COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure
Date: 2013-01-24
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: electric vehicle, hydrogen production, import (EU), international road transport, natural gas, substitute fuel, technical standard, trans-European network, transport infrastructure, waterway transport














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52013SC0005

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure /* SWD/2013/05 final */









COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a Directive
on the deployment of alternative
fuels infrastructure
APPENDICES
              Appendix 1: Assessment of the application of
the minimum consultation standards  2
Appendix 2:
Results of consultation with interested parties  4
Appendix 3:
Existing or planned initiatives at European level affecting the uptake of
alternative fuels  11
Appendix 4:
Existing initiatives for the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure  12
Appendix 5:
Existing and expected alternative fuels infrastructure in the EU   32
Appendix 6:
The root causes of the insufficiency of the infrastructure for alternative
fuels – Fuel-by-fuel analysis  36
Appendix 7:
Detailed pre-screening of possible policy options  43
Appendix 8:
Possible legislative formulations in the Policy Options  46
Appendix 9:
Illustration of possible implementation measures  49
Appendix 10:
Results of illustrative economic modelling  55
Appendix 11:
Manufacturers of alternative fuels infrastructure equipment, and of alternative
fuel vehicles and vessels  64
Appendix 1: Assessment of the application of
the minimum consultation standards
Aim and content of the consultation process
1.           The White Paper “Roadmap
to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a Competitive and Resource
Efficient Transport System”[1] announces that the Commission will develop “a sustainable
alternative fuels strategy including also the appropriate infrastructure”
(Initiative 24) and ensure “guidelines and standards for refuelling
infrastructures” (Initiative 26).
2.           The aim of the
consultation was to gather the views of the EU citizens and stakeholders on
this initiative.
3.           The consultation process
has been structured as follows:
(1)              
Consultation of stakeholders (industry and NGOs)
through several meetings of the European Expert Group on Future Transport Fuels;

(1)              
Consultation of representatives of the Member
States; 
(2)              
Public Consultation; 
(3)              
Targeted stakeholders’ consultation on the
policy options regarding the deployment of refuelling and charging
infrastructure under the study Exergia S.A. et al., 2012, Assessment of the
Implementation of a European Alternative Fuel Strategy and Possible Supportive
Proposals.
4.           The General Principles and
Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission were
respected in the elaboration and presentation of the consultation questionnaire.
Publication
5.           All reports have been
published on the Commission website at the following addresses:
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/cts/doc/2011-01-25-future-transport-fuels-report.pdf; 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/cts/doc/2011-12-2nd-future-transport-fuels-report.pdf; 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/cts/doc/jeg_cts_report_201105.pdf; 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/consultations/doc/cts/report-on-results.pdf; 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/studies/doc/2012-08-cts-implementation-study.pdf 
Time limits for participation
6.           The consultation of the
European Expert Group on Future Transport Fuels started on 26 April 2010, and
ended with the publication of the second report of the Group in December 2011.
7.           The consultation of the
Joint Expert Group Transport & Environment started on 17 March 2011, and
ended with the publication of its report in May 2011.
8.           A public on-line consultation
was published on 11 August 2011. The questionnaire was available on-line until
20 October 2011, respecting the minimum consultation standard period of at
least eight weeks.
9.           The consultation under the
Exergia S.A. et al., 2012, Assessment of the Implementation of a European
Alternative Fuel Strategy and Possible Supportive Proposals took place between
November and December 2011.
Acknowledgement and feedback
10.         The Commission requested
and obtained the approval of all members of the European Expert Group on Future
Transport Fuels and the Joint Expert Group Transport & Environment before
publishing the relevant reports. 
11.         As to the Public
Consultation, stakeholders were informed on-line that their contributions would
be handled by a consultant and used by the Commission services, and a summary
of the consultation’s results would be published on the Commission’s website.
              Appendix 2: Results of consultation with interested
parties
The
studies and the consultations with industry experts, national experts and the
public, carried out between 2010 and 2012, have arrived at the conclusion that
a fuel mix of several main alternative fuels is considered the only realistic
solution, not just as transition, but for the foreseeable future. All main
alternative fuel options should therefore be developed in parallel. However,
the efforts will need to be adjusted to the technological, and economic
maturity of the different fuels and related propulsion systems. Infrastructure
networks with refuelling/recharging facilities have been highlighted by all
parties consulted as an essential and necessary condition for the market
penetration of alternative fuels.
The
stakeholders that participated in the process belong to the sectors of energy
supply to transport; manufacturers of vehicles, vessels, planes and trains;
transport operators; users; public authorities; and civil society. 
 
The
relevant findings can be summarised as follows.
·       
The vast majority of respondents consider that
EU policy action should be taken to steer an EU wide market introduction of
alternative fuels.
Furthermore,
the majority of respondents:
·       
supports the build-up of alternative fuel
infrastructure
·       
believes that a mix of alternative fuels
(electricity, hydrogen, biofuels, methane, LPG and synthetic fuels) should be
included in the EU long-term strategy.
·       
believes that EU action should not be limited to
the adoption of common standards
·       
considers that voluntary action of industry
alone could not achieve the development of refuelling/recharging infrastructure
·       
considers that EU legislation requiring minimum
refuelling/recharging infrastructures is required
·       
believes that that the public sector should
intervene in the development of the refuelling/recharging infrastructures
·       
considers that support mechanisms (such as
incentives, RTD funds, loans, concession rights for first investors…) should be
set-up to promote alternative fuels vehicles and infrastructures.
Stakeholders’ Expert Group on Future Transport
Fuels
A
European Expert Group on Future Transport Fuels (EEGFTF) was created in March
2010 to obtain advice on the development of policy strategies and specific
actions aimed to gradually substituting oil as transport fuel in the long term
and to decarbonise transport while ensuring economic growth. The Group was
composed of all relevant industrial stakeholders, including transport
organisations and civil society. The Commission chaired the Group and
coordinated its activities. 
The
EEGFTF prepared two reports, namely:
–     
The first report (January 2011) sets out a
long-term strategy, a roadmap, and recommendations on short-, mid- and
long-term actions to support the market build-up for alternative fuels for all
modes and segments of transport. The Group identified electricity, hydrogen,
and liquid biofuels as long-term options for gradually substituting oil as an
energy source for propulsion in transport. Synthetic fuels, methane and LPG can
be considered as short/mid-term options. The report is available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/cts/doc/2011-01-25-future-transport-fuels-report.pdf.
–     
The second report (December 2011) focuses on the
“Infrastructure for Alternative Fuels”. This report provides additional
recommendations on short-, mid- and long-term actions to support the market
build-up of alternative fuels for all modes and segments of transport and the
relevant infrastructure. The report is available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/cts/doc/2011-12-2nd-future-transport-fuels-report.pdf 
The
EEGFTF pointed out that an appropriate regulatory framework and financial
instruments will be required to introduce sustainable low carbon alternatives
to the market. 
Some
members rejected binding targets in fuel infrastructure as they believe that
development in infrastructure, not in line with market development, would not
be cost effective; legislation should only aim at creating a level playing
field.
Most
members however share the opinion that binding targets could become a real
driver for the alternative fuel market, attracting clients and steering market
demand for these fuels. An appropriate refuelling infrastructure would need to
exist before producing and promoting more alternative fuelled vehicles on the
manufacturer side. 
Furthermore
the EEGFTF highlighted the need for supporting the private sector to undertake
effective actions to accelerate the development of new refuelling
infrastructure with the following objectives: 
–          
To establish EU-wide a minimum coverage of
refuelling infrastructure for the main alternative fuels that have
technological viability and market potential, to facilitate economies of scale
for market introduction;
–          
To ensure a harmonised implementation of
standards for the main alternative fuels;
–          
To align policy and public/private funding and
taxation in the field of alternative fuel infrastructure.
While
mandates on infrastructure are objected by some members, the other members of
the EEGFTF consider public intervention necessary to break deadlocks between
potential market growth for alternative fuel technologies and missing fuel
supply.
In
conclusion, most members consider not realistic to expect the market to cater
for the transition to more expensive low-carbon alternatives alone, and that,
therefore, important interfaces should be defined by legislation to allow and
encourage this market demand.
Report of the Joint Expert Group on Transport and Environment
The
Joint Expert Group Transport & Environment -JEGTE (composed of experts from
24 Member States and Norway for consultation purposes) was convened by the
Commission to obtain recommendations on the development of a consistent
long-term alternative fuels strategy of the EU, as preparation for the CPT
initiative. The JEGTE met on 17 March 2011 and discussed possible scenarios for
future transport fuels. In a report to the Commission[2] the Group agreed with the fuel mix recommended by the (EEGFTF). High potential in feedstock,
energy efficiency, and CO2 reduction would be important selection
criteria. The main alternative fuels should be available EU-wide with
harmonised standards. The Group also noted that the different transport modes
require different alternative fuels. The report is
available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/cts/doc/jeg_cts_report_201105.pdf.
Stakeholders’ Consultation
A
consultation of stakeholders in the alternative fuels sector was launched on
14/11/2011 as part of the study “Assessment of the implementation of a European
alternative fuel strategy and possible supportive proposals” MOVE
C1/497-1-2011. The consultation was mainly intended to data collection for
modelling.
In
total, 124 questionnaires were distributed to members of the Expert Group on
Future Transport Fuels and other relevant stakeholders. The organisations that
responded are: IATA, ePure, EBB, SCANIA, Eurelectric, AVERE, SIEMENS, ERTRAC,
NEW ENERGY WORLD IG, AirLNG, NGVA Europe, IVECO, AEGPL Europe, UPEI, SHELL,
ASFE, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation of the Netherlands, CEDEC, HyER. The report is available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/studies/doc/2012-08-cts-implementation-study.pdf.
Electromobility
The
majority of respondents:
·         
consider the infrastructure for
dedicated/captive fleets not to be enough for the development of an electric
vehicles market, and that a network for private electric vehicles has to be
developed, since about half the electric vehicles sales are for private users. 
·         
consider the number of charging points on the
basis of the annual vehicles registrations as the most effective indicator to
define the minimum, appropriate and optimum coverage.
·         
support the participation of both the government
and the industry in the investment cost. Government should help the industry
(e.g. electricity companies) participate with research and implementation of
the first steps to demonstrate accessibility (e.g. through incentives for the
promotion of the electric vehicles infrastructure, subsidization on the
national or regional level) possibly up to 2017. Afterwards the private sector
can bear the investment cost and expect normal profit (positive business case).
Respondents
consider that the proposed electric charging infrastructure would have a
positive impact to the competitiveness of the EU automotive industry and
creation of additional jobs for equipment manufacturers and along the supply
chain.
Hydrogen
·     
It is generally acknowledged that the European
hydrogen network would be effectively established if the regulatory barriers at
EU and national level were removed. The existing ISO and SAE standards should
be adopted EU-wide.
·     
According to the majority of respondents, during
the initial phase, public support is needed to realize the technological shift.
When moving closer to the commercial phase, risks should be borne by industry.
Biofuels
·     
The majority suggest that European Standards (EN
norms)/specifications of the higher grades of biofuels have to be established
and harmonised across the EU, and the OEMs to adjust the engine manufacturing
accordingly to meet the standards, so as to incentivize growth of a vehicle
fleet that is compatible with higher grades of biofuels.
·     
The majority of respondents expressed the
opinion that higher biofuel blends should be introduced in dedicated fleets, as
a first (but not a sufficient) step for the development of a market.
CNG
·     
The majority of respondents consider that the
minimum infrastructure coverage for private passenger cars and commercial
fleets using cars and vans should correspond to 10% of the urban filling
stations and to 25% of the stations along the motorways. This percentage should
be linked to the availability of methane stations at least every 150 km along
motorways.
LNG
·     
For heavy duty vehicles, there is a further
distinction in infrastructure coverage according to the type of transport
(whether it is urban for the transport of goods, or heavy trucks for long
distance). In the case of transport of goods, refuelling with LNG should be
made possible every 400 km.
·     
NGVA expects that the development of adequate
infrastructure for natural gas and biomethane will lead to an increased number
of natural gas vehicles, which will increase the competitiveness of this sector
in the EU, currently lying behind compared to the global natural gas vehicle
development.
·     
According to most respondents, the future of LNG
as fuel in vessels at European level depends on the policy measures that will
be taken. If the policy measures are appropriate, 20-30 new LNG fuelled vessels
could be expected per year.
LPG
·     
AEGPL suggests that binding targets for
harmonization in the LPG fuel quality can help the market develop, in order to
stimulate car makers. A regulatory process for establishing a unique LPG
connector in the EU is an example of how the market can grow.
·     
The majority of respondents see a positive
impact on automotive industry/equipment manufacturers from the development of
refilling stations, as it would lead the automotive industry to invest in more
LPG technology, manufacturing facilities, marketing and R&D.
Public consultation
A
public on-line consultation took place between 11 August 2011 and 20 October
2011. 
123
responses were received, with almost equitable distribution among individuals
(31.7%), private sector companies (33.3%) and industry associations or NGO
(29.3%). A small portion represented local or regional public authorities
(4.1%) and national public authorities (1.6%).
The
report is available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/urban/consultations/doc/cts/report-on-results.pdf 
The
main indications from the different sectors are the following. 
A vast majority (89%) shares the view that there is the need that EU
steers an EU-wide market introduction of alternative fuels through policy
actions.
In particular:
·       
ACEA underlines that “The roll-out of the
necessary infrastructure to deliver and supply such fuels [electricity,
hydrogen, biofuels, biomethane, LPG, and others] should be matched to
technical development and to enable the market penetration of new vehicles
technologies”.
·       
Daimler indicates “Harmonisation, fuel
infrastructure legislation, specification of blends” as issues justifying EU
policy action. Furthermore, Daimler indicates the need for legislative measures
on fuel infrastructures.
·       
The Centro Richerche FIAT underlines the need
for “Regulations and procedures to enhance realization of infrastructures for
fuel distribution”.
·       
The Oil Companies International Marine Forum
(OCIMF) states that “The European Union should progress the use of alternative
fuels for short sea maritime transport”.
·       
The natural Gas Vehicle Association NGVA
indicated that EU action is necessary for “infrastructure, research and
Development, funding and fiscal treatment”.
As to what fuels should be included in the EU long-term strategy:
·       
A vast majority of respondents pronounced in
favour of electricity 
·       
A considerable majority pronounced in favour of
biofuels and hydrogen
·       
Synthetic fuels, and CNG/LNG, and LPG were
indicated by significant shares of respondents
·       
Electricity, biofuels and methane-related fuels
are mostly suggested for the urban (short) transport mode
·       
Biofuels were suggested mostly for long distance
road-passenger vehicles followed by methane derivatives and synthetic gas
·       
Biofuels and LNG was mostly indicated for
waterborne transport
·       
Biofuels and synthetic fuels, followed by
methane LNG were mostly indicated for airborne transport.
In particular,
·       
The Association of German Transport Companies
VDV indicated “Long-term: rather electricity, hydrogen, biofuels. Medium-term:
also synthetic fuels and methane”.
·       
Polis declared “Emphasis should be placed on
these first three fuels (electricity, hydrogen, and biofuels). It must be
ensured that biomethane is included under biofuels. Synthetic fuels should
include those from biomass.”
·       
Shell commented that “A combination or mosaic
technologies will be needed to supplement fossil fuels across the various transport
sectors”.
Three quarters (77%) of the respondents considered that public
sector should intervene in the development of the refuelling/recharging
infrastructure.
In particular:
·       
Renault stated that “In the case of the electric
vehicles and the fuel cells the development of charging/refuelling
infrastructure is critical for the mass deployment. Therefore, the role of the
public sector is essential to guarantee an adequate regulatory framework and
the support needed to move quickly into a mass market solution.”
·       
Gas Infrastructure Europe stated that: “Gas
Infrastructures are needed to ensure the availability of CNG and LNG as
alternative fuels. Gas infrastructure investments entail long-lead times and
thus require long-term visibility. A sound investment climate together with a
stable and predictable regulatory framework is fundamental for the development
of infrastructure.”
·       
Polis declared that “[The public sector] should
intervene at least with regulation.”
·       
The Port of Rotterdam stated that “Policy instruments
could be used to cover financial/operational risks taken by the private sector
investing in alternative fuel technology.”
·       
Shell points out that “There is clearly work
needed on harmonization of standards”. 
·       
The European Hydrogen Association (EHA) underlined
the need to support the activities of local alternative fuel technology and
business clusters, facilitating industrial investment incentives and ensuring a
sustainable level of SME participation in large EU transport infrastructure
programmes.
The majority of respondents consider that:
·       
EU actions should not be limited to ensuring
the relevant infrastructure standards in order to achieve a consistent and
significant deployment of alternative fuels.
·       
Voluntary action of industry alone cannot
achieve the development of the refuelling/recharging infrastructures required
for travelling across the whole EU on alternative fuels.
·       
EU legislation requiring minimum
refuelling/recharging infrastructures is needed.
In particular:
·       
ACEA declared that “The parallel development of
vehicle technology and infrastructure needs coordination and common policies.
In some areas this has already failed, e.g. HFCV and hydrogen filling
infrastructure.”
·       
Renault stated that “In addition to the relevant
infrastructure standards and deployment, it is important to ensure the
visibility of the full support of the European public authorities to the zero
emissions technologies. Only with a transparent and clear support at European
level it will be possible to have a quick market introduction at the level of
the Member States.”
·       
Shell underlines that “the EU should promote
public funding in PPP projects”
·       
Better Place, Fédération Internationale de
l’Automobile and UITP stated that privileged access to access restriction zones
and lower charging tariffs for infrastructure use could be supportive measures.

·       
UITP considers that here should be no
obligations to introduce a specific alternative fuel for public transport. If
legislation is chosen, there should be no actions that put un-proportionate
burden on public transport undertakings and public transport authorities only.
·       
HyER (Hydrogen and Electromobility European
Regions) considers that “next to the necessary policy
action at EU level, as support for general standardisation of vehicles and
refuelling and recharging infrastructure, tax incentives as well as
risk-sharing financial schemes, national and regional policy support needs to
be leveraged to facilitate a rapid up-take of alternative fuels and customer
acceptance”.
              Appendix 3: Existing or planned initiatives at
European level affecting the uptake of alternative fuels 
(1)              
Decision No 406/2009/EC on the effort of Member
States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s
greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020
(2)              
Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use
of energy from renewable sources 
COM (2012) 271 Renewable
Energy: a major player in the European energy market
(3)              
Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community
framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity
COM (2011) 169
Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC
(4)              
Directive 2009/30/EC amending Directive 98/70/EC
relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels
(5)              
Directive 2009/33/EC on the promotion of clean
and energy-efficient road transport vehicles
(6)              
Regulation 443/2009/EC establishing CO2
emissions performance requirements for new passenger cars 
(7)              
Regulation 510/2011/EC establishes CO2
emissions performance requirements for new light commercial vehicles
(8)              
COM (2010) 186 European strategy on clean and
energy efficient vehicles
(9)              
Strategy for heavy-duty vehicle emissions
(10)          
Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and
cleaner air for Europe
(11)          
Directive 2001/81/EC on national emission
ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants
(12)          
COM (2005) 261 Proposal for a Council Directive
of 5 July 2005 on passenger car related taxes
(13)          
Green Cars Initiative
(14)          
Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking
(15)          
Directive 1999/94/EC relating to the
availability of consumer information on fuel economy and CO2
emissions in respect of the marketing of new passenger cars
              Appendix 4: Existing initiatives for the deployment of
alternative fuels infrastructure 
1.           This appendix provides an
overview of some of the national initiatives and policies implemented for the
deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure. 
Electricity 
2.           The following tables (Table
1, Table 2, Table 3) summarise some of the national initiatives and policies
implemented for the deployment of EV charging infrastructure, together with
national targets on infrastructure and vehicle deployment. 
Table
1: Targets for electric
vehicles, and existing policies for the deployment of infrastructure
 Member States || Targets regarding electric vehicles (PHEVs and EVs) || Targets regarding infrastructure || Existing measures for the deployment of infrastructure 
 Austria || 2020[3]:  250,000 stock || By 2020: 4,500 semi-public  charging stations || The National Implementation Plan for Electric Mobility covers the following topics: EVs, charging infrastructure, users (demands and requirements), preferential areas to start implementation, industrialization and the national economic policy, instruments for research, innovation and technology, energy systems and resources, integration of electric mobility in the transport system, environmental impacts, and laws and regulations to support innovation. Financial support : Support of € 1,000 was available in 2010 and 2011 for a charging Station (Klima: aktiv programme, Ministry of Environment). Also 30% of support for charging stations and incentives for E-Cars in 3 model regions. 
 Belgium || -   || 2020 (tentative)[4]: - Slow:    35,000 – 130,000 charging stations - Fast       1,000 – 4,000 charging stations   || Masterplan for electric mobility is being prepared covering the following topics: challenges for the infrastructure of charging stations, training for the service station mechanics towards the setup of new business models to make this new project successful. Financial support : For investment in infrastructure (i.e. public charging points), there is a 40% tax credit for individuals (max € 180, € 250 for 2010). 
 Bulgaria || - || - || Several large cities, including Sofia, have decided or are planning to provide street space for free parking of EVs next to charging stations. In Sofia several charging stations are in the process of being installed by the company FullCharger in cooperation with the street lighting company and the electric utility company CEZ.[5] 
 Czech Republic || - || - || Planned investments in public infrastructure (charging points), direct subsidies, fiscal incentives for the supply and operation of recharging system and for the purchase of EVs are already in place. The e-mobility project “futuremotion” (€ 20,000,000 budget until 2012), which initiated in Prague in 2009, includes the development of a public charging network. 
 Germany || 2020: 1,000,000 stock 2030: 5,000,000 stock[6] || 2012-2013: 2,000[7]   || The Federal Government, together with industry, is making available € 2 billion to promote research on how people can maintain their mobility in the future despite fossil fuels growing scarce. For this reason they jointly created the “National Platform for Electric Mobility” in May 2010[8]. 
 Denmark || 2015: 10-15,000 stock 2020: 50,000 stock[9]   2020: 200,000 stock[10] || 2020: 20,000 charging points[11] || In 2009, the Climate and Energy Agreement allocated DKK 30,000,000 (aprox. € 4,000,000) to promote demonstration programmes for battery EVs. The program is being administered by the Danish Energy Agency. DDK 200,000,000 (aprox. € 28,000,000) has been allocated specifically for demonstration projects between 2010 and 2013 that promote environmentally aware and energy-efficient transport solutions, including test projects with alternative types of fuels, electric cars, electric buses, and electric trucks. DKK 70,000,000 (aprox. € 9,400,000) are allocated to support infrastructure for electrical, hydrogen and gas cars. This will be launched in 2013. 
 Estonia || - || - || The electromobility program (2010): • An incentive scheme was introduced for electric car buyers. 50% or up to € 18,000 is compensated, plus € 1,000 is provided for the installation of a charger at home or office. • A country-wide fast charger network is being built so that the distance of fast chargers will not be more than 50 km. The network is expected to be in use starting from 2013. 
 Greece[12] || - || By 2020: 6,900 public double outlet charging points in the main urban areas || Governmental support A Special Commission, constituted by  the decision of the Minister of Energy and Climate Changes (Ministerial Act 21612/20.9.2011) is charged with the responsibility of identification of the pillars needed for the development of  a substantial market penetration of the electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles. The Hellenic Institute of Electric vehicles (HEL.I.E.V) is member of this Commission. Major section of the Commission’s work is the planning of the necessary infrastructure in the form of private and public networks suitable to cover the demand expected until the end of the decade (2020). The result of this investigation has already been submitted to the Ministry and the next expected step is the announcement of a call for bids for the supply and installation of two demonstrative EV’s charging networks, in collaboration with two selected municipalities located nearby of the two major urban centers of Athens and Thessaloniki.  Additionally a link constituted by some fast chargers will be realized along the connecting main road axis of each one of these municipalities with the corresponding major urban center.  The expected budget for these demonstrative and pilot networks is estimated to reach € 3,000,000. . Regional support - Next to the realization of the above demonstrative networks and the evaluation of its techno-economic parameters, a report will be forwarded to the 13 regions of the country with proposals/suggestions for the planning and creation of Regional EV charging station networks. It is estimated that a total number of 6.900 public double outlet charging points should be in operation in the main urban areas of the country in the year 2020. Municipalities’ support - The interest of municipalities is attracted by the possibility to combine small photovoltaic installations of 10 kWh installed on top of EV charging parking lots, whose legislation permits the connection of these small energy production units with the grid without the same bureaucratic procedures needed for photovoltaic generators with bigger capacity. By selling the generated energy to the grid on a permanent basis during a reasonable time period, they can balance the initial cost of the whole equipment. 
 Spain || 2012: 72,000 stock[13] 2014: 1,000,000 stock[14] 2020: 2,500,000 stock[15]   || 2014[16]: Homes: 62,000 Public parking: 12,150 Public road-side: 6,200 charging points || The Spanish Strategy for Energy Savings and Efficiency 2004–2012 includes the promotion of alternative fuels and vehicle technologies (LPG, natural gas, HEV, PHEV, BEV, hydrogen and fuel cells) as a key action line. In April 2010, Spain’s national government also presented the “Integral Plan for the Promotion of Electric Vehicles”, which includes an “Integrated Strategy for EVs 2010–2014”. Governmental support - MOVELE’s plan (El Plan de Accion del Vehiculo Electrico - Ministry of Industry) supports the installation of charging station in three cities (Barcelona, Madrid, Sevilla) subsidies 40% of the price of the station.  Regional support - At a regional level each Autonomous Community can develop a plan to support EVs. Andalusia, Castilla y Leon & Navarra have a plan and are supporting the installation of charging points. In Andalusia, the economic support for the installation of charging station is around 25% of the costs.[17] 
 France || 2015: 450,000 2020: 2,000,000 stock[18] || 1,250 public stations to be installed by 2012 in 20 cities 2015: 900,000 private and 7,500 public charging points 2020: 4,000,000 private and 400,000 public charging by 2020[19] || The Grenelle II legislation adopted in July 2010 addresses a number of environmental topics, including EV charging. Governmental support - € 50,000,000 between 2011 and 2015 for funding 50% of for normal and fast charging stations in 20 demonstrative cities. Regional and Municipalities’ support - The same cities should finance the other 50%. The situation is different in Paris, where 300 charging points had been build 15 years ago. The Autolib system of e-car renting counts today 250 stations, each of them has 4 to 6 plugs, 10% open to other cars. It has been financed by the operating company, group Bollore. The old ones are supposed to be replaced by the new ones. 
 Ireland || 2020: 230,000 stock[20]   2020: 350,000 stock[21]   || 2015: 6,000 charging points 2020: 25,000 public charging points[22] || E-car Ireland[23] Electric vehicles are exempt from the registration tax until 30 April 2011. From 1 May, they will benefit from VRT relief of maximum € 5,000. Plug-in hybrids benefit from VRT relief of maximum € 2,500 until 31 December 2012. Conventional hybrid vehicles and other flexible fuel vehicles benefit from VRT relief of maximum € 1,500 until 31 December 2012. 
 Italy || By 2015: 100,000 EV passenger cars and 30,000 EV commercial vans - sales[24] || 1,000 charging points 2013: 588 public charging stations 2014: 150 public[25] || Governmental support: - Draft bylaw in discussion at the Parliament in the framework of a public support to electrical road mobility. - 5 pilot projects  partially  supported until 2015 by the Italian Authority for Energy, for  building in total more than 1,000 public charging points in different cities  such Roma, Milano,  Napoli, Bari, Catania, Genova, Bologna, Perugia, but also in other cities in Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy  regions  and  in commercial  sites.   Among the above charging points, 200 have been supported also by the Ministry of Environment and 150 by Lombardy Region. 
 Luxemburg || 2020: 40,000 stock[26] || - || € 5,000 Grant for private purchase of electric vehicles. 
 Malta || - || - || Malta has various initiatives to promote EVs particularly in city centres such as Valletta. For instance, Transport Malta recently held a seminar in Malta to promote new regulations which provide incentives for transport operators to operate electric mini cabs for taxi services. 
 Netherlands || 2015: 20,000 stock 2020: 200,000 stock[27]   || 2013: 10,000 public charging stations 50 fast charging stations[28] || Formula E-team’s[29] activities for vehicles and infrastructure deployment can be summarized as follows: test projects for hybrid and electric mobility (9 projects), establishment of a committee under the standards organization of the Netherlands for electric transport (an agreement on standardized plugs); global access to charging facilities in the implementation phase; government roadmap for development of a market model for charging services; exemption from private motor vehicle and motor cycle tax (BPM) and motor vehicle tax (MRB); e-mobility program (e-rijden), which focuses on operating electric vehicles and licensing charging points along motorways. Amsterdam will implement at least 200 charging points in the city in the next two years and expects to have 10,000 EVs by 2015.[30] 
 Poland ||   || 2013: 300 charging points[31] || The activities from the “public support for infrastructure electromobility” of Warsaw were launched in 2009. Within the EU project the first charging points in Warsaw were constructed, while the first e-cars were tested by the local police and municipal service. The Warsaw City Hall works on implementation and preparation of pilot projects aimed at popularization of electric cars by creating adequate charging infrastructure together with RWE Poland.[32] 
 Portugal || 2020: 200,000 stock[33]   || 2020: 25,000[34] || National Program for Electric Mobility -  The government project Mobi-E: Construction of a nationwide charging points network. € 5,000 purchasing grant for a vehicle (first 5,000 vehicles), exemption from road tax; € 1,500 subsidy for trading the old car for an EV. The 1,300 public normal charging stations will be installed in the following municipalities: Almada, Aveiro, Beja, Braga, Bragança, Cascais, Castelo Branco, Coimbra, Évora, Faro, Guarda, Guimarães, Leiria, Lisboa, Loures, Portalegre, Porto, Santarém, Setúbal, Sintra, Torres Vedras, Viana do Castelo, Vila Nova de Gaia, Vila Real e Viseu. Additional 50 public fast charging stations, will be installed in primary roads and highways connecting the mentioned municipalities, which will allow travelling between them, and in strategic areas to guarantee emergency charges.[35] 
 Romania || - || - || The Government set up a special working group for developing the e-mobility strategy in Romania, subsidies for EV purchase recently introduced (up to € 3,700).[36] 
 Sweden || 2020: 600,000 stock[37] 2020: 18,000 sales[38] || - || The City of Gothenburg aims to evaluate 500 charging stations. Initially, 250 vehicles will be involved in the activity. The Swedish Hybrid Centre2 is managing many of these efforts and acts as a hub for knowledge and development[39]. 
 Slovenia || 2030: 23% (14,062) stock[40],[41] || - || No current public support at national or regional level for charging infrastructures. Subsidies for purchase of EVs: In 2011 and 2012, a support for legal entities and natural persons (€ 500,000  each year): - for purchase of new EV or PHEV between € 5,000  (M1 category) and € 2,000  (L6e[42] category) - for remodeling of vehicles with IC motor to electric drive between € 4,000 (M1 category) and €1,000  (L6e category)[43]   
 United Kingdom || 2020: 1,200,000 stock EVs 350,000 stock PHEVs   2030: 3,300,000 stock EVs 7,900,000 stock PHEVs[44] || By 2020 : 8,500 charging points[45]   || Plugged-in-Places project GBP 400,000,000 for “green cars” in 2008-2012, of which: GBP 30,000,000 for charging network, GBP 10,000,000 for test projects in 2009 and 2010, GBP 120,000,000 for R&D (loans to market players).   
Table
2: Overview table of Member
States’ targets for electric vehicles
 Member state || 2015 || 2020 || 2030 
 Austria[46] || - || 250,000 (stock) || - 
 Belgium || -   ||   || - 
 Bulgaria || - || - || - 
 Cyprus || - || - || - 
 Czech Republic || - || - || - 
 Germany[47] || - || 1,000,000 (stock) || 5,000,000 (stock) 
 Denmark[48] || 10,000 – 15,000 (stock) || 50,000 (stock)[49] 200,000 (stock) [50] || - 
 Estonia || - || - || - 
 Greece || - || - || - 
 Spain[51] || 1,000,000[52] || 2,500,000 (stock) || - 
 Finland || - || - || - 
 France || 450,000 (stock) || 2,000,000 (stock)[53] || - 
 Hungary || - || - || - 
 Ireland || - || 230,000 (stock)[54] 350,000 (stock) [55] || - 
 Italy || 130,000 (stock) [56] || - || - 
 Lithuania || - || - || - 
 Luxembourg || - || 40,000 (stock)[57] || - 
 Latvia || - || - || - 
 Malta || - || - || - 
 Netherlands || 20,000 (stock) || 200,000 (stock)[58] || - 
 Poland || - || - || - 
 Portugal || - || 200,000  (stock)[59] || - 
 Romania || - || - || - 
 Sweden || - || 600,000 (stock)[60] 18,000 sales[61] || - 
 Slovenia || - || 23% (approx. 14,062 stock -  based on existing new vehicles registration for 2011)[62],[63] || - 
 Slovak Republic || - || - || - 
 UK || - || 1,200,000 stock EVs 350 000 stock PHEVs[64]   || 3,300,000 stock EVs 7,900,000 stock PHEVs[65]   
Table 3: Overview table of Member States’ targets
for deployment of EV charging points
  Member state || Functional || 2012-2013 Under construction || 2014-2016 Planned || 2020 Proposed 
 Austria || 489[66] || - || - || Semi-public 4,500 [67] 
 Belgium || 188[68] || - || - || Public:    35,000 – 130,000   Public Fast     1,000 – 4,000[69]   
 Bulgaria || 1[70] || - || - || - 
 Cyprus || - || - || - || - 
 Czech Republic || Private 3 Public 20[71] || Public 250[72] || - || - 
 Germany || Private 613 Public 836 Semi-public 488[73] || 2,000[74] || - || - 
 Denmark || Public 280[75] || 30 ||   || Public 20,000[76] 
 Estonia || 2[77] || - || 250[78] || - 
 Greece || - || - || - || Public 6,900[79] 
 Spain || Public 731 LDVs: 625[80],[81]   || - || Private: 325,000[82] Public parking : 12,150 Public road-side : 6,200 || - 
 Finland || 1[83] || - || - || - 
 France[84] || 236 || STET 1,250 || Private 900,000 Public 7,500 || Private: 4,000,000 Public: 400,000 
 Hungary || 7[85] || - || - || - 
 Ireland[86] || Public: 640 of which are 27 fast charge points   ||   || 6,000 || Public: 25,000 
 Italy[87] || 1,000   || Public: 588 || 150 ||   
 Lithuania || - || - || - || - 
 Luxembourg || 7[88] || - ||   || - 
 Latvia || 1[89] || - || - || - 
 Malta || - || - || - || - 
 Netherlands || 1,700 || Public: 10,000 Fast: 50[90] || - || - 
 Poland[91] || Public: 27[92]   || 300 || - || - 
 Portugal[93] || Public 1,300 Fast 50 charging station ||   ||   || Public 25,000 
 Romania || - || - || - || - 
 Sweden || - || - || - || - 
 Slovenia || - || - || - || - 
 Slovak Republic || 3[94] || - || - || - 
 UK || 703[95] || - || - || 8,500[96] 
Hydrogen

3.           In the following, some of
the national initiatives and policies implemented for the deployment of
hydrogen infrastructure, together with industry-led action, are described.  
4.           Many of the first hydrogen
refuelling stations have been co-financed by regional and local authorities
operating or financing captive fleets (i.e. bus fleets or cars that are part of
public fleets). The first industry initiatives to establish a national network
of stations are the “H2 Mobility” initiative in Germany, with similar
initiatives in the UK[97] and France[98] (e.g. Clean Hydrogen in European Cities Project), mostly focused on
refuelling passenger cars.
              Germany – H2 Mobility
5.           The partners of the
initiative “H2 Mobility” are Linde, Daimler, EnBW, OMV, Shell, Total,
Vattenfall and the NOW GmbH National Organisation Hydrogen and Fuel Cell
Technology. During the 1st phase of the project, kicked-off in 2008,
an evaluation of options of where to place hydrogen fuelling stations in Germany took place, as well as the definition of a joint business plan agreement, setting
out possible public support measures. During the 2nd phase, the
installation of new hydrogen fuelling stations must take place in order to
develop hydrogen fuelling stations network that will facilitate the
introduction of hydrogen powered vehicles by 2015. This initiative falls under
the framework of the German economic stimulus package (Konjunkturpaket II) and
other national and state programs in order to look into standardization and
cost reduction issues[99].
              Italy, UK, Norway, Switzerland – The Clean Hydrogen in European Cities Project (CHIC)
6.           The Clean Hydrogen in
European Cities Project (CHIC) was launched in 2010. The project involves
integrating 26 fuel cell buses in daily public transport operations and bus
routes in five locations across Europe – Aargau (Switzerland), Bolzano/Bozen (Italy), London (UK),  Milan (Italy), and Oslo (Norway). The CHIC project is supported by the
European Union Joint Undertaking for Fuel Cells and Hydrogen (FCH JU) with
funding of € 26,000,000, and has 25 partners from across Europe, which includes
industrial partners for vehicle supply and refuelling infrastructure. The
project is based on a staged introduction and build-up of FCH bus fleets, the
supporting hydrogen refuelling stations and infrastructure in order to
facilitate the smooth integration of the FCH buses in Europe’s public transport
system.[100]
              United Kingdom – UKH2 Mobility 
7.           In January 2012, the
Department for Business Innovation and Skills launched the project UKH2 Mobility
in partnership with the industry. The Government is investing £ 400,000,000 to
support the development, demonstration and deployment of hydrogen vehicles. The
project will evaluate the potential for hydrogen as a fuel for Ultra Low Carbon
Vehicles in the UK before developing an action plan for an anticipated roll-out
to consumers in 2014/15. 
8.           The objectives of UKH2 Mobility
are as follows:
9.           Analyse in detail the
specific UK case for the introduction of hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles
as one of a number of solutions to decarbonise road transport and quantify the
potential emissions benefits;
10.         Review the investments
required to commercialise the technology, including refuelling infrastructure;
and
11.         Identify what is required
to make the UK a leading global player in hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicle
manufacturing thereby paving the way for economic opportunities to the UK, through the creation of new jobs and boosting of local economies.[101]
              United Kingdom – £ 19,000,000 investment in hydrogen fuel cell projects
12.         In July 2012, the
Technology Strategy Board and the Department of Energy and Climate Change
(DECC) announced that they will invest £ 9,000,000 for six new projects. The
objective of the projects is to demonstrate the potential of fuel cell systems
and hydrogen technology which can be integrated into energy and transport
industries. 
13.         The projects are
co-financed by private industry and they will include the creation of the UK’s
first end-to-end, integrated, hydrogen production, distribution and retailing
system, centred around a fully publicly accessible 700 bar renewable H2
refuelling station network across London.[102]
              United Kingdom – Isle of Wight[103]
14.         The Isle of Wight, off the UK’s south coast is test project for hydrogen fuel technology in a £ 4,660,000 project led
by energy storage and clean fuel company ITM Power.  £ 1,300,000 of the budget
is financed by a grant from the government-backed Technology Strategy Board.
15.         The project will design,
build, install and operate two grid-connected hydrogen refuelling platforms on
the Isle of Wight. A 15kg/day refueller will be used in a marine capacity
located on the south coast of the Island, and a larger 100kg/day unit will be
installed on a centrally located business park for the operation of a fleet of
hydrogen vehicles including Hyundai, Microcab and River Simple. Vehicles
showcased will include Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle (FCEV) cars, Hydrogen
Internal Combustion Engine (HICE) vans and a HICE boat. ITM Power will design
and build two refuellers and take a key role in the system integration.
16.         The Technology Strategy
Board is also sponsoring five other projects which include an end-to-end, green
hydrogen production, distribution and retailing system in London, a
wind-powered hydrogen generation system in Aberdeen to serve a fleet of fuel
cell buses and two solar-generated hydrogen projects in Swindon and Surrey.
17.         The Isle of Wight is part
of the Ecoisland project – a community-based initiative aiming to make the Isle of Wight self-sustaining by the end of the decade. The island will be home to a
hydrogen energy production, storage and vehicle refuelling system, which will
be integrated into the existing power network.
              United Kingdom – London[104]“Hydrogen network”
18.         In March 2010, the Mayor of
London announced the creation of a “Hydrogen network” by 2012, in order to help
accelerate the wider use of this zero-polluting, zero-carbon energy in the
capital. The London Hydrogen Partnership (LHP) is working with London boroughs and private landowners on plans to deliver at least six refuelling sites to
run hydrogen-powered vehicles in the capital over the next two years. One is
already being built in east London for the refuelling of hydrogen-fuelled buses
that will begin running on the RV1 route later this year. 
19.         One of the objectives of
the action plan is to encourage a minimum of 150 hydrogen-powered vehicles on
the road in London by 2012. This includes cars, vans, taxis, motorbikes, and
lorries. Fifty of the vehicles are expected to be operated by the Greater
London Authority’s functional bodies – Transport for London (TfL); the London
Development Agency (LDA); the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority
(LFEPA); and the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA). The London Hydrogen
Partnership and the Greater London Authority are also working with BAA on a
hydrogen feasibility study to explore ways to use hydrogen and fuel cell
technologies at Heathrow airport. 
              United Kingdom – London (part of the HyTEC project)
20.         The HyTEC project (Hydrogen
Transport in European Cities), which is co-funded by the European Union, will
deploy up to 15 London black fuel cell taxis, five fuel cell scooters and a new
H2 refuelling station operational in London by 2013.
21.         The first hydrogen-powered
taxis are now ready to operate and they will be used to transport VIPs during
the Olympic period, and will be fuelled at Air Products’ new fuelling station
at Heathrow airport. Copenhagen will be receiving ten fuel cell electric
vehicles (FCEV).[105] Also a hydrogen fuelling station is finalized in time for the
Olympic Games. 
              Denmark – Copenhagen (part of the HyTEC project)
22.         The vision of the city of Copenhagen is to become carbon neutral by 2025. It has adopted a new climate plan including
a target of 85% of the municipality vehicle fleet by 2015 to be powered by
electric propulsion systems (battery and/or hydrogen). The deployment of the
passenger vehicles of the HyTEC project fits in perfectly with this ambitious
goal and plan.
23.         A new publicly accessible
Central-Copenhagen refuelling station network, able to accommodate a minimum of
200 kg/day (across the network) 700 bar hydrogen refuelling according to SAE
specifications. The city network is to be linked with other major cities in Denmark, contributing to the efforts of securing a countrywide station network beyond 2015.[106]
              The Scandinavian Hydrogen
  Highway Partnership (SHHP)[107]
24.         The SHHP is a partnership
between local, regional and national authorities and private industries and
research institutions. The national networking institutions are: HyNor (Norway), Hydrogen Sweden (Sweden) and Hydrogen Link (Denmark). 
25.         The objective of the SHHP
is to make the Scandinavian region one of the first regions in Europe where hydrogen is commercially available and used in a network of refuelling
stations. 
26.         The target by 2015 is to
create a Hydrogen Refuelling Stations (HRS) network that includes: 
27.         15 stations
28.         30 satellite stations 
29.         and a large fleet of
vehicles: 100 buses, 500 cars and 500 speciality vehicles. 
              
              LNG 
30.         In the following, some of
the national initiatives and policies implemented for the deployment of LNG
infrastructure, together with industry-led action, are described.  
              
              The Netherlands – Green Deal LNG[108]
31.         In June 2012, the
representatives of the Dutch government (Minister of Economic Affairs,
Agriculture and Innovation and the Secretary of State), the Rotterdam Port
Authority and their partners (3TU, VSL, TNO, Energy Valley, Deltalinqs), have
signed the agreement “Green Deal LNG”. The main goal of the LNG Green Deal is
to make the inland shipping, fisheries and marine more sustainable through the
use of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) as fuel.
32.         The Green Deal focuses on
two specific areas: the Wadden and North Sea area and the Rhine between Rotterdam and Basel, including Amsterdam and Vlissingen. In both areas, initiatives are
being developed, such as the LNG ferry owned by shipping company Doeksen between
Harlingen and Terschelling, petrol station “Green Planet” in Pesse where an LNG
tank infrastructure will be installed for heavy trucks and two Anthony Veder
ethylene vessels, which will run between England and the European continent. 
              The Netherlands – The National LNG Platform[109]
33.         The government also
established the National LNG Platform. The Platform has a “50-50-500 objective”:
at least 50 barges, 50 sea-going vessels and 500 trucks running on LNG by 2015.
Initiators of the Platform are the two areas: the Wadden Sea-North Sea and the
Rhine region from Rotterdam to Basel, Switzerland, which will include the
cities of Amsterdam and Vlissingen, unified in Energy Valley (the energy
cluster in the north of the Netherlands) and Deltalinqs (the business
organization representing companies in the port of Rotterdam, part of the
Rotterdam Climate Initiative). In addition, LNG TR&D (collaboration between
3TU, VSL and TNO). 
              Danube Region Masterplan[110]
34.         The Danube region is
preparing a Masterplan for the introduction of LNG as fuel and as cargo for Danube navigation. One of the targets of the EU Danube Strategy is the modernisation of the
 Danube fleet in order to improve environmental and economic performance.
Switching from gasoil to LNG as fuel will have a contribution to this goal. 
35.         The Masterplan will
investigate the benefits of implementing LNG as fuel and as cargo for the Danube fleet and identify obstacles and costs. It will develop a comprehensive strategy
together with a detailed master plan for the necessary implementation steps. 
36.         The budget for the
Masterplan is € 1,250,000 and around € 10-15,000,000 will be allocated for
Pilot Implementations (2013 onwards). The project is financed by the Structural
Funds, IPA, ENPI, TEN-T and by financial contributions from related private
industry.
37.         The project partners are: a
consortium made up by barging companies, port and terminal operators,
shipyards, government authorities, vessel classification societies, gas
industry, key stakeholders for LNG use, LNG technology providers (storage, carriage,
transhipment), and engine providers. 
              Belgium – LNG study[111]
38.         The Flemish government and
the port authorities signed a contract with Det Norske Veritas AS (DNV) to
undertake a feasibility study for the provision of liquefied natural gas (LNG)
bunkering facilities at the ports of Antwerp, Zeebrugge and Ghent in Belgium. The work will consist of a market survey, a risk and safety analysis, and
modeling of the logistics, legal and regulatory requirements needed to
establish LNG bunkering infrastructure at the ports.
              Belgium – Port of Antwerp[112]
39.         Port of Antwerp is part of the International Association of Ports and Harbours (IAPH), within the World
Ports Climate Initiative. The association organize workshops for port members
on LNG and for the new workshop the Port of Antwerp was asked to be the lead
port. In the last workshop on LNG several ports participated: ports of Amsterdam,  Bremen, Brunsbüttel, Frederikstad, Gothenburg, Hamburg, Los Angeles, Oslo, Rotterdam and Stockholm, as well as the classification bureaus Det Norske Veritas
(DNV) and Germanischer Lloyd (GL-group) and the gas company Gasnor.
              Appendix 5: Existing and expected alternative fuels
infrastructure in the EU 
Figure 1: Public charging points in the
main urban areas of the EU[113]
Figure 2: Illustrative overview of announced
plans of Member States for the deployment of charging points by 2020[114]
Figure
3: Existing and planned hydrogen fuelling stations in the EU[115]
Figure 4: Existing LNG terminals and L-CNG
fuelling stations in the EU[116]
              Appendix
6: The root causes of the
insufficiency of the infrastructure for alternative fuels – Fuel-by-fuel
analysis
Existing
recharging/recharging equipment cannot be connected and is not interoperable in
all related alternative fuel vehicles/vessels
Electricity
1.           In June 2010, the
Commission mandated[117] three standardisation organisations, the European Committee for
Standardisation (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
(CENELEC) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to
develop European standards or to review existing ones in order to ensure
interoperability and connectivity between the electricity supply and the EVs,
including appropriate smart-charging issues[118], so
that the charger can be connected and be interoperable in all vehicles. This
work has not been concluded yet as no consensus was found to select either Type
2 or Type 3 EV charging socket (Figure ), which are both standardised under the same catalogue number
62196-2 of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). This current
failure of voluntary standardisation can be principally traced back to vested
industrial interests. 
               
Figure 5:
Three types of EV charging sockets[119]
2.           This situation led to, on
the one hand, the deployment of both charging sockets at the same time with
France deploying Type 3 and other Member States deploying Type 2 sockets (Figure ), on the other hand, the delay by
certain countries to deploy charging infrastructure at all. Stakeholders have
repeatedly called for ending this deadlock, fearing that “this situation is
not beneficial to e-mobility development”[120]. 
Figure
6: Choice of socket in various Member States[121]
              
              Hydrogen
1.                      
The International Organization for
Standardization (ISO)[122] and the Society of Automobile Engineers (SAE)[123] have developed standards on hydrogen refuelling interface, hydrogen
fuel quality, and hydrogen refuelling station safety. Some of them are being revised,
such as ISO standards on gaseous hydrogen fuelling
stations and on gaseous hydrogen land vehicle refuelling connection devices. The existing standards are currently applied voluntarily, and
stakeholders have confirmed that although they are already instrumental in
supporting deployment and gaining acceptance, their legislative establishment
would be important. 
Natural Gas (LNG and CNG)
LNG
Currently, for road vehicles, there are
different LNG fuelling systems as LNG vehicle manufacturers use different
engine inlet pressures. This has led the market to the existence of LNG storage
tanks working at different pressures. This makes necessary for the refuelling
infrastructure to be able to adapt to different existing systems. 
1.                      
Work is on-going within the ISO International
Organization for Standardization for the development of LNG/L-CNG refuelling
station standards and on LNG connectors and receptacles[124]. 
2.                      
For international shipping,
in addition to on-going work at Technical Committee 67 of the ISO, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) is developing an international code
for the construction and equipment of ships carrying LNG (IGC Code). The IMO
has also started work on a new international code on safety for gas-fuelled ships
(IGF Code). In addition and complementing ISO and IMO, the Society of
International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGGTO)
and the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) are also working on
international standards, including for LNG bunkering and related port
operations. 
CNG
3.                      
Currently, there is no EU
applicable CEN standard for the build-up of CNG vehicles refuelling
infrastructure. In the past, a process was created with the intention to fill
this gap, and CEN worked over six years to prepare the prEN 13638 2007, project
standard that had to be cancelled on its final approval step, as unanimity
could not be achieved.
4.                      
This fact has led to
different countries creating national standards on this topic in order to
answer the market demands. Some countries like Spain (UNE 60631), adopted this
draft CEN standard as the national standard to follow in their territory.
5.                      
ISO has recently created a
new committee covering all the necessary aspects (design, construction,
operation, maintenance and inspection) for CNG refuelling infrastructure. This
committee is the TC/ 252 which is divided in two sub-groups separately dealing
with the CNG and LNG/LCNG standards (ISO/WD 16923 and ISO/WD 16924
respectively). This committee is aiming at having the ISO standard ready by the
second half of 2014.- Fuelling Stations: ISO/TC 252 is working on an
international standard for fuelling stations for NGVs. The WG1 is dealing with
the CNG standard, and the WG 2 with the LNG & L-CNG standard. Target date
to deliver is mid-2015.
Investment uncertainty hinders the
deployment of recharging/refuelling infrastructure for electricity, hydrogen
and LNG
              Electricity
1.                      
Electricity recharging infrastructure is
characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and risk. As regards electricity,
the investment consists of building recharging points. The costs per smart[125] private charging point can be estimated to be around € 520; while
for a publicly accessible charging point it is approximately € 5,280[126].
Figure 7: Estimates for
investment and installation cost for single charging outlets[127]
2.                      
Public charging points need to be smart, in the
sense that there is controlled charging and vehicle-to-grid communication, in
order to ensure that the impact on the grid is manageable, to ensure adequate
billing and to ensure that the charging of EVs can contribute to grid
flexibility. In particular, the price for electricity at a charging point needs
to be able to reflect the electricity price in the wholesale market at the time
of charging, i.e. the price for electricity in that particular period (e.g. a
price per every 15 minutes)[128]. 
3.                      
In addition, the existing grid will
simultaneously require investment in sub-stations, in local stationary storage,
in smart metering and in advanced control systems, in order to improve the
balancing of demand and supply, to address grid congestion and peak shaving and
to stabilise the voltage and the development of the electricity grid at large[129]. This is necessary as the use of the grid for EVs will be an
additional demand for transport of electricity through the grid. Obviously, the
additional demand for electricity from EVs will depend on the quantity of vehicles,
their use, and the type of charging (slow or fast), and on local circumstances
and current status of the electricity grid. 
4.                      
From an institutional perspective, the entities
investing in recharging infrastructure will need to cooperate with the
electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) and the grid owners. Fast
charging points seem to be the most risky investments as they require high
initial capital and their utilisation rates are difficult to foresee. Although
the slow charging stations have lower unit costs, the relative short ranges of EVs
imply that the charging infrastructure needs to initially develop with a
sufficient density to incite consumers using such vehicles, and thus ensure
utilisation rates that lead to a reasonable payback period.
5.                      
These requirements imply that the initial amount
of investment is substantial and has to take place before having certainty
about the size of the EV fleet. Investors might need to impose a mark-up on the
electricity price in order to recuperate their investment[130].
Hydrogen
1.                      
Hydrogen refuelling infrastructure is
characterised by an even higher degree of uncertainty and risk. The case of
hydrogen implies building a production, transportation, distribution and
retailing infrastructure, which do not exist today to the extent necessary for
penetration in the transport sector. Consequently, the amount of initial
investment is high. According to the Expert Group on Future Transport Fuels,
the average capital cost of a hydrogen refilling station ranges from € 0.6-1.6
million.
2.                      
From an institutional and business perspective,
the transportation and distribution infrastructure has features similar to
natural gas (e.g. with respect to regulation), whereas the retailing
infrastructure can be handled on a pure private basis as the conventional pump
stations. Studies show that, while the transportation of hydrogen can be done
using trucks at the early stages of infrastructure development, the high
capital cost of the hydrogen retailing stations and the (un)certainty of the
utilisation rates are key factors for the viability of the investment. 
Natural Gas (LNG and CNG)
1.                      
The recovery of investment cost of an LNG
bunkering facility station highly depends on the use of LNG as a fuel by
shipowners. Such choice for LNG as alternative fuel is induced by two factors:
the need for ships to reduce in particular sulphur emissions and the cost
savings due to using LNG instead of oil. 
2.                      
According to an analysis undertaken by a recent
TEN-T co-financed study[131], the investment cost is around 15,000,000 € for small scale,
purpose-built LNG bunkering facility. The payback period for a local LNG
bunkering infrastructure is expected to range between 8-15 years (allowing for
lower LNG prices when choosing longer payback periods). The economies of scale
prevail in the economics of LNG bunkering infrastructure investment and the
demand for LNG. This implies that the higher the capacity of the terminal (m3),
the lower the specific tank cost (€/m3 LNG). Similarly higher demand
for LNG at a particular refuelling station can reduce the unit costs. Both may
reduce the payback period. 
3.                      
As for LNG/ CNG fuelling stations, the investors
face higher upfront initial costs compared to a conventional petrol station, in
the range of 200,000-400,000 €[132]. For new dedicated LNG fuelling stations, in particular those that
will be developed on inland waterways, it is assumed that LNG will be supplied
to the fuelling stations in liquid form, and therefore will not interact with
the natural gas transmission network. 
              Appendix 7: Detailed pre-screening of possible policy
options
Possible combinations of soft and
strict regulatory approaches
1.           All possible combinations
of soft and strict regulatory approaches are shown in Table 4 below.
Table
4: Overview of the
preliminary policy options
 Operational objective 1 Operational objective 2 || No EU intervention || Voluntary standardisation || Mandatory application of common standards 
 No EU intervention || Preliminary Policy Option (PPO) 1 || PPO2 || PPO3 
 Indicative targets at Member States level and industry self-regulation || PPO4 || PPO5 || PPO6 
 Binding targets at Member States level || PPO7 || PPO8 || PPO9 
2.           As a result of the
evaluation of stakeholder and expert input, four preliminary policy options
were selected for further analysis that reflect the whole range of possible
combination of soft and strict regulatory approaches: PPO1, PPO5, PPO6 and
PPO9. The remaining preliminary policy options were discarded for not being
capable of simultaneously achieving the specific objectives 1 and 2:
·       
Providing the investors with certainty on
technical standards would not be sufficient to create a business case for
infrastructure in the absence of sufficient demand for vehicles, nor would be enough
to drive consumer demand before the recharging/refuelling network is actually
in place (PPO2, PPO3). Conversely, quantitative targets on the deployment of
infrastructure would not automatically harmonise the required technical
standards (PPO4, PPO7);
·       
while it is theoretically possible to apply
stricter policy measures to address the coordination failure causing investment
uncertainty, it does not appear reasonable to do so without an appropriate
level of harmonisation in the ‘quality’ of infrastructure to be deployed (PPO4,
PPO7, PPO8).
Possible combinations of the various
fuels
3.           The combination of various
policy approaches as described above can be taken forward to apply to the three
fuels (and in case of LNG, either to vessels and/or to heavy-duty vehicles
(HDVs)) in differing degrees. All possible combinations with the selected
preliminary policy options are shown on Table 5, except for those that are strongly
interlinked: the deployment of LNG for HDVs is not feasible without the prior
or parallel deployment of LNG for vessels.
Table 5: Overview of the possible combinations of
the various fuels
   || Electricity || Electricity & Hydrogen || Electricity & Hydrogen & LNG for vessels || Electricity & Hydrogen & LNG for vessels & LNG for trucks & CNG for vehicles || Electricity & LNG for vessels || Electricity & LNG for vessels & LNG for trucks & CNG for vehicles || Hydrogen || Hydrogen & LNG for vessels || Hydrogen & LNG for vessels & LNG for trucks & CNG for vehicles || LNG for vessels || LNG for vessels & LNG for trucks & CNG for vehicles || LNG for trucks & CNG for vehicles 
   || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 5 || 6 || 7 || 8 || 9 || 10 || 11 || 12 
 PPO1 || Fuel combination (FC) 1 || FC2 || FC3 || FC4 || FC5 || FC6 || FC7 || FC8 || FC9 || FC10 || FC11 || FC12 
 PPO5 || FC13 || FC14 || FC15 || FC16 || FC17 || FC18 || FC19 || FC20 || FC21 || FC22 || FC23 || FC24 
 PPO6 || FC25 || FC26 || FC27 || FC28 || FC29 || FC30 || FC31 || FC32 || FC33 || FC34 || FC35 || FC36 
 PPO9 || FC37 || FC38 || FC39 || FC40 || FC41 || FC42 || FC43 || FC44 || FC45 || FC46 || FC47 || FC48 
4.           The
number of possible combinations is very large, however most of them would
violate technological neutrality and would strongly favour the deployment of
one specific fuel over the other technologies. This possible course of action
was rejected by stakeholders in the consultation process, is not consistent
with previous Commission analysis and policy documents and is not warranted by
any clear technical or economic superiority of any particular technology.
5.           Technological
neutrality is only ensured in combinations where all fuels, which face the
problems identified in Section 2, of the IA are covered. Hence, the combinations
in columns 1-3 and 5-12 are discarded, and only FC4, FC16, FC28 and FC40 are
taken forward.
6.           In
spite of this, it is possible to address all fuels, but with a differing of
policy intervention as envisaged under the preliminary policy options. The
possible ‘packages’ of fuel combinations are highlighted in Table 5, and are as follows:
·       
Fuel Package I (FC7 + FC12 + FC17): together
with voluntary standardisation, indicative targets would be set only for
electricity and LNG for vessels, but there would be no EU action on hydrogen, LNG
for trucks and CNG for vehicles.
·       
Fuel Package II (FC6 + FC19): together with
voluntary standardisation, indicative targets would be set only for hydrogen,
but there would be no EU action on electricity and natural gas (LNG and CNG).
·       
Fuel Package III (FC31 + FC36 + FC41): together
with mandatory application of common standards for all fuels, mandatory targets
would be set only for electricity and LNG for vessels. Indicative targets would
apply for hydrogen and LNG for trucks and CNG for vehicles.
·       
Fuel Package IV (FC30 + FC43): together with
mandatory application of common standards for all fuels, mandatory targets
would be set only for hydrogen. Indicative targets would apply for electricity
and natural gas (LNG and CNG).
7.           Out
of these 8 technologically-neutral combinations, four (FC4, FC16, FC40 and Fuel
Package III) have been selected for further analysis. The remaining four
combinations (FC28, Fuel Packages I, II and IV) were discarded for the
following reasons:
·       
It is unjustified to apply a stricter regulatory
approach to fuels and technological solutions that are in an earlier stage of
technological maturity (Fuel Package II and IV). 
·       
Mandatory application of standards coupled with
industry self-regulation for all alternative fuel infrastructure (FC28) will
not be effective due to the very large number of industries that would need to
be involved and come to a consensus: fuel suppliers, electricity providers,
vehicle manufacturers, equipment manufacturers and mobility service providers.
The stakeholder consultation[133] confirmed that the likelihood of vested interests in certain
technologies preventing cross-industry agreements would be very high. 
              Appendix 8: Possible legislative formulations in the
Policy Options 
1.           Addressing
problem driver 1 (“Existing recharging/refuelling equipment cannot be connected
and is not interoperable in all related alternative fuel vehicles/vessels”):
·       
All recharging stations for electric vehicles should [PO2] / shall [PO3, PO4] be compliant with the technical standards no later than from 2015,
2.           All
hydrogen refuelling facilities for road transport vehicles should [PO2] /
shall [PO3, PO4] be compliant with the technical standards no later than
from 2015.
3.           All
LNG refuelling facilities for waterborne vessels should [PO2] / shall [PO3,
PO4] be compliant with the technical standards no later than from 2015.
4.           All LNG refuelling
facilities for trucks and CNG for vehicles should
[PO2] / shall [PO3, PO4] be
compliant with the technical standards no later than from 2015.
5.           Addressing
problem driver 2 (“Investment uncertainty hinders the deployment of
recharging/refuelling infrastructure for electricity, hydrogen and natural gas
(LNG and CNG)”):
6.           Member
States should [PO3] / shall [PO3, PO4] ensure that a minimum number of
recharging points for electric vehicles are established according to the
targets set for each Member State no later than by 2020. At least 10% of this
minimum number of recharging points shall be publicly accessible recharging
points.
Table 6: Minimum number of electric
vehicle charging points in each Member State (in thousands)
 MS || Number of charging points || Number of publicly accessible charging points 
 BE || 207 || 21 
 BG || 69 || 7 
 CZ || 129 || 13 
 DK || 54 || 5 
 DE || 1503 || 150 
 EE || 12 || 1 
 IE || 22 || 2 
 EL || 128 || 13 
 ES || 824 || 82 
 FR || 969 || 97 
 IT || 1255 || 125 
 CY || 20 || 2 
 LV || 17 || 2 
 LT || 41 || 4 
 LU || 14 || 1 
 HU || 68 || 7 
 MT || 10 || 1 
 NL || 321 || 32 
 AT || 116 || 12 
 PL || 460 || 46 
 PT || 123 || 12 
 RO || 101 || 10 
 SI || 26 || 3 
 SK || 36 || 4 
 FI || 71 || 7 
 SE || 145 || 14 
 UK || 1221 || 122 
 HR || 38 || 4 
7.           Member
States should [PO2, PO3] / shall [PO4] ensure that existing hydrogen
refuelling stations are connected via the Trans-European Transport Core Network
(TEN-T) with a maximum distance of 300 km between stations, no later than by
2020.
8.           Member
States should [PO2] / shall [PO3, PO4] ensure that LNG refuelling
facilities for waterborne vessels are established in all maritime ports of the
TEN-T Core Network no later than by 2020.
9.           Member
States should [PO2] / shall [PO3, PO4] ensure that LNG refuelling
facilities for waterborne vessels are established in all inland ports of the
TEN-T Core Network, which are located on one of the corridors identified in the
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the
Connecting Europe, no later than by 2020.
1.                      
Member States should [PO2, PO3] / shall [PO4]
ensure that a minimum number of publicly accessible LNG refuelling stations for
trucks are established along the principal motorways of the TEN-T Core Network,
identified as being parallel to one of the corridors identified in the
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the
Connecting Europe Facility no later than by 2020. The maximum distance between
the refuelling stations should be 400 km. In addtion, CNG
publicly accessible refuelling points are available, with maximum distances of
150 km, to allow the circulation of CNG vehicles Union-wide by 2020.
Table 7: Overview of regulatory approaches in the
policy options
 Policy Option || 2 || 3 || 4 
 Problem driver 1 || Soft (“should”) || Strict (“shall”) || Strict (“shall”) 
 Problem driver 2 || Soft (“should”) || Soft (“should”) / Strict (“shall”) || Strict (“shall”) 
              Appendix 9: Illustration of possible implementation
measures
Protection of first mover investors
on infrastructure
1.           First mover investors, and
- to a smaller extent - follower investors, are confronted with high upfront
costs and uncertain payback times for investments due to the low diffusion of
alternative fuel vehicles and vessels and, consequently, the initially slack
demand for alternative fuels.
2.           Moreover, first mover
investors run the risk of losing some of their future profits to market players
who will enter the market at a later stage when the demand for the marketed
product consolidates, and uncertainty on financial viability is reduced. Such a
risk discourages first movers’ investments. The policy instruments that have
been identified as adapt to protect first investors are:
The granting of exclusivity rights to
first mover investors
3.           An example of how
exclusivity rights protected first investors is that of telecommunications.
Market entry for mobile communications has been initially facilitated by a
policy granting licenses only to few potential investors. The aim was to
tolerate oligopoly rents at a certain extent as a means of ensuring that
service prices above marginal costs would be sufficient to recover upfront
investment. This was justified by the market circumstances in the initial
phases of mobile communications characterised by high uncertainty about future
demand for mobile telecommunications.
Awarding concessions
4.           Concessions in ports are
granted by the port authority (usually public body or corporatized public
entity) to private investors in order to operate the port terminal efficiently.
The investor uses and improves (maintains, repairs) the infrastructure provided
by the port authority and further invests in superstructure (equipment for handling
the cargo). Port authorities can make joint investments with the private
operators in port related infrastructure like barge and rail terminals.
Direct
public financial support
5.           Funding support is
necessary to lower the risk premium, calculated based on the initial capital
costs for alternative fuel infrastructure, which are generally higher than
those for petroleum-based fuels due to the lack of economies of scale on the
side of alternative fuelling equipment manufacturers, and the expected
financial returns. Direct public financial support can take various forms such
as grant loans or loan guarantees and public-private partnerships (PPPs).
Incentives are not a standalone instrument and further instruments are
necessary.
Public
guarantees
6.           These measures are
dedicated to the implementation of infrastructure with high risks of
non-profit. Public guarantees can lower the risk of financing the
infrastructure by guaranteeing loans or guarantees in the form of state aid.
Specifically, public guarantees can assist the investor in obtaining a loan in
better financial terms.
The use of public procurement
7.           Public procurement allows
for risk sharing. Public procurement contracts for the introduction of
alternative fuels through public fleets would mean that the technology would
first be trialled through publicly financed demonstration projects and in case
it failed commercially the loss would be compensated to the investor.
              
Measures to promote alternative fuels
The example of Sweden: renewable fuel obligation on filling stations
8.           Ethanol 85 was introduced in
  Sweden in 2006 on the grounds of the “pump law”, where the government, the
national car manufacturers and the oil companies cooperated in an efficient
way. The law obliged all filling stations selling more than 3000 cubic meters
of fuel per year to supply at least one kind of renewable fuel. Due to lower
capital cost required for biofuels infrastructure, most petrol stations added
additional outlets for E85 instead of biogas, which would have required higher
investments, and arguably would have been more socially beneficial on the
medium and long-term. In parallel, the government gave incentives to consumers
to purchase flex-fuel cars, in order to facilitate the economic viability of
such infrastructure investments. This resulted in increased use of E85 as a
transportation fuel.
The
example of France: introduction of national targets[134]
9.           National targets of 4.4
million charging points supported by national laws adopted in July 2010 and
July 2011. 
10.         “Grenelle II Law” from July
12th, 2010 sets requirements for every newly built residential complex (at
least two residential units) with securised parking spaces or an individual
parking garage to be equipped with cables, cable ducts and safety equipment
needed to install charging electrical outlets for electric or plug-in hybrid
vehicle as long as the request for building permit is submitted after January
1st 2012.
11.         The law also sets a modification
of co-ownership rules in condominiums already built obliging the co-owners
assembly to put the topic of works to allow recharging of electric or plug-in
hybrid vehicles on its agenda and the decision to install the recharging
station shall be a majority vote of all co-owners. Also, the owner or the
building management of a residential complex cannot object to a request of a
lessee regarding the installation of charging infrastructure without “a serious
and legitimate reason“.
12.         According to this law,
already built office buildings used mainly as workplace and with parking lots
for employees’ cars must be equipped with charging infrastructure before
January 1st 2015. 
13.         The national law from July
2011[135] requires at least 10% of existing individual parking spaces (with
minimum of at last 1) to be equipped with independent electric lines to low
charging points in condominiums for which the building permit was submitted
after January 1st 2012 and in existing buildings from January 2015.
14.         For newly built office
buildings (i.e. those whose request for building permit was submitted after January
1st 2012) the law obliges the owner to electrify the car park and to design all
or some of the spaces to allow charging stations on a minimum of 10% of all
spaces.
15.         For “existing buildings”
(i.e. those for which a request for building permit was submitted before
January 1st 2012), the law obliges the owner to install charging stations to
cover at least 10 % of the parking spaces in urban areas with more than 50,000
inhabitants, 5 % in other cases, provided that the building and car park is
owned and occupied by one and the same person.
The
example of Estonia: the electromobility programme (2010)[136]
16.         In March 2011, the
Government of Estonia signed a contract with Mitsubishi Corporation for the
sale of 10 million AAUs to start the Estonian electromobility programme.
Besides achieving better city environment, energy efficiency and fuel
independence, the government of Estonia also recognised the opportunity for
positive branding to become the first demo-country in the world to be using
innovative technologies and covering the whole territory with quick electric
charging points. 
17.         Programme is fully financed
by the Mitsubishi Corporation and consists of three pillars:
18.         In
May 2012, 507 Mitsubishi iMiev electric cars were given in use to different public
sector organisations as an example and to promote electric cars (most of these
are used by social workers all over Estonia, but also by the police and air
force for example).
19.          In
July 2011, an incentive scheme was introduced for private and corporate
pucharses buying an electric car. The purpose of the grant is to decrease the
pollution load of transport. 50% or up to € 18,000 of the cost of the car is
compensated, plus € 1,000 is provided for the installation of a charger at home
or office. Eligibility date for the grant scheme is the end of 2012 and the
goal of the scheme is to provide grant for approx. 500 cars. 
20.         The
goal of selling 500 electric cars with the purchase grant already by the end of
2012 turned out to be too ambitious. As of October 2012, 94 purchase grant
applications have been submitted (75 grants have been awarded). Also in July,
government gave an authorisation to sign amendments to the contract with
Mitsubishi Corporation to prolong support scheme until the end of 2014.
21.         With
the proposed amendment of July 2012, the selection the plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles would be also added. The grant amount for plug-in hybrids shall be up
to 30% of the purchase price, but not more than 12,000 euros per vehicle. The
more detailed terms are being presently developed. 
22.          A
quick charging infrastructure for electric cars will be created to cover the
whole country by the end of 2012 to ensure sufficient freedom of movement for
all users of electric cars. There will be 163 quick charging points with the
distance not more than 40-60 km between them. The network will be covering all
roads with intense traffic, settlements with population over 5000 inhabitants
and ports serving local and international travel. The chargers will be built in
locations where people would move anyway – petrol stations, shopping centres,
parking lots, banks etc. It is expected that while finishing the quick charging
infrastructure by the end of the 2012, the grant scheme will also be fully
exhausted.
23.         As
part of the programme an extensive survey of user experience of electric cars
is planned. 
The example of Bulgaria
24.                  
Bulgarian government started
drafting the national action plan aimed at promoting the development of
sustainable transport, including electric mobility in Bulgaria, for the period 2012–2014 in the beginning of 2012 and it was submitted to the
Council of Ministers in August 2012[137]. The legislation intended to introduce a
preference for electric car owners – free parking in all cities, as well as the
opportunity for those vehicles to drive in the bus lanes. Additional stimulus
for electric vehicle owners in Bulgaria has been proposed by ministers, like
offering value-added-tax, local tax and registration fees exemptions and also
from the obligation of buying a vignette. 
25.                  
In Sofia several charging stations are in the
process of being installed by the company FullCharger in cooperation with the
street lighting company and the electric utility company CEZ. As of October
2012, there a total of ten charging stations in Sofia and one station in
Dobrich installed by FullCharger[138].
26.                  
For the near future, plans for the con­struc­tion
of a grid of 150-200 charg­ing points by end 2012 in Sofia and big Bul­gar­i­an
cit­ies are under way. The next two years will see install­ing charg­ing sta­tions
along high­ways and inter­city roads. City of Dobrich will be another
municipality promoting electromobility[139].
There is a goal of building 20 charging stations in Dobrich. Even though the
initiative in Dobrich came from FullCharger, the city government have also
showed their fully supportive role. 
The example of the Czech Republic
27.                  
The environmental initiative
“FutureMotion” (20,000,000 € budget until 2012), which initiated in Prague in
2009 by CEZ, the Czech energy production and service company, among other
things focuses research on electric cars, and the development of smart grids[140]. The task of CEZ is to set up the charging
infrastructure and provide the necessary energy to the customers. The motor
company Peugeot has joined in providing 100 cars for testing and promotion of
electric vehicles. 
28.                  
First charging stations were
installed on 2010. CEZ plans to install 200 public stations by 2013. The
stations will be not only in Prague but also in Central Moravia, South Moravia,
West and East Bohemia.
29.                  
Besides CEZ, there has been
a significant promotion of electric cars also by other major regional power
companies like E-ON and Prazska Energetika[141].
The example of Austria: support to natural gas vehicles and filling stations
30.                  
Austria has supported
the market introduction of natural gas vehicles and through the program “klima:aktiv”,
in the frame of the Austrian climate strategy. One of the targets of this
program is to reduce CO2 emissions from the transport sector. The purchase of
the natural gas vehicles is supported by up to 30% of the investment costs. The
program also includes a financial support for building CNG filling stations
(10,000 euro per pump). The design, construction, installation and operation of
a natural gas vehicles filling station is described in the regulation ÖVGW G97,
Feb 2008 (Revised 2010), published by the Austrian Association for Gas and
Water. The natural gas quality as well as the quality of biomethane is
regulated in the quality standards ÖVGW G31 and G33.
National Innovation Programmes
The case of Germany
31.         As part of the National
Innovation Program for Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology (NIP), Germany’s federal government and industrial sector are investing more than 40 million euros
to expand the country’s network of hydrogen filling stations from currently 15 to
50. The total funding for the National Innovation Programme will be 700 M€ for
ten years.
32.         The infrastructure
expansion plan focuses on the country’s metropolitan regions and the creation
of corridors connecting these metropolitan regions. The network of hydrogen
filling stations accompanies the commercialization of fuel cell vehicles that
the automobile industry has announced for 2014/15.
33.         The project “Clean Energy
Partnership- CEP” continues the activities carried out under the EU project
“Hyfleet-Cute”. CEP is one of the largest hydrogen demonstration projects in
the world, is the main lighthouse project, and comprises deployments of
passenger vehicles, buses, infrastructure, and sustainable production and
delivery in several cities throughout Germany. The project currently involves
15 partners including international automotive companies, energy companies, and
public transportation providers, and is focused on validating the technologies
under real-world conditions. Vehicles from seven different manufacturers (BMW,
Daimler, Ford, GM/Opel, Honda, Toyota, Volkswagen, and soon Hyundai) are being
used in everyday operation by real customers and fuelled at stations that are
integrated with the existing refuelling stations and open to the public. The
project also incorporates hydrogen buses serving actual customers within public
transit networks. 
The case of the United Kingdom
34.         In January 2012, the
Department for Business Innovation and Skills launched the project UKH2
Mobility in partnership with the industry. The Government is investing £ 400 million
to support the development, demonstration and deployment of hydrogen vehicles.
The project will evaluate the potential for hydrogen as a fuel for Ultra Low
Carbon Vehicles in the UK before developing an action plan for an anticipated
roll-out to consumers in 2014/15. 
Set-up of alternative fuels’ networks
The case of London
35.         In March 2010, the Mayor of
London announced the creation of a “Hydrogen network” by 2012, in order to help
accelerate the wider use of this zero-polluting, zero-carbon energy in the
capital. The London Hydrogen Partnership (LHP) is working with London boroughs and private landowners on plans to deliver at least six refuelling sites to
run hydrogen-powered vehicles in the capital over the next two years. One is
already being built in east London for the refuelling of hydrogen-fuelled buses
that will begin running on the RV1 route later this year.
              Appendix 10: Results of illustrative economic
modelling 
Business-as-usual developments 
Overall description 
1.           The Commission has carried
out an analysis of possible future developments in a scenario at unchanged
policies, the so-called baseline scenario or ‘Reference scenario’. This ‘Reference
scenario’ was used in the following Impact Assessments (IAs):
(1)              
the IA accompanying the White Paper - Roadmap to
a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient
transport system[142];

(2)              
the IA accompanying A Roadmap for moving to a
competitive low carbon economy in 2050[143];
and 
(3)              
the IA accompanying the Energy Roadmap 2050[144].

2.           Accordingly, the
‘Reference scenario’ has been extensively described in:
(1)              
the IA accompanying the White Paper - Roadmap to
a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient
transport system, Appendix 3 (pages 130-152). The list of policy measures
included in the ‘Reference scenario’ is provided in Appendix 4: Inventory of
policy measures relevant for the transport sector included in the 2050
Reference scenario (pages 153-155).
(2)              
the IA accompanying A Roadmap for moving to a
competitive low carbon economy in 2050.
(3)              
the IA accompanying the Energy Roadmap 2050,
Part A of Annex 1, which describes assumptions, results and sensitivities with
respect to the Reference scenario (pages 49-97)[145].
3.           The ‘Reference scenario’
is a projection of developments in the absence of new policies beyond those
adopted by March 2010. In order to take into account the most recent
developments, such as higher energy prices and additional policies on
infrastructure and energy taxation adopted by November 2011, an additional
scenario (Scenario 1) has been modelled to serve as a business-as-usual
scenario for the present IA. Scenario 1 was used in the IA accompanying the
proposal for a Regulation to define the modalities for reaching the 2020 target
to reduce CO2 emissions from new passenger cars and the proposal for
a Regulation to define the modalities for reaching the 2020 target to reduce CO2
emissions from new light commercial vehicles[146].
4.           The starting point for
developing Scenario 1 is the ‘Reference scenario’. Similarly to the ‘Reference
scenario’, Scenario 1 builds on a modelling framework including the PRIMES
energy model and its transport model (PRIMES-TREMOVE)[147], the PROMETHEUS and GEM-E3 models[148]. 
5.           The differences between Scenario 1 and the
‘Reference scenario’ have been presented in the IA
accompanying the proposal for a Regulation to define the modalities for
reaching the 2020 target to reduce CO2 emissions from new passenger
cars and the proposal for a Regulation to define the modalities for reaching
the 2020 target to reduce CO2 emissions from new light commercial
vehicles (pages 39-50 of the Annex).
              Main
assumptions
6.           In
light of the references listed above, we will focus on the main assumptions and
the most relevant information with respect to the subject of this IA. For the
purposes of this IA, Scenario 1 is considered as an illustration of
developments under Policy Option 1.
7.           The
population and macro-economic assumptions used in Scenario 1 are common
with those used in the ‘Reference scenario’, and are shown on Table 8.
Table 8: Population and macroeconomic assumptions
 Annual growth rates (%) || 2010-2020 || 2020-2030 || 2030-2040 || 2040-2050 
 Population || 0.29 || 0.12 || 0.00 || -0.09 
 GDP || 2.21 || 1.74 || 1.50 || 1.45 
              
8.           The
population projections draw on the EUROPOP2008 convergence scenario[149] from Eurostat, which is also
the basis for the 2009 Ageing Report[150].
The key drivers for demographic change are higher life expectancy, low
fertility and inward migration.
9.           The
recent economic crisis is assumed to have long-lasting effects, leading to a
permanent loss in GDP. The macro-economic projections show that the recovery
from the crisis is not expected to be sufficiently vigorous to compensate for
the current GDP losses. In this scenario, growth prospects for 2012 are
subdued. However, the economic recovery enables higher productivity gains,
leading to somewhat faster growth from 2013 to 2015. After 2015, GDP growth
rates mirror those of the 2009 Ageing Report. Hence the pattern of the ‘Reference
scenario’ is consistent with the intermediate scenario 2 “sluggish recovery”
presented in the Europe 2020 strategy[151]. The
medium and long term growth projections follow the “baseline” scenario of the
2009 Ageing Report. 
10.         The
assumptions on energy import prices for the EU-27 in Scenario 1 are
common with those used in the ‘Reference scenario’, and are shown on Table 9. 
Table
9: Energy import prices
 $’10 per boe (*) || 2010 || 2020 || 2030 || 2040 || 2050 
 Oil || 85.2 || 89.0 || 106.6 || 116.9 || 127.6 
 Gas (NGV) || 53.8 || 62.5 || 77.1 || 87.4 || 99.0 
 Coal || 22.8 || 28.9 || 32.8 || 32.8 || 33.7 
              Note:
(*) $’10 = U.S Dollar in 2010 prices; boe = barrel oil equivalent
11.         These
price assumptions are the result of world energy modelling using the PROMETHEUS
stochastic world energy model[152],
which derives price trajectories for oil, gas and coal under a conventional
wisdom view of the development of the world energy system. This stochastic
model is particularly well suited given the great uncertainty regarding future
world economic developments and the extent of recoverable resources of fossil
fuels. The price development to 2050 is expected to take place in a context of
economic recovery and resuming GDP growth without decisive climate action in
any world region. 
12.         The
price of the CO2 emissions allowances in the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme, derived with the PRIMES energy system model, reaches 15 €’10/tCO2
by 2020, and is projected to be around 50 €’10/tCO2 by 2050 in
Scenario 1, in line with the ‘Reference scenario’. 
13.         Scenario
1 includes all policy measures included in the ‘Reference scenario’ and adopted
by March 2010. The list of these policy measures is provided in the IA
accompanying the White Paper on Transport[153],
while the additional policy measures, included in Scenario 1 relative to the ‘Reference
scenario’ are provided in Table 10.  These are measures adopted by November
2011.
Table 10: Additional policy assumptions relative
to the ‘Reference scenario’
 Area || Measure || How it is reflected in the model 
 Efficiency standards || Update of the CO2 standards for vans according to the adopted regulation[154] || Implementation of CO2 standards for vans (175 g of CO2 per kilometre by 2017, phasing in the reduction from 2014, and to reach 147g CO2/km by 2020). 
 Pricing and taxation 
 Taxation || Energy Taxation Directive (revision 2011) || Changes to minimum tax rates to reflect the switch from volume-based to energy content-based taxation and the inclusion of a CO2 tax component. Where Member States tax above the minimum level, the current rates are assumed to be kept unchanged. For motor fuels, the relationships between minimum rates are assumed to be mirrored at national level even if the existing rates are higher than the minimum rates. Tax rates are kept constant in real terms. 
 Internalisation of local externalities || Eurovignette Directive (Directive 2011/76/EU) || Reflected through the introduction of infrastructure charges in Poland (starting with 2011) and the announced introduction of distance based infrastructure charges in Denmark and Belgium (from 2014). 
 Infrastructure || TEN-T guidelines (revision 2011) and Connecting Europe Facility. || Reflected through the increase in the capacity and performance of the network resulting from the elimination of bottlenecks and addition of missing links, and increase in the train length (to 1.5 km) and maximum axle load (to 22.5 tonnes), reflected through decreases in operation costs and time costs and higher load factors for freight. 
 Internal market || Recast of the first railway package (2010) || Reflected through a reduction of average operating costs for railway undertakings. 
 Other assumptions 
 Energy import prices ||   || Short-term increase to reflect the evolution of prices up to 2010 as in the Energy Roadmap 2050. 
 Technology assumptions || Developments in national support measures and the intensification of previous action programmes and incentives, such as funding research and technology demonstration (RTD) projects to promote alternative fuels. || Slightly higher penetration of EVs. One private connector per electric vehicle and one public AC connector per 10 vehicles is assumed by 2020. Around 120 existing hydrogen refuelling stations mainly located in Denmark, Germany, the Benelux states and the United Kingdom. Existing and planned LNG/ CNG stations. 
Main results
14.         Total
transport activity is expected to continue growing
in line with economic activity in the long-run, even though a decrease is
visible for 2008-2009 as a result of the recent economic crisis. Total
passenger transport would increase by 21% between 2005 and 2020, and an
additional 25% by 2050. Freight transport is projected to grow by 22% by 2020
and by about 49% between 2020 and 2050. The annual growth in transport activity
by mode is provided in Table 11.
Table 11: Annual growth in transport activity in
Scenario 1
 EU27 - Annual growth rates (in %) || 2005-2020 || 2020-2030 || 2030-2040 || 2040-2050 
 Transport activity  
 Passenger transport activity in Gpkm || 1.3% || 1.0% || 0.7% || 0.5% 
 Public road transport || 0.8% || 0.5% || 0.4% || 0.3% 
 Passenger cars & LCVs || 1.1% || 0.7% || 0.6% || 0.4% 
 Powered two wheelers || 1.1% || 1.1% || 0.6% || 0.4% 
 Rail || 1.6% || 1.9% || 1.1% || 0.7% 
 Aviation || 3.0% || 2.6% || 1.5% || 1.3% 
 Inland navigation || 0.9% || 0.8% || 0.5% || 0.3% 
 Freight transport activity in Gtkm || 1.3% || 1.5% || 1.3% || 1.3% 
 Trucks (HDVs) & LCVs || 1.5% || 0.6% || 0.7% || 0.5% 
 Rail || 2.0% || 1.3% || 0.8% || 0.6% 
 Inland navigation || 1.0% || 1.4% || 0.6% || 0.3% 
 Maritime || 1.3% || 1.7% || 1.4% || 1.4% 
Source:
PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model
15.         The
various modes are in general expected to maintain their relative importance at
EU level. Passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (LCVs) would represent
slightly more than 70% of total passenger activity in 2020 and about 67% in
2050, although this would correspond to a decrease of 6 percentage points in
modal share by 2050 compared to 2005. Road transport would also maintain its
dominant role in inland freight transport, contributing about 72% in 2030 and
70% in 2050.
16.         Transport
accounts today for over 30% of final energy consumption. In a context of
growing demand for transport, final energy demand by transport is projected to increase
by about 5% by 2020 and to slightly decrease afterwards (-7% between 2020 and
2050).
Figure 8: Evolution of
transport activity, energy demand and CO2 emissions of passenger
cars and LCVs
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE
transport model
17.         The
energy use of passenger cars and LCVs would drop by about 8% between 2005 and
2020 due the implementation of the regulations setting emission performance
standards for new passenger cars and vans[155],
and by an additional 17% by 2050. The use of alternative fuels (LPG, CNG,
electricity and hydrogen) is expected to remain limited in Scenario 1. Their
share is projected to be around 4% in 2020, and 8% in 2050.
18.         The
uptake of electric vehicles (battery and plug-in hybrids) is projected to be
limited: 0.5% in 2020, and 14% by 2050. Fuel cells do not make significant
inroads. The availability of charging infrastructure acts as a limiting factor,
in addition to the technology developments. 
19.         Energy
consumption by heavy duty vehicles (HDVs) and freight LCVs is projected to
increase by almost 20% between 2020 and 2050, and to stabilise afterwards.
Energy consumption in waterborne transport would grow by about 10% between 2005
and 2020, and an additional 30% by 2050. LNG does not make significant inroads
in either road freight or waterborne transport due to the lack of refuelling
infrastructure.
Figure 9: Evolution of
transport activity, energy demand and CO2 emissions of freight HDVs
and LCVs
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE
transport model
20.         In
Scenario 1, the EU transport system would remain extremely dependent on the use
of fossil fuels. Oil products would still represent 91% of the EU transport
sector needs in 2020 and about 88% by 2050.
21.         Compared
to 2005, CO2 emissions from passenger cars and LCVs are
projected to be 16% lower in 2020, and about 35% lower in 2050. The decrease in
CO2 emissions is higher than the reduction in energy use due to the
use of biofuels and the uptake electric vehicles[156]. CO2 emissions from HDVs and freight LCVs roughly
stabilise at their 2005 by 2050. Overall, CO2 emissions from
transport would still be 31% higher than their 1990 level by 2020, and 23%
higher by 2050 in Scenario 1, owing to the fast rise in the transport emissions
during the 1990s. This trend is not compatible with the objective of a
low-carbon, competitive economy that would meet the long-term requirements for
limiting climate change to 2 °C.
22.         NOx
emissions and particulate matter would drop by about 20%, and by 37% by 2020,
respectively. As a result, external costs related to air pollutants would
decrease by almost 40%. The increase in traffic would lead to a roughly 8
billion € increase of noise-related external costs by 2020.
Modelling
of illustrative scenarios
Overall description 
23.         Scenario
1, described above, provides business-as-usual developments that could be
regarded as an illustration of the results of Policy Option 1. Three additional
scenarios have been modelled, each corresponding to the respective Policy
Option 2, 3 and 4. The focus was on year 2020,
therefore no strengthening of policy intervention was assumed beyond 2020. The purpose of this modelling exercise was to illustrate the
environmental impacts of an overall policy intervention
aimed at deployment of alternative fuels for inland transport[157]. 
24.         As highlighted in Section 3
of the IA, deploying recharging and refuelling infrastructure alone is not
capable of ensuring the market up-take of alternative fuel vehicles and
vessels. In other words, the Policy Options under consideration in the IA
merely aim to provide the fulfilment of one necessary condition for such market
up-take: the deployment of a sufficient level of standardised infrastructure. 
25.         As stated in Section 5 of
the IA, environmental impacts of deploying alternative fuels infrastructure
alone, without policy intervention on issues related to technology and consumer
acceptance, would not be significant relative to business-as-usual
developments. 
              Main assumptions
26.         The
assumptions underlying each scenario have been set as follows, in line with the
general assumptions for the assessment of impacts shown in Section 5 of the IA.

27.         Under
Scenario 2, illustrating Policy Option 2, only partial
deployment of sufficient EV charging infrastructure and LNG infrastructure for
vessels will take place. This is modelled by assuming that only a fraction of
the sufficient EV charging network will be in place by 2020. Only inland
waterway ports located on more than one TEN-T Corridor will provide LNG
bunkering facilities. It is also assumed that there will be no deployment of
hydrogen infrastructure, and LNG refuelling infrastructure for trucks and CNG
refuelling infrastructure for road transport vehicles in addition to
developments under business-as-usual.
28.         Under
Scenario 3, illustrating Policy Option 3, full
deployment of sufficient EV charging infrastructure and LNG infrastructure for
vessels will take place. It is however assumed that there will be no deployment
of hydrogen infrastructure, and LNG refuelling infrastructure for trucks and
CNG refuelling infrastructure for road transport vehicles in addition to
developments under business-as-usual.
29.         Under
Scenario 4, illustrating Policy Option 4, not only will there be a full deployment of sufficient EV charging infrastructure and LNG
infrastructure for vessels, but also full deployment of sufficient refuelling
infrastructure of hydrogen, of LNG for trucks and CNG refuelling infrastructure
for road transport vehicles is assumed.
Cost-benefit analysis
30.         In
order to assess the investments costs identified in the IA, economic modelling
has been carried out to the benefits of deploying this sufficient network of
alternative fuels infrastructure. For this purpose, the following approach has
been used:
(4)              
Identify the investment costs associated with
the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure. 
(5)              
Assume that additional EU, national, regional
and local policies are put in place in order to enable vehicle and vessel
deployment. These policies would normally aim at decreasing the current
disutility costs of vehicles, which are related inter alia to their
higher purchase price, driven by technological limitations and lack of consumer
acceptance. 
This is a crucial step because the deployment of infrastructure is
merely a necessary, but not sufficient condition to ensure the market up-take
of alternative fuel vehicles and vessels.
(6)              
Determine the minimum number of vehicles and
vessels that would come to market as a result of the assumed policies of Step
2, enabled by the infrastructure deployed.
(7)              
Estimate the costs of deploying the same number
of vehicles and vessels as determined in Step 3, by simultaneously intensifying
the policies assumed in Step 2 and lowering the intensity of action on
infrastructure deployment. 
A practical example behind this step is the possibility to spend
more on R&D to improve the range performance of EV batteries, which would
result in less dense infrastructure needed to cover the same distances. 
(8)              
Compare the costs estimated in Step 1 with those
estimated in Step 5.
31.         The
results of this cost-benefit analysis are shown on Figure . In all Member
States, the ratio of benefits to costs is higher than 1.3, with several Member
States (Denmark, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal) having ratios
exceeding 2.5. 
Figure 10:
Indicative benefit-to-cost ratios across Member States
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE
transport model
              Appendix
11: Manufacturers of
alternative fuels infrastructure equipment, and of alternative fuel vehicles
and vessels
Table 12: Manufacturers of EV charging equipment 
 Company || Country || Activity || Annual turnover || Number of employees 
 Companies located in the EU 
 ROLEC || UK || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   || 90 
 Elektromotive || UK || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || $ 5,4 m[158] || 61 
 Chargemaster || UK || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   || 11-50 
 PodPoint || UK || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || £ 2m || 11-50 
 Charging Solutions || UK || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 APT Technologies || UK || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 Reuben Power || UK || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   || 11-50 
 British Gas || UK || UK utility supplier and supplier of charging infrastructure* || £12,730m (2010) || 27,298 (2010) 
 PMS Elektronik || DE || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 BRZ Bauer || DE || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 HTS Elektronik || DE || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 Technagon || DE || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || € 5m - <50m[159] || 12 (on the site) 
 Mennekes/Bosch || DE || Cooperation between the companies to design and manufacture charging infrastructure || Mennekes: € 100m (2010) Bosch: € 47.3bn (2010) || Mennekes: 900   Bosch: 285,000 
 RWE-eMobility || DE || Germany utility supplier and supplier of charging infrastructure* || € 52bn (2011)[160] || 50[161] 
 Leoni || DE || Manufacturer of EV charging cables || € 3,7 bn. (2011)   || 63,500 
 Hei || AT || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 365 Energy || AT || Partner of Coulomb Technologies (USA) ||   ||   
 Ekoenergetyka-Zachod || PL || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || < $ 1m[162] || 11 - 50 
 Alva Technologies || PL || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 Ensto || FI || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || € 215-240m. (2011) || 1600 
 Alfen || NL || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 CIRControl || ES || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || € 140m. (2008) || 850 
 Blue Mobility || ES || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 SGTE Power || FR || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || € 200m. || 1300 
 DBT CEV || FR || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || € 10m. || 47   
 Schneider Electric || FR || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || € 22.4bn (2011) || 130 000+ 
 Saintronic || FR || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || €75m. || 300 
 Legrand || FR || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure and other components || €4,25bn. (2011) || 33 000+ 
 Citelum || FR || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || €287m. (2011) || 3019 
 Marechal Electric || FR || Manufacturer of components for EV charging infrastructure (heavy duty plugs and socket outlets) || €60m. (2009) || 300 
 Nexans || FR || Manufacturer of components for EV charging infrastructure (cables and cabling systems) || €7 bn. (2011) || 24500 
 Radiall || FR || Manufacturer of components for EV charging infrastructure ||  €203 337 000 (2011) || 2513 
 Silec             Cable (subsidiary          of General         Cable Group) || FR || Manufacturer of components for EV charging infrastructure (power cables) || €3000 million[163] €1100 million[164] || 11000 4500 
 Scame || IT || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure and components || €121.4m. (2010) || 800 
 Fanton || IT || Manufacturer of components for EV charging (cables, plugs and sockets) ||   ||   
 GeWiss || IT || Manufacturer of components for EV charging infrastructure - electrical systems/units || € 322 101 000 2010) || 1600 
 Vimar || IT || Manufacturer of components for EV charging infrastructure - electric/electronic installations, wiring devices, plugs, sockets, adaptors etc. || €200m. || 501-1000 
 ChoosEV || DK || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   || 30 
 ABB || CH/SE || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||  $38 bn. (2011) || 134 000 
 Companies located outside the EU 
 Greenlots || SG || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 Better Place || USA || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || Does not generate revenue yet?[165] ||   
 AeroVironment || USA || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || $292.5 m. (2011) || 768 
 Coulomb Technologies || USA || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || ≈$2 m. (2009) || 100-200 
 GE          Charging Solutions || USA || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || $21 bn. (2011)[166] ||   
 EV-Charge America || USA || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure ||   || 11-50 
 Eaton Corporation || USA || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || $16.0 bn. || 73 000 
 ITT Cannon || USA || Manufacturer of EV charging connectors and components || $11 bn. (2011)[167] || 40 000 
 Clipper Creek Inc || USA || Manufacturer of EV charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 Plugless Power || USA || Manufacturer of wireless EV charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 Evoasis || USA || Manufacturer of EV charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 Brusa || CH || Manufacturer of battery chargers for charging infrastructure ||   ||   
 Alpiq || CH || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure || CHF 14 bn. (2011) || 11 443 
 Better Place || IL || Manufacturer of charging infrastructure, also provides a battery swap service || Does not generate revenue yet? [168] ||   
 Note: * unknown if these companies only supply or also manufacture charging infrastructure 
Table 13: EV manufacturers 
 Company || Country || Activity || Annual turnover || Number of employees 
 Lecsón || DE || Manufacturer of electrical bicycles ||   ||   
 Zoz Mobility || DE || Manufacturer of electrical bicycles ||   ||   
 Renault ZE || FR || Manufacturer of electric vehicles || € 39 bn.[169] (2010) || 122 615 
 BMW (project I, Mini) || UK/DE || Manufacturer of electric vehicles || € 68.8 bn[170] (2011) || 100 306 
 Axiam-Mega || FR || Manufacturer of electric vehicles ||   || 300 
 Electric Car Corporation (ECC) || UK || Converts Citroen CI into electric vehicles ||   ||   
 Metro Electric || UK || UK distributor of Comarths || £ 476 000 (2011) ||   
 Comarth || ES || Manufacturer of electric vehicles ||   ||   
 Euauto || HK || EV Stores are UK distributor of Hong-Kong made EUAuto MyCar ||   ||   
 Vectrix || PL || US company which could be bankrupt now but may have had a production facility in Poland; this company is the Polish distributor ||   ||   
 Think EV || NO || Norwegian manufacturer of EVs, may be exporting to the EU ||   ||   
 LUIS || DE || Manufacturer of electric cars ||   ||   
 GEM Car || US || US Producer of Electric Vehicles with sales in the EU ||   ||   
 Smiles AG || DE || Manufacturer of electric vehicles (e.g.City EL) || Insolvent since February 2012[171] ||   
 Trefiţmnkt        Zukunft        AG (Hotzenblitz) || DE || Manufacturer of electric vehicles || € 25 870 220 || 99 
 Fine Mobile (Twike) || DE || Manufacturer of electric vehicles ||   ||   
 Tazzari || IT || Manufacturer of electric vehicles ||   ||   
 Cree || CH || Swiss company producing a three-wheeled electric car in Poland ||   ||   
 Reva || IN || Indian company with sales in Europe ||  ≈ $ 0.25 m. [172] || 101 - 500 
 Micro-Vett || IT || Conversi Fiat (and other) vehicles into EVs ||   || ≈50 
 Heizmann || DE || Manufactures components for electric bikes ||   ||   
 Urban Mover || UK || Probably manufacturer of electric bikes ||   ||   
 Dalys Electric Vehicles Pic || UK || Manufacturer of electric vehicles || No information as the company is new[173] ||   
 Twike || UK || Manufacturer of electric vehicles ||   ||   
 Xero Technology || UK || Manufacturer of electric vehicles (cars/motorbikes) ||   ||   
 Zepii ||   || Manufacturer of electric scooters ||   ||   
 Nissan (Leaf) ||   ||   || ¥ 8,773,093 (2010)[174] || 155 099 
 Daimler (eSmart) || DE || Manufacturer of electric drive smart car || € 106.5 billion (2011)[175] || 271 370 
 Fiat(e500) || IT ||   || € 56.3 bn.[176] || 199 924 
 NICE || UK || UK arm of AIXAM-MEGA ||   ||   
 Venturi || FR/Monaco || Limited production of electric vehicles -designed like sports cars ||   || 400 
 Magna E Car Systems || AT || Components and systems for hybrid and electric vehicles. || $ 28.748 bn. (2011)[177] || 700[178] 
 Opel/Vauxhall (Hybrid - Ampera) || DE ||   || € 9.994 bn. (2010)[179] || 39 958 
 VW (E-Up!) || DE ||   || €159.3 bn (2011)[180] || 399 381 
 Porsche 918 Spyder (PHEV) || DE ||   || € 10.9 bn. (2011)[181] || 15 307 
 Mercedes Benz (EV/REEV) || DE ||   || € 57.4 bn (2011)[182] || 99 091 
 Audi (A2 - EV) || DE ||   || € 44.1 bn.[183] || 62 806 
 Spijkstaal || NL || Electric low tractors, platform trucks and special vehicles || € 10 m || 65 
 Mobicar || PT || Portuguese electric car developed through MobiE program ||   ||   
 ESORO || CH || Concept vehicles including electric ||   || 18 
 Matra || FR || Manufacturer of e-bikes, е-scooters and e-quads ||   ||   
[1]       COM(2011) 144 final 
[2] Report of the Joint Expert Group Transport & Environment, 22
May 2011
[3]       http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/austria-on-the-road-and-deployments/

[4]       Contribution from AVERE The European Association for Battery, Hybrid & Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles - Public support for infrastructure for
Electromobility
[5]       Idem footnote 4. 
[6]       EVI Electric Vehicles Initiative http://www.cleanenergyministerial.org/our_work/electric_vehicles/

The
Electric Vehicles Initiative (EVI) is a multilateral policy forum for
accelerating the introduction and adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) worldwide.
EVI seeks to facilitate the global deployment of 20,000,000 EVs, including
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles, by 2020. Data is
available for participating governments: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the  Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
[7]       http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/germany-charging-infrastructure/

[8]       http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/germany-research/

[9]
              Idem footnote 6. 
[10]     ENS Denmark, as reported  in IEA, 2011, Technology Roadmap,
Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[11]     www.dtu.dk/upload/institutter/dtu%20transport/projekter/bev%20paper%202011_7_tcj_clean3.pdf

[12]     Idem footnote 4.
[13]     http://www.movele.es/index.php/mod.pags/mem.detalle/relmenu.57/relcategoria.1031/idpag.33 

[14]     Integrated Strategy for EVs 2010-2014, http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/spain-policy-and-legislation/ 
[15]     IEA, Implementing Agreement for co-operation on Hybrid and
Electric Vehicle Technologies and Programmes (IA-HEV), 2011, Hybrid and
Electric Vehicles, The Electric Drive Plugs In, available at: http://www.ieahev.org/assets/1/7/IA-HEV_2010_annual_report_6MB.pdf

[16]     Universität Duisburg Essen, 2012, Competitiveness of EU
Automotive Industry in Electric Vehicles, Draft Final Report.
[17]      Idem
footnote 4.
[18]     National French roll-out plan 
http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Point-d-avancement-du-plan-avril,26840.html

[19]     Idem footnote 16; 
http://www.cleanvehicle.eu/info-per-country-and-eu-policy/member-states/france/national-level/

[20]     Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland
 http://www.seai.ie/Renewables/EV_support_programme_launched/

[21]     House of the Oireachtas, as reported  in IEA, 2011, Technology
Roadmap, Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[22]     http://www.mobieurope.eu/the-project/ongoing-initiatives/e-car-ireland/ 

[23]        http://www.esb.ie/electric-cars/index.jsp

[24]     Idem footnote 15. 
[25]     http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/italy---charging-infrastrure/

[26]      Policy
and Activities in electric mobility in Luxembourg 
        www.janson.be/var/media/site/presentaties/ENOVOS
05012012 Presentation e-mobility.pptx
[27]     Dutch Energy Agency as reported  in IEA, 2011, Technology
Roadmap, Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[28]     http://www.emobilitymagazine.nl/EmobilityeCarTec2011.pdf
and http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/the-netherlands-charging-infrastructure/

[29]     “Formula E Team” is a working group
collaborating with local governments, private companies and research institutes
to create national and regional electric vehicle initiatives. 
[30]     http://www.d-incert.nl/electric-mobility-in-the-netherlands-powering-implementation-and-innovation/

[31]     http://www.retailpoland.com/104848/300-electric-car-charging-points-planned-in-Poland.shtml

[32]      Idem
footnote 4.
[33]     Idem footnote 15.
[34]     Idem footnote 15.
[35]     http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/portugal-policy-and-legislation/ 
[36]     http://www.rolandberger.cz/media/pdf/Roland_Berger_CEE_emobility_study_20111020.pdf 
[37]     EVI, as as reported  in IEA, 2011, Technology Roadmap, Electric
and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[38]     Idem footnote 15.
[39]     http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/sweden-charging-infrastructure/

[40]      European Commission,
Directorate-General Mobility and Transport, 2012, Statistical pocketbook 2012.
[41]     http://www.rolandberger.cz/media/pdf/Roland_Berger_CEE_emobility_study_20111020.pdf

[42]     Quadricycles whose unladen mass is not more than 350 kg - 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/vehicles/categories_en.htm#L

[43]     Idem footnote 4.
[44]     Department for Transport “High Range Scenario”, as reported  in
IEA, 2011, Technology Roadmap, Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles,
available at:
 http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[45]     http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/making-the-connection-the-plug-in-vehicle-infrastructure-strategy/plug-in-vehicle-infrastructure-strategy.pdf

[46]     http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/austria-on-the-road-and-deployments/

[47]     EVI Electric Vehicles Initiative http://www.cleanenergyministerial.org/our_work/electric_vehicles/
. and The International Council on Clean Transport, 2011, Vehicle
Electrification Policy Study
The
Electric Vehicles Initiative (EVI) is a multilateral policy forum for
accelerating the introduction and adoption of electric vehicles (EVs)
worldwide. EVI seeks to facilitate the global deployment of 20,000,000 EVs,
including plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles, by 2020.
Data available for participating governments: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
[48]     Idem footnote 6.
[49]      Idem
footnote 6.
[50]     ENS Denmark, as reported  in IEA, 2011, Technology Roadmap,
Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[51]     http://www.ieahev.org/assets/1/7/IA-HEV_2010_annual_report_6MB.pdf Spain 
[52]     http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/spain-policy-and-legislation/

[53]     National French roll-out plan, available at:
 http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Point-d-avancement-du-plan-avril,26840.html

[54]     Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland
 http://www.seai.ie/Renewables/EV_support_programme_launched/

[55]     House of the Oireachtas, as reported  in IEA, 2011, Technology
Roadmap, Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[56]     http://www.ieahev.org/assets/1/7/IA-HEV_2010_annual_report_6MB.pdf
  Italy 
[57]        Policy and Activities in electric mobility in Luxembourg
www.janson.be/var/media/site/presentaties/ENOVOS 05012012 Presentation
e-mobility.pptx
[58]     Dutch Energy Agency as reported  in IEA, 2011, Technology
Roadmap, Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[59]     http://www.ieahev.org/assets/1/7/IA-HEV_2010_annual_report_6MB.pdf Portugal 
[60]     EVI, as reported  in IEA, 2011, Technology Roadmap, Electric
and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[61]     http://www.ieahev.org/assets/1/7/IA-HEV_2010_annual_report_6MB.pdf
  Sweden page 290
[62]     Idem footnote 40.
[63]     http://www.rolandberger.cz/media/pdf/Roland_Berger_CEE_emobility_study_20111020.pdf 
[64]     Idem footnote 43
[65]     Department for Transport “High Range Scenario”, as reported  in
IEA, 2011, Technology Roadmap, Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles,
available at:
 http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[66]     http://openchargemap.org/  

[67]     http://www.verbund.com/cc/en/news-media/news/2012/04/10/e-mobility-provider-verbund-siemens

[68]     http://www.asbe.be/en/locations

[69]     Idem footnote 4.
[70]     http://openchargemap.org/  

[71]     EURELECTRIC, 2012, EURELECTRIC views on charging infrastructure
– Facilitating e-mobility. 
[72]     http://www.ceskapozice.cz/en/business/companies/cez-plugs-electric-cars-charging-network

[73]     http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/germany-charging-infrastructure/

[74]     http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/germany-charging-infrastructure/

[75]     Idem footnote 71. 
[76]     www.dtu.dk/upload/institutter/dtu%20transport/projekter/bev%20paper%202011_7_tcj_clean3.pdf

[77]     http://openchargemap.org/  

[78]     http://www.successcharging.com/content/eastern-european-country-has-pledged-set-nationwide-network-250

[79]     Idem footnote 4.
[80]     Of which: normal load 616 and rapid charging 9, Motorcycles:
96, Disabled: 10.
[81]     http://www.movele.es/index.php/mod.puntos/mem.mapa/relmenu.20

[82]     Idem footnote 16.
[83]     http://openchargemap.org/  

[84]     Idem footnote 16; and http://www.cleanvehicle.eu/info-per-country-and-eu-policy/member-states/france/national-level/

[85]     http://openchargemap.org/  

[86]     http://www.mobieurope.eu/the-project/ongoing-initiatives/e-car-ireland

[87]     http://www.ieahev.org/by-country/italy---charging-infrastrure/

[88]     http://openchargemap.org/  

[89]     http://openchargemap.org/  

[90]     http://www.emobilitymagazine.nl/EmobilityeCarTec2011.pdf

[91]     http://www.retailpoland.com/104848/300-electric-car-charging-points-planned-in-Poland.shtml

[92]     14 normal open-access,  1  fast charging stations and 12
commercial points 1 demonstration in front of their headquarters in Warsaw
Polenergia
[93]     Idem footnote 15.
[94]     http://openchargemap.org/  

[95]     http://openchargemap.org/

[96]     http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/making-the-connection-the-plug-in-vehicle-infrastructure-strategy/plug-in-vehicle-infrastructure-strategy.pdf
[97]     http://www.fch-ju.eu/news/launch-uk-h2-mobility-new-governement-and-cross-industry-programme-make-hydrogen-powered-travel

[98]     http://washingtonfuelcellsummit.com/proceedings/aftKeynote1_mcGowan.pdf

[99]     http://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/pdfs/4_williamson_0610.pdf

[100]    http://chic-project.eu/about/background/chic-in-brief

[101]    http://news.bis.gov.uk/content/detail.aspx?NewsAreaId=2&ReleaseID=422877&SubjectId=2

[102]    http://www.thegreencarwebsite.co.uk/blog/index.php/2012/07/23/uk-invests-19-million-in-hydrogen-fuel-cell-projects/

[103]    http://www.eco-island.org/hub/page/press

[104]    http://www.london.gov.uk/media/press_releases_mayoral/london%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98hydrogen-network%E2%80%99-plans-unveiled

[105]    http://www.london.gov.uk/lhp/documents/HyTEC%20Fuel%20Cell%20Taxi%20Handover.pdf

[106]    http://hy-tec.eu/2012/h2-refueling/hytec-innovation/

[107]    http://www.scandinavianhydrogen.org/news?page=1

[108] http://www.tno.nl/content.cfm?context=overtno&content=nieuwsbericht&laag1=37&laag2=69&item_id=2012-06-15%2013:45:52.0&Taal=2

[109]    http://www.ngvglobal.com/netherlands-sets-2015-goals-for-lng-fuelled-transportation-0702

[110]    http://www.prodanube.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=3

[111]    http://www.dnv.com/press_area/press_releases/2012/dnvtomapthefutureoflngbunkeringinbelgium.asp

[112]    http://wpci.iaphworldports.org/project-in-progress/lng-fueled-vessels.html

[113]    Information shown on this graph is illustrative, reflecting the
state of deployment at the time of data gathering (1st half of
2012). It has been compiled based on publicly available data sources such as: www.lemnet.org/LEMnet_Land.asp; http://openchargemap.org/; http://www.electromaps.com/; http://www.asbe.be/en/locations. 
[114]    Cyprus and Malta have not announced any plans for the deployment
of charging points. Further details on the data sources are provided in Table 3
in Appendix 2. 
[115]    Information shown on this graph is illustrative, reflecting the
state of deployment at the time of data gathering (1st half of
2012). It has been compiled based on publicly available data sources such as www.h2stations.org
by LBST; and input received from the European Hydrogen Association.
[116]    Information shown on this graph is illustrative, reflecting the
state of deployment at the time of data gathering (1st half of
2012). It has been compiled based on publicly available data sources such as http://www.gie.eu.com/index.php/maps-data/lng-map;
and input received from NGVA Europe.
[117]            The objectives of the mandate
are as follows:
“a) Ensure interoperability and
connectivity between the electricity supply point and the charger of electric
vehicles, including the charger of their removable batteries, so that this
charger can be connected and be interoperable in all EU States […]
b) Ensure interoperability and connectivity
between the charger of electric vehicle- if the charger is not on board- and
the electric vehicle and its removable battery, so that a charger can be
connected, can be interoperable and re-charge all types of electric vehicles
and their batteries.
c) Appropriately consider any
smart-charging issue with respect to the charging of electric vehicles.
d) Appropriately consider safety risks and
electromagnetic compatibility of the charger of electric vehicles in the field
of Directive 2006/95/EC (LVD) and Directive 2004/108/EC (EMC)”
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General
Enterprise and Industry, June 2010, Standardisation Mandate to CEN, CENELEC and
ETSI concerning the charging of electric vehicles (Mandate M/468), available
at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/doc/2010_06_04_mandate_m468_en.pdf
[118]    Regarding smart charging issues, Mandate M/468 is coordinated
with Commission Mandate M/490 to European standardisation organisations (ESOs)
to support smart grids standards, which will deliver a first set of standards
by the end of this year. Source:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/doc/2011_03_01_mandate_m490_en.pdf
[119]    Source: Schneider Electric, 2010, Connection system on the
recharging spot – a key element for electric vehicles, available at: 
http://www.evplugalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/White%20paper%20connection%20system-english.pdf

[120]    Source: EURELECTRIC, March 2012, Facilitating e-mobility: EURELECTRIC
views on charging infrastructure. European car manufacturers (ACEA) recommend
installing Type2/Type Combo inlet/connector, as of 2017, for charging electric
vehicles.
[121]    Source: Reproduced and updated based on data provided by
EURELECTRIC, and in EURELECTRIC, March 2012, Facilitating e-mobility:
EURELECTRIC views on charging infrastructure, Table 1. 
[122]    Work is carried out by Technical Committee 197 on
standardization in the field of systems and devices for the production,
storage, transport, measurement and use of hydrogen. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom participate in the Committee;
 Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Poland and Romania are observing countries. Published standards include ISO/TS 20100:2008 which
specifies the characteristics of outdoor public and non-public fuelling
stations that dispense gaseous hydrogen used as fuel on-board land vehicles of
all types; ISO 17268:2006 that applies to design, safety
and operation verification of Compressed Hydrogen Surface Vehicle (CHSV)
refueling connection devices (nozzle and receptacle).  
[123]    Work is undertaken in the Fuel Cell Standards Committee.
Examples of issued standards: J2719 Hydrogen Fuel Quality for Fuel Cell
Vehicles; J2601 Fueling Protocols for Light Duty Gaseous Hydrogen Surface
Vehicles; J2600 Compressed Hydrogen Surface Vehicle Refuelling Connection
Devices
[124]    Work is carried out by Technical Committee 22 on vehicles using gaseous fuels, and by Committee 252 on natural gas fuelling
stations for vehicles. In latter Committee, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom participate in the Committee; France, Finland, Poland and Portugal are observing countries. ISO/CD 12617 standard on LNG vehicles -- Connector for refuelling vehicles is foreseen to be
published in Apr 2014, while, according to information provided by NGVA Europe,
the target date to deliver the ISO/CD 12614 standards on LNG fuel system
components is mid-2015. 
[125]    At home, when investing in separate charging points for EVs, the
EU smart meter policy (Annex I.2 of Directive 2009/72/EC) needs to be taken
into account: Member States shall equip at least 80% of all consumers for which
an assessment of the long-term costs and benefit has shown that the balance is
positive, with smart meters by 2020. The assessment had to be done by every Member State by 3 September 2012, and the European Commission is currently analysing these
assessments. The national policy on separate charging points for private
locations needs to be consistent with smart meter roll-out plans of the Member State: when smart meters are planned to be installed they need to ensure that EV
charging benefits from it. Vice-versa, smart meters may become more
cost-beneficial for owners of EVs.
[126]
   Source: Kaneko et al., 2011, EV/PHEV charging infrastructure analysis.
[127]    Figure 3.2.2.2 in source shown in Wiederer et al., 2010, Policy
option for electric vehicle charging infrastructure in C40 cities.
[128]    To stimulate the development of EVs, electricity market
participants need to be able to use the flexibility of the electric car, and
they need to be able to charge the costs of the electricity delivery. 
[129]    This is in principle not any different from any other investment
in the distribution grid due to the installation of an additional demand-point.
It requires however that the Distribution System Operator (DSO) is at least
involved in the installation of (public) electricity charging points or that the
investment is done by the DSO itself. Operating the distribution grid is a
regulated activity, and the terms and conditions for network connection
including tariffs for access to the grid are approved by the national
regulatory authority, according to Article 37(6) of Directive 2009/72/EC.
Investments in reinforcement of the grid are therefore part of the regulated
activity, and do not bear high financial risk for the DSO as long as the
regulator approves the investments (apart from for example risks linked to
efficiency requirements set by the regulator).  
[130]    An open issue is who can control the charging: the owner of the
charging station (i.e. when he/she has an electricity contract to provide
flexible demand) or the owner of the car (i.e. when he/she has bought a car
with the electricity included). At the moment, it seems that both models should
be possible, and that prohibitive contracts that limit the freedom of electric
vehicles to charge at any point available, needs to be prevented: this needs to
be monitored in the coming years.
[131]    Danish Maritime Authority, 2011, North European LNG
Infrastructure Project..
[132]    Source: NGVA Europe, as presented in the 2nd report
of the Expert Group on Future Transport Fuels.
[133]    See for example the following responses to the question “Do you
think that voluntary action of industry alone could achieve the development of
the refuelling/recharging infrastructures required for travelling across the
whole EU on alternative fuels?”:
“No, as
for any new technology introduced in the market the consensus between the
different players about the future of the refuelling/recharging infrastructure
is not possible. Pushing for a voluntary action will result in a slow-down of
the market uptake rather than a quick introduction of existing technologies.” (Renault)
“No.
The development of this market needs significant investments on infrastructure
and on converting the trucks or vessels. Players will be understandably
reluctant to take risks to invest too much before a certain critical mass is
reached and before the legislative and fiscal framework is clearer.” (Gas Infrastructure Europe)
“Absolutely
not: For certain fuels, public support is a pre-requisite for achieving the
necessary development of infrastructure and creates favourable market
conditions.” (AEGPL)
[134]    Darcet-Felgen, Anouk (BMH Advocates), Electromobility for Europe
- Overcoming Technical, Economical and Legal Challenges, Round Table
Discussion: Overview of European Member States Policy – FRANCE (January 16th, 2012)
[135]    JORF n°0172 du 27 juillet 2011 Texte
n°11: Décret 2011- 873 du 25 juillet 2011  
[136]    Estonian Electromobility Programme, http://elmo.ee/en 
[137]    BG Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism homepage
http://www.mi.government.bg/en/news/delian-dobrev-we-are-foreseeing-tax-relief-for-owners-of-electric-cars-812.html
[138]    https://fullcharger.chargepointportal.eu/index.php/device/devicelocation.html
[139]    Europost, June 8, 2012 "Additional 19 EV charging
stations to be built"
[140]    CEZ Group, Press release of May 3rd, 2011, http://www.cez.cz/en/cez-group/media/press-releases/3321.html

[141]    U.S. Commercial Service: Electric Vehicles – Europe in Brief, Ed
2010-2011
[142]            SEC(2011) 358 final, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2011:0358:FIN:EN:PDF

[143]    SEC(2011) 288 final, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2011:0288:FIN:EN:PDF

[144]    SEC(2011) 1565/2, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy2020/roadmap/doc/sec_2011_1565_part1.pdf

[145]            Short-term projections for oil, gas and coal prices were
slightly revised according to the latest developments in the Reference scenario
as compared to the version used in the White Paper -
Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and
resource efficient transport system and A Roadmap for
moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050.
[146]    SWD(2012) 213/2, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/cars/docs/impact_assesment_en.pdf

[147]    Model description available at.: http://www.e3mlab.ntua.gr/e3mlab/PRIMES%20Manual/The_PRIMES_MODEL_2010.pdf 
[148]    Model description available at:  http://147.102.23.135/e3mlab/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&id=8&Itemid=56&lang=en

[149]    EUROpean POPulation Projections, base year
2008
[150]    European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, 2009
Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States
(2008-2060). EUROPEAN ECONOMY 2|2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14992_en.pdf.
The “baseline” scenario of this report has been established by the DG Economic
and Financial Affairs, the Economic Policy Committee, with the support of
Member States experts, and has been endorsed by the ECOFIN Council.
[151]    Communication from the Commission: Europe 2020. A strategy for
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. COM(2010)2020,
Brussels, 3.3.2010.
[152]    Model description available at: http://www.e3mlab.ntua.gr/e3mlab/PROMETHEUS%20Manual/prometheus_documentation.pdf 
[153]    Idem footnote 142. The list of measures is provided in Appendix 4: Inventory of policy measures relevant for the transport
sector included in the 2050 Reference scenario (pages 153-155).
[154]    Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 11 May 2011, setting emission performance standards for new
light commercial vehicles as part of the Union’s integrated approach to reduce
CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles
[155]    Regulation (EC) 433/2009 and Regulation (EU) 510/2011.
[156]    The modelling results reflect the accounting method set out in
Commission Decision (2007/589/EC) establishing guidelines for the monitoring
and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council for the use of biofuels. In this
Decision, biomass is considered as CO2 neutral.
[157]    The illustrative modelling exercise did not cover the
environmental impacts on maritime transport.
[158]    For the 13- month period ended 31 March 2012 
Source: “Elektromotive
Group Limited 2012 Annual Report”
http://lexicon.listedcompany.com/misc/ar2012.pdf

[159]    Source: 
http://www.bayern-international.de/en/business-in-bavaria/key-technologies-in-bavaria/company-details/technagon-gmbh-1002972/

[160]    For RWE Group as a whole. Source: 
http://www.rwe.com/web/cms/mediablob/en/1299140/data/110822/10/rwe/investor-relations/reports/RWE-annual-report-2011.pdf 
[161]    “The implementation of specially tailored
e-mobility solutions is currently handled by a workforce of 50.” Source: https://www.rwe-mobility.com/web/cms/en/1157924/rwe-emobility/

[162]    Source: http://www.alibaba.com/member/pl1008005510/company_profile/trade_capacity.html

[163]    Data for General Cable Group as a whole. 
Source: http://www.sileccable.com/Compa%c3%b1%c3%ada/Qui%c3%a9nessomos/tabid/599/Default.aspx

[164]
   Data for General Cable Europe&Med. 
Source: http://www.sileccable.com/Compa%c3%b1%c3%ada/Qui%c3%a9nessomos/tabid/599/Default.aspx

[165]    Source: http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000737723&fid=1725

[166]    For GE´s Ecomagination portfolio as a whole, of which GE Charging
Solutions is a component 
Source: http://www.ecomagination.com/ar2011/index.html#!section=Progress 

[167]    For ITT as a whole. 
[168]    Source: http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000737723&fid=1725

[169]    For Renault Group as a whole, no data is available for Renault
ZE yet, as the first electric cars from this group were launched in the second
half of 2011. 
Source: 
http://www.renault.com/en/lists/archivesdocuments/renault%20-%202010%20annual%20report.pdf
[170]    For BMW Group as a whole.
 Source: 
https://www.press.bmwgroup.com/pressclub/p/pcgl/pressDetail.html?title=bmw-group-annual-report-2011&outputChannelId=6&id=T0125598EN&left_menu_item=node__2201
[171]    Source: 
http://www.mainpost.de/ueberregional/wirtschaft/mainpostwirtschaft/Insolvenz-Bei-der-Smiles-AG-gehen-die-Lichter-aus;art9485,6643793
[172]    Source: http://www.indiamart.com/company/3769296/

[173]    Source: http://www.dalyselectricvehicles.co.uk/about/

[174]    For Nissan as a whole.  
Source: http://www.nissanglobal.com/EN/DOCUMENT/PDF/AR/2011/AR2011_E_All.pdf

[175]    For Daimler as a whole. 
Source: http://ar2011.daimler.com/management_report/profitability/employment

[176]    For Fiat group as a whole. Source: http://annualreport2010.fiatspa.com/en/report-operations/highlights

[177]    For Magna international as a whole.
[178]    111 000 for Magna International as a whole.
[179]    For Opel as a whole.
[180]    For VW Group as a whole.
[181]    For Porsche AG as a whole.
[182]    For Mercedes-Benz Cars as a whole.
[183]    For Audi group as a whole.
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a Directive
on the deployment of alternative
fuels infrastructure
This
report commits only the Commission’s services involved in its preparation and
does not prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1........... Procedural issues and
consultation of interested parties. 5
1.1........ Background in the
development of the legislative proposal 5
1.2........ Organisation and timing. 5
1.3........ Consultation and
expertise. 5
1.4........ Results of the
consultation of the Impact Assessment Board. 6
2........... Problem definition. 8
2.1........ General context 8
2.2........ Description and scope of
the problem – Insufficient infrastructure network for electricity, hydrogen and
natural gas (LNG and CNG). 11
2.2.1..... Current and near-term
development of the infrastructure network for electricity, hydrogen and natural
gas (LNG and CNG). 11
2.2.2..... Assessment of the current
and near-term development of the infrastructure network for electricity,
hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG). 13
2.3........ The root causes of the
insufficiency of the infrastructure for alternative fuels. 26
2.3.1..... Existing
recharging/recharging equipment cannot be connected and is not interoperable in
all related alternative fuel vehicles/vessels. 26
2.3.2..... Investment uncertainty
hinders the deployment of recharging/refuelling infrastructure for electricity,
hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG) 27
2.4........ Who is affected, in what
ways, and to what extent?. 29
2.5........ Does the Union have the
right to act?. 30
3........... Objectives. 31
3.1........ General policy objective. 31
3.2........ Specific policy
objectives. 31
3.3........ Operational policy
objectives. 32
3.4........ Consistency with
horizontal objectives of the European Union. 33
3.4.1..... Europe 2020 Strategy and
Single Market Act 33
3.4.2..... Sustainable Development
Strategy. 34
3.4.3..... European Energy Policy. 34
4........... Policy options. 35
4.1........ Pre-screening of possible
policy options. 35
4.2........ Description of policy
options. 35
4.2.1..... Policy Option 1. 35
4.2.2..... Policy Option 2. 36
4.2.3..... Policy Option 3. 37
4.2.4..... Policy Option 4. 37
4.2.5..... Summary overview of policy
options. 37
5........... Impact analysis of
policy options. 39
5.1........ Economic impacts. 41
5.1.1..... Direct costs and benefits of
technical standards and infrastructure deployment 42
5.1.2..... Macroeconomic impacts. 53
5.1.3..... Impact on competitiveness. 54
5.1.4..... Impact on SMEs and
micro-enterprises. 57
5.1.5..... Impact on functioning of the
internal market and market development 58
5.1.6..... Impact on users of
alternative fuel vehicles and vessels. 59
5.2........ Social impacts. 60
5.2.1..... Impact on employment levels. 61
5.2.2..... Impact on skills. 62
5.2.3..... Impact on social cohesion. 63
5.2.4..... Impact on health. 64
5.3........ Environmental impacts. 65
5.4........ Conclusions. 68
6........... Comparison of the
options. 68
7........... Monitoring and
evaluation. 70
8........... Reference documents. 71
9........... Glossary. 73
10......... Appendices. 75
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Indicative number of installations per country
for the AC connector 11
Table 2: Overview of global industry targets for electric
vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. 15
Table 3: Overview of national targets and principal
projections for EV and PHEVs. 17
Table 4: Minimum number of charging points in each Member
State,  in thousands. 19
Table 5: Problem tree: mapping problems and objectives. 31
Table 6: Minimum number of electric vehicle charging
points in each Member State (in thousands) 32
Table 7: Detailed content of Policy Options 2, 3 and 4. 38
Table 8: Estimated investments costs under each Policy
Option. 44
Table 9: Estimated investment costs of recharging points
per Member State under Policy Option 4. 45
Table 10: Estimated investment costs of LNG and hydrogen
refuelling stations per Member State under Policy Option 4  46
Table 11: Illustrative investment profile parallel to
vehicle uptake under Policy Option 4. 47
Table 12: Sensitivity analysis on investments costs
regarding smart charging under each Policy Option. 49
Table 13: Summary table of impacts. 68
Table 14: Comparison of Policy Options. 69
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: EV and PHEV uptake forecasts for 2015 and 2020. 16
Figure 2: National EV/PHEV sales targets, if national
target year growth rates extend to 2020. 18
Figure 3: Overview of industry targets for FCEVs. 20
Figure 4: Projected development of the total cost of
ownership. 21
Figure 5: Minimum infrastructure network for hydrogen. 22
Figure 6: Minimum refuelling network for LNG.. 25
Figure 7: Gap between deployment targets of governments
and vehicle manufacturers. 28
Figure 8: The influence of oil price on the cost
competitiveness of FCEVs. 36
Figure 9: Illustrative investment profile under Policy
Option 4. 47
Figure 10: Impact of using public charging points
applying a mark-up on electricity price on total fuel cost of end-users –
example of Berlin and London. 51
Figure 11: Indicative benefit-to-cost ratios across
Member States. 53
Figure 12: EV/PHEV total sales by region through 2020. 55
Figure 13: Current Sales of Electric Vehicles. 55
Figure 14: Impact of mass production on unit costs in the
case of FCEVs. 56
Figure 15: The dynamics of the Revealed Technological
Advantage Index for different technologies for selected car manufacturers  57
Figure 16: EV charging equipment revenue by segment in
Europe. 61
Figure 17: Future shift in value added in automotive
services. 62
Figure 18: Exceedances of air quality objectives due to
traffic. 64
Figure 19: Summary of scenario results for 2020. 66
Figure 20: Summary of scenario results for 2030. 67
Figure 21: Summary of scenario results for 2050. 67
1.           Procedural
issues and consultation of interested parties
Identification
Lead DG: Directorate General for Mobility and
Transport
Agenda Planning: 2012/MOVE/014
1.1.        Background in the development
of the legislative proposal
1.           The White Paper “Roadmap
to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a Competitive and Resource
Efficient Transport System”[1] found that without the
significant uptake of alternative fuels, we cannot achieve the targets of the
Europe 2020 strategy and our climate goals for 2050. It therefore announces
that the Commission will develop “a sustainable alternative fuels strategy
including also the appropriate infrastructure” (Initiative 24) and ensure “guidelines
and standards for refuelling infrastructures” (Initiative 26).
2.           The Commission
Communication[2]
adopted on 24.01.2013 describes such comprehensive alternative fuels strategy,
covering all modes of transport. The Impact Assessment accompanying the White
Paper[3]
had assessed the overall effect of the set of actions that are needed to
achieve the uptake of alternative fuels. More specific impact assessments
accompany the individual actions – listed in Appendix 3 – that have been or
will be adopted as a follow-up. 
3.           This Impact Assessment
report focuses on one particular element of this strategy: the deployment of appropriate
infrastructure for alternative fuels, assessing whether supporting action is
needed and what the merits of different options are.
1.2.        Organisation
and timing 
4.           This Impact Assessment was
elaborated by DG MOVE, assisted by a Commission Inter-Service Group (ISG)
created in spring 2010The ISG met on 26 April 2012 and on 10 July 2012[4]. The last IASG meeting took
place on 26 July 2012. A final version incorporating the comments made during
this meeting was circulated on 3 August 2012.
1.3.        Consultation and expertise
5.           With a view to preparing
the ground for later policy developments, the Commission established the European
Expert Group on Future Transport Fuels in March 2010 with the participation of
all relevant stakeholders in the fields of transport and energy, and civil
society. The Joint Expert Group Transport & Environment, composed of
experts from the Member States for consultation purposes, was also convened by
the Commission to obtain its recommendations. Finally, the CARS 21 High Level
Group on the Competitiveness and Sustainable Growth of the Automotive Industry
in the European Union, consisting of representatives from European
institutions, Member States, industry, and civil society, also delivered
recommendations on “Developing alternative fuel infrastructure”. The
reports prepared by the two Expert Groups and the High Level Group are
available on the Commission’s website[5].
6.           A Public Conference on “Future
Transport Fuels” took place in the framework of the “European Union Sustainable
Energy Week” on 13 April 2011. This was followed by an on-line public
consultation which run between 11 August 2011 and 20 October 2011, and
attracted more than 120 respondents. Finally, a targeted consultation of 124
stakeholders was carried out in November-December 2011. The summaries of the
public conference and of the contributions received during the preceding public
and targeted stakeholder consultations are available on the Commission website[6], and an overview is provided in
Appendix 2.
7.           Input from stakeholders
has been taken into account both in developing the overall alternative fuels
strategy set out in the Commission Communication[7]
and in assessing the various options to deploy alternative fuels
infrastructure. 
8.           As shown by the detailed
assessment presented in Appendix 1 of this report, it can be concluded that the
minimum standards for the consultation have been respected.
9.           External
expertise was used to assess the various options available, including aspects
raised during the public consultation[8]. The
studies have revealed large gaps in data availability, and confirmed
uncertainties on future projections.
1.4.        Results of the consultation of the Impact Assessment
Board 
10.         Following the submission of
a draft report to the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) on 17 August 2012, and a
hearing with the IAB (which took place on 19 September 2012), the IAB sent its opinion
on 21 September 2012, asking DG MOVE to resubmit the draft report. A revised
version of the IA report has been sent to IAB on 12 October 2012.
11.         In its opinion, the IAB
made five recommendations that were addressed in the final version of the IA report
in the following manner:
(1)              
Strengthen the problem definition and the
baseline scenario
12.         In the revised IA report, the
policy context (Section 2.1) has been extended and an appendix had been added
on existing or planned initiatives at European level affecting the uptake of
alternative fuels (Appendix 3). In addition, Section 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5, as well
as the policy objectives in Section 3 have been revised clarifying the extent
of problem, and better defining the basis of assessing the baseline developments.
Finally, in Section 5, the impacts under the business-as-usual scenario have
been clearly identified.
(2)              
Better define the policy options
13.         The specific and
operational policy objectives (Section 3.2 and 3.3) have been revised. Further
clarification is provided on the policy options in the revised Section 4, as
well as two new appendices have been added to explain the detailed
pre-screening process (Appendix 7) and possible legislative formulations under
each Policy Option (Appendix 8). The practical implications for implementation
have been introduced in Section 5.1.1.3. Further assessment on the impact of
standardization has been provided in Section 5.1.1.1.
(3)              
Improve the assessment of impacts and comparison
of options
14.         The revised version of the
IA report contains a substantially extended Section 5 together with clear
assessment of costs and benefits and improved presentation of the impact of the
different policy options. The macroeconomic impacts, impacts on
competitiveness, SMESs, functioning of the internal market have been extended,
and the assessment of social and environmental impacts has been deepened. 
(4)              
Better present stakeholders’ views
15.         A new appendix (Appendix 2)
has been created to summarise the several rounds of stakeholder and expert
consultation, and the relevant views of the stakeholders have been introduced
throughout the report. 
(5)              
Improve presentation
16.         Some of the descriptive
elements have been included in separate Appendices in order to shorten the
report. The technical language has been simplified throughout the text, and a
glossary has been included.
17.         On 6 Nov 2012, the IAB
issued a second opinion on the revised IA report with several recommendations
which have been taken into account in the following manner:
(1)              
Further strengthen the problem definition and
baseline scenario. 
18.         This recommendation has
been addressed by revising Section 2.2 in order to provide additional evidence
on the market and technological potential of the various alternative fuels. The
uncertainties related to the projected market developments have also been
explicitly stated in Section 2.2.2.
(2)              
Better define the policy options.
19.         This recommendation has
been addressed by:
·       
revising the description of policy options
presented in Section 4.2,
·       
providing additional information on the
estimated investment costs Member State by Member State in Section 5.1.1.2,
·       
revisiting the section presenting the potential
sources of funding (Section 5.1.1.3). 
 (3)      Improve the assessment of
impacts and comparison of options.
20.         This recommendation has
been addressed by reinforcing the assessment of social impacts as well as of
impacts on SMEs. An overview table of the estimated impacts has been added in
Section 5.4.
2.           Problem definition
2.1.        General
context
21.         Transport depends heavily
on oil and oil products: for more than 95% of its needs worldwide and 96% in
the European Union (EU)[9]. At the same time,
more than 60% of the petroleum products used in OECD countries and about half
of those used in non-OECD countries are used as transport fuels[10].
22.         Oil dependency has a number
of critical implications. The EU imports 84% of the oil it needs[11] at a cost of 2.1% of GDP in
2011[12].
The International Energy Agency estimated that the EU oil import bill increased
in 2010 alone by $70 billion. The transport sector is very vulnerable to oil
price increases with fuel typically accounting for a quarter of European
hauliers direct operating costs[13].
Fuel also represents close to 7% of households’ expenditure[14]. Recent projections on the
price of oil are being revised upwards since, in the short term, the productive
capacity fails to grow in line with demand and, in the long term, new reserves
become more and more costly to extract[15].
Security of supply is an issue, since large amounts of oil are sourced from
politically unstable regions of the world. Finally, fossil fuel engines used in
transport are responsible for one quarter of all greenhouse gas in the EU and
for high levels of local pollutants and noise in urban contexts.
23.         Other regions of the world
face the same challenges in relation to oil dependency of transport and seek
alternative mobility solutions. This is particularly the case for the emerging
economies of Asia, which have fast-growing motorisation rates. The development
of alternative fuel technologies is thus a way not only to limit the drawbacks
of oil use, but also to serve the demand of the fastest growing world markets.
24.         Mandatory targets on the
use of energy from renewable sources in transport have been in place since 2009
“to provide certainty for investors and to encourage continuous development of
technologies which generate energy from all types of renewable sources”[16].
Their setting was a direct consequence of the limited progress achieved when
implementing the indicative targets of Directive 2003/30/EC, and of the
recognition that “a clear indication of the future level
of these targets is needed now, because manufacturers will soon be building
vehicles that will be on the road in 2020 and will need to run on these fuels”[17].
25.         In 2010, the Europe 2020
strategy[18]
called for maintaining “the lead in the market for green technologies as
a means of ensuring resource efficiency throughout the economy, while removing
bottlenecks in key network infrastructures, thereby boosting our industrial
competitiveness”[19].
More specifically, the Flagship Initiative “Resource efficient Europe” proposed to modernise and decarbonise the transport sector thereby contributing to
increased competitiveness. 
26.         In line with this strategy,
the White Paper on Transport[20]
aims at halving oil dependence of transport and sets a target of 60% greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions reduction from transport by 2050. This is to be achieved
through initiatives touching upon many aspects of transport policy, but economic
modelling shows that alternative fuel technologies have a central role to play.
As indicated in the White Paper, halving the use of conventionally fuelled cars
in urban transport by 2030 and phasing them out in cities by 2050 is an almost
obliged path to achieve environmental goals without curbing mobility.
27.         In its Communication “A
European strategy on clean and energy efficient vehicles”[21], the Commission recognised
that “At present, there is a lack of a European framework for electric
mobility. Therefore, to ensure technological neutrality in practice, […] on
actions needed to ensure an equivalent regulatory framework for enabling this
technology.” and presented a set of specific actions to be taken in the areas
of vehicle type-approval, and of standardisation and infrastructure for
electric charging.
28.         Based on the consultation
of stakeholders and expertise gathered, the Commission has identified the
alternative fuels which have already shown a potential for long-term oil
substitution. The Commission approach is to preserve technological neutrality
by creating the conditions for an efficient market selection of these, more
mature, technologies.
29.         In summary, full scale
deployment and commercialisation of alternative fuels is mainly hampered by (1)
the high price of vehicles related to technological and production
capabilities, (2) poor consumer acceptance, and (3) lack of recharging
/refuelling infrastructure[22]. The root causes can be found
in the existence of multiple market failures that several initiatives at
national and EU level are trying to correct[23].
30.         Previous initiatives and
support actions have mainly addressed fuel production, vehicle technology
development, and marketing of alternative fuel vehicles. The build-up of the
necessary infrastructures has been neglected.
31.         Ex-post analyses of
projects and policy actions have pointed out the lack of recharging/refuelling
infrastructure, and the inability of market forces to fill this gap, as a
fundamental barrier[24].
Technological maturity of alternative fuel vehicles and vessels has been
convincingly proven in large-size European projects, but those transport means
remain dis-functional without at least a basic network of
re-fuelling/recharging points. Without removing the ‘chicken and egg’ problem
between vehicles and infrastructure, all other efforts to allow efficient
market choices among technologies risk to remain ineffective. 
32.         A market failure in the
provision of recharging/refuelling infrastructure affects particularly the
deployment of three alternative transport fuels: electricity, hydrogen, and natural
gas (LNG and CNG). The other main alternatives to oil – biofuels  and liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) – are less concerned: 
·       
Biofuels do not require specific distribution infrastructure,
as long as they are brought into market through blending into conventional
fuels at a level compatible with present vehicles (< 7% for biodiesel and
< 10 % for bioethanol). Problems exist, however, with uneven labelling and
offer of the different fuel types across the EU. For higher levels of biofuels,
the availability of sustainable resources needs to be clarified before
considering specific infrastructure requirements.
·       
LPG is currently the most widely used
alternative fuel in Europe. Its market share stands at 3% of motor fuels, and
about 6 million cars in the EU are running on LPG. LPG refuelling infrastructure
is well established, with some 28,000 dispensing sites in the EU, but very
unevenly distributed across the EU. More homogeneous supply infrastructure
could be provided by industry initiatives, without need for EU intervention.
33.         The analysis of the
economic features of infrastructure investments (unit costs, initial investment
required, possibility of stepwise build-up) shows that LPG can expand the
established infrastructure network  on a sound economic basis without
additional public intervention; while for biofuels the infrastructure
requirements are not a significant barrier to vehicle deployment. 
2.2.        Description and scope of the problem – Insufficient
infrastructure network for electricity, hydrogen
and natural gas (LNG and CNG).
34.         The availability of recharging/refuelling
stations is not only a technical prerequisite for the functioning of alternative
fuel vehicles, but also one of the most critical components for consumer
acceptance[25].
The importance of infrastructure for alternative fuels has been recognised by a
large number of Member States, regional and local authorities[26]. Several initiatives have been
launched to address this problem. Their detailed overview is provided in
Appendix 4.
35.         In this context, the
network for the provision of electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG for
trucks and waterborne transport and CNG for road transport vehicles) is
currently insufficient compared to a network that would be necessary to enable
market take up of these fuels and is not likely to become available in the near
future. This is further explained in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
2.2.1.     Current and near-term
development of the infrastructure network for electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG).
36.         This section describes the
current state of play of the infrastructure networks for electricity, hydrogen
and natural gas (LNG and CNG), and the likely market developments in the near future
as a result of on-going and announced initiatives[27]. 
              Electricity
37.         Currently, while a large
part of the infrastructure needed for the deployment of electric vehicles (i.e.
the electricity grid) exists, the charging points for vehicles remain to be
developed. As shown on Table 1, the number of dedicated e-mobility
installations, including those commissioned in 2012, can be estimated to be
around 26,080 (5,830 existing and 20,250 commissioned in 2012) private and
29,800 (10,400 existing and 19,390 commissioned in 2012) public[28] Alternative Current
(AC) connectors. 
Table 1:
Indicative number of installations per country for the AC connector[29]
 Country || AC connector || Installed || Commissioned in 2012 
   || Private || Public || Private || Public 
 Austria[30] || Type 2 || 50 || 100 || - || - 
 Czech Republic[31] || Type 2 || 5 || 20 || - || 61 
 Denmark[32] || Type 2 || 0[33] || 280 || - || - 
 Germany[34] || Type 2 || 385 || 1,750 || - || 97 
 Spain || Type 2 || 0 || 30 || 0 || 60 
 France[35] || Type 3 || 3,500 || 4,000 || 10,500 || 10,000 
 Ireland[36] || Type 2 || 358 || 202 || 750 || 1,000 
 Italy[37] || Type 2 || 233 || 120 || 8,000 || 2,000 
 Netherlands[38] || Type 2 || >1,300 || 3,130 || >1,000 || >1,500 
 Portugal[39] || Type 2 || 0 || 525 || - || 675 
 United Kingdom[40] || Type 2 || 0 || 250 || - || 4,000 
38.         Table 1 also highlights
that the majority of Member States do not have a significant number of charging
points. This imbalance is even more apparent on Figure 1, Appendix 5, where
publicly accessible charging points in the main European cities are displayed. 
39.         Moreover the infrastructure
development across various Member States is highly uneven not only in terms of
quantity, but also of ‘quality’, i.e. of technical solutions chosen. As
highlighted by EURELECTRIC in its recent position paper: “in the absence of
any European agreement concerning the AC connector, European countries are
either installing e-mobility infrastructure that is incompatible with other
solutions (interoperability problems between Type 2 and Type 3) or are delaying
investments until a European agreement is reached”. If these trends continue,
the electricity charging infrastructure will continue developing in a
fragmented way.
40.         Based
on announcements of public authorities, the current network of private and
public charging points is expected to increase significantly only in France[41] with
4,400,000 points by 2020. In the rest of EU, only 600,000 points are expected
to be deployed by 2020, further aggravating the already existing imbalance
among Member States.
Hydrogen
41.         The total number of
hydrogen refuelling stations in operation in the EU is around 90 (Figure 3,
Appendix 5). The stations are mainly located in Denmark, Germany, the Benelux states and the United Kingdom. By 2015, the number of filling station is
expected to exceed 160 with a recent announcement in Germany to complete a
50-station network[42].
              LNG
42.         There are currently 20 LNG
terminals in the EU[43].
However for transport use, the infrastructure development is more limited: only
the LNG terminal in Nynäshamn, Sweden, has small-scale LNG bunkering facilities
for ships[44],
while there are only around 23 LNG/L-CNG fuelling stations for road vehicles in
place, mainly in Spain and in Italy[45].
43.         For the near future, further
13 LNG/L-CNG stations are planned to be built in the framework of the LNG Blue
Corridors project, accompanied by the deployment of a fleet of approximately
100 LNG Heavy Duty Vehicles[46]. 
44.         Concerning waterborne
transport, small-scale export/bunkering facilities at Swinoujscie (Poland),
Padilski (Estonia), Klaipėda (Lithuania), Rostock (Germany), Gotherburg (Sweden),
Turku and Porvoo (Finland) are planned or proposed[47].
Stakeholders indicate that a number of ports (e.g. Antwerp, Rotterdam) in the
vicinity of Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECAs) intend to provide LNG by
2015, while ports in the Mediterranean (e.g. Marseille, Barcelona) are starting
to study the provision of LNG by 2017-2020[48]. 
              CNG
1.                      
CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) as vehicle
technology is mature for the broad market, with close to 1 million vehicles on
the road in Europe and around 2,800 filling stations in the EU. However, the
stations are unevenly distributed across MS. In fact, more than half are
located in just two MS: Germany and Italy.
2.2.2.     Assessment of the current and
near-term development of the infrastructure network for electricity, hydrogen
and natural gas (LNG and CNG).
46.         In order to establish the
extent of the problem, the current and expected development of the alternative
fuels infrastructure needs to be compared to a network that would be necessary
to enable market take up of these fuels. The next sections describe such
minimum necessary network for vehicles powered by electricity, hydrogen and natural
gas (LNG and CNG).
47.         It must be noted that the
uncertainties related to projections on the development of alternative fuels
infrastructure and of the number of vehicles are very large. There are many
factors influencing the projections, such as technology developments (learning
rates, possible technology breakthroughs), the price and availability of oil,
abrupt changes in national policies, in the strategies of vehicle manufacturers
etc. Therefore the following section draws on a large variety of sources to
establish what can be regarded as conservative projections with relatively
lower uncertainty.
Electricity
48.         The
minimum necessary network for electric vehicles is here defined as an
infrastructure network that is not only capable of servicing the existing fleet
of vehicles, but ensures that alternative fuel infrastructure is available in
line with: 
(1)              
the critical mass of production needed
for vehicle manufacturers to achieve reasonable economies of scale in the
initial phases of deployment of a new technology. The International Energy
Agency (IEA)[49]
considers this critical mass to be in the range of 50,000 to 100,000 vehicles
per year and per model, in terms of global production. The European Automobile
Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) estimates a 3 to 10% market share by the
mid-2020s[50],
which corresponds to “new electrically chargeable vehicle registrations of
between 450,000 and 1,500,000 units by 2020 to 2025”[51].
Table 2: Overview of global industry targets for electric
vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles[52]
 Car manufacturer || Announced/reported production/sales targets || Battery  manufactures[53]   
 Daimler || 10,000 in 2013[54] || Johnson Controls – Saft (JCS), Sanyo, SK Innovation, Li-Tec Battery 
 Fisker || 50,000 in 2013[55] 85,000 in 2014-2015 || A 123 Systems 
 Ford || 10,800 in 2012 21,000 in 2013-2015 || LG Chem, JCS, MAGNA E-Car Systems, Toshiba, Sanyo 
 General Motors || 120,000 in 2012-201542 || LG Chem, JCS 
 Mitsubishi || 40,000 in 2012[56] 5% in 2015 20% in 2020 || GS Yuasa Corporation, Lithium Energy Japan, Toshiba 
 Nissan || 50,000 in 2010 in Japan 150,000 in 2012 in United States 50,000 in 2013 in United Kingdom || AESC 
 PSA || 40,000 in 2014[57] || Lithium Energy Japan, GS Yuasa, JCS 
 Renault || 250,000 in 2013 || AESC, LG Chem, SB Limotive (SBL) 
 Tesla || 10,000 in 201342 20,000 in 2014-2015 || Panasonic Energy Company 
 Th!nk || 10,000 in 201342 20,000 in 2014-2015 || A123 Systems, Enerdel, FZ Sonick 
 Volkswagen || 3% in 2018[58] || Sanyo, Toshiba, SBL, Varta Microbattery 
  
(2)              
the research findings, which centre
around the projected deployment of electric vehicles (EVs) and plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles (PHEVs)[59]
of approximately 6-8% of new vehicle sales in 2020[60] (900,000 to 1,200,000 units).
Figure 1: EV and PHEV uptake forecasts for 2015 and
2020[61]
49.         The above references
suggest taking the benchmark number of around 4 million vehicles on the road by
2020[62]
as the fleet that needs to be serviced by an adequate network. This corresponds
to 1 million vehicle sales in 2020, i.e. 7% of new vehicle sales, which is the
mid-point of scientific projections. This amount can be translated into the
mass production of up to 20 different vehicle models. 
50.         Four million vehicles on
the road by 2020 is less than half of what Member States announced as objective
for deployment of vehicles. It can therefore be considered to be a conservative
benchmark in comparison to the Member States’ aim of 8-9 million EVs and PHEVs
on the road by 2020 (Table 3). 
Table 3: Overview of national
targets and principal projections for EV and PHEVs[63]
 Country || Target || Announcement/ Report date || Source 
 Australia || 2012: first car on road 2018: mass adoption 2050: up to 65% stock || 04 Jun 2009 || Project Better Place Energy White Paper (referencing Garnault Report) 
 Australia || 2020: 20% production || 10 Jun 2009 || Mitsubishi Australia 
 Canada || 2018: 500,000 2020: 18,000 (EV sales in Ontario) || Jun 2008 15 Jul 2009 || Government of Canada’s Canadian Electric Vehicles Technology Roadmap 
 China || 5,000,000 stock || March 2011 || Electric Vehicle Initiative (EVI) 
 China || 540,000 by 2015 || 8 Jul 2009 || Pike Research 
 China || 2008: 21,000,000 electric bike stock || 27 Apr 2009 || The Economist 
 China || 2030: 20% to 30% market share || Oct 2008 || McKinsey & Co. 
 Denmark || 2020: 200,000 2020: 50,000 || - || ENS Denmark EVI 
 France || 2020: 2,000,000 || March 2011 || EVI 
 Germany || 2020: 1,000,000 || March 2011 || EVI 
 Ireland || 2020: 350,000 || 28 Apr 2009 || Houses of the Oireachtas 
 Ireland || 2020: 230,000 2030: 40% market share || 1 Oct 2009 || Electricity Supply Board (ESB) 
 Israel || 2011: 40,000 EVs 2012: 40,000 to 100,000 EVs annually || 9 Sept 2008 || Project Better Place 
 Japan || 2020: 20% market share (800,000 based on IEA estimate of 4,000,000) || March 2011 || EVI 
 Netherlands || 2015: 20,000 stock 2020: 200,000 stock || May 2011 || Dutch Energy Agency 
 New Zealand || 2020: 5% market share 2040: 60% market share || 11 Oct 2007 || Prime Minister Helen Clark 
 Spain || 2020: 2,500,000 || March 2011 || EVI 
 Sweden || 2020: 600,000 || March 2011 || EVI 
 Switzerland || 2020: 145,000 || Jul 2009 || Alpiq Consulting 
 United Kingdom || 2020: 1,200,000 stock EVs + 350,000 stock PHEVs 2030: 3,300,000 stock EVs + 7,900,000 stock PHEVs || Oct 2008 || Department for Transport “High Range” scenario 
 United States || 2015: 1,000,000 PHEV stock || Jan 2009 || President Barak Obama 
 Worldwide || 2015: 1,700,000 || 8 Jul 2009 || Pike Research 
 Worldwide || 2030: 5% to 10% market share || Oct 2008 || McKinsey & Co. 
 Worldwide || 2020: 10% market share || 26 Jun 2009 || Carlos Ghosn, President Renault 
 Europe || 2015: 250,000 EVs || 4 Jul 2008 || Frost & Sullivan 
 Europe || 2015: 480,000 EVs || 8 May 2009 || Frost & Sullivan 
 Nordic countries || 2020: 1,300,000 || May 2009 || Nordic Energy Perspectives 
Figure 2: National EV/PHEV sales targets, if national target year growth rates extend to 2020[64]
              
51.         Based on the 2nd
Report of the Expert Group on Future Transport fuels[65], the number of
charging points needed for servicing the benchmark 4 million vehicles can be
estimated to be around 8 million points, with overwhelming majority being
located at home and at the workplace, and around 1 charging point per 5
vehicles at a publicly accessible car park or on-street. These estimates take
into account that the recharging network has to develop beyond the bare minimum
needed for servicing the vehicles, in order to address the so-called ‘range
anxiety’ of users[66].

52.         In order to determine the
minimum number of charging points required in each Member State, motorisation
and urbanisation rates can be used as described in Table 4. The level of car
ownership also serves as a proxy for income per capita, while the share of
population residing in densely populated areas shows the potential for
deployment of EVs, which will have limited operating range (< 200km) in the
near-future. By comparing these numbers to Figure 2, Appendix 5 and Table 3,
Appendix 4, it can be concluded that France is the only Member State that has made a firm commitment[67]
to deploy a sufficient network of both private and public EV charging
points.
Table
4: Minimum number of
charging points in each Member State,  in thousands[68]
Hydrogen 
53.         Higher uncertainty and
lower predicted sales volumes characterise the deployment of Fuel Cell Electric
Vehicles (FCEVs), particularly up to 2015, both from the side of the industry (Figure
3) and the research community[69]. 
Figure 3: Overview of industry targets for FCEVs[70]
              
54.         Despite these
uncertainties, the United States have carried out pioneering work in the
establishment of what can be considered a minimum infrastructure network for
enabling the deployment of FCEVs. The U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory
has financed a number of projects in order to identify a minimum infrastructure
that could support the introduction of FCEVs. First, the location and number of
hydrogen stations were determined that would make hydrogen available along the
most commonly travelled interstate roads, thus making interstate and
cross-country travel possible. A network of 284 hydrogen refuelling stations
was proposed that would facilitate travel along 65% of the U.S. interstate highway system[71].
Second, a phased urban roll-out was established whereby the fuelling network is
created on the basis of major urban centres, followed by the establishment of
early corridors linking these[72].
55.         In the EU, several Member
States have been working on detailed plans for hydrogen infrastructure
deployment. Most recently, in June 2012, Germany has announced the expansion of
its refuelling network focusing on the country’s metropolitan regions and the
creation of corridors connecting these metropolitan regions[73]. Denmark has also announced an
infrastructure programme earlier this year, with the objective is to establish
national coverage by 2015[74]. 
56.         These
strategies are partly motivated by industry projections that show that hydrogen
fuel cell vehicles can become cost-competitive with conventional vehicles in
the medium-term (Figure 4).
Depending on the applicable tax regimes, the cost-competitiveness can be
achieved even sooner: according to the estimates of H2 Logic[75], a FCEV vehicle in Denmark will cost around € 49,770 in 2015, while
a comparable gasoline car would have a price tag of €49,583, including VAT and
tax.
Figure 4: Projected development of the total cost of
ownership[76]
57.         In line with these
strategies, building on existing fuelling stations and those planned in the
Member States, to link these urban clusters along main road transport corridors
would create a network capable of supporting the commercialisation of hydrogen
vehicles on the 2020 horizon. Subject to the uncertainties regarding technology
development, Figure 5 shows how hydrogen fuelling stations already built or
planned can provide national coverage and be connected via the proposed
Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) Core Network[77] with
the maximum distance of 300 km between stations[78]. The number of additional fuelling stations to achieve this network
is 72.
Figure 5: Minimum infrastructure network for
hydrogen
              Natural gas (LNG and CNG)
58.         The technological uncertainty
related to use of LNG in waterborne and road transport is low. This being said,
the take-up of LNG technology in Europe is still mainly in its planning stage[79],
with the availability of LNG fuelling possibilities being very limited. 
59.         Despite the fact that it
has been identified by industry as a main fuel option relatively recently, it
is already likely to achieve significant market penetration within a decade.
This is partly supported by regulatory developments, such as international
requirements on the use of low-sulphur fuels in shipping by 2015 in SECAs, and
globally by 2020[80].
Around 10,000 ships are currently mainly used for short sea shipping in Europe,
of which around 5,000 are spending more than 50% of their time in SECAs, thus
having to use mainly low sulphur marine gas oil. Stakeholder expectations are
to have 500 LNG fuelled ships on order by 2015, and more than 1,000 by 2020.
60.         In the inland waterways
sector, more than half of the engines will need to be replaced or adapted
within a decade, given their typical life cycle. The industry anticipates
tightening requirements on pollutant emissions; in particular as currently only
about 14% of the existing 8,500 vessels are subject to emission requirements[81]. 
61.         For road transportation,
the LNG technology in many regards is similar to CNG, and according to the
estimates of one of the main producer of LNG trucks, the market penetration of
LNG heavy-duty vehicles could reach more than 50,000 units per year by 2020[82]. According to industry
estimates[83],
the additional investment costs required for an LNG truck (€ 21,000) can be amortised
within less than a year due to fuel cost savings, while for a diesel-LNG dual
fuel truck (€30,000), the amortization would take less than two years.
62.          CNG vehicles can play an
important role in urban and medium distance transport in the mid-term 2020.
According to the estimations of the main association of natural gas vehicles, a
market share of 5% could be possible by 2020, with some 15 million vehicles. Sweden is leading the use of biomethane which is now accounting for 65% of all the natural
gas use in some 28,000 vehicles (as of June 2010).
63.         Often
located in the direct vicinity of existing and planned LNG import terminals,
which could be used to further distribute and provide shipping with bunker fuel,
the 83 maritime ports of the TEN-T Core Network are the primary locations on a
network that could enable the use of LNG in shipping. Linking these maritime
ports by equipping the inland waterway and road transport corridors[84] would provide sufficient coverage for the deployment of this
alternative fuel in these transport modes as well. This would require
additional bunkering facilities at the 41 inland ports of the Core Network, and
additionally locating 21 LNG/L-CNG fuelling stations at the maximum distance of
400 km on road (as illustrated on Figure 6)[85].
Figure 6: Minimum refuelling network for LNG
Conclusion of Section 2.2
On the basis of projected market developments and
in comparison with what would be necessary to allow widespread
commercialisation of the corresponding vehicles, the infrastructure for
electric, hydrogen, LNG for trucks and vessels and CNG for road transport vehicles
is likely to remain insufficient in quantity and (in particular for
electricity) in quality. 
2.3.        The root causes of the
insufficiency of the infrastructure for alternative fuels 
64.         Following the above
conclusion, this section analyses the underlying problem drivers that lead to
an insufficient recharging/refuelling infrastructure for alternative fuels.
2.3.1.     Existing
recharging/recharging equipment cannot be connected and is not interoperable in
all related alternative fuel vehicles/vessels
65.         The technology necessary
for the construction of a network for the distribution of alternative fuels is
substantially mature for all types of recharging/refuelling systems, as
highlighted in the Report of the Expert Group on Future Transport Fuels[86]. However, currently the
standards for alternative fuels infrastructure are not common EU-wide. This is
partly because voluntary standardisation has failed to deliver (e.g. plugs for
electric vehicles), the application of (draft) standards is not compulsory
(hydrogen) or because the standardisation work has not been completed for
natural gas (LNG and CNG). The situation of the selected alternative fuels is
summarised in Appendix 6.
              Overall
assessment
66.         Stakeholders
consider the issue of the lack of common standards for recharging/refuelling as
the main technical barrier that prevents the creation of a single market
as well as the reduction of costs of alternative fuels infrastructure. This
problem discourages potential infrastructure investors, manufacturers of
alternative fuel vehicles and vessels and consumers. Without EU-wide harmonised
standards, consumers are obliged to use adaptors while investors and
manufacturers face retrofit costs for adopting new recharging/refuelling
systems. 
67.         The lack of harmonised
development of alternative fuels infrastructure across the EU prevents two
beneficial effects: economies of scale on the supply side and network effects
on the demand side. Economies of scale can derive from reducing the unit cost
of production of refuelling/recharging points by introducing alternative fuels
infrastructure at a mass scale[87].
In addition, interoperability across the network due to harmonisation would
allow vehicle and recharging/refuelling equipment manufacturers (e.g. for smart
meters and charging devices) to sell off-the-shelf products which need not be
differentiated across national markets. At the same time, network effects of
harmonised alternative fuels infrastructure can be described as ‘demand-side
economies of scale’. This means that consumers would obtain higher value out of
the infrastructure than the price they would need to pay to access it. 
68.         On
the other hand, network effects may cause lock-in into certain technologies and
standards[88]. In such circumstances, the risk is that, at later stages of the
infrastructure development, the costs of revising those standards and
implementing new ones, including the cost of disutility for the public, may be
excessive. 
Conclusion of Section 2.3.1
The
lack of common standards on alternative fuels infrastructure leads to the
fragmentation of internal market against the development of a European market.
Even where international standards exist, their implementation is voluntary,
which allows EU-wide fragmentation, thereby discouraging potential
infrastructure investors, car manufacturers and consumers.  
2.3.2.     Investment uncertainty hinders the deployment of
recharging/refuelling infrastructure for electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG)
69.         Currently, fuelling stations
for gasoline and diesel represent a mature and attractive market for investors.
The lifetime of a conventional petrol station is estimated to be approximately
15 years[89],
depending on the country and the location. The existing vehicle fleet
running on petrol or diesel provides high utilisation rates, and this allows
for a fast recovery of the initial investment with an estimated payback period
of approximately 5 years. 
70.         On the contrary, the
business case for providers of alternative fuels infrastructure for
electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG) is not yet established. The
situation of each of these alternative fuels is summarised in Appendix 6.
Overall
assessment
71.         In addition to  the higher
costs for products at an early stage of technological development and market
deployment, there are market failures that are responsible for the missing
business case.
72.         There is notably
insufficient co-ordination among the relevant actors in a market that has
strong complementarity between alternative fuels distribution and alternative
fuel vehicles. This translates into a vicious circle whereby investors do not
invest in alternative fuel infrastructure as there is an insufficient number of
vehicles and vessels, the manufacturing industry does not offer alternative
fuel vehicles and vessels at competitive prices as there is insufficient
consumer demand, and consumers do not purchase the vehicles and vessels for
lacking of dedicated infrastructure. This coordination failure among the
complementary market actors, often referred to as the ‘chicken and egg’ issue,
generates uncertainty about the utilisation rates of infrastructure and the
length of payback periods for potential investors, and thereby hinders the
deployment of recharging/refuelling infrastructure for electricty, hydrogen and
natural gas (LNG and CNG). 
73.         Three different market
participants would need to coordinate in order to exit this vicious circle: (1)
the fuel supply industry (or in the case of electricity, the DSOs), which needs
to invest in alternative fuels infrastructure and provide a service at a
sufficient scale prior and parallel to the development of fuel demand; (2) the
manufacturers of alternative fuel vehicles and vessels who need to achieve
economies of scale so as to be able to supply those alternative fuel vehicles
and vessels at competitive prices; (3) the final consumers, who need to be
convinced about the attractiveness of alternative fuel vehicles and vessels and
are likely to purchase them only if they are assured about the availability of
sufficient recharging/ refuelling infrastructure[90]. Unless these actors proceed in
a coordinated manner, uncertainty for investors will remain exceedingly high,
and the markets will overall deliver a suboptimal solution (Figure 7).  
74.         A
good example of cooperation between different market players can be found in
the many demonstration projects in which car-makers and electricity utilities
have teamed-up to provide consumers with a full package of vehicle plus home
charging point plus a few public charging stations. Interestingly, the number of
applicants to such schemes often largely exceeds the available places, which
gives evidence on the potential demand from consumers. However, the
transformation of these demonstration projects into concrete business models
would require greater certainty of operators on the actual deployment of a
minimum sized network. Indeed, the value of a network – and therefore of the
whole mobility system based on the alternative fuel – increases with the
dimension of the network itself. In the stages of initial deployment, the ‘system’
has therefore little appeal for users and low profitability for investors. This
problem can only be overcome if there is a clear commitment for sufficient
investment in many geographical areas and within the same time horizon.
Figure 7: Gap between deployment targets of
governments and vehicle manufacturers[91]
75.         The lack of business case
also results from the fact that investors may be less willing to finance
open-access recharging/refuelling infrastructure for risk of ‘free riding’ by
competitor investors[92].
‘First mover investors, and – to a smaller extent – follower investors, are
confronted with high upfront costs and uncertain payback times for investments
due to the low diffusion of alternative fuel vehicles and vessels and,
consequently, the initially slack demand for alternative fuels. First mover’
investors run the risk of losing some of their future profits to market players
who will enter the market at a later stage when the demand for the marketed product
consolidates, and financial viability is improved. Such a risk discourages
first movers’ investments.
76.         There can also be a ‘principal-agent’-type
market failure, which is manifested in the scarce interest of landlords in
providing charging points for tenants/users in private dwellings and in office
buildings[93].
77.         Some Member States and national authorities have tried to address these problems through different
measures, including on  the demand side – for example by stimulating demand of
vehicles through consumer incentives and public procurement. However, the
different timing and scope of these initiatives has resulted in different
perceptions of consumers in national markets and has not been sufficient to
build up a ‘critical mass’ of demand and signal long-term commitment to the
support of alternative fuels. Initiatives that are aimed exclusively at
promoting the demand for vehicles do not appear sufficient to trigger
investment in infrastructure, as underlined by representatives of automotive industry[94]. 
Conclusion of
Section 2.3.2
In
order to establish a business case for alternative fuels infrastructure, the
underlying co-ordination failure among vehicle manufactures, infrastructure
providers, national authorities and final users must be addressed. Initiatives
that are specifically addressed at promoting infrastructure provision appear
necessary to break the deadlock and elicit consumer confidence in alternative
fuel technologies.  
2.4.        Who is affected, in what ways, and to what extent?
78.         European
citizens are hardly hit by high oil process, but do not feel sufficiently
confident yet in switching to other technologies. Widespread availability of
infrastructure, not only in some areas in a few cities, but throughout the EU,
can convince consumers that these technologies are mature for deployment and it
is time to invest in clean vehicles. 
79.         If
the recharging/refuelling stations are established by market operators, the
investment cost will be recovered from the users of that infrastructure. However,
this will not impact substantially the operational cost of clean vehicles, for
which the fuel cost will remain significantly lower than for oil products (cf.
§131 and §133).
80.         Public
authorities, fuel suppliers and distributors, vehicle and waterborne vessel
manufacturers and road and waterborne transport operators are also affected,
for different reasons and to different extents, by the lack of alternative
fuels infrastructure. 
81.         As
a consequence of this insufficient infrastructure for the selected alternative
fuels:
(1)              
The automotive and shipbuilding industry is
discouraged from producing alternative fuel vehicles and vessels. 
(2)              
Mobility with alternative fuel vehicles and
vessels running on electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG) is currently
constrained to few geographical areas that provide recharging/refuelling
facilities.
(3)              
The development of a single EU market for
alternative fuels in which the industry can benefit from economies of scale is
jeopardised. 
(4)              
The competitiveness of the EU industry related
to alternative fuels and alternative fuel vehicles and vessels industry at the
global level is limited. 
2.5.        Does the Union have the right to act?
82.         The right for the EU to act
in the field of transport is set out in Articles 90-91 of the TFEU, in Title
VI, which makes provisions for the Common Transport Policy and in Articles
170-171 of the TFEU, Title XVI on the trans-European networks.  
83.         An
EU initiative in this field would be necessary since Member States do not have
the instruments to achieve pan-European coordination in terms of technical
specifications of infrastructure and timing of investments. This would prevent
a sufficiently even and widespread deployment of infrastructure, despite the
existing and planned policy measures by Member States. 
84.         The value added of European
action in this field derives from the trans-national nature of the identified
problem. Vehicle and equipment manufacturers need to produce on a large scale
for a single EU market, and they need to be able to rely on consistent
developments across Member States. Similarly, consumers and transport users[95]  are interested in
pan-European mobility. European action can provide the requested coordination
at the level of the entire EU market. 
85.         In
addition, to comply with the principle of proportionality, the proposed action
only addresses two transport modes (road and waterborne) for which the
development of a minimum necessary network cannot be achieved without EU
support. These sectors represent more than 80% of the modal split in freight
and passenger transport[96].
In these sectors, the use of alternative fuels is functional to the reduction
of oil dependence, and GHG and pollutant emissions.
Conclusion of Section 2.5
EU
action is necessary to address technical, regulatory and financial barriers
across the EU in order to facilitate the development of a single market for
alternative fuels infrastructure and consequently for alternative fuel vehicles
and vessels, so as to create the proper conditions for the various market
actors to fulfil their respective functions. The EU intervention should focus
on ensuring the EU-wide implementation of common standards and breaking the
vicious circle of coordination failure among market actors. 
3.           Objectives
86.         Section 2 has shown that: 
(1)              
the existing
refuelling/recharging equipment cannot be connected and is not interoperable in
all related alternative fuel vehicles/vessels; and that
(2)              
the investment
uncertainty hinders the deployment of recharging/refuelling infrastructure for
electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG).
3.1.        General policy objective
87.         As part of the Climate and
Renewable Energy Package of 2009, the EU has agreed on a binding targets on the
share of renewable energy in the final energy use of transport (10% by 2020),
and on a reduction of the  greenhouse gas intensity of the energy that they
supply for the road sector (-6% by 2020). The White Paper on Transport
announced a reduction of 60% of CO2 emissions by 2050 based amongst
others on a significant uptake of alternative fuels.
88.         The general objective of
this initiative is to ensure, within the current economic climate, the
provision of a sufficient infrastructure network for alternative fuels[97], contributing
thereby to achieve the take-up of the alternative fuel vehicles’ and vessels’
market announced in the White Paper.
3.2.        Specific policy objectives
89.         The
general objective can be translated into more specific goals:
(1)              
To make sure that
recharging/refuelling equipment can be connected and are interoperable in all
vehicles/vessels;
(2)              
To ensure that investment
uncertainty is sufficiently reduced to break up the existing ‘wait and see’
attitude amongst market participants.
Table 5: Problem tree: mapping problems and
objectives
 General context Last year’s White Paper on Transport found that without the significant uptake of alternative fuels, we cannot achieve the targets of the Europe 2020 strategy and our climate goals for 2050. The Impact Assessment accompanying the White Paper has already described and assessed the set of Commission actions that are needed to achieve the uptake of alternative fuels. Most of these actions have been or will be accompanied by an individual Impact Assessment. || Context of the general objective As part of the Climate and Renewable Energy Package of 2009, the EU has agreed on a binding targets on the share of renewable energy in the final energy use of transport (10% by 2020), and on a reduction of the  greenhouse gas intensity of the energy that they supply for the road sector (- 6% by 2020). The White Paper on Transport announced a reduction of 60% of CO2 emissions by 2050 based amongst others on a significant uptake of alternative fuels. 
 Problem Based on planned investments of Member States and, the alternative fuel infrastructure for electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG) is likely to remain insufficient to enable the uptake of alternative fuels. || General objective The general objective of this initiative is to ensure, within the current economic climate, the provision of a sufficient infrastructure network for alternative fuels, contributing thereby to achieve the take-up of the alternative fuel vehicles’ and vessels’ market announced in the White Paper. 
 Problem driver 1 Existing recharging/refuelling equipment cannot be connected and is not interoperable in all related alternative fuel vehicles/vessels || Specific objective 1 To make sure that recharging/refuelling equipment can be connected and are interoperable in all vehicles/vessels 
 Problem driver 2 Investment uncertainty hinders the deployment of recharging/refuelling infrastructure for electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG) || Specific objective 2 To ensure that investment uncertainty is reduced to a level breaking up the existing ‘wait and see’ attitude amongst market participants 
3.3.        Operational policy objectives
90.         The following operational
objectives have been defined in order to achieve the specific policy objectives
set above:
(1)              
All recharging stations for electric vehicles, hydrogen and CNG and LNG refuelling stations for road transport
vehicles, and LNG refuelling facilities for waterborne vessels can be connected, and are interoperable in all related alternative
fuel vehicles/vessels.
(2)              
The number of recharging points for electric
vehicles reaches the threshold set out in Table 1 in each MS, with at least 10%
of this minimum number of recharging points being publicly accessible. 
Table 6: Minimum number of electric vehicle
charging points in each Member State (in thousands)
 MS || Number of charging points || Number of publicly accessible charging points 
 BE || 207 || 21 
 BG || 69 || 7 
 CZ || 129 || 13 
 DK || 54 || 5 
 DE || 1503 || 150 
 EE || 12 || 1 
 IE || 22 || 2 
 EL || 128 || 13 
 ES || 824 || 82 
 FR || 969 || 97 
 IT || 1255 || 125 
 CY || 20 || 2 
 LV || 17 || 2 
 LT || 41 || 4 
 LU || 14 || 1 
 HU || 68 || 7 
 MT || 10 || 1 
 NL || 321 || 32 
 AT || 116 || 12 
 PL || 460 || 46 
 PT || 123 || 12 
 RO || 101 || 10 
 SI || 26 || 3 
 SK || 36 || 4 
 FI || 71 || 7 
 SE || 145 || 14 
 UK || 1221 || 122 
 HR || 38 || 4 
(3)              
Existing hydrogen refuelling stations are
connected via the Trans-European Transport Core Network (TEN-T) with a maximum
distance of 300 km between stations by 2020.
(4)              
LNG refuelling facilities for waterborne vessels
are available in all maritime ports of the TEN-T Core Network no later than by
2020.
(5)              
LNG refuelling facilities for waterborne vessels
are available in all inland ports of the TEN-T Core Network, which are located
on one of the corridors identified in the Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council establishing the Connecting Europe, no later than by 2020.
(6)              
LNG refuelling stations for road transport vehicles
are available in along the principal motorways of the TEN-T Core Network with a
maximum distance of 400 km between stations by 2020. These motorways are
identified as being parallel to one of the corridors identified in the
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the
Connecting Europe Facility no later than by 2020. 
(7)              
CNG publicly accessible refuelling points are
available, with maximum distances of 150 km, to allow the circulation of CNG
vehicles Union-wide by 2020.
3.4.        Consistency
with horizontal objectives of the European Union
91.         The Europe 2020 strategy,
the Single Market Act and the Sustainable Development Strategy have set the
scene for the transport sector. In addition, due to strong complementarities,
the objectives of the European energy policy need to be taken into account.
3.4.1.     Europe 2020 Strategy and Single Market Act
92.         The Europe 2020 Strategy,
under the flagship initiative “Resource efficient Europe”, aims at supporting
the shift towards a resource efficient and low carbon economy through the
reduction of CO2 emissions as well as through increased
competitiveness and energy security. The specific objectives set out in section
3.2 above work towards the aim of the above-mentioned flagship. These
objectives are also consistent with other objective defined in priority areas
of the Europe 2020 strategy such as innovation, high employment, social and
territorial cohesion.
93.         The objectives listed in
section 3.1 and 3.2 are also fully in line with the ambition to create a
stronger, deeper and extended Single Market as set out in the Single Market Act[98].
3.4.2.     Sustainable Development Strategy 
94.         The overall objective of
the Sustainable Development Strategy, regarding sustainable transport is “to
ensure that our transport systems meet society’s economic, social and
environmental needs whilst minimising their undesirable impacts on the economy,
society and the environment”. The related operational objectives are:
(1)              
Achieving sustainable levels of transport energy
use and reducing transport greenhouse gas emissions;
(2)              
Reducing pollutant emissions from transport to
levels that minimise effects on human health and/or the environment;
(3)              
Reducing transport noise both at source and
through mitigation measures to ensure overall exposure levels minimise impacts
on health. 
3.4.3.     European Energy Policy 
95.         The European energy policy
aims at providing sustainable, secure and competitive supply of energy to all
consumers. The European Council of 4 February 2011 concluded that “major efforts are needed to modernise and expand Europe’s energy
infrastructure and to interconnect networks across borders, in line with the
priorities identified by the Commission communication on energy infrastructure”.
96.         The changes to the energy
system, driven by the targets to use 20% renewable energy (which translates to
+/- 35% electricity from renewable energy, of which +/- 17% will be
intermittent, in particular wind and solar energy), to reduce CO2
emissions by 20%, and to reduce energy consumption by 20% by 2020, mean that
generation of electricity will become more variable and less controllable, and
the electricity system needs to manage this variability to ensure uninterrupted
supply to consumers. Grids need to become smarter and allow consumers to
participate in the energy market. EVs can contribute to this policy by
providing a source of flexibility. This policy has been elaborated in the
following ways:
(1)              
The Electricity Market Directive[99] obliges Member States to
roll-out smart meters for consumers[100],
and requires DSOs to take into account demand-side management when operating
their system[101].
(2)              
The Energy Efficiency Directive[102] puts emphasis on
participation of energy consumers in the energy market through demand response
and participation of consumers in the balancing markets;
(3)              
In November 2011, the Commission has proposed a Regulation on “Guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure”[103], to enhance the
investments in networks in the EU, as well as the Connecting Europe Facility as
part of the EU budget for 2014-2020[104],
to provide EU funding for the development of networks, including smart grids
and investments in ICT at distribution level.
4.           Policy options
97.         This section will explore alternative policy options
aimed at achieving the objectives set out in Section 3.
4.1.        Pre-screening of possible policy options
98.         The Commission undertook an
extensive consultation of stakeholders preceding this Impact Assessment. where
various policy options were put forward for the alternative fuels, namely:
(1)              
Regarding technical specifications: no
harmonisation at EU level; voluntary standardisation; and mandatory application
of common standards concerning the issue of connectivity and interoperability
(2)              
Regarding infrastructure deployment: no EU
intervention; industry self-regulation on the basis of commonly agreed
methodology and indicative targets per Member State; and binding targets on
Member States to solve the coordination failure. 
99.         To arrive to the policy
options that are assessed in depth, a pre-screening of possible options was
carried out on the basis of the following criteria:
(1)              
Consistency with general, specific and
operational objectives
(2)              
Technology neutrality
(3)              
Feasibility
100.       The complete description of
the pre-screening process is provided in Appendix 7.  
4.2.        Description of policy options
101.       On the basis of the
pre-screening, the Commission has hence identified three policy options besides the ‘no policy change’ baseline scenario.
These are described below, with an overview provided in Table 7. 
4.2.1.     Policy Option 1 
(pre-screened
FC4)
102.       Policy
Option 1 represents the future without any additional policy intervention to
change current trends. Policy Option 1 refers to the ‘no policy change’
scenario. This policy option takes into account all current legislative and
policy initiatives in the field of alternative fuels infrastructure, as well as
the current and announced industry developments[105]. It
also considers national announcements for the deployment of EV charging points
as shown on Figure 2, Appendix 5 and Table 3, Appendix
4, and it includes the continuation of previous action
programmes and incentives, such as: 
(1)              
EU and Member States funding for RTD&D projects
to promote the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure; 
(2)              
Allocation of state aid on individual basis for
the construction of alternative fuels infrastructure;
(3)              
Use of existing European funding schemes
(Cohesion and TEN-T funding) and of EIB loans. 
103.       According
to economic modelling presented in Appendix 10, the oil price is foreseen to
substantially increase in the coming decades. This will heavily influence
future consumption trends, by incentivising a shift away from the use of oil in
transportation. As demonstrated on Figure 8, with the increase of the oil
price, alternative fuel technologies will become more attractive and
cost-competitive with conventional technologies.
Figure 8: The influence of oil price on the cost
competitiveness of FCEVs[106]
              
104.       However,
despite existing initiatives (and the resulting developments in technology) and
projected increase in oil prices, the share of alternative fuels in the energy
consumption of passenger cars and vans is expected to remain less than 10% by
2050 without further action on infrastructure. LNG and CNG would also not make
significant inroads in road transport and the same would also happen with LNG for
waterborne transport due to the lack of refuelling infrastructure.
4.2.2.     Policy Option 2 
(pre-screened
FC16)
105.       The EU
will issue recommendations to ensure the application of standards developed by international and European organisations concerning alternative fuels infrastructure. At the same it will
issue recommendations setting out basic criteria and indicative targets[107] for the deployment of infrastructure for electricity, hydrogen and natural
gas (LNG and CNG), addressed to Member States.
4.2.3.     Policy Option 3 
(pre-screened
Fuel Package III)
106.       The EU
will set out essential or specific requirements for alternative fuels
infrastructure for Member States. At the same time it will set out basic
criteria for minimum infrastructure coverage, together with binding targets[108] for the technologically most mature fuel technologies (electricity,
and LNG for waterborne transport), addressed to Member States. For the
remaining fuels (hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG) for road transport), the
targets would remain indicative[109]. 
4.2.4.     Policy Option 4 
(pre-screened
FC40)
107.       The EU
will set out essential or specific requirements for alternative fuels
infrastructure for Member States. At the same time it will set out basic
criteria for minimum infrastructure coverage, together with binding targets[110] for the electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG) in road
and LNG in waterborne transport, addressed to Member States. 
4.2.5.     Summary overview of policy options
108.       The
possible legislative formulations under the various policy options are provided
in Appendix 8. 
109.       It
should be noted that EU legislation would not specify further requirements
beyond the number and the minimum technical standards for the
recharging/refuelling points. Member States authorities would thus have
responsibility for deciding on the regulatory framework, territorial localisation,
and other implementation measures, in line with the principle of subsidiarity.
Table 7: Detailed content
of Policy Options 2, 3 and 4
 Problem and drivers || General and specific objectives || Policy Option 2 || Policy Option 3 || Policy Option 4 
 Fuels || Electricity || Hydrogen || Natural Gas || Electricity || Hydrogen || Natural Gas || Electricity || Hydrogen || Natural Gas 
 Vehicle segments ||   ||   || LNG Vessels || LNG and CNG vehicles ||   ||   || LNG Vessels || LNG and CNG vehicles ||   ||   || LNG Vessels || LNG and CNG vehicles 
 Insufficient infrastructure network for selected alternative fuels || Provide sufficient infrastructure network for alternative fuels supply enabling market take-up ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   ||   
 Lack of EU-wide implementation of common standards for alternative fuel recharging and refuelling || Ensure EU-wide implementation of common standards to avoid risk of deployment of different standards and non-interoperable equipment || Recommend technical requirements for charging points || Recommend technical requirements for fuelling stations || Recommend technical requirements for fuelling stations || Recommend technical requirements for fuelling stations (LNG and CNG) || Mandate technical requirements for charging points || Mandate technical requirements for fuelling stations || Mandate technical requirements for fuelling stations || Mandate technical requirements for fuelling stations (LNG and CNG) || Mandate technical requirements for charging points || Mandate technical requirements for fuelling stations || Mandate technical requirements for fuelling stations || Mandate technical requirements for fuelling stations (LNG and CNG) 
 Missing business case for infrastructure providers:  coordination failure among the complementary market actors (‘chicken and egg’ issue)   || Trigger  coordinated commitment at national, regional and local levels, and thereby enhance investment certainty || Recommend quantity requirements for charging points || Recommend quantity requirements for fuelling stations || Recommend quantity requirements for fuelling stations || Recommend quantity requirements for fuelling stations (LNG and CNG) || Mandate quantity requirements for charging points || Recommend quantity requirements for fuelling stations || Mandate quantity requirements for fuelling stations || Recommend quantity requirements for fuelling stations (LNG and CNG) || Mandate quantity requirements for charging points || Mandate quantity requirements for fuelling stations || Mandate quantity requirements for fuelling stations || Mandate quantity requirements for fuelling stations (LNG and CNG) 
5.           Impact
analysis of policy options 
110.       This section provides an
assessment of the economic, social and environmental impacts supported by
modelling results[111],
previous studies and/or by academic research where possible.  
111.       As highlighted in Section 3,
promoting the deployment of recharging/refuelling infrastructure addresses only
one of the various market failures that prevent efficient technological choices
and the market up-take of alternative fuel vehicles and vessels. In other
words, the Policy Options under consideration aim to provide the fulfilment of
one fundamental condition for such market up-take, but cannot ensure it without
the concourse of the other initiatives that are part of the overall strategy.
112.       This
circumstance complicates the analysis. For this reason, the assessment is
based, on the one hand, on modelling results that try to quantify the ‘direct’
or ‘stand-alone’ benefits of the policy proposal, and, on the other hand, on
evidence from other studies on the wider impact of the proposal, when it is seen
in combination with other existing and forthcoming initiatives to promote alternative
fuel vehicles.
113.       The ‘stand-alone’ impact is
assessed through modelling the effects of providing harmonised technical
standards for infrastructure and of deploying a recharging/refuelling network
that is denser then in a baseline projection. More specifically, the benefit of
the initiative is quantified by looking at the extra utility that it brings to
vehicle users[112]
with respect to baseline developments.
114.       In fact – since it can be argued
that an equivalent monetary incentive would have to be provided to potential
vehicle buyers to compensate for has more limited recharging possibilities –
the model simulations implicitly compare the option of investing in
infrastructure with that of providing a subsidy to vehicle buyers given a
certain sales objective.
115.       This approach has the
advantage of providing an estimate of the benefits of additional infrastructure
with respect to other possible incentive measures that have the same objective.
However, it does not gauge the merits of a successful market up-take of
vehicles and vessels, since it would be difficult to disentangle the effects of
the numerous existing and forthcoming initiatives that pursue this same
objective (CO2 standards, energy taxation, fuel quality, road
pricing, etc.).
116.       Moreover, modelling is not
capable quantifying the greater benefits that are associated with reaching
critical mass in demand/production and the subsequent improvement in the
competitive position of the European industry on global markets. However, as
already demonstrated, baseline developments are unlikely to promote a
deployment of alternative fuel vehicles that is in line with critical mass
production and sustainable mobility scenarios.
117.       That is why, in addition to modelling
the direct impacts, reference is also made to the more general benefits of
being able to kick-start a process of wide deployment of alternative fuel
vehicles. These benefits are multiple, and affect the economy (lower operating cost
of vehicles, lower cost of oil import, higher competitiveness of car and ship
manufacturing industry), and the society (improved public health, more high
value-added, high-skill jobs) and the environment (lower emissions of
greenhouse gases, noise and local pollutants).
118.       For the purposes of this
Impact Assessment, and in order to assess the range of impacts for each Policy
Option, it is assumed that:
(1)              
under Policy Option 2, despite the
recommendation of the Commission on the application of certain standards
concerning alternative fuels infrastructure, some Member States will decide to
follow their own, dissimilar national rules[113];

(2)              
under Policy Options 3 and 4, the Commission
would set out mandatory essential or specific requirements in its proposal for
a Directive. 
119.       In
order to better identify the range of likely costs and benefits of indicative
and binding targets on deploying the minimum infrastructure network for
electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG), for the purposes of this
Impact Assessment, it is assumed that:
(1)              
under Policy Option 2, only partial deployment
of sufficient EV charging infrastructure and LNG infrastructure for vessels
will take place; and there will be no deployment of hydrogen infrastructure,
LNG infrastructure for trucks and CNG infrastructure for vehicles. 
(2)              
under Policy Option 3, full deployment of
sufficient EV charging infrastructure and LNG infrastructure for vessels will
take place; and there will be no deployment of hydrogen infrastructure, and LNG
infrastructure for trucks and CNG infrastructure for vehicles.
(3)              
under Policy Option 4, full deployment of
sufficient infrastructure for electricity, hydrogen, LNG for trucks and vessels
and CNG for road transport vehicles will be achieved.
120.       The
assumption on the insufficient deployment of infrastructure under Policy Option
2 needs further qualification. As already indicated, many Member States have
ambitious plans for alternative fuel, in particular electric, vehicles which
would go beyond the objectives of the present initiative. These plans, however,
will inevitably be influenced by market developments, as an insufficient
response from consumers and investors would oblige Member States to step up
incentives and rely more on public resources for the necessary infrastructure
investments. There is therefore a risk that these plans are significantly
revised[114]. 
121.       As
argued in Section 2.3.2 “Overall assessment”, the deadlock between the various
market players needs to be removed to trigger widespread adoption of clean
vehicles and vessels. This can only be done if there is a credible commitment,
which Member States’ plans, voluntary industry agreements and EU
recommendations might not be sufficient in providing. Indeed, market
participants are aware of past non-binding initiatives in this field that
failed to produce the intended result. The example of the Biofuels Directive[115] and of the 1995 strategy for reducing CO2 emissions from
light duty vehicles[116] can be quoted in this respect.
5.1.        Economic
impacts
122.       This part assesses the
economic impacts of the various policy options looking first (Section 5.1.1) at
the ‘stand-alone’ costs and benefits of the deployment of infrastructure
according to the methodology described in §112-119. It then assesses the
macroeconomic impacts (Section 5.1.2), as well as those on competitiveness
(Section 5.1.3), SMEs (Section 5.1.4), internal market (Section 5.1.5), and on
consumers (Section 5.1.6), also by reference to the wider effect of this
initiative as part of a strategy for alternative fuels’ developments. 
5.1.1.     Direct costs and benefits of
technical standards and infrastructure deployment
5.1.1.1.  Impacts associated with
standardisation[117]
123.       Academic research on
different EU Member States agrees on the beneficial overall effects of
standards both for companies and sectors as well as the economy. While the specific
effects of standardisation for specific sectors of the economy vary according
to their characteristics, studies also point out that sectors such as transport
and communications services benefit more from standards. The recent Impact
Assessment on European Standardisation found that "In particular,
compatibility and interface standards add economic value to goods with network
externalities and facilitate the development of networks. Compatibility
standards can increase direct network externalities by allowing products to
work as part of a system or network. They allow each individual participant in
the network to derive benefits from interacting with other participants in the
network".
124.       The assessment also
highlighted some of the benefits that companies and industries in the European
Union derive from standardisation, such as:
125.       Cost
reduction or cost savings derived mainly from economies of scale, the
possibility to anticipate technical requirements, the reduction of transaction
costs and the possibility to access standardised components. 
126.       Improved
market access as a result of increased competitiveness due to increased
efficiency, reduced trading costs, simplified contractual agreements (because
the characteristics and functionalities of the product are clear as a result of
the standards) and increased quality.
127.       Better
relations with suppliers and clients derived from increased safety for
consumers, increased trust, reduced liability risk and wider choice of
suppliers for the same reasons mentioned above. 
128.       Optimized
returns on investment resulting from the possibility to confront competing
possible options for the development of a certain product or technology early
in the process and to avoid investments in those that will not be widespread.
129.       Concerning possible negative
effects of standardisation, first of all, the impact on competition needs to be
considered. Standards can have anticompetitive effects unless they are
available to all potential innovators and competitors. Second, there are costs
associated with retrofitting existing infrastructure. These costs are
particularly relevant for electricity, where a higher number of charging points
have already been deployed. For hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG) infrastructure,
the issue of ‘stranded investments’, which are not interoperable, and the need
to retrofit existing fuelling stations is much less relevant due to the very
early stage of their deployment. 
130.       As explained in Section 2.3.1,
one of the principal issues hindering the deployment of EV charging
infrastructure relates to the lack of decision on the type of socket-outlet
(Type 2 or Type 3) to be deployed. 
131.       Under Policy Option 1,
the amount of ‘sunk’ capital investment in various Member States can be
calculated using the cost assumption of 520 € per private and 5,280 € per
public charging point and the estimates on existing e-mobility points shown in Table
1. By the end of 2012, around 90 million € and 80 million € will have been
invested in installing Type 2 sockets and Type 3 sockets, respectively. Considering
announced plans of Member States for the deployment of charging infrastructure
as shown on Figure 2 (and in Appendix 4), and assuming no change in the
preference of Member States regarding the type of socket deployed, an
additional 508 million € and 4.1 billion € would be spent by 2020 on installing
Type 2 and Type 3 charging points, respectively.  
132.       On
the other hand, the cost of ensuring interoperability of existing
infrastructure could be estimated based on information concerning retrofitting
costs provided by stakeholders[118].
Assuming adaptation cost of 250 € per private e-mobility point, and of 3,000 €
per public charging station, requiring the use of a single type of socket from
2013 onwards could imply 45 – 50 million € total retrofitting costs for the
charging infrastructure foreseen by the end of 2012.  
133.       Policy
Option 2 would almost certainly be sufficient to affect the choices of
Member States that have not yet started significantly deploying one or other
type of socket. However, it would likely prove ineffective to alter the choice
of socket-outlet in many of the countries mentioned in Table 1, who are rather
advanced in deployment and would face the difficult trade-off between
substantial retrofitting costs (amounting to around half of their total
investment costs so far) on the one hand, and lack of interoperability of their
charging infrastructure on the other. 
134.       Under Policy Options 3
and 4, Member States would be required to adopt a single type of socket
EU-wide, and it would correspondingly necessitate the retrofitting of existing
charging points. The cost of these options would be as stated in paragraph 132,
while the benefits would be that investments become ‘future-proof’ against
issues of interoperability. 
5.1.1.2.  Estimated costs of
infrastructure deployment
135.       This
section assesses the costs of deploying a minimum infrastructure network for
electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG) based on the unit cost of a
recharging point, refuelling station and bunkering facility as provided by
stakeholders, and shown in Appendix 6. The unit cost per smart private charging
point can be estimated to be around 520 €; while for a publicly accessible
charging point it is approximately 5,280 €. The cost of hydrogen refuelling
station is 1.6 million €. The unit cost of a small-scale bunkering facility is
15 million €, the cost estimate used for LNG fuelling station is 400,000 € and
the cost estimate for CNG fuelling station is 250,000 €. These costs are
high-end estimates, not fully taking into account likely decreases due to
learning effects (Table 8).
Table 8: Estimated investments costs under each
Policy Option[119]
 ||   || Number of additional charging points/fuelling stations || Policy Option 2 || Policy Option 3 || Policy Option 4 
   || thousands || Million € || 
 || Electricity   (Total) ||                                  8,000 ||            3,984 ||             7,968 ||            7,968 
 || of 90% private ||                                  7,200 ||            1,872 ||             3,744 ||            3,744 
 || of 10% publicly accessible ||                                     800 ||            2,112 ||             4,224 ||            4,224 
 || Hydrogen || 0.077 || - || - || 123 
 || LNG for vessels ||                                  0.139 ||            1,140 ||             2,085 ||            2,085 
 || LNG for trucks ||                                  0.144 || - || - ||                   58 
 || CNG for vehicles || 0.654 || - || - || 164 
 || Estimated investment costs of infrastructure deployment ||   ||            5,124 ||             10,053 || 10,398 
 || Estimated retrofitting costs ||   || - || 45 – 50 || 90 –100 
 || Estimated total investments costs ||   ||            5,124 || 10,103 || 10,498 
136.       The
breakdown per Member State of the estimated investment costs under Policy Option 4 is
provided in Table 9 and Table 10. As further elaborated in Section 5.1.1.3, the choice of who will
finally bear these investments costs will depend on the Member State's policy decisions among a large variety of possible measures.  These policy decisions
will also determine what the precise incentive mechanisms are that will ensure
effective delivery of the targets.
Table 9: Estimated
investment costs of recharging points per Member State under Policy Option 4
 MS || Total charging points (thousands) || Publicly accessible charging points (thousands) || Investment cost for publicly accessible charging points (Million €) || Private charging points (thousands) || Investment cost for private charging points (Million €) || Total investment costs (Million €) 
 BE || 207 || 21 || 109 || 186 || 97 || 206 
 BG || 69 || 7 || 36 || 62 || 32 || 69 
 CZ || 129 || 13 || 68 || 116 || 60 || 128 
 DK || 54 || 5 || 29 || 49 || 25 || 54 
 DE || 1503 || 150 || 794 || 1353 || 703 || 1497 
 EE || 12 || 1 || 6 || 11 || 6 || 12 
 IE || 22 || 2 || 12 || 20 || 10 || 22 
 EL || 128 || 13 || 68 || 115 || 60 || 127 
 ES || 824 || 82 || 435 || 742 || 386 || 821 
 FR || 969 || 97 || 512 || 872 || 453 || 965 
 IT || 1255 || 126 || 663 || 1130 || 587 || 1250 
 CY || 20 || 2 || 11 || 18 || 9 || 20 
 LV || 17 || 2 || 9 || 15 || 8 || 17 
 LT || 41 || 4 || 22 || 37 || 19 || 41 
 LU || 14 || 1 || 7 || 13 || 7 || 14 
 HU || 68 || 7 || 36 || 61 || 32 || 68 
 MT || 10 || 1 || 5 || 9 || 5 || 10 
 NL || 321 || 32 || 169 || 289 || 150 || 320 
 AT || 116 || 12 || 61 || 104 || 54 || 116 
 PL || 460 || 46 || 243 || 414 || 215 || 458 
 PT || 123 || 12 || 65 || 111 || 58 || 123 
 RO || 101 || 10 || 53 || 91 || 47 || 101 
 SI || 26 || 3 || 14 || 23 || 12 || 26 
 SK || 36 || 4 || 19 || 32 || 17 || 36 
 FI || 71 || 7 || 37 || 64 || 33 || 71 
 SE || 145 || 15 || 77 || 131 || 68 || 144 
 UK || 1221 || 122 || 645 || 1099 || 571 || 1216 
 Total || 8000 || 800 || 4224 || 7200 || 3744 || 7968 
Table 10: Estimated
investment costs of LNG, CNG and hydrogen refuelling stations per Member State under Policy Option 4
 MS || Estimated number of additional LNG bunkering facility in maritime ports || Estimated number of additional LNG bunkering facility in IWW ports || Estimated number of additional LNG refuelling points on motorways || Estilared number of additional CNG refuelling points || Estimated number of additional hydrogen refuelling stations   || Total estimated investment costs (Million €) 
 BE || 3 || 6 || 2 || 10 || 3 || 143 
 BG || 1 || 2 || 5 || 0 || 0 || 47 
 CZ || 0 || 4 || 4 || 0 || 4 || 68 
 DK || 2 ||   || 2 || 20 || existing>target || 36 
 DE || 5 || 17 || 25 || 0 || existing>target || 340 
 EE || 1 ||   || 0 || 15 || 0   || 19 
 IE || 3 ||   || 3 || 22 || 0 || 52 
 EL || 4 ||   || 6 || 40 || 6 || 82 
 ES || 10 || 1 || 5 || 90 || 18 || 218 
 FR || 7 || 7 || 18 || 105 || 19 || 274 
 IT || 12 || 2 || 12 || 0 || existing>target || 215 
 CY || 1 ||   || 0 || 4 || 0 || 16 
 LV || 2 ||   || 4 || 20 || 0 || 37 
 LT || 1 ||   || 3 || 21 || 0 || 21 
 LU ||   || 1 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 15 
 HU ||   || 2 || 4 || 21 || 0 || 37 
 MT || 1 ||   || 0 || 1 || 0 || 15 
 NL || 3 || 5 || 1 || 0 || existing>target || 120 
 AT ||   || 2 || 4 || 0 || 4 || 38 
 PL || 2 ||   || 15 || 51 || 0 || 49 
 PT || 3 ||   || 3 || 23 || 0 || 52 
 RO || 2 || 3 || 6 || 44 || 0 || 88 
 SI || 1 ||   || 1 || 5 || existing>target || 17 
 SK ||   || 2 || 3 || 6 || 0 || 33 
 FI || 3 ||   || 6 || 60 || 6 || 72 
 SE || 5 ||   || 12 || 0 || 17 || 107 
 UK || 13 ||   || 0 || 96 || existing>target || 219 
 Total || 85 || 54 || 144 || 654 || 77 || 2,430 
137.       Further analysing these
costs, it is clear that investment is made most optimally if its profile is
gradual and if it is more or less parallel with the vehicle uptake. In fact,
using the example of electric vehicle uptake, modelling results show that
initial investment costs would amount to around 20 million € in the first year,
then 70 million €, and so on, gradually reaching 2.1 bn € by the final year.
The net present value of the total investment in charging infrastructure would
be 6.1 bn € under Policy Option 4 (Table 11 and Figure 9).
Table 11: Illustrative investment profile parallel
to vehicle uptake under Policy Option 4
   || Additional cost of private charging points per year (bn €) || Additional cost of public charging points per year (bn €) || Total investment costs per year (bn €) || Discounted investment costs per year (bn €) 
 Unit cost || 520 || 5280 ||   ||   
 Discount rate || 4% ||   ||   
 Year 1 || 0.01 || 0.01 || 0.02 || 0.02 
 Year 2 || 0.03 || 0.04 || 0.07 || 0.07 
 Year 3 || 0.08 || 0.09 || 0.17 || 0.16 
 Year 4 || 0.15 || 0.17 || 0.31 || 0.28 
 Year 5 || 0.24 || 0.27 || 0.50 || 0.43 
 Year 6 || 0.34 || 0.39 || 0.73 || 0.60 
 Year 7 || 0.47 || 0.54 || 1.01 || 0.80 
 Year 8 || 0.63 || 0.71 || 1.33 || 1.01 
 Year 9 || 0.80 || 0.90 || 1.70 || 1.24 
 Year 10 || 0.99 || 1.12 || 2.11 || 1.48 
 Total || 3.7 || 4.2 || 8.0 || 6.1 
Figure 9:
Illustrative investment profile under Policy Option 4
138.       In
addition to these costs, there could be possible impacts on the electricity
grid. To illustrate these impacts, it can be shown that the simultaneous
charging of 100 EVs will generate a peak load of 300 kW, 2000 kW or 17500 kW depending
on the recharging form, which would require the installation of 1, 4 or 35
additional transformers and, in the last case, massive distribution network
reinforcement[120]. In the case of France, 2 million EVs could, if recharged
simultaneously at around 19:00, generate an electricity demand equivalent to
10% of the current peak load, although their annual consumption would only
represent 1-2% of total annual electricity consumption[121]. On
average, the additional distribution grid investment needs could amount,
according to estimations by Électricité Réseau Distribution France, to 1
billion € per a million EVs, assuming only less than 10% of fast charging
stations. 
139.       At
the same time, Israel Electric Company calculated in 2008 that grid
reinforcement costs could go down to less than 200 million € per a million EVs,
if managed recharging solutions were chosen. Hence, if infrastructure for EVs
allows managed charging, the need to develop the electricity system further to
meet this increasing demand will be limited and these vehicles can contribute
to the flexibility of the electricity system. Furthermore, controlled charging
will mean less need to build additional peak (and expensive) electricity
production capacity[122].
140.       For these reasons, an
additional sensitivity analysis, shown on Table 12, has been carried out on how
requirements on private charging points to be smart meters would affect these
investment costs. By assuming varying rates (25% to 50%) of deployment of
charging points capable of Mode 3 charging[123]
instead of 100% as done in Table 8, and taking into account that all public
charging points should be smart, the investment costs would decrease by only
around 15%.
Table 12: Sensitivity analysis on investments costs
regarding smart charging under each Policy Option[124]
   || Number of additional charging points/fuelling stations || Cost (high penetration of smart charging) || Cost (medium penetration of smart charging) || Cost (low estimate of smart charging) 
   || thousands || million € 
 Electricity ||   
 Total (full deployment) ||                                  8,000 ||            7,968 ||             7,032 ||               6,564 
 of 90% private ||                                  7,200 ||            3,744 ||             2,808 ||               2,340 
 of 10% publicly accessible ||                                     800 ||            4,224 ||             4,224 ||               4,224 
 Total (partial deployment) ||                                  4,000 ||            3,984 ||             3,516 ||               3,282 
 Hydrogen || 0.077 || 123 ||                123 || 123 
 LNG for vessels ||                                  0.139 ||            2,085 ||             2,085 ||               2,085 
 Partial deployment ||                                  0.076 ||            1,140 ||             1,140 ||               1,140 
 LNG for trucks ||                                  0.144 ||                   58 ||                    58 ||                    58 
 CNG for vehicles || 0.654 || 164 || 164 || 164 
 Estimated investment costs in PO2  ||            5,124 ||             4,656 ||               4,422 
 Estimated investment costs in PO3 [125] ||            10,053 ||             9,117 ||               8,649 
 Estimated investment costs in PO4 [126] ||            10,505 || 9,462 || 8,994 
 Cost (high estimate): All EV charging points that count towards the mandated number are capable of Mode 3 charging (“smart charging”). 
 Cost (medium estimate): Half of private charging points that count towards the mandated number are capable of Mode 3 charging (“smart charging”). 
 Cost (low estimate): 25% private charging points that count towards the mandated number are capable of Mode 3 charging (“smart charging”). 
141.       With respect to the
interaction of LNG bunkering facilities and the existing gas infrastructure, it
is assumed that there is little interaction. Only at LNG regasification
terminals, which are built to feed natural gas into the transmission network
and could in the future also provide refuelling services to ships, may there be
an impact on the gas network. However, as quantities of LNG for shipping will
be relatively small compared to the overall gas market in the EU to have an
impact on the price. At the same time, they may make investments in LNG
regasification terminals more profitable for project developers that do not
only gasify LNG for inland consumption, but also sell LNG as a transport fuel. Therefore,
it is assumed that, as demand for LNG as fuel increases, LNG regasification
terminals can satisfy the increased demand for LNG without impacting the
operation of the gas network.
5.1.1.3.  Source
of funding for infrastructure deployment
142.       The
recommendation/mandate addressing problem driver 2 (“Investment uncertainty
hinders the deployment of recharging/refuelling infrastructure for electricity,
hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG)”) and calling for a minimum number of
recharging/refuelling points could be implemented in various ways by Member
States. While there will be no implication for the EU budget, national budgets
may be affected depending on the specific measures chosen by the Member States.

143.       Member States could ensure
implementation and thereby compliance through a variety of measures, without
necessarily involving public spending. In addition to
the measures described in Appendix 9, the following examples reflect some of
the initiatives already taken by national or local authorities:
144.       Minimum
requirements in building codes: national law could require a minimum percentage
of individual parking places to be equipped with independent electric lines.
The obligation could concern all new buildings and gradually extend to existing
buildings, notably office and business premises[127].
145.       Obligations
on DSOs to build-up the recharging points required by authorities
146.       Conditions
for parking lots permits:  the authorisation to open/operate parking lots in
public venues (shopping malls, governmental facilities, airports, restaurants,
cinemas, hotels, major retail outlets) could be made conditional on the
installation of a minimum percentage of charging stations.
147.       Schemes
that certify the environmental performance of businesses could acknowledge and
promote the installation of charging points open to employees/customer.
148.       Joint investments between
port authorities and port terminal operators for the provision of LNG terminals.
149.       Building
companies, concession holders, and other operators facing obligations to
provide recharging/refuelling points would likely pass (part of) the costs onto
consumers; however these users would still face lower operating costs for their
vehicles, than those relying on conventionally fuelled cars[128] and ships.
150.       Electric
utilities, carmakers and mobility service providers would also have an interest
in investing in charging stations. For electric utilities, in particular,
electromobility does not only have the advantage of additional demand, but also
the benefits of peak-load control highlighted in §139[129]. 
151.       Partnerships for demonstration projects between utilities and
vehicle manufacturers are already present in many Member States. Typically, the
customer has to pay a fee for using the charging service that often exceeds the
electricity cost by a mark-up, and these enable the investor to recover the
cost of the installation[130]. As shown on Figure 10, the impact of these additional costs on total fuel costs is
limited. Other business models foresee access to charging stations as part of a
package that includes the purchase or lease of an electric vehicle, or is granted
choice of an electricity provider[131].
Figure 10: Impact of using public charging points
applying a mark-up on electricity price on total fuel cost of end-users –
example of Berlin and London[132]
5.1.1.4.  Cost/benefit analysis of
infrastructure deployment
152.       The costs shown on Table 8 and
on Table 12 need to be compared to the benefits of deploying this minimum
network of alternative fuels infrastructure. For this purpose, the approach
described in §120-130 and in Appendix 10 has been used.
153.       The results of this
cost-benefit analysis are shown on Figure 11. This limited approach does not
take into account the benefits of reduced oil dependency, increased
competitiveness and better functioning of the internal market. Nonetheless,
even under the policy option that implies the most extensive deployment of
alternatives fuels infrastructure (Policy Option 4), comparing the
benefits of choosing deployment of infrastructure to the costs of other
possible policies that can address the existing disutility of alternative fuel
vehicles and vessels results in higher than 1.5 ratios in all Member States.
Figure 11: Indicative benefit-to-cost ratios across
Member States[133]
5.1.2.     Macroeconomic
impacts
154.       Under Policy Option 1,
the pace of electrification in the transport sector is projected to remain
slow: electric propulsion in road transport does not make significant inroads
by 2050. As a consequence, the EU transport system would remain extremely
dependent on the use of fossil fuels. Oil products would still represent 90% of
the EU transport sector needs in 2030 and 89% in 2050. 
155.       Policy Option 2, 3 and 4,
open up the possibility for an alternative path for the transport system with
much faster deployment of alternative fuels. The main macroeconomic effect
would be on reduced oil consumption and avoided fuel expenditure. The impact of
this reduced fuel expenditure depends on the alternative use of these
resources. Part of the savings would have to finance investment in fuel
infrastructure and in the extra cost alternative fuel vehicles, which remain
more expensive than the conventional models. Expenditure in infrastructure
would benefit activity through the multiplier effect, whereas the expenditure
for vehicles will benefit EU economy in proportion to the EU manufacturers’
market share in those vehicles. Some macroeconomic effects can also be expected
as a result of lower operating costs of vehicles for businesses and consumers. 
156.       The modelling analysis
carried out for the White Paper showed that as a result of the implementation
of policy measures presented, final consumption of oil by transport is expected
to decrease by about 70% by 2050, relative to business-as-usual. Based on the
results of economic modelling undertaken for the purposes of this Impact
Assessment, described in detail in Appendix 10, avoided fuel use increases progressively
over the decades 2010-2030 from about 610 million € per year in 2020 to about
2.3 bn € per year in 2030 under Policy Option 2, 1.7 bn € per year in
2020 to 4.6 bn € per year in 2030 under Policy Option 3, and 4.2 bn €
per year in 2020 to 9.3 bn € per year in 2030 under Policy Option 4. 
157.       In addition, it is possible
to estimate the economic benefits of improved energy security by calculating
the cost of achieving a similar improvement in energy security through the
establishment of a (additional) strategic stock of oil. The Joint Research
Centre estimated this cost to be about 130 € per tonne of oil equivalent (upper
bound value). Based on this, the estimated aggregate energy security benefit
increases gradually over the decades 2010-2030 from 150 million € per year in
2020 to 460 million € per year in 2030 under Policy Option 2, 410
million € per year in 2020 to 915 million € per year in 2030 under Policy
Option 3, and 1.04 bn € per year in 2020 to 1.9 bn € per year in 2030 under
Policy Option 4. 
158.       The main difference between Policy
Option 2 and 3 consists in the different probability of achieving the same
results through recommendations or mandates: Policy Option 2 is considered much
less effective on the basis of the arguments presented in §120-121. Similarly,
the difference between Policy Option 3 and 4 is the smaller likelihood
of deployment of a hydrogen refuelling network in Policy Option 3 as well as
for LNG for trucks and CNG for road ranspor vehicles: the macroeconomic impact
could be significant if these technologies gains market acceptance, although
this is subject to greater uncertainty than the case of electricity and LNG for
vessels. The high potential gains should however be assessed against the
relatively small investment costs (123 million €).
5.1.3.     Impact on competitiveness
159.       This section identifies the
potential impacts of Policy Options 1-4 on the competitiveness of European
manufacturers of alternative fuels infrastructure equipment, and of
manufacturers of alternative fuel vehicles and vessels (hereinafter
“manufacturers”), in terms of unit costs and pace of technological development
in comparison to their global competitors.  
160.        The European automotive
industry is a key industrial sector with a turnover of over €780 billion[134] and
representing about 8% of European manufacturing value
added. According to data from 2007, EU car
makers hold around 27% of global market share, but there are concerns on the
ability to maintain this position in new vehicle technologies[135].
161.       Today the world market share
of electric, LNG for vessels and trucks and hydrogen vehicles is very limited,
with less than a 0.1% of vehicles sold in 2011. Regarding natural gas vehicles;
in 2011 there were 15.2 million in the world, representing 1.2% of the total
stock. The main markets for electric vehicles are Japan and the United States (Figure 13). However,
according to projections by IEA, the sales of electric vehicles alone could reach
close to 7 million per year in 2020, 17.7 million in 2025 and 33.3 million in
2030. This represents a sizeable market opportunity for car makers and
manufacturers of transport equipment, in particular in the fast growing
emerging markets (Figure 12). 
Figure 12: EV/PHEV total sales by region through
2020[136]
Figure 13: Current Sales of
Electric Vehicles[137]
162.       Under
Policy Option 1, manufacturers will be directly affected by the lack of
EU-wide application of standards and by the un-coordinated demand for their
products, as they will not able to reap the benefits of mass-producing for a
single European market, but would need to cater for national requirements. In
particular, the learning effects and technology development associated with
mass production could be negatively affected. As illustrated on Figure 14, manufacturing rates are an
essential factor in achieving competitive prices of recharging/refuelling
equipment, vehicles and vessels. 
Figure
14: Impact of mass
production on unit costs in the case of FCEVs[138]
163.       These impacts would
disadvantage European firms vis-à-vis those producers that can optimise their
production processes due to their presence in large and uniform markets such as
 United States and Japan. The competitiveness of EU manufacturers would then
likely be lower when aiming to enter these or other emerging markets.
Currently, an assessment of patent applications shows a very recent catching up
of European manufacturers on electric and hybrid vehicles in the EU (Figure 15).
Figure 15: The dynamics of the Revealed
Technological Advantage Index for different technologies for selected car
manufacturers[139]
164.       Under
Policy Option 2, the economies of scale that could be achieved by
manufacturers would likely be higher, although not corresponding to the whole
EU market for reasons explained in paragraph 133. Further benefits could be
achieved under Policy Options 3 for EVs and ships and barges capable of
running on LNG and further still under Policy Option 4, for the
manufacturers supplying FCEVs, LNG  trucks and CNG road transport vehicles.
5.1.4.     Impact on SMEs and
micro-enterprises
165.       There
is generally limited quantitative evidence on the impact of deploying
alternative fuels on SMEs and micro-enterprises. However, these companies
dominate the road haulage and the taxi market, which suffer greatly from high
oil prices. More generally, SMEs and micro-enterprises are largely present in
traditional sectors of activity (retail, personal services, construction and
maintenance) for which transport costs typically represent a significant share
of overall costs. SMEs and micro-enterprises often have no alternative to the
use of personal vehicles and LDV and contrary to large enterprises have more
difficulty in optimising logistic costs and finding alternative arrangements
for transport. Although the use of alternative fuel vehicles requires a larger
initial investment in the vehicle, many studies show that for the high mileage
typically associated with professional use, the lower operating costs allow to
amortise the extra expenditure on the vehicle in a
shorter time period.
166.       A recent paper on the French
EV market by the OECD/ITF[140] has found that currently:
(1)              
 The additional consumer cost of a compact or
sedan EV is around € 4000-5000 over the vehicles lifetime;
(2)              
The consumer saving of a compact EV van is
around € 4000 compared to a conventional vehicle, 
(3)              
and concluded that "Under these conditions,
one might expect that a market already exists for BEV vans if potential buyers
have confidence in the advertised driving ranges and dealer support for these
vehicles."
167.       From
this point of view, SMEs and micro enterprises would benefit from the policy
proposals since many of them could profit from the reduced operating costs of
alternative fuel vehicles. Policy Option 4 would be the most favourable,
although the LNG infrastructure for ships would mainly concern large
enterprises and thus provide only a small advantage to SMEs compared to Policy
Option 3.        
168.       The proposals, however, do
not concern SMEs and micro-enterprises only from a cost reduction perspective.
Although the large car and vessels manufacturers are more directly affected, a
lot of the components and assisting technologies – such as fuel cells,
batteries, power electronics, gas liquefaction technologies, electrolysers for
hydrogen production – come from SMEs.
169.       Moreover, alternative fuel
vehicles have many advantages, but do not exactly reproduce the characteristics
of the conventionally powered vehicles. For this reason, their deployment will
be associated with new business models and modified behaviour of users. In
fact, an alternative system of mobility will gradually develop,
characterised to a larger extent by multimodality, mobility service providers
and IT technologies. 
170.       SMEs will have many
opportunities in a transport system with such characteristics as service providers,
software developers and manufacturers of equipment and components; indeed SMEs play
an important role in green markets and the related areas of eco-innovation and
resource efficiency[141]. Green jobs are mostly created in small and medium enterprises. 
171.       Whilst eco-innovation is
found one of the strongest drivers for growth and value generation of SMEs,
uncertain demand from the market is considered by far the largest barrier to an
accelerated market uptake, as shown in a recent Eurobarometer poll carried out
for DG Environment[142]. The value of the proposals, namely of Policy Option 3 and 4,
in reducing uncertainty and helping the build-up of new markets with
alternative fuel infrastructure would therefore first and foremost benefit to
SMEs and create new jobs there.
5.1.5.     Impact on functioning of the
internal market and market development 
172.       Imposing technical
specifications at an early stage of market development could thwart innovation
and act as a barrier to entry for providers having developed alterative
solutions. In a later phase, however, the lack of technical standards could
become a serious obstacle to wide acceptance of a product and the reaping of
economies of scale; dissimilar national requirements could be used to limit
competition[143] on the market for equipment and vehicles, by becoming a barrier to
the free movement of goods.
173.       In
the field of recharging/refuelling infrastructure, the phase of development can
be considered completed and the type of technology involved is not particularly
sophisticated. Eventually, a standard is likely to be adopted, since the
persistence of different technical solutions would represent a serious obstacle
to pan-European mobility and would not be tolerable. This however might imply
considerable stranded costs and additional expenditure for adaptation if a
decision is delayed. This is the likely scenario under Policy Option 1
(cf. §66-68).
174.       Under
Policy Option 2, the Commission would express its preference for one
specific technical standard without imposing it. This is an inferior solution
with respect to either Policy Option 3-4 or Policy Option 1: if the
recommendation is followed, there would be no difference in impact with respect
to a mandate, but if the recommendation is not (or only partially) followed the
objective would not be reached. Moreover, by recommending a specific solution
it would not facilitate any alternative agreement in the industry as
theoretically possible under Policy Option 1. In any event, many voices have
already been raised in favour of the establishment of standards without any
decision being taken: under Policy Option 1 the deadlock is not likely to be
broken within the desirable timeframe. 
5.1.6.     Impact on users of alternative
fuel vehicles and vessels
175.       The
impact on households and non-business users of the various policy options is
analogous to the impact on SMEs and micro-enterprises as described in §165-167.
Under Policy Option 1, users would have more limited possibilities to
switch to alternatives fuels in response to soaring gasoline and diesel prices.
These alternatives are increasingly expanded under Policy Option 2, 3 and 4.
176.       Policy Option 3 and 4 would
not only provide a more extended network, but ensure that this network covers
all Member States and has the same technical specifications. This would allow
wider commercialisation of vehicles with lower production costs to the benefit
of users. 
177.       Ultimately, investors will
have to recover the cost of infrastructure and will most likely do it by
charging users. Accordingly, Policy Option 3 and 4 imply a ‘premium’ over
Policy Option 1 and 2, for the availability of a wider network. The modelling
exercise, however, suggests that this premium is inferior to the additional
utility for the users.           
178.       An additional advantage to
users is related to cross-border mobility. A significant number of cross-border
journeys, in particular with holiday purpose, take place every year in the EU.
The large majority of them are undertaken using passenger cars[144]. As for road freight, the volume of intra-EU cross-border transport
increased from around 1,000 billion tonne km in 1995 to over 1,500 billion
tonne km in 2005[145]. Around 10,000 ships are currently used for European Short Sea
Shipping. Under Policy Option 1, the possibility of
using alternative fuel vehicles and vessels to undertake these trips would be
severely limited due to first, the lack of harmonised standards on recharging
and refuelling infrastructure; second, the lack of sufficient infrastructure.
179.       The various Policy Options
would impact the users involved in these cross-border trips differently: Policy
Option 2 would enable seamless mobility only across Member States that follow
the Commission’s recommendations, while under Policy Option 3 the possibility
of pan-European mobility would be ensured for all EVs and for all ships and
barges using LNG. Policy Option 4 would in addition cater for the users of the
main road transport corridors with LNG trucks, it would ensure enough coverage
for CNG vehicles, and would also enable cross-border mobility in-between more
than 15 Member States that already have hydrogen refuelling stations on their
territory.
5.2.        Social impacts
180.       The assessment of social
impacts tries to identify the possible effect of the proposal on four
dimensions: employment; workers skills; social cohesion and health. 
181.       The direct impacts on
employment would have to be estimated in the sectors related specifically to
alternative fuels infrastructure. However, the main manufacturers of equipment
for alternative fuels infrastructure are very large global companies (Siemens
AG providing work for 360,000 employees; General Electric, employing more than
280,000 people; ABB with number of employees over 130,000; Schneider Electric,
employing some 124,000 people etc), with a complex and wide portfolio of
products and services. Due to these characteristics, it is very difficult to
determine the number of people employed strictly in relation to the
manufacturing of alternative fuels infrastructure. An overview of current
employment figures is nonetheless provided in Appendix 11.
5.2.1.     Impact on employment levels 
182.       The procurement of
investment goods and services for the build-up of infrastructure for the main
alternative fuels would be mostly placed in Europe, given that the EU would be
a first mover in alternative fuel infrastructure investments. Most part of the
direct economic impact is associated with the creation of income for the
sectors directly involved in the infrastructure build-up process, as well as
additional employment.
183.       Additional employment, with
a wide range of job qualifications, will be created for a long period of
co-existence of alternative and conventional fuels, through investment into
alternative fuel infrastructure sectors, in particular in the areas of
construction, manufacturing, electricity, information and communication
technology, advanced materials, computer applications. In electricity, e.g. additional
employment would mostly come from smart meters maintenance; additional
employment in the LNG and CNG supply chain with high technical skills
employees. According to recent market research[146],
revenues related to EV charging infrastructure alone will grow from 72 million
€ in 2012 to more than 1 billion € by 2020, assuming the deployment of 4.1
million charging points (Figure 16). 
Figure 16: EV charging equipment revenue by segment
in Europe[147]
184.       The wider impact on
employment mirrors that of the economic impacts described in Sections 5.1.3 and
5.1.4. In sectors, such as automotive manufacturing and refining, employment will
shift, on the long term, to new qualifications required by the alternative fuel
technologies. This will follow the transformation of value added in the
different sectors: for instance in the automotive sector, the importance of
aftermarket services is foreseen to decrease while that of mobility services to
increase (Figure 17). Several reports[148] indicate that a relatively stable core employment in the automotive
industry in Europe can be expected with the deployment of EVs. The proximity of
markets will be crucial in the selection of the manufacturing location for
these vehicles, due to long and costly transport of batteries and finished EVs.
Therefore it can be safely assumed, that the majority of vehicle assembly will
concentrate in those areas which offer the greatest market demand.
Figure 17: Future shift in value added in automotive
services[149]
185.       The current decline of
refining industry in Europe is related to improving energy efficiency in
transport, and consequently less fuel consumption. A gradual market build-up
for alternative fuels will, in the short term, not accelerate that development,
but rather provide additional investments and employment. It will also prepare
smoothly for a shift to alternative fuels, in the long term.
186.       Early start of the
adaptation of the job market to the new requirements with the support to the
market build-up of alternative fuels will give a competitive advantage to
Europe.
5.2.2.     Impact on skills
187.       Particularly the skills of
the young professionals, which are needed in the field of R&D of the
automotive companies, will need to change significantly. In the future,
chemists and materials scientists will have significantly higher proportions
among the employees than today[150].
188.       Almost all manufacturers and
suppliers focus on recruiting young professionals from universities, competing
for the best graduates. Regarding the access to specialists, the responses of
the different experts for the purposes of a recent study[151] undertaken for the Directorate-General Enterprise and Industry,
vary considerably. While the large European manufacturers do not anticipate any
problems concerning the acquisition and advanced education of employees, the
majority of European associations, suppliers, and public policy makers expect a
shortage of skilled labour, even in the long run.
5.2.3.     Impact on social cohesion
189.       Affordable mobility is an
important component of social cohesion; currently this is largely dependent on
the use of private vehicles. Under Policy Option 1, personal mobility by
car will encounter increasing difficulties linked to high oil price and to
limits to local pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions that will inevitably
become more stringent. Whereas greater use of public transport, walking and
cycling is advisable, not all situations allow these alternatives. 
190.       Some of the less affluent
parts of society will be particularly penalised by these developments: people
leaving in poorly connected areas or not having the means to purchase more
modern and performing vehicles. Middle income groups also spend a higher
proportion of their income on transport fuel[152].  
191.       Alternative fuels vehicles
will be initially targeted to ‘early adopters’[153] which
typically belong to high income groups. They will also be a relatively small
number up to 2020. Accordingly, Policy Option 2, 3 and 4, will
not have a significant direct effect on social cohesion. However, in the
longer-term, a significant proportion of alternative fuels vehicles can have a
dumping effect on the demand, and therefore, on the price of oil. Perhaps more
importantly, alternative fuel vehicles will be a component of a mobility system
which will demand greater complementarity between private vehicles and public
transport, and any improvement in the public transport system will contribute
to greater social cohesion.     
5.2.4.     Impact on health
192.       Air and noise pollution is a
persistent issue affecting the life of millions of European citizens, in
particular in urban areas. Despite European legislation setting limit values
for pollutants, PM10 and NO2 concentrations regularly exceed
those in large areas of Europe (Figure 18). The European Environmental Agency concluded that in 2011, that
"In urban areas, the exceedances of the LVs for PM10 and NO2
imply exposure to concentrations levels which are expected to have adverse
effects on human health".
Figure 18: Exceedances of air quality objectives due
to traffic[154]
193.       Moreover, in March 2011, a joint assessment carried out
by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Commission's Joint Research
Centre found that noise generated by road traffic accounts for at least 1
million healthy life years lost in the Western Europe[155]. Most recently, in June 2012, the International Agency for Research
on Cancer (IARC), which is part of the WHO, classified "diesel engine
exhaust as carcinogenic to humans (Group 1), based on sufficient evidence that
exposure is associated with an increased risk for lung cancer"[156].
194.       Under Policy Option 1,
economic modelling shows that NOx emissions and particulate matter
would drop by about 20%, and by 37% by 2020, respectively. The increase in
traffic would lead to a roughly 8 billion € increase of noise-related external
costs by 2020. As demonstrated in detail in the following section on
environmental impacts, the deployment of alternative fuel vehicles reduces
further these external costs and therefore the impact on health. While Policy
Options 3 and 4 perform better in the reduction of external costs for noise
than Policy Option 2 on the 2020 horizon, the results do not vary greatly
among the scenarios. On the other hand, significant differences can be seen
among the scenarios for the emissions of pollutants such as NOx and
particulate matter. While under Policy Option 4, NOx emissions decrease
by 2.8% due to the higher deployment of clean fuels such as CNG in road
ransport and LNG in road transport and shipping, this reduction by 2020 is only
2.0% for Policy Option 3 and 1.4% in Policy Option 2. By 2020,
the reduction in particulate matter emissions follow a similar pattern to NOx
emissions, declining by 2.1% in Policy Option 4 relative to Policy
Option 1, by 1.6% in Policy Option 3 and 0.8% in Policy Option 2.    

5.3.        Environmental impacts
195.       There are potentially large
environmental benefits of deploying alternative fuels. As these benefits can
only be realised if market penetration is achieved, building up sufficient
infrastructure as foreseen in the Policy Options is a pre-condition. The
potential impacts of deploying vehicles and vessels (on energy use, pollutant
and GHG emissions and noise) are assessed below on the basis of modelling
results. The full description of the modelling exercise can be found in Appendix
10. 
196.       Results of three scenarios,
corresponding each to the respective Policy Option, are provided in comparison to
Policy Option 1, in order to illustrate the environmental benefits of
action on alternative fuel infrastructure in conjunction with policy
intervention on other issues hampering the deployment of alternative fuel
vehicles and vessels. 
197.       The modelling exercise shows
that there would be significant environmental impacts in terms of reduced
noise, pollutant and CO2 emissions relative to developments under
business-as-usual. Results are shown for these main environmental impacts and
for oil consumption. While the focus of the exercise was 2020, modelling
results are displayed for three chosen years, 2020, 2030 and 2050, on Figure 19,
Figure 20 and Figure 21, respectively. 
198.       As a result of increased
deployment of electric and fuel cell vehicles, including plug-in hybrids,
already by 2020, CO2 emissions decrease by up to 0.3% in Policy
Option 2 and 0.3% in Policy Option 3 both compared to Policy Option
1.  The reduction is marginally higher in Policy Option 3 relative to 4, due to
increased emissions from LNG trucks in Policy Option 4 in the medium-run.
199.       Under Policy Option 2,
NOx emissions decrease by 1.4% by 2020, by 2.0% in Policy Option 3,
and in Policy Option 4 by 2.8%. Particulate matter emissions follow a
similar pattern to NOx emissions. External costs for noise are
reduced by about 0.2% in Policy Options 3 and 4, and by slightly less
than 0.2% under Policy Option 2 on the 2020 horizon.
200.       Oil consumption goes down by
about 2.3% by 2020 in Policy Option 4 relative to Policy Option 1,
reflecting the highest uptake of alternative fuels, electricity, hydrogen,
natural gas (LNG and CNG) among the scenarios. Oil consumption decreases by
only 0.3% by 2020 in Policy Option 2 and about 0.9% in Policy Option
3.
201.       Similar reduction patterns
among scenarios are shown for 2030 and 2050. However, Policy Option 4
provides the highest reduction in CO2 emission (-4.6%) by 2050
relative to Policy Option 1, followed by Policy Option 3 (-3.4%)
and Policy Option 2 (-1.3%). Particulate matter emissions drop by more
than 8% by 2050 in Policy Option 4, while NOx emissions by
about 6% under the same scenario. The reduction in oil consumption is also
highest in Policy Option 4 by 2050, at more than 8% relative to Policy
Option 1.  
Figure 19: Summary of scenario results for 2020
Source:
PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model
Figure 20: Summary of scenario results for 2030
Source:
PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model
Figure 21: Summary of scenario results for 2050
Source:
PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model
5.4.        Conclusions
202.       This section is based on the
comparison of each individual policy option, acting on both problem drivers, to
Policy Option 1. The analysis of impacts shows that investing in a minimum
recharging/refuelling network is the most efficient way to promote alternative
fuel vehicles (Figure 10, Appendix 10). While infrastructure alone has no major
direct impact, an intervention on the refuelling/recharging network can have
very large and positive effect in combination with other initiatives targeted
at the introduction of cleaner vehicles. 
203.       Under Policy Option 4,
the benefits in terms of lower oil consumption over the lifetime of the
alternative fuel cars, HDVs and vessels whose uptake would be enabled by this
minimum network amount to about 84.9 bn € (with corresponding additional energy
security benefit of 18.9 bn €), while lower impact on the environment can be
monetised to be around 15.4 bn €. Hence, the benefits clearly outweigh the
approx. 10 bn € which are needed to put in place the minimum network. Under Policy
Option 3 the corresponding numbers for avoided fuel consumption, the energy
security benefits and the reduction in external costs are: 37.7 bn €, 8.3 bn €
and 12.5 bn €, respectively. Under Policy Option 2 the benefits in terms
of lower oil consumption amount to 17.5 bn € (with corresponding additional
energy security benefit of 3.8 bn €), while lower impact on the environment can
be monetised to be around 8.9 bn €.
Table 13: Summary table of
impacts
   || Policy Option 2 || Policy Option 3 || Policy Option 4 
 Economic impacts 
 Investment costs || - || -- || --- 
 Macroeconomic impacts || + || ++ || +++ 
 Competitiveness || + || ++ || +++ 
 SMEs || + || ++ || ++ 
 Internal market || + || ++ || ++ 
 Users || + || ++ || ++ 
 Social impacts 
 Employment level || = || =/+ || +/++ 
 Skills || + || ++ || +++ 
 Social cohesion || = || = || = 
 Health || + || ++ || +++ 
 Environmental impacts || + || ++ || +++ 
Legend: 
=              baseline
or equivalent to Policy Option 1
+ to +++ low
to high improvement compared to Policy Option 1
- to - - -   low to high
worsening compared to Policy Option 1
6.           Comparison of the options
204.       This section provides for an
assessment of how the policy options will contribute to the realization of the
policy objectives, as set in Section 3, in light of the following evaluation
criteria:
·      effectiveness – the extent to which options
achieve the objectives of the proposal;
·      efficiency – the extent to which objectives
can be achieved at least cost;
·      coherence – the extent to which policy
options are likely to limit trade-offs across the economic, social, and
environmental domain.
Effectiveness
205.       The objectives set out in
Section 3 are fully achieved under Policy Option 4 for all alternative
fuels considered in the IA. Policy Option 3 differs only in the coverage
of fuels, and the objective of enhancing investment certainty would be limited
to technologically more mature fuel solutions. Policy Option 2 has the
greatest risk of not satisfactorily delivering on the specific and horizontal
objectives, due to the very large margin of discretion left to Member States
for implementation of the Commission’s recommendations.
Efficiency
206.       The
least cost can be associated to Policy Option 2, which is however a
result of lower effectiveness in the achievement of objectives. While the costs
of Policy Option 4 are higher than of Policy Option 3, the
potential benefits can overweigh this difference, subject to the technological
developments.
              Coherence
207.       Policy Option 2 would
likely result in lower investments at lower overall costs. This outcome would
particularly penalise the environmental dimension since the development of
clean vehicles would be slower. Policy Option 3 achieves the most
comprehensive limitation of trade-offs across the economic, social and
environmental fields, taking into account in particular that large-scale
investment is only mandated for technologies that are mature enough to deliver
their economic, social and environmental benefits with high certainty. Policy
Option 4 would represent a more risky option, which can be considered to
place more emphasis on the environmental dimension with respect to the economic
one.
Conclusion
208.       The table below summarizes
the results of the comparison of policy options in terms of effectiveness,
efficiency and coherence based on the assessment provided above.
Table 14: Comparison of Policy Options
   || Effectiveness || Efficiency || Coherence 
 Policy Option 1 || no || no || no 
 Policy Option 2 || low || medium || low 
 Policy Option 3 || medium || high || high 
 Policy Option 4 || high || medium || medium 
209.       In light of the above,
Policy Option 2 is discarded, since it compares unfavourably with both Policy
Option 3 and Policy Option 4.  
210.       On the other hand, the
assessment of impacts do not point to huge differences between Policy Option 3
and Policy Option 4, and indeed the two options have many elements in common,
such as the measures envisaged in relation to the EU-wide implementation of
common standards and the deployment of alternative fuel infrastructure for EVs.
The preference is given to Policy Option 3 since it appears to better take into
account the economic constraints, particularly at a time of crisis.
211.       However, Policy Option 4 is
not formally discarded as its suitability is mostly influenced by existing
technological uncertainties and prospects that can change in the near future
with technology progressing rapidly. This would increase the efficiency, which
presently is rated medium.
212.       The overriding necessity of
giving clear signals to the markets, both industry and consumers, would rather
give larger political merits to the comprehensive Policy Option 4. If chosen,
such a decisive step on EU level could accelerate the market development of
alternative fuels in general and ensure that investments have a larger impact
on economic growth in Europe.
213.       Rapid implementation of the
necessary actions, with market comforting targets set for 2020, can also
strongly enhance the momentum for the EU 2020 strategy.  
7.           Monitoring and evaluation
214.       The Commission would need to
explore the inclusion of some monitoring and reporting requirements on the
availability of alternative fuels infrastructure in the legislative proposal,
building on existing reporting channels between the Statistical Offices of
Member States and Eurostat and carrying out additional information collection
through existing Joint Undertakings, Technology Platforms, and expert groups.
215.       Internet portals launched by
the Commission, such as the Clean Vehicle Portal would be used for data
collection and market surveys.
216.       The new European
Electromobility Observatory, launched by the Commission in 2012 will aggregate
data and information on the development of electricity and hydrogen as fuels
across the EU and support new policy and market actions on regional and local
level.
217.       Member
States would most likely need to provide the Commission with national plans on the build-up of alternative fuels infrastructure every two
years. These reports could inter alia include the following information:
·       
Detailed sales information on alternative fuel
vehicles and vessels
·       
Consumption of alternative fuels, including
electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (LNG and CNG) for transport 
·       
Annual progress of the number of each of the
concerned alternative fuels infrastructure
·       
Location and density of these infrastructures
218.       The Commission would submit
reports on the implementation and impacts of this Directive to the European
Parliament and the Council every two years. The report would assess the actions
taken by individual Member States and the effects of the Directive, in
particular on the market development of the alternative fuels covered by the Directive,
and the need for further action.
219.       The reports would also
review the requirements and the dates in view of the technical, economic and
market developments of the respective fuels, and propose adjustments as
appropriate.
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Melendez et al, 2005, Analysis of the Hydrogen
Infrastructure Needed to Enable Commercial Introduction of Hydrogen-Fueled
Vehicles.
(29)          
Melendez et al, 2007, Geographically Based
Hydrogen Consumer Demand and Infrastructure Analysis: Final Report.
(30)          
NEA et al, 2011, Medium and Long Term
Perspectives of IWT in the European Union.
(31)          
New-IG, 2011, Fuel Cell and Hydrogen
technologies in Europe, Financial and technology outlook on the European sector
ambition 2014-2020.
(32)          
OECD, 2012, Market Development for Green Cars.
(33)          
Peeters et al, 2004, European tourism, transport and environment.
(34)          
Pieters et al, 2012, Cross-border Car Traffic in
Dutch Mobility Models.
(35)          
Pike Research, 2012, Electric Vehicle Charging
Equipment in Europe.
(36)          
Royal Dutch Shell plc, 2005, Annual Report.
(37)          
Schneider Electric, 2010, Connection system on
the recharging spot – a key element for electric vehicles.
(38)          
United States Department of Energy. Source:
United States Department of Energy, 2011, 2010 Fuel Cell Technologies – Market
Report.
(39)          
Universität Duisburg Essen, 2012,
Competitiveness of EU Automotive Industry in Electric Vehicles, Draft Final Report.
(40)          
Westport, 2011, LNG: An Immediate Fuel
Alternative for Truck Transportation in Europe.
(41)          
Wiederer et al., 2010, Policy option for
electric vehicle charging infrastructure in C40 cities.
(42)          
Wiesenthal.et al, 2011, Mapping innovation in
the European transport sector.
9.           Glossary
·       
Alternative fuels: fuels such as electricity, hydrogen, biofuels (liquids), synthetic
fuels, methane (natural gas (CNG and LNG) and biomethane) and Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) which substitute, at least partly, fossil oil
sources in the energy supply to transport, contribute to its decarbonisation
and enhance the environmental performance of the transport sector.
·       
AC: Alternative
current connector
·       
ACEA: European
Automobile Manufacturers’ Association
·       
CARS21: Competitive
Automotive Regulatory System for the 21st century
·       
CEN:  European Committee for Standardization
·       
CENELEC: European
Committee for Electro-technical Standardization
·       
CHIC: Clean
Hydrogen in European Cities Project 
·       
CNG:  Compressed
Natural Gas
·       
DECC: Department
of Energy and Climate Change 
·       
DSO: Distribution
System Operator
·       
E-REV:
Extended-Range Electric Vehicles 
·       
ETSI: European
Telecommunications Standards Institute
·       
EV: Electric
Vehicle
·       
FCEV: Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle
·       
GHG:  Greenhouse
Gas
·       
HDV: Heavy Duty
Vehicle
·       
HEV: Hybrid electric vehicle 
·       
HICE: Hydrogen
Internal Combustion engine
·       
HRS: Hydrogen
Refuelling Station
·       
HyTEC: Hydrogen
Transport in European Cities project
·       
HDV: Heavy Duty
Vehicle 
·       
IEA:  International
Energy Agency
·       
IEC: International
Electro-technical Commission
·       
ISO:
international Organization for Standardization
·       
IMO:
International Maritime Organization
·       
LCV: Light
Commercial Vehicle 
·       
LDV: Light Duty
Vehicle
·       
LNG:  Liquefied
Natural Gas
·       
LPG:  Liquefied Petroleum Gas
·       
MS: European Union’s Member State
·       
OCIMF: Oil
Companies International Marine Forum
·       
PHEV:  Plug-in
Hybrid Electric Vehicle
·       
SAE: Society of
Automobile Engineers 
·       
SECA: Sulphur Emission Control Area
·       
SIGGTO: Society
of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators
·       
SME: Small and
medium enterprise
·       
TEN-T: Trans-European
Network for Transport
·       
Type of plug 1: Single
phase vehicle coupler 
·       
Type of plug 2: Type
3: Single & three phase vehicle coupler with shutters
·       
Type of plug 3: Single
& three phase vehicle coupler with shutters
10.         Appendices
Appendices 1 to 11 are provided in a separate
document.
[1]               COM(2011) 144 final 
[2]               COM(2013) 17 final 
[3]               SEC(2011) 358 final
[4]               The services involved in this group included the
Secretariat-General, DG Agriculture and Rural Development, DG Budget, DG
Climate Action, DG Competition, DG Communications Networks, Content and
Technology, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, DG Education and Culture, DG
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, DG Energy, DG Enlargement,
DG Enterprise and Industry, DG Environment, European External Action Service,
DG Health and Consumers, DG Internal Market and Services, the Joint Research
Centre, the Legal Service, DG Research, DG Regional Policy, DG Trade, and DG
Taxation and Customs Union.
[5]               http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/cts/doc/2011-01-25-future-transport-fuels-report.pdf;
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/cts/doc/2011-12-2nd-future-transport-fuels-report.pdf;
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/cts/doc/jeg_cts_report_201105.pdf;
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/automotive/files/cars-21-final-report-2012_en.pdf

[6]               http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/events/2011_04_13_future_transport_fuels_en.htm;

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/consultations/doc/cts/report-on-results.pdf;
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/studies/doc/2012-08-cts-implementation-study.pdf

[7]               Idem footnote 2.
[8]               Two studies have been carried out by COWI sprl
Belgium under two Specific Contracts. The first, “Study on Clean Transport
Systems”, was launched in September 2010 and explored possible contributions of
various fuel-technology combinations in the transport sector to achieve the 60%
GHG emissions reduction target set by the White Paper on Transport of March
2011. The second, “CTS Implementation Study on Alternative Fuels Infrastructure”,
was launched in October 2011. This study gathered further information on
alternative fuels infrastructure, and assessed different options to develop an
EU-wide alternative fuels infrastructure. The relevant reports are available
at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/studies/urban_en.htm

[9]               European
Commission, Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, EU Energy and
Transport in Figures, 2012, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/publications/statistics/statistics_en.htm

[10]             Source: International Energy Agency, 2009, Transport,
Energy and CO2: Moving Towards Sustainability.
[11]             Source: Eurostat.
[12]             SEC(2011) 288 Impact Assessment accompanying document
to the Communication “A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy
in 2050”.
[13]             European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and
Transport, Road Freight Transport Vademecum 2009, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/doc/2009_road_freight_vademecum.pdf
.
[14]             European Environmental Agency, Expenditure on personal
mobility (TERM 024) - Assessment published Jan 2011, available at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/expenditure-on-personal-mobility-2/assessment
[15]             See for example IEA, 2011, World
Energy Outlook 2010.
[16]             Directive 2009/28/EC. 
[17]             COM(2006) 848 final.
[18]             COM(2010) 2020 final.
[19]             Under Flagship Initiative “An industrial policy for the
globalisation era”, the Commission announced “to improve the way in which
European standard setting works to leverage European and international
standards for the long-term competitiveness of European industry. This will
include promoting the commercialisation and take-up of key enabling
technologies”.
[20]             Idem footnote 1.
[21]             COM(2010) 186 final 
[22]             A recent report from the OECD found that: "The
following factors may explain the slow development [of green vehicle
markets]:
• High
price of AFVs (especially BEVs, due to the cost of the battery) relative to
conventional ICE vehicles.
• Lack
of refuelling/charging infrastructure, which will take many years to be built
fully.
•
Restricted driving range compared to conventional ICE vehicles, and the
perceived distance needs of consumers, which often do not correspond to their
regular driving habits. But, even if BEVs have enough range for daily commutes,
consumers may be reluctant to pay for a vehicle that is not suitable for a trip
longer than 150 km before charging. 
•
Refuelling times that are longer than what consumers are accustomed to."
Source:
OECD, 2012, Market Development for Green Cars.
[23]             Concerning issues (1) and (2), at EU level, Horizon
2020 (COM (2011)809 final) is targeting suboptimal research efforts; CO2
standards for new road vehicles try to remedy consumer myopia and ‘wait and see’
attitudes of carmakers in a particularly risky business environment; proposals
and legislation for energy taxation and for road pricing address the presence
of negative externalities; initiatives on labelling help consumers making more
informed choices. An overview of related initiatives is provided in Appendix 2.
[24]             This was stated again prominently again at the opening of
the 2012 Mondial de l’automobile, Paris: “Le démarrage [de l’électrique] est
freiné par le manque d’infrastructure de recharge” (Carlos Ghosn, CEO of
Renault, in Le Figaro, 27 September 2012).
[25]             “Examining choice data from a survey of potential
car buyers in Germany, we have shown in this paper that demand for
alternative-fuel vehicles strongly depends on the availability of fuelling
infrastructure. Consequently, a failure to significantly expand the network of
stations for alternative fuels would significantly hamper the adoption of
alternative-fuel vehicles in coming years.” Source: Acthnicht et al., 2012,
The impact of fuel availability on demand for alternative-fuel vehicles.
Transportation Research Part D 17 (2012) pp. 262-269. Examples of other studies
supporting this statement: Egbue et al, 2012, Barriers to widespread adoption
of electric vehicles: Analysis of consumer attitudes and perceptions; Deloitte
Development LLC, 2010, Gaining traction - A customer view of electric vehicle
mass adoption in the U.S. automotive market.
[26]             The fact that market penetration of alternative fuels
requires the build-up of the appropriate infrastructure was also recognised by
the CARS 21 High Level Group on the Competitiveness and Sustainable Growth of
the Automotive Industry in the European Union in its recent report, available
at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/automotive/files/cars-21-final-report-2012_en.pdf.
[27]             In order to ease comparison, more details on business-as-usual
developments (Policy Option 1) are provided in Section 5 “Impact analysis of
policy options”.
[28]             ‘Public charging point’ is defined as publicly
accessible charging point through this Impact Assessment.
[29]             Source: Reproduced and updated based on data provided
by EURELECTRIC, and in EURELECTRIC, March 2012, Facilitating e-mobility:
EURELECTRIC views on charging infrastructure, Table 1.
[30]             The figures reflect efforts of Verbund.
[31]             The figures represent efforts of CEZ, PRE and Eon in
Czech Republic.
[32]             The figures reflect national situation in Denmark. 
[33]            Private locations
are equipped with standardised domestic sockets (“schuko”) charging in Mode 2.
[34]             For public, figures reflect German electricity industry
efforts, private installations reflect RWE installations.
[35]             The figures reflect the national French roll-out plan.
[36]             The figures reflect the national Irish roll-out plan.
[37]             The figures represent Enel’s installations.
[38]             The figures reflect the national situation in the Netherlands.

[39]             The figures reflect the national Portuguese situation.
[40]             Private installations are equipped either with a
standard connector for Mode 2, or a Mode 3 charger with a tethered cable. The
figures reflect the national UK situation.
[41]             Source: Universität Duisburg Essen, 2012, Competitiveness
of EU Automotive Industry in Electric Vehicles, Draft Final Report, study
contracted by DG Enterprise and Industry.
[42]             The German Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and
Urban Development (BMVBS) and the industry (industrial partner Daimler, Linde,
Air Products, Air Liquide and Total) decided in a joint declaration to expand
the hydrogen filling station network in Germany. By 2015 there should be at
least 50 public filling stations for fuel cell vehicles. For the time being, 15
exist. Source: http://www.bmvbs.de/SharedDocs/DE/Pressemitteilungen/2012/125-ramsauer-wasserstofftankstellen.html

[43]             Source: Gas LNG Europe.
[44]             14 LNG terminals in Norway are organised to supply fuel
to vessels, and five of those are used as bunkering stations. Source: Idem footnote 47. 
[45]
            Source: Natural & bio Gas Vehicle Association Europe (NGVA
Europe).
[46]             LNG Blue Corridors project under the 7th Framework
Programme, Sustainable Surface Transport Priority, Green Cars Initiative. The
project is pending on final Commission approval.
[47]             Danish Maritime Authority, 2011, North European LNG
Infrastructure Project.
[48]             As part of Priority Project 21 of the Trans-European
Transport Network, the COSTA Action aims at developing framework conditions for
the use of LNG for ships in the Mediterranean, Atlantic Ocean and Black Sea
areas. It will result in preparing an LNG Masterplan for short sea shipping
between the Mediterranean Sea and North Atlantic Ocean as well as the Deep Sea
cruising in the North Atlantic Ocean towards the Azores and the Madeira Island.
The implementing bodies are as follows: RINA,  Grimaldi
Group, Grandi Navi Veloci, Portos dos Açores, Portos da Madeira. Further information is available at: http://tentea.ec.europa.eu/en/ten-t_projects/ten-t_projects_by_country/multi_country/2011-eu-21007-s.htm

[49]             Source: IEA, 2011, Technology Roadmap, Electric and
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[50]             Source: Speech by Dieter Zetsche, President ACEA, CEO
Daimler on the future of electric cars at the Informal Competitiveness Council
of San Sebastian, 9 February 2010 available at: http://www.acea.be/images/uploads/files/20100211_Speech_Dieter_Zetsche.pdf

[51]             Source: ACEA position paper on electrically chargeable
vehicles, 6 Sep 2011, available at: http://www.acea.be/images/uploads/files/ACEA_on_ECVs.pdf

[52]             Source: Reproduced and updated based on Table 5A in
IEA, 2011, Technology Roadmap, Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles,
available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[53]             This may contain development partners and former
partnership.
[54]
            Source: www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=aT_u.QS7Y4tg

[55]
            Source: http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/news/documents/1_Million_Electric_Vehicle_Report_Final.pdf

[56]             “In June 2009, the company formulated and published
the “Mitsubishi Motors Group Environmental Vision 2020” as its overarching
guidelines for environmental initiatives. Among the goals to be achieved by
2020 are electric-powered vehicles (EV and PHEV) accounting for 20% or more of
total production volume, (new) models’ CO2 emissions to be reduced by 50% in
comparison from FY2005 levels as a global average. […] [The] “Environment Initiative Program 2015” sets
interim targets for 2015 as a step along the way to achieving the 2020 targets.
It calls for electric-powered vehicles to account for at least 5% of total
production volume […].”
Source:
www.mitsubishi-motors.com/publish/pressrelease_en/corporate/2011/news/detail0771.html

[57]             www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a4324f4-4353-11e0-aef2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1FLb87CdI

[58]             Estimated to be 300,000 cars. 
Source: http://content.usatoday.com/communities/driveon/post/2010/07/vw-sales-to-be-3-gybrid-and-electric-vehicles-by-2018/1;

http://www.treehugger.com/cars/volkswagen-plans-to-sell-300000-electric-cars-a-year-by-2018.html 

[59]             Extended-Range Electric Vehicles (E-REVs) are
considered PHEVs in this report. PHEVs are considered by many as bridging
technology towards full (battery-only) EVs. According to the findings of the
PHEV demonstration project undertaken by Toyota in Europe, the average trip
distance of PHEV users was 13.2 km, two-thirds of the trips were under 20 km,
and one-third of total driving time was done in pure electric mode. 
[60]             7% is the conclusion of Universität Duisburg Essen,
2012, “Competitiveness of EU Automotive Industry in Electric Vehicles”, Draft
Final Report, study contracted by DG Enterprise and Industry. 
[61]             Figure is based on selected PHEV and EV uptake
forecasts by Arup-Cenex, BCG, Berger, Cheuvreux, Deutsche Bank, Frost &
Sullivan and McKinsey, as shown in Department for Transport, 2011, Making the
Connection, The Plug-In Vehicle Infrastructure Strategy, United Kingdom,
available at: http://www.dft.gov.uk/publications/plug-in-vehicle-infrastructure-strategy/
[62]             The sales figure for 2020 of 1 million vehicles can be
translated into an estimated stock of EVs and PHEVs in 2020 using a simple
interpolation between the sales figure in 2011 of around 8,700 and the sales
figure of 2020. The result of a similar exercise done by the International
Energy Agency is shown on Figure 2.
[63]             Non-EU countries have also set targets for the
deployment of EVs and PHEVs. These targets need to be taken into account to
assess the likely global demand for the vehicles, and compare this to the
critical mass of production globally. Source: “Individual Country Roadmaps and
Announced Targets, as listed in the references.” Reproduced based on Table 4 in
IEA, 2011, Technology Roadmap, Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles,
available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[64]             Source: Figure 6 in IEA, 2011, Technology Roadmap,
Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[65]             The report is available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/urban/cts/doc/2011-12-2nd-future-transport-fuels-report.pdf
[66]             Source: Wiederer et al., 2010, Policy option for
electric vehicle charging infrastructure in C40 cities. 
[67]             France has announced the deployment of 4,000,000
private and 400,000 public charging points by 2020. Source:
http://www.cleanvehicle.eu/info-per-country-and-eu-policy/member-states/france/national-level/
[68]             Data on the existing stock of passenger cars and share
of urban population in each Member State is sourced from Eurostat.
[69]             For example, according to Pike
Research commercial sales of FCEVs will reach 1.2 million vehicles cumulatively
by 2020. Source: http://www.pikeresearch.com/newsroom/fuel-cell-vehicle-sales-to-cross-the-1-million-mark-in-2020

[70]
            Source: Ludwig-Bölkow-Systemtechnik GmbH, 2011, German efforts on
hydrogen for transport, available at: 
http://www.hydrogennet.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF-filer/Aktiviteter/Afholdte_aktiviteter/Transportworkshop%20d.%201.%20dec%202011/6_Buenger.pdf

[71]             Source: Melendez et al, 2005, Analysis of the Hydrogen
Infrastructure Needed to Enable Commercial Introduction of Hydrogen-Fueled
Vehicles.
[72]             Source: Melendez et al, 2007, Geographically Based
Hydrogen Consumer Demand and Infrastructure Analysis: Final Report.
[73]             Source: BMVBS, 2012, 50 hydrogen filling stations for
Germany: Federal Ministry of Transportation and industrial partners build
nationwide network of filling stations, available at:
 http://www.netinform.net/H2/files/pdf/50-hydrogen-filling-stations-Germany.pdf

[74]             Source: http://hydrogenlink.net/eng/PR-Danish-Government-launch-hydrogen-initiatives-23-03-2012.asp
The Danish industry coalition analysis & roadmap on “Hydrogen for transport
in Denmark onwards 2050” proposes to establish national coverage with 15
fuelling stations, achieving the maximum distance of 150 km to the nearest
station. 
Source:http://www.hydrogennet.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF-filer/Aktiviteter/Afholdte_aktiviteter/Transportworkshop%20d.%201.%20dec%202011/4_Sloth.pdf

[75]             Idem footnote 74.
[76]             Source: McKinsey & Company, 2010, A portfolio of
power-trains for Europe: a fact-based analysis. The role of Battery Electric
Vehicle, Plug-in Hybrids and Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles. Exhibit 28 "After
2025, the TCOs of all the power-trains converge", available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/research/fch/pdf/a_portfolio_of_power_trains_for_europe_a_fact_based__analysis.pdf

[77]             COM(2011) 650 final, Proposal for a Regulation of The
European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the development
of the trans-European transport network.
[78]             A route-based methodology rather than a strictly
distance-based (Euclidean-based) approach was applied. This choice avoids the
underestimation of the number of required stations as shown in Gutiérrez et
al., 2008, Distance-measure impacts on the calculation of transport service
areas using GIS.
[79]             Idem footnote 47 and 46. A number of further studies,
co-financed with EU funding available for the development of the TEN-T network,
analyse and refine LNG bunkering networks on a regional basis, such as LNG in
Baltic ports (until December 2014), LNG infrastructure and pilot project in the
North Sea (until March 2013), COSTA study on use of LNG in the Mediterranean,
Atlantic Ocean and Black Sea (until April 2014). 
[80]             “Under the revised MARPOL Annex VI, the global
sulphur cap is reduced initially to 3.50% (from the current 4.50%), effective
from 1 January 2012; then progressively to 0.50 %, effective from 1 January
2020, subject to a feasibility review to be completed no later than 2018. The
limits applicable in ECAs for SOx and particulate matter were
reduced to 1.00%, beginning on 1 July 2010 (from the original 1.50%); being
further reduced to 0.10 %, effective from 1 January 2015.” Source: IMO,
available at: http://www.imo.org/ourwork/environment/pollutionprevention/airpollution/pages/air-pollution.aspx

[81]             Source: NEA et al, 2011, Medium and Long Term Perspectives
of IWT in the European Union.
[82]             Source: Westport, 2011, LNG: An Immediate Fuel
Alternative for Truck Transportation in Europe, available at:
http://www.ngvaeurope.eu/members/presentations/Westport-Innovation-Nicholas-Sonntag.pdf
[83]             Source: HAM, 2012, Presentation "LNG fuel trucks
experience" available at: http://www.empresaeficiente.com/uploads/workshops/docs/f83279340ba1651353cbbe1e283e7cad1e1f478d.pdf

[84]             As identified in COM(2011) 665 final, Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Connecting
Europe Facility.
[85]             Idem footnote 78.
[86]             Idem footnote 5.
[87]             Source: Corts, K., 2009, Building out alternative fuel
Retail Infrastructure: Government Fleet Spillovers in E85, Center for the Study
of Energy Markets, University of California Energy Institute.
[88]             "Network externalities can cause inertia in the
development and diffusion of green cars. Barriers to entry can arise from
increasing returns to scale in networks and contribute to creating a bias in
the market towards existing technologies. Consumers may be reluctant to
purchase an AFV [alternative fuel vehicle] if they are uncertain that a
network of refuelling/charging infrastructure will be extended far enough to
cover their needs. Instead, they will tend to favour the incumbent ICE
technologies for which gasoline and diesel refuelling stations abound."
Source: Idem footnote 22.
[89]             Source: Royal Dutch Shell plc, 2005, Annual Report.
[90]             Idem footnote 25.
[91]             Idem footnote 49.
[92]             This risk has been highlighted by stakeholders
promoting hydrogen: “The main challenge to overcome for market introduction
is to break through the first-mover disadvantage and to raise sufficient
financial resources. Due to the high risk and amount of initial investments to
enter a mature and established market, there is little economic incentive for
any individual market-player to move first.” Source: New-IG, 2011, Fuel
Cell and Hydrogen technologies in Europe, Financial and technology outlook on
the European sector ambition 2014-2020, available at:
http://www.new-ig.eu/uploads/Modules/Publications/111026fchtechnologiesineurope-financialandtechnologyoutlook2014-2020_000.pdf

[93]             This market failure has been addressed in France, where
a requirement was put in place in 2010 for new buildings (large complexes),
defining an obligation for installing recharging points for EVs. Source: 
http://www.cleanvehicle.eu/info-per-country-and-eu-policy/member-states/france/national-level/

[94]             “Automaker Renault frustrated by the speed at which
electric car chargers are being installed across France“: 
Source: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/06/12/uk-renault-electriccars-chargers-idUKBRE85B0CJ20120612

[95]             Further details on the importance of cross-border
journeys within the EU are provided in paragraph 175.
[96]             Idem footnote 9. 
[97]             As defined in Section 2.2.2, paragraphs 48, 56, 63.
[98]             COM(2011) 206 final, Communication
from the Commission “Single Market Act, Twelve levers to boost growth and
strengthen confidence, “Working together to create new growth”“.
[99]
            OJ L 211 14.8.2009, p.94
[100]
           Annex I.2.
[101]
           Article 25.7.
[102]            On the basis of COM(2011) 370, agreement has been
reached in principle, but the final legislation still needs to be formally
adopted.
[103]            COM(2011) 658 final.           
[104]            COM(2011) 665 final. 
[105]            Planned and proposed infrastructure to be achieved by
2015 is not considered as additional investment for the description of Policy
Option 1. 
[106]            Source: Idem footnote 76. Exhibit 12 "All
conclusions are robust to significant variations in learning rates and the cost
of fossil fuels", available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/research/fch/pdf/a_portfolio_of_power_trains_for_europe_a_fact_based__analysis.pdf

[107]            The formulation of these targets could be similar to
Article 3 (1) of Directive 2003/30/EC on the promotion of the use of biofuels
or other renewable fuels for transport: “(a) Member States should ensure that a
minimum proportion of biofuels and other renewable fuels is placed on their
markets, and, to that effect, shall set national indicative targets. […]”
Source: OJ L 123 17.5.2003, p.42 
[108]            The formulation of these targets could be similar to
Article 3(4) of Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from
renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC
and 2003/30/EC: “Each Member State shall ensure that the share of energy from
renewable sources in all forms of transport in 2020 is at least 10 % of the
final consumption of energy in transport in that Member State. […]” Source: OJ
L 140 5.6.2009, p.16
[109]            Idem footnote 107.
[110]            Idem footnote 108.
[111]            Modelling results build primarily on the PRIMES-TREMOVE
transport model.
[112]            A refuelling/recharging network has a certain utility to
vehicles users. This utility is very high when the availability of
infrastructure is low: without infrastructure, alternative fuel vehicles would
be useless. On the other hand, the utility of infrastructure is marginally
decreasing and eventually an extra charging point will not make any significant
difference to the user. The relevant evidence can be found in the studies
mentioned in footnote 25.
[113]            “Internationally uniform standards can only be
effective if there is correspondingly harmonized government regulation.
Coordination processes in standardization will reach their limits if countries
adopt regulations that counteract harmonization because of diverging industry
policy interests. There is currently a need for action with regard to reaching
agreement on a uniform charging infrastructure, which will have a significant
impact on the customer uptake of electric vehicles. There is a pressing need
for the harmonization of national regulations in favour of pan-European and
international solutions.” Source: Second Report of the National Platform
for Electromobility, published on 20 Jun 2012, is available at: 
 http://www.bmvbs.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/86656/publicationFile/59036/electric-mobility-second-report-national-platform.pdf

[114]            Highlighting the importance of public policy action, Gas
Infrastructure Europe stated that "Gas infrastructure investment entails
long-lead times and thus requires long-term visibility. A sound investment
climate together with a stable and predictable regulatory framework is
fundamental for the development of infrastructure".
[115]            The Biofuels Directive 2003/30/EC established a
reference value of a 2% share for biofuels in petrol and diesel consumptions in
2005 and 5.75% in 2010. Member States were required to set indicative targets
for 2005, taking this reference value into account.  While these targets
“constitute a moral commitment on behalf of Member States, there is no legal
obligation for them to achieve the levels of biofuel use they have chosen to target.”
Regular assessments and reports have been prepared on the EU’s progress
towards its 2010 targets and on its efforts in general to develop renewable
energy. The reports issued in 2007 as well as the Renewable Energy Roadmap
(COM(2006) 845 final) highlighted “the slow progress Member States were
making and the likelihood that the EU as a whole would fail to reach its 2010
target. The Roadmap explained possible reasons for this, which included the
merely indicative nature of the national targets and the uncertain investment
environment provided by the existing legal framework.” The Commission
therefore proposed a new, more rigorous framework to drive forward the
development of renewable energy and more solid, legally binding targets for
2020, as part of the Climate and Renewable Energy Package.
[116]            The Community strategy for reducing CO2
emissions from light duty vehicles was based on three pillars, as proposed by
the Commission in 1995, and subsequently supported by the Council and European
Parliament. This structure allowed for the comprehensive integration of
measures addressing both supply (voluntary commitments from the three principal
automotive industry associations) and demand (labelling and taxation). In its
Communication (COM(2007) 19 final) in 2007 the Commission recognised that the
progress achieved so far goes some way towards the 140 g CO2/km
target by 2008/2009, but in the absence of additional measures, the EU
objective of 120 g CO2/km will not be met at a 2012 horizon. “As the
voluntary agreement did not succeed, the Commission considers necessary to
resort to a legislative approach and underlines that in addition to the
proposed legislation urgent action should also be taken by the public
authorities”. Mandatory binding CO2 standards have been since
adopted for both passenger cars (in 2009) and vans (in 2011).
[117]            Further details of the impacts related to EVs will be
provided in the specific impact assessment, led by Directorate-General
Enterprise and Industry, into the legislative options and technical modalities,
ensuring that practical and satisfactory solutions for the infrastructure side
of the interface are implemented throughout the EU. This is in line with the
conclusions of the final report of CARS 21 High-Level Group on the Competitiveness
and Sustainable Growth of the Automotive Industry in the European Union. The
assessment provided here draws upon the findings of the Impact Assessment
accompanying the proposal for Regulation on European Standardisation (SEC(2011)
671).
[118]            The unit cost per smart private charging point can be
estimated to be around 520 €; while for a publicly accessible charging point it
is approximately 5,280 €. The cost of hydrogen refuelling station is 1.6
million €. The unit cost of a small-scale bunkering facility is 15 million €,
while the cost estimate used for LNG fuelling station is 400,000 €. The
estimate retrofitting costs are derived in paragraph 132. 
[119]            Source: Idem footnote 118.
[120]            GEODE position paper on Electric Vehicles, April 2010.
[121]            Assuming no other investments in electricity storage
facilities such as stationary electricity storage.
[122]            A more detailed assessment of the grid-related
requirements for the recharging infrastructure has been carried out as part of
the Grid-for-Vehicles (G4V) project (http://www.g4v.eu/index.html).
[123]            Mode 3 charging enables vehicle-to-grid communication.
[124]            The unit cost per smart private charging point can be
estimated to be around 520 €; while for a publicly accessible charging point it
is approximately 5,280 €. The unit cost assumed per non-smart private charging
point is € 260.
[125]            Estimated retrofitting costs to be added € 45-50
million.
[126]            Estimated retrofitting costs to be added € 90-100
million.
[127]            In France, the national target of 4.4 million charging
points supported by a national law adopted in 2011. The national law (JORF n°0172 du 27 juillet 2011 Texte n°11: Décret 2011- 873 du 25
juillet 2011)  requires 10% of existing individual parking to be equipped with
independent electric lines to low charging points in new buildings from January
2012 and in existing buildings from January 2015.
[128]            See for example the calculation of energy costs on a
fuel-tax parity basis provided in Figure 4.2A.7 in EUROPIA White Paper on
Fuelling EU Transport, available at:
http://www.europia20years.eu/uploads/Europia_White_paper/

[129]            Electric vehicles have the
advantage of an on-board storage system and therefore the possibility to adapt
their charging schedule to demand and supply conditions.
[130]            Assuming a utilization of 205, which means that each charging
station is used at least approx.. 5 hours per day, approx.. a 50% mark-up over
private household electricity prices is required to achieve positive returns.
Source: Idem footnote 66.
[131]            See for example Ecotricity UK, http://www.ecotricity.co.uk/for-the-road/frequently-asked-questions

[132]            Figure 3.2.2.2 in source shown in footnote 66.
[133]            Results of PRIMES-TREMOVE model.
[134]            SEC(2009) 1111 final, Comission
Staff Working Document, European
Industry in a Changing World Updated Sectoral Overview 2009.
[135]            This is supported by the conclusions of a recent study
"Competitiveness of EU Automotive Industry in Electric Vehicles” (idem
footnote 60): "European companies have performed well in terms of
patent applications in the last few years, which is reflected in the increased
public reporting and perception. However, even if this is a noticeable upward
trend in Europe, it is doubtful that the European companies will catch up with
the Asian companies within a few years."
[136]            Source: Figure 5 in IEA, 2011, Technology Roadmap,
Electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, available at: http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/EV_PHEV_Roadmap.pdf 

[137]            Idem footnote 60.
[138]            Projected costs based on analysis by the United States
Department of Energy. Source: United States Department of Energy, 2011, 2010
Fuel Cell Technologies – Market Report, Figure 3, available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/2010_market_report.pdf

[139]            Source: JRC-IPTS based on the EPO-esp@cenet database for
21 world car manufacturers using a keyword-based search strategy developed by
Oltra and Saint Jean (2009), as shown on Figure 7 in Wiesenthal. et al, 2011,
Mapping innovation in the European transport sector, available at: 
                http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/111111111/26129/1/lfna24771enn.pdf

[140]            International Transport Forum, 2012, Electric Vehicles
Revisited – Costs, Subsidies and Prospects, Discussion Paper 2012-03, available
at:
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/DiscussionPapers/DP201203.pdf

[141]            http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/performance-review/index_en.htm
[142]            http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_315_en.pdf
[143]            This issue has been inter alia recognised in Directive
2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the
interoperability of the rail system within the Community (Recast) in its
recitals: “(7) There are major differences between the national regulations
and between internal rules and technical specifications which the railways
apply, since they incorporate techniques that are specific to the national
industries and prescribe specific dimensions and devices and special
characteristics. This situation prevents trains from being able to run without
hindrance throughout the Community network. (8) Over the years, this situation
has created very close links between the national railway industries and the
national railways, to the detriment of the genuine opening-up of markets. In
order to enhance their competitiveness at world level, these industries require
an open, competitive European market.”
[144]         Studies, such as Peeters et al, 2004,
European tourism, transport and environment, estimate that the car is the most
important mode of transport used for tourism within the EU; and that the total
number of passenger km related to tourism can represent up to 20% of total
passenger transport due to the larger distances covered by these trips.
Statistics are only available however for a small number of Member States. For
instance in the case of the Netherlands: “In 2008 the Dutch made 35.9
million holidays, of which 18.4 million, or 51,3%, abroad. In 54% of the
holidays abroad, the private car was used, air travel made up 34% of the total,
rail 4%, and coach 5% (CBS Statline, website).” Non-holiday cross-border
trips can be estimated to be less than 1% of the trips, less than 160,000 trips
a day, 77% of which made on road. Source: Pieters et al, 2012, Cross-border Car
Traffic in Dutch Mobility Models, available at:
                http://www.ejtir.tudelft.nl/issues/2012_02/pdf/2012_02_02.pdf

[145]            GHK and Technopolis, 2007, Evaluation of the Functioning
of Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 of 7 December 1998 on the functioning of the
Internal Market in relation to the free movement of goods among the Member
States, study contarcted by DG Enterprise and Industry, available at: 
                http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/dg/files/evaluation/regulation_report_en.pdf

[146]            Pike Research, 2012, Electric Vehicle Charging Equipment
in Europe.
[147]            Source: Chart 1.1 as provided in the Executive Summary
of Pike Research, 2012, Electric Vehicle Charging Equipment in Europe.
[148]            Fraunhofer IAO, 2012, Results of ELAB (Elektromobilität und
Beschäftigung) Project.
[149]            Idem footnote 41.
[150]            “A large spectrum of the surveyed companies plan to
expand or maintain their competitive advantages while focusing on R&D and
education of their employees. A German automotive premium manufacturer stated
that particularly in the area of new distribution channels future competitive
advantages can be expected. In this context it will be important to build up
new skills and competencies, since electromobility can be associated with a
change in consumer behaviour as well as mobility needs. The majority of
European suppliers and manufacturers consider the development of electrical,
electronic, or carbon technology skills (e.g. lightweight construction) to be
most important in securing competitive advantages. Additionally, a German
volume manufacturer underlined the importance of skills in relation to new
business models (e.g. Connected Cars).”  Source: "Competitiveness of
the EU Automotive Industry in Electric Vehicles" Final Report. December
19th of 2012. Framework Contract ENTR/2009/030 (Lot 3). Universität Duisburg
Essen 
[151]            Idem footnote 150. Error! Bookmark
not defined..
[152]            The middle
income quintiles spend a larger share of their incomes on heating and transport
fuels combined, while the lower-income households do not tend to own cars (and
the high-income households spend relatively less on fuel. “Focusing on
energy products consumed by households, the study shows that expenditure (and
taxes) on personal transport fuels constitutes the largest category. Personal
transport fuels account for the largest share of total expenditure of middle‑income
groups or, looking from another perspective, the expenditure of manual workers
and the unemployed, followed by the non-manual workers. Conversely, the retired
and inactive do not spend that much on mobility”. Source: EEA, 2011 Environmental tax reform in Europe: implications
for income distribution
[153]            As shown for the United States, ‘early adopter’
consumers have a very distinct profile: they have a much higher-than-average
household income, they tend to reside in urban or suburban areas, and nearly 90
% have garages with electricity. Their weekly mileage is low (about 160 km),
and they are environmentally sensitive. Source: Deloitte, 2010, Gaining
traction A customer view of electric vehicle mass adoption in the U.S.
automotive market
[154]            Source: Box.2.5 in EEA, 2011, Laying the foundations for
greener transport — TERM 2011: transport indicators tracking progress towards
environmental targets in Europe, available at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/foundations-for-greener-transport?b_start:int=0

[155]            WHO/JRC, 2011, Burden of disease from environmental
noise. Quantification of healthy life years lost in Europe, available at:
 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/index.cfm?id=1410&obj_id=13090&dt_code=NWS&lang=en

[156]            WHO, 2012, Press Release N° 213, available at: 
http://www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/pr/2012/pdfs/pr213_E.pdf