REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
Date: 2012-07-18
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, judicial reform, organised crime, prevention of delinquency

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 18.7.2012  
COM(2012) 411 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 

{SWD(2012) 232 final} 

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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 

I.  The  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism:  Supporting  Bulgaria  in  Justice 
Reform, the Fight against Corruption and the Fight against Organised Crime 

In the run-up to the accession of Bulgaria to the EU in 2007, it was agreed that further work 
was  needed  in  key  areas  to  address  shortcomings  in  judicial  reform,  the  fight  against 
corruption,  and  tackling  organised  crime.  This  led  to  the  establishment  of  a  framework  to 
support  Bulgaria  and  to  monitor  progress  in  these  areas,  the  Cooperation  and  Verification 
Mechanism  (CVM).1  Six  benchmarks  were  established,  covering  the  independence  and 
accountability of the judicial system, its transparency and efficiency; the pursuit of high-level 
corruption, as well as corruption throughout the public sector; and the fight against organised 
crime.  The  Decision  set  up  regular  reporting  from  the  Commission,  and  provided  that  the 
mechanism will continue until the objectives of the CVM are met and all six benchmarks are 
satisfactorily fulfilled.2  

Five  years  on,  this  report  assesses  whether  the  objectives  of  the  CVM  have  been  fulfilled. 
This  assessment  is  the  fruit  of  analysis  as  set  out  in  the  technical  report  accompanying  this 
report, taking stock of what has been achieved so far and what remains to be accomplished. It 
looks at the work of the past five years, the legislation and the instruments which have been 
put  in  place  and  the  results  which  have  followed.  Over  this  period,  there  have  been  times 
when progress has accelerated; others when there have been setbacks. Cooperation has been 
active  at  some  stages,  whereas  at  other  times  the  CVM  has  been  resented  and  resisted. 
Overall, the Commission is convinced that the CVM has made a major contribution to reform 
in  Bulgaria.  This  report  considers  in  particular  the  sustainability  and  irreversibility  of  the 
reform  process,  including  whether  ownership  is  sufficiently  embedded  to  maintain  the 
direction of reform.  

Today's European Union is highly interdependent. The rule of law is one of the fundamental 
values  of  the  EU  and  there  is  a  strong  common  interest  in  it  which  mirrors  the  interest  of 
Bulgarian  public  opinion  in  these  issues.3  Eurobarometer  polling  has  shown  that  96%  of 
Bulgarians consider corruption and organised crime to be an important issue for their country, 
and 92% have the same response over shortcomings in the judicial system. The same poll also 

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Conclusions  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  17  October  2006  (13339/06);  Commission  Decision  of 
13/XII/2006  establishing  a  mechanism  for  cooperation  and  verification  of  progress  in  Bulgaria  to 
address  specific  benchmarks  in  the  areas  of  judicial  reform  and  the  fight  against  corruption  and 
organised crime, 13 December 2006 (C (2006) 6570 final) 
It also provided for the possibility of a safeguard mechanism, which has not had to be invoked.  
The Conclusions of the European Council of 28 and 29 June include a commitment by the EU within 
the Compact for Growth and Jobs to tackle delays in judicial systems as part of the modernisation of 
public administrations (European Council Conclusions 29 June 2012, page 8). 

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concluded that 76% of Bulgarians considered that the EU should have a role in tackling these 
issues.4 

The  CVM  does  not  ask  Bulgaria  to  achieve  higher  standards  than  exist  in  other  Member 
States. Its target is to help Bulgaria achieve standards comparable to other Member States, an 
objective  supported  by  78%  of  Bulgarians.5  For  the  purpose  of  assessing  what  has  been 
achieved  by  Bulgaria  since  accession,  the  situation  in  other  Member  States  is  an  important 
factor.  The  Commission  uses  in  this  report  points  of  reference  and  comparative  indicators 
where  they  are  available.6  To  compare  progress  in  Bulgaria  with  the  situation  in  other 
Member States, the Commission also drew upon senior experts from key professions dealing 
with these issues.7 

Since  2007,  the  EU  budget  has  made  some  €41m  available  to  support  judicial  reform  in 
Bulgaria through the Structural Funds. By mid-2012, 25 projects for a budget of €13.6m have 
been  agreed  in  the  areas  of  training,  human  resource  development,  capacity  building  and 
technical assistance. At the same time, several Member States have supported Bulgaria with 
bilateral  projects  in  all  areas  of  judicial  reform  including  police  reform,  the  fight  against 
corruption and the fight against organised crime.8 

II. Analysis of progress under the CVM 2007-2012  

The Commission's overall assessment of progress under the CVM since Bulgaria's accession 
shows important progress in the basic legislative framework. At key moments, the Bulgarian 
government has shown strong political will to achieve deep and lasting reform.The challenge 
now is to fill some key strategic gaps, and to ensure effective implementation. The resolve in 
Bulgarian  society  to  deliver  the  reforms  overseen  by  the  CVM  has  been  variable:  a  more 
consistent  implementation  is  needed  to  join  together  disparate  actions.  This  more  consistent 
direction of reforms would be the best indicator of the sustainability and irreversibility of the 
process. 

Since 2007, Bulgaria has put in place a series of important legal and Constitutional reforms. 
Though  incomplete,  these  have  set  up  important  and  sometimes  innovative  structures,  in 
particular to encourage specialisation in tackling the problems faced. Key institutions like the 
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and its inspectorate have taken up their functions. There has 
been an important investment in the structures to fight organised crime leading to the creation 
of specialised bodies at the level of the judiciary and police, as well as major steps to improve 
the legal framework for asset forfeiture and successful cooperation with other Member States. 

However,  the  potential  of  this  framework  has  not  yet  been  used  to  the  full.  The  Supreme 
Judicial Council has been given wide-ranging powers to manage and lead the judiciary. These 
powers have not been used to govern the judicial profession effectively, on the basis of merit 
and  integrity,  or  to  drive  the  consistency  and  independence  of  justice  on  which  public 
confidence depends.  

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"The  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism 

Flash Eurobarometer poll conducted by the Commission in Bulgaria in May 2012 (Flash Eurobarometer 
for  Bulgaria  and  Romania"  at: 
351 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm ). 
Flash Eurobarometer 351 
Points of reference include the work of the Council of Europe, the OECD and UN agencies. 
Experts  used  in  2012included  senior  practitioners  from  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Poland,  Spain, 
Slovenia and the United Kingdom. 
Technical report, page 36. 

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There remains a lack of direction in policy which has held back progress. Many institutions 
have taken useful steps. But the limited scale of these measures inside such institutions, and 
the  lack  of  a  coordinated  approach,  suggests  that  questions  remain  about  the  direction  of 
reform. Over the five years of the CVM, different governments and Parliaments have given 
different  emphasis  to  these  issues,  and  variable  levels  of  commitment  to  results.  An  action 
plan for the reform of the judiciary was adopted in 2010. Fundamental principles such as the 
independence  of  the  judiciary  have  not  always  been  respected  to  the  full.  The  lack  of  a 
consistent trend means that the reform process has not built the momentum needed to become 
an accepted part of Bulgaria's development. 

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that many important steps seem to have been taken 
primarily as the result of external pressure. The CVM itself has been central to this process – 
and is recognised as such by Bulgarian public opinion.9 It has helped to maintain the direction 
of  reform  at  moments  of  pressure  and  to  encourage  changes  which  require  the  courage  to 
challenge  vested  interests.  The  fact  that  external  pressure  is  still  necessary  raises  questions 
about the sustainability and irreversibility of change.  

Ownership and implementation are therefore the key elements in the fulfilment of the CVM 
benchmarks. They determine the sustainability and irreversibility of reform. The appointment 
and work of the new Supreme Judicial Council and of the new General Prosecutor will be one 
of the indicators of the sustainability of reforms. 

II.1 Judicial Reform 2007-2012 

Benchmark 1: Adopt Constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the 
independence and accountability of the judicial system  

Benchmark 2: Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting and 
implementing a new judicial system act and the new civil procedure code. Report on the 
impact of these new laws and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably 
on the pre-trial phase 

Benchmark 3: Continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism, 
accountability and efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the results 
annually 

Upon  accession,  Bulgaria  committed  to  increase  the  independence,  accountability  and 
integrity  of  the  judiciary  and  to  ensure  a  more  efficient,  consistent  and  transparent  judicial 
process.  Such  comprehensive  reform  objectives  required  legislative  changes,  a  reform  of 
judicial structures and staffing, and improvements to judicial procedures and judicial practice. 
They  also  required  some  changes  in  attitude  amongst  magistrates,  and  other  actors  in  the 
judicial  system.  This  combination  implied  an  engagement  by  all  powers  of  the  state:  by 
Parliament, the executive and the judiciary, with the support of civil society. 

9 

These  conclusions  are  supported  by  public  perception.  71%  of  respondents  of  a  Flash Eurobarometer 
poll  conducted  in  Bulgaria  believe  that  EU  action  through  the  CVM  has  had  a  positive  impact  in 
addressing  shortcomings  in  the  judicial  system  .  67%  share  this  view  regarding  corruption,  and  65% 
concerning organised crime. At the same time, a majority believes that the situation in these areas has 
stayed the same or has deteriorated in the last five years. (Flash Eurobarometer 351).  

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Since 2007, Bulgaria has put in place a number of important building blocks to deliver on its 
commitments with the EU. The immediate aftermath of accession saw an important series of 
steps,  with  Constitutional  amendments,  a  new  Judicial  Systems  Act  (JSA),  a  new  Civil 
Procedure Code, new Administrative procedure code and amendments to the Penal Procedure 
Code.  The  first  year  of  accession  also  saw  the  creation  of  new  judicial  institutions.  An 
independent Judicial Inspectorate was created and a new Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) took 
office, with wide-ranging responsibilities for the management of the judicial system.10 These 
responsibilities 
including 
appointments,  promotions,  appraisals  and  staff  allocation.  The  Council  was  also  given 
disciplinary responsibility and therefore the task to safeguard the accountability and integrity 
of the judiciary and to ensure that judicial practice meets high professional standards.11 With 
these attributions, the Council became the main actor in implementing judicial reform. 

resource  management  of 

included  human 

judiciary, 

the 

Bulgaria has achieved results in implementing this new legal and institutional framework. For 
the  first  time,  independent  controls  of  courts  and  prosecutors  offices  have  been  carried  out, 
recommendations  regarding  court  management  and  judicial  practice  have  been  issued  and  a 
more  robust  approach  has  been  taken  to  disciplinary  activity.  In  addition,  Bulgaria  has 
improved  procedural  codes  in  all  three  branches  of  law  and  started  to  improve  judicial 
practice.  

However, these efforts have not yet led to significant improvements in judicial accountability 
and efficiency. Legal proceedings are often of an excessive duration.12 Disciplinary practice 
shows inconsistencies, and in many important cases has either not been able to conclude, or 
has not reached  dissuasive  results. Judicial appraisals, promotions and  appointments are not 
yet  transparent  and  do  not  follow  objective  and  merit-based  criteria.  There  is  as  yet  no 
comprehensive  human  resources  policy  which  can  balance  staff  needs  and  workload. 
Measures to improve judicial practice often appear superficial and have not yet had a concrete 
effect on results in important cases. Questions remain about judicial independence.  

Some  of  these  weaknesses  can  be  traced  to  failings  in  application  of  the  law,  but  they  also 
reflect  important  structural,  procedural  and  organisational  weaknesses  within  the  Supreme 
Judicial Council and the prosecution. The upcoming elections to the Council this autumn, and 
the  election  of  a  new  General  Prosecutor  and  of  a  new  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation, are crucial for Bulgaria to demonstrate its resolve to maintain the path of judicial 
reform. 

The potential exists to use the structures put in place for the judicial system to drive reform, to 
address  a  lack  of  public  confidence  in  the  judiciary  and  to  establish  a  system  based  on 
effective  and  accountable  governance.  This  could  deliver  a  system  with  the  right  balance 
between efficiency, accountability, integrity and independence. However, it requires a higher 

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The  Supreme  Judicial  Council  is  structured  according  to  the  Constitution  (Technical  Report  page  4, 
footnote 6). 
The SJC is assisted in these areas by the Judicial Inspection, by court presidents and by the Bulgarian 
judicial training institution, the National Institute for Justice. 
Statistics of the ECHR show that Bulgaria counts the highest number of ECHR judgements among any 
EU  Member  State  which  are  pending  execution.  For  a  large  majority,  these  judgements  concern  the 
excessive  length  of  criminal  proceedings  and  the  absence  of  an  effective  remedy.  Other  elements 
include  ineffective  investigations  and  an  excessive  use  of  firearms  by  police.  (Council  of  Europe: 
Supervision  of  the  Execution  of  Judgements  and  Decisions  of  the  ECHR,  Annual  Report  2011  at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Source/Publications/CM_annreport2011_en.pdf  

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level of commitment by the Supreme Judicial Council and the prosecution, strong enough to 
challenge well-rooted vested interests.  

The  engagement  of  civil  society  and  professional  associations  of  magistrates  for  judicial 
reform is an important achievement since 2007. The Bulgarian authorities should make better 
use of these resources, engage in more intense cooperation with foreign partners and bring all 
key players together in a common commitment to reform. 

Independence, accountability and integrity of the judiciary  

Constitutional amendments of February 2007 set the framework for judicial independence in 
Bulgaria.  The  Constitution  gives  the  judicial  system  considerable  managerial  autonomy. 
However, it also gives a strong role to political institutions - half the elected members of the 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  (SJC),  and  all  judicial  inspectors,  are  elected  by  Parliament13  –  a 
source  of  criticism  by  the  Venice  Commission  of  the  Council  of  Europe.14  Lay  judges  can 
have a decisive influence on decisions in court, but are nominated by local political forces.15 
CVM reports have also pointed to the issue of merit-based appointments and appraisals.16 

These concerns have been confirmed, as a number of key judicial appointments by Parliament 
and by the SJC have lacked transparency and objectivity and have been marred by allegations 
of political influence.17 Independence has also come in question following a series of direct 
political criticisms of individual judges - the dismissal from the judiciary of the President of 
the Union of Judges by the SJC raises concerns in this context.18 The Council has not taken 
clear  action  to  protect  judicial  independence  in  these  cases.  The  overall  impression  is  of  a 
failure to respect the separation of the powers of the state which has direct consequences for 
public confidence in the judiciary. 

The same Constitutional amendments of 2007 and the adoption of a revised Judicial Systems 
Act in the same year also created the basis for a proper policy of integrity and accountability 
for  the  judicial  system.  The  immunity  of  magistrates  was  restricted  to  the  execution  of 
professional  duties  and  an  independent  judicial  inspectorate  was  created.  In  2009,  Bulgaria 
adopted  an  ethical  code  for  the  magistracy  and  created  a  central  integrity  committee  within 
the SJC19. Legal amendments in 2010 made integrity assessments a compulsory step in career 

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The members of the Parliamentary quota of the SJC are elected by simple majority whereas inspectors 
are elected by a majority of two-thirds. 
See Technical Report page 5 and footnote 7. 
See Technical Report page 18  
Most recently, COM(2011)459 final, page 8. 
The  Commission's  reports  under  the  CVM  of  20  July  2011  (COM(2011)459  final,  page  4)  and  8 
February  2012  (COM(2012)57  final,  page  2)  raised  concerns  on  the  transparency  and  objectivity  of 
senior judicial nominations in this context (see Technical Report pages 6 and 14) 
Following to accusations of influence and bias in organised crime cases by a member of government, 
judges  of  Sofia  City  Court  appealed  to  the  SJC  in  February  to  protect  judicial  independence  and 
establish  the  facts  in  this  case.  The  accused  judge  also  filed  a  court  case  for  slander.  The  judge  has 
subsequently  been  dismissed  from  the  judiciary  by  the  SJC  on  12  July  for  delaying  the  motives  in  a 
court case. This led to walk-outs and protests by several courts including by a large number of judges 
from the Supreme Court of Cassation. 
However, independent experts consulted by the Commission expressed concern at the lack of separation 
of roles inside the Council (Technical Report page 13, footnote 49), 

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development and promotion within the judiciary and set up local structures for integrity and 
appraisal. The result was the first real disciplinary activity within the Bulgarian judiciary.20  

Most  of  these  disciplinary  cases  have  been  initiated  by  controls  made  by  the  inspectorate, 
which started its operational activities in 2008. The inspectorate has also actively represented 
its views on disciplinary issues within the SJC and was given the right to appeal disciplinary 
decisions in 2009. It makes detailed recommendations to court presidents. The control activity 
of  the  inspectorate  represents  a  positive  contribution  to  improving  judicial  discipline  and 
accountability as such activities had not existed before.21 At the same time, the work of the 
inspectorate  has  not  been  directed  at  promoting  solutions  to  the  systematic  shortcomings  in 
accountability  and 
inspectorate 
recommendations  in  areas  like  the  random  allocation  system,  or  the  correction  of  important 
and systematic shortcomings in judicial practice.22 

judicial  practice.  Examples 

the  absence  of 

include 

Disciplinary  activity  since  2007  shows  a  certain  leniency  and  a  reticence  to  address  serious 
cases, in particular in relation to integrity. Two emblematic cases of alleged trade in influence 
amongst the judiciary were only pursued after major public pressure.23 Successful challenges 
to  disciplinary  rulings  in  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  point  to  weaknesses  in  the 
jurisprudence  of  the  Court,  in  the  disciplinary  procedures  of  the  SJC  or  in  law:  such 
shortcomings should be analysed and corrected. So too should the lack of criminal follow-up, 
as the prosecution did not systematically investigate magistrates involved in these cases. This 
links to the overall poor results of the judiciary in pursuing cases of corruption within its own 
ranks.24 

Overall,  disciplinary  jurisprudence  itself  has  not  been  consistent.  Bulgaria  has  also  been 
unable to properly introduce integrity into the system of judicial promotions and appraisals, 
despite  amendments  to  the  Judicial  Systems  Act  of  2010.  Integrity  verifications  have  been 
formalistic  and  with  little  preventive  effect,  sometimes  relying  on  NGOs  to  put  relevant 
information  in  the  public  domain.  Various  senior  appointments  during  this  period  lacked 
sufficient  transparency  and  continue  to  be  marred  by  accusations  of  political  influence  and 
shortcomings in integrity.25 The inability of the judicial leadership to define and implement a 

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There  has  been  little  disciplinary  activity  prior  to  2007  and  to  the  creation  of  an  independent 
inspectorate. Overall, the SJC determined 179 disciplinary cases between October 2007 and December 
2011. The number of sanctions increased from 15 in 2008 and 24 in 2009 to 34 in 2010 and decreased 
again to 13 in 2011. 
The  inspectorate  carries  out  regular  and  ad-hoc  controls  of  the  management  of  local  courts  and 
prosecutors  offices,  it  followed  up  on  complaints  and  also  investigated  particular  issues  such  as  case 
delays. By 2011, the inspectorate had carried out a full assessment of all judicial districts. 
See Technical Report, page 7. 
All disciplinary sanctions have been cancelled in one of these two cases by the Supreme Administrative 
Court. See Technical Report page 14-15. 
This  was  highlighted  in  several  CVM  reports,  including  COM(2011)459final,  page  4  and 
COM(2012)57final, page 2-3.  
Integrity  issues  were  raised  at  the  occasion  of  appointments  of  chairs  to  several  senior  courts,  to  the 
Inspectorate of the SJC and regarding some members of the SJC. (Technical Report, page 6 and 14 and 
COM(2011)459final, page 4. 

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proper anti-corruption strategy26 alienated parts of the judiciary and can be seen to contribute 
to the low-level of public trust in this area.27  

Efficiency of the judicial process 

The Supreme Judicial Council is responsible for the human resources policy of the judiciary. 
This  includes  initial  recruitment,  the  provision  of  training  through  the  National  Institute  of 
Justice,  regular  appraisals,  promotions  and  appointments  to  senior  judicial  positions.  Legal 
amendments  in  2010  gave  the  SJC  the  role  of  assessing  workload,  amending  areas  of 
jurisdiction,  reallocating  resources  and  if  necessary  closing  down  courts.  Consequently,  the 
Council has all relevant powers to properly manage human resources and judicial structures 
for the benefit of judicial efficiency.  

Looking back at the period since 2007, a number of difficulties can be highlighted in the way 
the SJC has discharged its responsibilities in this area. First, the Council has been unable to 
properly  translate  the  objectives  of  the  revised  Judicial  Systems  Act  into  practice  regarding 
promotions. The system as it is practiced does not ensure a career development of magistrates 
according  to  professional  merit,  as  well  as  a  proper  consideration  for  issues  of  integrity. 
Although new appraisal criteria were defined in the law, these have not been used to properly 
reflect  differences  in  performance.28  The  weaknesses  of  the  appraisal  system  also  affect 
promotion procedures, and have led to frequent challenges of promotion decisions in court.29  

Promotions  and  initial  recruitments  did  not  follow  a  coherent  and  predictable  schedule,30 
based on an assessment of staff needs and on a strategy to satisfy them. Between 2009 and 
2011, no promotion decisions were taken. The consequent high number of vacancies in some 
courts  was  filled  through  secondments  –  a  procedure  outside  the  promotion  system,  reliant 
solely on agreement between court presidents.31  

There are important differences in workload between courts in Sofia and other courts in the 
country.32  These  workload  disparities  have  led  to  serious  delays  in  a  number  of  courts, 
particularly  in  issuing  motivations  of  judicial  decisions.  These  delays  in  publishing 
motivations  are  a  real  hindrance  for  the  efficiency  of  the  judicial  process.  They  also  affect 
judicial  independence:  as  high  workload  in  many  courts  often  leads  to  delays  in  issuing 

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For example, tackling shortcomings in the random allocation system of courts, where verification by the 
inspectorate has so far not led to concrete corrective action (see Technical Report page 7 and page 19). 
Bulgarians  have  the  most  negative  perception  regarding  the  prevalence  of  corruption  in  the  judicial 
sector  of  any  Member  State.  In  September  2011,  76%  of  all  respondents  in  Bulgaria  believed  that 
corruption is widespread within the judicial sector. This perception has however slightly improved since 
2009. (Special Eurobarometer no. 374 on corruption perception in the EU published in February 2012) 
See Technical Report page 13. For example, the SJC has acknowledged that appraisals carried out in 
2011 marked 98% of all magistrates as "very good". 
A  promotion  decision  of  the  SJC  was  nullified  by  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  in  May  as  the 
consideration  of  academic  results  of  the  candidate  by  the  SJC  in  this  context  was  considered 
inappropriate. 
See Technical Report page 13, footnote 46.  
De facto, secondments equal promotions and mostly concern courts and prosecutors offices in Sofia. In 
2011, the total number of seconded judges and prosecutors amounted to 265 compared to 294 positions 
offered for promotion and transfer in the same year.  
According to estimates by practitioners, workload at Sofia City Court is eight times higher than at other 
courts  of  first  instance,  the  situation  at  Sofia  Regional  Court  is  considered  worse.  Reallocations  of 
positions remained modest with 20 to 30 transfers on average by year (Technical report, page 14). No 
decisions to close entire courts and reallocate staff have yet been taken. 

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motivations,  a  large  number  of  judges  are  in  technical  infraction.  Professional  associations 
have  raised  concerns  that  this  opens  the  door  to  subjective  treatment,  arguing  that  some  of 
their members have been sanctioned, while late motivations in other cases have been tolerated 
by the judicial inspection.33 

Other  important  conditions  for  a  more  efficient  and  consistent  judicial  process  are  efficient 
procedures  and  professional  practice  among  police,  prosecution  and  courts.  Since  2007, 
Bulgaria has improved all three procedural codes, covering criminal, civil and administrative 
law.34 As a result, this allowed the police to improve investigative practice and has facilitated 
the  use  of  evidence  in  court.  It  also  allowed  courts  to  appoint  reserve  defence  counsels  to 
reduce the risk of delays and allowed the prosecution to appeal court decisions to send back 
cases for further investigation. Bulgaria also started to work on a new Penal Code in 2010 as 
the  current  Code  is  outdated  and  ill-suited  to  tackling  many  modern  crimes,  including 
corruption, abuse of office and organised crime.35 Work on the Penal Code has proceeded at 
an uneven pace and the initial target to submit a first draft for public discussion in early 2013 
has been postponed.  

Weaknesses in judicial and investigative practice, in particular in relation to cases involving 
high-level corruption and serious organised crime, have been highlighted by the Commission 
since 2008.36 Bulgaria initially responded to these concerns by introducing the monitoring of 
a  number  of  cases  of  public  interest  by  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council,  through  training 
activities and with controls by the inspectorate to establish whether procedural rules had been 
respected  by  judges.  The  reform  of  penal  procedures  in  2010  was  also  accompanied  by  a 
structural  re-organisation  of  police  investigation,  the  extension  of  investigative  tasks  to  a 
much  larger  group  of  police  officers,  and  the  provision  of  training  and  equipment  for  this 
purpose.  

These measures contributed to the acceleration in court of some cases but had little effect on 
the  most  important  cases  of  high-level  corruption  and  organised  crime  monitored  by  the 
Commission. As a result of a detailed analysis of some key cases, the July 2011 CVM report 
recommended  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  organisational  structures  and  judicial  procedures 
and  the  implementation  of  an  action  plan  in  cooperation  with  international  experts  and 
monitored together with civil society.37 This was in particular directed at the need to see the 
different  institutions  as  part  of  a  continuum,  rather  than  separate  bodies  pursuing  their  own 
strategies.  In  response,  Bulgaria  took  a  number  of  structural  and  organisational  decisions 
involving the prosecution and its cooperation with other key bodies. These measures have not 
yet led to perceptible improvements in the results of police and the judiciary regarding cases 
of  high-level  corruption  and  organised  crime  (see  below).  In  addition,  law  enforcement 
authorities  and  the  judiciary  have  not  yet  engaged  in  a  comprehensive  and  independent 
assessment  of  the  weaknesses  of  the  existing  structures  and  procedures.  Consequently,  the 
potential impact of measures taken by Bulgaria in this context since last summer is yet to be 
seen. 

33 
34 

35 
36 
37 

A case cited in this context is summarised in footnote 18. 
A  new  Civil  Procedure  Code  was  adopted  in  July  2007,  the  Administrative  Procedure  Code  was 
amended in 2007 and 2011 and the Penal Procedure Code was amended in 2010. See Technical Report 
pages 10-12.  
See Technical Report, page 9. 
See Technical Report, page 16. 
COM(2012)459final, page 8, recommendation f and g. 

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In  this  context,  it  is  important  to  stress  the  importance  of  judicial  consistency.  A  recent 
consultation within the judiciary exposed stark disagreement among judges on the conditions 
for  the  application  of  preliminary  detention  of  defendants  in  serious  criminal  cases. 
Disagreement in such important areas raises substantial concerns, and points to shortcomings 
in the pursuit of consistency by the judicial authorities, with the Supreme Court of Cassation 
(SCC) the most important player in this area. A proactive strategy by the SCC to identify and 
address inconsistent interpretation of the law in all relevant areas could bring major benefits, 
in  particular  in  support  of  Bulgaria's  fight  against  organised  crime  and  corruption.38  In 
addition, Bulgaria has not yet achieved a full publication of court rulings and motivations in a 
unified format. 

Reform of the Judicial System 

The shortcomings in  accountability  of the judiciary and in efficiency of  the judicial process 
must be linked to the key institutions that drive progress in this area, in particular the Supreme 
Judicial Council and the prosecution. For these reasons, the Commission has recommended a 
comprehensive reform of these institutions, assessing and improving organisational structures 
and professional practice regarding serious criminal cases.39 Although some limited action has 
been  taken  at  the  level  of  the  prosecution,40  these  recommendations  are  essentially  still 
pending. 

The  reform  of  the  SJC  has  been  in  particular  focus  as  the  mandate  of  the  current  Council 
draws to a close. This  focus  on  the  Council was  intensified when two members resigned in 
2011  in  disappointment  over  the  Council's  incapacity  to  deliver  tangible  improvements  in 
judicial  accountability  and  integrity,  and  shortcomings  in  transparency  within  its  internal 
organisation. In the election to replace these posts, a number of courts refused to be involved, 
considering that the current Council had lost the legitimacy to represent the judiciary.  

This  debate  led  to  reflections  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice  on  reforming  the  elections  to  the 
Council, and a variety of contributions from within the judiciary and civil society to promote 
fundamental reform of the way the Council is organised and elected.41 Some of the concerns 
raised in this context were confirmed by experts consulted by the Commission.42  

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

The  SCC  issued  only  five  interpretative  rulings  concerning  organised  crime  and  corruption  offences 
between 2007 and 2011. 
These recommendations were  made  by  the Commission  under points 1 and  3 on page  8 of  the  CVM 
report adopted on 20 July 2011 (COM(2011)459). 
For  example,  the  prosecution  created  two  new  departments  for  combating  financial  crime  and  a 
department  for  juvenile  justice.  Bulgaria  still  has  to  take  measures  to  strengthen  the  internal 
independence of prosecutors in order to ensure independent, objective and effective investigations. In 
particular,  Bulgaria  needs  to  address  the  absence  in  Bulgarian  law  of  sufficient  guarantees  for  an 
independent  investigation  into  offences  of  which  the  Chief  Public  Prosecutor  or  other  high-ranking 
officials  close  to  him  may  be  suspected  (ECHR  1108/02  Kolevi,  judgment  of  05/11/2009,  final  on 
05/02/2010). 
Proposals for a comprehensive reform of the SJC were made to the Minister of Justice in February 2012 
by a coalition of the most important professional organisations and NGOs active in the area of judicial 
reform. See Technical report page 16.  
Experts  notably  highlighted  the  lack  of  formal  separation  within  the  Council  between  chapters  of 
prosecutors  and  judges.  This  issue  has  previously  been  underlined  by  opinions  of  the  Council  of 
Europe's Venice Commission, as has the strong political role in the appointments. 

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The elections to the new Council this autumn are an important opportunity to strengthen its 
accountability and legitimacy among the judiciary and the public. They should be a starting 
point for a more fundamental reform towards a Council better able to fulfil its Constitutional 
role.  For  these  reasons,  the  Commission  recommended  to  the  Bulgarian  authorities  that  the 
introduction of direct elections in the judicial chapter would be an important step to address 
the  shortcomings  of  the  system  today.  Although  the  Bulgarian  government  endorsed  direct 
elections to the SJC in principle, it considered that this was impossible to organise properly 
this autumn. Amendments to the Judicial Systems Act adopted in June include an important 
step  forward  in  the  transparency  of  the  upcoming  election  procedure,  for  both  the 
parliamentary  and  the  judicial  chapters.  However,  the  judicial  chapter  will  still  be  elected 
through  the  indirect  election  model,  so  the  SJC  will  have  to  wait  another  five  years  before 
benefitting  from  recourse  to  direct  elections.43  First  reports  suggest  that  though  the 
transparency  requirements  are  proving  a  step  forward  in  the  process,  postponing  the  use  of 
direct elections for this year has led to inconsistent procedures and a dominant role for Court 
Presidents in the choice of delegates. 

The upcoming elections still provide an opportunity to choose SJC members committed to a 
more  active  role  for  the  Council  in  its  next  mandate.  Both  Parliament  and  the  judiciary  can 
focus  their  deliberations  on  criteria  such  as  professional  and  educational  qualification, 
integrity  and  a  vision  for  the  future.  Transparency  should  mean  an  opportunity  for  the 
candidates to be scrutinised by civil society and Parliament and the judiciary should be ready 
to be accountable for their choices. 

To contribute to the success of the Council’s next mandate, it will be important to improve the 
Council's structure, procedures and organisation. The new leadership of the Council can take 
a  fresh  look  at  the  role  of  the  Council  on  the  basis  of  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the 
Council's  current  mandate.  The  ideas  put  forward  by  professional  associations  and  civil 
society at the beginning of this year can offer inspiration for the new Council. An early test 
will  be  the  upcoming  elections  of  Prosecutor  General  and  Chair  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation.  The  new  Council  could  choose  to  make  the  elections  for  these  most  important 
judicial  positions  in  the  country  emblematic  of  a  new  approach,  with  open  and  transparent 
proceedings, clear criteria and a real competition. 

II.2 Fight against Organised Crime 2007-2012 

Benchmark  6:  Implement  a  strategy  to  fight  organised  crime,  focussing  on  serious 
crime,  money  laundering  as  well  as  on  the  systematic  confiscation  of  assets  of 
criminals.  Report  on  new  and  ongoing  investigations,  indictments  and  convictions  in 
these areas 

Upon  accession,  Bulgaria  committed  to  demonstrate  convincing  results  in  the  fight  against 
organised crime. This involves demonstrating the capacity of law enforcement authorities and 
the judiciary to successfully investigate, prosecute and try important organised crime cases so 
as  to  achieve  effective  dissuasiveness.  Key  issues  include  systematic  asset  seizures  and 
confiscation, the improvement of professional practice among police, prosecution and courts 

43 

Candidacies will be published two months before the election date and public hearings of all candidates 
will be organised to allow for public scrutiny. An indirect election with a doubled number of delegates 
will be organised this autumn. Direct election is foreseen for the next Council elections in 2017. 

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and  the  establishment  of  effective  structures  and  efficient  cooperation  between  police, 
prosecution and other administrative authorities. 

Activity against organised crime intensified in 2010 when police took a more active role, and 
a number of long-overdue procedural and institutional reforms were carried out. These efforts 
have  led  to  a  more  solid  institutional  set-up,  better  procedures  and  won  Bulgaria  trust  with 
law  enforcement  authorities  in  other  EU  Member  States.44  The  resources  devoted  to  police 
investigations have seen significant increases.45 However, convincing results are still missing 
at  both  the  pre-trial  and  trial  phases  to  tackle effectively  this  form  of  criminality.  There  are 
still  many  unsolved  and  delayed  cases  in  this  area.  Organised  crime  is  still  described  by 
independent  observers  as  a  fundamental  challenge  for  the  state  and  the  society,46  a  view 
shared by public opinion.47  

The  institutional  framework  for  the  fight  against  organised  crime  has  been  adjusted  several 
times since 2007.48 There has been an overall trend towards more specialisation, more training 
and more careful security vetting.49 Specialised joint teams for organised crime cases within 
the  prosecution  were  created  at  the  level  of  five  district  courts  in  2010,  and  in  2012  a  new 
specialised central prosecution office for organised crime and a new specialised court started 
its work.50 This approach is in line with recommendations in successive CVM reports.51 

These  new  specialised  structures  at  the  level  of  police,  prosecution  and  court  illustrate  a 
commitment to adapting structures to tackle organised crime. However, so far, they have not 
yet been able to prove their effectiveness in the successful investigation, prosecution and trial 
of  important  cases.  With  very  few  exceptions,  the  specialised  court  has  decided  so  far  only 
minor  cases  as  the  underlying  legislation  does  not  allow  the  court  to  prioritise  on  the  most 
important cases.52 This is accentuated by the staffing constraints on both the prosecution and 
the court. Another important weakness of the law is that it does not allow the court to pursue 
corruption  offences  which  are  in  reality  often  linked  to  organised  crime.  Together  with  the 
general  strengthening  of  penal procedures  and  the  reform  of  police  investigation,  these  new 
structures  and  reforms  are  a  clear  demonstration  of  Bulgaria's  interest  to  achieve  a  step-
change in the fight against organised crime.  

44 

45 

46 

47 

48 
49 

50 
51 
52 

Europol  has  noted  improvements  in  the  cooperation  of  Bulgaria  with  law  enforcement  institutions  in 
other EU Member States which had led to various successful joint operations.  
Police investigators have increased from 2000 in 2010 to 6000 in 2011 and should reach 8000 in total. 
(SEC(2011)967final, page 18). 
Europol  considers  organised  crime  in  Bulgaria  as  unique  in  the  EU  to  the  extent  that  it  exercises 
considerable influence over the economy which is a platform to influence the political process and state 
institutions. The annual turnover of the twelve most important organised crime activities in Bulgaria is 
estimated  at  1.8  BEUR  or  4.8%  of  GDP  annually.  (Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment 
2010-2011.  Centre  for  the  Study  of  Democracy,  Sofia.  April  2012,  p.5)  Europol  also  notes  that  the 
number of cases initiated in Bulgaria, while on the rise, is still low compared to the scale of organised 
crime. 
96% of respondents in a Flash Eurobarometer conducted in Bulgaria in May 2012 considered organised 
crime an important problem. (Flash Eurobarometer 351) 
Technical Report page 31.  
The overall strengthening of police investigation in 2010 has also had a positive effect on the capacity 
of police in this area. 
Technical Report page 32. 
COM(2009)402final, page 7; COM(2010)400final, page 8; COM(2011)459final, page 9. 
The definition of organised crime in the Bulgarian Penal Code is criminal offences committed by three 
or more individuals. 

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Better results in the forfeiture of assets are an important element to the dissuasiveness of the 
fight  against  organised  crime  and  also  the  fight  against  corruption.  The  first  years  after 
accession saw little progress in this area, with few assets secured and forfeited in important 
organised crime and high-level corruption cases. The year 2011 saw a significant increase in 
the amounts of forfeited assets in Bulgaria and a more proactive and rigorous approach by the 
asset forfeiture commission under a new director. His resignation in 2012,on the grounds of 
insufficient political support, cast doubt on the sustainability of this improvement and pointed 
to wider obstacles to effective asset forfeiture. 53  

to 

the  government 

in  Parliament,  Bulgaria  responded  positively 

To improve effective asset forfeiture, a new asset forfeiture act was adopted by Parliament in 
May.54 This law offers for the first time the possibility to confiscate illegal assets through a 
procedure in civil courts which does not require a prior conviction, but can be launched upon 
the  initiation  of  judicial  investigations  for  a  number  of  serious  crimes  and  upon  certain 
administrative infringements. With the adoption of this law, which required a particular effort 
by 
longstanding 
recommendations  by  the  international  community  and  many  Bulgarian  practitioners.  The 
Commission  and  Member  States  provided  encouragement  and  support  for  this  approach.55 
The  law  does  not  reflect  all  recommendations  made  by  CVM  reports  in  this  context56  and 
experts  have  highlighted  other  potential  shortcomings.57  In  order  to  allow  the  new  asset 
forfeiture act to achieve a real dissuasive effect, a systematic scrutiny of assets in all relevant 
cases  and  better  inter-institutional  cooperation  will  be  necessary.  This  will  require  that  the 
prosecution systematically associates the asset forfeiture commission, early enough during an 
investigation  to  prevent  the  disappearance  of  assets.  Administrative  control  authorities  will 
also  have  to  set  up  close  cooperation  with  the  asset  forfeiture  commission  to  identify  and 
profile relevant cases, as the commission lacks ex-officio powers to act on its own initiative. 
Consistency  of  court  jurisprudence,  in  particular  regarding  the  shift  of  the  burden  of  proof 
foreseen  in  the  new  law  will  be  another  important  element  to  determine  its  effectiveness.  It 
will also be important to assure the independence and efficiency of the future asset forfeiture 
commission  which  will  be  created  under  the  new  law,  notably  through  the  appointment  of 
competent and politically independent members in a transparent and objective process.58  

Although Bulgaria invested considerably to improve the institutional and legal framework for 
the  fight  against  organised  crime  since  2010,  results  have  been  limited:  Few  important 
organised  crime  cases  have  received  sentences59  and  there  have  been  several  acquittals  in 
important cases where evidence in public domain raised expectations of convictions.60 Serious 
concerns  must  be  raised  regarding  the  poor  results  in  uncovering  contract  killings:  Of  33 
contract killings monitored by the Commission since 2006, only four court cases have started, 

53 
54 
55 

56 

57 
58 
59 
60 

Technical Report, page 34. 
A Constitutional challenge was registered in the beginning of July. 
After a first failure in Parliament in July 2011 and the Commission's recommendations to return to the 
law  in  two  consecutive  CVM  reports,  several  Member  States  ambassadors  intervened  publicly  in 
support of the law in May and the Commission advised on some aspects of the law. 
Missing in particular are asset control of senior officials and politicians and an ex-officio right for the 
asset forfeiture commission. 
Technical Report, page 35. 
Members of the new commission will be elected by Parliament, Government and the President. 
Notable exceptions are the cases of Dimitar Zhelyazhkov, and Plamen Galev and Angel Hristov. 
Since  last  July,  four  important  cases  have  been  finally  acquitted  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation: 
The case of the so-called "crocodile gang", the case of the "Margin brothers", the case of Ilian Varsanov 
and the case of Dimitar Vuchev. Acquittals have furthermore been referenced in COM(2011)459final, 
page 5. 

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even  if  a  number  of  investigations  are  still  under  way.61  A  number  of  new  contract  killings 
have  taken  place  this  year.  In  this  context  it  is  important  to  mention  that  the  Commission 
regularly  receives  complaints  from  Bulgarian  citizens  and  foreign  investors  about  judicial 
inaction  and  alleged  collusion  with  organised  crime  on  local  level.62  More  progress  can  be 
seen  in  areas  linked  to  Bulgaria's  cooperation  with  other  Member  States.  This  has  led  to  a 
number  of  steps  to  specifically  address  crimes  with  a  cross-border  dimension,  such  as 
trafficking in drugs.63  

The weak results overall in the follow-up to individual cases cannot be attributed to a specific 
institution. Analysis shows that weaknesses are to be found at all stages of the investigative 
and judicial process among police, prosecution and courts.64 Some of these weaknesses are of 
systematic  character,  notably  the  fragmentation  of  investigations  among  several  bodies  and 
shortcomings in cooperation, weaknesses in the use of evidence and specific shortcomings in 
area like witness protection and economic and financial analysis.65 Bulgaria needs clear and 
effective procedures and practices and better tools for cooperation66 to succeed in important 
organised  crime  cases.  A  comprehensive  and  independent  assessment  of  case  failures,  with 
the support of EU partners, and corrective measures in the form of an action plan, seems the 
clearest way to make progress.  

Systemic  failures  in  law  enforcement  were  recently  demonstrated  after  two  prominent 
convicts  escaped  enforcement  of  their  prison  sentence.  The  Bulgarian  authorities  failed  to 
apprehend some of the most senior criminals of the country after an announced verdict was 
handed down by court. This must be seen as a major failure of the system. 

II.3 Fight against Corruption 2007-2012 

Benchmark  4:  Conduct  and  report  on  professional,  non-partisan  investigations  b  into 
allegations of high-level corruption. Report on internal inspections of public institutions 
and on the publication of assets of high-level officials 

Benchmark  5:  Take  further  measures  to  prevent  and  fight  corruption,  in  particular  at 
the borders and within local government 

Upon accession, the CVM set out how Bulgaria was expected to demonstrate better results in 
the  fight  against  corruption.  This  involved  demonstrating  the  capacity  of  law  enforcement 
authorities  and  of  the  judiciary  to  successfully  investigate,  prosecute  and  try  high-level 
corruption  cases  and  to  investigate  inexplicable  wealth.  Key  tools  include  a  system  of  asset 
control  for  high-level  public  officials,  measures  to  fight  corruption  in  law  enforcement, 

61 

62 
63 

64 
65 

66 

It is generally accepted that there have been some 150 or so contract killings over the last 10 years, very 
few of which have been uncovered and sanctioned. 
This concerns in particular the Black Sea region. 
An important organised crime figure has been arrested in May and will be extradited for trial in another 
EU  Member  State.  A  recent  large  seizure  of  drugs  was  the  result  of  cooperation  between  Bulgaria, 
several other Member States, and Europol. 
See Technical Report page 30.  
There  is  no  information  on  assets  secured  or  confiscated  in  relation  to  cases  raised  by  the  new 
specialised  prosecution  office  for  organised  crime.  An  important  money  laundering  case  has  been 
recently initiated concerning Plamen Galev and Angel Hristov. 
Proposals  made  by  experts  on  the  basis  of  practice  in  other  Member  States  have  included  regular 
reporting by senior management in prosecution and police, and a central register for bank accounts to 
facilitate financial investigation. 

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prosecution, at borders and other parts of the public sector, and specific measures in the areas 
of conflicts of interest and public procurement. 

Since  2007,  Bulgaria  has  developed  a  comprehensive  administrative  framework  and 
prevention  measures  to  combat  corruption.  Risk  assessment  tools  are  available  and  specific 
methodologies have been implemented for key areas such as asset declarations and conflict of 
interest. Reforms among border police and customs have reduced corruption opportunities in 
these areas. However, implementation has remained patchy. Setbacks have come in areas like 
the  2009  amnesty  act.67  In  addition,  the  Commission's  recommendation  to  turn  the  asset 
verification  system  into  an  effective  tool  to  detect  illegal  enrichment  has  not  yet  been 
followed.68.  

In  their  analysis  of  the  Bulgarian  anti-corruption  framework,  experts  consulted  by  the 
Commission highlighted some general weaknesses that inhibit progress in this area. Bulgaria 
lacks  independent  institutions  in  the  area  of  anti-corruption  with  the  authority  and  the 
obligation  to  make  proposals  and  to  drive  action.69  This  limits  their  freedom  of  action  to 
intervene  in  a  pro-active  way  and  to  deliver  independent  monitoring.  As  a  result,  many 
administrative  activities  in  this  area  tend  to  be  reactive  and  to  focus  on  formal  compliance 
alone. The lack of sanctioning rights in some areas, and the absence of effective sanctions in 
areas  where  these  rights  exist,  is  illustrative  of  how  difficult  it  is  for  this  action  to  gain 
traction.70  

In order to take a step change in its fight against corruption in the next period, Bulgaria should 
consider establishing an independent body to coordinate and assist monitoring in this area. In 
this  context,  it  would  also  be  appropriate  to  carry  out  an  independent  impact  evaluation  of 
Bulgaria's  national  strategy  for  the  fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime  and  to 
establish a new strategy with clearer indicators and benchmarks of achievement on this basis. 

The scale of concern about corruption in Bulgaria is substantial: 96% of Bulgarians perceive 
corruption as an important problem and 68% consider the situation in this area unchanged or 
worse than in 2007.71 Public perceptions will only change when determined action has been 
seen to be taken in the fight against corruption. 

High-level corruption 

The  response  of  the  judiciary  and  law  enforcement  regarding  cases  of  corruption  and  in 
particular cases of high-level corruption involving senior government officials and politicians 
has been a focus of the CVM since 2007. Bulgaria has developed specialisation in this area. 
Further to recommendations by the Commission72, in 2009 Bulgaria created a joint team for 
the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  fraud  with  EU  funds  and  strengthened  its  legal 

67 

68 
69 
70 

71 
72 

The amnesty act of 2009 led to 458 discontinued cases including abuse of office and misuse of public 
funds. 
COM(2011)459 final, page 10. 
Except for the National Audit Office, all authorities in this area are subordinated to the executive. 
The  National  Audit  Office  and  the  Conflict  of  Interest  Commission  cannot  sanction  if  cooperation  is 
refused. Inspectorates have the right to sanction non-compliance with corruption prevention rules but in 
reality have not exercised this right. 
Flash Eurobarometer 351 of July 2012. 
In  2009,  the  Commission  recommended  Bulgaria  to  set-up  specialised  structures  for  prosecuting  and 
judging high-level corruption and organised crime cases. (COM(2009)402final, page7. 

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framework.73 Some other high-level corruption cases were treated by joint teams focusing on 
organised crime, which were created at the same time. Following further recommendations in 
CVM  reports74,  in  2012  Bulgaria  created  a  dedicated  joint  team  to  focus  on  high-level 
corruption  and  reorganised  the  joint  team  on  EU  fraud,  extending  its  remit  to  several  other 
areas of fraud with public funds. 

The results of these specialised structures are mixed. Although the creation of the joint team 
on EU fraud initially led to an increase in cases and court, case numbers decreased again in 
201175  and  the  vast  majority  of  these  cases  were  of  minor  importance.  In  addition,  the 
Commission's  analysis  showed  a  large  number  of  unexplained  dismissals  and  unsuccessful 
cases.76 

The results of the judiciary regarding other corruption cases show a similar picture: Although 
case numbers increased in 2009 and 2010, there was a significant drop in 2011.77 In addition, 
there  are  very  few  high-level  cases  that  reach  court  and  many  of  those  cases  progress  only 
very slowly in trial, with a disproportionately high number of acquittals.78 Investigations into 
alleged  corruption  and  abuse  of  office  by  magistrates  have  received  a  particularly  weak 
response from the judiciary.79 

In  this  context,  particular  concerns  must  be  expressed  as  to  continuous  delays  and 
postponements at appeal court level in two emblematic cases regarding fraud with EU funds, 
where  long  prison  sentences  were  handed  down  by  court  in  first  instance  in  March  and 
October  2010.  No  satisfactory  explanation  has  been  found  why  the  available  procedural 
possibilities  to  accelerate  these  emblematic  cases  have  not  been  actively  pursued  by  the 
judiciary.80  The  disappointing  results  at  both  the  pre-trial  and  trial  phases  in  the  pursuit  of 
high-level  corruption  can  be  largely  attributed  to  systematic  weaknesses  that  affect  judicial 
efficiency in other areas – such as the legal framework, court jurisprudence, and the practice 
of  prosecution  and  administrative  control  authorities.  They  have  been  set  out  by  the 
Commission in 201181 and also find many echoes in an analysis carried out by the prosecution 
services  in  2012.  The  remedial  measures  implemented  by  the  prosecution82  demonstrate  an 

73 

74 
75 

76 

77 

78 

79 
80 

81 
82 

Amendments to the Penal Code in May 2008 allowed for the admittance in court of evidence provided 
by the European Anti-Fraud Office OLAF. 
COM(2011)459final, page 8-9. 
Convictions in EU fraud cases rose from none in 2007 steadily to a high of 243 convictions in 2010 and 
decreased again to 159 in 2011. All indictments for EU fraud registered in 2011 were discontinued as 
criminal cases and turned into administrative infringements. (COM(2012)57final, page 6).  
In its reports of July 2011 and February 2012, the Commission points to a large number of discontinued 
cases  where  related  aspects  were  prosecuted  in  another  Member  State  (COM(2011)459final,  page  6; 
COM(2012)57final, page 6).  
Newly initiated pre-trial investigations for corruption offences: 512 in 2007, 490 in 2008, 595 in 2009, 
684 in 2010 and 522 in 2011. 
Since the Commission's last analysis in July 2011, verdicts have been achieved in five high-level cases, 
two of them final. Final convictions for prison sentences were pronounced in two cases concerning a 
former Member of Parliament and a former director of a state-owned enterprise, the execution of one 
sentence  was  suspended.  During  the  same  period,  ten  cases  were  acquitted  involving  three  former 
ministers,  one  former  deputy  minister  and  other  senior  officials,  managers  of  state-owned  enterprises 
and businessmen. 
See above page 7. 
In  both  cases,  a  variety  of  delays  mean  that  first  instance  convictions  delivered  in  2010  have  barely 
progressed in appeal. (Technical Report, page 20, footnote 80). 
Technical CVM Report of 20 July 2011 (SEC(2011)967 final), page 12. 
See Technical report page 16-17. 

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increasing understanding within the judiciary that substantial change in professional practice 
and organisation will be needed to improve the results of Bulgaria in the fight against high-
level corruption.  

These measures should be embedded in an overall legal and institutional effort in Bulgaria to 
improve the way corruption cases are brought to justice, as recommended under the CVM in 
2011.83 This will require coordinated action in several areas. Firstly, Bulgaria should consider 
legal  amendments  to  facilitate  the  prosecution  of  corruption  offences  by  the  judiciary.84 
Secondly, administrative  control  authorities should  establish a pro-active attitude to identify 
cases and effective means of cooperation with the judiciary. Thirdly, police investigators and 
prosecutors  need  to  develop  the  capacity  to  analyse  complex  economic  and  financial  data. 
Finally,  the  prosecution  also  needs  to  be  able  to  properly  plan  and  steer  complex 
investigations  to  successful  closure  and  the  court  system  needs  to  improve  the  ability  of 
judges  to  appreciate  economic  and  financial  evidence,  align  jurisprudence  and  encourage 
dissuasive sanctions through cassation. In this context, it will be important to establish a close 
operational  cooperation  between  the  specialised  joint  team  against  corruption  and  the 
specialised prosecution office for organised crime. 

Despite  the  various  legal  and  procedural  instruments  developed  to  address  high-level 
corruption,  the  continuing  difficulties  of  such  cases  in  court  raises  questions  about  the 
capacity and resolve of the judiciary. High-level corruption cases typically involve influential 
public  personalities;  they  are  therefore  a  test  for  the  capacity  and  independence  of  the 
Bulgarian  judicial  system.  As  corruption  and  organised  crime  are  often  linked,  detailed 
financial investigations are an important part of any investigation in this area and of particular 
importance  to  uncover  links  between  organised  crime  and  politics.  These  aspects  have  not 
received appropriate attention in Bulgaria. It will also be important to work closely with the 
asset  forfeiture  commission  and  other  administrative  control  authorities  in  order  to  carry 
through an efficient pursuit of high-level corruption cases with dissuasive results. 

Corruption in public administration 

The  efforts  of  law  enforcement  institutions  in  the  fight  against  corruption  need  to  be 
complemented by effective administrative action to identify transgressions of rules, to apply 
sanctions  and  to  develop  preventive  measures.  Since  2007,  Bulgaria  has  developed  a 
comprehensive administrative framework in this area. In particular, Bulgaria created a high-
level  coordination  body  for  the  fight  against  corruption  under  the  Council  of  Ministers  to 
supervise  the  implementation  of  Bulgaria's  strategy  and  action  plans  in  this  area.  Two  new 
administrative bodies were created in 2010, a commission for the prevention  of  conflicts of 
interest,  and  a  horizontal  body  to  promote  the  fight  against  corruption.  In  addition, 
administrative  inspectorates  in  each  branch  of  government  activity  have  been  tasked  to 
develop  and  monitor  prevention  activities  and  risk  assessment  tools  and  are  also  asked  to 
apply disciplinary sanctions if required. This framework is completed by the National Audit 
office which is in charge of asset control of public officials. 

With  the  help  of  this  comprehensive  administrative  framework,  Bulgaria  has  been  able  to 
register a number of achievements in preventing and sanctioning corruption since 2007. Risk 

83 

84 

For  this  purpose,  the  Commission  recommended  that  Bulgaria  undertake  a  comprehensive  audit  of 
judicial  practice,  procedures  and  organisation  and  establish  a  detailed  action  plan  together  with 
international experts. (COM(2011)459 final, recommendations under points 3 and 6, pages 8-9) 
See Technical report page 9. 

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assessment tools and codes of ethics have been developed and implemented in most areas of 
government,  a  system  of  regular  declarations  for  conflict  of  interest,  incompatibilities  and 
assets  for  public  officials  has  been  set  up  and  some  institutions  such  as  customs,  tax 
authorities  and  border  police  carried  out  a  structural  reform,  with  particular  attention  to 
integrity and corruption prevention.  

However, there are also a number of important shortcomings which Bulgaria should correct in 
order  to  make  a  step  change  in  dissuading  corruption  and  to  improve  the  degree  of  trust 
Bulgarians have in their state institutions. The system of asset control whereby the National 
Audit Office collects and publishes asset declarations is a useful contribution to transparency, 
but  the  verification  of  declarations  falls  short  and  the  system  offers  no  possibility  to  detect 
illicit enrichment. Few cases of concrete follow-up of inconsistencies in declarations by other 
authorities  have  been  reported.85  The  recommendation  by  the  Commission  to  include  asset 
verification in the new law on asset forfeiture has not been followed.86 The fact that few of 
these  cases  are  ever  investigated  strongly  suggests  that  there  is  a  gap  here,  and  part  of  the 
administrative  machine  needs  to  have  explicit  responsibility  for  proactively  pursuing  illicit 
enrichment. 

Bulgaria adopted a law on conflicts of interest in 2009 and set up an administrative authority 
to establish and sanction conflicts of interest.87 The establishment of a dedicated commission 
to establish conflicts of interest and to suggest sanctions has led to an impressive increase of 
public signals on conflicts of interest and a number of decisions, but so far only one case has 
been  finalised.88  The  assessment  of  the  Commission's  first  15  months  of  operation  shows  a 
new authority that has taken up its challenge and started work quickly, but which has not yet 
been able to prove itself in convincing decisions in important cases.89 Questions must also be 
raised  regarding  the  effectiveness  of  the  law  on  conflicts  of  interest.  The  Commission's 
decisions  can  be  appealed  at  two  instances  before  the  courts  and  any  subsequent 
administrative sanction can also be appealed at two instances. As a result of this cumbersome 
two-tier  procedure,  the  Commission  has  been  able  to  issue  altogether  so  far  only  five  penal 
orders.90  The  Commission  needs  to  demonstrate  its  ability  to  deliver  sound  judgement  in 

85 

86 

87 

88 
89 

90 

Declarations are automatically checked by an IT programme against some other available data, such as 
tax declarations, but there is no risk profiling, no access to banking data, no comparison to declarations 
of previous years and therefore no possibility to follow-up on inexplicable wealth.  
The  Commission  recommended  Bulgaria  to  "adopt  legislation  providing  for  non-conviction  based 
confiscation  and  ex-officio  verification  of  assets  of  senior  officials,  magistrates  and  politicians  and 
demonstrate a track record in this area" (COM(2011) 459 final, page 9) 
Bulgaria adopted a law in 2009 and then established the Commission for Prevention and Ascertainment 
of  Conflict  of  Interest  (CPACI)  in  2011,  after  a  suspension  of  EU  funds  in  summer  2008  which  was 
motivated in particular by several cases of conflict of interest and a lack of protection of EU funds in 
this area. (Technical Report, page 27; see also COM(2008)496final "Report on the Management of EU 
Funds in Bulgaria"). 
See Technical Report page 27. 
Recent  cases  which  have  been  publicly  questioned  involve  the  previous  chairman  of  the  Asset 
Forfeiture  Commission  and  the  former  chairman  and  a  former  member  of  the  Commission  for 
Consumer Protection. 
Other weaknesses highlighted by experts notably include the inability to pursue anonymous signals and 
to  apply  administrative  sanctions  in  cases  incorrect  declarations  are  submitted  (see  Technical  report 
page 27). 

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sensitive  cases.  Recommendations  by  the  Commission  to  apply  conflict  of  interest  rules  to 
individual service contracts have not yet been followed.91 

Bulgaria implements a methodology on corruption risk assessment across the executive under 
the authority of the General Inspectorate of the Council of Ministers. This methodology can 
be  considered  a  useful  tool  for  corruption  prevention.  However,  its  application  is  not 
mandatory  and  the  capacity  of  the  General  Inspectorate  to  follow  up  on  implementation  is 
limited. In addition, corruption risk assessment is only mandatory for the executive branch92 
and disciplinary sanctions have so far not been applied in cases where the requirements were 
not  respected.  A  new  structure  to  assess  corruption  risks  across  the  Bulgarian  institutional 
framework  ("Borkor")  is  yet  to  become  operational.  To  have  added  value,  it  would  need  to 
become a strong central institution to coordinate the fight against corruption, with authority to 
assess the plans of other institutions, to make a risk assessment of declarations on conflict of 
interest, or to act as a secretariat for an independent monitoring process. 

Public Procurement 

Weaknesses in the implementation of Public Procurement legislation are an important source 
of corruption. They also undermine the effective use of EU funds and, in a general sense, lead 
to a lower quality in the delivery of public goods and the waste of public money. Audits and 
assessment  by  various  Commission  services  have 
identified  substantial  risks  and 
shortcomings in this area.  

Since  2007,  Bulgaria  has  made  efforts  to  improve  its  legal  framework  and  administrative 
action  regarding  public  procurement.  Bulgaria  reformed  its  public  procurement-related 
legislation with the aim to simplify the latter and to strengthen some administrative controls in 
order  to  comply  with  recommendations  by  the  Commission.93  The  Public  Financial 
Inspections Agency (PFIA) and the Court of Auditors received powers to undertake ex-officio 
checks and the requirement on the Public Procurement Agency (PPA) to check tenders before 
they  are  published  was  extended.  Efforts  have  been  made  to  improve  the  expertise  of  the 
judiciary, including through specialisation.  

However, these efforts have not yet led to the expected results. The complaints received by 
the Commission concerning the Bulgarian public procurement system continue to grow,94 and 
there are clear cases of serious violations of EU procurement rules. Although additional staff 
has been made available this year,95 the resources devoted to helping contracting authorities 
are  still  insufficient.  It  will  be  important  for  Bulgaria  to  implement  new  control  procedures 
effectively.  Giving  the  PPA  right  to  perform  ex-officio  checks  would  send  an  important 
message that a more pro-active risk-based approach is expected from all control bodies. 

III. Next Steps  

91 

92 

93 
94 

95 

(COM(2011)459 final, recommendation v, page 10) Individual service contracts are currently based on 
the  law  on  obligations  and  contracts  and  therefore  escape  labour  legislation  and  its  provisions  on 
conflict of interest and incompatibilities. 
Corruption  risk  assessment  is  not  compulsory  for  Parliament,  the  Judiciary,  local  self-government, 
public agencies, public institutes and public utilities and funds. 
COM(2011)459final, page 10. 
In the area of public procurement, the Commission received 4 complaints over the course of 2008 and 
2009 and 26 complaints over the course of 2010 and 2011. 
The  Public  Procurement  Agency  has  received  10  additional  posts  this  year,  mainly  to  carry-out 
additional ex-ante control functions. 

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The  Commission's  assessment  shows  the  progress  that  Bulgaria  has  made  in  the  five  years 
since its accession to the EU. The CVM has made a positive contribution to this progress. The 
Commission  considers  that  Bulgaria  is  on  its  way  to  attain  the  objectives  of  the  CVM, 
provided it steps up the reform process. Deepening reforms will need a stronger ownership of 
reform,  particularly  in  the  leadership  of  the  judiciary.  It  will  also  need  a  clear  common 
direction by the authorities, and a comprehensive approach to implementing change, joining 
the  work  of  different  institutions  together  more  effectively  than  in  the  past.  This  implies  a 
stronger effort to demonstrate, that integrity is valued and that corruption and organised crime 
is effectively punished. The CVM should continue, in order to lend its support to these efforts 
and  to  keep  up  the  momentum  of  change  towards  a  sustainable  and  irreversible  reform 
process – a process sufficiently strong that the external intervention of the CVM is no longer 
needed. 

The  past  five  years  have  shown  that  Bulgaria  can  take  major  strides  when  the  political 
direction  is  clear.  It  has  put  many  of  the  right  tools  in  place.  The  next  phase  will  be  to  use 
these tools in order to drive and implement reform. This will bring closer the fulfilment of the 
CVM requirements, as well as being a demonstration of commitment to the Bulgarian people. 
All  Member  States  have  both  obligations  and  opportunities  within  the  area  of  freedom, 
security and justice, and the Commission looks forward to Bulgaria completing the particular 
process of the CVM and addressing these issues on the same basis as other Member States. 

Recognising that Bulgaria now needs to implement what has been decided, avoiding any steps 
backward and demonstrating a strong track record, the Commission has decided to make its 
next assessment at the end of 2013.This will allow the time required to assess tangible results. 
The Commission will also end the practice of issuing mid term stock taking reports. However, 
the Commission will monitor progress closely over this period, with regular missions, as well 
as frequent dialogue with the Bulgarian authorities and with other Member States. 

IV. Recommendations 

To maintain progress, the Commission invites Bulgaria to take action in the following areas, 
on the basis of recommendations designed to help Bulgaria to focus its efforts in preparing for 
the Commission's next assessment of progress under the CVM at the end of 2013.  

1. 

Reform of the judicial system 

–  Renew 

the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  with  a  mandate 

to  undertake 

fundamental reform.  

–  Establish  and  implement  a  medium-term  human  resource  strategy  for  the 
judiciary, based on an analysis of needs and workload, with the changes in the 
structure of courts, recruitment and training.  

–  A new General Prosecutor should have a mandate to reform the prosecution in 
structure,  procedures  and  organisation  on  the  basis  of  an  independent 
functional audit and in cooperation with external experts. 

–  Set  a  target  for  the  completion  of  work  on  the  new  Penal  Code,  and  for  its 

implementation. 

–  Ensure  the  open  involvement  of  all  significant  NGOs  and  professional 

organisations in defining and monitoring strategies for reform. 

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2. 

Independence, accountability and integrity of the judiciary 

–  Focus the work of the Inspectorate on integrity and judicial efficiency. Define 
a single, effective system of random allocation of cases for use nationwide. 

–  Ensure  that  the  election  of  the  General  Prosecutor  gives  an  example  of  a 
integrity  and 

transparent,  competitive  process  based  on  criteria  of 
effectiveness. 

–  Make  transparency,  objectivity  and  integrity  the  top  priority  in  appraisals, 

promotions, appointments and disciplinary decisions for the judiciary. 

3. 

Efficiency of the judicial process 

–  Establish  a  strategy  for  reducing  the  backlogs  in  publishing  motivations  for 

cases and analyse how to remedy this problem. 

–  Close  loopholes  in  the  effective  implementation  of  court  decisions,  such  as 
absconding  to  evade  prison  sentences  or  failure  to  apply  financial  sanctions 
defined in court.  

–  Adopt a strategy to improve legal consistency, including a proactive strategy 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  to  identify  and  rule  on  areas  of 
disagreement.  

4. 

Fight against organised crime 

–  Ensure that the new Asset Forfeiture Commission is appointed on the grounds 
of  integrity,  that  other  authorities,  notably  the  prosecution,  fully  cooperate 
with  its  work;  and  that  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  rules  swiftly  to 
preserve its authority if necessary;  

–  Carry  out  an  independent  analysis  of  case  failures  covering  weaknesses  in 
both investigation and prosecution including witness protection, economic and 
financial  analysis,  collection  of  evidence  by  police  and  cooperation  between 
the judiciary and the executive. 

–  On  this  basis,  remedy  shortcomings  in  structure,  management,  staffing, 

training, cooperation and professional practice. 

5. 

Fight against corruption 

–  Use  experience  from  past  cases  to  improve  the  performance  of  police,  the 

prosecution and courts.  

–  Carry  out  an  independent  impact  evaluation  of  Bulgaria's  National  Anti-
Corruption Strategy. Entrust a single institution with the task to coordinate the 
fight against corruption, to assist and coordinate the efforts in different sectors, 
report  on  the  results  of  the  anti-corruption  strategy  in  all  public  bodies,  and 
support a new independent monitoring system involving civil society. 

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–  Amend  the  law  on  conflicts  of  interest  to  allow  dissuasive  sanctions  to  be 
effectively  applied.  Revise  the  asset  declaration  and  verification  system 
turning it into an effective instrument to detect illicit enrichment. 

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