Ex-post evaluation of the URBAN Community initiative 2001-2006.
Date: 2012-11-23
Institutions: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy
Subjects: EU programme, European Regional Development Fund, Structural Funds, case study, economic and social cohesion, regional aid, regional development, urban area, urban economy

Ex-Post Evaluation 
of Cohesion Policy programmes 2000-06: 
The URBAN Community Initiative

EN

Evaluation report  

 June 2010

Ex-Post Evaluation of The URBAN Community Initiative 
2001-2006

 Final Report prepared for the European Commission 

 
 
 
 
Contents  

Executive Summary................................................................................. i 

Introduction............................................................................................. 9 
The evaluation ............................................................................................................9 
Aims of the evaluation ...............................................................................................9 
Methodology and approach.....................................................................................11 
Structure of the Final Report...................................................................................20 

Background and Characteristics of URBAN II ................................... 21 
Introduction ..............................................................................................................21 
Summary of Key Points ...........................................................................................21 
Origins of the URBAN II Community Initiative .......................................................22 
Overview of URBAN II ..............................................................................................22 
Selection of URBAN II areas....................................................................................25 
Main challenges facing URBAN II areas .................................................................29 
Physical challenges....................................................................................................29 
Economic challenges .................................................................................................30 
Social challenges .......................................................................................................31 
Strategies deployed by URBAN II programmes.....................................................32 
Types of strategy by patterns of fund allocation .........................................................32 
Working across themes ..............................................................................................34 
Alignment with Objective 1 and 2 programmes ..........................................................35 
Strategic approaches at project level .........................................................................35 
Reasons behind different strategies ...........................................................................36 
Continuity of strategic approaches .............................................................................37 
Conclusions – URBAN II programme characteristics and strategies..................38 

Review of Outputs, Results and Impacts of URBAN II ...................... 40 
Introduction ..............................................................................................................40 
Summary of key findings.........................................................................................40 
Changes within the programme areas ...................................................................41 
Drivers of change .....................................................................................................51 
Programme logic: challenges and strategies ........................................................52 
Did programmes follow a logical process? .................................................................53 
Did the strategies match the challenges?...................................................................59 
Use of programme indicators..................................................................................60 
The collection of indicators .........................................................................................60 

1.0 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 

2.0 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.6.1 
2.6.2 
2.6.3 
2.7 
2.7.1 
2.7.2 
2.7.3 
2.7.4 
2.7.5 
2.7.6 
2.8 

3.0 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
3.5.1 
3.5.2 
3.6 
3.6.1 

 
 
 
3.6.2 
3.6.3 
3.7 
3.7.1 
3.7.2 
3.7.3 
3.8 
3.9 
3.10 

4.0 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
4.5 
4.6 
4.7 
4.7.1 
4.7.2 
4.7.3 
4.8 
4.9 
4.10 
4.11 
4.11.1 
4.11.2 
4.11.3 
4.12 

5.0 
5.1 
5.2 
5.3 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
5.6.1 
5.6.2 
5.6.3 
5.7 

Comparisons between actual and target values.........................................................62 
Factors affecting the relationship between actual and target values ..........................65 
Outputs, results and impacts ..................................................................................66 
Physical theme ...........................................................................................................66 
Economic theme.........................................................................................................72 
Social theme...............................................................................................................77 
Wider benefits of URBAN II .....................................................................................82 
Factors underlying programme success or failure ...............................................86 
Conclusions – the outputs, results and impacts of URBAN II..............................91 

Delivery Structures of URBAN II ......................................................... 93 
Introduction ..............................................................................................................93 
Summary of key points ............................................................................................93 
Management arrangements.....................................................................................94 
Linkages between URBAN II and wider policy and practice.................................96 
Administrative costs ................................................................................................98 
Delivery of projects funded by URBAN II ...............................................................98 
Local partnerships in URBAN II ..............................................................................99 
The strength of partnership working ...........................................................................99 
Approaches to URBAN II partnerships .....................................................................100 
Involvement of private and voluntary sector partners ...............................................102 
Capacity building of partners................................................................................103 
Analysis by typology .............................................................................................104 
Involvement of local communities........................................................................105 
Sustainability of URBAN II programme legacies .................................................106 
Sustainability of programme activities ......................................................................106 
Sustainability of impacts...........................................................................................106 
Success factors and barriers ....................................................................................107 
Conclusions – the delivery of URBAN II...............................................................108 

The Evaluation of URBACT I.............................................................. 111 
Introduction ............................................................................................................111 
Summary of key points ..........................................................................................111 
Background and objectives of URBACT ..............................................................112 
What outputs has URBACT achieved?.................................................................113 
Who participated in URBACT?..............................................................................115 
What results and impacts did URBACT 1 generate? ..........................................116 
Identifying and recording practice.............................................................................117 
Results: exchanging and ‘capitalising’......................................................................118 
Impacts: absorbing and applying lessons learned....................................................119 
URBACT and other networks ................................................................................121 

 
 
 
5.8 

Conclusions and lessons learnt ...........................................................................121 

6.0 
6.1 
6.2 
6.2.1 
6.2.2 
6.2.3 
6.2.4 
6.2.5 
6.2.6 
6.3 
6.3.1 

6.3.2 
6.3.3 
6.3.4 

Conclusions and Lessons ................................................................. 124 
Introduction ............................................................................................................124 
Conclusions............................................................................................................124 
Did URBAN II areas improve?..................................................................................124 
Were improvements to urban areas driven by URBAN II programmes? ..................125 
What difference did URBAN II make? ......................................................................126 
Critical success factors.............................................................................................128 
The sustainability of URBAN II .................................................................................129 
The assessment of URBACT I .................................................................................130 
The policy and delivery lessons from URBAN II..................................................130 
Programme development and delivery requires strong and inclusive 
partnerships..............................................................................................................131 
The area based local approach ................................................................................131 
Method is as important as funding............................................................................131 
Programmes need guidance ....................................................................................131 

List of figures 
Figure 1.1  Methodology and approach......................................................................11 
Figure 1.2  Map of the 15 case study locations ..........................................................19 
Figure 3.1  Average number of indicators per programme (by Member State) ..........62 

List of tables 
Table 1.1  Evaluation questions for the review of 70 URBAN II programmes ............10 
Table 1.2  Evaluation questions for the 15 URBAN II case studies ............................10 
Table 1.3  URBACT I evaluation questions ................................................................11 
Table 1.4  Comparisons between total population and case study selection .............13 
Table 1.5  The case studies .......................................................................................14 
Table 2.1  Overview of URBAN II programmes by Member State..............................24 
Table 2.2  General characteristics of URBAN II areas ...............................................25 
Table 2.3  Reasons for choosing URBAN II areas .....................................................27 
Table 2.4  Selection process used by Member States ...............................................28 
Table 2.5  National unemployment rates....................................................................30 
Table 2.6  Thematic emphasis of URBAN II allocation at country level (% of 
ERDF allocated to each theme) .................................................................................33 
Table 2.7  Key characteristics of projects funded through URBAN II under the 
three main themes......................................................................................................36 
Table 3.1  Changes and drivers in URBAN II programme areas ................................42 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2  Unemployment for URBAN II programme areas compared to host 
cities ...........................................................................................................................48 
Table 3.3  Programme logic across case study areas................................................53 
Table 3.4  Reporting indicator data (from the 2006 Annual Implementation 
Reports for the 70 URBAN II programmes) ................................................................60 
Table 3.5  Average achievement ratio: outputs, results and impacts (% actual 
values per programme against targets, minimum, maximum and average 
values)........................................................................................................................62 
Table 3.6  Outputs, results and impacts in the physical theme...................................68 
Table 3.7  Outputs, results and impacts in the economic theme ................................74 
Table 3.8  Outputs, impact and results for the social theme.......................................79 
Table 3.9  Critical Success Factors ............................................................................87 
Table 4.1  Delivery of URBAN II projects by organisational type................................98 
Table 4.2  Composition of URBAN II programme partnerships ................................100 
Table 4.3  Typology analysis for partnership inclusiveness......................................104 
Table 5.1  URBACT I outputs ...................................................................................114 
Table 6.1  Summary Headlines – Key URBAN II Outputs ........................................127 

 
 
 
 
 
Executive Summary 

1. The Evaluation 

The report forms part of the ex-post evaluation of Cohesion Policy Programmes 2000-2006 and covers 
the URBAN II Community Initiative (2001-2006) and URBACT I Programme (2003-2006). The evaluation 
methodology was as follows: 

•  A  desk  review  of  all  70  URBAN  II  programmes  combined  with  discussions  with  programme 

managers. 

•  A review of key statistics and trends over the programme period. 

•  A counterfactual analysis based on comparisons of changes in unemployment over the programme 
period and between the programme areas and the cities, within which the areas were situated. A lack 
of data meant that the counterfactual failed to produce results that met the tests of statistical validity, 
but the work of the evaluation demonstrated its value as a tool for measuring impact, if embedded at 
the start of the programme period.  

•  Detailed  case  studies  on  the  ground  for  fifteen  URBAN  II  programmes  and  ten  'good  practice' 
projects. The case studies were rigorously selected to be representative of all the programmes. More 
than  120  stakeholders  (including  local  and  regional  authorities,  community  organisations  and 
businesses, and academics) were interviewed as part of the process. 

•  A review of URBACT I documentation and interviews with key stakeholders. 

• 

Inputs to the evaluation team from three leading experts: Professor Michael Parkinson; Professor Jan 
Lambooy and Professor Alberto Martini, who provided a critical filter at the three key reporting stages 
of the evaluation - the inception, interim and final reports. 

2. The URBAN Community Initiative 

URBAN  II  (2001-2006)  followed  previous  urban  interventions,  the  Urban  Pilot  Projects  (1989-99)  and 
URBAN I (1994-1999) supported through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), one of the 
EU Structural Funds. Some €754 million of EU funding was committed to 70 programmes across fourteen 
Member  States,  covering  a  combined  population  of  2.2  million,  which  with  match  funding  rose  to  €1.6 
billion.  45  programmes  augmented  Objective  1  or  2  funding  in  their  cities  but  some  programmes  were 
selected  by  their  Member  States  to  spread  resources  to  urban  areas  not  eligible,  and  not  in  receipt  of 
support  from  the  Structural  Funds.  URBACT  I  (2003-2006)  had  a  separate  budget  under  the  URBAN 
Community Initiative (€18.03 million EU funding, €28.2 million including match funding). 

The  aim  of  URBAN  II  was  to  develop  innovative  and  integrated  approaches  to  regenerating 
neighbourhoods  in  crisis  and  promoting  sustainable  urban  development.  The  relatively  low  levels  of 
spend (an average of €10.7m per programme) and the fixed term period for programmes meant that in 
most cases URBAN II could not - and was not intended to - eradicate the deep rooted problems prevalent 
in  parts  of  many  European  cities.  However,  the  expectation  was  that  URBAN  II  would  contribute  to 
positive  improvements  and  would  develop  a  legacy  of  longer  term  change,  whereby  public  and  private 
agencies, together with local communities would work together to create sustainable neighbourhoods in 
their  cities.  There  was  a  strong  emphasis  on  fostering  local  ownership  of  the  challenges  and  policy 

i

 
 
 
solutions, with encouragement for partnership working to develop and deliver effective programmes. This 
'bottom  up'  approach  resulted  in  a  wide  diversity  of  programmes  and  projects,  although  programmes 
generally  fell  into  two  broad  categories,  the  first  focused  on  physical  regeneration  (land  and  building, 
transport and the environment) with smaller economic and social measures fitting within this framework, 
the second more balanced across economic, social and physical themes. This distinction should not be 
over  emphasised  however,  since  the  case  studies  showed  that  most  programmes  did  indeed  have  an 
integrated approach to the economic, social and physical challenges facing their area – only the relative 
spending figures changed. 

URBAN  II  supported  some  genuinely  innovative  and  high  quality  projects.  Not  all  projects  worked  and 
some  were  delayed,  but  from  the  case  study  work  we  conclude  that  the  majority  of  projects  achieved 
what they set out to do. 

The main aim of URBACT I was to identify good practice and promote an exchange of experience derived 
from  urban  projects,  including  those  funded  under  URBAN  II.  However,  it  was  not  approved  until  2002 
and did not become operational until 2003 and was therefore not embedded as part of the strategies and 
processes  adopted  by  URBAN  II  programmes.  It  supported  thematic  networks  that  proved  to  be  more 
popular than anticipated (20 were supported, against  an anticipated 10-12) and involved 248 cities and 
more  than  4,000  individuals.  URBACT  I  also  supported  the  development  of  information  tools,  studies, 
training, working groups and the deployment of experts to promote an exchange of experience. A second 
round of URBACT activities (URBACT II) is ongoing but was not part of this evaluation. 

3. The Impact of the URBAN II Community Initiative 

Overall, URBAN II made a positive contribution to tackling the challenges of neighbourhoods in crisis. In 
particular.  

There are a set of measurable outputs that can be aggregated across the 70 programmes 

Despite the diversity of programmes and programme outputs it was possible to aggregate the frequently 
mentioned  output  categories  from  the  monitoring  reports  submitted  by  the  programmes.  The  headlines 
are set out in Figure 1 and show the volume of outputs in respect of the re-use of spaces and buildings, 
transport  infrastructure,  training  projects  and  community  facilities,  green  space  and  environmental 
projects,  business  support  projects,  health  and  care  interventions.  There  is  less  programme  data  on 
results, and even less on impacts. For example, there were relatively few surveys to measure increased 
usage  or  appreciation  of  facilities  supported  by  the  programmes,  although  where  surveys  were 
undertaken positive changes were normally observed. 

There is qualitative evidence of impacts within the programme areas 

The case studies highlighted impacts that are not readily measurable (or in some cases not measured) 
resulting from URBAN II. There was evidence of: 

ii

 
 
 
•  Perceptions  of  an  improved  local  image  in  some  programme  areas,  normally  via  visible  physical 
regeneration  projects.  This  has  been  a  key  to  attracting  new  residents  and  businesses,  and  new 
investment. 

•  More activity in commercial quarters of programmes areas with more visitors, more cafés and other 
facilities  creating  a  more  vibrant  environment,  which  could  lead  to  increased  trade  and  business 
confidence, and the sustainability of these areas. 

• 

Improvements to the social cohesiveness of some neighbourhoods with projects targeted to support 
migrants  and  minority  groups.  Often  these  projects  have  strengthened  local  representative 
organisations. 

•  An  improved  quality  of  life  in  urban  areas  including  reduced  pollution  and  congestion,  as  well  as 

perceptions of safer neighbourhoods. 

Figure 1 - Key URBAN II Outputs 

Under the physical theme the key outputs were: 

372 restoration projects 

2.3 Million m2 of converted public space plus a further 557,115 m2 of space developed for social, sports, 
education and health uses 

3.2 Million m2 of new green space 

80 Kilometres of cycle and footpaths plus 11,614 m2 of renovated surfaces for cyclists and pedestrians 

10,712 m2 of new water collectors designed to reduce energy consumption 

194 environmental equipment projects to recover liquid and toxic waste 

Under the social theme the key outputs were: 

982 training projects with 64,801 training places for individuals 

246 security projects tackling crime and fear of crime 

593 community capacity building initiatives 

16 employment centres and 22 health and community centres 

162 drug advice interventions 

949 cultural events projects 

443 childcare places 

Under the economic theme the key outputs were: 

5,984 business support and advisory interventions 

43,004 training places for businesses 

23 commercial centres and stores renewed 

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7 innovation projects and 20 business incubator units 

43,942 m2 of new commercial floorspace 

7 ICT projects and services 

   Source:  ECOTEC Analysis of URBAN II programme data 

The socio-economic conditions in most programme areas have stabilised or improved  

The  socio-economic  conditions  of  most  URBAN  II  programme  areas  stabilised  and  in  some  cases 
improved during the programme period. There is evidence of positive change or stable conditions in 13 of 
the  15  case  programme  areas.  In  terms  of  quantification,  unemployment  is  the  key  measure  as  other 
statistical evidence is patchy. For those areas where data were available and unemployment rates were 
more  than  2%  higher  than  the  city  average  (20  programmes),  there  was  a  reduction  in  this  gap  in  10 
cases (with a high of a 7.6% decrease – a narrowing of the gap between the city and programme area 
unemployment rates), an increase in 9 cases (with a high of a 4.7% increase – a widening of the gap) and 
no change in one case. Overall, the evidence showed that unemployment rates in the programme areas 
had  stabilised  between  2000  and  2006  in  common  with  the  EU  average  for  that  period,  but  arguably  a 
greater  achievement  in  the  neighbourhoods  that  constituted  the  URBAN  II  programme  areas  where 
unemployment was often high and jobs (or access to nearby employment) difficult to secure. In addition  
most stakeholders perceived the areas as being in a stable or improved condition, whilst visual evidence 
of change (e.g. the re-use of redundant land and buildings) was evident from the case study visits.  

URBAN II contributed to positive change within programme areas 

URBAN  II  contributed  to  change  but  was  one  of  a  number  of  policy  'drivers'  and  often  not  the  most 
important driver. Regional and national economic factors shaped the labour market and the health of the 
business  community  whilst  the  plans and programmes,  including  mainstream  programmes,  delivered  at 
the  city  and  regional  level,  were  key  to  bringing  about  more  fundamental  change  in  respect  of  health, 
educational  and  skills  attainment,  crime  levels  and  environmental  conditions.  This  can  in  part  be 
attributed to the small scale of URBAN II programmes. In addition, some issues are most appropriately 
tackled at the neighbourhood level, but others are more effectively delivered at a larger spatial area such 
as the city or the region. This is particularly true for economic policies (changing the business base) or the 
provision  of  major  infrastructure  that  impact  significantly  on  economic  performance.  The  dovetailing  of 
local  actions  in  the  programme  areas  with  wider  city  and  regional  plans,  resulting  in  an  integrated 
approach to urban development was realised in some cases, enhancing the effectiveness and impact of 
URBAN II resources.  

There is evidence of sustainability of many elements of the URBAN II programmes 

URBAN  II  was  deliberately  time  limited  and  many  of  the  formal  structures  that  were  set  up  to  manage 
programmes  have  now  gone.  Several  projects  have  finished,  having  achieved  their  goals,  but  others 
(about  60%)  have  continued  in  some  form,  where  they  needed  to,  under  new  funding  and  delivery 

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regimes.  In  some  cases  local  communities  have  successfully  taken  on  projects  that  originated  out  of 
URBAN II, reflecting a commitment by local organisations to the ongoing regeneration of their areas.  

The URBAN II 'method' has provided an important legacy for tackling the challenges of 
neighbourhoods in crisis 

A significant impact of URBAN II has been the stimulation of new partnerships and ways of working within 
the  programme  areas.  There  is  evidence  from  the  case  studies  of  new  integrated,  multi-agency 
approaches, with a strong level of involvement from community organisations and the private sector. In 
the  best  examples  URBAN  II  has  embedded  new  approaches  that  have  a  lasting  legacy  after  the  EU 
funding  ceased,  giving  neighbourhoods  in  crisis  the  tools  –  and  the  confidence  –  to  tackle and  reverse 
urban decline in the longer term. URBAN II has also had a legacy in respect of individual and institutional 
knowledge, some of which has been put to effect in other neighbourhoods or in mainstream programmes.  

4. Critical Success Factors  

Whilst  the  challenges  experienced  in  the  programmes  areas,  and  the  strategies  and  projects  that  were 
employed, varied between the programmes, there were some common critical success factors that have 
helped to enhance the impact of URBAN II, and which provide generic lessons for future urban policies. 
Some of the lessons pose particular challenges for policy development in the new Member States, where 
programme integration, local 'bottom up approaches' and inclusive partnership working are generally not 
common place. 

The importance of local ownership and inclusive partnerships  

The key success factor in URBAN II projects was local involvement and ownership. This applied whatever 
the  nature  of  the  project  and  whether  it  was  drawn  from  the  field  of  physical,  social  or  economic 
regeneration. Projects were most successful when they responded to local perceptions of need and had 
the active support of a broad range of local partners, not just the local authority, but also the private and 
voluntary sector, and local residents. 

The  partnership  approach  to  the  delivery  of  programmes  was  one  of  the  defining  characteristics  of 
URBAN II. Some partnerships existed before 2001, some were a direct response to the availability of EU 
funding and some have continued - in some form - carrying on the work of the programmes after URBAN 
II.  

Local authorities were usually the 'glue' holding these partnerships together. They took the lead in 80% of 
URBAN  II  programmes,  providing  staffing,  processes,  information  and  intelligence  and  project  ideas. 
Successful  programmes  also  relied  on  broadly  based  local  partnerships  with  representatives  from  the 
public,  private  and  voluntary  sectors,  often  informal  as  the  formal  representation  of  the  private  and 
voluntary sectors in partnership working was not strong in many programmes.  

In particular partnerships worked best when:  

•  All  partners  were  in  a  position  to  play  an  effective  role  in  decision  making.  Capacity  building, 
especially  for  the  voluntary  sector  and  community  organisations  is  important,  but  also  for  other 

v

 
 
 
organisations.  This  often  included  the  need  for  specific  training  and  experience  in  aspects  of 
programme management (e.g. knowledge of legal and financial structures).   

•  Focused  on  local  issues  that  partners  felt  they  could  influence,  through  collective  working.  Often 
these issues provided a common platform that would bring together interests from all sectors (e.g. in 
one example, the problems created by traffic congestion in an historic city centre, mobilised partners 
from the public, private and voluntary sectors). 

•  The  management  and  delivery  of  projects  was  spread  across  a  range  of  partners,  providing 
experience and direct involvement in the delivery programme as an effective way of engaging local 
partners. This was often a good way of involving community organisations, although some required 
support from the public agencies. It also helped to boost the programme management and delivery 
capacity, which was often weak at the start of the programme period.  

Supporting partnerships 

URBAN II partnerships sometimes struggled to gain support from their cities and regions, and to engage 
key stakeholders and decision makers at that level. This was largely because of the small scale and local 
focus  of  the  programmes,  and  as  such  they  were  'off  the  radar'  of  city  and  regional  policy  makers. 
However,  many  local  partnerships  could  have  gained  from  more  active  support  from  their  cities  and 
regional agencies in respect of: 

•  Helping  to  embed  the  programmes  into  a  wider  spatial  policy  framework,  generally  necessary  for 
effecting change in respect of key economic and social indicators (such as reducing unemployment or 
changing the business base). 

•  Providing skills and learning experiences for programme managers and their teams, many of whom 

had limited experience of managing urban programmes. 

•  Providing  support  in  the  development  and  delivery  of  effective  monitoring  and  evaluation  systems 
which  track  progress  against  key  indicators  –  a  key  management  and  accountability  requirement. 
This was lacking in many programme areas but experience varied significantly. 

•  Providing support on strategy development and longer term planning. Most programmes were poor in 
respect of developing exit strategies, although regeneration has continued in most programme areas. 

Integration and synergies  

In  many  cases  the  impact  of  URBAN  II  resources  has  been  increased,  within  the  programme  areas, 
through  the  integration  of the  strategies  and  resources with other  urban development programmes.  We 
found high levels of programme integration in the great majority of programmes. Integration improved the 
impact of URBAN II in different ways and worked at different levels, namely:  

•  The  integration  of  the  strategy  and  programmes  (such  as  the  joint  development  of  URBAN  II  and 
mainstream Structural Funds programmes in some cities, the flexibility of URBAN complementing and 
adding  value  to  main  programmes).  The  integration  of  programmes  can  help  to  lever  in  additional 
funding,  including  mainstream  programmes,  but  also  has  the  potential  to  link  local  neighbourhood 

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specific actions with city and regional policies. This can improve the overall impact (e.g. in URBAN II 
there  were  examples  of  local  employment  initiatives  targeting  hard  to  reach  and  disadvantaged 
groups such as migrant workers, linked into policies that were more effective at a larger spatial level 
to increase the number of employment opportunities).   

•  Synergies  between  URBAN  II  funded  projects  (for  example,  the  reuse  of  buildings  to  serve 
community needs which were then physically linked to those communities through improved transport 
infrastructure). This works best when the links are intentional - rather than accidental - and built into 
the design of the programme and specific projects. 

•  The  integration  of  delivery  teams  (management  teams  drawn  from  different  local  authority 
departments and local organisations). There are potential benefits in terms of efficiency savings and 
also  the  opportunity  to  raise  the  profile  of  the  programmes  with  a  wider  group  of  stakeholders. 
However, integrating delivery teams is also likely to bring together a wider range of participants and 
interests that stretch beyond the programme area and it is important though to ensure that the local 
ownership - that was a significant contributor to the success of URBAN II - is not lost or diminished 
within  a  management  structure  that  is  not  just  focused  on  the  programme  area,  and  has  additional 
priorities.   

Sharing experience 

The  timing  of  URBACT  I  meant  that  it  was  less  supportive  of  URBAN  II  programmes  than  originally 
envisaged.  The  experiences  of  URBACT  I  though  illustrate  the  value  of  sharing  ideas  and  approaches 
between  cities,  ideally  also  between  Member  States  (some  URBAN  II  programmes  participate  in 
alternative  national  networks,  missing  the  benefits  of  international  networks).  Effective  networking 
requires a significant time and resources commitment from partners and the main lessons for the future 
are: 

•  As  much  as  possible  of  the  sharing  of  experience  should  be  done  through  active  participation  in 
networks,  ideally  face-to-face,  working  with  colleagues  from  other  cities,  but  experiencing  similar 
challenges.  The  exchange  of  experiences  through  written  materials  and  the  internet  was  less 
effective in URBACT I. This assumes that networking events have clear objectives and are managed 
effectively, which was not always the experience in URBACT I. 

•  Ensuring that those participating in networking activity can do so effectively by having the necessary 
language  and  technical  skills  (including  a  practical  knowledge  of  urban  regeneration  and 
development) and that processes are in place to ensure that benefits received by the participants are 
effectively disseminated to colleagues and partner organisations. Again, this was not always the case 
in URBACT I.  

5. Overall conclusions and recommendations 

The URBAN II initiative has finished but its legacy continues and can be found in the 70 programme 
areas where there is evidence of change seen through the projects funded by URBAN II, with results and 

vii

 
 
 
 
 
 
impacts, some captured in the monitoring and evaluation data, some not easily measured and some just 
not measured. The legacy has left a visual impact (e.g. buildings restored and vacant spaces converted 
into new community or economic uses), but is also manifest in the ongoing regeneration that continues in 
many of the programme areas. Here URBAN II stimulated processes of urban regeneration, often 
community led, that picked up and continued the work of URBAN II once EU funding had ceased.  

URBACT I has also ceased but has been continued through URBACT II working in the absence of 
URBAN, but addressing a demand for an international mechanism, whereby experiences can be shared 
and lessons learnt in the field of urban development and regeneration can be transferred.  

The experiences of URBAN II provide valuable lessons for future urban programmes. Most importantly 
any new programmes should:   

•  Be ambitious but also realistic in respect of what can be achieved with set budgets and time periods. 
URBAN  II  showed  that  programmes  focused  on  neighbourhoods  can  make  an  impact  through 
interventions  tailored  to  address  specific  local  challenges,  especially  those  that  are  most  suited  to 
policies that impact directly on local communities (e.g. improving educational attainment and reducing 
crime). URBAN II also showed that physical transformation could be achieved with new and improved 
buildings and spaces that have contributed to a more positive image for the area and an increase in 
confidence, often a trigger for private investment.   

•  Build strong local partnerships involving a range of partners, all able to contribute and bring value to 
the collective development and management of programmes. URBAN II showed that this is central to 
the  success  of  regeneration  at  a  city  level.  Local  'bottom  up'  partnerships  have  a  legitimacy  and  a 
strong  local  knowledge  base  that  can  help  lead  to  locally  owned  and  effective  solutions  to  urban 
challenges.  At  a  European  level  this  approach  has  often  been  missing  in  urban  development  since 
the closing of URBAN II.    

•  Utilise  the  active  support  of  city  and  regional  partners,  which  has  helped  programme  managers  to 
define what is realistic in terms of generating impacts and how local interventions can dovetail with 
city  and  regional  policies  for  greater  effect.  Cities  and  regions  can  also  lend  their  experience  in 
strategy development and effective monitoring and evaluation systems, areas where some URBAN II 
programmes  were  weak,  making  sure  that  programmes  are  aware  of  their  limitations  (resources, 
time,  spatial  coverage),  plan  accordingly  and  realistically,  and  have  the  means  to  know  what  they 
trying to achieve and how they will measure progress and success. 

• 

Integrate  programme  specific  resources  with  the  resources,  plans  and  programmes  of  city  and 
regional authorities, as well as mainstream providers of key services (including the police, education 
and health) to increase impact. This form of integration can flow from the support provided by city and 
regional partners and can be used to create strong working relationships with those partners.  

viii

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0  Introduction  

1.1 The evaluation  

This  final  report  presents  the  findings  of  the  ex-post  evaluation  of  the  second  round  of  the  URBAN 
Community Initiative (URBAN II), one of four Community Initiatives funded through the Structural Funds in 
the 2000-2006 period. URBAN II received €7001 million from the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF).  

The  report  also  presents  the  findings  of  an  evaluation  of  the  URBACT  I  (urban  networks)  programme 
created in 2002 as part of URBAN II.  

ECOTEC Research and Consulting has prepared the final report for the Evaluation Unit of the Directorate 
General  for  Regional  Policy  (DG  Regio).  It  builds  on  the  findings  of  the  interim  report2  ,  incorporating 
evidence gathered throughout the evaluation. The interim report includes a more detailed assessment of 
URBACT and the results of the counterfactual exercise (one of the evidence strands), which is distilled 
here in the section on outputs, results and impacts (Section 3).  

1.2 Aims of the evaluation 

The key objectives3 were to:  

•  analyse “the impacts of URBAN II4 on economic and social cohesion. This includes an assessment of 

the efficiency, effectiveness, community added value and management of the programmes”. 

• 

identify “lessons for current and future programmes, including the new Member States”.  

The evaluation focused on the impact of URBAN II and whether it achieved its aims and objectives. It also 
highlights elements of URBAN II that have worked well and also those that have not.  

The evaluation was guided by questions laid down in the call for tender. These are set out below. Table 
1.1 highlights the evaluation questions for the desk review of secondary information on all 70 URBAN II 
programmes,  and  Table  1.2  the  questions  for  the  case  study  element.  Table  1.3  covers  the  terms  of 
reference questions for the URBACT evaluation. 

1 At 1999 prices. This has translated to €754m of total ERDF programme spend. 
2 Ex-Post Evaluation of the Cohesion Policy Programmes 2000-2006: The URBAN II Community Initiative – 
Interim Report (Nov 2009) 
3 ToR number 2008.CE.16.0.AT.015 
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/rado2_en.htm). 
4 Including the URBACT programme 

9

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1  Evaluation questions for the review of 70 URBAN II programmes 

Key evaluation questions 
What were the methods by which URBAN II areas were chosen in each country? How relevant was this 
method and choice? 
What were the main challenges facing URBAN II areas at the start of the programmes and what have 
been the key features of the strategies deployed under URBAN II? 
How did the programmes’ perceptions of the challenges and the strategies deployed fit within literature 
on urban regeneration and urban neighbourhoods in crisis? 
What have been the results and impacts of URBAN II programmes and how do changes compare to the 
initial baseline? How do changes compare to general trends in similar non-URBAN areas across the EU?
Have some elements of URBAN II been more successful than others? (e.g. social rather than physical 
regeneration actions). Should the balance between investments have been different? 
What can be said about the degree of local partnership working? To what extent have municipalities and 
other actors been involved in the design and implementation of the programmes? How has this 
influenced the design and implementation of the programmes? 
For the above questions, are there systematic variations by Member States or by Structural Funds 
Objective? To what extent does URBAN II add value to national and sub-national public policy for urban 
regeneration? Has URBAN II impacted public policies in this field? 

Source: Terms of Reference  

Table 1.2  Evaluation questions for the 15 URBAN II case studies 

Key evaluation questions 
Has there been a gap between theory (as set out in the programming documents) and practice? Has the 
programme been experienced ‘on the ground’ as a solution to the most pressing problems of the area? 
What is the link between the URBAN II area and the broader economy, as well as the economic policies 
of the city? Where an URBAN II area is covered by Objective 1 or 2, what is the link between URBAN II 
and the strategy pursued in the mainstream? 
What are examples of successful projects? Why have projects and programmes been successful or 
unsuccessful in terms of outputs, results and impacts? What are the factors determining success or 
failure of the different types of URBAN II intervention? 
How successful has the integrated approach been? To what extent has there been a genuine synergy 
between measures? What are the factors underlying success in this area? 
How well have the programmes been managed in terms such as project selection, project support, 
monitoring, evaluation, communication/publicity, comparison, etc?  
What have been the main factors underlying the success (or otherwise) of programme and project 
management? 
Have administrative costs been reasonable and proportional?  
Where municipalities have been in the driving seat, how have they fared? 
How successful have the programmes been in building the capacity of local partners? And in building 
links between partners? What factors underlie success or failure? 
To what extent have programmes benefited from the various networks, especially URBACT? What has 
driven the degree to which they benefit? 
To what extent are the impacts of URBAN II likely to prove sustainable beyond the end of the period? 
What are the main factors driving this? 

Source: Terms of Reference  

10

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3  URBACT I evaluation questions 

Key evaluation questions 

What outputs have been generated? Did networks tend to focus on practicalities or new areas? 
To what extent have the outputs generated concrete results and impacts ‘on the ground’? What could be 
done to optimise this final impact? 
Who has participated and why? To what extent have new Member States been involved? What 
concretely could be done to optimise participation? 
The answers to the previous questions should be used to give an overall judgement as to how effective 
the networks have been, as well as recommendations for good practice 

Source: Terms of Reference  

1.3 Methodology and approach 

This  sub-section  summarises  the  approach  adopted  for  the  evaluation  process  (Figure  1.1).  A  detailed 
methodology is described in the inception report (published separately5).  

Figure 1.1  Methodology and approach 

Task 1: Review of 70 URBAN II programmes  

Document collection and review 

Document  review  of  all  70  URBAN  II  programmes.  This  desk-based  exercise  collected  secondary 
information about inputs and outputs and (to a lesser extent) the results and impacts of programmes. It 
focused on programme complements, annual implementation reports (AIRs), mid-term evaluations (and 
their updates) and final evaluation reports (where available) for each of the URBAN programmes.  

Interviews with stakeholders 

Telephone interviews with managing body representatives for URBAN II programmes (61 interviews: 50 
programme managers and 11 officials with management responsibility for elements of the programme, 
e.g. financial managers), and with representatives of national and/or regional managing authorities (18). 

Collection of statistics  

•  unemployment data for URBAN II areas (2000): available for 68 programmes 

•  unemployment data for URBAN II areas (2006): available for 46 programmes 

•  unemployment data (2000 and 2006) at city level: available for 70 programmes 

• 

long-term unemployment data (2000 and 2006) for URBAN II areas: available for 29 programmes 

•  population data for URBAN II areas (2000): available for 70 programmes 

•  population data for URBAN II areas (2006): available for 32 programmes 

5 Ex-Post Evaluation of Cohesion Policy Programmes 2000-2006: The URBAN II Community Initiative – Inception 
Report (Nov 2008) (http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/rado2_en.htm) 

11

 
 
 
 
•  city population (2000 and 2006): available for 70 programmes 

•  population density and size of URBAN II areas: available for 70 programmes. 

Counterfactual 

The evaluation also explored the impact of URBAN II by attempting to construct the counterfactual. The 
counterfactual analysis sought to compare outcomes among a group of areas receiving URBAN II funds 
(the treatment group) with those observed in a group of non-participating areas (the comparison group). 
The  analysis  was  based  on  unemployment  data,  and  the  results  are  briefly  outlined  in  Section  3, 
although the data available did not allow us to generate findings that were statistically significant.  

Task 2: Evaluation of URBACT I 

Document review 

Review  of  key  documents:  the  latest  implementation  report  (2006),  website  information  (including  the 
URBACT and national-level urban network websites) and written outputs from eight URBACT projects.  

Interviews with stakeholders 

• 

representatives  of  URBACT’s  Secretariat/Managing  Authority  (4  interviews)  and  Programme 
Monitoring Committee (3 interviews) 

•  project lead partners (8) 

•  project partners (8) 

• 

• 

• 

• 

thematic or secretariat experts involved in project implementation (8) 

representatives of the European Commission (2) 

representatives  of  other  urban  development  networks,  including  national  URBAN  II  networks 
(Germany-Austria, France) and EU networks (EUROCITIES, ERAN-Quartiers en Crise and EUKN. 

representatives of the EU and national urban networks and associations (4).  

Task 3: Evaluation of 15 in-depth case studies of URBAN II programmes 

The evaluation included 15 programme-level and 10 mini case studies of projects (selected from the 15 
programmes)  from  URBAN  II.  The  case  studies  (see  Table  1.5)  allowed  deeper  exploration  of  the 
findings from the first two tasks and gave more detailed understanding of the answers to the evaluation 
questions.  

Case studies were chosen from across Member States using a sampling framework and applying cluster 
analysis techniques to ensure that they were representative of the total population of the 70 URBAN II 
programmes. In total, 121 stakeholders were interviewed for the case studies. 

Face-to-face and telephone interviews were normally undertaken with the following stakeholders during 

12

 
 
 
each case study visit:  

• 

the manager of the URBAN II programme  

•  other key staff involved in the programme’s management (e.g. monitoring officer, theme leader) 

•  members of the Monitoring Committee  

• 

• 

local  stakeholders  working  for  organisations  focused  on  the  target  neighbourhood  (e.g.  local 
community worker, local police officer, local health worker)  

the managers of two projects funded through the URBAN II programme  

•  academics  and/or 

region’s 
regeneration/neighbourhood  renewal  agenda  (e.g.  city  regeneration  manager,  city  neighbourhood 
renewal manager).  

stakeholders 

the  wider 

city  or 

involved 

relevant 

in 

In total 121 stakeholders were interviewed as part of the case studies. 

The  case  studies  generated  a  particularly  strong  strand  of  the  evidence  base  for  the  evaluation.  By 
interviewing a wide range of stakeholders within each area, the evaluation gathered a significant amount 
of information, both qualitative and quantitative, to help answer the terms of reference questions. As the 
case  studies  provided  a  rich  and  deep  understanding  of  programmes,  in  terms  of  performance  and  – 
importantly – impact, we have used this evidence base to inform much of the final report.  

The  programme  review  undertaken  at  the  start  of  the  evaluation  provided  a  firm  base  for  the  study  to 
build on. However, as highlighted in Section 3, the data and information by themselves were often limited 
in  both  completeness  and  usefulness  when  it  came  to  understanding  the  impact  of  the  URBAN  II 
intervention. The counterfactual analysis was also helpful, but data limitations meant that statistically valid 
results could not be derived.  

The  case  studies  were  representative  of  the  total  population  of  programmes  on  a  range  of  measures, 
including  geography,  size,  spend  patterns,  strength  of  partnership  and  unemployment  levels  of  target 
areas, and thus formed a solid basis for drawing wider conclusions. This is demonstrated in Table 1.4  

Table 1.4  Comparisons between total population and case study selection 

Cluster (typology) 

Ideal6 

Actual 

Difference 

Physical regeneration group 

Relatively balanced group 

Social regeneration group 

43% 

34% 

9% 

47% 

30% 

7% 

-4% 

4% 

2% 

6 Figures do not add up to 100 because the sixth cluster (the ‘outlier’ Bremerhaven) has been omitted.  

13

 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic regeneration group 

Transport regeneration group 

Partnership 

Very inclusive partnership 

Relatively inclusive partnership  

Not inclusive partnership 

City size 

Big 

Medium 

Small 

3% 

10% 

Ideal 

47% 

36% 

17% 

Ideal 

36% 

38% 

26% 

7% 

7% 

-4% 

3% 

Actual 

Difference 

47% 

40% 

13% 

0% 

-4% 

4% 

Actual 

Difference 

33% 

53% 

13% 

3% 

-15% 

13% 

Unemployment 

Ideal 

Actual 

Difference 

Low 

Intermediate 

High 

23% 

43% 

34% 

13% 

40% 

47% 

10% 

3% 

-13% 

Objective 1/Objective 2/other  

Ideal 

Actual 

Difference 

Within Objective 1 area  

Within Objective 2 area 

Outside Objective1 or 2 area 

38% 

27% 

35% 

33% 

27% 

40% 

5% 

0% 

-5% 

Source:  ECOTEC  analysis  of  data  drawn  from  programme  Annual  Implementation  Reports  and  ECOTEC's 
assessment of the strength of partnerships     

Table 1.5 briefly describes each of the 15 case studies; their location is shown in Figure 1.2.  

Table 1.5  The case studies 

Programme  Summary 

Arhus 

Arhus, the second largest city in Denmark, had a total programme budget of €12 million 
(including  €5.3  million  from  the  ERDF),  which  was  focused  on  three  neighbourhoods 
identified as the most deprived areas in Denmark. The target area is dominated by 1960s 
high-rise housing estates built to accommodate immigrant workers. It is characterised by 
high worklessness, low educational attainment and high crime. 

A large share (42%) of the funding was allocated to leisure and cultural activities to address 
low participation in leisure activities and the community’s wider socio-economic needs. 

The local authority managed the programme but, particularly towards the end, there was a 

14

 
 
 
    
Programme  Summary 

conscious  effort  to  involve  residents  and  community  groups  in  developing  and  managing 
specific projects.  

Bristol 

Bristol is a large city in the south-west of England. Despite the successful development of 
financial,  business,  hi-tech  and  aerospace  sectors  in  the  city,  it  has  persistent  multiple 
deprivation  in  certain  areas.  The  Bristol  programme  had  a  total  budget  of  €22.4  million 
(including €10.6 million from the ERDF), which was targeted at five wards ranked within 
the 12% most deprived wards in England. 

The  programme  placed  young  people  aged  10-30  at  the  centre  of  the  decision-making 
process,  and  supported  projects  with  a  strong  focus  on  developing  opportunities  and 
provision for youth.  

Carrara 

The  Municipality  of  Carrara  is  located  in  Italy’s  Tuscany  region  and  has  an  economy 
focused on quarrying, transforming and distributing marble. The Municipality suffered from 
traffic congestion in its historic centre, and higher than average levels of unemployment. 

Of  a  total  budget  of  €27.2  million  (including  €8.7  million  from  the  ERDF),  approximately 
35% of the programme’s budget was allocated to constructing an urban bypass, although 
some of these funds ended up being used to clean up after the 2003 floods. The rest of 
the  budget  was  used  to  promote  enterprise,  tourism  and  culture  (aiming  to  re-launch 
Carrara as the ‘city of marble’) and fight social exclusion.  

In  addition 
governmental organisations (NGOs) were involved in the URBAN II partnership. 

institutional  stakeholders,  numerous 

trade  associations  and  non-

to 

Crotone 

The target area for this programme comprised 84% of the population of Crotone, a city on 
Italy’s  east  coast  suffering  from  above-average  unemployment  and  crime.  The  total 
budget for the programme in Crotone was €25 million, of which ERDF contributed €15.1 
of funding. 

A high proportion (80%) of funds was allocated to projects to improve the attractiveness of 
the territory through physical regeneration and cultural and social activities. This included 
renovating civic buildings and establishing the Pythagoras Theme Park and Museum. 

The  Municipality  Administration  successfully  partnered  with  the  Trade  Association  to 
deliver  the  ‘Pythagoras  Showcase’  competition  for  local  traders,  although  other 
partnership arrangements were less successful because of competing interests. 

Dortmund 

The German city of Dortmund had a total funding allocation of €28.6 million (including €10 
million from the ERDF), which was targeted on Nordstadt, an area in the northern part of 
the  city.  This  area  was  badly  affected  by  de-industrialisation  and  was  characterised  by 
high  unemployment,  poverty,  low  qualification  levels,  an  unbalanced  economy,  low 
external image and high population turnover. 

Most  of  the  resources  were  directed  at  entrepreneurship  and  employment  measures 
(42%) and physical and environmental projects (33%). 

The  programme  has  been  the  driving  force  behind  the  creation  of  new  forms  of 
networking and  joint  working,  and  the  consultation group  formed  for  the  programme still 
exists.  

Gijón 

Gijón  is  an  industrial  port  city  in  northern  Spain,  and  the  largest  city  in  the  region  of 
Asturias. Its traditional industries of shipbuilding, coal and metal production declined in the 

15

 
 
 
Programme  Summary 

1980s and 1990s, leading to high unemployment and population losses. 

The programme had a total budget of €14 million (including €10.5 million from the ERDF) 
and  was  focused  on  four  neighbourhoods  in  the  western  part  of  Gijón.  Over  half  of  the 
budget  was  allocated  to  physical  and  environmental  regeneration  projects  to  build 
infrastructure and regenerate public spaces. 

The  city  council  managed  the  programme  in  partnership  with  over  40  local  associations 
and  other  organisations  which  played  a  very  active  role  in  designing  and  implementing 
individual projects and the continuation of project activities after the programme ended.  

Graz 

The  district  of  Graz  West,  in  the  Austrian  city  of  Graz,  received  a  total  budget  of  €20.6 
million (including €4.2 from the ERDF) for the URBAN II programme. The decline of the 
area’s  heavy  industry  and  brewing  sectors  resulted  in  a  high  concentration  of  socially 
disadvantaged groups in the district, with unemployment three points higher than the city 
average. 

The programme focused on the relocation of the technical college and the establishment 
of  a  business  start-up  centre.  It  sought  to  develop  the  area’s  strengths,  such  as 
automotive, human technology, environmental and creative industries. 

The  building  directorate  of  the  city  council  managed  the  programme,  which  was 
influenced  by  a  steering  group  comprising  council  departments,  local  and  regional 
stakeholders and organisations implementing projects.  

Halifax 

Halifax, in northern England, had a total budget of €36 million (including €12.6 million from 
the  ERDF)  for  URBAN  II,  and  was  focussed  on  five  neighbourhoods.  Manufacturing 
accounts  for  30%  of  the  town’s  employment  (nearly  twice  the  UK  average),  but 
unemployment was rising and educational attainment and skills levels were poor. URBAN 
II was one of only two regeneration initiatives targeted on Halifax in the last 20 years. 

The  programme  focused  on  economic  regeneration  and,  in  particular,  enterprise 
development.  The  programme’s  vision  centred  on  helping  local  businesses  to  grow  and 
assisting local people to become more employable. 

The  programme  was  coordinated  by  Action  Halifax,  a  company  set  up  to  deliver 
regeneration projects in the town. It was directed by a Monitoring Committee consisting of 
26 people from across the public, private, community and voluntary sectors. 

Le Havre 

The  city  of  Le  Havre  is  France’s  largest  container  port,  but  has  experienced  economic 
challenges.  Its  port  and  industrial  activities  are  increasingly  capital  intensive  and  the 
population  is  relatively  low  skilled,  leading  to  higher  than  average  unemployment  rates. 
The city is also unattractive to tourists, investors and potential residents. 

The URBAN II funds were targeted on the city’s southern districts. The total budget for the 
programme  was  €30.3  million  (including  €10.7  million  from  the  ERDF).  Physical 
regeneration accounted for 70% of the programme budget, including the development of 
an urban park and improving facades in one of the main streets.  

The programme was managed by the city and backed by a large number of political and 
social stakeholders. 

Le Mantois  The programme was targeted at the two communities of Mantes-la-Jolie and Mantes-la-
Ville,  about  50km  west  of  Paris.  Following  a  period  of  population  growth,  the 
neighbourhoods underwent a sharp fall in prosperity during the economic downturn of the 
1970s, and unemployment exceeded 20%. Moreover, Le Mantois experienced large-scale 

16

 
 
 
Programme  Summary 

rioting in 1991, leading to a number of deaths. 

Le  Mantois  had  a  budget  of  €37.9  million  (including  €12.9  million  from  the  ERDF), 
allowing  the  programme  to  implement  70  projects.  The  largest  were  the  Green  Belt 
initiative 
the  Seine  river  embankment)  and  physical 
(physical  regeneration  of 
improvement of the Red Cross Nursing School. 

A local agency for urban planning managed the programme in close collaboration with the 
municipalities of Mantes-la-Jolie and Mantes-la-Ville. 

Leipzig 

Leipzig  is  the  largest  city  in  the  German  region  of  Saxony.  Since  the  reunification  of 
Germany,  the  city  suffered  a  major  contraction  of  its  manufacturing  base  resulting  in  a 
loss of 30,000 jobs since 1989 and a legacy of large areas of derelict land. 

The  programme,  which  had  a  total  budget  of  €19.8  million  (including  €14.9  million  from 
the ERDF), sought to arrest the decline of these areas through an integrated programme 
of activity focused on environmental and infrastructure improvements, local economic and 
employment development, and social integration and renewal. 

The  community  was  heavily  involved  in  designing  the  programme  and  its  associated 
projects, and it was perceived to be a bottom-up approach. There was also joint    working 
by different organisations for the greater good of the target neighbourhood. 

Perama 

The programme targeted €13.4 million on the port city of Perama (including €9.6 million 
from  the  ERDF),  on  the  outskirts  of  Athens.  With  its  historic  reliance  on  the  port  and 
shipbuilding for jobs, Perama had suffered a decline in its employment base, heightened 
by its inability to attract new employment opportunities in other sectors.  

The programme focused on physical and environmental regeneration, mainly because the 
decline  in  Perama’s  port  has  left  huge  swathes  of  vacant  land  which  were  seriously 
polluted.  

The programme was managed by the Municipality of Perama, which was not experienced 
in  managing  large-scale  European-funded  schemes  such  as  this  one.  The  partnership 
beyond this organisation was widespread, although organisations were mainly consulted 
on the direction of the programme rather than being key decision-makers.  

Porto-
Gondomar 

Gondomar  is  one  of  the  most  deprived  areas  within  the  metropolitan  area  of  Porto  in 
Portugal and suffers from high unemployment, illiteracy, poor ethnic integration, isolated 
elderly people, drug problems and inadequate roads. 

The programme’s total budget was €14.2 million (including €10 million from the ERDF); of 
which €9 million was allocated to a range of physical regeneration projects. 

Despite  partnership  working  not  being  widespread  practice  in  Portugal,  the  programme 
used a partnership model consisting of local, regional and national institutions, as well as 
local associations and civil society associations. 

Rotterdam 

The  URBAN  II  target  area  was  three  neighbourhoods  within  the  Borough  of  Rotterdam 
Noord in the Netherlands. The programme had a total budget of €23.7 million (including 
€8.9 million from the ERDF). The area was characterised by high migration flows, leading 
to  deteriorating  neighbourhood  relations,  and  high  unemployment,  although  incomes  for 
those with jobs were relatively high. 

The  programme  built  on  an  existing  strategy  and  focused  on  addressing  crime,  family 
breakdown,  physical  degradation  of  the  neighbourhood,  and  community  cohesion.  A 

17

 
 
 
Programme  Summary 

broad range of partners were involved. The programme management established strong 
links  with  educational 
institutes,  social  organisations,  housing  corporations  and 
entrepreneurs.  

Sambreville  Sambreville,  in  Belgium,  is  a  highly  industrialised  city  that  has  suffered  over  the  last  20 
years through the restructuring of its industrial base, leading to significant job losses in its 
key  employment  sectors.  The  city  had  high  unemployment,  low  skills  and  physical 
degradation.  The  largest  part  of  the  URBAN  II  budget  (45.3%)  was  allocated  to  the 
physical and environmental regeneration of the area, mainly focused on creating a ‘new’ 
centre of Sambreville at Auvelais. About a quarter of the budget (26.9%) was allocated to 
entrepreneurship  and  employment  projects.  The  programme  established  21  projects  in 
total and had a budget of €16.2 million (including €7.1 million from the ERDF). Partnership 
arrangements  were  relatively  strong  and  a  cohesive  group  of  partners  (from  the  public 
and  private  sector)  was  brought  together  to  specifically  oversee  the  programmes 
development and implementation.  

Source: ECOTEC  

18

 
 
 
Figure 1.2  Map of the 15 case study locations 

19

 
 
 
  
  
 
1.4 Structure of the Final Report  

The remainder of this report is structured as follows: 

Section  2:  Background  and  Characteristics  of  URBAN  II  –  includes  an  explanation  of  its  origins,  an 
overview of the URBAN II programmes by Member State, the rationale for URBAN II, and a description of 
the issues faced in URBAN II target areas and key features of the strategies deployed. 

Section 3: Review of Outputs, Results and Impacts of URBAN II – draws on programme data and the case 
study  research,  and  also  provides  a  short  analysis  of  the  findings  of  the  counterfactual  element  of  the 
evaluation approach.  

Section  4:  Delivery  Structures  of  URBAN  II  –  looks  at  the  management  and  operational  arrangements 
associated with delivering URBAN II, including its sustainability. 

Section 5: The Evaluation of URBACT I – presents the main findings, focusing on the rationale, impact, 
participation in and management of URBACT programmes.  

Section  6:  Conclusions  and  Lessons  from  the  URBAN  II  programmes  –  presents  the  overall  analysis  of 
the evaluation evidence.  

The case studies and mini- case study reports can be found on the DG Regio website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/evaluation_en.htm). 

20

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.0  Background and Characteristics of URBAN II 

2.1 Introduction 

This  section  outlines  the  background  to  the  URBAN  II  Community  Initiative  and  explains  the  selection 
process used, the main challenges found in target areas and the strategies deployed by programmes to 
tackle  urban  decline.  The  origins  and  objectives  of  URBAN  II  are  explained,  along  with  the  rationale 
behind the initiative and the programmes.  

2.2 Summary of Key Points  

•  URBAN II supported 70 programmes in 14 Member States. The European Union (EU) contributed 
€754 million between 2000 and 2006, rising to €1.6 billion with match funding. The EU contribution 
ranged  from  €3.5  to  €19.4  million.  The  programme  areas  combined  covered  a  population  of  2.2 
million.  

•  URBAN II followed the Urban Pilot Projects (1989-99) and URBAN I (1994-99) and shared with both 
initiatives a focus on innovative and integrated approaches to regenerating neighbourhoods in crisis, 
and  promoting  sustainable  urban  development.  In  common  with  the  previous  initiatives,  URBAN  II 
focused resources on defined neighbourhoods.  

•  The selection of cities and specific programme areas was delegated to the Member States. Different 
approaches  were  used,  with  differing  objectives  and  rigour.  In  some  countries  the  most  deprived 
cities and neighbourhoods (e.g. as measured in terms of unemployment or industrial decline) were 
selected, but elsewhere decisions were made to spread resources, especially to cities that had not 
been in receipt of urban regeneration and development funding streams.  

•  Whilst high levels of unemployment were a common characteristic for most URBAN II areas, there 
were also a mix of physical, economic and social challenges, some common to several areas (such 
as  physical  dereliction,  the  immigration  of  new  minority  ethnic  communities,  and  the  decline  of 
traditional  industries),  some  more  specific  to  individual  programme  areas  (including  histories  of 
sectarian violence and heavy traffic in historic city centres).  

•  There was a broad split, based on resource allocation, between programmes (30) that were centred 
on the physical regeneration theme and other programmes (40) that had a balance between social, 
economic and physical regeneration. The case studies highlighted integrated programmes (in 13 of 
the  15  case  studies)  bringing  together,  through  projects  and  partnership  structures,  physical, 
economic and social challenges and interventions to tackle those challenges (e.g. reusing redundant 
spaces and buildings for enterprise centres or new community facilities).     

•  There was a very close alignment to Objective 1 and 2 programmes in 4 of the 15 case studies with 
'joined  up'  approaches  to  avoid  duplication  of  activity.  In  a  further  two  case  study  programmes 

21

 
 
 
URBAN II operated entirely separately from the mainstream Structural Funds. 

• 

In the majority of cases (approximately three-quarters), programme strategies strongly mapped onto 
the characteristics and challenges of the programme areas. There were exceptions where strategies 
did not align closely to the main challenges although in the case of major structural problems (such 
as unemployment).  

•  Nearly all of case studies (14 out of 15) showed that programme strategies were followed throughout 
the programme period. However, programmes were also able to adapt to specific local events and 
changes including natural disasters and policy changes at the city level.  

2.3 Origins of the URBAN II Community Initiative 

The  origins  of  URBAN  II  were  in  59  Urban  Pilot  Projects  which  received  €164  million  from  the  ERDF 
between 1989 and 1999. The 33 Urban Pilot Projects launched in 1989 and the 26 additional pilots that 
followed  represented  the  first  time  that  the  ERDF  had  explicitly  supported  innovative,  holistic  urban 
regeneration  activities  across  Europe.  Although  some  Member  States  had  their  own  area-based  urban 
initiatives,  many  did  not  have  national  policies  specifically  aimed  at  holistic  regeneration  of  towns  and 
cities.  

Following the pilot stages, the first round of the URBAN programme was launched in 19947 and ran until 
1999. URBAN I supported 118 European cities in 15 Member States, with a Community contribution of 
€950  million.  The  experiences  from  the  Urban  Pilot  Projects  and  URBAN  I  fuelled  debate  about  future 
urban policy across the EU and the need for further ERDF investments in holistic and innovative urban 
programmes.  The  outcome  was  the  communication  ‘Sustainable  Urban  Development  in  the  European 
Union: A Framework for Action’,8 which explained the Commission’s intended approach to tackling urban 
decline and called for a second round of the URBAN Community Initiative - URBAN II.  

2.4 Overview of URBAN II  

URBAN II supported 70 programmes across 14 countries and received €754 million from the ERDF. With 
matched funding, URBAN II injected €1.6 billion into neighbourhoods in crisis with a combined population 
of nearly 2.2 million and an average programme population of 31,200 people.9  

URBAN  II’s  mission  was  the  ‘economic  and  social  regeneration  of  cities  and  urban  neighbourhoods  in 
crisis with a view to promoting sustainable urban development’.10 As with URBAN I, the emphasis was on 

7 Decision 94/C 180/02 Notice to Member States ‘Laying down guidelines for operational programmes which 
Member States are invited to establish in the framework of a Community Initiative concerning urban areas’.  
8 Com (1998) 605 final. 
9 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – An Initial Assessment of the URBAN Initiative (2002). 
10 Article 3(1) of EC regulation 1783/1999. 

22

 
 
 
 
 
an integrated approach to solving the problems of urban areas, taking into consideration physical, social 
and economic regeneration issues.  

The main objectives of URBAN II were to: 

• 

formulate  and  implement  innovative  strategies  for  sustainable  economic  and  social  regeneration  of 
small and medium-sized towns and cities or of distressed urban neighbourhoods in larger cities  

•  enhance and exchange knowledge and experience in relation to sustainable urban regeneration and 

development in the areas concerned.  

To  fulfil  these  objectives  the  principles  for  the  70  programmes  (and  associated  strategies)  supported 
through URBAN II were to 11: 

•  have  sufficient  critical  mass  of  population  and  associated  support  structures  to  facilitate  the 

formulation and implementation of innovative urban development programmes. 

•  have  strong  local  partnerships  to  define  challenges,  strategy  and  priorities,  allocate  resources  and 
monitor and evaluate the strategy; partnerships needed to be wide and include economic and social 
partners, NGOs and residents’ groupings. 

•  adopt an integrated territorial approach with links to development strategies for the wider urban area 

or region. 

• 

integrate  the  economic,  social,  environmental,  security  and  transport  aspects,  including  equality  of 
access to education and training opportunities. 

•  promote equal opportunities between men and women. 

•  ensure  complementarity  with  the  main  forms  of  assistance  under  the  Structural  Funds  and  other 

Community initiatives. 

Each  area  supported  through  URBAN  II  funding  had  to  demonstrate  a  need  for  economic  or  social 
regeneration and show that there was no duplication of regional or national funding. URBAN II aimed to 
finance  innovative  projects  and  activities  with  the  long-term  objective  to  transfer  these  innovations  into 
mainstream practice at local or national level.  

URBAN  II’s  guiding  principles  also  differentiated  it  from  mainstream  ERDF  support.  It  focused  on 
stimulating  innovative  and  partnership  based  ways  to  address  urban  problems,  sought  to  provide  an 
integrated response to all the challenges facing the area, and was generally flexible regarding what was 
funded and how funding was allocated.  

Table 2.1 sets out the areas selected to receive URBAN II funding and the allocation for each Member 
State.  

11 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – An Initial Assessment of the URBAN Initiative (2002). 

23

 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1  Overview of URBAN II programmes by Member State 

Country 

URBAN II area  

Number of 
programmes 

URBAN II FUNDS 
committed 
(million €) 

Austria 

Graz, Wien (Vienna) 

Belgium 

Antwerpen (Antwerp), Bruxelles-Capitale 
(Brussels), Sambreville 

Denmark 

Arhus 

Finland 

Helsinki/Vantaa 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Ireland 

Italy 

Bastia, Grenoble, Le Mantois, Bordeaux, 
Grigny/Viry, Strasbourg, Clichy-Montfermeil, Le 
Havre, Val-de-Seine 

Berlin, Gera, Luckenwalde, Bremerhaven, 
Kassel, Mannheim/Ludwigshafen, Dessau, Kiel, 
Neubrandenburg, Leipzig, Dortmund, 
Saarbrücken 

Iraklio, Komotini, Perama 

Ballyfermot 

Carrara, Milano (Milan), Pescara, Caserta, 
Misterbianco, Taranto, Crotone, Mola di Bari, 
Torino (Turin), Genova (Genoa) 

Netherlands  Amsterdam, Heerlen, Rotterdam 

Portugal 

Amadora, Lisboa (Lisbon), Porto Gondomar 

Spain 

Caceres, Orense, S. Cristobal de la Laguna, 
Gijon, Pamplona, Teruel, Granada, S. Adria de 
Besos, S. Sebastian-Pasaia, Jaen 

Sweden 

Göteborg 

UK 

Belfast, Halifax, Hetton and Murton, Stockwell, 
Bristol, Normanton in Derby, Thames Gateway, 
Burnley, Peterborough, West Wrexham, Clyde 
Waterfront 

TOTAL 
Source: An Initial Assessment of the URBAN Initiative (2002)12. 

2 

3 

1 

1 

9 

12 

3 

1 

10 

3 

3 

10 

1 

11 

70 

8.5 

21.5 

5.4 

5.4 

101.9 

149.7 

24.7 

4.9 

118.1 

30.6 

19.2 

120.0 

5.4 

139.0 

754.3 

The  Commission  allocated  money  in  proportion  to  the  level  of  urban  unemployment  and  provided  an 
indication of how many URBAN II programmes were likely to be funded within each Member State. The 
average  allocation  per  programme  was  €10.7  million.  The  largest  single  allocation  was  to  Thames 
Gateway in the UK (€19.4 million) and the smallest to Amadora in Portugal (€3.5 million).  

12 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – An Initial Assessment of the URBAN Initiative (2002) 

24

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 presents other key characteristics of areas receiving URBAN II funds.  

Table 2.2  General characteristics of URBAN II areas 

Characteristic 

Observations 

Population size of URBAN II 
programme areas and recipient cities 

Type of target area of URBAN II 

The 70 URBAN II areas covered a total population of just under 2.2 
million, with the largest target area containing 62,000 people 
(Amsterdam) and the smallest 10,000 (Amadora).13 In all, 18 
URBAN II programmes were located in cities with a relatively small 
population (under 150,000), 27 in cities with a population of 
between 150,000 and 500,000, and 25 in cities of over 500,000 
people.  

31 out of 70 URBAN II programmes were located on the outskirts 
or periphery of the urban area, 27 in the city centre. The remainder 
(12) were split between 8 city-wide programmes and 4 with a mix of 
peripheral and central areas. Countries with the majority of their 
URBAN II areas in the city periphery were France, Greece and 
Italy, while those with programmes located in the urban centre 
were Germany, Spain and the Netherlands.  

Overlap of URBAN II with Objective 1 
and Objective 2 areas 

45 URBAN II programmes were located in Objective 1 or 2 areas: 
26 in Objective 1 areas and 19 in Objective 2 areas. 25% of 
URBAN II funds were spent outside Objective 1 and 2 areas. 
Compared to the first round of URBAN, URBAN II was less focused 
on Objective 1 and 2 areas; only 17% of funding from URBAN I 
was spent outside Objective 1 and 2 areas.  

Levels of match funding 

Under half of all the URBAN programmes’ total spend was made 
up of URBAN II funds (48%). The two extremes in relation to levels 
of match funding were Greece (at 25% the smallest proportion of 
match) and Austria (at 76% the highest levels of match).  

Source: ECOTEC analysis of URBAN II programmes 

2.5 Selection of URBAN II areas 

Given the strong interest in URBAN II from prospective cities in all 14 Member States meaning a selection 
process was used to decide which areas received URBAN II funds. This process varied between Member 
States. 

The  decentralised  approach  for  selecting  URBAN  II  areas  stemmed  from  the  Commission’s  recognition 
that  urban  problems  differ  across  Europe,  requiring  a  more  localised,  country-level  decision-making 
process.  Qualitative  and  quantitative  evidence  was  used  to  inform  the  selection  process.  Virtually  all 
Member States used some form of statistical analysis when identifying areas most in need, though some 
had  stronger  and  more  complete  datasets  than  others.  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK  all  had 

13 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – An Initial Assessment of the URBAN Initiative (2002). 

25

 
 
 
 
 
relatively sophisticated statistical information to draw on, although (in 2000) even these countries tended 
not to have datasets that provided statistical information at the neighbourhood level.  

Partly  because  of  the  lack  of  data,  qualitative  evidence  was  also  important  when  selecting  programme 
areas. The case studies highlighted that political processes played a part in influencing decisions to select 
areas for URBAN II funding. In Rotterdam local figures lobbied for the city to have URBAN II funding, and 
local support and backing for the bid was strong and well organised. In Le Havre, political pressure was 
put  onto  national  organisations  to  award  URBAN  II  funds  to  the  city’s  southern  district,  an  area  not 
previously covered by other national, regional or European funds.   

Other factors at play in the selection process included:  

Geographical  balance  and  spread  –  Member  States  often  consciously  decided  to  spread  URBAN  II 
programmes equally across the country wherever possible. For example, in Belgium an equitable split of 
resources  across  regions  was  a  major  consideration  in  selecting  programme  areas.  In  Germany,  the 
selection process  was based  on one  programme  per  region. The  UK  initially  proposed  one programme 
per region but later amended this approach which resulted in a change of one of the selected areas.  

Target  areas  not  previously  in  receipt  of  funding  –  URBAN  II  programmes  were  sometimes  located  in 
areas not in receipt of other funding streams (e.g. UK, Spain and the Netherlands). Teruel in Spain is an 
example  of  an  area  which  had  historically  not  benefited  from  regeneration  funding.  The  government 
decided  to  prioritise  URBAN  II  funding  on  Treuel  as  opposed  to  nearby  cities  (Huesca  and  Zaragoza) 
which had previously enjoyed a comparatively wide range of regeneration funding regimes. Heerlen in the 
Netherlands had also missed out on Objective 2 funding and was designated an URBAN II area partly as 
a consequence.  

Capacity  of key  stakeholders – the capacity of the city and its stakeholders to deliver an effective urban 
regeneration  programme  was  another  consideration.  For  instance,  in  Germany  an  independent  panel 
decided which  areas  would  receive URBAN  II  funding,  with  the  city’s  capacity and  previous  experience 
being one of the deciding factors. 

Alignment with national strategies/funding streams – some areas were chosen specifically to link with and 
match national funding streams. As URBAN II required match funding, programmes often targeted areas 
where  other  public  and  private  finance  was  available.  France  focused  on  80  cities  already  in  receipt  of 
regeneration  funding,  partly  because  they  represented  the  most  deprived  parts  of  the  country,  but  also 
because URBAN II funding could more easily find a source of match funding in these cities. In Rotterdam, 
the  desire  to  build  on  existing  policy  initiatives  promoting  a  neighbourhood-based  approach  to 
regeneration was a key factor in determining the target areas. 

A balance between need and opportunity – some Member States chose to focus URBAN II resources on 
areas which were not necessarily the most deprived parts of the city. Overall, 11 (16%) URBAN II areas 
had  unemployment  rates  lower  than  the  city  level,  suggesting  that  some  Member  States  directed 
resources at less deprived areas (the strongest evidence for this came from the UK, Germany, Spain and 
Italy). The reasons were twofold. Firstly, less deprived urban areas would have more chance of recovery, 
as their problems could more ‘easily’ be addressed through a programme such as URBAN II. Secondly, 
targeting URBAN II funding on, for instance, the city centre (which was often not the most deprived part of 
the  urban  area)  could  provide  greater  opportunity  for  the  city  as  a  whole,  including  its  deprived 

26

 
 
 
neighbourhoods.  In  Spain,  URBAN  II  was  targeted  at  the  historical  core  of  cities  to  help  attract  more 
visitors and investment to the city as a whole.  

Table 2.3 summarises the key issues each Member State considered to help decide which areas would 
receive  URBAN  II  funds.  As  can  be  seen  it  was  normal  for  a  mix  of  considerations  to  be  taken  into 
account within individual Member States. 

Table 2.3  Reasons for choosing URBAN II areas 

Country 

Belgium 

Denmark 

Germany 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Ireland 

Italy 

Netherlands 

Austria 

Portugal 

Finland 

Sweden 

UK 

Tackling 
areas  most 
in  need/with 
highest 
disadvantage 

Targeting 
less 
deprived 
areas 
areas 
opportunity 

and 
of 

Achieving  a 
balanced 
geographical 
spread 

Capacity  of 
key 
stakeholders 

Alignment 
with  national 
funding 
streams 

Targeting 
areas not 
already in 
receipt of 
funding 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Source: Based on interviews with programme managers and stakeholders, including Member State representatives, 

undertaken by ECOTEC 

The methods Member States used to select URBAN II areas ranged from a very open and competitive 
process  (where  any  part  of  the  country  could  bid  for  funding)  through  to  a  closed  process  with  pre-
selected target areas. Our analysis showed that the three main categories were as follows:  

•  Open competition – an unrestricted bidding process where any city within a Member State could bid to 
receive URBAN II funding with the potential for high administrative costs (for the Member State) as 
well as the resources cities dedicated to preparing bids. The national government assessed the bids 
using  a  variety  of  qualitative  and  quantitative  criteria,  as  mentioned  above.  In  Germany,  the 
independent  panel  assessed  each  bid  using  a  scoring  system,  allocating  URBAN  II  funding  to  the 
strongest applications. This approach was also generally followed in Portugal, Spain and Finland. 

27

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Restricted  competition  –  while  still  using  an  element  of  competition,  Member  States  restricted  the 
cities eligible. In France, of the 80 eligible cities, 35 bid for URBAN II funds, 13 were shortlisted and 9 
were  chosen.  Restricted  competition  was  the  method  favoured  in  France,  the  UK,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Italy and Ireland.  

•  Closed call – some Member States invited specific cities to apply for URBAN II funding; these were 
pre-selected based on a quantitative assessment (i.e. the most deprived), or because very few cities 
met the minimum requirements for eligibility. This method tended to be used in small Member States, 
including Austria, Greece and Sweden.  

Restricted competition was the most popular selection method as it was thought to stimulate innovative 
proposals  while  restricting  the  level  of  overall  resources  dedicated  to  making  bids  for  URBAN  II 
programmes,  some  of  which  would  be  unsuccessful.  Thus  a  balanced  approach  encompassing  both 
competition and restricted selection was preferred for the decision-making process.  

Table  2.4  summarises  each  Member  State’s  selection  process,  drawing  on  the  results  of  interviews 
during the review of all 70 programmes. From our analysis we cannot demonstrate that one process was 
more effective than another (in terms of the subsequent impact of the chosen programmes). However, the 
value  of  a  rigorous  approach,  providing  there  is  transparency,  is  that  the  basis  for  selection  can  be 
defended, an important consideration for Member States in their ongoing relationship with cities. 

Table 2.4  Selection process used by Member States 

Country 

Belgium 

Denmark 

Germany 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Ireland 

Italy 

Netherlands 

Austria 

Portugal 

Finland 

Sweden 

UK 

Open competition 

Restricted 
competition 

Closed call 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Source: Based on interviews with programme managers and stakeholders, including Member State representatives, 

undertaken by ECOTEC 

28

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
2.6 Main challenges facing URBAN II areas 

This  sub-section  explores  the  broad  socio-economic  trends  prevailing  in  target  neighbourhoods  prior  to 
facing the areas prior to URBAN II.  

All  URBAN  II  programme  areas  suffered  significant  economic,  social  and  physical  problems.  Although 
there  were  different  local contexts  and  challenges  the  programme  areas  still  faced  a  range  of  common 
challenges.  Before  examining  these  common  challenges  in  more  detail,  we  highlight  three  case  study 
examples that typify the problems URBAN II tried to address.  

Case-study examples: typical problems 

Dortmund, Germany 

URBAN  II  targeted  an  isolated,  post-industrial  suburb  in  the  northern  part  of  Dortmund,  where  most 
residents lived in densely populated, poor quality accommodation. The area was badly affected by de-
industrialisation  and  developed  a  role  as  a  home  to  growing  numbers  of  immigrant  and  socially 
disadvantaged groups. The main challenges included tackling high unemployment rates (26.5% in 2000 
–  three  times  the  national  rate),  long-term  unemployment  (46.9%  of  the  total),  high  rates  of  economic 
inactivity,  poverty,  risk  of  exclusion,  low  levels  of  qualifications,  an  unbalanced  economy  and  poor 
external  image.  The  area  had  also  suffered  high  population  turnover  rates,  with  more  ‘successful’ 
residents moving out to be replaced by more disadvantaged groups.  

Le Havre, France 

Le Havre had suffered from decline in traditional industries (mainly associated with the port and petro-
chemical  sectors)  over  the  last  three  decades.  Prior  to  URBAN  II,  new  and  emerging  industries  had 
failed  to  create  sufficient  employment  opportunities  for  the  existing  population,  so  unemployment 
(particularly  long-term  unemployment)  and  benefit  dependency  were  noticeably  higher  than  in  the 
surrounding regions (the unemployment rate stood at 21% in Le Havre compared with 13% in France in 
1999).  Low  educational  attainment  levels  and  lack  of  an  enterprise  culture  also  hampered  economic 
recovery in the target area. High crime and delinquency rates were other symptoms of the deprivation 
existing  in  Le  Havre.  The  quality  of  the  physical  environment  was  poor  –  two  particularly  prevalent 
issues  were  high  levels  of  land  pollution  and  vacant  and  derelict  buildings.  Lack  of  public  sector 
investment (prior to URBAN II) also meant that transport links were degraded, while local public service 
provision was insufficient to meet the population’s needs.  

Perama, Greece 

The Municipality of Perama was one of the most disadvantaged areas of the capital region, Attiki, with 
particular  problems  on  the  quality  of  the  environment,  urban  fabric  and  residents’  socio-economic 
situation.  Some  of  the  most  deprived  neighbourhoods  had  a  much  degraded  urban  fabric.  The  local 
economy traditionally depended on ship-building, but this sector’s decline in the 1980s resulted in high 
levels  of  unemployment.  Other  challenges  included  low  incomes,  low  levels  of  entrepreneurship,  low 
participation  of  women  in  the  labour  force,  a  serious  shortage  of  social  care  and  health  services,  and 
overall  low  quality  of  life.  Residents’  ability  to  improve  their  quality  of  life  was  also  undermined  by  low 
educational attainment. Furthermore, the decline in heavy industry was not compensated by growth in 
the service sector and thus access to new employment opportunities had been scarce. 

The  following  is  a  more  general  overview  of  the  typical  challenges  URBAN  II  programmes  tried  to 
address.  

2.6.1   Physical challenges  

A number of characteristics defined the physical environment of the target areas for URBAN II, most often 
associated  with  the  decline  of  heavy  or  more  traditional  industries  leaving  a  legacy  of  derelict  or 
underused land and buildings, some with severe contamination problems.  

29

 
 
 
URBAN  II  target  areas  also  generally  suffered  from poor  quality  and  outdated  infrastructure  particularly 
that  related  to  roads,  rail  and  canals.  44%  of  the  programmes  were  located  in  more  peripheral  urban 
areas which tended to be more isolated, whether physically (i.e. geographically remote from other areas) 
or with a poor transport infrastructure. This meant that local residents were often disadvantaged in their 
ability 
immediate 
neighbourhood.  

to  access  key  services  or  potential  employment  opportunities  outside 

their 

Many programme areas had a lack of green and open space for local residents to undertake sporting or 
leisure  pursuits,  or  more  generally  a  lack  of  social  and  public  space.  This  characteristic  was  also 
substantiated in a European Commission initial review of the URBAN II programme areas,14 where only 
10.5% of the surface area of target areas could be accounted for by green space. 

Poor conditions in the social housing sector were a common feature across URBAN II programme areas 
with a focus on the problems of very high housing densities and overcrowding in some neighbourhoods. 
In other areas, URBAN II programme areas had problems of low demand for housing, because of unfit or 
undesirable properties which people tended to move away from.  

2.6.2   Economic challenges  

Many  programme  areas  were  facing  large-scale  ‘structural  difficulties’,  due  to  the  long-term  decline  of 
heavy or more traditional industries. This decline in what was often the main source of employment meant 
that  unemployment  levels  were  noticeably  higher  in  URBAN  II  programme  areas  than  in  surrounding 
areas  or  compared  to  regional  and  national  rates.  The  levels  of  unemployment  and  long-term 
unemployment were typically high across all programme areas, while economic activity and employment 
rates were normally low.  

According to the European Commission’s assessment15 of the 70 programme areas, 17% of the working-
age population were unemployed in 2000, compared to an EU average of around 8%. Furthermore, the 
average unemployment rate in target areas was higher than the whole-city average in all countries except 
Belgium and higher across all programmes by an average of 5.3% (see Table 2.5).  

Table 2.5  National unemployment rates 

Average 
unemployment 
rate in programme  
area (2000) 

Average  
unemployment  
rate in whole host city 
(2000) 

Average difference in 
unemployment 
between 
programme area and 
whole city 

15.0% 

12.2% 

15.0% 

5.1% 

0.0% 

+ 7.1% 

Country 
Belgium16 

Denmark 

14 Commission of the European Communities (2002) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘The Programming 
of the Structural Funds 2002-2006: An Initial Assessment of the URBAN Initiative’. 
15 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – An Initial Assessment of the URBAN Initiative (2002). 

16 Unemployment data for target area in Brussels was not available 

30

 
 
 
 
 
Average 
unemployment 
rate in programme  
area (2000) 

Average  
unemployment  
rate in whole host city 
(2000) 

Average difference in 
unemployment 
between 
programme area and 
whole city 

19.1% 

17.0% 

19.2% 

20.4% 

11.7% 

23.4% 

13.2% 

8.9% 

25.0% 

12.7% 

11.3% 

3.5% 

- 

15.9% 

11.2% 

15.8% 

9.8% 

- 

17.4% 

9.2% 

7.0% 

7.0% 

7.1% 

6.8% 

2.9% 

- 

+ 3.3% 

+ 5.8% 

+ 3.4% 

+ 10.6% 

- 

+ 7.0% 

+ 4.0% 

+ 1.9% 

+ 18.0% 

+ 5.6% 

+ 4.5% 

+ 0.6% 

+ 5.3% 

Country 

Germany 

Greece 

Spain 

France 
Ireland17 

Italy 

Netherlands 

Austria 

Portugal 

Finland 

Sweden 
UK18 

Overall 

Sources:  Programme  documents,  national  statistical  offices,  Eurostat,  Urban  Audit,  and  Assessment  of  the  Urban 
Initiative 

The  evidence  shows  that unemployment  levels  among  some  demographic  groups  were  especially  high 
within  the  programme  areas.  In  particular,  women,  younger  people  and  residents  from  minority  ethnic 
groups,  together  with  asylum  seekers  and  refugees,  were  over-represented  among  the  unemployed 
population. In a number of cases the unemployment rate in the programme areas was much higher than 
the  URBAN  II  average  of  17%.  For  example,  Mola  di  Bari,  Caserta  and  Crotone  in  Italy,  Perama  in 
Greece, Granada and S. Adria de Besos in Spain and Bordeaux in France all had unemployment rates 
above 25% in 2000.  

2.6.3  Social challenges  

Social exclusion was a key factor affecting the lives and opportunities of several key demographic groups 
in most of the URBAN II programme areas. Women, younger and older people, residents from minority 
ethnic  groups,  and  asylum  seekers  and  refugees  all  experienced  some  form  of  social  exclusion  or 
disadvantage.  Ethnic  minorities  accounted  for  15%  of  the  population  of  URBAN  II  areas  –  around  four 
times higher than the European average and more than double the figure for cities covered by the Urban 
Audit  (6%).  Brussels,  for  example,  had  a  particularly  high  immigrant  population,  comprising  59%  of  the 
target area’s total population.19  

17 Unemployment rate for Dublin agglomeration was not available 
18 Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) was used as a proxy for unemployment at both target area and city levels. Data for Scotland and 
Northern Ireland is not available 
19 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – An Initial Assessment of the URBAN Initiative (2002). 

31

 
 
 
 
 
Changing socio-demographic patterns were also a common feature. The following trends were identified 
in many programme areas: 

•  out-migration of the indigenous population from the programme area. 

• 

immigration of new minority ethnic population groups, asylum seekers and refugees, often to the most 
deprived parts of the target areas.  

•  polarised  population,  with  levels  of  both  younger  and  older  residents  above  regional  and  national 

averages. 

•  educational  attainment  levels  below  regional  and  national  averages,  as  well  as  high  drop  out  rates 

from school.  

•  high unemployment levels, low economic activity  levels, low skill and qualification levels and above 

national average levels of benefit dependency. 

Although anecdotal, there was also evidence to suggest that these changing socio-demographic patterns, 
together with the physical, economic and social problems, created social cohesion problems. Combined 
with the general levels of poverty and deprivation in the programme areas, these social cohesion issues 
were manifested in incidences of crime, drug and alcohol misuse and other anti-social behaviour. A few 
programme managers cited extremist problems; for example, terrorism as a serious issue in Bastia, and 
sectarian violence in North Belfast being a longstanding problem.  

The voluntary and community sector, which often provides key services to the local community, was weak 
in many of the programme areas and often unable to respond to local community needs. Many residents 
in the target areas were unable to access basic social services (such as health and wellbeing services), 
as well as more specific labour market or recreation and leisure-related services at local level. 

2.7 Strategies deployed by URBAN II programmes  

This  sub-section  highlights  the  types  of  approaches  adopted  by  the  various  URBAN  II  programmes  to 
tackle  and  overcome  the  problems  inherent  in  their  target  areas.  After  assessing  the  strategies  by 
examining their spend patterns, it looks at whether programmes adopted an integrated approach – a key 
original aim of URBAN II.  

2.7.1  Types of strategy by patterns of fund allocation  

A  starting  point  for  understanding  the  strategies  deployed  is  to  examine  the  allocation  of  funds  in 
programmes to the different regeneration themes. Table 2.6 shows the broad balance of strategies used 
by URBAN II programmes, based on the percentage of funds allocated to each of the themes20.  

20 Spend under information and communications technology (ICT) is included in the economic theme; transport 
and environmental spend is under the physical theme.  

32

 
 
 
 
Table 2.6  Thematic emphasis of URBAN II allocation at country level (% of ERDF allocated to each 
theme) 

Physical and 
environmental 
regeneration and 
transport 
infrastructure 

Sweden 

Denmark 

Ireland 

UK 

Germany  

Finland  

Netherlands 

Portugal 

Austria 

Greece 

France 

Belgium 

Italy 

Spain 

Average 

0% 

4.8% 

23.9% 

24.6% 

33.4% 

39.9% 

41.4% 

44.6% 

49% 

50.6% 

52% 

52.1% 

67.2% 

68.4% 

39% 

Social 

60.7% 

62.5% 

54.3% 

40.1% 

26.6% 

21.4% 

26.1% 

40.9% 

27.9% 

28.9% 

23.5% 

7.9% 

9.6% 

7.2% 

31% 

Economic 
regeneration and 
ICT 

Technical 
assistance 

31.2% 

27.3% 

18.7% 

27.4% 

27.7% 

29.7% 

26.4% 

10.4% 

19.4% 

16.9% 

20.2% 

34.3% 

14.8% 

19.7% 

23% 

8% 

5.2% 

3.1% 

4.8% 

5.3% 

8.8% 

5.9% 

3.8% 

3.5% 

7.1% 

4.1% 

5.5% 

6.0% 

4.5% 

5% 

Source:  ECOTEC  analysis  of  the  Annual  Implementation  Reports    NB:  Figures  do  not  equal  100  because  of 
rounding.  

Although  Table  2.6  is  helpful  in  understanding  the  broad  strategic  approaches  that  Member  States 
adopted,  it  does  not  show  the  variations  within  countries.  For  example,  one  programme  in  Portugal 
focused on the economic theme, even though the country’s overall average shows that the physical and 
social themes predominated at national level.  

A  cluster  analysis  was  a  useful  exercise  to  further  understand  programme  strategies  to  tackle  the 
challenges  highlighted  above.  This  analysis  (also  based  on  statistical  assessment  of  programme 
expenditure data) shows a typology of strategic approaches based around two key clusters21. Each was 
defined by the balance of spend allocated across the five main regeneration themes of URBAN II.22  

These groups are as follows:  

•  Cluster  1:  Focus  on  economic  and  social  regeneration  (but  also  with  some  spend  on  physical 
inclusion  and 

regeneration)  –  programmes  with  generally  high 

spend  on 

social 

21 The analysis explored a range of cluster groupings, the Interim Report highlighted six smaller clusters. For the 
purposes of the Final Report we present the two main meta-clusters.   
22 An econometric and hierarchical data clustering technique was used to decide which groups are most distant 
from each another. 

33

 
 
 
 
 
entrepreneurship/employment,  and  relatively  lower  spend  on  ICT  and  physical  and  environmental 
regeneration; the cluster contained 40 programmes.  

•  Cluster  2:  Physical  regeneration  (driven  by  physical  or  transport  priorities)  –  programmes  with  high 
inclusion  and 

low  spend  on  social 

spend  on  physical  environment,  and  a 
entrepreneurship/employment; the cluster contained 30 programmes. 

relatively 

2.7.2  Working across themes  

Programmes  generally  adopted  an  integrated  approach  to  regeneration.  13  of  the  15  case  study 
programmes showed signs of a holistic approach to their strategies. Stakeholders interviewed generally 
saw an integrated approach as a key characteristic of their programmes. The case studies also provided 
evidence  of  how  programmes  supported  projects  that  worked  across  the  three  themes,  with  projects  in 
one theme often supporting projects in another theme (see examples below).  

Case study examples: integration at programme level 

Gijon, Spain 

The  integration  of  physical,  economic  and  social  activities  was  designed  into  the  programme  from 
inception. The ‘integrated development path’, as it was known, resulted in key city council departments 
working together to deliver holistic regeneration projects. For example, a capital project to build a new 
waste  management  and  recycling  point  incorporated  public  space  for  community  events  and  training 
sessions  to  raise  awareness  of  environmental  issues.  In  addition,  the  physical  regeneration  of  three 
industrial  parks  included  economic  development  measures  to  stimulate  enterprise  development  and 
growth among resident small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  

Carrara, Italy 

The integration across themes in Carrara increased the programme’s overall impact, and led to positive 
perceptions of the programme by local residents. The improvement of bridges, piazzas and streets in the 
historic  centre  drove  the  subsequent  flourishing  of  economic  and  tourism  activity.  Marble  (a  key  local 
natural  resource)  was  used  to  regenerate  the  physical  environment  and  promote  cultural  regeneration 
through the XII Biannual International Sculpture Exhibition.  

Rotterdam, Netherlands 

Key  stakeholders  worked  collaboratively  to  tackle  particular  problems  in  three  geographically  well-
defined neighbourhoods. For example, a capital-intensive project to refurbish retail outlets in the target 
area  included  parallel  activities  such  as  training  shopkeepers  on  safety  issues  to  help  address  public 
fears  over  crime  and  anti-social  behaviour.  Activities  to  improve  public  areas  have  also  resulted  in 
various  social  and  economic  outcomes,  including  youth  facilities,  a  dedicated  cycle  path  for  learner-
riders, and public art exhibitions designed to encourage tourism in the target area. 

Further evidence from the case studies showed that: 

•  The  integration  agenda  already  existed  in  8  of  the  14  Member  States  involved  in  URBAN  II  - 
regeneration practitioners were already using an integrated approach prior to 2001. For example, in 
the  Netherlands,  the  integration  of  economic,  social  and  physical  objectives  was  not  considered  a 

34

 
 
 
 
new concept, as the National Large City Programme was already seen as a beacon of good practice 
in  promoting  holistic  regeneration.  In  the  UK,  the  Single  Regeneration  Budget  (a  national 
regeneration fund) also promoted regeneration in its widest sense.   

•  Where  integration  did  not  exist,  there  was  usually  a  good  reason  –  URBAN  II  programmes  focusing 
heavily  on  a  particular  theme  were  often  part  of  a  wider  programme  (contributing  a  physical 
dimension to a larger, multifaceted, city-wide programme). For example, the URBAN II programme in 
Halifax  in  the  UK  mainly  focused  on  economic  development;  this  was  intentional,  as  there  was 
another regeneration fund supporting mostly physical and social regeneration projects.  

2.7.3  Alignment with Objective 1 and 2 programmes 

URBAN II programmes worked well in conjunction with Objective 1 and 2 programmes, where the cities 
concerned  were  eligible  for  support  under  the  Structural  Funds,  as  in  the  following  examples  from  the 
case studies. However, in two case studies (Rotterdam and Le Havre), even though they targeted similar 
spatial areas there was no synergy between URBAN II and the mainstream Structural Funds programme, 
which  were  treated  as  entirely  separate  in  terms  of  how  they  were  run  and  their  overall  management 
processes. This was down to the programmes focusing on different strands of the regeneration agenda.     

Case study examples: alignment with Objective 1 and 2 

In Graz, Bristol, Leipzig and Carrara, the existence of an Objective 1 and 2 programmes proved to be 
highly positive. The two initiatives linked up to jointly fund activities and avoid duplication of activity. 

In  Bristol,  the  URBAN  II  management  team  was  placed  within  the  same  council  department  that  was 
managing  Objective  2.  This  strategic  decision  helped  to  ensure  ‘joined  up’  programmes  and  led  to 
shared experience and approaches across key management and finance team personnel, especially in 
areas  such  as  monitoring  technicalities.  There  was  close  liaison  and  coordination  between  URBAN  II 
and  the  Bristol  Objective  2  Action  Plan,  including  cross-referring  project  proposals  and  ensuring  that 
European Commission spend was not duplicated between the two programmes.  

One  project,  Archimedia  (which  has  won  a  number  of  national  and  regional  awards),  received 
investment from both Objective 2 and URBAN II, for different project elements. EU project management 
expertise was also shared between the two programmes. 

Carrara operated a close strategic alignment between the two programmes. URBAN II was regarded as 
a  tool  for  targeting  local  regeneration  needs,  and  Objective  2  as  a  means  of  tackling  economic 
conditions within the broader region. This approach was seen to work well with the two funding streams 
having a clear remit in terms of geography and target groups.       

2.7.4  Strategic approaches at project level 

Although URBAN II supported a wide variety of projects, they can be analysed under the three broad 
themes of the programmes (see Table 2.7). 

35

 
 
 
 
Table 2.7  Key characteristics of projects funded through URBAN II under the three main themes 

Physical 

Economic 

Social 

About a third of the projects aimed 
to improve public space, ranging 
from improving green space in 
deprived neighbourhoods through to 
major construction in city centres.  

About a fifth of projects focused on 
supporting business growth. Most 
supported high-growth businesses, 
to help local economies to ‘reinvent’ 
themselves in new industrial sectors 
and move away from over-reliance 
on declining ones.  

tackle 

unemployment 

Most  programmes  contained  projects 
and 
to 
worklessness.  As  most  target  areas 
had  very  high  unemployment  levels, 
they 
this  primary 
tackle 
problem head-on through investing in 
training,  workforce 
projects 
development,  education  and  skills 
enhancement. 

tried 

for 

to 

About a quarter of projects aimed to 
bring redundant buildings back into 
use. Many were old 
industrial/commercial buildings left 
over from the industrial past of the 
programme areas. Buildings were 
refurbished for a variety of uses, 
from new commercial premises 
through to new arts and cultural 
venues.  

About a quarter of physical 
regeneration projects were related 
to infrastructure investments. These 
tended to be road-building 
schemes, but cycle path 
construction was also a popular 
project type. 

About 10% of projects related to site 
preparation. Projects such as land 
decontamination and site assembly 
helped to stimulate further 
investments and lay the foundation 
for private sector-led regeneration 
activity.  

ICT-related projects  included ICT 
infrastructure in schools and 
community centres, and, 
particularly, improving ICT 
capabilities in small businesses.  

Many projects retrained people 
employed in older (declining) 
industries, while others helped local 
people to access job opportunities 
in emerging new industries.  

About a quarter of projects addressed 
health issues including projects 
aimed at  reducing the number of 
smokers through to interventions 
encouraging healthier eating and 
tackling  drug usage.  

About 10% of programmes had 
projects that dealt with 
underemployment as opposed to 
unemployment. These projects 
often targeted people who were in 
work but on low incomes.  

Almost half of the programmes 
supported projects that addressed 
crime issues, with a relatively large 
number of drug-related projects and 
interventions with an emphasis on 
anti-social behaviour.  

About a third of programmes had 
projects for capacity building and 
strengthening the voluntary and 
community sector. Projects supported 
these organisations to grow and 
develop and become more robust 
and sustainable, so that they could 
effectively deliver support for local 
communities.  

Many projects targeted specific 
groups in deprived communities. Key 
groups included women, ethnic 
minorities and (to a lesser extent) 
young people. Projects therefore 
seemed to prioritise the hardest to 
reach in the target communities.  

2.7.5  Reasons behind different strategies  

Various  factors  influenced  strategies  and  approaches  that  URBAN  II  programmes  and  projects  used  to 
address urban decline. The main drivers covered four areas:  

•  Neighbourhood  need  –  the needs  of  neighbourhoods  and  their communities  was  fundamental  to  the 
type of response of URBAN II programmes. Programmes focused on the economic theme tended to 
have  target  areas  suffering  from  economic  decline,  while  programmes  addressing  physical  renewal 
had target areas with high levels of physical degradation. 

36

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  The  national  regeneration  agenda  –  where  a  national  regeneration  policy’s  main  emphasis  was  on 
physical regeneration, the URBAN II programme often mirrored this approach. In the UK, for instance, 
the  emphasis  among  URBAN  II  programmes  was  on  social  inclusion  issues,  partly  because  of  a 
strong  emphasis  at  national  government  policy  level  (the  National  Strategy  for  Neighbourhood 
Renewal) to tackle neighbourhood deprivation through social (as opposed to physical) regeneration. 
In  Spain,  the  national  agenda  was  more  biased  towards  physical  change,  which  in  turn  influenced 
how URBAN II programmes addressed problems and allocated funding.  

•  The  local  regeneration  agenda  –  Vienna  concentrated  its  URBAN  II  funds  on  converting  the 
Rinderhalle  (cattle  hall),  because  this  was  a  flagship  and  catalytic  project  in  the  local  regeneration 
strategy.  In  Spain,  local  regeneration  plans  in  Granada  focused  on  physically  regenerating  the  city 
core  to  stimulate  an  increase  in  tourism  and  a  knock-on  effect  for  employment  opportunities  for 
deprived areas. Granada’s URBAN II programme mirrored this key objective, again influenced by an 
existing local regeneration plan. 

•  Gaps in funding – URBAN II funds were sometimes used to fill funding gaps in existing regeneration 
plans, or to add an extra dimension to target neighbourhoods’ regeneration plans which were not then 
being implemented because finance was not available.  

Overall, the needs of the urban areas were the main driver shaping URBAN II programmes. However, our 
desk research suggests that the focus of about a quarter of URBAN II programmes did not directly align 
with the needs and problems of the programme area. Some areas with problems of high unemployment 
did  not  have projects  that assisted  people  back  into  work.  Similarly,  programmes with  target  areas  that 
had  low  levels  of  school  attainment  did  not  always  have  projects  including  educational  activities.  Most 
programme managers stated  that  the  links between  urban  problems and  solutions  were often  complex, 
and  that  a  focus  on  physical  interventions  was  also  intended  to  address  a  wide  range  of  social  and 
economic  issues  (for  instance,  the  construction  of  a  community  facility  to  provide  neighbourhood 
childcare provision).  

2.7.6  Continuity of strategic approaches  

The evaluation also explored whether there were differences between what programmes intended to do 
and  what  happened  in  reality.  This  sub-section  assesses  whether  programmes  drifted  away  from  their 
original plans, and explains the reasons behind any changes.  

Programmes  reported  very  few  fundamental  shifts  from  their  original  plans.  Of  the  15  case  studies,  14 
stayed true to the aims and objectives developed at the start of the programme. Most put this down to a 
good  understanding  of  what  was  wrong  with  the  target  area  at  the  beginning  of  the  programme  and 
therefore what issues they needed to focus on. Despite changes to socio-economic conditions over the 
lifetime of URBAN II, these initial and fundamental challenges remained constant throughout the delivery 
period, which in turn led to consistent and stable programme objectives.  

Where changes occurred, this was more at project level. Sometimes, projects as originally developed did 
not come to fruition or were altered for various reasons. The following examples illustrate factors affecting 
project-level changes. 

37

 
 
 
Case study examples: changes to strategic approaches at project level 

•  Changing socio-economic conditions – in Halifax, the original plans were to develop projects to tackle 
rising  unemployment,  but  as  economic  conditions  improved  and  worklessness  became  less  of  an 
issue these projects were scaled down and replaced with business support interventions.  

•  Natural  disasters  –  large-scale  floods  in  Carrara  in  2003  led  the  programme  to  drop  some  longer 
term  projects  and  turn  its  attention  to  more  urgent  rebuilding  that  was  needed.  Similarly,  after  the 
Italian  earthquakes  URBAN  II  funds  were  redirected  to  make  people  more  aware  of  imminent 
earthquake danger.  

•  Political change – in Rotterdam, the 2002 murder of a key politician led to elections that brought in a 
new coalition which strongly promoted tackling crime and community safety. This led to an increase 
in the amount of resources the URBAN II programme funded in this area.  

•  Changes because of a review – two of the case studies changed the emphasis of projects because of 
a mid-term evaluation or internal review. Le Havre and Dortmund revisited their projects at this stage 
and found some to be underperforming. As a result, they either stopped or realigned them.  

2.8 Conclusions – URBAN II programme characteristics and strategies  

Evaluation findings from Section 2 based on the terms of reference questions are as follows:    

What  were  the  methods  Member  States  used  to  choose  their  areas?.  How  relevant  was  this 
method and choice? 

Three main methods, ranging from open competition to restricted and closed calls, with the first two being 
most common. Although areas were often selected because they were deprived (and therefore most in 
need)  other  considerations  included  targeting  areas  that  had  not  received  funding  from  other  sources 
(almost as compensation) and a focus less deprived areas (with more opportunity for revival with smaller 
amounts of URBAN funds). There was no evidence to suggest that a particular selection method was any 
better than another when it came to the levels of outputs or impacts achieved.      

What were the main challenges of URBAN II areas and what were the key features of the strategies 
deployed to tackle them? 

All programmes were in areas suffering significant economic, social and physical problems. Although all 
had different local contexts, and within these a wide  range of challenges, many programmes dealt with 
the  symptoms  of  de-industrialisation  (vacant  land,  high  unemployment,  poor  business  growth  and  the 
associated social problems).  

Derived from their approaches and strategies to tackle this complex group of problems, the programmes 
could be grouped into two large clusters:  

-  a  social  and  economic  regeneration  group  consisting  of  40  programmes  (programmes  with  generally 
high spend on social inclusion and entrepreneurship/employment and lower spend on ICT and physical 
and environmental regeneration, although some did have significant budgets in this area) 

38

 
 
 
 
-  a  physical  regeneration  group  consisting  of  30  programmes(programmes with  high  spend  on  physical 
environment and lower spend on social inclusion and entrepreneurship/employment). 

Was there a gap between theory and practice?  Was URBAN experienced as a solution to the most 
pressing problems 'on the ground'. 

Any gaps were relatively minor. As they progressed through their delivery period, programmes tended to 
‘tweak’ their activities rather than fundamentally alter them from their original plans. Despite socio-
economic conditions changing over the lifetime of URBAN II, the initial major challenges identified at the 
beginning of the programmes life remained constant throughout the delivery period, which in turn led to 
consistent and stable programme objectives. However, examples highlighted in this section and others in 
the case studies show that programmes did respond to emerging issues and changes to their target 
areas and target populations when required. URBAN II also tended to respond to the most pressing 
problems in target areas and was used by cities to tackle large scale and fundamental local challenges 
that had tended to exist in programmes areas for some time.  

How successful has the integrated approach promoted through URBAN II been? 

The impacts of adopting an integrated approach on the level of outputs achieved was less obvious. There 
was  no  evidence  to  clearly  show  that  a  programme  adopting  an  integrated  approach  achieved  more 
outputs or hit more targets, compared to programmes that were less integrated. However, stakeholders 
felt that integration promoted a better use of resources (as partners often joined up funding to tackle one 
single  problem)  and  less  duplication  which  in  turn  helped  generate  better  outcomes  for  the  project  in 
question.   Programmes  also  recognised  that  the  root  causes  of  a  problem  such  as  poor  health  were 
related to physical (poor housing) and economic drivers (access to services and appropriate medication), 
rather  than  simply  about  health  circumstances.  This  was  a  further  benefit  of  the  integrated  approach 
which promoted links between the different themes. However, actually how much this improvement in the 
delivery of the programmes increased levels of, for example, jobs created or businesses supported was 
difficult to quantify. These issues are covered in more detail in Section 3 and 4 of this report.   

39

 
 
 
3.0  Review of Outputs, Results and Impacts of 

URBAN II 

3.1 Introduction 

This section reviews the outputs, results and impacts of URBAN II based on data from the 2006 Annual 
Implementation  Reports  (AIRs)  and  information  from  the  15  case  studies.  It  identifies  how  programme 
areas have changed and explores the extent to which URBAN II programmes were a driver. The outputs, 
results and impacts of URBAN II are presented under the three themes - physical, economic and social - 
and the factors that underpinned the achievements of URBAN II are highlighted. 

The  evidence  informing  this  section  is  both  qualitative  and  quantitative.  The  AIRs  provided  the 
quantitative  information  as  they  recorded  the  output,  result  and  impact  indicators  from  monitoring  data 
collected by individual programmes23. The qualitative evidence comes from the case studies, which was a 
rich  source  of  information  on  impacts  that  were  not  necessarily  measured  or  picked  up  through  any 
monitoring  or  evaluation  process.  Most  of  the  main  impacts  and  benefits  identified  by  case  study 
consultees were non-quantifiable, or not quantified, and not recorded in any of the AIR documentation we 
reviewed. Hence the case studies were a strong source for this section. 

3.2 Summary of key findings   

•  We found evidence of positive change in 13 of the 15 case study programme areas over the period 
of  URBAN  II,  and  the  majority  of  local  stakeholders  felt  that  programme  areas  had  generally  got 
better. Positive change was identified through improved performance in relation to economic, health, 
crime, education and other data. There was also evidence of, the improved physical appearance of 
neighbourhoods, and also improvements such as a new image and increased business confidence 
which are difficult to measure (or were not measured).  

•  URBAN II tended not to be the main driver of change, but was one of a number of reasons for areas 
generally improving. URBAN II supported successful projects that were well received and achieved 
high  levels  of  outputs,  but  this  did  not  necessarily  lead  to  any  obvious,  or  at  least  measured, 
improvements in deep-seated deprivation. 

•  The intensity of URBAN II, in terms of financial and geographical scope, set against the scale of the 
issues  facing  programme  areas,  was  often  the  main  reason  why  URBAN  II  was  not  seen  as  a 
principal driver of change. 

•  Despite this, most stakeholders viewed the programmes in a positive light and deemed URBAN II a 
success  –  partly  because  they  never  expected  URBAN  II  to  fundamentally  reverse  long-term 
decline,  but  also  because  the  programmes  supported  a  wide  range  of  largely  successful  projects 
that helped to address economic, social and physical development.  

23 The AIRs were the most up-to-date source of programme information at the time of our evaluation, but their timing means that 

they  will  not  have  gathered  evidence  on  all  the  programme  results  and  impacts.  This  needs  to  be  borne  in  mind  when 

considering the progress of URBAN II programmes.  

40

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Stakeholders  highlighted  the  URBAN  II  ‘method’  as  the  key  impact  and  benefit,  more  than  the 
funding  itself.  Although  the  funding  supported  strong  projects,  local  stakeholders  saw  URBAN  II 
'methods'  including  the  promotion  of  integration,  its  flexibility,  its  partnership  building  and  its  local 
agenda as the main impacts and also the main legacy. Stakeholders saw URBAN II funding as a key 
way to encourage urban development practitioners to embed these new types of working and as a 
tool that stimulated cities to approach their regeneration agendas in different ways. The URBAN II 
'method'  is  also  dealt  with  in  Section  4  of  this  report  which  looks  at  implementation  and  delivery 
issues.   

•  The  scale  of  outputs  and  impacts  achieved  shows  that  programmes  supported  a  range  of  varied 
activities which had an impact on a whole host of issues connected with urban decline. Even though 
it is difficult to aggregate data (mainly because programmes could decide upon their own indicators 
for  monitoring  purposes)  there  are  many  quantified  outputs  for  improved  physical,  social  and 
economic circumstances. Some of the key headline figures relating to URBAN II outputs include 982 
training projects with 64,801 training places, 3.2 million sq m of green space created, 372 restoration 
projects, 593 community capacity building projects and 5,984 business support interventions.  

•  Most programmes made an initial study of their challenges through detailed baseline assessments. 
These varied in coverage and some were updated to provide an ongoing information and knowledge 
base.  In  many  cases  there are  good linkages  between  the  challenges,  the  programme  strategies 
and  the  projects, thus  demonstrating  a  logical  process.  However,  programme  monitoring  and 
evaluation systems designed to capture changes in the programme area and the impact of URBAN 
II were patchy, and very poor in some cases.   

3.3 Changes within the programme areas 

Table 3.1 shows that most programme areas experienced some positive socio-economic changes, with 
13 out of 15 case study areas seeing a general improvement over the timeframe of URBAN II. Although 
some of this change manifested itself in statistics (e.g. educational attainment, health levels): it was also 
evidenced  through  the  perspectives  of  stakeholders,  many  of  whom  perceived  that  their  areas  looked 
better, communities felt safer, traffic congestion had fallen, the area’s image had improved or businesses 
felt  more  confident.  Many  of  these  changes  were  not  quantified  and  where  changes  could  have  been  
measured additional primary research would have been required (something that most programmes did 
not do).   

41

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1  Changes and drivers in URBAN II programme areas 

Case study 
area 

Arhus  

How the programme area changed during URBAN II  

Was the URBAN II programme a driver of change? 

There have been positive changes in respect of participation in 
leisure and cultural activities and in crime reduction. The 
employment rate remained unchanged, standing at 47% between 
2000 and 2004. The share of residents with a post-compulsory 
school education or higher showed a small improvement (from 53% 
to 54%), while the percentage of young people involved in leisure 
and cultural activities also showed progress (up from 50% to 68%). 
The most positive change has been in reducing the incidence of 
crime relative to other similar areas (it fell from 65 to 52 per 10,000 
population).  

On the basis of the available evidence, URBAN II was 
generally not regarded as a key driver of change in 
terms of socio-economic conditions. However, the 
evidence suggests that the programme had a positive 
impact on reducing crime (18% of funding was devoted to 
this). Key stakeholders commented that crime levels fell at 
a faster rate relative to other similar areas. The programme 
was a key driver of change in improving perceptions of the 
area among local organisations, the local council and, 
crucially, residents. A resident survey revealed that the 
majority felt more positive things were happening in the 
area (66% of respondents); the area’s prospects were 
looking brighter (64%); and there were more opportunities 
than at the start of the programme (73%). 

Bristol 

Carrara 

Two key areas showing notable change over the course of 
URBAN II were educational achievement and crime levels. The 
number of pupils in the programme area achieving five A*-C GCSE 
grades doubled between 2005 and 2007. In the neighbourhood of 
Hartcliffe and Withywood, the proportion rose from 20.8% to 45.1%  
and for the neighbourhood of Knowle West from 15.3% to 32.1% 
over the programme period. This change compared favourably with 
the results for Bristol, which over the same period saw an increase 
from 35.3% to 45.6%. The crime statistics suggest an improvement 
towards the end of the programme, with total crime falling by 16% in 
Hartcliffe and Withywood and 28% in Knowle West, compared with 
just 6% in the city overall.  

The case study evidence indicates that URBAN II was 
a key driver of change for educational attainment and 
crime levels. A number of key stakeholders were 
convinced that URBAN II had contributed to conditions 
fostering better educational attainment by raising young 
people’s aspirations and encouraging them to achieve 
academically. The picture is more complicated for crime 
levels because of challenges in isolating and quantifying 
the contribution of URBAN II to reducing crime. However, 
stakeholders perceived that improvements in crime 
statistics can be linked to raised expectations and new 
facilities for young people, supported by URBAN II. 

Stakeholders commented that the main change evident was the 
reversal in the process of decay, which has created the basis 
for the urban renaissance of the programme area. Improvements 
to the physical infrastructure, including an urban bypass, and the 
restoration of areas damaged by a flood (2003) were the most 
apparent changes. Updated statistics demonstrating how the 
programme area has changed was lacking, although figures 
provided by the Management Authority indicate that dust pollution 

The existence of other urban regeneration strategies 
and funding regimes in Carrara meant that URBAN II’s 
role was important but not the main driver. URBAN II 
provided the funds to help reverse the process of decay 
and restore areas damaged by the flood, and to prepare 
for future urban renaissance. The physical revitalisation of 
the centre of Carrara supported by URBAN II was felt to 
have been particularly important in stimulating an increase 

42

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 
area 

Crotone 

Dortmund  

Gijon 

How the programme area changed during URBAN II  

Was the URBAN II programme a driver of change? 

fell by 32% and transit of heavy goods vehicles through the historic 
centre by 22%.  

Stakeholders felt that it was difficult to see any real changes 
over the period of the URBAN II programme. The limited statistics 
that are available show that the area has continued to be one of the 
worst in Italy (although the figures are at the city level). Stakeholders 
were hesitant to pinpoint any real areas of improvement.  

Although socio-economic indicators suggest that conditions 
have worsened from the original baseline situation, the 
management team pointed out that the Nordstadt is now a more 
attractive place to live and that local facilities have been 
improved. Depopulation was still a particular issue (the population 
of the Nordstadt fell by 2.6% between 2000 and 2008 compared with 
0.8% in Dortmund as a whole), as was the creation of new 
employment opportunities (although new jobs were created in the 
programme area, they were more than offset by job losses over the 
course of the programme). Also, in both the Nordstadt and 
Dortmund, long-term unemployed people accounted for a larger 
proportion of all unemployed people in 2008 than in 2000.  

Stakeholders regarded the main changes to be improvements 
in the programme area’s physical appearance and the recovery 
and growth of the economy. Key changes include the regeneration 
of industrial sites (which have been converted into residential areas) 
and the creation of new green areas and public spaces. Key 
changes from the baseline position included a reduction in the 
unemployment rate in the URBAN II area, down from 18% to 14% in 
2006 (a 4.3% reduction compared with 3.1% across Gijon as a 
whole). Equally, the percentage of people applying for a licence to 
start a business also showed improvement (rising from 15% in 2001 
to 25% in 2006), as did the percentage of local residents with tertiary 
or upper secondary educational attainment (up from 20.5% in 2002 
to 33.1% in December 2004).  

in commercial, productive and tourism activity.  

URBAN II does not seem to have acted as a driver of 
change in socio-economic conditions. Stakeholders 
doubted that the programme brought about any real or 
meaningful changes in addressing the area’s problems, 
because of its limitations in scale and the fixed term nature 
of the programme. 

URBAN II brought about changes that were unlikely to 
have occurred in the absence of EU funding support. 
Where change was evident (improved public spaces, 
buildings and services and facilities), URBAN II was 
regarded as a key driver; stakeholders commented that the 
majority of projects would not otherwise have taken place. 
URBAN II has also helped to develop economic structures 
and social support networks that are likely to assist future 
development and improve community cohesion.  

Key stakeholders perceived that the URBAN II 
programme was one of several drivers of change, but 
played an important role in improving urban public 
space in the western part of Gijón, which in turn has 
led to a substantial increase in residents’ standard of 
living. Stakeholders also commented on the rate of 
change in local socio-economic conditions as a key factor 
as to why they believed URBAN II had driven change – 
which was felt to be more significant in the URBAN II area 
compared to other parts of the city.  

Graz 

Stakeholders perceived a major physical transformation in the 
URBAN II area (including a new transport hub, railway 

There is little evidence to suggest that URBAN II acted 
as a key driver of change in socio-economic 

43

 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 
area 

Halifax 

Le Havre 

How the programme area changed during URBAN II  

Was the URBAN II programme a driver of change? 

underpass, library and crèche). Quantitative data to substantiate 
changes as compared to baseline conditions was generally lacking. 
However, despite large scale physical improvements, there was 
some evidence of depopulation between 2000 and 2006 (compared 
to 8% growth in the city as a whole), explained by people not 
wanting to live in the neighbourhood and choosing to move out 
whenever possible. Unemployment rate grew by 0.8% between 
2000 and 2008 (a slower rate than for the city as a whole).  

conditions in Graz; other external issues have been 
important in stimulating change. Stakeholders perceived 
that without URBAN II, some redevelopment work would 
have taken place, but at a much slower rate and less 
strategic in focus. Consultees also agreed that the 
prospects for future development had been greatly 
enhanced as a direct result of URBAN II investments to 
improve the business infrastructure (for example, high 
profile businesses are starting to move into the area). 

Socio-economic conditions in Halifax improved between 2000 
and 2007. The unemployment rate in the URBAN II area fell from 
6.5% in 2000 to 4.7% in 2007. This fall of 1.8% was higher than in 
surrounding Calderdale, which saw a drop of just 0.4% over the 
same period. The proportion of long-term unemployed people also 
fell sharply, from 21% in 2000 to 13% in 2007. In education, the 
percentage of pupils obtaining five or more GCSEs at grades A*-C 
increased from 28% in 2000 to 50% in 2007. The weakest area of 
performance over the course of the programme was in stimulating 
new enterprise development in the programme area. 

It is difficult to isolate URBAN II’s role in driving 
change in Halifax, because of the Single Regeneration 
Budget (SRB) programme which ran over the same 
period. However, stakeholders stated that key indicators 
such as unemployment have improved at a faster rate 
within the programme area than in other comparable areas 
because of the existence of URBAN II. They therefore 
regarded it as a key factor (along with the SRB 
programme) in driving change as compared to baseline 
conditions.  

The most apparent changes related to physical regeneration of 
the programme area, particularly new public and private sector 
housing. The picture was mixed regarding changes in socio-
economic conditions. While unemployment rates had reduced, youth 
and long-term unemployment remain a key problem (25% of the 
total of unemployed people were 25 or younger and 33% were long-
term unemployed). However, more positive was the growth in the 
number of companies located in the URBAN II area, which rose by 
21% over the period 2000-2008 compared with growth of 14% in Le 
Havre as a whole. 

The evidence strongly supports the assertion that 
URBAN II has been a key driver of (positive) change, 
most prominently in catalysing physical regeneration 
of the programme area. Key stakeholders were keen to 
point out that URBAN II was a key driver in enabling the 
Managing Authority to lever in additional private sector 
investment (every euro invested through URBAN II was 
matched by more than €10 of private investment). This 
enabled the programme to have a much greater impact in 
the target area than initially envisaged. It was also 
highlighted that in the absence of URBAN II, a number of 
additional spin-off benefits (such as the relocation of three 
universities, a private hospital and the Chamber of 
Commerce) would not have taken place.  

Le Mantois 

The main changes relate to improvements in physical 
appearance and infrastructure. The target areas have changed in 
their housing offer, with existing social housing being improved and 
new housing created. They also changed aesthetically, with 

As URBAN II resources were integrated into a much 
broader pot of regeneration funding (ERDF 
represented only 10% of the total budget), it is difficult 
to say that the programme played an important role in 

44

 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 
area 

Leipzig 

Perama 

How the programme area changed during URBAN II  

Was the URBAN II programme a driver of change? 

stakeholders commenting on improvements to green and other 
public spaces as well as to public services. However, the 
programme area has fared poorly compared to the French average 
in terms of changes to baseline conditions. For example, the 
employment rate remained well below the French average of 63% in 
2006, while the unemployment rate was again well above the French 
average of 12% in 2006.  

Neighbourhoods differed in terms of changes over the course 
of the programme. For example, Plagwitz performed very well and 
has developed a role as a fashionable neighbourhood for young 
artists, start-ups and students. The total number of businesses 
increased between 2000 and 2007, with a 54% rise in Plagwitz. 
However, Lindenau and Altlindenau performed less well and saw a 
decrease in employment levels over the course of the programme. 
Between 2000 and 2007, the unemployment rate in the programme 
area increased by 21%, with long-term unemployment up to almost 
50% of the total (compared with the city average of 45%). Lindenau 
and Altlindenau saw the main increases in unemployment.  

Statistical information to show changes to baseline conditions 
over the course of the programme was not available. However, 
stakeholders commented that the programme area changed for the 
better in terms of physical regeneration. The main changes were 
improvements to public squares and the creation of the new 
maritime museum and open air theatre. This was thought to have 
stimulated a change in commercial activity in the areas surrounding 
the squares and increased tourism through the museum and theatre. 
The issue of social exclusion was also tackled (by providing new and 
additional social services), although there is no exclusion-related 
data to suggest how matters have actually changed.  

driving change. Key stakeholders mostly commented on 
how URBAN II funding helped to change the image and 
physical appearance of the programme area. By driving 
these changes (particularly in the physical environment), 
URBAN II was regarded as a key element in creating the 
building blocks for future development, particularly in 
improving socio-economic conditions compared to baseline 
statistics.  

Whilst the severe socio-economic conditions in 
Leipzig’s programme areas restricted change, URBAN 
II has helped to start the process of recovery and 
improvement. As a result of the €19m spent through 
URBAN II, a further €127m from national government and 
private investors was released. In neighbourhoods where 
more change was evident (such as Plagwitz), URBAN II 
funded activities that built on existing activities within the 
local economy therefore reinforcing further development.  

On the evidence available, URBAN II cannot be 
considered a key driver of change in socio-economic 
conditions in Perama. URBAN II funds were used to 
create new and additional social services in the 
programme area in order to tackle social exclusion. But 
how far these new services have impacted on socio-
economic conditions and therefore acted as a key driver of 
change is not clear. However, stakeholders regarded 
URBAN II as a catalyst of change in the physical 
appearance of the programme area.  

Porto 
Gondomar 

Statistical information to provide a clear picture of any socio-
economic changes in the programme area is lacking. 
Stakeholders found it difficult to identify any key changes because 
the problems are so deep-seated, being linked to de-industrialisation 
(i.e. unemployment) and an unbalanced economic base. However, 
noticeable physical improvements have been made to public spaces 
and to the public services on offer to local residents (e.g. 

URBAN II has not been a key driver of change in socio-
economic conditions. Other national regeneration and 
development programmes existed during the life of 
URBAN II, which makes it harder to isolate the role of 
URBAN II. However, URBAN II helped to establish a 
programme of physical regeneration in the target area, as 
a result of which derelict neighbourhoods have better 

45

 
 
 
 
 
 
How the programme area changed during URBAN II  

Was the URBAN II programme a driver of change? 

access, new and improved street furniture and green 
spaces, improved facades and better equipped youth 
centres. Alongside the physical projects, the programme 
also improved access to services for those most at risk, 
such as elderly people, school children and drug addicts.  

Although it is not possible to clearly identify the role 
played by the programme in improving socio-
economic conditions in the programme area, it has 
driven change regarding some of the most pressing 
issues. The most obvious area where URBAN II 
encouraged change is in improving physical appearance 
and infrastructure. It has also clearly played a role in 
addressing crime and safety and social exclusion issues.  

URBAN II did not acted as a key driver of change in 
socio-economic conditions in Sambreville. For 
example, although URBAN II funded economic measures 
aimed at improving employability prospects and creating 
job opportunities for local residents, the unemployment 
rate fell at the same rate as that in Belgium overall.  

Case study 
area 

Rotterdam 

educational, cultural and sporting activities). 

Quantitative evidence to show how the programme areas have 
changed is lacking. The most apparent changes relate to physical 
appearance, including improvements to public spaces, renovation of 
the railway station and other transport improvements. While a 
number of economic measures related to the support of local 
businesses performed well, evidence to indicate how socio-
economic conditions have changed since the baseline analysis is 
again limited. The only other change relates to an improvement in 
public perceptions on crime and safety issues.  

Sambreville  Updated baseline analysis indicators do not suggest any 

significant improvement in socio-economic conditions. The 
strongest area of performance related to unemployment, with the 
unemployment rate in Sambreville decreasing by 2.9% between 
2001 and 2008 and the percentage of people classified as long-term 
unemployed decreasing by around 10% between 2001 and 2008 
(from 68.5% to 62%). However, other socio-economic indicators 
deteriorated over the course of the programme. For example, the 
number of active companies decreased by 13.8% between 2001 and 
2007 (from 1,358 to 1,170). The percentage of crimes per 1,000 
inhabitants increased by 21.8% between 1999 and 2003 (from 7.2 to 
8.7) compared with a decrease of 11.4% in Belgium overall. The 
number of beneficiaries on welfare benefits as a percentage of the 
population increased from 10.8% to 12.8% over the same period.  

46

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That broader and external issues dominated the local effects of URBAN II is illustrated by comparing the 
unemployment rates of URBAN II programme areas with those of the wider city. Table 3.2 shows data for 
the  37  programmes  where  reliable  unemployment  figures  for  the  programme  area  and  host  city  are 
available from 2000-2006. Unemployment rates in programme areas were strongly influenced by trends 
in the parent cities, with the 37 cases showing that percentage change figures for programme area and 
host  city  were  similar.  This  again  points  to  macro-economic  changes  at  city  (or  regional  and  national) 
level being greater influences on the economic position of URBAN II programme areas than the activities 
of the URBAN II programmes.  

47

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2  Unemployment for URBAN II programme areas compared to host cities 

Unemployme
nt rate of 
URBAN II 
area 2000 

Unemployment 
rate of URBAN 
II area 2006 

Change in 
area 
unemployment 
rate between 
2000 and 2006 

Unemployment 
of city in 2000 

Unemployment 
of city in 2006 

Change in 
unemployment 
between 2000 
and 2006 

Unemployment 
difference 
(URBAN II-
City) (2000) 

Unemployme
nt difference 
(URBAN II-
City) (2006) 

Change in 
difference 
(2000-
2006) 

de 

26.9% 

16.3% 

-10.6% 

9.6% 

6.7% 

City 

S.Adria 
Besos 

Dortmund  

26.5% 

26.7% 

20.4% 

Kassel  

Mannheim-
Ludwigshafe 

Clichy-
Montfermeil 

31.6% 

24.5% 

23.9% 

5.1% 

-2.2% 

3.5% 

14.1% 

16.2% 

10.3% 

18.1% 

18.4% 

10.3% 

19.1% 

22.6% 

3.5% 

9.3% 

8.1% 

Ballyfermot 

11.7% 

Arhus  

Dessau 

Jaen  

12.2% 

27% 

25% 

Amsterdam 

15.1% 

Grigny/Viry 

14.1% 

Göteborg 

Kiel  

Vienna 

Pamplona  

11.3% 

14.4% 

9.3% 

12% 

Rotterdam  

13.6% 

Heerlen 

Graz  

11% 

8.4% 

9.7% 

11.9% 

22.2% 

18.5% 

10.4% 

15% 

11.4% 

18.7% 

6.9% 

7.7% 

16.3% 

12% 

9.2% 

-2 

-0.3% 

-4.8% 

-6.5% 

-4.7% 

0.9% 

0.1% 

4.3% 

-2.4% 

-4.3% 

2.7% 

1% 

0.8% 

2.3% 

5.1% 

20.4% 

19% 

9.2% 

9.3% 

6.8% 

10.8% 

5.8% 

8.6% 

10.4% 

8% 

5.5% 

3.7% 

6.1% 

17.2% 

13.1% 

8.7% 

8.1% 

7.1% 

12.7% 

8.8 

3.4% 

10.9% 

9% 

6.8% 

48

2.9% 

4% 

2.2% 

0% 

-1.2% 

1.4% 

1% 

3.2% 

5.9% 

0.5% 

-1.2% 

0.3% 

1.9% 

3% 

5.2% 

0.5% 

1% 

1.3% 

17.3% 

12.4% 

10.5% 

9.6% 

14.5% 

6.1% 

-7.6% 

2.1% 

-4.4% 

10.1% 

13.6% 

3.6% 

9.8% 

9.4% 

7.1% 

6.6% 

6.0% 

5.9% 

4.8% 

4.5% 

3.6% 

3.5% 

3.4% 

3.2% 

3.0% 

2.9% 

14.5% 

4.0% 

5.8% 

5.0% 

5.4% 

1.7% 

6.9% 

4.3% 

6.0% 

-1.9% 

4.0% 

5.4% 

3.0% 

2.4% 

4.7% 

-5.4% 

-1.3% 

-1.6% 

-0.6% 

-4.2% 

2.1% 

-0.2% 

2.4% 

-5.4% 

0.7% 

2.2% 

0.0% 

-0.5% 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
City 

Helsinki/ 
Vantaa 

Unemployme
nt rate of 
URBAN II 
area 2000 

Unemployment 
rate of URBAN 
II area 2006 

Change in 
area 
unemployment 
rate between 
2000 and 2006 

12.7% 

12.2% 

-0.5% 

Stockwell  

5% 

Peterborough   3.5% 

Halifax  

Normanton  in 
Derby 

Burnley  

Berlin  

4.2% 

4.7% 

3.2% 

17.7% 

Sambreville 

20.1% 

Antwerp 

Wrexham  

Hetton & 
Murton  

Bristol 

Thames 
Gateway  

9.8% 

2.2% 

3.6% 

2.4% 

3.0% 

Gera  

17.5% 

Neubranden 

17.4% 

Leipzig 

16.2% 

Saarbrücken 

8.8% 

Gijon  

Teruel 

22.6% 

4% 

5.5% 

2.9% 

4.5% 

5.5% 

2.8% 

18.1% 

21.9% 

12.6% 

2.7% 

4.7% 

1.9% 

2.6% 

20.4% 

22% 

18.2% 

8.1% 

14% 

5.9% 

0.5% 

-0.6% 

0.3% 

0.8% 

-0.4% 

0.4% 

1.8% 

2.8% 

0.5% 

1.1% 

-0.5% 

-0.4% 

2.9% 

4.6% 

2% 

-0.7% 

-8.6% 

1.9% 

Unemployment 
of city in 2000 

Unemployment 
of city in 2006 

Change in 
unemployment 
between 2000 
and 2006 

Unemployment 
difference 
(URBAN II-
City) (2000) 

Unemployme
nt difference 
(URBAN II-
City) (2006) 

Change in 
difference 
(2000-
2006) 

10% 

3.2% 

2.3% 

3.2% 

3.7% 

2.3% 

17.6% 

20.1% 

9.8% 

2.3% 

3.7% 

2.9% 

3.2% 

17.9% 

17.9% 

17.3% 

10.1% 

24.6% 

7.6% 

7.8% 

3.3% 

2.7% 

6.2% 

3.4% 

2.6% 

20.1% 

21.8% 

11.7% 

2% 

2.9% 

2.4% 

3.3% 

18% 

19.4% 

20.8% 

10.8% 

14.2% 

5% 

2.2% 

0.1% 

0.4% 

3% 

-0.3% 

0.3% 

2.5% 

1.7% 

1.9% 

0.3% 

0.8% 

-0.5% 

0.1% 

0.1% 

1.5% 

3.5% 

0.7% 

-10.4% 

-2.6% 

2.7% 

1.8% 

1.2% 

1.0% 

1.0% 

0.9% 

0.1% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

-0.1% 

-0.1% 

-0.2% 

-0.2% 

-0.4% 

-0.5% 

-1.1% 

-1.3% 

-2.0% 

-3.6% 

4.4% 

2.2% 

0.2% 

1.7% 

2.1% 

0.2% 

-2.0% 

0.1% 

0.9% 

0.7% 

1.8% 

-0.5% 

-0.7% 

2.4% 

2.6% 

-2.6% 

-2.7% 

-0.2% 

0.9% 

1.7% 

0.4% 

-1.0% 

0.7% 

1.1% 

-0.7% 

-2.1% 

0.1% 

0.9% 

0.8% 

1.9% 

-0.3% 

-0.5% 

2.8% 

3.1% 

-1.5% 

-1.4% 

1.8% 

4.5% 

Source: ECOTEC analysis of data collected from the member states and the programme managers 

49

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Developing a counterfactual to assess the impacts of URBAN II  

The  terms  of  reference  called  for  a  counterfactual  analysis.  This  can  be  a  very  powerful  tool  to 
measure impacts and is increasingly popular for instruments such as enterprise support and active 
labour  market  measures.  The  intention  was  to pilot  this  for URBAN  II,  to  see  whether  the method 
could be applied to urban regeneration in the future. 

The key feature of the method is the construction of a comparison or control group. Each URBAN II 
area  would  be  paired  with  a  relevant  comparison  area  (for  example,  the  parent  city  or  a  similar 
deprived neighbourhood elsewhere in the city). If the sample is large enough and the data is of good 
quality, comparing the performance of the two groups indicates the average impact of URBAN II. 

The inception report set out the various approaches and data sets that could be used, concluding 
that in urban policy three indicators (unemployment, long-term unemployment and population) could 
–  given  data  availability  –  be  used  as  the  basis  of  a  counterfactual  analysis.  Further  work  for  the 
interim report effectively ruled out long-term unemployment and population, mainly because of data 
issues. The analysis was therefore undertaken on unemployment change between 2000 and 2006, 
comparing URBAN II programme areas with the wider city within which they were located. Even this 
had  data  availability  difficulties  –  most  programmes  had  not  collected  unemployment  rates  both 
before  and after  the  intervention,  and data  could only  be collected  or constructed  for  37  of the  70 
programmes. 

Using  a  difference-in-difference  technique,  we  undertook  a  range  of  analyses.  However,  none 
produced statistically significant results. This was partly because the impact on unemployment was 
relatively small, but also because of the small sample size and high variation in performance. The 
gap  in  unemployment  levels  between  the  more  disadvantaged  URBAN  II  areas  and  their  cities 
narrowed, although this too was not statistically significant. With better data from more programme 
areas, this would be an interesting ‘finding’ to test further. 

However, as noted above, URBAN II funding was relatively modest and many programmes did not 
target  unemployment.  In  this  context,  programmes  were  unlikely  to  create  dramatic  changes  in 
unemployment. 

For future evaluations of this type, a key lesson is the importance of establishing the counterfactual 
analysis  ex-ante  rather  than  ex-post.  Better  ‘before’  and  ‘after’  data,  covering  all  the  programmes 
and  a  broader  range  of  indicators  (not  just  unemployment),  would  give  a  much  clearer  picture  of 
impact. 

50

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Drivers of change 

A number of drivers caused programme areas to change, one of which was  the URBAN II programme. 
Although  stakeholders  felt  that  URBAN  II  was  a  contributing  factor,  it  was  not  generally  seen  as  the 
principal driver of change – other, larger, external forces generally underpinned area improvements. 

Physical  regeneration  –  URBAN  II  helped  to  reverse  urban  decay,  created  transport  hubs  and  new 
transport facilities, developed new community facilities (museums, libraries, and crèches) and improved 
public spaces. Most of these changes improved the attractiveness of the area.  

Economic  regeneration  –  projects  boosted  entrepreneurialism,  supported  business  creation  and 
growth  and  the  (small-scale)  development  of  industrial  sites.  Supporting  people  into  employment  was 
another key aspect of URBAN II measures.  

Social regeneration – projects helped to reduce crime, improve educational performance, improve the 
skills of local people and support disadvantaged groups (especially young people) in various ways.  

A  key  improvement  factor  was  wider  economic  conditions.  URBAN  II  was  implemented  at  a  time  when 
most  Member  States  and  host  cities  were  experiencing  relatively  high  levels  of  economic  growth. 
Stakeholders commented that wider economic prosperity within the host city had a beneficial impact on 
URBAN II programme areas, which experienced growth in new job opportunities, more business start-ups 
and  higher  standards  of  living  as  a  consequence.  For  example,  unemployment  within  the  programme 
area in Sambreville dropped because of an improvement in the region’s economic situation, which led to 
unemployment falling in the whole area at the same rate as in the programme area.   

The work and funding of wider regeneration programmes were also underlying factors, particularly where 
URBAN  II  targeted  a  relatively  small  part  of  a  large  host  city  which  was  being  supported  by  various 
regeneration initiatives. The projects and activities of other programmes were often cited as being more 
important than URBAN II in changing areas because they had larger budgets and were longer term. Le 
Mantois is a good example; the host city received more sustained intervention from the government prior 
to  and  during  URBAN  II,  which  stakeholders  felt  was  the  important  factor  contributing  to  the  area’s 
regeneration work.  

The work of other non-URBAN II-funded organisations also supported the regeneration objectives of the 
target neighbourhoods within programme areas. The police and local authorities were particularly cited as 
key  drivers  of  change,  and  their  ongoing  work  on  various  economic,  social  and  physical  development 
activities  were  important  factors  of  the  wider  improvement  of  programme  areas.  For  instance,  the  city 
police force in Le Mantois, targeting more neighbourhood-based resources on the programme area, was 
seen as the main reason why crime had reduced in recent years.  

Investments  and  improvements  in  other  parts  of  the  city  were  also  important  factors  affecting  target 
neighbourhoods. Physical and economic improvements to the centre of the host city were often seen to 
stimulate  better  job  opportunities,  better  business  prospects  and  more  investment  activity  in  nearby 
(URBAN II) neighbourhoods. For example, in Porto Gondomar, large-scale physical investment in the city 

51

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
centre  to  improve  the  tourism  offer  was,  according  to  stakeholders,  a  key  factor  that  led  to  URBAN  II 
target communities finding new jobs. The same can be said about Halifax, where large economic growth 
in the nearby and larger city of Leeds meant that more people in the target community were accessing 
new employment.  

The drivers underlying change within target neighbourhoods were relatively complex, but can be seen as 
operating at  a  wider  level  than  the  localised  agenda  of  URBAN II.  Stakeholders  identified  many  drivers 
(including  most  of  the  above)  as  being  external  to  the  target  neighbourhood,  with  activity,  funding  and 
decisions at city and national levels (including macro-economic policy) all having a large bearing on target 
neighbourhoods. They felt that URBAN II was one of a host of factors that caused areas to improve.  

Whilst  URBAN  II  has  been  a  factor  in  areas  changing,  it  was  usually  not  the  main  driver.  The  main 
reasons for this were as follows:  

•  Time-limited nature of URBAN II – stakeholders felt that programmes running for seven years were 
unlikely  to  make  any  real  headway  in  solving  long-term  and  deep-seated  issues.  No  matter  how 
successful the projects were, their time-limited nature (and some ran for a lot less than seven years) 
meant  that  they  were  only  likely  to  make  an  initial  and  short-term  impact  on  major  urban  decline 
issues.  Delays  in  implementing  some  programmes  (e.g.  Crotone)  exacerbated  this  problem  and 
further reduced the amount of time they had to make a positive difference. Delays in recruiting key 
staff, deciding priorities and developing a strong partnership held up programmes too, although these 
were not particularly common problems across the case study areas.  

•  Lack  of  scale  in  investment  –  stakeholders  saw  the  scale  of  URBAN  II  investment  as  unlikely  to 
affect significant issues such as high unemployment or poor health. Even when a programme focused 
on a relatively small area, the level of investment which stakeholders felt would be required to ‘shift’ 
long-term problems was larger than the resources available through URBAN II. 

•  Targeted at one area of the city – stakeholders felt that some of the real causes of deprivation were 
found elsewhere in the host city and not in the target neighbourhoods. For example, the closure of a 
large employer in another part of the host city was often seen as the main cause of decline in target 
neighbourhoods; the root causes and symptoms of urban decline were not always to be found in the 
same part of the city.  

Therefore,  the  intensity  of  URBAN  II,  in  relation  to  the  scale  of  its  funding  and  its  longevity,  was  an 
overarching  issue  affecting  the  extent  to  which  programmes  were  able  to  influence  change,  particularly 
considering  the wider  and  external  drivers  of change  mentioned earlier. Notably,  most  stakeholders  did 
not feel that poorly performing projects or badly run programmes – in the small amount of cases where 
this was perceived to be an issue - were the main reasons why URBAN II was not a key driver of change.  

3.5 Programme logic: challenges and strategies 

This sub-section assesses whether programmes were developed in a logical way. 

52

 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5.1  Did programmes follow a logical process? 

From our review of the programme documentation together with the stakeholder consultations in the case 
studies  we  made  an  assessment  of  the  extent  to  which  programmes  were  developed  using  a  logic 
process,  starting  with  the  definition  of  problems  and  challenges  through  to  objectives  and  targets,  the 
programme strategies and the processes to assess change and the impacts of URBAN II. 

The  start  of  a  logical  process  in  developing  strategies  and  programmes  is  a  relevant,  focused  and 
accurate  baseline  analysis.  Most  programmes  undertook  wide-ranging  baseline  exercises,  presenting 
statistics  on  socio-economic  conditions  within  the  programme  area,  often  regardless  of  whether  the 
programme was designed to impact on those conditions. Although this was to be expected early on (to 
understand the broad issues before focusing on a smaller range of problems), many programmes carried 
on  collecting    updated  data  on  (for  instance)  health  or  crime,  even  though  the  programme  focused  on 
economic  activity.  This  meant  that  changes  in  these  issues  would  show  little  in  terms  of  the  direct 
successes of the programme. 

Having assessed the key challenges the next step is the development of the programme strategy, based 
on  an  assessment  of  the  challenges  and  what  could  be  realistically  achieved  within  the  resources  and 
timescales of URBAN II. We assessed the case study programmes (as shown in Table 3.3) to see how 
far  strategies  were  informed  by  the  baseline  analysis.  Roughly  half  demonstrated  a  strong  logic  chain 
between challenges and the programme strategy, although a logic chain could be rationalised in some of 
the  remaining  case  studies.  However,  in  a  few  cases,  the  link  between  defined  challenges  and  the 
programme strategy was not clear.  

Table 3.3  Programme logic across case study areas 

Case study 
area 

Arhus 

Problems 

Strategy 

Key problems related to 
socio-economic issues, 
including high crime and 
unemployment levels, low 
educational attainment 
and low participation in 
leisure activities, as well 
as particular challenges 
related to integration of 
the growing share of 
minority ethnic groups, 
some of which lacked the 
necessary skills to enter 
the labour market. 

The programme focused 
heavily on social and 
cultural regeneration. It 
included a number of 
measures to promote 
participation in culture 
and leisure activities, 
personal responsibility, 
community cohesion and 
self-organising, 
entrepreneurship, 
vocational training, IT 
skills and upgrading 
green recreational 
facilities. 

Match between challenges 
and strategy 

Despite the high 
unemployment and low skill 
levels amongst the target 
population, only a relatively 
small proportion of 
resources (24%) was set 
aside for tackling these 
issues. In comparison, 
integration through leisure 
and cultural activities (47% 
of resources) and tackling 
drug/alcohol addiction (18%) 
received high levels of 
funding. However, rather 
than focusing explicitly on 
traditional economic and 
social interventions, the 
programme looked to 
stimulate social and 
economic integration by 
implementing a range of 
measures and placing 

53

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 
area 

Problems 

Strategy 

Match between challenges 
and strategy 

residents at the heart of 
regeneration. 

The programme logic 
appeared to be extremely 
strong, with a clear link 
between the baseline 
conditions in the target area 
and solutions developed to 
tackle those problems. A 
scoping study helped to 
shape the programme’s 
focus and identified key 
issues to tackle. Young 
people were heavily 
involved in developing the 
projects delivered through 
URBAN II. This helped the 
programme to maintain its 
focus on tackling youth 
issues and ultimately to 
address the key problems of 
low educational attainment 
and crime. 

Despite some 
reprogramming (because of 
flooding in 2003), the 
programme logic largely 
remained intact, with its 
strong focus on tackling 
physical and environmental 
problems in the target area. 
The decision to use the 
physical revitalisation of the 
centre of Carrara as a 
means of stimulating an 
increase in commercial, 
productive and tourism 
activity was also sound, 
although only a small 
proportion of resources 
were devoted to the 
economic theme (9%). But 
devoting only 5% of 
resources to social inclusion 
does not seem logical, given 

Bristol 

High levels of 
unemployment, benefit 
dependency and crime 
rates, as well as low 
economic activity and 
educational attainment 
levels, were key issues in 
the target areas. Young 
people were highlighted 
as a particular target 
group. 

The programme elected 
to place young people 
aged between 10 and 30 
at its heart, and set out to 
support projects with a 
strong focus on 
developing opportunities 
and provision for youth. 

Carrara 

The main challenges were 
environmental problems in 
the historic city centre and 
related social unease, 
tension and depopulation. 
The unemployment rate in 
the target area at the start 
of the programme was 
also highlighted as a key 
issue. 

The programme focused 
heavily on tackling the 
physical and 
environmental issues in 
and around the historic 
city centre and arresting 
the decline in population 
and productivity rates in 
the target area. Physical 
regeneration of the target 
area and improvements 
to the surrounding 
transport infrastructure 
accounted for the majority 
of programme resources 
(80%). 

54

 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 
area 

Problems 

Strategy 

Crotone 

The target area was 
experiencing many 
problems relating to 
employment (it had the 
lowest employment level 
for the whole of Italy prior 
to 2000), while the 
unemployment rate was 
also high. The level of 
crime (particularly car 
crime) was also regarded 
as a key problem.  

The programme had a 
strong physical focus, 
with regeneration of the 
historical centre a key 
objective (80% of 
resources). The desire to 
make the historical centre 
more attractive was also 
key to achieving the other 
programme objectives of 
addressing the 
abandonment of the city 
centre by stimulating 
tourism activity. 
Improvements to the 
transport infrastructure 
and social services were 
also identified as 
objectives. 

Match between challenges 
and strategy 

its mention as a key issue in 
the baseline analysis. 

The programme did not 
appear to have a strong 
logic, with little link between 
problems and strategy. The 
main challenges highlighted 
related to labour market 
deficiencies (low 
employment and high 
unemployment); however, 
only 13% of funding 
targeted entrepreneurship 
and employment activities. 
The majority of funding was 
focused on physical 
rehabilitation and revitalising 
cultural and social activities. 

Dortmund 

Gijon 

The main challenges were 
high unemployment 
(especially among young 
people and migrants), 
poverty and risk of 
exclusion, low educational 
attainment levels, an 
unbalanced economy, 
sub-standard living 
conditions and a poor 
external image. The target 
area was affected by high 
population turnover rates, 
with more successful 
residents moving out to be 
replaced by more 
disadvantaged groups. 

Most resources were 
focused on 
entrepreneurship and 
employment (42%) and 
physical and 
environmental measures 
(33%), with 15% devoted 
to social inclusion. The 
main priorities were 
creating and preserving 
jobs; improving the urban 
fabric and housing; 
developing structures for 
residents in commerce, 
housing and culture; and 
promoting social 
cohesion. 

The programme logic was 
strong, with close links 
between the problems 
highlighted in the baseline 
analysis and the strategy 
developed. A study of the 
strength and weaknesses of 
the programme area 
supplemented by intensive 
consultation with local 
partners and residents, and 
helped to ensure that the 
programme strongly 
reflected local needs and 
conditions. 

The main problems were 
the poor environmental 
conditions, the lack of 
social services and urban 
infrastructure for citizens 
to access (e.g. green 
space), high 
unemployment levels, a 
lack of employment 
opportunities, and 

The programme focused 
on the physical problems 
in the target area, 
including infrastructural 
weaknesses and lack of 
public space (61% of 
resources). However, this 
was not at the expense of 
economic and social 
measures, where 
improving residents’ 

The programme logic was 
strong. The solutions 
developed closely matched 
the problems initially 
highlighted in the area and 
amongst key target groups. 
The programme logic was 
also reflected in the 
programme’s quantifiable 
achievements, where a 
number of key targets were 

55

 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 
area 

Problems 

Strategy 

depopulation. 

Key problems in the target 
area included 
depopulation (although 
this had been stabilised 
by a growing minority 
ethnic population) and 
high levels of social 
disadvantage and 
unemployment. Other 
problems included a 
shortage of kindergarten 
places, high crime levels 
and a poor external 
image. 

Key problems included 
relatively high levels of 
worklessness, poor 
educational attainment, 
low skills levels, high 
crime rates, poor health 
and poor quality housing. 

Graz 

Halifax 

employability, fighting 
social exclusion, boosting 
economic activities and 
facilitating the use of ICT 
and broadband access 
for citizens and SMEs 
were also objectives. 

Nearly half (49%) of the 
URBAN II resources were 
allocated to the target 
area’s economic needs, 
with 40 projects under 
this measure. Two key 
projects were the 
relocation of the technical 
college and 
establishment of a 
business start-up centre. 

Match between challenges 
and strategy 

exceeded (for example, in 
relation to improving public 
spaces and narrowing the 
digital divide). 

There was a limited direct 
link between the problems 
highlighted and solutions 
developed. Project ideas 
largely came from the local 
authority departments based 
on pre-existing plans and 
strategic priorities for the 
area agreed previously 
(although this is not to say 
that the plans were not well 
considered or successfully 
implemented). 

The URBAN II 
programme had a strong 
focus on economic 
regeneration, with a 
particular interest in 
enterprise development 
and growth (about 70% of 
projects had links to the 
economic and enterprise 
agenda). This focus on 
economic regeneration 
was partly driven by the 
fact that another 
regeneration scheme 
(funded through the 
national SRB) also 
targeted virtually the 
same area as URBAN II. 

Although many projects 
seemed to fit the 
programme logic and had a 
strong economic focus, 
others had a distinct social 
or physical theme, and no 
apparent association with 
the original logic of the 
programme. It can be 
argued that all projects 
would help to stimulate a 
more enterprising 
programme area, but a 
number of projects 'drifted 
away' from the strategic 
intent for a highly focused 
economic programme. 

Le Havre 

The target area was not 
an attractive place for 
tourists, investors or 
residents. Key problems 
were access to and from 
the city and lack of green 
space. However, much of 
the quantitative baseline 
evidence was concerned 
with the poor socio-
economic conditions and 

Initially, the programme 
had a strong holistic feel 
with funding spread 
relatively evenly over the 
physical, social and 
economic measures. 
However, at the mid-term 
point the focus of the 
programme shifted to 
give greater emphasis 
(and resources) to 

Considering the high levels 
of physical deprivation in the 
target area, the decision to 
change the programme’s 
focus is defensible. 
However, it could also be 
argued that the programme 
did not formulate an 
effective strategy for tackling 
the main problems and thus 
changed its focus to create 

56

 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 
area 

Problems 

Strategy 

Match between challenges 
and strategy 

Le Mantois 

Leipzig 

the weak structure of the 
local economy. Prior to 
2000, key problems 
included high 
unemployment and low 
employment rates, high 
levels of benefit 
dependency, poor access 
to job opportunities and 
low educational 
attainment levels. 

The target population was 
characterised by high 
levels of unemployment 
(including long term) and 
benefit dependency, low 
levels of educational 
attainment, poor access to 
labour market 
opportunities and high 
levels of crime. The target 
areas were also 
characterised by poor 
housing conditions and 
suffered from a poor 
external image. 

After the decline of the 
traditional industrial base, 
the programme area 
struggled to replace the 
large number of 
manufacturing and 
engineering jobs lost. The 
target population found it 
difficult to access new 
employment opportunities 
and was characterised by 
high levels of 
unemployment and 
benefit dependency. 
Significant urban 
problems included 
decaying living quarters 
and high vacancy rates, 
poor environmental 
conditions, a shortage of 
green and open spaces 
and derelict and 
brownfield sites. 

physical actions, at the 
expense of the more 
socially focused 
interventions. 

a more obvious and visible 
impact in the target area (by 
funding more physically 
focused interventions). 

The design of the 
programme aimed to 
improve the economic 
and social development 
of the area, reducing the 
social divide between rich 
and poor and upgrading 
the natural environment 
to improve and sustain its 
image and attractiveness. 
The biggest share of 
funding was allocated to 
the physical theme 
(63%), followed by the 
social (22%) and 
economic (11%) themes. 

The programme logic is not 
strong when reviewing the 
key issues highlighted in the 
target area (mainly 
economic and social in 
nature) and the allocation of 
funding (mostly to physical 
measures). The programme 
was linked to a much larger 
national regeneration 
programme (Mantes en 
Yvelines II), so the target 
area’s social and economic 
needs may have been 
covered through other 
programmes. 

The programme theory was 
logical, with a strong links 
between the problems 
identified and the strategy 
developed. Given that the 
target areas suffered from 
multiple forms of 
deprivation, it was 
appropriate that the 
programme tackled the main 
problems by developing 
many small but integrated 
projects with a holistic focus.

The programme sought to 
arrest the decline of the 
target areas through an 
integrated programme of 
activity focused on 
environmental and 
infrastructure 
improvements, local 
economic and 
employment 
development, and social 
integration and renewal. 
The programme’s holistic 
nature was reflected in 
the funding allocation, 
which was evenly spread 
across the physical (35% 
of total budget), economic 
(33%) and social 
measures (26%). 

57

 
 
 
 
 
 
Problems 

Strategy 

Case study 
area 

Perama 

Porto 
Gondomar 

Rotterdam 

Many key problems 
related to the decline of 
traditional industries and 
lack of access to new 
employment opportunities. 
Other problems included 
low educational levels, 
low participation of 
women in the labour 
force, high unemployment 
rates (especially for 
women), pollution, a 
serious shortage of social 
care and health services, 
and an overall low quality 
of life. 

The urban environment 
was severely degraded 
prior to 2000, with many 
derelict buildings, a lack of 
green space and poor 
transport links. Residents 
in the target area suffered 
from multiple forms of 
deprivation and 
disadvantage, and had 
high levels of 
unemployment, low levels 
of educational attainment, 
with poor ethnic 
integration in some 
communities, isolated 
elderly people and high 
drug use and trafficking. 

The main problems 
related to the population 
structure (above-average 
levels of young people), 
difficulties in assimilating 
new migrants, high levels 
of unemployment and 
benefit dependency, low 
levels of educational 
attainment and high crime 
rates. 

Match between challenges 
and strategy 

Lack of quantitative 
information made it difficult 
to discern whether the 
balance of the programme 
accurately reflected the 
needs of the area. 
Qualitative evidence 
indicated a close match 
between the area’s needs 
and the strategy developed. 
The programme theory, 
which promoted a holistic 
approach to regenerating 
the target area, has 
generally been realised on 
the ground as planned in the 
inception stages. 

The theory underpinning the 
programme was sound, with 
the strategy developed, 
closely matching the 
challenges identified. 
Although the programme 
had a strong physical focus, 
much of the activity funded 
under this theme also had a 
strong social dimension 
(through the creation of new 
educational, cultural and 
social facilities). The 
programme also targeted a 
number of key groups, 
including older residents 
and people with severe drug 
and alcohol problems. 

The programme focused 
on physical and 
environmental 
regeneration, followed by 
interventions for social 
inclusion and a smaller 
intervention supporting 
entrepreneurship. In 
essence, the programme 
was designed to promote 
Perama’s long industrial 
and cultural tradition for 
the benefit of economic 
regeneration, to boost 
employment, upgrade the 
environment and improve 
the quality of life in the 
area. 

A holistic regeneration 
programme was 
developed with a strong 
focus on urban 
regeneration and tackling 
social exclusion. A 
significant proportion of 
resources (almost 60%) 
was devoted to 
regenerating the physical 
environment and 
improving services. Other 
key objectives included 
tackling drug/alcohol 
addiction and addressing 
the labour market 
disadvantages faced by 
the local population 
(particularly low skill and 
qualification levels). 

The programme was 
designed to tackle key 
problems related to 
crime, family breakdown 
(acknowledging that this 
was a source of multiple 
problems), and the 
physical environment, in 
particular the degradation 
of the target area, empty 
shops, lack of occupancy 
and lack of high quality 
areas in the 
neighbourhood. It also 

The programme logic was 
strong overall, with many 
projects linked to the needs, 
particularly the activity 
focused on addressing 
community safety issues 
and interventions targeted at 
young people, but the 
reasoning behind allocating 
the highest proportion of 
funding to physical 
measures was not 
immediately apparent. This 
was in part because 

58

 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 
area 

Problems 

Strategy 

aimed to stimulate 
partnership working and 
community cohesion by 
encouraging community 
groups to work together. 
This holistic focus was 
generally reflected in the 
funding allocation, where 
physical (45%), economic 
(26%) and social 
measures (29%) all 
received sizeable 
amounts of investment. 

The programme was 
holistic, with funding 
spread relatively evenly 
over the different themes 
and priorities. The largest 
share of the budget was 
allocated to physical and 
environmental 
regeneration of the area 
(45%), while 27% went 
on improving 
entrepreneurship and 
employment. 

Sambreville 

Prior to 2000, Sambreville 
was characterised by high 
levels of unemployment 
and benefit dependency 
and a lack of professional 
qualifications among the 
working-age population 
(limiting access to 
employment opportunities 
in high growth sectors). 
The decline of old industry 
in the target area also led 
to physical degradation, 
making the city a relatively 
unattractive area. 

Match between challenges 
and strategy 

complimentary regeneration 
initiatives operating with the 
programme area were also 
focus on economic and 
social measures and less on 
physical regeneration.  

The programme strategy 
was in line with the identified 
challenges. Many of the 
problems were linked to the 
decline of the traditional 
industrial base, so it was 
appropriate that a number of 
the projects and activities 
funded were highly 
integrated (for example, 
developing training projects 
that addressed the skill 
needs of local employers 
but also targeted local 
unemployed residents). 

3.5.2  Did the strategies match the challenges? 

In  summary  most  programmes  assessed  their  baseline  position  and  a  link  between  the  challenges 
identified  could  be  detected,  stronger  in  some  programmes  than  others  and  where  it  was  less  strong 
there was normally a rationale (other regeneration programmes were already tackling these challenges, 
so  URBAN  II  resources  were  directed  elsewhere.  The  link  largely  continued  into  programme  funding 
allocations  and  individual  projects  but  in  terms  of  the  strengths  of  the  links  the  case  studies  showed  a 
wide range of experiences. Overall, the example of Bristol (see box below) provided the strongest links 
amongst  our  case  studies.  However,  as  can  be  seen  in  the  next  section,  the  next  stage  in  the  logic 
process – developing monitoring systems to capture the information to test the ongoing appropriateness 
of  programme strategies and to help assess the impacts of URBAN II, was generally much weaker, and 
certainly in its implementation.  

Case study example: matching challenges with strategies 

Bristol’s  programme  was  soundly  developed  on  the  basis  of  an  identified  core  issue  that  closely 
informed  the  focus  and  content  of  the  programme,  which  was  implemented  with  an  appropriate 
monitoring system. The URBAN II scoping study on the five deprived neighbourhoods identified as the 

59

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
target  area  uncovered  low  educational  attainment  (fewer  than  15%  of  youths  obtaining  a  GCSE  A*-C 
grade pass compared with 32% for Bristol as a whole) as a symptom of social exclusion among young 
people.  This  had  adverse  consequences  for  skills  development  and  employability  and  contributed  to 
high  levels  of  crime.  Outputs  were  recorded  in  relation  to  education  initiatives  –  visits  to  schools 
addressing  drug  abuse,  bullying  and  offending,  and  mentoring  activities.  Monitoring  gathered 
programme  results  on  changes  in  educational  attainment  levels  (exhibiting  a  substantial  upward  shift 
across the neighbourhoods) and in local crime levels during the intervention timeframe. 

3.6  Use of programme indicators 

3.6.1 The collection of indicators  

The  next  step  was  to  compare  the  targets  set  by  programmes  with  the  actual  values  reported.24    A 
number of caveats should be noted before the findings are presented. 

•  Programmes focused most of their efforts on defining output indicators (2,067 – half of all the 
indicators collected) rather than results (1,357) and impacts (696 25). Output indicators are an 
essential tool in day-to-day management, but only a first step in evaluating the success of a 
programme. 

•  The recording of actual (achieved)  and target values from the AIRs for outputs, results and impacts 
was incomplete. Table 3.4 shows that there were actual values for 65% of all indicators, and that 
comparisons with actual and target values could only be made in 56% of cases.  

Table 3.4  Reporting indicator data (from the 2006 Annual Implementation Reports for the 70 
URBAN II programmes) 

Outputs 

Results 

Impacts 

All indicators 

Number 

% (of 
total) 
outputs) 

Number  % (of 
total) 
results) 

Number  % (of 
total) 
impacts) 

Number  % (of total) 
indicators) 

1,342 

65% 

766 

56% 

210 

30% 

2,318 

56% 

337 

16% 

306 

22% 

255 

37% 

898 

22% 

164 

8% 

140 

10% 

75 

11% 

379 

9% 

Actual value 
and target 
reported 

Target but 
no actual 
value 
reported 

Actual only 
with no 
target 

No target or 

224 

11% 

145 

11% 

156 

22% 

525 

13% 

24  We  have  defined  'achievement'  as  within  20%  either  side  of  an  actual  value  equalling  the  target  (therefore  we  have  applied  a 

banding of 80 to 120%, below 80% equals underachievement and above 120% equals over achievement).  

25 Defined as indicator headings as set out in annual reports and aggregated across the 70 programmes. 

60

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outputs 

Results 

Impacts 

All indicators 

Number 

% (of 
total) 
outputs) 

Number  % (of 
total) 
results) 

Number  % (of 
total) 
impacts) 

Number  % (of total) 
indicators) 

actual value 

2,067 

Total 
indicators 
set26 
Source: ECOTEC analysis of URBAN II programme data (base: 4,120 indicators) 

100% 

100% 

100% 

1,357 

696 

4,120 

100% 

• 

It  was  not  always  possible  to  aggregate  or  compare  programme  indicators.  Programmes  reflected 
local concerns and had significant levels of freedom; Member States and authorities had flexibility in 
how they developed and managed their programmes.  This meant that the variety of actions funded 
was  very  broad,  as  were  the  means  of  recording  information  on  outputs,  results  and  impacts. 
Aggregation was therefore difficult except for the most commonly reported activities across a number 
of programmes.  

•  Comparing  achievements  to  targets,  the  data  show  tremendous  variations  among  programmes. 
Underachievement  and  overachievement  were  both  significant  and  in  some  cases  the  variations 
between actual and target values exceeded a factor of ten. 

•  Target  setting  was  another  issue.  Just  because  a  target  was  met  or  overachieved,  this  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  a  programme  was  successful.  Achievement  rates  of  1,000%  above  targets 
almost certainly say more about the original target than about programme performance.  

• 

It should be emphasised that the information relating to outputs, results and impacts were drawn from 
Annual 
is  based  on  programme 
implementation up to the end of 2006 so it could underestimate the final performance figures. 

Implementation  Reports.  This  means 

the  analysis 

that 

Figure 3.1 presents the average number of monitoring indicators per programme, at Member State level. 
The figure combines output, result and impact indicators and the recording of actual and target values in 
each case. It shows a correlation between the completeness of the monitoring process with the number of 
indicators set by programmes. It suggests that where programmes have more indicators (programmes in 
Greece, France and Italy averaged more than 70 different indicators per programme) the levels of data 
collection  were  poor  with  several  indicators  having  an  actual  value  or  a  target  value  recorded,  but  not 
both, and a high level of no returns. Conversely, those programmes which had fewer indicators tended to 
have  higher  levels  of  data  completeness.  This  is  consistent  with  the  literature  on  monitoring  systems 
where good practice is generally to have fewer indicators (quality over quantity) and to be realistic as to 
what can be collected. 

26

This is the sum of the indicator headings, set by the programmes in the their Annual Implementation Report tables 

61

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Average number of indicators per programme (by Member State) 

Fully collected (target + actual) Actual only

Target only No data

Austria

Belgium

Denm ark

Finland

France

Germ any

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

Portugal

Spain

Sw eden

UK

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

Source:  ECOTEC  analysis  based  on  2,067  output,  1,357  result  and  696  impact  indicators  (70 
programmes) 

3.6.2 Comparisons between actual and target values 

Table  3.5  provides  the  level  of  achievement  for  the  70  URBAN  II  programmes  against  target  values 
(where set). 

Table 3.5  Average achievement ratio: outputs, results and impacts (% actual values per 
programme against targets, minimum, maximum and average values) 

Programme 

Average 

Minimum 

Maximum 

Number 
indicators 

of 

Clyde 

Perama 

Iraklio 

41% 

51% 

53% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

1,420% 

300% 

250% 

128 

34 

47 

62

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Programme 

Average 

Minimum 

Maximum 

Number 
indicators 

of 

Peterborough 

Lisbon 

Komotini 

Antwerp 

Le Mantois 

Crotone 

Milan 

Grenoble 

Orense 

Clichy 

Le Mantois 

Misterbianco 

Teruel 

Turin 

La Laguna 

Neubrandenburg 

Carrara 

Jaén 

Gera 

Val de Seine 

Caserta 

Belfast 

Dessau 

Grigny-Viry 

San Sebastian 

Gijon 

Bastia 

Brussels 

Vienna 

Bordeaux 

Caceres 

Hetton and Murton 

Pamplona 

Halifax 

Granada 

Bremerhaven 

254% 

133% 

625% 

1,530% 

88% 

1,000% 

4,400% 

150% 

300% 

300% 

100% 

3,056% 

200% 

170% 

500% 

145% 

167% 

10,010% 

450% 

433% 

278% 

584% 

450% 

600% 

927% 

444% 

1,780% 

2,145% 

7,167% 

500% 

1,566% 

1,750% 

820% 

1,520% 

610% 

238% 

39 

11 

88 

19 

2 

86 

61 

5 

30 

27 

4 

36 

34 

30 

83 

8 

18 

97 

29 

121 

23 

63 

28 

36 

26 

43 

38 

22 

14 

9 

50 

58 

61 

24 

24 

8 

58% 

59% 

62% 

64% 

64% 

67% 

68% 

69% 

70% 

74% 

76% 

81% 

84% 

86% 

87% 

89% 

92% 

94% 

94% 

97% 

98% 

101% 

109% 

110% 

115% 

120% 

123% 

124% 

125% 

127% 

128% 

128% 

129% 

135% 

140% 

142% 

0% 

2% 

0% 

0% 

40% 

0% 

0% 

7% 

3% 

0% 

22% 

0% 

0% 

30% 

1% 

28% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

33% 

0% 

0% 

6% 

14% 

7% 

2% 

0% 

0% 

33% 

1% 

0% 

3% 

22% 

3% 

100% 

63

 
 
 
 
 
 
Programme 

Average 

Minimum 

Maximum 

Number 
indicators 

of 

Mola di Bari 

West Wrexham 

Genoa 

Normanton in Derby 

Arhus 

Rotterdam 

Heerlen 

San Adria 

Sambreville 

Amsterdam 

Pescara 

Amadora 

Thames Gateway 

Kiel 

Kassel 

Saarbruecken 

Gothenburg 

Mannheim/Ludwigshafen 

Bristol 

Porto 

Berlin 

Burnley 

Helsinki/Vantaa 

Graz 

Stockwell 

Ballyfermot 

Leipzig 

Dortmund 

Grand total 

144% 

145% 

151% 

156% 

156% 

162% 

174% 

179% 

185% 

186% 

189% 

194% 

198% 

201% 

210% 

215% 

231% 

233% 

238% 

241% 

243% 

245% 

249% 

251% 

257% 

261% 

290% 

320% 

143% 

144% 

5% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

6% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

24% 

40% 

0% 

0% 

0% 

16% 

25% 

13% 

0% 

7% 

42% 

5% 

42% 

90% 

84% 

0% 

144% 

669% 

500% 

1,400% 

1,410% 

608% 

870% 

15,860% 

1,007% 

16,043% 

6,050% 

800% 

1,060% 

556% 

7,020% 

7,020% 

3,125% 

3,367% 

3,800% 

1,000% 

1,244% 

2,510% 

1,521% 

1,761% 

1,705% 

2,342% 

2,111% 

930% 

1 

14 

35 

26 

28 

27 

18 

51 

56 

35 

24 

35 

23 

6 

41 

41 

22 

30 

39 

48 

16 

43 

23 

17 

15 

26 

22 

8 

16,043% 

2,316 

Base:  67  programmes;  the  data  for  Le  Havre,  Strasbourg  and  Taranto  was  inadequate  to  provide 
comparisons between targets and values. 
Source: ECOTEC analysis of URBAN II programme data 

64

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To highlight from the table: 

•  15  programmes  achieved  their  targets,  i.e.  fell  within  the  80-120%  banding27.  This  suggests  that 
those  who  designed  the  programme  had  good  knowledge  of  what  the  programme  was  likely  to 
achieve.  However,  achievement  against  specific  targets  varied  considerably  within  this  group.  An 
extreme case was Jaén, where the average score for all indicators (outputs, results and impacts) was 
94%,  yet  individual  scores  ranged  from  0%  to  10,010%.  Similarly,  in  spite  of  an  average  score  of 
101%, the Belfast programme recorded individual scores ranging from zero to 584%. 

•  38 programmes met or exceeded their targets (averaged 120% or more above targets). In Dortmund, 

at the highest end of this range, the average achievement score against all targets was 320%.  

•  14  programmes  did  not  meet  their  targets  (fell  below  the  80%  banding).  Again,  variance  against 

specific targets within each programme was high. 

3.6.3  Factors affecting the relationship between actual and target values 

The poor link between target and actual values raises  questions. Many local factors were at work, with 
common factors appearing to be: 

•  uncertainty and inexperience in target-setting 

•  a desire not to raise local stakeholders’ expectations too high 

•  actual performance being influenced by developments in the broader area. 

The following examples illustrate these points. 

Case study examples: overshooting and undershooting 

Overshooting 

In  Dortmund,  the  programme  achieved  93  business  start-ups  against  a  target  of  10.  Programme 
managers stated that they were “cautious” when setting targets, being careful not to promise too much. 
This  caution  was  based  on  experiences  from  previous  programmes,  as  well  as  recognition  of  how 
difficult  it  can  be  to  help  long-term  unemployed  people  to  start  their  own  business.  In  the  event,  this 
objective and associated target proved much easier than anticipated. 

In  Halifax,  1,168  unemployed  people  accessing  training  against  a  target  of  220  –  a  531% 
overachievement – and a steeper 1,600% overachievement in jobs created, with 160 actual jobs against 
a target of 10. These targets were set at a time when the Halifax and UK economies were in a period of 
low growth. This meant that expectations on how many ‘new’ jobs the local economy would need and 
could create were relatively low. As the economy grew and new employment opportunities were created, 
the original target came to look very pessimistic.  

27 We have defined achievement as within 20% either side of a target value (therefore we have applied a banding 
of 80% to 120%, below 80% equals underachievement and above 120% equals over achievement).  Whilst 
achievements above 120% can be seen as positive it can also point to cautious target setting, especially for very 
high achievement values. 

65

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Undershooting 

In  Perama,  problems  of  underachieving  targets  were  relatively  acute.  Although  some  of  this 
underachievement  was  because  of  poorly  performing  projects,  much  of  it  was  explained  by  local 
stakeholders not having much experience of setting targets or setting up systems for similar area-based 
regeneration  programmes.  A  lack  of  benchmark  figures  from  other  similar  programmes  and  projects 
meant that stakeholders estimated targets based on personal opinion. They had less baseline data on 
the  target  area  available  to  them  than  most  programme  managers,  which  made  it  hard  for  them  to 
assess the scale of issues such as long-term unemployment or crime levels. It was therefore even more 
difficult to derive a figure for how many unemployed individuals the project had to work with.  

The  conclusion  is  that  performance  against  output,  result  and  impact  targets  told  us  more  about  the 
process  of  target  setting  than  it  did  about  real  achievements.  Nevertheless,  programme  managers  did 
tend to feel that having targets was necessary and it was seen as a useful exercise in terms of giving a 
focus to their activities. 

3.7 Outputs, results and impacts 

This  sub-section  presents  the  impacts  of  programmes  based  on  the  qualitative  and  quantitative 
information from the AIRs and the case study research. It starts with an assessment of impact by theme, 
looking at the difference URBAN II has made in economic, social and physical terms. The text and tables 
used  in  this  sub-section  are  selective  and  illustrative,  based  on  all  of  the  major  outputs  that  could  be 
aggregated and those results and impacts that could be linked back to outputs. Examples of the impacts 
drawn from the case study programmes are given in this sub-section. 

3.7.1  Physical theme 

Physical  regeneration  activities  tended  to  include  building  restoration,  the  re-use  of  public  space  for 
commercial, community and social benefits, transport projects, green space provision and environmental 
and  energy  projects.  Other  smaller  physical  projects  include  graffiti  removal  and  environmental 
awareness campaigns – all targeting improvements in the quality of the environment. 

In aggregate, there are some key headline outputs including: 

•  2.3 million m2 of public space converted across 56 programmes, plus a further 557,000 m2 of space 

dedicated to sports, social, health and education uses. 

•  25 programmes invested in 3.2 million m2 of green space. 

•  20 programmes built 80 km of cycle and footpaths. 

•  About half of all the public space improved is confined to just 3 of the 56 programmes reporting this 

as an output, namely Strasbourg, Vienna and Berlin.  

The  impacts  of  physical  projects  were  measured  in  terms  of  jobs  and  businesses  created  and  also 
measures  of  satisfaction  and  change  in  local  conditions.  In  one  example  of  public  space  conversion 
(Misterbianco),  surveys  have  shown  a  35%  satisfaction  level,  which  at  face  value  is  disappointing  but 
could  be  a  significant  increase  from  previous  levels  (although  there  was  no  baseline  survey;  had  there 

66

 
 
 
 
 
 
been  one  a  measurement  of  the  change  would  have  been  possible).  Only  one  of  the  25  green  space 
programmes  (in  Kassel)  had  measured  change  in  usage  (up  by  50%  with  increased  awareness  of  the 
area following the green space improvements up by 14%).   

Cycle  and  footpath  construction  were  popular  but  we  found  no  quantitative  evidence  on  results  and 
impacts, such as increased usage or contributions to reduced congestion and healthier living. There was 
stronger  evidence  for  the  results  and  impacts  of  environmental  projects  (e.g.  a  reduction  in  energy 
consumption resulting from environmental projects in Gijon - see below) 

The output – result – impact chain: specific examples from the programme documentation  

In Carrara (Italy) the asphalting of 2 km of road led to a reduction in pollution created by dust (30%) and 
an increase (30%) in the number of residents who said they wanted to stay in the area over the next 5 
years. 

In Gijon (Spain) 37,576 m2 of public space was converted for re-use for new activities including 500 new 
houses. Additionally, two new sports centres were built, regenerating 7692 square metres of space. This 
resulted in 75,583 people using the sports centres. Energy efficiency measures aimed at reducing water 
consumption  created  an  output  of  8,845  m  of  new  pipelines,  directly  benefiting  2,800  people  and 
resulting  in  a  30%  energy  consumption  reduction  in  the  area  because  the  need  to  'clean'  water  for 
consumption has decreased.  

In Normanton (UK) 15 targeted environmental awareness campaigns were run reaching 217 residents, 
slightly above the target of 200. The programme records that through the overall work of Normanton's 
environmental awareness and capacity building programme, almost 400 residents were actively involved 
in environmental projects, well above the target of 50.  

In Le Havre (France) the emphasis was on physical regeneration of the southern districts of the city as 
an  engine  for  urban  growth.  Projects  included  building  a  river  park,  as  well  as  renovating  streets  and 
squares.  Every  URBAN  II  euro  led  to  €10  of  private  investment  in  return,  generating  a  total  of  €400 
million  of  investment  in  public  and  private  housing.  The  physical  component  of  the  programme 
accounted for 71% of total URBAN II funds, and therefore it is plausible to assume that these projects 
made a sizeable contribution to aggregate results and that indeed the economic impact on the city was 
large. Some direct results of the physical component of the programme consisted of big supermarkets 
replacing  small  groceries  stores  and  steeper  upward  price  movements  for  apartments  sold  in  the 
URBAN  II  area  than  in  Le  Havre.  Unemployment  figures  decreased  in  the  area,  and  the  two 
neighbourhoods  in  the  southern  districts  experienced  an  unemployment  decrease  of  respectively  29% 
and 60%, against a 24% decrease in Le Havre as a whole.  

Table  3.6  shows  the  aggregated  indicators  (as  discussed  above)  for  physical  regeneration  projects  to 
provide a further idea of achievements associated with this theme. 

67

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6  Outputs, results and impacts in the physical theme 

Outputs  

Number of building 
restoration 
operations 
Converted public 
space (m2) 

Number of 
programmes  
6 

Achieved 
Value  
372 

56 

2,313,748 

Space for social, 
health, sports and 
education (m2) 

12 

Green space 
created (m2) 
Bicycle/footpath 
built (km) 
Road and footpaths 
renovated for 
pedestrians/cyclists 
(m2) 
Length of new 
water pipelines (m) 

New environmental 
equipment projects 

25 

20 

6 

3 

7 

557,115 

3,237,294 

80 

11,614 

10,712 

194 

Results of 
Activity 
Additional 
investment 
(€'000) 
Number of 
beneficiaries 

% increase 
in public 
spaces 
(average) 
Utilisation 
rate of new 
buildings 
Number of 
firms 
benefiting 
Number of 
new 
companies 
Users of new 
sport sites 
Number of 
cultural 
events 
Increased 
use of 
community 
parks (% of 
population) 

Number of 
beneficiaries 
of new 
infrastructure
Volume of 
solid waste 
recovered 
(ton) 
Volume of 
liquid waste 

Number of 
Programmes 
3 

Achieved 
Value  
6,605 

Impact  

Employment created (temporary or 
permanent)  

Number of 
programmes  
1 

Achieved 
Value  
20 

1 

2 

1 

4 

1 

3 

1 

1 

2 

4 

1 

6,175 

New gross jobs created 
(permanent or temporary) 

61% 

% of population satisfied 

60% 

Number of firms established 

1020 

14 

1 

5 

1565 

35% 

254 

9 

Number of gross jobs created  

5 

316 

80,774 

12 

50% 

Increased awareness of the area 

% of satisfied customers  

1 

1 

14% 

62% 

14800 

% energy consumption reduced 

1 

30% 

4,699 

Number of beneficiaries 

3 

35,250 

15,300 

68

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outputs  

Number of 
programmes  

Achieved 
Value  

1 

4 

Number of 
initiatives to 
improve the 
appearance of the 
environment 

Results of 
Activity 
recovered 
(litres) 
Volume of 
toxic waste 
recovered 
(ton) 
Reduction in 
number of 
people who 
have a 
problem with 
graffiti in the 
area 
Number of 
buildings  

Number of 
Programmes 

Achieved 
Value  

Impact  

Number of 
programmes  

Achieved 
Value  

1 

1 

105 

49% 

Satisfaction level with quality of the 
environment 

Not known  

11% 

2 

2 

Number of 
buildings improved 
Note: The number of programmes columns refers to the number of programmes that reported a specific output, result or impact in their Annual 
Implementation Reports. As can be seen (and also in the tables covering the economic and social themes) the number of programmes recording results 
and impacts that can be linked back to outputs are generally fewer than the total number of programmes recording outputs. In the above table 3 
programmes had output data concerning the installation of water pipes but only two recorded the results of that installation and only one had impact data 
Source: ECOTEC Analysis of Annual Implementation Reports 

Reduction of CO2 emission (ton) 

18,658 

7.6 

1 

1 

69

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  case  studies  reveal  that  in  addition  to  the  quantified  outputs  that  were  achieved,  other  results  and 
impacts on the physical investments were also realised, some measured and some not. Three main areas 
of achievement under the physical theme were most apparent, namely: 

• 

• 

transport and other infrastructure provision meeting the needs of the programme areas.  

the creation of new or improvement of existing green or other public spaces.  

•  building new or improving existing social, cultural, educational and business facilities.   

Case study examples: Transport and infrastructure improvements 

Stakeholders interviewed identified improvements made to the physical fabric of the programme area as 
particular impacts of URBAN II, with particular reference to transport improvements and more broadly to 
addressing the infrastructural needs of the area. Investment in the physical infrastructure of target areas 
seems to have resulted in a number of additional positive benefits, including for example, reduced levels 
of traffic and pollution and the stimulation of commercial activity in the target areas.  

This  was  evident  in  Carrara,  where  improvements  to  the  transport  and  physical  infrastructure  of  the 
programme area have been a major area of success for the programme. The creation of a bypass not 
only  contributed  to  improving  the  attractiveness  of  the  area  (in  terms  of  reducing  traffic  and  transport 
times) but has also had had a positive impact on commercial activity in the historic centre. Data supplied 
by the Managing Authority shows that dust pollution fell by 32% after the creation of the bypass, while 
transit  of  heavy  goods  vehicles  through  the  historic  centre  fell  by  22%  (making  it  a  more  pleasant 
experience for local people and tourists to visit and enjoy).  

In Le Mantois, the renewal of one of the main boulevards of Val Fourré and the improvement of access 
throughout  the  Domaine  de  la  Vallée  (Mantes-La-Ville)  were  regarded  by  stakeholders  as  significant 
achievements. Improved flow of traffic and making access to services (e.g. schools) much quicker and 
easier, also 'opened up' the programme area to outside residents, which has in turn stimulated greater 
interest and usage of retail facilities (an example of physical activity with a economic benefit).  

Stakeholders  in  Perama  pointed  to  a  positive  impact  on  the  quality  of  life  of  local  residents  from 
pedestrianisation  of  the  city  centre  and  creation  of  a  number  of  new  parking  spaces  in  convenient 
locations designated for use by residents with physical disabilities.  

In Rotterdam investment in the physical infrastructure of the programme area was not only regarded as 
having a major impact but was also identified as key to tackling long held perceptions on safety. Prior to 
URBAN  II,  no  one  agency  had  responsibility  for  the  area  surrounding  the  railway  station  and  thus  the 
infrastructure  and  transport  modes  (e.g.  bus, car,  bus,  bike) were  severely  degraded  and regarded by 
local people as being unsafe. Through URBAN II, much needed physical investments were made to the 
area, which not  only  made  access  to  and  from  the  railway  station  much  easier,  but  improved  resident 
perceptions on public safety.  

Case study examples: Green and public space improvements 

Stakeholders  saw  improvements  to  green  and  public  spaces  as  a  key  achievement.    The  Greenbelt 
project  in  Le  Mantois,  which  was  designed  to  connect  the  local  public  areas  in  neighbouring  districts 

70

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
through a range of improvements, including paths for pedestrians and cyclists, and the landscaping of 
key areas around the various lakes in the area. The improvements also acted as a catalyst to improving 
the  image  of  the  areas,  stimulating  a  greater  outside  interest  in  the  programme  area  (i.e.  tourism 
interest) and generally improving local residents' quality of life through access to a range of services.  

The  physical  regeneration  of  public  squares  in  Perama  was  regarded  by  stakeholders  as  one  of  the 
main  areas  where  an  impact  had  been  achieved  by  URBAN  II.  Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  the 
areas  around  the  renovated  squares  have  seen  an  increase  in  usage  by  local  citizens,  more  children 
playing  in  the  squares,  special  neighbourhood  events,  and  small  businesses  such  as  restaurants  also 
opening up around these squares.  

In  Leipzig,  stakeholders  commented  that,  while  they  had  no  quantitative  data  to  substantiate  their 
claims,  they  believed  that  the  new  green  and  public  space  were  successful  and  had  such  a  strong 
impact locally because residents had been engaged and consulted in all phases of project design and 
delivery and thus the end results met local expectations and needs. The impact again focused on how 
the green space had brought more people into these areas and a better 'buzz' in the neighbourhood.  

Case study examples: New social, educational, cultural and business infrastructure 

In  9  case  studies  stakeholders  cited  the  creation  of  new  social,  educational,  cultural  and  business 
infrastructure  facilities  as  a  contribution  to  the  generation  of  programme  impacts.  These  types  of 
physical improvements helped pave the way for additional social and economic activities and services to 
be provided in the programme areas. One of the key success criteria is that they were strongly based on 
local needs and priorities, and were designed with sustainability in mind.  

Many  of  the  projects  in  Porto  Gondomar  aimed  to  improve  the  attractiveness  of  the  neighbourhoods, 
renovate derelict sites and prepare them for social infrastructure (for example, cultural and educational 
functions,  such  as  youth  centres,  elementary  and  primary  schools).  Stakeholders  commented  that  the 
building  of  the  new  school  provided  much  needed  space  for  pre-school  and  primary-aged  children  to 
access  educational,  recreational  and  leisure  activities  (also  funded  through  URBAN  II  before  being 
mainstreamed  by  these  schools  themselves)  that  were  not  possible  in  the  existing  old  prefabricated 
school rooms.  

In  Gijon,  stakeholders  commented  that  the  strongest  performing  aspects  of  the  programme  were  in 
physical regeneration linked to economic and social issues. For example, a sports centre was renovated 
and a new one created in direct response to local needs expressed by residents living in the programme 
area. The results of this investment saw more than 130,000 local people (as well as residents from the 
rest of the city) using the new facilities in 2008. Investments made under the physical theme have also 
been used as a means to stimulate economic development and growth. An example was the creation of 
a  business  centre  with  the  capacity  to  host  16  new  companies  (of  which  14  are  taken)  as  well  as  a 
service centre designed to bring more dynamism to the local business community.  

Stakeholders in Bristol regarded the creation of the Knowle West Media Centre as one of the impacts of 
the programme. A success factor was that the architects worked collaboratively with a panel of young 
people in designing a centre that met the needs and expectations of this key target group. One young 

71

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
person  who  chaired  the  panel  now  occupies  a  flexible  workspace  within  the  centre  and  is  pursuing  a 
business venture in digital art and film making. The centre is a key driver in terms of helping Bristol as a 
whole to change its economic structure, in this instance towards the creative industries, and the project 
is part of a wider goal of helping the city to enhance its creative and media cluster.  

In  Perama,  many  new  physical  infrastructure  projects  were  designed  to  help  establish  the  area  as  a 
destination for cultural and educational tourism and to stimulate further private sector investment in the 
programme area. The programme funded the creation of an open-air theatre and a maritime museum. 
The area of Perama where these two projects were built was previously vacant and an environmental 
detractor for the city as a whole. According to consultees, URBAN II has put the west end of Perama 'on 
the map’ and brought 'life' back into a previously 'dead' part of the city. The presence of the theatre (and 
eventually  the  museum)  has  encouraged  local  residents  and  tourists  to  reintroduce  themselves  to  the 
area  and  attend  a  variety  of  theatre  shows  and  has  therefore  brought  a  new  'buzz'  to  the  programme 
area.  

The  evidence  provided  through  the  good  practice  project  case  studies  substantiates  the  claim  that  the 
physical measures have been an important factor in stimulating further impacts, particularly the provision 
of additional services and activities. The creation of the new Media Library in Le Havre is a clear example 
of  a  physical  improvement  project  that  integrated  other  measures,  notably  through  the  provision  of 
training  and  other  educational  services  related  to  ICT  as  well  as  childcare  facilities.  As  a  result  of  this 
integrated approach the library has been able to successfully support a number of key target groups in 
the southern districts of Le Havre including young people and the unemployed (in 2007, almost 40% of 
the members were under 18 years and 16% were unemployed). The library is now regarded as a symbol 
of  how  the  programme  area  has  changed  and  begun  to  shake  off  the  negative  image  that  people 
previously  had  of  the  southern  districts.  The  restoration  of  the  Civic  Museum  of  Marble  was  also 
perceived by stakeholders to have had a similar catalytic affect in Carrara. The impact of these physical 
improvements was not just contained to the provision of additional educational services, they were also 
key to stimulating greater tourism interest by linking the restoration of the museum to a number of cultural 
events connected to the marble industry. 

3.7.2  Economic theme 

URBAN  II  funded  advice  to  SMEs,  with  17  programmes  undertaking  almost  6,000  interventions, 
supporting 2,249 companies (in 13 programmes) and claiming the creation of more than 1,000 gross jobs 
(in 10 programmes) together with other benefits such as companies relocating to the URBAN II area, and 
131  business  start-ups  (in  3  programmes).  In  Graz,  URBAN  II  funding  resulted  in  a  reported  30% 
increase  in  the  number  of  businesses  operating  in  the  programme  area,  impacting  on  the  area's 
employment  headcount  with  300 gross new  jobs created.  As well  as advice,  business support  included 
business finance, especially in Germany and Italy, where a total of 1,100 companies were assisted.  

URBAN  II  supported  a  large  number  of  training  places  (43,000  participants  in  25  programme  areas). 
Much of the training involved the key steps needed for establishing or running a business. An example of 
specific  training  was  that  for  the  building  sector,  with  improved  quality  of  construction  works  as  an 
expected  result  (in  Bastia).  In  Sambreville,  training  courses  at  the  industrial  and  commercial  school  of 

72

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auvelais  were  co-financed  with  a  total  of  394  people  receiving  training  across  49  courses,  resulting  in 
new employment for 60-70% of participants. 

Seven programmes (through 19 projects) supported economic innovation where new growth sectors were 
promoted  to  replace  declining  traditional  sectors  such  as  manufacturing  or  shipbuilding.  The  number  of 
participating  SMEs  was  almost  3,000  in  5  programme  areas  with  44  start-ups  claimed  in  one  example 
(West Wrexham). 2 programmes (Sambreville and Thames Gateway) provided incubator centres with a 
100%  occupancy  rate  in  the  one  programme.  A  further  2  programmes  built  just  under  44,000  m2  of 
commercial floorspace, creating almost 600 jobs. 

Seven  programmes  delivered  ICT  projects  and  services  (some  130  individual  projects).  3  programmes 
reported  127  SMEs  implementing  ICT  upgrades  and  infrastructure,  with  2  programmes  reporting  123 
jobs. The text below provides examples of the impact chain for the economic theme. 

The output – result - impact chain: specific examples from the programme documentation 

In Mannheim, Germany, 409 individuals were trained in 22 SMEs (in line with the target of 22). 60 new 
jobs were created  against a target of 45. In another project, 149 SMEs received financial support, with 
267 jobs created claimed (against a target of 205). 

In Graz, Austria, URBAN II funding resulted in a 30% increase in the number of businesses operating in 
the programme area, impacting on the area's employment headcount through 300 new jobs.  

In Halifax, United Kingdom, 1168 unemployed people accessed training and an additional 438 worked 
towards  achieving  a  qualification.  At  the  same  time,  a  series  of  business  support  initiatives  achieved 
outputs  such  as  help  for  928  SMEs.  As  a  result,  634  new  jobs  were  created,  971  people  secured 
employment, contributing to an impact on the unemployment rate in the URBAN II area, which fell from 
6.5% in 2000 to 4.7% in 2007.  

In Sambreville, Belgium, URBAN II co-financed training courses at the industrial and commercial school 
of  Auvelais.  Consultations  with  local  enterprises  and  public  employment  organisations  had  highlighted 
the specific recruitment needs of local companies and the extent of the inadequacy of qualified labour 
supply  in  the  programme  area,  characterised  by  high  unemployment  (20%),  lack  of  skills  and 
qualifications  and  dependence  on  welfare  benefits.  Under  URBAN  II,  394  people  from  disadvantaged 
socio-economic  backgrounds  received  training  on  49  courses,  resulting  in  a  post-training  60-70% 
success  rate  in  accessing  employment.  Some  of  the  beneficiaries  had  been  unemployed  for  years,  or 
had no qualifications, others were socially isolated, or came from disadvantaged backgrounds. 

Table 3.7 shows the aggregated figures for projects supported under the economic theme. 

73

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7  Outputs, results and impacts in the economic theme 

Core Outputs   Number of  

Programmes  
17 

Business 
advisory / 
support actions 

Achieved 
Value  
5984 

Results  

Number of 
companies 
assisted 

Number of  
Programmes 
13 

Achieved 
Value  
2249 

25 

43,004 

21 

7,354 

Number of 
participants 
trained 
Number of 
commercial 
centres/stores 
renovated 
Number of 
(innovation) 
projects 
supported 
Service / 
support centres 
created 

Incubator units 
created 
Square metres 
of commercial 
real estate 
created 
ICT projects 
and services 

2 

7 

4 

2 

2 

7 

Cultural events 
realized  

1 

23 

19 

9 

20 

43,292 

130 

6 

1 

5 

3 

1 

3 

Number of 
SMEs 
supported 
Evolution of 
turnover 

Number of 
firms 
involved 

Nr of 
companies/
self-
employed 
benefiting 
Occupancy 
rate of 
incubators 

Number of 
SMEs 
implementin
g new ICT 
appliances 
Direct jobs 
created per 
event per 
year  

Not  
known  

41 

Source: ECOTEC Analysis of Annual Implementation Reports

74

Impact  

Jobs created or safeguarded 
Number of new companies / business 
start-ups 
New businesses existing after 
extended period of time 
Companies relocating to URBAN 
area 
Number of jobs created / maintained 
Number of business start-ups 

+10% 

Number of jobs created 

2,938 

Number of start-ups 

829 

Number of companies set up 

100% 

Employment created  

Number of  
Programmes 
10 
3 

Achieved 
Value  
1016 
131 

4 

1 

14 
5 

2 

1 

2 

2 

198 

64 

2,276 
515 

115 

44 

87 

595 

127 

Gross numbers of jobs created  

2 

123 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The case studies identified two main achievements under the economic theme: 

• 

• 

the provision of business support services to new and existing enterprises operating in the programme 
areas. 

the  provision  of  training  support  to  local  residents  to  improve  their  skill  levels  and  employment 
prospects. 

Case study examples: The provision of business support services 

The refurbishment of the Elsie Whiteley Incubation Centre was part of a vision to create a new image for 
Halifax, moving it away from traditional (declining) industrial sectors and a reliance on a small number of 
larger, at risk, employers (for example HSBC Bank). Through the employment of an incubation manager 
and youth enterprise manger the project was able to successfully target and support a number of local 
residents  looking  to  start  their  own  business,  as  well  as  recently  established  businesses  needing 
subsidised  workspace.  The  incubation centre  was only  one  element  of  a  'cocktail'  of  business  support 
measures  designed  to  improve  the  economic  performance  of  Halifax.  Other  examples  of  successful 
initiatives  include  the  ‘Halifax  Means  Business’  project,  which  provided  start-up  grants  to  residents, 
specialist  growth  support  to  existing  businesses,  as  well  as  offering  a  range  of  inducements  to  entice 
businesses  to  relocate  to  Halifax.  The  programme  manager  perceived  that  the  project  had  helped  to 
increase the entrepreneurial 'spirit' in the town although this was not measured. ,   

In  Arhus  the  establishment  of  the  Nyvirk  Enterprise  Centre,  which  provided  business  support  services 
targeted specifically at the ethnic minority population was regarded by stakeholders as one of the most 
positive impacts achieved under URBAN II. The enterprise centre was located next to a shopping centre 
where many entrepreneurs were active and where many residents would pass on a daily basis. Since 
2003, the centre has provided guidance and advice to 150 residents in Arhus who have subsequently 
established a business, as well as providing support to a further 200 existing businesses. 

In Leipzig stakeholders felt that the business support provided to SMEs had been successful with 245 
local companies supported overall. It was perceived that the business support activity helped to stabilise 
business  performance  in  Leipzig,  as  well  as  being  important  in  helping  to  secure  €7.4m  of  additional 
investment for the area and business community. The impact achieved was also evident in the updated 
baseline  indicators,  which  showed  that  the  total  number  of  businesses  increased  from  320  to  650 
between  2000  and  2007  (which  in  turn  helped  to  revitalise  demand  for  commercial  properties  in  the 
programme area). Much of this business growth was concentrated in the Plagwitz neighbourhood which, 
with the help of URBAN II funding, has begun to shed its old image and develop a role as a fashionable 
neighbourhood for young artists, start-ups and students. 

The additional business support services were one of the strongest performing aspects of the URBAN II 
programme  in  Sambreville.  In  total,  252  businesses  were  offered  a  holistic business  support  package, 
including  organised  trade  visits  and  business-to-business  conferences  as  well  as  a  range  of  online 
support tools. The business support was deemed by case study consultees to be instrumental in a local 
industrial  zone  being  filled  to  capacity,  as  well  as  helping  to  create  new  employment  opportunities  for 
local residents, especially vulnerable and unqualified people.  

The development of the local economy was a focal point of the programme in Graz, and resulted in a raft 

75

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of measures aimed at exploiting the potential of the knowledge economy. A key project that fell under 
this  area  of  activity  was  a  business  incubation  centre  that  was  created  to  provide  advice,  training, 
support  services  and  funding  to  entrepreneurs  looking  to  operate  in  the  'high  tech'  sector.  Key 
stakeholders  regarded  this  project  as  an  example  of  good  practice  because  it  was  based  on  local 
economic needs, and provided additional business start-up services that helped to stimulate a cluster of 
new  businesses  operating  in  the  high  tech  sector.  In  addition,  due  to  the  success  of  the  project,  the 
business support services have now been absorbed into the mainstream and rolled out to the whole of 
Graz.  

Case study examples: Training support to improve skill levels and employment opportunities 

The case studies showed that many local residents were offered a range of training support options to 
help improve their skill levels and employment options. Many case study consultees commented on this 
economic measure when referring to the most significant areas of impact achieved under URBAN II.  

In Sambreville, there was a high degree of synergy between economic measures. In addition to offering 
business support services, a number of local employers were also engaged through URBAN II to help 
devise a range of training support projects, including a welding training programme, that were targeted 
directly  at  the  local  labour  force,  many  of  whom  were  low  skilled  and  had  had  prolonged  periods  of 
unemployment.  The  welding  project  was  regarded  by  stakeholders  as  an  example  of  good  practice 
because  it  dealt  with  both  demand  and  supply  issues  within  the  local  economy  and  also  resulted  in  a 
number of quantifiable impacts (for example, 80% of trainees subsequently moved into employment with 
a local company) as well as softer impacts such as improved confidence and employment prospects for 
beneficiaries who did not immediately find a job.  

The additional start-up support services and training were also regarded as one of the strongest aspects 
of  the  programme  in  Dortmund.  In  order  to  create  new,  sustainable  employment  opportunities  for  a 
number of hard to reach groups (including alcohol and drug addicts and the long-term unemployed), a 
project  was  developed  to  stimulate  enterprise  development  by  converting  a  derelict  local  building  into 
managed  workspace  and  offering  a  range  of  start-up  business  support  services  and  training 
opportunities.  As  well  as  looking  to  address  worklessness  issues  by  stimulating  new  enterprise 
development  opportunities,  the  beneficiaries  of  the  project  were  also  encouraged  to  enter  trades  with 
skill shortages, thereby also addressing needs within the local economy. A large part of the success of 
the  managed  workspace  project,  which  is  now  operating  as  a  sustainable  business  requiring  little 
intervention  from  the  public  sector,  was  perceived  by  stakeholders  to  be  the  fact  that  it  was  based on 
local needs.  

Similarly in Perama, one of the strongest areas of perceived impact was the vocational training support 
that was offered to local residents, designed to help them exploit new employment opportunities in the 
local  economy.  Tailored  training  programmes  that  targeted  specific  groups  (e.g.  unemployed  women, 
particularly  those  in  danger  of  exclusion)  as  well  as  specific  occupations  (e.g.  management  and 
administration), particular sectors (e.g. cultural and recreational services) and specific trade skills (e.g. 
wooden  ship-building  crafts)  were  introduced  to  address  the  consequences  of  industrial  decline  in 
Perama (i.e. high levels of unemployment). Although there was no quantifiable evidence on how many 
trainees accessed employment, it was perceived that local people were more employable as they had 

76

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
obtained the skills needed by the new sectors that had gradually been moving into Perama (especially IT 
and logistics).    

In Gijon many of the more successful projects under the economic theme were focused on the provision 
of  ICT  training  activities  to  local  people  and  SMEs.  From  September  2003  until  July  2008,  training 
activities on ICT, electronic commerce and the use of internet attracted an average of 600 beneficiaries 
per year. Those training activities were tailored to meet the needs of the users, with specific modules for 
women, shop assistants and young people, for example. Stakeholders commented that the training not 
only helped to increase the number of households accessing the internet, but also helped to improve the 
employment options of residents and stimulated an increase in enterprise development.  

3.7.3  Social theme 

Training was the most popular activity under the social theme with 31 programmes reporting 982 training 
projects,  which  overall  (for  28  programmes)  accounted  for  the  training  of  almost  65,000  individuals. 
Training  can  cover  a  wide  variety  of  activity  with  different 
intensity  and 
formality/informality28.  Other  impacts  reported  were  reductions  in  illiteracy  levels  and  new  jobseekers 
entering the labour market. Only one programme (Normanton) recorded the most obvious result from the 
training - qualifications gained.  

levels  of  depth, 

Security  projects  were  common  in  disadvantaged  areas,  often  blighted  by  high  levels  of  crime  and 
vandalism.  7 programmes delivered  a  total  of  247  security  projects  that  impacted  on  more than  71,000 
people (in four programmes), and in one programme resulted in incidences of crime declining against a 
baseline  statistic  (Arhus).  The  impact  of  security  projects  should  ideally  be  a  reduction  of  crime  or  – 
sometimes  more  importantly  –  fear  of crime.  Due  to the  large  number of  indicators  used  for  measuring 
crime across Member States, it is not possible to come to a definitive view about the impact of security-
related measures, but it is clear that they have had some impact in the programme areas. 

5  URBAN  II  programmes  contributed  to  593  capacity  building  interventions.  In  one  case  (Belfast)  this 
resulted in increased business turnover for social economy projects and in a second case (Burnley) 134 
people involved in community management. In Amadora, 85 different publications were issued on public 
and citizenship participation and 2,062 residents participated in community capacity building events. The 
literature on urban governance and community involvement often highlights the sustainability of capacity 
building projects once funding ceases.  

The  social  projects  collectively  have  reached  large  numbers  of  participants,  whether  it  is  attendance  at 
employment,  health  and  social  centres,  attendance  at  cultural  events  or  participation  in  drug  advice 
programmes (three programmes, all in Portugal). Participation can be relatively passive (e.g. attendance 
at  events)  but  also  targeted  on  individuals  in  need  of  specific  support  (e.g.  the  drug  advice  projects). 
Evidence and measurement of results is patchy: for example, in one programme (Arhus), it is claimed that 
68%  of  young  people  are  active  in  sport  or  culture  as  a  result  of  cultural  events,  but  no  baseline 
comparison  is  offered  to  make  a  judgement  on  whether  this  represents  an  improvement.  Employment 
impacts  were  put  forward  as  impacts  for  health  projects  in  two  programmes,  but  improvements  to  the 

28 Training under the social theme is largely focused on individuals seeking work whilst training under the 
economic theme mostly concerns businesses and their employees. 

77

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
health of individuals and communities (not measured  in these cases) would have been a more obvious 
indicator, directly relating to the problems identified at the baseline stage. 

There is a theme of 'prevention rather than cure' for many social projects including the provision of advice 
on drugs, preventing crime through security measures and improving healthy living through participation 
in  sports  activities.  In  Peterborough,  the  programme  sought  to  increase self confidence,  motivation  and 
self reliance among the residents of local communities through training and advice projects, and sought to 
reduce crime and the fear of crime through community safety initiatives. The programme recorded a 20% 
decrease in the proportion of young offenders as one of its impacts. The text below provides examples of 
the impact chain for the social theme.  

The output – result – impact chain: specific examples from the programme documentation 

In Arhus the Outsiders2Insiders project established by four former convicted criminals to prevent crime 
worked with 11 young people (exceeding the target of  5 people), with the aim of make them role models 
for  the  community's  youth.  A  survey  of  residents  showed  that  66%  believed  positive  change  was 
happening in the area, with 64% believing that the area's prospects are looking brighter.  

The projects claiming the most training places are  in Val-de-Seine, France, with 87 projects delivering 
training to 35,030 participants (just above the target of 34,025). The creation of 12 jobs was claimed as 
an impact against a target of 11 (this could be associated with the provision of training but the monitoring 
of data is not clear).  

The Thames Gateway programme delivered 172 community capacity building measures and assessed 
the benefits with a claim of 20% of the local population accessing financial advisory service and a 20% 
reduction in criminal damage reported, the causal link between output and impact being more difficult to 
prove in this case.  

In Rotterdam initiatives aiming to improve the image of the programme area led to 81 projects in the field 
of preservation and dissemination of culture and 43 exchange projects. These, in turn, resulted in 12,550 
individuals  from  vulnerable  groups  participating  in  coaching  projects.  The  related  impact  is  difficult  to 
gauge with precision. A safety index was developed –and showed a positive trend - but several projects 
would  have  impacted  on  the  index,  thus  making  it  difficult  to  disaggregate  the  relative  weight  that  the 
above projects exerted. 

Table 3.8 shows aggregated figures for activities belonging to the social theme. 

78

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8  Outputs, impact and results for the social theme 

Core 
Outputs 

Number of 
Programmes

Achieved 
Value 

Results 

Number of 
Programmes 

Achieved 
Value 

Impact  

Number of 
Programmes

Actual Value 

Participants planning to 
study as result of 
programme 

Reduction in illiteracy levels 
relative to national average 

Increase in population 
accessing general training 

People securing recognised 
qualifications 

64,801 

Increase in use of services 
through new users 

New activities resulting 

4 

1 

71,403 

20% 

Number of jobseekers 
entering labour market 

Incidences of crime per 
10,000 population (baseline 
65) 

Reduction in criminal 
damage offences 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

3 

1 

1 

280 

3% 

20% 

49 

20% 

28 

481 

52 

20% 

1 

648 

Number of 
training actions 

31 

982 

Number of 
participants 

28 

7 

5 

246 

593 

Number of 
security actions 

Number of 
community 
capacity 
building 
initiatives 

Number of 
persons 

Proportion of 
population 
accessing 
local 
community 
service for 
financial 
security 

New sales in 
assisted 
social 
economy 
projects 
during 3 year 
period (Euro 

79

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Core 
Outputs 

Number of 
Programmes

Achieved 
Value 

Results 

Number of 
Programmes 

Achieved 
Value 

Impact  

Number of 
Programmes

Actual Value 

'000 

Community 
facilities 
benefiting 
from 
enhanced 
security 

New people 
involved in 
the 
management 
of community 
groups 

Number of 
users 

Number of 
users 

Increased 
community 
participation 
(average) 

Amount (m2) 
of improved 
public space 

Young 
people 
assisted by 
information 
and 
prevention 

Number of 
participants 

Number of 
ICT 

1 

2 

6 

4 

2 

1 

1 

7 

5 

80

33% 

Financially assisted 
programmes still in place 
after 18 months 

1 

 5 

1,278 

17,554 

Number of jobs 

4 

170 

14,258 

24% 

2,619 

12,650 

Number of (indirect) 
employed 

2 

568 

Number of community 
facilities improved 

1 

7 

91,646 

Increase in number of 
residents participating to 
activities 

35,817 

Number of jobs created 

1 

1 

1287 

3 

Number of 
employment 
support/training 
centres created 
or restored 

Number of 
community 
facilities 
improved 

Drug advice 
programme 
activities 

Number of 
cultural events 
and projects 

Number of 
buildings 

6 

8 

16 

22 

3 

162 

11 

6 

949 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Core 
Outputs 

Number of 
Programmes

Achieved 
Value 

Results 

Number of 
Programmes 

Achieved 
Value 

Impact  

Number of 
Programmes

Actual Value 

addressed/ 
equipped with 

Number of new 
childcare places 

8 

443 

users/benefic
iaries 

Number of 
children 
benefiting 

Source: ECOTEC Analysis of Annual Implementation Reports

3 

988 

Women returning to work 

2 

32 

81

 
 
 
 
 
 
The  case  studies  identified  one  main  area  of  impact  under  the  social  theme,  namely:  the  provision  of 
additional or new social services to address issues of supply and accessibility at the local level.  

Case study examples: improved social services 

The  provision  of  additional  or  new  social  services  and  resources  was  regarded  by  many  stakeholders  
as a base for generating impact under the social theme. It was also apparent in case study reports that 
the  investment  made  to  improve  the  physical  infrastructure  and  fabric  of  programme  areas  was 
contributed  to  the  provision  of  better  social  services  (for  example,  by  building  or  renovating  social 
centres offering information, advice, guidance and other support to residents).  

Gijon  is  an  example  of  a  programme  where  investments  to  regenerate  the  physical  fabric  of  the 
programme area played a key role in improving access to new social services. Stakeholders commented 
that the new social spaces created played a role in enabling delivery partners to host a range of training 
and  other  social  activities  targeted  at  local  residents.  URBAN  Online,  an  ICT  training  project,  was 
devised to narrow the digital divide between residents in the programme area compared to those living 
in more affluent surrounding areas (a need which was identified in a local research study). The project 
was successful in up-skilling local residents and also in promoting greater usage of the internet at home 
(broadband access increased from 11.5% of households in 2002 to 48.9% in 2008). This was seen to 
make local residents more employable as they were able to develop more better ICT skills in line with 
the new requirements of local employers.  

In  Le  Havre,  the  creation  of  a  new  Multimedia  Library  contributed  to  the  provision  of  a  range  of  new 
social services for local residents to access (including ICT and language training as well as multimedia 
workshops  and  public  reading  sessions).  One  stakeholder  commented  that  by  providing  high-level 
services that are not available in other libraries in the city, the library had become a focal point for the 
city of Le Havre. 

In  Perama,  the  municipality  was  aware  that  access  to  social  services  was  an  important  issue  in  the 
target community and commissioned a mapping and needs analysis study to establish the extent of the 
problem.  As  a  result  of  the  study,  the  municipality  created  a  'one  stop  shop'  offering  information  and 
public services to the citizens as well as encouraging residents to access employment services in order 
to move them closer to the labour market. They also used URBAN II funds to establish a mobile medical 
centre that was designed to reach out to citizens living in the more geographically isolated parts of the 
city. The project was regarded by stakeholders as an example of good practice because it provided an 
innovative solution to tackling a local need (i.e. access to health services) and helped to save lives (as 
the mobile centre allowed health professionals to go out into the community and diagnose serious health 
problems among patients who would not have visited the existing medical centre). 

3.8 Wider benefits of URBAN II 

The case studies also highlighted more general benefits to programme areas that cut across the themes 
but were either not systematically measured, or could not be quantified .  These benefits were referred to 
by  stakeholders  when  commenting  on  the  main  difference  that  URBAN  II  had  made  and  were  often 

82

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regarded  by  consultees  as  being  as  -  if  not  more  important  -  than  the  quantifiable  outputs,  results  and 
impacts,  particularly  in  terms  of  how  URBAN  II  has  left  a  lasting  legacy  in  programme  areas.  Some  of 
these benefits (e.g. improved image) have been introduced above as part of the thematic assessment of 
URBAN II. 

The main wider benefits of URBAN II that were evident can be summarised as follows: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

it  helped  to  change  the  image  of  programme  areas,  particularly  through  the  realisation  of  physical 
regeneration projects including new public and cultural amenities and green space.  

it helped to raise the strategic profile and promoted greater understanding of the needs of programme 
areas and their target communities.  

it  helped  establish,  build  and  strengthen  the  regeneration  infrastructure  in  programme  areas  (e.g. 
helped to support the development of the local voluntary sector or established a new business forum). 

it had a positive impact on building the confidence and aspirations of local people.  

Case study examples: Improved image  

In 10 of the studies the URBAN II programmes were a catalyst to change the image of their areas. In 
particular, stakeholders referred to the physical regeneration projects. The improvement of infrastructural 
links,  creation  of  new  public  space  or  cultural  amenities,  the  regeneration  of  key  buildings  in 
neighbourhoods and the development of new and improved green space were all perceived as having 
improved the image of the programme area to investors, residents, tourists, businesses, shoppers and 
public funding bodies.  

The  mix  of  physical  improvement  projects  in  Graz  (which  included  the  conversion  of  the  Helmut  List 
Halle concert venue, alongside transport improvements to the local transport hub and new services such 
as the community library) was perceived as contributing to changing the image of the area, particularly in 
terms of encouraging young people to stay and enticing visitors (tourists) to the area. The creation of a 
new  SME  start-up  centre  and  associated  facilities  for  technological  businesses  were  also  regarded  as 
being important factors in changing the image of Graz and encouraging new high profile companies and 
organisations to the area (such as Roche and the Eco World Styria network).  

In Dortmund, as a consequence of URBAN II, the Nordstadt is regarded as a more attractive place to 
live,  with  improved  local  facilities  and  services.  Communication  work  and  events  such  as  the 
‘International  Week’  were  also  identified  as  helping  to  increase  the  numbers  of  visitors  and  mitigate 
negative press about Dortmund. This was also the case in Arhus, where a resident survey highlighted 
that  'that  more  positive  things  are  happening  in  the  area'  compared  to  before  URBAN  II  (66%  of 
respondents); the area's prospects are looking brighter (64% of respondents); and that there were more 
opportunities than before the start of the programme (73% of respondents). 

Social and physical regeneration activities that stimulated an improved image were also considered the 
most visible successes of the Perama programme. Consultees commented that the area has certainly 
changed aesthetically, with many neighbourhoods being upgraded physically through the renovation of 
squares  and  the  creation  of  pedestrian  streets.  The  new  open  air  theatre  (and  eventually  a  museum) 
had encouraged local residents and tourists to reintroduce themselves to the area and attend a variety 
of shows, which in turn gave the programme area a new, more vibrant feel and image. Word of mouth 

83

 
 
 
 
 
 
and local press reports about the URBAN II projects helped to change the image of the programme area 
from one that was regarded as ‘dangerous’ to visit, to an area that is ‘welcoming’ and 'worth a visit'. 

Case study examples: Raised profile 

Stakeholders  in  Le  Havre  believe  that  the  programme  has  been  the  driving  force  behind  the 
rehabilitation of the area and that, prior to 2000, the southern districts were ‘forgotten’ and ‘neglected’ by 
most  policy  makers  in  the  city.  Strategic  stakeholders  now  have  a  much  better  understanding  of  the 
needs and key priorities in the programme area, and crucially this has been backed up with additional 
funding  to  address  those  needs.  URBAN  II  activities  are  continued  via  finance  from  a  national 
regeneration programme dealing with regional competitiveness. 

In Graz, stakeholders commented that one of the intangible impacts of the programme in Graz (West) 
has been its ability to put the programme area 'on the map' which has influenced the development of an 
integrated  regeneration strategy for of Graz South (which in turn attracted around €3m of national and 
regional  resources).  This  was  also  the  case  in  Leipzig,  where  the  success  of  a  number  of  spatially 
targeted projects led to the release of a further €127m from national government and private investors. 
Stakeholders  felt  that  this  additional  funding  would  not  have  happened  without  URBAN  II  raising  the 
profile of the challenges in Graz West.  

Case  study  consultees  in  Gijon  also  pointed  out  that  the  programme  raised  awareness  of  the  area's 
needs among regional stakeholders. During the last few years the municipality of Gijon has received a 
number  of  awards  recognising  the  work  undertaken  under  URBAN  II29,  which  assisted  in  raising  the 
profile and awareness of the programme, the programme area and its key target communities. 

Halifax  stakeholders  highlighted  that  regional  partners  (including  funding  organisations)  were  more 
aware of the town's need for regeneration funding. Even the attendance of regional stakeholders at the 
programmes  partnership  meetings  meant  that  important  decision  makers  came  to  the  town  more 
frequently than they had done previously.  

Stakeholders in Sambreville commented that URBAN II has been a key factor in the creation of a new 
long-term  successor  strategy  to  guide  regeneration  activities  in  the  city;  a  development  that  is  unique 
within  the  Walloon  Region.  Previous  regeneration  programmes  tended  to  be  developed  with  regional 
priorities  in  mind,  with  little  consideration  for  local  needs  and  issues.  URBAN  II  has  therefore  been 
influential in terms of promoting the local agenda, with Sambreville being regarded as a pioneer in the 
development  of  a  new  bottom-up  approach  to  regeneration.  Many  stakeholders  felt  that  further  socio-
economic  improvements  in  the  target  area  will  follow  on  from  the  physical  development  that  the 
programme has instigated. Another indirect impact of URBAN II was the accelerator effect on the pace 
of  development  in  the  programme  area.  The  programme  has  sharpened  the  focus  and  mobilized 
involved parties to provide a basis for continuing regeneration after URBAN II.  

29 The 2003 Award for the Best Public Initiative in Asturias (by the national economic magazine Actualidad 
Economica); the Award APIA 2003 for the full regeneration and renovation of the industrial parks of western 
Gijón; and the 2004 Award for the most attractive public building in Asturias for the Calzada Sports Centre. 

84

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study examples: Establishing and strengthening the regeneration infrastructure 

The  role  of  URBAN  II  in  helping  to  establish  new  -  as  well  as  build  and  strengthen  existing  – 
regeneration  delivery  infrastructure  and  mechanisms  is  another  example  of  one  of  the  less  easily 
measurable impacts that were reported in the case studies (9 out of 15 case studies made reference to 
this  factor).  In  some  instances,  this  impact  was  expressed  in  terms  of  equipping  the  programme 
management  team  with  the  skills  and  abilities  to  deliver  other  regeneration  initiatives  in  the  future.  In 
other  case  study  areas,  the  voluntary  and  community  sector  have  built  capacity  to  deliver  a  range  of 
local services direct to the community.  

In Le Mantois, the management team felt strongly that overseeing the delivery of URBAN II had exposed 
them to a new way of working that allowed them to develop new skills and abilities. The team highlighted 
new skills in relation to project development, appraisal and monitoring systems, community involvement 
and partnership working; skills which they believe have strengthened the infrastructure to support future 
regeneration priorities in Le Mantois. The team is now managing the ERDF Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment funds as well as all the other national and local initiatives targeting Le Mantois.  

This was also the case in Porto Gondomar, where the structures that were established (e.g. community 
and business forums) and the staff that were appointed to oversee the delivery of the programme, are 
still actively involved in other regional and local regeneration programmes. In this sense, URBAN II has 
created  a  lasting  legacy  by  developing  a  new  infrastructure  that  has  empowered  local  partners,  and 
created  new  ways  of  working  that  successor  regeneration  projects  and  initiatives  can  build  on  and 
enhance.  This  was  innovative  in  Porto  Gondomar,  where  much  policy  making  was  centralised  at  the 
national level.   

In  Gijon,  a  total  of  41  local  community  associations  were  involved  in  the  management  and 
implementation  of  the URBAN  II  projects.  The  voluntary  and community  sector  partners  included  local 
foundations,  youth  associations,  sports 
neighbourhood  associations,  educational  centres  and 
associations, associations for elderly people and local business associations. The participation of these 
organisations  led  stakeholders  to  believe  that  the  voluntary  and  community  sector  could  now  be 
regarded  as  a  'trusted  partner'  and  a  'key  player'  when  it  came  to  the  delivery  of  future  regeneration 
activity. Because of capacity building work, key stakeholders were much more confident that the overall 
regeneration  infrastructure  in  the  city  (particularly  concerning  planning  for  and  delivering  regeneration 
initiatives) was geared towards tackling the real needs and issues in Gijon.  

This  was  also  the  case  in  Halifax,  where  approximately  half  of  the  projects  were  run  by  voluntary  or 
community organisations. The targeting of the third sector in Halifax was part of a two-pronged approach 
to  strengthening  the  local  regeneration  infrastructure.  Resources  were  directed  at  a  Community 
Development Consortium, which provided four outreach workers to capacity build, fundraise and provide 
grants  to  various  local  resident  organisations,  as  well  as  funding  activities  and  services  that  were 
delivered directly by the voluntary and community sector. 

85

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study example: Building the confidence and aspirations of local residents 

It is also apparent that URBAN II has built the confidence and raised the aspirations of residents living in 
many of the programme areas.  

In Le Mantois, one consultee commented that there had been a "return of values to the area" among the 
local  population,  particularly  in  terms  of  respect  for  the  surrounding  environment.  Local  research 
suggested that, as the quality of life of people increased, their confidence rose and people were more 
optimistic  about  the  future,  when  compared  to  the  situation  prior  to  URBAN  II.  Stakeholders  also 
believed  that  resident  attitudes  had  begun  to  change  with  respect  to  the  value  they  placed  on 
employment and the importance attached to gaining a good education.  

In  Sambreville  the  development  of  a  training  programme,  which  actively  targeted  local  residents  who 
were  unemployed  and  low-skilled  (in  order  to  fill  the  skills  gaps  of  local  companies),  was  identified  as 
being  a  key  factor  in  changing  the  attitudes  and  aspirations  of  local  people.  Stakeholders  commented 
that  even  when  the  training  did  not  lead  to  a  direct  job  opportunity,  the  programme  had  the  indirect 
benefit of increasing the "motivation of the population”, especially the more vulnerable ones.  

In  Gijon,  stakeholders  commented  that  older  people  who  had  previously  felt  isolated  were  now 
interacting with the community on a much more regular basis and attending other activities as a direct 
result of being engaged in training events linked to improving employment support.  

In  Perama,  stakeholders  commented  that  local  residents  had  responded  positively  to  physical 
improvements to local public squares. This had manifested itself in greater resident involvement in local 
events  and  activities  (e.g.  visits  to  theatres  and  museums).More  generally  it  was  felt  that  local  people 
were  making  better  use  of  public  spaces  (evident  through  more  children  playing  and  people  taking 
walks) as well as through increased usage of local social services.  

In Bristol the involvement of young people in the management and delivery of the programme resulted in 
a  number  of  spin  off  benefits,  particularly  in  terms  of  raising  their  confidence,  self  esteem,  aspirations 
and  employment  opportunities.  In  the  words  of  the  Project  Manager,  one  of  the  key  impacts  of  the 
programme  was  "the  change  that  took  place  between  the  ears  of  those  young  people  involved  in  the 
programme". 5 young people were able to gain employment in the outdoor activity sector. This reflects 
the role of URBAN II in helping young people turn their interests into career opportunities, through their 
experience in managing the programme or as project beneficiaries. 

3.9 Factors underlying programme success or failure  

As well as the external factors discussed above, important internal issues affected programmes’ overall 
level  of  success  and  failure.  Table  3.8  shows  these  internal  factors  for  the  case  study  areas,  with  a 
particular focus on whether it was the URBAN II ‘method’ or funding that was the main success factor. It 
therefore  explores  whether  methods  promoted  by  URBAN  II  (integration,  multidisciplinary  approaches 

86

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
etc) were a deciding factor in a programme being successful, or whether the main driver was simply the 
money that URBAN II injected into the programme area. 

Table  3.9  shows  that  although  both  funding  and  method  were  important  factors  in  programme 
performance,  the  methods  and  practices  promoted  through  URBAN  II  were  often  clear  reasons  why 
programmes were deemed to be successful by stakeholders consulted as part in the evaluation.  

Of course, if the funding supported projects which were poorly delivered, inappropriate to local conditions 
or underperformed on outputs, this would have a major effect on the programme’s level of success. 

Table 3.9  Critical Success Factors  

Case study area 

Factors in success/failure 

Arhus 

Bristol  

Carrara 

Crotone 

A key success factor, particularly in driving change in opinions and attitudes, 
was the URBAN II method of encouraging resident empowerment and 
involvement. A large proportion of residents surveyed considered that 
URBAN II had tried to involve them and that they now had more influence 
over the area’s future development. In addressing crime issues, the URBAN 
II method, particularly in promoting the integration of themes, was also a key 
success factor. For example, a key project to engage socially excluded 
people and prevent crime was set up by four previously convicted offenders 
in partnership with a housing association and a family centre. 

Funding for projects which targeted specific issues would seem to be the key 
factor in addressing the socio-economic issues highlighted in the programme 
area (i.e. the money was more important than the method), particularly in 
terms of educational attainment. The critical mass of projects reflecting this 
theme and concentration of resources in this area were regarded as the 
main reasons why the context has improved in comparison to the baseline 
situation. However, key stakeholders’ comments suggest that the URBAN II 
principles, particularly resident and voluntary and community sector 
engagement and capacity building (in this case involving young people), 
were important factors in the success of the initiative and improving 
conditions.  

The activity funded through URBAN II was determined to some extent by 
external factors (the 2003 flood) and pre-existing urban regeneration 
strategy. What URBAN II funded rather than the method or approach 
developed was key to the relative success of the programme. The integration 
of infrastructural measures with social, economic and cultural ones, 
improved residents’ positive perception of the programme. For example, 
creating the urban bypass contributed to improving the area’s ‘liveability’ (in 
reducing urban traffic and transport times) and has had repercussions on 
commercial activity in the city’s historic centre. 

The programme was mainly designed around the priorities of the managing 
authority, and key stakeholders generally regarded it as having had little 
impact in the programme area or on the target population. Where the 
programme did make a positive impact in their target area the more 
successful projects were those which were less ambitious in nature, aimed to 
resolve simple problems, did not have a strong strategic focus, and had a 
built-in exit strategy or were designed to be short-term interventions. 

Dortmund 

Although URBAN II was unable to catalyse a change in socio-economic 
conditions in the Nordstadt, the methods for developing and implementing 

87

 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study area 

Factors in success/failure 

Gijon 

Graz 

Halifax 

Le Havre 

URBAN II activity had a strong bearing on the programme’s success. Key 
factors include developing a strong evidence base on the programme area’s 
needs (prior to designing interventions) plus the active engagement of the 
population. In implementing projects, stakeholders commented that the 
Nordstadt benefited from the involvement of a range of local organisations, 
many of which developed model projects from innovative ideas and were 
treated as equal partners by the city council. The integration of themes was 
also cited as a key factor. For example, improvements to local parks and 
green spaces impacted on the environment and on the social dimension and 
quality of life for neighbourhood residents. This work also attracted visitors to 
the area, creating an economic impact and changing perceptions of the 
Nordstadt among people from the rest of Dortmund and further afield.  

Stakeholders commented that the rate of change in local conditions was 
more apparent in the programme area than other comparable areas because 
of the intensity of the investments and resources devoted to physical 
regeneration of the urban public spaces, together with firm support to the 
local business community and the push towards general access to new ICT 
for residents and SMEs. Another instrumental factor in driving change was 
the ‘integrated development path’, which resulted in key city council 
departments working collaboratively to deliver a range of holistic 
regeneration projects. For example, a number of council departments 
worked together on a capital project to build a new waste management and 
recycling point. This was designed to incorporate public space to hold 
community events and training sessions on raising awareness of 
environmental issues.  

Where change was apparent (in relation to the physical environment), a ‘pre-
URBAN II programme’ was a key factor in shaping the activity subsequently 
funded through URBAN II. The good relationships between agencies, 
departments and other local stakeholders were also cited as an important 
factor in stimulating change. However, it is not clear to what extent URBAN II 
influenced the development of these relationships. One area where the 
URBAN II method did influence change was in integrating physical measures 
with social and economic ones. For example, the creation of a new technical 
college was linked to improved transport infrastructure and public realm 
work, and the college also hosted a project for single parent families. 

Targeting a tightly defined geographical area was as a key factor that 
contributed to the success of the URBAN II programme in Halifax. Engaging 
a range of local actors from the voluntary and community sector was also 
regarded as an important factor in achieving change. By working with local 
partners, the management team successfully targeted specific issues such 
as unemployment among those over 50 or developing an employment 
programme for people with disabilities. The integration of URBAN II 
resources with SRB and the focus on a single regeneration theme (economic 
measures), as well as URBAN II looking to build on existing projects and 
structures, was also regarded as a key reason why the programme drove 
change at the local level.  

A most revealing statement in the case study report was that: “much more 
attention and funding is devoted to the southern districts because of 
URBAN’s ability to make people more aware of the needs of the area and 
the funding from the programme that encouraged stakeholder organisations 
to get round the table. The funding drove change and was the impetus to 
bring key stakeholders together, and helped to lever in additional private 

88

 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study area 

Factors in success/failure 

Le Mantois 

Leipzig 

Perama 

Porto Gondomar 

sector investment. It also highlights that the method/approach facilitated 
change in the programme area too: the focus on a tightly defined 
geographical area was regarded as important. Integration in the 
management team (bringing together staff from different local authority 
departments) and in the projects (for example, the new Media Library offers 
a range of additional social and educational services) was also regarded as 
a key success factor.  

The funding rather than the method or approach was the most important 
factor in the programme’s success. Although several successful projects 
were cited as driving a change in image, there is no evidence that URBAN II 
principles shaped this change or influenced the level of success. URBAN II 
being a time-limited programme was a key driving force that brought 
stakeholders together, rather than a desire to work together in a more 
integrated way. The key factors influencing the development of the 
programme were historic (most regeneration programmes in France focus on 
a single issue) and related to the managing authority, which was a public 
planning institution with a strong focus on physical development. 

A key success factor was the evidence base of local need which was 
developed by engaging and consulting with a range of local actors (e.g. 
businesses) and residents. This helped to ensure that funded activities were 
targeted and built on existing strengths (for example, by funding cultural and 
enterprise-related activities in the Plagwitz neighbourhood district). The 
programme comprised a large number of small but highly integrated projects, 
where achievements were quickly visible and built up awareness of and 
support for the URBAN II programme. However, some stakeholders 
considered the small size of the projects as a weakness, as it potentially 
‘watered down’ the programme’s overall impact (and therefore its ability to 
drive change); the amount invested per project was seen as too small to 
make a real difference on a particular issue. The programme’s ability to drive 
change was also to some extent undermined by external economic factors, 
particularly job losses associated with the decline of a number of traditional 
industrial employers.  

It is not clear which factors were most influential in stimulating change (i.e. 
whether the funding and/or the method were most important). However, the 
creation of an evidence base on the needs and possible solutions for the 
programme area’s problems was highlighted as one of the main cross-
cutting factors associated with the more successful projects. The design 
phase of the programme included consultation with a range of local actors, 
which influenced the design and ensured that a large number of small but 
integrated projects were developed (as well as larger physical ones) to 
address the needs of the programme area and population.  

Although it was not possible to identify what role URBAN II has played in 
driving change in socio-economic conditions, its methods clearly influenced 
the programme design and delivery of projects. Prior to URBAN II, local 
stakeholders and other partners tended to work in isolation. By embracing 
the principles of URBAN II, new partnerships were developed and worked 
towards a common strategy; a number of integrated and targeted projects 
were created as a result. Community engagement, which previously tended 
not to occur, also became commonplace, which helped to ensure that 
projects responded to local needs.  

89

 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study area 

Factors in success/failure 

Rotterdam 

Where URBAN II drove change (for example, in addressing crime and safety 
issues), the integration of themes was clearly an important success factor. 
For example, the interventions for tackling crime and safety included training 
shopkeepers on safety issues, targeting families and children at risk of 
offending, and improvements to public spaces and infrastructure to address 
public perceptions of the fear of crime. However, the URBAN II programme 
must also be viewed in its broader strategic context. Rather than looking to 
duplicate or invent new ways of working, the programme built on and 
enhanced existing methods such as the ‘strategic neighbourhood approach’ 
to regeneration, which placed strong emphasis on targeting a tightly defined 
geographical area and integrating themes.  

In relatively few instances, URBAN II supported projects that completely failed. In general, a wide range 
of urban development activities were supported; some were weak, but the majority were relatively strong 
in achieving outputs and having a positive effect on target groups. Where projects failed, it was generally 
down  to  very  local  issues  specific  to  the  project.  For  example,  an  enterprise  support  project 
underperformed because its premises were not built on time; a health project underperformed because it 
duplicated another similar project; and a crime project failed because it did not recruit a manager quickly 
enough.  

The  URBAN  II  'method'  was  a  much  more  important  and  overarching  factor  in  determining  whether  a 
programme succeeded. Table 3.8 showed that stakeholders referred to critical success factors in terms of 
how the community was involved in decisions, how the programme encouraged multi-agency partnership 
working,  how  programmes  focused  on  tightly  defined  areas, and how  problems were  approached  in  an 
integrated way. All of these elements came together, to varying degrees to characterise an approach or 
method by which many URBAN II programmes were developed and implemented. Many of the principles 
involved  were  relatively  new  to  the  local  urban  development  agenda  within  host  cities,  and  URBAN  II 
stimulated  new  partnerships,  new  methods  for  engaging  with  local  residents  and  new  projects  that 
combined an economic and physical focus in a way not seen before in many of the host cities. The above 
points are expanded upon in section 4 which deals with the delivery of URBAN II programmes.   

The URBAN II method is dealt with in more detail in Section 4, which covers delivery structures. At this 
stage  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  the  URBAN  II  method  was  a  clear  ingredient  in  the  success  of 
programmes.  Some  of  the  more  strategic  stakeholders  viewed  the  funding  attached  to  URBAN  II  as  a 
useful tool in encouraging urban development practitioners to consider implementing methods attached to 
URBAN II. The funding was helpful to ensure that stakeholders ‘got round the  table’ and was often the 
initial  stimulus  that  persuaded  practitioners  to  consider,  for  instance,  spending  time  developing  a 
partnership or consulting with local people.  

90

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.10 

Conclusions – the outputs, results and impacts of URBAN II 

The  key  evaluation  findings  from  Section  3  based  on  the  terms  of  reference  questions  can  be 
summarised as follows. 

What have been the results and impacts of URBAN II programmes and how do changes compare 
to  the  initial  baseline?  How  do  changes  compare  to  general  trends  in  similar  non-URBAN  areas 
across the EU? 

Assessing the 'achievement' of programmes by looking at their performance against their target output, 
impact  and  result  figures  is  not  sufficient.  It  tells  us  more  about  target  setting  (and  the  programmes' 
inability to do this accurately) than it does about the 'performance' of programmes.  

The scale of outputs and impacts achieved shows that programmes supported a range of varied activities 
which had an impact on a whole host of issues connected with urban decline. Even though it is difficult to 
aggregate data (because programmes often did different things or counted them in different ways) there 
are many quantified outputs for improved physical, social and economic circumstances.  

The  case  studies  show  that,  according  to  local  stakeholders,  many  of  the  impacts  of  URBAN  are 
intangible, or have not been measured. The key impacts were: 

• 

• 

• 

to improve the image of the area. 

to raise its profile. 

to build up the regeneration infrastructure that supports successful urban development activity.  

URBAN II stimulated new regeneration approaches and it influenced the way regeneration organisations 
approached urban decline issues. It promoted and encouraged better methods in terms of, for instance, 
integration,  multi  agency  working  and  community  consultation  and  therefore  improved  and  challenged 
how  some  cities  approached  the  urban  development  agenda.  The  URBAN  'method'  was  the  most 
important result identified by stakeholders and was often the main success factor for programmes. This is 
a  key  evaluation  finding  as,  although  URBAN  funding  was  important  to  initially  'get  people  round  the 
table', the URBAN method was perceived to be the main legacy. 

URBAN  II  tended  not  to  be  the  main  driver  of  change,  but  was  one  of  a  number  of  reasons  for  areas 
generally improving. URBAN II  supported successful projects that were well received and achieved high 
levels  of  outputs,  but  this  did  not  necessarily  lead  to  any  obvious  improvements  in  deep-seated 
deprivation. 

The  reasons  why  URBAN  II  was  not  the  main  driver  of  change  were  mainly  the  time-limited  nature  of 
programmes, the lack of scale of the investment, and because programmes generally targeted one small 
part  of  a  city.  The  intensity  of  URBAN  II,  in  terms  of  financial  and  geographical  scope,  set  against  the 
scale of the issues facing programme areas, was often the main reason why URBAN II was not seen as a 
principal driver of change. 

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How have areas changed? 

The case studies highlighted a real mix of changes to programme areas during the delivery period of the 
URBAN  programme.  Although  some  areas  worsened,  a  general  conclusion  from  statistical  information, 
but  also  the  views  of  local  stakeholders,  was  that  the  conditions  in  the  programme  areas  stabilised  or 
improved between 2000 and 2006. Educational attainment, crime levels and health levels were improved 
in many programme areas. However, much of the evidence showed a slight turnaround in fortunes rather 
than a significant change. The main symptoms of deindustrialisation still remained in place and  the issue 
of expectations concerning what URBAN II could have realistically achieved within its delivery period and 
with its available resources remains a consideration here.  

13 of the 15 case study areas had evidence of a  positive change over the period of URBAN II, and the 
majority  of  local  stakeholders  felt  that  programme  areas  had  generally  got  better.  Positive  change  was 
identified  through  better  statistics,  the  improved  physical  appearance  of  neighbourhoods,  and  also  non 
measured  and  intangible  improvements  such  as  image  or  the  confidence  of  local  communities. 
Stakeholders often used these more difficult-to-measure changes as a gauge of whether an area had got 
better or worse, rather than relying on statistical data. 

How do changes compare to general trends in similar non- URBAN areas? 

In  terms  of  unemployment  data,  there  was  no  real  difference  between  the  rate  of  change  between 
supported and non supported areas (in the same cities) between 2000 and 2006. Although this could be 
seen as disappointing, it may be that the programme areas would have declined at a faster rate without 
URBAN II funding. There is evidence from the case studies that give examples of a narrowing of the gap 
between key indicators in the programme areas and their host cities.  

Have  some  elements  of  URBAN  II  been  more  successful  than  others?  (e.g.  social  rather  than 
physical regeneration actions). Should the balance between investments have been different?  

There  was  little  evidence  to  provide  a  firm  conclusion  on  whether  a  particular  theme  or  project  was 
generally  more  successful  than  others,  although  programmes  that  linked  projects  and  themes  with  one 
another were seen by stakeholders as being the most successful. The physical projects did tend to be the 
more high profile projects highlighted by stakeholders but again most of these also cut across economic 
and social development, providing facilities to support communities and businesses (such as health and 
community centres, transport infrastructure and business space).  

In terms of the physical theme, there was clear evidence of improved land and buildings, the provision of 
new  green  space,  cycle  and  footpaths.  There  was  survey  evidence  of  increased  usage  of  spaces  and 
buildings,  and  increased  appreciation  of  physical  improvements  in  some  programme  areas.  For  the 
economic theme, URBAN II tended to support projects that helped SMEs, providing them with business 
support  and  training.  Some  programmes  concentrated  on  ICT  improvements.  Generally,  stakeholders 
saw  employee  training  programmes  to  develop  new  skills  (and  to  up-skill)  as  the  most  effective  use  of 
resources under this theme. Training was also a key feature of the social theme, the target mainly being 
the  unemployed  (as  opposed  to  employees).  Programmes  also  included  a  variety  of  community  safety 
projects  (addressing  high  levels  of  crime),  community  capacity  building  programmes  and  measures  to 
address drug abuse.  

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4.0  Delivery Structures of URBAN II 

4.1 Introduction 

This  section  assesses  the  delivery  mechanisms  for  URBAN  II.  It  draws  on  programme  documentation, 
discussions with programme managers and uses evidence from the case studies. 

4.2 Summary of key points  

•  Based  on  our  analysis  of  all  70  programmes30  local  authorities  had  the  lead  responsibility  for 
programme  delivery  in  80%  of  cases,  organized  directly  thorough  a  department,  or  (and  most 
frequently) through a bespoke programme management team employed through the local authority. 
On a few occasions a third party (e.g. a private organization) was commissioned through the local 
authority. Local authorities played a lead role in the delivery of 40% of the projects funded through 
URBAN II, especially the large and more complex physical regeneration and infrastructure projects. 

•  The  local  approach  to  the  delivery  of  URBAN  II  was  a  strong  feature  allowing  for  a  more  flexible 
bottom-up style of delivery that focused on local issues and engaged local partners. It also helped in 
the  involvement  of  community  organizations,  some  of  whom  felt  alienated  from  the  workings  of 
national and regional bodies. 

•  The  authority  programme  managers  and  their  teams  had  on  influencing  policy  makers  within  their 
cities  was  mixed  but  was  more  difficult  where  the  programme  areas  were  a  small  part  of  the  city. 
Furthermore,  it  was  generally  difficult  to  engage  key  city  policy  makers  or  strategic  players  –  who 
had a city wide or sub-regional interest – in the workings of URBAN II. 

•  Strong partnerships were central to the success of URBAN II programmes. Of the 15 case studies, 
13  had  strong  and  inclusive  partnerships.  This  translated  into  an  active  involvement  of  a  range  of 
partners  from  the  public  (all  programmes  had  partners  from  this  cohort),  private  and  community 
sectors Strong partnerships were in a position to influence and shape the development of URBAN II 
programmes  from  an  early  stage  from  strategy  development  through  to  project  implementation. 
Partnership  size  was  not  seen  as  an  issue  (10-15  core  partners  was  commonplace)  as  long  as 
partners were active and were geared up to playing a full role (including leading sub-committees and 
having a responsibility for specific elements of the programme). 

•  Capacity  building  was  important  in  forming  strong  partnerships.  Typically  this  was  focused  on 
voluntary and community organizations (in 9 of the case studies) and involved training and informal 
learning  through  joint  working.  Some  of  the  training  was  technical  (including  employment  and  tax 
law) and in other cases community organizations were supported during project delivery in order to 
build their capacity. Local authority officials also benefited from training programmes.  

• 

In  most  cases  the  formal  programme  management  ceased  after  URBAN  II  funding  ended  as  did 

30 According to interviews with Programme Managers 

93

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
some  of  the  partnership  structures,  although  not  immediately.  This  is  not  surprising  and  nor  is  it 
necessarily  negative  –  URBAN  II  was  intended  to  create  the  conditions  for  sustainable  urban 
development, not the indefinite support of organizational structures. There is evidence of continuing 
regeneration activity in all of the case studies, delivered by local organizations once URBAN II had 
finished, and of regeneration skills, learnt by participants being put to good use elsewhere, often in 
other neighbourhoods in the city.  

•  Local  communities  were  consulted  on  elements  of  the  programmes  in  10  of  the  case  studies, 
although consultation in the early stages of programme development was often not carried through 
to  subsequent  stages.  Most  programmes  engaged  with  community  organizations  but  the  active 
involvement of residents in programme management and formal partnership activities proved more 
difficult to achieve.     

4.3 Management arrangements  

This sub-section describes the strengths and weaknesses of the management arrangements URBAN II 
programmes  adopted.  Although  each  programme  adopted  their  own  management  arrangements  to 
implement  URBAN  II  activity,  there  were  clearly  a  number  of  defined  characteristics  which  spanned 
across each of them. These included: 

•  Decentralised  management  to  the  local  level:  a  key  characteristic  of  URBAN  II  management 
arrangements  was  the  level  of  decentralisation  which  was  apparent  across  programmes.  This 
localised  approach  to  management  meant  less  responsibility  for  national and regional  governments 
and more power being found at the local, city and neighbourhood level.  

•  Flexibility and empowerment of local management arrangements: linked in with the above point 
was  the  fact  that  many  managers  of  URBAN  II  programmes  felt  empowered  in  relation  to  deciding 
upon the focus and priorities of their own particular programme.  

•  Local  Authority/  City  Authority  led:    80%  of  URBAN  II  programmes were  managed  by  local/  city 
authorities. Local and or city authorities can bring local knowledge of both the target neighbourhoods 
and the capacity of partners who could be involved in the delivery of the programme.  

Of the range of strengths stakeholders identified, the following were most frequently mentioned: 

•  Proactive management – URBAN II management teams were very involved in supporting the delivery 
of projects. 10 of the 15 case studies noted that a proactive management team was a key strength of 
the programme; this view was backed up by the review of all 70 programmes.  

Case study examples: proactive management 

In  Arhus,  the  management  team’s  hands-on  role  ensured  that  projects  delivered.  The  team  did  not 
simply  “sit  in  their  offices  counting  outputs”,  as  one  stakeholder  put  it.  The  team  helped  project 
managers  to  link  to  other  URBAN  II  activity  within  the  area  (to  stimulate  cross-referral),  assisted 

94

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
managers  in  marketing  and  public  relations,  and  helped  them  to  establish  monitoring  systems  to 
effectively record output and financial information.  

Bristol’s  management  team  also  supported  project  managers,  visiting  projects  to  troubleshoot  and 
resolve any problems they were experiencing.     

Localised, flexible management at local level – a key strength of URBAN II management was the level 
of  decentralisation  across  programmes.  This  localised  approach  meant  that  influence  over  the 
programme  lay  at  city  level.  In  all  of  the  15  case  studies  programme  teams  had  developed  links  within 
local authorities, with relevant departments and officials. Local city stakeholders felt more empowered to 
make decisions, were free of perceived top down constraints from regional or national organisations, and 
better understood the issues that programmes were tackling.  

Case study example: localised management 

In Le Havre, local stakeholders felt empowered in deciding on the focus and priorities of their particular 
programme, which in turn made the programme more “relevant and appropriate” to local needs. Other 
French regeneration programmes had often been controlled by regional bodies, influenced by national 
policy which was less tailored to local requirements.  

In Sambreville, the approach was more top down, with management at regional level and key decisions 
made remotely from the city authority by the regional government. This meant that much of the learning 
and  capacity  building  on  urban  development  remained  at  this  regional  government  level  with 
practitioners in the city feeling that they learnt little from the URBAN experience.         

•  Local authority led – local authorities managed 80% of URBAN II programmes31. Local authorities 
brought local knowledge of the target neighbourhoods and the partners, and often had the capacity to 
manage large regeneration programmes. It was not always local authority staff who were responsible 
for carrying out management duties with other arms length organisations having a key role.  

Case study examples: management by external organisations  

In  Leipzig  and  Graz,  the  local authorities  employed  an  external organisation  to  manage  the  URBAN  II 
programmes, bringing in additional capacity, expertise and skills the authority did not have. Similarly, Le 
Mantois  and  Halifax  assigned  management  to  an  external  organisation  (EPAMSA  in  Le  Mantois,  and 
Action Halifax in Halifax). These organisations were funded to manage the programme on behalf of the 
local authority, while the authority retained control over the direction and priorities of the programme.   

31 According to interviews with Programme Managers 

95

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst views of URBAN II management arrangements were generally positive, the following weaknesses 
also emerged: 

•  Perceived bureaucracy – some stakeholders perceived the programme management and monitoring 
requirements to be overly bureaucratic. The general perception was also that projects (including very 
small  ones)  had  to  spend  a  disproportionate  amount  of  time  recording  activity,  spend  and  output 
information,  and  that  managers  were  kept  away  from  actual  delivery,  spending  more  time  on 
administrative  management  than  on  managing  the  programme  activities.  Dortmund  and  Bristol,  for 
example,  noted  that  project  managers  were  often  from  small  voluntary  organisations  with  little 
experience of managing larger budgets, but also had no internal financial expertise to support them. 
However,  the  extent  to  which  the  monitoring  that  programme  managers  undertook  was  sufficient 
should be questioned, as the level of evidence of targets and outcomes had limitations – more so in 
some URBAN II programmes and some Member States than others. A key function of the programme 
manager’s  role  was  to  monitor  performance  –  this  was  a  responsibility  set  out  in  the  funding 
agreement with the European Commission.            

•  Lack of trust in management bodies – 5 of the 15 case studies highlighted some partners’ lack of trust 
of  the  local  authorities  managing  URBAN  II  programmes.  Local  community  and  voluntary  groups, 
were  sometimes  sceptical  of  city  authorities  because  of  their  control  over  regeneration  funds  in  the 
past and the lack of inclusivity in the past when forming partnerships. It should be noted that this lack 
of trust was more an issue at the beginning of the programme and that as the timeframe went on the 
level of trust with the local authority increased.        

•  Lack of experience – some programmes lacked capacity in terms of delivery and management. This 
was  more  apparent  in  those  more  affluent  areas  where  experience  and  previous  knowledge  of 
delivering  regeneration  initiatives  was  more  limited,  and  the  management  was  often  outsourced  to 
other organisations in these areas and therefore not embedded within local organisations. However, 
the  use  of  external  organisations  can  be  a  positive  (as  noted  above in  Halifax),  as  they  provided  a 
solution to any shortfalls in the skills and experience of local organisations.    

•  Management  not  embedded  in  the  wider  regeneration  agenda  –  problems  also  arose  from  the 
management  team  not  being  embedded  or  involved  in  broader  city-wide  regeneration  agendas, 
normally because of their tight focus on the programme and its target area. About a third of managers 
noted  that  they  were  too  engaged  with  the  delivery  of  their  programme  and  were  detached  from 
broader strategic thinking concerning the city’s urban development.  

4.4 Linkages between URBAN II and wider policy and practice 

URBAN II programmes were aligned with other initiatives and strategies in terms of their objectives and 
vision. 12 of the 15 case studies showed clear alignment and a strong match between what the URBAN II 
programme  was  trying  to  do  and  what,  for  instance,  the  city  regeneration  strategy  or  an  existing 
neighbourhood action plan aimed to achieve. Many URBAN II programmes undoubtedly played a role in 
and  added  value  to  wider  regeneration  agendas  within  the  host  city.  The  following  examples  provide 
evidence for this.  

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Case study examples: URBAN II and wider regeneration agendas 

Regeneration activity in Le Mantois has been guided for some years by the Mantes en Yvelines project, 
devised in 1995 and with a budget of over €130 million. The priorities of the URBAN II programme were 
designed  to  complement  this  broader  regeneration  strategy,  ensuring  that  activities  funded  through 
URBAN  II  benefited  from  a  high  level  of  leverage  (i.e.  visibility,  structures,  political  support)  and  from 
being  part  of  a  wider  strategy.  By  integrating  URBAN  II  within  a  broader  development  framework,  the 
programme  has  had  a  level  of  impact  beyond  its  original  funding  allocation.  For  example,  joining  the 
funding  streams  together  to  support  the  building  of  a  larger  community  facility  in  the  neighbourhood 
(which  has  multiple  different  uses)  as  opposed  to  two  smaller  facilities  separately  funded  by  each 
programme.    

In  Rotterdam,  the  URBAN  II  programme  was  designed  to  add  value  to  the  objectives  of  a  number  of 
strategies  at  local  and  national  level.  At  national  level,  the  Large  City  Policy  (1999-2004)  was  a  key 
influence  on  URBAN  II,  particularly  in  terms  of  promoting  an  integrated,  holistic  approach  to 
regeneration.  The  Large  City  Policy  in  Rotterdam  was  translated  into  a  local  initiative,  Rotterdam  op 
Koers  (Rotterdam  on  course),  which  promoted  a  neighbourhood-based  approach  to  regeneration  that 
URBAN II was able to build on and enhance. URBAN II helped sustain many of the projects which the 
Large  City  Policy  initially  developed,  including  the  provision  of  revenue  funding  to  carry  on  activities 
taking  place  in  capital  projects  originally  supported  by  this  programme  (e.g.  URBAN  II  supported  a 
business support mentoring project that took place in a incubator facility funded by the Large City Policy)   

Prior to URBAN II, the most deprived areas of Sambreville had not benefited from a local regeneration 
strategy or programme. However, the URBAN II programme, in promoting an area-based approach to 
regeneration, means that Sambreville now has a 15-20 year policy to guide its regeneration activity, 
based on the URBAN II strategy.  

In 3 case study programmes there was no link between broader city-wide or regional strategies and the 
URBAN  II  programme. However,  this was  because  no  such strategies existed  outside  of  the  URBAN  II 
programme meaning, in the case of Sambreville, the URBAN II strategy became the approach adopted 
by the city as a whole.   

Some  programme  managers  felt  isolated  from  wider  city  and  regional  agendas.  As  URBAN  II 
programmes often covered only a small part of the city, managers’ remits were relatively narrow and their 
level of influence at the wider level was often questioned, particularly by regeneration managers for the 
host city or those responsible for establishing regional priorities. This was particularly apparent during the 
case study  research: stakeholder  interviewees with  a  role  at  city  or  regional  level  often  lacked any  real 
understanding of the URBAN II programme and saw it as a relatively small element of the city’s overall 
approach to urban regeneration.   

The  extent  to  which  URBAN  II  was  integrated  into  wider  policy  within  the  city  was  complex.  URBAN  II 
certainly  supported  and  reinforced  wider  regeneration  policy  and  added  value  to  the  general  aims  of 
urban growth, but the extent to which it strongly influenced wider policy was less obvious. This was partly 
down to the small and well-defined target areas of most URBAN II programmes, but also because they 
mostly operated within large city areas which had many other regeneration activities targeted on them.         

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4.5 Administrative costs  

The terms of reference required an analysis of whether the level of technical assistance was reasonable. 

Of the total allocation of URBAN II funds, € 80.5 million (5.1%) was spent on technical assistance. The 
Nordic countries and Greece spent higher proportions of their allocations on technical assistance activity 
(around  8%),although  even  the  highest  figure  under  this  budget  heading  (Belfast,  with  11.8%)  was  not 
particularly  high.  The case  study work helped  in  understanding some  of  the  variances,  but  revealed  no 
sign of any excessive expenditure on administration.  

Programmes counted some administrative activities as URBAN II ‘projects’, meaning that these costs did 
not  always  appear  in  the  technical  assistance  budget.  Examples  included  mid-term  and  end-of-term 
evaluations,  promotion/marketing  and  consultancy  (management)  costs.  This  means  that  the  declared 
technical assistance allocation is somewhat undervalued. However, without a specific audit of programme 
expenditure and accounts it is difficult to assess how much this was the norm for URBAN II programmes.  

Nevertheless,  information  collected  from  programme  spend  data  under  the  technical  assistance  budget 
shows that the administrative costs attached to URBAN II were generally in proportion to overall spend 
allocations.  It  can  therefore  be  concluded  that  the  level  of  technical  assistance  was  reasonable  and 
corresponded to the needs of managing the programmes. 

4.6 Delivery of projects funded by URBAN II  

Table 4.1  Delivery of URBAN II projects by organisational type 

Proportion of projects led by organisational type  

Organisational type 
Local/city authority 
Mainstream  partner  (police,  health 
authority, housing) 
Voluntary/community 
Other  

40% 
40% 

10% 
10% 

Source: ECOTEC analysis of all 70 URBAN II programmes 

Table 4.1 shows that URBAN II projects were mostly delivered by public sector organisations and local 
authorities in particular. It was rare for the voluntary and community sector to play a direct role in leading 
URBAN II projects, although they may have been actively involved in aspects of delivery without actually 
managing  the  project.  It  was  noted  that  local  authorities  were  well  placed  to  lead  on  many  URBAN  II 
projects  because  they  were  large  organisations  which  had  a  board  set  of  skilled  staff  who  had  good 
access to information and who could bring together (relatively easily) a broad range of partners.    

The following key issues relate to the types of organisation delivering URBAN II projects: 

• 

In  almost  all  cases,  local  authorities  were  responsible  for  managing  physical  regeneration  projects. 
However, the nature of some of the physical regeneration projects meant that local authorities were 
often the best placed organisations to lead such initiatives, particularly the larger and more complex 

98

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
projects.  For  example,  the  development  of  a  road  in  Perama,    would  normally  be  led  the  local 
authority (as it was the case here).             

•  The  small  number  of  projects  managed  by  voluntary  and  community  organisations  were  almost  all 
concerned  with  the  social  regeneration  theme  and  dealt  with  matters  such  as  community 
development, capacity building and resident engagement. 

•  Programme  managers  perceived  that  mainstream  partners  fared  better  than  non-mainstream  ones 
when it came to capacity to deliver; they were more able to deal with the rigours of managing an EU-
funded project (including monitoring, expenditure reports) and had previous experience to ensure that 
outputs and results were more likely to be achieved.  

4.7 Local partnerships in URBAN II  

4.7.1  The strength of partnership working  

The level of partnership working was generally a strength of URBAN II. Our assessment of the strength of 
each  programme’s  partnership32  showed  that  47%  of  URBAN  II  programmes  had  very  inclusive 
partnership  arrangements,  36%  had  relatively  inclusive  partnerships,  and  just  17%  were  generally  not 
inclusive.  13  out  of  the  15  case  studies  identified  their  partnership  structures  as  either  ‘strong’  and/or 
‘inclusive’.  

Stakeholders  referred  to  a  ‘strong  partnership’  in  a  variety  of  ways.  Some  perceived  good  partnership 
working  to  be  about  involving  as  many  people  as  possible  in  the  monitoring  committees.  Others  saw 
strong partnerships as including new types of organisations or giving local organisations a voice.  

Case study examples: partnership working 

Local  stakeholders  in  Sambreville  thought  that  the  most  important  impact  of  URBAN  II  was  that  the 
programme  has  encouraged  collaboration  and  helped  to  develop  new  partnerships  in  the  city.  The 
programme  provided  the  impetus  to  bring  together  local  businesses,  associations  and  public 
organisations whose previous perception was that they could not work together. It helped to promote a 
common  understanding  of  the  key  issues  and  priorities  in  the  programme  area,  and  encouraged 
partners  to  work  collaboratively  to  develop  integrated  solutions.  Many  of  the  partnerships  developed 
have  been  sustained  post-URBAN  II.  For  example,  the  Industrial  School  in  Sambreville  continues  to 
work  with  GABS  (a  local  social  association)  on  an  initiative  to  develop  a  new  training  programme  (for 
local people with low skill levels).  

In Carrara, partnership working contributed to the success of URBAN II. The continuous involvement of 
social and economic institutions during the planning and implementation of the programme helped the 
managing  authority  to  respond  to  the  problems  in  the  programme  area.  In  addition  to  the  institutional 

32 Assessment was made on inclusiveness (the extent to which a wide variety and high number – over 6 – of 
partners were involved), partners’ role (whether partners were observers or more involved in leading key 
elements/decisions) and level of local involvement (the extent to which local players, including the local 
community, were involved in the partnership and the nature of their involvement). 

99

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
stakeholders,  trade  associations  (from  industry,  artisan  craft  trades,  small  businesses,  commerce  and 
tourism) and NGOs were involved in the programme partnership. With the exception of the industrialist’s 
association, all the partners actively participated in all phases of the programme. 

In  Arhus,  local  community  organisations  (with  close  contact  to  the  resident  target  groups)  initiated  a 
number of projects, and were heavily involved in managing and administering regeneration activity. An 
executive committee (comprising representatives from the public, private and community and voluntary 
sectors) was created to work with local partnerships and build the capacity of community organisations, 
so they could manage projects throughout their lifecycle.  

In Dortmund, a number of local networks existed before 2000. However, key stakeholders believed that 
partnership  working  has  intensified  as  a  result  of  URBAN  II.  They  also  perceived  that  the  programme 
has been the driving force behind the creation of new forms of networking and joint working. URBAN II 
has also helped to build local capacity by promoting networking which is independent of the city council; 
examples  include companies  liaising with  each other  through  the local business  associations,  resident 
forums as part of neighbourhood management, and resident juries supervising the work of projects. 

4.7.2  Approaches to URBAN II partnerships 

Although  programmes  adopted  a  wide  variety  of  different  partnership  approaches,  some  key 
characteristics could still be identified: 

Relatively large and broad partnerships – a key characteristic was the number of organisations involved in 
each partnership. On average, each partnership had approximately 10-15 core partners, and many had 
additional sub-groups or wider partnership groups. Partnerships were also relatively broad in the types of 
organisations involved, often with partners from the health, crime, housing, employment, and training and 
education domains (which shows the holistic approach adopted by most programmes). Table 4.2 gives a 
breakdown  of  partner  type  across  URBAN  II  programmes  drawn  from  the  analysis  of  programme 
documentation and discussions with programme managers.  

Table 4.2  Composition of URBAN II programme partnerships 

Partner type 

Number and proportion of the 70 URBAN II partnerships 
containing organisational type 

Local authority/city government 

Employment agency or organisation 
addressing unemployment issues  

Training and education providers and 
professionals addressing low 
skills/poor educational attainment 

Development agencies and planning 
authorities 

Law enforcement and community 
safety organisations and 
professionals (such as police)  

70 (100%) 

60 (85%) 

56 (80%) 

56 (80%) 

42 (60%) 

100

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partner type 

Number and proportion of the 70 URBAN II partnerships 
containing organisational type 

Health authority and health 
professionals 

Regional/national government 

Community/resident/voluntary groups 

Private companies/enterprises 

Source: ECOTEC analysis of all 70 URBAN II programmes 

35 (50%) 

18 (25%) 

14 (20%) 

7 (10%) 

•  Empowered  partners  –  the  organisations  involved  in  URBAN  II  partnerships  seemed  relatively 
empowered  regarding  their  level  of  influence  on  the  programme’s  priorities,  including  its  spending. 
Partners  played  an  active  role  in  management  arrangements;  they  had  authority  to  affect  the 
programme’s direction and spending patterns (as opposed to simply attending partnership meetings, 
for example).  

However, URBAN II partnership arrangements also typically lacked the following:  

•  Local residents on core URBAN partnerships–  Community members (i.e. local residents) were rarely 
in the main partnership group. Some URBAN II programmes had residents in their main partnership, 
but  the  majority  engaged  with  communities  through  specific  sub-groups  or  through  one-off 
consultation exercises (community forums).  

•  Participation  by  key  individuals  –  about  a  quarter  of  programme  managers  found  it  difficult  to 
encourage  key  strategic  players  onto  their  URBAN  II  partnership.  As  programmes  were  often 
concerned  with  just  a  few  neighbourhoods  within  a  city,  it  was  sometimes  difficult  to  secure  the 
involvement of key individuals with more of a city-wide remit (e.g. head of city development, director 
of  regeneration).  Often,  cities  had  a  number  of  area-based  programmes  each  focused  on  different 
target  neighbourhoods  and  all  with  their  own  partnership  arrangements.  The  focus  of  URBAN  II  on 
smaller  areas  was  a  key  reason  why  some  felt  that  their  partnerships  lacked  real  influence  at  city 
level,  and  why  partnerships  sometimes  felt  detached  from  the  city’s  wider  regeneration  agenda.  In 
Arhus, the partnership was strong on community representatives, which some stakeholders felt was 
at the expense of involving more strategically influential stakeholders, including the person in charge 
of the city authority and the local development organisation.   

•  Sustainability  –  partnerships’  sustainability  after  the  end  of  the  URBAN  II  programme  was  an  issue 
although  it  was  not  an  objective  to  maintain  delivery  structures  post  URBAN  II.  Some  80%  of  the 
formally  constituted  URBAN  II  partnerships  ended  once  the  funding  finished  as  might  be  expected. 
Partnership sustainability seemed to be an issue because of a lack of purpose once the funding was 
spent,  and  acceptance  that  the  partnership’s  scale  and  scope  needed  to  be  rethought  after  its 
principal  function  had  ceased  to  exist.  Partnerships  which  continued  usually  took  responsibility  for 
another funding stream, which suggests that the existence of funding is essential for the sustainability 
of  partnership  arrangements.  For  example,  the  Halifax  programme  was  managed  by  a  partnership 
run  by  Action  Halifax,  which  struggled  to  find  a  role  for  itself  post-URBAN  II  and  itself  closed  in 
December 2009 along with its associated partnership arrangements.  

101

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7.3  Involvement of private and voluntary sector partners  

The  case  studies  provided  useful  insights  into  the  level  of  private  and  voluntary  sector  involvement  in 
URBAN II partnerships. Partners from these two sectors often struggled to be heard above public sector 
partners, who dominate regeneration partnerships: 

•  Private sector representatives were both programme participants and recipients of URBAN funding in 
all but 2 of the 15 case studies. In most of these cases, private sector representatives were partners 
on  the  Monitoring  Committee  or  associated  sub-groups.  They  tended  to  play  an  equal  role  to  their 
public  sector  counterparts  in  decision-making,  and  in  one  case  (Halifax)  a  private  sector 
representative chaired the URBAN II partnership. 

•  All but 2 case studies highlighted that they were trying to “create an environment to stimulate private 
sector  investment”  where  inward  investors  and  property  developers  would  be  encouraged  into  an 
area  on  the  back  of  an  injection  of  resources  from  URBAN  II.  For  example,  in  Leipzig  the  physical 
regeneration  projects  for  improving  the  area’s  image  aimed  to  kick-start  more  private  sector 
investment from property developers, with the programme “laying the foundations and building blocks 
for the private sector to show interest in the area”. Programme managers felt that the private sector 
was a key stakeholder, and recognised that the public sector (with URBAN II resources) was only part 
of the solution in tackling the decline of their neighbourhoods.      

•  The  voluntary  sector was  a key  recipient  within  most  programmes  too.  Nine of  the  15  case  studies 
supported voluntary organisations to build their capacity. Most of the case studies saw the voluntary 
sector  as  a  key  player  to  involve  if  URBAN  II  were  truly  to  regenerate  their  area,  but  also  that 
voluntary  and  community organisations  needed  support before  they  could  play  a  meaningful  role  in 
the regeneration process.  

Case study example: capacity building voluntary organisations  

Le Havre developed a capacity-building programme for local voluntary organisations on topics such as 
internal  management,  financial  control  and  funding applications, so  that  they were  “more  professional” 
(as stakeholders put it) to deliver projects. Local stakeholders felt that the voluntary sector saw capacity 
building  as  a  way  of  promoting  a  lasting  legacy  for  their  programme.  This  was  because  the  newly 
strengthened voluntary sector could continue to play an important role in the local regeneration agenda 
post-URBAN  II  and  carry  on  supporting  target  groups,  building  on  what  they  had  learnt  from  their 
experiences of URBAN II.  

•   5  of  the  15  case  studies  used  the  voluntary  sector  to  contact  hard  to  reach  communities  that  were 
hard to engage with. Most of the voluntary organisations had better links into local communities than 
did their public sector counterparts – partly because they were often based within programme areas, 
but also because local people tended to trust them more than the city authorities. In 9 of the 15 case 
studies,  the  voluntary  sector  was  an  active  deliverer  of  projects,  particularly  those  on  social 
regeneration.          

• 

 In 4 of the 15 case studies stakeholders felt that the voluntary sector was viewed as being a ‘riskier’ 
delivery  partner  than  the  public  sector.  Some  stakeholders  perceived  that  voluntary  organisations 

102

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
lacked a track record and experience, particularly in delivering European-funded projects. However, 
as a majority of the case study programmes funded projects led by the voluntary sector, they clearly 
felt the risk was worth taking (although it was unclear whether any of the concerns about using the 
voluntary sector came to fruition).       

4.8 Capacity building of partners  
The partners who felt that their capacity had been built most through URBAN II were those which had not 
previously  been  involved  in  similar  regeneration  activity.  Voluntary  and  community  sector  partners  in 
particular  felt  stronger  because  of  involvement  having  had  experience  of  managing  a  European-funded 
project.  In  many  cases  voluntary  and  community  sector  partners  had  established  financial  and  data 
monitoring  systems  which  they  continued  to  use,  and  were  more  professional  in  their  marketing  and 
communication  to  reach  out  to  their  target  groups.  This  specific  capacity  building  of  voluntary  sector 
partners was seen in 9 of the 15 case studies, and brought lasting benefits to organisations well beyond 
the lifetime of URBAN II.  

Case study examples: capacity building in voluntary and community sector partners 

In  Arhus,  URBAN  II  had  a  specific  capacity-building  programme  for  voluntary  and  community 
organisations so they could better deliver projects to their target communities. It consisted of training on 
organisational  management,  financial  control  and  maintaining  robust  organisational  systems  (from 
health and safety through to employment law and tax).  

In  Halifax,  the  Monitoring  Committee  commissioned  voluntary  and  community  sector  organisations  to 
deliver regeneration projects, rather than simply working with mainstream providers; approximately half 
of projects were delivered by the third sector. This strategic decision not only enabled the programme to 
support  the  hardest-to-reach  groups,  but  also  helped  to  build  the  capacity  of  the  voluntary  and 
community  sector  so  that  it  became  more  professional  and  was  able  to  diversify  into  new  types  of 
provision  for  its  target  groups.  Halifax  also  funded  a  Community  Development  Consortium,  with  four 
outreach  workers  to  provide  additional  help  to  build  capacity,  fund  raise  and  provide  grants  to  various 
local resident organisations.  

Although  URBAN  II  featured  fewer  instances  of  capacity  building  with  core  organisations  in  the 
regeneration field (e.g. city authorities), the case study work still uncovered some clear examples. Most of 
this  capacity building  was in  teaching city  authorities  how  to  approach  regeneration  activity  in  a slightly 
different  way,  and  certain  new  techniques  when  it  came  to  planning,  managing  and  delivering 
regeneration activity.  

Case study example: capacity building within a city authority  

In Perama, the Municipality’s inexperience in managing and administering regeneration projects was a 
weakness in the programme, resulting in delays and inefficiencies in the early stages. However, over the 
course  of  the  programme  the  Municipality’s  capacity  was  built  up,  particularly  the  technical  team’s 
capabilities in monitoring and implementing complex regeneration projects. One key lesson the technical 
team  learnt  in  programme  management  was  the  amount  of  time  and  resources  needed  to  plan  and 
monitor physical regeneration projects.  

103

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
URBAN II also helped to build the capacity of city authorities to work more collaboratively with partners, 
involve the community, promote a bottom-up approach and adopt a holistic, integrated dimension to their 
regeneration agenda. The extent to which city authorities felt that their capacity had been built  differed 
greatly  across  programmes,  and  was  often  related  to  how  much  previous  experience  they  had  of 
neighbourhood regeneration.    

Caution  is  needed  in  concluding  that  URBAN  II  was  key  to  building  core  regeneration  organisations’ 
capacity to (for instance) work in partnership or adopt an integrated approach, as most had been working 
along  these  lines  prior  to  the  existence  of  URBAN  II.  Capacity  was  not  built  as  much  as  it  could  have 
been in 4 of the 15 case studies (Graz, Crotone, Leipzig and Halifax) because these programmes used 
external organisations, usually management consultants, to oversee their programmes. This meant that 
the skills and experience often remained external to the city authorities.  

Nevertheless, stakeholders highlighted capacity building as a key factor, as illustrated in the case studies 
above.  For some smaller partners,  the experience  of  URBAN  II  has strengthened  their  organisations  in 
the  long  term.  For  larger  regeneration  players,  including  city  authorities,  URBAN  II  often  reinforced 
existing capacity and skills within their regeneration approach.  

4.9 Analysis by typology 
Table  4.3  highlights  differences  in  the  levels  of  partnership  inclusiveness  for  the  two  main  cluster 
groupings  of  programmes  identified  in  Section  2.  The  latter  group  (with  high  spend  on  physical 
regeneration) generally had less inclusive partnerships: three times as many programmes in the physical 
regeneration  meta-cluster  had  ‘non-inclusive’  partnerships  compared  with  those  in  the  social  and 
economic regeneration meta-cluster.  

The majority of programmes in the social and economic regeneration meta-cluster had very or relatively 
inclusive  partnerships  because  of  their  focus  on  the  ‘people’  side  (e.g.  tackling  skills  gaps  and 
worklessness, dealing with health and community safety issues) of the regeneration agenda.    

Table 4.3  Typology analysis for partnership inclusiveness 

Cluster 1: mixed programmes 
covering all three themes 

Cluster 2: physical 
regeneration focus 

Very inclusive partnerships 

Relatively inclusive partnerships 

Not inclusive partnerships 

Total 

18 

8 

4 

40 

 Source: ECOTEC analysis of URBAN II programmes 

15 

16 

9 

30 

104

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.10 

Involvement of local communities   

Our review of the 70 programmes indicated that around 60% consulted with local people, using a variety 
of  methods  such  as  surveys,  workshops  and  community  meetings.  A  higher  proportion  of  the  case 
studies (10 out of 15) showed evidence of community consultation.  

Case study example: local community involvement 

In Halifax, community engagement and empowerment were designed into the programme from the start. 
A key strength of the programme was the Monitoring Committee, whose broad representation included 
people  living  in  the  target  neighbourhoods.  This  wide  ranging  group  of  individuals  ensured  that 
discussions  considered  a  range  of  viewpoints,  including  those  of  local  residents  and  local  business 
people (the chair was a local businessman). The programme also empowered the local community by 
placing  residents  at  the  heart  of  the  programme’s  key  decisions.  This  was  particularly  the  case  for 
funding  allocations  and  project  appraisal,  with  local  people  always  sitting  on  the  appraisal  or  approval 
committees. 

Views  were  mixed  on  the  extent  to  which  local  communities  influenced  the  focus  and  direction  of  their 
local  URBAN  II  programme.  However,  a  number  of  characteristics  defined  programmes’  overall 
approaches to involving local communities:    

•  Most  community  consultation  was  done  at  the  inception  stages  of  the  programme,  and  effort  to 
engage residents seemed to drop off further into the programme’s life. The community consultation 
focused on identifying need and issues within the programme area (to then design programmes and 
projects  around  them).  But  there  was  little  evidence  of  community  consultation  actually  influencing 
funding decisions or decisions on how the programme should tackle the problems identified.  

•  Many  programmes  consulted  with  local  people  through  existing  channels  (such  as  resident  panels 
and  community  forums)  in  the  context  of  other  regeneration  activity.  Only  a  small  number  set  up 
specific engagement mechanisms related specifically to the URBAN II programme and its associated 
activity.   

The  quality  and  depth  of  community  involvement  was  therefore  mixed.  Despite  instances  where 
programmes were relatively proactive in engaging with local people in a meaningful way (through electing 
local people onto their core partnership or having a resident sub-group), this was not the norm. However, 
some URBAN II programmes relied on their projects to consult with local people and businesses rather 
than organising and leading engagement work themselves at programme level. Hence some programme 
managers were unsure about the real extent of resident involvement, as this was done at the next level 
down within the delivery structure.  

105

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.11 

Sustainability of URBAN II programme legacies 

4.11.1Sustainability of programme activities 

All URBAN II programmes have now finished. So when stakeholders in Crotone, for instance, were asked 
“what  has  happened  to  the  ‘Making  Crotone  more  Attractive’  programme?”  (the  original  name  of  the 
URBAN II programme), they said it had come to an end and had not continued post-URBAN II funding. 
Similar points were recorded in 14 of the 15 case studies but whilst URBAN II programme had finished, 
regeneration activity was often continuing within the programme area under another banner or guise.  

While  the  actual  projects  funded  by  URBAN  II  have  not  carried  on,  much  of  their  content,  concept  and 
ways of working have been incorporated into other activities and are continuing, as in the following case 
study examples.  

Case study examples: sustaining URBAN II activities 

The  programme  manager  in  Arhus  estimated  that  up  to  50%  of  the  URBAN  II  activities  have  been 
sustained in some form or another, mainly through other organisations taking on funding responsibility. 
The  education  and  employment  guidance  for  young  people  and  parents  has  been  incorporated  into  a 
new youth guidance centre, funded nationally.  

The programme managers in Sambreville and Le Havre said that over 80% of activities were continuing 
post-URBAN II, while in Halifax 60% of activities supported through URBAN II could still be found in the 
programme area.  

URBAN II projects and programmes were not simply continued in the same way and under the same title, 
but evolved and aspects of them were passed on to other regeneration programmes or funding streams 
post-2007. This is a successful outcome and part of the legacy of URBAN II.     

Case study evidence showed that some project activities simply came to an end because they finished 
naturally or were no longer required. For instance, almost all of the physical projects had been completed 
because their construction phase was over. Their continued legacy was often viewed in terms of buildings 
still in use, such as a community centre or a business incubator. None of the case studies found capital 
projects  unsustainable  because  they  were  unable  to  secure  revenue  funding  (an  issue  that  physical 
regeneration programmes and projects sometimes suffer from).  

Despite activities continuing post-URBAN II, there was little evidence of programmes developing robust 
exit or continuation strategies that helped to plan the continuation of their activities. About half of the case 
study interviewees felt that although regeneration activity was still very much present in their areas, the 
main  driver  for  this  was  often  the  continued  need  to  focus  resources  on  areas  of  greatest  need  and 
disadvantage.  

4.11.2Sustainability of impacts 

Most stakeholders saw the main long-term impacts sustained post-URBAN II in terms of ‘approaches to 
regeneration’  –  the  URBAN  II  'method'  –  with  key  examples  being  the  lasting  legacy  of  inclusive  local 

106

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
partnerships, integrated approaches to delivering regeneration and the involvement of local communities 
through community consultation and empowerment.   

Case study examples: lasting impact of URBAN II 

The  main  long-term  impact  of  the  URBAN  II  programme  in  Graz  (West)  has  been  its  influence  on  an 
integrated  urban  development  strategy  for  the  regeneration  of  Graz  South  (which  has  attracted 
approximately €3m of national and regional resources).  

In  Arhus,  the  programme’s  key  lasting  impact  has  been  its  influence  on  supporting  a  greater 
geographical focus in regeneration and development policy, partly evidenced through the development 
of the neighbourhood plan for Gellerup, which represents an effort to implement an integrated approach 
into mainstream regeneration policy.  

Since many stakeholders saw the long-term impacts of URBAN II in terms of influence and approaches, 
very few quantified lasting impact as the jobs created post-funding or new businesses that have moved 
into  an  industrial  area  improved  through  URBAN  II.  Often  they  did  not  know  what  had  happened  since 
URBAN  II  had  invested  in  (for  instance)  a  business  support  project,  or  simply  because  they  could  not 
articulate the lasting impact of an investment in, say, a green space improved by URBAN II three years 
ago.  

Stakeholders  often  referred  to  capital  projects  as  lasting  impacts  of  the  programme.  For  instance,  the 
creation of a theatre, museum and public square in Perama was seen to have created a “lasting impact in 
the  form  of  increased  tourism  to  the  programme  area  as  well  as  providing  much-needed  public  realm 
space for local people to enjoy”. But stakeholders in the city were unsure about how many more visitors 
had  come  to  the  area  as  a  consequence  of  the  project,  how  much  they  may  have  spent  in  the  local 
economy, and how many new jobs have been created.  

4.11.3Success factors and barriers  

A  range  of  factors  stimulated  a  lasting  legacy  for  URBAN  II  programmes  and  projects.  These  are 
explained in more detail in the separate case studies, but are highlighted in outline here:  

• 

In  case  study  areas  which  had  strong  local  involvement  (including  local  people  and  local 
neighbourhood  organisations)  in  the  design  and  delivery  of  regeneration  activity,  the  legacy  of  the 
programme appears to be more assured. This legacy was usually expressed in terms of building the 
capacity of local organisations (especially in the voluntary and community sector), which continued to 
deliver regeneration projects post-URBAN II, thus increasing the legacy.  

•  When  URBAN  II  helped  to  develop  a  new  regeneration  strategy  or  simply  a  clearer  vision  for  the 
programme area, the level of legacy and sustainability was greater. This was because the improved 
or clearer strategy was then taken up and continued beyond the life of the programme. For example, 
the  programme  in  Sambreville  led  to  the  development  of  a  long-term  strategy  for  the  city  which 
remained the main document informing future activity in relation to regeneration post URBAN II.  

•  Rather  than  dispersing  resources  across  the  whole  of  a  city,  the  focus  on  a  very  tightly  defined 
geographical  area  was  also  important  in  creating  a  lasting  legacy.  If  a  programme  created  enough 

107

 
 
 
 
 
 
critical  mass  and  momentum  in  a  small  neighbourhood,  this  was  often  to  “hold  stakeholders’ 
attention” on the neighbourhood post-URBAN II, much more so than if the programme was broader.  

However, there were also barriers to sustainability and the legacy after URBAN II:  

•  The time-specific nature of URBAN II programmes meant that managers often left prior to the end of 
the programme’s life. Around half of the programme managers left their posts before the final year of 
the  programme  (most  moved  on  to  other  positions,  usually  within  the  same  city  or  local  authority). 
This was cited as one of the main reasons for the lack of a concerted effort to develop a proper exit 
strategy for programmes, as those who replaced the managers were often concerned with completing 
the programme’s contractual obligations rather than thinking strategically about sustainability.  

•  Since most URBAN II programmes focused tightly on small geographical areas, it was more difficult 
for some partnerships to attract key players from mainstream organisations (who often worked at city 
level and had less capacity to be involved in area-based regeneration initiatives).   

4.12 

Conclusions – the delivery of URBAN II 

The summary from Section 4 based on the terms of reference questions is as follows: 

What  were  the  levels  of  partnership  working  like  for  URBAN  II?  Were  municipalities  and  local 
actors involved in the design and implementation and how has this influenced programmes? 

Partnership working was generally strong and inclusive. Partnerships were large and broad, involving a 
range  of  players  from  the  grassroots  upwards.  Partners  were  also  empowered  to  make  decisions  on 
funding allocations and strategic direction.  

Local  authorities  were  key  players  in  URBAN  II,  they  managed  the  majority  of  the  programmes  and 
delivered  a  good  proportion  of  the  projects.  Most  programmes  were  managed  at  city  level  by  the  city 
authority, giving control at the local level which all stakeholders welcomed. City authorities usually had the 
capacity and experience to manage a large regeneration programme, though not all had a previous track 
record of coordinating URBAN II-type programmes (leading some to outsource management to external 
organisations).  

Local people were often consulted but not necessarily found within key decision making bodies although 
voluntary and community organisations were often an important benefactor of URBAN II funds.    

Evidence  about  the  role  and  involvement  of  the  private  and  voluntary  sectors  was  mixed,  although  the 
case studies found that these groups had a useful role in programme development and management.      

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How well have the programmes been managed in terms of selection, monitoring, evaluation etc? 
What  have  been  the  key  factors  underlying  the  success  of  management?.  Have  administration 
costs been reasonable and proportional? Where municipalities have been in the driving seat, how 
have they fared? 

Management  strengths  included  proactive  managers  who  were  ‘hands  on’,  and  managers  who 
understood  the  local  needs  of  programme  areas  and  communities.  Weaknesses  of  the  management 
arrangements  included  a  lack  of  trust  during  the  programmes  early  days  (usually  linked  to  the  city 
authority’s previous efforts in managing similar programmes) and a high levels of requirements linked to 
monitoring  (even  for  small  projects).  Another  key  issue  was  managers  of  URBAN  II  programmes  not 
being part of, or linked into, wider regeneration agendas within the host city. This was a key issue and it 
affected  the  ability  of  URBAN  II  to  influence  the  wider  regeneration  agenda  of  the  city  and  the  work  of 
other agencies working on the urban agenda.  

Monitoring  and  evaluation  of  programmes  were  mixed  (an  issue  also  highlighted  in  section  3). 
Programmes  often  did  not  set  targets,  were  seen  to  'over'  monitor  (even  small)  projects  and  impact 
information was limited at best. The use of the monitoring data is therefore relatively limited in terms of 
understanding the 'difference' URBAN II made (again, an issue mainly dealt with in Section 3).  

Despite these weaknesses, the management of URBAN II was seen as a strength and a highlight of the 
programme overall.  

The administrative costs associated with URBAN II was limited. Of the total allocation of URBAN II funds, 
€80.5  million  (5.1%)  was  spent  on  technical  assistance  which  is  not  untypical.  The  case  study  work 
helped  in  understanding  some  of  the  variances,  but  revealed  no  sign  of  any  excessive  expenditure  on 
administration activity. 

How  successful  have  programmes  been  in  building  the  capacity  of  local  partners  and  the  links 
between partners? What factors underlie success and failure? 

Capacity building was a key success, and was particularly demonstrated in the case studies. For some 
smaller  partners  (particularly  the  voluntary  sector,  but  also  smaller  city  authorities),  the  'experience'  of 
URBAN II has strengthened their organisations in the long term. They have been up-skilled in terms of 
managing and/or delivering integrated regeneration programmes. This was highlighted as a lasting legacy 
of the initiative.   

For larger regeneration players, including city authorities, URBAN II often reinforced existing capacity and 
skills  within  their  regeneration  approach,  although  even  these  stakeholders  learnt  from  URBAN  II’s 
integrated,  bottom-up  and  holistic  approach.  This  'impact'  of  URBAN  II  is  perhaps  greatest  in  terms  of 
how it has built capacity among urban practitioners. 

What is the link between URBAN II and the wider policy of the city? 

The extent to which URBAN II programmes were integrated into wider policy within the city was complex. 
URBAN II reinforced wider regeneration policy and added value to the overall goal of strengthening the 
urban area and its communities. However, the extent to which URBAN II programmes actually influenced 
wider policy was limited in most cases. This was partly because of the small and well-defined target areas 

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of most programmes, but also because they generally operated in large city areas which had many other 
regeneration activities targeted on them.    

To what extent are the impacts of URBAN II likely to be sustainable? 

Much  of  the  content,  concept  and  ways  of  working  or  URBAN  II  projects  and  programmes  have  been 
incorporated  into  other  activities.  About  60%  of  activities  are  still  evident  post-URBAN  II,  although  they 
have  evolved  as  they  have  been  incorporated  into  new  structures  and  funding  regimes  and  been 
delivered  by  different  organisations.  However,  there  was  little  evidence  of  programmes  or  projects 
developing robust exit or continuation strategies to help promote or plan their sustainability.  

Most  stakeholders  perceived  the  main  long-term  impacts  of  URBAN  II  in  terms  of  ‘approaches  to 
regeneration’ as opposed to actual hard impacts (such as jobs created or businesses supported). They 
found  it  hard  to  articulate  or  prove  the  lasting  benefits,  mainly  because  they  had  not  invested  time  in 
understanding (for instance) whether the businesses supported were still in operation or had grown since 
being helped by an URBAN II project. 

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5.0  The Evaluation of URBACT I 

5.1 Introduction 

This  section  presents  the  main  findings  from  the  assessment  of  the  first  URBACT  programme  (2002-
2006). The interim report provides a more detailed description of the evaluation and the approach used, 
as well as the objectives and context for the programme.  

5.2 Summary of key points  
•  The  URBACT  I  programme  was  part  of  URBAN  II  with  a  separate  budget  of  €18.03m  (€28.2m 
including match funding). The objective was to identify good practice and promote an exchange of 
experience  from  urban  development  projects,  including  those  funded  under  URBAN  II.  URBACT 
was not approved until 2002, and did not start until early 2003. There was no opportunity therefore 
to build URBACT exchange into URBAN II programmes during their inception stage.  

•  URBACT I supported a range of interventions including thematic networks, studies, training, working 
groups  and  the  deployment  of  experts  to  help  promote  knowledge  transfer.  URBACT  continues 
under a second programme (not subject to this evaluation), URBACT II. Many participants reported 
that their project activities led to a considerable flow of ideas and lively exchanges and discussions 
among  participants  from  different  European  cities.  There  was  significant  personal  benefit  to 
participants, but more those involved in face-to-face networking. 

•  Some  elements  of  URBACT  I  had  a  greater  take-up  than  others.  There  were  for  example,  20 
thematic  networks  involving  248  cities  and  more  than  4,000  individuals,  whereas  only  10-12 
networks had been planned. Demand was limited for transnational training exercises and only three 
cross-cutting  thematic  working  groups  were  established,  mainly  because  prospective  partners  had 
not built in the time or budget to participate.  

• 

Interest and participation levels also varied between Member States. Most interest, came from the 
(then) EU-15 with a history of involvement in urban programmes, but 28% of the cities participating 
in  the  thematic  networks  were  from  the  newer  EU-10  Member  States,  including  Romania  and 
Bulgaria  (not  EU  Member  States  at  that  time).  Interest  from  the  new  Member  States  increased 
during  the  period.  Participation  was  lower  in  Member  States  (such  as  Germany)  where  active, 
alternative networks were already well established. 

•  Most  participants  were  drawn  from  local  authorities  and  similar  organisations.  In  many  cases  the 
participants were 'European officers' with good language and networking skills but limited grounding 
in urban development. A lack of interpretation at network events (and the use of a single language, 
usually  English,  for  written  communications)  was  a  barrier  to  participation  for  some.  Overall, 
individuals  rather  than  institutions  got  the  most  benefit  from  URBACT  I,  with  limited  dissemination 
and follow-through between those directly involved and colleagues in the same organisations. 

•  The  focus  for  networks  and  other  exchanges  was  also  an  issue,  with  examples  of  both  overly 
restrictive  and  overly  broad  (or  sometimes  ambiguous)  themes,  lacking  focus.    Those  interviewed 

111

 
 
 
 
 
 
also  said  that  they  derived  more  benefits  from  active  participation  in  events,  rather  than  through 
written  materials.  The  search  facilities  on  the  URBACT  website  also  attracted  some  criticism  (e.g. 
difficulties in finding documents, or specific parts of documents).  

•  The  pattern  of  achievements  of  URBACT  I  in  influencing  urban  policy  thinking  and  working  in 
tandem with other networks is patchy. We cannot point to specific influences on policy and URBACT 
tended to work alongside other networks, but separately. In turn though, this has negated concerns 
of  duplication  of  activity.  URBACT  I  provided  an  exchange  of  material  and  experiences  that  was 
generally not covered elsewhere.  

•  Overall,  URBACT  I  was  a  meaningful,  successful  initiative  that  achieved  its  objective  to  promote 
good practice in urban development. This was sometimes difficult, and barriers – particularly relating 
to  transferability  (from  one  location  to  another,  but  also  from  individuals  into  their  organisations)  – 
sometimes  hampered  progress.  Those  responsible  for  URBACT  II  are  aware  of  these  issues  and 
actions have been put in place to overcome the shortfalls identified here.  

•  Although  many  individuals  involved  in  URBAN  II  took  part  in  URBACT  projects,  the  direct  links 
between  URBACT  and  URBAN  II  were  often  limited.  This  could  partly  be  seen  as  a  lack  of 
complementarity between EU funding streams, but the timing of the URBACT launch and its much 
wider  target  audience  (within  and  beyond  URBAN  II  cities)  made  it  inherently  difficult  to  fully 
integrate the two programmes. URBAN II would certainly have delivered regardless of the existence 
of URBACT I, although many URBAN II practitioners valued the opportunity of learning together, a 
message URBACT aimed to promote. 

5.3 Background and objectives of URBACT 

The  Communication  establishing  URBAN  II33  stipulated  that  programmes  should  make  provision  for 
exchange  and  dissemination  of  their  experiences.  An  indicative  financial  allocation  of  €15  million  was 
made  for  identifying  good  practice  and  facilitating  structured  exchange  of  experience  derived  from  the 
Urban Pilot Projects, URBAN I and URBAN II.  

URBACT  I  was  approved  in  2002  for  a  period  of  four  years,  with  a  budget  of  €28.42  million  (including 
€18.03  million  from  the  ERDF).  As  no  equivalent  EU-level  initiative  had  existed  under  URBAN  I,  and 
URBAN  II  programmes  had  already  started  in  2000,  the  managers  of  URBACT  I  not  only  entered  new 
territory,  but  also  had  to  begin  implementation  very  rapidly  when  the  programme  started  in  the  first 
quarter of 2003.34  

33 Communication from the Commission to the Member States of 28 April 2000 (2000/C 141/04), Articles 14 and 
15. 
34 From the outset, France offered to support the programme by providing a management and payment authority 
and hosting the secretariat. 

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URBACT’s aim was to identify good or effective practice in one location and promote the use of lessons 
extracted from this practice in other urban locations. As such, the programme sought to promote the flow 
and application of knowledge on an EU-wide scale. This knowledge transfer process lay at the heart of 
the programme’s rationale and had an important bearing on our consideration of its results and impacts.  

5.4 What outputs has URBACT achieved? 
The  programme  was  broadly  successful  in  disbursing  the  financial  resources  at  its  disposal  within  the 
programme  period,  although  encountered  difficulties  in  spending  the  funds  initially  allocated  to 
‘qualification’ actions, studies and programme-level information tools.  

URBACT  I  was  also  generally  successful  in  delivering  the  programme-level  outputs  (projects/activities) 
envisaged  in  the  programme  document.  These  outputs,  along  with  the  original  output  targets  and 
budgetary allocations, are summarised in Table 5.1. 

113

 
 
 
 
 
 
Final  budget 
(total)  

Final  budget 
(ERDF)  

Outputs achieved 

Table 5.1  URBACT I outputs 

Measure 

Original 
(indicators) 

target 

outputs 

 Thematic 
networks 

Qualification 

 Studies 

 Information tools 

10-12 networks involving 
around 1,000 people 

20-30 seminars involving 
400-600 people 

5-10 working groups 
2-6 studies 

Programme website 
5 publications a year 

Original 
budget 
allocation  

€12.4m 

€2.4m 

€600,000 

€4.1m 

€12.4m  
(43.6%) 

€1.66m 
(5.6%) 

€340,800 
(1.2%) 

€3.52m 
(12.4%) 

€6.1m 
(33.8%) 

€782,013 
(4.3%) 

€125,000 
(0.7%) 

€3.17m 
(17.6%) 

 Coordination 

Provision of experts 
Organisation of meetings 

€4.4m 

€5.43m 
(19.1%) 

€4.85m 
(26.9%) 

20 thematic networks nominally involving 4,301 people 
2 fast track pilot networks to test URBACT II (Task One) 

4 qualification projects (29 meetings and 230 participants) 
Annual conferences 

3 studies 

Programme website and monthly newsletter 
4 URBACT thematic seminars 
6 ‘thematic dossiers’ and 2 ‘virtual files’ for website  
Participation in external events (e.g. URBAN futures 2.0) 

3-4 secretariat experts  
52 thematic experts, supporting networks 
Support for 46 cities from new Member States and neighbourhood 
countries to participate in networks/working group as ‘experts’ 
Support for Cities initiative (43 cities) 

 Working groups 

Support for working groups 
(no target specified) 

 Technical 
assistance 1 

Operation of the programme 
secretariat 

€1.5m 

€2.4m 

€2.22m 
(7.8%) 

€2.39m 
(8.4%) 

€1.49m 
(8.6%) 

€1.29m 
(7.1%) 

 Technical 
assistance 2 

Evaluation and 
communication expenses 

€446,936 

€446,936 
(1.6%) 

€222,968 
(1.2%) 

TOTAL 

€28.42m 

€28.42m 

€18.03m 

Source: ECOTEC analysis of URBACT 

8 working groups initiated by public authorities 
3 cross-cutting thematic working groups35 

Salary costs of 1 director + 5 staff 
Operational expenses of staff 
Preparing Programme Monitoring Committee 

Evaluation (mid-term, ex-ante) 
Management information system 
Communication officer salary costs 

35 1) Local economic development; 2) The role of inhabitants in public urban management; 3) Adapting public services to the integrated approach. 

114

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  quantitative  terms,  URBACT  I  supported  more  thematic  networks  than  originally  envisaged  (20 
compared to 10-12), bringing together 248 partner cities and, nominally, involving at least 4,301 people. 
Many cities participated in more than one network, however, meaning that the total number of individual 
cities taking part was lower. Also, definitions of ‘people involved’ – one output indicator specified by the 
programme  –  varied  across  networks  and,  in  the  case  of  those  dealing  with  citizen  participation  for 
example, included people who attended public meetings and similar events. In addition, resources from 
the  Thematic  Networks  measure  of  URBACT  I  were  used  to  support  the  preparatory  tasks  of  two  pilot 
‘fast  track  networks’36  for  URBACT  II,  within  the  context  of  Regions  for  Economic  Change.  The 
implementation of these networks was supported by URBACT II; but their work has not been examined in 
detail in our evaluation.  

In  contrast  to  the  thematic  networks,  the  measures  on  qualification  and  studies  attracted  less  interest 
from cities and did not evolve in line with original expectations. Although four qualification projects were 
supported (three of which focused on the new Member States – the EU-10), it proved difficult to find cities 
to lead transnational training exercises not linked to thematic networks. Three studies were funded, but 
again, demand was limited.  

The Working Groups measure was used to support two types of working group: eight initiated by various 
public  authorities  (bottom-up),  and  three  cross-cutting  thematic  working  groups  initiated  by  the 
programme  secretariat  to  bring  together  participants  and  findings  from  different  thematic  networks  and 
distil  common  lessons.  In  practice,  those  of  the  first  type  were  similar  to  small  thematic  networks,  but 
were  notable  for  involving  non-city  partners,  such  as  regional  authorities.  The  Cross-  Cutting  Thematic 
Working Groups were initiated in 2005 with the aim of strengthening capitalisation of lessons learned. It 
proved difficult to persuade network partners to participate, as budget and time for these activities had not 
been built into their work programmes. As a result, only three working groups were implemented, rather 
than the four initially planned. 

5.5 Who participated in URBACT? 
Of  the  24837  cities  in  URBACT  thematic  networks,38  72%  were  eligible  cities  from  the  EU-15  (having 
participated  in  URBAN  or  Urban  Pilot  Projects),  25%  came  from  the  EU-10  Member  States,  and  the 
remaining 3% from cities in neighbouring countries (including Bulgaria and Romania), universities, NGOs 
or networks. The highest levels of participation in thematic networks came from Italy and Spain, followed 
by the UK and France. Germany was the only EU-15 Member State notably under-represented in relation 
to its size. The commonest explanation39 was the existence of a well-established city exchange network 
in Germany (a practice less developed in other large Member States). 

Cities from the EU-10 could participate in networks as a full partner, making a financial contribution to the 
network,  or  as  an  expert  partner,  receiving  100%  funding  for  travel  and  subsistence  costs  from  the 
Coordination  measure  of  the  programme.  Most  newly  eligible  cities  chose  to  participate  as  expert 

36 MILE, led by Venice, and URBAMECO, led by Grand Lyon. 
37 This is the number of network partners rather than individual cities (some cities participated in more than one 
network). Data will be updated when the consolidated list of participating cities is available. 
38 A total of 248 project partners, but some participated in more than one project. 
39 Interviews with representatives of the Deutsch-Österreichisches URBAN Netzwerk and URBACT Secretariat. 

115

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
partners. However, this evolved over time and by the end of the programme EU-10 cities had participated 
as full partners in networks in 38 cases,40 including as lead partner in the HOUS-ES project (Poznań).  

EU-10  cities  also  led  the  qualification  projects  Pre  Regeneration  and  URBAMUS,  while  the  Support  for 
Cities  initiative  explicitly  focused  on  the  new  Member  States.  The  URBACT  secretariat  and  project 
partners from new Member States considered that taking part in URBACT I was valuable preparation for 
full  integration  of  all  Member  States  in  URBACT  II.  They  also  frequently  acknowledged  that  integrated 
approaches  to  urban  development  remain  comparatively  underdeveloped  in  most  new  Member  States, 
and that URBACT II participants from those countries frequently aim to learn more than they contribute in 
terms of practice examples.  

Within  the  thematic  networks  and  other  project  types,  URBACT  I  participants  primarily  came  from  city 
administrations.  This was  consistent with  URBACT’s  ambition  to  create a  community  of  practice, rather 
than a political network. As might be expected, elected politicians tended to participate in the main events 
organised  by  projects,  rather  than  the  day-to-day  working  meetings.  While  there  was  broad  consensus 
among interviewees that URBACT should be about practice rather than politics, political commitment to 
projects  was  also  seen  as  important  for  ensuring  that  lessons  learned  were  translated  into  policy  and 
action.  

Among participants from city administrations, a noticeable split existed between European officers (who 
were  in  the  majority)  and  their  colleagues  from  thematic  departments.  Language  competence  clearly 
played  a  role  here,  as  many  networks  operated  in  one  working  language  with  little  or  no  use  of 
interpretation, which may well have restricted the range of those able to participate. While European and 
international  officers  had  the  language  skills  needed  to  participate  in  exchange  of  experience,  several 
interviewees  expressed  concern  that  these  participants  were  not  sufficiently  embedded  in  local  urban 
development policy and practice to ensure local impact.  

The commitment and motivation of URBACT I participants varied. Interviewees reported three main types 
of participant: those committed to and actively participating in the project; those who were more ‘passive 
observers’ and, in a few cases, those who were described as ‘professional tourists’. This is a qualitative 
assessment  drawn  from  our  discussions;  to  quantify  the  split  would  require  a  comprehensive  survey  of 
participants. 

5.6 What results and impacts did URBACT 1 generate? 
The  URBACT  I  Programme  Complement  limits  itself  to  the  basic  implementation  indicators  already 
reviewed  in  the  previous  section,  and  does  not  specify  explicit  result  and  impact  indicators.  This 
shortcoming  was  highlighted  in  the  ex-ante  evaluation  of  URBACT  II41  and  has  been  addressed  in  the 
new  programme  through  the  development  of  indicators  that  measure  results  and  impacts.42  The  key 
success  criterion  has  thus  been  the  observed  effectiveness  of  URBACT  I  in  supporting  the  knowledge 
transfer  process.  The  following  sub-sections  examine  our  evaluation  findings  in  relation  to  the  different 
stages in the process, from identification of (valuable) practice through to possible application of lessons 
on the ground.  

40 Annual Implementation Report (AIR) 2006, p.16. 
41 Ernst & Young (2007) ‘Evaluation ex-ante du programme URBACT 2 – Rapport final’ 
42 URBACT II includes results and impact indicators, although their applicability is still being tested. 

116

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.6.1  Identifying and recording practice 

Defining project focus 

Many interviewees stressed the need for projects to have a clearly defined focus from the outset, in order 
to  provide  a  coherent  framework  for  subsequent  activities,  increase  the  relevance  of  identified  practice 
and findings and, as a result, maximise the potential for achieving impact on policy and practice. While 
most of the case study projects had a reasonably clear focus and strategy, this was not always the case. 
A number of URBACT I networks began with only a limited shared idea of ‘where they wanted to go’. 

These  difficulties  can  partly  be  explained  by  the  innovative  nature  of  URBACT  I,  as  no  one  had  direct 
experience of a similar programme in urban development. But they also reflect that the first projects had 
to  be  created  and  approved  very  quickly,  and  that  several  networks  resulted  from  mergers  of  initially 
separate projects, ‘enforced’ by the programme management.43  

It  is  difficult  to  generalise  about  the  right  focus  for  networking  and  exchange  projects.  While  a  more 
specific  thematic  focus  helped  to  improve  the  relevance  of  findings  in  some  cases  (for  example,  the 
SecurCity  network  dealing  with  urban  security),  too  restrictive  a  definition  of  theme  could  also  limit  the 
relevance of activities for participants and of the outputs for a wider audience. Some projects with broad 
topics, such as ‘inclusion of populations of foreign origin’ or ‘physical regeneration’, operated effectively 
and produced interesting results. Consistency and strong project leadership emerged as important factors 
in these cases, whereas weak or uncommitted lead partners appeared to exacerbate problems of project 
focus.  

Capturing and presenting practice examples 

URBACT  I  was  somewhat  successful  in  identifying  and  recording  examples  of  practice.  Most  projects 
developed local case studies related to the topics covered (although not restricted to initiatives funded by 
EU  interventions  –  a  sensible  broadening  of  the  initial  programme  logic);  city  officials  prepared  these, 
often working with local or project experts. The identification and initial presentation of practice examples 
seems  to  have  run  smoothly  in  the  projects  examined,  despite  some  problems  with  local  surveys  and 
studies  (generally  related  to  lack  of  focus,  or  working  difficulties  between  cities  and  experts).  The 
numerous case study reports and presentations on the project mini-sites of the URBACT website testify 
to the rich variety of urban development practice identified and shared within URBACT I. The subsequent 
relevance and utility of case study reports is another matter however, as discussed below. 

A  recurrent  issue  raised  was  the  need  to  ensure  critical  presentation  and  analysis  of  cases.  While  a 
majority of participants in URBACT I projects took part with a commitment to objective presentation and 
discussion of their own cities’ practice, some appear to have taken the opportunity to indulge in municipal 
self-promotion.  

This  tendency  is  understandable  for  two  main  reasons.  Firstly,  some  interviewees  explicitly  stated  that 
their  cities  became  involved  in  an  URBACT  project  primarily  or  purely  to  enhance  their  reputation  and 
profile on the European stage (and specifically in relation to the European Commission, which was seen 
as  ‘owning’  the  programme).  Secondly,  URBACT  itself,  in  common  with  many  EU  programmes,  placed 

43 ISN and Citiz@move are notable examples here. 

117

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
considerable  emphasis  on  so-called  good  practice,  which  may  suggest  that  the  practice  presented  is 
expected  to  be  excellent  in  all  respects.  Several  interviewees  made  the  point  that  practice  is  always 
embedded in local environments and can only ever be presented as effective in given context, rather than 
inherently good. 

5.6.2  Results: exchanging and ‘capitalising’ 

Project-level activities – participation and ‘products’ 

The  main  intended  results  of  URBACT  I  were  to  ‘create  a  flow  of  exchange  of  good  practice’  between 
eligible  cities  and  ‘capitalise  lessons’  learned  from  EU  urban  development  programmes.  Generating 
exchange  of  practice  at  project  level  was  one  of  the  most  effective  aspects  of  URBACT  I.  Many 
participants reported that their project activities led to a considerable flow of ideas and lively exchanges 
and discussions among participants from different European cities.  

A  good  number  of  those  consulted  highlighted  as  particularly  valuable  the  interactive  and  reflective 
dimension of URBACT projects (some of which found innovative ways to go beyond the traditional ‘death 
by PowerPoint’ approach to seminars and conferences).44 This allowed participants to step outside their 
usual operating environment and consider their own activities in light of the experiences of others. Also of 
importance here is that networks enabled relationships to develop through a series of meetings over two 
or more years.  

A majority of interviewees reported that taking part in URBACT had been beneficial in terms of personal 
knowledge  of  the  subjects  covered  and  in  broadening  their  horizons  regarding  possible  approaches  to 
given problems. When asked about the relative usefulness of participatory projects or published outputs 
as  a  means  of  exchanging  lessons  about  practice,  most  informants  felt  that  participatory  approaches 
(projects, events involving activities, etc) were more effective. This is not a particularly surprising finding, 
as it reflects a basic element of most theories of learning: that active and contextualised learning is more 
effective than passive review and absorption of facts and examples, even if the latter has a role. 

Interviewees saw the value of written outputs of URBACT I projects45 primarily as a record of discussions 
and lessons learnt within URBACT activities, and for  participants to use when communicating to others 
within their own organisations or policy-making hierarchies. In contrast, they saw published products as 
far less relevant for the wider public of urban development practitioners in Europe, not least because of 
time  pressures:  “tell  me,  who  actually  has  time  to  read  this  sort  of  thing?”  Language  was  an  additional 
complication:  documents  in  English  or  French  are  of  limited  use  for  wider  dissemination  in  many  EU 
countries,  while  translation  is  very  costly  and  the  results  frequently  unsatisfactory.  Despite  this,  several 
case study networks translated at least one product into a wide range of languages.  

The quality of outputs from URBACT I projects was highly variable. While some publications were very 
well written and of considerable potential interest, others were of lower quality and/or apparently limited 

44 These included more interactive or activity-based forms of exchange and learning (‘action learning’), such as 
group tasks and challenges and visits to local organisations of relevance to network topics. In SecurCity, for 
example, participants in a workshop on fear of crime went out into the host city and interviewed (and videoed) 
representatives of different social groups, as a basis for discussing relevant issues. 
45 Often referred to as ‘products’, from the French ‘produits’ (outputs). 

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relevance.  Among  the  poorer  quality  products,  some  gave  the  impression  of  having  been  written  by 
committee  and  lacked  overall  coherence,  while  others  were  too  long  or  lacked  any  obvious  practical 
application. To compound the problem, the sheer number of documents on the URBACT website project 
pages makes it difficult to identify the most relevant and interesting documents. Wider dissemination also 
appeared to be an issue: generally, documents produced by the case study networks were rarely found 
anywhere except on the URBACT website.  

Programme-level capitalisation activities  

In addition to the exchange and capitalisation activities supported in individual projects, URBACT I sought 
to  develop  and  disseminate  project  findings  through  more  centralised  capitalisation  activities,  the 
programme website and events. However, the evaluation interviews revealed a widespread concern that 
the  capitalisation  workshops  and  programme  website  were  among  URBACT  I’s  least  successful 
elements. This appeared to be for two main reasons. The first related to doubts, highlighted above, about 
the real added value of published outputs as a means of influencing policy and practice. The second was 
more to do with the planning and quality of the programme-level capitalisation activities. 

The  cross-cutting  thematic  working  groups  were  intended  to  federate  the  results  of  thematic  networks 
operating in similar thematic areas, in a bid to identify overall lessons. However, they were not planned 
until  the  implementation  of  thematic  networks  was  underway,  so  networks  had  (rightly  or  wrongly)  not 
allocated  time  and  resources  to  participation.  It  thus  proved  difficult  to  ensure  sufficient  levels  of 
participation  in  the  working  groups,  while  a  lack  of  completed  project  outputs  made  the  process  of 
consolidating findings and extracting common lessons difficult. Though opinions varied on the usefulness 
of the events from the standpoint of those actually taking part, several interviewees doubted whether the 
outputs  of  the  working  groups  justified  the  efforts  made  by  project  participants,  coordinators  and  the 
programme secretariat. 

The  poor  quality  of  the  URBACT  website  was  a  source  of  contention  at  the  time  of  the  mid-term 
evaluation  and  update.  The  website’s  functionality  improved  considerably  with  the  change  of  service 
provider  in  2006,46  but  it  appears  to  have  retained  a  poor  reputation  among  project  participants. 
Moreover,  our  review  of  the  project  mini-sites  revealed  an  unfortunate  tendency  to  include  a  confusing 
array  of  documents,  not  always  in  a  logical  order.  This  is  a  pity,  since  some  interesting  and  relevant 
documents  are  lost  within  the  mass  of  material.  A  ‘less  is  more’  approach  would  have  been  more 
appropriate  in  terms  of  visibility  and  access.  More  positively,  the  hit  rates  for  the  programme  website 
increased considerably in the course of 2007, and some project mini-sites are still visited regularly.47 

5.6.3  Impacts: absorbing and applying lessons learned 
Capacity development in Europe’s cities 

URBACT  I  aimed  to  contribute  to  the  relevance  and  effectiveness  of  urban  development  actions  in 
Europe mainly by improving the capacity of urban development practitioners (‘urban actors’). As already 
noted, individual project participants almost universally reported that their participation was an enriching 
and a learning experience on a personal level. Differences emerged between those who felt that they had 

46 The programme secretariat encountered considerable problems with the previous service provider (AIR p.59). 
47 AIR 2007, pp.48-49. 

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entered projects from a leading position in a particular field and sought to share their practice, and those 
who took more of a learning approach. Several interviewees highlighted that participants in their projects 
who started out believing they had little new to learn frequently found it valuable to reflect on their own 
practice. 

In  general,  interviewees  perceived  the  impact  on  others  in  their  own  organisation  and  on  the  wider 
audience of urban practitioners in Europe to have been far more limited and, perhaps obviously, found it 
difficult to make firm statements about such impacts. This lack of embeddedness is possibly of concern, 
not  least  because  of  the  relative  mobility  of  the  individuals  involved.  Nevertheless,  some  URBACT  I 
projects have led to improved working relationships between European affairs and thematic departments, 
and to other departments becoming more European-oriented. 

Despite the overall objective, it would be unreasonable to expect a programme of URBACT’s size to have 
a local impact in cities. Indeed, the programme lacked an explicit mechanism to foster the application of 
lessons learned through the networking and exchange elements. Some project interviewees could point 
to  the  application  of  lessons  learned  through  URBACT;  for  example,  an  adapted  version  of  a  UK 
approach to urban security (the ASBO) was developed in Rotterdam, while a Dutch anti-graffiti scheme 
was adapted and applied in Birmingham. Such concrete examples seemed to be the exception, however, 
rather  than  the  rule.  A  number  of  interviewees  highlighted  Support  for  Cities  as  a  particularly  useful 
initiative.  Support  for  Cities  focused on  developing  local projects using  lessons  from  URBACT,  but was 
added right at the end of the programme.  

Influence on EU policy 

The most direct influence of URBACT I on EU policy has clearly been in the design of URBACT II which 
was launched without an accompanying URBAN programme (URBACT I was not exclusive to URBAN II 
and worked with other programmes and networks, a process that has been carried forward into URBACT 
II). Although URBACT I was designed to work alongside and support URBAN II, the timing of URBACT I 
reduced  its  level  of  usefulness  as  a  vehicle  for  sharing  experience  among  URBAN  II  stakeholders. 
Nevertheless,  URBACT  I  developed  a  niche  and  role  outside  of  URBAN  II  in  addressing  the  needs  of 
urban development practitioners – increasingly those from east and central Europe.  

Key  innovations  in  URBACT  II  –  such  as  the  restriction  in  partnership  size  and,  most  importantly,  the 
requirement for local action plans and local support groups – have been introduced explicitly to address 
perceived  weaknesses  in  URBACT  I.  Interviewees  generally  welcomed  these  changes  as  important 
improvements.  Indeed,  one  strength  of  URBACT  I  from  the  perspective  of  a  range  of  interviewees 
(projects, secretariat, other networks, European Commission) was to have acted as a testing ground for 
URBACT II. As such, the results and impacts of URBACT II will also be a test of URBACT I. 

More generally, evidence of the influence of URBACT  I on EU urban policy at strategic level is patchy, 
even  though  many  interviewees  commented  on  the  secretariat’s  energy  in  promoting  a  high  profile  for 
URBACT  with  the  European  Commission.  Accurately  identifying  such  policy  influence  and  attributing 
causality is, however, notoriously difficult. The impact of the work undertaken at operational level through 
Support for Cities will need evaluating in the context of regional programme evaluations, but – based on 
evidence now available – may prove to have been important. 

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5.7 URBACT and other networks 

URBACT  I  was  seen  as  largely  complementary  to  national  URBAN  II  networks  (in  Germany-Austria, 
France)  and  existing  European  networks  such  as  EUROCITIES  and  ERAN-Quartiers  en  Crise.  These 
other networks existed in tandem with URBACT and, although they had similar aims and objectives, most 
stakeholders were neither confused about this nor felt that there was duplication.  

URBACT was also seen as a valuable vehicle for transnational exchange at thematic and strategic level, 
promoting  good  practice  across  urban  development  practitioners.  However,  national  networks  of  cities 
(such  as  that  in  Germany  and  Austria)  were  considered  better  placed  to  interpret  lessons  from  other 
countries  for  application  in  their  own  national  context.  It  was  difficult  to  understand  exactly  why  these 
other  networks  were  seen  to  be  better  at  interpretation,  although  some  stakeholders  put  this  down  to 
focusing on just two Member States (i.e. Germany and Austria), rather than URBACT’s broader remit of 
trying to exchange good practice across the whole of Europe.  

Another  network,  EUROCITIES,  was  seen  as  being  more  political,  with  a  lobbying  role  promoting  the 
cause and needs of cities and their communities on various national and international stages. Although 
EUROCITIES  calls  itself  a  network,  it  was  felt  to  have  less  of  a  practice-oriented  approach,  as  actual 
urban  project  and  programme  experiences  were  not  necessarily  shared  and  promoted  among 
participating stakeholders. In addition, it brought together only large European cities (the key ‘big hitters’ 
as one stakeholder put it), whereas URBACT I also catered for small and medium-sized ones and tended 
not to exclude areas simply because they had less political ‘clout’. 

Thus  URBACT  both  added  value  to  and  supported  these  other  networks.  It  seemed  to  carve  out  a 
particular  role  for  itself,  taking  into  consideration  the  existence  of  these  similar  (but  not  identical) 
programmes. 

5.8 Conclusions and lessons learnt 
The main conclusions of the evaluation of URBACT 1 are as follows: 

What  outputs  (e.g.  in  terms  of  knowledge,  exchange  of  experience)  have  been  generated  by 
URBACT? Did networks tend to focus on practicalities or new ideas? 

URBACT  I  effectively  delivered  the  intended  programme-level  outputs  in  terms  of  exchange  and 
networking projects supported. 

The  projects  involved  both  direct  exchange  (between  project  participants  and  with  wider  audiences 
through  events)  and  the  production  of  publishable  outputs  (products).  The  direct  exchange  and 
qualification activities appear to have greater potential to influence policy and practice than the published 
outputs. 

Projects  tended  to  focus  on  strategic,  policy-related  discussions,  as  practical  issues  related  to 
implementation were highly conditioned by local context. New ideas thus played a more important role. 

URBACT  II  should  ensure  that  direct  exchange  activities  continue  to  be  supported,  and  that  projects 
incorporate  skills  and  capacity  building  (in  a  broad  sense),  even  if  there  is  no  longer  a  specific 
‘qualification’ measure. 

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Future  urban  networking  programmes  at  EU  level,  if  supported,  should  recognise  the  inherent  value  of 
people-to-people  exchanges  and,  equally,  the  limitations  of  written  practice  reports  and  outputs.  Such 
programmes should strive to ensure that as many practitioners as possible can benefit from exchanges 
and that exchange is linked to the possibility of implementation on the ground (see below). 

Who  has  participated  and  why?  To  what  extent  have  new  Member  States  been  involved?  What 
concretely could be done to optimise participation? 

The  level  of  participation  from  eligible  cities  was  generally  good.  However,  from  the  start  of  the 
programme, networks involved individuals and practice unrelated to the specific experience of Urban Pilot 
Projects  and  URBAN,  which  suggests  that  initially  restricting  participation  to  those  cities  was  unduly 
constraining. 

Motivation  for  participating  in  URBACT  I  varied  from  a  real  commitment  to  transnational  exchange  and 
learning to municipal self-promotion and even, in a few cases, apparent ‘professional tourism’. Language 
issues may have been a barrier to the ‘right’ people participating in some instances. 

Cities  from  the  new  Member  States  were  relatively  well  represented  in  URBACT  projects  (25%  in 
thematic networks), considering that they only became eligible after programme implementation began. 

In  terms  of  lessons  for  the  future,  the  question  is  rather  how  to  optimise  meaningful  and  useful 
participation – participation is not and should not be an end in itself. The requirements of URBACT II in 
relation to local action plans and local support groups appear to be a good step towards guaranteeing the 
commitment and engagement of project participants, from wherever in Europe. Opening URBACT II to all 
cities in the EU-27 also seems very sensible. The evaluation of URBACT II will be needed to examine the 
extent to which the new programme has met these expectations. 

To what extent have the outputs generated concrete results and impacts ‘on the ground’? What 
could be done to optimise this final impact? 

If  ‘outputs’  are  understood  as  projects,  there  is  considerable  evidence  of  individual  learning  (capacity 
enhancement). Evidence is more limited for institutional learning, influence on policy and the application 
of lessons learned on the ground, but examples of all exist. This largely reflects the focus of URBACT I on 
exchange of practice rather than on its direct application. 

Evidence that published practice material and written project outputs have had a direct influence on policy 
and  practice  on  the  ground  is  very  limited.  While  this  may  be  partly  attributable  to  variable  quality  and 
limited dissemination, in our view it principally reflects a flaw in the assumption that practitioners are likely 
to draw inspiration from such sources when they have had no involvement in developing them. 

As the weaknesses of URBACT I in terms of local impact were explicitly acknowledged and addressed 
when preparing URBACT II, particular attention should be paid to this area in implementing the successor 
programme. In particular, the resources required to develop effective local action plans and manage local 
support groups should not be underestimated. 

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Future  EU  urban  networking  programmes  should  also  include  a  clear  focus  on  local  relevance  and 
impact. The evidence from the evaluation suggests that the URBACT approach has greatest potential to 
develop human capital through participatory projects rather than published outputs. 

 How efficiently has URBACT I achieved the outputs, results and impacts identified?  

The answer needs to be set in the context of the comparatively limited budget (albeit €28m) available to 
URBACT I and the programme’s innovative character. In light of feedback from project participants and its 
role as a testing ground for URBACT II, we believe that URBACT I can be considered an efficient use of 
Community Funds. 

The  procedures  used  in  URBACT  I  for  first  level  financial  control  were  ineffective  and  disproportionate. 
Although  some  projects  simplified  matters  by  maintaining  centralised  control  of  budgets, 
the 
administrative  burden  on  public  sector  institutions  in  Europe’s  cities  was  excessive.  The  efficiency  of 
URBACT II, which has in principle learned from the limitations of URBACT I, will need to be judged more 
rigorously.  The  successor  programme  will  not  have  the  excuse  of  being  a  pioneer  in  the  field  of  urban 
networking and exchange. 

Procedures for financial control of expenditure, which have already been simplified under URBACT II, 
should be reviewed and compared to those used in other Community programmes (such as INTERREG 
IVC) to verify their appropriateness.  

The  answers  to  the  previous  questions  should  be  used  to  give  an  overall  judgement  as  to  how 
effective the networks have been, as well as recommendations for good practice  

Despite  some  shortcomings,  URBACT  I  proved  a  highly  popular  programme  among  Europe’s  cities. 
Moreover,  the  relevance of  a  networking  and  exchange  programme  at  EU  level  was  not  questioned by 
any of those consulted for this evaluation. 

The  correct  form  for  a  networking  and  exchange  programme  is  more  open  to  debate.  The  design  of 
URBACT  I  can  be  criticised  for  paying  insufficient  attention  to  local  impact  and  ensuring  an  arena  for 
applying  lessons  identified  in  exchange  and  networking  activities.  Moreover,  the  programme  focused 
excessively on developing publishable outputs, the relevance of which is far from proven, rather than on 
developing human capital.  

Demand  for  an  EU-wide  community  of  exchange  and  practice  in  the  field  of  sustainable  development 
appears real. And the case for such a network does not seem to depend on the existence of EU funding 
for urban development projects. Those consulted for this evaluation saw the added value of an URBACT-
style  programme  focused  on  practice  at  strategic  level,  in  addition  to  existing  EU  networks  (which  are 
more political) and national networks (which can focus on more detailed implementation issues in national 
contexts). 

Nevertheless, the possibility of EU support for local action plans and local support groups under URBACT 
II would be a useful mechanism to increase the relevance and local impact of exchange (even if the 
results have yet to be tested). Any future network programme will also likely need to ensure sufficient 
resources for local action to justify its relevance.

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6.0  Conclusions and Lessons 

6.1 Introduction  
This section brings together the main findings of the URBAN II and URBACT I evaluation and concludes 
with key lessons for urban policy makers, especially those in the new Member States who were not party 
to URBAN II but whose cities face similar challenges.  

Before  setting  out  the  main  findings  it  is  helpful  to  cover  the  parameters  of  URBAN  II  and  URBACT  I 
which informed the interpretation of evidence, namely:  

•  The relatively low level of resources at the programme level in the context of the deep-seated nature 
of  the  challenges  which  programmes  were  aiming  to  tackle.  The  average  ERDF  allocation  per 
programme was €10.7 Million, ranging from €3.5 to €19.4 Million across the 70 programmes. Whilst 
these are not insignificant sums, especially when matched funding is considered, they are not enough 
to tackle citywide structural economic problems such as unemployment and de-industrialisation.. 

•  Whilst the Commission set the guidelines, principles and objectives for URBAN II, they were neither 
detailed  nor  prescriptive.  This  was  deliberate,  and  the  flexibility  of  URBAN  II,  relative  to  the 
mainstream Structural Funds, was an attraction for many participating cities. A consequence of this 
flexibility was a very wide range of URBAN II supported activities, many unique to local circumstances 
and challenges.  

•  There  were  a  wide  range  of  participating  cities,  some  (especially  those  in  the  UK,  France, 
Netherlands, Austria and Germany) had a long tradition in urban development, but others were less 
familiar  with  urban  policy  and  therefore  gained  valuable  experience  through  their  participation  in 
URBAN II. Consequently, there was a steep learning curve for some of those involved in developing 
and  implementing  programmes.  This  inexperience  was  sometimes  reflected  in  the  management 
processes  attached  to  URBAN  II  such  as  a  lack  of  baseline  data  to  formulate  strategies  or  in 
developing effective monitoring and evaluation systems, tracking progress against key indicators.   

•  Whilst several individuals involved with URBAN II programmes did manage to participate in URBACT 
I networking events, the later start for URBACT I (effectively from the beginning of 2003) meant that 
activities supported by URBACT were less effective in involving URBAN II partnerships than originally 
conceived. This was largely because the strategies and networking arrangements (and budgets) had 
already been set. Some programmes opted for alternative networks, often national networks of cities.  

6.2 Conclusions 
This section sets out the main policy conclusions from the evaluation. 

6.2.1  Did URBAN II areas improve? 

Areas  supported  through  URBAN  II  were  all  characterised  by  a  set  of  significant  economic  and  social 
problems, including common challenges typical of urban areas in crisis across Europe, such as long term 
unemployment, poor economic performance and low quality urban environments.   

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Whilst the main economic problems of the programme areas largely remained after the completion of the 
programmes, there was quantitative and qualitative evidence of economic stabilisation and in some cases 
improvements in the performance of local economies in 13 of the 15 case studies. For example, where 
unemployment48 could be measured between 2000 and 2006 (in 37 programme areas), overall levels of 
unemployment were virtually the same for the two time periods (although there were variations between 
cities) and in some cases the gap in unemployment levels in the programme areas with their host cities 
reduced over the programme period.  

Changes could also be quantified through the use of crime, education, business and other key statistics. 
For example, over the period of URBAN II: 

•  education attainment levels doubled in Bristol's programme areas  
• 
• 

road congestion fell by 22% in Carrara and dust levels fell by 32%,   
there was a 13% increase in people achieving a secondary education qualification in Gijon's 
programme area,  
long term unemployment dropped by 8% in Halifax's programme area,  
there was a 21% rise in the number of companies found in the programme areas of Le Havre and a 
54% rise in business numbers in the Leipzig programme area, 

• 
• 

The majority of the above changes were at a better rate than the city average. Consultations with 
stakeholders as part of the case studies also highlighted important improvements that were either difficult 
to quantify or were simply not measured. For example, most of the stakeholders felt that the case study 
areas now had a better image, were generally safer places to live, had a more confident business 
community and had local residents who felt more positive about their neighbourhoods. Very few of these 
important improvements were measured through any primary or secondary research or picked up in any 
of the monitoring information collected by programmes.     

6.2.2  Were improvements to urban areas driven by URBAN II programmes?  

URBAN  II  programmes  were  an  important  driver  of  change  in  their  areas  but  normally  not  the  most 
important factor within their areas.  

The evaluation found that other factors generally were stronger influences on change, especially where 
areas had experienced positive changes in terms of employment and the business base. Here national 
and  regional  policies  tackling  unemployment,  skills  development  or  the  diversification  of  the  business 
base  were  the  main  policy  drivers.  Improvements  at  the  city  level  and  within  neighbourhoods  was  also 
strongly  influenced  by  the  work  of  mainstream  organisations,  their  programmes  and  their  funding.  This 
was  especially  so  for  policies concerned  with health,  education  and  reducing crime.  In  some  cases  the 
main  policy drivers were  other, well  established, regeneration programmes  operating  in  the  programme 
area or close by.  

Not surprisingly the scale of funding and the fixed timescales were limiting factors in the extent to which 
URBAN  II  could  influence  positive  change  in  the  socio-economic  performance  of  their  areas.  
Stakeholders generally felt that the URBAN II programmes could not be expected to make any significant 

48 The main quantifiable comparator indicator. Not all programmes though had unemployment data for their areas, 
for 2006. Hence the analysis was limited to 38 of the 70 programmes.  

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headway in solving deep seated challenges that had often been in existence for decades. Stakeholders 
also perceived that the underpinning causes of many urban problems, whilst manifest in the programme 
areas,  were  sourced  elsewhere  (e.g.  perceived  failings  of  training  provision  at  a  city  or  regional  level). 
Programmes  were  more  effective  at  influencing  local  change  and  in  improving  the  'life  chances'  of 
residents  (e.g.  ensuring  that  migrant  workers  and  ethnic  minority  groups  were  better  equipped  to  take 
advantage of new job opportunities that would arise from programmes delivered at a larger spatial level 
(such as the city or the region). 

6.2.3  What difference did URBAN II make?    

Despite  external  drivers  and  issues  of  scale  and  intensity  affecting  the  level  of  impact,  the  evaluation 
found  that  URBAN  II  programmes  were  still  important  players  in  addressing  locally  based  regeneration 
challenges. The evaluation has found that the positive benefits of URBAN II can be split into two broad 
categories:  the  impacts  on  tackling  local  regeneration  problems  in  target  neighbourhoods;  and  the 
impacts on improving regeneration methods and approaches.    

Changes at the neighbourhood level 

In some cases changes at the neighbourhood level were evidenced through statistical data (for example, 
educational attainment) with a narrowing of gaps  between the programme area and the city and, whilst 
the  precise  cause  and  effect  is  difficult  to  measure,  the  actions  supported  by  URBAN  II  made  an 
important contribution. By reference to the three themes some of the main changes are highlighted below: 

•  The physical theme – there was tangible evidence of improved land and buildings with subsequent 
re-use for economic and social end uses (such as enterprise and community centres), the provision 
of new green space, cycle and footpaths. In a few cases there was survey evidence in a few cases of 
increased  usage  of  spaces  and  buildings,  and  increased  appreciation  of  physical  improvements 
whilst some of the environmental projects lead to reductions in energy consumption plus campaigns 
that helped to raise environmental awareness. 

•  The  economic  theme  –  many  of  the  projects  focused  on  SMEs,  providing  business  support  and 
vocational  training  to  both  existing  businesses  and  new  starts.  Some  programmes  concentrated  on 
ICT  improvements.  Stakeholders  saw  employee  training  programmes  to  develop  new  skills  (and  to 
up-skill) as the most effective use of resources under this theme.  Whilst many programmes reported 
job creation, this was normally based on simple evidence such as a head count of those involved in 
supported projects, rather than a more careful look at net employment effects. 

•  The  social  theme  –  training  was  also  a  key  feature  of  the  social  theme,  the  primary  target  being 
unemployed and other disadvantaged groups (as opposed to employees). Programmes also included 
a variety of community safety projects (addressing high levels of crime), community capacity building 
programmes and measures to address drug abuse. The more successful projects under this theme 
were often those that focused on clearly identified priority groups (such as migrants and the long term 
unemployed). 

A  summary  of  the  key  outputs  arising  from  URBAN  II  programmes,  categorised  by  theme  is  set  out  in 
Table 6.1 

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Table 6.1  Summary Headlines – Key URBAN II Outputs 

Under the physical theme the key outputs were: 

372 restoration projects 

2.3  Million  m2  of  converted  public  space  plus  a  further  557,115  m2  of  space  developed  for  social, 
sports, education and health uses 

3.2 Million m2 of new green space 

80 Kilometres of cycle and footpaths plus 11,614 m2 of renovated surfaces for cyclists and pedestrians 

10,712 m2 of new water collectors designed to reduce energy consumption 

194 environmental equipment projects to recover liquid and toxic waste 

Under the social theme the key outputs were: 

982 training projects with 64,801 training places for individuals 

246 security projects tackling crime and fear of crime 

593 community capacity building initiatives 

16 employment centres and 22 health and community centres 

162 drug advice interventions 

949 cultural events projects 

443 childcare places 

Under the economic theme the key outputs were: 

5,984 business support and advisory interventions 

43,004 training places for businesses 

23 commercial centres and stores renewed 

7 innovation projects and 20 business incubator units 

43,942 m2 of new commercial floorspace 

7 ICT projects and services 

There  was  little  evidence  to  suggest  that  particular  measures  or  themes  were  more  successful  than 
others  although  there  were  particular  'headline'  projects  that  were  perceived  by  stakeholders  to  be 
especially  important  to  the  programme  as  a  whole,  generally  because  they  cut  across  themes  and 
realised  the  potential  synergies  between  different  interventions  (e.g.  the  refurbishment  of  a  derelict  mill 

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into a business incubator facility, that helped to develop and diversify the local business base, and space 
for local community organisations).  

Evidence from the case studies highlighted the contribution of URBAN II programmes to improvements in 
the  image,  confidence  and  positive  perception.  In  10  of  the  15  case  studies  there  was  evidence  that 
URBAN II had improved the image of the programme areas and raised their profile among investors and 
key decision makers in the public sector. There were examples where URBAN II actions – and often a set 
of inter-related actions – had made a significant impact in the appearance of and perceptions of areas, 
amongst  residents,  businesses  and  visitors.  These  actions  tended  to  be  physical  projects  that  in 
combination made a visual and tangible impact which in turn was seen by stakeholders to create the right 
conditions for new public and private investment in the future.  

Embedding the URBAN 'method'  

The second main area of positive change identified by the evaluation was the way URBAN II encouraged 
cities to develop new regeneration methods and approaches. Stakeholders often highlighted the level of 
learning from the URBAN II 'method' as the key impact and also the key legacy of the programme - often 
seeing  the  impact  of  the  'method'  as  more  important  than  the  direct  impacts  of  the  funding  itself.  The 
process  of  developing  and  implementing  URBAN  II  programmes  taught  many  urban  development 
practitioners about new ways to approach urban decline and helped them to understand the benefits of, 
for example, adopting an integrated approach, building up partnerships of organisations or consulting and 
engaging  with  local  people  during  the  regeneration  of  their  neighbourhoods.  This  process  was  far  from 
perfect and there was scope for improvement at all levels from the limited participation of key 'strategic' 
regional  and  city  levels  in  many  programmes  to  difficulties  in  getting  the  active  involvement  of  local 
residents in projects and the programme overall, in some programmes.   

6.2.4  Critical success factors 

The case studies provided strong evidence on the factors that contributed to the impact of URBAN II, and 
conversely factors that constrained impact. Two main factors were regularly highlighted which again point 
to  the  importance  and  benefits  of  the  URBAN  'method':  the  integration  of  URBAN  II  with  other 
programmes; and an inclusive partnership approach.  

Strong inclusive partnerships 

URBAN II was characterised by strong, inclusive local partnerships, often involving the public, private and 
voluntary sectors, although the formal involvement of community organisations and private companies in 
partnership  structures  and  management  was  limited.  Several  programmes  had  sought  to  address  this 
over  time  through  capacity  building  measures,  including  legal  and  financial  training  for  partners  and 
prospective  partners.  Community  organisations  were  more  commonly  involved  in  project  management, 
often seen by the programme managers as a way for those organisations to gain experience. Subsequent 
to  URBAN  II  community  organisations  have  played  an  important  role  in  sustaining  regeneration  in  the 
programme areas once EU funding had ceased. 

Practice varied but in most cases the local authorities provided the administrative 'glue' to bring partners 
together through the provision of programme secretariat and often, the programme manager. 

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The  more  successful  partnerships  were  those  which  brought  together  a  number  of  partners  to  tackle 
challenges  from  a  range  of  different  angles  (e.g.  high  female  unemployment  tackled  by  childcare 
providers, employers, training organisations and local community organisations). Some partnerships had 
developed  from  existing  networks  but  in  many  cases  URBAN  II  was  the  main  reason  and  stimulant  for 
new  inter-agency  working.  This  multi-agency  approach  was  again  highlighted  as  a  common  critical 
success factor. 

Integrated approaches to urban regeneration 

The integration of URBAN II with other programmes has added to the impact of URBAN II, allowing for a 
pooling  of  resources  and  a  forging  of  links  with  other  policies  and  programmes.  There  are  examples 
where URBAN II has been integrated with national programmes and also with the mainstream Structural 
Funds to provide more 'flexible' resources that were targeted at specific local neighbourhoods (whereas 
the mainstream programmes tended to have a regional or sub-regional focus). In many programme areas 
URBAN  II  played  a  central  role  in  providing  the  conditions  for  integration,  mostly  through  partnership 
working and in getting individuals across departments and agencies to work together.  

However, evidence of URBAN II programmes going one step further and influencing wider city strategies 
and policies is much more limited. This is not necessarily a failing, rather recognition that in most URBAN 
II  cities  the  programme  was  a  relatively  small  and  discrete  element  of  a  much  bigger  regeneration 
agenda. 

There  was  also  strong  evidence  of  integration  within  URBAN  II  programmes,  both  at  a  thematic  and 
project  level.  There  are  many  examples  where  projects  have  addressed  multiple  objectives,  across  the 
economic,  social  and  physical  themes.  These  include  physical  projects  that  have  bought  a  redundant 
building  back  into  use  for  economic  benefits  or  a  community  childcare  project  that  has  also  reduced  a 
large barrier to employment for local women.  

6.2.5  The sustainability of URBAN II  

There is the high probability with fixed term regeneration initiatives that the programme 'collapses' once 
funding ceases to exist. In URBAN II there were relatively few detailed exit/succession strategies and in 
several  cases  the  incumbent  programme  managers  left  early  (50%  left  in  the  final  year  of  the 
programmes, because of future funding and employment uncertainties). 

In URBAN II, whilst the original programmes have closed, some 60% of the projects continued under a 
different  guise,  even  where  the  attention  of  the  cities  regeneration  practitioners  has  moved  elsewhere, 
and resources have followed.  

Again,  the  URBAN  'method'  seems  to  be  the  area  where  sustainability  has  seen  the  most  success. 
Although project activity was supported post URBAN II, most stakeholders stated that it was the approach 
to  regeneration,  encouraged  by  URBAN  II,  that  was  most  likely  to  remain  as  the  main  legacy  of  the 

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Community Initiative.  In many programme areas a multi-agency partnership approach continues with a 
focus on community engagement and tackling issues at a very local level.       

6.2.6  The assessment of URBACT I 

The  first  URBACT  programme  set  out  to  "contribute  to  the  improved  relevance  and  effectiveness"  of 
urban  development  activities  in  Europe  by  supporting  knowledge  transfer  between  policy  makers  and 
practitioners  from  EU-15  cities  involved  in  URBAN  II,  as  well  as  cities  from  the  new  Member  States. 
URBACT I focused on bring together actors from participating cities in networks to identify, analyse and 
"externalise"  elements  of  their  own  practice  and  communicate  these  to  other  stakeholders,  through 
events and published outputs.  

URBACT  I  effectively  mobilised  relevant  actors  from  eligible  cities  and  supported  a  wide  range  of 
exchange  and  networking  projects.  Projects  tended to  focus  on  strategic,  policy-related  discussions,  as 
practical issues related to implementation are often highly conditioned by local context. At an individual 
and city level, motivations for participating in URBACT I varied from a real commitment to trans-national 
exchange  and  learning  to  city  promotion  and  even,  in  a  small  minority  of  cases,  apparent  ‘professional 
tourism”.   

The evaluation revealed considerable evidence of individual learning within URBACT I projects. However, 
evidence of institutional learning, influence on policy and the application of lessons learned on the ground 
is more limited, even if examples of all these types of wider impact exist. This finding largely reflects the 
focus  of  URBACT  I  on  exchange  of  practice  rather  than  on  its  direct  application.  There  is  very  limited 
evidence that published practice material and written project outputs have had a direct influence on policy 
and  practice  on  the  ground.  While  this  may  in  part  be  attributable  to  variable  quality  and  rather  limited 
dissemination,  in  our  view,  it  principally  reflects  a  flaw  in  the  assumption  that  practitioners  are  likely  to 
draw  inspiration  from  such  sources  where  they  have  had  no  involvement  in  developing  them.  Learning 
together, and through the experiences of colleagues in other cities, rather than learning from publications 
was a central message from the evaluation.  

Although many individuals involved in URBAN II took part in URBACT projects, the direct links between 
URBACT and URBAN II projects were often limited. Although this could to some extent be seen as a lack 
of  complementarity  between  EU  funding  streams,  the  timing  of  the  launch  of  URBACT  and  the  much 
wider target audience (within and beyond URBAN II cities) made it inherently difficult to fully integrate the 
two programmes. 

6.3 The policy and delivery lessons from URBAN II  

There are valuable lessons from URBAN II for European and national programmes tackling the complex 
challenges of urban areas. Those challenges are as severe now as they were in 2000 and are especially 
evident in the new Member States as their economies continue to experience major restructuring. Many 
of these do not have the traditions of partnership working, or evidence of either integrated programmes or 
community involvement. Neither do they necessarily have strong local structures given the dominance of 
a centralised system. Applying the URBAN 'method' in this type of environment would therefore require a 
large  level  of  support  but  would  also  act  as  a  significant  learning  experience  for  those  participating, 

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helping  them  to  develop  methods  and  approaches  to  tackling  urban  decline  but  also  giving  them  the 
resources with which to try these methods out.   

The  evaluation  conclusions,  policy  and  delivery  lessons  are  also  relevant  for  national  programmes,  the 
debates  around  the  future  of  EU  Cohesion  Policy,  including  the  merits  of  area  based  programmes 
compared to 'traditional' regional development programmes.  

The main lessons we draw from the evaluation are set out below. 

6.3.1  Programme development and delivery requires strong and inclusive partnerships 

Local authorities are likely to continue to play a lead role in future urban regeneration programmes. They 
combine  local  knowledge  and  resources,  capacity  -  through  their  structures  and  staffing  -  and  political 
legitimacy  through  their  elected  members.  However,  locally  based  urban  regeneration  requires  a  wide 
range  of  expertise  and  resources  including  the  other  public  agencies  with  interests  in  and  services 
operating  in  those  areas,  as  well  as  local  businesses  and  communities.  Resources  are  required  to 
develop partnership working and raise the skill levels of partners so that they can participate effectively in 
programme  management.  The  evaluation  shows  that  this  is  a  valuable  investment  and  one  that  can 
generate a momentum to allow regeneration to continue once finding programmes have ceased.  

6.3.2  The area based local approach 

The area based approach to tackling urban problems has been an essential ingredient of the success of 
URBAN  II.  It  is  unlikely  to  have  been  as  successful  if  the  funding  had  been  allocated  and  run  as  a 
regional  programme.  This  is  because  the  'essence'  of  URBAN  II  has  been  the  'bottom  up'  approach 
where, in the best examples, a wide range of public, private and community sector partners have been 
energised around a set of locally owned challenges and solutions. Having tightly defined programme area 
boundaries  is  another  lesson.  Smaller  area  based  programmes  cannot  resolve  deep  rooted  and  wider 
physical, economic and social problems, but they can make an effective contribution, particularly if linked 
to other strategies and programmes operating at a city or regional level. 

6.3.3  Method is as important as funding 

A key lesson for future European regeneration programmes similar to URBAN is that they should be as 
much about helping and challenging cities to develop new approaches to urban development as they are 
about trying to solve urban decline. Area based initiatives such as URBAN II will impact on issues such as 
unemployment or business growth but because of the limitations of scale and timescales they will only be 
a contributor rather than a major driver of change. If future programmes are viewed as relatively efficient 
ways  of  capacity  building  cities  and  their  urban  development  practitioners  to  test  out  and  embed 
principles such as integration and bottom up approaches, then this in itself will make a useful contribution 
to  tackling  the  problems  of  urban  decline.  If  future  regeneration  programmes  are  instead  viewed  as 
instruments that will try and 'solve' urban challenges then they are likely to fall short of expectations.              

6.3.4  Programmes need guidance  

The  step  change  that  new  Member  States  would  need  to  implement  principles  such  as  community 
development  or  partnership  working  would  be  significant  and  would  require  support  and  guidance  in 
respect  of  partnership  development,  programme  management,  methods  for  encouraging  multi-agency 

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working,  and  developing  baselines  to  understand  root  causes  of  decline  or  simply  around  developing 
priorities and projects. This could be delivered through networking and capacity building programmes that 
tackle  all  of  the  elements  of  delivering  locally  based  urban  programmes  and  are  aimed  at  both 
programme  managers  and  their  teams,  and  partners.  Regional  agencies  and  cities  with  expertise  and 
experience  can  play  an  important  role  in  supporting  and  advising  bottom-up  partnerships  from  strategy 
development  through  to  effective  monitoring  and  evaluation  systems.  This  support  should  not  stifle  the 
flexibility  and  devolved  nature  of  URBAN  type  programmes  but  it  should  help  them  to  maximise  the 
opportunities they have to make a difference to local neighbourhoods. 

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Report on behalf of the European Commission by ECOTEC.

Consult this website for further information: 

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/evaluation_en.htm 

Cover page: Vermeer: View of Delft. Courtesy of Royal Picture Gallery Mauritshuis, the Hague, Netherlands.  

Responsible editor: Veronica GAFFEY © European Commission, Regional Policy, Evaluation Unit
The texts of this publication do not bind the Commission.