COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON COSTS AND BENEFITS OF IMPROVING THE GENDER BALANCE IN THE BOARDS OF COMPANIES LISTED ON STOCK EXCHANGES Executive Summary
Date: 2012-11-14
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: appointment of staff, board of directors, gender equality, private sector, stock exchange

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 14.11.2012  
SWD(2012) 349 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
Accompanying the document 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON COSTS AND BENEFITS OF IMPROVING THE 
GENDER BALANCE IN THE BOARDS OF COMPANIES LISTED ON STOCK 
EXCHANGES 

Executive Summary 

{COM(2012) 614 final} 
{SWD(2012) 348 final}

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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
Accompanying the document 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON COSTS AND BENEFITS OF IMPROVING THE 
GENDER BALANCE IN THE BOARDS OF COMPANIES LISTED ON STOCK 
EXCHANGES 

Executive Summary 

1. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

Company  boards  in  the  EU  are  marked  by  persistent  and  manifest  gender  imbalances,  as 
evidenced by the fact that only 13.7% of corporate seats are currently held by women. Only 
15% of non-executive directors in the EU are women. 

Evidence  shows  that  although  women  not  only  possess  the  educational1  and  professional2 
credentials  to  participate  in  the  highest  economic  decision-making  bodies,  but  are  also 
willing3  and  available4  to  do  so,  from  the  outset,  they  are  at  a  systematic  disadvantage 
compared to men in attaining top management positions. Women face barriers rooted in the 
conduct  and  business  culture  of  companies  when  trying  to  realise  their  full  professional 
potential.  The  current  recruitment  practices  for  board  positions  are  characterised  by  a  high 
degree  of  opaqueness  contributing  to  these  barriers,  thereby  undermining  an  optimal 
functioning of the labour market for top management positions throughout the EU. 

Female under-representation in board rooms of publicly listed companies in the EU represents 
a missed opportunity to make full use of the EU's human capital, as the positive externalities 
associated with enhanced female participation in company boards, which are felt throughout 
the economy as a whole, are currently foregone.  

First,  gender  imbalance  in  the  boards  of  publicly  listed  companies  in  the  EU  constitutes  a 
missed opportunity at company level. Numerous corporate governance indicators point to the 
benefits  of  more  gender-diverse  company  boards.  A  lot  of  evidence  shows  that  companies 
with more gender-diverse boards are more profitable, and that the differences are statistically 
significant, provided that the level of representation of women in boards reaches a sufficiently 
high level in order to influence the behavioural patterns in decision-making. 

Second,  the  under-representation  of  women  has  negative  spill-over  effects  on  the  wider 
economy. It contributes to the gender employment gap (GEG) in terms of the representation 
of  male  and  female  employees  at  the  different  levels  of  responsibility  in  companies,  for 

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Almost 60% of EU university graduates are women. See Eurostat, Tertiary students (ISCED 5-6) by field of education and sex 
[educ_enrl5], 2009.  
Women account for around 45% of the people employed across the EU. See Eurostat, Employment by sex, age groups and 
nationality [lfsq_egan], 3rd quarter of 2011.  
Studies show that 83% of mid-level career women have expressed a strong desire to move up the company ladder. See 
http://www.mckinsey.com/Client_Service/Organization/Latest_thinking/Unlocking_the_full_potential.  
Contrary to the commonly articulated belief that there is a lack of qualified women to take up a corporate seat in an EU company 
board, a 2012 database established by European business schools demonstrates the suitability and availability of over 7000 
'boardable' women for seats in boards of listed companies. See 
http://gallery.mailchimp.com/3ad8134be288a95831cc013aa/files/2012_5_Commissioner_Reding_Initiative.pdf.  

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example,  in  managerial  positions  below  board  level,  but  also  in  terms  of  the  overall  labour 
market participation of men and women. It then feeds into the gender pay gap (GPG): women 
across  the  EU  still  earn  around  16%  less  than  men  on  average,  a  differential  that  is  even 
higher  in  publicly  listed  companies.  In  addition,  lower  rates  of  female  labour  force 
participation  and  pay  mean  a  lower  return  on  education  for  both  individuals  and  the  public 
sector, with associated consequences for the EU's gross domestic product (GDP).  

Empowering women to take leadership positions and thereby fully exploiting human capital, 
is  key  for  addressing  the  EU's  demographic  challenges,  for  competing  successfully  in  a 
globalised economy and for ensuring a comparative advantage vis-à-vis third countries. It is a 
necessary  means  to  reignite  economic  growth  as  laid  out  in  the  Europe  2020  Strategy.  This 
view  was  also  endorsed  by  the  public  consultation,  which  demonstrated  a  consensus  across 
stakeholder groups that empowering women to take leadership positions is important for both 
company  performance  and  economic  growth.  Although  they  acknowledge  this  need  and  the 
economic  benefits  of  enhancing  gender  diversity  in  the  workforce,  markets  fail  to  make 
improvements.  This  market  failure  can  be  explained  by  the  tendency  of  groups  with  a  very 
homogenous  composition  to  maintain  their  composition  due  to  an  aversion  to  working  with 
persons from different backgrounds or of different gender and a preference to associate with 
others from their own group. 

The  current  lack  of  women  in  boardrooms  generates  a  vicious  circle  which  perpetuates  the 
under-representation of women in decision-making. The current board composition affects the 
attitude  of  a  company  towards  gender  equality  and  negatively  influences  the  readiness  to 
appoint more female board members. The lack of female board members also implies a lack 
of  adequate  mentors,  sponsors  and  role  models  that  could  facilitate  a  woman's  career 
progression, thereby preparing females with high managerial potential for board membership.  

Despite  two  Council  Recommendations  (1984  and  1996),  several  legislative  and  non-
legislative  initiatives  at  national  level  and  numerous  attempts  at  self-regulation,  female 
representation in boards of publicly listed companies has only increased by slightly more than 
5% from 2003, to 13.7% by 2012. It is expected to advance at roughly the same pace to reach 
20.4% in 2020. There is broad consensus from stakeholders that action is needed to achieve 
faster progress. 

Moreover, divergence or the absence of regulation at national level also poses barriers to the 
internal market by imposing divergent corporate governance requirements on European listed 
companies.  These  differences  can  lead  to  practical  complications  for  listed  companies 
operating  across  borders,  as  well  as  for  candidates  for  board  positions.  The  current 
opaqueness of the selection procedures and qualification criteria for board positions in most 
Member  States  represents  an  important  barrier  to  more  diversity  of  board  members  and 
negatively affects both board candidates' careers and their freedom of movement, as well as 
investor decisions. 

2. 

SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 

Gender  equality  is  one  of  the  EU's  founding  objectives,  as  reflected  in  its  Treaties  (Article 
3(3)  TEU)  as  well  as  in  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  (Article  23).  Under  Article  8 
TFEU the Union in all its policies must aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, 
between women and men. The EU's right to act in issues of gender equality in employment 
and occupation follows from Article 157(3) TFEU. 

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The  current  growing  discrepancies  in  female  representation  on  boards  of  listed  companies 
between  Member  States  are  explained  by  the  fact  that  although  Member  States  may  adopt 
measures to counter the under-representation of women in economic decision-making, many 
do  not  show  any  willingness  or  face  resistance  to  act  at  their  own  initiative.  Therefore, 
imbalances  across  the  Union  can  only  be  reduced  through  a  common  approach,  and  the 
potential  for  gender  equality,  competitiveness  and  growth  can  be  better  achieved  through 
coordinated  action  at  EU  level  rather  than  through  national  initiatives  of  varying  scope, 
ambition  and  effectiveness.  Only  an  EU-level  measure  can  help  make  optimal  use  of  the 
existing  female  talent  pools.  An  EU-level  initiative  in  this  area  would  therefore  fully 
respect the principle of subsidiarity. 

There is only a rationale for taking EU action if it is indispensable to redress the continuing 
under-representation  of  women.  The  legislative  measure  will  thus  be  temporary,  thus 
underpinning its compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.  

The proposed action is in line with the principle of proportionality as it would be limited 
to  setting  common  objectives  and  principles.  In  the  spirit  of  minimum  harmonisation, 
Member States would be given sufficient freedom to determine how these common objectives 
should best be achieved taking into account national circumstances. Any binding EU measure 
would  not  interfere  with  the  possibility  for  companies  to  appoint  the  most  qualified  board 
members.  The  measure  would  fully  respect  the  requirements  of  the  relevant  positive  action 
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the specific purpose of which 
is to ensure compliance with the principle of proportionality.  

3. 

OBJECTIVES 

The general objectives are to promote gender equality in economic decision-making and to 
make  full  use  of  the  existing  talent  pool  for  more  equal  gender  representation  in  company 
boards,  thereby  contributing  to  the  Europe  2020  objectives.  In  line  with  the  underlying 
components of the problem, two specific objectives can be defined: i) to reduce the barriers 
for women to access board positions and ii) to improve corporate governance and company 
performance. This would lead to an operational objective of introducing a common target for 
the representation of each sex in boards of listed companies to be achieved by 2020. 

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

Having  identified  the  need  for  a  minimum  harmonisation  of  measures  to  improve  gender 
diversity  in  company  boards,  the  screening  of  policy  options  has  taken  into  account  the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as consistency with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (“Charter”) and other Commission policies. This is reflected in both the 
limited  scope  and  timeframe  to  which  any  possible  initiative  would  be  subject.  It  would 
therefore apply only to publicly listed companies, with the notable exception of SMEs. Listed 
companies  are  highly  visible  and  of  pivotal  economic  importance.  Furthermore,  the  female 
representation on their boards is one of the lowest compared to the other categories analysed.  

As  a  working  assumption,  the  target  set  in  the  retained  policy  options  is  40%.  This  lies 
between  the  “critical  mass”  minimum  that  has  been  found  necessary  to  have  a  sustainable 
impact  on  board  performance  (30%)  and  full  gender  parity  (50%).  Setting  the  compliance 
period  until  2020  would  enable  a  harmonised  effort  to  increase  the  number  of  women  on 

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company boards throughout the EU duly taking account of the different points of departure of 
different Member States. 

4.1. 

Option 1: Status Quo 

This  policy  option  would  involve  no  new  action  at  EU  level;  simply  a  continuation  of  the 
current situation.  

4.2. 

Option 2: Legally non-binding option 

This option would take the form of a non-binding recommendation to Member States to take 
appropriate measures to achieve a representation of at least 40% of each gender in company 
boards  by  2020,  thereby  targeting  both  executive  and  non-executive  directors  of  publicly 
listed companies in the EU. 

4.3. 

Option 3: Minimal legally binding option – objective set for non-executive board 
members only 

The  binding  legislative  option  would  introduce  a  quantified  objective  to  reach  at  least  40% 
representation  of  each  gender  in  company  boards  by  2020  only  applicable  to  non-executive 
directors  of  publicly  listed  companies  in  the  EU.  This  option  would  not  cover  SMEs  and 
would be temporary in nature, as would the two following ones.  

4.4. 

Option 4: Intermediate legally binding option – objective set for non-executive 
directors plus flexible objective for executive directors 

In addition to the legislative option of a quantified target of 40% for non-executive directors, 
this option would introduce the obligation to set a flexible objective for executive directors. 
This  would  be  determined  by  the  publicly  listed  companies  themselves  in  the  light  of  their 
own specific circumstances. 

4.5. 

Option 5: Maximal legally binding option – objectives set for both executive and 
non-executive directors 

This  option  would  introduce  a  quantified  target  of  attaining  gender  diversity  in  company 
boards  whereby  the  level  of  representation  would  have  to  be  at  least  40%  for  each  sex  by 
2020 for both executive and non-executive directors of publicly listed companies in the EU. 

5. 

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS 

5.1. 

Assessment of Option 1  

If  no  further  action  is  taken,  slow  progress  can  be  predicted  towards  achieving  both  the 
general  and  specific  objectives,  as  the  participation  of  women  in  company  boards  is 
expected  to  reach  only  20.84%  by  2020.  As  a  result,  this  policy  option  would  have  a 
negligible social and fundamental rights' impact, or for the latter even no impact as far as 
the  EU-level  is  concerned,  given  that  the  Charter  would  not  be  applicable  pursuant  to  its 
Article 51(1) to measures taken by Member States that do not implement Union law. 

The impact on the gender employment gap would be very limited since men would still be 
more than four times as likely as women to occupy a board position, and more than twice as 

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likely to be managers. The gender pay gap, which is the difference between female and male 
salaries in listed companies, would be 23.72%, whilst the average return on education would 
be  18.2%  for  individuals  and  22.11%  for  the  public  sector.  Company  performance  is 
expected to yield an average of 10.78% ROE for listed companies in the EU-27. 

As the status quo would not imply any change in investment or administrative burden, the 
corresponding costs are estimated to be zero.  

5.2. 

Assessment of Option 2  

Due  to  its  non-binding  nature,  this  option  is  expected  to  only  tip  the  balance  in  favour  of  a 
non-binding action only in the Member States where this issue is currently under debate. In 
the  light  of  past  experience,  a  recommendation  is  assumed  to  be  limited  in  its  effects.  The 
participation  of  women  in  the  boards  of  publicly  listed  companies  is  expected  to  reach 
23.57% by 2020, a slight increase of 2.73 percentage points compared to option 1. It would 
have a fairly small impact on social and fundamental rightssince the associated benefits of 
gender equality would only be reaped to a very small extent. Where the recommendation is be 
implemented  and  achieves  its  objective  of  increasing  the  proportion  of  women  in  company 
boards  and  thereby  reduce  gender  gaps,  it  would  positively  contribute  to  the  promotion  of 
gender equality and the rights enshrined in Articles 15 (freedom to choose an occupation and 
right to engage in work) and 23 (equality between women and men) of the Charter. Inasmuch 
as action by Member States following a recommendation must be considered as implementing 
EU  law  within  the  meaning  of  Article  51(1)  of  the  Charter,  Member  States  would  have  to 
ensure that the negative impact on the rights enshrined in Articles 16 (freedom to conduct a 
business) and 17 (right to property) of the Charter are minimised as far as possible.  

This option would have moderate positive spill-over effects on the wider economy in terms 
of reducing  the gender employment gap and the gender  pay gap  and increasing the average 
return  on  education.  Due  to  the  slight  increase  in  the  number  of  female  executive  and  non-
executive  directors,  it  is  expected  to  have  a  moderate  effect  on  the  overall  aspects  of 
corporate  governance.  On  the  basis  of  a  conservative  estimate  company  performance  in 
terms  of  ROE  is  projected  to  increase  by  0.67%  compared  to  the  baseline,  leading  to  an 
additional net benefit for listed companies of about €4 billion.  

Investment costs would arise only for Member States that follow the recommendation and, in 
the case of non-binding national measures, only for companies that respond to these measures. 
On that basis, the total annual investment costs in the EU are estimated to be €3.7 million for 
2017 – 2020 and €651800 for 2021 – 2030. The average annual  administrative burden due 
to the obligation on all companies affected to report the gender composition of their boards 
would amount to €115000. Assuming that all Member  States that take measures would also 
monitor progress, the total annual average for the costs of monitoring in the EU is estimated 
to be €93000. 

5.3. 

Assessment of Option 3  

Based  on  the  assumption  of  full  compliance  with  the  target,  this  option  would  generate  an 
increase in the participation of women in company boards to 32.58% by 2020, a tangible rise 
of 11.74 percentage points compared to Option 1. Due to the fact that female non-executive 
directors’ presence would increase to 40%, this option would have a considerable impact on 
social  and  fundamental  rights’  impact.  Accordingly,  it  would  trigger  much  greater 
associated benefits of gender equality would be felt at an appropriate level. This option would 

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have a clear beneficial impact on gender equality and the rights laid down in Articles 15 and 23 
of the Charter. Although it would also represent a limitation on the rights set out in Articles 16 
and 17 in that it would restrict their right to determine by whom the company is managed and 
supervised,  there  is  still  a  safeguard  since  it  leaves  a  sufficiently  wide  margin  of  choice  for 
selecting  the  most  qualified  board  members  as  the  instrument  would  only  affect  the  overall 
gender composition of the company board. Given that this option only covers non-executive 
members,  it  would  be  less  of  a  limitation  as  this  function  does  not  entail  day-to-day 
management  tasks.  If  companies  are  not  able  to  find  an  equally  qualified  female  board 
member, they do not have to attain the target.  

This  option  would  have  a  positive  spill-over  effect  on  the  wider  economy  in  terms  of 
reducing  the  gender  employment  gap  and  the  gender  pay  gap  and  increasing  the  average 
return  on  education.  It  would  have  a  significant  positive  impact  on  corporate  governance, 
with notable effects on board dynamics. Furthermore, company performance would visibly 
benefit  from  the  increase  in  female  board  members  since  this  option  implies  considerably 
higher  net  benefits  than  Option  2,  leading  to  an  increase  in  the  net  income  of  listed 
companies  of  about  €15.7  billion,  under  a  conservative  estimate.   The  average  ROE  is 
projected to increase by 2.61% compared to the baseline.  

Making the most of the available talent pool, this option would require €16.6 million in total 
annual  investment  costs  for  2017  –  2020  and  €3  million  for  2021  –  2030.  In  addition,  this 
option  would  generate  a  total  annual  administrative  burden  of  €124000  for  company 
reporting, while Member States would incur annual costs of €100000 to  monitor the progress 
made.  

5.4. 

Assessment of Option 4  

The  impact  of  this  option  on  non-executive  directors  would  be  the  same  as  Option  3.  As 
regards  the  flexible  target  for  executive  directors,  it  is  assumed  that  each  company  would 
replace  one  male  executive  director  by  one  female  director  (leaving  the  average  board  size 
unchanged).  This  would  represent  a  significant  increase  in  the  participation  of  women  to 
34.11% by 2020 in executive boards, thereby nearly doubling the number of executive female 
board  members  and  increasing  the  overall  number  by  13.27  percentage  points  compared  to 
option 1. This is due to the fact that on top of a 40% target for non-executive directors, female 
presence  among  executive  directors  would  increase  to  14.44%.  Similar  to  the  envisaged 
impact  of  option  3,  this  option  would  also  have  a  considerable  impact  on  social  and 
fundamental rights, as the associated benefits of gender equality would be the same. Going 
slightly beyond Option 3 as far as the fundamental rights' dimension is concerned, however, 
the  minimal  prescriptive  provision,  which  would  act  as  an  incentive  for  companies  to  raise 
their  share  of  female  executive  directors  and  thus  bring  more  women  into  the  highest 
management posts, could render the beneficial impact on the rights enshrined in Articles 15 and 
23 of the Charter even more substantial. Option 4 would not increase the negative impact on 
the  rights  enshrined  in  Articles  16  and  17,  as  each  company  would  be  free  to  set  its  own 
objective and determine the extent of its ambition. 

This  option  would  have  a  significant  positive  spill-over  effect  on  the  wider  economy  in 
terms of the reducing the gender employment gap and the gender pay gap and increasing the 
average  return  on  education.  Corporate  governance  indicators  would  score  significantly 
better  under  this  option.  Company  performance  would  also  significantly  improve.  The 
corresponding  net  benefits  are  estimated  to  increase  further,  generating  an  additional  net 

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income  for  listed  companies  of  about  €23.7  b illion  under  a  conservative  estimate,  as  the 
average ROE is projected to increase by 2.92% compared to the baseline. 

Under this option, the total annual investment costs for 2017 – 2020 are estimated to amount 
to €18.3 million and €3.5 million for 2021 – 2030. Th
ese investment costs are not negligible 
but  they  are  very  modest  given  the  above  benefits  for  companies,  quite  apart  from  the 
macroeconomic  benefits.  The  administrative  burden  on  companies  and  monitoring  costs 
for  Member  States  would  be  the  same  as  under  Option  3,  at  €124000  and  €100000 
respectively, given that Option 4 does not impose any additional requirements than Option 3.  

5.5. 

Assessment of Option 5  

Assuming full compliance, this option is bound to be the most effective in terms of increasing 
the participation of women in company boards. The share is expected to reach 40% by 2020 
amongst both executive and non-executive directors (compared to Option 1, this increase of 
19.16 percentage points at board level would entail an increase of 32.19 and 15.25 percentage 
points for executive and non-executive directors). This option would have a very high impact 
on social and fundamental rights, as the benefits associated with gender equality would take 
significant proportions. It would achieve the furthest-reaching and most sustainable change in 
management and business culture, achieving the strongest positive effects for the position of 
women on the labour market. Conversely, the limitation to the rights of Articles 16 and 17 of 
the  Charter  would  be  more  significant  if  gender  equality  considerations  were  to  limit  the 
choice  in  appointing  the  executive  member  responsible  for  a  company's  day-to-day 
management  and  the  most  important  business  transactions.  Nevertheless, this limitation does 
not  appear  to  be  disproportionate,  especially  given  the  importance  of  the  intended  aim  of 
gender  equality  which  is  recognised  both  in  the  Charter  and  the  Treaties.  In  addition,  this 
limitation  can  be  mitigated  since  companies  would  not  have  to  meet  the  gender  objective 
where equally qualified candidates of the under-represented sex cannot be found, for example, 
in  sectors  where  female  participation  in  the  workforce  and  management  is  particularly  low, 
and where executive positions require specific expertise and experience in that sector. Policy 
makers  would  have  to  consciously  take  into  consideration  the  extent  of  the  restrictions  on 
shareholders’ fundamental rights when choosing this option. 

This option would have a very significant positive spill-over effect on the wider economy in 
terms of the reducing the gender employment gap and the gender pay gap and increasing the 
average  return  on  education.  The  binding  measures  for  both  executive  and  non-executive 
board members would have a very significant positive impact on corporate governance and 
company performance could see an increase in the average ROE by 3.95% compared to the 
baseline.  This  would  generate  an  increase  in  the  net  income  of  listed  companies  of  about 
€23.7 billion, under a conservative estimate.   

Under  Option  5  it  is  expected  that  total  annual  investment  costs  in  the  EU  for  2017-2020 
would amount to €26.5 million, after which the  cost would decrease to €5 million for 2021 – 
2030. These investment costs are not negligible but they are rather modest in relation to the 
benefits  at  company  level  presented  above,  quite  apart  from  the  macroeconomic  benefits. 
Administrative burden on companies and monitoring costs for Member States would be the 
same as in Options 3 and 4, at €124000 and €100000 per ye

ar, respectively. 

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6. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 

All policy options are expected to address the main drivers of the problem and would help to 
reduce  to  different  degrees  or  even  to  break  the  vicious  circle  that  prevents  women  from 
participating  in  corporate  boards.  A  comparison  of  the  consequences  of  the  various  policy 
options  finds  that  (i)  binding  measures  are  more  effective  in  meeting  the  policy  objectives 
than non-binding measures, (ii) measures that target both executive and non-executive board 
members  are  more  effective  than  measures  only  targeting  one  group  and  (iii)  binding 
measures will generate more societal and economic benefits than non-binding measures. 

At  the  same  time,  binding  measures  would  entail  comparatively  higher  costs  and 
administrative burdens, but they are still rather modest given the projected economic benefits. 
Furthermore, the degree of effectiveness of the various policy options is directly linked to the 
extent of interference with the rights of the companies and the shareholders as their owners. 
Compared to a non-binding measure with a tangible yet limited effect, a substantial increase 
of  the  impact  in  terms  of  the  policy  objectives  would  require  an  instrument  with  binding 
force, setting targets for the composition of company boards. While the consequences of all 
options on fundamental rights are justifiable and in line with the principle of proportionality 
in  view  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  policy  objectives  and  the  in-built  safeguards,  those  that 
establish quantified targets for executive board members, the persons directly responsible for 
the  operative  day-to-day  management  of  a  company,  would  produce  the  most  beneficial 
effects but would also represent the most significant interference. 

The  choice  of  option  will  depend  on  whether  the  increased  cost  and  greater  degree  of 
interference  with  fundamental  rights  of  binding  measures  could  be  justified  by  their  wider 
socio-economic  benefits,  or  whether  non-binding  measures  are  to  be  preferred  because, 
although  they  generate  fewer  significant  socio-economic  benefits,  and  are  less  effective  in 
terms  of  meeting  the  policy  objectives,  they  also  entail  fewer  constraints  on  the  exercise  of 
fundamental  rights.  The  views  of  stakeholders  will  be  taken  into  careful  consideration  in 
choosing between the various options.  

The  administrative  burden  is  expected  to  be  minimal  for  all  policy  options,  given  that  they 
would apply only to publicly listed companies which are expected to be able to use existing 
reporting  mechanisms  to  provide  the  necessary  information  on  their  compliance  to  the 
Member  States.  During  the  preliminary  screening  exercise  of  policy  options,  the  options 
likely to entail an administrative burden were discarded at an early stage. 

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION ARRANGEMENTS 

In a legally binding measure is taken at EU level (options 3-5), Member States would have to 
monitor whether listed companies comply with the targets and report to the Commission on 
the  state  of  implementation  at  national  level.  The  Commission  would,  in  turn,  monitor 
whether  the  legally  binding  instrument  has  been  correctly  transposed  and  implemented  at 
national  level.  The  Commission  would  then  report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  on  the  progress  made  at  regular  intervals.  It  is  expected  that  a  legally  binding  EU 
measure would be limited in time, meaning that it would be repealed after a number of years, 
if  sufficient  progress  is  made  and  a  realistic  prediction  arises  that  the  upward  trend  in  the 
participation  of  women  in  economic  decision-making  positions  could  be  sustained  upon  the 
discontinuation of the EU measure.  

EN 

9 

   EN