COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT BULGARIA: Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification mechanism
Date: 2012-07-18
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, judicial reform, organised crime, prevention of delinquency

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 18.7.2012  
SWD(2012) 232 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

BULGARIA: Technical Report 

Accompanying the document 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification mechanism 

{COM(2012) 411 final} 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
  
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

BULGARIA: Technical Report 

Accompanying the document 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification mechanism 

1. 

2. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Introduction 

Benchmark 1: Adopt Constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding 
the independence and accountability of the judicial system ........................................ 4 

•  The National Assembly to adopt amendments to the Bulgarian Constitution 
•  The National Assembly to make necessary changes to the Judicial System Act 
•  The Inspectorate to be set up and functioning, first results to be published and evaluated 
Benchmark 2: Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting 
and implementing a new judicial system act and the new civil procedure code. 
Report on the impact of these new laws and of the penal and administrative 
procedure codes, notably on the pre-trial phase........................................................... 7 

•  Adopt the new Civil Procedure Code 
•  Adopt 

the  new  Judicial  System  Act  reflecting 

and the recommendations of the peer review experts 

the  amendments 

to 

the  Constitution  

•  Establish a monitoring system for all new codes 
•  Report at regular intervals on the findings of this monitoring process, notably as regards the pre-

trial phase, the execution of judgements and sentences 
•  Amend the relevant codes and legislation if necessary 
Benchmark 3: Continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance 
professionalism, accountability and efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform 
and publish the results annually ................................................................................... 9 

•  Establish  a  transparent  and  fully  functioning  decision  making  process  on  disciplinary 

investigations by the future Inspectorate with the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) 

•  Ensure  complete  and  overarching  application  of  the  Code  of  Ethics  for  magistrates,  especially 

procedures for review, investigation and dismissal/prosecution for violations 

•  Monitor the application of the system of competitive examination for recruitment and performance 

evaluation of magistrates 

•  Annually publish findings of the evaluation of the reform of the judicial system, in particular on 
how  specific  problems  related  to  professionalism;  accountability  and  efficiency  have  been 
addressed 
Introduce random case handling software in the prosecution services 

• 
•  Enhance the training on the implication of these new laws 
Benchmark 4: Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations b into 
allegations of high-level corruption. Report on internal inspections of public 
institutions and on the publication of assets of high-level officials ........................... 11 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
•  Associate  Member  States'  experts  to  provide  assistance  and  guidance  as  regards  improving  the 

quality of investigations and reporting on this 

•  Streamline and coordinate the institutional set-up of bodies empowered to fight corruption 
•  Establish administrative arrangements to safeguard whistle-blowers  
• 

Implement  fully  the  legislation  on  the  independence  of  the  inspectorates  in  the  public 
administration and ensure more pro-activeness in their investigative role 

•  Report on the implementation of measures taken to prevent and fight influence in the investigation 
and prosecuting entities, in particular sustain cases of suspension/dismissal/initiation of criminal 
proceedings against alleged corrupt law enforcement bodies 

•  Ensure  the  establishment  of  a  credible  checking  mechanism  for  asset  declarations  as  well  as 

effective sanctions in case of false or inaccurate declarations 

5. 

Benchmark 5: Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at 
the borders and within local government ................................................................... 13 

• 

Implement  disciplinary  sanctions  and  a  policy  of  zero-tolerance,  particularly  in  the  Veterinary 
Service, customs, the Road Executive Agency and other relevant services 

•  Establish electronic payment systems and a system of shifts at random for officers employed at the 

borders 

6. 

•  Conduct at regular intervals audits and checks, publish the findings and ensure their follow-up 
•  Report on investigations into inexplicable wealth 
Benchmark 6: Implement a strategy to fight organised crime, focussing on serious 
crime, money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of 
criminals. Report on new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in 
these areas .................................................................................................................. 17 

•  Associate  Member  States'  experts  to  provide  guidance  and  assistance  as  regards  improving  the 

quality of investigations and reporting on this 

•  Hand over an action plan to implement the strategy to fight organised crime and implement it with 

reports at regular intervals 

•  Fully implement relevant legislation on confiscation of assets of criminals 
•  Report  regularly  and  audit  internally  the  new  and  on-going  investigations,  indictments  and 

convictions 
Implement the new legislation to combat money laundering 

• 

Note: 

Under  each  of  the  six  benchmarks,  several  issues  of  particular  concern  were  mutually  agreed  when  the 
Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism  was  created  in  December  2006.  These  issues  are  listed  above.  You 
may consult previous reports at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/cvm/index_en.htm 

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

This technical report sets out the information and the data which the Commission has 
used as the basis for its analysis. This information has been collected from a variety 
of sources. Over the past five years, the Commission has devoted particular attention 
to  collecting  information  and  deepening  its  knowledge  of  Bulgaria.  It  has  used  a 
combination  of  on-the-spot  dialogue  with  key  Bulgarian  interlocutors,  a  permanent 
presence  in  the  Commission's  representation,  and  the  knowledge  and  experience  of 
experts from other Member States. It has also had the benefit of working closely with 
the  Bulgarian  government,  which  has  provided  detailed  and  increasingly  focused 
responses to a series of questionnaires. Finally, where relevant, the Commission has 
tested  its  findings  against  those  of  specialised  international  organisations,  EU 
agencies and NGOs. This technical report makes several references to past reports of 
the Commission under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), which 
provide a collective record of progress since Bulgaria's accession to the EU. 

2. 

BENCHMARK  1:  ADOPT  CONSTITUTIONAL  AMENDMENTS  REMOVING  ANY 
AMBIGUITY  REGARDING  THE  INDEPENDENCE  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY  OF  THE 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 

The role of the judiciary under the Constitution 

Before  Bulgarian  accession  to  the  EU  in  2007,  the  Council  of  Europe's  Venice 
Commission  had  criticised  several  aspects  of  the  judicial  system  in  Bulgaria, 
including the immunity of prosecutors and judges, and the risk of politicisation of the 
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC).1 

Constitutional  amendments  adopted  on  2  February  2007  sought  to  strengthen  the 
independence of the judiciary, its impartiality and accountability. The revised Article 
130  of  the  Bulgarian  Constitution  set  out  the  competences  and  attributions  of  the 
SJC.2  It  confirmed  its  functions  as  regards  appointments,  promotions,  demotions, 
transfer  and  removal  from  office  of  magistrates,3 as well  as its  budgetary  role. The 
Constitution also requires reports to be made by the highest judicial bodies for debate 
in the National Assembly.4 The scope and structure of these reports is determined by 
the SJC. Magistrates’ immunity has been restricted to acts committed in performance 
of their official duties, and they can be liable for civil or criminal action in relation to 
their  judicial  functions  in  situations  when  they  commit  an  intentional  indictable 
offense.5 

1 
2 

3 
4 

5 

http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/CDL-AD(2008)009-e.pdf (p.4) 
The amendments of February 2007 introduced new provisions concerning the judiciary: Art. 130 – (6), 
(7), (8), (9); Art. 84(16); Art. 132, 132 (a).  
See: Article 130 (6) reiterates powers already set out under Art. 129 (1) of the Bulgarian Constitution.  
See: Art. 84 and Art. 130-7 of the Bulgarian Constitution: The Council submits annual reports from the 
Supreme  Court  of  Cassation,  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  and  the  Prosecutor  General  on  the 
application of the law and their respective activities to the National Assembly. 
See: Art. 132 of the Bulgarian Constitution. 

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
                                                 
The  composition  of  the  SJC  was  maintained.6  The  Venice  Commission  criticised  a 
particular aspect of the election process, the risk that the use of simple majority vote 
meant  that  a  parliamentary  majority  could  determine  the  entire  11  members  of  the 
parliamentary quota.7 The Venice Commission was of the opinion that this risked the 
politicisation  of  the  Council.  This  concern  has  also  been  echoed  by  independent 
experts assessing judicial reform for the European Commission. 

The  Minister  of  Justice  has  the  function  of  chairing  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council, 
though with no voting rights. An amendment introduced in 2006 also provided that 
the  Minister  of  Justice  may  make  proposals  for appointment, promotion, demotion, 
transfer and removal of office of judges, prosecutors and investigators. The Minister 
also  proposes  a  draft  budget  for  the  Council's  consideration  and  manages  the 
property  of  the  judiciary.  However,  the  role  of  the  Minister  in  inspecting  judicial 
institutions  and  verifying  progress  of  judicial  proceedings  in  individual  cases  was 
removed  from  the  Constitution  in  2007.  The  Venice  Commission  has  expressed 
reservations concerning the role of the Minister, notably the right of initiative in the 
area of human resources and acting as a chairman of the Council.8 Over the past five 
years, experience shows that Ministers of Justice have in practice used their role in 
the SJC in different ways and to different degrees, but the general trend has been to 
leave issues concerning management and careers to the SJC. CVM reports have not 
highlighted the role of the Minister in the SJC as an area of concern. 

The constitutional revision of 2007 introduced a new provision on the Inspectorate to 
the  Supreme  Judicial  Council,  which  was  given  the  power  to  inspect  all  judicial 
bodies,  including  courts,  prosecution  offices  and  investigating  services.9  The 
Inspectorate can act ex-officio, or based on signals from citizens, state bodies, legal 
entities or judicial bodies. It has the discretion to plan its activities. It can approach 
the  competent  judicial  authorities,  with  alerts,  proposals  and  reports.  The  chief 
inspector and the inspectors are appointed by the National Assembly for a mandate 
of  5  and  4  years  respectively,  by  vote  of  two-thirds  majority.10  The  two-thirds 
majority  requirement  means  that  successful  nominees  would  normally  have  the 
support of a wider spectrum of political parties represented in Parliament.  

The legal framework set by these constitutional amendments was complemented by a 
new  Judicial  System  Act  (JSA)  adopted  in  July  2007,  which  defined  key  rules 
governing the organisation of the Bulgarian judiciary.11  

These constitutional amendments have an important bearing on the independence of 
the  judiciary.  In  the  opinion  of  independent  experts  including  the  Venice 
Commission,  the  guarantees  for  the  independence  and  accountability  of  the 
magistracy  enshrined  in  the  Bulgarian  Constitution  are  considered  a  good  basis  for 

6 

7 
8 
9 
10 

11 

Its  25  members  include  three  members  by  law,  the  General  Prosecutor  and  the  Presidents  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  and  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court,  11  members  designated  by 
Parliament and 11 members designated by the magistracy (6 judges, 4 prosecutors and one investigating 
magistrate).. 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/CDL-AD(2008)009-e.pdf (para 25, p.7) 
Idem, p.8-9. 
See: Art. 132 (a) of the Bulgarian Constitution. 
The Chief Inspector is appointed by the National Assembly through a ¾ majority for a term of 5 years. 
Inspectors are appointed by the National Assembly for a term of 4 years. The budget of the Inspectorate 
is  voted  by  the  National  Assembly.  The  Inspectorate  submits  a  yearly  report  on  its  activities  to  the 
Supreme Judicial Council (Art. 132a of the Bulgarian Constitution). 
See benchmark 3, below. 

EN 

5 

   EN 

 
                                                 
an  independent  judiciary  in  a  mature  democracy.  However,  there  have  been 
continuing areas of concern. Expert opinion has highlighted the risk of politicisation 
of both the Inspectorate and the SJC, due to the role of the National Assembly in the 
nomination  procedure.12  The  procedures  have  not  led  to  appointments  seen  to  be 
determined  by  the  professionalism  and  integrity  of  the  candidates.  Elections  for 
vacancies  in  the  SJC  from  the  parliamentary  quota  in  July  2011  were  criticised  for 
their  lack  of  transparency  and  for  the  lack  of  public  debate  on  the  nominated 
candidates. Parliament’s appointments of judicial inspectors in December 2011 and 
March 2012 raised similar criticism and did not allow for a real competition to take 
place.13  

Some  further  concerns  in  the  area  of  independence  have  been  voiced  in  relation  to 
the fact that the SJC brings together representatives of prosecutors, investigators and 
judges.  This  means  that  prosecutors  and  investigators  participate  in  decisions  on 
career  development,  disciplinary  matters  and  dismissals  of  judges.14  This  again 
became the subject of public debate at when discussing amendments to the Judicial 
Systems Act in 2012. 

These concerns about independence have been accentuated as a result of criticism by 
the  authorities  of  individual  judges  and  particular  judicial  decisions.  In  terms  of 
substance,  this  approach  undermines  the  separation  of  powers.  Just  as  importantly, 
underlying  the  benchmarks  on  independence  and  the  role  of  the  Inspectorate  is  the 
principle  of  an  independent  judiciary  without  political  pressure.  This  concern  has 
also been echoed by United Nations bodies.15  

Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council 

Following the constitutional amendments of February 2007, the Inspectorate became 
operational  in  the  first  quarter  of  2008.16  The  Inspectorate's  yearly  plans  of 
inspections defined priorities for each year so as to ensure full geographical coverage 
and focus on specific thematic issues. It can also launch ad hoc inspections, triggered 

12 
13 

14 

15 

16 

http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/CDL-AD(2008)009-e.pdf (p.11) 
Although  the  list  of  candidates  considered  by  the  National  Assembly  was  published  in  advance,  no 
presentation  of  the  candidates  and  no  discussion  on  their  suitability  to  perform  the  functions  of 
inspectors took place before the vote. See also 'Human Rights in Bulgaria in 2011', Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee,  p.17:  "The  ruling  party  and  the  opposition  were  united  in  their  drive  to  assign  people 
without  the  necessary  professional  and  moral  merits,  but  with  political  protections,  to  these  positions 
with the goal of controlling the exercise of disciplinary power over magistrates via the SJC." 
The Venice Commission has underlined that: "The prosecution should have no involvement whatsoever 
in  the  ultimate  administration  of  justice,  nor  in  the  appointment  and  functioning  of  judges,  and  the 
operation of the court system." (http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/CDL-AD(2008)009-e.pdf). 
United Nations Committee on Torture, 14 December 2011: "The Committee is concerned….. that the 
principle  of  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  is  not  respected  by  the  organs  outside  the  judiciary, 
including  high-ranking  government  officials,  nor  fully  applied  within  the  judiciary"  It  noted  the 
responsibility of the state to "raise the awareness of judicial and other officials and the public at large 
about the importance of independence of the judiciary." 'Human Rights in Bulgaria in 2011', Bulgarian 
Helsinki Committee, p. 15: "In 2011, the independence of the courts suffered serious attacks, both from 
the executive branch, primarily in the person of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior 
Tsvetan  Tsvetanov,  as  well  as  from  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (SJC)  and  its  Inspectorate  (ISJC). 
Parliament  also  contributed  to  the  creation  of  dependencies  within  the  judicial  system.  No  institution 
took an appropriate corrective position in response." 
The head of the Inspectorate was appointed in December 2007 and the positions of the inspectors and 
administrative staff were filled by May 2008. 

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
                                                 
by  signals  or,  increasingly  since  after  2008,  initiated  ex-officio.17  Between  early 
2008  and  December  2011,  the  Inspectorate  carried  out  inspections  covering  all  the 
judicial bodies in Bulgaria.  

The first round of inspections by the Inspectorate reported significant divergence in 
the  application  of  legal  provisions  and  a  lack  of  respect  for  procedural  deadlines 
required by law. It also pointed to a lack of follow up to these shortcomings from the 
administrative  heads  and  higher  jurisdictions  responsible.  The  Inspectorate  issued 
tailored  recommendations  addressed  to  the  judicial  bodies  concerned.  A  system  of 
follow-up inspections has been designed to ensure monitoring of measures taken in 
response  to  the  Inspectorate's  recommendations.  The  Inspectorate  can  make  use  of 
disciplinary  proceedings,  including  through  proposals  for  disciplinary  sanctions  to 
the Supreme Judicial Council. 

The  Inspectorate  reports  that  the  inspections  have  led  to  improvements  as  regards 
celerity of judicial proceedings and the alignment of judicial practice. They have also 
promoted  a  more  active  role  for  the  administrative  heads,  and  improved  the 
accountability of individual magistrates, notably through disciplinary action.  

The SJC and the Inspectorate have sought to ensure follow-up to recommendations 
issued by the Inspectorate, including on disciplinary matters. A joint working group 
was  established  in  December  2009  and  institutionalised  in  February  2010  as  a 
Commission  on  the  analysis  and  follow-up  to  the  ISJC  recommendations.  It  is 
considered to have helped to ensure alignment of disciplinary practice. Another step 
has been the plan to publish the Inspectorate's recommendations on the SJC website, 
to give visibility to the problems identified by the Inspectorate. 

The  Inspectorate’s  work  has  not  had  a  decisive  impact  on  the  shortcomings  of  the 
judicial  system.  It  has  not  been  able  to  provide  the  evidence  base  needed  to  help 
address systematic problems such as uneven distribution of workload across judicial 
bodies and wide variations in the size of judicial districts. Its investigations have not 
resulted in clear solutions to key horizontal issues like random distribution of cases, 
where  divergent  IT  systems,  how  to  assess  complexity  of  cases,  and  the  impact  on 
the distribution of workload would have benefitted from an authoritative assessment 
by  the  Inspectorate.  The  Inspectorate  has  not  exploited  the  opportunity  to  focus  on 
specific  problems  of  divergent  legal  interpretation,  which  could  have  led  to 
legislative clarifications, guidelines, and input into the training curricula offered by 
the National Institute of Justice.  

It  has  also  not  secured  a  track  record  in  terms  of  consistent  and  dissuasive 
disciplinary action. For example, when assessing the judiciary, it has tended to look 
at quantity (e.g. number of delayed cases by a given magistrate) rather than quality 
(difficulty  and  volume  of  a  given  case,  quality  of  reasoning).  In  2011,  the 
Inspectorate  was  accused  of  carrying  out  inspections  for  political  goals,18  or 

17 

18 

Between  January  2007  and  December  2011,  the  Inspectorate  carried  out  geographical  planned 
inspections  of  all  courts  and  prosecution  offices  in  all  the  appellate  regions  in  Bulgaria,  52  thematic 
inspections and 179 ad hoc inspections.  
'Human Rights in Bulgaria in 2011', Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, p. 15: "In June, the ISJC conducted 
a special unprecedented check of the whole criminal division of the SCC with the goal of blurring the 
responsibility of the newly appointed court chairperson for her confirmed abuses in cases (in connection 
with  a  concrete  complaint  against  her)  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  penalize  with  disciplinary  measures 
prominent representatives of the BJA [Bulgarian Judges Association], which was positioning itself as a 
significant opponent of the government with tangible civic influence." 

EN 

7 

   EN 

 
                                                 
launching cases only after public pressure. Such claims are supported by cases like 
the weak response by the Inspectorate and the prosecution to two emblematic cases 
of  alleged  trade  in  influence  and  corruption  in  2009  and  2010,  in  which  a  large 
number of senior magistrates and their families were involved.19 

3. 

BENCHMARK  2:  ENSURE  A  MORE  TRANSPARENT  AND  EFFICIENT  JUDICIAL 
PROCESS  BY  ADOPTING  AND  IMPLEMENTING  A  NEW  JUDICIAL  SYSTEM  ACT  AND 
THE NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE. REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF THESE NEW LAWS 
AND  OF  THE PENAL  AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE CODES, NOTABLY  ON  THE 
PRE- TRIAL PHASE 

Judicial System Act 

Following  Bulgaria’s  accession  to  the  EU,  a  new  Judicial  System  Act  was  adopted 
on  24  July  200720.  This  has  since  been  the  subject  of  several  amendments,  with  a 
view  to  introducing  more  effective  promotion  and  appointment  procedures  and 
giving  the  leadership  of  the  judicial  system  the  tools  needed  to  manage  the  system 
and  its  human  resources.  In  2009,  amendments  gave  the  Inspectorate  the  right  to 
appeal disciplinary decisions of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), which gave an 
extra "check and balance" to the fairness and impartiality of disciplinary procedure. 
In  2010,21  new  procedures  were  introduced  for  appointments  and  appraisals  of 
magistrates,  notably  through  introducing  a  functional  separation  in  the  career 
management  of  prosecutors  and  judges,  as  well  as  decentralised  appraisal 
commissions.22  Integrity  became  an  explicit  criterion  in  appraisals,  promotions  and 
senior  appointments.  The  SJC  received  new  attributions  to  assess  workload  of 
judicial  bodies,  adjust  personnel  schemes,  change  jurisdiction  areas,  reallocate 
resources or even close down some courts. The SJC can decide to open new vacant 
positions  in  a  given  court  or  prosecution  office  (based  on  a  request  of  the 
administrative  heads),  and  it  can  assign  additional  positions  to  a  given  court  or 
prosecution  office  to  deal  with  workload.  Up  to  20%  of  the  vacant  positions  in  a 
given  court  or  a  prosecution  office  can  be  filled  through  external  recruitment  of 
candidates with sufficient experience in the legal profession. 

The 2009 amendments received a positive assessment of the Venice Commission and 
addressed some of their earlier concerns.23 In the assessment of independent experts, 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

Following  to  public  pressure,  cases  were  launched  against  a  number  of  magistrates  in  the  first  major 
case which involved alleged trade in influence for a large number of senior judicial positions, however, 
only two cases led to more serious sanctions. In the second emblematic case involving alleged trade in 
influence and corruption for the purchase of real estate, only few disciplinary cases were launched and 
all sanctions were later cancelled by the Supreme Administrative Court. 
The  Judicial  System  Act  adopted  in  July  2007  entered  into  force  on  10  August  2007.  It  was 
subsequently amended in April 2009 and in December 2010. The latest amendments entered into force 
in January 2011. 
The amendments to the Judicial System Act were adopted by Parliament in December 2010 and entered 
into force on 4 January 2011. 
The reform of the appraisal system introduced more precise quantitative and qualitative criteria, taking 
into  account  the  workload  of  magistrates.  Magistrates  undergo  evaluation  by  decentralised  standing 
commissions established at the level of courts and prosecutions offices. Integrity issues and results of 
inspections are taken into account in appraisals and promotions. 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL-AD(2009)011-e.pdf  One  point  relevant  to  earlier  Vince 
Commission  criticisms  was  that  precise  rules  have  been  introduced  on  the  composition  of  the 

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
                                                 
the 2010 amendments also gave the SJC the powers needed to effectively discharge 
its managerial functions and to safeguard the independence and accountability of the 
judiciary.  

A  further  set  of  amendments  to  the  Judicial  System  Act  was  passed  in  July  2012. 
These  have  particular  significance  for  the  selection  of  members  of  the  Supreme 
Judicial Council, as well as its workings (see benchmark 3 below).  

Penal Code  

CVM reports have consistently noted that Bulgarian criminal justice suffers from an 
outdated  Penal  Code.  The  current  Penal  Code  dates  back  to  1968  and  many 
practitioners consider it ill-suited to modern types of crime. Serious crime and petty 
offences are prosecuted according to the same procedures, irrespective of the social 
threat  posed.  Certain  criminal  offenses  such  abuse  in  office  need  to  be  revisited  to 
ensure  adequate  protection  of  the  public  interest.  Bulgaria  applies  the  principle  of 
legality,  which  obliges  the  prosecution  to  process  all  cases,  irrespective  of  their 
objective threat to social order: a lack of discretion to prioritise which increases the 
workload on the prosecution and courts and makes it difficult to concentrate on the 
more  important  cases.  A  possible  shift  to  the  opportunity  principle  has  been  held 
back by public concerns that such discretion would not be used objectively. 

Amendments  to  the  Penal  Code  adopted  in  April  2007  introduced  more  severe 
penalties for certain serious crimes.24 In 2009 Bulgaria initiated a more fundamental 
reform of the Penal Code. The original timeline for this legislative reform has been 
postponed  on  a  number  of  occasions,  but  a  draft section on general  provisions  was 
published  for  consultation  in  January  201225  and  work  on  specialised  provisions 
continued.26  This  included  looking  at  modern  crimes,  such  as  cybercrimes  and 
environmental  offences.  A  revised  Code  would  also  give  an  opportunity  to 
modernise  definitions  and  sanctions  for  corruption  and  organised  crime  offences, 
with  GRECO  recommendations  on  corruption  offenses  to  be  taken  into  account.27 

26 

25 

24 

disciplinary  panel  within  the  SJC.  The  involvement  of  prosecutors  and  investigators  in  decisions  on 
judges’ careers has thus been diminished, albeit not eliminated. 
These  included  the  crime  of  inciting  prostitution,  inducing  to  use  drugs  for  the  purpose  of  acts  of 
prostitution, organised crime group involved in inciting to prostitution.  
The general part of the draft Penal Code introduces notably the following changes: abolishing the life 
imprisonment  without  the  possibility  of  pardon,  changing  the  concept  of  probation,  abolishing  the 
sanction  of  deprivation  of  the  right  to  receive  honorary  titles,  distinctions  and  military  ranks.  It  also 
reportedly  increases  the  penalties  for  serious  crimes,  defines  stricter  terms  of  recidivist  criminals, 
regulates the criminal liability of minors. 
The draft specialised provisions of the Penal Code are being elaborated by working groups composed of 
experts and representatives of the Ministry of Justice. They will notably aim to redefine the categories 
of  crime,  abolish  outdated  offenses  and  introduce  some  new  offenses.  Some  of  the  current  criminal 
offenses  will  be  redefined  as  administrative  violations.  Some  legal  definitions  and  concepts  will  be 
better defined. 
27 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3(2009)7_Bulgaria_One_EN.pdf  
GRECO  recommends  inter  alia  to  ensure  that  the  offences  of  active  bribery  in  the  public  sector,  as  well  as 
trading  in  influence,  are  construed  in  such  a  way  as  to  unambiguously  cover  instances  where  the 
advantage  is  not  intended  for  the  official  him/herself  but  for  a  third  party  (p.19)  and  to  continue  to 
clarify  the  interpretation  of  the  law  following  the  2002  amendments  relating  to  the  criminalisation  of 
both  material  and  non-material  advantages  (p20).  It  also  recommends  to  revise  the  automatic  –  and 
mandatorily total – exemption from punishment granted to perpetrators of active bribery in the public 
sector in cases of effective regret (article 306 of the Criminal Code) (p.21) and to spell out clearly that 
bribery of foreign arbitrators is a criminal offence also when the arbitrator performs his/her functions 
under the national law on arbitration of any other State.  

EN 

9 

   EN 

 
                                                                                                                                                         
Further  recommendations  provided  by  the  UNCAC  report  should  offer  further 
guidance  to  the  legislator.28  A  public  consultation  on  the  finalised  draft  is  foreseen 
for summer 2012, and the Government considers that a finalised draft may be ready 
to table in Parliament in September 2012. 

Penal Procedure Code 

The penal procedure rules were identified at the time of accession as one of the key 
factors  hampering  the  effectiveness  of  criminal  justice  in  Bulgaria,  in  particular  an 
excessive formalism which hampered court proceedings, as well as inconsistency. A 
monitoring group established in April 2006 worked to identify divergent practices in 
criminal  proceedings.  Bulgaria  has  received  advice  from  a  number  of  bilateral 
twinning projects on how to modernise its criminal procedures.  
2010 saw an important reform of the Penal Procedure Code (PPC).29 This extended 
the investigative powers of the police, clarified rules on the admissibility of evidence 
and  introduced  other  provisions  aimed  at  streamlining  criminal  proceedings. 
Decisions  by  courts  to  return  cases  to  the  prosecution  for  further  investigation  can 
now  be  appealed.  Stricter  rules  were  introduced  on  medical  certificates  justifying 
absence  at  court  hearings,  and  the  possibility  of  reserve  defence  counsels  was 
introduced to target the intentional absenteeism of defence lawyers. The reforms also 
helped  to  provide  the  legal  basis  for  the  establishment  of  a  specialised  court  for 
organised crime and an attached specialised prosecution office.30  

Bulgaria  reports  that  the  2010  amendments  have  helped  to  streamline  and  enhance 
the  effectiveness  of  criminal  proceedings.31  The  extension  of  investigative  powers 
conferred  to  the  police  has  reportedly  had  positive  impact  on  the  pre-trial  phase.32 
Amendments  to  the  Penal  Procedure  Code  extended  the  investigative  powers  of 
police,  allowed  certain  police  officers  to  testify  in  court,  and  introduced  the 
possibility  for  courts  to  hear  covert  witnesses.33  However,  occurrences  such  as  the 
absence of defence counsels which lead to postponement of hearings continued to be 

28 

29 
30 
31 

32 

33 

in 

sector 

the  private 

to  corruption 

The UNCAC Report on Bulgaria October 2011 puts forward recommendations inter alia on sanctions 
against legal persons, enhancing protection for whistle blowers, expanding the scope of the law on the 
forfeiture  of  proceeds  of  crime 
(see  pp.7-8). 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session4/V1186294e.pdf 
For further information on the PPC amendments see also: SEC(2010) 948.  
See benchmark six below 
Bulgaria  reported  some  positive  effects  of  the  amendments  on  administration  of  evidence  and  the 
possibility to use testimonies of police operational staff. The application of reserve defence counsels has 
reportedly helped to improve the celerity of some high-level cases. Bulgaria reports that the possibility 
to  appeal  courts'  decisions  to  return  cases  to  the  prosecution  for  further  investigation  has  helped  to 
reduce the number of such decisions.  
Bulgaria reports that expanding powers to institute pre-trial proceedings to investigative bodies led to 
increase  in  new  pre-trial  proceedings  initiated  (2010:  19.765;  2009:  13.360);  increase  in  new  cases 
decided by the prosecution: 2010: 19.208; 2009: 18.860; 2008: 12.985; decrease in cases unsolved by 
prosecution:  2010:  2.741;  2009:  5.655;  2008:  7.265.  The  Ministry  of  Interior  reports  increase  in  the 
number of pre-trial proceedings finalised: 2010: 57.834 cases; 2009: 51.690 cases. The number of cases 
finalised  beyond  the  statutory  deadline:  in  2010:  4200  delayed  investigations;  2011:  1068  delayed 
investigations.  The  number  of  criminal  proceedings  returned  to  the  police  by  the  prosecution  or  by 
court: in 2010: 20 139; in 2011: 13 112. 
Experts have however criticised the fact that only operative policemen can be heard by court and not the 
police investigator who has overall knowledge of all aspects of the case, contrary to practice in other 
Member  States.  Similarly  to  the  Penal  Procedure  Code,  practitioners  see  amendments  to  the 
Administrative  Procedure  Code  in  general  positive  but  consider  that  the  potential  of  the  new  Civil 
Procedure Code to accelerate the judicial process has not yet been fully exploited. 

EN 

10 

   EN 

 
                                                 
a cause of delays in some emblematic cases, suggesting that the new provisions have 
not been used to their full potential.  

On 10 May 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), published its first 
pilot  judgments,  concerning  Bulgaria.34  The  ECHR  has  required  Bulgaria  to 
introduce a remedy or remedies to deal with unreasonably long criminal proceedings 
and,  in  addition,  a  compensatory  remedy  in  respect  of  unreasonably  long  criminal, 
civil  and  administrative  proceedings.  Those  remedies  must  conform  to  the  Court's 
principles  and  become  available  within  12  months  from  the  date  on  which  the 
judgments became final. The cases concern the excessive length of civil and criminal 
proceedings in Bulgaria.  

In  November  2011,  additional  amendments  to  the  Penal  Procedure  Code  re-
introduced investigative powers of customs officers.  

Since  before  accession,  the  function  of  investigating  magistrates  (sledovateli)  has 
been  identified  as  a  source  of  overlaps  in  competences  among  the  police,  the 
investigators  and  the  prosecution  and  thus  a  factor  increasing  the  complexity  of 
criminal  proceedings.  According  to  the  Penal  Procedure  Code  currently  in  force, 
investigating  magistrates  are  in  charge  of  investigating  crimes  against  the  State, 
violations  of  State  secrets,  leakages  of  classified  information  and  crimes  against 
peace  and  humanity.35  Commitments  were  made  before  accession  to  limit  the 
competencies of investigating magistrates, but Bulgaria has argued that their status as 
magistrates means they cannot be dismissed or transferred to other judicial roles, so 
their role has been perpetuated. They are now located within the Prosecution office. 
The Commission has questioned the utility of a category of magistrates who appear 
to  add  to  the  complexity  of  the  Bulgarian  judicial  system  to  no  discernible 
advantage.36  

Civil Procedure Code  

A revised Civil Procedure Code adopted in July 200737 was intended to bring gains 
in terms of the efficiency and speed of court proceedings, with further amendments 
aiming at improving the enforcement of court decisions and allowing the re-opening 
of civil cases following decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.38 

Contacts with practitioners suggest that, with the new provisions not used proactively 
by the management of the judiciary, there has not been a substantial acceleration of 
civil proceedings or more streamlined judicial practice. Some provisions have led to 
further delays (this has been suggested, for example, in respect of double exchange 
of  documentations).  The  implementation  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  has  been 
monitored by the Inspectorate to the SJC. The detailed findings of these inspections 
have been reported to the administrative heads and to the SJC for follow-up and the 

34 
35 

36 
37 

38 

In the cases Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria and Finger v. Bulgaria. 
These offenses are dealt with by a service of 400 investigating magistrates (according to the information 
provided by Bulgaria). The General Prosecutor confirmed that this means that the average workload of 
the investigating magistrates is considerably lower than that of the regular prosecution. 
Technical Update 2008 (COM(2008)495, page 8. 
The  new  Civil  Procedure  Code  adopted  in  July  2007  entered  into  force  in  March  2008,  with  further 
amendments in 2009.  
Technical Update 2009 (COM(2009)402, page 7. 

EN 

11 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Council  reported  a  positive  effect  of  such  inspections  in  terms  of  identifying 
divergent  practices  and  taking  measures  to  eliminate  them.  It  remains  unclear  to 
which extent these findings are being shared with judicial bodies across the country. 
The  results  from  inspections  have  not  been  used  by  the  SJC  or  the  Inspectorate  to 
propose  horizontal  measures  such  as  guidelines  on  judicial  practice,  training 
curricula or legislative amendments. 

Administrative Procedure Code 

Amendments to the Administrative Procedure Code were adopted in March 2007 and 
in  May  2011  in  order  to  improve  proceedings  and  re-organise  the  first-instance 
jurisdiction  in  a  number  of  administrative  cases  from  the  Supreme  Administrative 
Court to the district administrative courts. Particular arrangements were put in place 
for  monitoring  the  changes,  which  concluded  that  implementation  was  relatively 
satisfactory and made a number of suggestions for improvements.39 

4. 

BENCHMARK 3: CONTINUE THE REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY IN ORDER TO ENHANCE 
PROFESSIONALISM, ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY. EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF 
THIS REFORM AND PUBLISH THE RESULTS ANNUALLY 

Judicial Reform Strategy 

A Strategy for the continuation of Judicial Reform was adopted in June 2010 and has 
been  taken  forward  through  detailed  action  plans  adopted  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  These  Plans  cover  some  6  months,  and  are  accompanied  by  timetables 
listing measures to be taken within established deadlines.40 Given that the powers to 
structure and manage the judiciary in Bulgaria rest to a great extent with the Supreme 
Judicial  Council  (SJC),  the  key  tool  for  the  Ministry  of  Justice  to  promote  reforms 
has  been  through  initiating  legislative  proposals  for  consideration  by  Parliament. 
Such measures have included amendments to the Judicial Systems Act and to other 
legislation concerning the responsibilities and organisation of courts.41  

Role of the Supreme Judicial Council 

The  Judicial  System  Act  adopted  in  2007  gave  the  SJC  extensive  powers  over  the 
organisation of the justice system, the planning and execution of the budget, human 
resources  management,  and  integrity  and  disciplinary  matters.42  The  SJC  received 
additional  powers  to  report  and  analyse  the  workload  of  courts  and  prosecution 
offices, and to adjust personnel levels by cutting and opening new positions. 

39 

40 

41 
42 

See Technical Update 2009 (COM(2009)402, page 7. A working group to monitor the application of the 
Administrative Procedure Code was established in March 2007 and reported positive results in the first 
year  of  its  application  in  terms  of  streamlining  the  administrative  procedure.  Technical  Update  2009 
(COM(2009)402, page 7. 
The  initial  Action  Plan  covered  the  period  of  July-December  2010.  The  Action  Plan  has  been 
subsequently  supplemented  for  the  period  January-July  2011,  August-  December  2011,  January-  July 
2012. 
See benchmark 1 above. 
The  functions  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  are  enumerated  in  Article  30  of  the  JSA.  Since  January  2011, 
appraisals  and  promotions  are  facilitated  by  commissions  established  at  the  local  level.  Appraisals  of 
judges and prosecutors are prepared by two sub-commissions of the SJC Commission for Appointments 
and  Appraisals.  Competitions  for  administrative  heads  are  interview-based  and  run  by  the  SJC.  The 
vote by the SJC is public and the Council is obliged to motivate its appointment decisions. 

EN 

12 

   EN 

 
                                                 
The  SJC  therefore  enjoys  considerable  powers  to  tackle  existing  problems  in  the 
judiciary such as differences in workload, systems for appraisal and promotion that 
command the confidence of the public and the judicial profession, and the need for 
the judiciary to set an example in terms of integrity. Successive CVM reports have 
concluded that the SJC has not taken the opportunity to fully use its powers to this 
end.43  The  judicial  leadership  continues  to  face  criticism  from  both  within  the 
profession  and  in  public  opinion  more  widely.44  The  Council  has  not  developed  a 
human  resources  strategy  that  plans  the  needs  of  the  system  and  sets  out  how  to 
achieve this, and promotes a profession with independence and integrity at its heart. 

A  number  of  specific  difficulties  can  be  highlighted.  First,  there  is  no  consistent 
human  resource  planning,  either  at  entry  level  or  for  promotions.  Promotion 
competitions  for  magistrates  have  been  organised  at  irregular  intervals,  despite  a 
steady level of vacancies.45 Promotions were suspended for over 2 years, reportedly 
due to the need to develop secondary legislation. During this period, gaps were filled 
by  secondments  largely  at  the  sole  discretion  of  the  administrative  heads  of  courts. 
Secondment has occurred on considerable scale, and has often been prolonged up to 
two and a half years. This practice has effectively undermined normal appraisal and 
promotion arrangements.  

Competitions  for  administrative  heads  have  been  held  more  regularly,  but  have 
differed significantly in the number of positions opened per year.46 

Second, the appraisals system has not been able to deliver the accurate and consistent 
appraisal  necessary  for  promotion.  One  problem  has  been  an  inability  to  use 
appraisal to differentiate between magistrates.47 Both before and after new rules on 
appraisals introduced in amendments to the Judicial Systems Act in December 2010, 
the  vast  majority  of  magistrates  were  scored  as  very  good:  reports  suggest  that  the 
end-2011  round  of  appraisals  based  on  the  revised  JSA  shows  that  98%  of  the 
magistrates received very good marks. This intensifies concerns about the promotion 
system,  in  particular  that  local  appraisal  commissions  do  not  use  consistent  or 

43 

44 

45 

46 

47 

Technical  Update  2011  (COM(2011)459,  p.5-6;  Interim  report  2011  (COM(2011)81,  p.  4;  Technical 
Update  2010  (COM2010)400,  p.  9;  Technical  Update  2009  (COM(2009)402  p.  8;  Technical  Update 
2008 (COM92008)495, p. 11. 
76% of Bulgarian respondents of a Eurobarometer poll conducted in September 2011 are of the opinion 
that  corruption  is  widespread  in  the  judiciary.  This  is  the  highest  result  collected  in  this  poll  among 
respondents in any EU Member State (Special Eurobarometer 374). This was also noted by the United 
Nations Committee on Torture, 14 December 2011: "The Committee is concerned….. by allegations of 
corruption within the justice system and lack of trust in the administration of justice, resulting in lack of 
public trust in the judiciary." 
Promotion  competitions  for  220  magistrates  were  organised  in  2008,  122  in  2009.  There  were  no 
promotions organised in 2010 and the last round of promotions for 294 magistrates was launched end 
2011. 
Appointments  for  administrative  heads  and  deputy  administrative  heads  included:  64  senior  positions 
filled in 2007, 41 in 2008, 240 in 2009, 178 in 2010 and 55 in 2011. 
Lacking objective input through proper appraisals or written competitions, promotion interviews at the 
SJC  often  fall  back  on  academic  results  or  statistical  information  on  case  disposition  by  candidates. 
Statistical  data  on  the  number  and  timeliness  of  case  handling  by  candidates  does  not  appear  to  take 
fully into account the differences in workload and the fact that case data does not properly reflect the 
complexity of individual cases. 

EN 

13 

   EN 

 
                                                 
relevant  criteria  during  interviews.  Experts  consulted  by  the  Commission  also 
pointed to a lack of clear separation of role in the Council.48 

Third, senior appointments conducted by the Council have been frequently criticised 
for  the  lack  of  transparency  and  objectivity  in  assessing  candidates'  professional 
qualities,  managerial  experience  and  integrity.  Disparities  in  the  numbers  of  senior 
positions open from year to year may adversely affect the quality of candidates. In 
2009,  the  year  with  the  highest  number  of  senior  appointments,  the  objectivity  of 
these appointments was challenged by reports of alleged trading in influence within 
the  Supreme  Judicial  Council.49  Concerns  about  a  non-transparent  appointment  by 
the SJC were raised again in 2012.50 

Finally, the SJC has not addressed the issue of disparities in workload. This is widely 
recognised  as  a  serious  problem,  at  its  most  critical  in  the  Sofia  based  courts  and 
prosecution offices.51 The SJC has analysed the problem, but with no results as yet: 
the starting point, defining criteria to measure workload per court and per magistrate, 
has  not  yet  been  undertaken.52  The  Council  has  the  power  to  close  down  unviable 
courts,  to  open  new  ones  or  to  redefine  the  geographical  scope  of  jurisdiction,  but 
these opportunities have not been used. The transfer of positions from judicial bodies 
with low workload to more busy ones has been applied to only a limited extent.53  

This  is  linked  to  a  serious  problem  of  delays  in  issuing  motivations  of  judicial 
decisions,  which  seems  to  affect  a  number  of  courts  in  Bulgaria.  This  has 
consequences  for  the  administration  and  transparency  of  justice,  and  for  the 
accountability  and  independence  of  judges.  There  has  been  no  examination  of  the 
extent  to  which  this  is  linked  to  uneven  workload  between  courts,  or  indeed  the 
uneven distribution of workload within courts.  

Integrity, ethics and disciplinary action  

Closely  linked  to  appraisal  and  promotion  is  the  establishment  of  a  system  for 
promoting  ethics  and  integrity  and  applying  disciplinary  measures.  This  also  has 
wider  relevance  of  public  confidence  in  the  judicial  system.  The  Code  of  Ethics 
adopted  in  May  2009  put  in  place  an  important  point  of  reference  setting  out 
principles  of  ethical  behaviour  for  magistrates  in  the  exercise  of  their  professional 

48 

49 

50 

51 
52 

53 

With  cases  reported  where  the  same  Council  member  advised  on  the  ethical  quality  of  a  candidate, 
considered this advice as part of the promotion committee and took a decision on the same candidate in 
the plenary of the Council. 
These  reports  led  to  the  dismissal  of  two  of  the  Council's  members,  however,  evidence  was  deemed 
insufficient to start criminal proceedings. Some cases are still pending. 
This concerned the appointment of the Deputy Chair of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the recent 
appointment of a Chief Appellate Prosecutor. 
See SEC(2011) 967, page 9. 
The  study  on  the  workload  of  individual  magistrates  and  judicial  bodies  launched  by  the  Supreme 
Judicial Council in 2011 has not yet been presented or discussed. No operational steps have been taken 
yet  concerning  the  reallocation  of  staff  in  order  to  address  the  imbalances  in  workload.  No  further 
information  is  available  on  the  follow-up  to  a  draft  project  prepared  by  the  SJC  Nominations  and 
Appraisal  Commission  on  reducing  the  number  of  positions  in  the  judicial  bodies  with  the  least 
workload. 
In  2007,  transfer  of  29  prosecutors’  positions,  in  2009  transfer  of  20  judges’  position  and  24 
prosecutors,  in  2010  transfer  of  4  judges  and  28  prosecutors,  in  2010  8  judges  positions  and  10 
prosecutors’ positions.  

EN 

14 

   EN 

 
                                                 
duties but also in their conduct in private sphere.54 Violations of the code of ethics 
have been used by the SJC to launch disciplinary proceedings and apply disciplinary 
sanctions.55  Recent  rulings  by  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court,  overruling  the 
disciplinary  measures  imposed  on  magistrates,  have  shown  that  the  structures  for 
ensuring  proper  disciplinary  control  over  the  judiciary  are  failing  to  deliver.  The 
prosecution  also  did  not  pursue  criminal  investigations  in  this  case.56  The 
disciplinary  practice  of  the  SJC  is  not  deemed  by  independent  experts  to  have 
contributed to improving the accountability of the judiciary. Concerns have also been 
raised  on  the  make-up  of  disciplinary  panels  under  the  SJC,  for  example  that 
prosecutors sit in judgment on disciplinary proceedings concerning judges. 

The  SJC  set  up  a  Commission  for  professional  ethics  and  prevention  of  corruption 
(Ethics  Commission).  The  opinions  produced  by  the  Ethics  Commission  in  the 
context of appraisals, promotions and senior appointments have not led to a rigorous 
and transparent assessment of candidates’ integrity. A number of controversies put in 
question the methodology of the Ethics Commission and the objectivity of its input. 
It  was  only  after  a  civil  society  initiative  to  produce  profiles  of  candidates  that  the 
track record of candidates started to come consistently  into the public domain. The 
Ethics  Commission  has  not  taken  any  concrete  steps  in  the  field  of  corruption 
prevention.  A  strategy  for  preventing  corruption  within  the  judiciary  produced  in 
2008 has not been followed by any noticeable steps on the ground.  
Before  2007,  disciplinary  action  against  magistrates  was  virtually  non-existent.57 
This responsibility lay with an inspection attached to the Ministry of Justice, and the 
role of higher ranking judicial bodies to inspect courts and prosecution offices within 
their  jurisdiction  had  not  been  effectively  exercised.  Restricting  magistrates' 
immunity to acts performed within professional duties and the establishment of the 
Inspectorate  have  been  important  steps  towards  strengthening  the  accountability  of 
the  judiciary  in  Bulgaria.  The  Judicial  System  Act  provides  for  two  types  of 
procedures, one initiated by the SJC and one by administrative heads.58 Disciplinary 
sanctions can be also taken based on the violation of the Code of Ethics. According 
to  the  information  provided  by  Bulgarian  authorities,  the  179  disciplinary 
proceedings submitted to the SJC between January 2007 and December 2011 led to 

54 

55 

56 

57 

58 

Before the code of ethics adopted in 2009, Bulgaria disposed of a rudimentary form of code of ethics 
prepared by judges association and endorsed by the Supreme Judicial Council in December 2003. 
Examples of disciplinary measures taken based on the code of ethics include the dismissal of two SJC 
members in the scandal on alleged trade in influence in senior appointments, sanctions of removal from 
office of administrative heads and other sanctions against three judges involved in a real estate property 
scandal.  
The  Supreme  Administrative  Court  cancelled  disciplinary  sentences  for  three  senior  judges  from  the 
same court who had allegedly been involved in a case of trade in influence and corruption related to real 
estate purchases. The court argued that a breach of the ethical code alone could not justify sanctions; 
concrete  violations  committed  in  office  were  required.  The  prosecution  raised  no  cases  against 
magistrates involved in the "Krassyo" and "Primorsko" scandals. 
3  disciplinary  cases  launched  against  top  prosecutors  in  2007,  sanctions  confirmed  by  SAC.  Parallel 
criminal proceedings have also been launched. 
Disciplinary  action  taken  by  administrative  heads  can  take  the  form  of  reprimand,  censure  or 
admonition. Disciplinary Action taken by the Supreme Judicial Council can lead to a range of sanctions 
from reprimand to removal from office. 

EN 

15 

   EN 

 
                                                 
172  decisions.  This  included  137  sanctions,  most  of  which  were  reprimands  and 
censures.59  

Concerns  have  been  raised  concerning  the  action  taken  when  transgressions  have 
been  identified.  First,  the  decisions  and  sanctions  have  not  always  been  consistent, 
including  at  the  level  of  appeals  to  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court.  The  Court 
could  play  an  important  role  in  promoting  consistency,  for  example  in  cases  of 
delays in motivations.60 Second, despite plausible signs pointing to criminal offenses, 
in  some  emblematic  cases  the  prosecution  did  not  decide  to  initiate  criminal 
proceedings against the magistrates concerned.61 

Debate on the reform of the SJC 

The 2012 amendments to the Judicial Systems Act provided an opportunity to put in 
place new arrangements for the SJC and the selection of its members. This has been 
a  source  of  concern  in  CVM  reports,  and  by  others  including  United  Nations 
bodies.62  The  amendments  introduced  a  number  of  measures  to  increase  the 
transparency  and  rigour  of  the  selection  process.  Candidates  will  be  publicly 
nominated  at  least  one  month  before  the  election  date  and  their  CVs  will  be 
published on the websites of the SJC or the National Assembly. Criteria for selection 
and  key  information  about  the  candidates,  for  both  the  parliamentary  and  judicial 
quota, will be set out more clearly. 

At the same time, the Ministry of Justice, professional associations, civil society and 
other stakeholders engaged in a debate on other potential changes to the SJC and its 
selection  process.  Proposals  included  a  stricter  separation  between  judges  and 
prosecutors,  a  part-time  mandate  for  SJC  members,  and  the  introduction  of  one-
magistrate-one-vote for the judicial quota. The principle of one-magistrate-one-vote 
has  been  introduced  for  future  elections  in  the  judicial  quota,  but  will  not  apply  in 
this  year's  elections.  This  year's  selection  process  will  see  a  greater  number  of 
delegates chosen by judges at the local level, but will retain a system of delegation 
rather than direct vote – though the Prosecutor-General has considered organising a 
more open system for elections amongst prosecutors. 

Judicial practice 

Successive  CVM  reports  have  pointed  to  weaknesses  in  judicial  and  investigative 
practice, and to the particular consequences of this in tackling high level corruption 

59 

60 

61 

62 

In  2011,  the  SJC  ruled  on  21  disciplinary  proceedings  and  applied  3  reprimands,  7  reductions  in 
salaries, 1 reduction in salary one removal from the function of administrative head and 4 dismissals. 
Between January 2007 and December 2011, disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Inspectorate led to 
39 sanctions imposed by the SJC and 96 disciplinary sanctions imposed by administrative heads. 
This  could  mitigate  the  approach  of  the  Inspectorate, which  has  been  to  consider  such  instances on  a 
case by case basis and adopt a more lenient stance where a high workload or high complexity of cases 
were  interpreted  as  mitigating  circumstances.  This  approach,  while  having  the  merit  of  flexibility, 
presents clear disadvantages to the parties and to the administration of justice as a whole as it de facto 
authorises breaches of statutory deadlines, without clear criteria. 
In 2010, two members of the Supreme Judicial Council were dismissed from the judiciary in relation to 
allegations  of  trade  in  influence  in  senior  appointments.  In  another  scandal  linked  to  real  estate 
property,  sanctions  applied  by  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  against  three  magistrates  have  been 
subsequently revoked on appeal by the Supreme Administrative Court. 
United  Nations  Committee  on  Torture,  14  December  2011:  "The  Committee  is  concerned…..  by  the 
lack  of  transparency regarding  the  selection  and  appointment  of judges and  members of  the  Supreme 
Judicial Council " 

EN 

16 

   EN 

 
                                                 
and  organised  crime  through  efficient  prosecution  and  final  decision  in  court.63 
Independent expertise has pointed to particular issues concerning the effectiveness of 
the prosecution and the investigation bodies. 

A number of steps have been taken in Bulgaria to improve judicial and investigative 
practice.  These  ranged  from  intensifying  training  for  magistrates  and  investigative 
services,  reforming  the  institutional  set-up,  to  changes  in  the  legal  framework.  The 
National Institute of Justice enlarged its training offer on criminal matters and started 
to  organised  joint  trainings  for  judges  and  prosecutors  on  topics  such  as  financial 
investigations, money laundering, and trafficking in human beings.  

An SJC commission for monitoring cases of high public interest was set up with the 
intention of having an overall disciplinary effect on how such cases are being dealt 
with  by  the  judiciary,  although  some  of  these  cases  continued  to  suffer  significant 
delays.64  A  methodology  for  the  analysis  of  acquittals  is  currently  being  developed 
jointly by the Ministry of Justice, the General Prosecutor and the SJC.  

the  end  of  2011.  Another 

In  2011,  the  General  Prosecutor  introduced  Instructions  and  a  new  management 
supervision scheme in prosecution offices to help make use of guidance and advice 
by  more  experienced  prosecutors.  A  unified  instruction  on  the  application  of  the 
penal  procedure  code  was  published  at 
joint 
methodological instruction on pre-trial proceedings for the police and the prosecution 
and  a  new  instruction  to  improve  and  unify  prosecutorial  practice  in  the  field  of 
complex economic and financial crimes have been adopted. A number of agreements 
have  been  signed  between  the  prosecution  and  other  administrative  bodies  to 
facilitate  cooperation  and  exchange  of  information.65  A  concept  paper  on  structural 
reform in the prosecution presented in February 2012 recognises the need for further 
specialisation and methodological guidance to address weaknesses in the work of the 
prosecution and to create appropriate structures to deal with cross-border crimes.66 In 
addition  to  the  proposed  structural  reform  in  the  Supreme  Prosecution  Office  of 
Cassation, the General Prosecutor has set up networks of prosecutors specialised in 
different categories of crimes (e.g. on corruption offenses, tax crimes, cyber crimes), 
linked  to  dedicated  training.  The  effectiveness  of  these  networks  will  need  to  be 
assessed. 

To bring about a decisive improvement, these measures will have to offset a number 
of structural weaknesses such as the high degree of management autonomy for local 
heads  of  prosecution  offices  and  the  role  of  the  investigating  magistrates 
(sledovateli).  Despite  a  number  of  formal  agreements,  the  prosecution  –  as  other 
parts of the administration – suffers from communication difficulties which seem to 
hold back cooperation between different services.67 The prosecution considers that an 

63 

64 
65 

66 

67 

Technical  Update  2011  (COM(2011)459,  p12,  p.17.;  Interim  report  2011  (COM(2011)81,  p.5-6; 
Technical Update 2010 (COM2010)400, p.11, p.14; Technical Update 2009 (COM(2009)402 p.13-14; 
Technical Update 2008 (COM92008)495, p.13-15, p.20-21.  
See also benchmark 4 and 6 
For example, the following agreements were signed in 2011: with CEPACA, with the Customs Agency, 
with the Public Financial Inspection Agency.  
In  addition  to  the  existing  departments  on  organised  crime  and  on  corruption,  the  concept  paper 
proposes  the  establishment  of  a  department  for  criminal  offenses  committed  by  minors  and  a 
department  dealing  with  violations  of  citizens'  rights  (e.g.  elections).  The  EU  fraud  department  will 
enlarge its competence to tax crimes, customs and excise crimes and money laundering.  
See for example the small number of signals between different services on issues of local corruption. 

EN 

17 

   EN 

 
                                                 
improved  quality  in  the  collection  and  presentation  of  evidence  can  be  seen  in  a 
reduced number of cases being returned from court.  

The  prime  responsibility  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  in  unifying  judicial 
practice is exercised through cassation decisions. The  Court has been less active in 
using another tool at its disposal: interpretative rulings.68 In 2011, the Supreme Court 
created a special unit within its criminal section whose role is to identify non-unitary 
jurisprudence. In addition to generating material for interpretative ruling, the unit has 
the task to promote discussions at the level of courts of appeal on matters of criminal 
law which raise diverging interpretation. This initiative can bring positive results if 
pursued with vigour and received with interest by judges.  

Identifying  non-unitary  jurisprudence  has  been  made  more  difficult  due  to  the  fact 
that  not  all  courts  publish  court  decisions  and  motivations  systematically  and  in  a 
timely  manner.  Despite  certain  efforts  to  improve  access  to  court  verdicts  and 
motivations,  access  is  incomplete,  delays  are  common  and  search  opportunities  are 
limited.  There  are  significant  differences  in  publication  modalities  from  court  to 
court. CVM reports have raised this issue on a number of occasions69 and the SJC  

Bulgaria has a system of lay judges who sit alongside professional judges in passing 
judgement, and who have the majority voice on panels. They are chosen to serve on a 
list by the local municipality. This appears an area where the Ministry of Justice and 
the SJC could undertake reforms to ensure more clarity and transparency.  

Training 

The  National  Institute  of  Justice  (NIJ)  has  evolved  from  a  training  centre  into  an 
autonomous  training  institute  providing  initial  and  continuous  training.  Training  is 
offered to judges, prosecutors, investigators and court administration. The number of 
participants trained per year by the NIJ has steadily increased from 3000 in 2007 to 
approximately  6000  in  2011.  Efforts  have  been  made  to  improve  the  range  and 
quality of the training offer on a regular basis. The initial training for candidates for 
magistrates has been extended from 6 to 9 months and concludes with both an oral 
and written exam.70 Attention has been drawn to the need to strengthen the offer for 
those magistrates recruited among lawyers with 3 years professional experience.  

The NIJ has sought to adapt the training offer to the needs of the judiciary based on a 
needs assessment. Since 2011, tailored training on judicial and investigative practice 
in  criminal  matters  has  been  made  available  to  judges,  prosecutors  and  police 
officers.  The  NIJ  invested  in  expanding  online  training  modules  and  decentralised 
training, which is more accessible for magistrates across the country. Training in EU 
law has evolved from general introductory training to integrating specific aspects of 
EU law into modules on national law (i.e. the direct application of EU law). In 2011 
and  2012,  the  training  offer  on  criminal  law,  including  with  the  involvement  of 

68 

69 

70 

Between  January  2007  and  December  2011,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  issued  5  interpretative 
rulings  concerning  provisions  on  organised  crime  and  corruption  offenses.  Three  more  signals  of 
inconsistent jurisprudence on criminal law provisions have been filed to the SCC in 2012. 
Technical  Update  2011  (COM(2011)459,  p.11.;  Interim  report  2011  (COM(2011)81,  p.4.;  Technical 
Update  2010  (COM2010)400,  p.9;  Technical  Update  2009  (COM(2009)402  p.7;  Technical  Update 
2008 (COM92008)495, p.12. 
These  changes  have  been  introduced  through  amendments  to  the  JSA  of  2010.  The  first  round  of 
candidates undergoing 9 month training will start the initial training in September 2012. 

EN 

18 

   EN 

 
                                                 
foreign  experts,  was  expanded,  with  an  emphasis  on  enhancing  the  capacity  of 
investigating bodies. 

The NIJ's human resources capacity and the budget have remained frozen for the past 
3 years, despite the increase in their activities.71 This led the Institute to pro-actively 
seek  alternative  sources  of  financing  through  international  funding  and  bilateral 
cooperation  projects.  An  international  department  has  been  created  to  ensure 
oversight  and  facilitate  implementation  of  these  projects.  In  2012,  these  alternative 
sources  of  financing  are  expected  to  exceed  funding  from  the  state  budget.  This 
entails  certain  risks  in  terms  financial  management  and  cannot  replace  appropriate 
financing through the state budget in the long run.  

Random allocation of cases 

The  system  of  random  allocation  of  cases  in  courts  is  based  on  IT  software 
accredited by the SJC. According to the Bulgarian authorities, all the judicial bodies 
have  been  by  now  equipped  with  the  IT  systems  for  random  allocation  of  cases. 
According to the information shared by practitioners, different systems deployed in 
different  courts  demonstrate  a  range  of  shortcomings.  Problems  identified  include 
insufficient security guarantees, opening the door to manipulation, and an inability to 
take  into  account  the  complexity  of  cases.  This  gives  rise  to  concerns  that  it  can 
exacerbate the uneven workload given to each judge. The system does not assign lay 
judges  to  cases.  A  new  system  taking  into  account  the  complexity  of  cases,  has 
started  to  be  tested  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  in  2012,  and  the  SJC  has 
acknowledged  the  desirability  of  a  single  IT  software.  This  would  facilitate 
monitoring  of  the  practical  application  of  random  allocation  and  should  allow  for 
greater transparency of the system. 

5. 

71 

72 

73 

74 
75 

BENCHMARK  4:  CONDUCT  AND  REPORT  ON  PROFESSIONAL,  NON-PARTISAN 
CORRUPTION. 
INVESTIGATIONS 
REPORT  ON  INTERNAL  INSPECTIONS  OF  PUBLIC  INSTITUTIONS  AND  ON  THE 
PUBLICATION OF ASSETS OF HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS 

HIGH-LEVEL 

ALLEGATIONS 

INTO 

OF 

High-level  corruption  has  been  consistently  identified  as  a  serious  problem  for 
Bulgaria,  both  before  accession  and  in  successive  CVM  reports.72  This  view  is 
shared  by  Bulgarian  public  opinion.  This  has  been  confirmed  in  a  number  of 
studies73 and opinion polls on corruption in general. For example, a Eurobarometer 
poll  saw  95%  of  Bulgarians  defining  corruption  as  a  major  problem.  Bulgaria  had 
figures  well  over  the  EU  average  in  terms of  perceived  corruption  in  the  judiciary, 
the  police,  the  customs  service  and  amongst  politicians.74  Corruption  has  also  been 
identified as the greatest obstacle to doing business in Bulgaria75. 

The  yearly  budget  of  the  NIJ  increased  from  BGN  2,2  to  3  mln  between  2007  and  2009  but  was 
maintained at BGN 2,5 mln in the last 3 years. The staff capacity increased remained stable with around 
60 positions of which 56 occupied. 
See COM(2007)377 Final p 13; COM(2008)63final p 9; COM(2008)495final p6; COM(2009) 402final 
p6; COM(2010)112final p5; COM(2011)459final p 6; COM(2012)57final p 2 
"Money,  politics,  power:  Corruption  risks  in  Europe",  study  by  Transparency  International  with 
financial support from the European Commission, the ISEC Programme. June 2012. p 13 
Special Eurobarometer 374, February 2012 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GCR_Report_2011-12.pdf  The  global  competitiveness  report 
2011–2012. World economic forum. Country fiche on Bulgaria p 130. Geneva, Switzerland, 2011. 

EN 

19 

   EN 

 
                                                 
In recent years, there have been some 100-200 cases of corruption coming before the 
courts each year. High-level cases have been few. They have faced delays and have 
suffered from procedural errors. The few final court rulings for corruption cases that 
can be reported mostly date from 2010 onwards, although the start of the cases often 
goes back to 2007 and 2008.  

A  satisfactory  legal  framework  is  in  place  to  allow  the  prosecution  of  corruption-
related  offences.  This  was  confirmed  by  the  GRECO  report  on  Bulgaria,  which 
stated  that  the  legal  provisions  on  bribery  and  trading  in  influence  provide  a  good 
basis  for  the  prosecution  of  various  corruption  offences,  although  some  room  for 
improvement  can  be  still  achieved.76  However,  analysis  by  the  prosecution  has 
pointed to some suggestions for legislative amendment.77 

The lack of results in terms of final court rulings in the field of high level corruption 
is therefore to a large extent attributable to weaknesses in both investigative as well 
as  judicial  practice.  The  general  shortcomings  in  these  areas  highlighted  in  CVM 
reports are particularly evident in the area of high-level corruption. Weaknesses have 
included  the  lack  of  a  proactive  approach  towards  investigative  practices,  an 
undeveloped capacity to conduct complex financial investigations, and investigations 
or indictments with too narrow a focus. Two recent cases involving fraud against EU 
funds  provide  typical  examples  of  delays,  in  this  case  on  appeal  following  lengthy 
first instance prison sentences.78  

The  trend  towards  specialisation  in  the  prosecution  and  the  police  has  included 
efforts to focus on high level corruption cases. This includes setting up separate units 
for the fight against corruption in the prosecution;79 increasing the specialisation of 
police  investigators  as  part  of  the  overall  reform  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior; 
establishing SANS with specific focus on the fight against high-level corruption as a 
threat to national security; the establishment in 2012 of joint investigation teams on 
high-level  corruption;  and  specialised  training  for  magistrates  and  police.  Most 
recently, following an order dated 8 May 2012 of the Prosecutor General, an internal 
specialised  network  of  prosecutors  for  counteracting  corruption  crimes  was 
established. The Commission's recommendation to focus on complex financial crime 
has  been  followed  up  by  a  commitment  by  the  prosecution  to  set  up  networks  of 

76 

77 

78 

79 

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3(2009)7_Bulgaria_One_EN.pdf  p.16. 
See also benchmark 2. 
The analysis of the prosecution notably considers the articles in the Penal Code in relation to "abuse of 
office"  (art.282  Penal  Code)  as  inapplicable  to  many  real  situations  of  corruption,  sees  a  need  for  an 
alignment  and  consolidation  of  legislation  in  specific  areas  and  suggests  reconsidering  legal 
requirements as i.e. the need to proof "direct intent" and a "special purpose". 
Data provided by Bulgaria in April 2012 show in the first case a first instance conviction in March 2010 
of  10  years  imprisonment.  The  case  resumed  at  appeal  level  in  May  2011  and  has been postponed at 
least  7  times  since  then,  notably  for  the  failure  of  defence  councillors  to  attend  court  hearings  –  a 
circumstance  in  which  the  Penal  Procedure  Code  allows  court  to  appoint  ex-officio  lawyers.  A 
conviction of 12 years of imprisonment was handed down in the second case in October 2010, however 
court  motivations  were  only  finalised  in  October  2011  and  were  only  delivered  to  all  defendants  in 
April 2012. In April this year, the case had not yet effectively started as certain documents could not yet 
be delivered to some defendants whose whereabouts could not be established. Already at first instance 
level, these cases were marred by procedural delays and cases of witness intimidation. 
The  prosecution  has  also  undertaken  a  number  of  procedural  and  management  actions,  notably  a 
monthly  analysis  of  cases,  regular  inter-institutional  meetings,  the  conclusion  of  agreements  of 
cooperation between the prosecution and administrative control authorities, the issuing methodological 
guidance and management supervision and training. 

EN 

20 

   EN 

 
                                                 
specialised  prosecutors  for  economic  and  financial  crime80  and  to  develop 
methodological instructions for the investigation of complex economic and financial 
crimes in co-operation with international experts. It is too early to assess the results 
of these measures. 

Following Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, several EU member states have continued 
to provide technical assistance either through bilateral or EU funded projects or on an 
ad  hoc  basis.  This  transfer  of  know  how  and  best  practices  remains  very  useful  to 
assist  the  Bulgarian  administration  and  the  judiciary  to  step  up  its  capacity  to 
adequately  deal  with  both  the  prevention  and  fight  against  petty  and  high  level 
corruption based on EU best practices.  

These  efforts  have  not  translated  into  a  high  level  of  dissuasiveness  through  clear 
indications that high-level corruption is systematically punished. In part, this is due 
to the broader issues of confidence of the public in the ability of Bulgaria to tackle 
corruption  (as  discussed  above).  But  it  also  reflects  the  fact  that  the  number  of 
indictments  has  remained  stable  in  recent  years,  and  that  a  substantial,  though 
declining, proportion of cases have resulted in acquittals.81 

Asset declaration and verification 

A  well-functioning  asset  declaration  and  verification  system  can  be  an  effective  tool  to 
prevent and fight corruption, to uncover inexplicable wealth and to promote good governance. 
In Bulgaria, the first steps to establish an asset declaration and verification system were taken 
well  before  accession  with  the  Law  on  the  Publicity  of  the  Property  of  Persons  Occupying 
State Positions, adopted in April 2000. The law was amended every year between 2002 and 
2008 and as a result, nearly 7000 officials are required to fill out asset declarations annually, 
as  well  as  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end  of  their  careers.  Since  their  spouses/children  fall 
under the same obligation, all together some 13,000 people are concerned. The National Audit 
Office (NAO) is in charge of checking these declarations (e.g. against data available in other 
registers)  and  has  a  special  software  for  this  task.  Where  needed  the  NAO  can  ask  the 
National Revenue Agency (NRA) for additional cross checks, or even a full tax audit.82 SANS 
is  also  be  notified  of  these  cases.  The  declarations  are  subsequently  put  on-line  by  the 
National Audit Office.  

The  coverage  of  this  system  is  undermined  by  a  number  of  potential  loopholes.  The 
declaration covers bank accounts and securities held on 31 December each year, so does not 
cover other accounts held in the course of the year, nor their maximum balance. It is not an 
offence to make a false declaration, unless intent can be established. In cases of real estate, the 
declared  value  does  not  always  correspond  to  market  value.  There  is  no  prioritisation  of 
checking  certain  categories  of  officials  and  the  NAO  does  not  have  investigative  powers  to 

80 

81 

82 

Trainings of the prosecutors from the specialized unit for counteracting fraud with EU funds and from 
the  Sofia  City  Prosecution  Office  and  Sofia  Regional  Prosecution  Office  involved  in  networks  for 
counteracting  tax,  customs,  excise  duties,  financial  and  credit  systems  crimes  were  organized  in  May 
2012. 
According  to  official  figures  the  number  of  acquitted  persons  with  enforced  acquittals  for  corruption 
crimes decreased over the years but still remained considerable : in 2007 36 persons were acquitted and 
109 persons condemned, in 2008 23 acquitted and 111 condemned , in 2009 43 were acquitted and 152 
condemned, in 2010 12 acquitted and 166 condemned and in 2011 21acquitted and 147 condemned 
In 2011 297 persons were subject to such inquiries which resulted in 4 full fledged tax audits 
In 2010 263 persons resulting in 3 tax audits.  

In 2012 : 167 persons are currently subject to additional inquiries by the NRA. 

EN 

21 

   EN 

 
                                                 
 
further  look  into  suspicious  cases.  While  spouses  are  concerned,  this  is  not  the  case  with 
partners  not  bound  by  marriage.  Art  works,  shares  in  trusts  or  jewellery  do  not  have  to  be 
declared.  

The system has resulted in only a few cases of irregularity, mainly linked to tax evasion. The 
CVM report of July 2011 concluded that despite the large number of the officials covered and 
the extension to their families, the system did not yet constitute an effective tool in detecting 
illicit enrichment.83 There have been no further improvements to the system.  

6. 

BENCHMARK 5: TAKE FURTHER MEASURES  TO PREVENT AND FIGHT CORRUPTION, 
IN PARTICULAR AT THE BORDERS AND WITHIN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 

Over  the  last  five  years  Bulgaria  has  adopted  several  anti-corruption  strategies  and  action 
plans84  and  a  number  of  different  state  institutions  have  been  involved  in  their 
implementation. In 2009, the Government adopted an integrated strategy to prevent and fight 
organised  crime  and  corruption.85  The  strategy  is  being  implemented  through  a  series  of 
action  plans.  The  variety  of  legal  steps  taken  has  been  recognised  by  the  United  Nations 
Convention  against  Corruption.86  However,  little  qualitative  data  on  inspection  strategies, 
control  priorities  and  actual  risk  assessments  conducted  is  available.  It  is  also  difficult  to 
assess  the  extent  to  which  inspectorates  not  only  react  to  signals,  but  also  make  proactive 
efforts to seek out unethical practices.  

The  Commission  has  noted  the  benefits  of  a  close  engagement  of  civil  society  in  the  fight 
against  corruption.  Over  the  years,  some  improvements  have  been  noted  in  this  respect  and 
civil society itself has become more engaged and better equipped to monitor ethical issues and 
corruption in general.  

Corruption and public administration 

Bulgaria's  anti-corruption  efforts  within  the  public  administration  are  co-ordinated  by  the 
Commission  for  the  Prevention  and  Countering  of  Corruption  (CPCC)  established  in  2006 
within  the  Council  of  Ministers.  The  organisation  of  the  Commission’s  work  and  the 
administrative and technical services are carried out by the Directorate “General Inspectorate” 
(GI) responsible to the Prime Minister. The GI co-ordinates the activities of inspectorates in 
Ministries  and  state  agencies,  and  reports  each  year  on  control  activities  in  public 
administration87. It has also, for example, developed a methodology for an integrity test. The 

83 
See COM(2011)459final p. 7 and SEC(2011)967final p. 14. 
84 
- National Strategy for good governance, prevention and counteraction of Corruption 2006-2008 
- Action plan for the implementation of the Strategy for Transparent Governance and for Prevention and 
Counteraction of Corruption (2006 -2008) 
- Integrated Strategy for prevention and countering corruption and organized crime and the instruments for its 

implementation (2009) 

-  Action  plans  to  implement  the  Integrated  Strategy  for  prevention  and  countering  corruption  and  organized 

85 

86 

87 

crime and the Complex Model for Prevention and Countering Corruption and Organized Crime (2010) 
The Commission has not been informed on whether any impact assessment of the previous strategy had 
been carried out or whether any detailed risk assessment to identify priority areas or actions had been 
conducted to feed into the 2009 integrated strategy to combat corruption and organised crime. 
The  UNCAC  noted  "considerable  efforts  to  adopt  reforms  of  Bulgaria's  legal,  and  particularly,  penal 
law system, to address issues of corruption." (16 January 2012). 
Between January 2007 and December 2011 a total of 7575 inspections were carried out resulting in 645 
disciplinary proceedings.  

EN 

22 

   EN 

 
                                                 
independence of the inspectorates is stipulated in law, but functions and powers are specified 
in the rules of procedure of the respective administrations. By the end of 2007, all parts of the 
central administration had introduced a corruption risk assessment system.88  

Based  on  the  analysis  of  the  yearly  reporting  by  the  GI,  some  recurrent  shortcomings  have 
been detected, related to the overall lack of internal control mechanisms. In order to remedy 
these  shortcomings,  a  concept  was  elaborated  to  improve  the  analytical  capacity  of  the 
inspectorates  as  units  of  internal  control.  This  was  endorsed  by  the  Prime  Minister  and 
submitted to the Council of Administrative Reform in 2012. 

At  regional  level,  Bulgaria  has  set  up  institutions  with  a  mandate  to  prevent  and  fight 
corruption.  All  28  regions  in  Bulgaria  have  anti-corruption  Councils,  which  have  been 
strengthened  in  recent  years  to  include  representatives  from  local  government,  territorial 
structures, the judiciary, various  ministries,  civil  society  and  the  business  community.  Their 
real impact on the reduction of corrupt behaviour in local and regional public bodies remains 
difficult to assess89  

At the level of municipalities, a number of anti-corruption measures were carried out, such as 
introducing the system of "one-stop-shops" to reduce the number of officials in direct contact 
with  the  public,  enhancing  transparency  through  municipal  newsletters,  public  hearings  and 
websites90,  Codes  of  Ethics,  establishing  systems  for  internal  financial  management  and 
control,  recruiting  some  400  internal  auditors  and  recruiting  local  public  mediators  (local 
ombudsmen). Such measures have been included in local programmes to prevent corruption 
as part of the national anti-corruption strategy.  

The newest element in Bulgaria's anti-corruption framework is the BORKOR project. Under 
preparation since 2010 and reportedly to be operational in summer this year, it is designed to 
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the current legal and institutional environment and to 
recommend  improvements.  In  this  way  it  aims  to  complement,  rather  than  replace,  the 
(already  numerous)  existing  anti-corruption  structures.  Substantial  resources  have  been 
devoted to this project.91 BORKOR is currently designing a risk assessment model to prevent 
and  fight  corruption  in  public  procurement.  The  legal  framework  providing  the  required 
human  resources  to  BORKOR  entered  into  force  on  1  July  2012.  Training  programmes  for 
staff have been deployed in the spring and soft and hardware has been delivered. However, as 
it has only recently been put into full operation, its effectiveness cannot yet be assessed. 

Whistleblowing  enables  public  employees  to  report  serious  irregularities  outside  the  normal 
reporting  channels.  If  there  is  sufficient  trust  in  the  capability  of  institutions  to  protect 
whistleblowers,  this  can  be  a  useful  additional  tool  for  disclosing  unethical  or  criminal 
behaviour. Bulgaria's legal framework on whistleblowing92 was amended in 2009 through the 

88 

89 

90 
91 

92 

The State Agency for National Security (SANS) had responsibilities for corruption issues from 2008 to 
2009, as an independent administrative entity with its own budget. 
Between  2007  and  2011  2464  financial  inspections  have  taken  place  at  local  level,  uncovering 
irregularities  worth  2,5M  €  involving  140  officials.  Inspections  in  over  3000  public  procurement 
procedures at local level worth 1,4billion € revealed irregularities in 2/3s of them for a total value of 
nearly 1 billion €. 339 inspection reports were transf erred to the public prosecutor for judicial follow up 
80% of municipalities in Bulgaria have a website. 
Its staff is currently at 150, 40 of which are permanent, the rest seconded. So far, €1,25 million has been 
allocated to BORKOR, with €2,5 million earmarked in the 2012 budget.  
This  is  based  on  the  Administrative  Procedure  Code  (effective  since  2006)  and  on  the  Conflict  of 
Interest prevention ascertainment act (effective since 2009). 

EN 

23 

   EN 

 
                                                 
adoption  of  the  Conflict  of  Interest  Prevention  and  Ascertainment  Act  containing  further 
provisions  on  the  protection  of  whistleblowers'  identity.  However,  effective  administrative 
arrangements  for  whistleblowers  do  not  yet  exist.93  The  2011  implementation  review  by 
United  Nations  Convention  against  Corruption  drew  attention  to  the  need  for  Bulgaria  to 
establish  more  comprehensive  provisions  on  the  protection  for  whistle  blowers.94  There 
remain so far very few, if any, cases of successful whistleblowing. 

The number of complaints concerning unethical behaviour by staff of the Ministry of Interior 
shows a slight decrease in terms of signals (561 in 2007 compared to 495 in 2011) while there 
is  an  increase  in  the  number  of  persons  referred  to  the  prosecution  service  (40  in  2007 
compared  to  72  in  2011)  as  well  as  in  the  number  of  pre-trial  proceedings  (23  in  2007 
compared  to  67  in  2011).  Various  operations  have  been  conducted  in  the  past  three  years 
against road traffic police officers, border police officers and customs officers, leading to the 
initiation of pre-trial proceedings which have not so far reached the stage of final sentencing. 

In 2011, the CVM report raised a particular issue concerning donations from private and legal 
persons to the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, mainly the police.95 The Bulgarian government 
decided to limit donations to police public bodies and state owned companies and to improve 
their  transparency.96  However,  there  remains  an  issue  of  accountability  and  financial 
transparency, and in particular the risk that large-scale donations, which can still be made, can 
be used to circumvent public procurement rules.  

Bulgaria has taken a variety of measures to prevent and sanction corruption at the borders and 
within border agencies. This is recognised as an area under considerable pressure,97 relying on 
staff with relatively low salaries.98 The border police has adopted a methodology for assessing 
and managing the risk of corruption, a code of ethics and various instructions and orders on 
disciplinary actions in cases of corruption. Tests on entry, specialised training and awareness 
campaigns target the issue of corruption, as well as the obligation to fill out a declaration of 
assets and of conflict of interest. Border staff wear badges to facilitate identification, booths 
are numbered and information sign boards are displayed to encourage complaints in case of 

93 

94 

95 
96 
97 

98 

For example, in the summer of 2011 the police officer who unveiled the policy of the Bulgarian Interior 
Ministry  towards  traffic  violations  committed  by  its  donors  was  subsequently  forced  to  resign  and 
threatened with a court case. 
"Rules for the protection of whistle-blowers are only included in the Law on Prevention and Disclosure 
of Conflict of Interest of 2008 without comprehensive provisions on the protection of persons providing 
relevant  information  on  corruption-related  acts.  The  existence  of  such  legislation  would  significantly 
enhance domestic efforts to prevent and detect corruption". 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/18-
22June2012/V1187232e.pdf (p.7). 
SEC(2011)967 final p. 18. 
These are now entered on a public register. 
"As a result of increasing migration flows globally and the difficult situation at the Greek-Turkish land 
border  in  2011,  Bulgaria’s  entry  into  the  Schengen  area  may  lead  to  higher  pressure  from  secondary 
illegal migration at the Bulgarian Greek border". Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 
– 2011. Centre for the Study of Democracy. Sofia, April 2012. p 8. 
"The  analysis  showed  the  salary  levels  of  border  guards  working  along  EU’s  external  eastern  land 
border  are  significantly  lower  in  comparison  to  the  salaries  in  border  services  in  most  other  MS.  In 
addition, in the past two years the pressure from petty as well as organised smugglers of illicit tobacco 
products  has  grown  significantly.  The  existing  vulnerability  of  low-paid  border  guards  and  the 
increased threat from organised criminals has heightened the risk of corruption along EU’s external land 
borders."  Study  on  anti-corruption  measures  in  EU  border  control.  Sofia,  April  2012.  Written  by  the 
Centre for the Study of Democracy for FRONTEX. See p. 112. 

EN 

24 

   EN 

 
                                                 
 
inappropriate behaviour through e.g. hotlines or complaint boxes. Video surveillance covering 
the entire border crossing point, including control booths is in place. The rotation principle is 
now  introduced  at  all  border  checkpoints  and  contributes  to  reducing  the  risk  of  petty 
corruption. Unannounced and planned inspections take place on a regular basis. Disciplinary 
action  ranging  from  fines  to  dismissals  has  been  applied  in  proven  cases  of  wrongdoings. 
Over  the  past  five  years  the  number  of  detected  cases  of  unethical  behaviour  has  remained 
relatively stable99  

The  Customs  Agency  underwent  a  number  of  structural  reforms  in  order  to  increase  the 
importance  of  ethical  standards  and  professionalism.  At  the  time  of  accession,  staffing  was 
rationalized  and  a  new  structure  put  in  place.100  A  new  system  for  selection  and  career 
development  of  staff  has  been  implemented  since  2010,  which  includes  integrity  testing  of 
candidates.  A  Code  of  Ethics  for  customs  officials  is  in  force  and  failure  to  comply  with  it 
constitutes  grounds  for  disciplinary  action.  The  Law  on  the  Customs  requires  officials  to 
provide information about their and their families’ property upon appointment, annually and 
upon  leaving  the  institution.  If  the  data  indicate  a  conflict  of  interest,  the  Commission  for 
preventing  and  establishing  conflicts  of  interest  is  notified.  Measures  have  been  taken  to 
guarantee that citizens can file signals.101  

Customs  officials  in  Bulgaria  face  considerable  challenges  given  the  pressures  of  organised 
crime at the borders, for example as regards cigarette smuggling102. They also now have the 
power  to  investigating  customs,  currency  and  excise  violations.  It  is  therefore  of  particular 
importance  that  possible  transgressions  are  followed  up.  Disciplinary  penalties  have  been 
imposed, and a few cases have been brought to court: 8 pre-trial investigations were opened 
against custom officials in 2007, 5 in 2008, 4 in 2009, 4 in 2010 and 1 in 2011103. 

The  health  and  education  sectors  have  frequently  been  flagged  in  CVM  reports  as  being 
particularly  vulnerable  to  corrupt  practices.104  In  both  areas  some  preventive  measures  have 
been  taken,  such  as  a  system  for  evaluating  corruption  risks  in  the  health  sector,  the 
establishment  of  a  Medical  Audit  Executive  Agency  to  deal  with  complaints  and  signals  of 
corruption, and an electronic register for signalling corruption practices. Both areas are also 

99 

100 

101 

102 

103 

104 

35  inspections  leading  to  25  disciplinary  proceedings  and  15  dismissals  in  2007  to  35  inspections 
leading  to  28  disciplinary  proceedings  and  22  dismissals  in  2011.  In  total  157  inspections  were 
conducted  between 2007  and  2011  with  111 disciplinary  proceedings  and 81  dismissals  and  29  other 
sanctions imposed. 
This included a substantial reduction in staff numbers (from 4003 to 3337), removing the level of the 
regional  customs  directorates  and  restructuring  the  Central  Customs  Directorate,  and  replacing  the 
previous Inspectorate with a combination of an internal audit unit and an Investigation Division. 
This includes anonymous questionnaires handed out to passengers and carriers at border crossing points 
to identify possible corruption practices, and a hotline. 
"The illegal distribution of tobacco products is a generator of corruption, which in some regions affects 
various levels of the law enforcement institutions, customs and the judiciary. In some cases entire shifts 
of  customs  officers,  security  police  officers,  mid  and  high  level  police  officers  receive  additional 
monthly  payments  from  the  illegal  trade  in  tobacco  products."  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat 
Assessment 2010 – 2011. Centre for the Study of Democracy. Sofia, April 2012. See p 44. 
The figures for 2012 will undoubtedly be influenced by an operation conducted on 2 May at the Capitan 
Andreevo checkpoint on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. The operation, carried out by the Directorate for 
Combatting Organized Crime, GDBOP, the Internal Security Department of the Interior Ministry, and 
the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office, aimed at countering racketeering of people and companies passing 
through the checkpoint. 30 Bulgarian Customs Officers were reportedly caught red-handed with bribes. 
SEC(2010) 948;  COM(2009)  402  final ;  SEC(2009) 1074,  COM(2008)  495  final  SEC(2008) 2350/2, 
COM(2008) 63 final. 

EN 

25 

   EN 

 
                                                 
subject to checks by the inspectorates of the respective Ministries in charge105. Nevertheless, 
reports on corruption in health106 and education continued to be frequent. Such practices have 
consequences  in  areas  like  equal  access  to  the  health  system107  and  the  perception  of 
Bulgarian diplomas. 

The electoral system 

(a)  A  recurrent  problem  highlighted  in  various  CVM  reports  has  been  the 
allegations  of  electoral  fraud,  especially  vote  buying.  All  local  and  to  a 
lesser  extent  Parliamentary,  Presidential  and  European  elections  held  in 
the  past  five  years  have  reportedly  suffered  from  such  practices,  which 
have  also  been  confirmed  by  specialised  international  organisations108 
and  local  NGOs109.  Amendments  to  the  penal  code  in  October  2007 
criminalized vote-buying: there have been cases of criminal investigation 
and so far 43 people have been sanctioned.110  

(b)  The  National  Audit  Office  systematically  checks  the  accounts  of  all 
political parties that participate in elections and of candidates. They must 
disclose their bank accounts and they must channel election expenditure 
through  those  accounts.  Donations  to  political  parties  have  to  be  made 
public.  

(c)  Bulgaria sought to take account of GRECO recommendations of 2010 on 
financing  of  political  parties  and  election  campaigns111  in  the  new 
Election Code which according to specialised international organisations 
"provides  a  sound  basis  for  democratic  elections".112  As  set  out  in  the 

105 

106 

107 

108 

109 
110 

111 
112 

Inspections in the education sector in the period 2007 – 2001 were predominantly related to allegations 
of  conflict  of  interest  and  to  a  lesser  extent  following  corruption  complaints.  The  number  of  checks 
varied between 5 and 15 per year. As regards the health sector, the Medical Audit Executive Agency 
started to work in 2010 and carried out checks on corruption, bad management and abuse of office (6 
thematic checks and 2 ad hoc checks in 2010 and 1 thematic check and 5 ad hoc checks in 2011). The 
majority of checks took place in response to complaints and signals.  
http://futurechallenges.org/news/healthcare-in-bulgaria%E2%80%94do-we-still-call-ourselves-
european  citizens/  Healthcare  in  Bulgaria—do  we  still  call  ourselves  European  citizens?  Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, March 2012 / Radina Ivanova 
"In  Bulgaria,  high-income  urbanized  patients  were  more  likely  to  make  informal  payments  and  thus 
receive care they needed in contrast to low-income patients" p 12  
http://www.undp.org.tt/News/UNODC/Anticorruption%20Methods%20and%20Tools%20in%20Health
%20L%20Res%20final.pdf Fighting corruption in the health sector – methods tools and good practices. 
UNDP, October 2011.  
"Nevertheless, pervasive allegations of vote-buying and the fact that virtually all campaign coverage in 
the media had to be purchased underscored the need for continued reform." Presidential and Municipal 
elections 23 and 30 October 2011 OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission - Final Report. 
p3. 
http://riskmonitor.bg/js/tiny_mce/plugins/ajaxfilemanager/upload/Reports/RM-24-fr-book.pdf 
2008:  8  criminal  proceedings  launched  resulting  in  1  sentenced  person  and  1  acquittal,  in  2009  79 
criminal proceedings launched and 21 persons sanctioned, in 2010 4 criminal proceedings launched and 
1  person  sanctioned  and  in  2011  92  criminal  proceedings  launched  and  20  persons  sanctioned. 
Sanctions vary from fines, over a number of hours of community services, deprivation of the right to be 
elected, to maximum one year of imprisonment. 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3(2009)7_Bulgaria_Two_EN.pdf 
(Venice 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/80841European  Commission 
Commission) and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR). Joint 
Opinion on the election code of Bulgaria. Adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections at its 37th 

for  Democracy 

through 

law 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
                                                 
 
CVM  report  of  July  2011,  full  implementation  of  all  GRECO 
recommendations  with  regard  to  the  transparency  of  financing  for 
political  parties  would  be  an  important  step  in  the  fight  against 
corruption. 113  

Prevention of conflict of interest 

Following  the  suspension  of  pre-accession  funds  in  2008,  triggered  by  a  series  of  financial 
irregularities, including some linked to conflicts of interest, a law on the prevention of conflict 
of interest was adopted and came into force in 2009.  

Parliament  set  up  a  Committee  on  Anti-Corruption,  conflict  of  interests  and  parliamentary 
ethics (CACCIPE) in July 2009. This initiated several ex-officio inspections which revealed 
that 5 MPs had not submitted their declarations before the deadline.  

Work to prevent conflicts of interest became more operational in summer 2011, when the new 
Commission for the Prevention of Conflict of Interest started its work. 114 Due to the fact that 
the implementation of the law was delayed, for some time signals on conflict of interest were 
not followed up. The Commission has received 300 signals115 and issued a total number of 71 
decisions, with conflict of interest established in 30 cases. One case out of these 30 has been 
finalised  so  far.  Co-operation  with  various  agencies  and  bodies  in  the  administration  is 
reported to be good, including with the local level.  

Experts  consulted  by  the  European  Commission  confirmed  that  weaknesses  in  the  system 
include  a  long  and  cumbersome  procedure  leading  to  a  final  decision.  The  Commission's 
decisions  can  be  appealed  at  two  instances  before  the  courts  and  any  subsequent 
administrative sanction can also be appealed at two instances. Independent experts have also 
noted other shortcomings: that the final sanction is taken by the President of the Commission 
alone and not by the entire Commission in a collegial way; that the Commission has no way 
of obliging requested information or evidence to be provided; and that it cannot oblige entities 
to publish the conflict of interest declarations of their staff. The Commission does not follow 
up  anonymous  signals,  though  it  has  the  power  to  convert  these  into  ex officio  actions.  The 
effectiveness and impartiality of the commission still needs to be proven and will ultimately 
depend  on  its  ability  to  deliver  sound  judgment,  especially  in  sensitive  cases  or  cases 
involving high-level officials and politicians.  

Public procurement 

Within  the  CVM,  the  Commission  evaluates  also  the  progress  made  in  the 
implementation  of  public  procurement  rules  since  weaknesses  in  this  area  are 

113 

114 

115 

meeting (Venice, 16 June 2011) and by the Venice Commission at its 87th plenary session (Venice, 17-
18 June 2011). P. 20. 
Bulgaria has submitted a compliance report to GRECO in response to its evaluation report containing a 
number of recommendations (October 2010) on incriminations and on political party funding, the two 
themes of the third evaluation round. GRECO will now assess to what extent its recommendations have 
been dealt with satisfactorily 
The  Commission  has  19  staff.  Its  Commission  budget  for  2011  amounted  to  BGN  555.000  of  which 
BGN 290.000 for building refurbishment. The budget for 2012 BGN 1,5 million. 
This  represents  a  major  increase:  in  2009  only  one  signal  of  conflict  of  interest  was  received  by  the 
authorities, in 2010, 22 signals were received and between April 2011 and February 2012, 201 signals 
were filed 

EN 

27 

   EN 

 
                                                                                                                                                         
considered  as  an  important  source  of  corruption.  Administrative  capacity  and 
practice and also the ability by administrative control authorities and the judiciary to 
protect  against  irregularities,  misuse  of  funds  and  fraud  are  elements  of  the 
Commissions considerations in this context. 

Since  2007,  Bulgaria  has  made  efforts  to  improve  its  legal  framework  and 
administrative  action  regarding  public  procurement.  Bulgaria  reformed  its  public 
procurement  legislation  in  2011  and  2012  with  the  aim  to  simplify  the  procedures 
and  to  strengthen  some  administrative  controls,  in  order  to  comply  with  the 
recommendations addressed by the Commission.116 The Public Financial Inspections 
Agency  (PFIA)  and  the  Court  of  Auditors  received  powers  to  undertake  ex-officio 
checks  and  the  requirement  on  the  Public  Procurement  Agency  (PPA)  to  check 
tenders before they are published was extended. Efforts have been made to improve 
the expertise of the judiciary, including through specialisation. 

However, Ex-officio powers which were conferred to the Court of Auditors and the 
Public  Financial  Inspections  Agency  were  not  conferred  upon  the  PPA  for  the 
purpose of ex-ante verification. In order to foster a culture of focussed and risk-based 
controls  and  to  avoid  a  "rubber-stamping"  approach  in  these  tasks,  it  would  be 
advisable  that  ex-officio  powers  are  granted  also  to  the  PPA.  Giving  the  PPA  the 
right to perform ex-officio checks would send an important message that a more pro-
active  approach  is  expected.  Following  the  broadening  of  its  ex-ante  control 
competences,  the  key  challenge  for  the  PPA  would  be  to  cope  with  the  number  of 
files to be processed.117 

Although additional staff has been made available this year,118 the resources devoted 
to helping contracting authorities seem still insufficient. It will therefore be important 
for Bulgaria to implement new control procedures effectively.  

The  Bulgarian  public  procurement  legislation  has  been  subject  to  frequent 
modifications119. Although some of these amendments were due to the obligation to 
transpose the European procurement directives, such  frequent changes have reduced 
legal  certainty  and  have  rendered  the  management  of  public  procurement  more 
complex for the administration and for the business.  

The efforts made by Bulgaria have not yet led to the expected results. The complaints 
received  by  the  Commission  concerning  the  Bulgarian  public  procurement  system 
continue  to  grow,120  and  there  are  clear  cases  of  serious  violations  of  EU 
procurement rules which the national control system cannot either detect, or treat in 
appropriate manner. For instance, the award of the contract for the construction of a 

116 
117 

118 

119 
120 

COM(2010)400final, page 9 and COM(2011)459final, page 10. 
Two months after the entry into force of the new ex-ante control model, the PPA received 116 requests 
for checks; 84 draft documents were checked and out of them 21 were subject to the second stage of the 
ex-ante  control.  Consequently,  for  the  whole  year  2012  the  number  of  procedures  is  expected  to  be 
higher than for 2011. 
The  Public  Procurement  Agency  has  received  10  additional  posts  this  year,  mainly  to  carry-out 
additional ex-ante control functions. 
Since 2004, the legislation has been amended 24 times. 
In the area of public procurement, the Commission received 4 complaints over the course of 2008 and 
2009 and 26 complaints over the course of 2010 and 2011. 

EN 

28 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Flue  Gas  Desulphurisation  plant121,  infringed  the  public  procurement  legislation 
since  it  was  based  on  false  information122.  This  situation  remained  without 
appropriated reaction from the national authorities and, consequently, the fraudulent 
bidder is still performing the contract. The most common violations are related to the 
direct and indirect discrimination of bidders, equal treatment, transparency and direct 
award of contracts without tendering procedures.123 

Protecting EU funds 

As of 2008, following the suspension of over €500 million of EU financial assistance 
due to mismanagement, a special focus was put on investigations into cases related to 
abuse  of  EU  funds.  Responding  to  the  Commission's  recommendation  to  foster 
specialisation,  Bulgaria  established  permanent  EU  fraud  “joint  teams”  within  the 
Supreme Cassation Prosecution at the end of 2008.124 This first step in the structural 
reorganisation  of  the  investigation  phase  was  coupled  with  a  new  methodology125 
focusing on a limited number of high profile cases. The joint teams consist of staff of 
the  prosecution,  the  police,  the  SANS  and  the  national  investigation  service.  Other 
services  (e.g.  tax  authorities)  can  be  associated  to  their  investigations  on  a  case  by 
case basis. In 2010 the competencies of the joint team on EU fraud were enlarged to 
a wider range of offences in relation to fraud to the EU budget. That same year, the 
joint teams on EU fraud started to report better results in terms of number of cases in 
pre-trial proceedings, indictments and court sentences compared to 2009. Since 2011 
there is an increasing trend in terms of final court rulings in cases of EU fraud.126  

7. 

BENCHMARK 6: IMPLEMENT A STRATEGY TO FIGHT ORGANISED CRIME, FOCUSSING 
ON  SERIOUS  CRIME,  MONEY  LAUNDERING  AS  WELL  AS  ON  THE  SYSTEMATIC 
CONFISCATION  OF  ASSETS  OF  CRIMINALS.  REPORT  ON  NEW  AND  ONGOING 
INVESTIGATIONS, INDICTMENTS AND CONVICTIONS IN THESE AREAS 

Organised  crime  is  an  important  challenge  for  Bulgaria127.  According  to  Europol, 
Bulgarian organised crime groups are active in 15 EU Member States and therefore 
among the most widespread in Europe. They mainly specialise in human trafficking 
and payment card fraud. While their role and impact outside Bulgaria is comparable 
to  that  of  other  organised  crime  groups,  their  role  inside  Bulgaria  is  unique.128  It 

121 
122 
123 

124 
125 

126 

127 

128 

A complaint has been received by the Commission in January 2009. 
This was confirmed by an investigation performed by OLAF. 
An analysis by the Bulgarian Construction Chamber of June 2012 alleges that in 35% of the contract 
notices of May 2012 in this sector discriminatory criteria were used. 
Their permanence was in contrast to the teams established for organised crime. 
The methodology was developed by prosecutors from the Specialized Prosecutor’s Offices on the basis of the first 
experiences of the joint teams 
Bulgaria  reports  the  following  data  on  indictments  in  EU  fraud  cases:    2007:  4;  2008:  10;  2009:  27; 
2010:  74;  2011:  50.  Data  on  the  number  of  persons  convicted  in  EU  fraud  cases:  2007:  0;  2008:  4; 
2009: 39; 2010: 225; 2011: 159. 
"The 12 most significant organised criminal activities generated around €1.8 billion in annual turnover 
which  is  equivalent  to  4.7%  of  the  country’s  GDP.  This  ratio  to  the  GDP  indicates  that  the  criminal 
economy generates much lower turnover compared to the period prior to Bulgaria’s EU accession. At 
the same time, such size of the illegal economy poses a serious threat". Serious and Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011. Centre for the Study of Democracy. Sofia, April 2012. p 5. 
Europol 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
differs from the situation in other EU Member States in a sense that still today they 
exercise  a  considerable  influence  over  economic  activities  in  the  country.  From  an 
economic perspective, this restricts competition and deters foreign investment. It also 
gives these groups a platform from which to influence the political process and state 
institutions.129 

One  of  the  keys  to  tackling  organised  crime  is  clearly  that  it  is  seen  to  be 
systematically and successfully investigated and prosecuted. It is accepted that over 
150 murders over the past decade can be defined as contract killings. Though many 
of  these  cases  are  reportedly  still  being  worked  on,  the  fact  remains  that  very  few 
have come to court, and fewer still have resulted in a successful conviction. It is also 
unclear  whether  these  crimes  have  been  systematically  followed  up  with  financial 
investigations.  

The Commission has monitored in detail some 77 key "high level" cases of organised 
crime. Only 16 of these cases have ended in a final court ruling and in 10 of these 
cases  some  or  all  defendants  were  acquitted  –  a  much  higher  acquittal  rate  than 
average  for  all  organised  crime  cases.130  In  the  last  two  years  law  enforcement  has 
shown increased efforts to fight organised criminal groups, though early 2012 saw a 
renewed number of contract killings.  

Over  the  past  five  years,  the  quality  of  criminal  investigations  into  major  cases  of 
organised  crime  has  continued  to  suffer  from  significant  structural  weaknesses.131 
The limited number of final rulings is a reflection of these weaknesses. However, a 
number  of important cases are  now  on  trial and should be decided in the course of 
this  year.132  Bulgaria  has  tried  to  address  some  of  these  through  general  legislative 
and  institutional  changes  (see  benchmarks  2,  3  and  4  above).  The  Ministry  of  the 
Interior has also undertaken a number of reforms which have included increasing the 
number of investigating police officers recruited and trained (see below). 

An area of particular attention remains trafficking in human beings133. The June 2012 
Trafficking  in  Persons  report  (US  Department  of  State)134  qualified  Bulgaria  as  a 
"Tier  2"  country,  meaning  that  the  Government  of  Bulgaria  does  not  fully  comply 

129 

130 

131 

132 
133 

134 

The Centre for the Study of Democracy – Examining the links between corruption and organised crime. 
Study  conducted  for  DG  HOME  Affairs,  Sofia,  2010.  p  19;  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat 
Assessment 2010 – 2011. Sofia, April 2012. p 67. 
These cases include a number of contract killings and the most notorious cases of large scale fraud with 
EU funds In one case 2 defendants were acquitted and 4 were convicted. Of the remaining 9 cases, in 3 
cases defendants received suspended sentences, in one case probation and a fine. For the remaining 5 
cases  the  sanctions  varied  between  4  years  and  life  imprisonment.      When  all  cases  defined  as 
"organised  crime"  under  the  Penal  Code  (art.  93/20  Penal  Code)  are  considered,  according  to official 
information  from  the  General  Prosecutor  of  Bulgaria,  the  share  of  acquitted  persons  in  final  instance 
remains  below 4%  
Analyses  of  acquittals  by  the  prosecution  notably  point  to  problems  in  the  assessment  and 
administration  of  evidence  by  police  and  prosecution,  in  operational  aspects  of  police  work,  with 
financial expertises, in witness protection, regarding incomplete and weak indictments, but also point to 
the high evidence-base usually required by courts and to the difficulties of the prosecution to achieve 
guilty verdicts on the basis of indirect evidence. 
This concerns i.e. the case of the "killers" pending in court in Shumen. 
See COM (2012)286 final "The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 
2012 – 2016, p 3 confirms that most victims identified within the EU come from Romania and Bulgaria.  
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192587.pdf 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
                                                 
with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking while recognising the 
efforts to do so. In December 2011 GRETA, the specialised anti-trafficking body of 
the Council of Europe had concluded  in its assessment  on Bulgaria135 that both the 
1egal framework and institutional framework provide a good basis for tackling this 
phenomenon from a human-rights based perspective. The Bulgarian authorities were 
invited to take further steps to ensure that the human rights-based and victim-centred 
approach  is  fully  reflected  and  applied  in  particular  through  special  attention  for 
vulnerable  groups,  training  for  law  enforcement  officers  and  overall,  through  more 
and  better  assistance  for  and  protection  of  victims  of  trafficking  in  human  beings. 
Some concrete measures are under way. 

Institutional change to address organised crime  

There  have  also  been  specific  measures  taken  to  address  organised  crime,  with 
several  new  institutions  put  in  place.  In  2008,  SANS  (State  Agency  for  National 
Security)  was  established,  uniting  some  core  tasks  on  the  fight  against  organised 
crime  from  the  Ministry  of  Interior  as  well  from  the  National  Security  Service,  the 
Military  Counter  Intelligence  Agency  and  the  Financial  Intelligence  Unit.  CVM 
reports  pointed  to  continued  weaknesses  including  the  lack  of  specialisation  at  all 
levels,  the  lack  of  clearly  defined  competencies  for  SANS,  and  poor  co-operation 
with  other  agencies.  These  accentuated  general  problems  with  investigative  and 
judicial  practice  such  as  the  frequent  return  of  cases  to  prosecution  by  courts,  and 
adjournments in courts for questionable reasons, such as uncorroborated absence due 
to illness. Admissibility of evidence, witness protection and the need for more special 
equipment and skills has also been highlighted. In 2009 Member States also reported 
weaknesses in co-operation with Bulgarian law enforcement authorities in areas like 
confidentiality, and a notable difference when cases involved influential persons.  

Other measures taken in this period have had a positive impact on proceedings. The 
number of effective convictions increased when the principle of plea bargaining was 
applied and when expedited procedures were introduced after the confession by the 
defendant.136  

2010  saw  a  change  of  gear  with  intensified  police  actions  against  organised  crime, 
which resulted in a number of targeted police operations and arrests of well-known 
figures. Even if this did not lead to the expected number of cases in court, with some 
pointing  to  failings  in  evidence  collection,  there  is  evidence  that  the  structures  of 
organised crime were  disrupted,  with  a positive impact curbing prostitution,  human 
trafficking and counterfeiting.137  

Two consecutive amendments to the Ministry of Interior act (end 2009 and in 2010) 
as  well  as  amendments  to  the  penal  procedure  code  (2010)  led  to  important 
institutional  changes  in  the  Ministry  of  Interior  with  an  impact  on  both  the  quality 
and  speed  of  the  pre-trial  stage.  Structures  were  streamlined  (doing  away  with  the 

135 
136 

137 

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/trafficking/Docs/Reports/GRETA_2011_19_FGR_BGR_en.pdf 
Bulgaria reports the following data: In 2010 and 2011, out of 313 persons convicted in corruption cases 
106 were convicted through expedited procedure and 21 through plea bargaining. Out of 499 persons 
convicted  in  organised  crime  cases  in  2010  and  2011,  70  persons  were  convicted  through  expedited 
procedure and 204 through plea bargaining. 
Source : EUROPOL; 

EN 

31 

   EN 

 
                                                 
overlap  between  SANS  and  the  Ministry  of  Interior)  and  the  number  of  police 
investigators  was  substantially  increased  (from  2000  to  8000).  Training  was  also 
stepped  up.  The  reforms  also  included  the  re-establishment  of  Chief  Directorate 
“Countering  Organised  Crime”  as  an  independent  police  structure,  specialised  in 
combating  serious  and  organised  crime.  As a result in 2011 there was  a substantial 
reduction  of  cases  referred  back  from  the  prosecution  to  the  police,  the  length  of 
investigations has been reduced and overall the quality of evidence had improved. In 
addition,  the  number  of  the  cases  overdue  has  been  substantially  reduced  (4200  in 
2010 compared to 1068 in 2011).  

At  the  same  time,  the  ongoing  reform  of  the  police  has  not  ended  concerns  about 
human rights abuses. Independent analysts continue to point to arbitrary action by the 
police and the use of unnecessary force.138 

CVM  reports  have  consistently  underlined  the  benefits  of  specialisation  in  tackling 
organised crime.139 In September 2009, a decision was taken by the National Security 
Agency, the Prosecutors Office and the Ministry of Interior to form "special teams" 
to increase the effectiveness in the fight against organised crime. In parallel, at court 
level,  in  2010,  specialised  organised  crime  joint  teams  were  established  in  five 
district courts and the idea was launched to establish specialised structures at central 
level.  

This  process  of  specialisation  was  taken  one  step  further  with  the  adoption  in 
December  2010  and  January  2011  of  legislation  to  establish  specialised  prosecutor 
offices and courts in charge of organised crime cases.140 The original intention of this 
legislation  had  been  to  deal  with  serious  cases  of  organised  crime  and  corruption. 
However, during the course of discussions in Parliament, the draft law was amended 
to exclude corruption cases, except when committed by organised crime groups.  

The new specialised court and prosecution office for organised crime cases became 
operational  in  January  2012.141  The  law  foresees  that  they  deal  with  all  "organised 
crime"  cases.  This  includes  the  offence  of  being  part  of  a  criminal  organisation  as 
well as crimes carried out by organised criminals: the scope of the work of the court 
is  therefore  defined  by  the  nature  of  the  perpetrators  of  the  crime,  not  by  its 
seriousness, which runs the risk that the structures will have to divert much of their 
resources to relatively minor offences. Changes to the Penal Code should be of help 
in  terms  of  allow  a  more  effective  penal  response  to  serious  and  organised  crime, 
including abuse of EU funds.  

138 

139 

140 

141 

'Human  Rights  in  Bulgaria  in  2011',  Annual  report  of  the  Bulgarian  Helsinki  Committee,  p  9:  "The 
BHC received many credible complaints from individuals regarding ill-treatment on the part of police, 
some of which amounted to torture. Such practices were justified several times by the Minister of the 
Interior and the Chief Secretary of the Ministry." 
COM(2011) 459 final p 9, COM(2011) 81 final p 6 and 7, COM(2010) 400 final p 9, COM(2009) 402 
final p. 7 and 8. 
Amendments  to  the  Penal  Procedure  Code  and  the  Judicial  System  Act  established  the  specialised 
criminal court and the attached prosecution office. 
These new structures were given specific new offices and equipment 

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
                                                 
The  CVM  report  of  summer  2011  underlined  the need  for  the  new  structures  to  be 
properly  resourced,  and  to  be  able  to  prioritise.142  Today  20  judges  and  17 
prosecutors  work  in  the  specialised  court  and  prosecution  office,  in  addition  to  30 
police officers at central level and 206 investigative police officers across the country 
that have been designed to support the investigations of the specialised prosecution 
office for organised crime. So far, the Court has ruled in 64 cases and convicted 48 
persons. Most of these verdicts were achieved through plea bargaining.  

An  area  of  judicial  practice  of  particular  importance  to  organised  crime  is  witness 
protection. Concerns remain that Bulgaria's witness protection system does not offer 
the  high  degree  of  protection  needed.  Although  there  are  a  number  of  protected 
witnesses  in  the  Bulgarian  witness  protection  programme,  this  programme  has  not 
delivered  results  in  a  number  of  important  cases,  where  the  protection  of  witnesses 
failed.143 In the assessment of the prosecution, the withdrawal of witness statements 
is an important reason for the failure in court of organised crime trials. In a number 
of cases there are concerns that changes in evidence from witnesses are the result of 
external pressure.144 

International cooperation 

A considerable amount of assistance has been provided to Bulgaria before and right 
after  accession  through  EU  funded  projects  to  modernise  the  Bulgarian  police  and 
contribute to improving the quality of investigations. Many of these projects took the 
form of twinning projects with one or more EU Member States. Member States have 
also  provided  bilateral  assistance  to  Bulgaria  in  particular  for  training  and  capacity 
building  in  areas  such  as  the  fight  against  trafficking  in  and  smuggling  of  human 
beings, trafficking of drugs or money laundering.  

At the same time, in the past few years cooperation with law enforcement agencies 
elsewhere  in  the  EU  has  improved,  in  particular  as  regards  intelligence  sharing.145 
Bulgaria has also participated in international police co-operation activities together 
with  Europol,  Member  States,  and  other  countries  in  the  region.  These  joint 
operations focused on various criminal activities, including counterfeiting of Euros, 
cigarette  smuggling,  drugs  and  credit  card  fraud.146  Nevertheless,  despite  the 

142 

143 

144 

145 
146 

The Commission recommended in 2011: "Allocate appropriate resources and staff and properly define 
the scope and internal organisation of the specialised court and prosecution office for organised crime in 
order to assure an effective judicial treatment of the most important cases." (COM(2011)459final, page 
9). 
Cases  were  the  protection of  witnesses  failed  include notably  the  case  of  the  "Margin  Brothers".  The 
number of protected witnesses per year as communicated by the Bulgarian authorities: 2007 : 72; 2008 : 
86;  2009  :  84;  2010  :  101  and  2011  :  91.  In  the  majority  of  these  cases  the  "witness"  is  him/herself 
involved in criminal activity.   
The withdrawal of witness statements notably led to the final acquittals in March of defendants in the 
"crocodiles gang" – a case involving alleged organised crime, highway robbery and attempted murder. 
Weaknesses in witness protection also became apparent in 2012 in the context of the case of the "Galevi 
brothers" and in the case of Evelin Banev where several witnesses refused to testify. 
Source: Europol 
In January 2011, Bulgaria identified a prolific and sophisticated Bulgarian and Greek Organised Crime 
Group linked to at least 21 separate tobacco seizures all round Europe, which accounted for about 366 
million  cigarettes  being  seized.  In  May  2011  Bulgarian  police  raided  and  dismantled  a  sophisticated 
counterfeit Euro print shop in a joint operation with Europol. The Bulgarian police arrested six suspects 
and seized over half a million very high-quality counterfeit Euro banknotes from print shops in Plovdiv 

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
                                                 
increased quantity of information shared, Europol has noted that the number of cases 
initiated – while on the rise - remains quite low compared with the scale of organised 
crime in Bulgaria.  

Freezing and confiscating assets 

One of the most important ways to protect the mainstream economy from organised 
crime  is  to  ensure  there  are  efficient  procedures  in  place  to  freeze  and  confiscate 
funds and property – with the necessary safeguards as regards fundamental rights –   
acquired  through  crime.  In  Bulgaria,  successive  measures  have  been  taken  in  an 
attempt to provide a sound and efficient legal and institutional framework to freeze, 
manage and confiscate criminal assets. In 2005, a law on forfeiture of criminal assets 
set up the Commission for the identification of criminal assets (CEPACA). However, 
it  was  hamstrung  by  limited  resources  and  only  a  limited  number  of  cases  were 
submitted  to  courts  –  with  an  even  a  smaller  number  of  cases  successful.  The  first 
final rulings on cases of asset forfeiture came only in 2009. Concerns remained that 
the  confiscation  procedure  started  too  late  in  the  pre-trial  phase  to  prevent  assets 
being transferred elsewhere to escape the law, and that final seizure was dependent 
on criminal conviction. 

2011 saw two important developments. First, under new leadership, CEPACA started 
to be more effective and proactive.  In cases carried through in 2011, it obtained final 
court rulings equivalent to some €5 m illion. Though only a small proportion of many 
estimates  of  criminal  wealth  in  Bulgaria,147  this  represented  a  substantial  increase 
compared  to  previous  years.148  Closer  co-operation  was  established  with  the 
prosecution  office,  albeit  still  on  an  ad  hoc  basis.  However,  the  resignation  of  the 
Director of CEPACA in early 2012, on the grounds that internal reforms were being 
obstructed and political support was lacking, cast doubt on the sustainability of this 
improvement.  The effectiveness of the Commission also rests on the reputation of its 
members, and appointments have not always reflected this imperative.149  

Second,  the  government  decided  to  strengthen  the  legal  framework.  In  the  CVM 
report  of  summer  2010,  the  Commission  set  out  a  number  of  recommendations  to 
ensure an effective asset forfeiture regime.150 A first attempt to adopt a strengthened 
legal basis failed before Parliament in July 2011, but amendments, a strong political 
prioritisation, and  support from EU  partners meant a new law  was adopted in  May 
2012.151  It  introduces  a  general  procedure  for  non-conviction  based  confiscation  of 

and Parvomay. The operation was carried out as a Joint Investigation Team between Europol, Bulgaria, 
Spain and Eurojust. Source : Europol. 
Which is only a fraction of the estimated value of the main criminal markets in Bulgaria : "The 12 most 
significant  organised  criminal  activities  generated  around  €1.8  billion  in  annual  turnover,  which  is 
equivalent to 4.7% of the country’s GDP". P 14 .Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 
– 2011. Centre for the Study of Democracy. Sofia, April 2012. 
Amounts of assets forfeited in 2009 : 335.000€, 2011: 3,3 M€, 2011 5,M€ For the first quarter of the 
year 2012 eight court decisions entered in force regarding claims of a value approximately amounting to 
BGN 4 million . 
One  current  member  of  CEPACA  was  under  investigation  at  the  time  of  appointment  to  the 
Commission  for  having  made  a  fraudulent  declaration  when  not  disclosing  he  was  a  member  of  a 
private company.  
COM(2010)400, page 9.  
Several Member States' Ambassadors intervened publicly in support of the law. 

147 

148 

149 

150 
151 

EN 

34 

   EN 

 
                                                                                                                                                         
unlawfully-acquired  assets,  to  be  exercised  in  front  of  civil  courts.  It  regulates  the 
freezing and confiscation of assets, and the management or disposal of such assets. 
The  law  does  not  regulate  third  party  confiscation,  although  its  provisions  on  non-
conviction  based  confiscation  can  in  certain  circumstances  also  be  applied  to  third 
parties.  

Some shortcomings in the legislation have been identified, in part due to weakening 
its  provisions  to  ensure  passage  through  Parliament.  Compared  to  the  July  2011 
draft,  the  law  saw  provisions  removed  on  asset  control  of  high  officials  and 
politicians, and the ex-officio rights for the new Commission to act in this area. The 
thresholds  to  determine  action  are  high  (€125.000).  The  law  does  not  foresee 
precautionary  freezing  -  the  Commission  can  ask  a  court  to  freeze  assets,  but  the 
delay  involved  and  the  burden  of  proof  may  give  the  chance  to  evade  effective 
seizure of the assets. The law also does not seem to cover all corruption offences and 
does not allow for continued scrutiny of assets after a sentence has been served, to 
capture assets which had been successfully hidden at the time of an investigation, but 
which later resurface. In addition, the law's effectiveness regarding economic crime 
may be limited by rules restricting asset control of legal persons to cases where such 
assets exceed 50% of the total assets of the company or non-profit entity in question. 

The result is that for the law to have the dissuasive effect intended, much will depend 
on  the  way  the  law  will  be  implemented  by  the  new  Commission  for  Forfeiture  of 
Unlawfully  Acquired  Assets.  The  main  task  of  this  Commission  is  to  identify 
suspicious  assets,  with  the  forfeiture  taking  effect  through  a  court  judgment.  The 
Commission had also recommended that this could be an opportunity to strengthen 
control  of  the  assets  of  senior  officials,  magistrates  and  politicians,  but  the  task  of 
stepping  this  up  will  now  stay  with  control  bodies  such  as  the  tax  authorities. 
Members of the Commission will be appointed for 5 years by the executive (with the 
Prime  Minister  nominating  the  chairperson)  and  legislative  authorities  (the  Deputy 
Chairperson  and  two  of  the  members  will  be  elected  by  the  National  Assembly). 
Finally, one member will be appointed by the President of the Republic. There will 
be “general oversight” by the National Assembly of the activity of the Commission.  

Implementation will rely heavily on a strong and independent Commission, and on 
good  cooperation  and  a  pro-active  attitude  by  the  prosecution  and  administrative 
control  authorities  such  as  the  tax  authorities.  With  no  ex  officio  power,  the 
Commission  depends  on  notification  of  cases  from  such  bodies.  A  situation  where 
cases are in the public domain, but where the Commission is unable to act because it 
has  received  no  notification,  would  quickly  undermine  public  confidence  in  the 
effectiveness  of  the  system.  Also  essential  will  be  the  approach  of  the  courts: 
whether court jurisprudence will adopt a consistent approach to the law and allow a 
shift of the burden of proof in practice.  

Money laundering 

The  Financial  Intelligence  Directorate  (FID)  within  SANS  collects,  stores, 
investigates,  analyzes  and  discloses  financial  intelligence  information  under  the 
terms and procedures of the Measures Against Money Laundering Act and Measures 
Against  the  Financing  of  Terrorism  Act.   The  Directorate  acts  as  the  Bulgarian 
financial intelligence unit (FIU). Although considerable efforts have been made and 
there has been an increase in the number of final convictions for money laundering 

EN 

35 

   EN 

 
over  the  past  five  years,  both  the  Bulgarian  money  laundering  legislation152  and  in 
particular its application continue to show a number of shortcomings.153 Large scale 
investments in real estate in tourism areas remain an important risk area for money 
laundering which could be investigated proactively. 

In 2008 the Commission noted that the mechanism for the control of cash payments 
showed severe deficiencies, and in 2009 it concluded that money laundering was still 
not systematically prosecuted – coming almost always only as an accessory crime to 
a main offence, and often being dropped if the main offence is dropped.154  

A lack of specialisation and expertise throughout the system contributes to the low 
number of cases.  In 2010 some minor improvement were registered, such as a joint 
manual issued by SANS and CEPACA. In 2011 the Council of Ministers adopted a 
Strategy  to  prevent  and  fight  money  laundering,  drafted  in  co-operation  with  the 
NGO  sector,  followed  by  an  inter-institutional  working  group  to  prepare  an  Action 
Plan for its implementation.  

An  operation  of  law  enforcement  agencies  in  February  2012  against  a  network  of 
fictitious  firms,  some  registered  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States,  to 
evade  tax  and  launder  money  revealed  that  in  this  case  alone  the  loss  to  the  state 
through fraudulent documentation to evade tax and launder money was estimated at 
about €15 million. 

There  continues  to  be  a  lack  of  prioritisation  of  money  laundering  investigations. 
This  is  also  reflected  in  the  instruction  of  the  Prosecutor  General  of  March  2012 
which serves as guidance for conducting a financial investigation, which has a rather 
to  existing  FATF 
narrow 
recommendations.155  

focus  on  asset  confiscation 

in  comparison 

8. 

DIRECT  SUPPORT  TO  THE  REFORM  PROCESS  FROM  THE  EU  AND  ITS  MEMBER 
STATES 

Substantial  support  has  been  made  available  to  Bulgaria  in  the  area  of  justice  and 
home affairs in  the years before and  after accession. Prior to accession, institution-
building support to Bulgaria was given by the Phare programme and the Transition 

152 

153 

154 
155 

Both MONEYVAL (Council of Europe) and FATF (Financial Action Task Force) confirm in their most 
recent  assessments  that  numerous  developments  have  taken  place  which  resulted  in  a  more  effective 
framework  to  fight  money  laundering.  However  both  institutions  confirm  that  Bulgaria  does  not  yet 
“fully” complies with any of their recommendations. 
"During the past 20 years money laundering was not a law enforcement priority and the majority of the 
criminal  entrepreneurs  in  Bulgaria  have  established  some  forms  of  legal  business.  In  the  field  of 
organised tax fraud the use of legitimate business structure is a necessary part of the criminal activity. 
But even in other forms of organised crime (narcotics, prostitution, racketeering, etc.) the majority of 
the criminal groups control some legal business structure. Bulgarian criminal groups participate in the 
legal economy at higher rates than groups in Western Europe. This represents a challenge to attempt to 
investigate  money  laundering  and  to  uproot  corruption."  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat 
Assessment 2010 – 2011, Centre for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, April 2012 p 64. 
See: SEC(2008)2350/2 p 22 and  SEC(2009)1074 p 15-16. 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatfrecommendations2012.html    
See in particular recommendation 30. 

EN 

36 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Facility, a significant proportion of which was available to support reform in justice 
and home affairs.  

Under the current Financing Period, the Commission has made available significant 
support under the Administrative Capacity Operational Programme of the European 
Social Fund (ESF). The ESF has two strategic priorities in Bulgaria – to improve the 
functioning of state administration and to enhance the professionalism, transparency 
and  accountability  of  the  judiciary.  Under  the  second  objective,  the  ESF  has  made 
some  €41m  available.  By  mid-2012,  25  pr ojects for  a  budget of  €13.6m have been 
agreed in the areas of training, human resource development, capacity building and 
technical  assistance  and  are  in  various  stages  of  implementation.  Many  of  the 
projects implemented have directly assisted with reforms necessary for the CVM. 

Over  the  years  important  support  has  also  been  supplied  by  Member  States.  These 
bilateral  projects  have  assisted  a  wide  range  of  institutions  and  covered  a 
comprehensive  range  of  issues  connected  to  judicial  reform,  police  reform  and  the 
fight  against  organised  crime  and  corruption.156  Recent  projects  have  included 
judicial training, police training,  border control, customs, public  procurement, legal 
assistance  and  support  to  the  fight  against  organised  crime.  A  large  number  of 
Member  States have  been  involved  in  assistance  to  Bulgaria  in  this  area  since 
accession.  Significant  assistance  has  also  been  provided  by  other  states  and 
international organisations. 

156 

Beneficiaries  have  included  the  National  Institute  for  Justice,  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  Bordeer 
Police, Customs, the Supreme Judicial Council, the Prosecution and Courts.  

EN 

37 

   EN