Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 November 2012 on euro banknotes and coins and amendments to the Banco de España’s Statute (CON/2012/89)
Date: 2012-11-15
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Spain, central bank, dismissal, euro, financial stability, institutional activity, money, national law

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 15 November 2012  

on euro banknotes and coins and amendments to the Banco de España’s Statute 

(CON/2012/89) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 20 September 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of the 

Banco  de  España,  on  behalf  of  the  Spanish  State  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  and  Support  for 

Business, for an opinion on a series of draft amendments to Law 10/1975 of 12 March on the regulation 

of coinage, Law 46/1998 of 17 December on the introduction of the euro, and Law 13/1994 of 1 June, on 

the autonomy of the Banco de España (hereinafter the ‘draft laws’). 

On 4 October 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Governor of the Banco 

de España, on behalf of the Spanish State Secretary for Economic Affairs and Support for Business, for 

an  opinion  on  draft  Article  22  (‘Fundamentals  and  coordination  of  the  general  planning  for  economic 

activity as regards public sector staff expenses’) of the Law on the State General Budget for 2013 and its 

Third  Final  Provision  (‘Amendment  to  Law  13/1994,  of  1  June,  on  the  autonomy  of  the  Banco  de 

España’)  (hereinafter  the  ‘draft  Law  on  the  State  General  Budget  for  2013’).  For  the  purpose  of  this 

opinion, the draft laws and the draft Law on the State General Budget of 2013 are referred to collectively 

as the ‘draft provisions’. 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning  of  the  European  Union  and  on  the  first,  third  and  sixth  indents  of  Article 2(1)  of  Council 

Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities  regarding  draft  legislative  provisions1,  as  the  draft  provisions  relate  to  the  Banco  de  España 

and  to  rules  applicable  to  financial  institutions  that  materially  influence  the  stability  of  financial 

institutions  and  markets;  also,  the  draft  laws  relate  to  currency  matters.  In  accordance  with  the  first 

sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council 

has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft provisions 

Draft laws 

The  new  Article  8  bis  in  Law  10/1975  entrusts  to  the  Banco  de  España  the  functions  referred  to  by 

Regulation  (EU)  No  1210/2010  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  December  2010 

1  

OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.  

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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concerning authentication of euro coins and handling of euro coins unfit for circulation2. Also, given the 

amount of time that has passed since the introduction of the euro in Spain, an amendment is proposed to 

Article  25  of  Law  46/1998  of  17  December  on  the  introduction  of  the  euro,  to  establish  31  December 

2020 as the deadline for exchanging pesetas for euro. 

The  amendment  to  the  Fourth  Additional  Provision  of  Law  46/1998  aims  to  ensure  compliance  with 

Article 6(3) of Council Regulation 1338/2001 (EC) No of 28 June 2001 laying down measures necessary 
for  the  protection  of  the  euro  against  counterfeiting3  and  adapting  the  sanctions  regime  for  breach  of 

Article 6(1) of the Regulation. Likewise, a sanctions regime is introduced for breach of Regulation (EU) 

No 1210/2010 and Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness checking 
and recirculation of euro banknotes4. 

The amendment to Article 15 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June on the autonomy of the Banco de España adapts 

the wording to Decision ECB/2010/14.  

Finally,  the  amendments  to  Article  25  of  Law  13/1994  remove  the  simultaneous  nature  of  the  roles  of 

Governor and Deputy Governor and the age limit for members of the governing bodies of the Banco de 

España. 

Draft Law on the State General Budget for 2013 

Article  22  freezes  increases  in  salaries  and  prohibits  contributions  to  pension  plans  with  the  aim  of 

reducing public expenditure. This is generally applicable to the public sector and the Banco de España is 

expressly included, albeit under the terms established in Law 13/1994 of 1 June on the autonomy of the 

Banco de España. 

The amendment introduced by the Third Final Provision in Article 6 bis of Law 13/1994 provides that the 

Banco  de  España  must  adopt  measures  equivalent  to  those  generally  established  for  public  sector  staff, 

expressly  prohibiting  remuneration  increases  that  overall  increase  the  payroll  beyond  the  limits 

established in the Draft Law on the State General Budget for 2013. 

2. 

The Banco de España as the competent authority for counterfeit coin authentication and coin 

recirculation 

The ECB welcomes the Banco de España’s appointment as the competent authority for counterfeit coin 

authentication and coin recirculation matters.  

3.   Redeeming peseta banknotes and coins 

Peseta  banknotes  and  coins  will  cease  to  be  redeemable  from  1  January  2021.  Article  16  of  Council 
Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro5 provides that ‘In accordance 

2 OJ L: 339, 22.12.2010, p. 1. 
3 OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6. 
4 OJ L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1. 
5 OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1. 

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with the laws or practices of participating Member States, the respective issuers of banknotes and coins of 

the Member States shall continue to accept, against euro at the conversion rate, the banknotes and coins 

previously  issued  by  them’.  The  ECB  takes  note  of  the  current  draft  provision  of  Article  25  of 

Law 46/1998,  which  explicitly  clarifies  the  terms  for  the  lapse  of  the  right  of exchange  of peseta  notes 

and coins into euro at the Banco de España. 

4.  

Sanctions regime for cash handlers 

The ECB  welcomes the establishment  of a deterrent sanctions regime for non-compliant cash handlers. 

The ECB emphasises that national law should impose fines that do not go beyond their objective and are 

proportional.  

Sanctions regimes in all Member States that have aligned their laws with Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 

in conjunction with Decision ECB/2010/14 could merit harmonisation insofar as the ECB procedures in 

the Decision apply equally to all euro area cash handlers. Therefore, the ECB considers it important for 

national authorities to contribute to establishing a level playing field among cash handlers falling within 

the scope of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001, without prejudice to (i) the particularities of the cash cycle 

and the national organisation of cash handlers, and (ii) the consistency of the levels of fines in their legal 
orders6. 

5. 

References to Union legislation 

According to the Fourth Additional Provision, paragraph 4 in fine of Law 46/1998, the Banco de España 

may  lay  down  precise  rules  for  the  application  of  Article  6(1)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  1338/2001.  The 

ECB encourages the Spanish national authorities to insert a provision confirming that any such rules are 

without  prejudice  to  the  ECB  procedures  for  authenticity  and  fitness  checking  of  euro  banknotes  in 

Decision ECB/2010/14.  

The  reference  in  Article  15(1)  in  fine  to  ‘the  provisions  of  the  Community  rules  in  force’  should  be 

replaced  with  ‘the  provisions  of  the  European  Union  rules  in  force,  including  the  relevant  ECB  legal 

acts’. In Article 15(2) in fine of Law 13/1994 identical wording should be introduced, ensuring that the 

mentioned criteria and operating procedures are in line with Union law, including the relevant ECB legal 

acts.  

6. 

Remuneration of the Banco de España’s staff  

The principle of central bank independence in Article 130 of the Treaty prohibits third parties, including 

the  governments  of  the  Member  States,  from  issuing  instructions  to  the  national  central  banks  (NCBs). 

Also,  the  principle  of  central  bank  independence  means  that  third  parties  may  not  exercise  direct  or 

indirect influence over an NCB, whether relating to the performance of its tasks or its financial ability to 

fulfil  its  mandate,  both  operationally  in  terms  of  manpower,  and  financially  in  terms  of  appropriate 

6 See Opinion CON/2010/87, paragraph 3.4. All ECB documents are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 

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financial resources7,8. The ECB has consistently recommended in the past in its opinions and convergence 

reports (see reference in footnote 8) that any amendment to the legislative provisions on remuneration of 

members  of  an  NCB’s  decision-making  bodies  and  staff  should  be  decided  in  close  and  effective 

cooperation with the NCB, taking due account of its views, to ensure the ongoing ability of the NCB to 

independently carry out its tasks, and that  Member States should not impair the autonomy of their NCBs 

in  staff-related  matters.  Autonomy  in  such  matters  extends  to  issues  relating  to  staff  salaries  and 
pensions9. It is therefore essential that measures such as those in the draft law do not prevent the Banco de 

España or its staff from performing independently the tasks conferred on them by the Treaty, the Statute 

of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of 

the ESCB’) and Spanish legislation, including Law 13/1994 of 1 June on the autonomy of the Banco de 

España.  

The ECB understands that pursuant to Article 22 and the Third Final Provision of the draft law, the Banco 

de España is required to apply autonomously measures to save staff costs equivalent to those in the Laws 

on the State General Budget adopted each year, while ensuring that the Banco de España’s institutional 

and financial independence are respected and to the extent that the Banco de España’s ongoing ability to 

carry out its tasks is not affected. Conversely, the ECB understands that the Banco de España must not 

take  measures  to  save  staff  costs  equivalent  to  those  established  for  public  service  staff  that  would 
interfere with the Banco de España’s ongoing ability to independently carry out its tasks10.   

In particular, an NCB may not be put into a position where it has limited control or no control over its 
staff or where the government of a Member State can influence is policy on staff matters11. For instance, a 

combination of measures to reduce staff costs with a prohibition on recruiting new staff would directly 

impair the ability of Banco de España to employ and even possibly retain qualified staff and may amount 

de jure to depriving its decision-making bodies of their powers of internal organisation and control over 
staff, or at least to significantly limiting them12. In the light of the Banco de España’s recently expanded 

competences in the field of early intervention, restructuring and resolution of credit institutions, the ECB 

is  particularly  concerned  that  qualified  and  sufficient  human  resources  will  be  required,  in  addition  to 

adequate  financing.  The  ECB  therefore  recommends  confirmation  in  the  Third  Final  Provision  that  the 

Banco de España will not be obliged to take measures if these interfere with its ability to independently 

carry out its tasks. Based on this understanding, Article 22 and the Third Final Provision of the draft law 

are compatible with the principle of central bank independence.  

7.  

Termination of office of the members of the decision making bodies of Banco de España 

7 See, for example, the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 26. 
8  See the latest Opinion CON/2012/6.   
9  See Opinion CON/2010/80, paragraph 3.2.1 and ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 27. 
10 See Opinion CON/2010/80, paragraph 3.2.2. 
11 See ECB Convergence Report 2012, p. 27. 
12 See by analogy Opinion CON/2010/80, paragraph 3.2.3. 

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The ECB welcomes the amendment to Article 25(4) of the Law on the autonomy of the Banco de España, 

to  the  effect  that  reaching  a  certain  age  would  no  longer  be  a  ground  for  termination  of  office  of  the 

Governor,  the  Deputy  Governor  and  the  non-ex  officio  Directors  of  the  Banco  de  España  in  line  with 

Article  14.2  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB.  The  ECB  understands  that  by  this  amendment  no  compulsory 

retirement age would apply to the Governor, the Deputy Governor and the non-ex officio Directors of the 

Banco de España.  

In addition, Article 25(4)(c) of the draft law enumerates grounds for dismissal of the Governor, Deputy 

Governors and the non-ex officio Directors other than those in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

Namely,  Article  25(4)(c)  provides  that  the  Governor,  the  Deputy  Governor  and  the  non-ex  officio 

Directors  may  be  dismissed  ‘due  to  permanent  incapacity  to  exercise  his/her  role,  serious  failure  to 

comply  with  his/her  obligations,  professional  disqualification  or  proceedings  for  a  wilful  offence’.  As 

consistently  stated  in  the  ECB’s  convergence  reports,  NCB  statutes  should  either  contain  grounds  for 

dismissal which are compatible with those laid down in Article 14.2 of the Statute, or omit any mention 
of grounds for dismissal since Article 14.2 is directly applicable13 Therefore, Article 25(4)(c) should be 

aligned with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

The ECB welcomes that Article 25(5) of the draft law provides that any replacement for the Governor, 

the Deputy Governor or a non-ex officio Director, if their position becomes vacant before expiry of their 

term of office, will serve for a full term. As regards the appointment process as such, and being aware that 

appointment to any of these positions has to follow a series of procedural steps involving several public 

bodies and authorities, the ECB also sees the need to ensure the timely appointment of the new Governor, 

new Deputy Governors or new non-ex officio Directors, as the case may be, safeguarding the smooth and 

continuous functioning of the NCBs’ decision-making bodies.  

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 November 2012. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

13 See for example the ECB’s Convergence Report 2012, p. 24. 

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