COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the documents Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Railways and repealing Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the rail system within the European Union (Recast) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on railway safety (Recast)
Date: 2013-01-30
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: European Union Agency for Railways, harmonisation of standards, intra-EU transport, operation of the Institutions, rail transport, technical standard, trans-European network, transport safety

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 30.1.2013  
SWD(2013) 8 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the documents 

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
European Union Agency for Railways and repealing Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
interoperability of the rail system within the European Union (Recast) 

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on railway 
safety (Recast) 

{COM(2013) 27 final} 
{COM(2013) 31 final} 
{COM(2013) 30 final} 
{SWD(2013) 9 final}

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the documents 

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
European Union Agency for Railways and repealing Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
interoperability of the rail system within the European Union (Recast) 

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on railway 
safety (Recast) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1 

2 

Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 3 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties................................................................ 4 

2.1  Organisation and timing ................................................................................................. 4 

2.2  Consultation and expertise ............................................................................................. 4 

2.3  Consultation of the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) .................................................... 5 

3 

Problem definition ......................................................................................................................... 6 

3.1  Description of the current framework ............................................................................ 6 

3.2  Description of the problem............................................................................................. 8 

3.3  The problem drivers ..................................................................................................... 12 

3.4  The Most affected stakeholders and their views on problem elements........................ 17 

3.5  Baseline scenario.......................................................................................................... 18 

3.6 

Subsidiarity .................................................................................................................. 19 

4 

Objectives .................................................................................................................................... 20 

4.1  General objective.......................................................................................................... 20 

4.2 

Specific objectives........................................................................................................ 20 

4.3  Operational objectives.................................................................................................. 20 

5 

Policy options .............................................................................................................................. 22 

5.1 

Identification of possible policy measures ................................................................... 22 

5.2  Description of the policy options ................................................................................. 22 

5.3 

Interaction with legal acts and stakeholders' views...................................................... 27 

6 

Assessment of impacts................................................................................................................. 28 

6.1 

Introduction and general methodological approach ..................................................... 28 

EN 

1 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
6.2  Approach to the calculation of costs and benefits   ...................................................... 28 

6.3 

Identification of the magnitude of the main impacts.................................................... 29 

6.4  Direct impacts on railway undertakings....................................................................... 30 

6.5  Direct impacts on public authorities............................................................................. 37 

6.6  Assessment of indirect impacts .................................................................................... 44 

6.7  Assessment of impacts on micro, small and medium sized enterprises ....................... 45 

7 

Comparison of Options................................................................................................................ 45 

7.1  Comparison in terms of direct impacts......................................................................... 45 

7.2  Comparison in terms of efficiency and effectiveness................................................... 47 

8 

Monitoring and Evaluation .......................................................................................................... 48 

LIST OF ANNEXES: 

ANNEX I  

THE FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE – THE 'BIG PICTURE' ............................ 50 

ANNEX II  

FUNCTIONING OF THE RAILWAY MARKET ................................................... 59 

ANNEX III  

FUNCTIONNING OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ............................................. 62 

ANNEX IV  

NATIONAL RAILWAY RULES ............................................................................. 70 

ANNEX V  

CONSULTATION of STAKEHOLDERS................................................................ 75 

ANNEX VI  

SCREENING OF INDIVIDUAL MEASURES........................................................ 82 

ANNEX VII  

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS – METHODOLOGICAL ELEMENTS .................. 87 

ANNEX VIII  

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREFERRED OPTION........................................ 114 

ANNEX IX  

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................. 118 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
1 

INTRODUCTION 

In its 2011 White Paper on transport policy adopted on 28 March 2011 (hereinafter the 2011 
White Paper), the Commission announced its vision to establish a Single European Railway 
Area  and  clarified  that  this  objective  implies  creating  an  internal  railway  market  where 
European  railway  undertakings  can  provide  services  without  unnecessary  technical  and 
administrative barriers. 1  

Additionally, the European Council conclusions of January 2012 highlight the importance of 
unleashing  the  growth-creating  potential  of  a  fully  integrated  Single  Market,  including 
measures with regard to network industries.2 Furthermore, the Commission Communication 
on Action for Stability, Growth and Jobs adopted on 30 May 2012 stresses the importance 
of  further  reducing  the  regulatory  burden  and  barriers  to  entry  in  the  rail  sector,  making 
country-specific  recommendations  to  that  aim.3  In  the  same  manner,  on  6th  June  2012  the 
Commission  adopted  the  Communication  on  strengthening  the  governance  of  the  single 
market, which also stresses the importance of the transport sector.4  

The EU railway market has seen massive changes in the recent decade. They were gradually 
introduced by three legislative "railway packages" (with some accompanying acts) intended 
to open up  national  markets  and  make railways  more  competitive  and interoperable at the 
EU  level,  while  maintaining  a  high  level  of  safety.  The  most  recent  development  is  the 
adoption  (passed  2nd  reading  in  Parliament  in  July,  to  be  adopted  by  the  Council  in 
December 2012) of the recast of the 1st Railway Package, which, in addition to legislative 
simplification  and  consolidation,  clarifies  certain  provisions  on  competition  issues, 
regulatory oversight and financial architecture of railway operations5.  

Despite the considerable development of the 'EU acquis' establishing an internal market for 
rail  transport  services,  the  modal  share  of  rail  in  intra-EU  transport  has  remained  modest. 
Therefore  the  Commission  has  planned  to  put  forward  with  the  4th  Railway  Package  (cf. 
Annex I for further details) in order to enhance the quality and efficiency of rail services by 
removing  the  remaining  obstacles  of  different  natures,  and  fostering  thereby  the 
performance  and  competitiveness  of  the  railway  sector.  As  announced  by  the  2011  White 
Paper, these issues will be addressed by different initiatives:  

•  removing  remaining  administrative  and  technical  barriers,  in  particular  by 
establishing  a  common  approach  to  safety  and  interoperability  rules  to  increase 
economies  of  scale  for  railway  undertakings  active  across  the  EU,  decreasing 
administrative  costs  and  accelerating  administrative  procedures,  as  well  as  to 
avoiding disguised discrimination; 

1  

2 
3 
4 
5 

White  Paper  Roadmap  to  a  Single  European  Transport  Area  –  Towards  a  competitive  and  resource 
efficient transport system (COM/2011/0144 final) 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127599.pdf 
COM (2012) 299 final 
COM(2012) 259 final 

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/520&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en 

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
                                                 
 
•  opening  the  domestic  rail  passenger  market,  providing  open  access  to  lines, 
including those under public service obligations (PSOs)6 to competition (completing 
the process of market opening);    

•  optimising  the  governance  of  infrastructure  management,  in  particular  by 
ensuring  that  the  infrastructure  manager  performs  a  consistent  set  of  functions  that 
optimises  the  use  of  infrastructure  capacity  and  guarantees  non-discriminatory 
access to the infrastructure and rail related services. 

This  impact  assessment  focuses  on  the  first  point.  However  at  the  same  time  expected 
synergies  from  other  elements  of  the  4th  Railway  Package  would  reinforce  the  overall 
outcome,  for  example  the  initiative  on  infrastructure  governance  will  help  to  reduce 
discrimination in relation to access to infrastructure, thus the access barriers for new entrants 
would be lowered. 

2  PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

This  impact  assessment  (IA)  has  been  prepared  by  DG  MOVE  to  support  legislative 
proposals  on  improving  efficiency  and  competitiveness  of  the  Single  European  Railway 
Area  in  the  field  of  interoperability  and  safety,  namely  revision  of  the  Railway  Safety 
Directive  2004/49/EC7,  Interoperability  Directive  2008/57/EC8  and  ERA  regulation  (EC) 
No  881/20049 
(Agenda  Planning  numbers  2011/MOVE/011,  2012/MOVE/031, 
2012/MOVE/033).  The  impact  assessment  road  map  has  been  published  at  the  website  of 
the Commission10. 

2.1 

Organisation and timing 

An  Impact  Assessment  Steering  Group  (IASG)  was  created  in  June  2011.  All  DGs  were 
invited to participate, however the main interested services are DGs ENTR, EMPL, SG, SJ, 
HR, RTD, BUDG, REGIO, ENER and ELARG.   
The  IASG  met  six  times.11  Last  IASG  meeting  was  held  on  13  July  2012  and  the  IASG 
members were given the opportunity to make final comments until 20 July. 

2.2 

Consultation and expertise 

The Commission services have discussed the developments of the Single European Railway 
Area with sector representatives on an on-going basis. In 2010-2011 it conducted also an ex 
post  evaluation  of  Regulation  881/2004  establishing  the  Agency  and  its  functioning12.  In 
order  to  support  the  Commission  in  the  IA  process,  an  external  consultant  was  tasked  to 
prepare an IA support study13 and to undertake a targeted consultation of stakeholders.   

6 
7  

8  

9  

10   
11  
12  
13 

List of abbreviations with explanations is provided in Annex IX. 

Directive 2008/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 amending 
Directive 2004/49/EC on safety on the Community’s railways (Railway Safety Directive) 
Directive  2008/57/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  17  June  2008  on  the 
interoperability of the rail system within the Community (Recast) 
Regulation (EC) No 1335/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 
amending Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 establishing a European Railway Agency (Agency Regulation) 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2011_move_011_railway_agency_en.pdf 
5 July 2011, 13 October 2011, 28 November 2011, 28 February 2012, 27 April 2012, 13 July 2012 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/evaluations/doc/2011_era-evaluation-881-2004.pdf 
[ reference will be added after publication] 

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
                                                 
The targeted consultation of interested parties started on 18 November 2011 with an internet 
survey which finished on 30 December 2011. It was followed by interviews with the most 
significant stakeholders14 and a stakeholder workshop in February 2012.   

Given  the  technical  nature  of  the  initiative,  no  open  public  consultation  was  carried  out. 
However, the Commission has taken care that all interested parties and Member States have 
been  consulted  in  due  time  and  that  discussions  have  covered  all  the  key  elements  of  the 
initiative. Therefore the minimum consultation standards of the Commission have been met.  

Summary of main conclusions 

In  general  stakeholders  agreed  with  the  initial  set  of  problems  as  proposed  by  the 
Commission15.  The  results  of  the  consultation  show  that  there  is  partial  consensus  on  the 
objectives and possible new roles of the Agency. It seems evident that currently there is no 
support  for  ERA's  involvement  in  the  market  access  sphere,  thus  transfer  of  competences 
from the Regulatory Bodies to the Agency is excluded at this stage and will not be analysed 
in  this  impact  assessment.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  support  for  higher  involvement  of 
ERA  in  the  functioning  of  the  NSAs  and,  to  lesser  extent,  also  of  the  Notified  Bodies.  In 
particular, the engagement of the Agency in the processes of granting of safety certificates 
and vehicle authorisations – currently performed by the NSAs – was supported. 

All the top-up measures complementing the options on the institutional role of ERA (such as 
dissemination of railway-related information and training, support in implementing the EU 
legislation and migrating from national systems to the system of EU rules) were evaluated 
positively by the stakeholders.  

Annex V provides more information on stakeholder consultation. 

2.3 

Consultation of the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) 

This impact assessment was reviewed by the Commission IAB on 5 September 2012. Based 
on the Board's recommendations, the impact assessment has been revised according to the 
following lines: 

-  more concrete evidence and statistical data supporting the argument that the existing 
system works in a sub-optimal manner were added or moved from the Annexes into 
the  body  of  the  text  (e.g.  costs  and  timescales  of  procedures  in  different  Member 
States, comparative statistics per MS relating to penetration by new entrants, number 
of  persons  working  in  different  national  institutions,  number  of  national  rules, 
limited monitoring responsibilities of ERA);  

-  expected synergies from other elements of the 4th Railway Package were added and 

indirect impacts clarified; 

- 

- 

the core measures common to options 2-5 were described in more detail and clarified 
regarding  their  differentiation;  option  6,  its  individual  measures  and  the  link  with 
other options were better explained; 

likely implementation problems of the preferred option were assessed and added (in 
Annex VIII); 

14 
15 

For the list of stakeholders consulted – see Annex V. 
For further details see Figure 2-2: Stakeholder views on different problem elements. 

EN 

5 

   EN 

 
                                                 
- 

the  methodology  regarding  the  assessment  of  impacts  was  clarified  and  better 
explained; its logic was reinforced by better cross-referencing; 

-  calculation  regarding  staffing  needs  for  the  institutions  concerned  under  different 

options was explained; 

-  better  distinction  between  administrative  costs  for  economic  actors  (railway 
operators)  and  the  cost  of  public  administration  (national  authorities,  ERA  and  the 
Commission) was made; 

- 

- 

- 

- 

the summary and overview tables in section 7 were explained and cross-references 
with previous sections added; 

the relevant monitoring indicators were added by linking them with existing targets 
for  operational  objectives  (number  of  national  rules,  cost  and  duration  of 
certification and authorisation procedures); 

indication that the founding ERA Regulation will be revised to include an obligation 
to  undertake  regular  evaluations  of  the  functioning  and  delivery  of  the  Agency  by 
the Commission was added; 

information on stakeholders' consultation was improved by adding specific views of 
different stakeholder groups, including national authorities.  

3  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

3.1 

Description of the current framework  

The legal framework 

Over the years national rail networks have developed  different technical specifications for 
infrastructure and rolling stock16 making it more difficult and more costly to run a train from 
one  country  to  another.  Also  different  national  rules  –  often  overly  complicated  and  not 
transparent  –  act  as  a  major  hindrance  for  new  railway  companies  looking  to  establish 
themselves on the market, or indeed for any company wanting to use rail infrastructure in 
different countries. 

The creation of an integrated European railway area, which intensified with the adoption of 
the  second  railway  package  in  2004,  called  for  harmonised  safety  rules  and  improved 
"interoperability”17 – or technical compatibility – of infrastructure, rolling stock, signalling 
and other part of the rail system, as well as less complex procedures for approving rolling 
stock  for  use  across  the  European  rail  network.  Specific  EU  legislation  exists  to  promote 
consistent approach to interoperability and safety and overcome national differences.  

The main legislative act in force in the field of safety is the railway Safety Directive and in 
the field of interoperability - a recast of the Interoperability Directive. 

The  Safety  Directive  applies  to  the  railway  system  of  Member  States  and  covers  safety 
requirements  for  the  system  as  a  whole,  including  infrastructure  and  traffic  management, 

16  

17  

Resulting,  inter  alia,  in  different  gauge  widths,  electrification  standards,  and  safety  and  signalling 
systems 
Interoperability  is  the  ability  of  a  rail  system  to  allow  the  safe  and  uninterrupted  movement  of  trains 
which accomplish the required levels of performance for these lines. 

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
                                                 
and  the  interaction  between  railway  undertakings  and  infrastructure  managers.  In  this 
respect, the Directive focuses on four major aspects: 

•  setting up, in each Member State, of an authority responsible for supervising safety;  

•  safety  certificates  delivered  in  Member  States  that  are  necessary  for  railway 

undertakings to be granted access to railway infrastructure;  

•  establishment of common safety indicators (CSIs) in order to assess that the system 
complies  with  the  common  safety  targets  (CSTs)  and  facilitate  the  monitoring  of 
railway safety performance;  

•  definition of common rules for safety investigations. 

The  Interoperability  Directive  aims  at  accelerating  integration  of  the  EU  rail  network 
through increased technical harmonisation, guaranteeing a high level of safety. It establishes 
conditions to be fulfilled to achieve interoperability within the EU rail system at the design, 
construction,  placing  into  service,  upgrading,  renewal,  operation  and  maintenance  stages. 
The  gradual  implementation  of  interoperability  of  the  rail  system  is  pursued  through  the 
harmonisation of technical standards. Thus this directive covers: 

•  essential requirements with regard to safety, reliability, human health, environmental 

protection and technical compatibility of the system;  

• 

the technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) adopted for each subsystem or 
part of subsystem pursuant to this directive;  

• 

the corresponding European specifications. 

The institutional framework 

In order to ensure a safe and interoperable EU railway sector, the second railway package 
has  created  a  decentralised  system  of  railway  authorities  covering  a  number  of  railway 
institutions with different roles and responsibilities. It includes today:18 

• 

• 

• 

• 

the  National  Safety  Authorities  (NSAs),  responsible,  inter  alia,  for  granting  safety 
certificates  for  railway  undertakings  and  safety  authorisations  for  infrastructure 
managers,  and  authorising  the  placing  in  service  of  railway  vehicles  and 
subsystems19; 

the  Notified  Bodies  (NoBos),  responsible  mainly  for  conformity  assessment  of  rail 
vehicles  and  subsystems,  after  having  verified  their  compliance  with  the  relevant 
Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs); 

the Designated Bodies (DeBos), responsible for conformity assessment in the case of 
national  rules  which  are  still  applicable  (TSI  open    points,  specific  cases, 
derogations);   

the  National  Investigation  Bodies  (NIB),  responsible  for  investigating  serious 
railway accidents; 

18  
19  

A detailed description of the functioning of national institutions is provided in Annex III. 
The system constituting the rail system may be broken down into the following subsystems, either: (a) 
structural areas (infrastructure, energy, control, command and signalling, rolling stock); (b) functional 
areas (traffic operation and management, maintenance, telematics applications for passenger and freight 
services). 

EN 

7 

   EN 

 
                                                 
• 

the Regulatory Bodies, responsible for ensuring a fair and non-discriminatory access 
to the rail network and services. 

In  addition,  the  ERA  Regulation  has  established  the  European  Railway  Agency  ('ERA'  or 
the  'Agency'),  which  plays  a  central  role  in  promoting  interoperability  and  safety  and 
harmonising  technical  specifications,  a  process  in  which  cooperation  between  the  above-
mentioned institutions of EU Member States and rail stakeholders is essential. To this end, 
the activities performed by ERA aim at: 

–  developing,  promoting  and  monitoring  a  common  EU  approach  to  safety 

management and governance across the Agency stakeholders. 

– 

improving  the  interoperability  of  the  European  rail  system  by  developing  the 
conditions for the free and uninterrupted movement of trains through technical and 
operational  harmonisation,  including  conditions  for  mutual  acceptance  of  railway 
vehicles.  To  this  end,  ERA  develops  common  technical  specifications  for 
interoperability (TSIs) and common  safety methods  and targets (CSMs and CSTs), 
working closely with stakeholders from the rail sector, national authorities, the EU 
institutions and other interested parties; 

organising  and  facilitating  the  exchange  of  information  within  the  railway  sector  by 
networking  with  national  bodies,  providing  registers  and  databases,  issuing  reports  and 
giving guidance on the implementation of the regulatory framework. 

Notwithstanding its important role in creation of the European railway interoperability and 
safety  legislation,  it  is,  however,  evident  that  currently  ERA  does  not  have  any  major 
control  and  oversight  powers  with  regard  to  national  railway  authorities,  infrastructure 
managers  or  market  players.  Its  monitoring  responsibilities  are  practically  limited  to 
monitoring  of  safety  performance  (through  collecting  and  publishing  common  safety 
indicators and facilitating cooperation between the NSAs and NIBs) and of interoperability 
(through publication of regular reports on progress with interoperability in the EU). 

3.2 

Description of the problem 

It must be stressed that, following the introduction of the respective railway packages, the 
level of railway safety (measured by indicators like number of accidents and fatalities) has 
gradually increased. Therefore, safety levels, as such, are not addressed by this IA. 

However,  the  Commission  has  received  frequent  complaints  that  the  system  of  railway 
authorities  described  above,  while  intended    to  cater  for  the  still  remaining  technical 
differences between national railway systems, incorporates barriers of different natures that 
contribute, among other reasons, to the low degree of efficiency and competitiveness of rail 
sector as illustrated by the problem tree of the 4th Railway Package. While in some Member 
States the national authorities function in general efficiently, in others the procedures which 
they manage are long and costly; this is partly linked with their inadequate resources. At the 
same time, the interoperability and safety requirements, which in principle should have been 
aligned  by  common  EU  rules,  still  diverge  significantly  at  the  national  level.  The  latter 
obstacles hamper in particular the processes leading to the delivery by NSAs of the safety 
certificates and the vehicle authorisations (see in this respect Annex III). 

During  evaluation  of  ERA  and  its  founding  Regulation  (2010-2011),  stakeholders 
expressed, in general, their support in relation to extension of competences of the Agency at 

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
the expense of existing national institutions20; this stemmed largely from their perception of 
ineffective functioning of the current model of the EU internal railway market. 

Therefore,  it  can  be  claimed  that  the  existing  system  works  in  a  sub-optimal  manner,  and 
there  is  a  room  for  improvement  in  particular  regarding  the  operating  conditions  and 
administrative  costs  for  railway  undertakings;  more  evidence  will  be  provided  in  the 
sections below. 

The above is especially relevant for the freight transport. The rail freight market  has been 
opened  for  a  number  of  years21,  and  therefore  the  continuous  relatively  low  level  of 
competition,  higher  prices  and  market  distortions  could  stem  (together  with  other  factors 
targeted  by  other  4th  Package  initiatives)  also  from  technical  and  administrative  barriers. 
Additionally,  the  new  entrants  are  relatively  more  vulnerable  to  complexity  and  delays  in 
procedures, since their human and financial resources are often limited. 

As  indicated  in  section  1  above,  the  present  IA  report  will  focus  on  optimising 
administrative procedures and tackling various barriers, while ensuring that existing safety 
levels will not be altered. 

3.2.1 

Long and costly procedures 

As  illustrated  in  the  box  below,  the  stakeholders  complained  that  the  procedures  foreseen 
under the current institutional set up, especially to obtain authorisation for a railway vehicle 
and  safety  certificate  for  railway  undertaking,  are  costly  and  long.  This  constitutes  an 
important  factor  hindering  the  development  of  the  EU  railway  market  and  its  efficient 
functioning.  

Besides being complicated and slow, these procedures do not guarantee sufficient level of 
mutual recognition of safety certificates and vehicle authorisations. This negatively affects 
particularly new companies wishing to enter into the market, thus contributing to a low level 
of  competition  and  lasting  market  distortions.  Additionally,  the  range  of  fees  differs 
significantly among Member States and can be very costly: 

-  a cost of a safety certificate may be from 0€ up to 70 000€

22; 

- 

total costs for an additional vehicle authorisation can  vary between 900 000€ up to 2 
€M per locomotive type 23. 

20  

21  

Figure  9.1,  page  136,  ERA  evaluation  (http://ec.europa.eu/transport/evaluations/doc/2011_era-
evaluation-881-2004.pdf) 
In  case  of  passenger  railway  market,  for  the  time  being  only  international  traffic  (relatively  small  in 
comparison with domestic traffic) is open to competition. 

22 See Table III-2 in Annex III 
23 
2011  ERA  Report 

authorisation, 
Register/Documents/Final%20report%20on%20vehicle%20authorisation%20%28part%201%29.pdf) 

(www.era.europa.eu/Document-

vehicle 

on 

47 

p. 

EN 

9 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
EXAMPLES: 

The procedure to receive an authorisation for a railway vehicle can last up to 2 years and cost up to €6 million 
(in case of new locomotive authorisation in its first country). One stakeholder provided figures regarding the 
second  authorisation  of  a  locomotive  equipped  with  ETCS  (European  Train  Control  System):  procedural 
authorisation  costs  are  equal  to  about  10%  of  costs  of  the  locomotive  per  country;  in  the  case  where  a 
locomotive  is  to  be  used  in  three  Member  States,  the  overall  costs  would  increase  by  about  30%  (without 
taking  into  account  the  costs of different  ETCS  systems  to  be  installed).  [source:  IA  support  study  of  SDG, 
2012] 

The Safety Directive requires railway undertakings from January 1st 2011 to hold a safety certificate in order 
to  be  granted  access  to  the  railway  infrastructure;  the  NSAs  are  responsible  for  issuing  them.  In  one  EU 
Member State, on December 1st 2010, an NSA handled only 114 out of 348 outstanding requests. Due to this 
delay a transitional arrangement had to be introduced that allows railway undertakings (RUs) to continue their 
operations  if  they  had  requested  the  new  safety  certificate  before  January  1st  2011.  Additionally,  RUs  are 
required to pay the NSA for the cost of the approval process. Some RUs had to invest 2 man-years and to pay 
up to €70,000 for administrative and advisory costs. Repr esentatives of RUs reported that these costs created a 
high  market  entry  barrier  in  particular  for  small  RUs.  Stakeholders  have  also  mentioned  problems  of  the 
approach adopted by this NSA (very judicial in nature and not sufficiently focused on understanding whether 
technical details can be overcome in a simple manner) which is common in relation to vehicle authorisation 
process.  In  addition,  many  stakeholders  have  mentioned  that  they  have  not  launched  an  appeal  against  the 
decisions  of  the  NSSA  for  fear  of  problems  in  future  with  other  authorisations/certificates.  [source:  Case 
studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012]  

An operator from one EU Member State has stated that it would have cost them approximately €30 million to 
get  its  high  speed  trains  approved  in  another  Member  State,  and  so  decided  to  abandon  the  authorisation 
process  (one  can  assume,  however,  that  this  amount  would  probably  include  retrofitting  of  locomotives  not 
compliant with the present TSIs). [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012]  

3.2.2 

Access barriers, especially for new entrants  

Besides  the  issue  of  inefficient  administrative  procedures,  stakeholders  complained  that 
national railway authorities may use technical arguments and a legacy of diverging and not 
always  transparent  national  rules  as  an  access  barrier  for  companies  wishing  to  enter  the 
railway market (new entrants). In this broad "new entrants" category the most potential can 
be unleashed from expected new cross-border operations, i.e. starting new railway operating 
in another Member State by a company already established elsewhere in the EU. Currently 
(2010),  in  case  of  rail  freight  the  level  of  penetration  by  new  entrants  varies  in  Member 
States from 0 to 55%24.  

According  to  the  results  of  the  targeted  consultation,  new  entrants  may  inter  alia  face 
discrimination  from  NSAs  when  applying  for  safety  certificate  or  during  vehicle 
authorisation processes.25 Stakeholders reported more specifically that the processes leading 
to the delivery of safety certificate and vehicle authorisation are not sufficiently harmonised 
and transparent to prevent arbitrary and discriminative decisions by NSAs.  

This situation poses a significant problem for those who would like to start offering railway 
services, either as a newly established company or as an existing company wishing to start 
its operation in another Member State. 

24  
25  

For full statistics see Annex II 
The most common problems in relation to safety certificates and vehicle authorisations  include:  not 
harmonised  and  transparent  methods  of  delivery  in  order  to  avoid  arbitrary  decisions,  lengthy 
procedures and discrimination, reluctance to accept authorisations given by the NSAs of other Member 
States 

EN 

10 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
EXAMPLES:  

The bureaucracy involved in the market entry process in one EU Member State was identified by a study of the 
Finnish  Rail  Administration  (2009)  as  the  main  barrier  for  entry  for  new  railway  undertakings;  this  is  also 
often the case in other Member States. The network statement26  proves not helpful for new entrants, and the 
process  for  acquiring  the  necessary  licences  and  permits  requires  a  great  deal  of  effort.  It  was  reported  that 
legally set periods for issuing certificates and authorisations are systematically circumvented by the NSA of 
this  Member  State  through  requests  for  additional  documentations  and  tests.  This  can  be  at  least  partly 
attributed to budget constraints and understaffing of the NSA. In order to perform its duties more effectively, 
the NSA considers that it would need twice as many staff as is currently employed. [source: Case studies, IA 
support study of SDG, 2012]  

Moreover,  poor  quality  of  national  law  and  unclear  system  of  rules  act  as  barriers  for  new  entrants.  In  one 
Member State, both the NSA and the railway undertaking indicated this was an issue, as the translation of EU 
legislation  is  generally  poor  and  leaves  substantial  gaps.  The  railway  undertaking  also  stated  that  there  are 
diverging  interpretations  of  the  same  rule  from  different  institutions,  and  that  they  incur  loss  of  time  and 
money, due to the lack of clarity and consistency of rules and interpretations generated by the lack of clarity 
and gaps left in domestic legislation. [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012]  

In  2010-2011  a  well-known  case  arose  concerning  authorisation  of  rolling  stock  of  a  new  entrant  in  one 
Member  State.  A  new  company  wanted  to  enter  the  market  using  spare  Class  66  locomotives  from  their 
operations elsewhere. The NSA of the Member State in question refused to accept the locomotives on the basis 
of a safety rule which required the driver's seat to be on the right side of the cab (the UK 66s have the driver's 
seat  on  the  left).  The  railway  undertaking  resorted  to  a  complaint  to  the  European  Commission.  The  NSA 
abandoned  its  position  after  the  European  Commission,  following  a  technical  opinion  from  ERA,  issued  a 
decision  refusing  the  draft  safety  rule  and  instructing  the  NSA  to  accept  the  locomotives.  The  Commission 
pointed out that, since the class 66 locomotive was already approved for use in the UK and in France, then, per 
Directive 2008/57/EC on Interoperability, there should be no reason to decline approval for its use in another 
Member  State.  [source:  Case  studies,  IA  support  study  of  SDG,  2012;  minutes  of  the  Railway  Safety  and 
Interoperability Committee ] 

26 

Directive  2001/14/EC  describes  the  obligation  for  each  rail  Infrastructure  Manager  to  publish  a 
Network Statement. It presents information on rail network's infrastructure, in particular on commercial 
and legal access conditions. Network Statements aim to provide all train operators wishing to operate 
services on a given rail network with comprehensive, up-to-date and relevant information on a fair and 
non-discriminatory basis. 

EN 

11 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
3.3 

The problem drivers  

The problem tree below shows the root causes of problems described above.  

Figure 3-1: Problems and drivers 

Inefficient functioning 
of national 
institutions

Patchwork of national 
legislative regimes

Discrimination of new 
entrants

Long and costly 
procedures

Access barriers

3.3.1 

Ineffective functioning of national railway institutions  

This concerns predominantly the NSAs and NoBos. 
As described in the ERA Interoperability Report27, differences in size of NSAs may reflect 
their  different  responsibilities,  and  the  size  of  the  respective  railways.  Number  of  staff 
involved  in  interoperability  issues  varies  from  1  person  in  case  of  some  smaller  Member 
States  up  to  162  in  Germany  (data  from  2010).  However,  the  sheer  size  of  the  railway 
market  in  a  given  country  cannot  alone  explain  these  huge  differences;  in  some  cases  the 
NSAs seem not to effectively perform their tasks due to insufficient staffing. 

Other issues of concern for NSAs are the independence of decision making staff and their 
level of technical capability. Sometimes large part of technical staff is on secondment from 
incumbent  operator  and  some  stakeholders  have  questioned  whether  this  can  compromise 
their  independence.  Similar  observations  can  be  found  in  a  study  commissioned  by  the 
European  Railway  Agency28:  different  NSAs  have  different  approaches  regarding  two 
crucial  processes,  the  issuing  of  safety  certificates  and  vehicle  authorisations.  This  is 
determined  either  by:  divergent  interpretation  of  EU  legislation  or  by  different  operating 
approaches, technical capabilities and the amount of resources dedicated to these activities. 

The IA support study has found that some of the authorities described in section 3.1, and the 
NSAs in particular, may not be properly equipped to face the growing tasks. This includes 
insufficient human and financial resources and, occasionally, lack of enforcement powers.  

The  NoBos  are  the  first  level  of  checking  technical  compliance  of  interoperability 
constituents  and  railway  sub-systems,  especially  crucial  in  the  European  Rail  Traffic 

27 

28  

European Railway Agency Interoperability Report 2011 
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-
Register/Documents/Final%20report%20on%20vehicle%20authorisation%20%28part%201%29.pdf  
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-
Register/Documents/development_of_a_migration_strategy_towards_a_single_safety_certificate.doc 

EN 

12 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
Management  System  (ERTMS)29  field.  NoBos  are  not  present  in  all  Member  States  and 
competition between them is on a regional rather than a European scale. Even if Directive 
2008/57  defines  minimum  criteria  for  Members  States  when  notifying  the  NoBos,  their 
operation  and  functioning  differ  due  to  diverging  national  backgrounds  and  a  lack  of 
detailed accreditation criteria.  

Given that the quality of work of some NoBos has been questioned by NSAs, the validity of 
their certificates is not recognised; this is especially problematic in relation to ERTMS. As a 
consequence the NSAs require the verifications to be repeated, contrary to Articles 11 and 
16 of Directive 2008/57/EC. 

During  stakeholder  consultation,  23%  respondents  indicated  that  NSAs  operate  'very  or 
rather  ineffectively'  and  around  40%  rated  them  as  ‘neither  efficient  nor  inefficient’. 
Furthermore, 63% agreed that that there is a lack of sufficient financial or human resources 
in  case  of  NSAs,  and  34%  in  case  of  NoBos.  In  addition,  43%  agreed  that  the  NSAs  are 
insufficiently  independent  of  infrastructure  managers,  the  incumbent  railway  undertaking, 
the  ministry  and/or  other  actors,  which  can  have  a  negative  impact  on  the  efficiency  and 
impartiality of these authorities.  

Sub-optimal operation of the national authorities has a direct negative impact on the smooth 
functioning of the integrated EU railway system resulting in:  

• 

longer times to obtain vehicle authorisations and safety certificates, which drives up 
the costs for the sector, including the lost opportunity costs;  

•  access barriers. 

EXAMPLES:  

Capital costs immobilised due to long authorisation processes are very significant for the railway industry. One 
of the leading European train manufacturers estimates that these costs amount to more than €100 million per 
year  for  the  concerned  company.  This  can  be  attributed  largely  to  ineffective  functioning  of  national 
institutions, namely the NSAs. [source: information provided at UNIFE General Assembly in Copenhagen, 14 
June 201230]  

The  NSA  and  Regulatory  Body  (one  institution)  of  one  EU  Member  State  is  heavily  under-resourced 
financially, making it unable to attract sufficient staff with the right qualifications. This has a negative impact 
on  its  performance.  As  of  23/01/2012,  its  website  showed  36  job  adverts  (out  of  a  total  of  180  Full  Time 
Equivalent  posts  -  20%  of  the  current  workforce).  Moreover,  the  poor  situation  of  the  NSA  is  even  more 
apparent when figures on staff numbers and budget are compared with those of other regulatory bodies in this 
Member State. They show that, despite other regulatory bodies having similar remits in terms of scope (they 
are either market regulators or safety authorities, or both), their budgets are much higher than the one of the 
NSA. The most meaningful comparison can be made with the aviation market and safety regulator: its 2011 
budget  was  almost  80%  higher  than  the  NSA's,  with  the  aviation  regulator  employing  2.3  times  as  many 
employees as its railway counterpart in 2009. It must be noted that railway transport has a higher modal share 
than air transport in this Member State. [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012]  

29 

30 

EU initiative to enhance cross-border interoperability and the procurement of signalling equipment by 
creating a single Europe-wide standard for train control and command systems; it comprises European 
Train  Control  System  (ETCS),  a  standard  for  in-cab  train  control,  and  GSM-R,  the  GSM  mobile 
communications standard for railway operations. 
http://www.railwaygazette.com/nc/news/single-view/view/rolling-stock-acceptance-delays-the-centre-
of-debate.html 

EN 

13 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
3.3.2  Discrimination against new entrants by national institutions 

This  problem  driver  predominantly  concerns  the  NSAs.  The  current  approach  to  safety 
certification  and  vehicle  authorisation  should  in  principle  allow  the  free  provision  of  rail 
services  and  circulation  of  trains  across  the  EU.  It  is  based  on  the  principle  of  mutual 
acceptance of the Part A certificate31 regarding the safety management system, granted by 
individual  NSAs  to  railway  undertakings,  and  requires  that  NSAs  work  at  similar  level  of 
performance.  The  effectiveness  of  this  approach  has  recently  been  questioned  by  many 
stakeholders (especially new entrants) given the de facto reluctance of NSAs to accept Part 
A certificates granted by other NSAs. This leads to additional checks and increases time and 
cost burdens for rail operators.  

The problem of possible discrimination can have both a national and cross border dimension 
when  NSAs  are  sometimes  more  reluctant  to  grant  the  safety  certificates  and  vehicle 
authorisations  to  new  national  or  foreign  entrants  in  comparison  with  granting  them  to  a 
national incumbent railway company.  

In  addition,  stakeholders  claim  that  some  NSAs  adopt  and  impose  on  all  operators  the 
technical  standards  (rules)  used  by  the  incumbent  and  fail  to  consult  all  railway 
undertakings when making key decisions. They are also reported to lack independence. The 
latter is particularly the case for NSAs that are part of wider transport or railway authorities, 
which also include the Regulatory Body. In these circumstances, launching appeals against 
perceived misconducts and discriminations can be difficult and ineffective. 

50%  of  the  association  representatives  questioned  during  the  stakeholder  consultation 
responded that there is discrimination by NSAs, suggesting that this is an issue of concern. 

A similar, but not such a common, situation may occur in relation to NoBos discriminating 
against some  actors when it comes to the conformity  assessment.  Such  discrimination  can 
take  a  form  of  prolonging  the  procedure  and/or  refusing  to  issue  the  certificate  without 
legitimate grounds. 

EXAMPLES:  

A  new  entrant  on  the  market  of  an  EU  Member  State  has  been  seeking  authorisation  for  passenger  rolling 
stock for services that will commence in 2012. Following initial testing, the new entrant asked the NSA to be 
able  to  start  carrying  out  authorisation  testing  for  its  new  rolling  stock.  The  NSA  instructed  the  national 
infrastructure manager (IM) to provide the new entrant with appropriate paths to be able to carry out its testing 
programme. After a number of attempts at arranging these paths the IM formally refused to allow testing on its 
network.  Subsequently  the  new  entrant  asked  the  Ministry  of  Transport  to  intervene,  which  lead  to  the 
Ministry directing the IM to allow the new entrant to reserve and use paths on its network. It should be noted 
that many staff members of the NSA in this country are seconded and paid by the IM. [source: Case studies, 
IA support study of SDG, 2012] 

In the NSA of an EU Member State about 50% of their technical staff (40 persons) are (in the 1st half of 2012) 
on  secondment  from  the  incumbent  rail  operator.  This  might  give  rise  to  concern  about  staff  loyalties  and 
impartiality.  It  should be  also  added  that, according  to  a  national  law from  1997,  the  principal  state  railway 
undertaking has the role of a "delegated infrastructure manager" in relation to most functions of infrastructure 
management and maintenance. [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012] 

The safety certificate has two parts: 

31  
Part  A:  valid  throughout  Europe  providing  the  type  and  extent  of  the  operation  is  unchanged.  NSAs  are 

therefore required to accept Part A certificates issued by other Member State.  

Part B: states the ability of the RU to comply with network rules applied in specific Member State. Therefore a 
RU can have a single Part A certificate but as many Part B certificates as the Member States in which it 
provides services. 

EN 

14 

   EN 

 
                                                 
The  European  Rail  Freight  Association  (ERFA),  in  an  open  letter  to  the  UK  Parliament  concerning  the 
consultation  process  that  preceded  the  Recast  of  the  First  Railway  Directive  raised  the  issue  of  possible 
discrimination against new entrants. It reported that “in some Member States, safety certification is abused as 
an instrument to foreclose the national market” (quoting the Poland Class 66 example) and that often “there is 
no  appeal  body  to  prevent  Member  States  and  their  public  authorities  to  abuse  safety  for  anti-competitive 
purposes”. According to ERFA “in some Member States, the national flag carrier is even tolerated to operate 
without  a  valid  safety  certificate  (e.g.  Hungary)  whilst  new  entrants  are  forced  to  go  through  lengthy  and 
unclear  safety  certification  processes”.  Another  issue  claimed  by  this  organisation  is  “the  restriction  of  the 
safety  certification  for  RUs  to  single  or  a  restricted  number  of  lines  of  the  network  (as  it  is  the  case  with 
Belgium and France)”. [source: letter from ERFA to the House of Lords, 200932] 

3.3.3 

Patchwork of national regulatory regimes and rules 

Railway  undertakings  operating  in  EU  still  face  a  patchwork  of  divergent  national 
regulations and rules. On the one hand this stems from the legacy of historical national laws 
and rules, but on the other hand from divergent interpretation and transposition of the EU 
railway acquis. 

Legacy of divergent national rail systems   

Various  national  rail  networks  have  grown  and  evolved  heterogeneously  over  the  past 
century and relevant national technical and safety rules were put in place when no relevant 
EU rules existed. Recital 21 of Directive 2008/57/EC states that “steps should be taken to 
avoid a situation where Member States adopt new national rules or undertake projects that 
increase  the  diversity  of  the  present  system.”  However,  experience  demonstrates  that 
national  rules  still  represent  an  obstacle  to  interoperability  within  the  Single  European 
Railway  Area  as  well  as  a  complication  for  new  entrants,  especially  from  other  Member 
States. In that sense, some of those rules can be regarded as discriminatory practice, leading 
to distortion of competition. As already mentioned it also happens that national authorities 
(predominantly NSAs) take decisions and introduce new technical and safety rules without 
proper  consultation  with  all  interested  parties,  especially  without  the  participation  of  new 
entrants.  According  to  the  calculations  of  ERA,  there  are  currently  over  11  000  national 
rules in the EU33. 

In addition, as far as the vehicle authorisations issued by the NSAs are concerned, in a large 
majority  of  cases  national  legislations  require  additional  authorisations.34  In  result,  as  the 
ERA  “Report  on  Railway  Vehicle  Authorisation”  (2011)35  indicates,  the  total  additional 
authorisation costs amount to around €1.6 million per vehicle. 36 

32  
33  
34  

35 

36  

Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/90/9032305.htm 
Please see Annex IV for more details 
In  this  respect,  a  distinction  can  be  made  between  the  first  and  additional  authorisations,  as  well  as 
authorisations for TSI-conform and non-TSI-conform vehicles. In theory, the first authorisation shall be 
valid  in  all  Member  States  without  further  checks  for  fully  TSI-compliant  vehicles  running  on  TSI-
confirm networks. However, in practice very often additional authorisations are required, as allowed by 
the directive in force.  
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-
Register/Documents/Final%20report%20on%20vehicle%20authorisation%20%28part%201%29.pdf 
However significant variation across Member States and type of authorisation were encountered. 

EN 

15 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
The  Commission  has  been  alerted  many  times  by  stakeholders,  especially  by  recently 
established  private  companies,  that  action  at  EU  level  is  needed  in  that  regard37.  This  is 
confirmed  by  the  results  of  stakeholder  consultation,  where  the  majority  of  respondents 
agreed  that  "national  technical  and  safety  rules  sometimes  pose  transparency  and/or 
discrimination problems to new entrants". 

EXAMPLES:  

Following a major rail accident in 2009, the NSA of the country involved took a decision to introduce tougher 
inspections for the transport of dangerous goods; in particular, the decision required extraordinary checks on 
wagons  fitted  with  wheel  sets  having  the  same  characteristics  of  the  ones  involved  in  the  accident,  before 
allowing  them  to  run  on  the  network  of  the  Member  State  in  question.  A  railway  undertaking  from  another 
Member  State  applied  against  this  decision  to  a  regional  administrative  court,  being  the  imposition  of  an 
unplanned  and  unjust  national  rule,  but  the  appeal  was  rejected.  The  NSA  insisted  that  these  norms  were 
urgent  and  temporary,  that  they  were  not  National  Safety  Rules  and  therefore  there  was  no  obligation  of 
notification and consultation according to Directive 2004/49. [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 
2012] 

A  joint  working  group,  including  representatives  from  industry,  operators  and  authorities,  was  created  in  a 
Member State to address problems with train authorisation and, as a result, a “Manual on Rolling Stock” was 
produced.  However,  this  manual  covers  neither  the  entire  national  legal  framework  of  the  rolling  stock 
authorisation  process  nor  the  entire  framework  of  the  European  directive  on  interoperability  on  this  issue 
(2008/57/EC) and hence is not compliant with it. For example, according to the manual, 16 different actors are 
involved in the authorisation process, although the interoperability directive envisages only 5 actors. Another 
difference is the project-based approach described in the manual, which involves the RU as a main actor in the 
authorisation process. In contrast, the Interoperability Directive describes a product–based approach, in which 
the manufacturer may place on the market already authorised design types. Even though the transparency of 
the whole process has increased with the manual, it is evident that different rules and regulatory regimes still 
overlap. [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012] 

Divergent interpretation of EU railway legislation by national authorities  

The directives leave Member States with a room of manoeuvre to adapt EU laws to national 
circumstances.  However,  sometimes  transposition  and  implementation  deviates  too  much 
from  what  has  been  provided  by  EU  law,  and  thus  become  counterproductive  to  the 
objectives  of  the  common  legislation.  There  are  also  cases  where  EU  legislation  has  been 
applied  erroneously.  This  makes  the  regulatory  system  of  EU  railways  unnecessarily 
complex leading to negative market consequences, such as higher costs for manufacturers of 
equipment and railway undertakings, and fragmentation of markets.  

According to the majority of stakeholders (62% of those expressing a view on this point) the 
divergent interpretation of EU railway directives hinders their proper implementation. The 
main victims of this situation are usually new entrants, both national and foreign, who can 
be  confronted  with  unknown  situations  in  each  of  the  Member  States  where  they  wish  to 
operate. 

Moreover,  the  current  level  of  monitoring  and  control  of  implementation  of  the 
interoperability  and  safety  legislation  by  Member  States  is  not  sufficient.  This  is  due  to 
unwillingness of railway undertakings, especially new entrants, to lodge formal complaints 
against national authorities for fear of possible future retaliatory actions. This in turn leads 

37 

For  example,  the  problem  was  discussed by  Rail  Forum  Europe’s  in  its  event  on  5  July  2011, where 
policy action was called in order to enforce cross-acceptance of national rules with the final objective to 
eliminate them to the benefit of European rules. 

EN 

16 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
to the Commission lacking a sufficient formal basis and/or evidence, and combined with the 
limited resources available, results in a sub-optimal level of European control.  

Finally,  the  Member  States  themselves  admit  that  there  are  sometimes  problems  with  the 
implementation of the EU railway  legislation, and have called the Commission  to provide 
more  assistance  and  support.  Those  problems  of  implementation  may  stem  from  lack  of 
sufficient  resources,  defence  of  vested  national  interests  by  some  companies  and 
institutions, or the highly complex nature of some EU rules. 

EXAMPLES:  

Stakeholders have indicated (in a survey from late 2011 – beginning 2012) that railway laws in one Member 
State have been known to favour the incumbent undertakings. They have also indicated that their point of view 
is not taken into account during the consultation phase of the drafting of new legislation. Moreover, the NSA 
has indicated that the Ministry of Transport does not often take into account its opinions, as the procedure for 
drafting new  laws does not  require  it  to  do  so.  This  is  despite  the  fact  that  the  NSA  is  at  the  same  time  the 
regulatory body responsible for upholding and executing the law drafted by the Ministry. On top of this, the 
NSA is aware of many examples where the EU law was incorrectly transposed into national law or the national 
laws passed had unnecessarily strict regulations; it is, however, unable to revert this situation which is in hands 
of the competent Ministry. [source: Case studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012] 

The Safety Directive of 2004 was transposed to national law of an EU Member State by a legal measure of 
2007.  This  national  legal  measure  excludes  railway  undertakings  that  are  exclusively  operating  on  regional 
networks from the obligation to obtain a safety certificate and de facto derogates regional lines from the scope 
of the Directive. Such interpretation is in contradiction with the letter and the spirit of the Directive; it might 
have arisen, though, due to erroneous translation of the Directive into national language. [source: Case studies, 
IA support study of SDG, 2012] 

In  a  Member  State,  one  railway  undertaking  signalled  (during  a  survey  from  late  2011  –  beginning  2012) 
major  delays  in  gaining  approval  of  a  new  locomotive  class.  Following  contact  between  two  of  these 
locomotives  and  station  platforms,  the  NSA  refused  to  permit  further  test  runs.  However,  the  undertaking 
informed  that  survey  work  ascertained  that  the  platforms  did  not  comply  with  TSIs,  despite  the  route  being 
declared to be TSI-compliant. Furthermore, 90% of such platforms were allegedly found to be non-compliant. 
The  issue  of  platform  gauging  was  also  reported  to  have  been  raised  in  an  international  forum  by  the 
locomotive  manufacturer  as  being  its  biggest  issue  in  getting  approvals  in  this  Member  State.  [source:  Case 
studies, IA support study of SDG, 2012] 

3.4 

The Most affected stakeholders and their views on problem elements 

This  initiative  affects  the  ERA,  the  Commission,  national  authorities  (NSAs  and  NoBos) 
and  railway  stakeholders  (predominantly  railway  undertakings,  but  also  infrastructure 
managers  and  railway  manufacturers).  It  indirectly  impacts  rail  users,  i.e.  passengers  and 
clients of freight services.  

In  general,  the  stakeholder  consultation  confirmed  the  elements  of  the  problem  drivers 
described above, as illustrated in the figure below. 

EN 

17 

   EN 

 
 
Figure 3-2: Stakeholder views on different problem elements. 

There is insufficient independence of the Notified Bodies from
infrastructure managers, incumbent rail undertakings, the ministry or other
actors

There is insufficient independence of the NSAs from infrastructure
managers, incumbent rail undertakings and/or the ministry

National technical and safety rules sometimes pose transparency and/or
discrimination problems for new entrants

There is insufficient independence of the Regulatory Bodies from
infrastructure managers, incumbent rail undertakings and/or the ministry

Some Notified Bodies lack sufficient financial or human resources to
effectively perform their tasks

The level of monitoring and control of implementation of the
interoperability and safety legislation by Member States is not sufficient

The granting of safety certificates to rail operators by the NSAs and the
authorisation of placing into service of rail systems and vehicles is too slow

There is an insufficient level of dissemination of railway-related
information and training within the EU and between EU member states

Some NSAs are reluctant to accept safety certificates or authorisations for
the placing in service of railway vehicles and subsystems granted by other
NSAs

There is a lack of sufficient financial or human resources in the case of
some NSAs to effectively perform their tasks

Some Regulatory Bodies lack sufficient financial or human resources to
effectively perform their tasks

-100% -80% -60% -40% -20%

0%

20% 40% 60% 80%

< AGREE  - percentage of those expressing a view  - DISAGREE  >

3.5 

Baseline scenario 

The  baseline  developments  could  affect  the  problem  drivers  identified  above  in  following 
ways:  

Inefficient functioning of national authorities and discrimination of new entrants 

• 

• 

the recent adoption of the recast of the 1st Rail Package will have a direct (although 
not immediate) positive effect on the independence and powers of Regulatory Bodies 
and should also decrease some barriers to access to rail related services for operators. 

improved staff resources in the NSAs, as at least 2 NSAs are currently addressing this 
issue  through  more  vigorous  recruitment.  Other  NSAs  are  likely  to  take  similar 
measures  in  the  coming  years;  this  should  have  an  impact  on  the  time  to  market  of 
operators as a result of relieving the bottlenecks at NSAs relating to staffing. 

Patchwork of national legislative regimes 

• 

the  possibility  of  extension  of  the  scope  of  the  technical  specification  of 
interoperability (TSI) to the lines beyond the TEN-T network (but with no retroactive 

EN 

18 

   EN 

 
 
• 

• 

• 

clauses) would lead to further harmonisation of technical rules applying to networks 
and  rail  equipment;  this  in  turn  would  mean  that  manufacturers  will  have  less 
opportunity  to  customise  their  equipment,  and  costs  for  rail  undertakings  and  local 
authorities can be assumed to decrease. 

an  improved  understanding  of  railway  directives  and  regulations  through  the 
publication  of  Commission  recommendations  and  guidelines  e.g.  the  Commission 
Recommendation  2011/217/EU  on  the  authorisation  for  the  placing  in  service  of 
structural  subsystems  and  vehicles  and  its  follow-up  (which  is  currently  being 
prepared  by  the  Agency).  These  documents  cover  in  greater  detail  the  manner  in 
which Member States should implement legislation. 

improved coherence of EU rail market as a result of continuing implementation of the 
Railway Directives. Some Member States have so far failed to properly implement the 
Safety and Interoperability Directives. For example, Germany has not yet transposed 
the  Interoperability  Directive  of  2008,  and  is  thus  subject  to  an  infringement 
proceeding. As part of this baseline scenario, the impact assessment calculations have 
assumed that all Member States will have implemented these Directives by 2015. 

 the  on-going  process  of  reducing  existing  national  rules  should  provide  limited 
progress, especially in relation to vehicle authorisation rules. The Agency, based on 
the input from Member States, is identifying and classifying these rules with a view to 
their reduction within the EU-wide cross-acceptance process. A similar process, albeit 
at  an  early  stage  of  development  and  of  a  non-binding  character,  is  taking  place  in 
relation to national safety rules38. 

The above developments should provide some overall positive results. It is estimated that by 
2025  the  measures  in  place  will  close  the  gap  between  average  authorisation  costs  and 
presumed  minimum  achievable  authorisation  costs39  by  over  30%40.  However  the 
Commission is ready to consider further action to achieve even quicker and more profound 
progress, following the request of the stakeholders and the needs of railway sector. 

3.6 

Subsidiarity 

3.6.1 

Legal basis 

Articles 58, 90 and 100 of the Treaty extend to railways the objectives of a genuine internal 
market in the context of a Common EU Transport Policy.  

3.6.2  Necessity and EU added value 

Actions  by  Member  States  alone  cannot  ensure  the  coherence  of  EU  railway  market  and 
address the divergent interpretation of the legislation. The continuing application of national 
rules and sub-optimal functioning of national  institutions,  acting  as  barriers  to the internal 
market, is in fact at the centre of the problem.  

Action at EU level aims to ensure consistent implementation of the EU rail acquis, which 
should  lead  to  creation  of  the  Single  European  Railway  Area  with  no  unnecessary 

38  
39 
40 

See Annex IV for more information regarding national rules 
See tables VII-5 – VII-8 in Annex VII 
See Section 4 in Annex VII 

EN 

19 

   EN 

 
                                                 
administrative and technical  barriers.  The aim is to enable railway undertakings to benefit 
from a single consolidated legislative framework and to face predictable business conditions 
throughout the EU. 

4  OBJECTIVES 

4.1 

General objective 

Eliminate  existing  administrative  and  technical  barriers  thereby  enhancing  the  competitiveness  of  rail  sector 
vis-à-vis other modes and developing further the Single European Rail Area.  

The 2011 White Paper foresees progressive modal shift from the air and road sectors, so that 
by  2050  the  majority  of  medium-distance  passenger  transport  would  be  carried  by  rail.  
Similar goals are set for rail freight. This modal shift will contribute to the 20% reduction of 
GHG emissions foreseen in the Europe 2020 Agenda for smart, sustainable and innovative 
growth,  and  to  the  objective  of  reducing  transport  CO2  emissions  by  60%  (compared  to 
1990 baseline) by 2050.  
Together  with  the  other  initiatives  of  the  4th  rail  package,  the  present  impact  assessment 
shall identify the most suitable policy option(s) needed to reach the above-described general 
objective.  To  this  aim,  the  general  objective  has  been  split  down  into  specific  and 
operational objectives. 

4.2 

Specific objectives 

SO1: 

Facilitate entrance of new operators into market 

SO2:  Reduce administrative costs of railway undertakings  

4.3 

Operational objectives 

OO1: 

Increase the efficiency of the safety certification and vehicle authorisation processes 

OO2:  Ensure  non-discrimination  in  the  granting  and  recognition  of  safety  certificates  and  interoperability 
authorisations across the EU  

OO3:  
interoperability aspects of the internal market for railways 

Increase  the  coherence  of  the  national  legal  frameworks,  notably  related  to  the  safety  and 

The operational objectives seek to tackle the problems created by the barriers in three areas: 

•  economically - by increasing efficiency of the processes;  

• 

• 

institutionally - by ensuring non-discrimination; and  

legally - by ensuring that the framework is correct. 

The specific objectives have been confirmed by the views of the stakeholders: 

•  OO1:   84% agreed that it is relevant; 

•  OO2:  88% agreed that it is relevant;  

•  OO3:  83% agreed that it is relevant. 

The specific and operational objectives are linked to the identified problems and drivers as 
follows: 

EN 

20 

   EN 

 
Figure 4-1: Links between the problems and objectives  

Drivers

Problems

Specific 
objectives

Operational 
objectives

Increase efficiency of
safety certification 
and vehicle 
authorisation 
process

Inefficient 
functioning of 
national 
institutions

Increase the 
coherence of the 
national legal 
frameworks

Patchwork of 
national legislative 
regimes

Non-discrimination 
in grantin and 
recognition of safety 
certificates and 
interoperability 
authorisations

Discrimination of new 
entrants

Long and costly 
procedures

Access barriers

Reduce 
administrative 
costs of railway 
undertakings

Facilitate 
entrance of 
new operators 
into market

The following targets have been set for the operational objectives: 

•  (a) to achieve, by 2025, the removal of all unnecessary national rules (cf. OO3) 

•  (b) to achieve, by 2025, a 20% reduction in the time to market for new railway 

undertakings above the baseline situation in 2025 (cf. OO1 and OO2) 

•  (c) to achieve, by 2025, a 20% reduction in the cost and duration of the authorisation of 

rolling stock above the baseline situation in 2025 (cf. OO1 and OO2) 

The chosen target date of 2025 would be challenging but potentially achievable. Based on 
experiences  with  the  recast  of  the  first  Railway  Package,  a  target  date  of  2020  was 
discarded. The legislative process would take several years. The new provisions could enter 
into force in 2015 at the earliest, which if the 2020 target was used would effectively leave 
only 5 years for the provisions to be applied and to start having an effect on the market. As a 
result,  a  timeframe  of  10  years  from  the  entry  into  law  date  (2015  to  2025)  seems  more 
appropriate.  

The  targets  to  the  operational  objectives  have  been  subject  to  consultation  with  the 
stakeholders41: 

•  58% agreed that target (b) is relevant and 54% that it is achievable; 

•  71% agreed that target (c) is relevant and 59% that it is achievable. 

Stakeholders were originally also consulted on target "To achieve, by 2025, a 25% market 
share  by  new  entrants  in  the  rail  freight  market",  but  this  target  was  removed  due  to 

41  

Initially  the  targets  were  set  at  the  level  of  25%  improvement  to  ensure  they  were  challenging  but 
achievable.  Following  the  analysis,  it  became  evident  that  the  impact  of  the  baseline  is  already  quite 
significant in terms of the cost to market for railway undertakings and more specifically the cost and 
timescales for vehicle authorisation. Therefore the second and third targets were modified and now they 
would achieve a 20% reduction over the baseline. 

EN 

21 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
 
inconclusive support and its indirect link to the core problems. It was subsequently replaced 
by the current target (a) which became apparent during the interviews with stakeholders and 
is of high relevance to the problems identified.  

5  POLICY OPTIONS 

5.1 

Identification of possible policy measures 

The analysis  of the  Commission,  the external consultants and the stakeholder consultation 
has enabled the identification of a broad set of measures having the potential to address the 
problem drivers described above. As the first step, stakeholders have assessed the individual 
policy  measures.  Subsequently,  the  measures  underwent  a  qualitative  review  and 
assessment. In effect, a number of individual measures were discarded because: 

-  either they have received a decisively negative response from stakeholders,  

- 

- 

they are not implementable, or 

they can be/are being covered by other EU legislation. 

The  discarded  measures  include,  inter  alia,  any  extension  of  competences  of  ERA  in  the 
field  of  market  oversight  (task  of  Regulatory  Bodies)  and  taking  over  the  competences  of 
the notified bodies.  

At the end, any additional measures that were not foreseen in the survey, but that have been 
identified  as  result  of  stakeholder  feedback,  were  added,  and  the  measures  that  would  be 
more appropriately considered collectively were combined. 

The full list of measures and the details of the screening process are provided in Annex VI.  

5.2 

Description of the policy options 

5.2.1  Construction and content of the policy options 

Based  on  the  screening  of  individual  measures,  the  Commission  has  identified  five  policy 
packages (options 2-6), besides the baseline scenario. By construction, options 2-5 primarily 
concern the level of interaction between ERA and national authorities, and are all capable of 
tackling the three operational objectives set out in section 4. Option 6 is a set of horizontal 
measures,  which  are  mostly  independent  of  the  interactions  between  ERA  and  national 
authorities, and can be applied on top of any of the options 2-5, with expected reinforcement 
of the overall final impact.  

Impacts  of  the  policy  options  are  expected  to  be  further  reinforced  by  synergies  with  the 
other initiatives in the 4th Rail Package. 

The policy options identified are the following: 

Option 1: Baseline scenario (do nothing) – continuing on the path that is currently set out 
for the sector, including developments described in section 3.5 

Option 2: Greater coordination role for the Agency in ensuring a consistent approach to 
certification of railway undertakings and vehicle authorisation 

EN 

22 

   EN 

 
 
Option  3:  ERA  as  a  one-stop-shop,  where  the  final  decision  on  certification  and 
authorisation  remains  with  the  NSAs,  but  ERA  performs  entry  and  exit  checks  of 
applications and of the decisions taken. 

Option 4: ERA & NSAs share competencies, where the final decision on certification and 
authorisation is taken by the Agency. 

Option  5:  ERA  takes  over  activities  of  NSAs  in  relation  to  certification  of  railway 
undertakings and vehicle authorisation. 

Option  6:  Horizontal  measures,  which  includes  other  legislative  and  soft  measures 
(beyond  sharing  the  responsibilities  between  national  authorities  and  ERA)  that  could  be 
implemented in the domain of interoperability and safety to improve the competitiveness of 
the rail sector. 

A  table  showing  all  the  policy  options  together  with  individual  policy  measures  is  given 
below. 

EN 

23 

   EN 

 
Table 5-1: Summary of policy options  

Option 1 

Baseline 

Option 2: Further ERA 
“Coordination” over NSAs 

Enhanced “coordination” and 
supervision role of ERA with 
respect to NSAs regarding 
granting of vehicle 
authorisations & safety 
certificates including ensuring 
their mutual recognition by 
national authorities. 

Option 3: ERA as One-Stop-Shop 

ERA shares the competences with the NSAs 
regarding granting of safety certificates to the 
railway undertakings and vehicle authorisations 
("one stop shop" concept): the decision is taken by 
NSA, ERA performs "entry and exit" checks of the 
application.  

ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of 
NSAs 

Migration to a single (common) safety certificate 
and single vehicle authorisation (setting up 
European "passport" for vehicles): national 
authorities issue single safety certificates & single 
vehicle authorisations (mutually recognised by 
definition) 

Option 5: ERA takes over activities of NSAs  

ERA takes over the competences of the NSAs 
regarding granting of certificates to the railway 
undertakings and vehicle authorisations. 

Option 4: ERA & NSAs share 
competencies 

ERA shares the competences with 
the NSAs regarding granting of 
safety certificates & vehicle 
authorisations: a "one stop shop" 
concept with the NSAs (acting as 
regional offices of ERA) 
contributing but the final decision 
rests with ERA.  

Migration  to  a  single  (common)  safety  certificate  and  single  vehicle  authorisation 
(setting up European "passport" for vehicles): ERA issues single safety certificates and 
single vehicle authorisations 
(Appeals to ERA decisions are sent to a separate appeal body)  

Control by ERA over the functioning of NSAs (e.g. developing guidelines & auditing adherence to them). 

Option 6: 
horizontal 
measures 
(independent 
of the level of 
interaction 
ERA/national 
authorities) 

Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NoBos regarding: type approval; rail vehicles certification; ERTMS certification and accreditation of 
NoBos. 

Strengthened action by the Commission outside infringement procedure, notably on non-discrimination in the railway market 

Amendment of the interoperability and safety directives to enable the adoption of implementing acts setting out common principles & practices for national authorities 

Enhanced role of ERA in monitoring and control of implementation of national safety and interoperability legislation 

Migrating from national technical & safety rules to a system of EU rules (requirement for national authorities to remove unnecessary rules and limiting their possibility of 
adopting new rules). 

Enhanced role of ERA in dissemination of railway-related information and training. 

Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice & support for Member States & other stakeholders in implementing legislation on safety & interoperability 

Communication from the Commission regarding guidelines on the interpretation of specific EU laws & decisions (including TSIs) 

Enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential spare parts to be standardised and coordination of industry activities in this area 

EN 

24 

EN 

 
  
5.2.2  Core measures for options 2-5 

Options 2-5 contain a number of core measures which concern similar issues, although with a 
differentiation  according  to  magnitude  of  involvement  of  ERA.  These  measures    address  the 
challenges  which  were  identified  in  the  impact  assessment  process  as  crucial  for  the  internal 
railway market and for the stakeholders, and at the same time have the biggest potential for cost 
savings. The core measures are: 

•  An  enhanced  role  of  ERA  in  the  safety  certification  process,  varying  from  ensuring 
mutual recognition of safety certificates by national authorities (option 2) up to issuing 
single safety certificates entirely by ERA (option 5); the overall aim is to ensure that a 
railway  undertaking  is  certified,  it  is  allowed to  operate  in  all  Member  States  without 
additional administrative hurdles. 

•  An enhanced  role  of ERA in the  vehicle authorisation process, varying from  ensuring 
mutual  recognition  of  vehicle  authorisations  by  national  authorities  (option  2)  up  to 
issuing single vehicle authorisations (European passports for vehicles) entirely by ERA 
(option 5); the overall aim is to ensure that once authorised, a railway vehicle does not 
need  further  authorisations  to  be  placed  in  service  in  other  Member  States  and  can 
circulate freely in the EU (provided that technical compatibility is assured). 

•  Control by ERA over the functioning of NSAs (e.g. developing guidelines & auditing 
their  adherence  to  them);  this  could  also  include  the  verification  of  whether  sufficient 
resources are assigned to interoperability and safety tasks at NSAs; common to options 
2-5,  however  at  a  different  level  of  magnitude  as  the  level  of  control  will  have  to  be 
greater  in  option  2  and  lower  in  option  5,  due  to  taking  over  of  part  of  the  NSAs' 
responsibilities by ERA. 

•  An enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA (including the right to audit) 
with respect to NoBos, regarding type approval, rail vehicle and ERTMS certification, 
and  accreditation  of  NoBos  (this  measure  is  especially  relevant  to  the  ERTMS 
deployment); common to options 2-5. 

The  importance  of  these  four  measures  was  confirmed  by  the  stakeholders  and,  following 
further analysis, they have been incorporated to each of the policy packages 2-5.42 They are of 
major importance to tackle three crucial challenges in the EU Railway Area: migration to both 
single safety certificate and single vehicle authorisation (European passport for vehicles), and 
improving the inefficient functioning of national authorities (NSAs and NoBos). 

5.2.3 

Short description of options  

Option 1: Baseline scenario (Do nothing) 

This option sets out the baseline scenario for the analysis going forward. All other options will 
be measured against this option; its elements are described in section 3.5. 

Option 2: Greater coordination role for the Agency 

This first incremental option looks at a more enhanced role for the Agency which foresees the 
Agency getting more involved in the activities of the national authorities, but without affecting 
their decision making process. This option assumes that all aspects of option 1 are taking place 
and adds the measures relating to enhanced coordination of ERA over NSAs regarding granting 
of vehicle authorisations & safety  certificates, including ensuring  their mutual recognition  by 

42 

Regarding single vehicle authorisation, subsequent to the stakeholder consultation and following analysis 
the  original  name  of  the  measure  ("Setting  up  a  European  passport  for  locomotives")  was  changed  and 
widened to become single vehicle authorisation, in order to create a harmonised and structured approach to 
vehicle authorisation that seeks to minimise the necessity of having differentiated authorisation processes. 

EN 

25 

   EN 

 
                                                 
national authorities. At the same time, the functioning of NSAs and NoBos will be subject to 
supervision  of  the  Agency,  with  the  possibility  to  audit  them  and  to  set  the  accreditation 
conditions  for  NoBos.  This  option  also  assumes  mutual  recognition  of  both  vehicle 
authorisations and safety certificates. 

Option 3: ERA as a one-stop-shop 

This  intermediate  option  builds  on  option  1  and  incorporates  some  elements  of  option 2 
(measures relating to coordination of national authorities activities by ERA), but assigns more 
power  to  the  Agency  in  relation  to  the  manner  in  which  NSAs  undertake  their  activities.  In 
particular  this  option  assumes  that  ERA  acts  as  a  "one  stop  shop"  for  safety  certificates  and 
vehicle  authorisation  (with  NSAs  still  responsible  for  issuing  the  decisions  and  the  Agency 
checking  the  applications  and  decisions),  at  the  same  time  being  an  appeal  body  for  some 
decisions  of  national  authorities.  This  option  also  assumes  migration  to  a  single  (common) 
safety certificate and single common vehicle authorisation (setting up European "passport" for 
vehicles), with the decision-making powers staying at national level.  

Option 4: ERA and NSAs share competencies 

The basis of this option is that the Agency would be the central body receiving and processing 
any requests for safety certification and vehicle/ERTMS subsystems authorisation. It would not 
hold  the  majority  of  the  required  competencies  in  ERA,  but  would  continue  to  rely  on  NSA 
staff to carry out the relevant activities within Member States where the part of the NSA's staff 
would be subordinate to the decisions and direction of the Agency. In this case, this staff would 
report to an EU body, the Agency, rather than to national authorities.  

The  NSAs  would  still  be  tasked  with  issuing  the  authorisations  for  placing  into  service  fixed 
installations and vehicle authorisations (vehicle passports) for domestic services. The existence 
of  national  rules  would  decrease  at  a  greater  rate  than  the  approach  adopted  in  the  previous 
options,  since  the  Agency  would  have  an  additional  overarching  goal  of  monitoring,  and 
eventually  requesting  the  removal  of  national  rules.  The  following  elements  would be  key  to 
this option: 

•  ERA  granting  safety  certificates  to  railway  undertakings  and  vehicle  authorisations 
(passports)  to  applicants  (a  "one  stop  shop"  for  safety  certificates  and  vehicle 
authorisation), on the basis of competences shared with the NSAs; 

•  Migration to a single safety certificate and single vehicle authorisation (passport), with 

the formal decision-making powers transferred to ERA. 

Option 5: ERA takes over all activities of the NSAs 

This  option  is  the  most  ambitious  in  terms  of  extending  the  future  role  of  the  Agency.  It 
assumes  that  the  Agency  would  take  over  all  safety  certification  and  authorisation  tasks 
currently undertaken by the NSAs. This would involve the Agency expanding its facilities and 
establishing  local  offices  in  each  Member  State  (or  at  least  in  the  larger  Member  States  or 
regional  hubs).  All  staff  involved  in  these  activities  would  be  employed  by  the  Agency.  It  is 
assumed  that  the  Agency  would  continue  to  be  subject  to  the  same  European  Commission 
administration  and  employment  procedures  for  all  of  its  activities.  The  key  measures  in  this 
option are: 

•  ERA  completely  takes  over  the  competences  of  the  NSAs  regarding  granting 

certificates to railway undertakings and authorisations for placing into service; 

•  Migration  to  a  single  common  safety  certificate  and  single  vehicle  authorisation,  with 

the formal decision-making powers transferred to ERA. 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
Option 6: Horizontal measures 

This  option  is  made  up  of  a  number  of  measures  that  have  a  wide  reaching  impact  on  the 
administrative procedures of NSAs, ERA and industry as a whole, but do not relate directly to 
the role of the Agency vis-á vis NSAs or NoBos. 

 This includes, inter alia: 

•  amending  the  railway  directives  to  enable  the  adoption  by  the  Commission  of 
implementing/delegated  acts  setting  out  common  principles  and  practices  for  the 
national authorities; 

•  enhancing  the  role  of  ERA  in  the  dissemination  of  railway-related  information  and 

training; 

•  migrating from national technical and safety rules to a system of EU rules (through the 
identification  of  unnecessary  rules  by  ERA  and  NSAs  and  then  the  requirement  for 
national authorities to remove those rules, as well as strictly limiting the possibility of 
adopting new rules). 

It is a self-standing option, as it would, in principle, lead on its own to certain improvements in 
all problem areas. It is therefore, and for the sake of transparency and due to positive outcome 
of stakeholders' consultation and early start of likely effects (2015), assessed separately.  

However,  at  the  same  time  option  6  has  amplificatory  effect  on  other  options,  hence  it  was 
deemed useful and appropriate to combine the measures in option 6 with options 2-5 to produce 
the  most  optimal  approach  in  terms  of  changes  to  the  sector,  leading  to  improved 
competitiveness. Therefore option 6 is also assessed in combination with options 2-5; it should 
be  noted  that  the  impact  of  individual  measures  of  option  6  was  differentiated  in  relation  to 
each of options 2-5, as shown in Table VII-15 in Annex VII. 

5.3 

Interaction with legal acts and stakeholders' views 

All options apply in principle to the three legislative acts in question (the Interoperability and 
Safety  Directives  and  ERA  Regulation);  implementation  of  each  option  would  require 
amendments to each legislative act.   

Stakeholders,  in  general,  largely  supported  the  measures  in  all  options  relating  to  enhanced 
coordination  and  control  of  NSAs  by  ERA  (including  audit),  as  well  as  ERA  acting  as  an 
appeal  body  to  some  decisions  of  national  authorities.  The  measures  on  developing  a  single 
safety certificate and setting up a European passport for vehicles (single vehicle authorisation) 
were  also  supported.  Respondents  were  divided  on  sharing  competences  between  ERA  and 
NSAs and rather unfavourable to a complete take-over of all functions of NSAs by ERA. The 
enhanced role of ERA in relation to NoBos (increased coordination and supervision) was also 
supported  decisively.  All  individual  measures  from  option  6  received  high  support  from 
stakeholders  and  were  perceived  as  beneficial  for  railways;  this  was  one  of  the  reasons  why 
option 6 was finally combined with the preferred option.  

The level of support was differentiated according to the group of respondents. Not surprisingly, 
the respondents representing the NSAs were in general against ERA sharing/taking over their 
responsibilities  (measures  from  options  3-5:  "ERA  shares/takes  over  the  competences  of  the 
NSAs  regarding  granting  of  certificates 
the  railway  undertakings  and  vehicle 
authorisations"), while the opinion of other respondents was more balanced. A similar pattern 
could be observed in relation to the Notified Bodies. 

to 

To  sum  up,  all  final  options  (i.e.  options  2-5  combined  with  option  6)  were  supported  by 
stakeholders, with option 2 and 3 having the highest level of support and option 5 the lowest.  

EN 

27 

   EN 

 
 
6  ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS 

Introduction and general methodological approach  

6.1 
This  section  details  the  impact  assessment  of  different  options43.  Given  the  strong  focus  on 
operational  efficiency,  the  core  impacts  of  this  initiative  are  economic,  while  social  and 
environmental  impacts  are  mostly  indirect  and  sometimes  negligible.  Direct  impacts  are 
quantified, while indirect impacts are assessed in qualitative terms. 

The section is comprised of the following sections: 

i) 

ii) 

iii) 

6.2 

identification of the magnitude of the main impacts; 

quantitative assessment of direct impacts on: 

• 

railway  undertakings  (vehicle  authorisation  timescales  and  costs,  certification 
timescales and costs and opportunity cost savings resulting from a reduced time to 
market for railway vehicles) 

• 

Cost of administration of ERA and NSAs; 

qualitative assessment of indirect impacts. 

Approach to the calculation of costs and benefits   

The report assesses the costs and benefits related to the different institutional setup as foreseen 
in options 1-5 and horizontal measures included in option 6. In principle, assessment consists of 
three major blocks: 

• 

• 

• 

calculation  of  savings  in  costs  and  timescales  of  certification  and  authorisation 
processes (including savings of administrative costs for operators); 

calculation of opportunity cost savings for operators resulting from a reduced time 
to market for railway vehicles and 

calculation  of  the  changes  in  the  cost  of  administration  of  ERA  and  national 
authorities. 

Results of these calculations are presented in separate sections below. Each section starts with a 
short overview of the methodology applied. 

Furthermore, the impacts of different policy options were considered to differ according to the 
current  industry  context  in  any  given  country.  In  these  terms  the  impacts  were  differentiated 
according to following country groups: 

•  Average – encompasses the majority of countries. 

•  Challenging – Germany and France since these countries have both been identified 
as having specific issues. Measures that enforce greater conformity with EU law are 
likely to have the greatest impact in these countries . 

•  Low  resource  –  a  number  of  countries  having  very  small  numbers  of  NSA  staff 
available  to  deal  with  authorisation  and  certification,  with  the  result  that  some 
measures are likely to particularly impact on authorisation and certification in these 
countries.  The  countries  included  in  this  category  are:  Italy,  Poland,  Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia. 

For  all  categories,  indicator  values  have  been  produced  for  a  ten  year  future  period  (2015  to 
2025). Impacts of different measures are phased to be commensurate with their anticipated time 

43 

Analysis  of  impacts  is  based  on  the  work  of  the  consultant.  For  full  details,  see  the  IA  support  study, 
especially its Appendix D [add link after publication] 

EN 

28 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
of  implementation  –  i.e.  soft  measures  have  earlier  impacts  (as  from  2015),  while  legislative 
measures are considered to have effect not earlier than 2017. Where the metric is a monetary 
value,  it  is  presented  in  net  present  value  (NPV)  terms  using  a  discount  factor  of  4%,  with 
values discounted to 2012. 

Annex  VII  provides  more  information  on  the  impact  assessment  methodology,  including 
baseline  and  forecasted  values  and  reasoning  supporting  the  assumptions.  Interim  results  at 
detailed level can be found in Appendix D of the IA support study44.  

6.3 

Identification of the magnitude of the main impacts 

The table below provides a summary of an initial qualitative assessment of key characteristics 
and phasing in of impact of measures included in each option. 'Impact magnitude' relates to the 
potential of each option to reduce the authorisation costs and timescales, which constitute core 
elements  of  expected  impacts45.  This  initial  assessment  provided  a  framework  for  further 
detailed calculations as well as reference point for a 'sense check' of the results.  

Table 6-1: Preliminary assessment of main impacts of options 1 to 6 

Measure 

Key impact characteristics (as prompted by question list 

Baseline 

The Baseline encompasses a wide range of impacts, a number 
of which (e.g. work on national rules) are likely to have a 
significant effect on authorisation costs and timescales.  

Impact 
magnitude (low/ 
medium/high) 

Likely 
phasing of 
main impact 

Medium 

2011-2025 

Option 
Greater 
coordination 
for the Agency 

2 

role 

The impact of this option is relatively low with additional 
powers of the Agency limited. Main impact is on additional 
authorisations. 

Low* 

2017-2022 

Option 3 
ERA as a one stop 
shop 

Whilst ERA has more powers in this option primarily through 
entry and exit checks of applications,   it is likely that 
additional benefits over option 2 will be limited with division 
of labour between NSAs and the Agency being an issue. 

Low/Medium* 

2017-2022 

Option 4 
ERA and NSAs 
share competences 

Provided ERA has sufficient powers to act as a strong central 
office this option is likely to have a significant impact on 
authorisation and certification costs and timescales. 

Medium/High* 

2017-2023 

Option 5 
ERA takes over 
activities of NSAs 
regarding 
authorisation and 
certification 

Option 6 
Horizontal 
measures 

This option would have a high impact on authorisation costs 
and timescales and would also enable additional efficiencies 
over the current arrangements through economies of scale. 

High* 

2017-2023 

This option contains some measures that can be implemented 
relatively quickly and as such has an earlier benefit than any 
other option. However, most of the measures have a medium or 
low impact and therefore the overall impact is similar to 
options 2 and 3. 

Medium* 

2015-2025 

44 
45 

* 

[add link after publication of the study] 
Undelying  detailed  analysis  at  the  level  of  individual  measures  is  provided  in  Tables  VII-9  to  VII-14  in 
Annex 7. 
On top of the baseline 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6.4 

 Direct impacts on railway undertakings 

6.4.1 

Benefits of reduced time and costs of authorisation and certification processes. 

Method of assessment 

The three key input data sets for calculations are as follows: 

•  current costs, timescales and levels of authorisation and certification by country  

• 

future trends in levels of authorisation and certification by authorisation/certification 
category (where significant change anticipated) 

•  expected effect of individual measures on the costs and timescales of authorisation 

and certification of the different options.  

The  input  data  for  Current  costs,  timescales  and  levels  of  authorisation  and 
certification include: 
•  Agency Report on railway vehicle authorisation46  
•  Agency Report on migration towards the single safety certificate47 
•  Data from the presentations given at the vehicle authorisation Task Force48 

•  Data from interviews with industry stakeholders 

•  Some (minimal) data provided within the stakeholder survey 

Inputs are differentiated by 20 different authorisation categories (see Table VII-1, Annex 7) and 
4 certification categories (Table VII-2, Annex 7).   

Future trends in levels of authorisation and certification are calculated on the basis of 
following assumptions:  

• 

• 

• 

• 

number of authorisations in 2008 (i.e. before the dramatic impacts of the 
economic downturn) is used as a baseline, but (very conservatively compared to 
what would be needed to achieve the expected higher modal share for rail) it is 
assumed that there would be no growth compared to 2008 level until 2025; 

the UNIFE estimate of savings from Cross-Acceptance assumes additional 
authorisations for each new locomotive and multiple unit type in ten countries, it 
has been assumed that this ratio holds true for all new authorisations;  

the number of authorisations related to ERTMS is considered being proportional 
to the share of the network covered by ERTMS49. 

it is anticipated that market consolidation and changes induced by the TSIs will 
reduce the number of vehicle types, in these terms estimates quoted in the Cross-
Acceptance report have been used50. 

46 

47 

48 

49 
50 

http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-
Register/Documents/Final%20report%20on%20vehicle%20authorisation%20(part%201).pdf 
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-
Register/Documents/development_of_a_migration_strategy_towards_a_single_safety_certificate.doc 
The Task Force was set up primarily following the stakeholders' request and in relation to the process of 
authorisation of placing into service of rail vehicles. It included approx. 35 persons representing Member 
States,  National  Safety  Authorities,  Notified  Bodies,  manufacturers,  operators    and  associations  (CER, 
EIM,  ERFA,  UNIFE,  UITP,  UIP,  EPTTOLA,  Keolis,  Mitsui,  Veolia,  Alstom,  AnsaldoBreda,  Siemens, 
SNCF, Trenitalia), the European Railway Agency and DG MOVE. 
Including routes for which ERTMS has been contracted but not yet implemented   
Table VII-4 in Annex VII presents the type size changes assumptions in detail. 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
 
 
                                                 
The impacts of the different options are expressed in terms of potential reductions in 
costs  and  timescales  of  authorisation  and  certification  achieved  by  different  options. 
To  this  end  each  measure  was  individually  assessed  and  attributed  an  'impact  value' 
expressed  as  a  percentage  reduction  of  the  gap  between  (a)  the  current  costs  and 
timescales (in each country type) and (b) the minimum (or ‘ideal’) achievable cost and 
timescale.  The  minimum  possible  authorisation  costs  and  timescales  are  set  out  in 
Tables  VII-5  to  VII-8  in  Annex  VII.  Once  each  measure  was  assessed  an  overall 
assessment  at  option  level  was  carried  out  to  translate  reductions  in  costs  and 
timescales  into  monetary  values.  This  amalgamated  the  impacts  at  an  option  level, 
applying adjustments to avoid double-counting of impacts when measures were added 
together. 

Results of individual options 1 to 6 

The summary of expected savings in authorisation costs in 2015-2025 (incremental on 
the baseline) of options 2-6 is given below: 

Figure 6-1: Total authorisation cost savings 2015-2025 of options 2-6 

 Real, undiscounted 

 50,000

 45,000

 40,000

 35,000

 30,000

s
0
 25,000
0
0
€

 20,000

 15,000

 10,000

 5,000

 -

Discounted 
savings over 
2015-2025 
(€  m NPV) 

Greater coordination role
for the Agency

ERA as a one-stop-shop

ERA and NSAs share
competences

ERA takes over activities of
NSAs regarding
authorisation and
certification

Horizontal measures

45 

62 

130 

212 

156 

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

Consistent with the qualitative analysis in section 6.3, option 5 is significantly more effective 
than other options, with efficiencies that can only be achieved through complete centralisation. 
Option  6  has  an  earlier  impact  than  the  other  options,  again  consistent  with  the  qualitative 
analysis, and reflecting measures that can be put in place relatively quickly. The significantly 
larger  impact  of  option  6  compared  with  options  2  and  3  can  be  explained  be  the  following 
reasons: 

• 

• 

• 

Early start of measures (in option 6, a majority of the measures can be 
implemented by 2015)  

Large number of measures (six) in option 6 with medium impact (see Table VII-9 
in Annex VII) 

Limited ‘power’ of option 2 and 3 measures resulting in low impacts of many 
measures (see Tables VII-10 and VII-11 in Annex VII).  

EN 

31 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
The  certification  savings,  as  indicated  in  Figure  6-2,  are  much  smaller  reflecting  both  a 
lower volume and lower costs of safety certifications compared with authorisation. There are 
also  fewer  differentials  between  options  3  and  4.  Also  the  benefits  of  the  horizontal 
measures (option 6) are significantly smaller than those for options 3-5.  

Figure 6-2: Total certification cost savings 2015-2025 of options 2-6 

 Real, undiscounted  

Discounted 
savings over 
2015-2025 
(€  m NPV) 

Greater coordination role
for the Agency

 0.9  

ERA as a one-stop-shop

ERA and NSAs share
competences

ERA takes over activities of
NSAs regarding
authorisation and
certification
Horizontal measures

 1.3  

 1.7  

 2.0  

 1.1  

600

500

400

s
0
0
0
€

300

200

100

0

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

Results of options 2 to 5 in combination with option 6 

In addition to the analysis of the individual policy options, a further set of policy options was 
created by combining the impacts of the horizontal measures (Option 6) with the impacts of the 
other policy options. It should be noted that assessment has not meant simple addition of the 
impacts,  since  the  horizontal  measures  have  different  combined  impacts  with  options  2  to  5. 
The  matrix  providing  detailed  information  on  the  extent  of  assumed  overlap  is  provided  in 
Table VII-15 in Annex VII. 

The figure below shows the impacts of each option 2-5 in combination with option 6. 

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Total authorisation costs 2012-2025 of options 2-5 in combination with option 6 

 Real, undiscounted 

Discounted 
savings over 
2015-2025 
(€  m NPV) 

201  

 217 

 235 

 276 

It  appears  that  the  combined  options  have  significantly  higher  impacts  on  the  cost  of 
authorisation, with options 4 and 5 when applied along with the horizontal measures reaching 
at least a 20% improvement over their individual impact. 

Figure 6-4: Total certification cost savings 2015-2025 of options 2-5 in combination with option 6 

Real, undiscounted 

600

500

400

s
0
0
0
€

300

200

100

0

2015

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

Discounted 
savings over 
2015-2025 
(€  m NPV) 

Greater coordination role
for the Agency

ERA as a one-stop-shop

ERA and NSAs share
competences

ERA takes over activities of
NSAs regarding
authorisation and
certification

 1.8 

 2.3 

 2.3  

 2.6  

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
The  difference  between  options  4  and  5  for  certification  costs  narrows  less  than  for 
authorisation costs, partly due to the dominating influence of bringing forward the impacts of 
the  single  safety  certificate  both  in  options  4  and  5.  However,  options  3  and  4  now  have  a 
virtually identical level of benefit. 

6.4.2  Opportunity cost savings 

Method of assessment 

More  effective  authorisation  procedures51  would,  in  addition  to  cost  savings,  also  result  in 
quicker  time  to  market.  Savings  in  time  are  assessed  in  similar  manner  as  the  savings  in 
authorisation costs, as described above. Results are shown in the figure below, with options 5 
and 4 being the most effective resulting in saving of time of about 25%. 

Figure 6-5: Average reduction in authorisation timescales by combined options 

e
p
y
T
/
s
h
t
n
o
M

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Baseline

Greater coordination role for the Agency

ERA as a one-stop-shop

ERA and NSAs share competences

ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding
authorisation and certification

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

There  will  be  a  number  of  savings  arising  directly  from  shorter  rolling  stock  authorisation 
timescales. These include: 

• 

• 

reduction in operating costs accrued as a result of needing to cover delayed stock 
with alternative stock; 

reduction  in  loss  of  revenue,  where  the  introduction  of  new  services  is 
delayed/existing services are cut back when rolling stock is not available to cover 
for delayed stock; 

• 

reduced storage costs. 

The key assumptions regarding the estimates are: 

• 

• 

Cost of alternative rolling stock is assumed to be cost of leasing additional rolling 
stock. For locomotives a value of approx. €30k per month has been used and for 
multiple  unit  vehicles,  €15k.  Both  these  va lues  are  approximately  1%  of  typical 
average new vehicle values. 

Using  UIC  (International  Union  of  Railways)  data,  average  revenue  per 
locomotive and passenger vehicle was calculated as a percentage of new vehicle 

51 

Reductions in certification timescales have not been included in the delay reduction since evidence suggests 
it is vehicle authorisation that is the primary binding constraint. 

EN 

34 

   EN 

 
 
 
                                                 
value. For locomotives this is 3.8% on a monthly basis and for passenger vehicles 
1.9% on a monthly basis. 

As  exact  quantification  is  challenging,  three  scenarios  were  developed  to  construct  an 
assessment of the possible range of opportunity cost savings. The scenarios are: 

• 

• 

• 

All affected services are covered by alternative rolling stock (lower bound); 

Half  of  affected  freight  services  and  half  of  affected  passenger  services  are  not 
able to run with resultant revenue loss (central case); 

None of the affected services are able to run (upper bound). 

Results of options 2 to 5 in combination with option 6 

The table below shows the discounted opportunity cost savings that could be achieved over the 
period 2015 – 2025, with option 2 being the least and option 5 the most effective. 

Table 6-2: Discounted opportunity cost savings 2015-2025 (discounted, € m NPV) of options 2-5 in 
combination with option 6 

Option 

Central Case 

Lower bound 

Upper bound 

Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination”+ 
horizontal measures 

Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop + 
horizontal measures 

Option 4+6: ERA and NSAs share 
competences + horizontal measures 

Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities of 
NSAs regarding authorisation and 
certification + horizontal measures 

 237  

 255  

 265  

 295  

 71  

 77  

 81  

 90  

 402  

 433  

 450  

 499  

EN 

35 

   EN 

 
 
 
The figure below illustrating savings by year for the central case further shows that savings per 
option are between €30 million and €40 million per  year by the end of the evaluation period. 

Figure 6-6: Total opportunity cost savings 2015-2025 of options 2-5 in combination with option 6 
(€ m, central case, real, undiscounted) 

60

50

40

m
€

30

20

10

0

Greater coordination role
for the Agency

ERA as a one-stop-shop

ERA and NSAs share
competences

ERA takes over activities of
NSAs regarding
authorisation and
certification

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

6.4.3 

Total cost savings for rail undertakings  

Combining the above mentioned authorisation, certification and opportunity cost (central case) 
savings demonstrates substantial benefits over the evaluation period with benefits of over €0.5 
bn  for  options  3-5  even  in  discounted  terms.  Summary  of  quantified  benefits  for  rail 
undertakings  by  each  combined  option  are  presented  in  the  table  below.  These  include  also 
savings  of  administrative  costs,  which  are  an  intrinsic  part  of  certification  and  authorisations 
costs.  

Table 6-3: Total quantified benefits for rail undertakings 2015-2025 of options 2-5 in combination with 
option 6 (discounted, € m NPV) 

Option 

Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination” 
+ horizontal measures 

Option  3+6:  ERA  as  One-Stop-Shop+ 
horizontal measures 

Option  4+6:  ERA  &  NSAs  share 
competencies+ horizontal measures 

Option 5+6:  ERA takes over activities of 
authorisation  & 
NSAs 

regarding 

EN 

Authorisatio
n cost 
savings 

(Figure 6-3) 

Certification 
cost savings 
(Figure 6-4) 

Opportunity 
cost savings 
(central 
case) 
(Table 6-2) 

Total 
benefits 

201 

217 

235 

276 

36 

2 

2 

2 

3 

237 

440 

255 

474 

265 

502 

295 

574 

   EN 

 
   
certification+ horizontal measures 

6.5 

Direct impacts on public authorities 

Some of proposed measures entail a variation in the staff needed by ERA to perform additional 
tasks,  and,  in  some  cases,  reductions  of  staff  at  NSAs,  due  to  competences  transferred  at  the 
central level. These changes will affect respectively cost of administration at EU and national 
level. 

Method of assessment 

For each policy option, the impacts have been disaggregated in order to identify variations in 
costs of each: 

i) 

ii) 

the Agency (and the Commission, particularly in relation to option 6); and 

national institutions (in particular NSAs). 

For the purpose of this analysis, all costs are indexed to a base year of 2012 and are computed 
in  real  terms  over  the  period  2012-2025  using  the  Net  Present  Value  (NPV)  at  4%  discount 
rate. 

For the different options the net costs of administration are estimated by computing: 

• 

• 

the  variation  in  gross  costs  of  administration  for  ERA  and  the  Commission  (namely 
variation  in  ERA  costs  and  in  the  “separate  appeal  body”  to  be  created  in  options  4 
and 5), and for national administrations (variation in NSAs costs);  

the variation of potential revenues collected by levying charges for the activities carried 
out by the NSAs and ERA for safety certificates and vehicle authorisations. 

The  difference  between  the  EU15  and  EU12  Member  States  has  been  taken  into  account  in 
terms of average salaries, average fees charged by NSAs, and average cost of NSAs’ staff in 
order  to  correctly  identify  the  magnitude  of  impact  of  any  potential  changes.  More  detailed 
description of calculations of cost of administration are provided in section 9 of Annex VII. 

6.5.1  Direct impacts on the ERA 

Method of assessment 

For each of the selected policy options, the number of additional staff needed by ERA has been 
estimated  on  the  basis  of  the  assessment  of  the  individual  measures  included  in  each  option.  
The  starting  point  for  this  analysis  was  the  preliminary  impact  assessment  work  already 
undertaken  to  date  by  the  Agency  in  relation  to  its  future  role,  though  applying  a  more 
conservative approach. Subsequently, the following steps were taken: 

•  As  a  first  step,  the  measures  evaluated  in  the  original  ERA  preliminary  impact 

assessment were compared with the measures included in the options.  

•  Then, the analogies between the original and the new set of measures were identified. 
This way it was possible to associate to each of the new measures assessed a number of 
extra  staff  consistent  with  the  considerations  made  by  the  ERA  in  their  preliminary 
impact assessment. 

EN 

37 

   EN 

 
 
•  Finally,  when  considering  the  policy  options,  the  potential  synergies  between  the 
different  measures  included  in  each  option  were  identified.  This  way,  the  number  of 
extra staff required by ERA for each policy option was estimated. 

• 

In addition, further considerations were made when merging option 6 with each of the 
other options, taking into account further synergies between measures and economies of 
scale. 

The estimated total variation in staff members were distributed across years to take into account 
the fact that the recruitment process needs a number of years to be finalised (it was estimated 
that by 2020 all staff member variations would have occurred).  

The following were also included in the figures of ERA staff variation: 

• 

• 

two additional human resources needed in option 4 and 5 to set up the “separate appeal 
body” at the European level (though this is clearly a cost that is not attributable to the 
Agency, but will be borne by the sector at the European level). 

two  additional  human  resources  needed  at  the  European  Commission  to  take  forward 
horizontal measures envisaged in option 6. 

Based on the current salary levels and the number of staff, the Agency estimates roughly €100k 
gross  cost  for  each  additional  staff  member.  Lower  average  staff  costs  were  assumed  where 
larger  numbers  of  staff  are  required,  as  more  junior  staff  will  be  required  when  numbers 
increase. 

Overhead  costs  were  assumed  to  amount  to  25%  of  direct  staff  costs.  Further  costs  for  other 
activities  related  to  the  individual  measures,  such  as  the  costs  of  carrying  out  tests  in 
laboratories for single components or travel costs for the training options, have also been taken 
into account, as well as costs related to ERA being able to obtain revenue. The starting point 
was  the  Agency  calculations  but,  as  for  the  staff  costs,  efficiencies  were  identified,  where 
possible, in the grouped options. No additional costs were identified as a result of the baseline 
activities. Full set of assumptions is provided in Figure VII-7 in Annex VII. 

Results of individual options 1 to 6 

The  table  below  sets  out  the  results,  and  the  consequential  impacts,  on  the  Agency  of  the 
individual options, with option 5 clearly standing out as the most costly. 

Table 6-4: Additional cost of administration on the ERA of options 2-6 (€m)  

Option 

Total 
ERA staff 
(2011) 

Yearly values by 2020 (when all staff changes have been phased in) 

Total 
additional 
staff by 
2020 

Total 
additional 
staff cost 

Overhead  

Other 
costs  

Total 
gross cost 
increase  

% of 
current 
ERA 
budget  

Total 
costs, 
NPV 
(2015-
2025) 

Option 1: Baseline 

154 

Option 2: Further 
ERA “Coordination” 

Option 3: ERA as 
One-Stop-Shop 

Option 4: ERA & 
NSAs share 

- 

20 

25 

37 

No impacts on cost of administration 

(1.9)52 

(0.5) 

(0.5) 

(3) 

14% 

(20) 

(2.4) 

(0. 6) 

(0.5) 

(4) 

17% 

(23) 

(3.4) 

(0.9) 

(0.3) 

(5) 

23% 

(30) 

52  All cost figures or negative numbers in tables are presented in brackets – (). 

EN 

38 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Option 

Total 
ERA staff 
(2011) 

Yearly values by 2020 (when all staff changes have been phased in) 

Total 
additional 
staff by 
2020 

Total 
additional 
staff cost 

Overhead  

Other 
costs  

Total 
gross cost 
increase  

% of 
current 
ERA 
budget  

Total 
costs, 
NPV 
(2015-
2025) 

competencies 

Option 5: ERA takes 
over activities of 
NSAs regarding 
authorisation & 
certification 

Option 6: Horizontal 
measures 

302 

(23.2) 

(5.8) 

(2.0) 

(31) 

154% 

(221) 

27 

(2.5) 

(0.6) 

(0.9) 

(4) 

20% 

(28) 

Note: These options also contain the potential impact on the Commission that arises particularly in option 6. Options 4 

and 5 contain the effects of the creation of the separate appeal body. 

Results of options 2 to 5 in combination with option 6 

Four  of  the  measures  included  in  option  6  entail  specific  tasks  for  ERA,  which  may  require 
additional  staff  involved  and  other  extra  costs,  therefore  implementing  these  horizontal 
measures on their own would imply 27 extra staff (as indicated in Table 6-4 above). However, 
when merged with other options, the impact on ERA in terms of cost of administration is likely 
to be rather small. It is estimated that about 18 of additional staff members would be needed by 
ERA  to  implement  Option  6  in  combination  with  option  2,  3  and  4  respectively.  As  regards 
option  5,  given  the  large  number  of  additional  staff  required,  the  impact  of  merging  it  with 
option  6  would  be  negligible.  The  estimate  of  the  cost  of  administration  for  ERA  after  this 
merging is given in the table below, with again option 5 being by far the most costly. 

Table 6-5: Additional cost of administration on the ERA of options 2-5 in combination with option 6 
(€m) 

Yearly values by 2020 (when all staff changes have been phased in) 

Option 

Total 
additional 
staff 

Total 
additional 
staff cost 

Overhead  

Other 
costs  

Total 
gross cost 
increase  

% of 
current 
ERA 
budget  

Total costs, 
NPV (2015-
2025) 

Option 2+6: Further ERA 
“Coordination"+ 
horizontal measures 

Option 3+6: ERA as One-
Stop-Shop+ horizontal 
measures 

Option 4+6: ERA & 
NSAs share 
competencies+ horizontal 
measures 

Option 5+6: ERA takes 
over activities of NSAs 
regarding authorisation & 
certification+ horizontal 
measures 

38 

(3.5) 

(0.9) 

(0.5) 

(4.9) 

24% 

(37) 

42 

(3.9) 

(1.0) 

(0.5) 

(5.4) 

27% 

(39) 

55 

(5.0) 

(1.3) 

(0.3) 

(6.6) 

33% 

(44) 

302 

(23.2) 

(5.8) 

(2.0) 

(31) 

154% 

(221) 

EN 

39 

   EN 

 
 
 
It can be seen from the table that the impact on the costs of the Agency for combined options 2 
to 6 lead to a change in the yearly costs for the Agency of between €5 m and €31 m. Option 5 
has the largest impact in terms of benefits for the industry, but also has the largest cost for the 
Agency, with the other four options having significantly lower additional costs. 

6.5.2 

Impacts on national institutions 

Method of assessment 

In  order  to  estimate  the  variations  in  costs  determined  by  a  reduction  of  staff  at  NSAs,  the 
average cost of one staff member in EU12 NSAs and EU15 NSAs was calculated on the basis 
of  5  case  study  countries  (Germany,  France,  Italy,  Poland  and  Hungary).  This  was  then 
compared with the average cost of labour in the two groups of countries. It was assumed that a 
reduction  of  10  staff  from  an  NSA  would  lead  on  average  to  a  cost  saving  of  €600k  in  a 
‘generic’ NSA53. 

It has been difficult to estimate the impact in terms of cost of administration on NSAs of the 
application of the horizontal measures (option 6). On the one hand, NSAs could face increased 
costs  due  to  the  need  to  implement  the  EU  rules,  requiring  tougher  standards  and  the 
supervision. On the other hand, the enhanced role of ERA in disseminating common rules and 
advising  on  their  implementation  could  help  to  smooth  the  workload  of  NSAs.  In  addition  a 
clearer  legislative  framework  (e.g.  migration  from  national  technical  and  safety  rules  to  a 
system  of  EU  rules)  should  reduce  burden  on  NSAs.  By  estimating  the  effects  of  the  single 
measures within this option, the second effect was considered to have a higher impact than the 
first, leading to a net reduction in staff members per NSA. 

Results of individual options 1 to 6 

The table below reports the impacts on the cost of administration sustained by NSAs of each 
policy option. 

Table 6-6: Savings of the cost of administration in NSAs of options 2-6 (€m) 

Option 

Option 1: Baseline 

Option 2: Further ERA 
“Coordination” 

Option 3: ERA as One-
Stop-Shop 

Option 4: ERA & NSAs 
share competencies 

Total NSA 
staff* 
(estimate 
2011) 

Yearly values by 2020 (when all staff changes have been 
phased in), per NSA 

Total staff 
variation  

Total staff 
costs saving  

Overhead  

Total gross 
cost saving  

Total 
NPV in 
the EU   
(2015-
2025) 

500 

No impacts on cost of administration 

Marginal impacts on cost of administration 

0 

-2 

-3 

EU12 

EU15 

0.08 

0.17 

EU12 

0.11 

EU15 

0.26 

0.02 

0.04 

0.03 

0.07 

0.1 

0.2 

0.1 

0.3 

26 

42 

53 

Taking into account the cost differences between NSAs in the EU12 and EU15 -approximately €220k for 
EU12  NSAs  and  about  €875k  for  EU15  NSAs.  The  fact  that  the  number  of  NSAs  in  the  EU15  group  is 
higher has also been factored in. 

EN 

40 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Option 

Total NSA 
staff* 
(estimate 
2011) 

Yearly values by 2020 (when all staff changes have been 
phased in), per NSA 

Total staff 
variation  

Total staff 
costs saving  

Overhead  

Total gross 
cost saving  

Option 5: ERA takes over 
activities of NSAs 
regarding authorisation & 
certification 

Option 6: Horizontal 
measures 

-10 

-2 

EU12 

0.38 

0.09 

0.5 

EU15 

0.87 

0.22 

EU12 

0.08 

EU15 

0.17 

0.02 

0.04 

1. 

0. 

0.2 

Total 
NPV in 
the EU   
(2015-
2025) 

151 

37 

* Only those working on certification & authorisation. An estimated value based on the Interoperability and Safety Reports 
of the Agency. Assuming that EBA (German NSA) staff in regional offices is not counted as certification and authorisation 
staff, but is being an inspection and auditing staff. 

The impact on the costs of the Agency for incremental options 3 to 6 leads to a change in the 
yearly  costs  for  the  single  NSAs  of  between  €  0.1  m  and  €0.4  m  in  EU12  countries,  and 
between €0.2 m and €1.1 m in EU15  countries. Clearly, option 5 has the largest benefit to the 
national public purse in terms of the impact on the NSAs, with the other four options leading to 
lower cost savings. 

Results of options 2 to 5 in combination with option 6 

The  cost  of  administration  on  NSAs  arising  from  combined  options  is  presented  in  the  table 
below, with option 5 having again the highest potential impact on reducing the costs. 

Table 6-7: Savings of the cost of administration in NSAs of options 2-5 in combination with option 6 
(€m) 

Option 

Total 
NSA 
staff* 
(estimate 
2011) 

Yearly values by 2020 (when all staff changes have been phased 
in), per NSA 

Total staff 
variation  

Total staff 
costs saving 

Overhead  

Total gross 
cost saving 

Total 
NPV in 
the EU   
(2015-
2025) 

Option 2+6: Further ERA 
“Coordination” + horizontal 
measures 

Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-
Shop + horizontal measures 

Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs 
share competencies + horizontal 
measures 

500 

Option 5+6: ERA takes over 
activities of NSAs regarding 
authorisation & certification + 
horizontal measures 

-2 

-4 

-5 

-11 

EU12 

EU15 

EU12 

EU15 

0.08 

0.17 

0.09 

0.35 

EU12 

0.11 

EU15 

0.44 

EU12 

0.24 

EU15 

0.96 

0.02 

0.04 

0.02 

0.09 

0.03 

0.11 

0.06 

0.24 

0.1 

0.2 

0.1 

0.4 

0.1 

0.6 

0.3 

1.2 

37 

55 

68 

152 

EN 

41 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
* Only those working on certification & authorisation. An estimated value based on the Interoperability and Safety Reports 
of the Agency. Assuming that EBA (German NSA) staff in regional offices is not counted as certification and authorisation 
staff, but is being an inspection and auditing staff 

Impact on employment level and working conditions in national institutions 

The  implementation  of  different  policy  measures  would  have  an  effect  on  the  employees  of 
NSAs  and  NoBos.  In  numerical  terms,  however,  the  effect  would  be  rather  limited,  with 
staffing variations in the NSAs likely to change in average by between 2 and 10 staff members 
on  average,  depending  on  the  policy  option  implemented.  The  effects  on  NoBos  would  be 
assumingly negligible, as they would be marginally affected by the policy measures in terms of 
staff requirements. 

As far as possible staff reduction in NSAs is concerned, its negative impact on employment is 
likely to be offset and/or minimised by the following: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Linked  increase  in  the  staffing  of  ERA  as  a  result  of  the  implementation  of  policy 
measures,  with  a  probable  trend  of  (an  at  least  partial)  transfer  of  interoperability 
experts from national to EU level; 

Changes  to  be  introduced  at  national  level  by  the  recast  of  the  first  railway  package 
which include, inter alia, strengthening of national Regulatory Bodies (which in practice 
infers  more  staff);  in  many  Member  States,  the  NSA  and  the  Regulatory  Body  is  the 
same institution. 

The general, well-known difficulties surrounding recruitment of railway experts in the 
EU also include national authorities. All NSAs in the EU, except in Denmark and the 
UK, experience problems in this area54. Therefore there is a strong basis for assumption 
that even if affected by staff reductions, a railway expert would find a new job relatively 
quickly (however probably not at national level). 

The  transfer  of  certain  competences  from  the  NSAs  to  ERA  (safety  certification  and 
vehicle  authorisation)  would  in  general  enable  the  national  authorities  to  better 
concentrate  on  other  current  important  tasks  such  as  monitoring  and  enforcement; 
corresponding staff reductions could be then limited.  

The nature of work in national administrations (including in the NSAs) is usually linked 
with  an  "official"  status  for  the  employees;  it  means  that  there  are  possibilities  –and 
sometimes obligations – for the states to ensure their constant employment. 

Finally, assuming that majority of former NSAs employees find their new jobs at ERA, their 
working conditions should normally improve, given higher salaries and benefits offered at the 
EU level in comparison with many national administrations (especially from the EU-12). 

6.5.3 

Total changes in the cost of administration for the Agency and NSAs  

The following table shows the estimated impacts on the  cost of  administration  for   ERA and 
NSAs respectively for each of the policy options analysed. For all options, except for option 5, 
an overall reduction in the cost of administration was estimated. 

54 

As indicated in the ERA Interoperability Report 2011, the most problematic issues are less attractive NSA 
salaries  and  the  limited  number  of  rail  experts  in  the  labour  market.  The  latter  is  related  either  to  the 
specifics of  the  national  educational  system,  which does  not  supply  sufficient numbers of graduates  with 
technical  railway  knowledge,  or  to  the  competition  for  qualified  staff  from  the  rail  industry,  which  may 
provide better salaries. 

EN 

42 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Table 6-8: Change in Agency and NSA costs and the net impact on cost of administration of options 2-5 
in combination with option 6 (Total costs, NPV, 2015-2025, € m) 

Option 

Estimated cost 
increase for ERA 
(Table 6-5) 

Estimated cost 
decrease for NSAs 
(Table 6-7) 

Total saving in the 
cost of administration 
(ERA+NSAs) 

Option 2+6: Further ERA 
“Coordination"+ horizontal measures 

Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop + 
horizontal measures 

Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share 
competencies + horizontal measures 

Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities 
of NSAs regarding authorisation & 
certification + horizontal measures 

(37) 

(39) 

(44) 

37 

55 

68 

0 

16 

24 

(221) 

152 

(69) 

The table above shows that option 4 leads to the highest potential cost savings of €24 m, while 
the implementation of option 5 is expected to impose an increase in cost of administration of 
about €69m. 

6.5.4  Cost recovery through fees 

To  complete  the  analysis  of  the  cost  of  administration,  an  assessment  was  made  of  how 
potential  fee  revenues  from  certification  and  authorisation  could  be  distributed  between  the 
institutions  in  case  of  different  policy  options.  The  input  data  for  this  analysis  has  been  the 
forecast  of  total  number  of  safety  certificates  issued  and  vehicle  authorisations  granted  as 
described in Section 6.4.1, the average fees for these two activities and how the fee revenues 
would be shared between the Agency and NSAs.  

Method of assessment 

It has been assumed that: 

•  Average  safety  certificate  fees  were  derived  from  the  stakeholder  consultation  -  €20k 
for EU 15 MS and €3 k for EU 12 MS. Future f ees have been set equal to € 10k across 
all the EU to take into account of a standardisation of payments and procedures.  

•  Revenue sharing: different criteria for sharing revenues between the Agency and NSAs 
have  been  identified  for  the  different  options.  In  the  case  of  options  2  and  3  safety 
certificate revenues have been entirely assigned to NSAs (as in the current situation); in 
the  case  of  option  4,  different  hypotheses  have  been  made  to  test  the  impacts  of  the 
consequences of changing the distribution of revenues between ERA and NSAs.  

•  over  time  there  will  be  a  gradual  reduction  in  the  total  number  of  vehicle  type 
authorisations as discussed earlier, which will lead to a reduction in total fees across the 
EU of about €29 m. 

Further details on calculations are in Section 9 of Annex VII.  

Results of options 2 to 5 in combination with option 6 

EN 

43 

   EN 

 
 
The table below illustrates the extent to which future revenues collected by the Agency for its 
part of issuing of safety certificates and vehicle authorisation can cover the additional cost of 
administration. 

Table 6-9: Cost coverage of incremental agency costs & additional call on EU budget of options 2-5 in 
combination with option 6 (Total costs, NPV, 2015-2025, € m) 

Option 

Revenue 
sharing 
criteria 

Additional cost of 
administration for 
Agency*  
(Table 6-5) 

Estimated 
Agency 
revenue 
increase 

Coverage of 
additional Agency 
costs (%) 

Additional 
call on EU 
budget  

Option 2+6: Further ERA 
“Coordination” + horizontal 
measures 

Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-
Shop + horizontal measures 

Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share 
competencies + horizontal 
measures 

100% NSAs 

(37) 

100% NSAs 

(39) 

0 

0 

0% 

0% 

(37) 

(39) 

a.  
25% NSAs 
75% ERA 

b. 
50% NSAs 
50% ERA 

c. 
75% NSAs 
25% ERA 

(44) 

56 

127% 

0 

(44) 

38 

86% 

(6) 

(44) 

19 

43% 

(25) 

Option 5+6: ERA takes over 
activities of NSAs regarding 
authorisation & certification + 
horizontal measures 

100% ERA 

(221) 

75 

34% 

(146) 

* 

Represents the amount of EU-wide revenue foregone by the NSAs.  

The  last  column  shows  the  additional  call  on  the  EU  budget  from  the  various  options.  In 
options 4 and 5 ERA is able to cover a significant part of its incremental costs related to safety 
certification and vehicle authorisation. In particular, option 4a, with the assignment of 75% of 
revenues to ERA, is the one that grants the highest coverage (127%) of additional Agency costs 
related to safety certification and authorisation activities. However, given the amount of work 
that will still need to be done by NSA technical experts in option 4, it would probably not be 
justifiable to give the NSA only 25% of the revenue. 

Conversely,  option  5  shows  the  least  coverage  of  costs.  Although  the  Agency  is  assumed  to 
keep all potential fees generated by these activities, they would not be sufficient to cover the 
incremental costs of the substantial increase in Agency staff.  

6.6 

Assessment of indirect impacts 

Section 10 in Annex VII gives an overview of the assessment of indirect impact. The indirect 
impact  on  rail  demand,  passenger  fares  and  industry  revenues,  as  well  as  any  environmental 
impacts (GHG emissions, air quality and noise) is expected to be low, and it reality would be 
difficult to establish to what extent these were originated by this initiative rather than other 4th 
Railway  Package  initiatives  and/or  external  factors  such  as  changes  in  demand  of  other 
transport  modes.  However,  options  4  and  5,  especially  when  combined  with  the  horizontal 

EN 

44 

   EN 

 
measures of option 6, are expected to have positive impacts on rail freight prices, service levels 
and  rail  investments  triggered  by  the  changes  in  rail  market  structure,  especially  in  those 
countries  where  the  interoperability  and  safety  procedures  are  currently  the  longest  and  most 
costly.  Rail  safety  levels  under  each  option  remain  the  same  given  that  the  principal 
responsibilities of each main actor in the safety chain (predominantly RU and IM) will not be 
changed, or could improve slightly as a result of more harmonised national legislation.  

6.7 

Assessment of impacts on micro, small and medium sized enterprises 

The key company groups (following the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 
2003  defining  micro,  small  and  medium  sizes  enterprises)  impacted  by  the  proposed  options 
are: 

•  Passenger Railway Undertakings 

•  Freight Railway Undertakings 

•  NoBos 

•  ROSCOs (Rolling stock leasing companies) 

•  Rolling stock suppliers 

For these groups, the effects of the proposed options will be primarily positive with reductions 
in  authorisation  costs  and  timescales  benefiting  both  passenger  and  freight  railway 
undertakings,  ROSCOs  and  rolling  stock  suppliers.  In  addition  benefits  are  likely  to  be 
proportionately larger for smaller type sizes which would be anticipated to disproportionately 
benefit  SMEs.  Finally,  benefits  are  likely  to  be  most  significant  for  new  entrants  currently 
facing discriminatory authorisation processes, a higher proportion of which will be SMEs than 
current incumbents. 

The one company group where the options could result in additional costs is NoBos, however 
not all of them, as small/medium companies they are often part of a bigger company or a group. 
This will result from the measure proposing coordination and supervision of NoBos in options 
2  to  5.  However,  apart  from  complying  with  guidance,  the  main  cost  for  NoBos  will  be 
facilitating audits by the Agency (which should represent small cost). Micro enterprises need to 
be  included  in  the  scope  of  the  legislation  in  order  to  ensure  the  principle  goals  of  the 
legislation, which is safety and interoperability of EU railways. 

It would be in any case recommended that: 

1.  Levels  of  NoBo  audit  are  proportional  to  the  volume  of  work  carried  about  by  each 

NoBo; 

2.  Guidance  to  NoBos  from  ERA  should  avoid  the  creation  of  administrative  costs  not 

directly related to the frontline services of NoBos. 

7  COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 

7.1 

Comparison in terms of direct impacts  

The overall results of the assessment of different  impacts  are summarised in the table below. 
Although option 6 could be pursued as a self-standing option, the analysis has shown the strong 
benefits of combining it with institutional options 2-5. Therefore, in this final section the report 
will  focus  only  on  the  impacts  of  combined  options  –  i.e  options  2-5  each  combined  with 
horizontal measures of option 6. 

EN 

45 

   EN 

 
Table 7-1: Summary table of discounted cost savings for rail undertakings and public authorities 2015-2025 of options 2-5 in combination with option 6 (NPV, € m)  

Option 

Savings to rail undertakings 
(including in administrative costs) 

Authorisation 
(Figure 6-3) 

Safety 
certification
(Figure 6-4) 

Opportunity 
costs 
(central 
case) 
(Table 6-2) 

Change in cost of administration 

Total 
benefits for 
operators  

For ERA 
(Table 6-5) 

For NSAs 
(Table 6-2) 

Total change in 
cost of 
administration 

ERA/NSA 
authorisation 
fee revenue 
loss55 

Total net 
benefit 

Option 2+6: Further ERA 
“Coordination” +horizontal 
measures 

Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-
Shop + horizontal measures 

Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share 
competencies +  horizontal 
measures 

Option 5+6: ERA takes over 
activities of NSAs regarding 
authorisation & certification + 
horizontal measures 

201  

217 

235 

276 

2 

2 

2  

3  

237 

440 

(37) 

255 

474 

(39) 

265 

502 

(44) 

37 

55 

68 

0 

16 

24 

(29) 

(29) 

411 

461 

(29) 

497 

295 

574 

(221) 

152 

(69) 

(29) 

476 

(146) 

Additional 
funds 
necessary 
from EU 
budget to 
cover ERA 
costs 
(Table 6-9) 

(37) 

(39) 

a: 0 

b: (6) 

c: (25) 

Taking into account the direct impacts, option 4 is the most beneficial, i.e. it has the best cost/benefit ratio. Moreover, it can also be cost-neutral to the EU 
budget (a minimal cost under scenario (b) and neutral under scenario (a)), given the proposed coverage of additional costs of ERA through industry fees.  

55 

As explained in Section 6.4.8, over time there will be a gradual reduction in the total number of vehicle type authorisations, which will lead to a reduction in total fees across the EU of 
about €29 m. 

EN 

46 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
7.2 

Comparison in terms of efficiency and effectiveness 

The net cost and benefits have to be compared with the expected effectiveness of each option in 
terms of the operational objectives as out in section 4. The table below show the results of the 
combined options in achieving the relevant targets. 

Table 7-2: Estimated changes in authorisation and certification costs and timescales by 2025 by the 
options 2-5 in combination with option 6 (incremental to the baseline developments) 

Option 

Reduction in 
cost of 
authorisation 

Reduction in 
time of 
authorisation  

Reduction in 
average time 
to market 

Reduction in 
cost of 
certification 

Reduction in 
timescale of 
certification 

Target: 20% reduction by 2025 

0% 

19% 

20% 

24% 

0% 

17% 

0% 

19% 

18% 

22% 

22% 

25% 

0% 

16% 

19% 

19% 

0% 

25% 

30% 

33% 

24% 

22% 

30% 

20% 

46% 

Option 1: Baseline 

Option 2+6: Further ERA 
“Coordination”+ horizontal 
measures 

Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-
Shop + horizontal measures 

Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs 
share competencies + horizontal 
measures 

Option 5+6: ERA takes over 
activities of NSAs regarding 
authorisation & certification + 
horizontal measures 

For total authorisation costs and timescales the target requiring a reduction of 20% in 2025 is 
only  achieved  in  options  4  and  5.  There  have  been  no  targets  set  for  the  reduction  in  safety 
certification costs (as these are less material), but for completeness the table also presents the 
estimated  reductions  in  this  category.  For  the  target  relating  to  average  time  to  market  (RU 
safety  certification  plus  vehicle  authorisation  timescale)  the  objective  of  a  reduction  is  also 
achieved  in  option  3.  Finally,  the  target  relating  to  national  rules  is  achieved  through  the 
measures contained in option 6, and, given that option 6 has now been joined to each option 2 
to 5, this target is achieved through all combined options. 

The effectiveness and efficiency of different options is summarised in the table below. 

Table 7-3: Efficiency and effectiveness of the options  

Option 

Efficiency (Total Net 
Benefit € m) 
(Table 7-1) 

Effectiveness 
(number of 
operational 
objectives met) 

Option 2+6: Further ERA “Coordination” + horizontal 
measures 

Option 3+6: ERA as One-Stop-Shop + horizontal measures 

Option 4+6: ERA & NSAs share competencies + horizontal 
measures 

Option 5+6: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding 
authorisation & certification + horizontal measures 

411 

461 

497 

476 

1 

2 

3 

3 

EN 

47 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
This table shows that by combining the net benefits with effectiveness in terms of operational 
objectives, option 4 remains the favoured option – all objectives will be achieved with a highest 
net benefit. While the benefits of option 3 are relatively close to those of option 4, this option 
would  compare  unfavourably  in  terms  of  effectiveness  as  the  target  for  reduction  in 
authorisation costs will not be achieved. 

In  conclusion,  option  4  would  be  a  coherent,  effective  and  efficient  solution  to  the  problems 
identified, as it provides the best balance of outcomes in relation to: 

• 

the  industry,  in  terms  of  reduced  costs  and  timescales  for  safety  certification  and 
vehicle, and other sub-system, authorisation; 

•  cost implications for the EU budget in terms of incremental costs of the Agency; 

• 

• 

the cost impacts on national institutions;  

respect of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles;  

•  addressing the problems identified in section 3; and 

•  meeting the objectives outlined in section 4. 

Furthermore,  it  can  be  noted  these  activities  are  in  line  with  the  type  of  role  that  EASA 
(European  Air  Safety  Agency)  and  EMSA  (European  Maritime  Safety  Agency)  have  within 
their  respective  sectors,  which  allow  for  direction  of  the  sector  without  impacting  on  the 
subsidiarity of Member States' institutions. 

Option  4  in  combination  with  option  6  should  be  therefore  pursued  in  the  preparation  of  the 
legislative proposal. Annex VIII gives more information on how the preferred option is planned 
to be implemented, both in terms of resources and planned policy measures. 

8  MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

Regarding  evaluation,  it  is  planned  that  in  2025  the  Commission  will  evaluate  whether  the 
objectives of the initiative were achieved, and if not, consider which additional steps need to be 
taken  in  order  to  complete  them  by  2030,  an  important    date  set  in  the  White  Paper  on 
Transport for many initiatives.  

Progress  in  terms  of  reaching  the  objectives  could  be  monitored  by  relevant  monitoring 
indicators.  For  this  purpose,  the  existing  targets  for  operational  objectives  could  be  used  and 
transformed in the following indicators: 

•  number of national rules,  
•  cost and duration of safety certification procedure, and 
•  cost and duration of vehicle authorisation procedure. 

The indicators could be verified by the following tools: 

• 

Interviews  (and,  where  possible,  a  questionnaire)  with  an  appropriate  selection  of 
stakeholders  who  should  provide  their  own  assessment  of  time  and  costs  related  to 
certification  and  vehicle  authorisation.  Such  a  survey  of  key  stakeholders  could  be 
carried out on the initiative of the Commission in 2020 and 2025 as an adequate basis to 
evaluate whether the foreseen time and cost savings have been achieved. This would be 

EN 

48 

   EN 

 
 
subsequently reported by the Agency in the framework of their regular Interoperability 
Report; 

•  Developments in relation to the number of published (notified to the Commission) 
national safety and technical rules, measured in the Commission Notif-IT database. 

Additionally, it might be also useful to monitor the position of stakeholders with respect to the 
specific  objectives  through  a  consultation  process  in  the  coming  years,  to  understand  if  the 
following is being achieved: 

•  Non-discrimination;  
•  An increase the coherence of the national legal framework.  

This  consultation  could  be  named  “Rail  administrative  barriers  barometer”  and  tied  to  the 
existing Eurobarometer survey in the area of rail. 

EN 

49 

   EN 

 
ANNEX I 
THE FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE – THE 'BIG PICTURE' 

Caveat: The content of this Annex will be further refined and updated as the policy preparation 
processes for the different initiatives within the Fourth Package progress 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

In its White Paper "Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive and 
resource  efficient  transport  system"  adopted  on  28  March  2011  ('2011  White  Paper'),  the 
Commission unveiled its vision to establish a genuine Single European Transport Area and it 
clarified that this objective implies creating the true Single European railway Area. A crucial 
condition  to  meet  this  goal  is  the  removal  of  all  obstacles  of  administrative,  technical  or 
regulatory nature still holding back the rail sector. As announced in the 2011 White Paper, the 
Commission  has  prepared  a  set  of  proposals,  to  be  adopted  sequentially  within  the  Fourth 
Railway Package. 

Additionally,  the  European  Council  conclusions  of  January  2012  highlight  the  importance  of 
releasing the growth-creating potential of a fully integrated Single Market, including as regards 
network industries.56 More precisely, the Commission Communication on Action for Stability, 
Growth  and  Jobs  adopted  on  30  May  201257  stresses  the  importance  of  reducing  further  the 
regulatory  burden  and  barriers  to  entry  in  the  rail  sector,  making  therefore  country  specific 
recommendations in that direction. In the same vein, the Commission adopted on 6 June 2012 
the  Communication  on  strengthening  the  governance of  the  single  market,  which  stresses  the 
importance of the transport sector with a special attention to rail.58  

This Annex gives a brief background of the development of EU railway acquis and clarifies the 
necessity and objectives of the Fourth Railway Package within this context. It presents all the 
elements  included  in  the  Package  (a  chapeau  communication  and  seven  legislative  proposals 
accompanied by three impact assessments) and explains how different pieces fit together.59 

2.  DEVELOPMENT OF EU RAILWAYS ACQUIS 

In  the  past  decade,  the  European  legislator  has  considerably  developed  the  EU  acquis 
encouraging  competitiveness  and  market  opening.  The  overarching  idea  has  been  that  greater 
competition makes for a more efficient and customer-responsive industry. In parallel measures 
have been taken to improve the interoperability and safety of national networks; and encourage 
the  development  of  well  integrated  rail  system  leading  to  'European',  rather  than  'national', 
railways. 

Rail  legislation  in  the  early  nineties  introduced  some  limited  degree  of  market  opening  and 
prompted  the  railways  to  improve  efficiency  by  introducing  management  independence  of 
railway  undertakings  from  the  state  and  separation  of  accounts  between  infrastructure 
management and transport operations. Since 2000, however, the European Commission has put 
forward further initiatives in the shape of packages of legislative measures. 

The First Railway Package, adopted in 2001, was designed to: 

•  open the international rail freight market, 

56  
57  
58  
59 

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127599.pdf 
COM (2012) 299 final. 
COM(2012) 259 final 
The intention is to add this (identical) background Annex to each of the 3 rail package IAs. 

EN 

50 

   EN 

 
                                                 
•  establish  a  general  framework  for  the  development  of  European  railways,  and  clarify 
the  relationship  between  (a)  the  state  and  the  infrastructure  manager;  (b) the  state  and 
railway  undertakings  and  (c)  the  infrastructure  manager  and  railway  undertakings 
(Directive 2001/12/EC); 

•  set out the conditions that freight operators must meet in order to be granted a licence to 

operate services on the European rail network (Directive 2001/13/EC); and 
infrastructure  charging 

for  capacity  allocation  and 

•  define  policy 
2001/14/EC).  

(Directive 

The Second Railway Package was adopted in 2004. Its aim was to determine: 

•  a common approach to rail safety (Directive 2004/49/EC) 
• 

requirements  for  interoperability  of  the  European  high  speed  and  conventional  rail 
systems (Directive 2004/50/EC) 
the  opening  of  national  and  international  rail  freight  markets  on  the  entire  European  
network (Directive 2004/51/EC)  
the  establishment  of  the  European  Railway  Agency  (Regulation  (EC)  881/2004, 
amended by Regulation 1335/2008). 

• 

• 

The Third Railway Package was adopted in 2007, to open up international passenger services 
to competition. The objective of the package was: 

•  opening  the  market  for  international  passenger  services  to  competition  (Directive 

2007/58/EC)  

•  setting  the  conditions  and  procedures  for  the  certification  of  train  crews  operating 

locomotives and trains (Directive 2007/59/EC); and  

•  ensuring  basic  rights  for  rail  passengers  (Regulation  1371/2007),  for  example,  with 
reduced  mobility. 

for  passengers  with 

ticketing,  and 

insurance, 

regard 

to 

The  Recast  of  the  First  Railway  Package  was  proposed  by  the  Commission  in  2010. 
Following  a  final  vote  of  approval  in  the  European  Parliament  on  3  July  2012,  the  new  EU 
rules should come into force by the end of 2012. The recast aims to simplify and consolidate 
the rules by merging three directives and their amendments into a single text. Importantly, the 
Recast also seeks to clarify existing provisions and tackle key problem areas which have been 
identified in the market over the last ten years. In particular, the new legislation will strengthen 
the  power  of  national  regulators,  improve  the  framework  for  investment  in  rail,  and  ensure 
fairer access to rail infrastructure and rail related services. 

3.  DEVELOPMENTS IN EU RAIL MARKET 

Despite  the  considerable  development  of  the  EU  acquis  and  rail  markets,  the  modal  share  of 
passenger rail in intra-EU transport has in average remained more or less constant since 2000, 
at around 6%. The latest Euro-barometer survey suggests that only 6% of Europeans uses the 
train  at  least  once  per  week.60  It  should  be  noted  that  there  are  marked  differences  between 
Member States, but in overall rail loses out in terms of modal share compared to other modes, 
reflecting a (real or perceived) lower level of efficiency, service levels and quality compared to 
other  transport  modes.  In  the  Consumer  Scoreboard  201161,  train  services  score  worst  of  all 

60  
61 

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_326_en.pdf 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_research/cms_en.htm 

EN 

51 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
transport services and four in ten consumers consider the choices in that service category to be 
inadequate.  

Improvements will be necessary in all rail segments 

As demonstrated by the EVERIS study62, to improve the overall modal split in favour of rail, 
improvement will be necessary in all rail segments, including conventional long-distance and 
urban train services. 

The  6%  modal  share  for  rail  in  the  EU  has  remained  fairly  stable  in  spite  of  the  impressive 
development of high-speed train networks. The latter have managed to gain some markets at 
the  expense  of  air  transport  services,  but  at  the  same  time  air  transport  has  maintained 
important  flows  of  passenger  traffic  on  routes  competing  with  rail63.  Since  the  mid-nineties, 
local and regional passenger train services in most Member States that did not open up their 
market  have  fallen  in  a  downward  spiral  of  continuous  operational  losses  and  subsequent 
reduced  service  offer.  This  decline  has  been  exacerbated  in  the  EU12  Member  States  by  the 
decay of old infrastructure and rolling stock on the one hand, and wealth driven high-growth of 
car ownership, on the other hand.  

Although  commuter  transport  around  urban  agglomerations  experiences  growth  in  some 
Member  States,  cars  still  secure  an  important  share  of  urban  transport  –  59%  of  Europeans 
never use suburban trains. This situation contrasts with the 75% urbanisation rate of the EU27 
and  therefore  indicates  a  huge  market  development  potential  for  suburban  and  regional 
passenger rail transport, especially given the raising congestions on roads. 

The  rail  freight  markets  within  the  EU  have  been  opened  for  a  number  of  years,  and  the 
industry’s stagnation cannot therefore be simply explained by the existence of legal barriers of 
the kind that continue to restrict competition in domestic passenger services. The problem to be 
addressed  therefore  also  needs  to  be  defined  in  terms  of  technical,  physical  capacity  and 
institutional barriers, which have frustrated action to open markets taken at the EU level. 

4.  WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS NECESSITATING ANOTHER RAIL PACKAGE? 

According to available studies, the modest development of the rail sector, as explained above, 
can  be  attributed  to  the  presence  of  several  administrative,  technical,  institutional  and  legal 
obstacles, which still hamper market access and operational efficiency of service providers. 

Domestic passenger market opening 

Whereas markets for rail freight services have been fully opened to competition since January 
200764 and those for international passenger transport services as of 1 January 201065, national 
domestic passenger markets remain largely closed66. However, by removing the legal barrier by 
allowing  open  access  to  infrastructure  for  domestic  passenger  services,  would  have  rather 
limited  effects  given  that  major  part  of  the  domestic  rail  market  is  covered  by  public  service 
contracts  (PSC).  The  rules  on  the  provision  of  transport  services  under  public  service 

62 

63 

64 
65 
66 

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/studies/doc/2010_09_09_study_on_regulatory_options_on_furt 
her_market_opening_in_rail_passenger_transport.pdf 
27  out  of  the  40  largest  intra-EU  air  routes  in  the  EU  were  within  the  reach  of  competing  long-distance 
(high-speed) railway services and yet attracted some 50 million passengers a year - i.e. as much as the 4th 
largest EU airport, Madrid-Barajas. 
Directive 2004/51/EC, amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC. 
Council Directive 91/440/EEC, as amended inter alia by Directive 2007/58/EC. 
Some Member States, such as United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden or Italy, have unilaterally opened their 
domestic markets. 

EN 

52 

   EN 

 
                                                 
obligations  (PSO)  are  laid  down  in  Regulation  1370/200767  which  gives  the  possibility  to 
competent  authorities  to  exclude  rail  transport  services  from  the  obligation  to  award  PSCs 
through  an  open  tendering  procedure.  This  means  that  most  local  and  regional  services,  and 
certain  long-distance  services,  are  operated  under  PSO  and  attributed  to  operators  through 
direct  award.  In  addition,  the  actual  impact  of  market  opening  depends  on  the  specific 
requirements imposed for and within PSCs, making the call either attractive or disguisedly non-
attractive for new entrants in tendering procedures (e.g. with the aim to protect the incumbent 
railway undertaking). 

Infrastructure governance 

The First Railway Package established a distinction between infrastructure managers (IM), who 
run  the  network,  and  railway  undertakings  (RUs),  that  use  it  for  transporting  passengers  or 
goods. The legislation requires that infrastructure charging and capacity allocation, being key 
factors in opening up the market, must be performed independently of the incumbent RU so as 
to ensure fair and non-discriminatory access of all operators to infrastructure. Independence of 
essential functions of infrastructure management has to be ensured in legal, organisational and 
decision-making terms as to allow for all railway undertakings an equal access to infrastructure 
and related services. Member States must also have independent regulatory bodies in place to 
monitor railway markets and to act as an appeal body for rail companies if they believe they 
have been unfairly treated. 

There are, however, problems with the transposition and enforcement of these requirements and 
the Commission has initiated several infringement procedures, on which it expects the Court of 
Justice  of  the  EU  to  express  its  view  by  the  spring  2013.  The  interactions  between  railway 
undertakings  and  infrastructure  managers,  where  these  independence  rules  have  not  been 
implemented,  have  created  conflicts  of  interest  still  resulting  in  access  barriers  and  market 
distortions  at  the  expense  of  new  entrants,  such  as  access  denials  to  infrastructure  and 
discriminatory charges. 

However, even where the existing legislation has been respected, there remain certain problems 
related to the use of infrastructure and related services. Partially these issues are expected to be 
solved  through  the  more  precise  provisions  provided  in  the  Recast  of  the  First  Package, 
especially  through  the  strengthened  role  of  rail  regulators.  However,  certain  issues  appear  to 
require further legislative intervention. For instance, according to the structure and economics 
of  the  railway  sector,  it  could  be  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  efficient  infrastructure 
management to keep certain IM functions together, rather than allowing them to be performed 
by separate (though independent) bodies (e.g. it could be useful to couple traffic management 
with planning of maintenance works). Furthermore, today the independence requirements apply 
only to the essential functions (infrastructure charging and capacity allocation), but it might be 
necessary  to  extend  these  requirements  also  to  certain  other  activities  of  the  IM  crucial  for 
competition,  such  as  infrastructure  investments  planning,  financing  and  maintenance.  The 
optimal governance structure has also led to reflections on the degree of institutional separation 
between infrastructure management and service provision.  

Interoperability and safety 

Specific EU legislation exists to promote interoperability in order to overcome national historic 
differences  in  the  field  of  technical  specifications  for  infrastructure  (gauge  widths, 

67 

Regulation  (EC)  No  1370/2007  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23 October  2007  on 
public  passenger  transport  services  by  rail  and  by  road  and  repealing  Council  Regulations  (EEC) 
Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 

EN 

53 

   EN 

 
                                                 
electrification  standards  and  safety  and  signalling  systems68).  EU  legislation  also  sets  the 
framework  for  a  harmonised  approach  to  rail  safety  in  the  EU69.  Furthermore,  it  obliges  the 
Member  States  to  set  up  the  system  of  national  authorities,  consisting  of  national  safety 
authorities, notified bodies, national investigation bodies and regulatory bodies.  

The European Railway Agency (ERA)70, established by the Second Railway Package, plays a 
central  role  in  promoting  interoperability,  harmonising  technical  standards,  and  developing 
common  approach  to  safety,  all  requiring  close  interaction  with  the  Member  States  and  rail 
sector stakeholders. 

While the level of safety on EU railways has gradually increased, and therefore safety levels as 
such  are  not  an  issue,  stakeholders  have  drawn  the  Commission's  attention  to  the  fact  that 
certain technical and administrative hurdles still persist, creating excessive administrative costs 
and  market  access  barriers,  especially  for  new  entrants.  This  suggests  that  the  highly 
decentralised  system  of  railway  authorities  in  place  may  not  have  fully  coped  with  the 
European dimension  of  the  rail  services.  Firstly, existence of largely  non-transparent national 
technical and safety rules, which overlap and/or are in conflict with the EU legislation, creates 
unnecessary  complexities  for  RUs.  Secondly,  there  are  marked  discrepancies  in  how  the 
national  safety  authorities  (NSAs)  conduct  vehicle  authorisation  and  safety  certifications 
processes, some NSAs being less efficient and effective than others. This has led to reflections 
on how to further enhance the role of the ERA in the integration processes. 

5.  RATIONALE OF THE FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE 

The main objective of the Fourth Railway Package is to enhance the quality and efficiency of 
rail  services  by  removing  remaining  legal,  institutional  and  technical  obstacles,  fostering  the 
performance  of  the  railway  sector  and  its  competitiveness.  As  announced  by  the  2011  White 
Paper, these issues will be addressed by the different initiatives in three main domains: 

−  Domestic  passenger  market  opening  –  opening  domestic  rail  passenger  market  to 

competition, including open access lines as well as the routes under PSOs; 

−  Infrastructure  governance  -  ensuring  that  the  infrastructure  manager  performs  a 
consistent  set  of  functions  that  optimises  the  use  of  infrastructure  capacity,  and  its 
organisation guarantees non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure and rail related 
services. 

−  Interoperability  and  safety  -  removing  remaining  administrative  and  technical 
barriers, in particular by establishing a common approach to safety and interoperability 
rules to decrease administrative  costs, to accelerate procedures, to increase economies 
of scale for RUs and to avoid disguised discrimination. 

What about infrastructure? 

Obviously, to contribute to the growth of the modal share of rail, new rail infrastructures need 
to be built across Europe. The 2011 White Paper calls for completing the European high-speed 
rail network by 2050, so that it would be fully connected to airports enabling the majority of 
medium-distance  passenger  transport  to  be  performed  by  rail.  Future  EU  strategy  for 
infrastructure  development  has  been  already  set  out  in  the  Commission  proposals  for 

68  

69  

70 

Directive  2008/57/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  17  June  2008  on  the 
interoperability of the rail system within the Community (Recast) 
Directive  2004/49/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  29  April  2004on  safety  on  the 
Community's railways (Railway Safety Directive). 
Regulation  (EC)  No  1335/2008  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  December  2008 
amending Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 establishing a European Railway Agency (Agency Regulation) 

EN 

54 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Connecting Europe Facility71 and the new TEN-T Guidelines72 and therefore remains out of the 
scope of the Fourth Package. 

6.  CONTENT OF THE FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE 

The package consists of following elements in the three domains: 

Domestic passenger market opening: amendments to: 

−  Council  Directive  91/440/EEC  on  the  development  of  the  Community's  railways  as 

amended [or alternatively recast of the first railway package, when adopted] 

−  Regulation  (EC)  No  1370/2007  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 

23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road 

The  initiatives  will  be  accompanied  by  the  [IA  on  access  to  domestic  passenger  rail 
markets]. 

Infrastructure governance: amendments to: 

−  Council  Directive  91/440/EEC  on  the  development  of  the  Community’s  railways  as 
amended and Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity 
and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure [or alternatively Recast 
of the first Railway Package, when adopted] 

The initiatives will be accompanied by the [IA on the governance of railway infrastructure 
in the Single European Railway Area]. 

Interoperability and safety: amendments to: 

−  Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 

on safety on the Community's railways 

−  Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 

on the interoperability of the rail system within the Community 

−  Regulation  (EC)  No  881/2004  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  29 

April 2004 establishing a European Railway Agency 

The initiatives will be accompanied by the IA on improving interoperability of the Single 
European Railway Area. 

In addition the Fourth Package contains: 

−  a chapeau Communication, providing overall context and justifications for the package 

of proposals;  

−  an  ancillary  initiative  repealing  Regulation  (EEC) 1192/69  on  common  rules  for  the 
normalisation of the accounts of railway undertakings, which has become obsolete and 
is inconsistent with EU law in force today. 

71 

72 

Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishing  the  Connecting 
Europe Facility, COM(2011) 665 final – 2011/0302 (COD) 
Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  union  guidelines  for  the 
development of the Trans-European Transport network, COM/2011/0650 final/2 - 2011/0294 (COD). 

EN 

55 

   EN 

 
                                                 
7.  OBJECTIVES OF THE FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE 

The  analysis  conducted  by  the  Commission  shows,  that  the  operational  inefficiencies  and 
quality  issues  of  rail  services  are  mainly  caused  by  low  degree  of  competition,  remaining 
market distortions and suboptimal structure of EU rail market. Underlying reasons – long and 
costly procedures, access barriers for new entrants and different market access rules in Member 
States – will be addressed from different angles by all the Fourth Package initiatives.  

Given that, the initiatives in the Fourth Package are complementary, they all contribute to the 
same general objective of improving the competitiveness of rail sector vis-à-vis other modes. In 
addition, some specific objectives are also similar of the initiatives, e.g. facilitating entrance of 
new operators into the market.  The operational objectives are unique for each domain of action. 
The table below demonstrates how the different elements fit together. 

Figure I-2: Summary table of the objectives of the Fourth Railway package initiatives. 

Domestic passenger 
market opening 

Infrastructure 
governance 

Interoperability and 
safety 

General 
objective 

Improve the quality of rail 
passenger services and enhance 
its operational efficiency … 

Improve the operational 
efficiency of infrastructure and 
the access to infrastructure  

Eliminate existing 
administrative and technical 
barriers … 

… thereby enhancing the competitiveness of rail sector vis-à-vis other modes and developing 
further the Single European Rail Area.  

SO1: 

Improve the IM ability 

to manage efficiently the 
infrastructure to the benefit of 
the users 

SO2:  Eliminate conflict of 
interest and discrimination in 
decisions and operations of the 
IMs 

SO1: 
Facilitate entrance 
of new operators into market 

SO2:  Reduce 
administrative costs of 
railway undertakings 

SO1:  Ensure freedom of 
entry into domestic rail 
passenger markets 

Specific 
objectives 

SO2:  Create more uniform 
business conditions 

SO3:   Better value for public 
money spent on public transport 
services 

8.  OPTIONS AND MAIN IMPACTS 

To achieve these objectives, all IAs will consider a range of different options, which ultimately 
should improve the operational efficiency and quality of rail services. 

The  IA  for  the  domestic  passenger  market  opening  would  propose  and  assess  options  on 
how the interaction of access conditions between open access services and services under PSC 
should  be  arranged.  The  IA  would  also  discuss  different  criteria  for  the  design  of  PSC  and 
analyse a possibility of introducing mandatory competitive tendering for PSC. The aim of these 
options  would  be  to  open  the  domestic  rail  market  to  competition,  which  should  lead  more 
passenger  friendly  services  and  better  use  of  public  money.  In  order  to  enhance  the  positive 
effects  of  market  opening,  the  IA  would  analyse  also  additional  options  for  'framework 
conditions',  such  as  access  to  rolling  stock,  through-ticketing  and  inter-availability  of  train 
tickets of different RUs. 

EN 

56 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The IA for the infrastructure governance initiative would study two dimensions of options: 
on the one hand, what functions should be included in the portfolio of an 'ideal IM' in order to 
optimise  its  operational  and  in  investment  decisions,  and  on  the  other  hand,  how  should  the 
separation between the IM and RUs to be enhanced in order to ensure equal level playing field 
for the access to infrastructure and the related services. As a result, new-entrant RUs should get 
a  better  access  to  infrastructure  and  related  services,  at  the  same  time  the  efficiency  of 
infrastructure utilisation at national and EU level should increase.  

The  IA  under  the  interoperability  and  safety  pillar  would  assess  several  'institutional' 
options  on  the  level  of  interaction  between  ERA  and  national  authorities  with  the  aim  to  (a) 
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safety certification and rolling stock authorisation 
processes and (b) reduce complexity caused by excessive national railway rules. As a separate 
option, a set of additional horizontal measures would be considered, which on their own could 
achieve the mentioned objectives, but could also be applied on top of the institutional options to 
reinforce the overall impact of reduced administrative costs/less fragmented markets. 

These policy options and their impacts will be presented and assessed in detail in the respective 
IAs. 

9.  EXPECTED SYNERGIES OF THE PACKAGE 

The  idea  of  the  proposed  package  approach  is  that there are synergies to be  achieved via the 
combined effects of the individual initiatives. Some examples of such synergies are provided 
below. 

−  Effectiveness  of  de  jure  market  opening  depends  on  allowing  for  certain  'framework 
conditions', such as access to infrastructure, rolling stock, stations, train path allocation, 
etc.  Some  of  these  framework  conditions  will  be  addressed  within  the  domestic 
passenger market opening initiatives, while the others via the proposal on infrastructure 
governance. 

−  One way to improve rolling stock availability is to support development of rolling stock 
leasing  market  (as  considered  under  in  the  domestic  passenger  market  opening  IA). 
However,  a  necessary  condition  for  that  is  more  standardised  equipment  and  the  on-
going standardisation process73 is expected to be enhanced by the European "passport" 
for vehicles, considered within the interoperability and safety initiatives. 

−  All  initiatives  would,  in  their  own  terms,  contribute  to  a  more  predictable  business 

models for RUs operating across the borders of EU Member States: 

o 

o 

o 

interoperability  initiative  by  harmonising  approach  to  safety  certification  and 
authorisation of rolling stock, 

 market  access  initiative  by  introducing  universal  licence  for  provision  of 
passenger  services  throughout  the  EU  and  setting  common  principles  for  PSO 
definition, and 

infrastructure  governance 
institutional setup of infrastructure managers in different Member States.  

initiative  by  proposing  a  more  harmonised 

−  Better infrastructure governance should improve the operational efficiency of railways 

and possibly allow an improvement in travel times for passengers and freight. 

Overall,  the  different  operational  gains  expected  as  a  result  of  each  initiative  should  allow  a 
better value for public money, on which the functioning of railways is still heavily reliant. 

73 

As the result of the changes induced by the Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs) decision. 

EN 

57 

   EN 

 
                                                 
EN 

58 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX II 
FUNCTIONING OF THE RAILWAY MARKET  

Over  the  past  decade,  the  European  rail  market  has  witnessed  a  range  of  changes  to  its 
structure, with the aim of improving services to passengers through the creation of an internal 
market.  The  market  for  freight  and  for  international  passenger  trains  has  now  been  opened. 
Moreover, some countries have opened their domestic services to competition, either through 
the introduction of open access operators, or through the competitive tendering of public sector 
contracts. 

Despite this progress, the performance of the rail sector compared to other transport modes is 
not  yet  satisfactory.  In  the  rail  passenger  sector,  the  quality  of  rail  services  does  not  always 
keep  pace  with  the  evolving  needs  of  passengers  in  terms  of  reliability,  comfort,  speed, 
resilience  to  delays  and  the  environment.  The  Commission’s  annual  Consumer  Markets 
Scoreboards show that the market for train services is perceived by EU consumers as one of the 
poorest performing service sectors. In 2012, the market ranks 27th out of 30 services markets 
(for  comparison  airline  services  and  local  public  transport  have  the  5th  and  13th  place  in  the 
ranking, respectively)74. In many circumstances the price/quality ratio of the services offered by 
railway  undertakings  is  perceived  by  passengers  as  insufficient  and  they  opt  for  alternative 
modes of transport, in particular road transport for short distance and commuting journeys, air 
transport for long distance services. As a result, the share of rail in the EU passenger transport 
market has remained low and relatively unchanged. This trend is illustrated in the figure below, 
where  rail’s  share  of  the  overall  market  (in  terms  of  passenger  km)  amounted  to  only  6%  in 
2009, while the private car accounted for some 73%, the same shares registered back in 2000. 

Figure II-1: Road and rail passenger volumes in the EU-27 

Source: Eurostat, International Transport Forum, Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer, national statistics 

These  overall  trends  mask  significant  differences  between  Member  States.  Rail  passenger 
traffic in the EU-15 increased by 16% between 2000 and 2009, with countries such as the UK, 

74  The  Consumer  Markets  Scoreboard  ranks  21  goods  and  30  services  markets  based  on  how  well  they  are 
functioning  for  consumers  in  terms  of  (1)   ease  of  comparing  offers,  (2)  consumer  trust  in 
retailers/providers to comply with consumer protection rules, (3) experience of problems and the degree 
to  which 
satisfaction.  See 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_research/cms_en.htm. 

(4)  overall 

they  have 

complaints 

consumer 

and 

led 

to 

EN 

59 

   EN 

 
 
 
                                                 
Sweden and Belgium experiencing growth in excess of 30%. This contrasts with a fall in traffic 
of  25%  in  the  EU-12  as  a  whole  and  falls  of  more  than  35%  in  Romania,  Lithuania  and 
Bulgaria.  The  wide  divergence  in  consumers’  assessment  of  railway  services  across  EU 
countries is confirmed by the most recent Consumer Markets Scoreboard75, which shows that 
the  market  performs  better  in  the  EU-15  than  in  the  EU-12,  with  the  lowest  scores  in  Italy, 
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Sweden. A wide range of external factors have contributed to 
these diverging trends, including economic growth, trends in oil and petrol prices, demographic 
trends, structural adjustments in many of the EU-12 countries (notably increased car ownership 
in response to rising living standards) and on-going difficulties in securing public funding for 
rail  services.  Nevertheless,  rail’s  inability  to  compete  with  road  reflects  widely  perceived 
shortcomings in a number of aspects of the service provided on many routes, including journey 
times,  service  frequency  and  reliability  and  other  aspects  of  service  quality.  Inadequate 
investment  has  also  meant  that  many  rail  services  have  failed  to  keep  pace  with  passenger 
expectations  of  service  quality,  for  example  in  terms  of  the  application  of  new  ticketing  and 
information technology and the quality of the environment at stations and on trains.  

In  the  freight  sector,  rail  accounts  for  a  little  over  10%  of  tonne-kilometres  transported.  The 
figure  below  shows  that  freight  volumes  transported  by  rail  grew  by  little  more  than  10% 
between  2000  and  2007,  declining  thereafter  along  with  other  types  of  freight  transport  as  a 
result of the global recession. 

Figure II-2: Changes in freight transport volumes and GDP in the EU-27 

Source: Eurostat, International Transport Forum, Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer, national statistics 

Again, the relative performance of rail in EU freight markets has varied significantly between 
different Member States. Across the EU as a whole, road-based freight accounted for over 75% 
of freight volumes transported by land in 2009. However, while the corresponding mode share 
in the EU-15 remained broadly constant at 80%, over the ten years to 2009 the share in the EU-
12  increased  from  14%  to  40%.  Moreover,  rail  freight  movements  in  the  EU-12  fell  by  15% 
over the same period, with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania and Slovakia, all 
experiencing falls in freight volumes by rail well in excess of 20%. 

These  trends  support  the  view  that  both  rail  passenger  and  freight  services  have  failed  to 
respond effectively to competition in road transport. Passenger rail services in some countries 

75 8th Consumer Markets Scoreboard, 2012, Commission, DG SANCO 

EN 

60 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
have benefited from economic trends encouraging greater rail use, yet, as a whole, the sector 
has failed to compete with the greater flexibility offered by car travel, notwithstanding greater 
congestion,  increased  motoring  costs  and  other  factors  that  might  have  been  expected  to 
improve rail’s competitive position. 

In the EU-15, rail freight has established a market niche, maintaining its share of overall freight 
movements over a sustained period but failing to capitalise on the opportunities presented by 
strong economic growth and increasing road congestion over the last decade. In the EU-12, the 
high share of rail freight at the beginning of the decade has been steadily eroded by the growth 
of road freight, which offers freight customers greater flexibility as well as competitive journey 
times and prices. 

In principle, rail freight markets within the EU have been opened for a number of years, and the 
industry’s  lack  of  competitiveness  cannot  therefore  be  simply  explained  by  the  existence  of 
legal barriers of the kind that continue to restrict competition in domestic passenger services. 
The problem to be addressed therefore also needs to be defined in terms of technical, physical 
capacity and institutional barriers, which have frustrated action to open markets taken at the EU 
level.  Such  barriers  will  also  need  to  be  reduced  if  the  benefits  of  liberalisation  of  passenger 
markets are to be addressed. 

To complete the picture, it is useful to provide information on market share of new entrants. In 
2010  the  situation  was  the  following76:  AT  14,6%,  BE  11,82%,  BG  21,6%,  CZ  13,16%,  DE 
25%, DK 25%, EE 45%, ES 8,08%, FI 0%, HU 19,47%, IE 0%, LT 0%, LU 0%, LV 23,3%, 
NL 40%, PL 35,82%, RO 54,7%, SE 40%, SI 0%, SK 2,03%, UK 51,4%.  

76  

Data from 2012 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on monitoring 
development of the rail market 

EN 

61 

   EN 

 
 
 
                                                 
ANNEX III 
FUNCTIONNING OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 

1. 

National Safety Authorities 

National  Safety  Authorities  (NSA)  are  defined  by  Directive  2004/49/EC  on  safety  on  the 
Community’s railways as : 

“the  national  body  entrusted  with  the  tasks  regarding  railway  safety  in  accordance  with  this 
Directive  or  any  bi-national  body  entrusted  by  Member  States  with  these  tasks  in  order  to 
ensure  a  unified  safety  regime  for  specialised  cross-border  infrastructures”  (Article  3  of  
Directive 2004/49/EC). 

NSAs  need  to  be  independent  from  railway  undertakings,  infrastructure  managers,  applicants 
for certificates and procurement entities (Article 16 Directive 2004/49/EC).  

Role of National Safety Authorities 

The  main  tasks  of  NSAs  are  set  out  in  Article  16  of  Directive  2004/49/EC  (as  amended  by 
Directive 2008/57/EC, Directive 2008/110/EC and Directive 2009/149/EC), also referred to as 
“the Safety Directive”. In summary, these tasks comprise: 

1.  authorising the bringing into service of the structural subsystems constituting the trans-
European high-speed rail system in accordance with Article 15 of Directive 2008/57/EC 
and  checking  that  they  are  operated  and  maintained  in  accordance  with  the  relevant 
essential requirements;  

2.  authorising the bringing into service of the structural subsystems constituting the trans-
European  conventional  rail  system,  in  accordance  with  Article  15  of  Directive 
2008/57/EC and checking that they are operated and maintained in accordance with the 
relevant essential requirements;  

3.  supervising  that  the  interoperability  constituents  are  in  compliance  with  the  essential 

requirements as required by Article 19 of Directives 2008/57/EC;  

4.  authorising the placing in service of new and substantially altered rolling stock that is 

not yet covered by a TSI;  

5.  the  issue,  renewal,  amendments  and  revocation  of  relevant  parts  of  safety  certificates 
and of safety authorisations granted in accordance with Articles 10 and 11 and checking 
that  conditions  and  requirements  laid  down  in  them  are  met  and  that  infrastructure 
managers and railway undertakings are operating under the requirements of Community 
or national law;  

6.  monitoring,  promoting,  and,  where  appropriate,  enforcing  and  developing  the  safety 

regulatory framework including the system of national safety rules;  

7.  supervising that rolling stock is duly registered and that safety-related information in the 
national register, established in accordance with Article 15 of Directive 2008/57/EC, is 
accurate and kept up-to-date. 

Article  17  of  the  Safety  Directive  (and  subsequent  amendments)  establishes  that  NSAs  shall 
carry out their tasks in an open, non-discriminatory and transparent way. They should promptly 
respond  to  requests  and  applications  and  communicate  its  requests  for  information  without 
delay  and  adopt  all  its  decisions  within  four  months  after  all  requested  information  has  been 
provided. Moreover, NSAs shall be free to carry out all inspections and investigations that are 

EN 

62 

   EN 

 
needed for the accomplishment of its tasks and be granted access to all relevant documents and 
to premises, installations and equipment of infrastructure managers and railway undertakings. 

Article 18 of the Safety Directive requires that NSAs publish an annual report concerning their 
activities in the preceding year and send it to the ERA by 30 September at the latest.  

NSAs in EU Member States 

Different  Member  States  have  adopted  different  solutions  regarding  the  establishment  of  the 
NSA. The table below summarises the role of each NSA in the five case studies performed for 
the impact assessment support study. The majority of the analysis and evidence for this Annex 
is drawn from the case studies conducted by the external consultant. 

The  case  studies  illustrate  that  in  some  Member  States,  NSAs  are  integrated  with  Transport 
Ministries  (e.g.  Germany)  or  are  a  separate  body  under  the  control  of  the  Transport  Ministry 
(e.g. Italy).  While in other cases they are part of an independent authority with responsibility 
for,  amongst  other  things,  the  regulation  of  the  sector  (e.g.  Hungary  and  Poland).  All  these 
arrangements  are  compliant  with  the  Safety  Directive,  which  requires  the  independence  of 
NSAs  from  railway  undertakings,  infrastructure  managers,  applicants  for  certificates  and 
procurement  entities  only.  However,  when  NSAs  are  part  of  a  wider  institution  that 
encompasses  Regulatory  Bodies  (RB),  as  with  the  Hungarian  and  Polish  authorities,  some 
stakeholders raised concerns. In Hungary some operators noted that they do not make recourse 
to the RB in case of problems with the NSA, as these are part of the same organisation, hence 
their mutual independence is questionable. A similar concern was raised in Poland, where the 
NSA and the Regulatory Body are integrated within the same authority, the UTK. It should be 
noted that no such concern was raised in the UK which has a similar structure.  

Table III-1: Case Study NSAs: staff and budget  

y
n
a
m
r
e
G

y
r
a
g
n
u
H

d
n
a
l
o
P

y
l
a
t
I

e
c
n
a
r
F

Staff headcount 

1,050 

54 

180 (*) 

100 

101 

Budget (m) 

Revenue (2010) 

€53.0 

€1.6 

€13 

€4.4 (*) 

€11.9 

Cost (2010) 

€81.4 

€2 

Note: (*) Total for UTK, which is both RB and NSA. No figures available for NSA activities only 

NSA organisation 

The case studies reveal that the number of staff and budget of NSAs varies significantly across 
Member  States  and  in  a  number  of  interviews NSAs claimed to be understaffed. Recent data 
published  by  ERA  on  NSA  staff  involved  with  interoperability  (see  below)  confirms  the 
heterogeneity of the amount of human resources across NSAs in EU Member States. The data 
highlights  that,  in  view  of  the  complexity  and  workload  of  interoperability  related  activities, 
countries with fewer than five people working in this area may face challenges.  
As  described  in  the  ERA  Interoperability  Report77,  differences  in  size  of  NSAs  may  reflect 
their different responsibilities, and the size of the respective railways. For example, the German 
NSA  may  require  more  staff  to  process  authorisations  due  to  the  specific  Länder  system  of 
regional government as well as the presence of a high number of passenger and freight RUs. 

77 

European Railway Agency Interoperability Report 2011 

EN 

63 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Figure III-1: Numbers of NSA staff directly involved with interoperability 

Source: ERA Interoperability Report, 2011 

Other issues of concern for NSAs are the independence of decision making staff and their level 
of technical capability. In the case of the French EPSF, around 50% of its technical staff are on 
secondment  from  SNCF.  Some  stakeholders  have  questioned  whether  this  can  compromise 
their  independence,  although  the  NSA  itself  strongly  disputes  allegations  of  partiality  by 
seconded staff.  

The  technical  capability  of  staff  is  a  separate  issue.  Again  in  France  it  was  noted  that  many 
expert EPSF specialists are approaching retirement and are likely to be replaced with staff with 
less relevant experience or understanding of the rail sector.  Similarly, the Hungarian NKH is 
concerned that at present it is not able to attract suitably qualified staff, due to the low salaries 
which it is able to offer.  

The  difficulties  surrounding  NSA  staff  recruitment  is  mentioned  in  the  ERA  Interoperability 
Report 2011. All NSAs in the EU, except in Denmark and the UK, experience problems in this 
area. The report indicates that the most problematic issues are less attractive NSA salaries and 
the  limited  number  of  rail  experts  in  the  labour  market.  The  latter  is  related  either  to  the 
specifics  of  the  national  educational  system,  which  does  not  supply  sufficient  numbers  of 
graduates with technical railway knowledge, or to the competition for qualified staff from the 
rail industry, which may provide better salaries. 

NSA operations 

Safety certificates 

From  the  1st  January  2011,  the  Railway  Safety  Directive  2004/49/EC  (and  subsequent 
amendments) required RUs to hold a safety certificate in order to be granted access to railway 
infrastructure.  The  responsible  authorities  for  issuing  these  certificates  are  the  NSAs.  The 
safety certificate has two parts: 

A  Part  A:  the  acceptance  of  a  Railway  Undertaking’s  Safety  Management  System  as 
described in Article 9 and Annex III of Directive 2005/49/EC. The Part A certificate 
is  valid  throughout  Europe  providing  the  type  and  extent  of  the  operation  is 
unchanged. NSAs are therefore required to accept Part A certificates issued by other 

EN 

64 

   EN 

 
 
 
Member State NSAs should the RU request to operate on a different network within 
Europe.  

B  Part  B:  the  acceptance  of  provisions  adopted  by  the  RU  to  meet  requirements 
necessary  for  safe  operation,  as  described  in  Annex  IV  of  Directive  2004/49/EC. 
These  cover  compliance  with  network  specific  requirements  for  staff  competence 
and management of rolling stock. The Part B certificate states the ability of the RU 
to comply with network specific rules applied in the Member State in which the RU 
operates.  Therefore  an  RU  can  have  a  single  Part  A  certificate  but  as  many  Part  B 
certificates as the Member States in which it provides services. 

As indicated by a study commissioned by the European Railway Agency, different NSAs have 
different approaches regarding the issuing of safety certificates. This is determined either by: 
divergent  interpretation  of  EU  legislation  or  by  different  operating  approaches,  technical 
capabilities and the amount of resources dedicated to these activities.  

One  of  the  key  findings  from  the  ERA  2010  study  on  migration  towards  single  safety 
certificate78    was  that  different  approaches  are  used  by  NSAs  for  the  release  of  safety 
certificates. In particular: 

•  There was no consistent assessment process to ensure that NSA decisions were harmonised, 

or at  least followed similar approaches; 

•  NSA  resources  and  activities  were  not  always  targeted  on  those  areas  or  operators  who 

created the biggest risks; and 

•  The  NSA  processes  or  procedures  were  not  always  found  to  be  transparent,  making  it 

difficult for RUs to understand what was expected of them; 

•  There were problems in the transparency and application of National Safety Rules. 

For example one stakeholder, representing different RUs, pointed out in a recent workshop that 
there are examples of NSAs not accepting Part A certificates released in other Member States 
and tend to “overregulate” Part B to cover national rules from part A. The 2010 Interfleet report 
also indicated that a small number of NSAs did not conform to the process and timelines set out 
by the EU Safety Directive, of issuing certificates within four months. This was also confirmed 
in the case studies. Interestingly, the Interfleet report claims that even for those NSAs who state 
they meet the four month deadline, there is scope for them to extend this period artificially by 
“procrastinating” over advising the RU on what documentation to submit and how. 

There  is  great  variation  in  the  fees  charged  to  RUs  for  the  issuing  of  safety  certificates  with 
countries that issue it for free (Sweden and Great Britain) and others charging up to €70,000 in 
some circumstances. The following table shows the comparative fees charged for the release of 
safety certificates based on the information provided by The Rail Liberalisation Index 2011 and 
those collected in the undertaken case studies for this Impact Assessment. 

Table III-2: Comparative fees of safety certificates  

Country 

Cost of safety certificate (€) 

Source (*) 

Sweden 

UK 

0 

0 

Czech Republic 

40 

A 

A 

A 

78  

http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-
Register/Documents/development_of_a_migration_strategy_towards_a_single_safety_certificate.doc 

EN 

65 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
Country 

Cost of safety certificate (€) 

Source (*) 

Slovakia 

Estonia 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Bulgaria 

100 

639 

1,000 

1,418 

3,270 

Denmark 

3,700. . The total sum varies depending on the work required 

Poland 

5,000 (Part A); 2,100  (Part B) 

Portugal 

5,000 

Hungary 

Austria 

Spain 

In the range of 3,600 – 6,900 according to the amount of 
vehicles of the RUs. 

10,000 

10,000 

Belgium 

7,000-15,000 

Greece 

Italy 

30,000 

30,000 

Netherlands 

30,000 

Finland 

Germany 

The fees for issuing the safety certificate are calculated 
according to the workload involved. . The hourly rate 
currently charged is €140 per hour 

The fees for issuing the safety certificate are calculated 
according to the workload involved. The German case study 
indicates up to €70,000. 

A 

A 

A 

A 

A 

A 

B 

A 

B 

A 

A 

B 

A 

A/B 

A 

A 

B 

Note: (*) A: IBM (2011) Rail Liberalisation Index 201179; B: Steer Davies Gleave case 
studies 

Authorisation of rolling stock 

The authorisations for placing in service of vehicles (including also authorisations for types of 
vehicles) are issues by the NSAs. A distinction can be made between the first and additional 
authorisations,  as  well  as  authorisations  for  TSI-conform  and  non-TSI-conform  vehicles.  In 
theory,  the  first  authorisation  shall  be  valid  in  all  Member  States  without  further  checks  for 
fully TSI-compliant vehicles running on TSI-confirm networks; additionally, these TSIs must 
be without specific cases and open points relating top technical compatibility between vehicle 
and the network. Therefore in practice additional authorisations are needed in a large majority 
of cases. 

As  a  consequence  –  and  as  with  safety  certificates  –  there  is  great  variation  in  both  the  time 
required and cost charged by NSAs, to issue vehicle authorisations. 

79

EN 

  http://www.deutschebahn.com/site/shared/en/file__attachements/position__papers/study__rail__liberalisa
tion__index__2011__complete__version.pdf 

66 

   EN 

 
                                                 
In  this  case,  however,  in  addition  to  the  administrative  fees  charged  by  NSAs,  the  cost  is 
impacted  by  the  significance  of  tests  and  documentation  involved  which  makes  it  difficult  to 
identify the exact amount of authorisation costs. The Rail IBM Liberalisation Index provides a 
variety of data which is often difficult to compare: for some countries it reports the cost of the 
overall  procedure  of  homologation  (understood  to  mean  vehicle  authorisation),  for  other 
countries  the  figure  provided  is  the  administrative  fee  only  (leaving  out  costs  of  tests  and 
documentation to produce). 

The  ERA  “Report  on  Vehicle  Authorisation”  (2011)  indicates  total  additional  authorisation 
costs  of  around  €1.6  m  per  vehicle,  however  signi ficant  variation  across  Member  States  and 
type of authorisation were encountered. 

2. 

Notified Bodies 

The role of NoBos 

According to article 2j of the Interoperability Directive (2008/57/EC), Notified Bodies (NoBos) 
are: “The bodies which are responsible for assessing the conformity or suitability for use of the 
interoperability  constituents,  or  for  appraising  the  EC  procedure  for  verification  of  the 
subsystems”. 

This  verification,  based  on  Technical  Standards  for  Interoperability  (TSIs)  must  enable  the 
authorities responsible for authorising the putting into service of subsystems to be certain that 
at  the  design,  construction  and  putting  into  service  stages,  the  result  is  in  line  with  the 
regulations,  technical  and  operational  provisions.  It  must  also  enable  manufacturers  to  be 
assured  of  equality  of  treatment,  whatever  the  country.  According  to  Article  13  of  the 
Interoperability  Directive  “where  the  corresponding  TSI  so  requires,  assessment  of  the 
conformity  or  suitability  for  use  of  an  interoperability  constituent  shall  be  carried  out  by  the 
notified  body  with  which  the  manufacturer  or  his  authorised  representative  established  in  the 
Community has lodged the application”. 

As set out by Article 18 of Directive 2008/57/EC, the task of the Notified Body responsible for 
the  “EC”  verification  of  a  subsystem  begins  at  the  design  stage  and  covers  the  entire 
manufacturing period through to the acceptance stage, before the subsystem is put into service. 
It also covers verification  of the  interfaces of the  subsystem in question with the  system  into 
which  it  is  incorporated,  based  on  the  information  available  in  the  relevant  TSI  and  in  the 
national registers of infrastructure and of rolling stock. Notified Bodies are required to meet the 
assessment  criteria provided  in the  relevant European standards, and are selected  by Member 
States  by  applying  the  criteria  provided  in  Annex  VIII  of  Directive  2008/57/EC.  A  Member 
State  can  withdraw  approval  from  a  body  which  no  longer  meets  the  criteria  referred  to  in 
Annex  VIII,  which  sets  out  the  minimum  criteria  which  must  be  taken  into  account  by  the 
Member States when notifying bodies. 

The  Directive  2008/57/EC  establishes  that  the  Notified  Body  responsible  for  checking 
production must have permanent access to: 

•  building sites, production workshops, storage areas;  

•  where appropriate, prefabrication or testing facilities; and  

•  more generally, to all premises which it considers necessary for its task.  

In addition, the Notified Body may pay unexpected visits to the worksite or to the production 
workshops of the manufacturer/relevant applicant. At the time of such visits the Notified Body 
may conduct complete or partial audits.  

EN 

67 

   EN 

 
The Notified Body must be independent of the applicants and ensure the independence of the 
staff responsible for the checks. 

NoBos organization and operation in the EU Member States 

According to the ERA Interoperability Report 2011, the total number of Notified Bodies as of 1 
January 2010 was 49, an increase of 4.3% compared with the situation on 1 January 2009.  

Figure III-2: Number of Notified Bodies under Directive 2008/57/EC by Member State 

Source: ERA Interoperability Report, 2011 

NoBos  are  not  present  in  all  of  the  relevant  EU  Member  States.  As  of  1st  January  2010,  18 
Member  States  and  Norway  have  established  at  least  one  Notified  Body.  With  a  total  of  11 
established Notified Bodies, the UK takes the lead in the EU, followed by The Netherlands and 
Slovenia with five and four notified bodies respectively.  

As  discussed  in  the  Interoperability  Report,  competition  between  the  Notified  Bodies  is  on  a 
regional  rather  than  a  European  scale,  as  language  is  a  key  asset  to  the  business.  The  few 
examples of competition are present only in those countries which use the same language. For 
example both Belgian and French Notified Bodies have successful contracts with French and 
Belgium companies respectively in both Member States.  

Of the 49 Notified Bodies across the Member States, 42 operate under both the High Speed and 
Conventional  Directives,  one  only  under  the  High  Speed  Directive,  and  six  only  under  the 
Conventional Network legislation.  

The number of Notified Bodies competent to carry out conformity assessment against the PRM 
TSI and TSI relating to Safety in Tunnels appears to be relatively low, as shown in the figure 
below.  According  to  the  Interoperability  Report,  in  the  last  two  years  only  four  countries, 
Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary and The Netherlands, notified conformity assessment bodies 
with a specific indication of their competence for TSIs PRM and SRT. During the IA support 
study the consultant was informed that, following the publication of the Interoperability Report, 
a further NoBo for these aspects has been authorised in France. The number of Notified Bodies 
competent for TSIs PRM and SRT is expected to increase considerably with the re-notification 
of the Notified Bodies required by Directive 2008/57/EC. 

EN 

68 

   EN 

 
 
Figure III-3: Number of Notified Bodies under Directive 2008/57/EC by subsystem/TSI 

Source: ERA Interoperability Report, 2011 

The  case  studies  undertaken  have  provided  a  more  detailed  picture  of  the  organisation  and 
operation of Notified Bodies. 

In  Germany,  the  tasks  of  the  Notified  Body  (NoBo)  are  carried  out  by  EISENBAHN-CERT 
(EBC).  EBC  is  an  autonomous  organisation  under  public  law  and  acts  as  a  financially  and 
legally  independent  department  of  the  EBA.  The  main  tasks  of  EBC  are  to  assess  the 
conformity  or  suitability  for  use  of  the  interoperability  constituents  and  to  carry  out  EC-
verification of subsystems. The close connection between the German NoBo and the NSA does 
not  ensure  a  smooth  authorisation  process.  Some  stakeholders  expressed  concern  that  on 
occasions  the  documents  that  have  been  provided  by  the  German  NoBo  have  not  been 
automatically  accepted  by  the  NSA  and  they  have  been  rechecked  leading  to  an  increase  in 
costs and timescales for authorisations.  

French Notified Bodies have been recognized as having a good technical knowledge but some 
stakeholders  have  had  some  difficulties  with  their  work.  In  the  UK,  stakeholders  pointed  out 
that  the  pricing  by  some  NoBos  for  the  same  work  can  be  highly  variable,  perhaps  on  the 
grounds of available capacity at the time. 

One  stakeholder  claimed  that  some  Notified  Bodies  try  to  avoid  their  obligations  and  reduce 
prices in order to win calls for tenders or just to simplify processes for their usual customers 
from whom they are not truly independent. As a result, the quality of work of some NoBos has 
been  questioned  by  NSAs,  and  the  validity  of  their  certificates  is  not  recognised.  As  a 
consequence  the  NSAs  require  repeat  verifications,  contrary  to  Article  11  &  16  of  Directive 
2008/57/EC. 

EN 

69 

   EN 

 
 
ANNEX IV 
NATIONAL RAILWAY RULES  

The railways across Europe have developed as islands over the past century with each Member 
State  choosing  to  adopt  their  own  national  standards  (or  in  some  cases  multiple,  competing, 
national standards) with little thought for the effects of integration across borders. These rules 
act as a barrier for the growth of the rail sector in terms of: 

•  Availability of rolling stock that can cross borders; and 

•  Getting vehicles and equipment authorised to operate in a number of Member States. 

National rules can be divided into National Technical Rules (NTRs) and National Safety Rules 
(NSRs).  The  Agency  is  currently  facilitating  the  process  of  notification  of  NTRs  by  the  MS 
with the ultimate goal of removing the majority, if not all, NTRs. However, the process is slow 
with substantive progress restricted to a subset of NTRs. Given this, it is difficult to obtain a 
clear picture of what NTRs exist in different Member States, let alone understand which ones 
are  no  longer  relevant  and  can  therefore  be  removed.  There  is  also  a  substantial  number  of 
NSRs. There is a more advanced process  in  place for  the notification  of  national safety rules 
(relative to NTRs) and a NSR task force is currently working on further progress in this area.  

1. 

Scope of national technical and safety rules 

National technical rules  

NTRs are covered by (i.e. will be replaced by) TSIs except where there is non-TSI conforming 
rolling stock and non-TSI conforming infrastructure. The complete scope of national technical 
rules  is  illustrated  in  the  figure  below  with  more  detail  illustrated  for  those  rules  relevant  to 
vehicle authorisation. The key categories of technical rules are design rules (i.e. rules covering 
structural  sub-systems),  maintenance  rules  (i.e.  functional  sub-system  maintenance)  and 
operating rules (i.e. functional sub-system operations). 

Within each of these categories there are rules for networks and vehicles and a further division 
into rules that have been superseded by TSIs and national rules that are required whilst non-TSI 
compliant rolling stock and non-TSI compliant networks are in place. 

EN 

70 

   EN 

 
Figure IV-1: National technical rules schematic 

National Technical Rules

Design Rules

Vehicle design 
rules for 
conformity with 
non-TSI compliant 
infrastructure

Network design 
rules for 
conformity with 
non-TSI compliant 
vehicles

All other Vehicle 
design rules

All other Network 
design rules

Operating Rules

Maintenance Rules

Key

Rules relevant to vehicle authorisation

National safety rules 

Safety Rules are covered by Annex 2 of Directive 2004/49/EC (and subsequent amendments), 
with some overlap of technical and safety rules in the operational rules area. 

2. 

Current number of national rules (both explicit and implicit) 

National technical rules 

ERA has calculated that there are approximately 320 parameters required to describe all aspects 
to be checked for vehicle authorisation  based  on TSIs  and NTRs currently in place. Of these 
320 parameters, approximately 120 relate to network compatibility. Using this as a basis (i.e. 
that there is a rule for each parameter) it is possible to calculate the number of vehicle technical 
rules  and  network  technical  rules  relevant  to  the  movement  and  operation  of  trains,  both 
explicit  and  implicit.  There  is  no  clear  picture  available  for  the  number  of  maintenance  and 
operational rules. 

National safety rules  

The majority of NSRs have been notified and therefore there is a reasonable understanding of 
the quantity of rules notified as national safety rules. Due to variations in understanding, it is 
likely that not all of these rules actually qualify as NSRs and that some may not be legitimate, 
if, for example, they prohibit free movement of goods and services. In  addition, many  of  the 
NSRs notified by Member States are actually Safety Management System (SMS) rules. 

The Agency has expressed the view that the majority of the 1,200 NSRs that have been notified 
are actually SMS rules and therefore can be removed. However, there are no robust estimates 
available of the size of the residual. 

The number of NTRs and NSRs in each category where information is available is set out in 
the table below. 

EN 

71 

   EN 

 
 
 
Table IV-1: Total number of national rules 

Category of rules 

Safety rules  

Number of rules 

1,200 

Vehicle design technical rules – to be covered in future by 
TSI (when scope is extended) 

7500 (300 x 25) 

Vehicle design technical rules to be covered in future by 
TSI (currently open points) 

2000 (80 open points x 25) 

Vehicle design technical rules – non-TSI required for 
compatibility with non-TSI conform networks 

Network design technical rules (relevant for vehicle-
network interface) 

3000 (120 x 25) 

3000 (120 x 25) 

Total National Rules currently quantified 

11,700 

Technical operational rules 

Technical rules for Maintenance 

400 (very high level estimate provided by 
Agency) 

400 (very high level estimate provided by 
Agency) 

Other Network rules 

Unknown 

3. 

National Rule Datasets and the process of transparency and elimination 

The  current  status  of  information  that  is  available  at  the  EU  level  on  national  rules  is  as 
follows: 

•  The  DG  Enterprise  and  Industry  TRIS  database  contains  draft  product  rules 
captured under the Directive 98/34 procedure. This should have been used to notify 
draft national technical rules for design. At the moment it contains a small portion 
of national rules. 

•  The  NOTIF-IT  database  held  by  DG  MOVE  contains  most  national  safety  rules 
(largely complete for 20 out of 25 Member States). Virtually no national technical 
rules are currently notified in this database. 

•  The Agency holds National reference documents which contain all national vehicle 
design  rules  for  all  Member  States  (except  Germany,  which  is  expected  very 
shortly). 

4. 

Timescales for removal of national rules 

Based  on  the  current  interoperability  and  safety  legislation,  the  Agency  has  been  internally 
considering the process for removal of unnecessary national rules in parallel with this report. 
This  meant  that  whilst  a  formally  documented  process  for  removal  did  not  exist  in  time  to 
support the analysis of this IA, the process and timescales for removal of national rules have 
been discussed with the Agency.  

The requirements for the complete removal of NTRs are: 

•  All  TSIs  are  complete  (all  open  points  closed  and  Member  State  specific  points 

removed) 

•  TSIs implemented in all MSs for all lines (extension of scope) 

•  All railway networks and vehicles conform to TSIs. 

EN 

72 

   EN 

 
 
The  removal  process  for  NSRs  is  more  advanced  than  for  NTRs  with  the  majority  of 
notification having already taken place as already noted. However, identification of appropriate 
extent of NSRs still needs to be determined and the NSR taskforce is still in process. Therefore, 
for NSRs some clean-up of rules will be required in the future. The envisaged process for the 
removal of all unnecessary national rules is illustrated in figures below; it should be noted that 
smooth cooperation with Member States would be indispensable. 

EN 

73 

   EN 

 
Figure IV-2: Process for removing national technical rules 

National technical rules removal strategy

Parallel activities impacting NRs

Stage 1: Identify subjects 
and technical parameters 
for which national rules are 
required

Stage 3: Rules notified and 
published in NOTIF-IT

Stage 2: 
Member 
States ‘clean 
up’ national 
rules by 
removal and 
re-drafting to 
ensure rules 
only cover 
scope 
identified in 
Stage 1

Stage 4: Agency/ Commission evaluate 
remaining rules and validate

Stage 5: Only rules for subjects and technical 
parameters identified in Stage 1 remain and 
only for non-TSI conforming vehicles and routes 
– objective reached

Cross 
Acceptance 
work

Extension 
of scope

Removal 
of open 
points

Agency 
produces 
technical 
opinions as 
requested 
on dubious 
national 
rules

Non-TSI 
conforming 
vehicles 
and 
networks 
replaced

Timeline
2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2025

Figure IV-3: Process for removing national safety rules 

National safety rules removal strategy

Stage 1: Rules 
notified and 

published in NOTIF   IT 

Stage 2: Identify 
subjects and 
technical parameters 
for which national 
rules are required

Stage 4: Agency/ 
Commission evaluate 
remaining rules and 
validate

Stage 3: Member 
States ‘clean up’ 
national rules by 
removal and re-
drafting to ensure 
rules only cover 
scope identified in 
Stage 1

Stage 5: Only rules for subjects and technical parameters identified in Stage 1 remain      - objective 
reached

Agency 
produces 
technical 
opinions as 
requested 
on dubious 
national 
rules 

Timeline 
2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2025 

EN 

74 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX V 
CONSULTATION OF STAKEHOLDERS 

1. 

List of stakeholders consulted  

The following organisations/persons have been consulted: 

•  Representative  bodies  at  the  European  level  (referred  to  in  Article  3of  the  ERA 
Regulation)  representing:  the  manufacturing  companies,  the  railway  undertakings  (the 
operators),  the  infrastructure  managers,  the  wagons  owners/keepers,  the  freight 
(Autonome  Lokomotivführer-
customers,  and  workers  and  passengers:  ALE 
Gewerkschaften  Europa),  CER  (Community  of  European  Railways  and  Infrastructure 
Companies), EIM (European Infrastructure Managers), EPTTOLA (European Passengers 
Train  and  Traction  Operating  Lessors'  Association),  ERFA  (European  Rail  Freight 
Association),  ETF  (European  Transport  Workers'  Federation),  UIP  (International  Union 
of  Private  Wagons),  UIRR  (International  Union  of  Combined  Road-Rail  Transport 
Companies), UITP (International Association of Public Transport), UNIFE (Union of the 
European Railway Industries); additionally, the International Union of Railways (UIC) 

•  National railway authorities: National Safety Authorities, Notified Bodies and Regulatory 

Bodies 

•  Member States: responsible Ministries and members of Administrative Board of ERA 

•  Selection of Members of the TRAN Committee of the European Parliament 

•  The European Railway Agency 

2. 

Coverage of consultation 

Size 

The on-line survey request was sent to a total of 119 individual institutions; 68 responses were 
received which represents a 57% response rate and is comparable with previous studies of this 
nature.  In  addition  to  this  a  further  10  written  responses  from  stakeholders  who  preferred  to 
respond in writing to the survey rather than complete the survey on-line were received.  

Type of respondent 

The  largest  stakeholder  group  was  the  NSAs  closely  followed  Member  State  representatives 
and railway undertakings. 

EN 

75 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure V-1: Breakdown of respondents by stakeholder group 

Other and unspecified

8

Regulatory Body

4

Notified Body

1

Representative Body

Member State Representative

National Safety Authority

Infrastructure Manager

7

Supplier of Rail Equipment and Systems

2

Railway Undertaking

12

16

9

9

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Figure V-2: Relative share of different responses 

Member States covered 

The following figure represents the breakdown of respondents to the survey by Member State. 
The UK is the MS that shows higher representation, with 7 respondents, followed by Germany, 
France, Poland and EU-wide organisations (4 respondents each).  

EN 

76 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure V-3: Breakdown of respondents by Member State 

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Note: The “other” category groups all MS with a single respondent, i.e. (Estonia, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Norway, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus) 

3. 

Main findings from the consultation 

Figure V-4: Discrimination from National Safety Authorities 

EN 

77 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Figure V-5: Existence of divergent interpretation of EU legislation  

Figure V-6: Relevance of problem elements 

There is insufficient independence of the Notified Bodies from
infrastructure managers, incumbent rail undertakings, the ministry or other
actors

There is insufficient independence of the NSAs from infrastructure
managers, incumbent rail undertakings and/or the ministry

National technical and safety rules sometimes pose transparency and/or
discrimination problems for new entrants

There is insufficient independence of the Regulatory Bodies from
infrastructure managers, incumbent rail undertakings and/or the ministry

Some Notified Bodies lack sufficient financial or human resources to
effectively perform their tasks

The level of monitoring and control of implementation of the
interoperability and safety legislation by Member States is not sufficient

The granting of safety certificates to rail operators by the NSAs and the
authorisation of placing into service of rail systems and vehicles is too slow

There is an insufficient level of dissemination of railway-related
information and training within the EU and between EU member states

Some NSAs are reluctant to accept safety certificates or authorisations for
the placing in service of railway vehicles and subsystems granted by other
NSAs

There is a lack of sufficient financial or human resources in the case of
some NSAs to effectively perform their tasks

Some Regulatory Bodies lack sufficient financial or human resources to
effectively perform their tasks

-100% -80% -60% -40% -20%

0%

20% 40% 60% 80%

< AGREE  - percentage of those expressing a view  - DISAGREE  >

EN 

78 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure V-7: Lack of financial and human resources of national bodies: overview of stakeholder 
responses 

No opinion/ 
missing
18%

Disagree
3%

Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
16%

Agree
63%

No 
opinion/mis
sing
31%

Agree
53%

Disagree
6%

Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
10%

No opinion/ 
missing
37%

Agree
34%

Disagree
12%

Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
17%

National Safety Authorities 

Notified Bodies 

Regulatory Bodies 

Figure V-8: Insufficient independence of national bodies: overview of stakeholder responses 

No opinion/ 
missing
13%

Disagree
32%

Agree
43%

Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
12%

No opinion/ 
missing
23%

Agree
40%

Disagree
25%

Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
12%

No 
opinion/ 
missing
31%

Agree
16%

Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
18%

Disagree
35%

National Safety Authorities 

Notified Bodies 

Regulatory Bodies 

EN 

79 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure V-9: Member States mentioned during the stakeholder consultation as regards 
existence of different problem elements 

EN 

80 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
EN 

81 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX VI 
SCREENING OF INDIVIDUAL MEASURES 

The most appropriate measures have been chosen in the process, which involved the following 
steps: 

•  Initially exclude those measures that have received a negative response from stakeholders, 

that are not implementable or that can be/are being covered by other EU legislation; 

•  Add any additional measures that were not foreseen in the survey, but that have been 

identified as result of stakeholder feedback; and  

•  Combine any measures that would be more appropriately considered collectively. 

These steps are described in more detail below. 

1. 

Stakeholder responses for individual measures 

The  replies  of  stakeholders  served  as  a  basis  for  exclusion  of  certain  measures  that  received  a 
negative opinion.  

Table VI-2: Stakeholder responses for individual measures 

Measure 

Enhanced role of ERA in certification through the setting of an appropriate framework and developing the 
single European railway certificate. 

Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NSAs regarding the granting of 
authorisations of placing into service. 

Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to Notified Bodies regarding type 
approval and rail vehicle certification. 

Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to Notified Bodies regarding type 
approval and ERTMS certification. 

Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to Regulatory Bodies (depending on 
developments in the rail recast. 

Control by ERA over the functioning of NSAs (for example by developing guidelines and auditing 
adherence to them. 

ERA takes over the competences of the NSAs regarding granting of certificates to the railway 
undertakings 

ERA takes over the competences of the NSAs regarding granting of authorisations of placing into service 
of rail vehicles and other sub-systems 

ERA takes over the competences of the Notified Bodies regarding checking the conformity with the TSIs 
of the rail sub-systems (including ERTMS equipment) 

ERA takes over the competences of the Regulatory Bodies regarding supervision over infrastructure 
managers, in particular as far as cross-border traffic is concerned (subject to the discussion on the recast of 
the first railway package) 

ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of certificates to the railway undertakings 
(a "one stop shop" for safety certificates") 

Score 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

- 

++ 

- 

- 

-- 

-- 

0 

EN 

82 

   EN

 
ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of authorisations of placing into service of 
rail vehicles and other sub-systems (a "one stop shop" for interoperability authorisations): an application is 
sent to ERA, relevant NSAs are consulted, ERA takes the decision 

ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of the NSAs relating to placing into service 

ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of the NSAs relating to safety certification 

ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of the Notified Bodies 

ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of the Regulatory Bodies 

Strengthened action by the Commission outside infringement procedures, notably on non-discrimination in 
the railway market 

Change of the railway directive into regulations 

Amendment of the railway directives to enable the adoption by the Commission of implementing measures 
setting out common principles and practices for the national authorities 

Enhanced role of ERA in monitoring and control of implementation of national safety and interoperability 
legislation  

Enhanced role of ERA in migration from national technical & safety rules to a system of EU rules 

Enhanced role of ERA in dissemination of railway-related information and training 

Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice and support for Member States and other stakeholders in 
implementing EU legislation on safety and interoperability 

Enhanced role of an EU body in providing advice in building capacities in Member States to design, 
implement and manage relevant investment projects 

Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice and support for Member States and other stakeholders in 
deploying and operating telematics applications 

Communication from the Commission regarding guidelines on the interpretation of specific EU laws and 
decisions (including Technical Specifications for Interoperability) 

Enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential spare parts to be standardised and coordination of industry 
activities in this area 

Modify the directive with a view to limit/remove the possibility for MS to adopt new national rules 

Setting up European passport for locomotives (this passport would contain a summary of the main 
technical parameters - it would facilitate route acceptance through comparison with the infrastructure 
register) 

0 

+ 
++ 
+ 
- 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

0 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

0 

Note: ++ indicates more than 60% of respondents gave positive view, + indicates more than 
50% gave a positive view, -- more than 60% gave a negative view, - more than 50% gave a 
negative  view,  0  denotes  where  there  was  no  outright  majority.  Shaded  rows  indicate  new 
measures that were inserted or split into multiple questions in the survey. 

2. 

Criteria for initial qualitative assessment 

Subsequently, the measures underwent a qualitative review/assessment in the following way: 

Table VI-3: Qualitative evaluation criteria 

Criteria 

Description 

Effectiveness 

What impact does each measure have on the three specific objectives? 

EN 

83 

   EN

 
• 

• 

• 

Increase the efficiency of the safety certification, vehicle authorisation and 
access granting processes; 

Ensure non-discrimination in the granting and recognition of safety 
certificates, interoperability authorisations and in the granting of access to the 
rail network and services across the EU; and 

Increase the coherence of the national legal frameworks, notably related to the 
safety and interoperability aspects of the internal market for railways  

Classified as High/Medium/Low/None. If all three objectives get “None” then that 
measure is excluded. 

Time to full 
effectiveness 

What are the timescales for the achievement of the three specific objectives set out 
above?  

Classified as Short/Medium/Long/Very long – the last of these leads to an automatic 
exclusion 

Impact on national 
institutions 

What is the impact on national institutions within the rail sector?  
Classified as High/Medium/Low/None 

Consistency with the 
national framework 

Are there significant issues of subsidiarity or proportionality?  

Classified as Yes/No – A ‘No’ answer excludes the measure 

The table below presents the initial qualitative evaluation of measures. 

EN 

84 

   EN

 
 
Table VI-4: Results of qualitative evaluation 

S
E
R
U
S
A
E
M

2.1.1

2.1.2

2.1.3

2.1.4

2.1.5

2.1.6

2.2.1

2.2.2

2.2.3

Description of Option

Enhanced role of ERA in certification through the setting of an appropriate framework & 

developing the single European railway certificate.

Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NSAs regarding the 

granting of authorisations of placing into service.

Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NoBos regarding type 

approval and rail vehicle certification.

Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to Notified Bodies 

regarding type approval and ERTMS certification.

Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to Regulatory Bodies 

(depending on developments in the rail recast).

Control by ERA over the functioning of NSAs (for example by developing guidelines and 

auditing adherence to them).

ERA takes over the competences of the NSAs regarding granting of certificates to the railway 

undertakings.

ERA takes over the competences of the NSAs regarding granting of authorisations of placing 

into service of rail vehicles and other sub-systems.

ERA takes over the competences of the Notified Bodies regarding checking the conformity 

with the TSIs of the rail sub-systems (including ERTMS equipment).

ERA takes over the competences of the Regulatory Bodies regarding supervision over 

Effectiveness

n
o
i
t
a
s
i
r
o
h
t
u
a

e
l
c
i
h
e
v
&
n
o
i
t
a
c
i
f
i
t
r
e
c

y
t
e
f
a
s

f
o
y
c
n
e
i
c
i
f
f
e

e
s
a
e
r
c
n
I

e
h
t

n
i

n
o
i
t
a
n
i
m

i
r
c
s
i
d
-
n
o
n

e
r
u
s
n
E

&
s
e
t
a
c
i
f
i
t
r
e
c

y
t
e
f
a
s

f
o

g
n
i
t
n
a
r
g

y
t
i
l
i
b
a
r
e
p
o
r
e
t
n
i

l
a
g
e
l

l
a
n
o
i
t
a
n

f
o

e
c
n
e
r
e
h
o
c

e
s
a
e
r
c
n
I

k
r
o
w
e
m
a
r
f

s
s
n
e
v
i
t
c
e
f
f
e

l
l

u
f
o
t

e
m
T

i

?
d
e
d
u

l
c
n
i

e
b

e
r
u
s
a
e
m
e
h
t

d
l

u
o
h
S

s
n
o
i
t
u
t
i
t
s
n
i

l
a
n
o
i
t
a
n

n
o

t
c
e
f
f
E

HIGH

LOW

NONE

SHORT

LOW

YES

LOW

LOW

LOW

SHORT

LOW

YES

LOW

LOW

LOW

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

YES

LOW

LOW

LOW

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

YES

NONE

NONE

NONE

SHORT

HIGH

NO

LOW

LOW

LOW

SHORT

MEDIUM

YES

HIGH

HIGH

NONE

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

YES

HIGH

HIGH

NONE

LONG

HIGH

YES

HIGH

HIGH

NONE

LONG

HIGH

YES

2.2.4

infrastructure managers, in particular as far as cross-border traffic is concerned (subject to 

NONE

NONE

NONE

LONG

HIGH

NO

2.2.5

2.2.6

2.3

3.1

3.2

3.3

4.1.1

4.1.2

4.2

4.3

4.4

4.5

4.6

4.7

4.8

4.9

the discussion on the recast of the first railway package).

ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of certificates to the railway 

undertakings (a "one stop shop" for safety certificates").

ERA shares the competences with the NSAs regarding granting of authorisations of placing 

into service of rail vehicles & other sub-systems (a "one stop shop" for interoperability 

authorisations):  application  sent to ERA, relevant NSAs are consulted, ERA takes  decision.

ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of the national authorities.

Strengthened action by the Commission in implementing the legislation.

Change of the railway directive into regulations.

Amendment of the railway directives to enable the adoption by the Commission of 

MEDIUM MEDIUM

LOW

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

YES

MEDIUM MEDIUM

LOW

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

YES

HIGH

HIGH

MEDIUM MEDIUM

MEDIUM MEDIUM

NONE

LOW

HIGH

SHORT

SHORT

LOW

LOW

MEDIUM

HIGH

YES

YES

YES

implementing measures setting out common principles and practices for the national 

MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM

LOW

YES

authorities.

Enhanced role of ERA in monitoring & control of implementation of national safety and 

interoperability legislation 

Enhanced role of ERA in migrating from national technical and safety rules to a system of EU 

rule.

LOW

LOW

MEDIUM

SHORT

MEDIUM

YES

HIGH

HIGH

MEDIUM

LONG

HIGH

YES

Enhanced role of ERA in dissemination of railway-related information and training.

LOW

NONE

NONE

SHORT

LOW

YES

Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice and support for Member States and other 

stakeholders in implementing EU legislation on safety and interoperability.

Enhanced role of an EU body in providing advice in building capacities in Member States to 

design, implement and manage relevant investment projects.

Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice and support for Member States and other 

stakeholders in deploying and operating telematic applications.

Communication from the Commission regarding guidelines on the interpretation of specific EU 

laws and decisions (including Technical Specifications for Interoperability).

Enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential spare parts to be standardised and coordination 

of industry activities in this area.

Modify the Directive with a view to limit/remove the possibility for MS to adopt new national 

rules

Setting up European passport for locomotives (this passport would contain a summary of the 

LOW

MEDIUM

HIGH

SHORT

MEDIUM

YES

NONE

NONE

NONE

SHORT

LOW

NO

NONE

NONE

NONE

SHORT

LOW

NO

MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM

SHORT

MEDIUM

YES

MEDIUM MEDIUM

LOW

SHORT

LOW

YES

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

YES

main technical parameters it would facilitate route acceptance through comparison with the 

HIGH

MEDIUM

LOW

LONG

MEDIUM

YES

infrastructure register)

4.10 Enhanced "coordination" and supervision role in the accreditation of NoBos

MEDIUM MEDIUM

LOW

MEDIUM

LOW

YES

EN 

85 

   EN

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 

Selection of the measures 

The following measures were, inter alia, dropped: 

•  Measures  related  to  Regulatory  Bodies:  although  the  operation  of  Regulatory  Bodies  was 
confirmed as a problem by the stakeholders, the measures that related to a greater role for the 
Agency  in  the  areas  of  capacity  allocation  and  regulatory  activities  received  a  negative 
evaluation. Another reason was the approaching agreement on the Recast of the First Railway 
Package  where  the  role,  activities  and  independence  of  the  Regulatory  Bodies  are  being 
addressed,  which  will  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  sector  and  the  problems  raised  by 
stakeholders should be addressed. 

•  Measures related to the Agency taking over all activities of the NoBos: this received a negative 
evaluation by the stakeholders. In addition, it would be difficult to justify the Agency taking 
over all the activities of bodies which are, to a large extent, operating on a competitive market 
and  where  part  of  them  is  private.  The  problems  identified  in  relation  to  NoBos  can  be 
addressed  by  greater  monitoring  and  coordination  by  the  Agency  which  is  more  appropriate 
from the proportionality perspective. 

•  Measure considering changing railway directives into regulations: the Commission concluded 
that this measure is not consistent with the principle of proportionality. While the effects of the 
problems with vehicle authorisation and safety certification are important, they are only a part 
of  the  overall  railway  legislative  environment.  Changing  both  Interoperability  and  Safety 
Directives just to address these problem areas seems excessive and may result in a substantial, 
one-off, administrative burden that could cancel out some of the benefits of having Regulations 
and therefore call into question the efficiency of the measure. Moreover, the political process 
of  adopting  them  would  be  much  longer  and  cumbersome,  with  Member  States  in  strong 
opposition.  Finally,  it  was  assessed  that  other  measures  will  address  the  problems  related  to 
vehicle  authorisation  and  safety  certification  (as  well  as  the  role  of  national  rules)  in  a 
sufficiently efficient and timely manner. 

The final set of measures is provided in the main text, Table 5-1: Summary of policy options. 

EN 

86 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX VII 
ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS – METHODOLOGICAL ELEMENTS 

1. 

Current costs and timescales of certification and authorisation 

The assessment of impacts has allowed for considerable disaggregating of authorisation inputs to 
capture the wide spread of costs and timescales that arise from the authorisation of different types 
of vehicles in different contexts. The different authorisation categories together with the average 
assumed costs and timescales are set out in the table below. 

Table VII-1: Authorisation categories used in the assessment 

Authorisation Category 

Average cost 
(000€s) 

Average timescale 
(months/Type) 

New locomotive type authorisation (1st country) 

New wagon type authorisation (1st country) 

New Multiple Unit type authorisation (1st country) 

New Coach type authorisation (1st country) 

New locomotive type authorisation (additional country) 

New wagon type authorisation (additional country) 

New Multiple Unit type authorisation (additional country) 

New Coach type authorisation (additional country) 

Locomotive type re-authorisation without ERTMS (1st 
country) 

Locomotive type re-authorisation with ERTMS (1st country) 

Number of wagon type re-authorisations (1st country) 

Multiple Unit type re-authorisation without ERTMS (1st 
country) 

Multiple Unit type re-authorisation with ERTMS (1st country) 

Coach type re-authorisation (1st country) 

Locomotive type re-authorisation without ERTMS (additional 
country) 

Locomotive type re-authorisation with ERTMS (additional 
country) 

Number of wagon type re-authorisations (additional country) 

Multiple Unit type re-authorisation without signalling 
(additional country) 

Multiple Unit type re-authorisation with ERTMS (additional 
country) 

Coach type re-authorisation (additional country) 

6,000 

100 

600 

100 

916 

0 

120 

0 

750 

1,500 

100 

600 

6,000 

100 

0 

750 

0 

0 

2,000 

0 

24 

2 

24 

24 

11 

0 

7 

0 

12 

12 

1 

24 

27 

24 

0 

8 

0 

0 

6 

0 

Note: zero values relate to where there no reauthorisation is necessary. 

A  risk  with  the  data  used  is  the  incentive  for  data  providers  to  share  data  on  their  worst-case 
experiences whilst not providing data from authorisation examples where the process has worked 

EN 

87 

   EN 

 
 
better. Therefore the available data has been used with caution and in one particular example the 
raw  data  have  been  adjusted  to  reflect  the  impact  of  exceptional  circumstances  unlikely  to  be 
repeated  for  the  majority  of  authorisations  in the  relevant  category.  However,  it  is  impossible  to 
completely  eliminate  this  possible  bias  and  this  should  be  borne  in  mind  when  interpreting  the 
results. 

Certification cost and timescale inputs require less disaggregating since scope for variation other 
than  between  country  and  passenger  and  freight  RUs  is  limited  (leaving  aside  discriminatory 
practices against non-incumbents). The different certification categories together with the average 
assumed costs and timescales are set out the table below. It should be noted that the data available 
for safety certification costs is very limited. Data on fees is available at a country level for some 
countries, but fees are excluded in this analysis since they are captured in the calculation costs of 
administration discussed below. Likewise, data on timescales is available but the majority of data 
reflects only NSA response times and does not include RU/IM preparation time. As such, the cost 
impacts calculated for the options primarily reflect the faster implementation of the single safety 
certificate  reducing  the  costs  of  additional  country  authorisation  and  the  reduction  of  costs  in 
Germany where there is evidence of a particularly long certification process. Calculated reductions 
in  timescales  reflect  improvements  in  NSA  response  times  and  do  not  capture  additional  time 
savings on RU/IM preparation times. 

Table VII-2: Certification categories in the assessment of impacts 

Certification Category 

Average cost (000€s) 

Average timescale 

Safety Certification (1st Country) – Freight 

Safety Certification (additional Country) – Freight 

Safety Certification (1st Country) – Passenger 

Safety Certification (additional Country) – Passenger 

21 

20 

20 

24 

2. 

Future levels of authorisation and certification 

(months) 

5 

5 

5 

6 

EN 

88 

   EN 

 
 
The  total  number  of  vehicle  authorisations  for  each  vehicle  category  that  has  been  used  for  the 
baseline position, are shown in the figure below.  

Figure VII-1: Base year Authorisations (2007/2008 adjusted) 

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

New

Existing

New

Existing

New

Existing

New

Existing

Wagons

Locomotives

Coaches

Multiple Units

•  The breakdown by authorisation category is the table below.  

Table VII-3: Base Year number of authorisations used for calculations 

Vehicle Category 

Wagons 

Locomotives 

Coaches 

Multiple Units 

New 
Country) 

(1st 

New 
(additional 
country) 

Re-
authorisation 
(1st country) 

Re-
authorisation 
(additional 
country) 

8,190  

40  

340  

50  

01  

390  

03  

460  

11,600  

1,760  

2,090  

1,410  

02  

60  

04  

50  

(cid:131) 

1,2,3,4 Data on authorisation numbers did not distinguish between first and additional authorisations and therefore  some 
assumptions have been made as to the proportions of each. It has been assumed that there will be zero wagon and coach 
additional authorisations. In practice there will be a small number but at with the data available zero was the most appropriate 
(and robust) assumption. 

•  The base year for authorisation numbers is 2008. The reasons for this are: 

•  The  period  2009-2011  has  seen  very  atypical  patterns  of  authorisation  due  to  the  severe 
economic downturn experienced during this period. For example the Agency estimated in the 
Cross-Acceptance report on vehicle authorisation that the number of vehicle authorisations in 
2009 dropped nearly 10% compared to 2008. 

•  More recent data at the disaggregated level available in the Cross-Acceptance report on vehicle 

authorisation is not readily available. 

3. 

Type size reduction 

A  key  issue  for  the  number  of  type  authorisations  is  the  number  of  vehicles  per  type.  It  can  be 
anticipated  over  time  that  market  consolidation  and  market  changes  induced  by  the  TSIs  will 

EN 

89 

   EN 

 
 
reduce the number of vehicle types on the market. This is consistent with the Agency’s analysis of 
the impacts of TSI scope extension. 

The estimates quoted in the Cross-Acceptance report on vehicle authorisation from  UNIFE have 
been used to derive the evolution of type size over the period 2007/2008 – 2025 for locomotives 
and multiple units. For wagons and coaches it has been  assumed that type  size for  new vehicles 
reaches that of existing vehicles by 2015 and remains constant thereafter. The assumed type size 
changes are shown in the table below. 

Table VII-4: Type size changes assumed in the assessment 

Vehicle Category 

New Wagons 

Existing Wagons 

New Locomotives 

Existing Locomotives 

New Coaches 

Existing Coaches 

New Multiple Units 

Existing Multiple Units 

105 

148 

5 

13 

22 

22 

16 

35 

Type Size 

2007/2008 

2025 

148 

148 

32 

13 

22 

22 

87 

35 

4 

Forecast authorisation and certification costs (baseline)  

The forecast evolution of total authorisation costs in the baseline scenario between 2012 and 2025 
is shown in the table below. This shows that in the baseline, even without major extensions of the 
Agency’s  role,  total  authorisation  costs  are  anticipated  to  fall  by  over  a  third  by  2020  as  Cross-
Acceptance,  reduction  of  National  Rules,  TSI  scope  extension  and  other  measures  impact 
authorisation costs. The total level of authorisation costs does however, demonstrate the scope for 
cost savings with estimated total authorisation costs  of over a quarter of a billion euros  in  2012. 
The increase in authorisation costs post 2020 is caused by growth in ERTMS deployment creating 
a  higher  volume  of  (expensive)  ERTMS  related  vehicle  authorisations.  This  is  an  area  of 
considerable uncertainty in the total level of authorisation costs but the impact on the incremental 
option benefits is small. 

The  main  external  reference  point  for  the  quantitative  outputs  in  this  study  is  the  Agency’s 
evaluation of the benefits of TSI Scope extension. A direct comparison of absolute authorisation 
costs  is  difficult  since  the  Agency’s  analysis  (which  deals  solely  with  locomotives)  includes  an 
estimate  of  the  economic  costs  of  locomotives  stored  in  sidings  as  well  as  the  direct  costs  of 
vehicle authorisation. However, what can be ascertained is that, whilst the Agency has estimated 
an  approximate  50%  reduction  in  authorisation  costs  (including  economic  costs  of  locomotives 
stored  in  sidings)  by  2020.  For  the  IA  calculation  a  more  cautious  view  was  taken,  estimating  a 
reduction of around a third by 2020. 

EN 

90 

   EN 

 
 
Figure VII-2: Forecast Authorisation costs all vehicle types 2012-2025 (real, undiscounted) 

Coaches

Wagons

Multiple Units

Locomotives

 300

 250

 200

m
€

 150

 100

 50

 -

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

The forecast evolution of average authorisation timescales in the baseline scenario between 2012 
and  2025  is  shown  in  the  figure  below.  Consistent  with  the  reduction  in  costs  a  reduction  in 
timescales is forecast although not as large as the proportional reduction in costs. 

Figure VII-3: Forecast authorisation timescales 2012-2025 

Locomotives

Multiple Units

Wagons

Coaches

 30

 25

 20

e
p
y
T
/
 15
s
h
t
n
o
M

 10

 5

 -

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

In the baseline certification costs and timescales are forecast to remain virtually constant with little 
improvement as illustrated in the figure below. 

EN 

91 

   EN 

 
  
 
  
 
Figure VII-4: Forecast Certification costs 2012-2025 (real, undiscounted) 

 3,500

 3,000

 2,500

s
0
0
0
€

 2,000

 1,500

 1,000

 500

 -

Certification costs

Certification timescales

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

s
h
t
n
o
M

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

Impact on costs and timescales of authorisation and certification of the different 

5. 
options 

Explanation on the assumptions is given in Section 6. The minimum costs and timescales used are 
set out in the tables below. These are based on the range of costs and timescales assessed as part of 
the study.  

Table VII-5: Minimum possible costs of authorisation (€000) 

Vehicle 
Category 

New 
Country) 

(1st 

(additional 

New 
country) 

Re-authorisation 
(1st country) 

Re-authorisation 
(additional 
country) 

Wagons 

100 

Locomotives 

5,000 

Coaches 

100 

Multiple Units 

480 

n/a1 

500 

100 

200 

100 

n/a 

375 
ERTMS) 
(with ERTMS) 

(without 
750 

n/a 
ERTMS) 
(with ERTMS) 

(without 
500 

100 

n/a 

480 
ERTMS) 
(with ERTMS) 

(without 
4,800 

n/a 
ERTMS) 
(with ERTMS) 

(without 
2,000 

1 Note that where costs are ‘n/a’ this reflects the assumption that there are no authorisations (at least at a significant level) for this 
authorisation category. 

EN 

92 

   EN 

 
 
 
Table VII-6 Minimum possible timescales of authorisation (months/type) 

Vehicle 
Category 

Wagons 

Locomotives 

Coaches 

Multiple Units 

New 
Country) 

(1st 

(additional 

New 
country) 

Re-authorisation 
(1st country) 

Re-authorisation 
(additional 
country) 

1 

18 

18 

18 

n/a1 

6 

 n/a 

12 

1 

n/a 

(without 
6 
ERTMS)  8  (with 
ERTMS) 

(without 
n/a 
ERTMS)  8  (with 
ERTMS) 

18 

 n/a 

18 
(without 
ERTMS)  20  (with 
ERTMS) 

n/a 
(without 
ERTMS)  6  (with 
ERTMS) 

1 Note that where timescales are ‘n/a’ this reflects the assumption that there are no authorisations (at least at a significant level) for this 
authorisation category. 

Table VII-7: Minimum possible costs of certification (€000) 

Market 

1st Country 

Passenger 

Freight 

18 

18 

Additional 
country 

0 

0 

Table VII-8: Minimum possible timescales of certification (months/type) 

Vehicle 
Category 

Wagons 

Locomotives 

1st Country 

Additional 
country 

3 

3 

0 

0 

It should be noted that a particular issue is the treatment of Germany where there currently exists a 
fundamental conflict between German and EU law. It has been assumed that this is cancelled out 
through  a  positive  outcome  (for  the  Commission)  of  the  infringement  proceedings  currently  in 
process and hence a portion of the benefits from reduction of authorisation costs and timescales are 
included in the baseline. 

Calculating the impact of options on authorisation costs and timescales  

Calculation  of  impacts  of  options  on  authorisation  costs  and  timescales  is  fundamental  to  the 
impact assessment. However, whilst the consultant acquired data from a number of sources for a 
number of countries as to the costs and timescales of authorisation which indicates the size of the 
difference between efficient and non-efficient authorisation, there is no data that directly tells how 
far  any  given  option  will  reduce  the  cost  and  timescales  towards  the  most  efficient  level  of 
authorisation.  

To  increase  the  robustness  of  the  estimates  the  possible  impacts  of  measures  were  assessed  as 
systematically as possible based on the following criteria:  

Authorisation  

i) 

Does the measure address issues specific to a particular vehicle type?  

EN 

93 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
ii) 

Is the measure relevant for both 1st authorisation and additional authorisation?  

iii)  Which elements of the authorisation process does the measure impact?  

iv)  What other measures are interrelated?  

v)  What are the timescales for implementation of the measure?  

vi)  What are the timescales for the impact of the measure once implemented?  

vii)  Will the impact be different in different countries?  

Certification  

i) 

ii) 

Does the measure address issues specific to freight or passenger Railway Undertakings?  

Is the measure relevant for both 1st certification and additional certification?  

iii)  Which elements of the certification process does the measure impact?  

iv)  What other measures are interrelated?  

v)  What are the timescales for implementation of the measure?  

vi)  What are the timescales for the impact of the measure once implemented?  

vii)  Will the impact be different in different countries?  

Based  on  these  questions  it  has  been  identified  what  is  the  likely  scope  of  impacts,  which 
authorisation  and  certification  categories  are  likely  to  be  impacted  most  significantly,  the 
timescales  over  which  impacts  will  arise  and  whether  impacts  are  likely  to  differ  significantly 
between countries. Measures have been categorised as having a low, medium or high effect where 
a low effect corresponds to a reduction of the gap between current average authorisation costs and 
‘perfect’ authorisation costs of between 0 and 5%, medium 5-15% and high, greater than 15%.  

Once each measure was assessed an overall assessment at option level was carried out to translate 
reductions  in  costs  and  timescales  into  monetary  values.  This  amalgamated  the  impacts  at  an 
option level, applying adjustments to avoid double-counting of impacts when measures were added 
together.  Each  option  has  been  assessed  as  having  a  low,  medium  or  high  effect  where  low 
corresponds  to  a  reduction  of  the  gap  between  current  average  authorisation  costs  and  ‘perfect’ 
authorisation costs of between 0-20%, medium with an impact of 20-50% and high with an impact 
of 50-100%.  

It  should  be  noted  that  the  qualitative  assessment  of  options  2  to  6  has  been  carried  out  on  an 
incremental  basis  relative  to  the  baseline.  This  means,  for  example,  that  whilst  the  baseline  has 
been assessed overall as having a medium impact, option 2 has a low to medium impact. This does 
not  mean  that  option  2  is  worse  performing  than  the  baseline,  rather  that  the  incremental 
improvement in option 2 compared to the baseline is relatively small. The baseline is assessed as 
medium  impact  since  it  represents  a  substantial  reduction  in  authorisation  costs  and  timescales 
compared to the current position.  

Results of assessment of each option are provided below. 

EN 

94 

   EN 

 
Table VII-9: Impact analysis of baseline factors 

Factor 

Key impact characteristics (as prompted by question 
list) 

Impacts should be felt across authorisation categories. 
Impact will be most significant in ‘challenging’ 
countries 

The entering into force of these additional TSIs will 
increase the burden of applicable TSIs. In the short term 
this has the potential to further slow the authorisation 
process 

Measure in 
place 

Likely phasing of 
main impact 

Impact 
magnitude 
(low/ 
medium/high) 

Medium 

2011 

2011-2014 

Low 

2011 

2011-2018 

The elimination of open points should have a significant 
impact on authorisation over time but is a lengthy 
process 

Medium 

Benefits 
already 
being felt 

2011-2020 

Impacts should be felt across authorisation categories. 
Effects limited to countries where there is evidence of 
plans for improved staffing in the future (e.g. Italy and 
Poland) 

Low 
(geographically 
limited 

2013 

2013-2014 

High 

This primarily benefits additional authorisation costs 
and is likely to be particularly significant for 
locomotive and multiple unit authorisations since these 
are the vehicle types for which the number of Cross-
Acceptance agreements currently is most limited. 
Impacts are highly related to the number of open points. 
Tidy up of national rules will also impact 1st country 
authorisations. 

2011-2018 

Benefits 
already 
beginning 
to be felt 

DV29 is 
commonly 
followed 

Entering into 
force of CR RST 
and LOC&PAS 
TSIs 

Progressive 
elimination of 
open points 

Improved staffing 
levels at NSAs 

Cross-Acceptance 
& tidy up of 
national rules 

TSI scope 
extension 

TSI scope extension will reduce the need to assess 
vehicles against national rules over time and also 
encourage migration to TSI compliant networks and 
vehicles 

High 

2014 

Improved ‘self-
regulation’ 

Impacts likely to be patchy given dependence on self-
enforcement 

Low 

Some 
measures 
already in 
place  

2014-2017 main 
effect 

2017-onwards 
continuing effect 

On-going 

Medium 

2011 

2011-2025 

Complete 
Baseline 

The Baseline encompasses a wide range of impacts, a 
number of which (e.g. work on national rules) are 
likely to have a significant effect on authorisation 
costs and timescales. It is estimated that by 2025 the 
measures in place will close the gap between average 
authorisation costs and minimum achievable 
authorisation costs by over 30%. The impact on 
certification costs is however, much smaller with no 
significant initiatives to reduce certification costs. 

EN 

95 

   EN 

 
 
 
Table VII-10: Impact analysis of option 2 measures 

Measure 

Key impact characteristics (as prompted 
by question list 

Impact magnitude 
(low/ medium/high) 

Measure 
in place 

Likely phasing 
of main impact 

Enhanced “coordination” and 
supervision role of ERA with 
respect to NSAs 
regarding granting vehicle of 
authorisations and safety 
certificates, including ensuring 
their mutual recognition by 
national authorities. 

This is a general measure affecting all 
authorisations and certifications. 

Ensuring mutual recognition of safety 
certificates should have a high impact. 

Significant benefits from mutual recognition 
of vehicle authorisation not likely to be 
realised without implementation of other 
measures. 

Enhanced “coordination” and 
supervision role of ERA with 
respect to Notified Bodies 
regarding: type approval; rail 
vehicles certification; ERTMS 
certification and accreditation 
of NoBos. 

This is likely to particularly impact 
additional authorisations by giving 
additional countries confidence in NoBo 
outputs. 

Will also particularly impact vehicle 
authorisations involving ERTMS sub-
systems 

Low (authorisations 
and 1st country 
certification) 

High (additional 
country 
certification) 

2017 

2017-2025 

2020-2025 
(mutual 
recognition of 
authorisations) 

Medium 

2017 

2017-2020 

Control by ERA over the 
functioning of NSAs (for 
example by developing 
guidelines and auditing 
adherence to them). 

Complete Option 

This is a general measure affecting all 
authorisations and certifications 

Low 

2017 

2017-2022 

The impact of this option is relatively low 
with additional powers of the Agency 
limited. Main impact is on additional 
authorisations. 

Low 

2017 

2017-2022 

EN 

96 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VII-11: Impact Analysis of option 3 measures 

Measure 

Key impact characteristics (as 
prompted by question list 

Migration to a single (common) safety 
certificate: national authorities issue single 
safety certificates (mutually recognised by 
definition) 

The key impact of the single safety 
certificate is the eventual removal of 
the need for additional Part B 
authorisations. 

Impact 
magnitude 
(low/ 
medium/high) 

Measure 
in place 

Likely 
phasing of 
main 
impact 

High 

2017 

2017-2021 

ERA shares the competences with the 
NSAs regarding granting of safety 
certificates to the railway undertakings and 
vehicle authorisations placing into service 
(a "one stop shop" for safety certificates 
and vehicle authorisation concept): the 
decision  is taken by the NSA, ERA 
performs "entry and exit" checks of the 
application and of the decision. 

ERA as an appeal body for some decisions 
of NSAs 

Enhanced “coordination” and supervision 
role of ERA with respect to NoBos 
regarding: type approval; rail vehicles 
certification; ERTMS certification & 
accreditation of NoBos. 

Control by ERA over the functioning of 
NSAs (e.g. by developing 
guidelines & auditing adherence to them). 

Migration to a single vehicle authorisation 
(setting up European "passport" for 
vehicles): national authorities issue single 
vehicle authorisations (mutually 
recognised by definition) 

Complete Option 

This is a general measure affecting all 
authorisations and certifications 

Medium 

2017 

2017-2021 

Medium 

2017 

2017-2019 

Medium 

2017 

2017-2020 

Low 

2017 

2017-2022 

Low 

2020 

2020-2025 

Low/Medium 

2017 

2017-2022 

Likely to impact all authorisations & 
certifications. Assume that prospect of 
appeal has immediate effect on NSA 
behaviour. However, impact is likely 
to decrease with reduction in open 
points and national rules. 

This is likely to particularly impact 
additional authorisations by giving 
additional countries confidence in 
NoBo outputs. 

Will also particularly impact vehicle  
authorisations involving ERTMS sub-
systems 

This is a general measure affecting all 
authorisations and certifications 

Impacts should be felt across all 
authorisation categories but mainly 
additional authorisations. Full benefits 
not likely to be realised without 
implementation of other measures e.g. 
improved infrastructure registers. 

Whilst ERA has more powers in 
this option primarily through 
measure on safety certificate it is 
likely that additional benefits over 
option 2 will be limited with 
division of labour between NSAs 
and the Agency being an issue. 

EN 

97 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Table VII-12: Impact analysis of option 4 measures 

Measure 

Key impact characteristics (as 
prompted by question list 

This is a general measure affecting all 
authorisations and certifications. 

ERA shares the competences with the 
NSAs regarding granting of safety 
certificates to RUs & vehicle 
authorisations to applicants: a "one stop 
shop" concept with the NSAs (acting as 
regional offices of ERA) contributing in 
the process but the final decision rests 
with ERA.  

Impact 
magnitude 
(low/ 
medium/high) 

Measure in 
place 

Likely 
phasing of 
main 
impact 

High 

2017 

2017-2022 

Migration  to  a  single  (common)  safety 
certificate:  ERA  issues  single  safety 
certificates 

The key impact of the single safety 
certificate is the eventual removal of the 
need for additional Part B authorisations. 

High 

2018 

2018-2023 

Enhanced “coordination” and 
supervision role of ERA with respect to 
NoBos regarding: type approval; rail 
vehicles certification; ERTMS 
certification and accreditation of NoBos. 

Migration to a single vehicle 
authorisation (setting up European 
"passport" for vehicles): ERA issues 
single vehicle authorisations 

Complete Option 

This is likely to particularly impact 
additional authorisations by giving 
additional countries confidence in NoBo 
outputs. 

Will also particularly impact vehicle 
authorisations involving ERTMS sub-
systems 

Impacts should be felt across all 
authorisation categories but mainly 
additional authorisations. Full benefits not 
likely to be realised without 
implementation of other measures e.g. 
improved infrastructure registers. 

Provided ERA has sufficient powers to 
act as a strong central office this option 
is likely to have a significant impact on 
authorisation and certification costs and 
timescales. 

Medium 

2017 

2017-2020 

Medium 

2020  

2020-2025 

Medium/High 

2017 

2017-2023 

EN 

98 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Table VII-13: Impact analysis of option 5 measures 

Measure 

Key impact characteristics (as 
prompted by question list 

ERA takes over the 
competences of the NSAs 
regarding granting of 
certificates to RUs & vehicle 
authorisations 

Migration to a single (common) 
safety  certificate:  ERA  issues 
single safety certificates 

This is a general measure 
affecting all authorisations and 
certifications. 

The key impact of the single 
safety certificate is the eventual 
removal of the need for 
additional Part B authorisations. 

Enhanced “coordination” and 
supervision role of ERA with 
respect to Notified Bodies 
regarding: type approval; rail 
vehicles certification; ERTMS 
certification and accreditation 
of NoBos. 

This is likely to particularly 
impact additional authorisations 
by giving additional countries 
confidence in NoBo outputs. 
Will also particularly impact 
vehicle authorisations involving 
ERTMS sub-systems 

Migration to a single vehicle 
authorisation (setting up 
European "passport" for 
vehicles): ERA issues single 
vehicle authorisations 

Complete Option 

Impacts should be felt across all 
authorisation categories but 
mainly additional 
authorisations. Full benefits not 
likely to be realised without 
implementation of other 
measures e.g. improved 
infrastructure registers.  

This option would have a high 
impact on authorisation costs 
and timescales and would also 
enable additional efficiencies 
over the current 
arrangements through 
economies of scale. 

Impact 
magnitude 
(low/ 
medium/high) 

Measure 
in place 

Likely 
phasing of 
main 
impact 

High 

2017 

2017-2023 

Measure will 
take some 
time to bed 
in 

High 

2017 

2017-2022 

Medium 

2017 

2017-2020 

Medium 

2020  

2020-2025 

High 

2017 

2017-2023 

EN 

99 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Table VII-14: Impact analysis of option 6 measures 

Measure 

Key impact characteristics (as prompted 
by question list 

3.1: Strengthened action by the 
Commission in implementing the 
legislation 

This will impact all authorisations and 
certifications. Impact will be greatest in 
‘challenging’ countries.  

Amendment of the railway 
directives to enable the adoption by 
the Commission of implementing 
measures setting out common 
principles & practices for the 
national authorities 

Impacts should be felt across all 
authorisation and certification categories. 
Impact will be most significant in 
‘challenging’ countries 

Enhanced role of ERA in 
monitoring & control of 
implementation of national safety & 
interoperability legislation 

Impacts should be felt across all 
authorisation and certification categories. 
Impact will be most significant in 
‘challenging’ countries. 

Migrating from national technical & 
safety rules to EU rules through 
clear indication of what national 
rules need to be removed by 
national authorities with the 
national authorities tasked with the 
role of removing them. Also modify 
the directive with a view to 
limit/remove the possibility for MS 
to adopt new national rules 

Impacts should be felt across all 
authorisation categories although particularly 
for additional authorisations. 

It has been assumed that this measure does 
have an impact on the number of national 
rules 

 in existence at the end of the evaluation 
period, not just a speeding up of the process 
of removal. 

Measure 
in place 

Likely phasing 
of main impact 

Impact 
magnitude 
(low/ 
medium/high) 

Medium 

2015 

2015-2018 

Medium 

2017 

2017-2022 

Low 

2016 

2016-2018 

Medium 

2015 

2015-2020 

Enhanced role of ERA in 
dissemination of railway-related 
information and training. 

Enhanced role of ERA in providing 
advice and support for Member 
States and other stakeholders in 
implementing EU legislation on 
safety & interoperability 

Impacts should be felt across all 
authorisation and certification categories.  

Low 

2015 

2015-2017 

Impacts should be felt across all 
authorisation and certification categories. 

Medium 

2015 

2015-2018 

Communication from the 
Commission regarding guidelines 
on the interpretation of specific EU 
laws & decisions (including TSIs) 

Impacts should be felt across all 
authorisation and certification categories. 
Impact will be most significant in 
‘challenging’ countries. 

Enhanced role of ERA in 
identifying potential spare parts to 
be standardised and coordination of 
industry activities in this area 

Impact of spare parts component evaluated 
qualitatively – see Maintenance costs 
indicator.  

Medium 

2015 

2016-2018 

Low 

2016 

2016-2025 

Medium 

2015 

2015-2025 

Complete Option 

This option contains some measures that 
can be implemented relatively quickly and 
as such has an earlier benefit than any 
other option. However, most of the 
measures have a medium or low impact 
and therefore the overall impact is similar 
to options 2 and 3. 

6. 

Horizontal measures impacts matrix 

EN 

100 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Individual  measures  included  in  option  6,  when  combined  with  options  2-5,  will  have  different 
effect. The matrix shows the extent of differentiation of horizontal measures' impact on options 2 
to  5.  Where  the  impact  is  the  same  for  the  combined  option  as  for  the  stand-alone  horizontal 
option,  this  is  denoted  by  ‘100%’.  Where  it  is  less,  a  correspondingly  smaller  percentage  is 
included. The key feature is that a number of horizontal measures have a smaller impact in options 
4  and  5  since  the  core  measures  for  these  options  negate  the  need  for  some  of  the  horizontal 
measures.  Option  level  adjustments  have  also  been  included  to  keep  the  combined  effects  to  a 
feasible level (i.e. reduction of gap between average and ‘perfect’ authorisation/certification cannot 
be more than 100%).   

Table VII-15:  Horizontal measures impacts matrix 

Horizontal option measure 

Option 

A 

B 

C 

D 

E 

F 

G 

H 

Option 2 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

Option 3 

100% 

100%  

75% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

75% 

100% 

50% (additional 
country 
certification)  

Option 4 

25% 

50% 

50% 

100% 

100% 

75% 

50% 

100% 

Option 5 

0% 

0% 

25% 

100% 

75% 

50% 

25% 

100% 

A.  Strengthened action by the Commission in implementing the legislation; 
B.  Amendment of the railway directives to enable the adoption by the Commission of implementing 

measures setting out common principles and practices for the national authorities; 

C.  Enhanced  role  of  ERA  in  monitoring  &  control  of  implementation  of  national  safety  and 

interoperability legislation; 

D.  Enhanced  role  of  ERA  in  migrating  from  national  technical  and  safety  rules  to  a  system  of  EU 

rules; 

E.  Enhanced role of ERA in dissemination of railway-related information and training; 
F.  Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice and support for Member States and other stakeholders 

in implementing EU legislation on safety and interoperability; 

G.  Communication  from  the  Commission  regarding  guidelines  on  the  interpretation  of  specific  EU 

laws and decisions (including Technical Specifications for Interoperability); 

H. Enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential spare parts to be standardised and coordination of 

industry activities in this area. 

Note: percentages reflect the relative impact of measures when combined with options 2-5 compared to   impact in 
option 6. I.e. if impact of measure in option 6 is 10% and percentage in table is 50% this implies a 5% impact. 

7. 

Standardisation of fees 

Within the analysis of the cost of administration it was investigated how potential revenues could 
vary for the institutions involved in the different options and to what extent the extra calls to EU 
budget  could  be  covered.  The  input  data  for  this  analysis  has  been  the  total  number  of  safety 
certificates issued and vehicle authorisations granted in recent years, the average fees for these two 
activities and how the fee revenues would be shared between the Agency and NSAs. 

To facilitate this analysis a standardisation of the fees was assumed in different Member States for 
all the cumulative options (2 to 5) above the baseline, which has been set equal to €10k per safety 
certificate  and  €17k  per  vehicle  authorisation.  This  implies  a  reduction  in  the  fees  per  safety 
certificate collected by EU15 NSAs (from an average of €20k to €10k) and an increase in those 
raised by EU12 NSAs (from an average of €3k to €10k)

. It also implies a reduction in the fees per 

EN 

101 

   EN 

 
 
 
vehicle authorisation collected by EU15 NSAs (from an average of €28k to €17k) and an increase 
in those raised by EU12 NSAs (from an average of €11k to €17k). The variation in fee revenues 
for NSAs and the Agency in options 2 to 5 is set out in the table below.  

Table VII-16: Impacts of options on NSAs and agency revenues (€ m) 

Option 

Revenue 
sharing 
criteria 

NSAs Revenue Increase 
(Decrease) – NPV  
across the EU   (2015-
2025) 

Agency Revenue 
Increase (Decrease) 
– NPV   (2015-
2025) 

Net change in 
revenues 
(NSAs + 
ERA) - NPV 

Option 2: Further ERA 
“Coordination” 

100% NSAs 

Option 3: ERA as One-Stop-
Shop 

100% NSAs 

(29.42) 

(29.42) 

- 

- 

(29.42) 

(29.42) 

Option 4: ERA & NSAs share 
competencies 

Option 5: ERA takes over 
activities of NSAs regarding 
authorisation & certification 

a.  

25% NSAs 

75% ERA 

b. 

50% NSAs 

50% ERA 

c. 

75% NSAs 

25% ERA 

100% ERA 

(85.84) 

56.43 

(29.42) 

(67.04) 

37.62 

(29.42) 

(48.23) 

18.81 

(29.42) 

(104.65) 

75.23 

(29.42) 

In case of option 4 the total amount of potential revenues was distributed between NSAs and ERA 
with the criteria (percentages) of different revenue sharing scenarios. 

8. 

Opportunity cost savings from reduced authorisation timescales  

There  will  be  a  number  of  savings  arising  directly  from  shorter  rolling  stock  authorisation 
timescales. These include:  

• 

• 

• 

reduction in operating costs accrued as a result of needing to cover delayed stock with 
alternative stock; 
reduction in loss of revenue where the introduction of new services is delayed/existing 
services are cut back where rolling stock is not available to cover for delayed stock; 
reduced storage costs. 

Whilst the impacts are significant, quantification is challenging. For example, the balance of cost 
savings  versus  reductions  in  lost  revenue  is  highly  dependent  on  the  precise  nature  of  services 
involved.  Further,  the  magnitude  of  cost  savings  and  reductions  in  revenue  loss  will  also  be 
dependent  on  a  number  of  other  factors.  For  example,  an  incumbent  might  be  able  to  cover 
affected  services  with  existing  rolling  stock  and  therefore  only  incur  storage  costs,  but  a  new 
entrant might forgo significant revenue if it is unable to obtain covering rolling stock.  

Therefore  three  scenarios  were  developed  to  construct  an  assessment  of  the  possible  range  of 

opportunity cost savings. The scenarios are:  

EN 

102 

   EN 

 
 
i)  All affected services are covered by alternative rolling stock (lower bound)  

ii)  Half  of  affected  freight  services  and  half  of  affected  passenger  services  are  not  able  to  run 

with resultant revenue loss (central case)  

iii) 

None of the affected services are able to run (upper bound). 

The key parameters for assumptions were:  

•  Cost of alternative rolling stock is assumed to be cost of leasing additional rolling stock. 
For locomotives a value of approx. €30k per mo nth has been used and for multiple unit 
vehicles, €15k. Both these values are approxi mately 1% of typical average new vehicle 
values. 

•  Using UIC data, average revenue per loco and passenger vehicle have been calculated as a 
percentage of new vehicle value. For locomotives this is 3.8% on a monthly basis and for 
passenger vehicles 1.9% on a monthly basis. 

Using these parameters together with the current value of delayed rolling stock in sidings derived 
from data collected by the Agency it has been possible to construct estimates of the savings arising 
from  reduced  authorisation  timescales.  It  has  been  assumed  that  reductions  in  authorisation 
timescales  are  reflected  one  for  one  in  reductions  in  average  delays.  Reductions  in  certification 
timescales  have  not  been  included  in  the  delay  reduction  since  evidence  suggests  it  is  vehicle 
authorisation that is the primary binding constraint.  

Average reductions in authorisation timescales by option are shown in Figure VII-5.  

Figure VII-5: Average reduction in authorisation timescales by combined options  

The  analysis  only  covers  locomotives  and  multiple  units  since  the  Agency  has  stated  that  its 
studies show that coaches and wagons usually achieve their due dates and they only have data for 
locomotives  and  multiple  units.  In  addition,  costs  of  storage  are  not  incorporated  since  available 
data suggests that these costs are relatively small compared to the costs of leasing stock or forgone 
revenue.  

EN 

103 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Table VII-17 shows the discounted opportunity cost savings that could be achieved over the period 
2015  –  2025.  The  inclusion  of  the  three  different  scenarios  illustrates  the  large  degree  of 
uncertainty but suggests that savings could be at least €100m for option 5. Figure  VII-6 illustrating 
savings  by  year  for  the  central  case  further  shows  that  savings  per  option  are  between  €30  and 
€40m per year by the end of  the evaluation period.  

Table VII-17: discounted opportunity cost savings 2015-2025 (€ m) 

Option  

Option 2: Further ERA “Coordination”  

Option 3: ERA as One-Stop-Shop  

Option 4: ERA and NSAs share competences  

Option 5: ERA takes over activities of NSAs regarding authorisation and 
certification  

Central 
Case  

Lower 
bound  

Upper 
bound  

237  

255  

265  

295  

71  

77  

81  

90  

402  

433  

450  

499  

Figure VII-6: Total opportunity cost savings 2015-2025 with horizontal measures ((€ m, central case, real, 
undiscounted)  

9.  Calculations of the impacts on the cost of administration for the ERA and national 

authorities 

Introduction  

The policy options considered have a significant impact on the cost of administration of EU and 
national institutions and, as such, need to be investigated in detail. This analysis has been carried 
out on the basis that some of proposed measures entail a variation in the staff needed by ERA to 
perform  additional  tasks,  and,  in  some  cases,  possible  reductions  of  staff  at  NSAs  due  to 
competences transferred at central level.  

The aim of this analysis is to assess the difference in the cost of administration determined by the 
implementation  of  the  selected  policy  options  against  a  baseline  scenario  in  which  none  of  the 

EN 

104 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
measures are adopted. Although it is acknowledged that in the actual baseline scenario there could 
be  administrative  cost  variations  over  time  (e.g.  due  by  NSAs  or  ERA  staff  growth  for  better 
implementation of current rules), in this analysis the aim was to point out the difference in costs 
between adopting the policy options or doing nothing. The only assumption regarding the baseline 
scenario which differs from the present situation is the fact that the different fees currently applied 
by the NSAs for the release of the safety certificate, were assumed to converge toward a single fee 
whose value is fixed across the EU.  

For each Policy Option, impacts were disaggregated in order to identify variations in costs on each 
specific stakeholder groupings, i.e.:  

• 

the Agency (and the Commission particularly in relation to the Horizontal Measures); and  

•  national institutions (in particular NSAs).  

For the purpose of this analysis, all costs are indexed to a base year of 2012 and are computed in 
real terms over the period 2012-2025 using as indicator the Net Present Value at 4% discount rate, 
which is consistent with the assumption made for the IA model presented above.  

For the different options the net administrative cost has been estimated by computing:  

• 

• 

the  variation  in  gross  administrative  costs  at  Community  level  (namely  variation  in  ERA 
costs, in the "separate appeal body" to be created in Options 4 and 5 and in the Commission 
staff), at national level (variation in NSAs costs) and at the EU level (sum of variation in 
ERA and NSAs costs); and  
the variation of potential revenues collected by levying charges for the activities carried out 
by the NSAs and ERA in relation to the release of safety certificates.  

Assumptions 

The following inputs have been used for the estimation of the cost of administration:  

Agency costs:  

•  Variation  of  number  of  staff  in  the  different  options:  estimated  on  the  basis  of  the 
assessment of the individual measures included in each option; see Table VII-18 below. In 
addition, the estimated total variation in staff members was distributed across years to take 
into account the fact that the recruitment process needs a number of years to be finalised (it 
was assumed that by 2020 all staff member variation have occurred).  

•  Gross  cost  of  Agency  staff  members:  estimated  on  the  basis  of  the  average  staff  cost 
indicated by the Agency, i.e. €100k. This value  was converted into a range of costs varying 
with staff number increase in line with expected lower average cost of staff where larger 
numbers  of  staff  are  required  (as  more  junior  staff  will  be  required  when  numbers 
increase).  

•  Overhead costs: computed at 25% of staff costs.  
•  Other costs: values estimated on a case by case basis looking at individual measures. These 
costs  include,  for  example,  travelling  costs  to  attend  conferences,  outsourcing  costs  for 
evaluation studies/technical support.  

The work already undertaken to date by the Agency in relation to its future role has informed this 
assessment but the approach used to these calculations differs from those used by the Agency as 
the  synergies  have  been  identified  through  the  implementation  of  different  measures  within  a 
single “option” package.  

EN 

105 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Table VII-18: Summary of policy options with relevant number of staff attributed to each measure 

Option 1 

Baseline 

Option 2: Further ERA 
“Coordination” over NSAs 

Enhanced “coordination” and 
supervision role of ERA with 
respect to NSAs regarding 
granting of vehicle 
authorisations & safety 
certificates including ensuring 
their mutual recognition by 
national authorities. (13) 

Option 3: ERA as One-Stop-Shop 

ERA shares the competences with the NSAs 
regarding granting of safety certificates to the 
railway undertakings and vehicle authorisations 
("one stop shop" concept): the decision is taken by 
NSA, ERA performs "entry and exit" checks of the 
application. (15) 

ERA as an appeal body for some decisions of 
NSAs (3) 

Migration to a single (common) safety certificate 
and single vehicle authorisation (setting up 
European "passport" for vehicles): national 
authorities issue single safety certificates & single 
vehicle authorisations (mutually recognised by 
definition) 

Option 5: ERA takes over activities of NSAs  

ERA takes over the competences of the NSAs 
regarding granting of certificates to the railway 
undertakings and vehicle authorisations. (275) 

Option 4: ERA & NSAs share 
competencies 

ERA shares the competences with 
the NSAs regarding granting of 
safety certificates & vehicle 
authorisations: a "one stop shop" 
concept with the NSAs (acting as 
regional offices of ERA) 
contributing but the final decision 
rests with ERA. (30) 

Migration  to  a  single  (common)  safety  certificate  and  single  vehicle  authorisation 
(setting up European "passport" for vehicles): ERA issues single safety certificates and 
single vehicle authorisations 
(Appeals to ERA decisions are sent to a separate appeal body)  

Control by ERA over the functioning of NSAs (e.g. developing guidelines & auditing adherence to them). (4) 

Enhanced “coordination” and supervision role of ERA with respect to NoBos regarding: type approval; rail vehicles certification; ERTMS certification and accreditation of 
NoBos. (3) 

Strengthened action by the Commission outside infringement procedure, notably on non-discrimination in the railway market (1 EC) 

Amendment of the interoperability and safety directives to enable the adoption of implementing acts setting out common principles & practices for national authorities (1 EC) 

Enhanced role of ERA in monitoring and control of implementation of national safety and interoperability legislation (6) 

Migrating from national technical & safety rules to a system of EU rules (requirement for national authorities to remove unnecessary rules and limiting their possibility of 
adopting new rules). (9) 

Enhanced role of ERA in dissemination of railway-related information and training. (5) 

Enhanced role of ERA in providing advice & support for Member States & other stakeholders in implementing legislation on safety & interoperability (3) 

Option 6: 
horizontal 
measures 
(independent 
of the level of 
interaction 
ERA/national 
authorities) 

Communication from the Commission regarding guidelines on the interpretation of specific EU laws & decisions (including TSIs) 

Enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential spare parts to be standardised and coordination of industry activities in this area (2) 

EN 

106 

EN 

 
  
NSAs costs:  

•  Variation  of  number  of  staff  in  the  different  options:  for  each  option  at  first  an  average 
variation in NSAs staff members in the EU was estimated, taking into account the current 
structure of NSAs in the EU, which have different size and tasks. Aggregated variations in 
EU 12 and EU 15 MS were then computed, taking into account that only 25 out of the 27 
MS currently have railway infrastructure and related institutions. In addition, as was done 
for the Agency, the estimated total variation in staff members were distributed across years 
assuming in any case that by 2020 all staff member variations have occurred.  

•  Gross cost of NSA staff members: estimated on the basis of the average staff cost resulting 
for EU 12 and EU 15 MS from the case studies undertaken. It was  also assumed that there 
is no growth for EU 15 MS salaries over the period of analysis, while a 7% yearly growth 
rate for EU 12 salaries was used to close the existing gap with EU 15 ones.  

•  Overhead costs: computed at 25% of staff costs as for the Agency.  
•  Other costs: no cost additions were considered for NSAs.  

Safety certificate revenues and cost coverage:  

•  Number of safety certificates: the numbers of forecasted safety certificates issued yearly in 
the EU in the 2015-2025 period was used (calculations explained above). Data have been 
disaggregated by EU 12 and EU 15 MS.  

•  Safety  certificate  fees:  average  current  fees  have  been  estimated  on  the  basis  of  the  data 
collected during the stakeholder consultation (a fee of €20k fo r EU 15 MS and €3 k for EU 
12 MS). Future fees have been set equal to €  10k across all the EU to take into account of a 
standardisation of payments and procedures.  

•  Revenue  sharing:  different  criteria  for  sharing  revenues  between  the  Agency  and  NSAs 
have  been  identified  for  the  different  options  analysed  on  the  basis  of  the  various 
contribution given by these institutions to this process. In the case of options 2 and 3 safety 
certificate revenues have been entirely assigned to NSAs (as in the current situation); in the 
case  of  option  4,  different  hypotheses  have  been  made  to  test  the  impacts  of  the 
consequences of changing the distribution of revenues between ERA and NSAs, i.e.: option 
4.a  where  ERA  keeps  75%  of  revenues  and  NSAs  25%,  option  4.b  where  revenues  are 
equally  split  between  ERA  and  the  NSAs  and  option  4.c  where  ERA  collects  25%  of 
revenues and NSAs 75%.  

•  Distribution  of  Agency  costs  between  safety  and  authorisation  activities:  to  compute  the 
extent  that  the  share  of  safety  certificates  revenues  can  contribute  to  the  coverage  of 
additional Agency’s cost in this area, the amount of additional Agency costs was estimated 
which could be attributable to the issuing of safety certificates. This has been set equal to 
30%  and  50%  of  total  additional  costs  for  the  period  2015-2020  and  2020-2025 
respectively.  The  percentage  is  assumed  to  increase  from  30%  of  2015  to  50%  of  2020 
because the forecasted reduction over time of the work related to type authorisation (due to 
a standardisation of vehicle fleets in the EU).  

EN 

107 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Figure VII-7: Key assumptions for calculations of cost of administration 

10. 

Assessment of indirect impacts 

Quantification of the indirect impacts set has not been carried out for a number of reasons: 

•  Considerable  time  and  effort  has  been  expended  quantifying the direct impacts  on costs 
and  timescales  of  vehicle  authorisation  and  railway  undertaking  safety  certification. 
However,  the  complexity  and  multi-faceted  nature  of  authorisation,  in  particular,  means 
that  precise  estimation  is  not  possible.  Estimation  of  indirect  impacts  would  therefore 
have been built off a base already containing a significant degree of uncertainty. 

•  One of the key links in the chain of causality between direct and indirect impacts is the 
impact  of  changes  in  vehicle  authorisation  costs  and  timescales  on  new  entrant  levels. 

EN 

108 

   EN 

 
 
Whilst there clearly is an impact, authorisation costs are only one component of a large 
set  of  costs  and  barriers  which  will  affect  new  entry  into  the  rail  market  and  any 
quantification of this link would necessarily have been tenuous at best. 

•  Relative  to  authorisation  cost  savings  most  of  the  indirect  impacts  are  anticipated  to  be 

small. 

Therefore the quantification of impacts is restricted to direct impacts only. In this context it is very 
difficult to identify a range of impact with the low/medium/high categorisation due to the level of 
uncertainty.  However,  ‘low’  means  an  impact  hardly  noticeable  even  at  a  country/market  sector 
level, whilst ‘medium’ might be noticed in some countries and market sectors. Only ‘high’ impacts 
would  be  detectable  at  the  EU  level.  Finally,  for  some  categories  impacts  were  assessed  as  zero 
where being so small as to be negligible. 

Table VII-17 below presents the qualitative assessment summary; additional explanations follow. 
It is clear, and is discussed further below, that the global impacts are low across all options due to 
the very technical and sector specific impacts of the provisions within this initiative.  

EN 

109 

   EN 

 
Table VII-19: Qualitative assessment summary 

Impact 

Key indicator(s) 

Magnitude of impact (High/Medium/Low) 

O
p
t
i
o
n

2

O
p
t
i
o
n

3

O
p
t
i
o
n

4

O
p
t
i
o
n

5

O
p
t
i
o
n

6

Effect on freight 
transport demand 

Effect on rail freight 
prices 

Total rail freight tonne km 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Price per tonne km 

Low 

Low 

Medium 

Medium 

Low 

Modal shift (freight) 

Rail freight mode share 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Effect on passenger 
transport demand 

Rail passenger km 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Change in service levels 

Train km 

Low 

Low 

Medium 

Medium 

Low 

Modal shift (passenger) 

Rail passenger mode share 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Effect on operational 
costs (beyond direct 
effects) 

Total industry operational 
costs 

Effect on fares for 
passengers 

Average fares for 
passengers 

Low 

Low 

Medium 

Medium 

Medium 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Effect on rail 
investment 

Total capital expenditure on 
rolling stock 

Low 

Low 

Medium 

Medium 

Low 

Effect on industry 
revenue (beyond direct 
effects) 

Total rail industry revenue 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Effect on public funding 

Total rail subsidy 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Effect on market 
structure 

New entrant market share 

Low 

Low 

Medium 

Medium 

Low 

Effect on employment 
levels and working 
conditions 

Total rail employment 

Average wage 

Effect on GHG emissions 

Total CO2 emissions (tonnes) 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Noise emissions 

Local air quality 

Total noise emissions (in 
dB(A) 

Concentration of 
atmospheric pollutants 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Low 

Rail safety 

Number of fatalities 

Zero 

Zero 

Zero 

Zero 

Zero 

Passenger security 

Number of crimes on rail 
network 

Zero 

Zero 

Zero 

Zero 

Zero 

Maintenance costs 

Total maintenance costs 

Zero 

Zero 

Zero 

Zero 

Global qualitative impact evaluation 

Low 

Low 

Low/ 
Medium 

Low/ 
Medium 

Low 

Low 

Additional explanation of qualitative assessment 

Effect  on  operational  costs:  the  dominant  impact  on  operational  costs  will  be  the  fall  in  vehicle 
authorisation timescales reducing the need to cover services using alternative rolling stock 
(either via lease or sub-contract) whilst waiting for delayed authorisations. This has been 
measured separately as part of the ‘opportunity cost’ indicator. The  other key impact of 

EN 

110 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
improved  vehicle  authorisation  will  be  the  removal  of  a  significant  barrier  to  entry  for 
new  entrants.  It  can  be  anticipated  that  an  increase  in  new  entrants  will  result  in  lower 
average costs in the industry. 

Effect on rail freight prices: Rail freight prices will be impacted through two mechanisms: 

•  Reduction in prices through incumbent freight operators passing through a proportion 

of cost savings from cheaper authorisation to customers 

•  New  entrants  entering  the  market  due  to  lower  authorisation  and  certification  costs 

reducing the barriers to entry 

It is likely that the overall impact on prices will be low or medium at best in all options for three 
reasons: 

1.  Authorisation  changes,  though,  substantial  in  absolute  terms  are  only  one  component  of 

railway undertaking costs 

2.  Since  in  many  cases  a  large  proportion  of  cost  savings  accrue  to  manufacturers  and 
lessors  of  rolling  stock  as  well  as  railway  undertakings  i.e.  another  step  removed  from 
customers  some  of  the  savings  are  likely  to  be taken  in increased  margin  further up the 
supply chain 

3.  The majority of cost savings will still be for incumbent freight operators often operating 

in markets with little competition with low incentives to reduce prices 

Effect on fares for passengers: As for freight prices it is likely that the impact on passenger fares 
will  be  low  for  all  options.  Given  that  the  key  impacts  are  for  locomotives  which 
overwhelmingly affect the freight sector, the impact on passenger fares is likely to be very 
small.  

Change in service levels: Reduced authorisation costs could result in additional new entry into the 
market, stimulating increased service levels and also stimulate an improved service offer 
from incumbent operators. Impacts, however, are likely to be isolated to a limited number 
of specific cases, even in the highest impact options. 

Effect on freight transport demand: Reduced authorisation costs could result in additional freight 
demand through lower prices and improved service offer. However, impact will be very 
small. 

Effect  on  passenger  transport  demand:  Reduced  authorisation  costs  could  result  in  additional 
passenger demand through lower prices and improved service offer. However, impact will 
be very small. 

Modal shift (freight):  A  proportion  of  the  additional  rail  freight  demand  will  be  abstracted  from 
competing  modes  of  freight  transport.  The  key  competitor  mode  for  rail  freight  is  road 
and  therefore  the  majority  of  abstracted  demand  will  be  drawn  from  road  haulage. 
However, with only a very small anticipated increase in rail demand, mode shift will be 
correspondingly very small.  

Modal shift (passenger): A proportion of the additional rail passenger demand will be abstracted 
from  competing  modes  of  passenger  transport.  However,  with  only  a  very  small 
anticipated increase in rail demand, mode shift will be correspondingly very small. 

Effect on rail investment: Most railway investment, particularly at an infrastructure level is funded 
by  public  investment  and  as  such  is  politically  driven  and  likely  to  be  independent  of 
vehicle  authorisation.  There  will  be  some  impact  on  investment  through  faster 
authorisation enabling new investments to be brought forward in some instances although 
this  is  hard  to  quantify.  Also,  both  authorisation  and  opportunity  cost  savings  could  be 
used  to  finance  additional  investment  but  again  this  is  difficult  to  quantify  since  these 

EN 

111 

   EN 

 
savings  could  also  simply  be  used  to  reduce  public  subsidy  requirements.  Finally, 
increased new entry could generate additional investment. However, given the relatively 
small size  of  the combined opportunity  cost  and authorisation  cost savings  compared to 
total  rolling  stock  investment  (<3%  in  central  case)  and  an  uncertain  link  between  cost 
savings and additional investment, effects on investment are not likely to be large. 

Effect on industry revenue: Impact on industry revenue beyond any direct effects captured in the 

opportunity cost indicator will be low, reflecting the small changes in demand. 

Effect  on  non-operational  costs:  The  key  cost  change  other  than  reductions  in  operational  cost 
changes  induced  by  new  entrants  will  be  a  reduction  in  authorisation  costs.  Whilst  the 
changes  are  substantial,  as  a  proportion  of  non-operational  costs  they  will  be  relatively 
low. 

Effect on public funding: The impact on public funding will be composed of two key components: 

•  Change in costs and revenues of publicly funded RUs due to new entrants 

•  Reduction in authorisation costs borne by publicly funded RUs 

Compared to the total level of public funding the effects will be low in all options. 

Effect on market structure: The key impact of improved vehicle authorisation will be the removal 
of a significant barrier to entry for new entrants which will encourage more new entrants 
to the market. This will be most significant in countries where discrimination against new 
entrants is currently an issue. For options 4 and 5 this could have a noticeable impact in 
some countries. 

Effect on employment levels and working conditions: There will be some impact on employment 
levels  where  additional  staff  are  required  to  run  additional  services  that  become  viable. 
However, in some instances it is likely that a portion of authorisation cost savings could 
be reflected in job reductions. Total impacts are hard to quantify but overall impacts are 
likely to be small. 

The  implementation  of  different  policy  measures  would  also  have  effects  on  the  employees  of 
NSAs and NoBos. The numeric terms, however, the effect would be rather limited, with staffing 
variations in the NSAs likely to change between 2 and 10 staff members on average, depending on 
the  policy  option  implemented.  The  effects  on  NoBos  would  be  assumingly  negligible,  as  they 
would be marginally affected by the policy measure in terms of staff requirements. 

Effect on GHG emissions, Noise emissions and Local air quality: Impact on these three indicators 
will be driven by three effects: 

(cid:131)  Increased train service levels 

(cid:131)  Faster introduction of more efficient, quieter locomotives  

(cid:131)  Reduced travel on other modes (primarily road haulage and car use) 

However,  these  effects  will  all  be  small  with  the  most  significant  impact  being  from  the 
introduction of more efficient locomotives. 

Rail safety: Impact on safety standards will be very limited especially since safety standards are 
regulated  by  external  authorities  and  therefore  the  key  driver  of  safety  standards  is  the 
effectiveness of those external bodies rather than the operators themselves. Additionally, 
the basic responsibilities of main actors as regards safety (RU, IM) will not be affected. 

Passenger security: Very limited effect with none of the main drivers directly impacting passenger 
security. 

EN 

112 

   EN 

 
Maintenance Costs: the measure on enhanced role of ERA in identifying potential spare parts to be 
standardised and coordination of industry activities in this area has a potential impact on 
maintenance  costs  by  substantially  reducing  the  cost  of  and  number  of  spare  parts 
required to be maintained.80 

Whilst the potential  savings  from  standardisation are  large it is  not  clear  whether the measure is 
likely to realise a significant portion of these savings. Interested parties (i.e. manufacturers) have a 
strong interest in maintaining the status quo where they retain a position as monopoly supplier for 
many products. Therefore some form of legal requirement (e.g. inclusion of standardised parts in 
TSIs) would be required to achieve significant changes beyond the current voluntary arrangements. 
However, the Agency carried out a study into the interchangeability of spare parts in 201181 which 
suggested  that  TSIs  were  not  the  appropriate  mechanism  with  questions  as  to  the  feasibility  of 
defining interchangeability in a TSI in a manner that was ‘transparent and non-discriminatory’. 

80 

81  

Evidence presented by Deutsche Bahn AG and SNCF to a European Parliamentary Lunch on the 8th February 
2012  highlighted  the  substantial  cost  savings  that  could  be  generated  by  reducing  the  huge  variety  of  non-
standardised  spare  parts  currently  in  existence.  Spare  parts  represent  a  large  cost  to  the  rail  industry  with 
Deutsche Bahn AG and SNCF alone spending up to €500m a year on spare parts, representing up to 30% of 
their entire rolling stock purchase budget. Deutsche Bahn AG estimates that standardisation of the rail wheels 
they use could reduce the number of wheel types they currently stock from 190 to just 15 with an associated 
cost  saving  of  60%  on  their  circa  €50m  annual  wheel  budget.  Wheels  re present  only  one  area  of  potential 
savings with other items for potential standardisation identified by Deutsche Bahn AG and SNCF. In total there 
is  the  potential  to  save  hundreds  of  millions  of  euros  annually  with  the  widespread  standardisation  of  spare 
parts. 
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-
Register/Documents/Report%20on%20study%20on%20interchangeable%20spare%20parts.pdf 

EN 

113 

   EN 

 
                                                 
ANNEX VIII 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREFERRED OPTION  

This annex gives an overview of how the preferred option – combination of options 4 and 6 – is planned 
to  be  implemented,  both  in  terms  of  resources  and  planned  policy  measures.  Individual  measures 
contained  in  these  options  respond  to  the  three  main  administrative  challenges  identified:  safety 
certification,  vehicle  authorisation  and  the  functioning  of  national  railway  regimes  (inefficient  national 
authorities and diverging rules). 

1. Resources required 

As Table 6-5 in Section 6.5.1 shows, implementation of option 4 combined with option 6 will require 55 
additional staff (by 2020). The planned additional personnel would cover the following categories: 

•  Technical experts (45 persons), to deal predominantly with issuing of authorisations for placing on 
the  market  of  vehicles  and  vehicles  types,  authorisations  for  placing  in  service  of  trackside 
control-command and signalling sub-systems and safety certificates; 

•  Linked administrative staff (10), including two accountants to deal with management of a planned 

system of external fees and charges, and accountancy with national authorities; 

Regarding  the  planned  costs  increase,  out  of  the  gross  cost  increase  estimated  at  €6.6  m,  €5  m  can  be 
attributed  to  the  direct  staff  cost  and  €1.6  m  to  overhead  and  other  co sts.  It  must  be  noted  that  the 
overhead  costs  are  estimated  at  a  sufficient  level  to  cover  the  following  important  activities  of  the 
Agency: 

•  Translation of decisions issued by ERA into national languages; 

• 

IT system needed for accountancy purposes (external fees and charges, accountancy with national 
authorities). 

Finally, as Table 6-9 in Section 6.5.4 demonstrates, there is a high probability that implementation of the 
preferred option will not have any, or a minimal, impact on the EU budget. This is due to the possibility 
of  charging  the  applicants  for  issuing  of  safety  certificates  and  vehicle  authorizations  by  ERA.  As  this 
work will be to some extent performed together with the NSAs, three general scenarios were constructed 
to illustrate how the fee revenues would be shared between the Agency and the NSAs. In case of scenario 
(a) (25% of planned external revenues attributed to the NSAs and 75% to ERA) the additional call on the 
EU  budget  will  be  zero  as  the  coverage  of  additional  costs  of  the  Agency  will  be  127%.  In  case  of 
scenario  (b)  (50%  NSAs,  50%  ERA),  the  additional  call  on  the  EU  budget  will  be  €6  M  (over  2015-
2025), as the coverage of additional costs of the Agency will be 86%. In case of scenario (c) (75% NSAs, 
25%  ERA)  there  would  be  a  more  substantial  additional  impact  on  the  EU  budget  (€25  m  over  2015-
2025). 

2. Single safety certificate 

The  concept  of  a  single  safety  certificate  for  railway  undertakings,  already  indicated  as  a  target  in  the 
original safety directive of 2004, should be implemented in the following way: 

1)  ERA  would  issue  all  single  EU  safety  certificates  requested  by  the  railway  undertakings  using 
knowledge and experience of the NSAs; such a certificate will be valid in all EU Member States. 

2)  To this end the railway safety directive needs to be modified in order to remove the requirement 

of part B certificate and the certification process will consists of following elements: 

(a)  The applicant submits his request to ERA. 

(b)  As appropriate, ERA requests one or more the NSA(s) to carry on an audit of the RU. 

EN 

114 

   EN 

 
(c)  Taking  into  account  the  results  of  the  audit(s)  ERA  takes  the  decision  for  issuing  the 

certificate. 

(d)  As already provided by the legislation in force, each NSA performs supervision of all RUs 
operating in its country. A report will be produced for each inspection/audit. Once a year, 
all reports are transmitted to ERA and to the NSA(s) of the MS(s) where the same RUs are 
operating. 

3. Single rail vehicle authorisation   

The current process should be simplified and modified in such a way that there is no longer any need for 
an  additional  authorisation  for  each  Member  State  where  the  vehicle  is  being  used.  The  proposed  new 
process would be the following: 

implemented  by  ERA 

1)  The  first  authorisation  is  issued  by  ERA  and  consists  of  a  “vehicle  passport”  which  would  in 
principle be an extract of the future ERATV (European Register of Authorised Vehicle Types – to 
be 
implementing  decision  N° 
in  accordance  with  Commission 
2011/665/EU). The "vehicle  passport"  would  attest the values of the  parameters specified in the 
TSIs as being relevant to check the technical compatibility between the vehicle and the network. 
The  values  themselves  can  be  compliant  with  the  TSIs  or,  in  some  justified  cases,  with  the 
national rules. The "vehicle passport" may stipulate conditions for use and other restrictions.  

2)  The  vehicle  passport  would  not  include  anymore  the  aspect  of  compatibility  with  the  national 
network. The compatibility with any specific network is already, according to the railway safety 
directive,  a  responsibility  of  the  railway  undertaking  and  will  be  checked  by  the  railway 
undertaking with the help of the future RINF (Register of Infrastructure – to be implemented by 
Member  States  and  ERA 
implementing  decision  N° 
in  accordance  with  Commission 
2011/633/EU).   

3)  The  TSIs  will  have  to  be  modified  in  order  to  include  not  only  the  procedures  to  verify 
conformity  with  the  TSI  (which  exist  already),  but  also  the  procedure  for  checking  the 
compatibility between vehicle and the network and the roles of all actors involved. The results of 
the  checks  would  lead  to  individual  decisions  by  the  railway  undertaking  to  place  a  vehicle  in 
service, and this would replace the additional authorisation(s).     

4. Functioning of national railway regimes  

In order to improve the (often inefficient) functioning of national authorities, ERA would have the duty to 
monitor the performance and decision making of the NSAs, including the right to audit: 

1.  capacities (staffing, financial resources) of NSAs  to execute tasks related with railway safety and 

interoperability, and 

2.  effectiveness of their operations as regards monitoring of safety management systems of railway 

undertakings, infrastructure managers and entities in charge of maintenance. 

In  parallel,  ERA  would  also  play  a  greater  role  in  the  certification  process  by  supervising  and 
coordinating the Notified Bodies, especially to ensure that they perform in a more harmonised way; this is 
of particular importance in relation to ERTMS. It means that ERA would: 

•  check that the NoBos meet the criteria provided for in annex VIII to the Interoperability Directive, 
and  to  recommend  any  change  necessary  for  the  NoBo  to  retain  the  status  conferred  upon  it 
(accreditation criteria); 

EN 

115 

   EN 

 
•  define  guidelines  and  templates  for  the  assessment  of  conformity  or  suitability  for  use  of  an 
interoperability constituent and for the EC verification procedure (e.g. templates for the certificate, 
for the technical file, test report template, checklist);  

•  check  that  application  files  to  be  submitted  to  the  NoBo  are  adequately  documented  (including 
product/component  test  reports,  on-site/in-vehicle/in-labs  integration  test  reports)  before  the  EC 
verification procedure of individual ERTMS (on-board or trackside) subsystems is launched; 

•  check that the NoBos perform the EC verification procedure in a common (high quality) manner 

and report as less as possible "reservations" in the certificates they deliver; 

•  check  that  the  technical  files  are  adequately  documented  before  the  authorisation  of  individual 

ERTMS subsystems are requested; 

•  guide all NoBos in ERA ad-hoc ERTMS coordination group. 

In  addition  ERA  should  check  that  calls  for  tenders  published  in  the  case  of  individual  deployment 
projects are in line with the ERTMS specifications (stemming from measure "Enhanced role of ERA in 
providing  advice  and  support  for  Member  States  and  other  stakeholders  in  implementing  legislation  on 
safety and interoperability" (option 6)) .  

Regarding  the  migration  from  the  system  of  national  rules  to  the  common  EU  rules,  the  possibility  of 
adopting  new  national  rules  by  Member  States  will  be  limited  to  strictly  defined  cases.  In  this  context, 
ERA would: 

(a)  Continue the work of cataloguing and evaluating national rules; 

(b)  Identify (in consultation with relevant national authorities) of which of the national rules can be 

removed;  

(c)  Request the national authorities the removal of unnecessary and obsolete national rules. 

In  case  the  national  authorities  disagree,  they  could  refer  to  the  Commission  which  will  take  a  final 
decision  whether  to  reverse  the  decision  of  ERA  or  to  pursue  it,  including  launching  the  infringement 
procedure against a Member State in question, if necessary. 

5. Possible implementation problems linked with the preferred option  

Besides possible political difficulties to have the proposed changes agreed (especially in relation to giving 
up  a  part  of  power  by  national  authorities),  the  implementation  of  the  preferred  option  could  pose 
problems, including: 

1.  Legal inconsistency:  

There is a risk that the interoperability and safety part of the 4th Railway Package (the Interoperability and 
Safety Directives, and ERA Regulation) will not be adopted at the same time and/or important provisions 
of the three acts dealing with the same issue will differ. Similarly, it might happen that the Directives are 
implemented  later  than  the  effects  of  the  Regulation  take  place.  Another  possible  risk  is  linked  with 
eventual delay of adoption of implementing measures setting out details of cooperation of ERA and the 
national authorities and fees and charges modalities. All this could lead to delays in effective phasing-in 
of the impacts of the preferred option and/or reduce its benefits. 

2.   Preparedness of the main actors: 

There  is  a  risk  that  implementation  of  the  preferred  option  could  be  delayed  by  low  degree  of 
preparedness of the main actors (ERA, national authorities) to undertake new tasks. At the national level 

EN 

116 

   EN 

 
this could be linked with political/vested interests' opposition to the changes, while at the level of ERA a 
possible opposition to a partial restructuration of the Agency and the change of operational methods could 
be the main reasons. Similarly, the maturity of the overall railway system must be sufficient in order to 
move  towards  issuing  single  safety  certificates  and  vehicle  passports;  without  these  prerequisites,  the 
target dates envisaged in the impact assessment might not be attained.  

3.   Financial difficulties: 

There is a risk that there will be not enough financial resources (at the EU level) to sufficiently cover the 
needs  of  the  enhanced  Agency.  It  is  not  impossible  that  after  the  legal  act  is  adopted,  the  following 
establishment plans for staff and annual budgets will be cut down by the Budgetary Authority. 

4.   Cooperation between ERA and national authorities: 

It  is  not  excluded  that  following  adoption  of  the  legal  act  the  relations  between  ERA  and  national 
authorities,  especially  the  NSAs,  will  deteriorate.  Currently  the  Agency  is  a  "partner"  to  national 
authorities  and  stakeholders,  while  in  the  future  it  will  have  more  control  functions,  which  can  have  a 
negative effect on the quality of their cooperation. Moreover, there might be problems with problematic 
cooperation  between  ERA  and  the  NSAs  regarding  issuing  of  vehicle  passports  and  safety  certificates. 
This is supposed to be a shared work, however the exact extent and scope of this cooperation is still to be 
established by the implementing acts, to be adopted later. There is a risk that these implementing acts will 
not  cover  sufficiently  well  all  the  necessary  details  of  cooperation  and/or  this  cooperation  will  not  be 
smooth  due  to  other  reasons,  mainly  political  or  linked  with  the  defence  of  vested  interests.  Also,  the 
issue of responsibility for the decisions to be taken might come up. Another potential source of conflict 
may be the level of external fees and charges, and their division by ERA and the NSAs. 

5.  Relations with stakeholders: 

There  is  a  risk  that  railway  stakeholders,  especially  the  main  railway  undertakings,  could  start  exerting 
pressure  on  ERA,  for  example  with  a  view  to  adapt  the  future  level  of  charges  for  issuing  of  vehicle 
passports and safety certificates to their needs or to follow their policy line. It will probably be easier for 
them to put pressure on a single EU body that has to work in a transparent way and should in principle 
listen to the needs of stakeholders. The evolving role of ERA towards an authority charging for some of 
its  services  could  be  also  a  possible  source  of  problems,  as  far  as  relations  with  stakeholders  are 
concerned. 

EN 

117 

   EN 

 
ANNEX IX 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

Community of European Railways and Infrastructure Companies 

Common Safety Methods 

Common Safety Targets 

European Aviation Safety Agency 

Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (German NSA) 

EISENBAHN-CERT  (German  NoBo  and  certification  and  inspection 
body)  

European Maritime Safety Agency 

(or 

the 

European Railway Agency 

European Register of Authorised Vehicle Types 

European Rail Traffic Management System 

European Train Control System 

Member States accessed the EU since 2004 

EU Member States before 2004 

Infrastructure Manager 

National Investigation Bodies 

Notified Bodies 

Net Present Value 

National Safety Authorities 

National Safety Rules 

National Technical Rules 

Persons with Reduced Mobility (a TSI) 

Regulatory Body 

Register of Infrastructure  

CER 

CSMs 

CSTs 

EASA 

EBA 

EBC 

EMSA 

ERA 
Agency) 

ERATV 

ERTMS 

ETCS 

EU-12 

EU-15 

IM 

NIBs 

NoBos 

NPV 

NSAs 

NSRs 

NTRs 

PRM 

RB 

RINF 

ROSCOs 

Rolling stock leasing companies 

RU 

SDG 

SMS 

SRT 

Railway Undertaking 

Steer Davies Gleave 

Safety Management System 

Safety in Railway Tunnels (a TSI) 

EN 

118 

   EN 

 
 
TSIs 

UIC 

Technical Specifications for Interoperability 

International Union of Railways 

UNIFE 

Association of the European Rail Industry 

EN 

119 

   EN