COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Implementation of Article 325 by the Member States in 2011 Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND TO THE COUNCIL Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against fraud Annual Report 2011
Date: 2012-07-19
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU statistics, European Anti-fraud Office, activity report, common agricultural policy, data recording, economic and social cohesion, financial control, fraud against the EU, fund (EU)

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 19.7.2012  
SWD(2012) 227 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Implementation of Article 325 by the Member States in 2011 

Accompanying the document 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
TO THE COUNCIL 

Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against fraud 
Annual Report 2011 

{COM(2012) 408 final} 
{SWD(2012) 228 final} 
{SWD(2012) 229 final} 
{SWD(2012) 230 final} 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

2. 

2.1. 

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 4 

Summary of Member states’ contributions .................................................................. 5 

Qualitative evaluation: Improvements in the financial control and risk management 
system in order to prevent fraud against the EU financial interest .............................. 5 

2.1.1.  Measures taken in the period 2007-2011 which have substantially contributed to 
better prevention of cases of suspected fraud in the area of the Cohesion Policy 
or/and improvements in the risk management system. ................................................ 5 

2.1.2.  Description of the outcome of the measures taken in relation to prevention of 

suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds ........................................... 5 

2.1.3.  Use of new control and investigation strategies in order to reduce the risk of fraud 

and to better detect cases of fraud in the spending of the Cohesion Policy funds ....... 6 

2.1.4.  Use of fraud indicators ................................................................................................. 6 

2.1.5.  Financial controls systems sufficiently oriented towards detecting fraud ................... 7 

2.1.6. 

Improvements of the detection record.......................................................................... 7 

2.1.7.  Cost benefit analysis when conducting anti-fraud investigations ................................ 8 

2.1.8.  Has your Member State administration adopted guidelines to distinguish between 

fraud and irregularities? ............................................................................................... 8 

2.1.9.  How often do you audit the reporting of suspected fraud to OLAF?........................... 8 

2.1.10.  How often trainings have been given to staff dealing with reporting of suspected 

fraud to OLAF? ............................................................................................................ 8 

2.2. 

Statistical elements....................................................................................................... 8 

2.2.1.  Performed anti-fraud investigations and finalised criminal proceedings the end of 
2011, related to projects financed under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 
2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area ............................................................................. 8 

2.2.2.  Amounts recovered in relation to anti-fraud investigations pertaining to programming 
period 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 ................................................................................ 9 

2.2.3.  Personnel assigned and involved in anti-fraud investigations ................................... 10 

Annex: Replies of Member States to the questionnaire "Implementation of Article 325 TFEU 

by the Member States in 2011" .................................................................................. 13 

Key Developments Concerning The Implementation Of Article 325 Of The Treaty On The 

Functioning Of The European Union (TFEU) ........................................................... 13 

3. 

3.1. 

Controls To Combat Irregularities And Fraud Against The Financial Interests Of The 
EU In The Area Of Cohesion Policy.......................................................................... 31 

Qualitative evaluation: Improvements in the financial control and risk management 
system in order to prevent fraud against the EU financial interest ............................ 31 

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3.1.1.  Briefly describe three measures (within the national legal framework and or 

administrative procedures) taken in the period 2007-2011 which have substantially 
contributed to better prevention of cases of suspected fraud in the area of the 
Cohesion Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These 
measures could be disseminated as best practices among the MS............................. 31 

3.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the 

performed activities in relation to prevention of suspected fraud cases and recovery 
of misused EU funds terms of:? ................................................................................. 56 

3.1.3.  Based on the lessons learnt from the findings of the administrative investigations 

undertaken in the period of 2007-2011 which new control and investigation strategies 
has your Member State put in place or plans to put in place, in order to reduce the 
risk of fraud and to better detect cases of fraud in the spending of the Cohesion 
Policy funds?.............................................................................................................. 69 

3.1.4.  Use of fraud indicators ............................................................................................... 77 

3.1.5.  Comparing your Member State's suspected fraud record to the EU 25 average 

suspected fraud rate of 0.25% (as shown in the Commission report 2010 [8] for the 
programming period 2000-2006 in the area of Cohesion policy), do you consider 
your financial controls to be sufficiently oriented towards detecting fraud............... 86 

3.1.6.  How could the detection record be improved ............................................................ 90 

3.1.7.  Does your Member State apply cost benefit analysis when conducting anti-fraud 

investigations?............................................................................................................ 97 

3.1.8.  Has your Member State administration adopted guidelines to distinguish between 

fraud and irregularities? ............................................................................................. 99 

3.1.9.  How often do you audit the reporting of suspected fraud to OLAF?....................... 103 

3.1.10.  How often trainings have been given to staff dealing with reporting of suspected 

fraud to OLAF? ........................................................................................................ 104 

3.2. 

Statistical elements................................................................................................... 106 

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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Implementation of Article 325 by the Member States in 2011 

Accompanying the document 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
TO THE COUNCIL 

Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against fraud 
Annual Report 2011 

1. 

INTRODUCTION  

Article  325(5)  of  the  TFEU  (ex  article  280  of  the  EC  Treaty)  requires  the  Commission,  in 
cooperation with the Member States, to submit a report each year to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the measures taken to implement that Article. The Commission bases the 
part  of  the  report  relating  to  the  Member  States  on  the  answers  to  the  “Article  325” 
questionnaire, as agreed upon with them within COCOLAF and adapted each year in the light 
of past experience so as to facilitate the monitoring of anti-fraud measures. 

Consequently, each year, the Commission draws up a report in cooperation with the Member 
States  on  the  measures  taken  to  implement  this  obligation,  according  to  article  325  of  the 
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU).  This  report  is  addressed  to  the 
European Parliament and the Council and it is published. 

The Commission report is drafted on the basis of the Member States' answers to the "Article 
325" questionnaire sent by the Commission to the Members States. The present questionnaire 
covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2011. 

This document lists all the answers of Member States to the 2011 questionnaire. 

Over the time the report had become more and more voluminous. Both the Council and the 
European  Parliament  were  concerned  that  its  size  was  increasing  and  that  its  being  annual, 
horizontal  and  multisectoral  hampered  a  detailed  assessment  of  all  the  aspects  of  the 
protection of the EU’s financial interests by the Member States. Since 2003, the Commission 
has therefore applied a new approach. After the traditional question asking Members States to 
report on new measures taken in 2011, the questionnaire focuses on one major theme. The 
aim is to gather information on topics which go beyond the measures taken in the course of a 
calendar  year,  thereby  allowing  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  these  topics.  The  topics  change 
from year to year. 

As  in  the  previous  years,  the  first  part  of  the  questionnaire  asks  the  Member  States  to 
present the main measures that give effect to Article 325, i.e. measures to combat fraud and 
all illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the EU. This part is structured the same 
as  for  the  2011  questionnaire.  Member  States  are  invited  to  describe  two  or  three  "key" 
measures taken in the year 2011 in order to implement Article 325 of the Treaty. 

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The second set of questions concerns the controls to combat irregularities and fraud against 
the financial interests of the EU in the area of cohesion Policy. 

2. 

SUMMARY OF MEMBER STATES’ CONTRIBUTIONS  

2.1. 

Qualitative  evaluation:  Improvements  in  the  financial  control  and  risk 
management system in order to prevent fraud against the EU financial interest  

2.1.1.  Measures  taken  in  the  period  2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to 
better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion  Policy 
or/and improvements in the risk management system. 

All  Member  States  reported  measures  either  legislative  either  administrative  that  they  have 
taken  in  the  period  2007-2011.  In  the  views  of  the  Member  States,  these  have  substantially 
contributed  to  better  prevention  of  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion  Policy  and/or  to 
improvements in the risk management system. 

These  measures  concern  among  other  thing  the  eligibility  of  rules;  on  the  spot-cheks  and 
control;  reporting  and  processing  of  fraud  and  general  irregularities,  recovery  procedures, 
cross-check mecanisms to detect and eliminate cases of double financing of projects, public 
procurement  procedures,  introduction  of  penalties,  actions  to  counter  fraud  and  corruption, 
establishment of coordination bodies for combatting fraud affecting the financial interests of 
the EU, participation by staff in trainigs and seminars and prosecution of the beneficiaries and 
of anyone person involved in case of suspected fraud and corruption. 

2.1.2.  Description  of  the  outcome  of  the  measures  taken  in  relation  to  prevention  of 

suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds  

Member  States  reported  as  outcome  of  the  above  mentionned  measures  on  the  performed 
activities in relation to prevention of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds 

• 

in terms of effectiveness and efficiancy of operations: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

the  strong  proactive  approach  with  more  irregularities  detected  before 
payment1; 

the decreased number of irregularities2;  

the elimination of cases of suspected fraud3; 

the  reduction  of  errors  in  tenders  and  more  effective  controls  on  expenditure 
and public procurement procedures4; 

the  greater  discipline  and  transparency  of  the  whole  process  of  the  project 
implementation5; 

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 

Except Greece and France. 
DK, ES, IE, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SI, SE, UK 
BG, CZ, EL, EE and UK. 
BE, EE, HU, MT 
CZ, BG, AT 

EN 

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• 

in terms of reliability of financial reporting: 

– 

the  higher  proportion  of  accepted  eligible  amounts  by  the  beneficiary  to  the 
managing authorities6; 

• 

in terms of compliance with the applicable rules: 

Some  Member  States7  mentioned  the  preventive  impact  of  the  Commission 
Guidelines  on  public  procurement8,  the  Commission  Note  on  fraud  indicators9,  the 
national provisions on public procurement, the Irregularities Notification Manual and 
Guidelines and the provisions of Articles 27 to 36 (Irregularities) of Regulation (EC) 
No 1828/2006.  

2.1.3.  Use of new control and investigation strategies in order to reduce the risk of fraud 
and to better detect cases of fraud in the spending of the Cohesion Policy funds 

Based  on  the  lessons  learnt  from  the  finding,  the  majority  of  Member  States10  reported  as 
measures put in place in order to reduce the risk of fraud and to better detect cases of fraud in 
the  spending  of  the  Cohesion  Policy  funds  the  establishment  of  National  strategies  (e.g 
antifraud committees, audit activities to prevent and detect irregularities, …) a number11 the 
establishment  of  Regional  strategies  while  a  number  of  Member  States12  use  the  'types  of 
operations'  (development  of  various  sorts  of  preventive  measures  -including  preliminary 
procurement  checks,  further  cooperation  with  law  enforcement  officers,  performance  of 
broader-scale management checks at the behest of the MA. One Member State13 reported that 
the current arrangements for checks appear to serve their purpose and restrict to a satisfactory 
extent  the  risk  of  irregularities  while  two  other  Member  States14  reported  that  no  new 
strategies were put in place or planned during the reporting period as they are satisfied with 
existing.  

2.1.4.  Use of fraud indicators  
Most  of  the  Member  States15  make  use  of  general  and  or  specific  indicators  (Categories  of 
irregularities;  Categories  of  economic  operators;  Categories  of  operations;  Categories  of 
modus operandi; Economic sectors; Geographical areas, of Projects; Transactions; Individual 
economic  operators),  that  may  contribute  to  fraud  detection  and  to  the  improvement  of  the 
results of anti-fraud control activities. However, they mentioned that consider that fraud is no 
linked only to certain economic operators, economic sectors or categories of operation. As all 
cases  are  different,  the  rapid  exchange  of  information  is  used  to  detect  irregularities/fraud 
schemes.  

6 
7 
8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 

DE, ES, IE, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, NL, PL, PT, RO, FI and UK  
BG, DE, EE, EL, ES, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, RO, SI, SK, SE and UK. 
Guidelines for determining financial corrections to be made to expenditure co-financed by the structural 
funds or the cohesion fund for non-compliance with the rules on public procurement: COCOF 
07/0037/03-EN. 
Information Note on fraud indicators for the ERDF, ESF and CF (COCOF 09/0003/00-EN). 
BG, CZ, EE, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, PT, RO, SI, SK and FI, 
BE, UK. 
DE, EL, LV 
PL 
NL, UK 
BG, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, FR,IT, CY, LU, LV, HU, MT, PL PT, RO, SI, SK, UK 

EN 

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In addition, the use of general fraud indicators are indentified in certain Member States16, in a 
Manual  or  Guide  for  Audit  of  EU  Funds,  contains  fraud  indicators  providing  help  and 
orientation  for  the  Audit  Authority  employees  in  their  audit  activity,  system  of  preliminary 
checks of procurement.  

Most  Member  States17  replied  that  they  use  general  indicators  to  redirect  their  controls  and 
that  these  contribute  to  detecting  fraud  and  to  improving  the  results  of  anti-fraud  control 
activities.  

Some fraud indicators are identified as: 

-  non-compliance  with  legislation  in  the  area  of  public  procurement,  corruption 
practices,  undeclared  conflict  of  interests,  agreements  inconsistent  with  the  law, 
manipulation  of  financial  results,  unusual  financial  transactions18;  un  –transparent 
procurement procedure; submission of false date that is difficult to check 19. 

A limited number of Member States20 reported that they do not use fraud indicators 
as  all  projects  are  checked  at  least  once  in  their  lifetime  or  twice  or  not  applicable 
due  to  low  level  of  fraud  detected  thus  far  or  all  working  methods  are  geared  to 
uncovering fraud and identifying irregularities in the early stage of the process. 

2.1.5.  Financial controls systems sufficiently oriented towards detecting fraud 

All the Member States consider their financial control to be sufficiently targeted on detecting 
fraud..  Most  of  them  consider  that  the  established  control  structures  and  mechanisms  have 
strengthened desk checks of public procurement procedures held on the spot checks of project 
implementation. On double side answer the less positive aspect was regarding the competence 
of officials which must be improved21.  

2.1.6. 

Improvements of the detection record 

Most  of  Member  States  presented  concrete  aspects  through  the  detection  record 
could  be  improved.  Human,  technical  and  financial  resources  are  proposed  mostly 
for improving fraud detection22.  

- Human aspects – enhancing administrative capacity, training of competent staff23 

- Financial – increase of financial resources, as to reduce the risk of corrupt attitudes 
and practices, competitive wage24;  

-  Technical  -  the  drawing  up  of  a  handbook  and  compilation  of  best  practices, 
development of a common platform and databases, database access and checks25. 

16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 

BG, HU, PT, RO 
BG, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, IE, HU, MT, PL, RO, SI, SK and UK. 
BG, EE 
BG; EE, ES, DE., LV 
BE, DK, IE, NL, 
EE, SI 
BE, BG, CZ, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, SE 
BE, BG, CZ, DE, EE, ES, LT, HU, MT, CY, PL, PT, SI , SK, FI, UK 
BG, CZ, EE, ES, IT, CY, LT, LU, , MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, SE, SK  
BE, DE, LV, LT, AT, RO, SI, SE, UK,HU 

EN 

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2.1.7.  Cost benefit analysis when conducting anti-fraud investigations  

A  limited  number  of  Member  States26  reported  that  they  apply  cost  benefit  analysis  when 
conducting anti-fraud investigations and the majority of Member States27 replied no as fraud 
is  investigated  irrespective  of  the  amount  involved,  and  all  incidences  of  irregularities  and 
fraud detected are pursued.  

2.1.8.  Has  your  Member  State  administration  adopted  guidelines  to  distinguish  between 

fraud and irregularities?  

Most  of  Member  States  answered  positive  to  this  question.  Many  of  them  replied  that  the 
distinction based on The EU legal framework (PIF Regulation and PIF Convention).  

2.1.9.  How often do you audit the reporting of suspected fraud to OLAF?  

Most of Member Sates replied that they audit the reporting of suspected fraud annually and 
another part declared biannually.  

2.1.10.  How  often  trainings  have  been  given  to  staff  dealing  with  reporting  of  suspected 

fraud to OLAF? 

The replies vary from biannually to nover.  

2.2. 

Statistical elements 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  the  end  of 
2011,  related  to  projects  financed  under  the  programming  periods  2000-2006  and 
2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area 

All  Member  States  reported  on  performed  anti-fraud  investigations  and  finalised  criminal 
proceedings related to projects financed under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-
2013  in  Cohesion  Policy  area.  Some  Member  States  included  the  obligatory  'on-the-spot-
checks'  provided  for  in  the  EU  regulations  in the  framework  of  the  anti-fraud  administative 
investigations. In a number of Member States, the possibility of cases of fraud is checked by 
performing on-the-spot checks, payments claim checks, preliminary procurement checks and 
sample  checks  of  systems  audits  and  experience.  If  suspicion  arises,  additional  checks  are 
carried  out  and,  where  necessary,  a  report  is  lodged  with  the  law  enforcement.  In  some 
Members States, the administrative fraud investigations are treated separatly.  

Some  large  Member  States28  reported  a  very  limited  number  of  ongoing  criminal 
investigations.  Some  Member  States29  provided  valuable  data  on  anti-fraud  investigations 
performed and criminal proceedings completed, but others30 provided no data concerning the 
criminal proceedings completed along with the court decisions.  

The table 1 bellow summarises the data reported by the Member States: 

26

27
28 
29 
30 

BG,CZ, FR,EL, IT, MT, RO 
BE, DK, EE, ES, IE, LU, NL, AT, PL, PT, SI, SK, FI, SE, UK 
DE, FR and ES. 
BG, CZ, EE, HU, PL, PT, SK and SE. 
DE, EL, ES, FR, IT, LT, LU, HU, AT and RO. 

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
                                                 
 
 
MS

BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
UK

Total number of anti-fraud administrative 
investigations (including on-the-spot checks)

Total number of criminal 
investigations

The number of finalised criminal proceedings 
with the court decision (guilty or not guilty)

615
2.867
404
3
no data available
68
5
SDOE : 41 ; EDEL : 1227
4

N/A
26.944

24

N/A

N/A

1.429
423
38
2
2

766
9.630
56
4
148
17.039

51

0
2.293
13
3

19
3
7
13

0

60
19
338
0
2

265
112
1.371
4
225
7

166 preliminary investigations 

23

0
245
5
3
no data available
11
0
no data available
no data available
no data available
161
0
1
no data available
no data available
50
0
2
no data available
60
30
no data available
0
102
3
42
5

2.2.2.  Amounts  recovered 

in  relation 

to  anti-fraud 

investigations  pertaining 

to 

programming period 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 

The information provided by the Member States concerning the amounts recovered in relation 
to  anti-fraud  investigations  pertaining  to  programminig  periods  2000-2006  and  2007-2013 
indicates that the data are not homogenous and sequentially could not be comparable. In fact, 
no link could be established between the reported in the Irregularity Management System and 
those reported under this exercise. Two Member States31 reported large amounts and only one 
third32  reported  that  amounts  above  EUR 1 million  had  been  recovered  following  an  anti-
fraud investigation. For another third33 the amounts reported in this exercise are of low value, 
while some Member States34 reported no amount at all or indicated as” non applicable”. Two 
Member  States35  indicate  that  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  irregular  amounts  have  been 
deducted  before  the  payment  claim  of  expenditure  conncerned  has  been  presented  to  the 
Commission. 

The table 2 bellow summarises the amounts recovered reported by the Member States related 
to admisistative and criminal investigations: 

31 
32 
33 
34 
35 

IT and PT. 
BG, EE, ES, IT, LV, LT, PT, SK, FI and UK. 
BE, CZ, IE and RO. 
DE, EL, FR, HU, MT, AT, SE and SI. 
DK, CY 

EN 

9 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
MS

BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
IT
CY

LV
LT
LU

HU
MT
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
UK

Amounts recovered (excluding 
financial penalties and interests) in 
10.018
1.461.165
2.582
973.607

3.021.725
31.343

15.041.348

516.653.844 *

one case identified that related to fraud, 
involving an amount of €5.000 (public 

1.515.736
4.497.566
Irregularities: €44 000 (ESF)5.791.800 

533.250

3.031.418
597.573.777 *
76.895
0
1.951.783
24.520.146
N/A
1.050.000

Amounts of financial penalties in €

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0
5.800.504
15.718
973.607

0
0

N/A

306.656

N/A
13.875.310
N/A

N/A
unknown

224.805

0
7.591

0

*(figure  subject  to  variation;  figure  does  not  include  the  total  value  of  property  seizures  by  the  Guardia  di 
Finanza in the context of criminal proceedings, which is € 322 181 684.00) 

2.2.3.  Personnel assigned and involved in anti-fraud investigations 

Finally  the  table  3  below  summarises  the  situation  with  regard  to  personnel  assigned  and 
involved  in  anti-fraud  investigations.  The  data  shows  that  a  number  of  Member  States 
included  all  staff  involved  in  systems  audits  and  even  in  audits  of  transactions  because  this 
staff may be involved in anti-fraud operations. As in the case of point 1.2.2 the reported data 
with regard to the personnel assigned are not homogenous and sequentially not comparable; 
hence conclusions are difficult to be drawn.  

The table 3 bellow summarises the number of personnel assigned and involved in ant-fraud 
investigations for the period 2007-2011 

EN 

10 

   EN 

 
 
MS

BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE

EL
ES
FR

IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
UK

Personnel assigned and involved in anti-fraud 
investigations 2007-2011)
44
64
17
3
no data available
217

Fraud investigation undertaken by: An Garda 
Siochana (Police Force) -  and the Management 
and Internal Audit Unit of FAS 

SDOE : 313 ; EDEL : 491
6
All staff involved in systems audits and audits of 
transactions may be involved in anti-fraud 
operations.

3.634
N/A
293
125
9
1.120
2
0
N/A
1.343
347
25
0
317
750
13,5
16

In  conclusion,  the  Member  States’  responses  to  the  questionnaire  point  to  improvements  in 
the  financial  control  and  risk  management  system  to  prevent  fraud  in  the  area  of  cohesion 
policy.  These  include  legal  provisions  and  guidelines,  national  or  regional  strategies,  use  of 
risk indicators, administrative procedures and cooperation between national authorities. 

Conversely,  further  progress  is  needed  on  monitoring  the  results  of  the  administrative  and 
criminal anti-fraud investigations, including recovery of the amounts concerned36. 

It  is  also  clear  that  better  fraud  statistics  are  necessary  so  that  the  Commission  and  the 
Member  States  can  focus  their  efforts  in  higher-risk  areas.  In  that  respect,  the  Commission 
intends to put more emphasis in the reporting in this area. 

36 

EN 

See  Tables  1  and  2  of  the  relevant  Commission  Staff  Working  Paper  accompanying  this  report,  pp.  9-11,  which 
summarise the data reported by the Member States. 

11 

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ANNEX: REPLIES OF MEMBER STATES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE "IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 325 TFEU BY THE MEMBER STATES IN 2011" 

1. 

KEY DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 325 OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (TFEU) 

Maximum three most important legislative or administrative measures taken in the course of 2011 for the protection of the EU’s financial interests 
and  the  fight  against  fraud.  These  should  be  measures  adopted  at  Member  State’s  own  initiative  and  not  measures  which  simply  transpose  EU 
legislation. 

In particular, Member States are asked to indicate:  

•  Type of measure (law, regulation, etc.) and references (number, date of adoption and/or publication, name of programme, etc.) 

•  Its scope (horizontal, specific field) 

•  Why it was needed 

•  Improvements made to the existing system. (see Annex). 

BE 

Prosecution Service: College of Public Prosecutors  
1.1. Law of 14 April 2011 on various provisions (including Articles 55-57 on the lifting of bank secrecy in cases where there is evidence of 
tax evasion) (published 6 May 2011). 
Since 1 July 2011 the tax authorities have been able to access information held by financial institutions about taxpayers if there is evidence of 
tax  fraud  within  the  meaning  of  the  law  of  14  April  2001  amending  the  1992  Income  Tax  Code  (CIR  92).  This  possibility  of  access  to 
banking information also extends to foreign tax authorities bound by a cooperation agreement with Belgium in the framework of reciprocal 
exchanges of banking information where there is evidence of tax fraud. In such cases the principle of banking secrecy no longer applies and 
is no longer enforceable.  
In its report of 12 September 2011 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that Belgium had adopted 
an adequate legislative framework for the transfer of tax data on foreign taxpayers; its implementation will be discussed in more detail by the 
OECD in 2012 (www.oecd.org). 

1.2. The law of 11 July 2011 amending Articles 216bis and 216ter of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 7 of the law of 6 June 2010 
introducing the Social Penal Code (published 1 August 2011).  

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This legislative change enables the prosecution service to offer plea bargaining through the payment to the Federal Public Finance Service of 
a sum of money proportionate to the seriousness of the charges for all offences, including economic and financial (ECOFIN) offences liable 
to punishment by imprisonment not exceeding two years or to a more severe sanction, including confiscation, not entailing serious physical 
damage, at any stage of the proceedings even if the examining magistrate has already started investigations or the case is already in court, if 
the suspect or defendant expresses a desire to make good the wrong caused to another person, provided that no judgment or decision with the 
force of res judicata has been issued. This judicial measure should make it easier to act more quickly and more appropriately by shortening 
proceedings in minor cases of fraud prejudicial to the interests of the European Union. 

1.3. (Internal) Memo No 9/2011 of 10 May 2011 from the federal prosecutor's office (parquet fédéral) on international cooperation in relation 
to collaboration between the Belgian federal prosecutor's office and OLAF. 
This  general  memo  regulates  international  cooperation  between  the  federal  prosecutor's  office  and  OLAF,  and  describes  the  role  of  each 
within  their  respective  jurisdictions.  It  also  sets  out  the  principles  governing  OLAF  investigations,  taking  into  account  the  specific 
environment in which these investigations are conducted. 

After setting out the principles of OLAF's powers of investigation in the EU countries, paragraph 8 of this memo provides that the initial 
processing  of  a  file  from  OLAF  should  be  carried  out  by  the  federal  prosecutor's  office,  which  acts  as  the  central  contact  point  for 
international legal institutions, including OLAF.  
Notification  of  files  on  acts  constituting  fraud  against  the  interests  of  the  EU  should  be  sent  by  OLAF  to  the  federal  prosecutor's  office, 
which will deal with all those destined for the Brussels prosecutor's office at federal level in the interests of uniformity of prosecution and 
will deal with those destined for other offices on a case-by-case basis with a view to federalising them as well.  
This measure to centralise OLAF cases will prevent their dispersion among different national judicial authorities and will mark a significant 
improvement  in  the  quality  of  their  handling,  which  will  henceforth  be  standardised  at  national  level  by  the  federal  prosecutor's  office, 
including the choice of the police force to conduct the investigation, usually the federal police. 
On the subject of prosecution policy, point 4.2 of the memo sets out the general principle of 'zero tolerance' in the investigation of 'internal' 
cases brought by OLAF. 
This general memo also falls within the framework of the criminal policy guidelines set out in the circular on OLAF from the College of 
Public Prosecutors of 23 July 2003 (COL 9/2003), which also provides for the sending of a copy of the charges to the main coordinator of the 
College's ECOFIN experts network. 

BG 

1. Act Amending and Supplementing the Public Procurement Act (State Gazette (SG) No 93 of 25 November 2011). The adopted law has 
changed the model for exercising ex-ante control of public procurement procedures that are either fully or partially financed by the EU. The 
model  involves  control  of  the  contract  notices,  the  methodology  of  evaluation  of  the  tenders  and,  in  certain  cases,  the  procedures  and 
decisions for launching procedures. Control will be exercised in two stages: before and after the publication of the contract notice, which will 

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allow a follow-up check of results. The existing practice of exercising joint control by the Public Procurement Agency and the respective 
Managing Authorities or Intermediate Bodies will be discontinued and only the Agency will be vested with these powers. The anticipated 
result of exercising ex-ante control is to cover an increased number of procedures and raise their level of compliance with the law. The law 
envisages  a  possibility  for  a  contracting  authority  to  appoint  a  commission  to  inspect  information  submitted  by  the  applicants.  The 
commission may request additional details from the applicants as well as from other bodies and persons. Under a new provision an applicant 
may be disqualified on the grounds of supplying false information to certify compliance with the selection requirements. The new law also 
introduces a new template for a "decision on change". It allows the contracting authority the possibility to change the terms of the procedure 
once within 14 days of its opening. It stipulates that every interested party is eligible to request the contracting authority to make changes. 
This will allow the elimination of infringements and missing information, including those established during the ex-ante control of the Public 
Procurement Agency, without the need to terminate the procedure. Therefore, time is saved and unnecessary appeals delaying the procedure 
are avoided. The change does not affect the time schedule of public procurement procedures and does not prejudice the right of the interested 
party to appeal any decision, action or inaction of the contracting authority. 

2. Act Amending and Supplementing the Public Financial Inspection Act (SG No 60 of 5 August 2011). The legislative framework that was 
in force prior to these changes did not allow the Public Financial Inspection Agency (ADFI), on its own initiative and following an analysis 
of reports on public procurement activities, to identify contracting authorities subject to control. This prompted a change to the model of ex-
post control by the introduction of a new function and regulation of financial controls for awarding and implementing public procurement 
contracts, conducted periodically by ADFI on the basis of an approved annual schedule. The amendments to the Public Financial Inspections 
Act  and  the  introduction  of  a  new  function  of  conducting  scheduled  financial  inspections  make  it  possible  to  identify  the  specific  public 
procurement contracting authorities, subject to control for the respective year, on the basis of an analysis of reports on their performance and 
assessment of risk factors. The new law allows for extending the scope of the exercised control so as to focus on the contracting authorities 
that entail the highest risk. Therefore, more efficient prevention will be ensured and the risk of unregulated disbursement of public finances 
will be reduced.  

3. Act Amending and Supplementing the Customs Act (SG No 82 of 21 October 2011). The amended law vests customs authorities with the 
following powers:  

-  investigation  of  customs  offences  through  the  establishment  of  the  institute  of  the  investigating  customs  inspector  (Article  10а  of  the 
Customs Act); 

- detention, for a period of 24 hours, of persons for customs, currency and tax offences as set out in Articles 234, 242, 242а, 251, 255 and 256 
of the Criminal Code (Articles 16а and 16b of the Customs Act). 

Paragraph  10  of  the  Final  Provisions  of  the  Act  Amending  and  Supplementing  the  Customs  Act  changes  the  Excise  Duties  and  Tax 
Warehouses Act (ZADS) and invests police officers with the power to issue statements of administrative infringement, as set out in Article 

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123(1), (2) and (6) of ZADS (offences related to the sale of goods without excise duty stamps, respectively, forged stamps or ones that have 
expired or goods that have a DUTY FREE stamp but are sold outside duty free commercial outlets). In these cases the issuing of penal orders 
and the conducting of criminal proceedings remain within the competence of the Customs Agency. Police authorities will be competent only 
to institute criminal proceedings (Article 128(3) of ZADS).  

Administrative measures  

1.  An  order  of  the  Minister  of  Finance  approved  a  new  administrative  structure  of  the  Operational  Programme  Administrative  Capacity 
(OPAC) Directorate under the Ministry of Finance. A new department, Control and Irregularities, has been established to ensure prevention, 
ex-ante  and  ex-post  control  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  and  reducing  irregularities  and  suspected  fraud  with  regards  to  OPAC-financed 
projects. The restructuring covers a specific area and is prompted by the need for additional separation and clarification of the main functions 
of the OPAC Managing Authority carried out by the respective departments. It is prompted by the European Commission audit report on the 
OPAC management and control system, recommendations of the Executive Agency Audit of European Union Funds and of the Anti-fraud 
Coordination  Service  (AFCOS)  Directorate  under  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  The  improvements  of  the  existing  system  are  aimed  at 
strengthening the control mechanism at the OPAC Managing Authority, including combating irregularities and fraud, reducing the number of 
prevented  and  detected  irregularities  and  attempted  fraud  within  OPAC  projects  and  accelerating  the  procedures  for  recovery  of  unduly 
received sums. The control mechanism is detailed in the updated Handbook for OPAC Implementation, effective as from 18 May 2011. 

2. The Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Interior and Chair of the Council for Coordination of the Combat of Fraud Affecting the Financial 
Interests of the EU issued an order on the establishment of a Standing Working Group on Irregularities. The Working Group has two heads 
and  a  secretary,  nominated  by  AFCOS  under  the  Ministry  of  Interior,  while  its  34  members  are  nominated  by  the  competent  institutions, 
represented  in  the  Council  and  involved  in  the  management,  audit  and  certification  of  the  EU  funds  disbursement.  The  Working  Group 
carries  out  analytical  activity,  resolves  problematic  and  controversial  cases  involving  irregularities,  and  establishes  benchmarks  for  the 
settlement of identical problems; discusses errors made on a regular basis by the officers in charge of irregularities; exchanges experience, 
good practices and information about new practices; analyses and summarises information about more typical irregularities, cases, opinions 
etc, so as to compile them into a handbook when enough of these are gathered; where necessary, acts on requests for information, on-spot 
checks or assistance by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)/European Commission. 

3.  Specialised  training  and  exchange  of  experience  between  the  Italian  and  Bulgarian  authorities  in  the  implementation  of  the  project  on 
sharing of Italian experience in prevention and countering fraud against EU funds with the competent Bulgarian authorities. The project was 
implemented under the Hercule II Programme. The project beneficiary was Guardia di Finanza and AFCOS Directorate, under the Ministry 
of Interior, the Bulgarian partner within the project.  

In  the  period  23  January  to  11  February  2011,  25  prosecutors,  investigators,  police  investigators  and  experts  working  in  the  field  of 
administrative and criminal investigation of fraud involving EU funds were trained under the project at the structures of Guardia di Finanza. 

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The training was conducted in two stages: a theoretical module at the police school of Guardia di Finanza in Lido di Ostia from 23 January to 
6 February and practical training in four regional structures of Guardia di Finanza in Italy from 7 February to 11 February. 

The results achieved during training and the possibilities for the Italian experience to be used by the Bulgarian competent authorities were 
discussed and summarised during the conclusive module of the project held at the Interior Ministry Academy in Sofia on 17-18 February 
2011. The Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, Chair of the Council for Coordination of the Combat of Fraud Affecting the Financial 
Interests of the EU and the Italian Ambassador in Sofia all took part. 

CZ 

Amendments to the binding procedures for the award of contracts co-financed from EU resources not covered by Act 137/2006 on public 
procurement for the 2007-2013 programming period (approved by means of Government Resolution No 48/2009). Table of penalties drawn 
up in line with COCOF (Guidelines for determining financial corrections to be made to expenditure co-financed by the Structural Funds or 
the Cohesion Fund for non-compliance with the rules on public procurement) with a view to harmonising penalties relating to the awarding 
of  contracts  co-financed  from  EU  resources  not  covered  by  Act  137/2006.  An  amendment  to  Act  137/2006,  which  was  intended  to  be  a 
significant improvement in the fight against corruption, is currently going through the legislative procedure (expected to enter into force on 1 
January 2012). The major changes introduced by the amendment include a lower threshold of CZK 1 million triggering an obligation to issue 
a  call  for  tender  for  supplies  and  services,  and  CZK  3  million  for  construction  (the  current  thresholds  are  2  million  and  6  million, 
respectively,  excluding  VAT).  Another  change  is  an  obligation  to  disclose  information  about  the  final  price.  The  Act  also  lays  down  an 
obligation to advertise all contracts for a value exceeding CZK 500 000. 

DK 

No significant new measures were taken in 2011 for the protection of the EU's financial interests and the fight against fraud. 

DE  Measures to reduce ineligible expenditure and reduce the risk of corruption: 

- On 1 June 2001, amendments to the Law on the prevention of conflicts of interest in the activities of State officials entered into force. The 
amendments provide for the legal protection of individuals who have given information on State officials' conflicts of interest. Pursuant to 
the amendments, the head of a central or local government authority, person responsible for preventing conflicts of interest and corruption at 
the  relevant  authority,  or  a  collegiate  body  are  prohibited  from  disclosing  information  that  has  become  known  to  them  concerning  which 
official or member of staff of the relevant central or local government authority has provided information on conflicts of interest. Neither are 
they permitted to directly or indirectly create unfavourable consequences for the individual without due cause. The prohibition to disclose 
information  does  not  apply  to  the  provision  of  information  to  the  Corruption  Prevention  and  Combating  Bureau  (KNAB),  State  Police, 
Constitutional Defense Bureau, court or prosecutor's office. Information on conflicts of interest of which a State official is aware and which 
involve other State officials of the particular government body must be provided to the head of that body or to the KNAB. Information held 
by a State official employed by the State security services is provided to the Director of the Constitutional Defense Bureau. 

- On 20 July 2011 amendments to Article 166.33 of the Administrative Infringements Code entered into force. These amendments establish 

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administrative  liability  relating  to  the  infringement  of  the  aforementioned  ban  on  disclosing  information  relating  to  a  person  who  has 
provided information on the conflicts of interest of another State official, and the creation of unfavourable consequences for the informant 
without due cause. This legal protection is necessary to ensure the protection of whistleblowers, which could help prevent infringements and 
make them easier to detect, thereby reducing the risk of corruption and potentially mitigating the threat to the EU's financial interests.  

- In 2011 amendments were made to Cabinet Regulation No 410 of 26 June 2007 laying down the procedure according to which the bodies 
involved in the management of the EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund prepare programming documents and implement the funds. The 
amendments state that from now on, preliminary checks of procurement will be intensified, with the aim of preventing procurement-related 
infringements.  It  is  anticipated  that  from  2  December  2012  onwards,  preliminary  procurement  checks  will  be  carried  out  not  only  by  the 
Procurement  Monitoring  Bureau  (PMB),  but  also  by  the  Responsible  Authorities  (RA)/Liaison  Bodies  (LB).  Along  with  performing  the 
checks, the PMB will also provide methodological guidance. A method has already been devised which the RA/LB have to incorporate into 
their procedures and apply when carrying out preliminary procurement checks. Furthermore, the PMB has the responsibility of keeping the 
methodology up-to-date and in line with the latest changes to legislation or EU case law. Beyond this, the PMB will also ensure that regular 
meetings are held with the persons carrying out the preliminary checks of RA/LB procurement, in order to discuss practices and develop a 
common understanding of procurement infringements. 

-  To  prevent  irregularities  in  projects  implemented  by  State  authorities,  the  issue  of  making  disciplinary  penalties  more  stringent  was 
considered  at  the  Cabinet  meeting  of  8  March  2011  at  the  initiative  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  In  addition  a  proposal  has  been  made  to 
consider whether to establish a similar system of penalties at the local government level. 

Measures to recover ineligible expenditure 

- On 10 January 2011 the Guidelines for reporting irregularities in the implementation of EU funds and the recovery of undue expenditure in 
the 2007-13 programming period were updated. The guidelines were broadened to cover the identification of cases of fraud, information on 
potential situations in which the project will need to be the subject of increased scrutiny, in what cases the law enforcement authorities need 
to be contacted, and other clarifications added. 

–  On  26  June  2011  the  Guidelines  for  applying  financial  corrections  to  projects  financed  from  EU  Fundwere  updated.  Annex  2  to  the 
Guidelines  was  fundamentally  updated  and  supplemented  with  practical  examples,  based  on  experience,  of  how  a  proportionate  financial 
correction is applied. 

Training: on 27 May 2011 the Managing Authority for the EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund held a training course for prosecutors, 
which covered a range of EU-funds-related issues, including the nature and identification of irregularities etc. 

EE 

1.Government of the Republic Regulation No 278 'Conditions and procedure for recovering and repaying aid and for providing information 

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on irregularities arising during the granting and use of aid'. Amendments entered into force on 8 July 2011, in part on 1 January 2012. 

- The Act further specified the requirements for public procurements below the public procurement threshold. - The amendments standardise 
the rules, comparable errors will result in equivalent recoveries. 

Irregularities 

- 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/13348007?leiaKehtiv  

procurements 

public 

in 

are 

increasingly 

being 

detected, 

sanctions 

have 

been 

harmonised 

IE 

ES 

2.  On  13  February  2011  amendments  to  the  2007-2013  Structural  Assistance  Act  entered  into  force.  Expenditure  must  be  linked  to  the 
supported project and may not already have been reimbursed from EU funds; restriction on the granting of funds to local governments whose 
debt  obligations  exceed  the  permitted  threshold;  stopping  aid  payments  by  the  implementing  body,  i.e.  where  there  is  doubt  as  to  the 
continued viability of the project for further information to be requested and investigation to be carried out - Amendments further define and 
harmonise the rules - Emphasising the ban on double-financing helps reduce the risks and encourages the implementing bodies to carry out 
more thorough checks https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/103022011002  

N/A 

Law 6/2011 of the 30th of June, which amends the Law of 12/1995 of the fight against contraband (Ley Orgánica 6/2011, de 30 de junio, 
modifica la Ley Orgánica 12/1995 de represión del contrabando) 

To guarantee proper and fair trading and to protect EU financial interests, Spanish legislation classifies certain types of associated conduct as 
smuggling.  In  particular,  and  in  line  with  this  objective,  Spain  classifies  as  an  offence  actions  intended  to  illicitly  introduce  goods,  in 
complement to the regulation of offences affecting EU finances provided for in the Penal Code and amended in 2010. As a result, the reform 
undertaken  is  likely  to  have  an  impact  on  EU  financial  interests,  and  specifically  the  duties  of  the  customs  authorities  as  regards  the 
avoidance of customs controls and the payment of EU resources. 

The key points of the reform in relation to the part directly concerning the illicit introduction of goods are as follows: 

- Increase in the quantitative assessment threshold of goods for the re-classification as an unlawful offence as opposed to an administrative 
infringement. 

-  Increase  in  the  maximum  sentences  for  the  offence  and  the  maximum  pecuniary  fines  for  committing  offences  and  for  administrative 
smuggling infringements.  

- Regulation of the system of criminal responsibility for legal persons similar to that provided for in the Penal Code for offences affecting 
national or EU public finances. 

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- Specific inclusion in the concept of civil responsibility arising from the offence of unpaid tax and customs liabilities, which the authorities 
have not been able to clear for any legal grounds provided for in national or EU legislation.  

- Specific introduction by the tax authorities of an assistance mechanism for judges and courts to impose fines and civil responsibility. 

-  Introduction  as  an  aggravating  factor  of  the  sanction  for  an  administrative  smuggling  infringement  of  the  filing  of  an  incorrect  customs 
statement with the intention of avoiding the computerised control thereof.  

Decision of 2 February 2011 of the Directorate-General of the State Tax Authority establishing new wording for the general guidelines of the 
general plan for tax control 

The introduction of these guidelines is intended to promote and give greater visibility to the action against fraud in 2011 so as to optimise 
their use as a tool in the prevention of and fight against tax fraud 

Ley 6/2011, de 23 de marzo, de Subvenciones de la Comunidad Autónoma de Extremadura [Law No 6 of 23 March 2011 on grants of the 
Autonomous Community of Extremadura]. 

In the Autonomous Community of Extremadura (administrative measures): boosting physical or material inspections of subsidised projects 
or assets to obtain sufficient evidence of the investment having been carried out. 

EL 

(1)  Articles  1  and  2  of  Law  3932/2011  (Government  Gazette  49/10.3.2011)  established  the  ‘Authority  for  the  Prevention  of  Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and for Control of Declarations of Assets.’ In this way the pre-existing Committee under Article 
7  of  Law  3691/2008  was  upgraded  to  an  Authority  for  combating  three  particularly  harmful  types  of  criminal  behaviour:  (a)  money 
laundering, (b) the financing of terrorism, and (c) unlawful enrichment. 

(2)  Law  3961/2011  (Government  Gazette  97/29.4.2011),  revised  the  existing  law  on  the  responsibility  of  ministers.  It  provided  for  the 
following:  

• The extension of the time limitation of crimes of ministers, in line with what applies to ordinary citizens; 

• The possibility of imposing restrictive conditions on ministers, such as a ban on leaving the country; 

• The compulsory seizure of the financial gains associated with the criminal offence under investigation, by decision of the Parliamentary 
Committee; 

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• The possibility of freezing accounts, securities and financial products. 

(3) Under Law 3843/2011 amending the National Customs Code (Law 2960/01), Article 157(1)(C) of Law 2960/01 was replaced; as a result 
for large cases of duty and tax evasion of over €150 000, the penalties are more severe and punishable by the competent criminal courts as 
serious crimes, with no upper limit on sentencing. 

Government Decree No 501/2011 on the eligibility of expenditure co-financed by the structural funds. Under this Decree, a percentage of the 
indirect  expenditure  on  structural  fund  projects  may  be  reimbursed  on  the  basis  of  an  application,  thereby  making  it  easier  for  eligible 
indirect expenditure to be verified, checked and certified. 

As  regards  the  CICC  for  EU  funds  (ERDF-ESF-EFF),  Law  No  2011-900  of  29  July  2011  on  amending  finances  for  2011  reinforced  the 
national audit authority (ERDF-ESF-EFF) by linking general economic and financial audits (audit bodies of financial ministers) 

We  would  remind  you  that  the  CICC  for  EU  funds  is  responsible  for  notifying  any  irregularities  detected  (systems  audits  and  audits  for 
ERDF-ESF and EFF transactions) to OLAF. 

1) Lombardy Region: Review and approval by decree n. 7258 of 02/08/2011 of the irregularity manuals and on-site inspections (new check 
control 
list 
and  implementing  the  new  procedures  IMS)  and  review  of  approval  of  "Operational  models  for  functioning  of  the  Group  of 
Verifiers on site for control activities in Level I of Operational regional Programme ERDF Competitiveness 2007-2013 "adopted by decree 
no. Of 3317 12/04/2011. 

site 

for 

on 

FI 

FR 

IT 

2) Marche Region: Regional Law No 29 April 2011. Article 7. 55 "Revocation of company support interventions." It is a law of horizontal 
scope,  which  was  necessary  to  regulate  better  the  manner  of  calculation  of  interest  and  any  sanctions  for  revocation,  even  partial,  of  the 
benefits granted in connection with operations of the Region to support the companies where, as a result of checks carried out for whatever 
reason, are detected irregularities or breaches of contracts for acts which are attributable to the beneficiary and not remediable 

3) Calabria Region: Circular no. 2274 of 14/04/2011 concerning the Recoveries of irregular amounts, to put into effects the Article. 70 b) of 
EC  Regulation  1083/2006  about  the  obligation  of  Member  States  to  correct  irregularities  and  recover  amounts  properly  paid.  With  this 
Circular are defined the persons in charge for the initiation of the recovery procedures (Arrangement of the revocation, decree, injunction 
Authority 
decree, 

communication 

Certification 

Managing 

etc..) 

with 

and 

and 

the 

CY 

No important measures have been taken in 2011 

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LT 

LU 

HU 

The  Rules  for  the  administration  of  European  Union  Cohesion  Fund  resources  in  Lithuania,  approved  by  Resolution  No  1026  of  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania  of  24  August  2001  (Official  Gazette  2001,  Nos  74-2596;  2008,  87-3483),  as  amended  by 
Resolution  No  905  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania  of  24  August  2011  (Official  Gazette  2011,  No  105-4914).  The  main 
amendment makes it clear that irregularities are investigated by the implementing bodies or, if the suspected irregularities relate to public 
procurement  carried  out  by  the  implementing  bodies,  by  intermediate  bodies,  the  latter  taking  decisions  on  any  irregularities  detected. 
Arrangements  for  notifying  suspected  and  detected  irregularities  and  suspected  criminal  acts  and  for  recording  information  in  the 
computerised information management and monitoring system for EU structural assistance (SFMIS) have also been revised.  

EU legislation applied fully in second-level controls by the audit authority, which include taking additional samples if necessary. 

1.In order to detect and handle irregularities in a quicker and more efficient manner and to implement corrections Government Decree 4/2011 
of  28  January  2011  on  the  rules  governing  utilisation  of  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund,  the  European  Social  Fund  and  the 
Cohesion Fund and Order 24/2011 of 6 May 2011 of the Minister for National Development on the Common Operational Handbook were 
introduced in the programming period 2007-2013. In accordance with the new rules, the Public Procurement Supervisory Department set up 
within the National Development Agency examines the public procurement of the beneficiaries by audits integrated in the process and by ex-
post  audits.  If  infringements  are  detected  it  may  turn  to  the  Public  Procurement  Arbitration  Board.  Appeals  against  the  decisions  of  the 
institutional system have been introduced. Upon request the National Development Agency examines at second instance the lawfulness of 
the decision made at first instance. The right of the inspecting authority to establish irregularities, the setting up of the simplified irregularity 
procedure to assess simple instance the lawfulness of the decision made at first instance. The right of the inspecting authority to establish 
irregularities, the setting up of the simplified irregularity procedure to assess simple cases, and the possibility of suspending payments at any 
time throughout the whole inspection period have been introduced.  

2. Section 122 of Act XXXVIII of 1992 on the state budget has been in force since 1 January 2011. Section 122(1) of the State Budget Act, 
referring to the supervision of aid, states that any person receiving aid from the national budget or from EU sources shall cooperate with the 
organisations participating in and supervising the aid procedure and shall assist the representatives of the inspecting bodies – in particular the 
European  Court  of  Auditors,  the  competent  services  of  the  European  Commission,  the  State  Audit  Office,  the  state  audit  body,  the  audit 
bodies of the chapters, the treasury, the authorities managing EU aid, the paying, certifying and inspection authority - in the audit by making 
available the relevant documents, invoices, certificates and reports proving accomplishment and by assisting with on-the-spot inspection of 
physical  performance.  If,  in  the  course  of  the  inspection,  the  beneficiary  obstructs  the  work  of  the  inspection  bodies  through  conduct 
attributable to him/her, the aid decision shall cease to be valid, the aid agreement shall be terminated and no further aid shall be disbursed to 
the beneficiary, and the beneficiary shall be obliged to repay the aid used to that date.  

(2)  The  bodies  conducting  external  and  internal  financial  audit  of  the  state  budget  shall  cooperate  with  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office 
(OLAF) investigating the lawfulness of the utilisation of aid from EU resources. 

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(3)  The  inspection  powers  of  the  body  appointed  by  the  Government  to  examine  EU  and  other  international  aid  shall  apply  to  inspection 
relating to aid granted from resources laid down in a separate Government Decree 

(a) of the institutions involved in settlement, 

(b) of the legal entities, organisations without legal personality, and natural persons receiving aid, 

(c) of procurements relating to the aid, the performance of contracts concluded for this purpose and, in this connection, of contracting parties 
responsible for the performance of the contract or collaborating in it.  

3. Section 310 of Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code (in force from 1 January 2012). In connection with budget fraud, Section 310 states:  

(1) It is an offence punishable by imprisonment of up to two years 

(a) to mislead, deliberately foster misapprehension or conceal facts in respect of budgetary payment obligations or budgetary funds, 

(b) to use unlawfully any benefits connected to budgetary payment obligations, 

(c) to use budgetary funds for a purpose other than that approved, and thereby cause financial loss to one or more budgets. 

(2) Imprisonment shall be for up to three years if 

(a) the budgetary fraud causes greater financial loss, 

(b) the budgetary fraud referred to under paragraph (1) is committed  

(ba) in a criminal organisation, 

(bb) for gain. 

(3) Imprisonment shall be for up to five years if 

(a) the budgetary fraud causes significant financial loss, 

(b)  the  budgetary  fraud  causing  greater  financial  loss  as  referred  to  in  (2)(a)  is  committed  in  the  manner  specified  in  paragraph  (2)(b), 
subpoints (ba) and (bb). 

(4) Imprisonment shall be between two and eight years if 

(a) the budgetary fraud causes particularly large financial loss, 

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(b) the budgetary fraud causing significant financial loss as referred to in (3)(a) is committed in the manner specified in paragraph (2)(b), 
subpoints (ba) and (bb). 

(5) Imprisonment shall be between five and ten years if 

(a) the budgetary fraud causes major financial loss, 

(b) the budgetary fraud causing particularly large financial loss as referred to in  (4)(a) is committed in the manner specified in paragraph 
(2)(b), subpoints (ba) and (bb). 

(6) Any person who produces, acquires, holds, places on the market or sells excise goods in the absence of the conditions laid down in the act 
on excise duties and special rules governing the distribution of excise goods and in the legislative act based on the authorisation of the latter 
act or without an official permit, and thereby causes financial loss to the budget, shall be punishable in accordance with paragraphs (1)-(5). 

(7) Failure to comply with or to comply fully with the accounting or reporting obligation laid down for budgetary funds, the making of an 
inaccurate statement or use of inaccurate, false or falsified documents constitutes an offence punishable by imprisonment of up to five years. 

(8)  Punishment  may  be  reduced  without  limitation  for  any  person  who  repays  the  financial  loss  caused  by  the  crime  specified  under 
paragraphs (1)-(6) before the indictment is submitted. The unlimited reduction may not be used if the offence specified under paragraphs (1)-
(6) has been committed in a criminal organisation or for gain. 

Section  310/A  states  that  a  manager,  member  with  supervisory  powers  or  employee  of  a  business  organisation  shall  commit  an  offence 
punishable  by  imprisonment  of  up  to  five  years,  if  he/she  fails  to  comply  with  the  supervision  or  control  obligations  in  connection  with 
budgetary fraud, and a member or employee of the business organisation commits a crime punishable under Section 310 in the interests of 
the business organisation, which could have been prevented by the such supervision or control. 

LV  Measures to reduce ineligible expenditure and reduce the risk of corruption: 

- On 1 June 2001, amendments to the Law on the prevention of conflicts of interest in the activities of State officials entered into force. The 
amendments provide for the legal protection of individuals who have given information on State officials' conflicts of interest. Pursuant to 
the amendments, the head of a central or local government authority, person responsible for preventing conflicts of interest and corruption at 
the  relevant  authority,  or  a  collegiate  body  are  prohibited  from  disclosing  information  that  has  become  known  to  them  concerning  which 
official or member of staff of the relevant central or local government authority has provided information on conflicts of interest. Neither are 
they permitted to directly or indirectly create unfavourable consequences for the individual without due cause. The prohibition to disclose 
information  does  not  apply  to  the  provision  of  information  to  the  Corruption  Prevention  and  Combating  Bureau  (KNAB),  State  Police, 
Constitutional Defense Bureau, court or prosecutor's office. Information on conflicts of interest of which a State official is aware and which 

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involve other State officials of the particular government body must be provided to the head of that body or to the KNAB. Information held 
by a State official employed by the State security services is provided to the Director of the Constitutional Defense Bureau. 

- On 20 July 2011 amendments to Article 166.33 of the Administrative Infringements Code entered into force. These amendments establish 
administrative  liability  relating  to  the  infringement  of  the  aforementioned  ban  on  disclosing  information  relating  to  a  person  who  has 
provided information on the conflicts of interest of another State official, and the creation of unfavourable consequences for the informant 
without due cause. This legal protection is necessary to ensure the protection of whistleblowers, which could help prevent infringements and 
make them easier to detect, thereby reducing the risk of corruption and potentially mitigating the threat to the EU's financial interests.  

- In 2011 amendments were made to Cabinet Regulation No 410 of 26 June 2007 laying down the procedure according to which the bodies 
involved in the management of the EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund prepare programming documents and implement the funds. The 
amendments state that from now on, preliminary checks of procurement will be intensified, with the aim of preventing procurement-related 
infringements.  It  is  anticipated  that  from  2  December  2012  onwards,  preliminary  procurement  checks  will  be  carried  out  not  only  by  the 
Procurement  Monitoring  Bureau  (PMB),  but  also  by  the  Responsible  Authorities  (RA)/Liaison  Bodies  (LB).  Along  with  performing  the 
checks, the PMB will also provide methodological guidance. A method has already been devised which the RA/LB have to incorporate into 
their procedures and apply when carrying out preliminary procurement checks. Furthermore, the PMB has the responsibility of keeping the 
methodology up-to-date and in line with the latest changes to legislation or EU case law. Beyond this, the PMB will also ensure that regular 
meetings are held with the persons carrying out the preliminary checks of RA/LB procurement, in order to discuss practices and develop a 
common understanding of procurement infringements. 

-  To  prevent  irregularities  in  projects  implemented  by  State  authorities,  the  issue  of  making  disciplinary  penalties  more  stringent  was 
considered  at  the  Cabinet  meeting  of  8  March  2011  at  the  initiative  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  In  addition  a  proposal  has  been  made  to 
consider whether to establish a similar system of penalties at the local government level. 

Measures to recover ineligible expenditure 

- On 10 January 2011 the Guidelines for reporting irregularities in the implementation of EU funds and the recovery of undue expenditure in 
the 2007-13 programming period were updated. The guidelines were broadened to cover the identification of cases of fraud, information on 
potential situations in which the project will need to be the subject of increased scrutiny, in what cases the law enforcement authorities need 
to be contacted, and other clarifications added. 

–  On  26  June  2011  the  Guidelines  for  applying  financial  corrections  to  projects  financed  from  EU  Fundwere  updated.  Annex  2  to  the 
Guidelines  was  fundamentally  updated  and  supplemented  with  practical  examples,  based  on  experience,  of  how  a  proportionate  financial 
correction is applied. 

Training: on 27 May 2011 the Managing Authority for the EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund held a training course for prosecutors, 

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MT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

which covered a range of EU-funds-related issues, including the nature and identification of irregularities etc. 

1a. (Value Added Tax) Act IV of 2011 (an act to implement budget measures for the financial year 2011 and other administrative measures) 
was published on 22/3/2011. This Act amended (amongst others) sub-article 77(d) of the Value Added Tax Act. (Article 77 of the Value 
Added Tax Act deals with irregularities in records, etc. and false represenatations). This addition states that it is a criminal offence possessing 
or supplying to another person software used to erase, destroy, damage or conceal any stored information, records, documents or accounts 
(with the intent of concealing any evidence which he/she knows is relevant for the purposes of the Value Added Tax Act).1b. (Value Added 
Tax) Act IV of 2011 also provides for increased fines regarding sub-articles 77(c) and (d) of the afore mentioned Value Added Tax (VAT) 
Act, for falsifying records, documents, or accounts required to be kept by the VAT Act, and for destroying, erasing, damaging or concealing 
information or records or documents or accounts relevant for the purposes of the VAT Act. 

No important legislative or administrative measures were taken in the course of 2011. 

OP Phasing Out Burgenland acc. MA: The management and control system for the programme Phasing Out Burgenland 2007-2013 ESF is 
structured to guarantee a high degree of security and avoid cases of fraud. 

1. Amendment of the 'Guidelines of the Minister for Regional Development on the audit process under the responsibility of the Managing 
Authority for the Operational Programme'. The amendment covered, inter alia, the drafting of a separate section laying down the conditions 
for carrying out horizontal cross-checks against projects implemented under the 'Sustainable development of the fisheries sector and coastal 
fishing areas 2007-13' OP, which should help increase the effectiveness of checks on the double financing of expenses paid using resources 
from the aforementioned programme and the programmes of the National Strategic Reference Frameworks. 

2. Adoption of instructions on the principles and methodology for establishing irrecoverability or for deeming traditional EU own resources 
from customs duties to be irrecoverable and for removing the value of such duties from the TOR report. The instructions were approved by 
the Head of the Customs Service in December 2011.  

3.  Adoption  of  a  document  entitled  'Imposing  financial  corrections  for  infringements  of  public  procurement  law  connected  with  the 
implementation of projects cofinanced by the EU from the External Border Fund, the European Refugee Fund and the European Return Fund 
under the General Programme 'Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows''. The procedure was introduced in January 2011 by decision 
of the Chairman of the Interministerial Team for the Schengen Fund, the Norwegian Financial Mechanism, the European Refugee Fund, the 
External Border Fund and the European Return Fund. In the event of infringement of the rules governing the award of public contracts in 
respect of projects cofinanced by the above funds, the Implementing Authority for European Programmes will implement the procedure for 
imposing financial corrections in accordance with the aforementioned document. 

PT 

(A) During 2011 a new import declaration system came in, which will allow for an interface with the Automatic Selection System (SSA). 

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Risk  analysis  and  assessment  will  become  fully  automated  and  customs  controls  will  become  more  effectively  focused  on  high-risk 
consignments while customs clearance times will be reduced for regular goods. (B) In 2011, in connection with the PROMAR programme, 
the  managing  authority  applied  the  law  prohibiting  access  to  PROMAR  funding  for  project  organisers  with  any  links  to  fishing  vessels 
included  on  the  Community  or  regional  lists.  (C)  In  2011  the  PROMAR  managing  authority  improved  its  template  for  reports  of  on-site 
monitoring  visits  to  operators,  to  be  conducted  at  the  latest  by  their  closure,  involving  more  detailed  checks  of  operations  to  verify 
compliance  with  organisational,  financial,  accounting,  technical  and  physical  elements  of  public  procurement  rules  and  with  rules  on 
information and publicity. This will allow irregularities to be identified and corrected, and in future, avoided. 

RO 

1. Consolidation of the anti fraud regulatory framework 

In  2011,  the  anti  fraud  regulatory  framework  has  been  consolidated  through  the  adoption  of  Act  No  61/2011  on  the  organisation  and 
functioning  of  the  Anti  Fraud  Department  (DLAF),  published  in  Official  Gazette  of  Romania  Part  I  No  331  of  12  May  2011,  and 
Government Decision No 738/2011 approving the rules governing the organisation and functioning of the Anti Fraud Department (DLAF), 
published in Official Gazette of Romania Part I No 553 of 4 August 2011. The new institutional framework ensures independent decision 
making  and  institutional  stability,  has  extended  and  consolidated  the  control  powers  and  has  endowed  DLAF  with  legal  personality.  The 
legislative framework has also been supplemented by the introduction of penalties for non compliance with a specific duty in carrying out 
control  tasks  as  regards  the  protection  of  the  financial  interests  of  the  European  Union.  These  amendments  have  strengthened,  from  an 
administrative  point  of  view,  DLAF’s  functional  independence  and  institutional  stability,  and  have  created  a  solid  and  predictable  legal 
framework for the organisation and functioning of DLAF.  

2. Improving the public procurement system 

Government  Decision  No  801/2011  amending  Government  Decision  No  525/2007  on  the  organisation  and  functioning  of  the  National 
Regulatory  and  Monitoring  Authority  for  Public  Procurement  (ANRMAP),  published  in  Official  Gazette  of  Romania  Part  I  No  563  of  8 
August  2011,  has  introduced  the  task  of  verifying  the  documentation  on  the  awarding  of  public  procurement  contracts  with  an  estimated 
value of more than the RON equivalent of €15 000, representing the threshold above which it is mandatory to apply a public procurement 
procedure  in  accordance  with  Government  Emergency  Order  No  34/2006.  Thus,  ANRMAP  will  be  able  to  verify  that  the  documentation 
complies  with  the  legislation  applicable  in  the  field  of  public  procurement.  That  check  does  not  cover  the  technical  aspects  of  the  tender 
specifications. The same package of measures relating to public procurement also included Order No 313/2011 of the President of ANRMAP 
on  interpreting  certain  provisions  concerning  the  procedures  for  awarding  public  procurement  contracts,  concession  contracts  for  public 
works and concession contracts for services. That interpretation refers in particular to legal entities that do not act as contracting authorities 
and do not fall within the scope of Article 9(c) and (c1) of Government Emergency Order No 34/2006 as amended, and which can also be 
financed/subsidised  through  the  structural  instruments.  The  National  Authority  for  Regulating  and  Monitoring  Public  Procurements 
(ANRMAP)  has  concluded  cooperation  agreements  with  the  Managing  Authorities,  the  Unit  for  Coordinating  and  Verifying  Public 

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Procurements, the National Trade Register Office, the Competition Office, and the Directorate-General for Public Records 

3. Measures aimed at protecting revenue for the budget of the EU 

The National Tax Administration Agency (ANAF) has developed the software application called ‘Traffic Control’ for managing information 
concerning  transports  of  goods  representing  intra  Community  acquisitions.  The  application  enables  the  monitoring  and  risk  analysis  of 
suspect intra Community acquisitions, thus contributing to the efficient control of amounts representing revenue for the national budget and 
for the budget of the EU.  

Order No 1984/2011 of the Minister for Public Finances on criteria applying to registration for VAT purposes has been drawn up in order to 
reduce fraud and fiscal evasion in the field of VAT (a key source of revenue for the budget of the EU). That regulatory act has established a 
new procedure and the criteria applying to the registration of companies for VAT purposes, in accordance with Article 153(1)(a) and (c). 
Under the new procedure, registration for VAT purposes consists of two steps: (i) documentary check; (ii) factual check carried out by the 
Financial Guard at the request of ANAF. 

SE 

European Fisheries Fund (EFF) 

Fisheries Project 

On 1 July 2011 the Swedish Board of Agriculture (Statens Jordbruksverk) took over the administration of the EFF from the Swedish Board 
of  Fisheries  (Fiskeriverket).  The  move  has  meant  that  there  will  be  opportunities  for  synergies  through  coordination  with  the  Board  of 
Agriculture's existing work and the systems available there. 

On  11  April  2011  the  Board  of  Fisheries  adopted  a  quality  assurance  system,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  monitor  whether  the  Managing 
Authority is operating according to the rules and complying with established administrative procedures. By extension, this will ensure that 
the Managing Authority can guarantee that the content of a particular declaration of expenditure is truthful, correct and complete. The quality 
assurance system includes a quality control of the procedures of the Provincial Administration and the Board of Agriculture/Fisheries which 
is carried out by an official who was not involved in the aid measure to be verified. The Board of Agriculture will follow up all of the control 
reports  for  the  control  period  up  until  31  August  2011.  The  quality  assurance  system  also  includes  physical  checks  on  projects  receiving 
support. 

The planning of the changes, which will lead to the development of administrative measures aimed at protecting the EU's financial interests 
and preventing fraud, will take place in the course of 2011. With the transfer of the EFF to the Board of Agriculture, the processing of EFF 
matters will be coordinated with other forms of aid dealt with by the Board of Agriculture, which means that attention has been focused on 
the potential for developing EFF operations. The quality assurance system will be updated, follow-up to quality controls will be improved, 
the selection of targets for physical controls will be reviewed and a data system for procedures with different versions will be introduced. 

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SI 

SK 

The Commission for the Prevention of Fraud has launched a web application called Supervizor (available at: http://supervizor.kpk-rs.si/) for 
monitoring  the  expenditure  of  public  institutions.  This  web  service  allows  the  general  public,  media,  businesses  and  State  bodies  to  view 
expenditure by public institutions on goods and services. Transparency in the flow of money between the public and private sector makes 
holders  of  public  office  more  responsible  for  using  public  funds  efficiently  and  effectively,  facilitates  debate  on  adopted  and  planned 
investments, reduces the risk of mismanagement and the abuse of authority, and, in particular, limits systemic corruption, unfair competition 
and clientelism. Progress is also apparent in the latest reports on the reporting of irregularities to OLAF which show more reporting of IRQ5s 
and IRQ3s, thus ensuring more coherent and effective oversight of all national institutions. 

1.  The  document  "Problematic  areas  of  implementation  of  operational  programmes  and  horizontal  priorities  of  the  National  Strategic 
Reference  Framework",  adopted  by  Government  Resolution  No  323/2011  of  18  May  2011.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  comprehensive 
information  on  problematic  areas  of  implementation.  For  each  problematic area identified, the facts of the situation and the specific tasks 
required to improve it are described. Successful completion of the specified tasks is expected to make the implementation of the operational 
programmes and horizontal priorities both faster and more effective. 

2. By Resolution No 689 of 2 November 2011 the Slovak Government approved a proposal for a new register of projects financed through 
recoverable  and  non-recoverable  financial  assistance  from  public  funds.  The  register  enables  information  on  projects  on  Slovak  territory 
financed from recoverable and non-recoverable financial assistance to be coordinated and shared, the aim being to prevent duplicate project 
financing. The deadline for completing the register of projects financed through recoverable and non-recoverable financial assistance from 
public funds is twelve months from the adoption of the Government Resolution. 

3. Update No 3 to Ministry of Finance Guideline No 16/2008-U on irregularities in the financial management of the Structural Funds, the 
Cohesion Fund and the European Fisheries Fund lays down the detailed procedure for eliminating financial-management irregularities in the 
2007-2013  programming  period,  concerning  the  data  processing  of  irregularities  and  reconciled  funds  via  interconnecting  IT  systems  (the 
ITMS monitoring system and the ISUF accounting system) and the calculation of net reciprocal obligations from a non-recoverable financial 
contribution; the Irregularities Notification Manual Version 4.0 addresses inter alia the recording and reporting of irregularities in the IMS 
system, which has operated at national level since 2009, and the methodology for classifying irregularities that are the subject of criminal 
proceedings. 

UK 

SG: No significant changes for 2011. DCLG: No significant changes in 2011, DFPNI: The Bribery Act came into force on 1 July. The aims 
of the Act are 

to reduce the levels of corruption across the UK without being burdensome to business. 

There are four key offences under the Act: 

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General Offences: bribery of another person (section 1); accepting a bribe (section 2) 

Commercial  Offences:  bribing  a  foreign  public  official  (section  6);  failure  of  a  commercial  organisation  to  prevent  bribery  (section  7).  A 
revised  copy  of  the  NI  Civil  Service's  Managing  the  Risk  of  Fraud  Guide  was  issued  to  all  departments  in  NI  in  December  2011.  "Dear 
Accounting  Officer"  letters  were  also  issued  to  departments  alerting  them  to  the  introduction  of  the  Bribery  Act;  highlighting  the  risk  of 
supplier details changes leading to fraudulent loss; and outlining arrangements for departments to notify the NI Charity Commission where 
potential fraud issues are identified within charitable bodies. WG: Last year we identified the appointment of a new Head of Counter Fraud 
for the Welsh Government, the development and acceptance of our new Counter Fraud Strategy and the planning and preparation for new 
legislation  in  relation  to  Bribery  for  2011.  Building  on  from  this  the  Welsh  Governments,  Counter  Fraud  Branch  has  introduced  separate 
Fraud and Corruption Risk Assessments authorised and supported by the Corporate Governance Committee, for each area of the business, 
including European Funding. These risk assessments identify and grade the risk areas and identifying the measures to minimise, erradicate or 
manage the risk on a regular basis. Each area of business within the Welsh Government has ownership of their identified risk areas and those 
with a greater risk must reviewed quarterly. They are submitted to the Head of Counter Fraud who identifies the higher risk areas for a Welsh 
Government Corporatel Fraud and Corruption Risk Register. They are discussed with IAS and EFAT to take recognizance and influence the 
Audit  Plan  for  the  next  12  months.  They  also  enable  us  to  identify  and  target  higher  risk  areas  such  as  procurement  and  grant  funding 
including the EU's financial interests. No fraud risk assessments were in place prior to this. The Bribery Act 2010 went live on the 1st July 
2011 and has created two new offences of bribing a foreign official and allowing bribery to occur unless you have adequate precautions in 
place. The Act also gives guidance from the Secreatary of State on what is likely to be acceptable business practice and acceptable corporate 
hospitality.  Anything  outside  of  the  guidance  is  likely  to  be  a  criminal  offence  under  the  Act.  We  have  and  continue  to  be  proactive  in 
communicating and raising awareness of the new and existing legislation across all parts of the Welsh Government. 

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2. 

2.1. 

CONTROLS  TO  COMBAT  IRREGULARITIES  AND  FRAUD  AGAINST  THE  FINANCIAL  INTERESTS  OF  THE  EU  IN  THE  AREA  OF  COHESION 
POLICY 

Qualitative evaluation: Improvements in the financial control and risk management system in order to prevent fraud against the EU 
financial interest  

Member State: 

BE 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

ERDF Wallonia: Decree of the Walloon Government laying down common eligibility rules for the ERDF and setting up a First-Level 
Documentary Control Directorate 
ESF Agency Flanders (ESF-VL): Procedure for MA on-the-spot checks adapted, basic risk analysis of financial reports submitted, so that 
the check takes place before payment on the basis of the relevant reports. 
European Social Fund (ESF) Agency: Establishment of a recurrent procedure for the detection of double financing of expenditure within 
the  CPAS  financed  by  the  ESF,  the  Federal  government  (in  the  form  of  the  SPP  IS,  the  Federal  Public  Planning  Service  for  Social 
Integration)  and  the  Walloon  Region  (ESF  Agency).  (2008-2013  Competitiveness  Programme  for  the  CPAS  or  CPAS  associations 
cofinanced by the two Belgian bodies). 

ERDF Wallonia: Sharing information with administrations functionally responsible at coordination meetings, information meetings with 
beneficiaries,  and  reminders  about  constraints  at  meetings  of  the  OLAF  inter-administrative  working  party  on  the  importance  of 
adherence  to  the  applicable  rules  for  preventing  irregularities  and  fraud.  Emphasis  on  adhering  to  public  procurement  rules,  the  list  of 
eligible expenditure, the risk of double financing, etc. in documentary and on-the-spot checks. 
D2  EFRO  VL  (ERDF  Obj.  2  Flanders):  increased  focus  on  compliance  with  public  procurement  rules  (ex  ante  through  practical 
guidelines and requirement to submit procurement plan before project approval, ex post by carrying out thorough documentary and on-
the-spot checks) 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 1) development of a standard procedure with a checklist and a standard report for on-the-spot checks, 
plus implementation of on-the-spot checks  
(achievements,  administrative  and  financial/accounting  checks)  as  soon  as  project  implementation  starts  and  at  least  once  per  project 
before the end of programming; 2) double  

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Member State: 

BG 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

first-level control for each payment request (accounting + R1); 3) development of tools/procedures for beneficiaries (e.g. providing for 
the obligation to enter an ERDF stamp on the original invoices).  
Legislative measures: 1. The State Financial Inspectorate Act has been amended (by SG No 98 of 14 November 2008) to reinforce control 
of  the  allocation  of  EU  funds  and  improve  coordination  and  cooperation  with  the  European  Commission's  control  authorities  for  the 
implementation of Articles 14 and 15 of Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot 
checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities' financial interests against fraud and 
other  irregularities.  It  ensures  that  the  Commission's  auditors  can  count  on  the  assistance  of  the  Public  Financial  Inspection  Agency 
(ADFI) when performing audits or on-the-spot checks under the Regulation in the event that the event that the organisations and persons 
being  audited  refuse  to  provide  access  voluntarily  to  premises  and/or  documents  for  the  purpose  of  controls.  For  the  effectiveness  of 
cooperation, AFI also disposes of appropriate instruments, including means of coercion for gathering information and securing evidence. 

2.  Under  subparagraphs  22  and  24  of  the  Article  19(2)  of  the  Public  Procurement  Act,  in  force  since  1  January  2009,  the  Public 
Procurement  Agency  (AOP)  performs  two  types  of  ex  ante  control.  The  first  concerns  procedures  for  the  award  of  contracts  financed 
wholly or partly by European funds (the Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
and the European Fisheries Fund). The terms and conditions for such control are laid down in a Regulation on ex ante control over public 
procurement  procedures  wholly  or  partly  financed  by  European  funds.  The  second  type  of  ex  ante  control  concerns  contracting 
procedures without publication initiated under subparagraphs 3-9 and 12 of Article 90(1) ZOP by contracting authorities referred to in 
subparagraphs  1-4  of  Article  7  ZOP  (Article  19(2)(24)  ZOP).  Control  is  performed  with  a  view  to  establishing  the  legality  of  the 
procdedure's selection and covers the contracting authority's decisions to initiate the procedures, the invitations to tender adopted and the 
documents sent out.  
3. Amendments to Council of Minister’s Decree No 18/2003 (SG No 39 of 26 May 2009; SG No 71 of 4 September 2009; SG No 97 of 8 
December  2009;  SG  No  54  of  15  July  2011)  establish  the  Council  for  Coordination  of  the  Combat  of  Fraud  Affecting  the  Financial 
Interests of the EU. They also create a uniform mechanism for reporting irregularities and fraud at national level, which ensures high-
level coordination of all structures that administer EU funds and improved coordination and performance when detecting and monitoring 
irregularities. Furthermore, the powers of AFCOS to carry out administrative checks, ascertain infringements and make recommendations 
for  their  elimination,  as  well  as  to  provide  methodological  instructions  enhances  the  efficiency  of  the  systems  for  administration  and 
reporting of irregularities and countering fraud. 

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31 

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Member State: 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

4. Council of Ministers Decree No 285 of 30 November 2009, which was published in SG No 97 of 8 December 2009 and entered into 
force the same day, adopted a Regulation laying down the procedures for handling irregularities under funds and programmes cofinanced 
by the European Union.  
5.  Council  of  Ministers'  Decree  No  134/2010  (SG  No  53  of  13  July  2010)  on  the  adoption  of  a  methodology  for  applying  financial 
corrections to expenditure, related to the implementation of the operational programmes co-financed by the structural instruments of the 
European  Union,  the  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development  and  the  European  Fisheries  Fund.  The  methodology  aims  at 
detecting  irregularities  in  the  implementation  of  grant  contracts  and  those  stemming  from  non-compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Public Procurement Act, the Regulation on Awarding Small Public Procurement Contracts and Council of Ministers' Decree No 55/2007. 
The main objective of Decree No 134/2010 is to enhance project management, reduce irregularities and recover unduly disbursed sums. It 
also  ensures  uniformity  between  the  type  of  infringement  and  the  respective  size  of  financial  corrections  set  by  the  competent  control 
bodies. 
Administrative measures/procedures: 
1. Internal rules concerning some of the programmes provide for 100% on-the-spot and document checks, including checks on a sample 
based on risk analysis for the purposes of management checks. 
2. Instructions have been issued by the Minister for Finance concerning implementation of the operational programmes cofinanced by the 
Structural and Cohesion Fund (Annex 1 - list of current departmental circulars (DNF): -- - National Fund Directorate (NFD) No 4 of 26 
July  2010  ¬–  Instructions  on  the  terms  and  procedure  for  the  payment  of  grants  under  the  EU  Structural  and  Cohesion  Funds  and  the 
respective national co-financing;  
- NFD No 5 of 21 October 2010 – Instruction on certification of expenditure under the operational programmes co-financed by the EU 
Structural and Cohesion Funds;  
- NFD No 6 of 13 December 2010 – Instructions on the organisation of the accounting process of the Managing Authority/Intermediate 
Bodies, managing the funds under the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds and the respective national co-financing;  
- NFD No 7 of 22 December 2010 – Instructions on the write-off and recovery of unduly paid or overpaid amounts and unduly received 
and disbursed amounts within projects financed by the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds. 
3. The IT system for the management and monitoring of EU structural instruments in Bulgaria has been set up and an interface built in for 
exchanging  data  with  ISAC  and  Popeye  for  the  centralised  storage  of  data  on  registered  applicants,  project  proposals  and  grant 
agreements  concluded  under  the  operational  programmes  cofinanced  by  the  EU's  Social  and  Cohesion  Funds,  the  Rural  Development 

EN 

32 

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Member State: 

CZ 

DK 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

Programme  cofinanced  by  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  and  the  Fisheries  Operational  Programme  cofinanced  by  the 
European Fisheries  Fund.-  National Fund  Directorate (NFD) No  4  of  26  July  2010 ¬– Instructions on the terms and procedure for the 
payment of grants under the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds and the respective national co-financing; 
Legislative measures: An amendment to Act No 218/2000 is being drawn up and will include measures against corruption in the granting 
of subsidies and refundable financial assistance aimed at fulfilling the task set out in the "Government's Anti-Corruption Strategy for the 
period 2011-2012"; Act No 141/1961, the Code of Criminal Procedure; Act No 40/2009, the Criminal Code (Section 212 – Definition of 
Fraud); drafting of an amendment to Act No 320/2001 on financial control in public administration. 
Administrative  measures/procedures:  National  Strategy  to  protect  the  European  Communities’  financial  interests;  Methodology  of 
financial  flows  and  the  control  of  programmes  co-financed  from  the  Structural  Funds,  the  Cohesion  Fund  and  the  European  Fisheries 
Fund  for  the  2007-2013  programming  period  (the  most  recent  version  in  force  since  1  January  2011);  Methodological  guidance  - 
Irregularities (published by the National Coordination Authority, the most recent version - October 2011); checks on tenders in the period 
between the selection of the most suitable tender and the conclusion of a contract with the successful tenderer; Advertising of small-scale 
contracts and contracts not covered by the Procurement Act. Ministerial orders – monitoring of risks in connection with fraud, corruption, 
etc.;  manual  for  beneficiaries  –  measures  against  double-financing  –  beneficiaries  have  to  indicate  on  each  invoice  its  relation  to  a 
particular project. In 2011 the system of checks was reinforced, including financial and public administration checks, on-the-spot checks 
and monitoring visits. The Code of Conduct was also revised, in relation to both MA staff and subcontractors. Irregularities continue to be 
analysed (in line with the working procedures) and corrective measures will be taken based on the conclusions drawn from the analyses, 
in the form of revisions and updates of project manuals and guidelines, and in particular of checklists.(that comment was not from CZ) 

In the programming period 2007-2013 for the Regional Fund and the Social Fund, reports have been made bi-annually to the managing 
authority concerning the status and accounts of the projects. 
Cooperation has been established with an external auditor, who is responsible for auditing all status reports and accounts issued under the 
Regional Fund and the Social Fund. 
The external auditor must visit all projects at least once during their lifetime. In addition, the managing authority carries out verification 
visits for the Regional Fund and the Social Fund for at least 10% of the commitments made. 

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Member State: 

DE 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

Legislative  measures:  1)  Cabinet  Regulation  No  740  of  10  August  2010  laying  down  the  procedure  according  to  which  the  bodies 
involved in the management of the EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund prepare programming documents and implement the funds. 
Pursuant  to  this  Regulation  a  meeting  of  the  Managing  Authority  (MA),  Audit  Authority  (AA),  Certifying  Authority  (CA),  Paying 
Authority  (PA),  RA  and  LB  is  held  every  quarter  to  discuss  the  irregularities  detected  that  quarter  and  take  a  decision  on  which 
irregularities to report to the European Commission. 2) Pursuant to Cabinet Order No 168 of 24 March 2010 on the composition of the 
Council  for  Coordinating  the  Protection  of  EU  Financial  Interests  and  Cabinet  Regulation  No  269  of  23  March  2010  laying  down  the 
Statutes  of  the  Council  for  Coordinating  the  Protection  of  EU  Financial  Interests,  a  Council  (AFCOS)  has  been  established,  which 
functions as a consultative collegiate body with the aim of facilitating the implementation and development of a common national policy 
for  the  protection  of  EU  financial  interests.  Law  enforcement  authorities  are  also  represented  on  the  Council;  these  present 
recommendations on improving the protection of EU financial interests and, together with staff involved in the EU funds system, examine 
unclear issues related to suspected fraud. See replies under Section 1. 
Administrative measures/procedures: 1) An EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund Risk Management Group has been established at the 
Ministry  of  Finance.  The  Group  identifies,  assesses,  confirms  and  manages  the  risks  associated  with  conflicts  of  interest  and  fraud, 
including  corruption,  identified  by  the  EU  funds  MA.  To  mitigate  and  prevent  these  risks,  many  EU  funds  management  procedures 
employ  declarations  of  impartiality.  Representatives  of  the  MA,  State  Treasury  (CA)  and  RA  are  involved  in  the  working  group.  2) 
Effective staff training courses are being run using funding from the Technical Assistance Project. The State Chancellery runs seminars 
presented by specialist lecturers, including from OLAF, and staff involved with the EU funds system can upgrade their knowledge by 
participating in training and workshops organised by various authorities (e.g. the EC and OLAF). 3) On 27 May 2011 the MA organised 
training for prosecutors on various issues related to EU funds, including the nature and identification of irregularities, among others. See 
replies under Section 1. 
In  accordance  with  Regulations  (EC)  Nos  1083/2006  and  1828/2006,  the  Commission  was  sent  the  operational  programmes  (OP)  and 
descriptions of the management and control  
systems (MCS), which provide information about the structures and procedures of the administrative authorities, certifying authorities, 
and intermediate bodies, and about the structure and  
procedures of the audit authority and other bodies carrying out audits under the responsibility of the authorities. The OP and MCS were 
approved, and changes to the OP, the MCS or audit 
strategies  are  reported  regularly  through  the  ordinary  procedure.  Recent  reports  have  been  based,  inter  alia,  on  the  European 

EN 

34 

EN 

 
  
Member State: 

EE 

ES 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

Commission's 'Guidance Note on Annual Control Reports and 
Opinions' of 18 February 2009 (COCOF 09-0004-01-EN) and 'Guidance on treatment of errors disclosed in the Annual Control Reports' 
of 7 December 2011(COCOF 11-0041-01-EN), which 
supplement  Regulations  (EC)  Nos  1083/2006  and  1828/2006.  The  effective  functioning  of  management  and  control  systems  are 
constantly monitored, also taking into account the 'Guidance 
document on a common methodology for the assessment of management and control systems in the Member States (programming period 
2007 - 2013)'. 
Legislative measures: 1) A Section 26(4) was added to the Structural Assistance Act (entered into force on 14 June 2008) under which the 
administration is required to make the recovery request subject to an enforcement procedure if the beneficiary fails to pay on time the 
request sent to it. This means the aid is recovered from the beneficiary through a bailiff who has the right to seize the beneficiary's goods 
in order to satisfy the recovery request. Under the Code of Enforcement Procedure a bailiff is required to take immediately all measures 
permitted  by  law  in  order  to  enforce  an  enforcement  instrument.  2)  Government  of  the  Republic  Regulation  No  278  'Conditions  and 
procedure for recovering and repaying aid and for providing information on irregularities arising during the granting and use of aid' as 
amended. 
Administrative measures/procedures: 1) Seminars are organised twice a year for officials dealing with infringements and recoveries; these 
also involve partners (the police, Prosecutor's Office, Tax and Customs Board). 2) AFCOS Estonia advises/trains implementers and each 
quarter compiles statistical overviews of infringements. 3) Partners' contact details are available to implementers - consultation is possible 
if there is suspicion of fraud.  
Law No 6 of 23 March 2011 on grants of the Autonomous Community of Extremadura], which is adapted to the organisational structure 
of  this  autonomous  community,  contributing  to  the  improvement  of  the  recovery  processes  of  public  interests  and  prevention  by 
establishing  certain  guarantees  with  regard  to  regulating  state  aid  awards,  the  financial  control  procedures  and  the  regulation  of  the 
infringement and sanction system. This law will come into force from 25 June 2011. 
Orden  de  10  de  noviembre  de  2009  de  la  Consejería  de  Economía  y  Hacienda  de  Canarias,  por  la  que  se  establecen  normas  para  la 
gestión,  seguimiento  y  control  de  las  operaciones  cofinanciadas  con  Fondos  Estructurales  [Order  of  10  November  2009  of  the  Canary 
Islands  Regional  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Public  Finances  establishing  rules  on  the  management,  monitoring  and  control  of  the 
operations  co-financed  by  the  structural  funds],  published  in  the  Canary  Islands  Official  Gazette  No  227  of  19  November.  Decreto 
36/2009, de 31 de marzo, por el que se establece el régimen general de subvenciones de la Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias [Decree No 

EN 

35 

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Member State: 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

36/2009 of 31 March 2009 establishing the Canary Islands general system of aid], published in the Canary Islands Official Gazette No 68 
of 8 April. 
Creation of  the  Oficina Antifrau  de Catalunya [Antifraud Office of Catalonia], set up since the third quarter of 2009 to investigate all 
public funds. Llei 14/2008 [Law 14/2008]. 

Creation  of  the  Comisión  General  de  Coordinación  [General  Coordination  Committee],  made  up  of  the  Intervención  General  de  la 
Administración  del  Estado  [State  Public  Accounts  Department]  and  the  Autonomous  Communities’  audit  departments,  whose  main 
purpose is to discuss and approve the rules, plans and procedures used to set up an integrated system that allows the Audit Authority to 
carry out the functions established by Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. An audit guide on management and control systems and an 
operational guide have been drawn up for all of Spain.  

Development of a computerised tool that allows the selection of operations to be controlled, the inclusion of data and information on the 
controls already carried out and serves as a database to obtain the information required by the Audit Authority to meet the obligations laid 
down by the Regulations and the Commission. 

In the Autonomous Community of Extremadura: 
1.- Strengthening of cross checks, with the aim of detecting inconsistencies in the expense declarations; 
2.- Standardisation of the information required from third persons, whether or not they are involved in the subsidised project (suppliers, 
clients, financial entities, tax authorities): 

In the Autonomous Community of Valencia:  
Circular  de  15  de  marzo  de  2010  sobre  Régimen  Jurídico  del  control  y  tramitación  de  informes  de  control  financiero  [Circular  of  15 
March 2010 on the legal arrangements for the control and processing of financial control reports].  
In the Autonomous Community of the Canary Islands: 
Implementation of permanent financial control with the objective of performing ongoing analysis and assessment of the economic and 
financial  management  of  public  sector  bodies  in  order  to  verify  if  this  is  being  carried  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  legality, 
effectiveness,  efficiency,  quality  and  other  sound  management  principles,  and  to  propose,  if  necessary,  the  adoption  of  corrective 

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36 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
Member State: 

IE 

EL 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

measures for unsound practices that are detected, of preventive measures and of improvements to public management. 
- Resolución de 13 de junio de 2011, de la Intervención General, [Decision of 13 June 2011, of the Public Accounts Department] issuing 
instructions  on  the  coordination,  the  implementation  measures  and  the  establishment  of  criteria  and  action  for  recovery  procedures 
proposed by the Public Accounts Department, arising from the audits and financial controls of aid. 
Administrative measures/procedures: 1. New National IT certification system for 2007-2013 EU Structural Funds assists in tracking all 
irregularities (including fraud cases). 2. Increased level of independent audit on ESF co-financed activities compared to the 2000-2006 
period. 3. A more systematic procedure to follow up all irregularities (including fraud cases) has been introduced for the 2007-2013 ESF 
and  ERDF  co-financed  activities.  See  also  Footnote  1  -  which  explains  the  inbuilt  irregularity  protections  in  terms  of  binding 
administrative agreements through the cascade structure (see note 1 below).  

2007: Publication of Law 3614/2007 ‘Management, audit and implementation of development interventions for the 2007 13 programming 
period.’ Detailed reference was made to this law in the questionnaire for the 2007 Article 280 Report. 
2008:  Pursuant  to  Law  3614/2007  the  following  three  Decisions  were  issued:  (1)  Decision  No  2/49837/0004/2.7.2008/Government 
Gazette  II  1334/8.7.08  laying  down  the  responsibilities  of  the  Committee  on  Financial  Control  -  EDEL,  and  also  specific  matters  of 
procedure;  (2)  Decision  No  2/49840/004/2.7.2008/Government  Gazette  II  1334/8.7.08  laying  down  the  internal  organisation,  structure 
and  distribution  of  responsibilities  in  the  individual  support  Directorates  of  EDEL;  and  (3)  Decision  No  567/EDEL/2.12.2008/ 
Government  Gazette  II  2486/5.12.08,  which  established,  in  the  Directorate-General  for  Management  and  Control  of  Programmes  co-
financed by the EU of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Private-Sector Expert Register, from which private-sector experts are 
selected to participate as members of the audit teams under Article 16(8) of Law 3614/2007. 
2010:  Publication  of  Law  3840/2010  amending  and  supplementing  Law  3614/2007  which  set  up  the  Operational  Programmes 
Management and Control System of the NSRF. The main provisions of this legislation lie in establishing the Operational Implementation 
Agreements, abolishing the screening of the procedure for awarding contracts that fall outside the scope of EU directives, broadening the 
range of operators that can be defined as intermediaries for management of state aid operations, reducing the deadline for objections to 
EDEL  reports  by  auditees  from  40  days  to  20  days  to  accelerate  the  finalisation  of  EDEL  reports  and  establishing  the  procedure  for 
imposing across-the-board financial corrections and other corrective measures by EDEL following evaluation of the results of its audits.  
2011:  Ministerial  Decision  No  448/0052/4.3.2011  on  the  recovery  of  amounts  unduly  or  illegally  paid  out  of  the  government  budget 
and/or the European Community budget for programmes co-financed under the NSRF (Objectives 1 and 2), the NSPDF 2007 2013 and 

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Member State: 

FR 

EN 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

the EEA. This Ministerial Decision applies to irregularities detected as a result of EDEL audits. 
As regards the fight against fraud, the Ministerial Decision provides that: ‘If in the course of the audits there is suspicion of criminal acts 
or omissions, the final audit reports shall be sent to the Public Prosecutor following a decision by EDEL. Where the EDEL audits find 
amounts incorrectly or illegally paid that involve mismanagement on the part of a public accounting officer within the meaning of Law 
2362/95, or cause actual damage to the state or local government or other public entities, in accordance with Article 46 of Presidential 
Decree 774/80, the relevant reports shall be sent, following a decision by EDEL, to the Court of Auditors or the General Prosecutor of the 
State respectively.’ 

2010: As  Audit  Authority of  OP Objectives 1, 2 and 3 of the NSRF and the OP for Fisheries 2007-2013, EDEL has drafted an Audit 
Manual, which was updated at its 426th meeting on 27 December 2010 and notified to the European Commission. The manual makes 
systematic reference to the investigation of cases of suspected fraud. 
2011:  As  part  of  its  administrative  measures,  EDEL  has  adapted  both  the  Managing  Authority/Intermediate  Body  Systems  Audit 
Questionnaire and the Operations Audit Questionnaire. These changes improve instructions to auditors so that they can now verify the 
correct  implementation  of  new  circulars,  designed  to  encourage  agencies  to  strictly  follow  and  properly  implement  public  works 
legislation as regards the approval of quantity surveys and accounts in public works and checking of certifications of interim accounts of 
co-financed public works. 
The  CICC  for  EU  funds  is  the  audit  authority  within  the meaning  of Articles 59 and 62 of  Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11  July 
2006.  
The  audit  authority  is  in  particular  responsible  for  ensuring  that  audits  are  performed  in  order  to  verify  the  smooth  running  of  the 
management and control system for operating programmes and that transaction audits are based on a sample which is appropriate for the 
purposes of verifying declared expenditure. 

The performance of systems audits and transaction audits is governed by EU legislation and European Commission guidance notes. 
During  such  audits,  irregularities  or  even  fraud  may  be  detected.  Forms  for  reporting  irregularities  to  OLAF  are  produced  under  the 
responsibility  of  the  management  authority  for  operational  programmes.  All  such  forms  meeting  the  criteria  established  by  EU 
Regulations are sent to the CICC, which examines them before they are sent to OLAF. 
The  samples  for  transaction  audits  are,  where  necessary,  rounded  up  to  take  account  of  the  risks  which  are  likely  in  view  of  the 

38 

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Member State: 

IT 

CY 

EN 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

populations examined  
(see figures in 2.2.1), 
The  CICC  for  EU  funds  also  employs  trainers  for  ERDF,  ESF  and  EFF  auditors,  who  are  responsible  for  forwarding  irregularity 
notifications to OLAF. 
The CICC has also implemented a procedure for the detailed follow-up of close monitoring of audit missions (procedures for approving 
monitoring plans, monitoring missions). 
Administrative  measures/procedures:(1)  Ministry  of  Economic  Development:  the  Prime  Minister's  Circular  of  12  October  2007  was 
aimed  at  rationalising  and  making  more  reliable  the  exchange  of  communications  with  the  Commission  on  irregularities  and  fraud 
harmful to the Community budget. The Circular standardised for all bodies responsible for such communication the moment when the 
obligation to inform the Commission arises. In this way, it has enhanced risk management, inasmuch as unnecessary communications on 
risks  which  subsequently  prove  to  be  in  all  or  in  part  non-existent  or  unfounded  are  avoided.  (2)  Interior  Ministry:  In  order  to  ensure 
sound financial management of the structural funds, the Management Authority for the NOP 'Security' has established a system of internal 
checks whereby the verification activity during the implementation stage of projects is carried out by staff chosen by the person in charge 
of  the  operational  goal  and  officially  appointed  by  the  Management  Authority.  These  employees  carry  out  the  checking  activity  on 
projects financed under the goal in question and are coordinated, in terms of methods, procedures and measures, by the Monitoring Office 
of the Technical Secretariat of the NOP 'Security'. 
(3)  Region  of  Umbria:  Management  Authority,  Inspection  Authority  and  Audit  Authority  'Procedural  Manuals'  adopted  in  line  with 
ERDF and ESF Regional Operational Plan management and monitoring systems; SIRU and SMG-QSN IT systems making possible the 
allocation  of  checking  activities  between  the  three  authorities,  while  avoiding  financing  overlaps  and  allowing  for  the  full  upload  of 
supporting documents for expenses. 
Administrative  measures/procedures:  (1)The  issuance  of  guidance  from  the  Managing  Authority  to  the  Intermediate  Bodies  and 
Beneficiaries,  regarding  both  Projects  and  Grant  Schemes,  in  relation  to  audits  and  verifications,  at  all  stages  of  the  co-financing 
procedure  (project  selection,  implementation  procedures,  closure),  for  on-the-spot  checks  and  desk  reviews.  The  most  important 
procedures/guidance  issued  cover  the  following  areas:  (a)  project  selection  criteria  (b)  ex-ante  controls  on  Community  Policies  (c) 
Eligibility of expenditure (d) Calculation of revenue-generating projects (e) Verifications (f) Adequate audit trail (g) Payment flows (h) 
Management Information System (i) Treatment of irregularities and Reporting procedures (issued by the CA). (2) Participation of staff in 
training seminars and workshops (organised by EC, OLAF or external bodies) has helped to improve knowledge and understanding of the 

39 

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Member State: 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

regulations  and  their  application.  The  above  measures  have  helped  to  improve  the  risk  management  system  and  to  identify 
errors/irregularities before payment. 

LT 

On the basis of proposals from and observations by the competent authorities, the Ministry of Finance is constantly improving legislative 
acts governing the use of EU structural aid and other international financial assistance. 

1.  A  European  Union  (EU)  structural  assistance  management  and  control  system  has  been  set  up  which  assigns  the  functions  of 
preventing,  investigating,  detecting  and  correcting  irregularities  to  the  bodies  administering  EU  structural  assistance  (Rules  on  the 
allocation of responsibilities and functions between bodies and authorities with regard to the implementation of the Lithuanian Strategy 
for the use of European Union structural assistance for 2007-13 and operational programmes, approved by Government Resolution No 
1139 of 17 October 2007 (Official Gazette 2007, No 114-4637)). 
2. The Rules on the repayment into the Lithuanian national budget of financial aid paid and/or used in breach of legislation, approved by 
Lithuanian  Government  Resolution  No  590  of  30  May  2005  (Official  Gazette  2005,  No  69-2469;  2010,  No  33-1570)  (hereinafter  'the 
rules  on  recovery')  have  been  updated,  laying  down  the  procedure  for  repaying  assistance  provided  under  EU  and  other  international 
assistance programmes administered in the Republic of Lithuania and paid and/or used in breach of legislation into the national budget 
and restrictions on allocating that assistance. 
The rules on recovery: 
2.1.  lay  down  a  common  procedure  for  repaying  into  the  budget  assistance  provided  under  EU  and  other  international  assistance 
programmes administered in the Republic of Lithuania and paid and (or) used in breach of legislation.  
2.2. improve the existing procedure for recovering funds in the light of Lithuania’s economic situation and experience in implementing 
EU and other international assistance programmes: 
2.2.1. extend the period for recovering funds (from 30 to 60 calendar days);  
2.2.2. simplify the procedure for adopting decisions on the recovery of funds (a decision on the recovery of funds can now be adopted 
using the functionalities introduced into information systems, thereby shortening the time needed for adopting decisions and simplifying 

EN 

40 

EN 

 
  
 
Member State: 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

the administrative process); 
2.2.3. allow repayable funds to be recovered at the request of the debtor by paying interest in instalments;  
2.2.4. establish clearer responsibility for the performance of functions related to the collection of funds. 
2.3. Provisions of directives associated with applying restrictions on granting assistance to employers who employ the citizens of third 
countries illegally have been transposed.  
3. Methodological recommendations for investigating and detecting irregularities have been drawn up and approved by Order No 1K-173 
of  the  Minister  for  Finance  of  29  May  2009  (Official  Gazette  2009,  No  67-2716)  (hereinafter  'Methodological  recommendations  for 
investigating  and  detecting  irregularities').  These  establish  the  procedure  to  be  followed  by  authorities  when  jointly  investigating, 
detecting  and  rectifying  irregularities  committed  by  the  manager  of  a  project  financed  from  EU  funds  (hereinafter  'project')  and  by 
Ministries  and/or  other  public  bodies  when  taking  decisions  on  the  irregularities  committed.  Along  with  the  Methodological 
recommendations for investigating and detecting irregularities, the form for reporting a suspected irregularity and the form for reporting 
the findings of an investigation into an irregularity have been approved, as have, pursuant to Order No 1K-121 of the Minister for Finance 
of 20 April 2009 (Official Gazette 2009, No 47-1886), the irregularity reporting form, the instructions for filling it in and the standard 
form for the registration of suspected irregularities. 
4.  A  computerised  information  management  and  control  system  for  EU  structural  assistance  for  the  2007-13  programming  period 
(hereinafter ‘the SFMIS’) has been established and is being continuously updated, and its implementing rules have been approved. All 
project-related information is to be registered in the SFMIS (including irregularities and all related information) and the implementing 
functionalities of this system enable the risk associated with projects to be analysed and evaluated, double financing of expenditure to be 
prevented  (for  instance,  the  SFMIS  is  able  to  ensure  that  invoices  do  not  repeat  across  projects),  information  to  be  disseminated  and 
categorised rapidly and other irregularity prevention operations to be carried out. 
5.  An  irregularities  inspector  working  group  has  been  established  by  Order  No  1K-115  of  the  Minister  for  Finance  of  16  April  2009 
(Official  Gazette  2009,  No  45-1785;  2012,  No  10-402)  to  examine  issues  related  to  the  investigation,  detection,  elimination  and 
prevention  of  irregularities  and  coordinate  operations  related  thereto.  Representatives  of  the  certifying  and  audit  authorities,  ministries 
and/or other public bodies, the Public Procurement Office and Financial Crimes Investigation Service at the Ministry of the Interior are 
invited to attend the proceedings of the irregularities inspector working group as observers.  

Preventive measures. In the course of administering action programmes and implementing projects, prevention and control of suspected 

EN 

41 

EN 

 
  
 
Member State: 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

cases of fraud in the area covered by cohesion policy is carried out systematically, i.e. monitoring and control activities take place at each 
and every stage of action programme and project implementation, and these measures together ensure adequate management of the risks 
associated with suspected cases of fraud: 
At  the  programming  stage:  when  establishing  investment  axes  and  priorities,  initial  assumptions  for  the  assessment  and  prevention  of 
risks associated with cases of suspected fraud are drawn up. 
At the project appraisal stage: when verifying that the project is eligible for financing, the risk of suspected cases of fraud is established 
while checking the project funding application ('application') by evaluating the project manager's replies to following questions, which 
appear on the application form approved by Order No 1K-066 of the Minister for Finance of 20 February 2008: 
1. Has an application already been submitted for assistance from the European Community, Lithuanian State and municipal budgets or the 
funds of the public authorities of EU or non-EU countries for the project under consideration or part thereof? 
2. Does the project under consideration or part thereof complement any other project for which financial support has already been or will 
be granted? 
3.  Was  an  application  submitted  for  financial  assistance  for  the  previous  phase  of  the  project  under  consideration  or  part  thereof 
(including feasibility studies and preparatory phases)? 
If at least one of these questions is answered affirmatively, additional provisions and restrictions related to the risk/control of cases of 
fraud are included in the project financing and administration contract ('the contract'). 
During the project implementation phase – by 1) managing the irregularities: the irregularities are detected, investigated and rectified; 2) 
verifying  and  certifying  payment  claims:  the  documentary  evidence  of  expenditure  having  been  justified  and  cleared  is  verified  and 
eligible and/or ineligible expenditure is identified; 3) carrying out an on-the-spot check, during which it is determined whether project 
managers are duly fulfilling the terms of the contract, whether the actual  situation corresponds to that described in the documents and 
whether there have been any irregularities in the use of EU funds, public procurements are evaluated and future work and the possible 
risks associated with procurements for the projects are discussed, so that project managers take preventive measures to prevent possible 
irregularities;  4)  preventing  the  risk  of  double  funding  of  the  same  expenditure  for  the  same  activity  under  the  programmes  managed, 
which  is  ensured  systematically  during  the  programming,  appraisal  and  implementation  phases;  5)  performing  risk  management  on 
projects:  the  risk  of  possible  double  financing  and  improper  procurement  is  assessed  and  preventive  risk  management  measures 
determined;  6)  monitoring  follow-up  procurement  to  procurement  by  non-contracting  authorities:  pre-procurement  monitoring  is 
performed if, based on a pre-procurement monitoring risk analysis, a pre-evaluation of the procurement documents and an evaluation of 

EN 

42 

EN 

 
  
Member State: 

LV 

EN 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

the  procurement  are  carried  out;  7)  assessing  the  information  provided  by  the  implementing  bodies:  information  about  possible 
irregularities is evaluated and decisions taken on entering into a contract, reducing funding etc.;  
8) in cases of suspected fraud, risk activities have to be carried out, and while cooperating: the implementing bodies cooperate with the 
Ministry of Finance and, where appropriate, information is transferred to the Financial Crime Investigation Service under the Ministry of 
the Interior (OLAF's contact body), the Special Investigation Service (anti-corruption body) and Public Procurement Office; 9) providing 
information: the public, project managers and founders and competent authorities are informed of established irregularities or cases of 
fraud;  10)  ex-post  checks  are  carried  out:  five  years  after  the  completion  of  a  project  an  assessment  is  made  of  whether  there  are any 
circumstances that have occasioned the termination of the contract, a return of assistance funds or otherwise had an effect on the funding 
provided, and projects at risk are identified. 
The implementing bodies have also established additional measures to prevent cases of suspected fraud. These measures have been laid 
down in descriptions of internal project risk management procedures or other documents, or are applied as measures to prevent cases of 
suspected fraud in project risk assessment systems. The application of procedures such as staff and project manager training, which also 
concern cooperation among project managers, are also aimed at avoiding suspected fraud by drawing the attention of participants to the 
most risky aspects of project management, possible effective measures and the application of COCOF guidelines in practice. 
1) Cabinet Regulation No 740 of 10 August 2010 laying down the procedure according to which the bodies involved in the management 
of the EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund prepare programming documents and implement the funds. Pursuant to this Regulation a 
meeting of the Managing Authority (MA), Audit Authority (AA), Certifying Authority (CA), Paying Authority (PA), RA and LB is held 
every  quarter  to  discuss  the  irregularities  detected  that  quarter  and  take  a  decision  on  which  irregularities  to  report  to  the  European 
Commission. 2) Pursuant to Cabinet Order No 168 of 24 March 2010 on the composition of the Council for Coordinating the Protection 
of EU Financial Interests and Cabinet Regulation No 269 of 23 March 2010 laying down the Statutes of the Council for Coordinating the 
Protection of EU Financial Interests, a Council (AFCOS) has been established, which functions as a consultative collegiate body with the 
aim of  facilitating the implementation  and development of a common national policy for the protection of EU financial interests. Law 
enforcement authorities are also represented on the Council; these present recommendations on improving the protection of EU financial 
interests and, together with staff involved in the EU funds system, examine unclear issues related to suspected fraud. See replies under 
Section 1. 

1)  An  EU  Structural  Funds  and  Cohesion  Fund  Risk  Management  Group  has  been  established  at  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  The  Group 

43 

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Member State: 

LU 

HU 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

identifies, assesses, confirms and manages the risks associated with conflicts of interest and fraud, including corruption, identified by the 
EU  funds  MA.  To  mitigate  and  prevent  these  risks,  many  EU  funds  management  procedures  employ  declarations  of  impartiality. 
Representatives of the MA, State Treasury (CA) and RA are involved in the working group. 2) Effective staff training courses are being 
run using funding from the Technical Assistance Project. The State Chancellery runs seminars presented by specialist lecturers, including 
from  OLAF,  and  staff  involved  with  the  EU  funds  system  can  upgrade  their  knowledge  by  participating  in  training  and  workshops 
organised by various authorities (e.g. the EC and OLAF). 3) On 27 May 2011 the MA organised training for prosecutors on various issues 
related to EU funds, including the nature and identification of irregularities, among others. See replies under Section 1. 
Administrative measures/procedures: No fraud detected or suspected by the audit authority so no need for specific anti-fraud measures. 
The audit authority does its sampling on the basis of risk analysis. In addition to the 'compulsory' samples laid down in the legislation, 
additional samples may be taken on the audit authority's initiative to obtain a better overview of the systems in place, particularly at the 
start of the period.  
ESF: - remodelling of the management and control system; - 100% ex ante control based on 5 criteria (legality, regularity, reasonableness, 
linkage, realism) 
Legislative measures:  
1.  In  order  to  detect  and  handle  irregularities  and  suspected  fraud  cases  more  quickly  and  efficiently  and  to  implement  corrections, 
Government Decree 4/2011 of 28 January 2011 on the rules governing utilisation of aid from the European Regional Development Fund, 
the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and Order 24/2011 of 6 May 2011 of the Minister for National Development on the 
Common Operational Handbook were introduced in the programming period 2007-2013 (see point 1).  
2. Pursuant to the provisions of Government Decree No 210/2010 of 30 June 2010 on the Directorate-General for the Audit of European 
Grants (EUTAF), EUTAF was established by subdividing the Government Control Office (KEHI). EUTAF's primary mission is to act as 
control authority as regards grants from the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and 
to perform control tasks established by the Government in respect of other EU and international support. The primary objective of the 
organisational change was to enable a single body to concentrate on the tasks of auditing EU projects and combating fraud, while taking 
over the experts and technical equipment to do so. Nevertheless, KEHI can continue to check the use of international grants.  
3. Act No CLIII of 2010 amending the acts establishing the 2011 budget of the Republic of Hungary supplements Act No XXXVIII of 
1992 on the state budget, which details and supplements the concept of EU resources, extending it to also include, besides resources from 
the  EU  budget,  resources  from  the  budget  of  non-EU  members  of  the  European  Economic  Area  or  from  the  ‘Swiss  Contribution’ 

EN 

44 

EN 

 
  
Member State: 

MT 

NL 

EN 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

programme.  The  amendment  clarifies  and  ensures  the  accountability  of  beneficiaries  as  regards  the  appropriate  use  of  non-social  EU 
grants. It provides for stricter penalties for infringements of the rules on financing granted partly from Hungarian and partly from the EU 
budget  (EU  co-financing),  defines  the  general  rules  on  exclusion  from  the  grant  scheme,  and  establishes  the  central  database  of 
beneficiaries excluded from the grant scheme.  
4.  To  achieve  more  effective  and  economical  central  budget  revenue estimates  and  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  state  budget, Act No 
CXXII of 2010 on the National Tax and Customs Office (NAV) integrated the Tax and Financial Control Office and the Customs and 
Finance Guard from 1 January 2011. The new organisation will be more effective than its predecessor in administering customs revenue 
due to the EU and in collecting the revenue necessary for the VAT-based contribution, thus indirectly contributing to securing the GNI-
based resources. 
Administrative measures/procedures:preparation of legislative acts revision of the system 
Administrative  measures/procedures:  1.  Centralised  system  of  payments,  where  all  payment  claims  and  supporting  documentation  are 
checked in the first instance by the Beneficiary, inserted in a national structural funds database, checked by the respective Line Ministry 
(LM), then by Treasury who finally instructs payment to the Central Bank of Malta. Therefore this payment process involves multiple 
stages of controls with each level checking different things.  
2.  Administrative  verifications  on  public  procurement,  horizontal  priorities  and  payment  process  by  the  Managing  Authority  after 
payment is effected but before certification to the EC in the Statement of Expenditure. 
3.  Use  of  a  common  national  database  which  enables  Programme-wide  monitoring  and  facilitates  the  detection  of  possible  double-
funding, over-claims, etc.  
Administrative measures/procedures : 
1) implementation of cross-check mechanisms to detect and eliminate double-financing of expenditure. With a view to detecting cases 
involving double-financing of expenditure effectively, three types of cross-check have been introduced: cross-checks on programmes (to 
detect  double-financing  of  expenditure  within  the  framework  of  individual  operating  programmes),  horizontal  cross-checks  (to  detect 
double-financing  of  expenditure  within  the  framework  of  various  operating  programmes  in  the  2007-2013  financial  perspective)  and 
intermediate  cross-checks (to detect double-financing of expenditure within the framework of operating programmes in the 2004-2006 
and 2007-2013 financial perspectives);  
2)  Introduction  of  a  new  IT  system  (KSI  SIMIK  2007-2013)  to  facilitate  the  collection  and  aggregation  of  data  concerning  operating 
programmes,  including  projects  implemented  using  funds  made  available  under  these  programmes  and  used  in  the  management, 

45 

EN 

 
  
Member State: 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

monitoring and control process; 
3) Commissioning bodies outside the management and control system to carry out checks by way of public procurement procedures.  

AT 

PL 

PT 

A  high  density  of  verifications  pursuant  to  Article  13  of  Regulation  (EC)  1828/2006  serve  to  prevent  irregularities.  The  verification 
procedures often provide that 100% of the expenditure reported by the recipients are to be checked by the administrative departments.  

1) Implementation of cross-check mechanisms to detect and eliminate double-financing of expenditure. With a view to detecting cases 
involving double-financing of expenditure effectively, three types of cross-check have been introduced: cross-checks on programmes (to 
detect  double-financing  of  expenditure  within  the  framework  of  individual  operating  programmes),  horizontal  cross-checks  (to  detect 
double-financing  of  expenditure  within  the  framework  of  various  operating  programmes  in  the  2007-2013  financial  perspective)  and 
intermediate  cross-checks (to detect double-financing of expenditure within the framework of operating programmes in the 2004-2006 
and 2007-2013 financial perspectives); 
2)  Introduction  of  a  new  IT  system  (KSI  SIMIK  2007-2013)  to  facilitate  the  collection  and  aggregation  of  data  concerning  operating 
programmes,  including  projects  implemented  using  funds  made  available  under  these  programmes  and  used  in  the  management, 
monitoring and control procress; 
3) Commissioning bodies outside the management and control system to carry out checks by way of public procurement procedures.  
The prevention of cases of suspected fraud and the risk management system are governed by Decree-Law No 312/2007 of 17 September 
2007 determining the management model for the NSRF and the respective operational programmes. Like for the other funds, there is an 
Implementing  Decree  for  the  ESF,  No  84-A/2007  of  10  December  2007,  which  lays  down  the  general  implementing  rules.  In  this 
connection,  we  would  flag  up  the  integrated  information  system  for  the  ESF  (SIIFSE),  which  supports  management,  certification, 
registration  of  financial  flows,  verification,  follow-up,  assessment,  and  physical  and  financial  monitoring  for  operations  funded  by  the 
ESF.  Applications  are  made  through  SIIFSE,  and  a  database  containing  information  on  the  debt  situation  and  integrity  of  applicants 
allows  the  financial  risk  of  awarding  funding  to  be  assessed  and  managed.  It  is  up  to  IGFSE  (the  certifying  authority)  to  manage  and 
update the information system as regards the integrity and ESF debts of applicants for and recipients of ESF funding. Factors that would 

EN 

46 

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Member State: 

RO 

EN 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

block  or  restrict  access  to  ESF  funding,  that  determine  the  integrity  of  applicants  and  the  degree  of  risk  they  represent,  are  set  out  in 
Article 17(1)(d)  and (3) to (5) of Implementing  Decree No  84-A/2007 as amended by Implementing  Decree  No  4/2010  of  15  October 
2010. Before approving applications, the managing authorities must obtain from IGFSE information on the integrity and possible debts of 
applicants,  including  associated  entities  and  partners  submitting  joint  training  applications  and  partnership  applications  under  the  ESF. 
The  SIIFSE  also  contains  information  on  entities  found  during  control  or  audit  exercises  to  have  engaged  in  financial,  accounting  or 
organisational irregularities. This enables the managing and audit authorities to pay close attention to project implementation by entitites 
which, while not guilty of any conduct that would block or restrict their access to ESF funding, none the less pose some risk of misuse of 
public funds. The same close attention is paid to entities that have previously had their access to funding blocked or restricted. 
A. IGFSE has been monitoring insolvency proceedings against beneficiaries with a view to recovering amounts unduly paid or received 
under the ESF by filing claims in the insolvency proceedings identified. Where insolvency proceedings are found to have been initiated 
against recipients of ESF funding, the information is sent to the managing authorities so that they can take appropriate action in terms of 
monitoring project implementation. B. Based on its experience with the management of Community funds, in particular under CSF III, 
the  Regional  Development  Institute  decided  to  pay  close  attention  to  monitoring  compliance  with  public  procurement  rules  by 
beneficiaries  under  the  Rumos  OP.  It  issued  guidelines  in  order  to  clarify  beneficiaries  and  standardise  management  checks 
(administrative and on-the-spot)  to take account of check lists for public procurement. On-the-spot checks also cover compliance with 
legal  requirements  on  introducing  accounting  and  pedagogical  procedures  (checks  of  orginals)  and  information  and  publicity  rules. 
Following the checks, beneficiaries are given recommendations and a time-frame for implementing them. Where recommendations are 
made regarding future repayments/operations, subsequent on-the-spot checks look for evidence that they have been implemented. 
Government  Emergency  Order  No  66/2011  on  preventing,  detecting  and  penalising  irregularities  in  the  granting  and  use  of  European 
funds  and/or  the  corresponding  national  public  funds,  published  in  Official  Gazette  of  Romania  Part  I  No  461  of  30  June  2011,  and 
Government Decision No 875 of 31 August 2011 approving the implementing rules for Government Emergency Order No 66/2001 on 
preventing,  detecting  and  penalising  irregularities  in  the  granting  and  use  of  European  funds  and/or  the  corresponding  national  public 
funds, published in Official Gazette of Romania Part I No 659 of 15 September 2011, have introduced financial management and control 
principles and rules to be applied, during the course of their current activities, by the authorities responsible for administering European 
funds. 
The new legislative framework has consolidated the powers of the control bodies set up both inside and outside the authorities responsible 
for administering Community funds, and has extended the Ministry of Public Finances’ specific control powers concerning the detection 

47 

EN 

 
  
Member State: 

SI 

EN 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

of  irregularities  and  the  establishment  of  budgetary  debts.  ANRMAP  -  The  adoption  of  Act  No  279/2011  amending  Government 
Emergency Order No 34/ 2006 on awarding public procurement contracts, contracts for the concession of public works and contracts for 
the  concession  of  services,  published  in  Official  Gazette  No  872  of  9  December  2011  has  strengthened  ANRMAP's  role  in  ex-ante 
evaluation/control. Ex-post checks will focus in particular on identifying conflicts of interest and unfair competition (see Sections 66-69 
of Government Emergency Order No 34/2006). 

The  Anti  Fraud  Department  (AFCOS  Romania)  has  access  to  the  Single  Management  Information  System  (SMIS)  2007  2013.  The 
information  extracted  from  that  database  is  used  to  justify  control  policies  and  carry  out  risk  analysis.  Furthermore,  by  accessing  that 
database, DLAF is able to respond immediately to OLAF's requests concerning the existence of certain projects, the source of financing, 
the stage of implementation and other project details. During the same period, DLAF also gained access to the public records database 
and other national and European databases (e.g. the central exclusion database) and the information extracted from those databases has 
contributed to improving the risk management system.  
The managing authorities use ‘whistle blowing' schemes in order to uncover irregularities and suspicions of fraud.  
In  addition,  some  managing  authorities  have  established  administrative  procedures  that  also  cover  risk  management,  management  of 
irregularities and anti fraud control. The Code of Conduct for the avoidance of situations of incompatibility and conflicts of interest by the 
personnel  administering  programmes  financed  from  non-reimbursable  European  funds  was  adopted  on  19  December  2011,  by 
Memorandum approved by the Prime Minister. 
The Code of Conduct is a guide for preventing and avoiding situations involving conflicts of interest and/or incompatibilities that may 
affect the personnel administering non-reimbursable European funds. 
Penal Code (KZ-1) (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia (OGRS) No 39-1876/2009), Article 229 (Fraud to the detriment of the 
European Communities) (1) Anyone who avoids expenses by using or submitting false, incorrect, or incomplete statements or documents, 
or  does  not  reveal  data  and  thus  misappropriates  or  unlawfully  withholds  or  uses  inappropriately  funds  of  the  general  budget  of  the 
European  Communities  or  of  the  budgets  managed  by  the  European  Communities  or  managed  on  their  behalf,  shall  be  sentenced  to 
imprisonment for not less than three months and not more than three years. (2) Anyone who unlawfully acquires funds from the budgets 
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be punished in the same way. (3) If an offence under the preceding paragraphs has resulted in 
the  acquisition  of  a  considerable  economic  benefit  or  caused  a  considerable  economic  loss,  the  offender  shall  be  sentenced  to 
imprisonment for not less than one and not more than eight years. (4) The penalties referred to in the above paragraphs of this Article 

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Member State: 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

shall  apply  to  the  managers  of  companies  or  other  persons  authorised  to  take  decisions  or  carry  out  supervision  in  companies,  if  they 
facilitate or fail to prevent the criminal offences of offenders referred to in the above paragraphs who are under their authority and act on 
behalf of the company. 
The Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act (OGRS No 45/2010) requires the inclusion of an anti-corruption clause. All public-sector 
bodies  taking  part  in  public  procurement  procedures  must  report  on  their  financial  situation.  Corruption  must  be  reported  and 
whistleblowers  are  protected.  Integrity  plans  are  to  be  introduced  (assessment  of  exposure  of  institutions  to  corruption,  names  and 
positions of persons responsible for the integrity plan, description of areas of work and decision-making methods including an assessment 
of  exposure  to  corruption,  proposals  to  improve  integrity,  measures  for  the  early  detection,  prevention  and  elimination  of  the  risks  of 
corruption).  
Amendment  to  the  Public  Procurement  Act  (OGRS  No  19/10),  Article  77a  (Register  of  tenderers  with  negative  references)  (1)  The 
authority which takes a decision on the infringement referred to in Article 109a(2) shall inform the ministry responsible for finance of that 
decision, within three working days of it taking effect. This notification shall state the tenderer's full name and registration number and 
the  date until  which the  tenderer is to be excluded from public procurement procedures. (2) The ministry responsible for finance shall 
keep a register of tenderers with negative references which shall include: the full name and registration number of the tenderer, the date 
when the tenderer was entered in the register and the date until which the tenderer is excluded from public procurement procedures; this 
register shall be published on the ministry's website. A tenderer shall be entered in the register if it has committed an infringement under 
Article  109a(2)  of  this  Act  or  Article  106a(2)  of  the  Public  Procurement  in  the  Water,  Energy,  Transport  and  Postal  Services  Act 
(ZJNVETPS). (3) The ministry responsible for finance shall enter the tenderer in the register within three working days of receiving the 
notification  referred  to  in  the  first  paragraph  of  this  Article.  No  appeal  shall  be  allowed  against  entry  in  the  register  of  tenderers  with 
negative  references.  (4)  The  ministry  responsible  for  finance  shall  remove  the  tenderer  from  the  register  of  tenderers  with  negative 
references within three working days of the date referred to in the third indent of the second paragraph of this Article. 
Decree on the Implementation of Procedures for the Use of European Cohesion Policy Funds in the Republic of Slovenia in the 2007-
2013  Programming  Period  (OGRS  Nos  17/09,  40/09,  3/10  and  31/10),  public  procurement  instruments,  cofinancing  agreement, 
Instructions on management of checks (on-the-spot and administrative checks), Managing Authority instructions on eligible costs. 

EN 

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Member State: 

FI 

SK 

EN 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

1) The managing authority of the structural funds issued new joint instructions for the ESF and ERDF in the 2007-13 programming period 
concerning administrative and on-the-spot verifications under Article 13. The aim of the procedures set out in the instructions is to ensure 
the conformity of procedures at the various intermediary bodies and ascertain whether all the key considerations affecting the eligibility 
of  expenditure  have  been  taken  into  account  during  the  performance  of  administrative  and  on-the-spot  verifications.  The  intermediate 
bodies  carry  out  administrative  verifications  on  all  applications  for  payment.  On-the-spot  verifications  are  carried  out  on  some  of  the 
projects on a sample basis. In order to check the eligibility and reality of expenditure, the authorities use the checklists drawn up by the 
managing  authority.  All  payment  applications  are  handled  using  information  systems.  Since  1  June  2010,  expenditure  and  funding 
tranches approved as eligible have been entered in the systems, as have the sums rejected together with the reason for rejection and the 
error category. Information concerning on-the-spot verifications (including the checklist questions and any ineligible expenditure found 
together with the error category) is also entered into the information systems. The entry of data concerning administrative and on-the-spot 
verifications into the information systems allows data reporting and analysis. The managing authority analyses, with the help of reports, 
the  problems  discovered  during  administrative  and  on-the-spot  verifications.  In  order  to  eliminate the  problems  found  or  minimise  the 
associated risks, the managing authority takes them into account in its instructions, training and risk management. 2) Administrative and 
on-the-spot  verifications  under  Article  13  are  entered  into  the  structural  fund  information  systems,  together  with  the  findings  of  the 
inspection  authority's  verifications  and  the  associated  follow-up  measures.  The  intermediate  bodies  can  thus  obtain  information  on  the 
findings of verifications concerning the various projects and beneficiaries and take this information into account both in the granting and 
payment process and/or in risk assessment regarding beneficiaries and/or projects. During the project selection stage, the finance provider 
assesses  the  risk  classification  of  the  project  and  the  beneficiary.  The  risk  classifications  are  entered  into  the  information  systems.  3) 
Monitoring of the intermediate bodies by the managing authority has been stepped up. In accordance with the annual monitoring plan, the 
managing authority carries out guidance and monitoring visits to the intermediate bodies in order to verify that, when they are granting 
and  paying  aid,  they  operate  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  sound  financial  management  and  that  they  impose  the  necessary 
corrective measures when they discover irregularities. 
1. Act No 528/2008 on assistance and support provided from EU funds, as amended, which lays down the procedure for protecting the 
financial interests of the EU at national level, the selection process for projects financed from EU funds and the management of financial 
relations and control. 2. Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund Management System for the 2007-2013 programming period, laying down 
the obligations for regulatory authorities to carry out preliminary financial checks, administrative checks and on-the-spot checks. 3. The 
National  Strategy  for  protecting  the  European  Community's  financial  interests  in  the  Slovak  Republic  together  with  its  annexes,  the 

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Member State: 

SE 

EN 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

Irregularities  Notification  Manual  and  the  AFCOS  Network  Cooperation  Manual,  under  which  the  protection  of  the  European 
Community's  financial  interests  in  Slovakia  rests  on  three  pillars:  prevention,  detection  and  investigation  of  irregularities,  corrective 
action and prosecution. 
1. Administrative and on-the-spot checks are the basic mechanism for preventing irregularities and fraud. The regulatory authorities also 
compile and update the Applicants and Beneficiaries Handbook and issue guidelines and methodologies providing detailed instructions 
for the preparation of applications for non-returnable financial contributions and the implementation of OP projects. 2. Major extensions 
to the checklists for more detailed investigations of State aid, public procurement, media cases and findings of the European Commission 
and Court of Auditors. 3. The regulatory authorities and their subordinate intermediate bodies carry out administrative checks according 
to the public-procurement rules and principles in order to ensure that funds are used economically and effectively. A regulatory authority 
carries  out  administrative  checks  in  connection  with  the  procurement  of  goods,  services,  construction  work  and  related  procedures  by 
beneficiaries of non-returnable financial contributions before the contract between the beneficiary and the successful tenderer is signed 
(unless it was concluded before the contract for the granting of non-returnable financial contributions entered into force), and no later than 
the  first  payment  of  the  non-returnable  financial  contribution  relating  to  project  expenditure  incurred  in  connection  with  the 
implementation of the procurement. The regulatory authority may also exercise the right to take part in the public-procurement process as 
an non-voting member of the committee. 
On 1 January 2008 a general framework was introduced for internal regulation and control within national authorities. The framework 
consists of several instruments. In addition to a new regulation on internal regulation and control (2007:603), the framework comprises 
the new authority regulation (2007:515) concerning management responsibility, the internal audit regulation (2006:1228) concerning the 
objective of auditing, and a regulation on annual reports and basic data for budget procedures (2000:605) which concerns the signing of 
annual  reports.  The  purpose  of  the  new  framework  is  to  clarify  the  management's  responsibility  and  create  better  conditions  for 
accountability and more effective and secure activities, not only for national resources but also for EU resources administered nationally 
under shared management. The aim of the framework is also to contribute to better protection of EU resources. The authority regulation 
clarifies responsibility for activities and internal regulation and control. Management is responsible for ensuring that activities are carried 
out  effectively  and  in  accordance  with  the  legislation  in  force  and  the  obligations  associated  with  EU  membership.  It  is  also  the 
responsibility  of  management,  under  the  regulation,  to  ensure  that  a  reliable  and  correct  account  is  given  of  the  activities  and  that  the 
authority manages state resources responsibly.  

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Member State: 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

Under the new regulation on internal regulation and control, the authorities concerned are required to carry out a risk analysis, implement 
control  measures  and  ensure  systematic  and  continuous  follow-up  and  appraisal  of  internal  regulation  and  control  arrangements.  They 
must also document the risk analysis, control measures, follow-up and appraisal.  
In other words, the authority's management must ensure that the authority operates planning, control and reporting systems, etc. that are 
both effective and fit for purpose.  
As a result of the changes in the internal auditing regulation, the authorities responsible for managing or certifying EU resources must 
organise internal auditing to examine the internal regulation and control system and report their findings and suggested improvements to 
the authority's management.  
Finally, the regulation concerning annual reports and basic data for budget procedures has been amended. These amendments mean that, 
by signing the annual report, the authority's management certifies that the document gives a true picture of the result of activities and of 
expenditure,  income  and  the  authority's  financial  situation.  In  connection  with  the  signature,  an  appraisal  must  also  be  carried  out  to 
determine whether the internal regulation and control system is satisfactory. The regulation also stipulates that funds and activities that 
are financed wholly or partly by the EU will also be covered by the management's certification and appraisal. 
As a result of the decision to introduce a joint framework for internal regulation and control at national level, the Government has, since 
the 2008 financial year, provided annual national certification of  the use of  EU funds. The framework provides an important basis for 
national certification and the aim is to create a more effective management and control system for EU resources. National certification 
takes the form of an annual statement which the government submits to parliament, with copies for the European Commission and the 
European  Court  of  Auditors.  It  forms  part  of  the  central  government's  annual  report  and  contains  an  assessment  of  whether  the 
compilation  of  EU  accounts,  including  profit/loss  statements,  balance  sheets  and  cash-based  accounting,  gives  a  correct  picture  in  all 
important respects, and whether the Government has a system (internal regulation and control framework) in place to ensure satisfactory 
internal regulation and control of EU funds.  
The  Government's  certification  will  be  based  on  the  certifications  and  assessments  of  the  authorities  responsible  and  the  opinions  and 
observations  of  the  auditors.  Responsibility  for  ensuring  satisfactory  internal  controls  and  sound  economic  management  lies  with  the 
authority responsible for managing each programme. The EU funds covered by the certification are those managed in partnership between 
Sweden and the Commission and reported under the appropriations and revenue headings of the central government budget. The funds 
concerned  are  the  European  Agricultural  Guarantee  Fund,  the  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development,  the  European 
Fisheries  Fund,  the  Structural  Funds,  ERDF  transnational  programmes  and  the  funds  managed  within  the  framework  programme  on 

EN 

52 

EN 

 
  
Member State: 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows. 

Regulation (2007:14) on the management of EU Structural Funds. Nutek’s instructions on aid from the European Regional Development 
Fund 2007-2013. Organisation and revision of the management and control system under Article 71 of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
(ERDF) 

A  new  selection  model,  revised  guidelines  and  improved  instructions  for  on-the-spot  controls  under  Article  13(2)b  of  Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006. (ESF). 
An  audit  plan  is  established  for  each  project  and  any  risk  areas  are  identified.  A  risk  assessment  is  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  the 
information collected and the plan is revised as necessary (ESF). 

Sweden's Council for the Protection of EU Financial Interests (SEFI Council) is responsible at national level for coordinating measures to 
combat fraud and other irregularities involving EU-related funds. It is composed of all the Swedish authorities which are responsible in 
different  ways  for  handling  EU  funds.  Its  meetings  are  also  attended  by  representatives  of  the  ministries  and  judicial  authorities 
concerned. In 2008 the Council's terms of reference were changed to strengthen its role as a strategic forum for cooperation and give a 
more  thematic  slant  to  its  meetings,  with  the  aim  of  responding  better  to  the  authorities'  need  to  exchange  information  and  compare 
experiences.  
In  2011  the  SEFI  Council  agreed  on  a  common  reporting  policy  for  all authorities, so  that  suspected  EU  fraud  will  be  reported  to  the 
judicial authorities. The policy also includes a report on circumstances that can give grounds for suspecting a crime and a description of 
how to proceed if officials suspect that a crime has been committed and what information a crime report should contain. 
WG - Within the specified period of 2007 - 2011 the two Major pieces of Legislation introduced within the UK that have contributed to 
the better prevention of suspected fraud cases are the Fraud Act 2006 which actually went live in 2007 and the Bribery Act 2010 which 
went live in July 2011. The Counter Fraud Branch for the Welsh Government has only been in existance 18 months but has introduced 
Counter  Fraud  and  Corruption  Risk  Assessments  for  each  of  the  business  areas  using  the  Bribery  legislation.  Controls  and  actions  are 
identified to deal with the risk identified. They are monitored and reviewed according to the aproportinate level of risk and submitted to 
the  Head  of  Counter  Fraud  to  identify  the  Corporate  Risks  for  the  organisation  in  relation  to  fraud.  The  Bribery  Act  identified  a  new 
corporate offence of allowing bribery to occur but only if you failed to introduce adequate precautions to prevent Bribery. This included 

53 

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UK 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
Member State: 

2.1.1.  Briefly  describe  three  measures  (within  the  national  legal  framework  and  or  administrative  procedures)  taken  in  the  period 
2007-2011  which  have  substantially  contributed  to  better  prevention  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  in  the  area  of  the  Cohesion 
Policy or/and improvements in the risk management system. These measures could be disseminated as best practices among the 
MS. 

having risk assessments in place, performing due diligence and monitoring and reviewing the risks. In essence the legislation dictated that 
risk assessments were mandatory and this gave us the 'teeth' to encompass fraud within the risk assessments and get the 'buy in' from all 
areas  of  the  business  including  WEFO.  In  essence  it  gave  legislative  ownership  to  each  area  of  the  business  to  identify,  maintain  and 
consider  their  own  responsibility  for  dealing  with  the  risk.  These  risks  are  also  be  used  to  identify  higher  risk  areas  to  be  targeted  by 
Counter Fraud and Internal Audit and to subsequently influence the audit plan. Northern Ireland: Fraud Act 2006 came into force in 2007. 
DCLG:  Same  as  SG,  DFPNI:Effective  vouching  of  claims;  Performance  monitoring  (including  site  visits)  by  first  line  Implementing 
Body (IB) staff responsible for projects; Training conducted by Managing Authority and Audit Authority for IBs on compliance issues. 
Systems regularly reviewed - including on-the-spot checking and subsequent analysis of procedures - recent review of Article 13 On the 
Spot verifications on PEACE III & INTERREG IVA resulted in a change of emphasis to a systems test approach as opposed to focusing 
on process. 
SG  -  The  Management  and  Control  System  was  approved  by  the  Commission  and  sets  out  the  compliance  regime  for  operations  in 
Scotland.  This  includes  MA  administrative  and  on-the-spot  checks  and  activities  of  the  CA  and  AA.  WG:  Administrative 
measures/procedures: Check of transaction lists for all grant claims received, annual independent audit of projects and Article 13 on the 
spot  checks.  DCLG:  Same  as  SG,  DFPNI:Effective  vouching  of  claims;  Performance  monitoring  (including  site  visits)  by  first  line 
Implementing  Body  (IB)  staff  responsible  for  projects;  Training  conducted  by  Managing  Authority  and  Audit  Authority  for  IBs  on 
compliance issues. Systems regularly reviewed - including on-the-spot checking and subsequent analysis of procedures - recent review of 
Article 13 On the Spot verifications on PEACE III & INTERREG IVA resulted in a change of emphasis to a systems test approach as 
opposed to focusing on process. 

EN 

54 

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Member State: 

BE 

BG 

EN 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

COMMENT: D2 EFRO VL: strong proactive approach appears effective) More irregularities detected before payment 
D2 EFRO VL 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: thanks to first-level double controls. Fewer irregularities with financial impact 
ERDF  Wallonia  ESF-VL:  Fewer  recoveries.  FSED  (ESF  -  German-speaking  community):  Fewer  irregularities  with  financial  impact. 
Other 
ESF-VL: Fewer corrections to certified statements of expenditure and reports to OLAF. 
ESF: In future there should be no cases of double financing thanks to the recurrent control procedures. 
D2 EFRO VL: prevention of irregularities with a financial impact 

By the beneficiary to the managing authorities  
ESF-VL: Financial reports not drawn up until after checks 
FSED: By the beneficiary to the managing authorities. 
ERDF Wallonia 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region. Higher proportion of accepted eligible amounts 
D2 EFRO VL 
ERDF Wallonia. Other 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: ERDF stamp to prevent double financing 
Compliance with applicable regulations, standards and guidelines (specify): 
ERDF Wallonia: public contracts, list of eligible expenditure 
D2 EFRO VL: growing awareness and increased expertise re compliance with public procurement legislation among project beneficiaries 
and in the Managing Authority 
FSED: Clarification of the eligibility of expenditure, professionalisation in the administration of projects (in particular small non-profit 
organisations) 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: more effective controls on expenditure and public procurement procedures 
More irregularities detected before payment. The enforcement of the management and control systems of the Managing Authorities has 
strengthened ex-ante control of the procedures for grant provision and ex-ante and ex-post control of the awarding of public procurement 
contracts by the beneficiaries. The mechanisms for verification of project expenditure have been improved as a whole. This has increased 
prevention of irregularities and/or follow up and rectification of errors/irregularities on the part of the beneficiaries during the processing 
of  operational  expenditure,  prior  to  it  being  reimbursed  by  the  Managing  Authority.  Communication  with  the  beneficiaries  has  been 

55 

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Member State: 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

improved  and  they  have  been  familiarised  with  errors  made,  the  ways  for  their  removal  and  the  possible  consequences  of  a  failure  to 
rectify them. 
A check for any reports of irregularities and fraud is made upon every request for payment. This preventive measure is aimed at carrying 
out  comprehensive  inspections  (including  on-the  spot  checks),  counter-inspections  and  audits,  which  in  some  cases  results  in  the 
suspension of advance or partial payments under contracts if reports on irregularities or fraud are filed in regards to them. 
The  improvement  of  the  above  procedures  on  the  basis  of  acquired  experience  has  resulted  in  the  detection  of  a  higher  number  of 
irregularities in project implementation before the interim and the final payment. Checks are carried out on 100% of the interim and final 
technical reports and financial statements related to the project implementation are carried out, which reduces the number of registered 
and  reported  irregularities  with  a  financial  impact.Decreased  number  of  irregularities  with  financial  impact.  The  measures  taken  have 
considerably reduced the need to register irregularities with a financial impact. Timely actions and corrective measures are carried out 
prior to the payment stage. 
The  lower  number  of  irregularities  with  a  financial  impact  is  due  to  the  recommendations  given  by  the  Managing  Authorities  and  the 
Intermediate Bodies with regard to project implementation.Other 
- prevention of ineligible expenditure and misuse of funds 
- definition of the number of on-the-spot checks necessary for the following calendar year. 
- avoidance of unlawful procedures and overall improvement of public procurement.  
- optimisation of management and control systems by establishing a mechanism for handling irregularities which is clear and the same for 
all bodies managing European funds and programmes in Bulgaria. - control of projects and documents related to public procurement has 
ensured that the procedures do not contain terms and requirements that are not compliant with the Public Procurement Act.  
- ex-ante control allows strict monitoring of the compliance of procedures with law and provides reasonable assurance to the management 
prior to the signing of contracts. 
By the beneficiary to the managing authorities. The abovementioned enforced ex-ante control has ensured that the requests for payment 
submitted  by  beneficiaries  contain  a  lower  number  of  ineligible  expenditure  and  improved  consistency  of  project  proposals  with  the 
eligibility criteria and the spending benchmarks.Higher degree of accepted eligible amounts 
Greater reliability of sums approved/verified.The requests for payment submitted by beneficiaries contain a lower number of ineligible 
costs. Increased discipline and transparency of the project implementation is achieved.. Other 
Increase  in  the  reliability  of  financial  reporting  in  terms  of  the  improvement  of  the  control  machinery  and  the  scope  for  identifying 
irregularities and fraud at an earlier stage. 
Compliance with applicable regulations, standards and guidelines (specify): Council of Ministers Decree No 134 of 5 July 2010 adopted a 

EN 

56 

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Member State: 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

methodology  for  applying  direcdt  financial  corrections  to  expenditure  relating  to  the  implementation  of  operational  programmes 
cofinanced by the EU’s Structural Funds, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Fisheries Fund under 
Article  98  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1083/2006  of  11  July  2006  laying  down  general  provisions  on  the  European  Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund or Article 33 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 
2005  on  the  financing  of  the  common  agricultural  policy  and  the  European  Commission’s  Guidelines  for  determining  financial 
corrections  to  be  made  to  expenditure  cofinanced  by  the  Structural  Funds  or  the  Cohesion  Fund  for  non-compliance  with  the  rules  on 
public procurement (COCOF 07/0037/03). 
Reinforcing  the  checks  system  with  checks  on  projects  has  had,  inter  alia,  a  preventive  impact,  since  it  has  made  it  possible  to  detect 
irregularities  prior  to  payment  of  funding;  use  of  ex-post  financing  leads  to  elimination  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud;  improved  mutual 
information of all state administration bodies involved actively or passively in the protection of the EU's financial interests (in particular 
cooperation with the Czech Police). This approach was set to be applied in the programmes at the Ministry for Regional Development 
less than six months ago. To date it has not been possible to make precise comments on effectiveness; prevention in the case of ex-ante 
and on-the-spot checks; reduction of errors in tenders; greater transparency of the whole process. Consistent checks and audits, reducing 
the number of irregularities with financial impact - prevention by the MA inspecting officers; statements submitted by beneficiaries to the 
MAs (lists of accounting documents annexed by beneficiaries to applications for payments). 
By the beneficiary to the managing authorities: in connection with administrative checks on payment requests or in on-the-spot checks the 
reliability of financial reporting is being examined: requests for reimbursement of expenditure. 
The administrative measures introduced have led to better management and control of projects. The administrative measures have led to 
the  detection  of  errors  in  the  calculation  of  internal  hours,  depreciation,  indirect  costs,  holiday  pay,  VAT  processing  and  insufficient 
documentation of payment. More irregularities detected before payment. Decreased number of irregularities with financial impact. 
Financial reporting has become more reliable. By the beneficiary to the managing authorities. Higher degree of accepted eligible amounts.  
More irregularities have been detected before project managers' expenditure was covered. More than 50% of infringements are detected 
before payment is made as a result of discussing unclear issues and detected cases at quarterly meetings on irregularities, consulting with 
law enforcement officers and identifying and assessing risks in a risk management working group. Fewer irregularities with a financial 
impact.  Training  for  staff  involved  with  the  EU  funds;  consideration  of  unclarified  issues  and  discussion  of  the  most  characteristic 
infringements  and  irregularities  at  quarterly  meetings  on  irregularities  and  at  meetings  of  the  AFCOS  Council;  consultation  with  law 
enforcement officers, and intensification of preliminary procurement checks. Other Training for prosecutors/law enforcement officers on 
issues related to EU funds, including the nature of irregularities, how to identify them etc., in order to develop a common understanding 

EN 

57 

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Member State: 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

of compliance with EU legal acts and detect fraud associated with EU financial instruments more effectively. 
The reliability of reporting by beneficiaries to management authorities has increased. Staff training. Higher degree of accepted eligible 
amounts Staff training. 
More  irregularities  detected  before  payment  particularly  in  connection  with  public  procurements  -  public  procurement  checklists  were 
completed, inspectors trained. Decreased number of irregularities with financial impact: checks of public procurement are more thorough, 
problems  are  detected  before  aid  is  paid.  Other  -  possibility  of  using  compulsory  enforcement  for  unrecovered  requests,  possibility  to 
consult the police or the Prosecutor's Office 
Other  -  the  managing  authorities'  awareness  has  increased,  the  rules  are  more  precise;  inter-authority  cooperation  has  improved  (the 
investigating authority is consulted while resolving cases) 

Compliance with applicable regulations, standards and  guidelines (specify):  rules made more specific in training sessions and working 
groups; on-the-spot checks help ensure that beneficiaries adhere to the rules, different checks, incl. comments made during audits are used 
to help improve the system (the quality of supervision by the paying agency and the managing authority has improved) 
More irregularities detected before payment - No significant diference due to the continued low level of suspected fraud cases. Decreased 
number of irregularities with financial impact - As above. 
By the beneficiary to the managing authorities - Increased. Higher degree of accepted eligible amounts - Yes. 
EDEL audits have so far uncovered no suspicion of fraud. However, following recommendations on fraud prevention made by EDEL in 
the  course  of  its  audits  to  bodies  involved  in  managing  NSRF  co-financed  projects,  the  Special  Department  for  Institutional  Support, 
taking  into  account  EDEL’s  comments,  undertook  a  series  of  fraud  prevention  measures.  In  particular,  the  Special  Department  for 
Institutional Support drafted a new chapter of the Management and Control System Guidebook, which provides details on how to tackle 
cases  of  ‘suspected  fraud’,  as  defined  in  the  COCOF  "Note  of  Fraud  Indicators"  (18  February  2009),  through  the  Management  and 
Control System and national law. The guidelines contained in the COCOF Guidance Note have also been sent to all managing bodies to 
be posted on their websites as well as being communicated to the beneficiaries of co-financed operations. 
As part of its monitoring activities and in compliance with the regulations, the COCOF Guidance Note ‘Note of Fraud Indicators’ (18 
February 2009) for indicators of fraud against the Structural Funds, and auditing standards, EDEL harmonises its actions to prevent and 
combat fraud.  
Effectiveness and efficiency of operations 
More irregularities detected before payments : EXTREMADURA: 

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Member State: 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

Due to the recent entry into force of the law, more time is needed before evaluating and quantifying the results thereof. 
CANARY ISLANDS: 
Regulations  apply  to  the  actions  of  the  bodies  involved  in  managing  and  running  the  co-financed  operations,  as  well  as  to  their 
cooperation in preliminary, administrative and on the spot checks.  
CATALONIA: 
The  managing  body  does  not  accept  supporting  documents  before  payment.  Decreased  number  of  irregularities  with  financial  impact: 
EXTREMADURA: 
Administrative measures have led to an increase in the irregularities recovered and in the reliability of the preparation of financial reports. 
CANARY ISLANDS: 
The results obtained in the financial controls undertaken in 2007-2013 reveal a considerable reduction in the number of irregularities. 
CATALONIA: 
Although  deficiencies  have  been  identified  in  the  managing  body,  control  weakness  with  an  economic  impact  are  minor.  Other:  The 
Coordination  Committee  enables  improved  coordination  and  standardisation  in  the  development  of  the  financial  controls  of  structural 
funds. 
EXTREMADURA: 
Increase in the irregularities recovered.  
VALENCIANA has been improved the monitoring of irregularities detected in the controls on the operations included in the annual plan 
of the EU funds. 
Reliability of financila reporting 
By the beneficiary to the managing authority 
Higher degree of accepted eligible amounts : CANARY ISLANDS: 
The drop in the number of irregularities with a financial impact has directly led to an increase in the accepted eligible amounts. 
Other: Models have been drawn up for reports on financial controls of structural funds, both for operations and management and control 
systems. 
Compliance with applicable regulations, standards and guidelines (specify): CANARY ISLANDS: 
The laws adopted, in particular Orden de 10 de noviembre de 2009 de la Consejería de Economía y Hacienda [Order of 10 November 
2009 of the Regional Ministry of Economy and Public Finances] favour the application of the management and control systems provided 
for in Council Regulation (EC) No 1083 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, 
the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund. 

EN 

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Member State: 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

FR 

IT 

CY 

LT 

Preparation underway 

More irregularities uncovered before payment. The number of irregularities with a financial impact has declined. Other: (1) Ministry of 
Economic Development: Risk management system works better due to a reduction in the number of cases of suspected or non-existent 
fraud being reported to the EU. (2) Interior Ministry: for the NOP 'Security' the number of instances of non-compliance (with no financial 
impact) prior to the commitment of expenditure for the beneficiary before the Management Authority has declined. 
From the beneficiary to the Management Authority. A greater percentage of eligible amounts accepted. Interior Ministry: this appears to 
be linked to the greater reliability of the administrative and accounting documentation owing to the adoption and spread of monitoring 
and support measures (Operating Manuals, Beneficiary Vademecum, first-level check list, explanatory circulars, information seminars) 
offered by the Management Authority to beneficiaries. Other: (1) Ministry of Economic Development: improvement in quality/quantity of 
appropriate information. 
More  irregularities  detected  before  payment  -  this  is  due  to  the  ex-ante  controls  carried  out  by  the  Intermediate  Bodies  in  relation  to 
financial  and  non-financial  aspects  of  the  transactions  (eg  public  procurement  certificates  issued  ex-ante).  Decreased  number  of 
irregularities with financial impact - this is due to the ex-ante contros carried out by the IBs on 100% of the expenditure claims submitted 
for certification by the beneficiaries. 
Compliance with applicable regulations, standards and guidelines (specify): The compliance is monitored by the Intermediate Bodies and 
verified by the MA and the rest of the audit bodies (Certifying Authority and Audit Authority) 
More irregularities have been detected before project managers' expenditure was covered (therefore the amount of repayable funds paid 
out has decreased in relative terms).  
More  irregularities  have  been  detected  before  project  managers'  expenditure  was  covered,  as  payment  claims  were  verified,  suspected 
irregularities  investigated  or  on-the-spot  checks  carried  out  based  on  information  provided  by  the  implementing  body,  decisions  were 
taken on the application of financial sanctions (reduction in the amount of assistance) and the project manager's founding body informed 
thereof,  and  measures  with  long-term  impact  applied  which  also  reduce  the  recurrence  of  irregularities.  Fewer  irregularities  with  a 
financial impact 
There  have  been  fewer  irregularities  with  a  financial  impact,  as  preliminary  verification  of  procurements  was  carried  out,  with 
recommendations  made  by  the  implementing  bodies  to  project  managers  concerning  the  procurement  documents  they  drew  up.  Also, 
given that project managers' founding authorities were provided with information on detected irregularities (including possible cases of 
fraud) and sanctions established, 
project managers have become more disciplined, the transparency of  

EN 

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Member State: 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

project implementation has increased, and this has had a positive impact on 
preventing irregularities. A new project risk management system has been  
applied and staff training courses run. Other (please specify) 
The risk of irregularities occurring has been reduced and the quality 

The reliability of reporting by beneficiaries to management authorities has increased. Higher degree of accepted eligible amounts  
There has been a greater number of accepted eligible amounts because of more intensive work with potential applicants, a new project 
risk management system and the training provided. Other [(please specify) 
The risk of irregularities occurring has been reduced and the quality of project management has improved. 

Compliance with applicable regulations, standards and guidelines (please specify): 
1.  European  Commission  Guidelines  for  determining  Financial  Corrections  to  be  made  to  Expenditure  Co−Financed  by  the  Structural 
Funds or the Cohesion Fund for Non-Compliance with the Rules on Public procurement (final version of 29 November 2007, COCOF 
07/0037/03-ES);  
2. Rules on the repayment into the Lithuanian national budget of financial aid paid and (or) used in breach of legislation, approved under 
Lithuanian Government Resolution No 590 of 30 May 2005 (Official Gazette 2005, No 69-2469; 2010, No 33-1570); descriptions drawn 
up by the implementing bodies: description of internal procedures relating to project risk management, description of internal procedures 
for investigating and detecting irregularities in the use of resources from EU funds. 
More  irregularities  detected  before  payment:  (ESF)  All  irregularities  are  detected  before  payment  thanks  to  100%  controls.  Decreased 
number of irregularities with financial impact on the ESF: The 100% controls contribute to this. 
By the beneficiary to the managing authorities ESF: Thanks to the structure of the database. Higher degree of accepted eligible amounts 
(ESF):  Thanks  to  more  detailed  definitions  in  the  Financial  Guide.  Other  ESF:  Each  item  of  expenditure  is  analysed  according  to  5 
criteria. 
Compliance with applicable regulations, standards and guidelines (specify): 
ESF: One of the results of the new Financial Guide is that it reduces the number of ineligible operations 
More  irregularities  detected  before  payment:  The  entry  into  force  of  Government  Decree  4/2011  of  28  January  2011  introduced 
preliminary quality assurance of public procurement procedures, which decreases the number of public procurement infringements. 
Decreased number of irregularities with financial impact: Payments may be susbended at any time in the course of irregularity procedure. 
Preliminary quality assurance of public procurement procedures decreases the number of public procurement infrigements. 

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LU 

HU 

EN 

 
  
 
 
Member State: 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

By the beneficiary to the managing authorities: According to Government Decree 4/2011 of 28 January 2011 intermediate bodies check 
the  implementation  of  the  projects  in  the  course  of  audits  integrated  into  the  process.  The  scope  of  documents  supporting  payment 
applications  has  been  standardised,  which  has  reduced  the  administrative  burden  on  the  intermediate  bodies.  The  area  is  governed  by 
Order 24/2011 of 6 May 2011 of the Minister for National Development on the Common Operational Handbook. Increase in accepted 
eligible amount: Reliability of financial reporting by the beneficiaries to the managing authorities: More effective checks to reduce cases 
of irregular expenditure being declared for reimbursement by beneficiaries.  
Increased  eligible  amounts:  The  preventive role  of  the  audits,  which  help  to  reduce  the  number  of  irregularities  in  the  implementation 
phase  of  the  projects,  are  having  a  positive  impact  on  the  level  of  expenditure  eligible  for  reimbursement.  The  ex-ante  controls,  in 
particular  those  in  connection  with  public  procurement,  have  an  instructive  role,  in  that  they  identify  unlawful  measures  taken  by 
beneficiaries. 
The new procedures enable the institutional system to react more quickly to irregularities identified. 
More irregularities have been detected before project managers' expenditure was covered. More than 50% of infringements are detected 
before payment is made as a result of discussing unclear issues and detected cases at quarterly meetings on irregularities, consulting with 
law enforcement officers and identifying and assessing risks in a risk management working group. Fewer irregularities with a financial 
impact.  Training  for  staff  involved  with  the  EU  funds;  consideration  of  unclarified  issues  and  discussion  of  the  most  characteristic 
infringements  and  irregularities  at  quarterly  meetings  on  irregularities  and  at  meetings  of  the  AFCOS  Council;  consultation  with  law 
enforcement officers, and intensification of preliminary procurement checks. Other Training for prosecutors/law enforcement officers on 
issues related to EU funds, including the nature of irregularities, how to identify them etc., in order to develop a common understanding 
of compliance with EU legal acts and detect fraud associated with EU financial instruments more effectively. 
The reliability of reporting by beneficiaries to management authorities has increased. Staff training. Higher degree of accepted eligible 
amounts Staff training. 
More irregularities detected before payment; Decreased number of irregularities with financial impact; Other: Reduction of possibility to 
certify irregular claims to the EC. Decreased number of irregularities with financial impact: Payments may be suspended at any time in 
the course of the irregularity procedure. Preliminary quality assurance of public procurement procedures decreases the number of public 
procurement infringements. 
By the beneficiary to the managing authorities 
Compliance  with  applicable  regulations,  standards  and  guidelines  (specify):  Ex-ante  compliance  with  national  legislation  on  VAT  and 
public procurement and EU legislation, ex-post checks by the MA as further compliance assessment. Publication of national manual of 
procedures and eligibility rules. 

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Member State: 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

NL 

AT 

PL 

The measures mentioned in the previous question are not directly linked to fraud prevention or the recovery of EU funds that have been 
paid out. On the other hand, improvements in working methods and control structure,  of the kind operating in the current ESF period, 
coupled with an independent CA and AA, have led to more irregularities being discovered before payment. Regular contact between the 
MA and the applicants, which quickly leads to a better understanding of the rules, will then result in fewer irregularities with financial 
consequences.More  irregularities  detected  before  payment:  during  first  control  period  (2009-2010).  Decreased  number  of  irregularities 
with financial impact: during second control period (2010-2011). Other: educating applicants. 
By the beneficiary to the managing authorities: first period low degree of reliability, second period higher degree of reliability. Higher 
degree of accepted eligible amounts: during second period. 
Compliance with applicable regulations, standards and guidelines (specify): this increased over the entire period thanks to the measures 
taken. 

More irregularities detected before payments : The control system for structural funds always provides for an ex-ante check, so as a rule 
of  payments  is  made  only  after  the  check.  Decreased  number  of  irregularities  with  financial  impact  :  The  Austrian  control  system  for 
structural funds always provides for an ex-ante check, so payments are usually made only after the check. A high number of on-the-spot 
checks also reduces the risk of irregularities. 
Standardised  forms  (check  lists)  for  the  checks  improve  the  quality  of  the  accounts  submitted.  Standardised  forms  are  also  being 
developed for the calculation of personnel costs and increase transparency and clarity. 
Compliance with applicable regulations, standards and guidelines (specify) : Formal requirements in the national rules on eligibility and 
in the administration and control system should increase efficiency. 
More  irregularities  detected  before  payment:Under  Article 49  of  Decree-Law  312/2007,  OP  managing  authorities  are  responsible  for 
implementing an internal control system for preventing and detecting irregularities and an appropriate system to check the physical and 
financial implementation of actions  and to validate expenditure. Under Article 49(2) the internal control system has to provide for the 
adoption  of  appropriate  corrective  measures.  Article  16(4)(b)  of  Decree-Law  312/2007  stipulates  that  the  managing  authority  is 
responsible for validating expenditure and approving payments to beneficiaries. To this end, pursuant to Article 10(1)(f) of Implementing 
Decree 84-A/2007, it must check copies of original documents supporting at least 5% of the total amount of expenditure declared by each 
entity, broken down by expenditure heading. This means that payment approval is preceded by an assessment of the legality, veracity and 
exactitude of a representative sample of expenditure declared by beneficiaries. The advantage of this system is that irregularities can be 
detected before there has been any loss to EU or national budgets. Decreased number of irregularities with financial impact: The checks 
performed  by  the  managing  authorities  prior  to  payment  approval  on  documents  supporting  5%  of  declared  expenditure  mean  that 

EN 

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Member State: 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

PT 

RO 

irregularities can be detected before payments are made, thereby reducing financial impact/recovery. Other: The monitoring of insolvency 
proceedings  against  ESF  beneficiaries  means  that  IGFSE  can  act  in time to recover sums unduly paid or received by lodging a claim, 
thereby reducing the financial impact on the funding budgets whenever sums can be recovered by this means. 
Since  it  allows  better  cross-checking,  boosts  the  number  of  administrative  checks  and  makes  beneficiaries  more  responsible  for  their 
actions: By the beneficiary to the managing authorities. Higher degree of accepted eligible amounts 
Efficiency of management checks before award decision and payment. More irregularities detected before payment:Under Article 49 of 
Decree-Law 312/2007, OP managing authorities are responsible for implementing an internal control system for preventing and detecting 
irregularities and an appropriate system to check the physical and financial implementation of actions and to validate expenditure. Under 
Article 49(2) the internal control system has to provide for the adoption of appropriate corrective measures. Article 16(4)(b) of Decree-
Law 312/2007 stipulates that the managing authority is responsible for validating expenditure and approving payments to beneficiaries. 
To this end, pursuant to Article 10(1)(f) of Implementing Decree 84-A/2007, it must check copies of original documents supporting at 
least  5%  of  the  total  amount  of  expenditure  declared  by  each  entity,  broken  down  by  expenditure  heading.  This  means  that  payment 
approval  is  preceded  by  an  assessment  of  the  legality,  veracity  and  exactitude  of  a  representative  sample  of  expenditure  declared  by 
beneficiaries. The advantage of this system is that irregularities can be detected before there has been any loss to EU or national budgets. 
Decreased number of irregularities with financial impact: The checks performed by the managing authorities prior to payment approval 
on documents supporting 5% of declared expenditure mean that irregularities can be detected before payments are made, thereby reducing 
financial impact/recovery. Other: The monitoring of insolvency proceedings against ESF beneficiaries means that IGFSE can act in time 
to recover sums unduly paid or received by lodging a claim, thereby reducing the financial impact on the funding budgets whenever sums 
can be recovered by this means. 
Since  it  allows  better  cross-checking,  boosts  the  number  of  administrative  checks  and  makes  beneficiaries  more  responsible  for  their 
actions. Higher degree of accepted eligible amounts 
More  irregularities  detected  before  payment  -  Government  Emergency  Order  No  66/2011  on  preventing,  detecting  and  penalising 
irregularities in the granting and use of European funds and/or the corresponding national public funds has created a stable and coherent 
legal basis for proactive measures aimed at preventing irregularities and fraud, by defining the concepts of conflict of interest, reasonable 
pricing and the percentage reduction of the amounts claimed where deviations from the rules applying to public procurement have been 
found,  including  in  the  case  of  private  beneficiaries.The  implementing  agencies  were  able  to  proceed  with  the  partial  recovery  of  the 
amounts affected by irregularities by making deductions from the final payment to beneficiaries. The Managing Authorities identified the 
irregularities before making the payments. The databases mentioned above, in particular the central exclusion database, have been used to 
carry out checks that have detected irregularities and suspicions of fraud before payment. 

EN 

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Member State: 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

SI 

Higher  degree  of  accepted  eligible  amounts  -  as  a  result  of  the  training  provided  to  the  staff  of  certain  managing  authorities  and 
intermediary bodies, and to the beneficiaries, on the applicable legislation and operational procedures. 
Steps  to  ensure  compliance  with  public  procurement  regulations  and  EU  regulations,  implementation  of  ex  post  inspections  under  the 
responsibility of the Managing Authority as an additional means of ensuring compliance, adoption of instructions on the implementation 
of inspections to verify the eligibility of expenditure. 
More irregularities detected before payment (owing to 100% administrative checks and reviews of public procurement procedures prior to 
payment).  Fewer  irregularities  with  a  financial  impact  (owing  to  100%  administrative  checks  and  reviews  of  public  procurement 
procedures prior to payment). Other (Supervisor web application provides transparency regarding the cash flow between the public and 
private  sector  and  makes  holders  of  public  office  more  responsible  with  regard  to  mismanagement  and  the  abuse  of  authority,  and,  in 
particular, limits systemic corruption, unfair competition and clientelism. Progress is also apparent in the latest reports on the reporting of 
irregularities  to  OLAF,  which  show  more  reporting  of  IRQ5s  and  IRQ3s,  thus  ensuring  more  coherent  and  effective  oversight  of  all 
national institutions.) 
For the beneficiary and the intermediate body, the reporting methods are laid down in detail in the Managing Authority instructions: a 
monthly financial report serves as a tool for financial monitoring for planning and risk-prevention purposes - N+3/2.  
Financial data monitored in the monthly financial reports: 
- budget commitments; 
- funding awarded; 
- instruments approved; 
- operations approved through public invitations to tender; 
- operations approved directly; 
- agreements signed; 
- disbursements from state budget; 
- claims for repayment forwarded to paying authority; 
- certified claims for repayment to the European Commission. Every quarter the authorities must also report on forecast payments from 
the state budget and repayment claims forwarded to the paying authority for the current year. 
Steps  to  ensure  compliance  with  public  procurement  regulations  and  EU  regulations,  implementation  of  ex  post  inspections  under  the 
responsibility of the Managing Authority as an additional means of ensuring compliance, adoption of instructions on the implementation 
of inspections to verify the eligibility of expenditure. 

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Member State: 

SK 

FI 

SE 

UK 

EN 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

More irregularities detected before payment: At administrative checks the regulatory authority identifies ineligible expenditure before the 
payment application is approved and reduces the amount of the eligible expenditure. Where infringements of public-procurement rules 
are identified, the expenditure relating to public procurement from the financing is usually disqualified; where appropriate, the amount of 
the ineligible expenditure is also identified. Reduced number of irregularities with a financial impact: By intensifying and optimising the 
checks,  the  authorities  succeeded  in  eliminating  errors  and  irregularities  before  they  arose.  Since  ineligible  expenditure  has  been 
identified before payment applications are cleared or paid to the beneficiary, the number of subsequent irregularities has been reduced.. 
Other:  Improved,  higher-quality  procedures  of  regulatory  authorities  and  their  subordinate  intermediate  bodies  aimed  at  more  rigorous 
control and prevention of irregularities as part of the project approval and selection process; reduced error rate in public procurement and 
retrospective checks on the procurement process. 
By the beneficiary to the managing authorities: The identification of previous shortcomings on the part of the beneficiary is reducing the 
error rate in processing new payment applications. Higher rate of accepted eligible amounts: Intensified and optimised checks are helping 
to prevent errors from being committed. 
Compliance  with  applicable  regulations,  standards  and  guidelines:  (Irregularities  Notification  Manual  and  Guidelines  No  16/2008  - 
irregularities  in  the  financial  management  of  the  Structural  Funds,  the  Cohesion  Fund  and  the  European  Fisheries  Fund):  intensified 
cooperation  between  the  supervisory  and  law-enforcement  authorities  in  preventing  fraud  from  being  committed  and  investigating 
suspected fraud. 
More irregularities detected before payment: Front-loading, for example preliminary discussions and proper guidance in the initial stage 
of the project, reduces instances of ineligible expenditure in payment applications.The uniform procedures introduced for administrative 
verifications of expenditure (checklists) have meant, in practice, that the majority of irregularities have been found before the aid has been 
paid. This is confirmed by the low number of euro-denominated ineligibility errors found in Article 13 on-the-spot verifications and in the 
inspection authority's project inspections. 
More irregularities detected before payment. Decreased number of irregularities with financial impact 
Other (specify) The audit authority's project audit reports suggest a low error rate. 
Compliance with applicable regulations, standards and guidelines (specify): The management authority's guidelines and procedures for 
monitoring aid beneficiaries' compliance with the rules on procurement (ERDF) 
SG -not quantified. WG: It is far too early yet to identify the details asked in this section in relation to irregularities, since the introduction 
of  our  Fraud  and  Corruption  Risk  Assessments.  There  is  currently  a  case  under  investigation  which  has  in  part  received  European 
Funding  but  this  cannot  be  described  as  fraud  under  the  European  definition  as  there  is  no  conviction  by  a  court.  It  may  however  be 

66 

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Member State: 

2.1.2.  Describe the outcome of measures you mentioned under previous question on the performed activities in relation to prevention 

of suspected fraud cases and recovery of misused EU funds terms of:? 

termed  an  irregularity  at  present.  This  particular  case  has  issues  regarding  the  lack  or  level  of  identified  risk  and  due  diligence.  More 
irregularities  detected  before  payment.  DCLG  &  SG:  Administrative  checks  help  ensure  eligibility  and  reality  of  expenditure.  DFPNI: 
More iregularities detectred than before. Decreased number of irregularities with financial impact - (SG) see above. Other DFPNI: The 
combination of measures outlined under 2.1.1 has enabled a range of non-compliance issues to be identified and corrected and will further 
enable better detection and prevention of future irregularities. 
By the beneficiary to the managing authorities. SG: Reliability is improving as final beneficiary experience develops and administrative 
(and  other)  checks  inform  final  beneficiaries.  DFPNI:  The  combination  of  measures  outlined  under  2.1.1has  helped  to  provide  more 
reliable data on eligible expenditure. Higher degree of accepted eligible amounts. SG: See above. 
DFPNI: The measures outlined under 2.1.1. have resulted in a high degree of compliance with Comission Reg (EC) No 1828/2006 (Art 
27-36) for cases related to the programming period 2007-13. 

EN 

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Member 
State: 

2.1.3. 

 Based on the lessons learnt from the findings of the administrative investigations undertaken in the period of 2007-2011 which new 
control and investigation strategies has your Member State put in place or plans to put in place, in order to reduce the risk of fraud 
and to better detect cases of fraud in the spending of the Cohesion Policy funds?. 

BE 

Regional strategies (including the number of such regional strategies) 
All  funds:  On-the-spot  checks  by  project  inspectors  and  verification  that  the  project  really  exists  and  expenditure  is  substantiated  by  the 
managing authorities. The spot check carried out by the managing authority on the partners' files is a second-level control on the validity of 
the expenditure. These procedures help combat fraud in this way. 

ESF:  Emphasis  on  searching for duplication in the expenditure declared in several files of the same operator, or in the same file for two 
consecutive calendar years. 

ERDF  Wallonia:  In  the  areas  of  irregularities  and  fraud,  ongoing  information/training  of  functional  administrations  and  funding 
beneficiaries concerning the importance of adhering to the applicable rules; common first-level control from the 2007-2013 programming 
period,  supporting  documents  can  be  accessed  in  the  Structural  Funds  database  managed  by  the  Department  for  the  Coordination  of 
Structural Funds (transparency). 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: Not control strategies as such but prevention through information and updating of vademecum for project 
promoters.  Type  of  operations  FSED:  Coordination  between  various  funding  departments  of  ministry.  Economic  sectors  covered  FSED: 
Educational establishments,  associations, public authorities. Specify the most relevant aspects of these strategies FSED: Avoiding double 
financing, content-based procedures and interpretations. 
National  strategies  Technical  and  financial  inspections,  on-the-spot  checks  and  administrative  investigation  activities  are  carried  out  in 
accordance with the manuals approved by the Heads of the Managing Authority. Checks in legal information systems and other data bases 
are carried out within ex-ante control (prior to contract signing and during implementation) and ex-post control (prior to payment). Checks 
are  also  made  in  the  next  period  of  monitoring  of  the  sustainability  of  results  is  agreed  with  the  beneficiaries.  The  Certifying  Authority 
carries out administrative and on-the-spot checks prior to approving the respective expenditure in certification reports. 
National  strategies:  Implementation  in  line  with  the  currently  applicable  legal  provisions:  Act  No  320/2001  on  financial  control,  as  last 
amended, and Act No 552/1991 on State control, as last amended. Regional strategies (including the number of such regional strategies): 
Practical examples published on websites. Type of operations: Risk analysis as a basis for on-the-spot checks; inclusion of economic sectors 
(construction, tourism, etc.). (that comment was not done by CZ) 

68 

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BG 

CZ 

EN 

 
  
 
 
Member 
State: 

2.1.3. 

 Based on the lessons learnt from the findings of the administrative investigations undertaken in the period of 2007-2011 which new 
control and investigation strategies has your Member State put in place or plans to put in place, in order to reduce the risk of fraud 
and to better detect cases of fraud in the spending of the Cohesion Policy funds?. 

DK 

DE 

EE 

IE 

EL 

ES 

National strategies: Cooperation has been established with an external auditor concerning the auditing of all projects funded by the Regional 
Fund and the Social Fund. Type of operations: Constant efforts are being made to improve information for beneficiaries on the rules, e.g. by 
offering the possibility to meet with the managing authority to go through the rules. 
Type of operations - Development of various sorts of preventive measures (including preliminary procurement checks, further cooperation 
with law enforcement officers, performance of broader-scale management checks at the behest of the MA). When carrying out checks, the 
RA informs the MA and CA without delay of any detected risks and suspected fraud. 
National strategies: Estonia intends to develop a strategy (resources allowing) which would set out in more detail the tasks of implementers 
and support structures in protecting the financial interests of the EU. Type of operations: The SF database makes it possible to cross-check 
expenditure  documents;  on-the-spot  checks  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  risk  assessment;  more  thorough  checks  before  payment  to  aid 
recipients; preliminary checks of public procurement; overview of all subsidies in EU (single database) which will help eliminate double 
financing. Specify the most relevant aspects of these strategies: cooperation and rapid exchange of information 
National strategies - Not applicable due to low level of fraud detected thus far. Regional strategies (including the number of such regional 
strategies)  -  As  above.  Type  of  operations  -  As  above.  Economic  sectors  covered  -  As above.  Specify  the  most  relevant  aspects  of  these 
strategies - As above. 

Type of operations: Extracting information from databases relating to funding from the EU budget, processing it through the information 
system  ELENXIS  (already  in  pilot  operation)  for  the  selection  of  targets  to  be  audited  (Risk  Analysis).  (Economic  and  Financial  Crime 
Squad  –  SDOE).  Economic  sectors  covered:  Area  of  responsibility  of  SDOE  and  EDEL.  Specify  the  most  relevant  aspects  of  these 
strategies: As mentioned above, EDEL has drafted an Audit Manual, which was updated in 2010 and contains, among other things, makes 
systematic  reference  to  investigation  of cases  of  suspected  fraud.  EDEL’s  strategy  is  updated  twice  a  year,  aiming  at  full  auditing  of  the 
operation of management and control systems. Alongside this main objective, the parallel aims are a reduction of the risk of fraud and better 
detection of such cases. 
National strategies: Compliance with the audit strategy approved by the Commission and its updating; 
DG Funds: 
The verification plan for 2007-2013, whose purpose is to verify the quality of the control systems adopted by the intermediary organisations 
involved in the operations co-financed by the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund. 
Type of operations: DG Funds: 

EN 

69 

EN 

 
  
Member 
State: 

2.1.3. 

 Based on the lessons learnt from the findings of the administrative investigations undertaken in the period of 2007-2011 which new 
control and investigation strategies has your Member State put in place or plans to put in place, in order to reduce the risk of fraud 
and to better detect cases of fraud in the spending of the Cohesion Policy funds?. 

FR 

HU 

IT 

Verification of the effectiveness and efficiency of the control systems adopted by the intermediary organisations in compliance with Article 
13 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006. 
CATALONIA: 
Based on the type of aid and the purpose thereof. The knowledge acquired from previous controls is used in the strategy to be followed in 
the control of operations, and the specific inclusion of these operations in the sample. 
UAFSE:  In  the  aid  granted  to  entrepreneurs  to  promote  permanent  contracts  has  adopted  the  method  of  certifying  expenditure  once  the 
period specified in each call for the maintenance of employment. 
National strategies: As indicated in 2.1.1, the CICC for EU funds (ERDF-ESF and EFF) is the audit authority within the meaning of EU 
regulations. It operates in accordance with EU regulations. 
In this context, it should be noted that CICC systems audits are based on procedures aimed at detecting irregularities, and, where necessary, 
fraud,  more  effectively.  These  procedures  include  examination  of  internal  audit  systems  (on-the-spot  checks,  quality  certification  audits, 
quality management audits). 
National  strategies:  Hungary  plans  to  set  up  a  national  anti-fraud  strategy  in  the  future.  As  part  of  efforts  to  combat  corruption,  an  anti-
corruption strategy was developed in April 2008. 
National  strategies:  National  Antifraud  Committee  (COLAF)  -  Preventing  fraud  through  changes  in  the  law  concerning  criminal-law 
protection, international cooperation and the identification of the most widespread and significant types of fraud, running a vast information 
and training activity; Guardia di Finanza financial police - the antifraud strategy followed at the national level by the Guardia di Finanza is 
being stepped up in order to extend subsequently the risk analysis activity developed to the identification of potentially rewarding targets in 
terms of inspections and to establish closer cooperation between the individual Management and Payment Authorities. With this in mind, a 
project, with European funding, is currently being implemented aimed at setting up an IT system to enhance the effectiveness of antifraud 
action (see form in Annex 1). In addition to this, targeted checking activity based on the 'project actions' has been devised and implemented 
(see form in Annex 2), along with the possibility of applying cross-checking methods, making it possible to address patterns of fraud within 
various areas of competency often linked to fraud (tax evasion, money-laundering investigations and financial crime). The Court of Auditors 
engages in constant monitoring of Community irregularities/fraud for the purposes of risk analysis, including by way of its SIDIF IT system, 
set up to track various aspects of irregularities and recoveries (number, amounts concerned, type, programming, mechanisms) and to take 
account of the various phases and outcomes of disputes (criminal, administrative, accounting, civil). Regional Strategies: Guardia di Finanza 
- in implementing the national strategy at the regional level, specific agreements have been signed with all the relevant Regional Authorities, 

EN 

70 

EN 

 
  
Member 
State: 

2.1.3. 

 Based on the lessons learnt from the findings of the administrative investigations undertaken in the period of 2007-2011 which new 
control and investigation strategies has your Member State put in place or plans to put in place, in order to reduce the risk of fraud 
and to better detect cases of fraud in the spending of the Cohesion Policy funds?. 

CY 

LV 

LT 

aimed  at  ensuring  a  continued,  regular  and  steady  flow  of  information  regarding  the  beneficiaries  of  funding  and  thereby  enhance  the 
effectiveness  of  the  analysis  and  identification  activities  for  antifraud  purposes.  Type  of  operations:  National  Antifraud  Committee  - 
carrying out projects on prevention and risk analysis, organising seminars, drafting specific manuals - Guardia di Finanza - see Annex 3 - 
Region  of  Tuscany  -  organising  and  increasing  ex  post  documentary  and  on-the  spot  checks,  including  by  way  of  developing  specific 
competencies and ad hoc working groups. Specify the most relevant elements of these strategies: Guardia di Finanza: see forms in Annexes 
1  and  2  -  Region  of  Tuscany:  checks  designed  to  verify  the  existence  and  operational  capacity  of  beneficiaries  in  order  to  ensure  that 
investments are maintained and to verify that Community and national resources are not being used to bestow an undue advantage. 
National strategies - coordination of the bodies granting aid in grnat schemes for the prevention and elimination of double financing, with 
the use of a common database (to be put in place). Specify the most relevant aspects of these strategies - prevention of double financing. 

Type of operations - Development of various sorts of preventive measures (including preliminary procurement checks, further cooperation 
with law enforcement officers, performance of broader-scale management checks at the behest of the MA). When carrying out checks, the 
RA informs the MA and CA without delay of any detected risks and suspected fraud. 

No new control and investigation strategies to reduce the risk of fraud and better detect cases of fraud in the spending of Cohesion Policy 
funds have been adopted as such. 
However  we  would  point  out  that,  based  on  our  experience  of  project  administration  and  in  view  of  the  problems  encountered,  we  have 
made improvements to legislation and taken appropriate measures which are set out in more detail in points Nos 1, 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 of this 
questionnaire. 
The  Ministry  of  Finance  engaged  the  services  of  external  experts  to  draw  up  appropriate  measures  to  ensure  that  the  risk  of  manifest 
corruption  is  managed  when  administering  EU  structural  assistance.  These  experts  carried  out  a  public  opinion  survey  and  drew  up  the 
following measures on the basis of the results: review and verify existing procedures and develop tools to ensure the adequate evaluation, 
selection, administration and implementation monitoring of projects and other related procedures and develop operational tools accordingly 
(for instance, improve the functionality of the SFMIS, introduce verification by experts of project expenditure); strengthen interinstitutional 
cooperation  at  national  and  supranational  (EU)  levels  to  ensure  effective  and  above  all  prevention-oriented  management  of  the  risk  of 
possible fraud; evaluate the  responsibilities and  functions of the EU structural  assistance management and control system in detail in the 
context of appropriate allocation in order to ensure that projects are evaluated appropriately and control functions are allocated appropriately 
at the level of bodies administering EU structural assistance and the EU-wide structural assistance management and control system; make a 

EN 

71 

EN 

 
  
Member 
State: 

2.1.3. 

 Based on the lessons learnt from the findings of the administrative investigations undertaken in the period of 2007-2011 which new 
control and investigation strategies has your Member State put in place or plans to put in place, in order to reduce the risk of fraud 
and to better detect cases of fraud in the spending of the Cohesion Policy funds?. 

clearer distinction between cases of irregularities and possible fraud in authorities' internal procedures; establish a corruption and fraud risk 
assessment methodology based on a single principle in order to give more structure to and strengthen fraud risk assessment in EU structural 
assistance-related administration (i.e. introduce principles for the analysis of the systemic risk of suspected fraud); pay increased attention to 
combating  fraud  and  corruption  by  organising  training  for  employees  involved  in  the  administration  of  EU  structural  assistance  and 
introducing  an  anti-fraud  and  anti-corruption  model.  The  analysis  also  highlights  potential  areas  of  SFMIS  functionality  and  audit  and 
review  procedures  to  improve  and  gives  relevant  examples  (proposals  include  drawing  up  'black'  and  'white'  lists  of  project  managers 
integrating them into risk assessment, audit selection and other related procedures; extending the functionality of the SFMIS to ensure that 
not  only  recipients  of  direct  assistance,  but  also  related  undertakings  and  organisations  (for  instance,  subcontractors)  can  be  evaluated; 
expanding the possibility for SFMIS to cross-check data against the contents of other public registers, etc.). The feasibility of implementing 
these external experts' proposals are under consideration. 
In the first quarter of 2012, the Ministry of Finance also released a new version of the EU structural assistance website www.esparama.lt, 
and from the end of April 2012 the website will give visitors to the site, including applicants and project managers, the ability to report on 
lack of transparency in the utilisation of EU structural assistance.  
Given that public procurement is an important component of public financing and an integral part of successful project management, and in 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  vast  majority  of  project  irregularities  detected  relate  to  inappropriately  conducted  public  procurement,  on  10 
February 2011 the Ministry of Finance launched an impact assessment of the effectiveness of the use of EU structural assistance in public 
procurement, which is scheduled to be completed by 30 June 2012. The aim of this assessment is to evaluate the impact on the effective use 
of  resources  from  EU  funds  of  applying  the  requirements  laid  down  in  legislation  governing  public  procurement,  the  conformity  of  the 
requirements of this legislation with current Lithuanian and EU policies and the adequacy and conformity of public procurement procedures 
and administrative procedures for EU structural assistance and to provide examples of good and bad practice from other countries. 
National strategies: Audit authority second-level controls are always carried out on the spot and on the basis of original documents only. 
Specify the most relevant aspects of these strategies 
ESF: 100% ex ante controls have been introduced which reduces the risk. 
The controls to be carried out have been put in a check-list which obliges auditors to check operations in detail. 
National  strategies:  On  the  part  of  the  Managing  Authority,  continuous  improvement  on  the  already-rigorous  centralised  management 
verifications.  Type  of  operations:  All  operators  are  effected  by  such  improvements.  Economic  sectors  covered:  All  economic  sectors  are 
effected by such improvements. Specify the most relevant aspects of these strategies: With respect to the Managing Authority, it is not a 
specific strategy directly related to fraud detection but a general approach towards management verifications that gives more assurance of 

72 

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LU 

MT 

EN 

 
  
Member 
State: 

2.1.3. 

 Based on the lessons learnt from the findings of the administrative investigations undertaken in the period of 2007-2011 which new 
control and investigation strategies has your Member State put in place or plans to put in place, in order to reduce the risk of fraud 
and to better detect cases of fraud in the spending of the Cohesion Policy funds?. 

the regularity of expenditure to be declared. 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

No new strategies were put in place or planned during this period in order to reduce the risk of fraud. The working methods introduced by 
the MA have a strong preventive effect. 
National strategies :N/A 

The  current  arrangements  for  checks  appear  to  serve  their  purpose.  The  current  arrangements  restrict,  to  a  satisfactory  extent,  the  risk  of 
irregularities arising in connection with the implementation of projects joint-funded by the EU. One solution which may impact positively 
on  the  detection  of  irregularities  is  shifting  the  emphasis  away  from  checking  to  ensure  that  measures  taken  comply  with  formal 
requirements towards checks on progress made and differentiating between purely formal errors which do not have financial consequences 
and irregularities which do have negative financial consequences for the EU budget. Checks which are carried out by bodies forming part of 
the  management  and  control  system  or  commissioned  by  those  bodies  are  not  an  effective  or  sufficient  instrument  for  the  detection  of 
offences.  That  purpose  is  served  by  proceedings  or  investigations  carried  out  by  relevant  authorities  (e.g.  the  public  prosecutor  or  the 
police).  Accordingly,  the  MInistry  for  Regional  Development  has  concluded  agreements  with  the  police  and  the  Central  Anti-Corruption 
Bureau which should improve detection rates for offences committed by beneficiaries. 
National strategies:Audit activities are designed to prevent and detect irregularities with a view to correcting and recovering funds unduly 
paid. The strategy of separate audit structures contained in the audit plan is designed to reduce the risk of fraud and better detect cases of 
fraud  in  accordance  with  the  findings  of  system  audits,  or  in  other  words  the  confidence  level  attributed  to  the  management  and  control 
system.  If  a  large  number  of  errors  are  detected  when  operations  are  audited,  the  confidence  level  will  be  'low'  and  the  number  of 
interventions will be higher. If the error rate is low, a higher confidence rating will be given ('medium' or 'high') and the number of checks 
required by the strategy will be correspondingly lower. 
The strategy is defined each year by the audit authority (IGF) subject to the procedures and criteria laid down in the Audit Manual. Type of 
operations: Discouragement of deficient financial management by: (a) proportion of typologies with most problems reported represented in 
on-the-spot checks; (b) rapid intervention triggered as soon as serious shortcomings with an operation are reported. 

EN 

73 

EN 

 
  
Member 
State: 

2.1.3. 

 Based on the lessons learnt from the findings of the administrative investigations undertaken in the period of 2007-2011 which new 
control and investigation strategies has your Member State put in place or plans to put in place, in order to reduce the risk of fraud 
and to better detect cases of fraud in the spending of the Cohesion Policy funds?. 

RO 

SI 

SK 

National strategies - In accordance with Article 10(d) of Government Decision No 738/2011, DLAF intends to draw up and implement a 
new national anti fraud strategy based on the guidelines laid down by the European Commission’s anti fraud strategy. Type of operations - 
When  planning  audit  operations,  an  essential  element  refers  to  identifying  areas  of  risk  or  potential  risk  within  the  management  systems 
introduced,  including  as  regards  how  projects  are  being  run  by  their  beneficiaries.  That  identification  stage  is  followed  by  the 
development/application of audit procedures/techniques which can also detect possible fraud, among other things. One example is given by 
the  amendments  to  the  checklist  for  public  procurement  procedures  for  projects  financed  through  structural instruments.  Some  managing 
authorities have drawn up control strategies that take into account the specific aspects of the projects financed from the funds administered 
by them. 
National  strategies.  Audit  Authority  and  Managing  Authority  always  carry  out  audits  and  on-the-spot  checks  on  the  basis  of  original 
documents. Before disbursement 100% administrative checks are carried out; all checks are carried out on the basis of checklists laid down 
by  the  Managing  Authority,  taking  into  account  the  regulations  and  an  analysis  of  irregularities  detected  in  the  past.  Regional  strategies 
(including the number of such regional strategies): Strategy for the development of public internal financial control 2005-2008, Strategy for 
the  development  of  public  internal  financial  control  2011-2015,  Crime  prevention  strategy,  Resolution  on  the  national  programme  for 
preventing  and  combating  crime.  Type  of  operations.  The  Budget  Supervision  Office  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  organises  regular 
conferences - annually or as and when required - to provide continuous up-to-date further training for persons responsible in the system for 
managing and monitoring the use of EU funds. Specify the most relevant aspects of these strategies: Prevention of fraud and corruption, 
better risk management, appropriate use of budget and EU funds. 
National strategies: 1. Procedures for government audits of the Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund and the European Fisheries Fund. 2. 2. 
National Strategy for protecting the European Community's financial interests in the Slovak Republic. Regional strategies (please specify, 
including  number  of  such  regional  strategies).  Type  of  operations.  Please  specify  the  most  relevant  aspects  of  these  strategies:  Detailed 
methodological  guidelines  setting  out  the  aims  and  performance  of  audits  under  Article  62(1)(a)  and  (b)  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1083/2006, targeting the procedures for government audits of the Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund and the European Fisheries Fund, 
were  issued  and  have  improved  the  prevention  of  irregularities  and  suspected  fraud.  2.  The  protection  of  the  European  Community's 
financial interests in Slovakia rests on three pillars: (a) prevention, (b) detection and investigation of irregularities, and (c) corrective action 
and prosecution. The activity of bodies engaged in protecting the financial interests of the European Union is primarily aimed at preventive 
measures  reducing  the  risk  of  irregularity  to  a  minimum.  Measures  for  protecting  the  financial  interests  of  the  EU  implemented  in  the 
process of using EU funds are intended to prevent illegal activity and to act as a deterrent to potential 
offenders. The Management Committee for protecting the financial interests of the EU in the Slovak Republic and working groups dealing 

EN 

74 

EN 

 
  
Member 
State: 

2.1.3. 

 Based on the lessons learnt from the findings of the administrative investigations undertaken in the period of 2007-2011 which new 
control and investigation strategies has your Member State put in place or plans to put in place, in order to reduce the risk of fraud 
and to better detect cases of fraud in the spending of the Cohesion Policy funds?. 

with the issue of irregularity, control and public 
procurement, Article 325 the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU etc., were set up in 2007. 

FI 

SE 
UK 

National strategies: The intermediate bodies check the following on the basis of the managing authority's sampling: 1) all projects exceeding 
€ 500 000 of public funding; 2) projects classified as high-risk, which must be checked at least once during the project life cycle; 3) at least 
50% of the remaining projects must be subject to on-the-spot verifications on a sample basis, with a wide range of different beneficiaries and 
activities being covered. In addition, a 10% sample is to be taken of the ongoing projects on which on-the-spot verifications have already 
been carried out. 

N/A 
SG: None - satisfied with existing. Regional strategies (including the number of such regional strategies) WG: As previously stated above 
we have one investigation currently ongoing but cannot produce any findings for this at present. There is however a Grants Project which is 
being progressed and this is likely to standardise the grants process across the Welsh Government and increase some of the counter fraud 
initiatives  around  risk  and  due  diligence  and  in  particular  transferring  the  onus  onto  the  applicant  to  disclose  some  of  the  issues  by 
answering specific questions which in turn may increase the risk. If they answer dishonetly this will make it far easier to identify an attempt 
to  commit  fraud  at  the  application  stage.  Type  of  operations  DFPNI:When  undertaking  Art  16  checks  a  sample  of  original  cheques  is 
requested  from  the  bank.  Staff  have  been  reminded  of  their  responsibilities  with  regard  to  fraud  awareness  and  how  to  deal  with  any 
suspicions of fraud including where appropriate the cross-checking of information with third parties. Revised guidance on the eligibility of 
specific allowances issued in NI in June 2011 provided greater clarity on distinguishing between eligible and ineligible items of expenditure 
enabling staff conducting audits of operations to more readily identify where errors have been made or ineligible items have been included 
in  claims  submitted.  Specify  the  most  relevant  aspects  of  these  strategies  -DFPNI:  guidance  for  audits  of  operations  provides  greater 
assurance that the detection of suspected fraud is being actively managed. 

EN 

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Member 
State: 

BE 

BG 

EN 

2.1.4. 

 Use of fraud indicators  

COMMENT: ESF, ERDF, FSED: No risk criterion, each  
operator must be checked on the spot at least twice  
during the programming period. All cofinanced projects are subject to controls.  
So  no  fraud  indicator  within  the  meaning  of  the  COCOF  Working  Document  09/0003/00  of  18.2.2009  is  used  for  the  organisation  of 
controls.  
But controls are organised in the spirit of this working document (for instance, use of red flags during controls). 
COMMENT: ESF, ERDF, FSED: No risk criterion, each operator must be checked on the spot at least twice  
during the programming period. All cofinanced projects are subject to controls.  
So no fraud indicator within the meaning of the 
COCOF Working Document 09/0003/00 of 18.2.2009 is used for the organisation of controls.  
But controls are organised in the spirit of this working document (for instance, use of red flags during controls). (COMMENT: D2 EFRO 
VL:  Selection  by  risk  analysis  for  on-the-spot  checks,  e.g.  on  basis  of  type  of  promoter  (private/public),  project  (activities/investments), 
number of partners, amount of ERDF aid, previous irregularities, existence of public procurement and revenue, etc.). Projects 
D2 EFRO VL 
ERDF Wallonia: all cofinanced projects are subject to controls. 
FSED ERDF Brussels Capital Region: not within the meaning of COCOF Working Document 09/0003/00. Individual economic operators 
ERDF Wallonia: all cofinanced projects are subject to controls. 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: The fewer controls to which an organisation is subject, whether internal or external, the greater the risk of 
fraud. Therefore not-for-profit organisations (Asbl) in general, especially the smallest, represent a high risk of fraud because they are seldom 
checked. This is why the audit authority (CAIF) gives a higher weighting to this risk in its risk analysis. Other (to be specified) 
FSEBRU  (ESF  Brussels):  If  errors  or  problems  are  found  in  the  files  checked,  these  files  will  be  systematically  subject  to  second-level 
controls. 
The general indicators are included in the Manual of Internal Audit in The Public Sector, volume ІІІ, approved by the Minister of Finance in 
January 2010. 
The Audit of EU Funds Executive Agency, in its capacity as Audit Authority under Regulation (ЕC) No 1083/2006 of the Council, carries 
out audits of systems and operations. During the systems audit the Audit Authority assesses the efficient functioning of the management and 
control systems, including by testing the control activities for reduction of the risk of irregularities and fraud, the rules for taking corrective 
measures in the case of irregularities, as well as the procedures envisaged for reporting detected fraud to the competent authorities. During 
the audit of operations the Audit Authority should provide the European Commission with assurance that the declared expenditure is valid 

76 

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Member 
State: 

2.1.4. 

 Use of fraud indicators  

and the related transactions are legal and regular. Where auditors ascertain irregularities, they perform a detailed analysis of the reason for 
them  and  check  for  the  possible  presence  of  fraud  indicators.  These  may  be  non-compliance  with  legislation  in  the  area  of  public 
procurement, corruption practices, undeclared conflict of interest, agreements inconsistent with the law, manipulation of financial results etc. 
The audit methodology and, in particular, the Manual for Audit of EU Funds, contains fraud indicators providing help and orientation for the 
Audit Authority employees in their audit activity. 
Categories of irregularities 
Analysis  of  most  common  errors  by  beneficiaries  resulting  in  ineligible  expenditure.  Categories  of  economic  operators.  NGOs,  project 
partners and contractors.  
Categories of operations 
-Complex  activities  related  to  public  procurement  and  outsourcing.Categories  of  modus  operandi.The  beneficiary  cannot  be  contacted  at 
their nominated addresses; does not comply with the instructions given by the Managing Authority; different activities under the project are 
outsourced  to  the  same  persons;  the  same  or  related  persons  are  regularly  invited  to  present  tenders;  irregular  book-keeping.;  Economic 
sectors.  The  risk  of  irregularities  is  the  highest  in  the  non-governmental  sector,  which,  respectively,  reports  the  highest  number  of  them. 
New economic sectors with very little experience of economic operators.  
Geographical areas. Other (specify) 
During on-the-spot checks, attention is paid to operations and transactions that may potentially involve fraud with the indicators being the 
conduct of the individual persons, availability of the necessary documents within transactions and operations and the related requirements, 
as well as compliance with the requirement for accountability. 
Presenting false documents, amendment of agreements or signing of annexes and overpricing. 
The beneficiary attempts to justify irregularities by claiming that the monitoring experts are prejudiced against him. 
The specific indicators are included in the Manual of Internal Audit in The Public Sector, volume ІІІ, approved by the Minister of Finance in 
January 2010. Projects. Lack of accountability for their implementation; lack of coordination and control of the project implementation by 
the management of the company or the NGO.  
Detected  errors  or  irregularities  in  previous  or  ongoing  projects;  inadequate  capacity  and  experience;  the  relationship  of  the 
beneficiary/partner  with  persons  related  to  other  beneficiaries  under  irregular  projects,  investigated  by  OLAF/the  prosecution 
authority.Transactions. Transactions between related persons involving assets acquired by EU funds; a discernable increase in the prices of 
services;  the  project  activities  are  fully  outsourced;  unduly  increased  criteria  for  awarding  public  procurement  contracts;  change  of  price 
proposals  and  other  terms  by  the  selected  contractors;  division  of  procurement  by  signing  multiple  service  contract  for  an  identical 
object.Individual economic operators. Related persons and fictitious participants in procedures.Other (specify) 

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The restriction of competition in public procurement procedures; division of contracts; unjustified disqualification of candidates. 

Categories of irregularities; Categories of economic operators; Categories of operations; Categories of modus operandi; Economic sectors; 
Geographical areas 
Projects; Transactions; Individual economic operators 

All projects are checked at least once in their lifetime in an on-the-spot check by an external auditor. 
Before EU aid is paid, all accounts are inspected in a desk check by the managing authority. Categories of operations.  
Timesheets cannot be found.  
Only one offer per tender. Transactions. 
Categories  of  irregularities  -All  types  of  check  (carried  out  by  the  RA/LB,  PMB,  AA,  CA)  also  cover  issues  relating  to  possible  fraud. 
Furthermore, the system of preliminary checks of procurement has been strengthened by increasing the intensity of these checks and making 
sure that intermediate bodies carry out such checks in addition to the PMB. Cooperation with law enforcement bodies has been facilitated 
and explanations provided as to when a possible infringement needs to be evaluated particularly thoroughly. 
Individual  economic  operators-  registered  offshore  or  whose  owners'  origins  are  unclear.  Other  (specify)  :  If  even  one  of  the  indicators 
mentioned below is attained, the project must be evaluated particularly thoroughly. Should more than one indicator be attained the need to 
contact  law  enforcement  agencies  must  be  considered.  The  relevant  indicators  are:  supplier  is  registered  offshore,  supplier  has  received 
payment as an advance of more than 50% prior to delivery of the goods, payments to the supplier have been artificially subdivided, and the 
price of equipment is significantly greater than the market price. 

General indicators (Bold selected answers): we do not consider that fraud is linked only to certain economic operators, economic sectors or 
categories  of  operation.  As  all  cases  are  different,  the  rapid  exchange  of  information  is  used  to  detect  irregularities/fraud  schemes. 
Categories of irregularities: it is important to know and share the schemes behind the irregularities/fraud detected. Categories of economic 
operators:  rapid  exchange  of  information  on  suspects/undertakings'  operations  (missions).  Categories  of  operations:  risk  assessment  for 
every project, the aid consultant and inspector must be different people. Categories of modus operandi: flexible approach when organising 
on-the-spot  inspections  in  order  to  focus  on  identification  (not  in  favour  of  reports  with  fixed  inspection  questions).  Economic  sectors: 
assessment of risks of aid measures and regular risk review, involvement of partners (police etc) in the assessment 

Specific  indicators  (red  flags)  aiming  at  identifying  (Bold  selected  answers):  un-transparent  procurement  procedure;  unusual  financial 
transactions; submission of false data or data that is difficult to check. Projects: abundance of "light" activities. Transactions: transactions 

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linked  to  persons;  "inflated  price",  transactions  that  cannot  be  checked  (offshore  firms).  Individual  economic  operators:  tax  difficulties, 
debts; problems when implementing previous projects, aid to persons who generate a profit (aid not necessary); NGOs (activity as a whole is 
not  checked).  Other  (specify):  unexpected  on-the-spot  checks,  the  right  where  necessary  for  implementers  to  demand  data  on  all  the 
operator's activities, including accounting data . 

Not applicable due to low level of fraud detected thus far. 

Other (specify) During the audits of the operations and the system, EDEL assesses the elements of the audit with a critical eye and from the 
viewpoint of possible fraud. For this purpose, account is taken of fraud indicators, such as those contained in the auditing standards and in 
the EU guidance note. In the preparatory phase of the audit, fraud indicators are taken into account in assessing the risks of certain questions 
or control points. In the course of audits fraud indicators are taken into account for the verification of documents or other elements. At the 
time of presentation of the recommendation on the objections for approval by EDEL of the report on the final audit results, the Audit Team 
refers  to  the  appropriate  directorate  for  the  data  which  raise  the  suspicion  of  fraud.  The  directorate  advises  EDEL  accordingly.  EDEL 
decides on disclosure of the report to an authority competent to investigate and to OLAF. Note, however, that until now no cases of fraud 
have been found through EDEL audits. 
Projects (SDOE); Transactions (SDOE). 
Categories of irregularitites ; categories of economic operators ; categories of operations ; economic sectors ; geographical areas. Others: 
unjustified allocation of costs, especially for personnel. 
Other (specify): The sample of transactions to be audited each year is primarily based on a random statistical sampling method (see Article 
17 of Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006 of 8 December 2006). An additional sample focused on transactions likely to lead to irregularities may 
be conducted if required. 
Other  (specify):  Systems  audits  conducted  by  the  CICC  (audit  authority)  involve  the  verification  of  fraud  prevention  factors,  such  as  the 
separation of duties, internal audit, the appropriateness of levels of decision-making. 
During these audits as well as during transaction audits, points are, in particular, verified against check-lists: public contracts, State aid. 
Type  of  irregularities.  Type  of  traders.  Type  of  modus  operandi.  Other  (specify)  Guardia  di  Finanza  -  Apart  from  those  already  used  by 
OLAF  and  some  of  those  cited  on  the  left,  the  Guardia  di  Finanza  principally  uses  the  following:  the  size  of  the  amount  accepted  for 
financing; concentration of several items of financing with the same subject; discrepancies between (declared) activities conducted by the 
subject  and  the  object  of  the  financing;  reports  concerning  the  recipient;  the  procedures  used  to  award  the  financing  and  the  type  of 
financing granted; the time taken to grant financing; applications for financing made close to the end of the programming period (which may 

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reduce the time available for the supervisory authorities to perform their tasks); the relationship between the means necessary to implement 
the project and those at the applicant's disposal; the coherence between the tax parameters of the subject and those of the economic sector to 
which it belongs; local knowledge of the subject. 
Other (specify): Ministry of Economic Development - number of projects which the same physical or legal person manages or participates 
in. 
Categories of irregularities; Categories of economic operators; Categories of operations 
Projects; Transactions; Individual economic operators; Other (specify) - level of expenditure 
Categories  of  irregularities  -All  types  of  check  (carried  out  by  the  RA/LB,  PMB,  AA,  CA)  also  cover  issues  relating  to  possible  fraud. 
Furthermore, the system of preliminary checks of procurement has been strengthened by increasing the intensity of these checks and making 
sure that intermediate bodies carry out such checks in addition to the PMB. Cooperation with law enforcement bodies has been facilitated 
and  explanations  provided  as  to  when  a  possible  infringement  needs  to  be  evaluated  particularly  thoroughly.  Categories  of  economic 
operators. Categories of operations. Economic sectors. 
Projects. Transactions. Individual economic operators- registered offshore or whose owners' origins are unclear. Other (specify) : If even one 
of  the  indicators  mentioned  below  is  attained,  the  project  must  be  evaluated  particularly  thoroughly.  Should  more  than  one  indicator  be 
attained  the  need  to  contact  law  enforcement  agencies  must  be  considered.  The  relevant  indicators  are:  supplier  is  registered  offshore, 
supplier has received payment as an advance of more than 50% prior to delivery of the goods, payments to the supplier have been artificially 
subdivided, and the price of equipment is significantly greater than the market price. 
Categories of irregularities, Categories of operations, Economic sectors, Geographical areas, Projects, Transactions, In practice irregularities 
most often occur as a result of discriminatory terms in the procurement documents. 
Categories of irregularities: ESF: A table of irregularities has been drawn up (based on the OLAF model) 
Other (specify): ESF: Any irregularities identified result in recommendations to be implemented by the beneficiary. Failure to implement a 
recommendation means a red flag. 
Checks integrated into the process of preparing and carrying out public procurement in respect of the relevant contract amendments (with 
special attention to the restriction of competition).Tax registration audit (in respect of decisions and payments). In the case of certain types 
of operation, it was compulsory to specify the scope of documents verifying payment and actual performance of the activities listed on the 
invoice, together with the list of inspection criteria for the documentary checks. Categories of modus operandi The most efficient manner of 
detecting suspected fraud is on-the-spot check. The criteria are laid down in Section 76 of Government Decree 4/2011 of 28 January 2011. 
As  part  of  FEUVE  (integrated  ex-ante  and  ex-post  executive  control  system)  the  Hungarian  State  Treasury,  the  National  Development 

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2.1.4. 

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Agency, the person appointed by the National Development Agency and the intermediate body conduct an on-the-spot inspection of projects 
selected by risk-analysis-based sampling. The intermediate body carries out on-the-spot inspections of at least 5% of the projects completed 
with an aid amount under HUF 10 million before the projects have been closed. For projects receiving aid between HUF 10 and 25 million, 
the on-the-spot inspection rate before closure is at least 25%. If the project aid exceeds HUF 25 million the intermediate body inspects the 
project at least once on the spot before closure. In the course of on-the-spot inspections the body performing the inspection must pay special 
attention  to  the  following:  checking  that  original  copies  of  the  supporting  documents  and  certificates  submitted  with  the  application  for 
payment  are  available  and  correspond  with  the  copy  submitted  with  the  application  for  payment;  checking  that  physical  and  financial 
progress  correspond  to  the  aid  agreement  for  the  project  and  that  they  accord;  ensuring  that  a  separate  project-level  accounting  record  is 
kept. Invoices must be checked in the course of the on-the-spot checks in order to be able to establish eligibility of the costs listed in the 
application  for  payment,  including  invoices  listed  in  the  previous  summary  of  invoices,  agreements  connected  to  the  invoices,  relevant 
performance  certificates  and  any  other  documents  certifying  payment  not  submitted  with  the  invoices;  and  the  audit  integrated  into  the 
process must be documented accordingly, stating the work completed, the results of inspections and the measures taken where irregularities 
or errors were detected. The person conducting the inspection must send the report drawn up on the basis of the on-the-spot check to the 
certifying  authority  by  the  20th  day  of  the  month  following  the  month  in  question.  limitation  of  wage  and  management  services  costs, 
account settlement and checks in proportion to the degree of completion of the project. 
Other (specify) limitations of wage costs and management service costs, proportional accounting and control in relation to the performance 
of the project 
Categories of irregularities; Categories of economic operators; Categories of operations; Categories of modus operandi 
The MA does not use indicators. All of its working methods are geared to uncovering fraud and identifying irregularities in the early stages 
of the process. Categories of modus operandi: the risk profiles referred to above may not really help to make fraud detection more effective, 
but they do help to prevent irregularities and detect them at a much earlier stage. 
N/A 
Categories of irregularities; Categories of economic operators; Categories of operations; Categories of modus operandi 
Categories  of  economic  operators:  Categorisation  by  amount  of  funding  for  non-institutional  operators.  Other  (specify):  Reports  or 
complaints. For the ESF in Portugal, one of the criteria for targeting on-the-spot financial controls is the risk of fraudulent use of funds. The 
level of risk is determined on the basis of the information on integrity contained in the SIIFSE. For operations audits carried out by IFDR 
(ERDF and Cohesion Fund), the tools and methodology were laid down in a 'Manual of procedures for auditing operations' with a view to 
establishing systematic procedures and obtaining better control outcomes. 

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 Use of fraud indicators  

Categories  of  irregularities  -  all  the  irregularities  mentioned  in  the  COCOF  guide,  because  that  document  has  been  fully  integrated  into 
national law (Government Decision No 875/2011) and has thus become mandatory. Categories of economic operators - public institutions, 
beneficiaries  of  European  funds  and/or  the  corresponding  national  public  funds,  and  any  other  privately  or  publicly  owned  operators 
engaged in activities financed with European funds on the basis of legal acts. Categories of operations - all the operations mentioned in the 
COCOF  guide,  because  that  document  has  been  fully  integrated  into  national  law  and  has  thus  become  mandatory.  Categories  of  modus 
operandi  -  all  of  those  mentioned  in  the  COCOF  guide,  because  that  document  has  been  fully  integrated  into  national  law  and  has  thus 
become mandatory. Economic sectors - all the sectors mentioned in the COCOF guide, because that document has been fully integrated into 
national law and has thus become mandatory. Geographical areas - all.  
Projects - everything that is mentioned in the COCOF guide, because that document has been fully integrated into national law and has thus 
become mandatory. Transactions - everything that is mentioned in the COCOF guide, because that document has been fully integrated into 
national law and has thus become mandatory. Individual economic operators - everything that is mentioned in the COCOF guide, because 
that document has been fully integrated into national law and has thus become mandatory. 
General  indicators:  The  Budget  Supervision  Office  (AFCOS)  has  drawn  the  attention  of  the  persons  responsible  for  management  and 
monitoring,  and  of  internal  auditors  to  the  'Notification  of  fraud  indicators'  which  it  also  published  on  its  website.  Internal  auditors  are 
familiar  with  IIA  documents  on  the  prevention  and  detection  of  fraud,  and  Slovenia  has  organised  workshops  on  that  topic  both  in 
cooperation with the IIA and independently. The risks of fraud are analysed in the context of risk registers and internal controls are duly set 
up  and  improved.  The  Supervizor  web  application  makes  a  significant  contribution  to  tackling  fraud  and  corruption  in  the  public 
procurement  field,  as  it  provides  all  parties  involved  with  an  clear  view  of  public  procurement  and  has  already  helped  to  detect 
irregularities.Categories of irregularities ; Categories of operations ; Categories of modus operandi 
Categories  of  irregularities:  Amount  of  the  irregularity  and  type  according  to  the  OLAF  code  table  (e.g.  the  types  plus  the  name  of  the 
falsification, such as code 213). Categories of economic operators: Large number of irregularities in different projects of the same economic 
operator.  Categories  of  operations:  Similar  type  of  irregularities  found  in  the  same  operational  programme.  Other  (specify):  Submissions 
from the public and the media, risk analysis, amount of funding granted, type of expenditure. 
Projects: Type, number and total amount of irregularities within the project, focus of the project. Transactions: Third party and partners in 
connection  with  public  procurement  within  the  project.  Individual  economic  operators:  Legal  form  of  economic  operator  in  relation  to 
project focus. Other (specify): Risk factors for establishing project risks expressed by assessing the budgetary risk calculated on the basis of 
current non-returnable  financial contributions and risk coefficients:1. 1. communication with the  beneficiary; 2. measurable indicators; 3. 
compliance  with  deadlines;  4.  correctness  of  documentation  submitted;  5.  conduct  of  tendering  procedure;  6.  findings  from  on-the-spot 
checks. 

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UK 

2.1.4. 

 Use of fraud indicators  

Categories of economic operators: When handling applications, the finance provider is to assess the risk classification of the project and its 
beneficiary and enter this into the EURA 2007 system or the TUKI2000 system, which also contain the instructions for performing the risk 
classification. The risk classification takes account of previous experience with the beneficiary and the type of project. The purpose of the 
risk  classification  is  to  identify  the  most  risky  projects  and  beneficiaries  in  advance.  This  information  is  used  in  project  verification  and 
monitoring. The risk classification influences the sampling for the on-the-spot verifications under Article 13. All high-risk projects must be 
covered.  Projects,  applicants  and  implementing  bodies  are  assigned  one  of  three  risk  levels,  namely  low,  normal  and  high.  The  finance 
provider must change the risk classification when the the findings of verifications or other facts give grounds for so doing. Information on 
the risk classification of projects and beneficiaries is intended for the public authorities only. Projects deemed to be high risk are subject to 
on-the-spot verifications (first-level controls) at least once during the project life cycle. 
N/A 
WG - The indicators of fraud eminate from the due diligence. Starting with knowing your customer, identity and residence. In requesting 
prove of identity and residence, the last 3 months bank statements are a good source as these can often identify other financial concerns. 
This can be enhanced by requesting a CV with a business plan of company officers which occasionally identify conflicts of interest within 
backgrounds,  or  missing  years  of  employment.  Building  on  from  this  additional  funding  streams,  contributions  or  match  funding  need 
scrutiny as regards money laundering regulations. Occasionally funding streams will be ficticious and are often identified in exact matches 
to applicants phone or fax numbers. Conflicts of interest if not identified at the outset raise concerns, these may be business, financial or in 
friends,  family  or  associates  tied  into  a  group  of  companies. Fledgling  companies  can  be  used  to  flout  grant  funding  across  a  number  of 
organisations. Financial accounts can give an indication of concern  prior to and during  a  funding  programme.  Accounts  submitted to the 
funding body may differ from those held at companies house. Expenditure increasing substantially towards the end of a project. Excessive 
interest for what appears in the accounts.Certificated amounts throughout a project as to expenditure or targets that are evidently incorrect. 
SG: Categories of irregularities. Other (specify) DFPNI: Article 16 checks include an on site visit to verify the existence and the reality of 
expenditure.  The  scope  of  these  checks  is  influenced  primarily  by  regulatory  requirements  and  any  guidance  emanating  from  the  MS  / 
Commission. Where relevant the Audit Authority takes into consideration the results of previous checks. Article 16 checking currently is 
sufficiently  anti-fraud  oriented.  Audit  Authority  staff  are  aware  of  the  areas  whereby  fraud  may  be  more  easily  perpetrated,  for  example 
procurement / tendering process. 
WG - Duplicate details in match funders or stakeholders particularly telephone fax. Numbers. Inflation of pricing through invoices or sister 
companies. Evident financial difficulties being exposed through various sources. Exact amounts certificated as in business plan to rounded 
amounts.  Excessive  expenditure  at  end  of  project.Retrospective  projects  through  the  same  company  or  associated  companies.  Breaching 

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procurement rules. Conflicts of interest. Differences in documentation from same suppliers or companies as regards colour, print, font or 
evidence  of  copying.  Invoices  to  other  companies  affiliated  to  the  applicant  one  with  Vat  number  and  another  without.  Projects;  DWP: 
England MA's Article 13 strategy, DFPNI : On the spot checks of projects. Transactions - DFPNI: Unsupported expenditure at first level of 
control.  Individual  economic  operators  -  DFPNI:Issues  with  a  particular  economic  operator  would  trigger  a  wider  review  of  any  other 
projects. Other (specify) DFPNI:fraud checks are embedded into claims checking. 

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2.1.5.  Comparing  your  Member  State's  suspected  fraud  record  to  the  EU  25 
average suspected fraud rate of 0.25% (as shown in the Commission report 
2010  [8]  for  the  programming  period  2000-2006  in  the  area  of  Cohesion 
policy),  do  you  consider  your  financial  controls  to  be  sufficiently  oriented 
towards detecting fraud 

COMMENT: The question is not formulated correctly. OLAF obviously mistakenly 
assumes  that  when  the  fraud  percentage  is  too  low,  the  controls  are  inadequate. 
Controls  are  not  designed  specifically  to  find  cases  of  fraud  but  to  discover 
irregularities.  The  task  of  the  audit  authority,  however,  is  to  report  whether  the 
irregularities found relate to a presumption of fraud or a case of fraud. The authority 
must  also  establish  the  correct  working  procedures  to  carry  out  this  task.  We  refer 
also  to  the  legal  obligation  of  each  public  official  to  report  suspected  fraud  to  the 
public prosecutor's office (Code of Criminal Procedure). No 
Generally speaking, no for the managing authorities and yes for the audit authorities. 
Audit Unit of the Inspectorate of Finance for European Funds - Wallonia (CAIF): The 
statistical  report  (SEC(2011)  1108),  which  accompanies  the  2010  annual  report 
(COM(2011) 595 of 29.9.2011), evaluates the BE irregularity rate (IrR) for the 2000-
2006  programming period at 1.1% and the BE  fraud rate (FrR) at 0.01%, while the 
suspected fraud frequency level (FFL) is 1.5% (4 of 272 irregularities notified), and 
the suspected fraud amount level (FAL) is 0.8% (€171 000 of €21 887 437 affected 
by  irregularities).  The  suspected  fraud  rate  of  0.01%  is  among  the  lowest  of  the  27 
MS and one might think that the Belgian notifiers are particularly reluctant to classify 
irregularities as suspected fraud.  
Note that ESF-VL did not detect any cases of fraud. 
FSED:  Geographical  proximity  to  the  project  promoters  generally  ensures  close 
scrutiny of implementation 
ERDF  Wallonia:  The  fraud  rate  is  relatively  low  in  Belgium  for  2000-2006 
programmes. However, the concept of 'suspected fraud' has been only recently added 
to 
to  provide 
information/training  concerning  rules  and  controls  has  necessarily  improved  the 
quality of funded projects and reduced the number of irregularities and cases of fraud.
ERDF  Brussels  Capital  Region:  No  opinion.  Hitherto  controls  have  detected 
irregularities but no cases of fraud.  
The established control structures and mechanisms have strengthened desk checks of 
public  procurement  procedures  held  and  on-the-spot  checks  of  project 
implementation.  The  ex-ante  control  of  the  selection  procedures  on  the  part  of 
beneficiaries  is  also  enforced  as  a  mechanism  to  prevent  the  inclusion  in  the 
documentation  of  criteria  contrary  to  the  principles  of  publicity  and  transparency, 
equal  treatment  and  free  competition.  We  consider  that  the  established  system  of 
financial control is sufficiently oriented not only towards detecting fraud but also (and 
most importantly) towards its prevention. 
Yes. Checks at MA/IB levels are sufficient; no suspected fraud has yet been detected; 
in  checks  on  beneficiaries  of  aid  emphasis  is  always  given  to  checks  of  public 
contracts, while checks on delegated activities focus in particular on the transparency 
of  the  evaluation  system  and  selection  of  project  applications  by  the  IB;  checks  are 
carried  out  on  the  basis  of  risk  analyses,  which  include  major  risks  related  to  fraud 
and corruption. 
Yes: on the basis that the Danish rate of fraud is low. 

irregularities  codes.  The  great  deal  of  effort  made 

the 

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2.1.5.  Comparing  your  Member  State's  suspected  fraud  record  to  the  EU  25 
average suspected fraud rate of 0.25% (as shown in the Commission report 
2010  [8]  for  the  programming  period  2000-2006  in  the  area  of  Cohesion 
policy),  do  you  consider  your  financial  controls  to  be  sufficiently  oriented 
towards detecting fraud 

YES  Successful  cooperation  has  been  established  with  the  law  enforcement 
authorities,  the  specificities  of  EU  funds  have  been  explained  to  prosecutors,  and 
clear indications given to the RA/LB concerning the recommended course of action to 
take  when  an  infringement  is  detected  which  could  subsequently  be  classified  as 
suspicion  of  fraud.  Questions  designed  to  reveal  the  occurrence  of  fraud  have  been 
incorporated into the RA/LB''s verification documents. 
Yes/No  -  The  legal  framework  is  good,  but  the  competence  of  officials  must  be 
improved.  Activities  would  become  more  targeted  if  Estonia  had  a  strategy  to 
safeguard  the  EU's  financial  interests  which  set  out  the  main  developments  among 
implementers  and  partners  in  the  area  and  which  would  be  implemented  through 
short-term action plans. Principles for monitoring similar projects, the assessment and 
improvement  of  regular  systems  (and  comparison  with  other  countries)  would  help 
improve activities. 
N/A 

Preparation underway 

Yes 
Yes. The institutional system opens irregularity procedures if activities breaching the 
legislation  or  the  provisions  of  the  aid  contract  are  detected  in  the  course  of 
documentary or on-the-spot inspections. The National Development Agency and the 
intermediate bodies pay special attention to activities infringing the Penal Code, that 
is activities that could be deemed fraud. If fraud is suspected the institutional system 
always reports to the competent investigating authority.  
 Yes.  Because  of  the  financial  controls  employed  in  the  area  of  ESF  and  ERDF 
(within  the  Cohesion  Policy)  during  the  2000-2006  programming  period  and  those 
currently being implemented in the 2007-2013 programming period and the continued 
low level of fraud detected, Ireland considers its financial controls to be sufficiently 
oriented towards detecting fraud. 
Yes 
Yes - the small number of bodies/authorities involved in the procedures gives ground 
for close cooperation, exchange of views and immediate resolve of issues identified, 
thus preventing the occurrence of potential irregularities and fraud 
Yes/No Given the level of suspected fraud in Lithuania (in the area of cohesion policy 
during the 2000-06 programming period), i.e. 0.14% compared to the average level of 
suspected fraud in EU Member States (0.25%, though this varies between 0.01% and 
1.21%), financial control in Lithuania is adequate for detecting fraud. The procedure 
for investigating, detecting and eliminating irregularities in respect of projects to be 
implemented under measures for the relevant programming period is laid down: 
1.  in  the  case  of  projects  financed  from  EU  structural  funds  in  accordance  with 
Lithuania’s  Single  Programming  Document  for  2004-06 
the  Rules  for 
administering  and  financing  measures  under  Lithuania’s  Single  Programming 
Document  for  2004-06  and  the  projects  to  be  financed  through  implementation  of 
these  measures,  approved  by  Order  No  1K-033  of  the  Minister  for  Finance  of  28 
January 2004 (Official Gazette 2004, No 19-599; 2005 No 21-667). 

in 

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2.1.5.  Comparing  your  Member  State's  suspected  fraud  record  to  the  EU  25 
average suspected fraud rate of 0.25% (as shown in the Commission report 
2010  [8]  for  the  programming  period  2000-2006  in  the  area  of  Cohesion 
policy),  do  you  consider  your  financial  controls  to  be  sufficiently  oriented 
towards detecting fraud 

2. in the case of projects financed using Cohesion Fund resources for 2000-06 in the 
Rules  for  administering  European  Union  Cohesion  Fund  resources  in  Lithuania, 
approved  by  Government  Resolution  No  1026  of  24  August  2001  (Official  Gazette 
2001,  No  74-2596;  2008  No  87-3483)  and  the  Rules  for  detecting  and  eliminating 
irregularities  in  the  use  of  EU  financial  assistance  and  laying  down  restrictions  on 
obtaining EU financial resources, approved by Order No 1K-307 of the Minister for 
Finance of 17 October 2005 (Official Gazette 2005, No 127-4588). 
3.  in  the  case  of  projects  financed  from  EU  funds  for  2007–13  in  the  Rules  for 
administering  and  financing  operational  programmes,  approved  by  Government 
Resolution No 1225 of 12 November 2008 (Official Gazette, 2008, No 137-5429), the 
Rules on project administration and financing, approved by Government Resolution 
No  1443  of  19  December  2007  (Official  Gazette  2008,  No  4-132),  and  the 
Methodological recommendations for investigating irregularities. 
These  rules  lay  down  that  once  the  implementing  body  suspects  that  an  irregularity 
has  occurred  (for  instance,  when  carrying  out  an  on-the-spot  check  of  project 
documents) and/or has received information from another body regarding a suspected 
irregularity,  it  launches  an  investigation  into  the  irregularity  in  accordance  with 
established  procedure  and,  having  evaluated  the  nature  of  the  suspected  irregularity 
and  suspecting  criminal  activity,  immediately  informs  the  Financial  Crimes 
Investigation Service at the Ministry of the Interior (FNTT), which is empowered to 
carry out investigations of criminal financial activities, thereof.  
It should be pointed out that the FNTT organises anti-fraud training for employees of 
public  institutions  involved  in  the  administration  and  control  of  EU  structural 
assistance on an annual basis, during which it presents examples of the most prevalent 
fraud schemes and engages in discussions of topical issues relating to, and prospects 
for,  the  investigation,  prevention  and  detection  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  and 
cooperation  between  the  FNTT  and  bodies  involved  in  the  administration  of  EU 
structural assistance. 
Yes  Very  low  error  rate  <0.25%  for  the  ERDF  'Regional  Competitiveness  and 
Employment'  programme  (rate  <0.02%)  /  ESF:  The  controls  in  place  should  help 
detect  fraud.  However,  each  new  case  is  analysed  by  the  control  team  in  order  to 
optimise control procedures. 
YES  Successful  cooperation  has  been  established  with  the  law  enforcement 
authorities,  the  specificities  of  EU  funds  have  been  explained  to  prosecutors,  and 
clear indications given to the RA/LB concerning the recommended course of action to 
take  when  an  infringement  is  detected  which  could  subsequently  be  classified  as 
suspicion  of  fraud.  Questions  designed  to  reveal  the  occurrence  of  fraud  have  been 
incorporated into the RA/LB''s verification documents. 
Yes. Malta's suspected fraud rate for the Programming Period 2004-2006 was 0%. A 
number of types of Structural Funds (e.g. FIFG) for Programming Period 2004-2006 
have already been closed by the EU Commission. 
Yes, on-the-spot checks are always carried out for every project. If there are doubts 
about  the  legitimacy  of  declared  expenditure,  further  questions  are  asked  and 
additional evidence is collected until it is clear whether the expenditure was incurred 

EN 

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Member 
State: 

2.1.5.  Comparing  your  Member  State's  suspected  fraud  record  to  the  EU  25 
average suspected fraud rate of 0.25% (as shown in the Commission report 
2010  [8]  for  the  programming  period  2000-2006  in  the  area  of  Cohesion 
policy),  do  you  consider  your  financial  controls  to  be  sufficiently  oriented 
towards detecting fraud 

legitimately. No cases of fraud have been detected recently, and any doubts that have 
arisen have been allayed by additional control measures. 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SE 

Yes 

Yes.  Poland's  suspected  fraud  record  in  the  2000-06  period  in  the  area  of  cohesion 
policy was 0.78%. This is a higher percentage than the overall percentage established 
for the EU25, namely 0.25%. Therefore, a relatively higher number of cases of fraud 
are detected in Poland. This testifies to the effectiveness of the Polish control system 
and  to  the  fact  that  it  is  targeted  correctly.  This  system  allows  cases  of  fraud  to  be 
detected effectively, and in consequence it prevents improperly incurred expenditure 
from being covered by EU resources. 
Yes.  The  rate  of  cases  of  suspected  fraud  communicated  to  the  Public  Prosecutor's 
Office is lower than in the 2000-2006 programming period owing to a tightening of 
the  internal  control  system  and  the  implementation  of  measures  to  prevent  irregular 
situations. 
Yes.  The  Anti-Fraud  Department  (DLAF)  has  developed  an  effective  operational 
cooperation  system  for  combating  fraud  and  any  illegal  activities  affecting  the  EU 
budget. That system has three levels:  
I.  The  first  level  is  the  Irregularity  Reporting  Network  comprising  the  bodies  with 
tasks in administering European funds. Its role is to facilitate the communication of 
relevant  information,  considering  that  these  bodies  are  the  first  to  notice  any 
irregularities/fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU in Romania. 
II.  The  second  level  refers  to  cooperation  between  the  control  authorities,  and  the 
cooperation  agreements  concluded  with  the  bodies  involved,  such  as  the  Financial 
Squad  (Garda  Financiară),  the  National  Tax  Administration  Agency,  the  Audit 
Authority,  the  General  Inspectorate  of  the  Romanian  Police,  the  Romanian 
Information  Service, 
the  Central  Unit  for 
the  State  Building  Inspectorate, 
Harmonising  Public  Internal  Audit,  the  Information  and  Domestic  Protection 
Directorate-General,  and  the  National  Office  for  Preventing  and  Combating  Money 
Laundering. The goal is to inform DLAF of any irregularity or fraud detected during 
the  control  activities  specific  to  each  of  those  bodies,  and  provide  operational 
assistance for DLAF's control activities. 
III. The third level relates to strengthening cooperation with the prosecutors, in order 
to  follow  up  on  the  inspection  by  sending  the  defendants  before  the  courts  and 
recovering any damages. There is a cooperation agreement concluded to this end with 
the National Anticorruption Directorate. 
Yes 

EN 

88 

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State: 

SI 

SK 

FI 

UK 

Member 
State: 

BE 

2.1.5.  Comparing  your  Member  State's  suspected  fraud  record  to  the  EU  25 
average suspected fraud rate of 0.25% (as shown in the Commission report 
2010  [8]  for  the  programming  period  2000-2006  in  the  area  of  Cohesion 
policy),  do  you  consider  your  financial  controls  to  be  sufficiently  oriented 
towards detecting fraud 

Yes/No.  The  financial  controls  in  place  have  always  taken  into  account  the  risk  of 
fraud and corruption, in line with the risk assessment. The fact that no suspected fraud 
was detected during the 2004-2006 programming period is explained by the relatively 
low level of funds allocated in proportion to the internal controls in place. With the 
increase in the volume of funds allocated and in the number of beneficiaries, and the 
spread of fraudulent practices from other Member States, the probability of fraud is 
increasing and the development of internal controls is being adapted accordingly. 
Yes: Audits under Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 438/2001, Article 9 of 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1389/2002 and Article 62(1) (a) and (b) of Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  1083/2006  are  conducted  on  the  basis  of  detailed  checklists 
aimed at preventing irregularities, fraud and errors or defects in the management and 
control  system  The  checklists  for  both  administrative  and  on-the-spot  checks  are 
based  on  Article  13(2)  of  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  1828/2006.  Project 
checks  are  therefore  carried  out  as  administrative  and  on-the-spot  checks.  From  a 
process  point  of  view,  administrative  checks  may  be  carried  out  as:  administrative 
checks  on  the  procurement  of  goods,  services,  construction  work  and  related 
procedures;  administrative  checks  on  payment  applications  and  on  other  facts.  The 
main  aim  of  the  on-the-spot  checks  is  to  assess  the  real  (actual)  supply  of  goods, 
performance  of  works  and  rendering  of  services  declared  in  the  accounting  and 
supporting documents submitted by beneficiaries with the payment application under 
the  contract  for  the  granting  of  non-returnable  financial  contributions  or  in 
accordance with documents referred to by the contract. On-the-spot checks focus on 
the  implementation  of  the  project  as  a  whole.  Projects  may  be  checked  by  several 
supervisory authorities – in other words, the checks are multi-stage. 
Yes. The procedures introduced for the 2007-13 programming period for the selection 
of projects and the verification and payment of expenditure, the procedures based on 
the  information  systems  and  the  increased  monitoring  activity  of  the  management 
ensure sufficient prevention of irregularities and fraud. 
SG: Yes; DWP: Yes; DCLG: Yes; WG - Very low error rates and systems have been 
subject to audit by DG Employment. 

2.1.6.  How could the detection record be improved 

FSED : ERDF Brussels Capital Region :Training of competent staff 
Flemish  Authority,  Dept.  for  Agriculture  and  Fisheries,  Agriculture  and  Fisheries 
Policy Division, Sea Fisheries Service (ALV - Agency for Agriculture and Fisheries): 
Even if fraud is suspected, it is difficult to prove it beyond all doubt. Training might 
help remedy this. 
FSED : Increased access to national and regional databases 
ALV:  Linking  databases  or  making  them  accessible  might  make  it  easier  to  trace 
double financing. 
ERDF  Brussels  Capital  Region:  Legislation  allowing  cross-checking  of  different 
relevant data sources 

EN 

89 

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Member 
State: 

2.1.6.  How could the detection record be improved 

ALV:  Linking  databases  or  making  them  accessible  might  make  it  easier  to  trace 
double  financing.  Increased  powers  of  the  authorities  in  relation  to  exchange  of 
information, database access and checks 
FSED: 

BG 

CZ 

Financial. Increase of financial resources. 
Provision of additional financial incentives for employees so as to reduce the risk of 
corrupt  attitudes  and  practices.Technical.  Computerisation  of  project  files  and  the 
reduction of hardcopies in order to simplify control.Human. Closer interaction of the 
separate activities (contracting, monitoring, control). 
Enhancing administrative capacity.Training of competent staff. Annual staff training 
and exchange of experience through round tables, discussions and seminars with the 
participation of the authorities involved in the management and control of EU funds. 
Increased access to national and regional databases. Exchange of good practices and 
information with other Management Authorities and control bodies. 
Access  to  international  databases  would  also  be  an  advantage.  The  ability  to  access 
information  about  detected  cases  of  fraud  and  the  exchange  of  experiences  on  its 
detection  will  have  a  preventive  effect  on  fraud,  for  example,  the  Unified 
Management  Information  System  (UMIS)  for  the  operational  programmes;  PHARE 
MIS  and  the  central  exclusion  database.Legislation  allowing  cross-checking  from 
different  relevant  data  sources.  The  Regulation  laying  down  the  procedures  for 
handling irregularities under the funds and programmes co-financed by the EU is due 
to  be  amended  regarding  joint  controls  by  the  Managing  Authority  and  AFCOS 
(under  the  Ministry  of  Interior).Increased  powers  of  the  authorities  in  relation  to 
exchange of information, access to databases and checks. Verification of expenditure 
should not be restricted, in terms of time, by controls and investigations carried out by 
the competent authorities. The officers in charge of irregularities, irrespective of the 
operational  programme  on  which  they  are  working,  can  draft  and  enter  a  report  in 
UMIS  that  provides  information  about  detected  irregularities  under  all  operational 
programmes.  The  above  report  shall  include  information  about  the  type  of 
irregularity,  precise  data  about  the  beneficiary,  including  BULSTAT  number, 
information  about  the  project,  as  well  as  data  about  all  involved  natural  and  legal 
persons related to the beneficiary and the contractor. 
The  procedure  may  be  enhanced  if  the  prosecution  authority  provided  more  data 
about investigated irregularities to the Managing Authority to be compared with those 
established by them. 
Financial:  by  building  up  capacities  in  the  area  of  checks  by  external  contractors. 
Technical:  e.g.  the  possibility  to  generate  or  filter  the  requested  data.  Human: 
emphasis  on  expertise  and  ethics  of  human  resources;  sufficient  staff  capacities; 
further  training  in  the  area  of  checks  and  irregularities;  selecting  high-quality  staff 
and  providing  them  with  continuous  training  is  fundamental,  Training  of  competent 
staff: targetted analysis of needs within the training system - better qualifications of 
the staff performing checks increase their abilities to detect suspected criminal acts. 
Increased  access  to  national  and  regional  databases:  by  means  of  legal  provisions 
making it possible to cross-check data from various relevant sources; existence of a 
central  database  of  financing  that  would  make  it  possible  to  obtain  information  and 

EN 

90 

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Member 
State: 

2.1.6.  How could the detection record be improved 

DK 

DE 

EE 

EL 
ES 

prevent double financing. Increased powers of the authorities in relation to exchange 
of  information,  access  to  datababasis  and  checks:  mutual  exchange  of  information 
between MAs, improved access to the relevant databases . 
Better technical capacity for linking databases. Technical. 
One option might be to acquire access to tax authority data on income.  
Investigation  of  whether  projects  have  received  aid  for  the  same  project  from  more 
than one fund, e.g. the Regional and Social Funds/Rural Development Fund and the 
Fisheries Fund. Increased access to national and regional databases. 
Technical  -  The  drawing  up  of  a  handbook  and  a  compilation  of  best  practice, 
development  of  a  common  platform  and  databases,  and  provision  of  specific  skills, 
equipment  and  IT  tools.  Training  of  competent  staff  -  To  ensure  that  there  is  a 
common approach 
Increased  access  to  national  and  regional  databases  -  State  Revenue  Service 
databases, the databases of the State Land Service and land registries, the Mortgage 
Register,  Enterprise  Register,  and  the  Office  of  Citizenship  and  Migration  Affairs. 
Increased powers of the authorities in relation to exchange of information, access to 
databases  and  checks  to  ensure  that  the  information  can  be  checked  in  a  timely 
manner. 
Financial:  competitive  wage;  possibility  to  employ  top  experts  in  order  to  better 
detect  fraud.  Technical:  analytical  software.  Human:  competent,  experienced  staff 
with potential for development (competitive wage). Training of competent staff: more 
training and sharing of experience across the EU 
Increased  access  to  national  and  regional  databases:  automatic  reading/checking  of 
information  from  different  databases.  Legislation  allowing  cross-checking  from 
different  relevant  data  sources:  there  is  no  legislation  permitting  this.  Increased 
powers of the authorities in relation to exchange of information, access to databases 
and checks: ensures power delegated to officials working on fraud detection. Other: 
pan-European database of aid recipients (to prevent double financing) 
N/A 
Increased or improved use of resources 
Technical :  
This  would  improve  controls  and  could  be  extended,  with  specific  checks  being 
carried out in situ. 
Human:  
Staff increases would boost the level of control, which could reach 100%. 
Training of competent staff:  

More training for staff on potential risks and knowledge of operations and operators 
would help to spot new and previously undetected risks. 
Improved information sharing and availability 
Incresased access to national and regional databases :  
A  database  that  could  be  consulted  to  check  the  cumulation  of  aid,  irregularities 
detected for a type of operation, work schedules of other inspectors, etc. incidents that 
are not detected due to a lack of awareness of their potential existence or risk could be 
avoided. 
Legislation allowing cross-checking from different relevant data sources:  
Support from inspectors in other regions could improve the control of multinational 

EN 

91 

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Member 
State: 

2.1.6.  How could the detection record be improved 

FR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

CY 

companies  with  subsidiaries  in  the  EU,  which  market  within  the  EU  subsidised 
products that are out of our control. This measure should  be set within a legislative 
framework that has no territorial constraints. 
Increased powers of the authorities in relation to exchange of information, access to 
databasis and checks 
the  main  issues  relate  to,  firstly,  the  quality  of  the  internal  audit  (management 
authority  and  certification  authority)  and  secondly,  the  quality  of  the  external  audit 
and the mobilisation of human resources and staff training 
Development  and  improvement  of  the  technical  support  for  control  and  indication 
systems.  Continuous  improvement  of  human  resources  and  expertise,  professional 
training. Continuous provision of professional training possibilities. Increased powers 
of  the  authorities  in  respect  of  exchange  of  information,  access  to  databases  and 
checks: reinforcing checks not only on beneficiaries, but also on suppliers. Other: The 
legislation  concerning  exchange  of  information  abroad  should  be  clarified,  for 
example  as  regards  when  personal  data  relating  to  criminal  offences  can  be  used  in 
foreign procedures other than criminal procedures, or what information may/must be 
transferred  abroad  under  the  arrangements  for  mutual  judicial  assistance  and 
exchange  of  police  information  in  the  case  of  procedures  in  Hungary,  and  at  what 
stage in the procedure. 
No Suggestions. However the strong financial controls employed in the area of 2000-
2006 ESF (within the Cohesion Policy) and the additional controls during 2007-2011 
as outlined above, and the low level of fraud detected would suggest that neither an 
increase in resources, nor, if possible, improved use of resources would be of limited 
benefit. 
Financial:  Ministry  of  Economic  Development  -  increase  in  funding  for  checks, 
improved  use  of  information  through  databases  and  cross-checking,  increase  in 
number of inspectors. Technical: Guardia di Finanza - intensification of exchanges of 
information  between  central  and  local  government  bodies  and  between  them  and 
European  bodies  (in  particular,  OLAF);  Ministry  of  Economic  Development  - 
improved  use  of  information  through  databases  and  cross-checking,  increase  in 
number of inspectors; National Antifraud Committee - maximum transparency in the 
publication  of  lists  of  beneficiaries.  Human:  Ministry  of  Economic  Development  - 
increase  in  number  of  inspectors.  Training  of  relevant  staff:  National  Antifraud 
Committee - holding post-graduate and ad hoc professional courses. 
Increased  access  to  national  and  regional  databases.  Legislation  allowing  for  cross-
checking  between  various  appropriate  sources  of  data.  Increased  powers  for  the 
authorities  in  terms  of  exchanging  information,  access  to  databases  and  to  checks. 
Drafting of blacklists of subjects deemed unworthy of trust having committed fraud in 
the past, in line with Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002. 
Human  -  more  staff  on-the-spot  /  experienced  staff  with  operation's  specifics. 
Training of competent staff - currently there are bodies with limited experience in the 
implementation of specific programmes (eg. Grant schemes) - a solution would be the 
exchange of knoweledge with more experienced staff in the specific field from other 
IBs in MS or other MS (networking, training) 
Increased access to national and regional databases - this would increase knowledge 
and information sharing about cases of fraud identified, alerting staff for similar cases 
in  the  future.  Legislation  allowing  cross-checking  from  different  relevant  data 

EN 

92 

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Member 
State: 

2.1.6.  How could the detection record be improved 

LV 

LT 

sources.  Amendments  to  legislation  on  time  baring  and  quantitative  thresholds 
identifying  criminal  behaviour.  Increased  powers  of  the  authorities  in  relation  to 
exchange of information, access to databasis and checks - eg. Common databases in 
relation to the funding of private organisations through grant schemes would assist in 
detecting cases of double financing. 
Technical  -  The  drawing  up  of  a  handbook  and  a  compilation  of  best  practice, 
development  of  a  common  platform  and  databases,  and  provision  of  specific  skills, 
equipment  and  IT  tools.  Training  of  competent  staff  -  To  ensure  that  there  is  a 
common approach to the investigation of fraud cases, training courses for prosecutors 
have been organised. Various anti-fraud workshops will be continue to be organised 
in  cooperation  with  the  State  Chancellery  (the  workshops  are  held  in  response  to  a 
survey  administered  by  the  State  Chancellery  to  ascertain  what  workshops  and 
training are required). 
Increased  access  to  national  and  regional  databases  -  State  Revenue  Service 
databases, the databases of the State Land Service and land registries, the Mortgage 
Register,  Enterprise  Register,  and  the  Office  of  Citizenship  and  Migration  Affairs. 
Increased powers of the authorities in relation to exchange of information, access to 
databases  and  checks  to  ensure  that  the  information  can  be  checked  in  a  timely 
manner. 
Technical 
The existing databases should be improved. Human  
Administrative  capacity  should  be  strengthened; 
that 
responsibilities  are  performed  well  and  in  a  timely  manner.  Training  of  competent 
staff 
It is essential to continually raise the level of knowledge or support for acquiring new 
knowledge  in  the  management  authorities  by  training  personnel  to  detect  possible 
cases  of  fraud  at  the  project  appraisal  and  implementation  stages  by  applying  the 
practical COCOF guidelines on fraud, participating in international training events (to 
become  familiar  with  practice  in  other  countries),  familiarising  project  managers 
through seminars and lectures with the best practice of the Lithuanian authorities and 
EU  Member  States  in  combating  fraud,  and  also  by  disseminating  information  on 
irregularities  and  suspected  criminal  acts  (notification  of  detected  cases)  established 
by intermediate and implementing bodies and informing project managers' founding 
authorities about the detected irregularities, sanctions applied to the project managers 
and  preventive  measures  to  improve  the  management  of  irregularity  prevention  and 
the risk of fraud. 
Increased access to national and regional databases 
Access  to  databases  would  improve  the  prevention  of  fraud  aimed  at  obtaining 
assistance  from  several  sources  and  reduce  the  possibility  of  illegally  obtaining 
assistance through the submission of incorrect data. To improve the detection of cases 
of  fraud  it  is  essential  that  information  available  to  other  bodies  on  infringers  and 
possible  cases  of  fraud  be  exchanged,  the  early  warning  system  be  applied, 
information  be  entered  and  regularly  updated  in  the  SFMIS  on  all  irregularities 
committed  by  project  managers,  and  it  is  necessary  to  apply  sanctions  to  infringers 
and conduct litigation proceedings and, as already mentioned, publicise irregularities 
and  suspected  criminal  acts  detected  by  the  implementing  bodies  (notification  of 
cases detected), and offer international training (to become familiar with the practices 
of other countries). Legislation allowing cross-checking from different relevant data 

this  would  ensure 

EN 

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Member 
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2.1.6.  How could the detection record be improved 

sources. Cross-checking of information increases the likelihood of preventing double 
financing. Increased powers of the authorities in relation to exchange of information, 
access to databases;and checks.  
Other:  Closer  cooperation  with  law  enforcement  agencies  is  essential,  by  sharing 
experience through the discussion and classification of typical cases of fraud, as is the 
training  of  staff  dealing  with  irregularities.  Regular  meetings  of  staff  members  of 
international implementing bodies who investigate irregularities should be organised, 
at which particular investigated cases of fraud could be considered For this purpose it 
is suggested that the AFCOS meeting platform be more widely used. 
Financial ESF: by cross-checking figures from different sources. Technical ESF: by 
using  IT  tools  that  facilitate  controls  (e.g.  Excel  table  to  calculate  salaries 
automatically).  Human  ESF:  through  a  larger  control  team  and  more  availability  in 
the  field.  Training  of  competent  staff  ESF:  A  considerable  effort  has  been  made  on 
training and circulating information. This effort must be permanent.  
Other ESF: The circulation and availability of information is important.  
Financial - investment in training on fraud detection techniques and investment in a 
common  computerised  information  repository  for  the  cross-checking  of  information 
provided by different national stakeholders. Technical - by using IT tools to facilitate 
controls.  Human  -  through  a  larger,  qualified  control  team.  Training  of  competent 
staff - training on the detection and prevention of fraud and awareness campaigns on 
fraud indicators. 
Increased  access  to  national  databases  (Technical);  Legislation  allowing  cross-
checking  from  different  relevant  data  sources  (Technical);  Increased  powers  of  the 
authorities in relation to exchange of information, access to databasis and checks 
In the case of Structural Funds, not necessary in the NL. 

Increased  access  to  national  and  regional  databases  :  The  planned  national 
transparency database (on all the public support granted) could be helpful, especially 
with regard to multiple funding. 
Staff training – According to the statistics concerning proven anomalies, the majority 
of  such  cases  concern  highly  specialised  fields,  including  in  particular  public 
procurement  law.  In  order  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  control  activities  in  these 
areas, it is necessary to have skilled staff with extensive knowledge in the area under 
investigation.  Knowledge  should  be  increased  above  all  through  the  staff  training 
mentioned earlier. 
Other:  
One solution which may impact positively on the detection of irregularities is shifting 
the emphasis away from checking to ensure that measures taken comply with formal 
requirements  towards  checks  on  progress  made  and  differentiating  between  purely 
formal  errors  which  do  not  have  financial  consequences  and  irregularities  which  do 
have negative financial consequences for the EU budget. 
Human  -  More  human  resources  allocated  to  on-the-spot  checks.  Training  of 
competent staff - Training in judicial investigations. 
Financial - encouraging performance by offering financial incentives to the personnel 
with control tasks, according to their achievements in preventing fraud and recovering 
damages  caused  by  the  projects'  beneficiaries;  priority  allocation  of  financial 
resources  to  preventing  irregularities  and  the  resizing  of  the  control  apparatus  to 
achieve that goal. Technical - increased and more efficient use of technical resources 

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2.1.6.  How could the detection record be improved 

such as the control software (I2 Analist Notebook, Ibase, Ibridge, etc.) and analytical 
instruments,  interconnecting  the  databases,  data  mining,  database  access.  Providing 
portable IT equipment for the personnel with control tasks, to enable them to access 
the database developed on the basis of previous checks during missions taking place 
outside the office; the possibility of carrying out on-the-spot technical checks in the 
case  of  projects  providing  financing  for  infrastructure  works.  Human  -  mainly 
training  on  preventing  irregularities.  Training  of  competent  staff  -  continuous 
development  of  the  professional  skills  of  the  staff  through  training/exchanges  at 
various  institutions,  covering  topics  related  to  the  prevention,  detection  and 
rectification  of  irregularities.  Adjusting  the  number  of  personnel  employed  by  the 
control  bodies,  in  line  with  the  number  of  projects  monitored  and  checked.  -  more 
flexibility in the working procedure established between the departments responsible 
for monitoring the projects and those responsible for control, to enhance efficiency in 
communication and reduce the duration of the checks. 
Increased  access  to  national  and  regional  databases  -  obtaining,  through  OLAF, 
access  for  DLAF  to  the  EURODB  and  INFOBASE  databases.  Increased  powers  of 
the authorities in relation to exchange of information, access to databasis and checks - 
Once  the  new  Ministry  of  European  Affairs  has  been  established,  pursuant  to 
Government  Emergency  Order  No  78/2011  introducing  certain  organisational 
measures  in  the  field  of  European  affairs,  the  exchange  of  information  among  the 
entities  involved  in  administering  structural  instruments  will  be  more  efficient  and 
flexible, because that new institution will act as coordinating authority for structural 
instruments.  It  will  be  responsible  for  the  coordination,  preparation,  development, 
harmonisation  and  operation  of  the  legal,  functional  and  planning  framework  for 
managing structural instruments. 
Increased  or  improved  use  of  resources  (Bold  and  specify  selected  answers): 
Introduction of IT software for detecting and preventing duplicate financing using the 
databases  of  the  Tax  Administration,  the  Public  Payments  Administration  and  the 
Agency  for  Public  Payments  and  Records,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia. The Budget Supervision Office organises annual 
conferences  on  the  protection  of  the  EU's  financial  interests  for  persons  responsible 
for the management and control of EU funds.Technical; Training of competent staff 
Improved  information  sharing  and  availability  (Bold  and  specify  selected  answers): 
Introduction of IT software for detecting and preventing duplicate financing using the 
databases  of  the  Tax  Administration,  the  Public  Payments  Administration  and  the 
Agency for Public Payments and Records. Increased access to national and regional 
databases;  Legislation  allowing  cross-checking  from  different  relevant  data  sources; 
Amendments  to  legislation  on  time-barring  and  quantitative  thresholds  identifying 
criminal  behaviour;  Increased  powers  of  the  authorities  in  relation  to  exchange  of 
information, access to databases and checks. 

Financial: Increased funding or better appraisal of staff conducting checks, aimed at 
reducing  the  turnover  (fluctuations)  in  staff.  Technical.  Human:  Increased  numbers 
and  improved  motivation  of  staff.  Training  of  competent  staff:  Regular  training  of 
employees  checking  areas  connected  with  expenditure  eligibility,  accounting,  fiscal 
obligations  and  public  procurement,  thus  improving  the  quality  of  checks  at 
regulatory  authority  level  and  enabling  unauthorised  expenditure  to  be  identified 
before  payment.  Information  on  the  latest  findings,  problems  and  staff  training  at 

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international  level,  enhancing  awareness  of  experiences  and  good  practice  in  other 
countries.  
Increased  access  to  national  and  regional  databases:  Access  to  national  and 
transnational  databases  in  other  Member  States  would  shed  light  on  other  cases  of 
irregularities  and  suspected  fraud.  Linking  of  information  systems  on  funding  from 
State  budgets  and  EU  sources  would  be  useful  particularly  in  terms  of  avoiding 
duplication  of  funding  and  identifying  problematical  beneficiaries.  Legislation 
allowing cross-checking from different relevant data sources. Increased powers of the 
authorities  in  relation  to  exchange  of  information,  access  to  databases  and  checks: 
The  best  method  of  detecting  offences  is  effective  cooperation  and  information 
exchange between all concerned, particularly at national level but also at international 
level.  One  possibility  for  strengthening  mutual  cooperation  is  to  link  different 
information  sources  or  databases  and  to  give  competent  staff  limited  access  to 
important information from those databases. Other. 
Increased  access  to  national  and  regional  databases.  Other:  There  are  currently 
opportunities  in  Sweden  for  staff  from  different  managing  authorities  to  exchange 
experiences. Cooperation and exchange of information could be developed further. 

WG  -  Increased  due  diligence.  More  resources  (numerous  options).  UK:  Human. 
Training  of  competent  staff  -  DFPNI:  Part  of  the  induction  process  for  new 
Programme  staff  could  be  used  to  deliver  training  on  Indicators  of  Fraud,  with 
specific  reference  to  COCOF  Working  Document  09/0003/00  of  18/02/2009; 
Information Note on Fraud Indicators for ERDF, ESF and CF in addition to refresher 
training for existing front-line staff. Additional emphasis placed on fraud prevention 
training. 
WG  -  Information  sharing  between  grant  funding  bodies.  Intelligence  database  on 
fraudulent  companies  and  individuals.  Additional  financial  investigative  powers. 
Increased  access  to  national  and  regional  databases-  DFPNI:  More  use  of  National 
Fraud  Initiative  including  checking  all  persons  employed  through  the  Programmes 
against  welfare  and  housing  benefit  databases.  Greater  visibility  on  the  websites 
regarding  the  reporting  of  fraud.  More  emphasis  on  the  verification  of  third  party 
suppliers  and  procurement  issues  in  general.  Legislation  allowing  cross-checking 
from  different  relevant  data  sources.  Amendments  to  legislation  on  time  baring  and 
quantitative  thresholds  identifying  criminal  behaviour.  Increased  powers  of  the 
authorities  in  relation  to  exchange  of  information,  access  to  databasis  and  checks. 
Other (specify). SG & DCLG: Better sharing of information between Mas. 

Member 
State: 

BE 

2.1.7.  Does  your  Member  State  apply  cost  benefit  analysis  when  conducting  anti-

fraud investigations?  

No 
FSEBRU  
ESF-VL 
FSED: 
ESF:  No  -  controls  are  carried  out  automatically  with  the  aim  of  checking  each 
operator on the spot at least twice over the whole programming period. 

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2.1.7.  Does  your  Member  State  apply  cost  benefit  analysis  when  conducting  anti-

fraud investigations?  

ERDF Wallonia 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 

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Yes. Financial risk threshold. Ex-ante control of public procurement depending on its 
type and value. 
Where  public  procurement  procedures  are  carried  out  by  the  beneficiary,  the 
Managing Authority of the Operational Programme ‘Technical  Assistance’ performs 
ex ante control according to the value of the contract. Public interest. The priority of 
the  check  conducted  dependes  on  how  much  public  contribution  is  affected.Other 
(specify) 
All  suspicions  of  irregularities  or  fraud  have  to  be  investigated  by  the  managing 
authority. 
Yes. In some cases we request an expert opinion on the open market value. Where the 
MA is to assess an irregularity which is a suspected fraud, it automatically refers the 
irregularity to be examined by the competent authorities. 
No. There appears to be no immediate need for cost benefit analyses, as all incidences 
of irregularities and fraud detected are pursued. 
N/A 

No  -  Fraud  is  investigated  irrespective  of  the  amount  involved,  either  in 
misdemeanour proceedings or criminal proceedings 

Other  -  Yes,  provided  it  does  not  impinge  on  proven  privacy  entitlements  of 
individuals within Member States. 
No specific cost benefit analysis of anti-fraud investigations are carried out in respect 
of ESF or ERDF activities. 
N/A 
Preparation underway 

Yes. Public interest (SDOE). Annual investigative priorities (SDOE). 

NO 
Other  (specify):  Ministry  of  Economic  Development  and  Ministry  of  Education, 
Universities and Research - On-the-spot checks on a sample of measures selected by 
way of preliminary risk analysis. The Region of Basilicata and the Guardia di Finanza 
carry out joint analysis of irregularities uncovered in terms of: 
- Economic sectors most at risk; 
-  Most  significant  or  most  frequent  types  of  irregularities  uncovered  and  the 
mechanisms involved; 
- Comparison of the outcomes; 
- More effective monitoring methods. 
There is no information on what methods the law enforcement authorities use in their 
work.  If  cases  of  suspected  fraud  are  detected  in  the  EU  funds  system,  the  bodies 
involved  in  managing  the  EU  funds  contact  the  law  enforcement  authorities,  which 
perform the relevant investigation. 
N/A 

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2.1.7.  Does  your  Member  State  apply  cost  benefit  analysis  when  conducting  anti-

fraud investigations?  

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BE 

No, ESF: each operation is checked with the same attention to efficiency. 
Yes. Financial risk threshold 

In the case of Structural Funds, not necessary in the NL. 

No 
No 

introduces 

the  corresponding  national  public  funds 

No 
Financial  risk  threshold  -  Government  Emergency  Order  No  66  on  preventing, 
detecting  and  penalising  irregularities  in  the  granting  and  use  of  European  funds 
and/or 
the  principle  of 
proportionality,  according  to  which  any  administrative  measure  adopted  must  be 
appropriate,  necessary  and  in  line  with  the  objective  pursued  as  regards  both  the 
resources  used  in  order  to  detect  irregularities,  taking  into  account  the  nature  and 
frequency  of  irregularities,  and  the  establishment  of  budgetary  debts  arising  from 
irregularities. 
No. We perform internal controls in accordance with a risk assessment which includes 
up to 10 risk factors for individual operational programmes and a prescribed sampling 
methodology. 
No: Audits are conducted regardless of cost or potential findings 
No 
No 

SG:  No;  DWP:  No  DFPNI;  No,  All  suspected  fraud  is  investigated.  NI  policy  is  to 
report all suspected fraud to the PSNI and the decision to pursue a criminal case rests 
with the the Public Prosecution Service. 

2.1.8.  Has  your  Member  State  administration  adopted  guidelines  to  distinguish 

between fraud and irregularities? 

Yes 
CAIF 
Wallonia region: An administrative circular approved by the Walloon Government on 
16  March  2006  establishes  general  principles  for  assessing  irregularity.  Point  2.9  of 
the  circular  defines  suspicion  of  fraud  as  an  irregularity  triggering  administrative 
and/or judicial proceedings at national level to determine the existence of intentional 
behaviour, in particular fraud. 
FSED. When were they updated last? 
FSED: 2008 
ERDF Wallonia: administrative circular 
No 
ALV: No 
ESF: No - definition taken from European legislation. 
D2 EFRO VL: No 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: According to CAIF, fraud exists when the irregularity 
has  been  intentionally,  i.e.,  knowingly,  committed.  How  do  you  propose  a  coherent 
application of the definition of fraud vs irregularity? 

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2.1.8.  Has  your  Member  State  administration  adopted  guidelines  to  distinguish 

between fraud and irregularities? 

ALV: In the case of fraud there is the question of intentional conduct according to the 
definition. Do you plan to adopt guidelines and if so, when? D2 EFRO VL: No, no 
specific difference between fraud and irregularities as regards the choice of procedure

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Yes. When have they been updated the last time? 
The definitions of Regulations (EC) Nos 2988/95 and 1083/2006 and the Convention 
of  26  July  1995,  adopted  on  the  basis  of  Article  К3  of  the  Treaty  on  the  European 
Union,  are  applied.  These  are  transposed  in  the  supplementary  provision  of  the 
Regulation  laying  down  the  procedures  for  handling  irregularities  under  funds  and 
programmes co-financed by the EU, the Procedural Manual for the Management and 
Implementation  of  the  Operational  Programmes  and  the  Financial  Management  and 
Control of the Public Sector Act. 
The  Regulation  laying  down  the  procedures  for  handling  irregularities  under  funds 
and programmes co-financed by the EU was last updated by an amendment (SG No 7 
of 21 January 2011). 
The Financial Management and Control of the Public Sector Act was last updated by 
an amendment (SG No 98 of 13 December 2011). 
The Manual of Procedures of the operational programmes was last updated in 2011. 
Yes.  They  form  part  of  the  Methodological  guidance  on  irregularities  and  the 
Methodology of financial flows and the control of programmes co-financed from the 
Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund and the European Fisheries Fund for the 2007-
2013  programming  period.  When  have  they  been  updated  the  last  time?  The 
Methodological guidance on irregularities was last updated in October 2011, and the 
Methodology of financial flows and the control of programmes co-financed from the 
Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund and the European Fisheries Fund for the 2007-
2013 programming period was last updated in January 2011. 
Yes. When were they last updated? 3 November 2000. 

No.The  forms  of  fraud  are  defined  in  the  Penal  Code,  as  are  the  duties  of  public 
officials if they suspect fraud. Irregularities regarding suspected fraud are dealt with 
by  the  interdepartmental  working  group  AFCOS,  on  which  the  State  Prosecutor's 
Office. 
When  were  they  last  updated?  -  The  guidelines  for  notifying  infringements  that 
occurred when using aid (also concerns fraud) were updated in 2010 and reviewed in 
early 2012. Ongoing consultation and cooperation, regular training. 
No. While no specific guidance makes a distinction between fraud and irregularities, 
irregularities  are  covered  comprehensively  in  the  Department  of  Finance  Circular 
12/2008 for EU Structural funds of 21 July 2008. 
N/A 
Yes.  When  have  they  been  updated  the  last  time  ?  Ley  Orgánica  5/2010,  de  22  de 
junio,  por  la  que  se  modifica  la  Ley  Orgánica  10/1995,  de  23  de  noviembre  del 
Código Penal [Organic Law No 5 of 22 June 2010 amending Organic Law No 10 of 
23 November 1995 of the Penal Code] raises the threshold above which fraud against 
public finances is subject to criminal penalties to EUR 120 000. 

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2.1.8.  Has  your  Member  State  administration  adopted  guidelines  to  distinguish 

between fraud and irregularities? 

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The CICC for EU funds (ERDF-ESF-EFF) applies the definition of fraud contained in 
EU  regulations  (Commission  notice  OJ  C  316,  27.11.1995,  p.  49)  (MAJ  No  5, 
September 2000). 
Most  recent  update?  (1)  National  Antifraud  Committee  -  Decision  No  13/2008  on 
"Explanatory  notes  on 
Interministerial  Circular  of  12  October  2007  on 
communication  flows".  (2)  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  and  Finance  -  General 
National Accounts Department - IGRUE, within the Technical Assistance for Regions 
Project under the Convergence objective (IGRUE OP AT), with the assistance of the 
NOP 'GOVERNANCE' and ERDF AT 2007/2013, drew up “Guidelines for managing 
irregularities and recoveries", most recently updated on 29 July 2011. 
Yes - the CA has issued the "Reporting of Irregularities Circular" where a distinction 
has  been  made  between  fraud  and  irregularity and there is specific guidance  for the 
treatment of cases  of fraud  (as far as reporting  is  concerned).  When  have they  been 
updated the last time? Dec 2009 
Yes.  When  have  they  been  updated  the  last  time?  a)  The  Guidelines  for  reporting 
irregularities found in the implementation of EU Funds and for recovery of ineligible 
expenditure  in  the  2007–2013  programming  period,  which  were  updated  on  10 
January  2011,  contain  information  on  what  is  to  be  done  when  RA/LB  suspect  that 
fraud has been committed. Some issues related to cases of fraud are also considered at 
quarterly meetings on irregularities (see the reply under point 2.1.1) and information 
recorded in the minutes of these meetings. Where there is a lack of clarity, the RA/LB 
request  explanations/recommendations  from  the  MA.  b)  The  RA/LB  are  provided 
with  all  the  latest  information  and  explanations  received  from  the  EC/OLAF;  c) 
Unclarified issues in respect of possible suspicion of fraud are discussed at meetings 
of  the  AFCOS  Council  and  at  separate  meetings  with  representatives  of  the  law 
enforcement authorities. 
Yes. When have they been updated the last time?  
The  notion  of  an  irregularity  has  been  defined  in  the  Rules  on  establishing  and 
eliminating irregularities in the use of EU financial assistance, which were approved 
in  Resolution  No  1K-307  of  the  Minister  for  Finance  of  17  October  2005  (Official 
Gazette 2005, No 127-4588). The notion of fraud corresponds to that of a criminal act 
as  laid  down  in  Article  182  of  the  Lithuanian  Criminal  Code  (last  amended  on  28 
June 2007, Official Gazette 2007, No 81-3309). 
Yes. When were they updated last? ESF: Updated regularly. 
The  instructions  issued  in  August  2010  for  notifying  the  Commission  of  the 
irregularities  established  in  the  course  of  using  the  aids  granted  from  the  structural 
funds  in  the  2000-2006  and  the  2007-2013  programming  periods  contain  guidelines 
for  distinguishing  between  irregularities  and  fraud  and  cases  giving  rise  to  the 
suspicion of fraud. 
In  October  2011  a  technical  manual  will  be  issued  for  reporting  irregularities 
concerning aid from the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund  and  the  Cohesion  Fund  in  the  programming  period  2007-2013.  In  order  to 
ensure knowledge of the legal provisions on reporting irregularities, this manual will 
contain  guidelines  on  the  procedures  to  be  followed  in  cases  of  fraud  or  suspected 
fraud. 
Yes. 2008 

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2.1.8.  Has  your  Member  State  administration  adopted  guidelines  to  distinguish 

between fraud and irregularities? 

Yes.  This  distinction  is  made  in  both  the  Management  and  Organisation  policy 
framework  and  the  Irregularities  Management  Plan  (Draaiboek  onregelmatigheden). 
When  have  they  been  updated  the  last  time?  ESF:  Management  and  Organisation 
policy framework 2010; Irregularities Management Plan (Draaiboek) 2008. ERDF: an 
amended version was issued In November 2010; this is currently being updated. 
How do you foresee a coherent application of the definition of fraud vs irregularity? 
Using the Irregularities Management Plan. 
Yes. When have they been updated the last time ? There is an information sheet for 
reporting irregularities, and reporting forms. These are for all administrative bodies. 
The last update was in June 2010 and explains the definitions. 
No.  How  do  you  foresee  a  coherent  application  of  the  definition  of  fraud  vs 
irregularity ? Irregularities are recorded centrally. If there is any confusion as regards 
to the definitions of irregularity and suspected fraud, further information is obtained. 
Do you plan to adopt guidelines and if yes, when ? An amendment of the information 
sheet  is  planned  -  an  adjustment  in  line  with  the  amendments  to  Directive  (EC) 
1828/2006. 
No.  The  distinction  is  clear  from  existing  legislation,  which  indicates  that  action 
should  be  considered  a  crime.  There  are  also  guidance  for  differentiation  and 
classification of suspected cases of irregularity and fraud.  
Yes. Guidelines were adopted on 11 February 2011 with the approval of the Manual 
for reporting irregularities to OLAF (2007-2013 PP). 
When  have  they  been  updated  the  last  time?  -  The  last  update  occurred  on  29  June 
2011,  through  the  adoption  of  Government  Emergency  Order  No  66/2011  on 
preventing, detecting and penalising irregularities in the granting and use of European 
funds  and/or  the  corresponding  national  public  funds.  And  on  15th  of  September 
2011,  through  the  adoption  of  Government  Decision  No  875/2011  approving  the 
implementing  rules  for  Government  Emergency  Order  No  66/2011  on  preventing, 
detecting  and  penalising  irregularities  in  the  granting  and  use  of  European  funds 
and/or the corresponding public funds. 
No.  The  forms  of  fraud  are  defined  in  the  Penal  Code,  as  are  the  duties  of  public 
officials if they suspect fraud. Irregularities regarding suspected fraud are dealt with 
by  the  interdepartmental  working  group  AFCOS,  on  which  the  State  Prosecutor's 
Office and the Criminal Police Administration are also represented. By April 2012 the 
Managing  Authority  intends  to  go  into  more  detail  concerning  this  field  -  and  the 
measures  for  distinguishing  irregularities  and  fraud  -  in  its  instructions  on 
implementing checks under Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006, taking into 
account  the  European  Commission's  updated  document,  'Requirement  to  Report 
Irregularities'.  
Yes. When have they been updated the last time? 1 April 2011. 

Yes.  When  have  they  been  updated  the  last  time?  Internal  guidelines  for  OLAF 
reports adopted on 2011-05-10 (ERDF) 
SG: Yes. There are a number of publications spread across the Scottish Government 
setting  out  the  differences  between  irregularities  and  fraud.  These  include  our 
Management  Control  System,  the  Audit  Manual  and  Desk  Instructions.  In  addition, 
there  are  corporate  guidelines  such  as  the  Scottish  Public  Finance  Manual,  which 
provides guidance on the prevention, detection, reporting and handling of fraud, and 
the Scottish Government also subscribes to the HM Treasury publication: "Managing 

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Member 
State: 

2.1.8.  Has  your  Member  State  administration  adopted  guidelines  to  distinguish 

between fraud and irregularities? 

Fraud  -  a  guide  to  Managers",  which  covers  the  handling  of  fraud  and  financial 
irregularities. DFPNI: Yes 

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2.1.9.  How often do you audit the reporting of suspected fraud to OLAF? 

Every year 
ALV: Fraud is a permanent feature in the European Fisheries Fund annual audit, but 
is  yet  to  crop  up  during  the  reference  period.  Never  CAIF,  ESF,  FSED,  ERDF 
Brussels Capital Region 
Annually 
AFCOS now has an ‘Administrative Control’ sector, which performs administrative 
checks on the handling of irregularities under EU funds and programmes by means of 
ex ante and ex post checks under pre-established plans for the year in question. For 
2011  22  checks  were  planned,  of  which  14  had  been  carried  out  at  30  September 
2011. 
Never. 

Bi-annually 
Twice  a  year  -  The  MA  performs  such  an  audit  four  times  a  year,  during  which  it 
evaluates and checks the information presented at quarterly meetings on irregularities 
and takes the relevant decisions. 
Never:  Reports  are  sent  to  OLAF  by  AFCOS  Estonia  which  checks  all  reports  on 
infringements sent to it by the implementing body. The activities of AFCOS Estonia 
were assessed by Sigma in 2004. The obligation to inform the implementing body of 
any  infringements  was  assessed  as  part  of  the  audit  of  management  and  control 
systems, but the area as a whole was not audited. 
Annually - Yes 
Less frequently (SDOE). 
Never 
During systems audits, the CICC verifies whether irregularities of more than EUR 10 
000 (EU funds) have been notified to OLAF. 
Half-yearly  (Region  of  Basilicata,  Bolzano  Autonomous  Province,  Ministry  of 
Economic Devlopment) 
Annually (by the Internal Audit Service) 
Annually 
Annually (ESF) ; Less frequently (ERDF) 
Twice  a  year  (the  quarterly  irregularity  reports  contain  these  data.  The  Managing 
Authorities and Intermediate Bodies review the reports every quarter). 
Twice  a  year  -  The  MA  performs  such  an  audit  four  times  a  year,  during  which  it 
evaluates and checks the information presented at quarterly meetings on irregularities 
and takes the relevant decisions. 

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Member 
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BE 

2.1.9.  How often do you audit the reporting of suspected fraud to OLAF? 

Less frequently: As part of the system audit 

Never. So far there has never been a report of suspected fraud. 
N/A 

Annually 
Annually - When it audits the certifying authorities for the 2007-2013 programming 
period,  IGF  checks  whether  all  cases  of  irregularity  and  suspected  fraud  subject  to 
reporting  requirements  that  have  been  detected  during  management  and  audit 
procedures  have  been  communicated  to  IGF  so  that  it  can  meet  its  reporting 
obligations  in  full.  Quarterly  -  Checks  are  done  every  quarter  when  IGF  (OLAF's 
contact  point  in  this  connection)  sends  each  certifying  authority  an  overall  list  of 
cases  reported  to  OLAF.  Less  frequently  -  When  it  audits  the  management  and 
control systems for the 2007-2013 OPs, IGF checks for each OP whether it has been 
informed of all cases of irregularity and suspected fraud, detected during management 
and  audit  procedures,  that  have  to  be  reported  to  OLAF.  IGF  also  sends  each 
certifying authority the IMS export files showing which cases have been reported, so 
that they can see the state-of-play at OLAF (e.g. cases closed after confirmation by 
managing DG that the expenditure has been withdrawn from certification to the EC). 
Annually - during audit missions carried out at the relevant authorities and quarterly 
during the process of reporting irregularities, as well as whenever necessary. 
Annually  

Annually - Quarterly 

Annually.  As  the  managing  authority  in  Slovenia  the  SVLR  reports  annually  but  in 
some cases more frequently e.g. twice a year. Less frequently. In line with the audit 
strategy of the independent audit authority, a horizontal audit of how irregularities are 
dealt with is carried out every seven years. 
Annually Follow up reported cases with OLAF, further develop procedures (ERDF, 
ESF) 
Annually:  WG  -  Reporting  of  suspected  frauds  would  be  undertaken  as  these  are 
identified.  Less  frequently:  SG  -  We  have  logged  the  need  to  cover  this  and  have 
included  in  our  long  term  plan  a  review  of  the  adequacy  and  robustness  of  the 
management, control an operational systems to prevent, detect and investigate fraud. 
DFPNI: Less Frequently. DWP - Never 

2.1.10.  How  often  trainings  have  been  given  to  staff  dealing  with  reporting  of 

suspected fraud to OLAF? 

COMMENT: This question should be rephrased as follows: how often do staff who 
mention fraud when reporting irregularities to OLAF follow training courses? Once a 
new case is entered in the opinion modules, the individuals concerned are invited by 
OLAF  to  update  their  training  and  documentation.  This  information  is  then 
transmitted  internally  to  officials  on  the  ground  through  specific  training  (see  the 
'train the trainers' principle). Every year 
ESF: Yearly 'train the trainers' seminar organised by OLAF. 
FSEBRU: Every year 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: Less frequently ALV. Never 

EN 

103 

   EN 

 
 
Member 
State: 

2.1.10.  How  often  trainings  have  been  given  to  staff  dealing  with  reporting  of 

suspected fraud to OLAF? 

ALV 
FSED 

BG 

CZ 

DK 
DE 
EE 

IE 
EL 
ES 
FR 

IT 

CY 
LT 
LU 
HU 

LV 

MT 

NL 
AT 

PL 

PT 

Bi-annually. Training is provided to newly-appointed staff dealing with irregularities 
and, when new modules are introduced in the IMS system, working meetings are held 
with officers in charge of irregularities of all managing authorities, at which reporting 
of irregularities is discussed, information about the latest developments is given and 
methodical assistance is provided on specific cases. 
Bi-annually. Training is provided to newly-appointed staff dealing with irregularities 
and, when new modules are introduced in the IMS system, working meetings are held 
with officers in charge of irregularities of all managing authorities, at which reporting 
of irregularities is discussed, information about the latest developments is given and 
methodical assistance is provided on specific cases. 
Less frequently 
Twice a year  
Annually: OLAF is notified by AFCOS Estonia (OLAF's official partner in Estonia) 
and  only  OLAF  provides  the  officials  working  for  AFCOS  Estonia  with  training 
(AFCOS Round Table Meeting). There are too few training sessions, discussions and 
meetings. 
Annually - Yes 
Less frequently 
Never 
CICC  EU  funds  (ERDF-ESF-EFF):  yearly  (auditors  seminar,  100  participants 
annually) 
Yearly by e-learning (Guardia di Finanza) 

Less frequently 
Annually 
Bi-annually (ESF) but not specifically with OLAF in mind. Less frequently (ERDF). 
Twice  a  year  (in  cooperation  with  the  National  Tax  and  Customs  Office's  OLAF 
Coordination Office) 
Twice  a  year  -  Training  is  organised  as  required.  Staff  also  participate  in  training 
organised by the EC/OLAF. Information is entered in the EC/OLAF IMS system in 
line  with  EC/OLAF  guidelines.  The  EC/OLAF  clarify  issues  which  are  unclear  and 
the  AA/CA  are  informed  thereof.  These  issues  are  also  examined  at  quarterly 
meetings on irregularities (i.e. all irregularities, not just those reported to EC/OLAF). 
Annually 

Never. 
Never.  We  cannot  answer  this,  as  owing  to  Austria's  federal  structure  the 
administration  and  control  system  is  decentralised  and  each  department  can 
implement basic and further training measures at its own discretion. 
Less  frequently*  -  (or  more  frequently)  training  is  organised  as  the  need  arises  for 
staff to be made aware of new or amended legislation 
Less frequently.  

EN 

104 

   EN 

 
Member 
State: 

RO 

SI 

SK 

FI 

SE 

UK 

2.1.10.  How  often  trainings  have  been  given  to  staff  dealing  with  reporting  of 

suspected fraud to OLAF? 

Less frequently. 

Annually. Continuously. Staff regularly take part in meetings organised by OLAF, by 
the European Commission and by the Council (GAF) concerning the protection of the 
EU's  financial  interests.  Staff  also  attend  regular  conferences  on  public  internal 
financial control, the prevention of fraud and corruption and the EU budget organised 
by  the  Budget  Supervision  Office  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia,  the  Anti-Corruption 
Commission, the Audit Court and the EU Representation, etc. 
Annually: At least once a year 

Less frequently. 

Annually  

Annually:  WG;  SG  -  (this  is  the  best  fit  classification  from  the  options  available)  - 
Internal Audit Division's training tends to be undertaken on an ongoing basis topped 
up with ad-hoc events etc. Staff have been provided with fraud training as part of the 
professional syllabus set by the Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors. In addition, 
individual  staff  have  attended  specific  fraud  training  sessions  and  all  staff  involved 
with  EC  business  receive  guidance  on  OLAF  requirements  as  part  of  the  induction 
process. Less frequently DFPNI. DWP - Never 

EN 

105 

   EN 

 
 
2.2. 

Statistical elements 

Member 
State: 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  [3]  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  [4]  until  the  end  of  2011,  related  to  projects  financed 
under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area: 

BE 

ESF-VL: 318 Art. 4 Reg. 438/2001 - 549 Art. 10 Reg. 438/2001 
ESF: Article 4 (on-the-spot checks by managing authority): 2 346 
Art. 9 = 372 project audits 
Art. 10 = 69 system + project audits 
Total = 2 787 FSED: 12 
D2 EFRO VL: 440 (Art. 4) 
54 (Art. 9) 16 (Art. 10) 
510 
ERDF Wallonia: The information will be notified at a later date.  
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 90 
FSE BRU:  
Managing authority:  
- administrative controls: 852 - on-the-spot checks 624 
Paying authority: 
- administrative controls: 36 
- on-the-spot inspections: 1 
Audit authority: 
- administrative controls: 25 
- on-the-spot checks: 25 
TOTAL: 1563 
Interreg IVA France-Wallonia-Flanders  
Wallonia-Brussels International (WBI):  
Art. 4: 25 
Art. 9: 4 
Art. 10: 49 
CAIF Wallonia: On-the-spot checks under Article 4 of Reg. 428/2001 - to be notified by Mr Boreux for the ERDF and Ms Rober for the 
ESF. Controls (not necessarily on the spot) under Article 9 of Regulation 428/2001 carried out by paying authorities, namely the DAFE for 

EN 

106 

EN 

 
  
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  [3]  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  [4]  until  the  end  of  2011,  related  to  projects  financed 
under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area: 

the ERDF and FIFG, the SGAQ for the ESF, and the CAFF for the EAGGF (CAIF estimate for the four structural funds 2000-2006, based 
on closure statements): 1256 
On-the-spot checks under Article 10 of Reg. 438/2001 (carried out by the CAIF on the ERDF and ESF): 156 
On-the-spot checks under Article 62(1)(b) of Reg. 1083/2006 (carried out by the DAFE, associate body of the audit authority, or by the 
CAIF for the ERDF)/ 
On-the-spot checks under Article 62(1)(b) of Reg. 1083/2006 (carried out by the SGAQ, associate body of the audit authority, for the ESF) / 
ESF-VL: 0 
OCRC (Central Corruption Office): 0 for fraud relating to projects financed with Cohesion Policy funds. (Other EU files: 6) 
ESF: 0 
FSED: 1 
D2 EFRO VL: 2 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0 
CAIF Wallonia: 
ESF-VL: 0 
OCRC: 0 
ESF: 0 
D2 EFRO VL: 1 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0 

ESF-VL: 147 OTSC MA - 108 OTSC AA 
CAIF: Wallonia region: on-the-spot checks by the audit authority (DAFE, associate body of the CAIF for the ERDF) under Art. 62(1)(b) of 
Reg. 1083/2006: 28 checks in 2010 and 28 in 2011. 
Wallonia region: on-the-spot checks by the audit authority (SGAQ, associate body of the CAIF for the ERDF) under Art. 62(1)(b) of Reg. 
1083/2006: 28 checks in 2010 and 15 in 2011. 
ESF: Art. 60 = 111 on-the-spot checks completed 
Art. 62 = 21 project audits + 
7 system audits 
FSED: 15 

EN 

107 

EN 

 
  
 
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  [3]  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  [4]  until  the  end  of  2011,  related  to  projects  financed 
under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area: 

D2 EFRO VL: 
14 on-the-spot checks 
68 audit checks 
82 
ERDF Wallonia: The information will be notified at a later date. » 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 93 at 31.12.2010 
FSE BRU:  
Managing authority:  
- administrative controls: 284  
- on-the-spot checks 256 
Paying authority: 
- administrative controls: 19 
- on-the-spot checks:  
Audit authority: 
- administrative controls: 28 
- on-the-spot check: 28 
TOTAL: 615 
Interreg IVA France-Wallonia-Flanders 
Wallonia-Brussels International (WBI):  
First-level on-the-spot check: 35 
Checks by the certifying authority: 19 
Operation audits (or second-level checks): 22 
CAIF:  
On-the-spot checks under Article  62(1)(b) of Reg. 1083/2006 (carried out by the DAFE, associate body of the audit authority, or by the 
CAIF for the ERDF): 76 
On-the-spot checks under Article 62(1)(b) of Reg. 1083/2006 (carried out by the SGAQ, associate body of the audit authority, for the ESF): 
24 
ESF-VL: 0 

EN 

108 

EN 

 
  
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  [3]  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  [4]  until  the  end  of  2011,  related  to  projects  financed 
under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area: 

OCRC (Central Corruption Office): 0 for fraud relating to projects financed with Cohesion Policy funds. (Other EU files: 6) 
ESF: 0 
FSED: 1 
D2 EFRO VL: 2 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0 
CAIF Wallonia: 
ESF-VL: 0 
OCRC: 0 
ESF: 0 
D2 EFRO VL: 1 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0 

ESF-VL: 147 OTSC MA - 108 OTSC AA 
CAIF: Wallonia region: on-the-spot checks by the audit authority (DAFE, associate body of the CAIF for the ERDF) under Art. 62(1)(b) of 
Reg. 1083/2006: 28 checks in 2010 and 28 in 2011. 
Wallonia region: on-the-spot checks by the audit authority (SGAQ, associate body of the CAIF for the ERDF) under Art. 62(1)(b) of Reg. 
1083/2006: 28 checks in 2010 and 15 in 2011. 
ESF: Art. 60 = 111 on-the-spot checks completed 
Art. 62 = 21 project audits + 
7 system audits 
FSED: 15 
D2 EFRO VL: 
14 on-the-spot checks 
68 audit checks 
82 
ERDF Wallonia: The information will be notified at a later date. » 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 93 at 31.12.2010 
FSE BRU:  

EN 

109 

EN 

 
  
 
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  [3]  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  [4]  until  the  end  of  2011,  related  to  projects  financed 
under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area: 

Managing authority:  
- administrative controls: 284  
- on-the-spot checks 256 
Paying authority: 
- administrative controls: 19 
- on-the-spot checks:  
Audit authority: 
- administrative controls: 28 
- on-the-spot check: 28 
TOTAL: 615 
Interreg IVA France-Wallonia-Flanders 
Wallonia-Brussels International (WBI):  
First-level on-the-spot check: 35 
Checks by the certifying authority: 19 
Operation audits (or second-level checks): 22 
CAIF:  
On-the-spot checks under Article  62(1)(b) of Reg. 1083/2006 (carried out by the DAFE, associate body of the audit authority, or by the 
CAIF for the ERDF): 76 
On-the-spot checks under Article 62(1)(b) of Reg. 1083/2006 (carried out by the SGAQ, associate body of the audit authority, for the ESF): 
24 
ESF-VL: 0 
OCRC: 0 for fraud relating to projects financed with Cohesion Policy funds. (Other EU files: 9) 
ESF: 0 
FSED: 0 
D2 EFRO VL: 0 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0 
police – 2420 police investigations; the number of investigations may not be broken down per fund as they are classified in accordance with 
the Criminal Code; 

110 

EN 

BG 

EN 

 
  
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  [3]  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  [4]  until  the  end  of  2011,  related  to  projects  financed 
under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area: 

audits – 247;  
Managing Authorities – 200. 

criminal proceedings under all EU funds and instruments for the 2007-2010 period–1709; 
case files of the prosecution authority under the Structural and Cohesion Funds–392; 
pre-trial proceedings under the Structural and Cohesion Funds–192. 
concluded criminal proceedings with a court decision under all EU funds and programmes for the 2007-2010 period – 213; 
concluded criminal proceedings with a court decision under the Structural and Cohesion Funds for the 2008-2011 period – 32. 
N/A 
No investigations are carried out, specifically for the detection of fraud, but in general for the detection of irregularities. The verifications 
are carried out by the Intermediate Bodies for every expenditure claim submitted by the Beneficiaries (100% document check) and also on-
the-spot technical checks in frequent intervals. Furthermore, verifications, review and audits are carried out by the Managing Authority, the 
No investigations are carried out, specifically for the detection of fraud, 
Certifying Authority and the Audit Authority. 
but in general for the detection of irregularities. The verifications are carried out by the Intermediate Bodies for every expenditure claim 
submitted  by  the  Beneficiaries  (100%  document  check)  and  also  on-the-spot  technical  checks  in  frequent  intervals.  Furthermore, 
verifications, review and audits are carried out by the Managing Authority, the Certifying Authority and the Audit Authority.  0 

0 

0 

0

No  investigations  are  carried  out,  specifically  for  the  detection  of  fraud,  but  in  general  for  the  detection  of  irregularities.  The 
verifications are carried out by the Intermediate Bodies for every expenditure claim submitted by the Beneficiaries (100% document check) 
and also on-the-spot technical checks in frequent intervals. Furthermore, verifications, review and audits are carried out by the Managing 
Authority, the Certifying Authority and the Audit Authority. 
10 3 3 394 10 2 404 13 5 

0 

0 

All projects receiving aid are subject to administrative checks.  
All projects are checked by an external auditor.  
Article 4 checks for the Regional Fund have checked more than 15% of the external costs, corresponding to 58 checks. Article 4 checks for 
the Social Fund have checked 100% of the status reports submitted, including annexes, and more than 15% of projects have been checked 
on-the-spot. 
3 cases of criminal investigations or anti-fraud criminal investigations. 

111 

EN 

CY 

CZ 

DK 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  [3]  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  [4]  until  the  end  of  2011,  related  to  projects  financed 
under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area: 

3 finalised cases of court proceedings with court decision 
All projects receiving aid are subject to administrative checks. 
All projects are checked by a central auditor.  
The managing authority's target for the programme period is to carry out verification visits under the Regional Fund and the Social Fund 
concerning at least 10% of the commitments made. So far 41 verification visits have been carried out for the programme period 2007-2013. 
To our knowledge, there have been no criminal investigations or anti-fraud criminal investigations 
No finalised cases of court proceedings with court decision 

All projects receiving aid are subject to administrative checks.  
All projects are subject to external control. 
Projects selected are subject to checks by the managing authority. 
3 cases of criminal investigations or anti-fraud criminal investigations 
3 finalised cases of court proceedings with court decision 
55 

11 

13 

13 

19 

68 

6 

7 

4 

EE 

ES 

3 

13 

N/A 

1 

N/A 

4 

13 

N/A 

DE 

0 / 3 / 1 / 6 / 21 / 0 / 24 / 1 
In  investigations  into  administrative  fraud  the  MA  and  AB  are  not  treated  separately.  The  possibility  of  cases  of  fraud  is  checked  by 
performing  on-the-spot  checks,  payment  claim  checks,  preliminary  procurement  checks  and  sample  checks  of  systems  audits  and 
expenditure.  If  suspicion  arises,  additional  checks  are  carried  out  and,  where  necessary,  a  report  lodged  with  the  law  enforcement 
authorities. 

EN 

112 

EN 

 
  
 
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  [3]  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  [4]  until  the  end  of  2011,  related  to  projects  financed 
under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area: 

EL 

SDOE : 21 ; EDEL : 928 
SDOE:7 

N/A 

SDOE : 6 

N/A  SDOE : 20 ; EDEL : 299 

SDOE : 1 

N/A  SDOE 

:  41 

;  EDEL 

:  1227

HU 

N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 

IE 

FI 

FR 

5 separate investigations relating to a suspicion of fraud in a single area. 
1/0/ 5 separate investigations relating to a suspicion of fraud in a single area. / 2 /0 / 5 separate investigations relating to a suspicion of fraud 
in a single area. 3/0  

Projects verified on the spot pursuant to Article 4: 11 124 in total for the ERDF and 2 969 for the ESF.  7 
3: S00349, S00782, S00509 
(also 3 cases where the charges were waived: S00190,S82769, S01595)  Administrative  verifications  carried  out  on  all  applications  for 
payment. Total number of Article 13 on-the-spot verifications carried out: 2 215 for the ERDF and 671 for the ESF.  N/A  N/A  On-
the-spot verifications: 13 339 for the ERDF and 3 640 for the ESF. 7 
Structural Funds 
In  accordance  with  Article  10  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  438/2001  at  least  5%  of  expenditure  declared  to  the  European  Commission  was 
checked. 
As indicated above, CICC audits and controls do not specifically constitute anti-fraud investigations. Structural funds 
Audit of transactions (Reg (EC) No 1828/2006, Articles 16 and 17) 
- 2009: 13 audits 
- 2010: 253 audits 
- 2011: 405 audits 
Number of systems audits: 6 audit missions per year and per fund and one or two follow-up audit missions for systems audits per year. 
The CICC is aware of one finalised proceeding (not guilty) 
Preparation underway 

3 

EN 

113 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  [3]  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  [4]  until  the  end  of  2011,  related  to  projects  financed 
under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area: 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

AT 

23.788 2006  data collection underway 

591 

559 

data collection underway 

26.944 data collection underway 

488 

53 

N/A 

941 

7 

N/A 

1429  60 

N/A 

N/A  N/A 

N/A  N/A 

"ERDF: Audit authority: 4 (into irregularities, incl. fraud) 

"ERDF: Audit authority: 10 (into irregularities, incl. fraud) 

"ERDF: Audit authority: 6 (into irregularities, incl. fraud) 
Managing authority: 83 (into irregularities, incidentally into fraud) 
ESF: 190" 
Managing authority: 50+ (into irregularities, incidentally into fraud) 
ESF: 90" 
Managing authority: 133+ (into irregularities, incidentally into fraud) 
ESF: 280" 
without distinction; the first statistics date from 2008) 
In  investigations  into  administrative  fraud  the  MA  and  AB  are  not  treated  separately.  The 
/ 
possibility  of  cases  of  fraud  is  checked  by  performing  on-the-spot  checks,  payment  claim  checks,  preliminary  procurement  checks  and 
sample checks of systems audits and expenditure. If suspicion arises, additional checks are carried out and, where necessary, a report lodged 
with the law enforcement authorities. 24 
2 Administrative Investigations 

19 (EU and non-EU together without distinction; the first statistics date from 2008) 

2 Administrative Investigations 

(EU  and  non-EU 

1 
N/A 

together 

N/A 

N/A 

21 

19 

3 

6 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

/ 

2 investigations in 2006 relating to 1 exporter 

2 

2, guilty 

0 

0 

0 

2 

2 

2 

Anmerkung: Approximately 127 861 measures (all programmes) were implemented - after it was provided for in the Austrian system that 
an  administrative  check  (usually  encompassing  all  documents)  had  to  be  made  before  every  payment  to  a  recipient,  all  projects  were 
checked at least once and some (particularly EQUAL) were checked several times because of interim financial statements. Giving all the 
details  here  would  entail  an  excessive  administrative  burden.  It  can  be  assumed  that  approximately  128  150  administrative  checks  were 
carried out.  The relevant data must be extracted from the OLAF database. As an MS not all evaluation possibilities are available - 2 cases 

EN 

114 

EN 

 
  
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  [3]  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  [4]  until  the  end  of  2011,  related  to  projects  financed 
under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area: 

PL 
PT 

RO 

SI 

SK 

were identified in the IMS. One case has been entered in OLAF's AFIS/IMS system for the FIFG programme.  Proceedings  ongoing.  For 
"57 460 FLC cases (employment OP), measures checked acc. expenditure declaration 
the FIFG case the proceedings are still ongoing. 
up  to  and  including  first  quarter  of  2011;  2  655  FLC  cases  (Phasing  Out  OP),  measures  checked  acc.  expenditure  declaration  up  to  and 
including second quarter of 2011;  
In  total  approximately  320  EFF  projects  have  been  subjected  to  100%  document  checks  and  on-the-spot  controls  under  the  FLC.  The 
checking rate for second level controls is approximately 70% document checks and on-the-spot checks." "One  case  for  the  ERDF  has  been 
entered in the IMS.  
No case has been entered for the EFF." 
11 
177 
482 
0 
6917  107 

All proceedings still ongoing. 
265 
766 
9630  112 

284 
2713  5 

60 
30 

49 
30 

88 

N/A  N/A 

Not applicable in the case of Romania 
" - The reply under heading 2.2 refers only to investigations carried out by the 
Anti-Fraud Department (DLAF) and does not include checks performed by the Managing Authorities, the audit authorities, etc., as agreed at 
the COCOLAF meeting of 18 October 2011. 
-DLAF has carried out 56 anti-fraud administrative investigations." 
In total, in the period 2003-2011 there were 1 371 cases of anti-fraud investigations carried out by the National Anticorruption Directorate 
through its head office and its 15 local departments. According to the National Anticorruption Directorate, in the period 2003-2011 there 
were 61 criminal cases ended with final sentences relating to 94 defendants. 
0 
0 

N/A 

4 

4 

4 

0 

4 

0 

0 

"78: Of this number, 54 inspections/audits were conducted by the audit and financial control authorities, six by the anti-fraud coordination 
service (AFCOS) and 18 by the regulatory authorities and their subordinate intermediate bodies.  
(Note:  In  two  cases  the  law-enforcement  authorities  reported  suspected  criminal  activity;  of  the  number  indicated,  12  inspections/audits 
were conducted in 2011)" 
"70:  Of  this  number,  15  inspections/audits  were  conducted  were  conducted  by  the  audit  and 
financial  control  authorities,  three  by  the  anti-fraud  coordination  service  (AFCOS),  one  by  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  and  51  by  the 
regulatory authorities and their subordinate intermediate bodies. 
(Note:  In  five  cases  the  law-enforcement  authorities  reported  suspected  criminal  activity;  of  the  number  indicated,  41  inspections/audits 
148:  Of  this  number,  69  inspections/audits  were  conducted  were  conducted  by  the  audit  and 
were conducted in 2011)" 

132 

54 

93 

48 

EN 

115 

EN 

 
  
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.1.  Performed  anti-fraud  investigations  [3]  and  finalised  criminal  proceedings  [4]  until  the  end  of  2011,  related  to  projects  financed 
under the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 in Cohesion Policy area: 

SE 

UK 

financial  control  authorities,  nine  by  the  anti-fraud  coordination  service  (AFCOS),  69  by  the  regulatory  authorities  and  their subordinate 
intermediate bodies and one by the Supreme Audit Office.(Note: In seven cases the law-enforcement authorities reported suspected criminal 
activity; of the number indicated, 53 inspections/audits were conducted in 2011)  225 (Note: the data are processed according to the time of 
the offence)  102 (Note: the number indicated represents court verdicts in which the offender was found guilty) 
"166 preliminary investigations launched. (All figures relate to criminal investigations and judgments handed down concerning EU 
N/A 
funds as a whole. There are no figures for the Structural Funds alone, so it is not possible to report on this. Similarly, court judgments are 
not broken down in this way either.  
The statistics do not indicate which programme period cases relate to either. This means that a preliminary investigation launched in 2007, 
for example, may relate to resources that date from the 2000-2006 programme period. The figures reported therefore relate only to the total 
number of preliminary investigations launched and judgments handed down.)" 
SG:1; WG: 0; DWP: 13; DFPNI: 0; DCLG: 32; MMO/DEFRA: 2[FIFG]  SG:  1;  WG:  0;  DFPNI:  10  (PEACE  II)  DWP:  5;  DCLG:  2; 
MMO/DEFRA: 2 [FIFG]  WG:  0,  SG:  1;  DWP:  1;  DFPNI:  1(PEACE  III)  RESULTED  IN  Court  action  -  fine  imposed;  DCLG:  2; 
WG, SG: 0; DFPNI: 3 (PEACE III) DWP: 
SG: 0; WG: 0; DWP - 0; DFPNI - 0; DCLG: 3; MMO/DEFRA: N/A 
MMO/DEFRA: 0 
0; DCLG: 0; MMO/DEFRA: N/A  UK: 0  SG: 1; WG: 0; DWP: 13, DFPNI: 0; DCLG: 35; MMO/DEFREA: 2 
SG:  1;  WG:  0; 
DFPNI 13 (PEACE II & III), DWP: 5; DCLG: 2; MMO/DEFRA: 2 

WG: 0, SG: 1; DWP: 1; DFPNI: 1; DCLG: 2; MMO/DEFRA: 0 

42 judgments or summary punishment orders 

Member 
State: 

2.2.2. Amounts recovered in relation to anti-fraud investigations pertaining to programming period 2000-2006 and 2007-2013: 
Amounts recovered (excluding financial penalties and interests)  Amounts of financial penalties  

"ESF-VL: 0 
OCRC: 0 
ESF: see annex 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 10 018.86 (in irregularities) 
" 
OCRC: 0 
ESF: 0" 
OCRC: 0 

"ESF-VL: 0 

"ESF-VL: 0 

BE 

EN 

116 

EN 

 
  
 
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.2. Amounts recovered in relation to anti-fraud investigations pertaining to programming period 2000-2006 and 2007-2013: 
Amounts recovered (excluding financial penalties and interests)  Amounts of financial penalties  

"ESF-VL: 0 

"ESF-VL: 0 

ESF: see annex. The system for entering certified data has been changed: only ESF and PPB (Belgian public authority) to be declared (for 
the amounts the PPB was not confined to the ESF to reach the 50% level) 
FSED: 0 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0 at this stage 
" 
OCRC: 0 
ESF: 0 
FSED: 0" 
OCRC: 0 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 10 018.86"  "ESF-VL: 0 
OCRC: 0 
ESF: 0 
" 
N/A  BGN 2 857 658.79  BGN 11 344 976.74  N/A 
During the PP2000-2006, there was one case identified that related to fraud, involving an amount of €5.000 (public contribution). Due to 
the fact that the "Withdrawals" method (instead of the "Recoveries" method) is used in Cyprus, amounts are immediately withdrawn from 
the  Payment  Application  to  the  EC  and  thus  the  EU  funds  are  safeguarded.  As  regards  the  recovery  of  national  funds,  this  is  the 
responsibility of each Intermediate Body (body granting the aid). 
CZK 400 000  CZK 65 727  CZK 65 727  CZK 400 000 

Payments for the Regional Fund have been recovered amounting to EUR 934 172.57, EU CONTRIBUTION. There has not been any need 
for recovery with regard to the Social Fund, as all irregularities were corrected before payments were made. 
Payments  for  the  Regional 
Fund have been recovered amounting to EUR 934 172.57, EU CONTRIBUTION. There has not been any need for recovery with regard to 
the Social Fund, as all irregularities were corrected before payments were made. A procedure was followed for the Social Fund 2000-2006 
programming period with regard to drawing up ESF accounts for the European Commission. In cases where a project incurred expenditure 
that  could  not  be  approved,  the  project  was  not  included  in  the  accounts  in  its  entirety.  Once  the  project  had  been  corrected  so  that  the 
expenditure could be approved, it was again included in the accounts. For this reason, Article 8 reports have shown DKK 0.00. Repayments 
to the Regional Fund and the Social Fund until now total EUR 39 434.68, EU CONTRIBUTION Repayments to the Regional Fund and the 
Social Fund until now total EUR 39 434.68, EU CONTRIBUTION 

117 

EN 

BG 
CY 

CZ 

DK 

EN 

 
  
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.2. Amounts recovered in relation to anti-fraud investigations pertaining to programming period 2000-2006 and 2007-2013: 
Amounts recovered (excluding financial penalties and interests)  Amounts of financial penalties  

Repayments to the Regional Fund and the Social Fund until now total EUR 973 607.25, EU CONTRIBUTION  Repayments 
Regional Fund and the Social Fund until now total EUR 973 607.25, EU CONTRIBUTION 

to 

the 

EE 

ES 

EL 

FI 

FR 

HU 

IE 

2.500.713,04  12.782,00 

521.032,00 

0,00 

3.021.725,04  0,00 

14.862.669  N/A 

178.679 

N/A 

15.041.348  N/A 

N/A 

€ 22 962 782 (including interest) 
covering all types of funding) / 
Not notified 

Damages - € 7 591 (S00349)  € 1 557 364.09 (TUKI2000 and EURA data, figure includes corrections 
€ 24 520 146.09 

€ 7 591 (damages) 

Criminal  proceedings  are  under  way  and  therefore  data  are  not  available  yet.  Related  to  the  financial  penalties:  In  Hungary  financial 
penalties can be imposed only by criminal authorities during the criminal procedure, but data are not available the sum of these penalties. 
currently unquantified amounts included in an overall negative adjustment to EU claims (see note 1 below) 
currently unquantified amounts included in an overall negative adjustment to EU claims (see note 1 below) 
currently unquantified amounts included in an overall negative adjustment to EU claims (see note 1 below) 

€31,343 
€31,343 

plus 
plus 

0 
0 
0 

IT 

493 924 148.14 (figure subject to variation)  306 655.66 (figure subject to variation) 

22 729 695.5 (figure subject to variation) 

0

516 653 843.64 (figure subject to variation; figure does not include the total value of property seizures by the Guardia di Finanza in 

the context of criminal proceedings, which is € 322 181 684.00) 

306 655.66 (figure subject to variation) 

LT 

LU 

EN 

3.071.308,00  10.369.197,00 1.426.258 

3.506.113,00  4.497.566,00  13.875.310,00 

"(ERDF) Fraud: 0 
Irregularities: €44 000 (ESF) Objective 3: €5 240 370.56 
Equal: €321 710.03"  N/A 

"(ERDF) Fraud: 0 

118 

EN 

 
  
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.2. Amounts recovered in relation to anti-fraud investigations pertaining to programming period 2000-2006 and 2007-2013: 
Amounts recovered (excluding financial penalties and interests)  Amounts of financial penalties  

Irregularities: 0 (ESF) 229 719.14"  N/A 
Irregularities: €44 000 (ESF): 5 791 799.73" N/A 

"(ERDF) Fraud: 0 

Amounts involved €133,000. Recovery was not applicable as amounts had neither yet been paid nor certified to the EU. 0 

€ 533.250,00  unknown 

0 

0 

€ 533.250,00  unknown 

see above - AFIS/IMS evaluation  N/A  See above - AFIS/IMS evaluation  N/A 

PLN 2 525 083.42 

PLN 143 528.83 

PLN 10 659 774.38  PLN 834 239.67 

PLN 13 184 857.80  PLN 977 768.50 

530468057  N/A 

67105720 

N/A 

597573777  N/A 

N/A  As a result of DLAF's investigations, the Managing Authorities made administrative recoveries amounting to EUR 76 895 N/A 
N/A 
0 The suspected criminal activities/fraud reported to the authorities responsible have not yet been the subject of a final judgment 
"EUR 441863.17  
€ 4064.25 of this amount were returned in 2011" 
0 
€ 1 501 961.76 of this amount were returned in 2011" 
(Note: this amount consists of funds from the EU budget and not from the Slovak budget) 0 
SG:0; WG: 0; DFPNI: €1,050,000(PEACE II), DWP: N/K  WG, SG:0, DWP: N/K; MMO/DEFRA: 0  SG:0;  WG:  0;  DFPNI:  €632,272 
WG, SG:0, DWP: 0; MMO/DEFRA: N/A  SG:0;  WG:  0,  DFPNI:  €1,050,000  (excluding  pending)
(PEACE III) pending, DWP: 0 

EUR 1 951 783.8. € 1 506 026.01 of this amount were returned in 2011 

"EUR 1 509 920,63  
0 

WG, SG:0; DWP: 0; MMO/DEFRA: 0 

2.2.3. Personnel assigned and involved in anti-fraud investigations: 

2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Total 

119 

EN 

MT 

NL 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 
SE 
SI 
SK 

UK 

Member 
State: 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Member 
State: 

BE 

BG 

EN 

2.2.3. Personnel assigned and involved in anti-fraud investigations: 

"OCRC: approx. 7 

"OCRC: approx. 7 

"OCRC: approx. 7 

"OCRC: approx. 7 

2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Total 
"OCRC: approx. 7 
ESF: Art. 60 = 6 FTE on-the-spot checks 
FSED: 3 
D2 EFRO VL: 3 FTE 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0" 
ESF: Art. 60 = 6 FTE on-the-spot checks 
FSED: 3 
D2 EFRO VL: 3 FTE 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0" 
ESF: Art. 60 = 6 FTE on-the-spot checks 
FSED: 3 
D2 EFRO VL: 3 FTE 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0" 
ESF: Art. 60 = 6 FTE on-the-spot checks 
FSED: 3 
D2 EFRO VL: 3 FTE 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0" 
ESF: Art. 60 = 6 FTE on-the-spot checks 
FSED: 3 
D2 EFRO VL: 3 FTE 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0" 
ESF: Art. 60 = 6 FTE on-the-spot checks 
FSED: 
3 
ERDF Brussels Capital Region: 0 
" 
17 

N/A 

64 

66 

48 

73 

"OCRC: Here we are referring to full time equivalents and not physical persons: between 30 and 35 

120 

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Member 
State: 

2.2.3. Personnel assigned and involved in anti-fraud investigations: 

CY 

CZ 

DK 

DE 

EE 

ES 

FI 

EL 

2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Total 
N/A - see explanation above   

15 

16 

16 

17 

17 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

56 

55 
prosecutor, except in cases where an investigation team is established. 

57 

62 

63 

293 - In addition, at the Prosecutor General's Office criminal proceedings are conducted by a single 

51 

52 

45 

44 

25 

217 

6 

150 person-years (Source: 'Cost of controls' report ERDF plus 50% (estimated ESF share)) 
controls' report ERDF plus 50% (estimated ESF share)) 
ESF share)) 
'Cost of controls' report ERDF plus 50% (estimated ESF share)) 

'Cost  of 
150 person-years (Source: 'Cost of controls' report ERDF plus 50% (estimated 
150  person-years  (Source: 

150 person-years (Source: 'Cost of controls' report ERDF plus 50% (estimated ESF share)) 

150  person-years 

750 person-years 

(Source: 

SDOE : 57 ; EDEL : 84 
: 85 

SDOE : 313 ; EDEL : 491 

SDOE : 61 ; EDEL : 100 

SDOE : 62 ; EDEL : 106 

SDOE : 57 ; EDEL : 116 

SDOE  :  76  ;  EDEL 

HU 

N/A 

EN 

121 

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State: 

IE 

FR 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

EN 

2.2.3. Personnel assigned and involved in anti-fraud investigations: 

2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Total 
0 
(Training and Employment authority) 
and Internal Audit Unit of FAS (Training and Employment authority) 
Siochana (Police Force) - and the Management and Internal Audit Unit of FAS (Training and Employment authority) 

Fraud  investigation  undertaken  by:  An  Garda  Siochana  (Police  Force)  -  and  the  Management  and  Internal  Audit  Unit  of  FAS 
Fraud investigation undertaken by: An Garda Siochana (Police Force) - and the Management 
Fraud  investigation  undertaken  by:  An  Garda 

0 

0 

All staff involved in systems audits and audits of transactions may be involved in anti-fraud operations. 

594 (figure subject to variation) 
variation) 
24 
22 

743 3634 
27 
25 

27 

805 (figure subject to variation) 

745 (figure subject to variation) 

747 

(figure 

subject 

to 

125 

"(ERDF) Audit authority: 1 + 3 (subcontractors) 

"(ERDF) Audit authority: 1 + 3 (sub-contractors) 

"(ERDF) Audit authority: 1 + 3 (sub-contractors) 

"(ERDF) Audit authority: 1 + 3 (subcontractors) 
Managing authority: 4 
(ESF) 2" 
Managing authority: 4 
(ESF): 2" 
Managing authority: 4 
(ESF): 2" 
Managing authority: 5 
(ESF): 2" 
Managing authority: 5 
(ESF): 3.25"  "(ERDF) Audit authority: 1 + 3 (sub-contractors) 
Managing authority: 5" 
55 
prosecutor, except in cases where an investigation team is established. 
2 

"(ERDF) Audit authority: 1 + 3 (sub-contractors) 

56 

57 

62 

63 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

293 - In addition, at the Prosecutor General's Office criminal proceedings are conducted by a single 

0 

122 

EN 

 
  
 
 
Member 
State: 

2.2.3. Personnel assigned and involved in anti-fraud investigations: 

AT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 
SK 

SE 

UK 

2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Total 
N/A 

1187,9 1267,9 1343,65 

972,3  1126,05 
Adding  together  staff  numbers  could  be  misleading  given  that,  in  each  year,  there  is 
overlap between posts occupied by the same people working on the processes described. In this connection, it has been decided not to give 
the total number of staff assigned to anti-fraud investigations. 
87 
43 

347 

53 

80 

84 

DLAF-22 

DLAF-28 

DLAF-28 

DLAF-32 

DLAF-25 

0 
51 
investigations" indicated in the first part of point 2.2.1.) 

112 

46 

45 

63 

317  (Note:  this  figure  refers  to  the  number  of  staff  involved  in  "administrative  anti-fraud 

3 

3 

3 

3 

1,5 

Figures relate to man/years 

SG:  2;  WG:  0,  DWP:  Non-specifically;  DCLG: 
SG: 2; WG: 0, DWP: Non-specifically; DCLG: 1.5; DFPNI: 0; MMO/DEFRA: 0.01 
1.5; DFPNI: 0; MMO/DEFRA: 0.1  SG:  2;  WG:  0,  DWP:  Non-specifically;  DCLG:  0.5;  DFPNI:  0;  MMO/DEFRA:  0.2SG:  2;  WG:  0, 
DWP: Non-specifically; DCLG: 0.5; DFPNI: 0; MMO/DEFRA: 0.2 
SG:  7;  WG:0;  DWP:  Non-specifically'  1.2;  DFPNI:  0; 
MMO/DEFRA: 0.2  SG:10; WG: 0;, DWP: Non-specifically; DCLG: 5.2; DFPNI: 0; MMO/DEFRA: 0.7 
NOTES - Please see the additional notes submitted with the return. DWP has submitted a copy of their AN063 referred to across. DFPNI: 
For  NI  Programmes  fraud  detection  is  embedded in claim verification work, with staff not assigned solely to fraud detection. If fraud is 
suspected dedicated resources are then deployed. DWP: For ESF England & Gibraltar, MA has a protocol with the investigation team. This 
has been issued as Action Note 063 (AN063) to all colleagues and to customers of DWP. 

EN 

123 

EN