COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments ("stress tests") of nuclear power plants in the European Union and related activities
Date: 2012-10-04
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: nuclear law, nuclear power station, nuclear safety

EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 

Brussels, 4.10.2012  
COM(2012) 571 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments ("stress tests") of nuclear power 
plants in the European Union and related activities 

{SWD(2012) 287 final} 

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments ("stress tests") of nuclear power 
plants in the European Union and related activities 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

There are currently 132 nuclear reactors in operation in the EU, grouped on 58 sites. 
Their  safety  record  is  such  that  although  incidents  have  occurred  and  continue  to 
occur,  no major  accidents have ever taken place. While the overall safety record is 
therefore  good,  EU  citizens'  confidence  in  Europe's  nuclear  industry  hinges  on 
continuous improvements of the EU nuclear safety and security framework, so as to 
ensure  that  it  remains  the  most  effective  in  the  world,  based  on  the  highest  safety 
standards. 

The challenges which nuclear safety and its governance face were highlighted in the 
accident  at  the  Fukushima  reactors  in  Japan  following  the  earthquake  and  the 
tsunami  in  March  2011.  This  event  demonstrated  that  nuclear  reactors  must  be 
protected  even  against  accidents  which  have  been  assessed  as  highly  improbable. 
Events  at  Fukushima  revealed  well-known  and  recurring  issues:  faulty  design, 
insufficient  backup  systems,  human  error,  inadequate  contingency  plans,  and  poor 
communications. The EU must learn the lessons of Fukushima to further reduce the 
risk of nuclear incidents in Europe. 

The  Fukushima  accident  resulted  in  unprecedented  efforts  to  review  the  safety  of 
nuclear  installations  in  Europe  and  worldwide.  Initiatives  were  taken  at  national, 
regional and international level. 

In the  EU, the European Council, in March  20111 concluded that “the  safety of  all 
EU  nuclear  plants  should  be  reviewed,  on  the  basis  of  a  comprehensive  and 
transparent  risk  and  safety  assessment ("stress tests"); the European Nuclear Safety 
Regulatory Group (ENSREG) and the Commission are invited to develop as soon as 
possible  the  scope  and  modalities  of  these  tests  in  a  coordinated  framework  in  the 
light of lessons learned from the accident in Japan and with the full involvement of 
Member  States,  making  full  use  of  available  expertise  (notably  from  the  Western 
European  Nuclear  Regulators  Association);  the  assessments  will  be  conducted  by 
independent  national  authorities  and  through  peer  review;  their  outcome  and  any 
necessary  subsequent  measures  that  will  be  taken  should  be  shared  with  the 
Commission and within the ENSREG and should be made public.” In addition, the 
European Council asked the Commission to invite EU neighbouring countries to take 
part in the stress test process, to "review the existing legal and regulatory framework 
for  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations"  and  to  "propose  by  the  end  of  2011  any 
improvements that may be necessary". 

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EUCO 10/11 (paragraph 31). 

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Close  cooperation  between  plant  operators,  nuclear  regulators  and  the  Commission 
made it possible to carry out stress tests in 2011 and 2012. The Commission can now 
give  a  response  to  the  European  Council's  mandate  with  the  present  report  which 
identifies  the  Commission's  conclusions  and  recommendations  based  on  the  stress 
tests  and  related  activities.  It  also  considers  the  international  dimension  of  nuclear 
safety and security and outlines how the nuclear safety framework in the EU can be 
improved, underlining the dynamic nature of nuclear safety: enhancing nuclear safety 
is not a one off exercise, it must be continually reviewed and updated. Above all, it 
brings  together  all  the  strands  of  the  review  exercise  with  a  view  to  developing 
legislative, non-legislative and project proposals. All these measures seek to improve 
the  safety  of  the  plants  and  related  governance  at  EU  and  national  level,  and  to 
promote EU values for nuclear safety and security in the international context. 

Details on the technical findings and the stress test methodology are presented in the 
accompanying Commission Staff Working Document. 

2. 

THE  PROCESS,  KEY  FINDINGS  AND  IMMEDIATE  FOLLOW-UP  TO  THE  RISK  AND 
SAFETY ASSESSMENTS 

2.1. 

An unprecedented review of nuclear safety and security 

In  response  to  the  Fukushima  accident  and  the  subsequent  mandate  given  by  the 
European Council to the Commission, many layers of activities ran in parallel. These 
are presented briefly below.  

While  ENSREG  and  the  Commission  developed  the  scope  and  modalities  of  the 
tests,  the  assessment  of  the  safety  of  nuclear  power  plants  falls  under  the 
responsibility  of  nuclear  operators  and  national  regulators  who  participated  in  the 
stress tests on a voluntary basis. The Commission cannot guarantee the nuclear safety 
and security of nuclear installations, since the legal responsibility remains at national 
level. All the conclusions in the present Communication need to be read against this 
background. 

The safety assessments lead by ENSREG 

The  stress  tests  were  defined  as  a  targeted  reassessment  of  the  safety  margins  of 
NPPs  in  the  light  of  the  lessons  drawn  from  the  events  in  Fukushima  related  to 
extreme natural events challenging the plants safety functions. They were organised 
taking  due  account  of  the  distribution  of  competences  among  the  various 
stakeholders  in  the  area  of  nuclear  safety2.  All  fourteen  EU  Member  States  that 
operate nuclear power plants3 plus Lithuania4 participated in these assessments on a 

2 

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According to article 6 of the Nuclear Safety Directive, the prime responsibility for nuclear safety lies 
with  the  "licence  holder"  (i.e.  the  plant  operator)  under  the  supervision  of  the  national  competent 
regulatory  authority.  Member  States  are  responsible  for  establishing  and  maintaining  a  national 
legislative, regulatory and organisational framework for nuclear safety. Under the Euratom Treaty, the 
Commission can make legislative proposals to create an EU legislative framework for nuclear safety, 
without however being able to substitute its responsibility for that of the Member States. A change to 
this situation would require an amendment of existing legislation. 
Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Hungary,  Netherlands,  Romania, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 

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voluntary  basis.  The  132  nuclear  reactors5  in  operation  in  the  EU,  are  based  on 
different technologies and types, but are mainly Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR), 
Boiling  Water  Reactors  (BWR)  or  gas  cooled  reactors.  Stress  tests  were  started  by 
self-assessments  carried  out  by  nuclear  operators  and  the  preparation  of  national 
reports by national regulators in line with the responsibilities for the safety of NPPs. 
Peer  review  teams  mainly  composed  of  experts  from  the  Member  States,  with 
support from the European Commission, visited 23 sites, taking into account the type 
of reactor as well as the geographical location. Team visits to selected sites in each 
country  were  organized  in  order  to  firm  up  the  implementation  of  the  stress  tests, 
without  encroaching  on  the  responsibilities  of  national  authorities  in  the  area  of 
nuclear  safety  inspections,  which  organised  inspections  of  each  operating  nuclear 
power plant (NPP) in the EU after the Fukushima accident. Information on each NPP 
can be found in the accompanying Commission Staff Working Document as well as 
its  references  to  information  made  available  by  plant  operators,  the  national 
regulators or ENSREG as a whole.  

Following  the  presentation  of  the  Commission  Interim  Report6,  an  extensive  EU 
wide peer review process was carried out from January to April 2012. It produced an 
overview  report  by  the  ENSREG  Peer  Review  Board,  endorsed  by  ENSREG,  and 
seventeen  individual  national  reports7  with  detailed  recommendations.  In  July, 
ENSREG  agreed  on  an  Action  Plan  to  follow  up  the  implementation  of  the  peer 
review 
findings  and 
recommendations described in this Communication are formulated. 

recommendations. 

that  safety 

this  basis 

is  on 

It 

Work on nuclear security by the Council (Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security, 
AHGNS) 

In order to deal with matters related to the security of nuclear power plants, a new ad 
hoc group was set up in the Council. The group met regularly as of September 2011, 
chaired by the Polish and Danish Presidencies. It comprised security experts from the 
Member States with the Commission closely associated. In contrast to the ENSREG 
safety assessments, the AHGNS did not look at individual installations but assessed 
the state of nuclear security in the EU as a whole, by looking at methodology for the 
evaluation and protection of nuclear power plants including preventive measures.  

The  AHGNS  encouraged  the  exchange  of  existing  practices  and  identified  possible 
methodological improvements, making mainly use of good practices in the existing 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance. It concluded its work in May 
2012. 

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Where the Ignalina NPP is being decommissioned. 
Altogether, the stress tests were performed on the 132 reactors in operation in the EU, 13 EU reactors 
that were phased out since the stress tests were initiated, 15 reactors in Ukraine, and 5 reactors in the 
Swiss Confederation. 
COM 784 final, 24.11.2011. 
14 Member States operating nuclear power plants (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Germany,  Hungary,  Netherlands,  Romania,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden,  United 
Kingdom), Lithuania (where the Ignalina units are being decommissioned under operating licenses) and 
Switzerland and Ukraine as EU neighbouring countries. 

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Involvement of EU neighbouring countries in the process 

Switzerland, Ukraine and Croatia participated fully in the EU stress tests and the peer 
review  process,  while  other  neighbouring  countries  (e.g.  Turkey8,  Belarus  and 
Armenia9)  that  agreed  to  work  on  the  basis  of  the  same  methodology,  are  working 
within  different  timetables.  The  Russian  Federation  also  carried  out  re-assessments 
and  identified  improvement  measures  at  its  NPPs,  using  its  own  methodology. 
Switzerland is fully committed to follow up the recommendations of the stress tests, 
while Ukraine has included the stress tests finding in the modernisation programme 
of  its  nuclear  power  plants.  The  Commission  appreciates  these  efforts  to  converge 
with the EU's approach in this field. 

Commission assessment of the institutional and legal framework 

Beyond  the  review  of  the  safety  of  the  plants,  the  Commission  has  assessed  the 
institutional  architecture  and  legal  framework  for  nuclear  safety  in  Europe,  taking 
into account the IAEA Action Plan10 and the outcome of international discussions on 
the Convention on Nuclear Safety. It has identified gaps and best practices that can 
be addressed or included within EU legislation on the basis of the existing balance of 
competences, extended collaboration among Member States or in the implementation 
of existing EU programmes. 

Effects of aircraft crashes  

Events that could affect both the safety and the security of nuclear power plants, like 
aircraft  crashes,  have  been  considered  within  this  review  exercise.  The  effects  of 
aircraft  crashes  on  the  safety  of  nuclear  power  plants  are  covered  in  the  ENSREG 
stress tests specification. On security, the AHGNS report identifies good practices to 
be followed by Member States on the prevention of malevolent aircraft crashes. 

The Commission has organised a seminar  "Safety of Nuclear  Power Plants against 
Aircraft  Impacts"  on  25  September  2012  aimed  at  upgrading  plant  safety  and 
exploring  alternative  protection  methods.  Participation  included  Member  States 
safety regulatory authorities as well as contributions from USA and Japanese experts. 
Invited  experts  considered  the  characteristics  of  existing  plants  and  new  designs 
separately. 

Off-site emergency preparedness 

During  the  peer  review  phase  of  the  safety  stress  tests  some  NGOs  requested  to 
extend the scope of the stress tests to off-site emergency preparedness. In the EU, 47 
nuclear  power  plants  with  111  reactors  have  more  than  100  000  inhabitants  living 
within a circle of 30 km. This demonstrates that off-site preventive measures are of 

8 
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10 

Stress test report submitted to the Commission in May 2012. 
Financial and technical assistance from the EU Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation. A report is 
expected by early 2013. 
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/actionplan/reports/actionplanns130911.pdf  

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primary  importance.  The  responsibility  for  such  measures  is  shared  by  several 
national, regional and local authorities. The Commission, with ENSREG support, is 
launching a study aiming at drawing a picture of current arrangements, focussing on 
cross border regions in the EU and at making recommendations as necessary. Results 
are expected by the end of 2013. 

Cooperation in the framework of international organisations 

The Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety held an Extraordinary 
Meeting  in  August  2012  to  review  its  effectiveness  and  continued  suitability.  The 
Commission prepared a report on behalf of the Euratom Community11 and has been 
mandated  by  the  Member  States  in  the  Council  to  negotiate  improvements  to  the 
implementation of the Convention  as well as amendment proposals tabled by other 
Contracting Parties. 

2.2. 

Findings from the safety assessments and from the institutional and legal review 

The  findings  are  described  in  detail  in  the  Commission  Staff  Working  Document 
accompanying 
topic  are 
summarised in the following paragraphs. 

this  Communication.  Key  considerations  for  each 

2.2.1.  Findings on safety measures in existing NPPs 

Based  on  the  stress  tests,  national  regulators  concluded  that  there  are  no  technical 
reasons requiring the shutdown of any NPP in Europe, and identified a series of good 
practices.  The  Commission  is  not  empowered  to  make  assessments  of  this  nature. 
However, practically all NPPs need to undergo safety improvements, as hundreds of 
technical  upgrade  measures  have  been  identified.  Following  the  accidents  at  Three 
Mile Island and Chernobyl, measures to protect nuclear plants were globally agreed. 
The stress tests demonstrated however that in many instances the implementation of 
those measures is still pending. 

The  Annex  highlights  the  main  recommendations  identified  in  the  stress  test 
exercise. Further detail on required improvements and on good practices detailed by 
NPP is provided in the Staff Working Document. 

Examples of significant findings: 

In 4 reactors (located in two different countries), there is less than 1 hour available to 
operators to restore the safety functions in case of loss of all electrical power and/or 
ultimate heat sink. 

In 10 reactors, on-site seismic instrumentation is not installed yet. 

4  countries  currently  operate  additional  safety  systems  fully  independent  from  the 
normal  safety  systems,  located  in  areas  well  protected  against  external  events  (e.g. 
bunkered systems or hardened core of safety systems). A fifth country is considering 
this option. 

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C(2012) 3196 final, 10.5.2012. 

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Mobile equipment, especially diesel generators needed in case of total loss of power, 
external events or severe accident situations, are already available in 7 countries, and 
will be installed in most of the others. 

The seminar on aircraft crashes showed the existence of significant differences in the 
national  approaches  to  deal  with  the  assessment  of  the  safety  implications  with 
regard to existing and new NPPs: 

Design requirements for new NPPs require that – following impact of a large aircraft, 
no  releases  to  outside  of  the  containment  take  place.  For  historical  reasons,  the 
situation  is  different  for  existing  NPPs,  and  the  methodologies  applied  and 
implications  developed  are  not  necessarily  coherent  and  consistent  across  Member 
States. 

Participants stressed the need to keep a clear separation with security issues because 
of  the  different  level  of  institutional  responsibility  and  transparency  vis-à-vis  the 
public. 

2.2.2.  Findings on safety procedures and frameworks 

The stress tests highlighted best practices as well as shortcomings in Member States. 
These  are  detailed  in  the  Staff  Working  Document.  The  following  key  issues  have 
emerged  from  the  stress  tests  and  from  other  reports  on  the  Fukushima 
investigations12: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

There  is  a  lack  of  consistency  with  respect  to  assessing  and  managing 
external  hazards  to  plant  safety.  For  example,  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  guidance  for  seismic  loads  or  the  guidelines  for  flooding  are 
not  implemented  by  all  Member  States  (first  ENSREG  peer  review  Board 
recommendation, see 2.3.2.).  

The scope and depth of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) used to 
characterise  the  safety  of  nuclear  reactors  differ  significantly  and  in  some 
Member  States  there  is  an  urgent  need  to  bring  them  up  to  accepted 
international standards. 

Severe  Accident  Management  Guidelines  (SAMG's)  covering  all  types  of 
situations  have  to  be  available  in  all  NPPs.  The  stress  tests  have  shown  that 
SAMG's  need  to  be  updated  and  fully  implemented  as  soon  as  possible  in  a 
number of Member States. 

Improvements  in  safety  culture  are  needed.  There  are  gaps  in  ensuring 
comprehensive  and  transparent  identification  and  management  of  key 
safety issues. A glaring lesson from Fukushima is that the tsunami hazard was 
underestimated, mostly due to human, systemic and organisational factors. 

12 

"Investigation  Committee  on  the  Accident  at  Fukushima  Nuclear  Power  Stations  of  Tokyo  Electric 
Power Company", final report July 2012 (http://icanps. go.jp/) and "The Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Independent Investigation Commission", final report July 2012 (http://www.naiic.jp/en/2012/) 

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2.2.3.  Findings on the legal framework for safety and its implementation 

A  number  of  weaknesses  in  the  existing  nuclear  safety  framework  at  the  European 
and the Member States level have been identified. 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The  key  finding  relates  to  continuing  differences  between  Member  States 
resulting  in  the  absence  of  a  consistent  approach  to  nuclear  safety 
regulation.  There  are  no  codified  EU  mechanisms  to  agree  on  technical 
standards  and  ways  to  conduct  safety  reviews.  The  Nuclear  Safety  Directive 
does not have any provisions to this end. 

The  provisions  covering  the  independence  of  the  national  regulatory 
authorities and the means to ensure their effectiveness are minimal and not 
necessarily  sufficient 
regulatory 
responsibility  is  split  between  several  entities  or  is  included  directly  in 
Ministries (Economy, Environment, etc.). Moreover, the existing catalogue of 
regulatory competencies is not sufficiently explicit. 

for  preventing  situations  where 

the 

Transparency is essential in ensuring that the best possible safety practices are 
used,  as  shown  by  the  stress  tests.  However,  the  Nuclear  Safety  Directive 
contains only generic requirements on public information. 

The monitoring and verification mechanisms at EU level are limited to the 
peer review of the national nuclear safety framework. 

2.3. 

Key recommendations from the stress tests on safety 

2.3.1.  Recommendations on safety measures in existing NPPs 

The  Staff  Working  Document  provides  an  overview  of  the  number  of  safety 
measures required in individual nuclear power plants. 

Follow-up: 

All participating countries have begun to take operational steps to improve the safety 
of  their  plants.  These  measures  include  additional  mobile  equipment  to  prevent  or 
mitigate  severe  accidents,  the  installation  of  hardened  fixed  equipment,  and  the 
improvement of severe accident management, together with appropriate staff training 
measures.  The  costs  of  additional  safety  improvements  are  estimated  to  be  in  the 
range of €30 million to €200 million per react
or unit. Thus, the total costs for the 132 
reactors operating in the EU could be in the order of €10–25 billion for all NPP units 
in the EU over the coming years. These figures are based on the estimates published 
by the French nuclear safety authority (covering more than one third of the reactors 
in the EU) and are subject to confirmation in the national actions plans. 

In line with a Joint Declaration issued by the Commission and ENSREG on 25 April 
201213,  ENSREG  agreed  an  Action  Plan  in  July,  which  aims  at  ensuring  that  the 

http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/EC%20ENSREG%20Joint%20Statement%2026%20A

pril%202012%20-Final%20to%20publish.pdf 

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recommendations from the peer review process are implemented in a consistent and 
transparent manner. This must be a priority for all affected Member States. In view 
of the high number of recommended improvements, methods and criteria need to be 
developed  and  applied  to  judge  the  importance  of  different  measures,  to  prioritise 
and allocate funding to those areas which bring the greatest safety benefits. 

At the same time, the assessment carried out on plants being constructed considered 
the likelihood for new reactor designs to be strongly  affected by all of these  safety 
upgrading  measures  as  low.  Therefore,  large  increases  in  the  investment  costs  for 
new  nuclear  generation  capacity  in  Europe  are  unlikely  if  the  best  available 
technologies are chosen. 

The  responsibility  for  implementing  monitoring  and  verification  mechanisms 
belongs to the Member States. 

2.3.2.  Recommendations on procedures and frameworks 

Regarding safety, the ENSREG peer review Board report identified four main areas 
for further improvement across Europe: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

European  guidance  should  be  developed  on  the  assessment  of  natural 
hazards,  including  earthquake,  flooding  and  extreme  weather  conditions, 
and  safety  margins,  in  order  to  increase  consistency  between  Member 
States.  The  Western  European  Nuclear  Regulators'  Association  (WENRA), 
involving the best available expertise from Europe (linked with the first finding 
under 2.2.2.) would be well placed to carry out this task. 

Periodic Safety Review  (PSR) of each NPP should be carried out at least 
every  10  years,  to  maintain  and  improve  the  safety  and  robustness  of  plants 
and revaluate the natural hazards to which plants may be subject to. 

Recognised  measures  to  protect  containment  integrity  as  the  last  barrier  to 
protect  people  and  the  environment  against  radioactive  releases  must  be 
implemented. 

Accidents  resulting  from  natural  hazards  should  be  prevented  and/or 
mitigated  so  as  to  limit  their  consequences.  Measures  to  be  considered 
include bunkered equipment to prevent and manage a severe accident, mobile 
equipment  protected  against  extreme  natural  hazards,  emergency  response 
centres  protected  against  extreme  natural  hazards  and  contamination,  rescue 
teams  and  equipment  rapidly  available  to  support  local  operators  in  long 
duration events.  

Follow-up: 

The Commission and national regulators have agreed that national action plans with 
timetables  for  implementation  will  be  prepared  and  made  available  by  the  end  of 
2012. The peer review methodology will be applied to them in early 2013 in order to 
verify  that  the  “stress  tests”  recommendations  are  consistently  implemented  in  a 
transparent way throughout Europe. In areas where additional technical analysis and 
guidance  are  needed  national  regulators  will  closely  collaborate  in  the  WENRA 
framework. 

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The occurrence of incidents in nuclear plants, even in Member States with otherwise 
good safety records, confirms the need for thorough safety reviews on a regular basis 
and  for  the  assessment  of  operational  experience,  and  highlights  the  need  for  close 
cooperation  and  information  sharing  between  operators,  vendors,  regulators  and 
European institutions, such as the European Clearinghouse of Operating Experience, 
maintained by the Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC). In addition, ENSREG 
can  play  a  key  role  in  ensuring  that  experience  and  conclusions  from  any  nuclear 
incident  are  shared  promptly  and  applied  consistently  in  other  Member  States.  For 
example, the results of recent investigations into the Doel 3 reactor in Belgium have 
demonstrated  the  need  to  continuously  check  plant  status  with  state  of  the  art 
techniques and share information as widely as possible. 

Furthermore,  the  Commission  recommends  that  national  regulators  include  in  their 
future safety reviews more detailed analysis with respect to the effects of multi-unit 
accidents,  considering  also  ageing  on  equipment  and  materials,  protection  of  spent 
fuel  storage  ponds  and  possibilities  to  reduce  the  amount  of  spent  fuel  stored  in 
ponds, in order to reduce risks due to loss of cooling. 

The  Commission  considers  that  extending  the  safety  assessment  to  off-site 
emergency  preparedness  and  response  arrangements  is  an  important  additional 
activity  to  improve  citizens'  safety.  Therefore,  as  a  first  step,  the  Commission  is 
launching  a  study  on  the  "Review  of  Current  Off-Site  Nuclear  Emergency 
Preparedness  and  Response Arrangements in EU Member  States and  Neighbouring 
Countries".  The  objective  is  to  review  the  off-site  nuclear  emergency  preparedness 
and  response  capabilities  in  EU  Member  States  and  neighbouring  countries,  to 
identify  inconsistencies  and  gaps,  and  to  develop  proposals  (legislative  or  non-
legislative) for possible improvements. 

Regarding  the  safety  implications  of  aircraft  crashes  on  nuclear  power  plants,  the 
Commission  recommends  to  ENSREG  to  work  urgently  on  a  European  safety 
approach  in  order  to  develop  a  coherent  methodology  and  to  arrive  at  comparable 
high-level standards across the European Union. 

2.4. 

Key findings and recommendations from the security assessments14 

The final report of the Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security15 presents conclusions on 
the  five  themes  discussed,  namely  physical  protection,  malevolent  aircraft  crashes, 
cyber-attacks,  nuclear  emergency  planning,  and  exercises  and  training.  As  national 
security  remains  a  Member  States  responsibility  and  the  sensitivity  of  the  subjects 
and  confidentiality  obviously  implies  strict  constraints,  the  report  contains  several 
recommendations to the Member States in order to strengthen nuclear security in the 
EU. It highlights in particular: 

• 

the urgent need for the Member States which have not yet done so to complete 
ratification of the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials; 

14 
15 

This section is based on the Final Report of the Council Ad-hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS). 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st10/st10616.en12.pdf, 31.5.2012. 

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• 

• 

• 

the  added  value  of  IAEA's  guidance  and  services,  including  IPPAS16 
missions on a regular basis in all Member States having nuclear power plants; 

the importance of regular and close cooperation between Member States and 
with neighbouring countries and 

the  necessity  to  define  modalities  and  fora  for  the continuation  of  EU  work 
on nuclear security. 

2.5. 

Recommendations on linking work between safety and security issues 

Sustained  efforts  are  required  to  link  up  work  on  nuclear  safety  and  security  and 
address possible gaps. For example, neither the safety stress tests nor the report on 
nuclear  security  answer  all  relevant  questions  on  issues  like  aircraft  crashes  or  the 
resistance of nuclear power plants to external events. However, the stress tests have 
to a considerable extent covered the effects of aircraft crashes through the thorough 
work undertaken on station blackout and loss of plant cooling. While this is an area 
where competence is shared among different authorities, the Commission intends to 
further study this area through dedicated expert hearings. On other areas of nuclear 
security,  specific  projects  under  the  EU  CBRN  Action  Plan  and  actions  on  cyber 
security  will  need  to  be  considered  in  close  collaboration  with  Member  States 
ENSREG has agreed in its action plan to further collaborate on the issue of aircraft 
crashes as far as the legal competencies of national regulators permit. 

3. 

STRENGTHENING THE EU NUCLEAR SAFETY FRAMEWORK  

3.1. 

Implementing the existing nuclear safety legislative framework 

The deadline for the EU Member States to complete the transposition of the Nuclear 
Safety  Directive17  at  national  level  was  22  July  2011.  The  European  Commission 
started infringement proceedings against twelve Member States that did not comply 
with  this  deadline18.  To  date,  two  Member  States19  have  still  not  completed  their 
transposing  measures.  The  Commission  will  now  start  an  in  depth  analysis  of  the 
quality of the transposing measures by the Member States. 

3.2. 

Improving the legislative framework for nuclear safety 

3.2.1.  Revision of the nuclear safety directive 

It is crucial to ensure that the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident and the 
conclusions of the stress tests are properly and consistently implemented in the EU 
and  reflected  in  the  legislative  framework.  The  stress  tests,  the  reports  from  Japan 
and the work of the international community in the IAEA have confirmed that there 

16 
17 

18 

19 

International Physical Protection Advisory Service. 
Council  Directive  2009/71/Euratom  of  25 June  2009  establishing  a  Community  framework  for  the 
nuclear safety of nuclear installations. 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and the 
United Kingdom. 
Poland and Portugal. 

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are not only significant differences between Member States, but also gaps in ensuring 
comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key safety issues.  

Moreover  a  number  of  weaknesses  with  the  existing  EU  nuclear  safety  framework 
have been identified (see section 2.2.3). In order to address these, the Nuclear Safety 
Directive requires revision in the following area: 

(1)  Safety  procedures  and  frameworks.  The  scope  of  the  existing  Nuclear  Safety 
Directive  is  limited  to  overall  principles  mainly  fixing  the  distribution  of 
competencies  among  nuclear  operators,  national  regulators  and  other  national 
instances,  hence  it  cannot  address  the  technical  safety  issues  identified  in  the 
Fukushima  nuclear  accident  and  the  stress  tests.  The  main  framework 
recommendations arising from the stress tests (e.g. the periodic revaluation of 
external hazards, the implementation of recognised techniques to minimise the 
impact  of  accidents,  etc.)  need  to  be  translated  into  agreed  mechanisms 
anchored  in  the  revised  directive  on  which  the  national  regulatory  authorities 
can  base  their  independent  decisions.  Improvements  are  needed  in  preparing 
and  responding  to  a  serious  nuclear  or  radiological  emergency.  The  revised 
directive should include provisions that require Member States to have in place 
appropriate  on-site  emergency  preparedness  and  response  measures.  Specific 
attention needs to be paid to the safety of new nuclear installations. While the 
revised directive can define basic parameters and safety objectives, the role of 
ENSREG in providing guidance for their implementation needs to be defined, 
as  shown  by  recent  developments  in  the  reactor  in  Doel.  Those  events  have 
once  more  highlighted  the  need  for  dialogue  between  operators  and  safety 
authorities  in  order  to  share  and  implement  best  practices  and  state  of  the  art 
technology. For new reactors, WENRA safety objectives should be considered 
in the directive.  

(2)  Role  and  means  of  nuclear  regulatory  authorities.  The  current  provisions  on 
regulatory  separation  and  the  effectiveness  of  nuclear  regulatory  authorities 
need  to  be  strengthened  to  ensure  the  effective  independence  of  these 
authorities and guarantee that they have the appropriate means of action. 

(3)  Openness  and  transparency.  Transparency  of  regulatory  decisions  and  regular 
provision of information to the public by nuclear operators should be extended 
and specified, for example by putting obligations on the licence holders, or by 
specifying the type of information that should be provided, as a minimum, to 
the public by the competent regulatory authority. 

(4)  Monitoring and verification. The provisions on monitoring and verification, for 
example through the extended use of peer reviews, should be extended to other 
areas than the review of the national regulatory framework. 

3.2.2.  Nuclear Insurance and Liability 

The  analysis  of  provisions  for  the  compensation  of  victims  in  case  of  nuclear 
incidents or accidents is not covered at all by the current EU legislative framework. 
As such, this was not part of the stress test process. However, Euratom Treaty article 
98  provides  for  Council  Directives  establishing  binding  measures  on  this  issue. 
Therefore,  based  on  an  impact  assessment,  the  Commission  will  analyse  to  what 

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extent  the  situation  of  potential  victims  of  a  nuclear  accident  in  Europe  should  be 
improved, within the limits of EU competence. The Commission intends to propose 
binding  legislation  in  the  area  of  nuclear  insurance  and  liability.  In  this  context, 
compensation for damage to the natural environment should also be addressed.  

3.2.3.  Revising the legislation on food and feedstuff 

The management of food and feedstuff that is contaminated as a result of a nuclear 
emergency is covered both by the Basic Safety Standards Directive (96/29/Euratom), 
and it is subject to specific provisions with regard to their placing on the market in 
Council Regulation (Euratom)  No 3954/87 laying  down  maximum  permitted  levels 
of radioactive contamination. The latter legislation has become the subject of a recast 
procedure20. However, the Commission now intends to withdraw the proposal for a 
recast  and  to  bring  this  Regulation  in  line  with  the  new  Comitology  Regulation21 
which entered into force in March 2011. 

The experience gained from the events in Fukushima and Chernobyl demonstrated a 
need  to  differentiate  between  instruments  regulating  the  import  of  food  from  third 
counties and those for the placing on the market of food in case of an accident within 
the EU. On the basis of this experience, the Regulation needs to be revised in order 
to  provide  more  flexible  tools  which  will  allow  specific,  targeted  reactions  to  any 
nuclear accident or radiological emergency (in the EU, in the vicinity of the EU or in 
a remote country). 

3.3. 

Strengthening human resources and training 

Whether a country has chosen to continue the use of nuclear energy, to phase out the 
use or to start using this energy source for the first time, ensuring the availability of 
an experienced workforce should be a top priority. 

At  European  level  the  EC  Joint  Research  Centre,  in  cooperation  with  EU  nuclear 
safety regulators and TSOs, manages the Operating Experience Feedback initiative. 
The Joint Research Centre will open these activities to all national nuclear regulatory 
authorities,  who  want  to  participate,  in  order  to  establish  a  permanent  European 
Nuclear Safety Laboratory for the continuous improvement of safety. This laboratory 
will  provide  scientific  and  technical  support  for  effective  work  for  the  continuous 
improvement  of  nuclear  safety  in  particular  through  incident  analyses  and 
assessments, which may be identified by the Commission or ENSREG. 

In Euratom research and innovation actions (Horizon-2020), special attention should 
be  dedicated  to  the  lessons  from  Fukushima,  and  better  coordination  between 
national, European and international actions in this area is needed. Further exchanges 
of  best  practices  should  be  encouraged  as  a  way  of  continuously  improving  and 
harmonising nuclear safety culture. 

20 
21 

COM(2010)184 final, 27.4.2010. 
Regulation EU 182/2011. 

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3.4. 

Building up international cooperation 

The Commission will continue to encourage all EU neighbouring countries through 
appropriate  incentives  and  instruments  to  share  the  results  of  their  stress  tests, 
participate  in  peer  reviews  and  ensure  that  experiences  in  the  implementation  of 
recommendations are shared to improve nuclear safety both inside the EU and at its 
borders. A Euratom loan is currently being considered for Ukraine, in order to speed 
up the implementation of its comprehensive safety upgrade programme. 

Contacts  are  also  under  way  to  develop  bilateral  cooperation  on  stress  tests  and 
regulatory  issues  with  Japan.  A  draft  Memorandum  of  Understanding  for  better 
cooperation  on  nuclear  safety  has  already  been  submitted  to  the  IAEA.  More 
generally,  the  Commission  will  work  with  the  European  External  Action  Service 
(EEAS) in order to make the best use of existing external cooperation instruments in 
the field, in particular the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, the Instrument 
for  Stability  in  its  Chemical,  Biological,  Radiological  and  Nuclear  risk  mitigation 
component and the Instrument for Pre-Accession. 

3.5. 

Improving the global legal framework for nuclear safety 

Through the IAEA, the main instruments governing nuclear safety are internationally 
agreed  safety  standards  and  conventions,  in  particular  the  Convention  on  Nuclear 
Safety (CNS), and the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Emergency, 
to which the Euratom Community is a Contracting Party. The extraordinary meeting 
of  the  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety  in  August  2012  agreed  to  set  up  a  working 
group tasked with reporting in 2014 on a list of actions to strengthen the Convention 
and on proposals to amend it, if necessary. A majority of nations participating to this 
working group highlighted the need to take into account the IAEA safety standards, 
regulatory independence and effectiveness, extended use of peer reviews as well as 
improved  openness  and  transparency.  The  Commission  will  take  full  account  of 
these  principles  and  objectives.  The  continued  commitment  of  Member  States  and 
EU institutions is needed to ensure that the EU legislation is reflected to the extent 
possible  in  future  revisions  of  the  international  nuclear  safety  framework.  The 
Commission will continue its efforts to make this possible. 

4. 

REINFORCING NUCLEAR SECURITY 

The Commission supports the findings and recommendations highlighted in the final 
report of the AHGNS. In order to contribute to the work on nuclear security matters, 
the  Commission  will  use  the  existing  competencies  and  programmes  to  encourage 
Member States in progressing further on the implementation of specific measures. In 
particular, the Commission will continue to work with Member States on: 

– 

the  reduction  of  the  threat  of  Chemical,  Biological,  Radiological,  Nuclear 
(CBRN)  incidents  of  intentional  origin,  including  acts  of  terrorism  and 
detection  of  radioactive  and  nuclear  materials,  through  the  implementation  of 
the  EU  CBRN  Action  Plan  and  the  management  of  programmes  on  CBRN 
security; 

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– 

– 

– 

– 

the revision of Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of 
European critical infrastructures22, foreseen in 2013; 

the  Commission  will  table  a  legislative  proposal  on  network  and  information 
security by the end of the year. Under the proposal operators in certain critical 
sectors relying heavily on ICT will be required to ensure the security of their 
information systems and report serious security breaches to public authorities. 
Electricity  utilities  with  nuclear  operations  will  be  subject 
these 
requirements; 

to 

adoption  of  the  proposal  for  the  revision  of  the  Union  Civil  Protection 
Mechanism23  that  facilitates  co-operation  between  the  Member  States  in  civil 
protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies, including 
radiological  and  nuclear  accidents  as  well  as  prevention  and  preparedness 
actions  (e.g.  risk  assessments  and  risk  management  plans,  CBRN  modules, 
training  and  exercises  for  large-scale  disasters,  scenario  development  and 
contingency planning); 

the  speedy  ratification  of  the  amended  Convention  on  Physical  Protection  of 
Nuclear  Materials  by  all  Member  States.  The  Commission  will  complete  the 
ratification process by Euratom as agreed by the Council in 2006 once Member 
States have finalised their internal procedures. 

The  Commission  also  considers  that  there  remains  a  need  to  tackle  more  explicitly 
aspects located at the interface between nuclear safety and security. 

Outside the EU, the Instrument for Stability – the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence 
programme –  will  enhance  institutional capacities of selected countries and regions 
against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks. 

5. 

CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD 

The  EU  nuclear  stress  tests  were  an  unprecedented  exercise  in  terms  of  extent, 
collaboration  and  commitment  of  all  parties  involved.  They  have  been  used 
internationally either as basis or as a benchmark for the safety assessment of nuclear 
power  plants24.  The  public  availability  of  all  safety-related  reports  and  the 
participation  of  non-nuclear  countries  have  made  the  exercise  an  example  of 
transparency.  

The stress tests are now completed. However, their impact should not be considered 
as a one-off exercise, but as an on-going process to improve nuclear safety, in close 
collaboration with national regulatory authorities in the context of ENSREG and the 
IAEA. The EU must seek to develop a comprehensive European approach to safety, 

22 

23 

24 

Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European 
critical  infrastructures  and  the  assessment  of  the  need  to  improve  their  protection,  OJ  L  345, 
23.12.2008, p. 75–82. 
Proposal  COM/2011/0934  under  negotiation  in  the  Parliament  and  the  Council  to  repeal  Council 
Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast). 
For example the Latin American forum of nuclear regulators (FORO), the Russian Federation and Japan 
have followed closely the EU stress tests and made use of part of the specifications. 

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includes  a  revision  of  nuclear  safety  specific  Euratom 

which 
legislation, 
complemented  by  legislative  or  non-legislative  instruments  on  nuclear  liability,  on 
emergency preparedness and response, and by pursuing actions in the area of nuclear 
security. In this way, citizens in the whole EU can be confident that nuclear power 
produced in the EU is subject to the most stringent safety conditions in the world. 

The  stress  tests  and  related  activities  are  a  major  achievement  for  the  EU  and  the 
regulatory authorities in the Member States and have led to tangible results: 

• 

Significant  and  tangible  plant  improvements  have  been  identified  in  all 
participating countries, and are being implemented or planned. 

•  Weaknesses  in  frameworks  and  procedures,  as  well  as  gaps  in  the  legal 
arrangements, have been identified and proposals to improve these are on the 
drawing board. 

• 

First bridges have been built between authorities dealing with safety and those 
dealing  with  security.  Improving  the  dialogue  between  them  on  topics  that 
reside  at  the  safety/security  interface  is  essential  to  respond  to  citizens' 
concerns. 

With a view to ensuring proper follow-up to the stress tests, the Commission: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

invites  the  European  Council  to  commit  Member  States  and  to  call  upon 
participating third countries to implement swiftly the recommendations of the 
stress tests. The Commission will ensure openness and transparency during the 
follow-up of the stress test process but  will, under the current legislation, not 
be legally responsible for the operational assessment of the safety of NPPs. It 
proposes that the European Council examine the status of the implementation 
of the recommendations by June 2014, on the basis of a consolidated report by 
the  Commission,  to  be  drafted  in  close  cooperation  with  ENSREG.  It  invites 
Member  States  to  take  action  without  delay  to  implement  all  stress  test 
recommendations,  in  accordance  with  the  timetable  of  the  ENSREG  action 
plan and with the aim of implementing the vast majority of the required safety 
improvements by 2015; 

will present an ambitious revision of the EU nuclear safety directive, which 
it  will  submit  to  the  European  Parlament  and  Council  by  early  2013  at  the 
latest,  after  consulting  Member  States  scientific  and  technical  experts  as 
foreseen by article 31 of the Euratom Treaty. Presentation of a further proposal 
on  nuclear  insurance  and  liability  is  under  consideration  and  will  follow  in 
2013,  just  as  the  proposal  on  maximum  permitted  levels  of  radioactive 
contamination of foodstuffs and feeding stuffs; 

will explore proposals in the the Horizon 2020 Euratom programme aiming to 
faciliate the exchange between Member States of staff working in the nuclear 
field; 

will  propose  to  the  Council  a  mandate  to  participate  actively  in  the  working 
group  on  effectiveness  and  transparency  in  the  framework  of  IAEA  seeking 
improvements of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and preparing a European 

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joint proposal for the next review meeting in March 2014; the Commission will 
also  maintain  the  ongoing  dialogue  with  other  countries  to  ensure  the 
maximum convergence on the European proposals; 

will continue to encourage scientific activities aiming at further harmonization 
of nuclear safety assessments and practices in EU; 

will continue to contribute to the reinforcement of nuclear security building as 
appropriate  on  existing  work  on  CBRN,  by  using  reinforced  cooperation  of 
Member  States  and  EU  insitutions  as  needed  as  well  as  external  cooperation 
instruments in close collaboration with the EEAS. 

• 

• 

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS: 

AHGNS 

Ad-hoc Group on Nuclear Security 

BWR 

CBRN 

CNS 

EEAS 

Boiling Water Reactor 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 

Convention on Nuclear Safety 

European External Action Service 

ENSREG 

European Nuclear Safety Regulators' Group 

IAEA 

ICT 

INSC 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

Information and Communication Technologies 

Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 

IPPAS 

International Physical Protection Advisory Service 

JRC 

NPP 

SAM 

Joint Research Centre of the European Commission 

Nuclear Power Plant 

Severe Accident Management 

SAMG 

Severe Accident Management Guidelines 

TSO 

PSA 

PSR 

Technical Safety Organisation 

Probabilistic Safety Assessment 

Periodic Safety Reviews 

WENRA 

Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association 

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Annex25 

Summary of the Main Recommendations for Improvement during the 
Stress Tests in EU Member State Nuclear Power Plants 

External hazard safety cases corresponding to an exceedance probability of less than 
once in 10 000 years should be used for earthquakes. 

(The  suitability  of  a  NPP  construction  site  should  be  assessed  based  on  an 
seismic  analysis  that  takes  into  account  the  most  severe  earthquake  over  the 
last 10 000 years)  

External hazard safety cases corresponding to an exceedance probability of less than 
once in 10 000 years should be used for flooding. 

(The  suitability  of  a  NPP  construction  site  should  be  assessed  based  on  an 
analysis  that  takes  into  account  the  most  severe  flood  over  the  last  10  000 
years) 

A Design Basis Earthquake corresponding to a minimum peak ground acceleration of 
0.1 g should be used. 

NPP  design  must  be  able  to  withstand  an  earthquake  producing  at  least  a  peak 
ground acceleration 0.1 g. 

Means  needed  to  fight  accidents  should  be  stored  in  places  adequately  protected 
against external events. 

On-site seismic instrumentation should be installed or improved. 

Time available to the operator for restoration of the safety functions in case of loss of 
all  electrical  power  and/or  ultimate  heat  sink  should  be  more  than  1  hour  (without 
human intervention). 

Emergency  Operating  Procedures  should  cover  all  plant  states  (full  power  to 
shutdown states). 

Severe  Accident  Management  Guidelines  should  be  implemented  and  should  cover 
all plant operating states (from "full power" to "shutdown" states). 

Passive  measures  to  prevent  hydrogen  explosions  (or  other  combustible  gasses)  in 
case  of  severe  accident  should  be  in  place  (such  as  Passive  Autocatalytic 
Recombiners or other relevant alternatives). 

Containment Filtered Venting Systems should be in place, so as to limit the amount 
of radioactivity released outside the containment in case of accident. 

25 

The issues listed should be read together with the accompanying Commission Staff Working Document 
where they are explained in more detail and linked to nuclear power plants where they were observed. 

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A  backup  Emergency  Control  Room  should  be  available  in  case  the  Main  Control 
Room becomes inhabitable as a consequence of the radiological releases of a severe 
accident, of fire in the Main Control Room or due to extreme external hazards. 

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