syria (60%)

Unknown (74%)

Unknown (50%)

Unknown (15%)

Syria (45%)

Senegal (52%)

Afghanistan (46%)

Mali (63%)

Syria

Unknown (17%)

Albania (19%)

Albania (39%)

Morocco (73%)

Albania (86%)

Syria (37%)

Morocco (44%)

Unknown (53%)

Albania (36%)

Unknown (50%)

Unknown (40%)

Senegal (14%)

Syria (22%)

Unknown (10%)

Afghanistan (16%)

Bangladesh (48%)

Iran (38%)

Nigeria (29%)

Senegal (31%)

Nigeria (25%)

Sri Lanka (64%)

Nigeria (89%)

Unknown (38%)

Dominican Republic (29%)

Unknown (21%)

Document Type

Passports

FRA-Authentic

SWE-Authentic

TUR-Counterfeit

TUR-Forged

FRA-Forged

SWE-Forged

SEN-Forged

GBR-Forged

MLI-Authentic

SYR-Forged

Others

Id cards

ITA-Counterfeit

ESP-Authentic

ITA-Forged

BGR-Counterfeit

BEL-Counterfeit

FRA-Authentic

ROU-Counterfeit

TUR-Counterfeit

GRC-Counterfeit

BEL-Authentic

Others

Visa

FRA-Counterfeit

ITA-Forged

DEU-Counterfeit

BEL-Counterfeit

FRA-No more details

ESP-Counterfeit

ITA-Counterfeit

AUT-Counterfeit

FRA-Forged

ESP-Forged

Others

Total: see Table 11B

 706

 20

 6

 7

 13

 5

 3

 5

 12

 6

 3

 626

 238

 42

 41

 3

 6

 6

 5

 18

 2

 9

 1

 105

 183

 40

 7

 17

 1

 10

 14

 19

 0

 8

 1

 66

In Greece, the discontinuity between 2011 and 2012 is due to the introduction of reporting of counterfeit stamps used by Albanian nationals at the land border 
between Greece and Albania.
Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit.
2012 Q1 data for Sweden only include fraudulent documents detected in March.
Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France have been excluded from this table in 2012. Due to reporting and comparability issues data from 
France have been excluded from this table.

60 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013Annex Table 11B.  Document fraud

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2013

Q1

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

Document Type

Residence permits

 345

 308

 330

 387

 461

 385

GRC-Stolen blank

ITA-Counterfeit

FRA-Authentic

GRC-Forged

ESP-Counterfeit

DEU-Stolen blank

ESP-Authentic

GRC-Counterfeit

BEL-Counterfeit

DEU-No more details

Others

Stamps

GRC-Counterfeit

POL-Counterfeit

FRA-Counterfeit

DEU-Counterfeit

ITA-Counterfeit

HUN-Counterfeit

HUN-Forged

TUR-Counterfeit

ESP-Counterfeit

BEL-Counterfeit

Others

Other

ITA-Counterfeit

ITA-Authentic

BGR-Counterfeit

MDV-Pseudo

FRA-Counterfeit

SVN-Counterfeit

UNK-Pseudo

DEU-Counterfeit

ESP-Counterfeit

SWE-Forged

Others

Total

 21

 47

 9

 9

 27

 24

 33

 9

 21

 7

 138

 577

 254

 78

 20

 5

 9

 9

 0

 0

 6

 3

 47

 63

 9

 17

 14

 18

 21

 5

 20

 1

 93

 959

 646

 34

 2

 8

 12

 5

 2

 2

 5

 2

 193

 35

 241

 35

 2

 5

 1

 0

 2

 0

 1

 0

 0

 0

 7

 5

 0

 0

 0

 0

 0

 0

 0

 0

 33

 46

 20

 14

 9

 17

 20

 7

 23

 9

 132

 630

 405

 29

 8

 10

 16

 12

 9

 1

 5

 1

 134

 63

 12

 7

 0

 0

 0

 0

 0

 0

 0

 0

 58

 29

 22

 33

 14

 36

 18

 32

 25

 1

 119

 509

 352

 27

 13

 11

 5

 5

 3

 10

 4

 3

 76

 134

 78

 19

 3

 0

 2

 0

 2

 1

 1

 1

 57

 37

 34

 17

 16

 60

 28

 14

 23

 6

 169

 409

 251

 15

 9

 21

 11

 10

 7

 2

 8

 5

 70

 71

 16

 15

 7

 1

 2

 1

 3

 0

 1

 0

 58

 38

 35

 35

 28

 24

 23

 18

 14

 12

 100

 350

 200

 30

 14

 13

 10

 9

 8

 7

 6

 5

 48

 63

 13

 8

 7

 5

 3

 2

 2

 2

 2

 2

 24

 23

 44

 27

 25

 17

2 084

2 366

2 175

2 564

2 810

2 615

 25

23

-40

289

106

100

33

9.5

260

-30

1100

7.5

-64

-69

-12

600

63

-17

80

300

250

20

150

-80

 80

86

60

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

-26

 11

per cent 
of total

Highest share

Nationality Claimed

 15

15

10

9.1

9.1

7.3

6.2

6.0

4.7

3.6

3.1

26

 13

57

8.6

4.0

3.7

2.9

2.6

2.3

2.0

1.7

1.4

14

2.4

21

13

11

7.9

4.8

3.2

3.2

3.2

3.2

3.2

27

Syria (16%)

Syria (47%)

Morocco (21%)

Unknown (29%)

Pakistan (43%)

Dominican Republic 
(25%)

Iran (33%)

Morocco (43%)

Syria (67%)

Morocco (21%)

Côte d'Ivoire (42%)

Unknown (17%)

Albania (52%)

Albania (87%)

Ukraine (93%)

China (21%)

Kosovo* (23%)

Albania (30%)

Ukraine (56%)

Albania (25%)

Syria (57%)

Gambia (33%)

Angola (40%)

Ukraine (21%)

Romania (27%)

Bangladesh (31%)

Bangladesh (88%)

Romania

Maldives (40%)

Romania

Slovenia (50%)

Ukraine

Turkey (50%)

Romania 

Iraq (50%)

Unknown (18%)

-16

1.8

2.7

2.9

106

75

-60

-18

29

-39

100

-41

-14

-20

100

56

-38

-9.1

-10

14

250

-25

0

-31

-11

-19

-47

0

400

50

100

-33

n.a.

100

n.a.

-32

-6.9

 100

In Greece, the discontinuity between 2011 and 2012 is due to the introduction of reporting of counterfeit stamps used by Albanian nationals at the land border 
between Greece and Albania.
Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit.
2012 Q1 data for Sweden only include fraudulent documents detected in March.
Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France have been excluded from this table in 2012.
* 

 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

61 of 64

Annex Table 12.  Return decisions issued

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Top Ten Nationalities

Albania

Pakistan

Morocco

India

Algeria

Nigeria

Afghanistan

Russian Federation

Ukraine

Tunisia

Others

Total

3 568

5 854

4 214

3 088

3 696

2 455

6 421

1 812

2 163

3 103

4 149

5 782

4 022

2 467

3 955

2 251

7 198

1 684

2 160

2 761

3 615

7 097

3 744

2 360

3 269

2 327

6 321

2 125

2 445

2 498

4 024

5 974

3 456

2 713

2 851

2 312

3 207

2 029

2 487

2 048

33 530

31 462

35 328

29 924

27 557

26 247

69 904

67 891

71 129

61 025

55 285

53 586

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

4 588

4 034

3 242

2 624

2 264

2 252

2 237

2 141

2 072

1 885

11

-30

-19

6.4

-43

0

-69

27

-4.1

-32

-17

-21

20

-15

-5.7

-9.5

-8.7

-2.9

-0.7

0.7

-5.9

30

-4.8

8.6

7.5

6.1

4.9

4.2

4.2

4.2

4.0

3.9

3.5

49

-3.1

100

Annex Table 13.  Effective returns

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Top Ten Nationalities

3 028

2 366

2 388

2 078

1 473

1 683

1 470

1 094

1 621

1 598

3 071

2 490

2 204

2 020

1 906

1 882

1 539

1 259

1 841

1 388

2 903

1 831

1 973

1 889

2 106

1 990

2 078

1 158

1 782

1 146

4 166

3 826

2 392

1 769

2 163

1 977

1 813

1 160

1 263

1 125

2013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

5 876

2 992

2 133

1 766

1 749

1 742

1 705

1 340

1 318

1 267

91

20

-3.2

-13

-8.2

-7.4

11

6.4

-28

-8.7

-14

69

-5.9

-15

2.1

2.8

5.9

-4.1

3.6

17

-6.6

-3.1

4.0

15

7.5

5.4

4.4

4.4

4.4

4.3

3.4

3.3

3.2

45

100

19 845

20 843

19 414

20 518

18 434

17 869

38 644

40 443

38 270

42 172

38 231

39 757

-1.7

2013

Q1

3 838

4 723

3 439

2 901

2 480

2 320

2 253

2 126

2 203

1 445

2013

Q1

3 478

3 179

2 508

1 729

1 702

1 645

1 777

1 293

1 130

1 356

Albania

Pakistan

India

Morocco

Ukraine

Serbia

Russian Federation

Nigeria

Tunisia

China

Others

Total

62 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 20132013 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Annex Table 14.  Effective returns by type of return

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Type of Return

Forced

Enforced by Member State

Not specified

Enforced by Joint Operation

19 625

17 077

2 211

337

21 273

18 423

2 241

609

18 892

14 976

3 471

445

22 840

20 305

2 192

343

2013

Q1

19 534

15 263

3 924

347

22 176

20 114

1 747

315

4.2

9.2

-22

-48

-8.0

-12

0.9

-7.4

-10

Voluntary

Others

IOM assisted

Not specified

Not specified

Total

16 123

16 584

15 767

17 127

16 529

15 256

8 586

4 254

3 283

2 896

9 589

3 984

3 011

2 586

8 476

3 423

3 868

3 611

9 782

3 761

3 584

2 205

9 431

3 697

3 401

2 168

8 447

4 020

2 789

2 325

38 644

40 443

38 270

42 172

38 231

39 757

-1.7

TOP TEN NATIONALITIES

Forced

Albania

Pakistan

Tunisia

Serbia

Morocco

India

Bangladesh

Nigeria

Egypt

Algeria

Others

2 871

1 574

1 277

741

870

843

669

586

389

624

2 864

1 759

1 511

785

847

872

706

774

499

615

2 579

997

1 575

659

830

899

501

707

438

580

3 649

2 873

935

770

817

824

1 304

660

337

717

3 246

2 298

5 599

2 070

668

846

747

731

809

641

378

575

877

856

732

717

709

696

666

656

9 181

10 041

9 127

9 954

8 595

8 598

95

18

-42

9.0

-14

-18

0.4

-10

33

6.7

-14

14

32

-55

-9.2

-7.7

-10

8.7

-18

7.2

4.0

72

-9.9

31

1.2

-2.0

-1.9

-12

8.6

76

14

0

56

91

7.9

1.4

38

55

26

18

5.8

100

25

9.3

4.0

3.9

3.3

3.2

3.2

3.1

3.0

3.0

39

Total Forced Returns

19 625

21 273

18 892

22 840

19 534

22 176

4.2

14

100

Voluntary

Ukraine

India

Russian Federation

Pakistan

Serbia

China

Nigeria

Kosovo*

Bangladesh

Tunisia

Others

1 124

1 536

1 132

770

938

903

429

400

409

344

1 483

1 328

1 171

708

1 094

759

433

392

381

330

1 707

1 038

1 741

680

1 323

563

336

393

271

205

1 765

1 560

1 488

918

1 197

477

444

408

366

326

1 377

1 766

1 483

861

792

846

609

308

466

461

1 416

1 410

1 338

893

879

712

566

489

473

440

8 138

8 505

7 510

8 178

7 560

6 640

Total Voluntary Returns 16 123

16 584

15 767

17 127

16 529

15 256

-4.5

6.2

14

26

-20

-6.2

31

25

24

33

-22

-8.0

2.8

-20

-9.8

3.7

11

-16

-7.1

59

1.5

-4.6

-12

9.3

9.2

8.8

5.9

5.8

4.7

3.7

3.2

3.1

2.9

44

-7.7

100

*    This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo 

declaration of independence.

63 of 64

Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the ex-
ternal borders, some of the border types are 
not  applicable  to  all  FRAN  Member  States. 
This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators 
since  the  data  are  provided  disaggregated 
by border type. The definitions of detections 
at  land  borders  are  therefore  not  applica-
ble  (excluding  borders  with  non-Schengen 
principalities)  for  Belgium,  the  Czech  Re-
public, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Neth-
erlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to 
the  Green  Line  demarcation  with  the  area 
not under the effective control of the gov-
ernment of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea 
borders, the definitions are not applicable for 
land-locked Member States including Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal bor-
der-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are 
not  available  for  Iceland,  Ireland  and  Spain 
and in Greece, these detections are included 
in  the  data  for  Indicator  1A.  Data  for  Nor-
way only includes detections of illegal bor-
der-crossing  at  land  and  sea  BCPs  (1B),  not 
between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing 
at  sea  BCPs  are  only  reported  for  intra-EU 
border-crossing  from  Greece.  Data  on  de-
tections  of  illegal  border-crossing  between 
sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of 
facilitators is not available for Ireland. For It-
aly, the data are not disaggregated by border 
type,  but  are  reported  as  total  apprehen-
sions (not specified). Data for Italy and Nor-
way also include the facilitation of illegal stay 
and  work.  For  Romania,  the  data  include 
land intra-EU detections on exit at the bor-
der with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal 
stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections 
at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) 
at the external EU borders are not disaggre-
gated  by  reason  of  refusal  for  Ireland  and 
the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land 
borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the is-
suance of a refusal form) are reported sepa-
rately and are not included in the presented 
FRAN data.

The  data  on  applications  for  international 
protection  (FRAN  Indicator  5)  are  not  dis-
aggregated by place of application (type of 
border  on  entry  or  inland  applications)  for 
Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For 
these countries, only the total number of ap-
plications is reported. For France, only asy-
lum applications at the external borders are 
reported, not inland applications. For Swit-
zerland,  requests  for  asylum  at  the  Swiss 
Embassies abroad are also reported and con-
sidered  as  inland  applications  in  the  FRAN 
data.  For  the  UK,  data  reported  for  appli-
cations at air BCPs also include applications 
at sea BCPs

64 of 64

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2013European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union

For Public Release

Risk Analysis Unit

Reference number: 16506/2013

Warsaw, September 2013

Rondo ONZ 1 
00-124 Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 205 95 00 
F +48 22 205 95 01

frontex@frontex.europa.eu 
www.frontex.europa.eu

TT-AF-13-002-EN-N 

ISSN 2363-0566