REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Interim Progress Report on the implementation of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States
Date: 2012-12-14
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: application of EU law, budget deficit, budget estimate, budgetary equilibrium, disclosure of information, national budget, national planning, stability pact

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 14.12.2012  
COM(2012) 761 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

Interim Progress Report on the implementation of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on 
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States 

{SWD(2012) 433 final} 

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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

Interim Progress Report on the implementation of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on 
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Council  Directive  2011/85/EU  on  requirements  for  budgetary  frameworks  of  the  Member 
States1 entered into force in December 2011. It is an important component of the legislative 
package  on  the  strengthening  of  economic  governance  (also  known  as  the  ‘six-pack’).  This 
Directive provided the first opportunity for the European Union to set minimum requirements 
for  budgetary  frameworks,  providing  legal  certainty  on  top  of  the  country-specific 
recommendations  issued  under  the  European  semester  process.  With  pressing  consolidation 
demands  in  a  large  number  of  Member  States,  emphasis  on  delivery  has  now  become 
paramount.  Against  this  background,  efforts  to  enhance  national  budgetary  frameworks  are 
strongly  intertwined  with  fiscal  consolidation  policies  since  both  aim  to  bring  about  lasting 
improvements in the quality of fiscal outcomes. 

According  to  the  Directive,  a  budgetary  framework  means  the  set  of  arrangements, 
procedures,  rules  and  institutions  that  underlie  the  conduct  of  budgetary  policies  of  general 
government,  in  particular:  (i) systems  of  budgetary  accounting  and  statistical  reporting; 
(ii) rules  and  procedures  governing  the  preparation  of  forecasts  for  budgetary  planning; 
(iii) country-specific  numerical  fiscal  rules;  (iv) medium-term  budgetary  frameworks; 
(v) mechanisms that regulate fiscal relationships between public authorities across sub-sectors 
of  general  government.  For  each  headline,  the  Directive  specifies  a  number  of  essential 
standards.  Member  States  have  to  transpose  these  into  their  law  by  31  December 2013.  In 
July 2011  added  impetus  was  given  by  the  political  commitment  of  the  Heads  of  State  and 
Government of the euro-area Member States to transpose the Directive by the end of 20122. 
Finally,  the  adoption  of  the  intergovernmental  Treaty  on  Stability,  Coordination  and 
Governance (TSCG) provided a follow-up to the Directive. 25 Member States committed to 
establishing a domestic budget-balance rule in structural terms. 

Under  Article 15(3)  of  the  Directive,  the  Commission  is  asked  ‘to  prepare  an  interim 
progress report on the implementation of the main provisions of this Directive on the basis of 
relevant  information  from  Member  States,  which  shall  be  submitted  to  the  European 
Parliament and the Council by 14 December 2012.’ To that end, the Commission submitted 
to  the  Economic  Policy  Committee  in  May 2012  a  questionnaire  giving  Member  States  the 
opportunity  to  report  on  measures  in  place,  reforms  already  launched  or  concrete  plans. 
Accordingly, this report is primarily based on the information reported by the Member States. 
Most  Member  States  have  delivered  their  contributions  in  September  20123.  Therefore  the 
information  reflects  the  state-of-play  at  the  time  of  reporting.  Detailed  country  fiches  are 
presented in the accompanying Commission staff working document (SWD(2012) 433). 

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OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p.41. 
Statement of 21 July 2011, p.4, point 14. 
NL, SI, LT PT, IT and HU reported in October; CY, LV, MT and UK in November. 

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The  purpose  of  the  Interim  Progress  Report  (IPR)  is  to  inform  the  Council,  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  public  of  the  progress  made  in  transposing  the  Directive.  It  should 
therefore  not  be  construed  as  a  full-fledged  assessment  of  the  conformity  of  national 
provisions with the Directive, which will be performed following expiry of the transposition 
deadline in accordance with EU law. In order to provide a suitable overview, section 2 of the 
present report is structured around five sub-sections corresponding to the main provisions of 
the Directive, followed by a conclusion summarising the main findings. 

2. 

2.1 

PROGRESS IN TRANSPOSING THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIVE 

Accounting, statistics and transparency provisions (Chapter II and Article 14 of 
the Directive) 

Sound  fiscal  policy  should  be  based  on  sound  fiscal  reporting.  Comprehensive,  timely  and 
accurate  information  on  budgetary  execution  is  essential  for  policy-makers  in  many  ways. 
First, it ensures that the budgets voted by legislative bodies are correctly executed. Second, it 
allows  fiscal  authorities  to  monitor  in  almost  real  time  any  deviation  from  agreed  fiscal 
trajectories. Third, from a forward-looking perspective, it ensures that budgetary planning is 
conducted  on  the  most  up-to-date  basis,  minimising  base  effects  caused  by  subsequent 
revisions of fiscal data. 

Up until recently, high-frequency fiscal reporting has been patchy in the majority of Member 
States.  Even  where  reporting  duties  were  properly  defined,  general  government  data  have 
been collected for different parts of government under different accounting rules or statistical 
principles in terms of frequency, reporting deadlines or compilation methodologies. Against 
this  background,  negative  budgetary  developments  have  remained  undetected  for  an  overly 
long period of time, especially when they originated in non-central government entities. One 
of  the  first  steps  to  be  taken  by  Member  States  under  economic  adjustment  and  growth 
programmes was the preparation of high-frequency fiscal reports for all general government 
entities4. 

Therefore  the  Directive  provides  a  major  opportunity  to  harmonise  accounting  conventions 
within  general  government,  streamline  reporting  lines,  and  ensure  an  effective  data  feed  to 
decision-makers and external observers. Enshrining existing informal collection processes and 
new  statistical  requirements  in  law  would  ensure  that  the  hundreds  —and  sometimes 
thousands—  of  entities  within  general  government  are  properly  integrated  within  a 
comprehensive data collection system. 

Almost  all  reporting  Member  States  make  monthly  data  for  the  central  government  bodies 
available in cash or in other accounting basis (BG, DK, DE, EE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LT, MT, 
NL, AT, PT, RO, SK, FI, SE, SI and UK)5. However, fiscal data availability in compliance 
with the Directive is markedly lower for social security entities (BG, DK, EE, EL, NL, RO, 
PT, and FI) and on-going reforms are not yet completed for State government entities in AT, 
DE  and  ES6.  At  the  local  level,  for  which  the  Directive  requires  relatively  lower  standards 

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Extensive  work  has  been  conducted  in  this  regard  in  Greece;  see  European  Economy  —  Occasional 
Paper No 94. ‘The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece — March 2012’. 
However, it is not always evident from Member States’ reporting whether all entities and bodies outside 
the state budget but within central government are effectively contributing to data collection. 
In some cases, however, social security is included in central government while many Member States 
have no regional level budgets according to the European system of accounts (S.1312). 

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(quarterly reporting on a cash basis or equivalent), only eleven Member States (BG, DK, EE, 
EL, IT, LT,  MT, PT,  RO, FI and UK) report some data. Consequently, there is still a great 
deal  to  be  done  in  most  Member  States  for  non-central  government  sub-sectors.  This  is 
especially  topical  given  the  sometimes  sizeable  share  they  represent  in  total  public 
expenditure, especially in highly decentralised states.  

In  parallel  with  the  Member  States’  efforts,  the  Commission  is  also  taking  steps  in  the 
statistical  field.  In  order  to  assist  Member  States  in  the  practical  implementation  of  the 
statistical  provisions  in  Articles  3  and  14  of  the  Directive,  Eurostat  has  established  a  Task 
Force on the implications of the Directive on the collection and dissemination of fiscal data. 
The  output  from  the  Task  Force  is  expected  to  be  a  set  of  templates  and  related  notes 
indicating  the  methodology,  the  scope  of  compulsory  details,  and  the  periodicity  and 
timeliness  for  national  publication  of  individual  indicators  to  guide  the  efforts  of  national 
statistical institutes. Most Member States have indicated their willingness to take into account 
the conclusions of the Task Force when finalising their efforts in the statistical field. 

Moreover,  Article 16(3)  of  the  Directive  stipulates  that  ‘by  31  December  2012  the 
Commission  shall  assess  the  suitability  of  the  International  Public  Sector  Accounting 
Standards (IPSAS) for the Member States’. In this regard, over sixty contributions have been 
received following the Commission’s public consultation. The assessment report is due to be 
published  before  the  end  of  2012  and  will  cover  the  importance  and  usefulness  of  accrual 
accounting,  the  current  use  of  accrual  accounting  in  Member  States,  a  summary  and 
assessment  of  the  suitability  of  IPSAS,  the  links  and  differences  between  IPSAS  and 
statistical  accounting,  the  potential  cost  of  implementing  new  accounting  standards  and 
governance-related issues. 

Finally,  for  the  implementation  of  Article  4(7)  of  the  Directive,  Eurostat  released  on 
6 February 2012 for the first time a dedicated, regular press release on quarterly government 
debt,  providing  data  for  the  EU,  the  euro  area  and  individual  Member  States.  A  similar 
initiative is envisaged for the quarterly deficit. 

2.2 

Macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts (Chapter III of the Directive) 

Macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts used for fiscal planning have long been considered a 
weak  spot  in  the  production  of  annual  budgets.  Some  Member  States  have  been  seen  for  a 
long  time  to  be  suffering  from  a  bias  in  their  fiscal  estimates.  In  such  cases,  budgets 
underpinned  by  biased  assumptions  could  hardly  be  considered  as  providing  a  true  and  fair 
image when submitted to Parliament and the general public. This is why the Directive pays 
particular  attention  to  forecasting  by  devoting  a  chapter  to  this  issue,  which  essentially 
requires  Member  States’  fiscal  planning  to  be  based  on  realistic  macroeconomic  and 
budgetary forecasts using the most up-to-date information. 

While  setting  standards  for  forecasting  is  a  challenging  endeavour,  Member  States  should 
exert  due  diligence  when  preparing,  publishing  and  evaluating  their  forecasts.  Appropriate 
steps at the implementation stage would normally include a clear delineation of tasks between 
the entities involved in the forecasting process and include ex post evaluation. While the latter 
need not be conducted every year, it is a valuable step that could alert fiscal authorities to the 
existence of a bias. 

Forecasting  may  also  include  the  involvement  of  independent  institutions  or  bodies  with 
functional  autonomy,  as  proposed  in  the  ‘two-pack’  draft  regulation  for  monitoring  the 

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budgetary plans of the euro-area Member States7, which extends and further specifies some of 
the Directive’s provisions. When eventually adopted, the two-pack fiscal regulation may well 
provide effective support for achieving the Directive’s objectives in this area. 

Overall  a  third  of  Member  States  (BG,  DE,  DK,  EE,  PL,  RO,  SE,  SI,  SK  and  UK)  report 
having  structured  processes  in  place  involving  several  institutions  or  bodies  to  ensure 
transparency  and  accountability  of  forecasts.  Other  Member  States  are  still  at  the  drawing 
board  stage  or  have  so  far  reported  only  vague  declarations  of  intent.  The  drafting  of 
alternative macroeconomic and budgetary scenarios —a sound preventive step that facilitates 
budget  shifts  at  the  budget  execution  stage  when  actual  parameters  depart  from  the  central 
scenario—  is  reported  by  AT,  BG,  CY,  DE,  DK,  EL,  RO,  SE  and  UK.  Only  a  minority  of 
Member States report that they compare (or plan to compare) their forecasts with those of the 
European  Commission  (BG,  CY,  DE,  EE,  EL8,  FR,  RO  and  SI),  although  some  Member 
States use some Commission assumptions as input to their own processes (EE and PL). Few 
Member  States  report  at  this  stage  any  specific  measures  to  assess  ex  post  the  quality  of 
forecasts in the sense of Article 4(6) of the Directive. 

2.3 

National numerical fiscal rules (Chapter IV of the Directive) 

The Directive requires Member States to have in place country-specific numerical fiscal rules 
that effectively promote compliance with Treaty obligations in the field of budgetary policy 
(Articles 5 to 7). While the Directive does not specify such rules in detail, they must include 
requirements to the effect that the targets and scope of the rules are well defined, effective and 
timely independent monitoring is put in place, strict compliance mechanisms exist and only 
well-circumscribed escape clauses are defined9. 

Well-designed  rules-based  frameworks  are  known  to  significantly  enhance  budgetary 
discipline. Several pre-requisites need to be met when Member States design such rules. First 
and  foremost,  national  fiscal  rules  must  be  fully  compatible  with  the  EU  fiscal  framework. 
Second, it is important to avoid two opposite pitfalls. On the one hand, coverage gaps would 
weaken  the  effectiveness  of  the  entire  framework  by  providing  openings  for  budgetary 
overruns. On the other hand, over-stacking of national rules may increase the probability of 
conflicts between them if not properly designed and as a result weaken their overall authority. 
Finally, for the rules to fully make their presence felt and effectively ensure fiscal discipline, 
compliance  needs  to  be  assessed  on  a  regular  basis.  Effective  monitoring  and  ex  post 
assessment  are  especially  warranted  when  the  rules  are  complex  or  there  are  numerous 
national rules whose interplay might be less straightforward to interpret. Periodic checks by 
monitoring  institutions  with  sufficient  authority  would  also  provide  an  opportunity  to  raise 
awareness of fiscal sustainability, and  foster a healthy  debate with fiscal authorities and  the 
general public on shared fiscal objectives. 

Spurred  by  the  introduction  of  the  Directive  and  the  TSCG,  major  reforms  leading  to  an 
overhaul  of  fiscal  rules  have  been  unveiled  or  are  reportedly  already  completed  in  twenty 

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Proposal  for  a  regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  common  provisions  for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States in the euro area – COM(2011) 821 final. 
This  is  carried  out  within  bilateral  discussions  in  the  context  of  the  economic  adjustment  and  growth 
programme. 
The inter-governmental TSCG constitutes a concrete application of the Directive for euro-area Member 
States and other Member States that have ratified it on a voluntary basis. It mandates the introduction of 
a budget balance rule in structural terms at national level, which would naturally have to comply with 
the Directive’s requirements like any other national numerical rule. 

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Member States (AT, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, IE, IT, FR, LT, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, 
SE, SK, and SI). Including proposed legislation, new budget balance rules have been unveiled 
in  eleven  Member  States  (CY,  IE,  ES,  FR,  IT,  LT,  LV,  NL,  PL,  PT  and  SI).  Furthermore, 
budget-balance rules are being updated with a view to strengthening them in five others (BG, 
DK,  DE,  EE,  and  AT).  Some  budget-balance  rules  would  fully  enter  in  force  only  after  a 
transitional period. This is the case for Germany (2016 for the federal government, 2020 for 
the Länder), Austria (2017), and Spain (2020). Expenditure rules are being established in ten 
Member States (AT, CY, DK, EE, ES, IT, LT, LV, PL, and PT) and reformed in five other 
Member  States  (BG,  CZ,  RO,  SI,  and  SK).  The  creation  or  strengthening  of  national  debt 
rules is a new development in twelve Member States (AT, BG, CY, CZ, EE, IE, IT, ES, NL, 
PL, PT, and SK). In addition, Member States under an adjustment programme are subject to a 
multi-annual, multi-target framework constraining their fiscal policy as a de facto fiscal rule 
with enhanced features for monitoring and enforcement.  

Many Member States declare that the new or updated rules will have features in line with the 
Directive’s  requirements.  In  particular,  several  Member  States  report  that  monitoring 
institutions will be tasked with assessing the implementation of fiscal rules (BG, CY, CZ, DK, 
DE, EE, IE, IT, LV, PL, and SK). Escape clauses have been defined in BG, CY, CZ, DK, DE, 
ES, IE, LV, AT, PL, and SK. The scope of fiscal rules is being expanded to include other sub-
sectors  of  general  government  outside  central  government.  Local  or  regional  government  is 
being subjected to fiscal rules, whether budget-balance rules (BG, DE, ES, FR, LT, LU, NL, 
AT, RO, SE, and SK), debt rules (BG, CZ, EE, ES, IT, AT, PT, RO, and SK), or expenditure 
rules (BG, ES, and AT). Overall, the establishment of national numerical fiscal rules appears 
to  be  on  the  right  track.  However,  their  specific  features  and  overall  consistency  would 
eventually have to be assessed against the requirements of the Directive’s Articles 5 and 6. 

2.4 

Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks (Chapter V of the Directive) 

Under  the  Directive,  Member  States  are  required  to  establish  a  credible,  effective  Medium-
Term  Budgetary  Framework  (MTBF),  enabling  them  to  expand  fiscal  planning  beyond  the 
annual  horizon  and  thereby  fostering  more  consistent,  effective  and  potentially  ambitious 
policy-making  over  the  medium  term.  The  MTBF  must  contain  multi-annual  budgetary 
objectives in combination with projections of each major revenue and expenditure item based 
on  unchanged  policies,  with  explanations  of  corrective  medium-term  policies  to  bridge  the 
gap between the no-policy change projections and policy targets. Additionally, it must contain 
an assessment as to how the policies envisaged are likely to affect the long-term sustainability 
of public finances. 

While the Directive dedicates a chapter to MTBFs (Articles 9-11), it is important not to see 
the drafting of a national MTBF in isolation. The timing of the preparation of the MTBF and 
its  integration  within  the  annual  budget  cycle  have  to  be  carefully  considered  so  that  it  can 
fully  serve  as  a  strategic  document  for  the  state,  functioning  in  tandem  with  regular  annual 
budget  documents.  Wherever  necessary  the  MTBF  should  replace  existing  planning 
documents or consolidate them into a single, well-identified, strategic document. Consistency 
is  critical  and  should  be  understood  along  several  dimensions.  First,  the  MTBF  should 
genuinely  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  subsequent  preparation  of  the  annual  budget.  Second,  as 
some Member States have developed multi-annual binding fiscal rules, figures derived from 
these fiscal rules should naturally feed into the MTBF. Finally, the MTBF document should 
also  be  consistent  over  time  by  documenting  in  detail  and  transparently  numerical 
adjustments,  whether  they  derive  from  base  effects,  deviations  in  outturns  or  discretionary 
changes. 

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Multi-annual frameworks are reported to be in place or concrete plans exist to establish them, 
in twenty-two Member States (BG, CY, CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, EL, FR, HU, IT, LT, LV, NL, 
AT,  PL,  PT,  RO,  SE,  SI,  SK  and  UK).  Almost  all  are  of  a  rolling  nature  and  consequently 
updated  at  least  every  year  with  the  inclusion  of  an  outer  year.  However,  NL  updates  its 
framework  only  to  accommodate  price  developments  during  the  course  of  a  legislature, 
whereas FR updates it every two years. SI operates a two-yearly budget, through adjustments 
conducted  every  year  in  combination  with  an  expenditure  framework  for  three  years. 
Reported multi-annual frameworks span three years (BG, CY, FR, IT, LT, LV, HU, RO, SE, 
and  SK),  four  years  (CZ,  DK,  EE,  EL,  NL,  PL,  AT,  PT  and  SI)  or  five  years  (DE,  UK). 
Legislative  provisions  ensuring  consistency  between  national  multi-annual  frameworks  and 
the  corresponding  annual  budget  processes  can  be  found  in  BG,  CZ,  EE,  LV,  PL  and  SK. 
Multi-annual  frameworks  are  also  a  vehicle  of  choice  for  setting  expenditure  ceilings  or 
targets (CZ, DK, EE, EL, FR, LT, LV, NL, AT, PT, SE, and SI), although the presentation of 
medium-term developments only for expenditure would not suffice to qualify as a medium-
term budgetary framework in the sense of the Directive. Finally, only a few Member States 
report that multi-annual projections are presented under a no-policy change basis, although it 
is  crucial  to  establish  a  baseline  scenario  in  combination  with  policy  measures  to  ensure 
achievement of the policy targets or values implied by existing fiscal rules. 

2.5 

Mechanisms of coordination across government sub-sectors (Articles 12 and 13 
of the Directive) 

Article 12 stipulates that the measures provided for by the Directive must be consistent across, 
and comprehensive in the coverage of, all sub-sectors of general government. This reflects the 
fact that initial efforts to improve budgetary frameworks concerned central government level 
only.  With  the  Directive,  the  scene  is  set  for  a  broad-based  extension  of  the  principles  for 
accounting,  statistics,  forecasting  and  fiscal  rules  to  social  security  funds  and  local 
government, which taken together, account for a sizeable share of total expenditure. To ensure 
good  administration,  Article 13  of  the  Directive  also  stresses  the  importance  of  a  clear 
delineation of budgetary responsibilities among government tiers, and lays down the principle 
that  ‘Member  States  shall  establish  appropriate  mechanisms  of  coordination  across  sub-
sectors  of  general  government  to  provide  for  comprehensive  and  consistent  coverage  of  all 
sub-sectors of general government in fiscal planning, country-specific numerical fiscal rules, 
and in the preparation of budgetary forecasts and setting-up of multiannual planning as laid 
down, in particular, in the multiannual budgetary framework.’ 

National  provisions  should  accordingly  make  sure  that  the  constraints  deriving  from  fiscal 
targets  for  general  government  are  properly  internalised  by  all  government  levels.  Such 
detailed  provisions  can  only  be  of  a  country-specific  nature  given  the  specificities  of  the 
sometimes complex horizontal and vertical redistribution schemes among and within levels of 
administration. While clear and effectively enforced rules and procedures are essential for that 
purpose,  such  instruments  should  ideally  be  accompanied  by  fora  where  representatives  of 
government  entities  have  the  opportunity  to  exchange  views  and  participate  in  the  overall 
annual budgetary cycle at a strategic level, before each government level prepares its annual 
budget according to its own procedural rules. 

Beyond the establishment of fiscal rules for (or their extension to) sub-national governments, 
Member  States  report  a  variety  of  coordination  instruments  at  various  stages  of  the  annual 
budgetary  process.  In  BG,  consultations  with  municipalities  are  held  during  the  MTBF 
drafting process. The minutes of such consultations provide input for discussion of the draft 
State  Budget  Law  by  the  Council  of  Ministers.  In  DK,  a  closer  linkage  is  to  be  established 

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between  agreed  targets  and  central  government  grants  to  municipalities.  In  DE,  the 
monitoring institution for the budget-balance rule (Stability Council) includes members of the 
federal government and the Länder. The longstanding practice of jointly forecasting revenue 
from shared taxes in a committee also constitutes some form of ‘built-in’ coordination. In ES, 
the  new  Organic  Law  lays  down  debt  ceilings  broken  down  by  government  levels,  with 
corrective procedures applicable to sub-national governments. This type of domestic stability 
pact  is  also  encountered  in  AT,  where  deficit  targets are  also  assigned  to  each  level,  with  a 
conciliation  body  to  settle  disputes  between  government  levels.  In  NL,  the  draft  law  on  the 
sustainability of public finances aims to legally anchor the obligation for local governments to 
contribute  their  fair  share  to  achieving  the  Medium-Term  Objective.  Failure  to  achieve 
common  targets  may  result  in  the  imposition  of  fines  on  all  ‘failing’  government  levels.  In 
RO, the Ministry of Public Finances submits instructions to local authorities in a Framework 
Letter on the drafting of local budgets, the macroeconomic framework, and ceilings for fiscal 
transfers from the state budget. In addition, BE, DE, IE, FI, FR, LU, and SI are considering 
adaptations to their coordination arrangements. 

3. 

CONCLUSION 

Overall, Member States reported substantial but uneven progress in transposing the Directive. 
With regard to Chapter II of the Directive, Member States have still some way to go to ensure 
timely  and  comprehensive  statistical  coverage  for  all  general  government  sub-sectors. 
Reported  forecasting  provisions  lack  detail  in  quite  a  few  Member  States.  Progress  is 
somewhat more advanced regarding numerical fiscal rules as specified in Chapter IV of the 
Directive:  a  wide  array  of  national  instruments  is  being  prepared  to  buttress  national  fiscal 
policy-making.  The  mutually-reinforcing  nature  of  all  pieces  of  legislation  contained  in  the 
‘six-pack’  that  relate  to  the  reform  of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  combined  with  the 
additional impetus brought by the TSCG, has helped to place these issues high on the Member 
States’ reform agenda. While many Member States report that MTBFs in the sense of Chapter 
V of the Directive are in place or planned, the details given are sometimes scarce and do not 
provide  enough  evidence  that  they  will  fully  comply  with  the  Directive’s  specifications. 
Finally,  work  on  effective  coordination  arrangements  for  sub-national  governments  is  being 
carried out in many Member States, but the positive intentions reported need to be turned into 
concrete and enforceable arrangements. A number of Member States considered good fiscal 
performers  have  reported  fewer  completed  reforms  at  this  stage,  but  are  considering 
formalising  part  of  their  currently  informal  framework  for  increased  efficiency.  The 
Commission  will  continue  implementing  the  Directive  for  the  sections  it  is  responsible  for, 
and  after  the  transposition  deadline  will  conduct  a  full-fledged  compliance  assessment  in 
accordance with standard EU procedures. 

EN 

8 

   EN