Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, as regards the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and the governance of the railway infrastructure
Date: 2013-01-30
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: carriage of passengers, free competition, liberalisation of the market, national transport, provision of services, rail transport, services contract, transport infrastructure

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 30.1.2013  
COM(2013) 29 final 

2013/0029 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

amending Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, as regards the opening of 
the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and the governance of the 
railway infrastructure 

(Text with EEA relevance) 

{SWD(2013) 10 final} 
{SWD(2013) 11 final} 
{SWD(2013) 12 final} 
{SWD(2013) 13 final} 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

1. 
In its 2011 White Paper on transport policy adopted on 28 March 20111, the Commission put 
forward its vision of a Single European Railway Area with an internal railway market where 
European  railway  undertakings  can  provide  services  without  unnecessary  technical  and 
administrative barriers. 

Several policy initiatives have recognised the potential of rail infrastructure as a backbone for 
the internal market and a driver of sustainable growth. The European Council conclusions of 
January  2012  highlighted  the  importance  of  unleashing  the  growth  potential  of  a  fully 
integrated  Single  Market,  including  measures  with  regard  to  network  industries.  The 
Commission  Communication  on  Action  for  Stability,  Growth  and  Jobs  adopted  on  30  May 
2012 stressed the importance of further reducing the regulatory burden and barriers to entry in 
the rail sector. Likewise, the Commission Communication on strengthening the governance of 
the  single  market,  adopted  on  8  June  20122  also  stressed  the  importance  of  the  transport 
sector. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Commission  has  proposed  for  the  next  2014-2020  multi-annual 
financial  framework  to  create  the  ‘Connecting  Europe  Facility’  (CEF)  and  allocate  €
 31.7 
billion to transport infrastructure out of the total €

 50 billion envelope. 

In the last decade, three legislative "railway packages" have progressively opened up national 
markets and making railways more competitive and interoperable at the EU level. However, 
despite the considerable development of the ‘EU acquis’, the modal share of rail in intra-EU 
transport  has  remained  modest.  This  proposal  targets  the  remaining  obstacles  that  limit  the 
effectiveness of railway markets. 

1.2. 

Problems to be addressed 

Remaining  obstacles  relate  first  of  all  to  the  access  to  the  market  for  domestic  passenger 
services.  In  many  Member  States  these  markets  are  closed  to  competition,  which  does  not 
only  limit  their  development,  but  also  creates  disparities  between  those  Member  States  that 
have opened their markets, and those that have not.  

The majority of domestic passenger services cannot be provided on a commercial basis alone 
and  require  support  from  the  State.  They  are  performed  under  public  service  contracts. 
Therefore  this  legislative  package  also  addresses  the  issue  of  competition  for  public  service 
contracts, and additional points such as the availability of rolling stock for potential bidders 
for  such  contracts,  and  integrated  timetabling  and  ticketing  systems  where  they  benefit  the 
passenger. 

A second set of problems which prevent the rail market from developing its full potential are 
issues relating to the governance of infrastructure managers. Since infrastructure managers are 
natural  monopolies,  they  do  not  always  react  to  the  needs  of  the  market  and  its  users,  thus 
hindering  the  performance  of  the  sector  as  a  whole.  In  a  number  of  Member  States 
infrastructure  managers  are  unable  to  fulfil  their  tasks,  since  their  functions  are  separated 

White Paper : Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource 

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efficient transport system ; COM(2011)144 
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Better Governance for the Single Market ; COM(2012)259 

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between  different  bodies.  Moreover,  the  current  legal  framework  has  not  led  to  improved 
cross-border cooperation among infrastructure managers. 

In  addition,  a  number  of  market  entry  barriers  result  from  situations  where  infrastructure 
management and transport operations are part of the same integrated structure. In such a case, 
infrastructure managers face a conflict of interests as they have to take account of the business 
interests  of  the  integrated  structure  and  its  transport  subsidiaries  and  have  an  incentive  to 
discriminate in the provision of access to the infrastructure. 

Finally,  integrated  structures  make  it  much  more  difficult  to  enforce  the  separation  of 
accounts  between  infrastructure  management  and  transport  operations.  Regulators  find  it 
difficult to trace financial flows between the different subsidiaries and the holding company in 
an integrated structure. Accountancy tools allow for the artificial increase or decrease of the 
transfers  of 
the  respective  subsidiaries.  Cross-subsidising  practices  and 
results  of 
infrastructure  funds  to  competitive  activities  are  a  serious  market  entry  barrier  for  new 
operators  that  do  not  have  the  possibility  to  rely  on  such  funds.  Cross-subsidising  practises 
may also imply State aid granted to competitive activities. 

1.2 

General Objectives 

The main objective of the European Union’s transport policy is to establish an internal market 
through  a  high  degree  of  competitiveness  and  the  harmonious,  balanced  and  sustainable 
development of economic activities. The 2011 Transport White Paper stated that rail should 
account  for  the  majority  of  medium-distance  passenger  transport  by  2050.  This  modal  shift 
would contribute to the 20 % reduction of greenhouse  gas  emissions foreseen in the Europe 
2020 Agenda for smart, sustainable and innovative growth3. The White Paper concluded that 
no major change in transport would be possible without the support of adequate infrastructure 
and a smarter approach to using it. 

The overall objective of the Fourth Railway Package is to enhance the quality and efficiency 
of  rail  services  by  removing  any  remaining  legal,  institutional  and  technical  obstacles,  and 
fostering  the  performance  of  the  railway  sector  and  its  competitiveness,  in  order  to  further 
develop the Single European Railway Area. 

1.3. 

Specific Objectives 

This proposal encompasses provisions with the following aims:  

a)  The  opening  of  the  market  for  domestic  passenger  transport  services  by  rail  with  the 
objective of intensifying competitive pressure on domestic rail  markets, in order to increase 
the quantity and improve the quality of passenger services. These proposals have to be seen 
alongside 
to  Regulation  1370/2007/EC  (Public  Service 
Obligations)  and  in  this  context  aim  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  public  financing  of 
passenger services. 

the  proposed  amendments 

b) Enhancing governance of the infrastructure manager with the objective of ensuring equal 
access  to  the  infrastructure.  This  should  be  achieved  through  the  removal  of  conflicts  of 
interest affecting decisions of the infrastructure manager on market access and the elimination 
of  the  potential  for  cross-subsidisation,  which  exists  in  integrated  structures.  The  proposal 
also  aims  to  ensure  that  all  of  the  infrastructure  manager’s  functions  will  be  managed  in  a 

3 

Communication from the Commission : Europe 2020 ; A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth ; COM(2010) 2020 

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consistent  manner.  Finally,  the  proposal  aims  at  strengthening  coordination  between 
infrastructure  managers  and  rail  operators  to  better  address  market  needs  and  at  enhancing 
cross-border cooperation between infrastructure managers. 

2. 

RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND 
IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 

In order to support the Commission in the impact assessment process, an external consultant 
was asked to prepare a support study and to undertake a targeted consultation. The study was 
started in December 2011 and the final report was delivered in December 2012. 

To  gather  the  views  of  the  stakeholders,  a  variety  of  targeted  consultation  methods  was 
preferred  to  an  open  consultation.  Between  1  March  and  16  April  2012,  tailored 
questionnaires were sent to 427 rail-related stakeholders (railway undertakings, infrastructure 
managers,  public  transport  ministries,  safety  authorities,  ministries,  representative  bodies, 
workers’  organisations  etc.).  The  response  rate  was  40 %.  The  views  of  passengers  were 
collected through a Eurobarometer survey that reached 25 000 members of the public evenly 
spread  over  the  25  Member  States  with  railways.  The  network  of  the  Committee  of  the 
Regions was used to reach local and regional authorities and the Sectoral Dialogue Committee 
on railways has also been consulted. 

These  consultations  were  complemented  with  a  stakeholder  hearing  held  on  29  May  2012 
(with some 85 participants), a conference with some 420 participants on 24 September 2012 
and with interviews with specific stakeholders throughout 2012. Commission staff met with 
representatives  from  the  Community  of  European,  the  European  Passenger  Transport 
Operators, 
the  European  Passengers’ 
Federation,  the  European  Rail  Infrastructure  Managers  and  UITP  –  the  International 
Association  of  Public  Transport.  Visits  and  face-to-face  interviews  with  stakeholders  were 
also organised in Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. 

the  European  Transport  Workers’  Federation, 

The  majority  of  stakeholders  agreed  during  the  targeted  consultation  that  the  quality  of  rail 
services  and  the  competitiveness  of  the  sector  in  the  EU  were  being  affected  by  different 
access barriers for railway undertakings. 69 % found different interpretation of legislation to 
be an issue. Infrastructure capacity constraints were considered to be the main access barrier 
for railway undertakings (quoted by 83 %). 

The  result  of  the  consultation  showed  that  views  are  highly  polarised  regarding  the 
appropriateness  of  solutions  that  should  ensure  the  independent  and  efficient  governance  of 
railway  infrastructure.  A  large  majority  of  transport  ministries,  competition  authorities, 
regulatory bodies, independent infrastructure managers and railway undertakings, passengers 
and freight forwarders’ associations advocated a complete separation which would ensure full 
transparency  and  a  level  playing  field  for  all  operators.  In  contrast,  holding  companies, 
infrastructure managers depending on such holdings and workers’ representatives referred to 
scientific literature that highlights the disadvantages of separation, such as higher transaction 
costs and the risk of disconnection inefficiencies. These stakeholders thought that a stronger 
role  of  regulatory  oversight  could  be  sufficient  to  solve  the  issues.  64 %  of  respondents 
supported the idea of creating a specific body of representatives from all infrastructure users 
to ensure interests are taken into account in a non-discriminatory way. 

Throughout the consultation process the Commission took a proactive approach to prompting 
stakeholders  to  participate.  Given  that  all  relevant  parties  were  given  the  opportunity  to 
express their opinions, the Commission’s minimum consultation standards were met. 

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Based  on  the  external  study  mentioned  above  and  the  conclusions  of  the  stakeholder 
consultation  process,  the  Commission  made  a  quantitative  and  qualitative  assessment  of  the 
impact  of  the  proposed  measures.  This  evaluation  examined  alternative  options  for  new 
measures aiming to modernise the existing regulatory framework. 

3. 

LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

3.1. Definition of the infrastructure manager (Article 3(2)) 

The clarification sets out all the relevant functions of infrastructure management that are to be 
performed  by  the  infrastructure  manager,  in  order  to  ensure  that  all  these  functions  are 
fulfilled in a consistent manner. It abolishes the option set out in the existing text for functions 
of  the  infrastructure  manager  on  a  network  or  part  of  a  network  to  be  allocated  to  different 
bodies  or  firms.  It  also  clarifies  the  meaning  of  the  different  functions  of  infrastructure 
management. 

3.2. Definition of international passenger services (Article 3, point 5) 

The  fifth  Point  of  the  existing  Article  3  defines  international  passenger  services.  With  the 
opening  of  the  market  for  domestic  passenger  transport  services  by  rail,  the  distinction 
between international and domestic passenger services becomes irrelevant for the purpose of 
this Directive. This definition is therefore deleted. 

3.3. Separation of accounts within an integrated group (Article 6(2)) 

The existing Article 6(2) allows for the possibility of organising infrastructure and transport 
services  within  a  single  undertaking  while  fulfilling  the  requirements  of  a  separation  of 
accounts. Since the proposal contains specific rules on the separation of the two activities, this 
provision has to be deleted. 

3.4. Institutional separation of the infrastructure manager (Article 7) 

This  provision  establishes  that  infrastructure  managers  should  be  able  to  fulfil  all  the 
necessary  functions  for  the  sustainable  development  of  the  infrastructure.  It  also  introduces 
the  institutional  separation  of  the  infrastructure  manager  from  transport  operations,  by 
prohibiting  the  same  legal  or  natural  person  from  having  the  right  to  control  or  exercise 
influence over an infrastructure manager and a railway undertaking at the same time. It allows 
for  the  possibility  of  a  Member  State  to  be  owner  of  both  legal  entities,  in  which  control 
should be exercised by public authorities that are separate and legally distinct from each other. 

3.5.  Independence  of  infrastructure  managers  within  vertically  integrated  undertakings 
(Articles 7a and 7b) 

The  proposal  allows  vertically  integrated  undertakings,  including  those  with  a  holding 
structure, to maintain ownership of the infrastructure manager. However, it clarifies that this 
is only permissible if conditions are fulfilled which ensure that the infrastructure manager has 
effective  decision-making  rights  for  all  its  functions.  It  further  sets  out  that  this  must  be 
guaranteed  by  strong  and  efficient  safeguards  protecting  the  infrastructure  manager’s 
independence. It specifies that these safeguards should be in place with regard to the structure 
of  the  undertaking,  including  the  separation  of  financial  circuits  between  the  infrastructure 
manager  and  other  companies  of  the  integrated  group.  It  also  sets  out  rules  on  the 
management structure of the infrastructure manager. 

3.6. Verification of compliance (Article 7c) 

This  provision  establishes  a  possibility  for  Member  States  to  limit  access  rights  of  railway 
operators which are part of vertically integrated undertakings, in case the Commission is not a 

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position to confirm that safeguards to protect the independence of the infrastructure manager 
have been effectively implemented.  

3.7. Coordination committee (Article 7d) 

This provision seeks to ensure good coordination between the infrastructure manager and the 
users of the network which are affected by his decisions, including applicants, representatives 
of passengers and users of freight services, and regional and local authorities. It lists the issues 
on  which  the  infrastructure  manager  should  take  advice  from  the  users  which  include  their 
needs on the development of the infrastructure, performance targets, allocation and charging. 

3.8. European Network of Infrastructure Managers (Article 7e) 

The  proposal  creates  a  forum  for  the  cooperation of  infrastructure  managers  across  borders, 
with  a  view  to  developing  the  European  rail  network.  This  includes  cooperation  on  the 
establishment of the core network corridors, the rail freight corridors and the implementation 
of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) deployment plan. The proposal 
also  covers  the  role  to  be  played  by  this  Network  in  monitoring  the  performance  of 
infrastructure  managers  with  the  aim  of  improving  the  quality  of  services  offered  by 
infrastructure managers. 

3.9. Conditions of access to railway infrastructure (Article 10) 

Article  10(2)  is  amended  to  grant  to  European  railway  undertakings  access  rights  for  the 
purpose of operating domestic passenger services. Since the distinction made in the existing 
legislation between international and domestic services is removed, Article 10(3) and 10(4), 
whose purpose had been to determine the international or domestic nature of a service, have 
to be deleted. 

3.10. Limitation of the right of access (Article 11) 

This  provision  gives  Member  States  the  possibility  to  limit  access  rights  for  the  purpose  of 
operating domestic or international services if the exercise of this right would compromise the 
economic  equilibrium  of  a  public  service  contract.  As  is  currently  the  case  for  international 
services,  the  provision  stipulates  that  regulatory  bodies  have  the  responsibility  to  determine 
whether  the  economic  equilibrium  of  a  public  service  contract  is  being  compromised  by  a 
domestic service according to common procedures and criteria. 

3.11. Common information and integrated ticketing schemes (Article 13a) 

In  order  to  ensure  that  passengers  continue  to  benefit  from  network  effects,  this  provision 
gives Member States the possibility to establish information and integrated ticketing schemes 
common to all railway undertakings operating domestic passenger services in a way that does 
not  distort  competition.  In  addition,  it  provides  for  the  adoption  of  coordinated  contingency 
plans  by  railway  undertakings  to  provide  assistance  to  passengers  if  there  is  a  major 
disruption of traffic. 

3.12 Capacity rights (Article 38(4)) 

With a view to giving all market players sufficient legal certainty to develop their activities, 
this  provision  is  amended.  It  defines  the  time  frame  within  which  regulatory  bodies  should 
assess whether the economic equilibrium of a public service contract would be compromised. 
This is consistent with the process for the allocation of infrastructure capacity. 

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2013/0029 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

amending Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, as regards the opening of 
the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and the governance of the 
railway infrastructure 

(Text with EEA relevance) 

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Article 91 thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, 

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national Parliaments, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee4, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions5, 

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Over the past decade, the growth of passenger traffic by rail has been insufficient to 
increase its modal share in comparison to cars and aviation. The 6 % modal share of 
passenger  transport  for  rail  in  the  European  Union  has  remained  fairly  stable.  Rail 
passenger services have not kept pace with evolving needs in terms of offer or quality. 

The Union markets for freight and for international passenger trains have been opened 
to competition since 2007 and 2010 respectively through Directives 2004/51/EC6 and 
2007/58//EC7. In addition, some Member States have opened their domestic passenger 
services  to  competition,  either  by  introducing  open  access  rights  or  competitive 
tendering for public service contracts or both. 

Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 
2012  establishing  a  single  European  railway  area8  establishes  a  single  European 
railway  area  with  common  rules  on  the  governance  of  railway  undertakings  and 
infrastructure  managers,  on  infrastructure  financing  and  charging,  on  conditions  of 

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8 

OJ C , , p. . 
OJ C , , p. . 
OJ L164, 30.4.2004, p. 164. 
OJ L315, 3.12.2007, p. 44. 
OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 32. 

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access  to  railway  infrastructure  and  services  and  on  regulatory  oversight  of  the  rail 
market. With all these elements in place, it is now possible to complete the opening of 
the Union railway market and reform the governance of infrastructure managers with 
the objective of ensuring equal access to the infrastructure. 

Directive 2012/34/EU requires the Commission to propose, if appropriate, legislative 
measures  in  relation  of  the  opening  of  the  market  for  domestic  passenger  transport 
services  by  rail  and  to  develop  appropriate  conditions  to  ensure  non-discriminatory 
access  to  infrastructure,  building  on  the  existing  separation  requirements  between 
infrastructure management and transport operations. 

Better coordination between infrastructure managers and railway undertakings should 
be ensured through the establishment of a coordination committee, in order to achieve 
efficient management and use of the infrastructure. 

(4) 

(5) 

(6)  Member  States  should  also  ensure  that  all  functions  necessary  to  the  sustainable 
operations, maintenance, and development of the rail infrastructure will be managed in 
a consistent manner by the infrastructure manager itself. 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

Cross-border  issues  should  be  addressed  efficiently  between  infrastructure  managers 
of  the  different  Member  States  through  the  establishment  of  a  European  network  of 
infrastructure managers. 

In order to ensure equal access to the infrastructure, any conflicts of interest resulting 
from  integrated  structures  encompassing  infrastructure  management  and  transport 
activities should be removed. Removing incentives to discriminate against competitors 
is  the  only  way  to  guarantee  equal  access  to  the  railway  infrastructure.  It  is  a 
requirement for the successful opening of the market for domestic passenger transport 
services by rail. This should also remove the potential for cross-subsidisation, which 
exists in such integrated structures, and which also leads to market distortions. 

The  existing  requirements  for  the  independence  of  infrastructure  managers  from 
railway transport undertakings, as laid down in Directive 2012/34/EU, only cover the 
essential  functions  of  the  infrastructure  manager,  which  are  the  decision-making  on 
train path allocation, and the decision-making on infrastructure charging. It is however 
necessary  that  all  the  functions  are  exercised  in  an  independent  way,  since  other 
functions may equally be used to discriminate against competitors. This is in particular 
true for decisions on investments or on maintenance which may be made to favour the 
parts of the network which are mainly used by the transport operators of the integrated 
undertaking.  Decisions  on  the  planning  of  maintenance  works  may  influence  the 
availability of train paths for the competitors.  

(10)  The existing requirements of Directive 2012/34/EU only include legal, organisational 
and  decision-making  independence.  This  does  not  entirely  exclude  the  possibility  of 
maintaining  an  integrated  undertaking,  as  long  as  these  three  categories  of 
independence  are  ensured.  Concerning  the  decision-making  independence  it  must  be 
ensured  that  the  appropriate  safeguards  exclude  control  of  an  integrated  undertaking 
over  the  decision-making  of  an  infrastructure  manager.  However,  even  the  full 
application  of  such  safeguards  does  not  completely  remove  all  the  possibilities  for 
discriminatory  behaviour  towards  competitors  which  exist  in  the  presence  of  a 
vertically  integrated  undertaking.  In  particular,  the  potential  for  cross-subsidisation 
still exists in integrated structures, or at least it is very difficult for regulatory bodies to 
control  and  enforce  safeguards  which  are  established  to  prevent  such  cross-

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subsidisation.  An  institutional  separation  of  infrastructure  management  and  transport 
operation is the most effective measure to solve these problems.  

(11)  Member  States  should  therefore  be  required  to  ensure  that  the  same  legal  or  natural 
person  or  persons  are  not  entitled  to  exercise  control  over  an  infrastructure  manager 
and,  at  the  same  time,  exercise  control  or  any  right  over  a  railway  undertaking. 
Conversely,  control  over  a  railway  undertaking  should  preclude  the  possibility  of 
exercising control or any right over an infrastructure manager. 

(12)  Where  Member  States  still  maintain  an  infrastructure  manager  which  is  part  of  a 
vertically  integrated  undertaking,  they  should  at  least  introduce  strict  safeguards  to 
guarantee effective independence of the entire infrastructure manager in relation to the 
integrated  undertaking.  These  safeguards  should  not  only  concern  the  corporate 
organisation of the infrastructure manager in relation to the integrated undertaking, but 
also  the  management  structure  of  the  infrastructure  manager,  and,  as  far  as  possible 
within  an  integrated  structure,  prevent  financial  transfers  between  the  infrastructure 
manager and the other legal entities of the integrated undertaking. These safeguards do 
not  only  correspond  to  what  is  necessary  to  fulfil  the  existing  requirements  of 
decision-making independence of the essential functions under Directive 2012/34/EU, 
in  terms  of  management  independence  of  the  infrastructure  manager,  but  go  beyond 
those  requirements  by  adding  clauses  to  exclude  that  incomes  of  the  infrastructure 
manager  may  be  used  to  fund  the  other  entities  within  the  vertically  integrated 
undertaking. This should apply independently of the application of fiscal legislation of 
Member States and without prejudice to EU state aid rules. 

(13)  Despite  the  implementation  of  the  safeguards  guaranteeing  independence  vertically 
integrated  undertakings  could  abuse  of  their  structure  to  provide  undue  competitive 
advantages  for  railway  operators  belonging  to  such  undertakings,  For  this  reason, 
without prejudice to Art 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
the  Commission  should  verify,  upon  request  of  a  Member  State  or  on  its  own 
initiative,  that  these  safeguards  are  effectively  implemented  and  that  any  remaining 
distortions of competition are removed. In case the Commission is not in a position to 
confirm that this has been achieved, all Member States should have the possibility to 
limit or revoke access rights of the integrated operators concerned.  

(14)  Granting Union railway undertakings the right of access to railway infrastructure in all 
Member  States  for  the  purpose  of  operating  domestic  passenger  services  may  have 
implications  for  the  organisation  and  financing  of  rail  passenger  services  provided 
under a public service contract. Member States should have the option of limiting such 
right of access where it would compromise the economic equilibrium of those public 
service contracts and where approval has been given by the relevant regulatory body.  

(15)  Regulatory bodies should assess the potential economic impact of domestic passenger 
services  provided  under  open  access  conditions  on  existing  public  service  contracts 
following  a  request  made  by  interested  parties  and  on  the  basis  of  an  objective 
economic analysis. 

(16)  The process of the assessment should take into account the need to provide all market 
players with sufficient legal certainty to develop their activities. The procedure should 
be as simple, efficient and transparent as possible and coherent with the process for the 
allocation of infrastructure capacity. 

(17)  The  assessment  of  whether  the  economic  equilibrium  of  the  public  service  contract 
would be compromised should take into account predetermined criteria. Such criteria 

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and the details of procedure to be followed may evolve over time, in particular in the 
light  of  the  experience  of  regulatory  bodies,  competent  authorities  and  railway 
undertakings  and  may  take  into  account  the  specific  characteristics  of  domestic 
passenger services.  

(18)  When  assessing  whether  the  economic  equilibrium  of  the  public  service  contract 
would be compromised, regulatory bodies should consider the economic impact of the 
intended service on existing public service contracts taking into account its impact on 
the  profitability  of  any  services  included  in  such  public  service  contracts  and  the 
consequences  for  the  net  cost  to  the  competent  public  authority  that  awarded  the 
contracts. To make this assessment, factors such as passenger demand, ticket pricing, 
ticketing arrangements, location and number of stops and the timing and frequency of 
the proposed new service should be examined.  

(19) 

(20) 

In  order  to  increase  the  attractiveness  of  railway  services  for  passengers,  Member 
States  should  be  in  a  position  to  require  railway  undertakings  operating  domestic 
passenger  services  to  participate  in  a  common  information  and  integrated  ticketing 
scheme for the supply of tickets, through-tickets and reservations. If such a scheme is 
established,  it  should  be  ensured  that  it  does  not  create  market  distortion  or 
discriminate between railway undertakings. 

In  accordance  with  the  Joint  Political  Declaration  of  Member  States  and  the 
Commission of 28 September 2011 on explanatory documents9, Member States have 
undertaken to accompany the notification of their transposition measures with one or 
more  documents  explaining  the  relationship  between  the  components  of  a  directive 
and  the  corresponding  parts  of  national  transposition  instruments  in  justified  cases. 
With  regard  to  this  Directive,  the  legislator  considers  the  transmission  of  such 
documents to be justified, 

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 

Article 1 

Directive 2012/34/EU is amended as follows: 

1. 

Article 3 is amended as follows: 

(a)  Point 2 is replaced by the following: 

‘infrastructure  manager’  means  any  body  or  firm  ensuring  the 
‘(2) 
development,  operation  and  maintenance  of  railway  infrastructure  on  a 
network;  development  includes  network  planning,  financial  and  investment 
planning as well as building and upgrades of the infrastructure; operation of the 
infrastructure  includes  all  elements  of  the  process  of  train  path  allocation, 
including  both  the  definition  and  the  assessment  of  availability  and  the 
allocation of individual paths, traffic management and infrastructure charging, 
including  determination  and  collection  of  the  charges;  maintenance  includes 
infrastructure renewals and the other asset management activities’; 

(b)  Point 5 is deleted; 

(c) 

the following new Point 31 is added: 

9 

OJ C 369, 17.12.2011, p. 14. 

EN 

10 

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'(31) 

'vertically integrated undertaking' means an undertaking where: 

- one or several railway undertakings are owned or partly owned by the same 
undertaking as an infrastructure manager (holding company), or 

- an infrastructure manager is owned or partly owned by one or several railway 
undertakings or 

-  one  or  several  railway  undertakings  are  owned  or  partly  owned  by  an 
infrastructure manager'; 

2. 

3. 

In Article 6, paragraph 2 is deleted; 

Article 7 is replaced by the following: 

‘Article 7 

Institutional separation of the infrastructure manager 

1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  infrastructure  manager  performs  all  the 
functions  referred  to  in  Article  3(2)  and  is  independent  from  any  railway 
undertaking. 

To  guarantee  the  independence  of  the  infrastructure  manager,  Member  States 
shall  ensure  that  infrastructure  managers  are  organised  in  an  entity  that  is 
legally distinct from any railway undertaking. 

2.  Member States shall also ensure the same legal or natural person or persons are 

not allowed: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

to  directly  or  indirectly  exercise  control  in  the  sense  of  Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/200410, hold any financial interest in or exercise 
any right over a railway undertaking and over an infrastructure manager 
at the same time; 

to appoint members of the supervisory board, the administrative board or 
bodies  legally  representing  an  infrastructure  manager,  and  at  the  same 
time to directly or indirectly exercise control, hold any financial interest 
in or exercise any right over a railway undertaking; 

to  be  a  member  of  the  supervisory  board,  the  administrative  board  or 
the  undertaking,  of  both  a  railway 
bodies 
undertaking and an infrastructure manager; 

legally  representing 

to  manage  the  rail  infrastructure  or  be  part  of  the  management  of  the 
infrastructure  manager,  and  at  the  same  time  to  directly  or  indirectly 
exercise control, hold any financial interest in or exercise any right over a 
railway undertaking, or to manage the railway undertaking or be part of 
its  management,  and  at  the  same  time  to  directly  or  indirectly  exercise 
control,  hold  any  interest  in  or  exercise  any  right  over  an  infrastructure 
manager. 

3. 

For  the  implementation  of  this  Article,  where  the  person  referred  to  in 
paragraph 2 is a Member State or another public body, two public authorities 

10 

OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1. 

EN 

11 

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which  are  separate  and  legally  distinct  from  each  other  and  which  are 
exercising  control  or  other  rights  mentioned  in  paragraph  2  over  the 
infrastructure  manager,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  railway  undertaking,  on  the 
other hand, shall be deemed not to be the same person or persons. 

4. 

Provided  that  no  conflict  of  interest  arises  and  that  confidentiality  of 
commercially  sensitive  information  is  guaranteed,  the  infrastructure  manager 
may  subcontract  specific  development,  renewal  and  maintenance  works,  over 
which  it  shall  keep  the  decision-making  power,  to  railway  undertakings  or  to 
any other body acting under the supervision of the infrastructure manager. 

5.  Where  on  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  this  Directive,  the  infrastructure 
manager  belongs  to  a  vertically  integrated  undertaking,  Member  States  may 
decide not to apply paragraphs 2 to 4 of this Article. In such case, the Member 
State  concerned  shall  ensure  that  the  infrastructure  manager  performs  all  the 
functions  referred  to  in  Article  3(2)  and  has  effective  organisational  and 
decision-making  independence  from  any  railway  undertaking  in  accordance 
with the requirements set in Articles 7a to 7c.’ 

4. 

The following Articles 7a to 7e are inserted: 

‘Article 7a 

Effective  independence  of  the  infrastructure  manager  within  a  vertically  integrated 
undertaking  

1.  Member States shall ensure that the infrastructure manager shall be organised 
in  a  body  which  is  legally  distinct  from  any  railway  undertaking  or  holding 
company controlling such undertakings and from any other legal entities within 
a vertically integrated undertaking. 

2. 

3. 

Legal  entities  within  the  vertically  integrated  undertaking  that  are  active  in 
railway  transport  services  markets  shall  not  have  any  direct  or  indirect 
shareholding  in  the  infrastructure  manager.  Nor  shall  the  infrastructure 
manager  have  any  direct  or  indirect  shareholding  in  any  legal  entities  within 
the  vertically  integrated  undertaking  active  in  railway  transport  services 
markets. 

The infrastructure manager’s incomes may not be used in order to finance other 
legal  entities  within  the  vertically  integrated  undertaking  but  only  in  order  to 
finance the business of the infrastructure manager and to pay dividends to the 
ultimate  owner  of  the  vertically  integrated  company.  The  infrastructure 
manager  may  not  grant  loans  to  any  other  legal  entities  within  the  vertically 
integrated undertaking, and no other legal entity within the vertically integrated 
undertaking  may  grant  loans  to  the  infrastructure  manager.  Any  services 
offered by other legal entities to the infrastructure  manager shall  be based on 
contracts and be paid at market prices. The debt attributed to the infrastructure 
manager  shall  be  clearly  separated  from  the  debt  attributed  to  other  legal 
entities  within  the  vertically  integrated  undertaking,  and  these  debts  shall  be 
serviced separately. The accounts of the infrastructure manager and of the other 
legal entities within the vertically integrated undertaking shall be kept in a way 
that ensures the fulfilment of these provisions and allows for separate financial 
circuits for the infrastructure manager and for the other legal entities within the 
vertically integrated undertaking. 

EN 

12 

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4.  Without prejudice to Article 8(4), the infrastructure manager shall raise funds 
on the capital markets independently and not via other legal entities within the 
vertically  integrated  undertaking.  Other  legal  entities  within  the  vertically 
integrated undertaking shall not raise funds via the infrastructure manager. 

5. 

The infrastructure manager shall keep detailed records of any commercial and 
financial relations with the other legal entities  within  the  vertically  integrated 
undertaking  and  make  them  available  to  the  regulatory  body  upon  request,  in 
accordance with Article 56(12). 

Article 7b  

Effective  independence  of  the  staff  and  management  of  the  infrastructure  manager 
within a vertically integrated undertaking 

1.  Without prejudice to the decisions of the regulatory body under Article 56, the 
infrastructure  manager  shall  have  effective  decision-making  powers, 
independent  from  the  other  legal  entities  within  the  vertically  integrated 
undertaking,  with  respect  to  all  the  functions  referred  to  in  Article  3(2).  The 
overall  management  structure  and  the  corporate  statutes  of  the  infrastructure 
manager shall ensure that none of the other legal entities within the vertically 
integrated undertaking shall determine, directly or indirectly, the behaviour of 
the infrastructure manager in relation to these functions. 

2. 

The  members  of  the  management  board  and  senior  staff  members  of  the 
infrastructure manager shall not be in the supervisory or management boards or 
be  senior  staff  members  of  any  other  legal  entities  within  the  vertically 
integrated undertaking. 

The  members  of  the  supervisory  or  management  boards  and  senior  staff 
members of the other legal entities within the vertically integrated undertaking 
shall  not  be  in  the  management  board  or  be  senior  staff  members  of  the 
infrastructure manager. 

3. 

The infrastructure manager shall have a Supervisory Board which is composed 
of  representatives  of  the  ultimate  owners  of  the  vertically  integrated 
undertaking.  

The  Supervisory  Board  may  consult  the  Coordination  Committee  referred  to 
under Article 7d on issues under its competence. 

Decisions  regarding  the  appointment  and  renewal,  working  conditions 
including remuneration, and termination of the office of the management board 
members  of  the  infrastructure  manager  shall  be  taken  by  the  Supervisory 
Board.  The  identity  and  the  conditions  governing  the  duration  and  the 
termination  of  office  of  the  persons  nominated  by  the  Supervisory  Board  for 
appointment  or  renewal  as  members  of  the  management  board  of  the 
infrastructure manager, and the reasons for any proposed decision terminating 
the  office,  shall  be  notified  to  the  regulatory  body  referred  to  in  Article  55. 
Those conditions and the decisions referred to in this paragraph shall become 
binding  only  if  the  regulatory  body  has  expressly  approved  them.  The 
regulatory  body  may  object  to  such  decisions  where  doubts  arise  as  to  the 
professional independence of a person nominated for the management board or 
in the case of premature termination of office of a member of the management 
board of the infrastructure manager. 

EN 

13 

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4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

Effective rights of appeal to the regulatory body shall be granted for members 
of the management board who wish to enter complaints against the premature 
termination of the office. 

For a period  of three years after leaving the infrastructure manager, members 
of  the  Supervisory  Board  or  management  board  and  senior  staff  members  of 
the infrastructure manager shall not be entitled to hold any senior position with 
any  other  legal  entities  within  the  vertically  integrated  undertaking.  For  a 
period of three years after leaving those other legal entities within the vertically 
integrated undertaking, their supervisory or management boards' members and 
senior staff members shall not be entitled to hold any senior position with the 
infrastructure manager. 

The infrastructure manager shall have its own staff and be located in separate 
premises  from  the  other  legal  entities  within  the  vertically  integrated 
undertaking.  Access  to  information  systems  shall  be  protected  to  ensure  the 
independence  of  the  infrastructure  manager.  Internal  rules  or  staff  contracts 
shall  clearly  limit  contacts  with  the  other  legal  entities  within  the  vertically 
integrated undertaking to official communications connected with the exercise 
of  the  functions  of  the  infrastructure  manager  which  are  also  exercised  in 
relation  to  other  railway  undertakings  outside  the  vertically  integrated 
undertaking.  Transfers  of  staff  other  than  those  referred  to  under  point  (c) 
between  the  infrastructure  manager  and  the  other  legal  entities  within  the 
vertically integrated undertaking shall only be possible if it can be ensured that 
sensitive information will not be passed on between them. 

The infrastructure manager shall have the necessary organisational capacity to 
perform  all  of  its  functions  independently  from  the  other  legal  entities  within 
the  vertically  integrated  undertaking  and  shall  not  be  allowed  to  delegate  to 
these legal entities the operation of these functions or any activities related to 
them. 

The members of the supervisory or management boards and senior staff of the 
infrastructure manager shall hold no interest in or receive any financial benefit, 
directly  or  indirectly,  from  any  other  legal  entities  within  the  vertically 
integrated  undertaking.  Performance-based  elements  of  their  remuneration 
shall  not  depend  on  the  business  results  of  any  other  legal  entities  within  the 
vertically  integrated  undertaking  or  any  legal  entities  under  its  control,  but 
exclusively on those of the infrastructure manager. 

Article 7c 

Procedure of verification of compliance  

1.  Upon request of a Member State or on its own initiative, the Commission shall 
decide whether infrastructure managers which are part of a vertically integrated 
undertaking fulfil the requirements of Article 7a and Article 7b and whether the 
implementation of  these requirements is appropriate  to ensure a level playing 
field for all railway undertakings and the absence of distortion of competition 
in the relevant market. 

2. 

The Commission shall be entitled to require all necessary information within a 
reasonable  deadline  from  the  Member  State  where  the  vertically  integrated 
undertaking is established. The Commission shall consult the regulatory body 

EN 

14 

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or  bodies  concerned  and,  if  appropriate,  the  network  of  regulatory  bodies 
referred to in Article 57. 

3.  Member  States  may  limit  the  rights  of  access  provided  for  in  Article  10  to 
railway undertakings which are part of the vertically integrated undertaking to 
which  the  infrastructure  manager  concerned  belongs,  if  the  Commission 
informs  Member  States  that  no  request  has  been  made  in  accordance  with 
paragraph 1 or pending the examination of the request by the Commission or if 
it decides, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 62(2), that: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

no  adequate  replies 
to 
accordance with paragraph 2 have been made, or 

the  Commission 

information  requests 

in 

the infrastructure manager concerned does not fulfil the requirements set 
out in Articles 7a and 7b, or 

the  implementation  of  requirements  set  out  in  Articles  7a  and  7b  is  not 
sufficient to ensure a level playing field for all railway undertakings and 
the absence of distortion of competition in the Member State where the 
infrastructure manager concerned is established. 

The Commission shall decide within a reasonable period of time. 

4. 

The  Member  State  concerned  may  request  the  Commission  to  repeal  its 
decision referred to in paragraph 3, in accordance with the procedure referred 
to in Article 62(2), when that Member State demonstrates to the satisfaction of 
the Commission that the reasons for the decision do not exist any longer. The 
Commission shall decide within a reasonable period of time. 

5.  Without  prejudice  to  paragraphs  1  to  4,  the  on-going  compliance  with  the 
requirements set out in Articles 7a and 7b shall be monitored by the regulatory 
body referred to in Article 55. Any applicant shall have the right to appeal to 
the regulatory body if it believes that these requirements are not complied with. 
Upon such an appeal, the regulatory body shall decide, within the time-limits 
indicated  in  Article  56(9),  on  all  the  necessary  measures  to  remedy  the 
situation. 

Article 7d 

Coordination Committee 

1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  infrastructure  managers  set  up  and  organise 
Coordination  Committees  for  each  network.  Membership  of  this  committee 
shall  be  open  at  least  to  the  infrastructure  manager,  known  applicants  in  the 
sense  of  Article  8(3)  and,  upon  their  request,  potential  applicants,  their 
representative  organisations,  representatives  of  users  of  the  rail  freight  and 
passenger transport services and, where relevant, regional and local authorities. 
Member  State  representatives  and  the  regulatory  body  concerned  shall  be 
invited to the meetings of the Coordination Committee as observers. 

2. 

The Coordination Committee shall make proposals concerning or advising the 
infrastructure manager and, where appropriate, the Member State on: 

(a) 

the  needs  of  applicants  related  to  the  maintenance  and  development  of 
the infrastructure capacity; 

EN 

15 

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(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

the  content  of  the  user-oriented  performance  targets  contained  in  the 
contractual  agreements  referred  to  in  Article  30  and  of  the  incentives 
referred to in Article 30(1) and their implementation; 

the  content  and  implementation  of  the  network  statement  referred  to  in 
Article 27; 

the  charging  framework  and  rules  set  by  the  State  and  the  charging 
scheme  established  by  the  infrastructure  manager  in  accordance  with 
Article 29 and the level and structure of infrastructure charges; 

the  process  for  allocation  of  infrastructure  capacity,  including  priority 
rules  for  the  allocation  of  capacity  between  different  categories  of 
infrastructure users; 

issues of intermodality; 

any  other  issue  related  to  the  conditions  for  access  and  use  of  the 
infrastructure  and  the  quality  of  the  services  of  the  infrastructure 
manager. 

The  Coordination  Committee  shall  have  the  power  to  request  relevant 
information from the infrastructure manager on points (a) to (g) in order to be 
able to carry out these tasks. 

3. 

The Coordination Committee shall draw up rules of procedure that include, in 
particular, rules on participation in and frequency of meetings which shall be at 
least quarterly. A report of the Coordination Committee’s discussions shall be 
submitted  annually  to  the  infrastructure  manager,  the  Member  State,  the 
regulatory  body  concerned  and  the  Commission  with  an  indication  of  the 
respective positions taken by the Committee members. 

Article 7e 

European Network of Infrastructure Managers 

1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  infrastructure  managers  participate  and 
cooperate in a network to develop the Union rail infrastructure, in particular to 
ensure  timely  and  efficient  implementation  of  the  trans-European  transport 
network, including the core network corridors, rail freight corridors according 
to Regulation (EU) No 913/201011 and the European Rail Traffic Management 
System (ERTMS) deployment plan laid down in Decision 2012/88/EU12. 

The  Commission  shall  be  a  member  of  the  Network.  It  shall  coordinate  and 
support the work of the Network and make recommendations to the Network, 
as  appropriate.  It  shall  ensure  the  active  cooperation  of  the  appropriate 
infrastructure managers. 

2. 

The Network shall participate in the market monitoring activities referred to in 
Article  15  and  benchmark  the  efficiency  of  infrastructure  managers  on  the 
basis  of  common  indicators  and  quality  criteria,  such  as  the  reliability, 
capacity,  availability,  punctuality  and  safety  of  their  networks,  asset  quality 

11 
12 

OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, p. 22. 
OJ L 51, 23.2.2012, p. 51. 

EN 

16 

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and  utilisation,  maintenance,  renewals,  enhancements, 
financial efficiency. 

investments  and 

3. 

The  Commission  may  adopt  measures  setting  out  the  common  principles  and 
practices of the Network, in particular to ensure consistency in benchmarking, 
and  the  procedures  to  be  followed  for  cooperation  in  the  Network.  Those 
measures shall be adopted by means of an implementing act in accordance with 
the procedure referred to in Article 62(3).’ 

5. 

Article 10 is amended as follows: 

(a)  paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: 

‘2. 
Railway  undertakings  shall  be  granted,  under  equitable,  non-
discriminatory  and  transparent  conditions,  the  right  of  access  to  railway 
infrastructure in all Member States for the purpose of operating all types of rail 
passenger  services.  Railway  undertakings  shall  have  the  right  to  pick  up 
passengers at any station and set them down at another. That right shall include 
access  to  infrastructure  connecting  service  facilities  referred  to  in  point  2  of 
Annex II.’; 

(b)  paragraphs 3 and 4 are deleted. 

6. 

Article 11 is amended as follows:  

(a)  paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

‘1.  Member  States  may  limit  the  right  of  access  provided  for  in  Article 
10(2)  to  passenger  services  between  a  given  place  of  departure  and  a  given 
destination when one or more public service contracts cover the same route or 
an  alternative  route  if  the  exercise  of  this  right  would  compromise  the 
economic equilibrium of the public service contract or contracts in question.’; 

(b) 

the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: 

'In  order  to  determine  whether  the  economic  equilibrium  of  a  public  service 
contract  would  be  compromised,  the  relevant  regulatory  body  or  bodies 
referred to in Article 55 shall make an objective economic analysis and base its 
decision  on  pre-determined  criteria.  They  shall  determine  this  after  a  request 
from  any  of  the  following,  submitted  within  one  month  from  the  information 
on the intended passenger service referred to in Article 38(4): 

(a) 

(b) 

the competent authority or competent authorities that awarded the public 
service contract; 

any  other  interested  competent  authority  with  the  right  to  limit  access 
under this Article; 

(c) 

the infrastructure manager; 

(d) 

the railway undertaking performing the public service contract.’; 

(c)  paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 

The  regulatory  body  shall  give  the  grounds  for  its  decision  and  the 
‘3. 
conditions under which a reconsideration of the decision within one month of 
its notification may be requested by one of the following:, 

(a) 

the relevant competent authority or competent authorities; 

(b) 

the infrastructure manager; 

EN 

17 

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(c) 

the railway undertaking performing the public service contract; 

(d) 

the railway undertaking seeking access.’; 

In case the regulatory body decides that the economic equilibrium of a public 
contract would be compromised by the intended passenger service referred to 
in Article 38(4), it shall indicate possible changes to such service which would 
ensure  that  the  conditions  to  grant  the  right  of  access  provided  for  in  Article 
10(2) are met.'; 

(d)  paragraph 5 is deleted. 

7. 

The following Article 13a is inserted: 

‘Article 13a 

Common information and integrated ticketing schemes 

1.  Without  prejudice 

to  Regulation  (EC)  No  1371/200713  and  Directive 
2010/40/EU14,  Member  States  may  require  railway  undertakings  operating 
domestic  passenger  services  to  participate  in  a  common  information  and 
integrated  ticketing  scheme  for  the  supply  of  tickets,  through-tickets  and 
reservations  or  decide  to  give  the  power  to  competent  authorities  to  establish 
such a scheme. If such a scheme is established, Member States shall ensure that 
it  does  not  create  market  distortion  or  discriminate  between  railway 
undertakings  and  that  it  is  managed  by  a  public  or  private  legal  entity  or  an 
association of all railway undertakings operating passenger services. 

2.  Member States shall require railway undertakings operating passenger services 
to  put  in  place  and  coordinate  contingency  plans  to  provide  assistance  to 
passengers, in the sense of Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007, in the 
event of a major disruption to services.’ 

8. 

In Article 38, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: 

‘4.  Where  an  applicant  intends  to  request  infrastructure  capacity  with  a  view  to 
operating  a  passenger  service,  it  shall  inform  the  infrastructure  managers  and  the 
regulatory bodies concerned no less than 18 months before the entry into force of the 
working  timetable  to  which  the  request  for  capacity  relates.  In  order  to  enable 
regulatory  bodies  concerned  to  assess  the  potential  economic  impact  on  existing 
public service contracts, regulatory bodies shall ensure that any competent authority 
that  has  awarded  a  rail  passenger  service  on  that  route  defined  in  a  public  service 
contract, any other interested competent authority with the right to limit access under 
Article 11 and any railway undertaking performing the public service contract on the 
route  of  that  passenger  service  is  informed  without  undue  delay  and  at  the  latest 
within five days.’ 

9. 

In Article 63, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

'1.  By  31  December  2024,  the  Commission  shall  evaluate  the  impact  of  this 
Directive on the rail sector and shall submit to the European Parliament, the Council, 

13 
14 

OJ L315, 3.12.2007, p. 14. 
OJ L207, 6.8.2010, p. 1. 

EN 

18 

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the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a 
report on its implementation.  

By the same date, the Commission shall assess whether discriminatory practices or 
other types of distortion of competition persist in relation to infrastructure managers 
which  are  part  of  a  vertically  integrated  undertaking.  The  Commission  shall,  if 
appropriate, propose new legislative measuress.' 

Article 2 

1. 

2. 

1. 

2. 

Member States shall adopt and publish, by [18 months after entry into force] at the 
latest, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with 
this  Directive.  They  shall  communicate  to  the  Commission  the  text  of  those 
provisions immediately. 

When  Member  States  adopt  those  provisions,  they  shall  contain  a  reference  to  this 
Directive  or  be  accompanied  by  such  a  reference  on  the  occasion  of  their  official 
publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 

Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions 
of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. 

Article 3 

This Directive shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Union. 

Points 5 to 8 of Article 1 shall apply from 1 January 2018 [in time for the working 
timetable starting on 14 December 2019]. 

This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 

Done at Brussels,  

Article 4 

For the European Parliament 
The President 

For the Council 
The President 

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