COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing specific conditions to fishing for deep-sea stocks in the North-East Atlantic and provisions for fishing in international waters of the North-East Atlantic and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2347/2002
Date: 2012-07-19
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Atlantic Ocean, biodiversity, catch by species, discarded fish, environmental impact, exploitation of resources, fishery management, fishery resources, fishing area, international waters, protection of animal life, protection of plant life

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 19.7.2012  
SWD(2012) 202 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

Proposal for a 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

establishing specific conditions to fishing for deep-sea stocks in the North-East Atlantic 
and provisions for fishing in international waters of the North-East Atlantic and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 2347/2002 

{COM(2012) 371 final} 
{SWD(2012) 203 final} 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table of Content 

1.  

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

2.4. 

2.5. 

2.6. 

2.7. 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties .............................................. 4 

Organisation and timing ............................................................................................... 4 

Consultation and expertise ........................................................................................... 4 

Changes to the working document following the IA Board’s opinion......................... 5 

Problem definition ........................................................................................................ 5 

Context: the specific management framework ............................................................. 5 

Context: related areas of the fisheries policy ............................................................... 6 

Problems ....................................................................................................................... 6 

Main problems: unsustainable fishing, risk to VMEs, undesired catch, poor 
scientific advice ............................................................................................................ 6 

The affected sector: metiers, catches, economic importance ....................................... 6 

Problem evolution and underlying driving forces ........................................................ 6 

Grounds for EU action and scope................................................................................. 6 

2.7.1.  Necessity and subsidiarity ............................................................................................ 6 

2.7.2.  Scope ............................................................................................................................ 6 

3. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

4.4. 

4.5. 

4.6. 

Objectives ..................................................................................................................... 6 

General objective.......................................................................................................... 6 

Specific objectives........................................................................................................ 6 

Policy options ............................................................................................................... 6 

Separate regulation ....................................................................................................... 6 

Option 1 – no change/indispensable update ................................................................. 6 

Option 2– ban deep-sea fisheries.................................................................................. 6 

Option 3– ban gears that are most harmful to the deep-sea ecosystem........................ 6 

Option 4 – access conditional on international management standards for the High 
Sea ................................................................................................................................ 6 

Option 5 – instrument for the implementation of NEAFC decisions, extending 
those decisions to EU waters where possible ............................................................... 6 

5. 

Analysis of impacts ...................................................................................................... 6 

5.1. 

Overall assessment of impacts...................................................................................... 6 

5.1.1.  Economic impact and impact on fisheries management .............................................. 6 

 
 
 
5.1.2.  Social impact ................................................................................................................ 6 

5.1.3. 

Impact on the environment........................................................................................... 6 

5.1.4.  Burden and costs for public administration.................................................................. 6 

5.1.5.  Transposition and compliance aspects ......................................................................... 6 

5.1.6.  Third country impacts................................................................................................... 6 

5.2. 

Summary of impacts..................................................................................................... 6 

6. 

Comparing the options ................................................................................................. 6 

6.1. 

Qualitative assessment by option ................................................................................. 6 

6.1.1.  Comparison with regard to effectiveness ..................................................................... 6 

6.1.2.  Comparison with regard to efficiency and coherence .................................................. 6 

6.2. 

Ranking of options ....................................................................................................... 6 

7. 

Monitoring and evaluation .......................................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX - Glossary............................................................................................................... 6 

ANNEXES.................................................................................................................................. 6 

 
 
 
1.  

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

Lead DG: DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE) 

Other services involved (underlined: primary involvement): SG, BUDG, ENV, 
EMPL, ENTR, ECFIN, REGIO 

Agenda Planning reference: 2008/MARE/025 

1.1. 

Organisation and timing 

This  impact  assessment  concerns  policy  options  for  managing  deep-sea  fisheries  in  the 
North-East  Atlantic,  developed  during  revising  the  2002  Council  Regulation  establishing 
specific  access  requirements  for  deep-sea  fisheries  (Regulation  2347/20021,  in  the 
following called the "access regime"). The spatial scope is visualised in 

Annex I. 

The  Commission  is  obliged  to  report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the 
access regime and to propose necessary amendments (Article 10 of the access regime). This 
revision  is  foreseen  in  DG  MARE's  Agenda  Planning  (2008/25)  and  in  the  2010  Annual 
Management Plan of the Directorate-General of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, as one of 
the main policy outputs under the activity "Conservation, management and exploitation of 
living aquatic Resources", with the specific objective: "To develop a consistent policy for 
the conservation and management of fish resources and the protection of biodiversity." 

The  Commission's  internal  review  process  started  with  a  2007  Communication  on  the 
management  of  deep-sea  fish  stocks2.  The  European  Parliament  provided  its  opinion  in 
2008.3  

DG  MARE  consulted  Member  States  from  spring  2009  to  spring  2010.  It  then  organised 
meetings  with  the  inter-service  steering  group  in  May  and  October  2010.  DGs  ENV  and 
REGIO participated in the meetings.  

1.2. 

Consultation and expertise 

The  main  part  of  the  assessment  work  started  in  2009  with  a  technical  questionnaire  that 
DG  MARE  sent  to  the  Member  States  which  report  under  the  access  regime,  receiving 
contributions up to October 2009.  

From  December  2009  DG  MARE  consulted  Member  States  concerned  and  the  four 
Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) on the future of the access regime4. The consultation 
was  targeted  to  these  recipients  in  view  of,  on  the  one  hand,  the  wide  coverage  of 
stakeholders  and  interest  groups  in  the  RACs  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  technical  and 
routine character of the review process. By the time of closing the consultation on April 9, 

1  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2347/2002  of  December  2002  establishing  specific  access  requirements  and 
associated conditions applicable to fishing for deep-sea stocks, OJ L 351 dated 28.12.2002. 
2 COM(2007)30 final. 
3 P6_TA(2008)0196. 
4 On the function of RACs, see Council decision of 19 July 2004 establishing Regional Advisory Councils 
under  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy;  OJ  L  256  of  3.8.2004.  Concerned  are  the  RACs  concerning  North-
Western waters, South-Western waters, North Sea and long distance fleet. Not concerned are the RACs for 
the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2010, the Commission had received detailed feedback. In the wake of this, the service held 
individual meetings with stakeholders who had asked for this.  

The feedback showed general agreement on a modernisation of the access regime, and in 
particular on a move towards fishery-specific management. There was wide agreement that 
the  reshuffle  should  be  designed  open  enough  so  that  it  can  take  account  of  evolving 
scientific advice, e.g. coming from the ongoing major EU-funded project “Deepfishman”. 
This project should deliver by 2012 i.a. innovative harvest control rules for deep-sea stocks 
in prevailing data-poor conditions. So far, these rules are not available from the project, and 
the future access regime should therefore be open to testing them once available. 

A  number  of  NGOs  signed  an  additional  contribution  in  which  they  advocated  the 
transposition  towards  deep-sea  fisheries  in  EU  waters  of  deep-sea  management  standards 
adopted for the High Sea; in this contribution, they also highlighted the discard-problem of 
these fisheries. The contributions, which have been entirely taken into account during the 
impact assessment, are summarised in  

Annex II.  

Also in 2009, the Commission asked its Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for 
Fisheries (STECF) to provide scientific advice on certain aspects of the access regime. The 
report, and also the stock assessment of deep-sea species, passed the Plenary of STECF in 
July  2010.5  STECF  updated  the  list  of  deep-sea  species  which  is  attached  to  the  access 
regime and advised that some deep-sea species live in different depth ranges depending on 
the geographical location, and that some are separated in depth from shallower fisheries on 
the continental slope, while others are overlapping with them. Discussing the exploitation 
of  deep-sea  species  in  general,  STECF  advised  that  the  fisheries  could  be  developed 
towards  sustainable  fisheries,  but  only  at  very  low  levels  of  exploitation  which  would  be 
closely  monitored.  It  also  highlighted  the  considerable  problem  of  discards  in  the  trawl 
fishery. This assessment can be found in  

Annex III. 

In January 2010 the Commission launched a data call to Member States dedicated to catch 
and  fishing  effort  data  of  the  deep-sea  metiers  in  the  North-East  Atlantic.  The  data  was 
processed by the Joint Research Centre in its capacity as secretariat and scientific support to 
the  STECF,  and  linked  to  economic  data  that  concerns  the  fleet  segments  in  which  those 
metiers operate. The resulting information allows describing the sector most affected by the 
access  regime  and  assessing  the  economic  importance  of  deep-sea  fisheries  for  the  fleets 
therein engaged. Spain and the UK did not provide data, so that information on their fleets 
could not be taken into account. The deep-sea fisheries of Spain are important in relative 
terms.  

Finally, in November 2011 the Commission reported on the review of Regulation (EC) No 
734/2008.6  This  regulation  transposed  the  2006  UN  standards  on  protecting  vulnerable 
marine ecosystems on the bottom of the High Sea. The report states that so far no Member 

5 Website:  https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. Go  to Final  Reports/  Evaluation  of  Effort  Regimes  and  then chose 
"09-09_SG-MOS 09-05 - Deep Sea & Western waters". 
6 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No734/2008  on  the  protection  of  vulnerable  marine  ecosystems  in  the  high  seas  from  the 
adverse impacts of bottom fishing gears. COM(2010)651.  

 
 
                                                 
State  submitted  an  environmental  impact  assessment,  that  some  standards  needed  to  be 
technically more precise, and that the UN standards were enlarged in 2009, which is not yet 
reflected  in  the  Regulation.  While  this  review  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  impact 
assessment, there are repercussions because one of the policy options suggests transcribing 
the UN standards into EU waters. 

1.3. 

Changes to the working document following the IA Board’s opinion 

This  version  of  the  impact  assessment  report  takes  into  account  the  opinion  given  by  the 
Commission’s Impact Assessment Board on 25 February 2011. Main changes are: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

The scope of the assessment has been more precisely defined; 

The description of the current regulatory framework has been reorganised in order 
to better show the interrelation among the various governance levels and topics; 

The problem definition has been restructured in order to distinguish between basic 
problems  of  the  deep-sea  fisheries  and  problems  related  to  the  design  and 
implementation of the current access regime; 

The options have been enlarged by envisaging a more ambitious measure, namely 
the complete ban of deep-sea fishing; in addition, the options were revised to clarify 
the  intervention  logic  and  more  critically  assessed  concerning  their  utility  in 
achieving the objectives; 

The baseline case is now further detailed in view of the evolving concept of the new 
CFP (adoption of the reform proposals due in summer 2011).  

Following the second opinion of the Impact Assessment Board dated 6 May 2011,  

– 

– 

– 

– 

the policy options presented in this report are explained in more detail, 

the  analysis  of  the  coherence  of  policy  options  with  the  envisaged  CFP  reform  is 
outlined  more  in  detail,  in  particular  concerning  individually  transferable  quotas, 
simplification  and  regionalisation;  in  addition,  the  link  to  the  reform  of  the  Data 
Collection Framework was explained, 

the  link  between  objectives  and  expected  outcomes  is  improved  by  refining  the 
qualitative assessment of options, 

The view of different stakeholder groups is incorporated into the main text, and the 
executive summary contains an overview on expected impacts of policy options. 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1. 

Context: the specific management framework 

The  current  management  framework  for  deep-sea  fisheries  has  developed  as  stand-alone 
EU  measures,  measures  agreed  in  the  competent  regional  fisheries  management 
organisation (NEAFC7) to which the EU is a Contracting Party8, and multinational political 
agreements (UN) on measures for the unregulated High Sea. The link of EU measures to 
international measures is two-fold: the specific problems of deep-sea fisheries are the same 

7 North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission. 
8 The others are Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Iceland, Norway and the Russian 
Federation. 

 
 
                                                 
wherever  these  fisheries  occur;  and  some  deep-sea  species  are  widely  distributed,  thus 
being exploited in EU waters by EU vessels and in international waters by EU and foreign 
vessels. 

While the EU was innovative when starting its measures in 2002, the policy development 
since 2006 is more and more driven by the multinational scene: 

EU measures 

UN resolutions and FAO 
standards 

NEAFC measures 

timeline 

Since 2002 

UN since 2006; FAO 
standards 2008 

Since 2004, increased 
activity since 2009 

scope 

EU vessels in all or parts 
of the waters of the 
North-East Atlantic; 
foreign vessels in EU 
waters 

Management for deep-sea 
fisheries in the High Sea 

Influence on 
the other 
measures 

Improved negotiation 
case for general 
precautionary measures 
in the regional and 
multinational forum 

NEAFC has started 
developing the management 
of its deep-sea fisheries 
according to UN/FAO 
standards 

Vessels of contracting 
parties in the international 
waters of the North-East 
Atlantic 

Need to be transposed into 
EU law for EU vessels 
fishing in NEAFC area 

In  terms  of  EU  measures,  there  is  mainly  the  access  regime  which  since  its  inception  is 
accompanied  by  total  allowable  catches  (TACs)  for  catching  target  deep-sea  species,  and 
additional  technical  measures  against  the  environmental  damage  of  bottom  gears 
(protecting bottom habitats and sharks), namely: 

•  Council Regulation (EC) No 1568/2005 bans the use of trawls and gillnets in waters 

deeper than 200 m around the Azores, Madeira and Canary Island. 

•  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  41/2007  banned  the  use  of  gillnets  by  Community 
vessels  at  depths  greater  than  600  m  in  ICES  Divisions  VIa,b,  VII  b,c,j,k  and 
Subarea  XII.  This  ban  was  later  extended  to  all  western  waters,  and  continues  by 
virtue of Regulation (EC) No 1288/2009 until mid 2011. 

•  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2270/2004  established  protection  areas  where  the 
fishing for orange roughy is restricted. Since 2010, fishing for orange roughy is no 
longer allowed. In addition, protection zones for blue ling where established in the 
West of Scotland. 

•  The first measure to protect corals and other spots of high biodiversity (vulnerable 
marine ecosystems, VMEs) was the prohibition of fishing activity that can get into 
contact with the bottom in the Darwin Mounds to the North of Scotland (Regulation 
(EC) No 602/2004), accompanying the designation of a Special Area of Protection 
under  the  Marine  Habitats  Directive  (Council  Directive  92/43/EEC).  Additional 
area closures followed in the West of Scotland and later to the North of Spain (El 
Cachochu). 

 
 
 
  
The  access  regime  itself  concerns  deep-sea  fisheries  in  the  North-East  Atlantic  including 
EU  waters  of  the  outermost  regions  of  Azores,  Madeira  and  Canary  Islands9;  it  basically 
consists of:  

– 

– 

– 

– 

A  centralised  reporting  on  the  activities  of  fishing  vessels  specifically  engaged  in 
deep-sea fisheries,  

an  obligatory  sampling  of  those  vessels  activity  for  monitoring  by  independent 
observers;  

freezing the size of the fleet that can fish directed on deep-sea species, accompanied 
with a system of special fishing permits;  

an improved surveillance of those vessels' activity by rules on the  non-functioning 
of  the  satellite  tracking  device  (VMS)  and  on  obligatory  landings  in  designated 
ports. 

The  access  regime  does  not  contain  and  does  not  provide  a  mechanism  for  adopting 
technical measures, for instance closed areas or gear restrictions, neither in EU waters nor 
in follow-up of resolutions in NEAFC. All technical measures so far adopted have been ad 
hoc  measures  decided  by  the  Council.  They  were  renewed  until  mid  of  2011  in  the 
Regulation  on  transitory  technical  measures  (Regulation  (EC)  No  1288/2009);  a  further 
renewal is currently being discussed by the co-legislators. New measures would have to be 
adopted in co-decision procedure by the European Parliament and the Council, unless the 
legislators  empower  the  Commission  to  introduce  them  by  way  of  delegated  acts  or 
implementing rules. 

In the Regulatory Area of NEAFC, which consists of the international waters of the North-
East Atlantic, the main measures adopted within NEAFC are the following: 

•  Fishing effort directed towards deep-sea species is capped until 2012 at 65% of the 

effort deployed in 2003. 

•  All gillnets are banned from waters deeper than 200 m. 
•  Ten areas where VMEs are present have been closed for bottom gears. 
• 

In 2009, five very large areas of the Mid-Atlantic were closes for bottom gears as a 
precautionary  measure.  Since  2009,  NEAFC  develops  maps  on  existing  and  new 
fishing areas in order to develop proportionate prerequisites for undertaking fishing 
trips with bottom gears. 

•  A seasonal closure for spawning aggregations of blue ling was introduced close to 

the Exclusive Economic Zone of Iceland. 

The multinational political agreements, namely UN GA Resolutions 61/10510 of 2006 and 
64/72 of 2009, are not directly applicable but set out how to manage deep-sea fisheries on 
the unregulated High-Sea. A direct consequence of these agreements was Regulation (EC) 
734/2008 which aims at protecting VMEs on the bottom of the High Sea from interference 

9  It  applies  first  to  ICS  areas.  These  areas  coincide  with  the  NEAFC  Convention  area,  i.e.  the  North-East 
Atlantic. In concerns then EU waters of CECAF areas. These areas defined in the Committee for the Eastern 
Central Atlantic Fisheries concern waters around the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands. 
10 A/RES/61/105 - Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions  of  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  of  10  December  1982  relating  to  the 
Conservation  and  Management  of  Straddling  Fish  Stocks  and  Highly  Migratory  Fish  Stocks,  and  related 
instruments. Adopted in December 2006. 

 
 
 
                                                 
by  EU  vessels.  However,  these  standards  should  were  appropriate  also  be  applied  in  the 
RFMO  or  the  national  context.  The  2006  agreements  were  technically  more  completely 
described by the FAO guidelines of 2008.11 The main elements are:  

• 

 Conduct impact assessments (to ensure that bottom fishing does not have an impact 
on VMEs) and ensure that vessels do not engage in bottom fishing until assessments 
have been carried out (UN GA 64/72 para 119 a). 

• 

Identify where VMEs occur or are likely to occur (UN GA 64/72 para 119 b). 

•  Establish protocols of VME encounters (UN GA 64/72 para 119 c). 

•  Adopt  measures  to  ensure  long-term  sustainability  of  deep-sea  stocks  including 
non-target  species,  on  the  basis  of  the  best  available  scientific  assessments  and 
information  and  including  monitoring  and  control  measures  and  ensuring  fishing 
effort, capacity and catch limits are commensurate with the stocks (UN GA 64/72 
para 119 d). 

•  Strengthen data collection (UN GA 64/72 para 119 d). 

Context: related areas of the fisheries policy 

2.2. 
The Basic Regulation in the Common Fisheries Policy12 circumscribes the legal framework 
for the conservation, management and exploitation of ‘living aquatic resources’. It obliges 
adopting conservation measures in a precautionary approach and to minimise the impact of 
fishing on the marine eco-system. These basic obligations are highly relevant for managing 
deep-sea fisheries. 
It  also  imposes  an  obligation  to  adopt  management  plans  as  far  as  necessary  to  maintain 
stocks  within  safe  biological  limits  or  to  restore  such  limits.  This  obligation  cannot  be 
directly used for developing a specific management for deep-sea stocks because biological 
reference points are not known for these stocks.  

Neither does the obligation to manage stocks in a way that allows extracting the maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY) directly affect deep-sea stocks, because the scientific knowledge is 
too scarce to apply this concept. A large scientific projects ("deepfishman") is ongoing that 
will  try  to  identify  management  approaches  for  data-poor  situations  based  on  secondary 
indicators, given that the primary indicator (fishing mortality (F) exercised on the stock) is 
not known.  

Concerning  the  level  of  detail,  the  Basic  Regulation  does  not  contain  any  provision  on 
managing specific fisheries or stocks.  

The  Habitats  Directive13  obliges  Member  States  to  create  a  network  of  sites  to  protect 
biodiversity, called the network of NATURA 2000. To the extent that a protection measure 
intervenes with fisheries, the EU regulates the fisheries part of the protection measure based 
on the CFP. Marine offshore sites of NATURA 2000 are still in development, and only a 
few  have  been  created  already.  Reefs  are  explicitly  mentioned  as  possible  objects  of 

11 FAO International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-sea Fisheries in the High Seas. 
12  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2371/2002  on  the  conservation  and  sustainable  exploitation  of  fisheries 
resources under the Common Fisheries Policy. 
13 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
NATURA  2000  protection  measures.  The  reform  of  the  Basic  Regulation  of  the  CFP 
foresees  introducing  a  specific  procedure  for  channelling  Member  State  requests  on  the 
CFP part of designations under NATURA 2000. 

The  Data  Collection  Framework  (DCF)  is  based  on  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
199/2008.14 It establishes the principles and standards for programs of data collection for 
the CFP. The deep-sea fisheries can represent a metier on which data needs to be collected 
according  to  the  DCF.  However,  the  current  disaggregation  level  of  the  metiers  in  this 
framework is too broad as to allow distinguishing all deep-sea fisheries in the recurrent data 
assemblage.  Therefore,  the  access  regime  obliges  Member  States  to  collect  specific  data 
from vessels that are engaged in deep-sea fisheries. 

The  Western  Waters  Regulation15  establishes  annual  fishing  effort  ceilings  for  demersal 
fisheries  in  large  areas  of  the  North-East  Atlantic  and  around  the  adjacent  outermost 
regions.  Until  2003,  it  also  covered  deep-sea  fisheries,  but  those  were  excluded  after  the 
adoption of the access regulation. 

2.3. 

Problems 

The four fundamental problems of deep-sea fishing, which are also apparent in the North-
East Atlantic, are: 

a)  the high vulnerability of these stocks to fishing; many of them will only sustain fishing 

pressure over a longer period that is economically not viable; 

b)  fishing  with  bottom  trawls  destroys  or  risks  destroying  irreplaceable  benthic  habitats 
(vulnerable  marine  ecosystems)  which  represent  main  sources  of  biodiversity  in  the 
deep sea. The extent of destruction that already occurred is unknown; 

c)  fishing  with  bottom  trawls  for  deep-sea  species  produces  medium  to  high  levels  of 

undesired catch of deep-sea species; 

d)  determining the sustainable level of fishing pressure via scientific advice is particularly 

difficult. 

In addition to these fundamental problems, there are problems of efficiency, coherence and 
effectiveness of the current access regime which to some extent aimed at overcoming the 
four basic problems; namely: 

e)  The scope of fleets concerned is too large and too inflexible (lack of effectiveness as the 

regime is not targeted enough) 

f)  The regime does not allow the transposition of NEAFC measures (lack of efficiency) 

14 Regulation concerning the establishment of a Community framework for the collection, management and 
use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy; OJ 
L 60, 5.3.2008, p. 1 
15 Regulation (EC) No 1954/2003. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
g)  After the adoption of the new control regulation16, the regime is partly redundant and 

the link to the control standards is unclear (lack of coherence); 

h)  The  separate  data  collection  is  of  very  limited  use  to  scientific  advisory  bodies, 
although  constituting  an  administrative  burden17  (lack  of  effectiveness  and  lack  of 
coherence with the Data Collection Framework). 

Among these technical shortcomings, the Commission's review of 2007 already identified 
the following: scope of the fleet concerned is too large (e); lack of guidance on control in 
designated ports (g) and on sampling programs (h); lack of reporting follow-up by Member 
States  (h).  In  2010,  STECF  confirmed18  that  the  data  collection  on  fishing  effort  and 
catches was inappropriate for scientific analysis, both concerning method and quality (h). 

Following this review report, the Commission did not take immediate steps for improving 
the access regime. Concerning the control aspect, DG MARE maintained deep-sea fisheries 
on its inspection programmes in Member States, in order to emphasize the importance of 
effective  control  of  these  fisheries  and  to  help  Member  States  in  improving  their  control 
system. The control problems have not been markedly serious and certainly not as serious 
as in some fisheries of commercially high importance (cod, mackerel, bluefin tuna, hake).  

2.4.  Main  problems:  unsustainable  fishing,  risk  to  VMEs,  undesired  catch,  poor 

scientific advice 

Deep-sea  stocks  are  fish  stocks  caught  in  waters  beyond  the  main  fishing  grounds  of 
continental  shelves.  They  are  distributed  on  the  continental  slopes  or  associated  with 
seamounts. These species are slow-growing and long-lived, which makes them particularly 
vulnerable  to  fishing  activity.  Some  species  like  blue  ling  and  black  scabbardfish  grow 
faster  and  live  shorter  than  others  (e.g.  orange  roughy,  deep-sea  sharks  and  roundnose 
grenadier), and are thus relatively less vulnerable. The vulnerability to fishing also depends 
on whether the species can be targeted in local aggregations, which is the case for orange 
roughy, blue ling and alfonsinos.  

The biological state of deep-sea stocks is unknown. Based on the information available, 
some  of  the  stocks  are  considered  depleted  (orange  roughy,  two  species  of  sharks,  red 
seabream  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay).  Other  stocks  are  considered  overfished  in  view  of  rapid 
declines  in  catches  per  deployed  fishing  effort,  such  as  roundnose  grenadier.  For  the 
remainder,  the  fisheries  are  considered  unsustainable.  Some  of  them  have  stabilised  in 
recent  years  at  low  harvest  levels,  which  can  be  attributed  to  reduced  fishing  activity 
following the reduction in fishing opportunities. 

Scientists in general recommend reducing the catch levels until signs of population increase 
come from the stocks. In case were exploitation levels over a series of years do not seem to 
have had a detrimental effect on the stocks, scientists advise that the fishery could be kept 

16 Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009. 
17  The  associated  costs  are  not  significant  in  absolute  terms  (EUR  5k  to  10k  per  MS  estimated  using  the 
standard cost model), but still relevant in view of the limited economic value of the fisheries. 
18 2009 report on the evaluation of effort regimes, SG-MOS 09-05 - Deep Sea & Western waters, p. 19; cited 
before. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
stable. In other cases, scientists advise that the fishery should not expand or catches should 
be brought back to levels before the expansion of fishing activity.19 

For the few stocks for which scientists have advised a concrete precautionary catch level, 
the corresponding TACs have been reduced in order to approach these levels. The situation 
in 2012 will be as follows20: 

Species/area 

Deep-sea sharks 

Advised max. catch level (tonnes)  TAC 2012 (tonnes) 

Reduce to lowest level 

Black scabbard fish North-Western waters 

2.000 

Black scabbard fish Iberian waters and Azores 

2.800 

Roundnose grenadier North-Western waters 

Less than 6.000 

Orange roughy 

Reduce to lowest level 

Red seabream Southern Spain  

Red seabream Azores 

500 

1.050 

0 

2.179 

3.348 

6.525 

0 

780 

1.136 

Fishing by bottom trawls probably represents the greatest threat to VMEs based on coral 
and  sponge  grounds.21  Any  long-lived  sessile  organisms  that  stand  proud  of  the  seabed 
will be highly vulnerable to destruction by towed demersal fishing gear. The vast majority 
of bottom trawling is currently shallower than 1500 m, while corals are known to occur as 
deep  as  3800  m.  However,  the  diversity  and  abundance  of  corals  and  sponges  peaks 
between depths of 800–1500 m meaning that in fact the majority of those VMEs may be at 
risk of impact. The most obvious impact of trawling on reef corals is mechanical damage 
caused by the gear itself. The impact of trawled gear will kill the coral polyps and break up 
the  reef  structure.  The  breakdown  of  this  structure  will  alter  the  hydrodynamic  and 
sedimentary  processes  as  well  as  cause  a  loss  of  shelter  around  the  reef.  Organisms 
dependent on these features will have a much less suitable habitat and reef recovery  may 
not be possible or could be seriously impaired. The scale of effects will depend on the scale 
and frequency of any trawling operations. Damage will range from a decrease in the size of 
the  reef,  and  a  consequent  decrease  in  abundance  and  diversity  of  associated  fauna,  to  a 
complete  disintegration  of  the  reef  and  its  replacement  with  a  low-diversity  disturbed 
community. 

It is likely that the majority of trawling impact to VMEs happened between 1970 and 1990. 
After  2000,  fishing  effort  has  largely  declined  in  offshore  and  deep-water  areas. 
Furthermore,  efforts  to  protect  cold-water  coral  habitats  in  the  past  decade  (Hatton  bank, 
Rockall,  Porcupine  slope  and  Darwin  mounds)  have  likely  further  reduced  the  relative 

19  See  STECF,  Review  of  scientific  advice  for  2011,  Consolidated  Advice  on  Stocks  of  Interest  to  the 
European Community, 2010, page 236 et seqq. 
20 See Council Regulation No 1225(2010), and STECF Consolidated advice cited before. The TAC areas are 
not always identical to the areas of scientific advice. 
21 The following is summarised from ICES, Report of the ICES/NAFO Joint Working Group on Deep-water 
Ecology  (WGDEC),  Copenhagen  2010.  ICES  CM  2010/ACOM:26,  ICES,  WGDEEP  report  2010,  CM 
2010/ACOM:17, p. 71 seq., and from STECF, Report of the subgroup Fisheries and Environment, Deep-sea 
Fisheries, SEC(2002)133.  

 
 
                                                 
proportion of coral habitats being affected by human activity. Sponge grounds in the North-
East Atlantic have received no specific protection measures and it is likely that there is still 
a heavy impact of fishing on sponges in certain areas. There is also less incentive for fishers 
to  avoid  areas  where  non-reefal  corals  occur  because  there  are  no  gear  damaging 
consequences. While there are many observations of corals and sponges being trawled by 
commercial  fishing  operations,  there  are  very  few  records  with  precise  information  on 
quantity. While research vessel surveys do usually record accurately the quantities of VME 
by-catch, there are very few occasions when more than a few kg have been caught in the 
last decade. Bottom trawls are only likely to retain a small fraction of corals and sponges 
due to their fragile nature. 

The estimated rates of undesired catch in observed trawl fisheries are on average between 
20  and  30%  in  weight22,  but  can  go  beyond  50%  (main  species:  afterwards  discarded  is 
baird's  smoothhead).23  Rates  of  undesired  catch  (primarily  of  the  deep-sea  species 
rabbitfish) in gillnet fisheries targeting anglerfish went easily beyond 50% of the catch; in 
hake  gillnet  fisheries,  discard  rates  used  to  be  highly  volatile,  between  2  and  80%,  on 
average 30%.24 In view of this, and in view of the destructive impact of lost and abandoned 
nets  continuing  ghost  fishing  in  the  deep  sea25  the  Community  has  banned  gillnets  from 
depths  below  600m  since  2006  and  restricted  it  below  200m  (transitional  measure). 
Consequently, today there are no gillnet fisheries targeting deep-sea species. They are a by-
catch  in  anglerfish  and  hake  fisheries  above  600m.  Rates  of  undesired  catch  in  longline 
fisheries are much lower. 

Discarded  fish  does  not  survive.  These  fisheries  with  high  discards  tend  to  deplete  the 
whole fish community biomass. Depletion of dominant species can induce major changes 
to fish communities through removing key predatory or forage fish. 26 

As  a  general  obstacle  to  proper  management,  the  poor  information  on  deep-sea  stocks 
does  not  allow  scientists  to  assess  the  stocks’  status,  neither  in  terms  of  absolute 
population  size  nor  fishing  mortality.  There  are  several  reasons  for  this:  Data  series  from 
commercial  catches  are  short,  they  often  lack  discard  information  and  information 
particularly  valuable  for  assessment  like  fishing  depth.  The  longevity  and  low  growth 
makes it impossible to structure the stock into age classes and to assess the effect of fishing 
on the stock by changes in the length or age structure of catches. Scientific surveys do not 
cover their whole distribution and are very expensive. 

2.5. 

The affected sector: metiers, catches, economic importance 

Mostly  affected  is  the  primary  production  sector  engaged  in  wild  fisheries.  Deep-sea 
fisheries as defined by the access regime are currently practiced by fleets from (in the order 
of effort deployed in 2008 according to MS notifications): France, Spain, Portugal, United 
Kingdom,  Netherlands,  Ireland,  Germany,  Lithuania  and  Denmark.  Of  these  Member 

22 ICES advice 2010 Book 9, chapter 9.4.15.2 Advice on roundnose grenadier. 
23 ICES, Report of the Working Group on the Biology and Assessment of Deep-sea Fisheries Resources 
(WGDEEP), 2010, CM 2010/ACOM:17. 
24 STECF, Deep-sea gillnet fisheries, November 2006. 
25 See Hareide (et al), A preliminary Investigation on Shelf Edge and Deep water Fixed Net Fisheries to the 
West and North of Great Britain, Ireland, around Rockall and Hatton Bank, 2005; Brown (et al), Ghost fishing 
by lost fishing gear, 2005 (study contract DG FISH/2004/20). 
26 See for example ICES, WGDEEP report 2010, CM 2010/ACOM:17, p. 71. 

 
 
                                                 
States,  France  accounts  for  79%  of  the  fishing  effort,  and  the  three  most  active  countries 
(France, Spain and Portugal) together for 93%. 

Deep-sea  species  are  harvested  by  very  different  types  of  fleet:  on  the  one  hand,  capital-
intensive large trawlers that are also present in other fisheries and that have a wide range of 
operation  (France,  Spain,  Netherlands,  Germany,  Denmark).  On  the  other  hand,  coastal 
fleets  of  smaller  vessels  that  use  handlines  and  longlines  in  deep-waters  of  coastal  areas 
that have a very short shelf area (Portugal). While these vessels might be less dynamic in 
their  exploitation  pattern,  they  are  more  difficult  to  be  brought  under  management  and 
control  measures  (lack  of  space  for  observers  on  board,  lack  of  VMS-monitoring  or 
electronic  logbook,  multitude  of  landing  places  etc).  A  short  description  of  the  main 
fisheries is given in  

Annex IV: overview on deep-sea fisheries in the North-East Atlantic 

The overall importance of deep-sea catches is small: The 34.434 tonnes of deep-sea species 
landed  from  the  North-East  Atlantic  in  2008  represent  only  about  1%  of  the  overall 
landings  (3.563.711  tonnes)  from  the  North-East  Atlantic.27  In  the  regional  context,  the 
picture might be very different. For instance, in the Azores deep-sea species are responsible 
for  24%  of  the  landings  and  51%  of  the  value  (first  sale),  and  in  Madeira  for  about  one 
third. The landings of deep-sea species have in general decreased. Looking at the species 
subject  to  quota-management,  this  decrease  is  only  visible  in  the  figures  since  2005 
(decrease  of  35%  from  2005  to  2009),  as  some  important  stocks  were  not  under  quota 
before. 

Annex V: list of deep-sea species and landings per Member State 
Annex VI: Evolution of the landings of quota-species 

The value of landings of deep-sea species by EU fleets is estimated for 2008 at 78,9 million 
EUR.28 The main species marketed in France attained an average price on first sale of 2,40 
EUR, which is below the price of most sought-after whitefish (cod: 2,85 EUR, hake: 3,04 
EUR).29 The highly-priced orange roughy can currently not be landed by EU vessels as the 
fishing opportunities are fixed at zero. 

Annex VII: List of species by landings in weight and value 

With regard to the relevant fleets, there are 145 fleet segments that report catches of deep-
sea species. However, only 24 metiers target deep-sea species (2008).30  

Annex VIII: Relation between deep-sea metier and fleet segment; 
Annex IX: Landings made by deep-sea metiers 

27 Data on deep-sea catches from Joint Research Centre, Data Call on the Collection of Transversal Variables 
for  Analysis  of  the  Access-Regime  to  Deep-Sea  Fisheries,  report  April  2010.  Catches  made  by  Spain  are 
taken from 2007 (10.302t). Data on EU27 landings from the North-East Atlantic are taken from EUROSTAT. 
28 Source: JRC report on data call, as before. 
29 Source: Le Grenelle de la Mer, Avenir des Pêches Profondes, groupe n° 1, rapport final septembre 2010 
(pas encore publié). 
30 To be noted that this data is incomplete as Spain and United Kingdom did not provide data at the metier-
level.  Also,  this  being  the  first  statistical  exercise  of  its  kind,  the  results  obtained  have  to  be  treated  with 
caution 

 
 
                                                 
For  the  14  fleet  segments  which  have  been  identified  as  housing  deep-sea  metiers,  the 
landings  and  revenues  attributable  to  deep-sea  species  can  be  compared  to  the  overall 
landings and revenues. The deep-sea related landings per fleet segment are responsible for 
between  1 and  60 % of the overall landings, and for between 0,3 and 66% of the overall 
revenues. This shows that some segments heavily depend on the sale of deep-sea fish. This 
is particularly true for the fleet segments identified in Portugal. It is to be noted that at the 
level  of  business,  the  dependence  could  be  high  also  within  other  segments,  as  the  fleet 
segments  are  based  on  vessel  characteristics,  not  undertakings.  The  14  fleet  segments 
identified are hardly profitable, and their profitability is slightly lower than the average of 
all fleet segments.31 

Annex X: Deep-sea related fleet segments with their economic performance 

It  is  not  possible  to  identify  the  number  of  employment  posts  in  the  primary  sector,  the 
auction  places,  transport,  processing  and  markets  that  depend  on  landings  of  deep-sea 
species. However, the Member State most active in the fishery, France, estimates that the 
two  companies  most  involved  in  deep-sea  fishing  and  landing  the  large  majority  of  the 
species count 300 fishermen; parts of the respective vessels are engaged in other fisheries. 
Also,  there  are  200  fish  mongers  specialised  in  deep-sea  fish.32  The  biggest  processing 
business  employs  more  than  300  persons,  and  one  of  their  processing  plants  in  Lorient 
sources  to  a  considerable  extent  from  deep-sea  fishing  activity.33  The  four  ports  most 
related to deep-sea landings are Boulogne sur Mer, Lorient, Concarneau and Le Guilvinec. 
The ports of Lorient and Boulogne account 26% and 6%, respectively, of deep-sea species 
in their overall landings.34  

2.6. 

Problem evolution and underlying driving forces 

Before  2002,  deep-sea  fisheries  had  developed  without  accompanying  management 
measures of the Community. While some fisheries, in particular Portuguese ones, are long 
established and relatively stable, the trawl fisheries in the North-Western waters developed 
rapidly  from  the  end  of  the  eighties,  partly  in  response  to  a  starting  decline  in  demersal 
fisheries  on  the  continental  shelf.  As  this  decline  is  not  yet  reversed,  alternative 
opportunities are not readily available. In addition, some of the large trawlers also depend 
on  access  to  deep-sea  resources  of  Faroese  Islands,  and  the  corresponding  annual 
agreements with the EU have become more and more difficult to reach. 

Like  is  the  case  for  all  wild  fish  stocks,  leaving  deep-sea  fisheries  unrestricted  leads  to  a 
race by fishing undertakings to take possession of a free resource, without having sufficient 
regard to the sustainability of the exploitation level or knock-on effects on the environment. 
For  example,  the  valuable  orange  roughy  species  in  north-western  waters  is  considered 
depleted after only some years of exploitation, as well as the valuable red seabream in the 
Bay of Biscay. In the case of deep-sea species, restricting the fishing activity is of particular 

31 Source: JRC report on data call, as before. Annual return on investment per related fleet segment between  
-0,05 and 0,39%, on average -0,03%. Average of all fleet segments:  0,27%, ranging from -0,63 to 6,57% 
32 Source: Le Grenelle de la Mer, Avenir des Pêches Profondes, groupe n° 1, rapport final septembre 2010 
(pas encore publié). 
33 
Départementale des Territoires et de la Mer, Lorient 2008. 
34 Source: Le Grenelle de la Mer, Avenir des Pêches Profondes, groupe n° 1, rapport final septembre 2010 
(pas encore publié). 

.Source:  Monographie  des  pêches  maritimes  et  des  cultures  marines  du  Morbihan,  Direction 

 
 
                                                 
importance due to the fact that the recovery from depletion of slow-growing stocks might 
take a very long time or might fail. 

After  2002,  the  fishing  pressure  on  deep-sea  species  has  fallen  considerably,  as  have  the 
number of vessels engaged in these fisheries, in particular among trawlers. This is due to 
stock depletion, reduced fishing opportunities and technical restrictions for bottom gears, in 
particular trawls and gillnets. 

Trawling in deep waters wide off-shore is energy- and thus cost-intensive. Some trawlers 
were able to reduce their current costs by landing into foreign harbours that are closer to the 
fishing  grounds,  but  the  economic  viability  of  the  activity  has  often  been  questioned, 
particularly in view of subsidies. There is an economic incentive to switch to passive gear 
(in  particular  longlines),  as  this  gear  is  less  fuel-intensive.  Reluctance  for  gear-change 
normally is due to the expected change in catch composition, technical problems, need for 
investment, and lack of expertise and experience. 

The obligation of the Member States to show a good environmental status of marine waters 
by  202035  fosters  a  critical  assessment  of  deep-sea  fisheries  including  environmental  and 
biodiversity aspects. This political driver will be further strengthened by the Commission’s 
Post-2010 Biodiversity Strategy.  

Wide-spread concerns in the public about biodiversity and unsustainable fishing practices 
create  demand  for  products  that  stem  from  a  production  process  not  harmful  to  the 
environment and preserve the resource base. 

2.7. 

Grounds for EU action and scope 

2.7.1.  Necessity and subsidiarity 

The  proposal  concerns  a  field  of  exclusive  Union  competence  (Articles  3(1d),  38  to  44 
TFEU), therefore subsidiarity does not apply. 

Member  States  are  able  to  develop  measures  for  their  own  fleets  that  lead  to  a  more 
sustainable  management  of  deep-sea  resources.  However,  most  deep-sea  fisheries  are 
shared between Member States (and sometimes the fleet of one Member State are mostly 
present in the waters of another Member State), and this makes Member States reluctant to 
submit  their  own  fleets  to  constraining  measures  unless  the  same  or  equivalent  rules  will 
apply to neighbouring fleets. In addition, the scientific knowledge on deep-sea stocks can 
only improve when common standards for data sourcing are followed, otherwise scientists 
would not be able to compare data stemming from various Member States.  

2.7.2. 

Scope 

This  report  develops  policy  options  for  managing  deep-sea  fisheries  in  the  North-East 
Atlantic  which  respond  to  the  problems  listed  in  this  section.  Concerning  the  insufficient 
scientific  knowledge-base  (main  problem  (d)),  this  problem  concerns  data  sourced  from 
activity of commercial vessels, and data sourced from scientific surveys and other scientific 
probes. Only the former aspect (data sourcing from commercial vessels) is addressed here. 
On  the  latter  aspect,  the  Commission  has  asked  the  International  Council  for  the 
Exploration  of  the  Sea  (ICES)  for  advice  on  improving  scientific  deep-sea  surveys.  The 

35 See Marine Strategy Framework Directive, Directive 2008/56/EC, OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19. 

 
 
                                                 
advice  was  issued  in  April  2011  and  will  feed  into  the  review  of  the  Data  Collection 
Regulation scheduled for 2012. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES 

3.1. 

General objective 

to 

the  concept  of  Maximum  Sustainable  Yield, 

General  objective  of  the  proposal  is  to  ensure  sustainable  exploitation  of  deep-sea  stocks 
the 
according 
environmental impact as much as possible. As long as data and method have not achieved 
the requisite quality level  allowing a management towards MSY, the fisheries have to be 
managed according to the precautionary approach. 

limiting 

thereby 

These  objectives  are  in  line  with  the  EU  2020  Strategy  announced  by  the  Barroso 
Commission  in  2010,  because  they  would  pave  the  way  towards  sustainable  fishing  of 
deep-sea  species  and  contribute  to  employment  stability  in  coastal  areas.  With  regard  to 
growth, the current level of fishing activity is considered unsustainably high, and therefore 
growth could not come from quantity, but only from quality of fish. 

3.2. 

Specific objectives 

Specific objectives are (linked to the specific problems listed in the problem definition): 

Main objectives: 

a)  To comply with scientific advice on precautionary catch levels; to facilitate the future 

development of MSY-management for these data-poor stocks; 

b)  To  reduce  the  impact  of  bottom  gears  on  the  seafloor  in  order  to  reduce  the  risk  of 

damage to VMEs; 

c)  To reduce the level of undesired deep-sea species in the catch;  

d)  To ensure the collection of all data needed for improving scientific advice. 

Technical objectives: 

e)  To  focus  the  rules  on  the  metiers  that  are  targeting  deep-sea  species  and  make  the 

metier-definition adaptable to evolving scientific advice and fleet behaviour; 

f)  To provide for the transposition of NEAFC conservation measures; 

g)  To make the access regime coherent with the control regulation; 

h)  To harmonise the special data collection with the general standards and ensure follow-

up.  

 
 
 
4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

4.1. 

Separate regulation 

i)  Maintaining  a  distinct  regulation  for  deep-sea  fisheries  is  justified  by  the  fact  that 
deep-sea fisheries have distinct biological characteristics (slow growth, longevity, late 
maturity, low natural mortality) and can be distinguished from other fisheries through 
the concept of metier, although there are overlaps with demersal fisheries on the shelf 
that take deep-sea species as a by-catch (fisheries on anglerfish, tusk, ling, hake, blue 
whiting). The Union has strongly advocated international standards on the management 
of deep-sea fisheries36, and within the international fora it is accepted that management 
of deep-sea fisheries needs tailored measures. Maintaining a distinct regulation will also 
allow  the  Union  to  pursue  the  sustainable  management  of  deep-sea  fisheries  with 
Northern countries (Norway, Russia, Iceland, Faroese) which are less committed to this 
policy. During the consultation with stakeholders, no Member State has questioned the 
usefulness of a specific regulation, and NGOs have insisted on the need to continue a 
stand-alone regulation. 

j)  The  future  basic  regulation  for  the  CFP  evolving  under  the  reform  process  is  not  a 
suitable  place  for  regulating  specifically  the  access  to  deep-sea  fisheries,  because  the 
basic regulation will not relate to specific fisheries. 

 An integration of the access regime into the Western Waters Regulation is not preferred 
for  the  following  reasons:  Due  to  the  political  nature  of  its  core  elements37,  the  Western 
Waters  Regulation  is  closely  related  to  the  reform  process,  unlike  the  access  regime;  its 
future  depends  on  the  political  decisions  to  be  taken  with  the  reform.  Furthermore,  the 
Western  Waters  Regulation  only  concerns  one  element  of  management,  namely  effort 
regulation, and is designed as a general access limitation, not as an instrument to manage 
specific fisheries; it does not deal with scientific data collection. 

4.2. 

Option 1 – no change/indispensable update 

The  first  policy  option  is  to  continue  the  access  regime  as  it  is  currently  running.  As  an 
indispensable update, the access regime would be aligned with new control regulation. No 
stakeholder has requested to continue the access regime as it is. 
This baseline case would be influenced by the CFP reform. The following new topics38 are 
relevant for the future of deep-sea fisheries: 

Highly relevant: 
Discard  ban:  The  reform  proposal  might  contain  a  discard  ban  directly  applicable  to  the 
main deep-sea species for which catch limits are established. This policy would be phased 
in  stepwise,  addressing  technically  problematic  fisheries  like  deep-sea  fisheries  at  a  later 
stage, and foresee Commission implementation measures. 
Procedure for adopting fisheries measures in the pursuit of designating areas of NATURA 
2000:  Member  States  are  currently  increasing  efforts  on  identifying  marine  sites  suitable 

36  1995  UN  Fish  stocks  agreement  and  2008  International  Guidelines  for  the  Management  of  Deep-sea 
Fisheries in the High Seas of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations; the principles and 
management  descriptions  laid  down  therein  were  confirmed  recently  by  the  UN  General  Assembly 
(Resolution 64/72 of December 2009). 
37 See the Commission's review report of November 2011, adopted as document COM(2010)661. 
38 The topics reflect current status of discussion and do not pre-empt the Commission's deliberations.  

 
 
 
                                                 
for protection under the Habitats Directive, which could consist of deep-sea coral reefs. The 
new procedure would allow introducing the fisheries management part (e.g. closed areas). 
Mandatory  system  of  individually  transferable  quotas:  This  mechanism  will  induce 
capacity reduction as the quotas will over time accumulate with the more efficient part of 
the fleet. The extent of impact will depend on the safeguard against monopolisation and for 
small-scale fleets.  
Indirectly or later relevant: 
Obligatory management according to MSY: not yet applicable to deep-sea fisheries for lack 
of stock assessment. 
Results-based fisheries management with regionally coordinated design of implementation 
measures: the results to be achieved need to be formulated in management plans and other 
instruments, and are not established by the reform-proposal itself. 

4.3. 

Option 2– ban deep-sea fisheries 

A  second  option  would  consist  of  closing  fisheries  that  are  targeting  deep-sea  species.  In 
the context of the consultation on the access regime, no stakeholder has requested to ban 
deep-see fishing; however, in the context of fixing TACs in 2010, NGOs had requested the 
phasing out of deep-sea fisheries as they have not proved to be sustainable. 

4.4. 

Option 3– ban gears that are most harmful to the deep-sea ecosystem 

A third option would ban gears that are most harmful to the deep-sea ecosystem. Those are 
trawls, for their high levels of undesired catch of deep-sea species and the risk of damaging 
bottom  habitats,  and  gillnets  for  their  negative  impact  on  the  ecosystem  when  they  were 
used  unsustainably  in  the  deep  sea  before  transitional  restrictions  came  into  force.  The 
technical  solution  would  consist  in  either  banning  those  gears  from  the  fleets  that  are 
allowed  to  target  deep-sea  species  (sup-option  1:  fishing  authorisation)  or  by  banning 
those  gears  from  operating  deeper  than  at  a  certain  depths  (sub-option  2:  spatial).  This 
option would respond to the main problems on damage to VMEs and undesired catch. In 
accordance with applicable rules of the European Fisheries Fund, financial assistance could 
be made available for the change of gear during a transitional phase, to be funded by the 
existing  envelope.  For  other  bottom  gears,  their  range  of  operation  could  be  limited  to 
existing  fishing  patterns,  and  only  allowed  to  expand  after  assessment  of  their  risk  to 
VMEs. 

The other problems would be tackled by adaptations to the existing rules: 

The problem of unsustainable fishing could be reduced by a rule that does not allow setting 
annual fishing opportunities at a higher level than precautionary levels advised by scientific 
bodies. Such a rule would not prejudice the development of MSY-conform harvest rules in 
the future, as it would only relate to management according to the precautionary principle. 
In accordance with scientific recommendation, fishing opportunities could be fixed by way 
of  regional  fishing  effort  maxima,  provided  that  measures  against  the  capture  of  most 
vulnerable deep-sea species are in place and the vessels have to land all of their catches.  

The problem of disintegrated  data collection and its dissemination shortcomings could be 
tackled  by  defining  the  data  collection  standards  for  deep-sea  fisheries  as  part  of  the 
existing Data Collection Framework and allow the Commission to close the fishery if data 
is not collected. 

 
 
 
The problem of inefficient effort reporting would be tackled by discontinuing this reporting 
tool. The analysis of effort levels for management purposes could be done by data calls on 
scientific data according to the data collection regulation, under which the link according to 
the previous paragraph ensures data collection specifically on deep-sea metiers. 

The problem of the current access regulation affecting too many vessels could be tackled by 
distinguishing fishing authorisations for by-catch from those for targeted fisheries, whereby 
the thrust of measures would only concern target fisheries. For fine-tuning, the Commission 
should be empowered to amend of the list constituting deep-sea species and the elements 
that help distinguishing a target fishery from a by-catch fishery. 

The  lack  of  efficiency  caused  by  the  absence  of  a  mechanism  to  transpose  NEAFC 
technical measures could be solved by a provision that describes the NEAFC measures in 
force  and  empowers  the  Commission  to  amend  those  measures  or  add  similar  measures 
following  adoption  in  NEAFC.  Alternatively  to  incorporating  such  a  mechanism  into  the 
reviewed  access  regime,  this  objective  could  be  fulfilled  by  providing  such  a  mechanism 
via  the  technical  measures  regulation  that  is  going  to  replace  the  transitional  measures, 
which are valid only until end of 2012. 

Finally, the redundant control provisions could be abolished, and a provision added which 
specifies  the  enhanced  control  standards  which  apply  according  to  the  control  regulation 
(equivalent to the control of the implementation of multi-annual plans). 

NGOs have since years advocated the banning of harmful gears (trawls and gillnets), or as a 
minimum  approach  individual  prior  environmental  impact  assessments.  The  stakeholders 
using trawls in the deep-sea fisheries consider such a measure disproportionate mainly for 
five reasons: that a gear change might be too expensive or targeting the same species with 
other  gear  might  fail;  that  there  is  no  proof  of  destruction  of  coral  reefs,  and  that  if  this 
could  happen,  destruction  would  have  occurred  in  the  past,  in  particular  in  the  orange 
roughly fishery; that the fishery does not longer expand; that the enterprises are willing to 
cooperate  in  discard  reduction  measures;  and  that  this  could  result  in  a  general  political 
stigma against trawling which cannot be accepted, as the fishing pattern and impact varies 
from fishery to fishery. 

4.5. 

Option 4 – access conditional on international management standards for the 
High Sea 

A  fourth  option  would  incorporate  management  standards  developed  by  UN/FAO.  The 
main new elements would be: 

– 

– 

– 

Conduct impact assessments before allowing bottom fishing; 

Identify  where  VMEs  occur  or  are  likely  to  occur;  establish  protocols  of  VME 
encounters; 

Close  areas  where  encounters  with  VMEs  above  a  certain  weight  of  indicator 
biomass has occurred..  

These  measures  would  aim  at  solving  the  main  problem  of  risks  to  VMEs.  For  the 
reduction  of  undesired  catch,  which  is  a  topic  not  addressed  by  those  standards,  option  4 
would either oblige vessels to drastically reduce discards (sub-option 1: discard reduction 
targets),  or  move  towards  a  mandatory  regime  of  regional  effort  management  where  all 

 
 
catches  have  to  be  retained  on  board  (sub-option  2:  regional  effort  limits).  The  other 
problems would be tackled as described in option 3. 

NGOs and the South-Western RAC were in favour of submitting EU deep-sea fisheries to 
international standards developed for the High Sea. Most Member States were in favour of 
simplifying the access regime, which is not compatible with this option. 

4.6. 

Option 5 – instrument for the implementation of NEAFC decisions, extending 
those decisions to EU waters where possible 

Option  5  would  consist  in  reducing  the  regulatory  content  of  the  access  regime  to  the 
minimum  required  to  fulfil  the  obligations  resulting  from  the  NEAFC  resolutions,  and 
extending  those  measures  to  EU  waters  where  possible.  This  would  in  essence  mean  to 
limit  and  monitor  overall  fishing  effort  expended  in  the  NEAFC  Regulatory  Area 
(international  waters)  and  EU  waters  (current  limit  is  65%  of  the  2003  fishing  effort),  to 
transpose  technical  measures  (e.g.  ban  on  gillnets,  area  closures,  VME  encounter 
protocols), and to undertake a documentation of the fishing "footprint" in EU waters, within 
the  aim  of  limiting  the  need  for  environmental  impact  assessment  to  areas  which  are  not 
already heavily fished. 

No stakeholder was generally in favour of this option. However, France was in favour of 
freezing  the  "footprint"  of  bottom  activity,  and  Member  States  often  requested  not  to 
advance  with  burdensome  unilateral  measures  as  long  as  a  level  playing  filed  at  the 
international stage is not ensured. 

NGOs  criticise  the  performance  of  NEAFC  protection  measures  in  the  area  of  deep-sea 
fisheries, which they consider insufficient. However, given that most recently NEAFC has 
put more emphasis on developing a deep-sea policy in accordance with UN standards, this 
opinion might evolve as well.   

5. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

The access regime is a framework regulation for which impacts are difficult to estimate in 
quantitative  terms.  However,  where  concrete  elements  for  a  quantitative  estimation  are 
available, those are presented.  

5.1. 

Overall assessment of impacts 

5.1.1.  Economic impact and impact on fisheries management 

Option 

impact 

1 – no change 

The capacity and effort limits constrain the fishery, and stability of these 
limits is foreseeable until 2012 (NEAFC horizon for reviewing the 
effort limits). In medium term perspective, the discard ban envisaged by 
the CFP reform will put economic pressure on fleets which will have to 
sort, store and land unwanted/ un-marketable fish. The introduction of 
ITQs will rationalise the capacity base of production and thus reduce 
costs. The MSY-approach will only be useable after substantial 
improvement in scientific knowledge on the stocks. A change in income 
from changing fishing opportunities cannot be predicted, because the 
maximum sustainable yield provided by these species is not known. In 
case that TACs continue to be reduced towards precautionary catch 

 
 
 
2 – banning DS 
fisheries 

3 – banning 
harmful gears 

4 – High Sea 
standards 

5 – NEAFC 
alignment 

levels, the turnover will be impacted by less available quota. 

Azores fishing sector would lose half of its income (and therefore 
employment by up to this amount), Madeira fishing sector would lose 
one third of income. French port Lorient would lose a quarter of its 
turnover. Three French fleets of 15 high-performing vessels would lose 
about 30% of their income and thus would have to rationalise or find 
alternative harvest opportunities; loss of specialised processing industry 
in France. 

Loss of turnover in France and Spain generated with species that can 
only be targeted with trawls (e.g. roundnose grenadier). Possibility to 
target other main species (black scabbard, blue ling) with longlines like 
practiced in Portugal and Northern countries. Investment in gear, vessel 
modification and know-how necessary. EFF could be used for financial 
assistance, depending on the national operational program. A by-catch 
allowance for those gears when targeting other species would cushion 
the negative economic effect and ensure that unavoidable by-catch in 
deep-sea species does not need to be discarded. No significant impact 
on gillnet fisheries because those are currently not targeting deep-sea. 

TACs would better regulate the fishing mortality, because the remaining 
gears would have much less discards. A change in income from varying 
fishing opportunities cannot be predicted, because the maximum 
sustainable yield provided by these species is not known. 

High inception costs for conducting and documenting environmental 
impact assessments. Costs are unknown as this is a new concept only 
applied in the High Sea where so far no Member State has finalised an 
impact assessment. Costs will depend on the available knowledge on the 
seabed, the type and operation range of the vessel, and additional 
research needed. Costs might strangle small businesses in outermost 
regions which do not have access to finance, have low income and  
whose bottom gear (longlines) is less harmful; therefore an exemption 
might be necessary. 

The effort limits agreed in NEAFC are partly restricting, and their 
further development after 2012 is subject to negotiation. EU-TACs will 
have to continue for controlling the catch of high-value species that are 
particularly vulnerable, but there would be no obligatory guidance on 
the TAC levels.  

5.1.2. 

Social impact 

Option 

impact 

1 – no change 

No impact. 

2 – banning DS 
fisheries 

Loss of employment in outermost regions (see 5.1.1) where alternative 
jobs are scarce. Employment figures on the fisheries sector in Madeira 
and Azores are unreliable, but several hundred could be affected. 

3 – banning 

The loss of parts of the turnover in the French and Spanish trawl fleets 
might force scaling down of workforce, depending on alternative fishing 

 
 
 
 
harmful gears 

opportunities that make good for it. 

4 – High Sea 
standards 

If discard reduction is pursued by regional fishing effort management, 
fleets that are active in a fishery will benefit from a regional "ring-
fencing" of activity, deterring the development of new fisheries on deep-
sea species exercised by other, e.g. more modern type of fleet. 

5 – NEAFC 
alignment 

No impact. 

5.1.3. 

Impact on the environment 

Option 

impact 

1 – no change 

Reduction in by-catches depends on the development of technical 
measures which so far have only rudimentary been tested in DS trawl 
fisheries. With the discard ban coming with the CFP reform, unwanted 
fish will have to be landed, which gives fishermen an incentive to use 
more selective techniques. Reduction of the risk of VME damage 
depends on the designation of marine protected areas, which is an 
ongoing process requiring a lot of expensive research. The CFP reform 
plans to foresee a special procedure for adopting fisheries closures in the 
context of creating marine sites of NATURA 2000 

2 – banning DS 
fisheries 

The environmental problems of VME-destruction, high discards and 
high vulnerability of stocks would be effectively solved in all waters of 
the NE Atlantic, excluding those caused by foreign vessels.  

3 – banning 
harmful gears 

4 – High Sea 
standards 

5 – NEAFC 
alignment 

Remaining gears would have much less discards; the main risk to VME 
damage would be eliminated. Damage risk due to bottom longlines 
remains, but is considered much less severe. 

If implemented properly, VMEs would be protected from the risk of 
damage. Reduction in by-catches depends on the development of 
technical measures which so far have not been tested in DS trawl 
fisheries. Otherwise, following the discard ban, unwanted fish will have 
to be landed, which does not have a direct effect on the environment. 

If implemented properly, VMEs would, after several years of footprint 
documentation/arbitration, be protected against damage from bottom 
gears. The added value is nevertheless questionable because Member 
State documentation of NATURA 2000 offshore areas of protection is 
already ongoing. 

Discard policy in NEAFC does so far not cover deep-sea species. 

5.1.4.  Burden and costs for public administration 

Option 

impact 

1 – no change 

No additional costs. The recurrent expenses on monitoring the fishing 
effort are not effectively spent, as the information is considered being of 
low use by scientists. Inefficient existence of two separate systems for 

 
 
 
 
 
2 – banning DS 
fisheries 

3 – banning 
harmful gears 

4 – High Sea 
standards 

effort monitoring (separate reporting under access regime (Article 9) 
and data calls under data collection regulation). 

In France and Spain, administrative control capacity that was dedicates 
to deep-sea fisheries would be freed for other fisheries of more 
economic importance. In Portuguese outermost regions, administration 
would supposedly have to be scaled down in view of the eroding 
economic activity. 

No more costs from separate effort and logbook follow-up (estimated 
being several thousand Euros per Member State). 

No more costs from separate effort reporting. Financial assistance to 
support gear change is already programmed or could be reprogrammed 
within the existing financial envelope (European Fisheries Fund). 

No more costs from separate effort reporting. The costs associated with 
impact assessments are expected to be passed onto the businesses (see 
5.1.1). The large amount of parallel management measures requested 
will increase the control needs and therefore the administrative costs (no 
estimation possible) 

5 – NEAFC 
alignment 

One-off costs of documenting and approving the footprint of bottom 
activity in EU waters, estimated at least one expert man-year per 
Member State39. 

5.1.5.  Transposition and compliance aspects 

1 – no change 

The current access regime has suffered implementation shortcomings, 
but those are not considered material. However, the reporting tool used 
for assessing compliance with global effort limits agreed in NEAFC is 
considered unreliable and has not been designed for this purpose, but for 
gathering more detailed scientific information (Article 9). 

2 – banning DS 
fisheries 

Monitoring that certain species are not caught poses recurrent control 
problems. For key species, the control could be facilitated by imposing 
zero landing/marketing obligations. 

3 – banning 
harmful gears 

The transposition and compliance depends much on the technique 
selected for implementing the ban. If the ban refers to the depth in 
which the gear is deployed, a new control mechanism (on fishing depth) 
would have to be employed which is not at hand today and is no part of 
the major control reform that still needs to be implemented in practice. 
If the ban refers to the catch composition, it would use the same 
reference as employed for defining the deep-sea fisheries today, and the 
obligatory reporting of catches in electronic logbooks as required from 
2011 could be used as a control mechanism. 

4 – High Sea 
standards 

The transposition and compliance might be hampered by the fact that a 
multitude of management measures apply in parallel, while the vessels 
engaged in these fisheries are particularly difficult to control by the 
nature of their operation (see evaluation of effectiveness below) 

5 – NEAFC 

The control regime in NEAFC area is relatively strict which helps 

39 Based on the experience within NEAFC area for which this process is ongoing since 2009. 

 
 
 
                                                 
alignment 

ensure compliance. The documentation of the bottom fishing footprint 
will be very difficult for small vessels and inactive vessels, and poses 
the problem of distinguishing between bottom gear vessels and pelagic 
ones (which is not visible from VMS data). The transposition of the 
footprint concept to EU waters would be extremely difficult for the 
control side if it reveals a patchwork of areas which in future could be 
fished or only under certain conditions. Vessels that fish in the water 
column (not on the bottom) would have to have access to all areas, 
making control even more difficult. 

5.1.6.  Third country impacts 

1 – no change 

2 – banning DS 
fisheries 

The access regime does not apply to third country vessels. The regime 
and associated TAC decisions have in the past been used to advocate 
stricter management for deep-sea species within NEAFC. However, 
NEAFC has started implementing the UN standards, so the access 
regime has less value as an argument today. 

Some stocks that are classified by ICES and NEAFC as "deep" are 
being fished by Norwegian vessels in EU waters, namely tusk and ling. 
However, those would not be classified as "deep" under the ban because 
they have life characteristics more similar to shallower species. No 
direct impact on foreign vessels in NEAFC waters, which could be 
achieved only via negotiation 

3 – banning 
harmful gears 

No direct impact. The ban could be used to advocate a similar measure 
for foreign trawlers operating in NEAFC and targeting deep-sea species 
(level playing field). Gillnets are already banned from deep-sea fishing 
in NEAFC. 

4 – High Sea 
standards 

Gradual implementation of High Sea standards already ongoing in 
NEAFC area. 

5 – NEAFC 
alignment 

By limiting its policy to implementing measures agreed in NEAFC, the 
EU would lose the negotiation power coming from unilateral measures.  

5.2. 

Summary of impacts  

Option 

Advantages 

Drawbacks 

1 – no change 

+  No need to change 

−  Does not address the problems identified with 

administrative practice, 
no adaptation costs 

the current system (cf. Commission 
communication of 2007) 

−  Member States and stakeholders are in favour of 

a more ambitious overhaul 

+  Continuation of 

established framework 
provides stability 
+  Re-establish policy 

consistency among CFP 
regulations (control). 

2 – banning 
DS fisheries 

+  Strong reaction to 

the lack of proof 
for a sustainable 
fishery. 

+  The environmental 

−  Azorean fishermen would lose halve of their income, 
Madeira fishermen one third, probably loss of several 
hundreds of employment with limited alternatives. 
Lorient in France would lose 25% of its turnover, loss 
of jobs in the French processing industry. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(VME) and 
biological problem 
(high vulnerability 
of target species) 
would be 
addressed. 
Effective 
protection of 
benthic habitats 
and the ecosystem 
at large 

−  Could be considered disproportionate because some 
deep-sea fisheries exist since long ago, and some key 
species seem to have life characteristics which allow 
sustainable exploitation. 

− 

− 

 Loss of data collection from commercial fisheries, on 
which the scientific advice relies; lack of willingness 
of MS to continue scientific surveys in fisheries which 
they do not exploit, therefore no improvement in 
advice 

 Northern states are not directly affected in 
international  water, the level playing field will depend 
on the could “take over” the negotiation pressure that  
will be appropriate for this aspect of negotiations 

+ 

Improved protection of benthic habitats 
and the ecosystem at large 
+  Strong answer to the problem of 

undesired catch in the deep-sea fisheries 
+  The ban could be combined with a more 
lean (simpler) update of the access 
regulation. 

+  The vessels concerned could be assisted 
in changing towards less destructive 
gears in order to continue fishing for 
some key deep-sea species.  

−  VMEs like cold water corals also 
appear in shallower water, where 
trawling for other species would 
continue. However, this aspect is 
outside the scope of this impact 
assessment. 

−  gears would also be banned from 
areas of the deep sea where there 
are no VMEs or where they are 
unlikely; 

3 – banning 
harmful gears 

4 – High Sea 
standards 

+  All technical 

shortcomings of the 
existing regime would be 
addressed  
+  Response to the 

international standards on 
deep-sea fishing 

5 – NEAFC 
alignment 

+  From a conceptual point 
of view, effective 
protection of  VMEs 

−  Policy reliant on multiple individual measures 
that are difficult to define precisely and then to 
implement with sufficient assurance that they 
will be effective. Trawling would be banned by 
overregulation rather than by a straightforward 
measure. 

−  Option would rely on measures that would have 
to be taken and implemented by Member States 
against vested interests. 

−  The administrative burden to manage DS 

fisheries would increase 

−  Costly and long preparation phase with unclear 
quality of the resulting footprint documentation 

−  Difficult to implement with regard to small 

vessels and inactive vessels 

−  Difficult to monitor in case of patchy area limits 

−  Questionable added value in view of ongoing 

documentation of NATURA 2000 offshore areas 
of protection 

− 

 EU would lose negotiation power coming from 
unilateral action towards more sustainable deep-
sea fishing. 

In view of the strong drawbacks, options 2 and 5 are discarded. Option 1 is discarded 
as  well  because  it  does  not  respond  to  shortcomings  identified,  nor  to  stakeholder 
expectations. 

 
 
6. 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS 

6.1.  Qualitative assessment by option 

The  qualitative  assessment  of  outcomes  is  based  on  DG  MARE's  experience  with  the 
impact  of  the  current  access  regime  and  with  the  implementation  of  measures  similar  to 
those  proposed  in  the  options,  in  particular  the  prohibition  of  certain  gears  in  certain 
fisheries and the introduction of UN standards of managing deep-sea fisheries in the High 
Sea in 200840 and in NEAFC in 2009. 

6.1.1.  Comparison with regard to effectiveness 

Effectiveness: The extent to which options achieve the objectives of the proposal 

Recall: General objective: General objective of the proposal is to ensure sustainable exploitation of 
deep-sea  stocks  according  to  the  concept  of  Maximum  Sustainable  Yield,  thereby  limiting  the 
environmental  impact  as  much  as  possible.  As  long  as  data  and  method  have  not  achieved  the 
requisite  quality  level  allowing  a  management  towards  MSY,  the  fisheries  have  to  be  managed 
according to the precautionary approach. 

Recall: Specific objectives: 
a)  To  comply  with  scientific  advice  on  precautionary  catch  levels;  to  facilitate  the  future 

development of MSY-management for these data-poor stocks; 

b)  To reduce the impact of bottom gears on the seafloor in order to reduce the risk of damage to 

VMEs; 

c)  To reduce the level of undesired catch;  
d)  To ensure the collection of all data needed for improving scientific advice. 

e)  To  focus  the  rules  on  the  metiers  that  are  targeting  deep-sea  species  and  make  the  metier-

definition adaptable to evolving scientific advice and fleet behaviour; 

f)  To provide for the transposition of NEAFC conservation measures; 

g)  To make the access regime coherent with the control regulation; 
h)  To harmonise the special data collection with the general standards and ensure follow-up.  

Recall:  Sub-options of option 3 concern the implementation of the ban. Sub-option 1 would ban 
bottom  trawls  and  gillnets  by  not  allowing  to  provide  them  with  fishing  authorisations  to  target 
deep-sea  species.  Sub-option 2 would not allow them to fish below a certain  depth which would 
have to be established according to scientific advice. 

The  sub-options  of  option  4  deal  with  the  problem  of  undesired  catch  which  is  not  directly 
addressed  by  the  international  standards  but  needs  action  nevertheless.  Sub-option  1  of  option  4 
would  reduce  undesired  catch  by  imposing  reduction  targets  in  %  of  catch,  and  ensure  scientific 
estimation  of  discards  for  the  metiers  concerned.  Sub-option  2  of  option  4  would  move  the 
management towards obligatory regional fishing effort limits in which all species would have to be 
landed. 

6.1.1.1.  Summary table 

O  =  neutral  impact,  +  =  positive  impact,  ++=  very  positive  impact  (relative  to  other  options),  -  =  negative 
impact, -- = very negative impact (relative to other options), n.a. = not applicable as the option does not cover 
this aspect  

40 40 See Communication COM(2010) 651. 

 
 
 
                                                 
        Objective 

option 

3  - Banning 
harmful gears 

Sub-option 1: 
fishing 
authorisation 

Sub-option 2: 
spatial 

4 – High-Sea 
standards 

Sub-option 1: 
discard-
reduction targets 

Sub-option 2: 
regional effort 
limits 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

General 
objective

Specific 
objective 
a) 

Specific 
objective 
b) 

Specific 
objective 
c) 

Specific 
objective 
d) and h) 

Specific 
objective 
e) 

Specific 
objective 
f) 

Specific 
objective 
g) 

++ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

n.a. 

n.a. 

+ 

n.a. 

n.a. 

++ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

n.a. 

++ 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

+/° 

n.a. 

n.a. 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

++ 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

6.1.1.2.  Discussion 

For the specific objectives a), d), e), f), g) and h), the options provide the same solution (see 
chapter 4.4 and 4.5) and are therefore considered equivalent. The expected outcomes with 
regard to objectives can be summarised as follows: 

a) (- To comply with scientific advice on precautionary catch levels; to facilitate the future 
development  of  MSY-management  for  these  data-poor  stocks  -  ):  By  regulating  in  co-
decision  that  recurrent  decisions  on  the  allocation  of  fishing  opportunities  cannot  go 
beyond what is scientifically advised as a precautionary level of catches or fishing effort, it 
will  be  ensured  that  the  scientific  advice  on  precautionary  management  is  adhered  to.  As 
the  rule  only  applies  to  the  precautionary  framework,  it  leaves  open  the  possibility  to 
develop  harvest  rules  scientifically  based  on  MSY  in  the  future,  and  following  those 
harvest rules in recurrent decisions on the allocation of fishing opportunities. 

d)  +  h)  (-  To  ensure  the  collection  of  all  data  needed  for  improving  scientific  advice;  to 
harmonise  the  special  data  collection  with  the  general  standards  and  ensure  follow-up  -): 
By enlarging the general data collection requirements towards fishing depth, VMS position 
and  logbook  entries  haul  by  haul,  the  additional  data  considered  necessary  by  scientists 
would  be  collected  in  the  deep-sea  metier.  By  linking  this  data  collection  to  recurrent 
notification exercises (VMS position, electronic logbook reports), the administrative burden 
for the fishing undertakings can be kept to a minimum. By incorporating the data collection 
on the deep-sea metier into the standards of the general data collection, it will be ensured 
that  the  data  collected  responds  to  the  recurrent  statistical  validity  requirements,  can  be 
compares  across  Member  States  and  will  be  channelled  though  the  established  data 
processing  and  reporting  flows,  rather  than  being  stored  "on  the  side".  The  obligation  to 
sample  deep-sea  metiers  according  to  a  specific  metier  definition  is  needed  because 
otherwise the biological data from the commercial fishery would sometimes be submerged 
in larger, more disaggregated metiers. This obligation could be transferred into a reviewed 

 
 
data  collection  regulation  (2012)  in  case  it  will  be  decided  to  incorporate  metier-specific 
requirements. Finally, the need to enlarge scientific surveys in deep-sea areas, as expressed 
by ICES in its advice to the Commission of April 2011, will also be analysed in the context 
of  the  DCF  review  2012,  when  the  list  of  international  surveys  eligible  for  financial 
contributions will be scrutinised. 

e)  (  -  to  focus  the  rules  on  the  metiers  that  are  targeting  deep-sea  species  and  make  the 
metier-definition adaptable to evolving scientific advice and fleet behaviour - ): By defining 
a metier of deep-sea fishing (10% of deep sea catches per fishing day), the special fishing 
authorisations can be split into two categories, one for vessels targeting deep sea species, 
one  for  vessels  the  catches  of  which  are  limited  to  y-catches  only.  All  vessels  would  be 
subject to the limit on vessel capacity in the fishery and on landing in designated ports, but 
the  other  obligations  and  rules  of  the  access  regime  (eligible  gears,  limitation  in  range, 
effort limitations, data collection) would only apply to vessels targeting deep-sea species, 
thus repairing one of the shortcomings of the existing regime. The Commission would be 
empowered  to  modify  or  detail  the  list  of  deep-sea  species  and  the  metier-definition 
according to scientific advice and regional fishing pattern, thus allowing for an evolution of 
the regime according to the reality of the fisheries and the improving scientific knowledge. 

f)  (  -  To  provide  for  the  transposition  of  NEAFC  conservation  measures  -  ):  The 
implementation of technical conservation measures agreed in NEAFC for the international 
waters  of  the  North-East  Atlantic  is  a  technical  exercise  which  could  be  ensured  by 
referring  to  the  currently  applicable  measures  in  the  co-decision  act  and  empowering  the 
Commission  to  amend  or  supplement  those  measures  according  to  evolving  decisions 
within NEAFC, by way of delegated acts. Alternatively to incorporating such a mechanism 
into  the  reviewed  access  regime,  this  objective  could  be  fulfilled  by  providing  such  a 
mechanism  via  the  technical  measures  regulation  that  is  going  to  replace  the  transitional 
measures, which are valid only until end of 2012. 

g) ( - To make the access regime coherent with the control regulation - ): The new control 
regulation contains a number of provisions similar to the existing access regime. Alignment 
can  be  achieved  by  discontinuing  those  provisions.  For  the  remainder  of  measures,  the 
access  regime  cold  ensure  control  standards  applied  to  multi-annual  stock  management 
plans  by  stipulating  that  the  precautionary  measures  contained  in  the  access  regime  shall 
have  the  same  bearing  as  multi-annual  stock  management  measures,  and  by  limiting 
landing  possibilities  to  designated  ports,  with  prior  notice.  In  addition,  the  access  regime 
could  strengthen  the  control  regulation's  instrument  of  closing  a  fishery  when  essential 
provisions of the conservation measure are not complied with, by stipulating that the data 
collection  obligations  are  to  be  considered  also  as  essential  conservation  measures  in  the 
particular case of deep-sea species. 

Concerning  VME  protection  (objective  b),  the  banning  of  bottom  trawls  from  targeted 
fishing  is  considered  more  effective  than  implementing  the  High-Sea  standards  related  to 
VME-protection  (prior  impact  assessment,  encounter  protocols,  search  for  VME  sites). 
Bottom  trawls  would  no  longer  be  present  on  the  deep-sea  grounds,  irrespective  of  the 
results  of  a  risk  assessment.  Risk  assessment  according  to  the  international  standards  is 
influenced  by  the  notion  of  "intensity  of  prior  presence",  and  this  would  give  rise  to 
qualification problems41, in particular where vessels have old and patchy track records but 
have  since  limited  their  area  of  operation.  Concerning  the  reduction  of  undesired  catch 

41 See Communication COM(2010) 651, p. 6. 

 
 
                                                 
(objective  c),  option  3  is  also  considered  more  effective,  because  rather  than  trying  to 
impose  on  vessels  discard  targets  which  are  not  known  to  be  reachable  beforehand,  the 
gears with the highest undesired catch would no longer be employed. Such a strong policy 
is  considered  proportionate  in  this  special  case  because  of  the  high  vulnerability  of  these 
species, and the impact of trawls reducing the biodiversity in those depths. Within option 4, 
the move towards regional effort levels is preferred over discard reduction targets, in view 
of affirmative scientific advice on the utility of effort management42. 

Within  the  more  effective  option,  the  sub-option  which  introduces  the  ban  via  restricted 
fishing authorisations is considered more effective than the sub-option which would ban the 
gears from a certain depth. There are three reasons for this: First, a spatial approach would 
require control of depth levels at which gears are employed, and such a control instrument 
is  currently  not  implemented.  Second,  the  depth  limits  would  have  to  be  established 
according  to  scientific  advice  on  local  occurrence  of  deep-sea  species,  because  those 
inhabit varying depth ranges.43 Third, the distribution area of deep-sea species overlap with 
the distribution area of other species on the lower part of the continental shelf44; therefore a 
depth-criterion would constrain also fisheries which are not considered for this measure. By 
contrast, the sub-option 'fishing authorisation' would refer to the catch composition during 
the trip, and information on the catch composition becomes in future more reliable through 
the  obligation  to  send  electronic  logbook  information.45  This  aspect  also  influences  the 
comparison  of  effectiveness  with  regard  to  the  objective  of  focussing  the  access  regime 
towards  the  target  metier  (e):  If  other  metiers  will  be  affected  by  the  new  restrictions  as 
well, the focus would still be too large. 

6.1.2.  Comparison with regard to efficiency and coherence 

Efficiency: The extent to which objectives can be achieved for a given level of resources/ at least cost 

Coherence:  The  extent  to  which  options  are  coherent  with  the  overarching  objectives  of  EU  policy,  in 
particular the reformed CFP and the revision of the Data Collection Framework foreseen in 2012.  

For ease of simplicity, the comparison is given as a global appreciation with regard to the policy objectives. 

6.1.2.1.  Summary table 

 Assessment criterion 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

option 

3  - Banning harmful gears 

Sub-option 1: fishing authorisation 

Sub-option 2: spatial 

4 – High-Sea standards 

Sub-option 1: discard-reduction targets 

++ 

+ 

+/° 

+/° 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

Partly +, partly - 

+ 

42 See Annex III and already STECF, Report of the subgroup Fisheries and Environment, Deep-sea Fisheries, 
SEC(2002)133.p. 8, 71 et seqq. 
43 See chapter 1.2 with reference to the SGMOS 0905 report on the evaluation of effort regimes in the Deep 
Sea & Western waters, 2010. 
44 See SGMOS report before. 
45 See Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 1224/2008. 

 
 
                                                 
Sub-option 2: regional effort limits 

+ 

Partly +, partly - 

6.1.2.2.  Discussion 

Regarding efficiency, option 3 gets a higher rating than option 4. This is because option 3 
bans  harmful  gear  from  these  fisheries  directly,  whereas  option  4  poses  ever  increasing 
conditions  on  the  use  of  bottom  gears.  Thus,  option  4  makes  it  very  burdensome  to  use 
bottom gears, which in economic terms makes it less attractive, while option 3 forces the 
operators  to  use  less  harmful  gear.  A  further  relative  disadvantage  of  option  4  is  that  it 
relies  on  implementation  and  control  of  several  additional  measures  in  parallel,  while  the 
fisheries  administrations  are  facing  cost-cutting  exercises  imposed  by  the  need  for  fiscal 
discipline  and  need  thus  to  concentrate  their  control  effort  on  economically  important 
fisheries.  Within  option  4,  the  sub-options  concerning  discard  reduction  are  considered 
equally  efficient.  Introducing  regional  effort  limits  would  mean  upfront  costs  for  the 
establishment  of  baseline  fishing  effort  levels46,  and  then  normal  administrative 
supervision,  while  the  sub-option  on  discard-targets  would  mean  increasing  costs  when 
implementation  and  monitoring  of  discard  performance  starts.  For  the  businesses,  the 
situation is similar.  

Within option 3, the sub-option on spatial limitation is considered less efficient because it 
needs  an  additional  control  effort  related  to  fishing  depth,  while  national  administrations 
are in the process of implementing the new control regulation which in itself puts extreme 
strain on them. 

Concerning  coherence,  option  3  is  more  appreciated  than  option  4.  On  the  one  side,  the 
banning  of  harmful  gear  is  a  policy  already  developed.47  The  discard  ban  forthcoming 
under the CFP reform48 is being anticipated by following a particularly restrictive policy 
on this subject in fisheries where the species caught are particularly vulnerable to fishing. 
The ecosystem approach to fisheries management, a concept already valid under the current 
CFP,  is  put  into  practice  for  fisheries  that  operate  in  the  most  fragile  ecosystems.  The 
intentional  limitation  in  regulatory  detail  and  deliberate  restriction  in  imposing  additional 
administrative requirements on the pursuit of certain fishing operations is in line with the 
reform's simplification approach. The CFP reform's move towards regional management 
could  be  translated  by  giving  an  option  for  a  voluntary  move  towards  regional  effort 
management for those gears that are allowed to remain in the fishery. The architecture of 
such  an  approach  is  a  follows:  The  access  regulation  defines  the  possible  scope, 
prerequisites and scientific assessment of regional fishing effort management plans. Once 
finalised, the Commission would base its proposals for allocating maximum fishing effort 
levels in the concerned fishery on the regional plan, and the Council would fix the fishing 
effort limits at annual intervals accordingly. Safeguards would ensure that the management 
can be rescheduled according to catch limits if the conditions for operating the effort plans 
do  not  remain  fulfilled.  Finally,  the  option  is  coherent  with  the  development  of 
individually  transferable quotas. Those quota shares would be established based on the 
catch records of the vessels concerned. The banning of a certain gear in the deep-sea fishery 
would  not  preclude  the  respective  vessels  from  having  access  to  the  species  according  to 

46 For comparison, the establishment of reliable baseline effort levels under the Atlantic cod plan has taken 
three years of administrative and scientific assessment. For deep-sea fisheries, the period would be shorter as 
the fisheries are much smaller and more concentrated. 
47 See chapter 2.1. 
48 Which is expected to apply during the first years to key quota species, not to all species caught. 

 
 
                                                 
their  catch  records,  but  rather  force  them  to  use  a  different  technique  or,  if  this  is  not 
feasible, to sell/lease the quota share to another stakeholder who wants to use a gear that is 
still allowed. 

On the other side, option 4 on introducing High Sea standards is coherent with an existing 
policy  protecting  the  same  type  of  species,  although  in  a  different  economical/fleet 
context.49 The negative note here comes from two considerations: 1) In EU waters, VMEs 
receive  protection  also  through  the  development  of  sites  of  NATURA  2000  under  the 
Habitats Directive. The CFP reform will introduce a procedure for putting into practice the 
fisheries  part  of  these  environmental  measures.  This  approach  is  based  on  the  idea  of 
creating  a  positive  list  of  unique  communities  of  biodiversity  which  will  be  directly 
protected,  while  the  international  concept  is  based  on  the  idea  of  risk  mitigation  and 
avoidance  strategies.  Both  are  not  incompatible  but  could  lead  to  duplication  of  work.  2) 
The  addition  of  new  administrative  requirements  to  the  fishery,  without  assurance  on  the 
result, is not coherent with the simplification-approach intended by the CFP reform. 

Within the option 4, the sub-option on discard-reduction targets  is coherent with the CFP 
reform  focussing  on  result-based  management  and  technical  implementation  by 
Member States on a regional basis. The sub-option on imposing regional effort limits is 
likewise  coherent  with  the  CFP  reform,  as  fishing  effort  management  combined  with  a 
landing  obligation  is  a  tool  for  eliminating  discards.  However,  the  partly  negative 
evaluation comes from the fact that fishing effort levels – which are gear-specific - would 
conserve fishing with bottom trawls, although this gear has a harmful impact on VMEs; the 
Commission has a higher interest in encouraging switching gears than in reducing discards 
using a gear that is harmful to the environment. Finally, option 4 is also coherent with the 
introduction  of  individually  transferable  quotas,  as  it  does  not  touch  on  the  fishing 
opportunities as such. 

Within  option  3,  banning  gears  by  way  of  putting  conditions  to  the  pursuit  of  certain 
species  (sub-option  1)  is  coherent  with  regulatory  practice.50  Likewise  there  are 
prohibitions to use a certain gear below a certain depth (sub-option 2).51  

Both  options  are  coherent  with  the  forthcoming  review  of  the  Data  Collection 
Framework. That review concerns the harmonised method of data collection, the sampling 
intensity  and  the  nature  of  information  to  be  collected,  as  well  as  the  processing  and 
dissemination of data and the financing of scientific surveys. Options 3 and 4 provide the 
same  rules  related  to  data  collection,  namely  to  ensure  that  deep-sea  metiers  are  sampled 
even  if  under  general  rules  this  metier  would  be  submerged  in  a  larger  one,  and  that 
additional  information  is  collected  from  the  commercial  fisheries  which  is  sceintifically 
important for the analysis of deep-sea fisheries. If so decided during the review of the data 
collection framework, these metier-specific rules could be absorbed into the data collection 
framework. Finally, the access regime would allow the Commission closing a fishery if the 
data  collection  has  not  been  carried  out,  an  instrument  that  would  be  a  precautionary 
conservation measure in addition to the possibility under the data collection rules to reduce 
the financial contribution. 

49  Only  large  capital-intensive vessels  are  able  to  undertake  long  journeys  on  the  High Sea,  while  in costal 
waters of the deep like in Portugal, a large amount of artisanal vessels prosecutes the fishery. 
50  E.g.  in  the  annual  fishing  opportunities  regulations,  or  in  Regulation  (EC)  No  1228/2009  on  transitional 
technical measures, or in Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 concerning the Mediterranean Sea. 
51  See  chapter  2.1;  also  Regulation  (EC)  No  1228/2009  on  transitional  technical  measures,  and  Regulation 
(EC) No 1967/2006 concerning the Mediterranean Sea. 

 
 
                                                 
6.2. 

Ranking of options 

Option  3  (banning  harmful  gears)  is  overall  the  policy  option  that  receives  the  best 
evaluation. It addresses shortcomings of the existing regime by measures that are developed 
for  both  options,  3  and  4.  But  the  two  main  problems,  namely  protection  of  VMEs  and 
reduction of undesired catch, is addressed in a more direct way. Option 4 has merits in that 
it  is  coherent  with  the  current  policy  approach  towards  the  management  of  deep-sea 
fisheries  in  the  High  Sea.  However,  its  effectiveness  is  doubtful.  The  option  relies  on 
multiple  individual  measures  that  are  difficult  to  define  precisely  and  then  to  implement 
with sufficient assurance that they will be effective. Bottom trawling would be banned by 
overregulation  rather  than  by  a  straightforward  measure.  The  option  would  rely  on 
measures that would have to be taken and implemented by Member States against vested 
interests,  while  increasing  the  burden  of  administrative  follow-up  within  a  context  of 
administrative structures being scaled down. 

Within  the  preferred  option,  banning  gears  by  limiting  fishing  authorisation  for  targeting 
deep-sea species to less harmful gears is preferred over establishing a regulatory depth line 
which cannot be trespassed by these gears. Main reason is the need for depth control under 
the  alternative  measures  and  the  problem  that  overlapping  bottom  trawls  and  gillnet 
fisheries on the lower part of the continental shelf would also be affected. 

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

For the progress of the policy the following indicators are proposed provisionally and will 
be further developed: 

Policy area 

Possible progress indicator 

Sustainable fixing of fishing 
opportunities 

Discard reduction 

Protection of VMEs 

Data gathering and channelling 
is adapted to scientific needs 
and aligned with the general 
data collection policy. 

Number of stocks which are 
managed according to the 
precautionary advice received 
from ICES/STECF; 
Number of stocks for which 
exploratory MSY-rules are 
being tested 
Trends in discards of deep-sea 
metiers 

Accomplish phase-out of bottom 
trawls in deep-sea fisheries by 
the end of the transition period. 
Spatial profile of bottom 
trawlers concerned moves 
towards shallower waters 
Reduction in fish stocks for 
which ICES working group on 
deep sea species reports 
unavailability of commercial 
fisheries' data 

Data gathering / evaluation 
arrangement 

Commission service  

Technical reports from STECF  
based on data collection under 
the access regime and DCF. 
Monitoring of fishing 
authorisations of Member 
States, Member States to assess 
VMS-traces and catch 
composition protocols of vessels 
concerned 
ICES advice 

 
 
 
 
APPENDIX - GLOSSARY 

B 
Bathymetry – is the study of underwater depth. 

Biological reference points – values of fish stock population parameters (such as biomass 
or  fishing  mortality  rate)  used  in  fisheries  management,  for  example  with  respect  to  an 
acceptable level of biological risk or a desired level of harvest yield. 

By-catch – the catch of non-target species and undersized individuals of the target species. 
By-catches of commercial species may be kept or discarded along with the non-commercial 
by-catch. 

C 
Capacity – The fishing capacity of a vessel depends on various factors. The basic factors 
which  are  easily  measurable  are  the  vessel's  power  in  kilowatt  and  its  volume  in  gross 
tonnage. 

CFP – the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union. It provides the framework for 
management  of  the  EU  fishery  sector,  including  all  marine  fisheries  within  200  miles  of 
Member  States’  baselines.  The  latest  basic  regulation  on  the  CFP  is  Regulation  (EC)  No 
2371/2002 which should be replaced by a new one in 2012. 

D 
DCF – (=Data Collection Framework) is based on Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008.52 
It establishes the principles and standards for programs of data collection for the CFP. The 
deep-sea fisheries can represent a metier on which data needs to be collected according to 
the DCF. 

Demersal – meaning the area close to the sea bed. Demersal fish lives close to the seabed 
(benthopelagic fish or groundfish) or rests on the seabed (benthic fish). 

Discards  –  any  fish,  or  other  living  matter  caught  when  fishing,  that  is  not  kept  but  is 
returned to the sea – alive or dead. 

E 
Effort  – the total quantity of fishing gear in use over a specific period of time. Effort can be 
expressed in many ways: days away from port, hours trawling, length of driftnet, number of 
hooks used and so on. The basic concept followed by the CFP is a combination of time at 
sea and fishing capacity expressed in kilowatts or volume (gross tonnage) 

F 
Fishing effort – see Effort. 

52 Regulation concerning the establishment of a Community framework for the collection, management and 
use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy; OJ 
L 60, 5.3.2008, p. 1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Forage  fish  -  Small  fish,  often  in  shoals,  prolific  and  serving  as  food  for  predatory  fish 
higher up in the food chain. 

H 
Habitats Directive - The Habitats Directive53 obliges Member States to create a network of 
sites to protect Biodiversity called the network of NATURA 2000. To the extent that the 
protection concept intervenes with fisheries, the EU has regulated the fisheries part of the 
protection measures based on the CFP. Marine offshore sites of NATURA 2000 are still in 
development, and only a few have been created already. Reefs are explicitly mentioned as 
possible objects of NATRA 2000 protection measures (code 1170). 

Harvest control rule – stipulates how harvest is to be controlled by management in relation 
to  some  indicator  of  stock  status.  For  example,  a  harvest  control  rule  can  describe  the 
various fishing mortality values which will be aimed at for various stock abundance values. 
It  formalises  and  summarises  a  management  strategy.  In  the  absence  of  fishing  mortality 
and stock size values, such rules could for example set maximum harvest levels according 
to trends observed in abundance indices. 

I 
ICES  –  the  International  Council  for  the  Exploration  of  the  Sea  founded  in  1902.  It 
facilitates  and  coordinates  collaboration,  including  fish  stock  assessments,  between 
Member  States.  It  works  via  numerous  working  groups  under  the  remit  of  one  or  more 
standing committees. 

ITQ  –  individually  transferable  quotas.  A  concept  partly  applied  in  European  fisheries 
management, but not at EU level so far, which allows undertakings to trade in their fishing 
opportunities subject to certain conditions and safeguards. The main purpose of ITQ is to 
rationalise the capacity base of resource exploitation by using market-mechanism. The CFP 
reform process favours the mandatory introduction of such a system in EU fisheries. 

J 
Juvenile – an immature fish, i.e. one that has not reached sexual maturity. 

M 
Metier – a combination of vessel characteristics and fishing pattern, normally described as 
the fishing operations of vessels using a certain gear in a certain area (and season) targeting 
(a) certain species. 

Monitoring  –  regular  and  systematic  collection  of  environmental  and  biological  data  by 
agreed methods and to agreed standards. Monitoring provides information on current status, 
trends and compliance with declared standards and objectives.  

Fishing Mortality (F) – the death of organisms due to fishing. It is usually expressed as an 
instantaneous  rate:  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  ratio  between  the  number  of  animals 
surviving to the end of the year and the number at the start of the year. 

MSY – maximum sustainable yield: the largest average catch that can be taken 
continuously from a stock under existing environmental conditions. (For species with 

53 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
fluctuating recruitment, the maximum might be obtained by taking fewer fish in some years 
than in others.) Also known as ‘maximum equilibrium catch’. The MSY-concept is 
originally based on international law (Johannesburg summit on Sustainable Development 
2002) and now also enshrined in Community rules: According to Commission Decision 
2010/477/EU of 1 September 2010 on criteria and methodological standards on good 
environmental status of marine waters54, the fishing pressure has to be held at levels equal 
or below Fmsy in order to indicate a good environmental status with regard to healthy 
stocks that are commercially exploited. In case where an F value cannot be estimated, 
secondary indicators have to be used. The Commission plans to enshrine the concept in the 
2012 CFP reform as obligatory management basis. 

O 
Overfishing  –  an  exploitation  rate  is  greater  than  is  required  to  meet  or  match  a  specific 
management objective, e.g. maximum sustainable yield (MSY).  

P 
Passive  gear  –  (equivalent:  static  gear)  gear  that  catches  fish  by  attracting  it  or  by 
hampering its further move and enmeshing. Opposite: towed gear. 

 Pelagic – meaning the water column excluding the space close to the seabed. Pelagic fish 
lives and feeds in the open water, not on or from the bottom. 

Precautionary  approach  –  a  decision  to  take  avoiding  action  based  on  the  possibility  of 
significant  environmental  damage,  even  before  there  is  conclusive  evidence  that  damage 
will occur. This approach requires fishery managers to pay due regard to the uncertainties 
of stock assessment and management.  

S 
Safe biological limits – to keep stocks within safe biological limits, there should be a high 
probability that spawning stocks are above the threshold where recruitment is impaired and 
fishing mortality is below the level which will drive the spawning stocks to the threshold.  

Sampling  –  selection  of  factual  information  to  acquire  some  knowledge  of  a  statistical 
population.  Sampling  standards  for  collecting  data  on  sea  fisheries  are  contained  in  the 
Commission Program55 adopted under the Data Collection Framework56. 

Spawning  aggregations  –  fish  often  groups  closer  together  to  spawn.  Spawning 
aggregations  provide  an  easier  target  for  fishing  operations,  because  more  fish  can  be 
caught  with  the  same  effort.  But  the  risk  of  depleting  the  stock  is  also  higher,  and  fish 
caught before spawning was not able to contribute to reproduction during that season. 

STECF  –  the  Scientific,  Technical  and  Economic  Committee  on  Fisheries  of  the  EC. 
Unlike  ICES  working  groups,  which  consider  stock  assessments  and  management  from  a 
scientific  perspective  only,  the  STECF  is  expected  to  consider  the  socio-  economic 
implications of modifying or varying scientific, including ICES advice. 

54 OJ L 232, 2.9.2010, p. 14. 
55 Commission Decision 2010/93/EU of 18 December 2009 adopting a multiannual Community programme 
for the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector for the period 2011-2013 (notified under 
document C(2009) 10121),  OJ L 41, 16.2.2010, p. 8 
56 Regulation (EC) No 199/2008. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Stock - means a marine biological resource with distinctive characteristics that occurs in a 
given management area. 

Stock assessment - provides a science-based quantitative evaluation of fish populations, in 
order  to  help  define  management  objectives  and  guide  their  implementation.    It  produces 
biological  reference  points  and  indicators  on  the  status  of  the  stock  compared  to  those 
reference  points.  For  deep-sea  species,  no  stock  assessments  are  available,  because  of 
paucity or insufficient quality of data. 

Sustainable  fisheries  –  fisheries  with  an  annual  catch,  including  discards,  that  does  not 
exceed  the  surplus  production  of  the  stocks  (i.e.  annual  growth  plus  recruitment  less  the 
annual natural mortality).  

T 
TAC  –  total  allowable  catch:  the  quantity  of  fish  that  can  be  taken  from  each  stock  each 
year.  The  figure  is  agreed  by  the  Fisheries  Council  of  Ministers  in  annual  meetings,  for 
deep-sea  species  biannual  meetings.  EU  Member  States  are  allocated  a  set  share  of  the 
TAC as their national quota. 

V 
VME, vulnerable marine ecosystems - Features of the deep seabed such as seamounts, coral 
reefs and hydrothermal vents are known to act as biodiversity hot spots and also to attract 
large numbers of fish. These ecosystems are extremely vulnerable for a number of reasons 
including the low growth rates associated with great depths as well as the fragility of the 
organisms,  such  as  corals  and  sponges,  which  provide  structural  support  to  the  habitats. 
Although  scientific  research  on  these  organisms  and  ecosystems  has  increased  in  recent 
years, including through projects supported by the EU such as the Hermes, Hermione and 
Coralfish  projects,  more  information  is  still required  on  their  biology,  location  as  well  as 
the associated fisheries. These vulnerable ecosystems are threatened by natural causes such 
as  climate  change  and  ocean  acidification,  as  well  as  by  a  variety  of  anthropogenic 
activities,  which  include  deep-sea  bottom  fishing,  deep-sea  mining,  bio-prospection  and 
deep-sea tourism. While these activities generate economic benefits, they contribute to the 
destruction of these habitats which results in a continuing loss of marine biodiversity. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXES 
Annex I: Deep-sea grounds in the North-East Atlantic 

Depth contours at 1500 m of the North-East Atlantic potentially impacted by deep-water fisheries, with the 
delimitations of several regulatory areas. (By Ricardo Medeiros, Department of Oceanography and Fisheries of the 
University of the Azores).  
Source: REPORT OF THE ICES-NAFO JOINT WORKING GROUP ON DEEP WATER ECOLOGY (WGDEC) 
2008, p. 16. ICES CM 2008/ACOM:45 

 
 
 
 
Annex II: Contributions following the consultation 

Entity 

Scope of 
review 

Put 
whole 
regime 
under 
review, 
but no 
abrupt 
changes 
needed 

France (an 
exhaustive 
background 
document was 
finalised in 
September 
2010: "Le 
Grenelle de la 
Mer", Avenir 
des Pêches 
Profondes, 
groupe n° 1, 
rapport final) 

Spain 

Specific 
interest/ 
ideas 
Acknowledge 
positive 
development in 
some important 
stocks; 
acknowledge that 
DS57 regime is 
only part of a 
number of 
management 
improvements; 
develop VME58-
closed areas, 
spatial-seasonal 
closures, 
prohibition to new 
fisheries unless 
accompanied by 
scientific advice; 
regulation on 
ghost-fishing is 
already sufficient 

Concentrate 
the special 
regime on 
targeted 
fisheries and 
let by-catch 
fisheries be 
regulated by 
the western 
waters 
regime alone 

Effort 
limitations 
and TACs 
By-catch 
TACs60 need 
to be aligned 
with the 
reality of the 
fisheries 

Special 
permits 

The 100 kg-
threshold 
should be 
increased for 
non-SPP59 
vessels 
which 
should be 
allowed to 
land up to 
400kg per 
trip, if 
avoidance 
measures are 
put in place 
to prevent 
any discards 
above this 
level 

Improve 
knowledge 

Control 

Encourage 
science-
industry 
partner-
ships 

adapt the regime 
to the new control 
regulation; 
request prior 
notification of 
landings of DS 
species until 
introduction of 
electronic 
logbook; 
foresee increased 
frequency of 
VMS61-
transmissions in 
case of transfer 
through VME 
areas; 
problem with the 
identity of 
designated ports 
in the gillnet 
fisheries 

The 
threshold 
of 100 kg 
per trip 
or 10t 
per year 
are 
inapprop
riate in 
view of 
the 
variety of 
vessel 
sizes and 
mixed 
fisheries 

Effort calculation does 
not show a clear picture, 
as the effort depends on 
the variety of species 
caught and rectangles of 
operation; no effective 
follow-up of 
commitments in the 
Northeast Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC) possible; 
TACs are more limiting 
now, and effort regime is 
not independent measure 
as it also depends on real 
landings 

57 Deep Sea. 
58 Vulnerable Marine Ecosystem. 
59 Special Fishing Permit.  
60 Total Allowable Catches. 
61 Vessel Monitoring System. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Improve 
knowledge 

Control 

adapt to 
control 
regulation; 
delete article 6 
(reporting of 
position in 
case of VMS 
failure) 

data-
coverage 
should be 
possible 
within the 
DCF63; on 
board 
observers no 
solution for 
small vessels 

gathering of 
knowledge for 
a complete 
stock 
assessment 
might be too 
expensive in 
view of the 
value of the 
fisheries 

Effort 
limitations 
and TACs 
Effort ceilings 
should be 
developed by 
(target) fishery and 
take account of the 
stability of the 
artisanal fisheries; 
By-catch TACs (DS 
sharks) need to be 
aligned with the 
reality of the 
fisheries; difficulty 
to obtain caches per 
rectangle in Azores 
(76% vessels under 
10m) 

Zero TAC for 
sharks is 
consistent 
with UK 
policy; 
continue 
current 
approach and 
develop in 
addition an 
MSY-
approach for 
selected 
fisheries for 
which 
knowledge on 
fishing 
mortality will 
improve 

ditto 

Do not cover 
by-catch 
fisheries 
(except with 
TAC rules), 
for reason of 
proportiona-
lity 

align with 
control 
regulation 

Improved 
scientific 
coverage 
should be 
incorporated 
into the data 
collection 
framework 

Entity 

Scope of 
review 

Specific 
interest/ ideas 

Special 
permits 

Ring-
fencing 
fishing 
effort 
around 
Azores and 
Madeira 

SPP system 
not effective 
as too many 
vessels are 
concerned 
(other MS) 
or too few 
(small 
vessels in 
Portugal); 
an Annex II 
species is 
primary 
fishing 
target in 
Azores (red 
seabream) 

Revise the 
regime in a 
way that future 
develops can 
be influenced 
by the results 
of the 
Deepfishman 
project; 
stress the 
precautionary 
approach, as 
many DS 
stocks might 
be incapable of 
discovery 
within a decent 
time horizon; 
develop closed 
areas for 
aggregations 
of orange 
roughy and 
blue ling 
Differentiate 
between by-
catch and 
targeted 
fisheries 

Portugal 

United 
Kingdom 

Review of 
the 100 
miles zone 
around 
Azores 
needed 
(linked to 
the CFP62 
reform and 
western 
waters 
regime) 

Put whole 
regime 
under 
review, but 
no abrupt 
changes 
until 
outcome of 
the 
Deepfish-
man project 
is known  

Germany 

Put whole 
regime 
under 
review in 
order to wok 
towards 
sustainable 
exploitation 

62 Common Fisheries Policy. 
63 Data Collection Framework. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Entity 

Scope of 
review 

Specific 
interest/ ideas 

Special 
permits 

Netherlands 

Control 

Improve 
knowledge 

Effort 
limitations 
and TACs 
System of effort 
calculation totally 
inappropriate for NL, 
where the fleet that on 
some days has some DS 
by-catch are large pelagic 
trawlers that are away for 
4 weeks sometimes 

Define the fisheries 
more clearly; 
delete species from 
the list that are 
caught in more 
shallow waters; 
open to inclusion 
of other species 
that share the 
common criteria; 
advocate spatial-
seasonal closures 

Bring 
reward/-
punishment 
mechanism 
into the 
issuance of 
permits 
(award, 
renewal, 
withdrawal) 

Effort ceilings 
should be 
developed by 
(target) fishery, 
and adjustments 
should be 
possible in view 
of improved 
stock status 

RAC64 
North-
Western 
waters 

RAC 
South-
Western 
waters 

Put whole 
regime 
under 
review, but 
act very 
carefully in 
order not to 
punish 
vessels that 
have made 
efforts 
already 
Put 
whole 
regime 
under 
review 

ditto; 
By-catch 
TACs need to 
be aligned 
with the reality 
of the fisheries 

Limits need 
to be 
developed by 
group of 
species/fisher
ies. If the 
annual 
criterion of 
10t should 
stay, at least 
the trip-based 
threshold of 
100kg should 
be defined by 
fishery 

Acknowledge the 
variety of biological 
characteristics; 
acknowledge that the 
measures adopted since 
2002 have brought 
positive development; 
improve transparency in 
data provision to 
NEAFC; 
New fisheries should be 
prohibited unless 
accompanied by impact 
assessment; 
further develop closed 
areas for protection of 
VMEs 
Apply UNGA standards 
for deep-sea fishing on 
the High Sea also to EU 
waters, in particular 
prior impact assessment 
on bottom habitat. 
Count all catches 
against the quota 

Precautionary 
principle calls 
for lower 
TACs. Move 
towards effort 
management 
presupposes 
better effort 
data 

Full observer 
coverage; 
standardise 
monitoring 
protocols; 
revoke 
permit in 
case of data 
shortcomings 

COM to put 
more money 
to science-
industry 
partnerships 

Reference 
data should 
be the haul 
and not the 
landings per 
trip; training 
needed in 
order that 
fishermen 
can 
distinguish 
species 

NGO 
Alliance65 

Put 
whole 
regime 
under 
review 

64  Regional  Advisory  Council, established  through  Council  Decision  of 19  July  2004  establishing  Regional 

Advisory Councils under the Common Fisheries Policy (2004/585/EC). 

65 PEW, Greenpeace, Seas at Risk, deepsea conservation coalition 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Annex III: Scientific advice from the Scientific, Technical and 
Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) 

A) 2010 report of the SGMOS-09-05 Working Group "Fishing Effort Regime" 
Part 3: Deep Sea and Western Waters page 117: Discussion on the vulnerability and 
exploitation of deep sea species 

There are no extant scientific reasons for not exploiting deep-water fish and shellfish species in 
the NE Atlantic. Even fisheries for the most vulnerable species, such as orange roughy, are 
likely to be sustainable if catches [exploitation rate] are maintained at sufficiently low levels. 
For example, stock reduction analyses of orange roughy in VI indicate that MSY may be 
around 150-250 t whereas in the early years of this fishery annual catches amounted to several 
thousand tonnes. 

The key issue as to whether deep-water species can be exploited sustainably is the extent, 
efficacy and compliance of management and monitoring. It is evident that management 
frameworks and approaches in place in recent years have not been effective in achieving 
sustainability. Management by TACs and quotas is unlikely to be an effective management tool 
because the relationship between F and catches is unknown in most fisheries. Furthermore, 
many fisheries are of a mixed species nature and management by TACs and quotas, particularly 
where these are restrictive for some species, is likely to lead to high-grading and higher levels 
of discarding. In contrast, effort management, particularly at the fisheries rather than at the 
stock level, is more likely to be effective as there is an underlying relationship between F and 
effort. 

Difficulty of bycatch 
Effective monitoring is essential and this should include multinational coordinated fisheries 
independent surveys to generate reliable abundance indices for use in assessments. Without 
such data the scientific justification for exploiting these stocks would be seriously 
compromised. Effective observer schemes are also essential and it may be necessary to have 
100% coverage in international waters (as in the NAFO Regulatory Area) and particularly in 
some fisheries e.g. orange roughy.  

A general concern is the high level of discarding on deep-water trawl fisheries. Most of these 
fish die and as a consequence long-term exploitation could have a significant impact on the 
general deep-water fish assemblage and ecosystem as a whole. This needs to be monitored on 
an ongoing basis and provides another justification for the development of extensive fisheries-
independent surveys. 

Most deep-water fisheries in the NE Atlantic are currently being ratcheted down to a low level 
in line with ICES advice, and these should only be allowed to expand when information 
becomes available as to the level of fishing that is sustainable, and for some stocks, where there 
is reliable evidence of stock recovery. While current deep-water fisheries may be of minor 
economic significance, they have in the past generated substantial landings and have been of 
high socio-economic importance to many countries. If the stocks are exploited sustainably 
economic returns are likely to be lower but nevertheless important to some regional 
communities. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B) Review of scientific advice for 2011, Consolidated Advice on Stocks of Interest to the 
European Community, Edited by John Casey, Willy Vanhee & Hendrik Doerner, 2010, page 
236: 

STECF notes that appropriate sustainable exploitation rates for most deepwater species have 
not been determined and the risks associated with current fishing effort are not quantified. 
Given the biology of many of these species, very low exploitation rates or zero fishing are 
likely to be advised in most cases. STECF once again reiterates its comment that management 
measures based on effort/fleet regulation are a more appropriate long-term approach for 
management of these fisheries and consequently fisheries based advice, in addition to that 
currently given, has value. 

(…)  

STECF further notes that several of these deep-water fisheries take place in international waters 
outside national or EU jurisdiction. Hitherto this has rendered it difficult to enforce 
management measures for these fisheries. 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex IV: Overview deep-sea fisheries in the North-East 
Atlantic 

Source: STECF stock assessment part 2, July 201066 

In  ICES  Division  IVa  there  is  a  by-catch  of  Greater  silver  smelt  (Argentina  silus)  in  the 
industrial  trawl  fishery.  A  longline  fishery  targets  tusk  (Brosme  brosme)  and  ling  with 
forkbeard  (Phycis  blennoides)  and  grenadier  as  a  by-catch.  Some  deepwater  species  are 
landed as a by-catch in the trawl fisheries targeting anglerfish and Greenland halibut. 

In  ICES  Division  IIIa  there  is  a  targeted  trawl  fishery  for  roundnose  grenadier 
(Coryphaenoides  rupestris)  and  greater  silver  smelt.  Several  deep-water  species  are  also 
taken as a by-catch in, for instance, the trawl fisheries for northern shrimp. 

In ICES Sub-area V there are trawl fisheries targeting blue ling, redfish species, argentine 
and  orange  roughy  (Hoplostethus  atlanticus),  which  have  as  by-catch  a  great  number  of 
other deep-water species. There are also traditional longline fisheries for ling and tusk, and 
trawl and gill net fisheries for Greenland halibut and anglerfish. 

In  ICES  Sub-areas  VI  and  VII  there  are  directed  fisheries  for  blue  ling,  roundnose 
grenadier, orange roughy, black scabbardfish and deep-water sharks. 

In  Sub-area  VIII  there  is  a  longline  fishery,  which  mainly  targets  greater  forkbeard,  and 
trawl fisheries for hake, megrim, anglerfish and Nephrops which have a by-catch of deep-
water species. 

In  ICES  Sub-area  IX  some  deep-water  species  are  a  by-catch  of  the  trawl  fisheries  for 
crustaceans. Typical species are bluemouth (Helicolenus dactylopterus), greater forkbeard, 
conger  eel  (Conger  conger),  blackmouth  dogfish  (Galeus  melastomus),  kitefin  shark 
(Dalatias  licha),  gulper  shark  (Centrophorus  granulosus)  and  leafscale  gulper  shark 
(Centrophorus  squamosus).  There  is  a  directed  longline  fishery  for  black  scabbard  fish 
(Aphanopus carbo) with a by-catch of the Portuguese dogfish (Centroscymnus coelolepis) 
and leafscale gulper shark (Centrophorus squamosus). There is also a longline (Voracera) 
fishery for Pagellus bogaraveo. 

In ICES Sub-area X the main fisheries are by handline and longline near the Azores, and 
the  main  species  landed  are  red  (blackspot)  seabream  (Pagellus  bogaraveo),  wreckfish 
(Polyprion  americanus),  conger  eel,  bluemouth,  golden  eye  perch  (Beryx  splendens)  and 
alfonsino  (Beryx  decadactylus).  At  present  the  catches  of  kitefin  shark  are  made  by  the 
longline and handline deepwater vessels and can be considered as accidental. There are no 
vessels at present catching this species using gillnets. 

Outside  the  Azorean  EEZ  there  are  trawl  fisheries  for  golden  eye  perch,  orange  roughy, 
cardinal fish (Epigonus telescopus), black scabbard fish, and wreckfish. 

In ICES Sub-area XII there are trawl fisheries on the mid-Atlantic Ridge for orange roughy, 
roundnose  grenadier,  and  black  scabbard  fish.  There  is  a  multispecies  trawl  and  longline 

66 To be found on the website: https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. The fisheries are partly no longer active. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
fishery  on  Hatton  Bank,  and  some  of  this  occurs  in  this  sub-area,  some  in  Sub-area  VI. 
There  is  considerable  fishing  on  the  slopes  of  the  Hatton  Bank,  and  effort  may  be 
increasing.  Smoothheads  (Alepocephalus  species)  were  previously  usually  discarded  but 
now feature to a greater extent in the landings statistics. 

In  ICES  Sub-area  XIV  there  are  trawl  and  longline  fisheries  for  Greenland  halibut 
(Rheinhardtius hippoglossoides) and redfish that have by-catches of roundnose  grenadier, 
roughhead grenadier (Macrourus berglax) and tusk. 

 
 
 
 
Technical Annex V: list of deep-sea species; landings per MS in 
2008 

The access regime contains two lists of deep-sea species. Landings in species of the Annex 
I-list trigger the allocation of the vessel’s trip to deep-sea activity, while on both Annex I 
and II-species, special data collection has to apply. 

List of deep-sea species (Annex I to the access regime) 

Scientific name 
Aphanopus carbo 
Apristurus spp.  

FAO code 
BSF 
CSA, CSF, CSG, CSJ, CSN, 
CSU, CSV, CSW, CSX, CSZ 
ARU 
Argentina silus  
BXD, BYS 
Beryx spp.  
GUP 
Centrophorus granulosus  
GUQ 
Centrophorus squamosus 
Centroscyllium fabricii 
CFB 
Centroscymnus coelolepis  CYO 
Coryphaenoides rupestris   RNG 
SCK 
Dalatias licha 
DCA 
Deania calcea 
ETR 
Etmopterus princeps 
ETX 
Etmopterus spinax 
SHO 
Galeus melastomus  
GAM 
Galeus murinus  
ORY 
Hoplostethus atlanticus  
BLI 
Molva dypterygia  
Phycis blennoides  
GFB 
Centroscymnus crepidater   CYP 
SYR 
Scymnodon ringens  
SBL 
Hexanchus griseus  
HXC 
Chlamydoselachus 
anguineus  
Oxynotus paradoxus  
OXN 
Somniosus microcephalus   GSK 

Common name 
Black scabbardfish 
Iceland catshark 

Greater silver smelt 
Alfonsinos 
Gulper shark 
Leafscale gulper shark 
Black dogfish 
Portuguese dogfish 
Roundnose grenadier 
Kitefin shark 
Birdbeak dogfish 
Greater lanternshark 
Velvet belly 
Blackmouth dogfish 
Mouse catshark 
Orange roughy 
Blue ling 
Forkbeards 
Longnose velvet dogfish 
Knifetooth dogfish 
Six-gilled shark 
Frilled shark 

Sailfin roughshark (Sharpback shark) 
Greenland shark 

Additional list of deep-sea species (Annex II to the access regime) 

FAO code 
Scientific name 
SBR 
Pagellus bogaraveo  
Chimaera monstrosa  CMO 
RHG 
Macrourus berglax 
RIB 
Mora moro 
ANT 
Antimora rostrata  
Epigonus telescopus  EPI 
Helicolenus 
dactylopterus 
Conger conger 

BRF 
COE 

Common name 
Red (blackspot) seabream 
Rabbit fish (Rattail) 
Roughhead grenadier (Rough rattail) 
Common mora 
Blue antimora (Blue hake) 
Black (Deep-water) cardinal fish 

Bluemouth (Blue mouth redfish) 
Conger eel 

 
 
 
 
SFS 

HPR 

ALC 
ELZ 
RJG 
SFV 

Lepidopus caudatus 
Alepocephalus 
bairdii 
Lycodes esmarkii 
Raja hyperborea 
Sebastes viviparus 
Hoplostethus 
mediterraneus 
Trachyscorpia 
cristulata 
Raja nidarosiensIs 
Chaecon (Geryon) 
KEF 
affinis 
Raja fyllae 
RJY 
Hydrolagus mirabilis  CYH 
Rhinochimaera 
atlantica 
Alepocephalus 
rostratus 
Polyprion 
americanus 

TJX 
JAD 

PHO 

RCT 

WRF 

Silver scabbard fish (Cutlass fish) 

Baird's smoothhead 
Eelpout 
Arctic skate 
Small redfish (Norway haddock) 

Silver roughy (Pink) 

Spiny (Deep-sea) scorpionfish 
Norwegian skate 

Deep-water red crab 
Round skate 
Large-eyed rabbit fish (Ratfish) 

Straightnose rabbitfish 

Risso's smoothhead 

Wreckfish 

Member State landings of Annex I+II deep-sea species in 2008 as 
reported in the economic data call 2010: 

Member state 

Weight (Ton)  

France 
Spain 
Portugal 
Germany 
Lithuania 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Sweden 

12.988
10.302*
8.910
281
148
132
115
64
37
   0,02

* Data from 2007 

         Total                                  34.432 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Annex VI: Evolution of the landings of quota-species (t) 

FAO 
code 

2005 

2003 

2004 

2006 

2007 

BSF* 

ARU  

9.563,2 

5.982,1 

5.527,8 

5.790,9 

2.513,7 

Name 
Black 
scabbardfish* 
Greater silver 
smelt 
Roundnose 
grenadier** 
Orange roughy 
Blue ling 
Deep Sea 
Sharks*** 
Alfonsinos 
nei*** 
Blackspot(=red) 
seabream 
Greater 
forkbeard*** 
1.607 
Total                                                                            18.094,3                    15.857,4                    32.908,7                       29.244,6                       29.446                     25.132,1                    21.344,8 

10.262,7 
585,4 
2.877,5 

RNG**  
ORY  
BLI 

4.445,1 
529,2 
3.585,7 

9.049,1 
387,3 
3.093,6 

7.811,6 
372,1 
2.396 

5.336,7 
104,3 
1.865,8 

4.543 
37,0 
2.182,9 

4.604 
590,8 
3.431 

DWS*** 

GFB*** 

ALF*** 

3.457,5 

2.863,4 

1.745,3 

1.286,6 

3.428,4 

4.042,7 

1.341,6 

3.026,4 

1.826,7 

1.874,8 

1.854,8 

1.776,9 

1.882,3 

8.645,5 

9.715,8 

9.263,2 

7.892,3 

1.553,4 

1.411,9 

1.427,0 

1.772,4 

1.376,1 

1.618,5 

1.506,5 

302,4 

321,8 

305,8 

792,6 

323,7 

298,2 

2008 

2009 

SBR 

* Catches for Madeira are only accounted for since 2005. 
** Catches in ICES areas VIII, IX, X, XII and XIV are only accounted for since 2005. 
***TACs only exist since 2005. 

Source: Member states’ catches according to FIDS system. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex VII: List of species by landings 

a)  List  of  regulated  deep-sea  species  (Annex  I  and  II  to  Regulation 
2347/2002) by landing’s weight realised in 2008. Landings concerning 
Spain are taken from 2007. 

Name 
Black scabbardfish 

Conger eel 
Baird's smoothhead 
Black (Deep-water) cardinal fish 
Blue ling 
Roundnose grenadier 
Forkbeards 

Roughhead grenadier (Rough rattail) 
Portuguese dogfish 
Leafscale gulper shark 

Wreckfish 
Bluemouth (Blue mouth redfish) 
Red (blackspot) seabream 
Deep-water red crab 
Kitefin shark 

Common mora 
Orange roughy 
Knifetooth dogfish 
Gulper shark 
Black dogfish 

Other species 

Total weight (Ton) 

FAO code  Weight (Ton) 
BSF 
COE 
ALC 
EPI 
BLI 
RNG 
GFB 
RHG 
CYO 
GUQ 
WRF 
BRF 
SBR 
KEF 
SCK 
RIB 
ORY 
SYR 
GUP 
CFB 

7.686 
7.453 
5.888 
4.151 
2.143 
1.911 
969 
514 
494 
492 
460 
429 
398 
379 
271 
139 
131 
116 
95 
76 
240 

34.706 

Annex 

1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1&2 

1&2 

Source:  Member  states’  notifications  to  the  deep  sea  and  economic  data  call  2010. 
Due  to  the  autonomous  methods  applied  in  responding  to  (economic)  data  calls, 
landings figures from this source are not necessarily identical to landings notified to 
the Commission’s system for following up the fishing quota consumption.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) List of regulated deep-sea species by landings during 2008 in order 
of value. Spain is not included. (Spain is responsible for roughly 30% 
of the landings in weight.) 

Name 
Black scabbardfish 
Conger eel 
Wreckfish 
Blue ling 
Roundnose grenadier 
Red (blackspot) seabream 
Forkbeards 
Bluemouth (Blue mouth 
redfish) 
Deep-water red crab 
Orange roughy 
Portuguese dogfish 
Leafscale gulper shark 
Other species 
Total value (EUR) 

FAO code 
BSF 
COE 
WRF 
BLI 
RNG 
SBR 
GFB 

BRF 
KEF 
ORY 
CYO 
GUQ 

Value (EUR) 

Annex 

24.689.079 

11.567.070 

6.699.253 

5.130.028 

3.511.307 

3.242.361 

1.460.557 

1.369.542 

1.354.676 

830.987 

827.808 

799.281 

2 

1 

1 

2 

2 

1 

2 

1 

1 

2 

2 

2 

2.250.112 

1&2 

63.732.061 

Member states’ notifications to the deep sea and economic data call 2010.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex VIII: Relation between deep-sea metier and fleet 
segment 

Fleet correspondence between the métier-level data (Deep-Sea Data Call) and the fleet 
segment level data  
Fleet segment level 
(AER Data Call) 

Metier-level 
(Deep-Sea Data Call) 

Fishing Days 

Country 

Gear 

V. Length 

Country 

Gear  V. Length 

EST 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

IRL 

DEU 

OTB  VL40XX 

OTB  VL40XX 

GEN  Unknown 

GEN  VL2440 

GNS  VL2440 

GNS  Unknown 

DEU 

EST 

DTS  VL40XX 

DTS  VL40XX 

FRA 

DFN  VL2440 

GNS  VL40XX 

FRA 

DFN  VL40XX 

LLD 

Unknown 

LLS 

LLS 

Unknown 

VL2440 

FRA 

HOK  VL2440 

OTB  VL1824 

OTT 

VL1824 

OTB  VL2440 

OTT 

VL2440 

OTB  VL40XX 

OTT 

Unknown 

OTB  Unknown 

OTB  VL40XX 

LITH 

OTB  VL40XX 

POL 

POR 

POR 

POR 

POR 

OTB  VL40XX 

LLS 

LLS 

LLS 

LLS 

VL1012 

VL1218 

VL1824 

VL2440 

FRA 

DTS  VL1824 

FRA 

FRA 

IRL 

LTU 

POL 

PRT 

PRT 

PRT 

DTS  VL2440 

DTS  VL40XX 

DTS  VL40XX 

DTS  VL40XX 

DTS  VL40XX 

HOK  VL0012 

HOK  VL1224 

HOK  VL24XX 

Total: 

673 

1.352 

61 

90 

496 

207 

70 

3 

303 

163 

2.938 

18 

1.129 

1.019 

3.073 

1.100 

331 

13 

239 

51 

44 

863 

2.025 

526 

16.786 

The  métier  with  the  length  reported  as  "Unknown"  for  France  are  vessels  without 
Deep water species licenses that nevertheless landed some deep water species in 2008. 
Terms used: AER= Annual Economic Report; VL= vessel length, 2440 = from 24 to 
40 metres, DEU = DE, EST = EE, FRA = FR, IRL = IE, LITH = LT, POL = PL, POR 
=  PT,  OTB  =  bottom  otter  trawl,  GEN  =  gillnets  and  entangling  nets,  GNS  =  set 
gillnets, LLD = drifting longlines, LLS = set longlines, OTT = multi-rig otter trawl. 

Source:  JRC  synthesis  report  on  the  Data  Call  on  the  Collection  of  Transversal 
Variables  for  Analysis  of  the  Access-Regime  to  Deep-Sea  Fisheries,  April  2010; 
Member states’ notifications to the deep sea and economic data call 2010. 

 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Technical Annex IX: Landings made by deep-sea metiers  

Landings of species made by metiers targeting deep-sea species in the year 2008 
in order of value. Spanish metiers are not included.  

FAO code 
Name 
PRA 
Northern prawn 
GHL 
Greenland halibut 
BSF 
Black scabbardfish 
BLI 
Blue ling 
COD 
Atlantic cod 
RNG 
Roundnose grenadier 
RED 
Atlantic redfishes nei 
GFB 
Greater forkbeard 
ORY 
Orange roughy 
CYO 
Portuguese dogfish 
GUQ 
Leafscale gulper shark 
SKA 
Raja rays nei 
CPL 
Lowfin gulper shark 
PLA 
Long rough dab 
CFB 
Black dogfish 
SYR 
Knifetooth dogfish 
WRF 
Wreckfish 
Red (blackspot) seabream 
SBR 
Roughhead grenadier (Rough rattail)  RHG 

Value (EUR) 

24.187.163
17.072.811
16.391.765
5.451.524
4.766.113
3.828.724
1.557.121
1.057.484
832.579
706.869
369.963
293.987
241.122
217.071
184.835
122.637
117.562
107.054
102.749

Source: Member states’ notifications to the deep-sea and economic data call 2010. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technical Annex X: Deep-sea related fleet segments with their economic performance 

a) Landings of regulated species by fleet segment which could be identified as being relevant for deep-sea metiers 

Fleet segment 

country 

gear 

length 

year 

Annex I 
species 

Weight 
Landings 
kg 

North 
Atlantic 

All 

Value 
Landings 
Euros 

North 
Atlantic 

Annex II 
species 

Weight 
Landings kg 

All 

North 
Atlantic 

All 

Value 
Landings 
Euros 

North 
Atlantic 

All 

Total 
Annex I & 
II species 

Weight 
Landings kg 

North 
Atlantic 

All 

Value 
Landings 
Euros 

North 
Atlantic 

All 

VL40XX 

2008 

*) 

DEU 

EST 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

FRA 

IRL 

LTU 

POL 

PRT 

PRT 

PRT 

DTS 

DTS 

DFN 

DFN 

DTS 

DTS 

DTS 

VL40XX 

VL2440 

VL40XX 

VL1824 

VL2440 

VL40XX 

HOK 

VL2440 

DTS 

DTS 

DTS 

HOK 

HOK 

HOK 

VL40XX 

VL40XX 

VL40XX 

VL0012 

VL1224 

VL24XX 

2008 

2008 

2008 

2008 

2008 

2008 

2008 

2008 

2008 

2008 

2008 

2008 

2008 

131.880 

24.682 

693.546 

462.340 

88.593 

306.974 

7.623 

131.880 

24.682 

703.555 

465.662 

88.593 

306.974 

7.623 

114.820 

114.820 

125.046 

289.264 

380.618 

125.046 

433.114 

397.315 

59.602 

60.700 

59.602 

60.700 

80.378 

5.864 

80.378 

5.864 

985.417 

266.588 

266.591 

143.262 

11.132 

863.037 

143.262 

11.132 

863.056 

131.880 

105.060 

5.864 

131.880 

105.060 

5.864 

59.602 

59.602 

203.962 

203.962 

11.132 

11.132 

960.134 

970.146 

1.831.574 

1.848.474 

607.458 

1.447.028 

1.447.049 

3.365.525 

3.365.610 

1.909.368 

1.912.711 

3.967.891 

3.973.067 

93.312 

5.093.858 

5.093.858 

13.276.721 

13.276.721 

5.182.451 

5.182.451 

13.370.033 

13.370.033 

590.977 

6.674 

37.520 

4.974 

6.023 

33.080 

4.974 

6.023 

33.080 

8.772 

7.040 

9.695 

8.772 

7.040 

9.695 

311.948 

13.645 

147.900 

311.948 

13.645 

147.900 

599.748 

599.748 

13.714 

47.215 

13.714 

47.215 

968.536 

602.366 

93.312 

590.977 

6.674 

37.520 

542.846 

542.846 

59.379 

59.379 

158.511 

158.511 

184.425 

184.425 

701.357 

701.357 

2.423.614 

3.444.422 

2.875.342 

3.422.430 

9.030.786 

10.257.810 

3.164.605 

3.855.544 

11.454.400 

13.702.233 

3.689.268 

3.851.241 

286.454 

358.855 

1.265.445 

1.387.656 

667.072 

756.170 

4.954.713 

5.238.898 

Grand Total 

2.625.385 

2.799.264 

9.075.416 

10.280.170 

10.158.966 

10.778.481 

28.139.925 

29.489.265 

12.784.352 

13.577.744 

37.215.342 

39.769.436 

*) data not contained for business secrecy reason, number of vessels too small  

DTS=demersal trawls and seines; DFN=Source drift and fixed nets; HOK: gears using hooks 

Source: Member states’ notifications to the deep-sea and economic data call 2010. 

b) Deep-sea landings by relevant fleet segment in comparison with overall landings 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
length 

year 

Fleet segment 

country  gear 
DEU 
EST 
FRA 
FRA 
FRA 
FRA 
FRA 
FRA 
IRL 
LTU 
POL 
PRT 
PRT 
PRT 
Grand Total 

DTS  VL40XX 
DTS  VL40XX 
DFN  VL2440 
DFN  VL40XX 
DTS  VL1824 
DTS  VL2440 
DTS  VL40XX 
HOK  VL2440 
DTS  VL40XX 
DTS  VL40XX 
DTS  VL40XX 
HOK  VL0012 
HOK  VL1224 
HOK  VL24XX 

total Weight Landings, kg 
North Sea 
& Eastern 
Artic 
*) 

North 
Atlantic 

all 

13.313.977 
0 
6.034.382 
0 
441.861 
0 
48.577.719 
0 
35.618.733 
0 
31.195.634 
0 
2.920.655 
0 
342.638 
0 
1.044.766 
764.566 
0 
5.424.840 
1.131.226 
0 
4.387.326 
1.078.494 
1.944.212 
2.080.802 
9.348.702  146.953.128 

13.313.977 
6.034.382 
441.861 
48.967.602 
37.705.265 
31.195.634 
2.920.655 
342.638 
1.809.332 
5.424.840 
1.131.226 
6.423.579 
11.593.048 
167.304.038 

Deep 
sea 
landings 
as % of 
total 
landings 

total Value Landings, EUR 
North Sea & 
Eastern 
Artic 

North Atlantic  all 

Deep 
sea 
value 
as % of 
total 
value 

1,0 
1,7 
1,3 
2,0 
5,1 
16,6 
10,7 
4,0 
8,2 
0,0 
16,3 
60,0 
6,5 
8,1 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
384.461 
0 
0 
0 
0 
384.461 

23.735.345 
25.871.040 
2.287.079 

23.735.345 
25.871.040 
2.287.079 
144.755.822  146.027.941 
86.631.588 
51.065.671 
11.139.769 
654.766 
1.853.379 
0 
4.120.852 
20.611.737 
28.123.115 
367.610.624  402.122.283 

82.202.684 
51.065.671 
11.139.769 
654.766 
1.094.596 
0 
4.120.852 
14.948.769 
5.734.230 

0,3 
0,8 
0,5 
1,3 
4,6 
26,2 
5,4 
2,1 
2,5 

17,0 
66,5 
18,6 
9,9 

2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 

*) data not contained for business secrecy reason, number of vessels too small 

Source: Member states’ notifications to the deep-sea and economic data call 2010.