Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and Turkey
Date: 2012-12-18
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Russia, Türkiye, anti-dumping duty, import (EU), iron, originating product, piping, steel

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 18.12.2012  
COM(2012) 770 final 

2012/0357 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty 
imposed on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia 
and Turkey 

EN 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1) CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

110 

•  Grounds for and objectives of the proposal 

This  proposal  concerns  the  application  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1225/2009  of 
30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members 
of  the  European  Community1  ('the  basic  Regulation')  in  the  proceeding  concerning 
imports  of  certain  tube  and  pipe  fittings  of  iron  or  steel  originating  in  Russia  and 
Turkey. 

120 

•  General context 

This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation and 
is the result of an investigation which was carried out in line with the substantive and 
procedural requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. 

•  Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

By Regulation (EU) No 699/2012 the Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia 
and Turkey. 

•  Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union 

Not applicable. 

139 

141 

2) CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

•  Consultation of interested parties 

219 

229 

230 

Interested parties concerned by the proceeding have had the possibility to defend their 
interests during the investigation, in line with the provisions of the basic Regulation. 

•  Collection and use of expertise 

There was no need for external expertise. 

•  Impact assessment 

This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation. 

The basic Regulation does not provide for a general impact assessment but contains an 
exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed. 

3) LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

•  Summary of the proposed action 

OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.  

305 

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On 1 November 2011, the Commission announced by a notice (‘notice of initiation’), 
published  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Union,  the  initiation  of  an  anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports into the Union of certain tube and pipe fittings 
of iron or steel originating in Russia and Turkey. 

The  anti-dumping  proceeding  was  initiated  following  a  complaint  lodged  on  20 
September 2011 by the Defence committee of the Steel Butt-Welding Fittings Industry 
of  the  European  Union  (‘the  complainant’  on  behalf  of  producers  representing  more 
than 40% of the total Union production of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel 
containing evidence of dumping and of material injury resulting there from. 

On  31  July  2012,  the  Commission  imposed,  by  Regulation  (EU)  No  699/2012,  a 
provisional  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  into  the  Union  of  certain  tube  and  pipe 
fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and Turkey ranging from 2,9 % to 23,8 %.  

The  enclosed  Commission  proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  imposing  a  definitive 
anti-dumping  duty  ranging  from  2,9  %  to  23,8  %  contains  the  definitive  conclusions 
regarding  dumping,  injury,  causation  and  Union  interest.  The  continuation  of  the 
investigation has confirmed the essential provisional findings. 

It  is  proposed  that  the  Council  adopt  the  attached  proposal  for  a  Regulation  which 
should be published in the Official Journal of the European Union by 29 January 2013 
at the latest. 

310 

•  Legal basis 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1225/2009  of  30  November  2009  on  protection  against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. 

329 

•  Subsidiarity principle 

The  proposal  falls  under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Union.  The  subsidiarity 
principle therefore does not apply. 

•  Proportionality principle 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons: 

The form of action is described in the above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves no 
scope for national decision. 

Indication of how financial and administrative burden falling upon the Union, national 
governments,  regional  and  local  authorities,  economic  operators  and  citizens  is 
minimized and proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable. 

•  Choice of instruments 

Proposed instruments: regulation. 

Other means would not be adequate for the following reason: 

331 

332 

341 

342 

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The above-mentioned basic Regulation does not provide for alternative options. 

EN 

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4) BUDGETARY IMPLICATION 

409 

The proposal has no implication for the Union budget. 

EN 

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2012/0357 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty 
imposed on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia 
and Turkey 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,  

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community2 ('the basic 
Regulation'), and in particular Article 9 thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal submitted by the European Commission after having consulted 
the Advisory Committee, 

Whereas: 

1. 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

A. 

PROCEDURE  

Provisional measures 

On 31 July 2012, the European Commission ('the Commission'), by Regulation (EU) 
No 699/20123 (‘the provisional Regulation’) imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and 
Turkey. 

The proceeding was initiated by a notice of initiation4 published on 1 November 2011, 
following a complaint lodged on 20 September 2011 by the Defence committee of the 
Steel  Butt-Welding  Fittings  Industry  of  the  European  Union  ('the  complainants')  on 
behalf  of  producers  representing  more  than  40  %  of  the  total  Union  production  of 
certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel.  

As set out in recital (15) of the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping 
and  injury  covered  the  period  from  1  October  2010  to  30  September  2011 
(‘investigation period’ or ‘IP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment 

2 
3 
4 

OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.  
OJ L 203, 31.7.2012, p. 37.  
OJ C 320, 1.11.2011, p. 4 

EN 

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2. 

(4) 

(5) 

3. 

(6) 

4. 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

of  injury  covered  the  period  from  1  January  2008  to  the  end  of  the  IP  (‘period 
considered’). 

Subsequent procedure 

Subsequent to the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations  on the basis of 
which  it  was  decided  to  impose  provisional  anti-dumping  measures  ('provisional 
disclosure'),  several  interested  parties  made  written  submissions  making  their  views 
known on the provisional findings. The parties who so requested were also granted the 
opportunity to be heard.  

The  Commission  continued  to  seek  and  analyse  all  information  it  deemed  necessary 
for its definitive findings.  

Sampling 

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  concerning  the  sampling  of  Union  producers, 
unrelated importers and exporting producers, the provisional findings in recitals (5) to 
(11) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

Measures in force in respect of other third countries 

It is reiterated that definitive anti-dumping measures are in force in respect of certain 
tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of 
China,  the  Republic  of  Korea  and  Thailand,  and  following  circumvention  practices 
also  in  respect  of  certain  tube  and  pipe  fittings  of  iron  or  steel  originating  in  the 
People's Republic of China consigned from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and 
Taiwan (with certain exceptions)5. The countries mentioned in the preceding sentence 
shall hereafter be referred to as 'countries under anti-dumping measures'. 

B. 

PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 

As set out in recital (17) of the provisional Regulation, the product concerned is tube 
and pipe fittings (other than cast fittings, flanges and threaded fittings), of iron or steel 
(not  including  stainless  steel),  with  a  greatest  external  diameter  not  exceeding  609,6 
mm,  of  a  kind  used  for  butt-welding  or  other  purposes,  currently  falling  within  CN 
codes ex 7307 93 11, ex 7307 93 19 and ex 7307 99 80 ('the product concerned').  

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  concerning  the  product  concerned  and  the  like 
product, the provisional findings in recitals (17) to (20) of the provisional Regulation 
are hereby confirmed. 

C.  DUMPING 

1.  Russia 

1.1.  Normal value 

(10)  One  Russian  exporting  producer  claimed  that  only  data  obtained  from  Russian 
companies should have been used in the dumping margin calculations and that it is not 

5 

OJ L 275, 16.10.2008, p. 18 and OJ L 233, 4.9.2009, p. 1. 

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accurate to use data from Turkish companies. It should be recalled that in the absence 
of  cooperation  by  any  Russian  exporting  producer,  the  normal  value  for  Russia  has 
been established in accordance with Article 18(1) and 18(5) on the basis of the facts 
available,  i.e.  information  obtained  from  those  Turkish  exporting  producers  that  use 
Russian  seamless  steel  pipes  and  tubes  as  input  for  the  production  of  the  product 
concerned. The claim is therefore rejected.  

(11) 

In the absence of any other comments concerning the determination of normal value, 
the  provisional  findings  in  recitals  (22)  to  (25)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are 
hereby confirmed.  

1.2.  Export price 

(12) 

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  concerning  the  determination  of  export  price,  the 
provisional findings in recitals (26) and (27) of the provisional Regulation are hereby 
confirmed.  

1.3.  Comparison 

(13) 

In the absence of any comments concerning the comparison of export price and normal 
value, the provisional findings in recitals (28) and (29) of the provisional Regulation 
are hereby confirmed. 

1.4.  Dumping margin 

(14)  One  Russian  exporting  producer  claimed  that  the  provisional  anti-dumping  duty  of 
23,8% is not justified in light of the fact that the company only exports steel elbows to 
the Union and even those in only very small quantities. However, steel elbows are part 
of  the  product  subject  to  this  investigation  and  this  has  not  been  contested  by  any 
interested  party.  In  addition,  the  criterion  to  consider  imports  into  the  Union  as 
negligible as referred to in Article 5(7) and Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation is only 
considered  on  a  country-wide  level  and  not  individually  per  company.  The  claim  is 
therefore rejected. 

(15)  Another Russian exporting producer claimed it has not been dumping and that this is 
reflected by the fact that on multiple occasions it has lost tenders to Union competitors 
for  supplying  elbows  and  bends.  As  mentioned  above,  it  is  recalled  that  no  Russian 
exporting  producer  cooperated  in  this  investigation  and  therefore  the  dumping 
calculations for Russia were made in accordance with Article 18(1) and Article 18(5) 
of  the  basic  Regulation  on  the  basis  of  the  facts  available.  Even  if  the  claim  is 
considered, it should be noted that the loss of tenders to Union competitors does not 
contradict the finding about dumping by the Russian exporting producer. The claim is 
therefore rejected.  

(16) 

In the absence of any other comments concerning the dumping margin calculation, the 
findings in recitals (30) and (31) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

(17)  The  country-wide  dumping  margin  finally  determined,  expressed  as  a  percentage  of 

the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, is the following: 

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Company 

dumping margin 

23,8 % 

All companies 

2. 

Turkey 

2.1.  Normal value 

(18) 

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  concerning  the  determination  of  normal  value,  the 
provisional  findings  in  recitals  (32)  to  (40)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are  hereby 
confirmed.  

2.2.  Export price 

(19)  One exporting producer claimed that the profit margin achieved on the ocean freight, 
i.e. the difference between the freight charged to its customers and the freight paid by 
the  exporting  producer  to  the  shipping  company,  should  be  included  in  the  export 
price. However, pursuant to Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation the export price shall 
be  the  price  actually  paid  or  payable  for  the  product  when  sold  for  export  from  the 
exporting  country  to  the  Union.  A  profit  margin  achieved  on  the  transport  of  the 
product to the customer cannot be considered as part of the export price of the product 
itself. The claim is therefore rejected. 

(20) 

In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  concerning  the  determination  of  export  price, 
the  provisional  findings  in  recitals  (41)  to  (43)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are 
hereby confirmed.  

2.3.  Comparison 

(21)  The  Turkish  Steel  Exporters'  Association  (ÇIB)  claimed  that  the  significant  price 
differences  between  seamless  and  welded  pipe  fittings  have  not  been  properly  taken 
into account in the comparison between export price and normal value. However, all 
cooperating  companies  have  submitted  information  on  a  transaction-to-transaction 
basis with regard to sales of seamless and welded fittings. This information has been 
explicitly  used  for  the  comparison  between  export  price  and  normal  value.  In  other 
words, seamless fittings have only been compared with seamless fittings and welded 
fittings have only been compared with welded fittings. Therefore, the claim is rejected. 

(22) 

In the absence of any other comments in respect of comparison, the findings in recital 
(44) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

2.4.  Dumping margins 

(a)  Dumping margin for companies investigated 

(23) 

It is recalled that the individual dumping margin provisionally established for one of 
the  three  cooperating  exporting  producers  was  determined  on  the  basis  of  a 
comparison of a weighted average normal value with the company's weighted average 
export price of the product concerned to the Union. In the absence of any comments 

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concerning  the  determination  of  this  company's  dumping  margin,  the  provisional 
findings in recital (46) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

(24)  For  the  two  other  cooperating  companies  the  dumping  calculations  in  their  respect 
showed  that  the  companies  conducted  targeted  dumping  in  terms  of  a  given  time 
period as well as in respect of given customers and regions. Indeed, there was a clear 
pattern of their export prices which differed significantly among different purchasers, 
regions  as  well  as  time  periods  (up  to  30%  for  identical  models  of  the  product 
concerned).  Furthermore,  the  dumping  calculation  based  on  the  comparison  of  a 
weighted average normal value to a weighted average of export prices in accordance 
with the method provided in Article 2(11) first part of the first sentence of the basic 
Regulation  did  not  reflect  the  full  degree  of  dumping  being  practised  by  the  two 
producers  concerned,  as  demonstrated  in  recital  (27)  below.  The  dumping  margin 
could  also  not  be  established  by  a  comparison  of  individual  normal  values  and 
individual  export  prices  to  the  Union  on  a  transaction-to-transaction  basis  in 
accordance with Article 2(11) second part of the first sentence of the basic Regulation, 
given  the  lack  of  sufficient  domestic  transactions  for  normal  value  corresponding  to 
the export transactions as demonstrated in recital (28) below. 

(25)  Therefore, in order to reflect the full amount of dumping being practised by the two 
companies  concerned,  in  accordance  with  Article  2(11)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  the 
normal  value  established  on  a  weighted  average  basis  was  compared  in  their  case  to 
prices  of  all  individual  export  transactions  to  the  Union.  Given  that  such  method  of 
comparison is an exception to the two first methods provided in Article 2(11) of the 
basic Regulation, the Commission carefully checked whether the conditions to resort 
to  it  were  clearly  met  in  this  case.  The  detailed  dumping  calculations,  including  the 
established export price patterns, have been disclosed. None of the Turkish exporting 
producers contested the underlying data.  

(26)  However, both cooperating companies, the ÇIB and the Turkish Government, claimed 
that insufficient explanation has been provided as to the targeted dumping established 
for the two Turkish exporting producers and that  in any  event, any  pattern of export 
prices  was  unintended.  In  a  hearing  with  the  Hearing  Officer,  requested  by  the  two 
Turkish  exporters,  detailed  explanations  have  been  provided  to  the  two  companies 
with  regard  to  the  establishment  of  targeted  dumping  and  the  underlying  dumping 
margin  calculations.  The  Commission  also  clarified  that  even  if  unintentional6,  their 
practices had the effect of targeted dumping. It is noted that the basic regulation does 
not  require  the  investigating  authority  to  identify  potential  reasons  for  targeted 
dumping,  such  as  currency  fluctuations,  different  regional  pricing  policies  etc.  The 
mere establishment of patterns of export prices differing significantly among different 
purchasers,  regions  or  time  periods,  is  sufficient7.  Further  to  the  hearing,  company-
specific  explanations  have  also  been  disclosed  to  the  two  companies.  Moreover,  a 
Note  Verbale  has  been  sent  to  the  Permanent  Delegation  of  Turkey  to  the  EU  with 
clarifications on the establishment of targeted dumping and the methodology applied 
for the dumping margin calculation. Furthermore, in another hearing with the Hearing 
Officer,  requested  by  the  ÇIB,  detailed  explanations  have  been  provided  to  the  ÇIB 

6 
7 

T-274/02, Ritek, § 57. 
T-274/02, Ritek, § 60. 

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(27) 

with  regard  to  the  establishment  of  targeted  dumping  and  the  underlying  dumping 
margin calculations. 

In fact, the investigation has established for each of the two exporting producers three 
clear  patterns  of  export  prices  covering  the  vast  majority  of  their  export  sales  to  the 
Union, i.e. export prices differed significantly among different purchasers, regions as 
well  as  time  periods,  as  it  was  demonstrated  by  the  underlying  data  disclosed  to  the 
parties.  This  was  the  result  of  a  thorough  examination  of  the  exceptional 
circumstances of this case on the basis of which it was considered necessary to resort 
to  targeted  dumping.  Having  established  significant  export  price  differences,  and 
whereas only one of these three patterns of export prices would be sufficient to resort 
to the weighted average to all individual export transaction comparison methodology, 
this  particular  case. 
this  comparison  method  was  considered  appropriate 
Furthermore, for each of the two companies, the total amount of dumping established 
by comparison of the weighted average normal value with the weighted average export 
price  of  the  product  concerned  to  the  Union  (the  first  symmetrical  method) 
significantly  differs  from  the  amount  of  dumping  established  by  comparison  of  the 
normal  value  established  on  a  weighted  average  basis  with  prices  of  all  individual 
export transactions to the Union (the asymmetrical method), as it was demonstrated by 
the underlying data disclosed to the parties. Therefore it can be concluded that the use 
of the first symmetrical method would have the effect of inappropriately disguising the 
targeted dumping which took place during a specific time period, in specific regions 
and to specific customers. In other words, the dumping margin established by the first 
symmetrical method would not reflect the full degree of dumping being practiced by 
the two companies concerned.  

in 

(28)  The  dumping  margin  could  also  not  be  established  by  a  comparison  of  individual 
normal  values  with  individual  export  prices  to  the  Union  on  a  transaction  to 
transaction basis in accordance with Article 2(11) second part of the first sentence of 
the  basic  Regulation  (the  second  symmetrical  method).  This  method  involves 
identifying  individual  domestic  transactions,  which  are  comparable  to  individual 
export transactions, taking into account factors such as sales quantity and transaction 
date.  Given 
transactions  for  normal  value 
corresponding to the export transactions, it was not possible to establish the dumping 
margin  on  the  basis  of  the  second  symmetrical  method.  Therefore,  given  the 
establishment of a pattern of export prices which differed significantly among different 
purchasers, regions or time periods and given that the two symmetrical methods would 
not reflect the full degree of dumping, it has been concluded, in accordance with the 
second sentence of Article 2(11), to establish the dumping margin on the basis of the 
asymmetrical method. 

lack  of  sufficient  domestic 

the 

(29)  Both  cooperating  companies  and  the  ÇIB  claimed  that  it  was  unjustified  to  compare 
export  prices  converted  in  Turkish  Lira,  given  the  fact  that  sales  to  the  Union  have 
been  made  in  Euro  while  Turkish  Lira  is  only  used  for  accountancy  reasons.  It  was 
argued that currency exchange fluctuations between Euro and Turkish Lira have had a 
significant effect on the price determinations which would inevitably affect the result 
of  export  price  comparison  between  different  time  periods  in  an  unjustified  manner. 
However, the Commission's consistent practice is to carry out export price comparison 
and dumping margin calculations in the accounting currency of co-operating exporting 
producers in the exporting country. It should be noted that costs and domestic prices 
used  as  a  basis  for  normal  value  are  expressed  in  Turkish  Lira.  Consequently,  the 

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comparison  of  export  prices  with  the  normal  value  is  carried  out  in  that  currency. 
Thus,  the  only  logical  approach  to  establish  a  pattern  of  export  prices,  within  the 
framework of the same dumping calculation, is to use the same export prices already 
expressed in Turkish Lira. In addition, as stated above, the basic Regulation does not 
require  an  analysis  of  possible  reasons  of  targeted  dumping,  such  as  exchange  rate 
fluctuations8. The claim is therefore rejected. 

(30)  Both  cooperating  exporting  producers  claimed  that,  in  order  to  establish  a  pattern  of 
export  prices,  weighted  average  prices  of  comparable  product  types  should  be  taken 
into account rather than arithmetic average prices. However, Article 2(11) of the basic 
Regulation refers to a pattern of export prices and not to a pattern of weighted average 
export prices or a pattern of export values. The use of a weighted average export price 
would distort the analysis by taking into account the volume of exports instead of only 
the export prices. In any case, even when weighted average prices are used instead of 
arithmetic  average  export  prices,  still  a  pattern  of  export  prices  could  be  established 
which differs significantly among different purchasers, regions as well as time periods. 
Two  parties  contested  the  significance  of  differences  in  patterns  of  export  prices,  if 
any, in case weighted averages are used. It is noted that the parties do not contest the 
factual findings based on the arithmetic average, which is the appropriate methodology 
as explained above. This claim is therefore rejected.  

(31)  The ÇIB claimed that the application of zeroing is unjustified by referring to a WTO 
Appellate Body Report9 in which the zeroing practice was found to be contrary to the 
WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement.  The  General  Court10  has,  however,  confirmed  that 
the  findings  of  the  Bed  Linen  Report  are  not  applicable  in  a  situation  of  targeted 
dumping.  Indeed,  the  Bed  linen  Report  concerns  only  the  zeroing  technique  in  the 
context  of  the  first  symmetrical  method  and  cannot  be  considered  to  deal  with  this 
mechanism when it is used in the context of the asymmetrical method. Therefore, even 
if, as the WTO Appellate Body found, it might indeed be contrary to Article 2.4.2 of 
the  1994  Anti-dumping  Code  and  unfair  to  employ  the  zeroing  technique  in  the 
context  of  the  first  symmetrical  method,  and  especially  in  the  absence  of  an  export 
price  pattern,  it  is  not  contrary  to  that  provision  or  to  Article  2(11)  of  the  basic 
Regulation,  or  unfair  within  the  meaning  of  Article  2(10)  of  that  Regulation,  to 
employ  the  zeroing  technique  in  the  context  of  the  asymmetrical  method,  where  the 
two conditions for applying that method are met. Furthermore, the zeroing technique 
has  proved  to  be  mathematically  necessary  in  order  to  distinguish,  in  terms  of  its 
results, the asymmetrical method from the first symmetrical method. In the absence of 
that reduction, the asymmetrical method will always yield the same result as the first 
symmetrical method. This claim is therefore rejected. 

(32)  Further, the ÇIB claimed that the use of zeroing causes a violation of the lesser duty 
rule.  It  was  argued  that,  because  of  the  zeroing  practice  used,  margins  of  dumping 
have been calculated at a level higher than they should actually have been.  

(33)  However,  the  use  of  zeroing  in  the  asymmetrical  method  does  not  preclude  the 
application  of  the  lesser  duty  rule.  For  all  three  cooperating  companies  the  dumping 

8 
9 

10 

T-274/02, Ritek, § 51 – last sentence. 
WTO  Appellate  Body  Report,  European  Communities  –  Anti-Dumping  Duties on Imports  of  Cotton-
Type Bed Linen from India 
T-274/02, Ritek, § 98-103 

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margins,  regardless  of  the  methodology  used,  have  been  compared  with  the 
companies'  injury  elimination  levels  to  ensure  that  the  lower  of  the  two  would 
determine the duty. The claim is therefore rejected. 

(34) 

In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  in  respect  of  the  dumping  margins  for 
companies  investigated,  the  findings  in  recitals  (47)  and  (48)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

(b)  Dumping margin for non-cooperating companies  

(35) 

In the absence of any comments concerning the dumping margin for non-cooperating 
companies,  the  provisional  findings  in  recital  (49)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are 
hereby confirmed.  

(36)  The country-wide dumping margins finally determined, expressed as a percentage of 

the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are the following: 

Company 

dumping margin 

RSA 

Sardogan 

Unifit 

All other companies  

9,6 % 

2,9 % 

12,1 % 

16,7 % 

1. 

Union production, Union industry and consumption 

D. 

INJURY 

(37) 

In the absence of any comments with regard to Union production, Union industry and 
consumption the content of recitals (51) to (54) of the provisional Regulation is hereby 
confirmed. 

2. 

Imports from the countries concerned 

3.1.  Cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports concerned 

(38)  Following  provisional  disclosure,  the  ÇIB  argued  that  the  cumulative  assessment  of 
dumped imports from the two countries concerned is not warranted. In principle, they 
echoed  the  comments  made  by  the  Turkish  exporting  producers  following  the 
initiation  and  claimed  that  imports  from  Russia  and  Turkey  show  different  trends  in 
terms of volume and prices. 

(39) 

It  is  reiterated  in  this  regard,  as  already  stated  in  recital  (59)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation  that  the  investigation  established  that  while  imports  from  Turkey  are 
relatively stable in terms of volumes, imports from Russia are increasing in absolute 
terms. However, given the contraction in demand in the period considered, the market 
shares of imports from both countries are increasing.  

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(40)  At the same time their pricing do not appear to be substantially different, with Russian 
average prices being somewhat lower but very close to the average Turkish prices. It is 
also  reiterated  in  this  regard  that  for  companies  in  both  countries  the  investigation 
established  significant  undercutting  of  up  to  ca.  30%  (see  recital  (65)  of  the 
provisional Regulation). Consequently, the claim is rejected.  

(41)  The ÇIB also argued that imports from Turkey should be considered insignificant and 
pointed out that in a previous case concerning a similar product – namely in "pipe and 
tube fittings from the PRC, Croatia, Slovakia, Taiwan and Thailand"11 – imports from 
Slovakia and Taiwan have been considered insignificant (although they were above de 
minimis  threshold)  and  therefore  not  cumulated  with  dumped  imports  from  other 
countries. 

(42) 

It is noted in this regard that in the case mentioned above imports from Slovakia and 
Taiwan were indeed found to be dumped and despite being above the 1% market share 
threshold  they  were  not  cumulated  with  other  dumped  imports.  The  situation  in  that 
case, however, was very different from the current one, as imports from Slovakia and 
Taiwan  were  actually  sharply  losing  their  market  share  and  where  not  considered 
significant  when  compared  to  the  volume  of  imports  from  the  other  countries  and 
consequently were considered not to be causing injury. In contrast, in the case at hand 
imports  from  both  Turkey  and  Russia  are  increasing  their  market  share  and  are 
comparable to each other in terms of volumes. Consequently, the claim is rejected. 

(43)  The ÇIB also argued that imports from Turkey and Russia are not similar in terms of 
conditions  of  competition  as  there  are  "differences  in  geographical  concentration  of 
sales".  They  have  provided  statistics  showing  that  during  the  IP  Turkey  has 
concentrated over 70% of their sales on Spain, France, Italy and Poland, while Russia 
concentrated almost all of their sales on Czech Republic and Germany.  

(44) 

It is noted in this regard that differences in geographical concentration of sales cannot 
be considered to be an indication of different conditions of competition. Given that the 
European Union is a single market, the point of entry of any imports will normally not 
be decisive for the competitiveness of these imports with each other and vis-à-vis the 
like product. It is also reiterated with respect to conditions of competition that price-
wise Russian and Turkish imports are similar and were both found to undercut Union 
prices and that their channels of sales are similar. Consequently, the claim is rejected.  

(45) 

In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  with  regard  to  cumulative  assessment  of  the 
dumped imports from the countries concerned the content of recitals (55) to (60) of the 
provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. 

3.2.  Volume,  market  share  of  the  dumped  imports  concerned,  their  import  prices 

and undercutting. 

(46) 

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  with  regard  to  volume  and  market  share  of  the 
dumped imports concerned, their import prices and undercutting, recitals (61) to (65) 
of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

11 

OJ L 234, 3.10.1995, p.4. 

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(47) 

It  is  reiterated  that  the  dumped  product  concerned  originating  in  the  countries 
concerned sold in the Union undercut the Union industry's prices by up to ca. 30 %. 

3. 

Situation of the Union industry 

(48)  Following  provisional  disclosure  the  ÇIB  and  the  Turkish  Government  claimed  that 
given that the Union industry increased their market share by some 3% between 2008 
and  the  IP,  the  Commission  should  have  concluded  that  the  Union  industry  did  not 
suffer material injury in the period considered.  

(49) 

It  is  noted  in  this  regard  that  firstly,  it  was  clearly  recognised  in  the  provisional 
Regulation (see for example recitals (72), (86) or (91) of the provisional Regulation) 
that  there  was  a  slight  increase  in  the  market share of the  Union industry. Secondly, 
the recital (72) of the provisional Regulation clarifies that the increased market share is 
a reflection of the fact that the sales volumes of the Union producers dropped slightly 
less than the consumption in the period considered. 

(50)  Moreover,  apart  from  falling  stocks  referred  to  below,  it  is  the  only  injury  indicator 
that  shows  a  positive  development  over  the  period  considered.  Consequently,  the 
claim is rejected.  

(51)  The  Turkish  government  also  claimed  that  a  dropping  closing  stock  of  the  sampled 

Union producers is an indication of a non-injurious situation of the Union industry. 

(52) 

It  is  noted  in  this  regard  that  indeed  as  stated  in  recital  (79)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation  the  closing  stock  of  the  sampled  Union  producers  decreased  by  18% 
between 2008 and the IP.  

(53)  At the same time it is recognised that a drop in stocks could be seen as a positive sign 
but only in a situation when sales would be growing at a faster pace than production. 
However, this is not the case in the current investigation. To the contrary, the drop in 
stocks in this case is just a reflection of production volumes dropping at a faster pace 
than  sales.  In  this  situation  the  drop  in  stocks  cannot  be  seen  as  a  positive 
development. Consequently, the claim is rejected. 

(54) 

In the absence of any other claim or comments, the content of recitals (66) to (88) of 
the provisional  Regulation including the conclusion that  Union  industry has  suffered 
material  injury  within  the  meaning  of  Article  3(5)  of  the  basic  Regulation  is  hereby 
confirmed. 

1. 

Effect of the dumped imports 

E. 

CAUSATION 

(55) 

In  the  absence  of  any  specific  comments,  recitals  (90)  to  (93)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

2. 

Effect of other factors 

(56)  Following  the  provisional  disclosure  the  ÇIB  and  the  Turkish  Government  claimed 
that the actual cause of any injury suffered by the Union industry would be low priced 

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imports from other third countries and in particular from countries under anti-dumping 
measures. 

(57) 

In  this  regard  it  is  noted  that,  as  already  stated  in  recital  (96)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation, imports from the eight countries under anti-dumping measures continued 
to penetrate the Union market although their market share declined from 21 % in 2008 
to 17 % in the IP. The average prices of those imports are generally lower than those 
of the dumped imports from the countries concerned. Even when the applicable anti-
dumping  duty  is  taken  into  account,  the  prices  of  those  imports  remain  low  and 
comparable with the prices of Russian and Turkish imports and are below the average 
prices of the Union producers. 

(58)  However,  it  is  noted  that  for  the  countries  under  anti-dumping  measures  (as  for  all 
third  countries)  only  limited  statistical  information  and  average  prices  are  available 
and the established price difference is not necessarily conclusive and may be a result 
of  a  different  product  mix.  Moreover,  imports  from  countries  under  anti-dumping 
measures  show  a  clear  downward  trend.  Hence,  the  conclusion  that  they  were  not 
breaking  the  causal  link  between  injury  to  the  Union  industry  and  the  increased 
dumped imports from Turkey and Russia. 

(59)  With regard to imports from other third countries their market  share declined  during 
the  period  considered  from  7  %  in  2008  to  6  %  in  the  IP  while  Russia  and  Turkey 
increased. The average prices of those imports were generally higher than the dumped 
imports  from  the  countries  concerned  and  close  to  the  average  prices  of  the  Union 
producers and as such are considered not to break the causal link between injury to the 
Union  industry  and  the  increased  dumped  imports  from  Turkey  and  Russia. 
Consequently, the claim is rejected and the provisional conclusion that imports from 
third countries are not breaking the causal link is confirmed. 

(60)  The  Turkish  Government  also  argued  that  any  injury  suffered  by  the  Union  industry 
would  be  caused  by  the  increased  cost  of  production  resulting  from  contraction  in 
demand. 

(61) 

It  is  noted  in  this  regard  that,  as  already  stated  in  recitals  (101)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation,  the  financial  and  economic  crisis  of  2008/2009  is  in  all  likelihood  the 
reason  behind  the  decreased  consumption  for  pipe  fittings.  The  consumption  has 
dropped  by  over  40 %  between  2008  and  2009  and  remained  at  this  low  level 
throughout  the  rest  of  the  period  considered  (although  slightly  increasing  in  the  IP). 
Given  that  fixed  costs  make  up  to  40  %  of  the  manufacturing  costs  of  the  Union 
producers,  the  decreased  demand,  sales  and  output  result  in  significantly  higher  unit 
manufacturing costs. This obviously has had an important impact on the profitability 
of the Union industry. 

(62)  At the same time, any negative impact of higher unit manufacturing cost was clearly 
deepened  by  the  fact  that  the  prices  of  the  Union  industry  were  dropping  subject  to 
severe price pressure and significant undercutting by the dumped imports from Turkey 
and Russia. In a normal market situation the Union industry should have a possibility 
to minimise the impact of any unit cost increase by at least keeping the normal price 
level,  which  was  clearly  not  possible  in  the  situation  of  exerted  price  pressure  by 
artificially cheap dumped imports from the countries concerned. 

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(63)  Consequently,  the  claim  is  rejected  and  it  is  definitely  concluded  that  any  negative 
effect  of  contraction  in  demand  is  not  such  as  to  break  the  causal  link  between  the 
injury  suffered  by  the  Union  industry  and  the  dumped  imports  from  Russia  and 
Turkey. 

(64) 

In the absence of any other claim or comments, the content of recitals (94) to (106) of 
the provisional Regulation, including the conclusion that the dumped imports from the 
countries  concerned  have  caused  material  injury  to  the  Union  industry  within  the 
meaning of Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation is hereby confirmed. 

G. 

UNION INTEREST 

(65)  Following the provisional disclosure the ÇIB claimed that imposition of any measures 
would  lead  to  a  situation  in  which  ERNE  Fittings,  a  complainant  would  have  a 
monopoly-like position in the Union market. 

(66) 

It  is  noted  in  this  regard  that  ERNE  is  only  one  of  two  complainants  and  that  the 
second  one  –  INTERFIT  –  is  similar  in  size  to  ERNE.  In  addition,  data  in  the 
provisional Regulation concerning the sampled Union producers also included a third 
Union producer – Virgilio CENA & Figli. Moreover, there is a significant number of 
smaller companies in the Union producing and selling the product under investigation 
and there are significant imports from other sources. Given the above, it is considered 
that there is no risk of monopolisation of ERNE's position.  

(67) 

In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments,  recitals  (107)  to  (117)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation,  including  the  conclusion  that  no  compelling  reasons  exist  against  the 
imposition  of  measures  on  the  dumped  imports  from  the  countries  concerned  are 
hereby confirmed.  

H. 

DEFINITIVE MEASURES 

1. 

Injury elimination level 

(68) 

In  the  absence  of  any  specific  comments,  recitals  (118)  to  (120)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

2. 

Definitive measures 

(69) 

In  view  of  the  conclusions  reached  with  regard  to  dumping,  injury,  causation  and 
Union  interest,  and  in  accordance  with  Article  9  of  the  basic  Regulation,  it  is 
considered  that  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  should  be  imposed  on  imports  of  the 
product concerned originating  in  Russia and Turkey at  the level of the  lowest of the 
dumping margin and injury elimination level found, in accordance with the lesser duty 
rule, which is in all cases the dumping margin. 

(70)  For Russia, in the absence of cooperation by Russian exporting producers, a country-
wide  dumping  margin  was  calculated  as  explained  in  recitals  (21)  to  (31)  of  the 
provisional Regulation and hereby confirmed.  

(71)  For Turkey, given that the level of cooperation was considered to be relatively low, the 
residual dumping margin was based on a reasonable method leading to a margin which 
is  higher  than  the  highest  among  the  individual  margins  of  the  three  cooperating 

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companies  as  explained  in  recital  (49)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  and  hereby 
confirmed. 

(72)  On the basis of the above, the proposed duty rates are : 

Country 

Company 

Definitive anti-dumping 
duty  

Russia 

All companies 

Turkey 

RSA 

Sardogan 

Unifit 

All other companies  

23,8 % 

9,6 % 

2,9 % 

12,1 % 

16,7 % 

(73)  The  individual  company  anti-dumping  duty  rates  specified  in  this  Regulation  were 
established  on  the  basis  of  the  findings  of  the  present  investigation.  Therefore,  they 
reflect  the  situation  found  during  that  investigation  with  respect  to  these  companies. 
These  duty  rates  (as  opposed  to  the  country-wide  duty  applicable  to  ‘all  other 
companies’)  are  thus exclusively applicable to imports of products originating in  the 
countries  concerned  and  produced  by  the  companies  and  thus  by  the  specific  legal 
entities mentioned. Imported products produced by any other company not specifically 
mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation with its name and address, including 
entities  related  to  those  specifically  mentioned,  cannot  benefit  from  these  rates  and 
shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. 

(74)  Any claim requesting the application of an individual company anti-dumping duty rate 
(e.g. following a change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of new 
production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission12 forthwith with 
all  relevant  information,  in  particular  any  modification  in  the  company’s  activities 
linked  to  production,  domestic  and  export  sales  associated  with,  for  example,  that 
name  change  or  that  change  in  the  production  and  sales  entities.  If  appropriate,  the 
Regulation  will  then  be  amended  accordingly  by  updating  the  list  of  companies 
benefiting from individual duty rates. 

(75)  All  parties  were  informed  of  the  essential  facts  and  considerations  on  the  basis  of 
which it was intended to recommend the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and 
Turkey and the definitive collection of the amounts secured by way of the provisional 
duty  ('final  disclosure').  They  were  also  granted  a  period  within  which  they  could 
make representations subsequent to this disclosure. 

12 

European  Commission,  Directorate-General  for  Trade,  Directorate  H,  Office  N105  08/20,  1049 
Brussels, BELGIUM. 

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(76)  Following  the  final  disclosure,  submissions  were  received  from  the  complainant  as 
well  as  from  two  cooperating  exporting  producers  from  Turkey  and  the  ÇIB.  Both 
Turkish producers and the ÇIB requested and have been granted hearings.  

(77)  The complainant agreed with all findings as disclosed. The oral and written comments 
submitted by two Turkish  exporters  and the  ÇIB  were  a  reiteration  of  the  comments 
already  made  following  the  provisional  disclosure.  It  is  noted  that  none  of  the 
interested parties contested the underlying data. 

(78)  A justification and a reply to the claim for the application of the asymmetrical method 
including zeroing in the dumping calculation is provided in recitals (24) to (33) above. 
The use of Turkish Lira for the establishment of export price patterns is explained and 
the  relevant  claim  addressed  in  recital  (29)  above.  The  use  of  arithmetical  average 
prices  instead  of  weighted  average  prices  in  identifying  patterns  of  export  prices  is 
explained and the relevant claim addressed in recital (30) above . The claim to include 
the profit margin achieved on the ocean freight into the export price is described and 
dismissed in recital (19) above. The claim that no cumulative assessment  of Turkish 
and Russian imports is warranted in view of differences in geographical concentration 
of  Turkish  and  Russian  sales  is  described  and  dismissed  in  recitals  (43)  and  (44) 
above. The claim that Union industry suffered no injury given their increased market 
share is addressed and dismissed in recitals (48) to (50) above. 

(79)  Given  that  following  the  final  disclosure  no  arguments  that  would  influence  the 
outcome of the assessment of the case were brought forward, no modification of the 
findings as detailed above is warranted. 

I. 

DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF THE PROVISIONAL DUTY 

(80) 

In  view  of  the  magnitude  of  the  dumping  margin  found  and  given  the  level  of  the 
injury  caused  to  the  Union  industry,  it  is  considered  necessary  that  the  amounts 
secured  by  way  of  provisional  anti-dumping  duty  imposed  by  the  provisional 
Regulation  should  be  definitively  collected  to  the  extent  of  the  amount  of  the 
definitive duty imposed,  

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

1.  A  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  is  hereby  imposed  on  imports  of  tube  and  pipe  fittings 
(other than cast fittings, flanges and threaded fittings), of iron or steel (not including stainless 
steel),  with  a  greatest  external  diameter  not  exceeding  609,6  mm,  of  a  kind  used  for  butt-
welding or other purposes, currently falling within CN codes ex 7307 93 11, ex 7307 93 19 
and ex 7307 99 80 (TARIC codes 7307 93 11 91, 7307 93 11 93, 7307 93 11 94, 7307 93 11 
95, 7307 93 11 99, 7307 93 19 91, 7307 93 19 93, 7307 93 19 94, 7307 93 19 95, 7307 93 19 
99, 7307 99 80 92, 7307 99 80 93, 7307 99 80 94, 7307 99 80 95 and 7307 99 80 98) and 
originating in Russia and Turkey. 

2.  The  rate  of  the  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  applicable  to  the  net  free-at-Union-frontier 
price,  before  duty,  of  the  products  described  in  paragraph  1  and  manufactured  by  the 
companies listed below, shall be as follows: 

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Country 

Company 

Russia 

All companies 

anti-dumping 
duty  

TARIC 
additional 
code 

23,8 % 

- 

Turkey  RSA  Tesisat  Malzemeleri  San  ve 

9,6 % 

B295 

Ticaret AŞ, Küçükköy, Istanbul 

SARDOĞAN  Endüstri  ve  Ticaret, 
Kurtköy Pendik, Istanbul 

UNIFIT BORU BAĞLANTI ELEM. 
END.  MAM.  SAN.  VE  TİC.  AȘ, 
Tuzla, Istanbul 

2,9 % 

B296 

12,1 % 

B297 

All other companies  

16,7 % 

B999 

3. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. 

Article 2 

The  amounts  secured  by  way  of  provisional  anti-dumping  duty  pursuant  to  Commission 
Regulation  (EU)  No  699/2012  on  imports  of  certain  tube  and  pipe  fittings  of  iron  or  steel 
originating in Russia and Turkey shall be definitively collected. 

This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day  following  that  of  its  publication  in  the 
Official Journal of the European Union. 

Article 3 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels,  

For the Council 
The President 

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