COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU: the European Information Exchange Model (EIXM)
Date: 2012-12-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU body for police and judicial cooperation, Europol, Schengen Information System, corruption, disclosure of information, exchange of information, money laundering, organised crime, prevention of delinquency

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 7.12.2012  
COM(2012) 735 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 

Strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU: 
the European Information Exchange Model (EIXM) 

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 

Strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU: 
the European Information Exchange Model (EIXM) 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Ensuring  a  high  level  of  security  within  the  EU  and  Schengen  area  requires  that  criminal 
networks be tackled by concerted European action1. This is needed to address not just serious 
and  organised  crime,  such  as  trafficking  in  human  beings,  illicit  drugs  or  firearms,  but  also 
less serious offences committed on a large scale by mobile organised crime groups and crimes 
committed by individual offenders across Member State borders. 

Exchanging  information  between  Member  States  is  in  this  context  an  essential  tool  for  law 
enforcement  authorities.  International  and  bilateral  arrangements  have  therefore  been 
supplemented by EU instruments and systems, such as the Schengen Information System and 
the Europol Information System, with in-built safeguards to protect privacy and personal data 
in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This Communication takes stock of how the 
resulting  cross-border  information  exchange  in  the  EU  works  today,  and  makes 
recommendations for how to improve it. 

It  concludes  that  information  exchange  generally  works  well,  and  examples  of  successful 
results  are  given  below  to  illustrate  this.  No  new  EU-level  law  enforcement  databases  or 
information  exchange  instruments  are  therefore  needed  at  this  stage.  However,  the 
existing EU instruments could and should be better implemented, and the exchanges should 
be organised more consistently.  

This  Communication  accordingly  sets  out  recommendations  to  Member  States  for  how  to 
improve the implementation of existing instruments and streamline the communication 
channels used. It emphasises the need to ensure high data quality, security and protection. 
It also explains how the Commission will provide support, including funding and training, 
for  Member  States.  In  this  way,  it  provides  a  Model  for  guiding  EU  and  Member  State 
activity. 

This  Communication  responds  to  the  invitation  in  the  Stockholm  Programme  for  the 
Commission  to  assess  the  need  for  a  European  Information  Exchange  Model  based  on  an 
evaluation  of  existing  instruments.  It  builds  on  the  Commission’s  Communication  of  2010 
giving  an  overview  of  information  management  in  the  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice 
(‘2010  Overview  Communication’)2  and  on  the  EU  Information  Management  Strategy  for 
internal  security  agreed  in  20093,  along  with  actions  undertaken  by  Member  States,  the 
Commission  and  Europol  to  implement  it  (‘IMS  Actions’).  It  further  draws  on  a  mapping 
exercise  of  EU  information  exchange  involving  national  and  other  (EDPS,  EU  agencies, 

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2 
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The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action, COM(2010) 673. 
COM(2010) 385. 
Council Conclusions 30 November 2009, 16637/09. 

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Interpol) experts, a study on information exchange among law enforcement authorities4, and 
discussions with stakeholders, including data protection authorities. 

2. 

THE CURRENT SITUATION 

Law  enforcement  authorities  exchange  information  for  different  purposes:  for  criminal 
investigation,  for  preventing  crime,  for  detecting  crime  (e.g.  using  criminal  intelligence 
operations)  and  for  ensuring  public  order  and  security.  As  to  the  scale  of  cross-border 
exchanges,  the  above-mentioned  study  from  2010  reported  responses  by  national-level 
agencies  in  Member  States  that  in  about  ¼  of  their  investigations  and  criminal  intelligence 
operations requests were sent to other EU or Schengen Member States. 

2.1. 

Instruments 

The  2010  Overview  Communication  described  all  EU-level  measures  regulating  the 
collection,  storage  or  cross-border  exchange  of  personal  information  for  the  purpose  of  law 
enforcement  or  migration  management.  This  Communication  focuses  on  instruments  used 
for cross-border exchanges between Member States. Examples of how the instruments are 
used have been provided by Member States. 

The  Swedish  Initiative5  establishes  rules,  including  deadlines,  for  exchange  of  information 
and  intelligence  between  Member  State  law  enforcement  authorities  for  the  purpose  of 
conducting criminal investigations or criminal intelligence operations. It applies the principle 
of  ‘equivalent  access’:  information  must  be  provided  to  requesting  Member  States  under 
conditions  no  stricter  than  that  applicable  at  national  level.  The  information  must  also  be 
exchanged with Europol and Eurojust insofar as the exchange refers to offences within their 
mandate. 

In 2012 a Swedish company was tricked by a known Italian fraudster into paying €65  000 to 
an Italian account. The Swedish SPOC (see 3.2 below) received a request from Italy, via the 
SIRENE channel (see below), to contact the company’s director to check if payment had been 
made, in which case Italy would freeze the money. Sweden took action and replied under the 
Swedish Initiative in less than 24 hours. Due to this quick action, the Swedish police received 
information  that  a  company  was  a  fraud  victim  and  the  Italian  authorities  obtained 
information needed to take action and the money will probably be recovered. 

In  2012  in  the  emergency  department  of  a  hospital  near  Paris,  a  Belgian-born  man  gave 
confused  accounts  of  how  he  had  received  a  serious  gunshot  wound.  His  companion’s 
statements  pointed  investigators  towards  possible  acts  in  Belgium.  First  enquiries  showed 
that  the  man  was  known  in  BE,  including  for  murder.  The  French  authorities  immediately 
under the Swedish Initiative sent spontaneous information to the Belgium police who rapidly 
made a link with events two days previously in Belgium when four armed men had kidnapped 
a jewellery shop employee. Police intervention had put the men to flight; the men escaped, but 
one was shot in an exchange of fire with police. This information led the French authorities to 
put the man under surveillance pending a European Arrest Warrant (EAW), which was issued 
the same day in Belgium and transmitted to France via SIRENE. 

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5 

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/categories/studies/index_en.htm 
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA. 

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The Prüm Decision6 provides for automated exchange of DNA profiles, fingerprint (FP) data 
and vehicle registration data (VRD) for investigating criminal offences (for DNA, FP, VRD), 
preventing criminal offences (FP, VRD) and maintaining public security (VRD). Comparison 
of  biometric  data  (DNA,  FP)  operates  on  a  ‘hit/no-hit’  basis:  an  automated  comparison 
produces  an  anonymous  ‘hit’  if  the  DNA  or  FP  data  held  by  the  requesting  Member  State 
match data held by another Member State. The related personal or case data are only provided 
in response to a separate follow-up request. 

A man was found stabbed to death in an apartment in a German city. A fingerprint was found 
on a doorframe. An automated Prüm search led to a hit in the Bulgarian database. Follow-up 
information  requested  from  Bulgaria  the  next  day  was  submitted  within  3  hours  and 
immediately entered into the Schengen Information System (SIS – see below). The next day the 
individual concerned was arrested in Austria. 

In 2007, at the start of Prüm exchanges, equipment was stolen from a police car in Vienna. A 
DNA  trace  from  the  car  was  matched  in  the  Austrian  database  with  a  trace  from  a  similar 
case, but it was a Prüm hit in the German database that led to the identification of a Polish 
serial burglar. An EAW was issued in Austria. The suspect was arrested in Poland (due to a 
hit on an SIS alert) and was later convicted in Austria. 

Europol  supports  Member  States’  action  and  cooperation  in  preventing  and  combating 
organised  crime,  terrorism  and  other  forms  of  serious  crime  (as  listed  in  the  Annex  to  the 
Europol Council Decision7) affecting two or more Member States. It provides a platform for 
Member  States  —  through  Europol  National  Units  (‘ENUs’)  —  to  exchange  criminal 
intelligence  and  information.  The  Europol  Information  System  is  a  database  of  information 
(183 000 items) supplied by Member States on cross-border crime within Europol’s mandate, 
the individuals involved (41 000) and other related data. Europol uses it for its analyses and 
Member  States  can  use  it  for  investigations.  Since  2011  Member  States  may  designate  law 
enforcement authorities other than ENUs to be granted access to make searches on a hit/no-hit 
basis.  Analysis  work  files  allow  Europol  to  provide  operational  analyses  to  support  cross-
border investigations. 

Counterfeit payment cards were used to withdraw large sums of money from cash machines 
throughout  Slovenia.  Two  Bulgarian  citizens  were  being  investigated;  use  of  the  Europol 
Information System (EIS) led to a hit showing that one of them had committed similar acts in 
France and Italy. France provided detailed information to the EIS. Due to a swift reply from 
France via SIENA (see below), followed by a fingerprint check and the lifting of a handling 
restriction,  authorities  in  Slovenia  could  use  the  data  as  evidence  before  the  courts.  The 
Europol analysis work file revealed links between cases in SI, BG, FR, IE, IT and NO. 

The  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS)  contains  alerts  on  persons  and  objects.  As  a 
compensatory  measure  for  the  lifting  of  internal  border  controls,  it  is  used  both  within  the 
Schengen area and at its external frontiers with the aim of maintaining a high level of security 
within  the  area.  It  is  a  large-scale  system  (over  43  million  alerts)  accessible  on  a  hit/no-hit 
basis to frontline officers. Following a hit (i.e. details of a person or object match an alert), 
supplementary information can be obtained via the SIRENE Bureaux (see below). SIS will be 
replaced by SIS II, which will bring improvements such as the possibility to link related alerts 
(e.g.  alert  on  a  person  and  a  vehicle),  new  categories  of  alerts,  and  a  facility  to  store 

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Council Decision 2008/615/JHA. 
2009/371/JHA. 

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fingerprints,  photographs  and  copies  of  European  Arrest  Warrants.  The  SIS  II  Council 
Decision8  defines  categories  of  alerts  to  support  cooperation  between  police  and  judicial 
authorities  in  criminal  matters.  For  these,  all  EU  Member  States  will  participate  in  SIS II, 
while Europol and Eurojust will continue to have access. Management of central parts of SIS 
II will be transferred to the IT Agency9. 

Other EU instruments or IT systems provide for exchange of law enforcement information 
between customs authorities (Naples II Convention; Customs Information System as part of 
the Anti-Fraud Information System databases operated by the European Anti-Fraud Office – 
OLAF),  Financial  Intelligence  Units,  Asset  Recovery  Offices  and  Cybercrime  Alert 
Platforms10.  Law  enforcement  access  to  other  large-scale  EU  systems  is  provided  for  (Visa 
is  proposed  (EURODAC11)  for  preventing,  detecting  and 
Information  System)  or 
investigating  terrorism  and  other  serious  crime.  The  question  of  granting  law  enforcement 
access and, if so, under what conditions, is also part of the preparatory work currently being 
undertaken in view of the proposal for an Entry/Exit System that is to be presented soon. 

A  European  Border  Surveillance  System  (EUROSUR)  is  being  developed  for  information 
exchange  and  operational  cooperation  between  National  Coordination  Centres  and  with 
Frontex  to  improve  situational  awareness  and  reaction  capability  for  preventing  irregular 
migration  and  cross-border  crime  at  the  EU’s  external  borders.  A  Common  Information 
Sharing Environment (CISE) for surveillance of the EU maritime domain aiming inter alia at 
enhancing  maritime  situational  awareness  is  being  developed  to  enable  exchanges  of 
information  across  public  authorities  of  seven  relevant  sectors  (including  general  law 
enforcement)  and  across  borders  while  establishing  interoperability  between  existing  and 
future surveillance systems such as EUROSUR. 

Member States also exchange information under national laws and bilateral agreements. They 
are also all members of Interpol, through which information can be exchanged with countries 
across  the  world  either  through  Interpol  notices  and  databases  (e.g.  Stolen  and  Lost  Travel 
Documents) or bilaterally using the Interpol channel. 

2.2. 

Channels and communication tools 

Three main channels are used for cross-border information exchange, each based on national 
units in each Member State that use a related communication tool: 

(1) 

SIRENE12  Bureaux  can,  following  a  hit  on  an  alert  in  SIS,  obtain  supplementary 
information  from  the  Member  State  that  issued  the  alert.  They  operate  24/7  and 
follow the procedures in the SIRENE Manual. Currently, they exchange information 
using a system called SISNET, which will be replaced by the SIS II communication 
network by the end of March 2013. 

(2) 

Europol National Units (ENUs) exchange information with Europol. They may also 
exchange  information  bilaterally  on  crime  outside  Europol’s  mandate  and  without 

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2007/533/JHA. 
European  Agency  for  the  operational  management  of  large-scale  IT  systems  in  the  area  of  freedom, 
security and justice. 
The  forthcoming  European  Cyber-Security  Strategy  will  provide  an  opportunity  to  assess  future 
information  exchange  needs  between  the  network  and  information  security  authorities  and  law 
enforcement, e.g. via the European Cybercrime Centre. 
EU database of fingerprints of asylum applicants and those crossing borders irregularly. 
Supplementary Information REquest at the National Entry. 

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involving  Europol.  ENUs  can  exchange  information  directly  or  through  Europol 
Liaison Officers, who are part of an ENU but stationed at Europol headquarters. A 
secure  communications  tool,  SIENA13,  has  been  developed  by  Europol  for 
exchanges with Europol and between Member States. In 2011, Member States used 
SIENA  to  exchange  222 000  messages;  in  53%  of  those  the  information  in  the 
message was shared with Europol. 

(3) 

Interpol  National  Central  Bureaux,  operating  24/7,  exchange  information  with 
Interpol  as  well  as  bilaterally  without  involving  Interpol.  National  Central  Bureaux 
use the I-24/7 communication tool developed by Interpol. 

Other  channels  include  bilateral  Liaison  Officers  (stationed  in  other  Member  States  and 
typically used in more complex cases) and Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (set up 
by neighbouring Member States to support information exchange and operational cooperation 
in border areas). 

The choice of channel is partly regulated by EU law: SIS requests for post-hit supplementary 
information  must  be  via  SIRENE  Bureaux,  and  information  exchange  with  Europol  via 
ENUs. Otherwise the choice is up to Member States. 

2.3. 

Interaction of the different instruments, channels and tools 

There is a diversity of instruments, channels and tools, each designed for particular purposes. 
A criminal investigation can involve parallel or sequential use of more than one instrument. In 
a cross-border case of serious or organised crime, a person or object could be checked against 
both the Europol Information System and SIS, and where there are ‘hits’ follow-up requests 
could be made via Europol or SIRENE channels, respectively. A biometric trace could be the 
subject  of  a  Prüm  exchange  followed  by  a  post-hit  Swedish  Initiative  request  using  the 
SIENA tool. 

Whatever the combination or sequence, the rules of each instrument must be respected. These 
include rules on data protection, on data security and quality, and on the purpose for which 
the  instruments  may  be  used.  National  processing  of  data  for  cross-border  exchanges  must 
also  comply  with  EU  legislation  on  protection  of  personal  data14.  Proportionality  must  be 
respected, e.g. requests may be refused under the Swedish Initiative if providing information 
would  be  clearly  disproportionate  to  the  request’s  purpose.  Respecting  these  rules  requires 
that  requests  and  replies  be  validated  by  well-qualified  staff  working  with  appropriate 
information tools. 

2.4. 

Interface with judicial cooperation 

The  criminal  justice  process  involves  both  law  enforcement  and  judicial  authorities,  but 
differences  between  Member  States  include  the  extent  to  which  criminal  investigation  is 
directed  or  supervised  by  judicial  authorities  (including  prosecutors).  Where  judicial 
authorities  are  in  the  lead,  as  well  as  where  information  is  needed  as  evidence,  judicial 
cooperation procedures of mutual legal assistance (MLA) are typically required. 

Furthermore,  information  directly  accessible  to  law  enforcement  in  one  Member  State  may 
require judicial authorisation in another. The Swedish Initiative requires that where requested 

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Secure Information Exchange Network Application. 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977. 

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information requires judicial authorisation, then the requested law enforcement authority must 
make  a  request  to  the  judicial  authority  which  must  apply  the  same  rules  as  in  a  purely 
internal case. 

The  mapping  exercise  found,  however,  that  law  enforcement  experts  perceive  the  differing 
rules  as  a  source  of  delay  in  cross-border  investigations.  Although  outside  the  scope  of  this 
Communication,  it  can  be  noted  that  Eurojust  is  available  to  facilitate  judicial  cooperation. 
Also  relevant  would  be  the  European  Investigation  Order,  currently  being  discussed,  which 
could replace existing rules for cross-border obtaining of evidence implementing the principle 
of  mutual  recognition.  It  would  be  required  to  be  recognised  and  executed  with  the  same 
celerity as for a similar national case, and, in any case, within stipulated deadlines. 

2.5. 

Principles 

In  its  2010  Overview  Communication  the  Commission  set  out  substantive  and  process-
oriented principles for developing new initiatives and evaluating current instruments.  

The substantive principles are: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

Safeguarding  fundamental  rights,  in  particular  the  right  to  privacy  and  data 
protection. These are rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and Article 16 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.  

Necessity.  A  restriction  of  the  right  to  privacy  may  be  justified  only  if  it  is  lawful, 
pursuing a legitimate aim and necessary in a democratic society. 

Subsidiarity. 

Accurate risk management. Necessity tests and purpose limitations are essential. 

The process-oriented principles are: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Cost-effectiveness. This requires taking existing solutions into account and assessing 
whether  a  proposal’s  objectives  could  be  achieved  through  better  use  of  existing 
instruments. 

Bottom-up policy design. An example of this is the mapping exercise involving law 
enforcement experts when preparing this Communication. 

Clear allocation of  responsibilities. The 2010 Overview Communication  noted that 
Member States had no project leader to turn to for advice on Prüm implementation. 
The  Commission’s  Prüm  Report  notes  how  this  deficit  is  now  in  part  filled  by 
support at Europol. As to the idea in the 2010 Overview Communication that the IT 
Agency may be able to provide technical advice, the Agency’s current priorities lie 
elsewhere.  An  occasion  for  reconsidering  this  will  be  the  3-year  evaluation  due  by 
the end of 2015. 

(4) 

Review  and  sunset  clauses.  The  Commission  has  issued  reports  on  the  Swedish 
Initiative and Prüm. This Communication takes account of those. 

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3. 

ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

the  SIRENE  channel  account  for  a  high  volume  of 

This section focuses on the Swedish Initiative, Prüm and the Europol channel. Although SIS 
and 
information  exchange, 
recommendations are not presented on these because extensive changes are already underway 
notably the forthcoming move to SIS II. 

3.1. 

Improve the use of existing instruments 

Other than the forthcoming Europol reform, the Commission does not intend in the short-term 
to  propose  amendments  to  the  above-mentioned  EU  instruments.  Nor  are  new  instruments 
currently needed. First of all, existing instruments need to be implemented. 

This  applies  particularly  to  Prüm.  The  Commission’s  Prüm  Report  accompanying  this 
Communication  finds  that  Prüm  data  exchange  is  highly  appreciated  for  investigations,  but 
that implementation is seriously lagging. Many Member States are not yet exchanging data 
under Prüm even though the deadline for transposition was 26 August 201115. The main 
reasons  are  of  a  technical  nature  and  due  to  a  lack  of  human  and  financial  resources  in 
Member States. However, given the possibilities of EU support (funding, Mobile Competence 
Team, helpdesk), what seems to be needed above all is political will to implement. As stated 
in the Report, the Commission will continue to assist by offering EU funding. However, the 
context  will  change  in  December  2014  when  the  Commission  will  be  able  to  bring 
infringement  proceedings.  Rules  for  control  of  national  implementation  do  not  apply  until 
then, since Prüm, like the Swedish Initiative, was adopted under the former third pillar. 

As to the Swedish Initiative, the Commission reported in 2011 that the instrument had not 
yet reached its full potential but that its importance would increase16. That assessment remains 
valid; not all Member States have yet implemented17. Most Member States have informed that 
they have transposed it into their domestic legislation18, while some have stated that they had 
no need to transpose it as their domestic legislation was already in line with it19. Nevertheless, 
despite its advantages including the equivalent access principle and deadlines, it is in practice 
still  not  widely  used.  Reasons  given  include  that  alternatives  are  considered  to  be  adequate 
and that the request form is cumbersome (even in its 2010 simplified version20). 

The Commission was asked to examine its usefulness for Prüm post-hit follow-up requests21. 
Where  follow-up  information  is  needed  as  evidence  before  a  court,  a  judicial  cooperation 
request will normally be required. However, where use as evidence is not or not yet needed, 
systematic  use  of  the  Swedish  Initiative  as  legal  basis  and  SIENA  as  communication  tool 
should  be  promoted  so  as  to  make  full  use  of  the  advantages  of  each  and  to  align  Member 
States with a single best practice.  

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The following Member States have implemented: 
DNA: BG/CZ/DE/ES/EE/FR/CY/LV/LT/LU/HU/NL/AT/PT/RO/SI/SK/FI; 
FP: BG/CZ/DE/EE/ES/FR/CY/LT/LU/HU/NL/AT/SI/SK; 
VRD: BE/DE/ES/FR/LT/LU/NL/AT/PL/RO/SI/FI/SE. 
For more details, see the Prüm Report. 
SEC(2011) 593. 
The following Member States are still to adopt implementing legislation: BE/EL/IT/LU. 
BG/CZ/DK/DE/EE/ES/FR/CY/HU/LT/LV/NL/PL/PT/RO/SI/SK/FI/SE. 
IE/MT/AT/UK. 
9512/1/10. 
Council Conclusions 27-28 October 2011, 15277/11. 

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As regards Europol, a 2012 evaluation22 confirmed other findings that Member States do not 
adequately  share  information  with  Europol  (and  thereby  with  each  other).  The  Commission 
will address this in a proposal to amend Europol’s legal basis. For its part, Council has invited 
Member States to make increased use of the Europol Information System23. 

In  line  with  the  Stockholm  Programme,  the  Commission  ordered  a  study  on  a  possible 
European  Police  Records  Index  System24.  The  idea  is  to  respond  to  the  perceived  need, 
given the increased cross-border nature of crime, for a police officer in one Member State to 
know if a suspect is known to police in another. In line with the cost-effectiveness principle, 
the  Commission  considers  that  creating  an  EPRIS  is  currently  not  justified  given  that 
existing instruments and tools, which could serve this purpose partly or fully through better or 
intensified use, are not fully used. This concerns in particular the Europol Information System 
(uploading  relevant  data  and  extending  access  at  national  level),  SIS II  (increasing  use  of 
relevant  alerts  on  persons  or  vehicles  for  checks  for  the  purposes  of  prosecuting  criminal 
offences  and  preventing  threats  to  public  security),  SIENA  (further  developing  access  at 
national  level,  interlinking  with  national  systems  and  automating  tasks  where  appropriate), 
and  Prüm  (full  implementation  to  improve  identification  of  criminals  acting  in  different 
Member States). 

Member States are invited to: 

• 

• 

• 

Implement fully the Swedish Initiative, including its principle of equivalent access. 

Implement fully the Prüm Decision, using the available EU support. 

For Prüm post-hit follow-up requests, use the Swedish Initiative and the SIENA tool. 

The Commission will: 

• 

• 

Continue to provide EU funding to support implementation of Prüm. 

By December 2014: prepare for applying in this area the rules for ensuring national 
implementation of EU law.  

3.2. 

Streamline and manage the channels 

Choice of channel. One result of Member States having a free choice of channel (apart from 
the  legal  requirements  relating  to  SIRENE  Bureaux  and  ENUs)  is  that  they  use  different 
channels to different extents. The Manual of Good Practices concerning International Police 
Cooperation Units at National Level (‘2008 Manual’)25, drawn up under the aegis of the EU 
Police Chiefs, contains criteria26, but they are not binding and have not led to convergence of 
national  practices.  Some  Member  States  have  moved  towards  more  systematic  use  of  the 
Europol channel. Others continue to rely a good deal on the Interpol channel, the attraction of 
which seems to lie partly in its traditional central role in international police cooperation and 
partly  in  its  perceived  ease  of  use.  SISNET  is  used  by  some  Member  States  for  non-SIS 
matters e.g. Swedish Initiative requests. 

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https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/rand_evaluation_report.pdf 
Council Conclusions 7-8 June 2012. 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/categories/studies/index_en.htm 
7968/08. 
Repeated in Guidelines on the implementation of the Swedish Initiative, 9512/1/10. 

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The Commission believes the time has come within the EU for a more coherent approach, one 
giving  the  Europol  channel  a  central  role.  Under  this  approach,  where  the  channel  is  not 
legally  defined  the  Europol  channel  using  the  SIENA  tool  should  become  the  default 
channel  unless  there  are  specific  reasons  to  use  another.  Thus,  for  example,  police 
cooperation requests currently made using SISNET (which will close when SIS II goes live27) 
should in future be made using SIENA. 

Some Member States favour an approach that leaves wide flexibility to use different channels. 
The Commission disagrees. The development by all Member States of national rules on the 
choice  of  channel  and  their  convergence  towards  a  single  shared  approach  would  be  better 
than  the  current  dispersed  approach.  The  choice  of  the  Europol  channel  is  justified  by  its 
advantages. Europol Liaison Officers can be asked to intervene where necessary. SIENA can 
be used for direct bilateral exchanges, but also facilitates sharing of information with Europol 
in  line  with  legal  requirements  of  the  Europol  Decision  and  the  Swedish  Initiative.  SIENA 
messages are structured, can handle large data volumes and are exchanged with a high level 
of security. Data protection is enhanced by exchanging information in a structured format e.g. 
by using SIENA. The suggested approach is fully in line with the Commission’s forthcoming 
proposal  for  Europol  reform  and  with  the  European  Council’s  strategic  guidelines  in  the 
Stockholm  Programme,  which  state  that  ‘Europol  should  become  a  hub  for  information 
exchange between the law enforcement authorities of the Member States, a service provider 
and a platform for law enforcement services’. 

Managing  the  channels.  A  Single  Point  of  Contact  (SPOC)  is  a  ‘one-stop  shop’  for 
international police cooperation, operating 24/7, in which a Member State brings together its 
SIRENE  Bureau,  ENU  and  Interpol  National  Central  Bureaux,  and  contact  points  for  other 
channels. The creation by each Member State of a SPOC (even if that term was not always 
used)  was  in  2007  a  conclusion  of  the  third  round  of  mutual  evaluation  visits28  and 
recommended  by  the  2008  Manual.  Most  Member  States  have  international  police 
cooperation  departments,  but  only  some  of  these  have  the  characteristics  of  fully  fledged 
SPOCs.  In  2012,  the  Council  invited  Member  States  ‘to  explore  the  possibilities  of 
establishing’ a SPOC29. The Commission would go further: to improve EU law enforcement 
information  exchange  as  a  whole,  all  Member  States  should  set  up  SPOCs  with  certain 
minimum features. 

For requests to another Member State, bringing together the different channels into a single 
organisational  structure  that  follows  national  choice  of  channel  rules  will  ensure  the  correct 
and  consistent  choice  of  channel  as  well  as  the  quality  of  requests.  Quality  is  ensured  by 
SPOCs  validating  requests  to  confirm  that  they  are  necessary  and  appropriate.  Where 
information is not exchanged through a SPOC itself (e.g. via Police and Customs Cooperation 
Centres  (PCCCs)  or  via  national  agencies  making  direct  exchanges  using  SIENA),  a  SPOC 
can  ensure  national  coordination.  For  incoming  requests,  SPOCs  should  where  legally 
permissible  have  direct  access  to  national  databases  to  answer  requests  quickly,  particularly 
under  Swedish  Initiative  deadlines.  SIRENE  Manual  rules  (e.g.  on  security,  workflow 
systems, data quality and staffing) could be a basis for organising all channels in a consistent 
way.  Sharing  resources  such  as  staff  and  infrastructure  can  contribute  to  cost  savings  or  at 
least better use of resources. 

27 
28 
29 

The SIS II communication network is legally limited to SIS II data and supplementary information. 
13321/3/07. 
Council Conclusions 7-8 June 2012, 10333/12. 

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SPOCs should include all law enforcement agencies including customs. Cooperation should 
be  established  between  SPOCs  and  National  Coordination  Centres  (NCCs)  for  border 
surveillance.  Where  compatible  with  national  legal  systems,  links  should  be  created  with 
judicial authorities, in particular where they supervise criminal investigations. 

A growing number of PCCCs30 successfully exchange information at local and regional level. 
Annual conferences at EU level enable experiences to be shared and common approaches to 
be  discussed.  Although  the  generally  high  number  of  exchanges  mostly  do  not  concern  the 
most serious and organised crime, one challenge is to ensure that information in relevant cases 
is passed up to national (SPOC) level and, where appropriate, to Europol. In this context, the 
Commission looks forward to the results of an on-going pilot project (under an IMS Action) 
using SIENA at a PCCC. 

The Information Exchange Platform is an IMS Action led by Europol to develop a common 
portal  to  access  existing  channels  and  systems,  fully  respecting  their  security  and  data 
protection  rules.  The  Commission  considers  that  there  are  benefits  from  facilitating  use  of 
existing channels and systems, but that further assessment is needed of the costs/benefits of an 
Information Exchange Platform, who would provide the funding, and how the project would 
be governed. This assessment should also involve the IT Agency31. 

Member States are invited to: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Use,  for  exchanges  where  the  channel  is  not  legally  defined,  the  Europol  channel 
using the SIENA tool as the default channel, unless there are specific reasons to use 
another. 

Develop national instructions for choice of channel. 

In  particular,  after  SIS II  goes  live  and  SISNET  is  closed,  use  the  Europol  channel 
and SIENA tool for police cooperation exchanges currently using SISNET. 

Create, if not already existing, a Single Point of Contact (SPOC) covering all main 
channels,  available  24/7,  bringing  together  all  law  enforcement  authorities,  with 
access to national databases. 

Ensure that information exchanged through Police and Customs Cooperation Centres 
is where appropriate passed up to national level, and where relevant to Europol. 

Establish cooperation between SPOCs and EUROSUR NCCs. 

The Council is invited to: 

• 

Amend  EU-level  guidance  to  reflect  the  choice  of  channel  guidelines  suggested 
above. 

The Commission will: 

• 

30 
31 

EN 

Participate in work to assess the feasibility of an Information Exchange Platform.  

38 at end 2011. 
European  Agency  for  the  operational  management  of  large-scale  IT  systems  in  the  area  of  freedom, 
security and justice. 

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3.3. 

Ensure data quality, security and protection 

Data protection safeguards in the existing instruments must be carefully observed. Under the 
Commission’s proposal of 25 January 2012 for a Directive applying to the national processing 
of  personal  data  for  the  purposes  of  prevention,  investigation,  detection  or  prosecution  of 
criminal offences32, the data protection rules in existing instruments will need to be reviewed 
to assess the need to align them with the Directive. 

A  high  level  of  data  security  is  necessary  to  protect  the  integrity  of  personal  data  that  is 
exchanged and to ensure that Member States have confidence in exchanging information. A 
chain is only as strong as its weakest link: Member States and EU agencies must ensure data 
is  exchanged  over  networks  that  are  highly  secure.  The  above-mentioned  proposal  for  a 
Directive contains rules on data security33, and at EU level there are detailed security rules for 
protecting EU classified information34.  

A  high  level  of  data  quality  is  equally  important.  The  ‘business  process’,  i.e.  how 
information exchange is carried out in practice, is relevant in this context. One aspect of this 
is,  where  possible  and  appropriate,  to  automate  specific  tasks.  For  example,  drawing  up  a 
request  for  information  from  another  Member  State  requires  re-entering  data  recorded  in  a 
national  system  into  the  communication  tool  used;  doing  this  manually  risks  introducing 
errors  and  takes  time.  Automating  such  tasks  will  be  enabled  by  UMF II35,  another  IMS 
Action. This EU-funded project led by Europol aims to develop a standard for the format of 
messages  used  to  request  information  and  to  provide  replies.  This  would  enable  the 
automation of data transfer between different systems, e.g. national case management systems 
and SIENA. As well as potential cost savings or at least better use of resources, the benefits 
from  eliminating  manual  re-entry  of  data  are  two-fold.  It  releases  staff  to  be  deployed  on 
validation  tasks.  Further,  by  reducing  copying  errors  and  facilitating  the  exchange  of 
information in structured formats, it improves the management and protection of data.  

Automation of tasks does not imply that every police officer in the EU should have access to 
all police information in the EU. Exchanges must be limited to those that are necessary and 
appropriate,  and  need  to  be  managed  so  as  to  ensure  that  they  stay  within  those  limits. 
Automated searches, as a way to overcome capacity problems, therefore function under 
existing EU information exchange instruments on a hit/no-hit basis (e.g. SIS, Prüm DNA 
and  fingerprints),  or  else  are  limited  to  narrowly  defined  types  of  data  (e.g.  Prüm  vehicle 
registration data). Certain tasks cannot and should not be automated, notably the validation of 
requests  and  replies.  This  is  particularly  important  under  the  Swedish  Initiative,  which 
requires requests to be justified. 

Finally, interoperability between different national systems and administrative structures can 
yield  benefits  in  terms  of  consistent  procedures,  shorter  response  times,  better  data  quality, 
and  simplified  design  and  development.  The  European  Interoperability  Framework36 
identifies four levels of interoperability: technical, semantic, organisational and legal. UMF II 
will develop the semantic level37. Aligning with shared practices (SPOCs, choice of channel) 

32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 

COM(2012) 10. 
Arts 27 to 29 of the proposal. 
Council Decision 2011/292/EU. 
Universal Message Format. 
COM(2010) 744. 
UMF II takes account of other work on semantics, such as common data models being developed under 
the EU programme on interoperability solutions for European public administrations.  

EN 

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will  promote  the  organisational  level.  However,  information  may  only  ever  be  actually 
exchanged and used where legally permitted. 

Europol and Member States are invited to: 

• 

Continue development of the UMF II standard. 

3.4. 

Improve training and awareness 

To equip law enforcement officers with knowledge and skills needed to cooperate effectively, 
the  Commission  is  preparing  a  European  Law  Enforcement  Training  Scheme.  A  mapping 
exercise showed that relevant EU information exchange instruments are covered in the initial 
training  of  law  enforcement  agencies,  but  it  did  not  assess  the  quality  of  the  training. 
Specialist officers such as those working in SPOCs need more in-depth training. Exchanges of 
such staff are also recognised38 as beneficial and should be encouraged. 

Member States are invited to: 

• 

• 

Ensure that all law enforcement officers receive appopriate training on cross-border 
information exchange. 

Organise exchanges of SPOC staff. 

The Commission will: 

• 

Ensure  that  the  European  Law  Enforcement  Training  Scheme  includes  training  on 
cross-border information exchange. 

3.5. 

Funding 

EU funding under the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Fund (ISEC) has been allocated 
to  information  exchange  projects  such  as  UMF II  (€830  000)  and  implementation  of  Prüm 
(€11,9 million). The Fund will be replaced in 2 014-20 by an EU Internal Security Fund, for 
which EU information exchange projects will also be eligible. 

Part  of  the  Internal  Security  Fund  will  be  managed  by  Member  States  through  so-called 
‘shared  management’  in  accordance  with  multiannual  programmes.  Those  programmes 
should  consider  relevant  national  information  exchange  priorities  in  line  with  the 
recommendations in this Communication. The Commission will in parallel consider how parts 
of  the  Internal  Security  Fund  under  its  direct  management  can  in  particular  support  pilot 
projects, e.g. by further developing UMF II. 

As regards Member States’ own spending, other recommendations (on SPOCs, UMF II) could 
as indicated contribute to cost savings or at least better use of resources. 

Member States are invited to: 

• 

Consider 
programmes under the 2014-20 EU Internal Security Fund. 

information  exchange  priorities 

relevant 

in  national  multiannual 

38 

10333/12. 

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The Commission will: 

• 

• 

Include information exchange policies in ISF programming dialogues with Member 
States. 

Invite proposals for direct (Commission) funding of relevant pilot projects. 

3.6. 

Statistics 

Existing statistics, while good in some areas (e.g. SIS, SIENA), are not comprehensive. Better 
statistics  would  improve  knowledge  of  the  use  of  the  Swedish  Initiative  (for  which  only 
numbers sent using SIENA are known) and Prüm. 

Gathering  statistics  may  however  be  resource-intensive,  particularly  if  not  embedded  in 
normal  workflow.  Ad  hoc  exercises  should  be  avoided.  An  evolutionary  approach  is  best, 
building on processes already begun e.g., as described in the Prüm Report, identifying Prüm 
hits  that  helped  investigations.  Increased  use  of  SIENA  for  Swedish  Initiative  requests, 
recommended above, will result in more such requests being reflected in SIENA statistics. 

Member States are invited to: 

• 

Improve Prüm statistics. 

4. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Improving cross-border information exchange is not an end in itself. The purpose is to tackle 
crime more effectively and thus to reduce harm to victims and to the EU economy.  

Cross-border information exchange generally works well and, as illustrated by the examples 
given  above,  makes  a  highly  valuable  contribution  in  the  fight  against  serious  and  cross-
border crime in the EU. There is, however, scope for improvement. Legislation that has been 
agreed  must  be  fully  implemented,  by  all  Member  States.  Looking  to  the  future,  Member 
States should in particular all converge towards more systematic use of the Europol channel 
and all develop comprehensive national Single Points of Contact (SPOCs). 

The Commission for its part will continue to review how the instruments are implemented and 
used, to provide EU funding and to bring together the different aspects to ensure consistency. 
The  Commission  is  not  here  proposing  any  new  instrument.  If  it  does  in  the  future,  it  will 
follow  the  substantive  principles  in  the  2010  Overview  Communication:  safeguarding 
fundamental rights, and ensuring necessity, subsidiarity and accurate risk management. 

A  strong  effort  is  still  needed  to  ensure  relevant  information  is  shared  at  Europol  so  as  to 
create  an  EU-wide  picture  of  cross-border  criminality.  The  Commission’s  forthcoming 
proposal for Europol reform will address this need. However, the provision of information to 
Europol  would  already  be  facilitated  by  the  recommendations  in  this  Communication  for 
more systematic use of the Europol channel and its secure communications tool SIENA. 

To  follow  up  on  this  Communication,  the  Commission  will  continue  to  work  with  Member 
States in the context of the EU Information Management Strategy for internal security, and it 
proposes  that  the  Council  should  hold  an  annual  debate  in  its  Internal  Security  Committee. 

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The  Commission  also  invites  the  European  Parliament  to  debate  its  recommendations, 
including in its Special Committee on Organised Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering. 

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