REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY (19th report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011)
Date: 2012-07-10
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU institution, impact study, principle of proportionality, principle of subsidiarity

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 10.7.2012  
COM(2012) 373 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION 

ON SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY  

(19th report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011) 

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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION 

ON SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY  

(19th report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011) 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

This  is  the  nineteenth  annual  report  on  the  application  of  the  principles  of  subsidiarity  and 
proportionality in EU lawmaking. It is presented in accordance with Article 9 of the Protocol 
(No 2) on the application of these principles (hereinafter ‘the Protocol’) attached to the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 

As in previous years, the report looks at how the principles are implemented by the different 
EU  institutions  and  bodiesthe  Commission,  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the 
Committee  of  the  Regions  and  presents  in  more  detail  some  Commission  initiatives  and 
legislative proposals which have raised subsidiarity issues during 2011. It also examines how 
the subsidiarity control mechanism, which under Article 12 of the TEU and the Protocol gives 
national  Parliaments  a  particular  role  in  scrutiny  of  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  has 
developed since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Given the close links between the 
subsidiarity control mechanisms and the political dialogue between national Parliaments and 
the  Commission,  this  report  should  be  seen  as  complementary  to  the  Commission's  annual 
report for 2011 on relations with national Parliaments 1. 

2. 

HOW THE INSTITUTIONS APPLY THE PIRNCIPLES 

Decisions as to whether to propose action at EU level (subsidiarity) and, if so, the extent and 
formof such action (proportionality) are fundamental to smart regulation2. All EU institutions 
and bodies have to comply with both principles.  

A  careful  assessment  of  the  principles  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  during  the  pre-
legislative phase is important ensuring that proposals are appropriately conceived. At the post-
legislative  stage,  the  Court  of  Justice  could  be  called  on  to  controlthe  legality  of  adopted 
legislation.  So  far,  the  Court  has  not  annulled  a  measure  for  breach  of  the  subsidiarity 
principle. 

It is imperative to make the arguments on subsidiarity and proportionality transparent, as this 
enables the various institutional players as well as the public at large to discuss the validity of 
the  proposal  constructively.  Therefore,  in  accordance  with  Article  5  of  the  Protocol  and 
irrespective of where the initiative originates, a draft legislative act should contain a detailed 
‘statement’  making  it  possible  for  the  interested  parties  to  judge  compliance  with  the 
principle. Although subsidiarity cannot be assessed mechanically by reference to operational 

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COM(2012) 375 
Wider smart regulation issues were addressed in the Commission Communication COM(2010)543 

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criteria, the Commission continues to use ‘necessity’ and ‘EU value-added’ tests as part of its 
analytical framework and recommends that others do likewise.  

2.1. 

The Commission 

As the author  of legislative proposals under  its right  of initiative, the Commission works to 
ensure that the correct choices about whether and how to propose EU level action are made at 
an early stage of policy development.  

Roadmaps3,  which  are  published  for  all  the  major  initiatives,  outline  the  Commission’s 
intentions,  including  an  initial  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  justification.  These  ideas  are 
verified  later  during  both  stakeholder  consultation  and  the  impact  assessment  (IA)  process. 
The  subsidiarity  statement  for  each  legislative  proposal,  as  foreseen  by  Article  5  of  the 
Protocol,  is  presented  in  the  explanatory  memorandum  and  recalled  in  the  recitals  of  the 
proposal. IAs, which accompany proposals with significant impacts, provide the most detailed 
analysis  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality.  The  quality  of  this  analysis  is  systematically 
scrutinised by the IA Board. 

In 2011, the Board continued to assess EU added value when scrutinising the quality of IAs. 
Though the Board's recommendations on subsidiarity and proportionality were down slightly 
compared to 2010, they still featured in a significant number of opinions (43 %). The Board 
frequently asked for stronger justification of the need for action at EU level, in particular: 

— 
the need for more evidence of problems that require action at EU level. As regards the 
initiative on Alternative Dispute Resolution, the Board requested a better demonstration of the 
existence and magnitude of market failure and its relevance for the functioning of the internal 
market. Similarly, in the case of the EU Strategy for the protection and welfare of animals, 
the  Board  asked  that  the  problems  associated  with  EU  competence,  such  as  distortion  of 
competition on the internal market, be better distinguished from those other problems where 
action at Member State level would be more appropriate.  

— 
on some occasions it concluded that the evidence base to demonstrate the need for and 
proportionality  of  an  EU  legislative  initiative  remained  weak  for  instance  in  the  case  of  the 
above mentioned initiative on Alternative Dispute Resolution, which estimated that 'there was 
not sufficient clarity on the costs and benefits of a full EU coverage ADR [alternative dispute 
resolution] at both European and Member State level’ .Similarly, concerning the initiative on 
access  to  a  basic  payment  account,  the  Board's  view  was  that  there  remained  a  need  to 
demonstrate  more  convincingly  the  need  for,  and  the  proportionality  of,  a  binding  EU 
instrument. Services introduced Board's comments into the final IA report.  

2.2. 

National Parliaments 

The subsidiarity control mechanism gives national Parliaments the right to express their views 
on  whether  draft  legislative  acts,  which  do  not  fall  within  the  EU's  exclusive  competences 
comply  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity.  Depending  on  the  number  of  reasoned  opinions 

3 

Access to roadmaps is via the Commission’s IA Website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.htm. 

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concluding  that  a  proposal  is  in  breach  of  the  subsidiarity  principle4,  i.e.  if  the  thresholds 
mentioned in Article 7 of the Protocol are met within the eight-week deadline, the so-called 
‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ can be triggered. These entail a review of the draft legislation 
and may lead to the relevant legislative proposal being amended or withdrawn.  

In  2011,  the  Commission  received  64  reasoned  opinions  from  national  Parliaments,  an 
increase  of  almost  75%  in  comparison  with  2010,  the  first  year  of  functioning  of  the 
subsidiarity  control  mechanism.  Despite  this  increase,  these  64  reasoned  opinions  still 
represent only about 10% of the total number of 622 opinions received by the Commission in 
2011 as part of its broader political dialogue with national Parliaments. 

As  in  the  first  year  of  application  of  the  new  subsidiarity  control  mechanism,  the  focus  of 
national  Parliaments'  reasoned  opinions  remains  quite  disparate:  the  64  reasoned  opinions 
received in 2011 related to 28 different Commission proposals. Most of the reasoned opinions 
focused  on  legislative  proposals  in  the  fields  of  taxation,  agriculture,  internal  market  and 
justice. The proposals which elicited the highest number of reasoned opinions concerned the 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (nine opinions), the temporary reintroduction of 
border controls at internal borders in exceptional circumstances (six), the Common European 
Sales Law (five) and the Single CMO Regulation (five). The national Parliaments most active 
in  issuing  reasoned  opinions  were  the  SwedishRiksdag,  the  Luxembourg  Chambre  des 
Députés (lower chamber and the Polish Sejm and Senat (lower and upper chambers).  

In none of the 2011 cases were the thresholds for triggering the yellow or orange cards met. 
Apart  from  the  above  mentioned  files,  the  vast  majority  of  the  28  legislative  proposals  on 
which national Parliaments issued reasoned opinions in 2011 elicited at most three reasoned 
opinions. As per to its political commitment to national Parliaments, the Commission replied 
or is in the process of preparing a reply to each reasoned opinion in the context of the political 
dialogue  and  put  forward  into  account  in  the  ensuing  interinstitutional  discussions  and 
negotiations.  

Each national Parliament chooses its own internal procedure for adopting reasoned opinions 
and  the  format  in  which  these  are  sent  to  the  Commission.  This  is  reflected  in  the  huge 
diversity of formats, length, detail and of the actors involved in the adoption process. Given 
that  the  political  dialogue  and  the  subsidiarity  control  mechanism  unavoidably  overlap  to  a 
certain  extent,  the  only  request  President  Barroso  addressed  to  national  Parliaments  in  his 
letter  of  1  December  20095  was  "to  distinguish  in  their  opinions  as  far  as  possible  between 
subsidiarity  aspects  and  comments  on  the  substance  of  a  proposal,  and  to  be  as  clear  as 
possible  as  regards  their  assessment  on  a  proposal's  compliance  with  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity". The Commission will continue to emphasise this latter point in its contacts with 
national Parliaments. 

Apart from the more formal aspects, the content and reasoning of the reasoned opinions sent 
to the Commission in 2011 also varied. In several cases, national Parliaments used substantive 
arguments  to  justify  a  breach  of  subsidiarity,  such  as  the  potential  negative  effects  of  a 

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A reasoned opinion is defined as an opinion sent by a national Parliament to the Commission (or the 
European  Parliament,  the  Council  ,  Court  of  Justice,  the  European  Central  Bank  or  the  European 
Investment Bank – depending on which institution has proposed the respective legislation) within the 
eight weeks period mentioned in the Protocol and stating a breach of subsidiarity.  
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_fr.htm 

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proposed measure on the overall economic situation, while other based their conclusions on 
subsidiarity  and  proportionality  arguments  or  on  an  allegedly  incorrect  or  unspecified  legal 
basis. Finally, national Parliaments in several cases used a reasoned opinion to express their 
opposition to the proposed use of delegated acts in a certain area or to the lack of subsidiarity 
justification  in  the  explanatory  memorandum  (see  chapter  3.1.).  As  stated  in  the  above 
mentioned  letter  of  President  Barroso,  the  Commission  will  "consider  all  reasoned  opinions 
raising  objections  as  to  the  conformity  of  a  legislative  proposal  with  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity  (…), even if the different reasoned opinions provide different motivations as to 
the  non-compliance  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity".  In  line  with  its  interpretation  of  the 
subsidiarity  control  mechanism,  the  Commission  considers  that  the  issuance  of  a  reasoned 
opinion on a Commission proposal and the arguments on which it is based, fall solely within 
the responsibility of each national Parliament.  

As some reasoned opinions received in 2011 highlighted insufficient or missing subsidiarity 
justifications and some have concluded that this constitutes a formal breach of the subsidiarity 
principle,  the  Commission  reiterates  its  commitment  to  ensure  that  the  explanatory 
memoranda of all legislative proposals within the scope of the subsidiarity control mechanism 
contain an appropriate subsidiarity justification.  

2.3. 

The European Parliament and the Council 

The  legislators  also  have  a  responsibility  to  ensure  the  proposal’s  conformity  with  the 
principles  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  and  to  provide  a  justification  wherever  an 
amendment they propose affects the scope of EU action.6  

In Council, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) ensures that the principles 
are  complied  with.7  In  the  European  Parliament,  the  internal  Rules  of  Procedure  contain  a 
specific Rule on the "Examination of respect for the principle of subsidiarity"8, which states 
that  compliance  is  verified  by  the  committees  in  charge  of  specific  legislative  dossiers, 
together  with  the  Committee  on  Legal  Affairs,  and  that  the  committee  responsible  may  not 
take its final vote before expiry of the eight-week deadline. 

It should also be noted that in 2011 the Commission received a small number of parliamentary 
questions (32 out of more than 12 000) which concerned issues in relation to respect for the 
principles  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality.  They  mainly  covered  requests  to  substantiate 
the  compliance  of  certain  Commission  proposals  with  these  principles,  partially  echoing 
concerns raised by other institutions and players. 

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8 

See the Inter-Institutional Agreement on subsidiarity (OJ C 329, 6.12.1993, p. 132). 
Council Decision 2009/937/EU, OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 35. 
Rule 38a  

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2.4. 

The Committee of the Regions 

The Committee of the Regions expresses its views either when it is consulted or in the form of 
own-initiative opinions. In accordance with Article 8 of the Protocol, it also has the right to 
challenge under Article 263 TFEU the validity of legislation as regards compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, but only if it has been consulted by virtue of an obligation under the 
TFEU. 

The Committee's subsidiarity monitoring is expressed either via its opinions, the activities of 
the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network (SMN) or via contributions which regional parliaments 
with  legislative  powers  provided  to  national  Parliaments  under  the  subsidiarity  control 
mechanism. The way in which regional Parliaments with legislative powers are consulted by 
their  national  Parliaments  varies  and  in  this  regard  the  eight-week  deadline  poses  a  major 
challenge. A few regional Parliaments have started to send their subsidiarity opinions directly 
to the Commission for information.  

Though  it  observed  no  subsidiarity  breach  in  2011,  the  Committee  has  reinforced  the 
references  to  the  principle  in  its  opinions  and  plans  to  increase  the  number  of  subsidiarity 
assessments  included  in  its  final  opinions.  It  continues  to  use  its  subsidiarity  and 
proportionality analysis grid.  

The  Committee's  Subsidiarity  Monitoring  Network  (SMN)  included  by  the  end  of  the  year 
2011  134  partners.  This  represents  a  significant  increase  in  particular  as  regards  regional 
parliaments  and  governments.  In  2011  the  SMN  conducted  targeted  consultations  on  five 
Commission  proposals  (Connecting  Europe  Facility;  Less  Bureaucracy  for  citizens;  Review 
of  EU  Air  Quality  and  Emissions  policy;  Energy  Efficiency  and  Roma  Integration9).  It  also 
launched the second Action Plan focused on TEN-T policy with the aim of identifying best 
practices in the application of the subsidiarity principle in Europe’s regions and cities.  

2011 also saw preparations for the launch of the REGPEX website, which is designed to help 
regions  with  legislative  powers  play  their  part  in  the  subsidiarity  control  mechanism  and  to 
provide a source of information and exchange between regional parliaments and governments 
as they prepare their subsidiarity analyses. The website was launched in March 201210.  

Finally,  the  revised  Agreement  on  Cooperation  between  the  European  Commission  and  the 
Committee of the Regions, on which negotiations started in 2011 and which was signed on 16 
February  201211,  reflects  a  willingness  to  strengthen  further  cooperation  and  exchanges  in 
terms of implementing of the Protocol. 

2.5. 

The Court of Justice  

The  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  is,  in  accordance  with  Article  263  TFEU, 
competent to review the legality of legislative acts as regards compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity.  The  Protocol  states  that  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  or  Member  States, 
themselves or on behalf of their national Parliaments, can bring a case before the Court.  

9 
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COM(2011)665, COM(2010)747, SEC(2011)342, COM(2011)370 and 173 respectively 
http://extranet.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/regpex/Pages/default.aspx 
http://cor.europa.eu/en/about/interinstitutional/Documents/EN.pdf 

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A judgment Luxembourg vs Parliament and the Council12confirmed what was already noticed 
in the ruling on the Roaming Regulation13 , covered in 2009 report. In examining complianace 
with  the  principles  of  proportionality  and  subsidiarity,  the  Court  will  look  to  the 
Commission's impact assessment.  

3. 

KEY CASES WHERE SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY CONCERNS WERE RAISED 

This section looks at the Commission proposals which have generated the most discussion on 
subsidiarity and proportionality. 

3.1. 

Follow-up to cases mentioned in previous reports 

For some of the cases mentioned in earlier reports, such as the Directives on Aviation Security 
Charges,14  Protection  of  Soil,15  Equal  Treatment  outside  Employment16  andCultivation  of 
Genetically  Modified  Organisms  there  were  no  significant  developments  in  the  ongoing 
legislative procedures during 2011. On the Seasonal Workers Directive, discussions continued 
in the EP and Council without issues related to subsidiarity or proportionality being raised.  

As regards the Maternity Leave Directive,17 mentioned in the 2008 report, the legislators have 
not  yet  managed  to  find  common  ground.  At  the  Employment,  Social  Policy,  Health  and 
Consumer  Affairs  Council  in  June  2011,  the  Council  took  note  of  a  progress  report  which 
notes the concerns of some delegations calling for due consideration be given to the principle 
of  subsidiarity  and  the  diversity  of  the  situations  in  the  different  Member  States.  Some 
delegations  at  the  meeting  recalled  the  minuted  statement  by  eight  delegations  at  the 
December 2010 Council, proposing that each Member State should be free to decide on the 
level of protection while respecting certain minimum requirements, in line with the principle 
of subsidiarity. There were some voices calling for the Council to discontinue its work on this 
topic. 

During the inter-institutional discussions in December 2011 an agreement was found on the 
proposal  concerning  Food  Distribution  to  the  Most  Deprived  People,  which  had  elicited  3 
reasoned opinions from national Parliaments in 2010. The European Parliament expressed its 
strong  support  for  continuing  the  programme  beyond  2013.  The  Council  also  reached  a 
political agreement on continuing the scheme up to 2013. In its declaration, the Commission 
took note of the opinion of a significant group of Member States not to pursue the programme 
beyond 2013. However, this is without prejudice to the Commission's right of initiative under 
the Treaty. 

The  plenary  session  of  the  European  Parliament  in  February  2012  adopted  a  report  on  the 
Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme  proposal,  on  which  a  first  reading  agreement  had  not  been 

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Case C-176/09,  
Case  C-58/8  Vodafone  Ltd,  Telefónica  O2  Europe  plc,  T-Mobile  International  AG,  Orange  Personal 
Communications  Services  Ltd  v.  Secretary  of  State  for  Business,  Enterprise  and  Regulatory  Reform 
about EC Regulation No 717/2007 
COM(2009) 217. Here and afterwards, details on inter-institutional discussion are accessible via PreLex 
database: http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm. 
COM(2006) 232. 
COM(2008) 426. 
COM (2008) 637. 

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possible.  This  proposal  elicited  3  reasoned  opinions  from  national  Parliaments  in  2010. 
Nevertheless,  both  the  rapporteur,  Mr  Simon  (S&D/DE),  and  the  Danish  Presidency  of  the 
Council expressed their willingness to pursue negotiations with a view to concluding an early 
second reading agreement. 

Finally, the Consumer Rights Directive was formally adopted by the Council in October 2011.  

3.2. 

Further cases where subsidiarity was debated 

Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)18 

In  March  2011  the  Commission  proposed  a  common  system  for  calculating  the  tax  base  of 
businesses  operating  in  the  EU.  The  aim  of  this  proposal  is  to  reduce  significantly  the 
administrative  burden,  transfer  pricing  compliance  costs,  allow  cross-border  relief  of  tax 
losses and tackle legal uncertainties which businesses in the EU currently face by dealing with 
up to 27 different national systems for determining their taxable profits.  

This  proposal  attracted  the  highest  number  of  opinions  from  national  Parliaments  during 
2011,  eliciting  in  total17  opinions,  nine  of  which  were  reasoned  opinions  according  to  the 
Protocol, namely arguing that the proposal was in breach of the subsidiarity principle. As the 
reasoned opinions received represented only 13 votes, the so–called "yellow card procedure", 
which requires at least 18 votes, was not triggered.  

In addition to alleged shortfalls in the subsidiarity justification, several national Parliaments 
were concerned that the proposal was regulating an area of Member State competence. They 
claimed  that  it  would  negatively  affect  Member  States  as  they  would  not  be  entitled  to  use 
corporate tax as an instrument for boosting growth and employment. They consiodered that it 
would  deprive  the  Member  States  of  their  individual  competitive  advantages  and  would 
generate indirect pressure on national tax rates, leading to budgetary erosion and a decrease in 
tax revenues. In addition, two reasoned opinions raised the issue of proportionality claiming 
that the proposal went further than necessary leading to two different corporate tax  systems 
which would result in unnecessary administrative burden. 

In  its  replies  to  national  Parliaments,  the  Commission  pointed  out  that  the  present  area  of 
taxation falls under shared competence and that Article 115 TFEU provides the legal base for 
measures in this area. It is on this basis that the Commission adopted draft legislation with the 
aim of tackling fiscal impediments and disparities mainly resulting from the fragmentation of 
the  internal  Union  market  into  27  distinct  tax  systems.  Businesses  are  faced  with  those 
obstacles when they operate within the internal market. The CCCTB is expected to generate 
savings  for  companies  thus  encouraging  cross-border  expansion  not  only  of  existing 
multinational groups but also of purely domestic companies, including SMEs which currently 
cannot  afford  to  establish  themselves  accros  the  border.  Therefore,  the  CCCTB  aims  at 
generating  positive  scale  effects  and  at  encouraging  cross-border  business  investment. 
Moreover, the Commission emphasised that the proposal does not affect the Member States' 
sovereignty  to  set  tax  rates  individually,  as  this  is  left  to  be  dealt  with  through  national 
legislation. 

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COM(2011)121 

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The proposal, falling under a special legislative procedure is currently under discussion in the 
Council.The  European  Parliament  gave  a  favourable  opinion  to  the  proposal  on  19  April 
2012. 

Temporary  reintroduction  of  border  controls  at 
circumstances19 

internal  borders 

in  exceptional 

The proposal for a regulation adopted in September 2011, building on the conclusions of the 
European Council in June 2011, is intended to strengthen the governance of the area without 
internal  border  controls  (the  Schengen  area).  It  aims  to  enable  it  to  respond  effectively  to 
exceptional circumstances which would put the overall functioning of Schengen cooperation 
at risk, without, however, jeopardising the principle of free movement of persons. 

The Commission received 11 opinions from national Parliaments on this proposal, 6 of which 
were  reasoned  opinions.  National  Parliaments  argued  that  the  proposal  encroaches  on  the 
sphere of national sovereignty of Member States, which are better placed to assess and decide 
on  the  possible  reintroduction  of  border  controls.  Moreover,  some  national  Parliaments 
considered  that  compliance  with  the  subsidiarity  principle  was  not  appropriately  justified. 
Arguments raised by national Parliaments were also echoed in the Council discussions on this 
proposal. 

In  its  replies  to  those  national  Parliaments  which  had  raised  subsidiarity  concerns,  the 
Commission focused on the fact that the Schengen area is an asset shared by the whole EU, so 
any decision affecting it must be taken at EU level and not individually. The rules governing 
the creation and maintenance of such an area without internal frontiers are the subject of EU 
legislation, and any exceptions to the principle of free movement should be made at that level. 
The Commission also argued that the proposal fully respects the sovereign responsibility of 
Member States with regard to maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.  

Passenger Name Records20 

The  Commission  received  ten  opinions  from  national  Parliaments  on  this  proposal,  the 
majority  concluding  that  the  Commission  proposal  was  in  line  with  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity.  However,  five  chambers  considered  the  proposal  not  to  be  in  compliance  with 
the principle of proportionality due to the perceived disproportionate length of the proposed 
data retention period.  

4. 

CONCLUSIONS 

As  in  previous  years,  the  majority  of  Commission  proposals  were  adopted  by  the  co-
legislators  without  significant  discussions  on  subsidiarity  and  proportionality.  In  2011  the 
thresholds  for  the  so-called  "yellow  card"  and  "orange  card"  were  not  reached  and  only  a 
small percentage (about 10%) of national Parliaments' opinions sent to the Commission in the 
context of the political dialogue were reasoned opinions within the meaning of the Protocol, 
i.e.  stating  a  breach  of  subsidiarity.  At  the  same  time,  in  cases  where  compliance  with  the 

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COM(2011)560 
COM(2011)32 

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principles of subsidiarity and proportionality was questioned, the views of the institutions and 
other players involved sometimes differed widely.  

The  concepts  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  are  fundamental  elements  in  the  policy 
development process of the EU Institutions; and the Commission's impact assessments remain 
the  main  vehicle  for  addressing  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  issues  during  the  pre-
legislative  phase,  the  IA  Board  playing  a  key  role  in  this  respect.  However,  institutional 
practice shows that the way these principles are interpreted and applied during the legislative 
phase often depends on the political context, highlighting thus their political dimension.  

The  way  in  which  most  of  the  national  Parliaments  implement  the  Protocol  and  use  the 
subsidiarity  control  mechanism  has  highlighted  the  primarily  political  character  of  this  new 
tool, a fact, which the Commission had already highlighted in President Barroso's letter of 1 
December 2009.  

The subsidiarity control mechanism has served to make the process more transparent and has 
clearly helped to bring EU policies into the public debate in Member States and thus to raise 
public awareness on these issues. 

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ANNEX 

List of Commission initiatives on which  
national Parliaments delivered reasoned opinions 
on the subsidiarity principle in 2011 

Title 

1. 

Common  Consolidated  Corporate  Tax 
Base (CCCTB), COM(2011)121 

2. 

reintroduction  of  border 
Temporary 
control  at  internal  borders  in  exceptional 
circumstances, COM(2011)560 

3. 

Single CMO regulation, COM(2010)799 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

Common 
COM(2011)635 

European 

Sale 

Law, 

Jurisdiction,  applicable 
the 
recognition  and  enforcement  of  decisions 
regarding  the  property  consequences  of 
registered partnerships, COM(2011)127 

law  and 

Prudential 
institutions, COM(2011)452 

requirements 

for 

credit 

Common  Financial  Transaction  Tax, 
COM(2011)594 

European  Globalisation  Adjustment  Fund 
(2014 - 2020), COM(2011)608 

Specific  requirements  regarding  statutory 
audit 
- 
public-interest 
COM(2011)779 

entities 

of 

10. 

Marketing standards, COM(2010)738 

11. 

Restructuring  the  Community  framework 
for  the  taxation  of  energy  products  and 
electricity, COM(2011)169 

National chambers submitting reasoned opinions 
UK House of Commons  
BG Narodno Sabranie 
SE Riksdag  
NL Tweede Kamer 
PL Sejm 
ML Kamra tad-Deputati 
IE Dail Eireann 
RO Camera Deputaţilor 
SK Národná Rada 
FR Assemblée nationale 
Both NL Chambers 
PO Assembleia da República 
SE Riksdag  
RO Senatul 
SK Národná Rada 
PL Sejm 
PL Senat 
DK Folketing  
LU Chambre des Députés 
SE Riksdag  
AT Bundesrat 
DE Bundestag 
UK House of Commons 
BE Sénat 
BE Chambre des Représentants 
PL Senat 
PL Sejm 
RO Senatul 
IT Senato della Repubblica 

UK House of Commons 
SE Riksdag 
FR Sénat 
CY Vouli ton Antiprosopon 
SE Riksdag 
MT Kamra tad-Deputati 
Both NL Chambers 
SE Riksdag  
DK Folketing 
BE Chambre des Représentants 
SK Národná Rada 
SE Riksdag 

LU Chambre des Députés 
PL Senat 
BG Narodno Sabranie  
Both ES Chambers 

EN 

11 

   EN 

 
 
12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

Enhanced  cooperation  in  the  area  of  the 
creation  of  unitary  patent  protection, 
COM(2011)215  and  in  the  area  of  the 
creation  of  unitary  patent  protection  with 
translation 
the  applicable 
regard 
arrangements, COM(2011)216 

to 

IT Camera dei Deputati 
Both ES Chambers 

Energy 
COM(2011)370 

efficiency 

directive, 

FI Eduskunta 
SE Riksdag 

to 

the 

the 
Access 
supplementary 
credit 
institutions,  insurance  firms  in  a  financial 
conglomerate, COM(2011)453 

activity 
supervision  of 

and 

support 

Rules  for  direct  payments  to  farmers 
under 
the 
framework  of  the  common  agricultural 
policy, COM(2011)625 

schemes  within 

SE Riksdag  
RO Camera Deputaţilor 

DE Bundesrat 
LU Chambre des Députés 

Support  for  rural  development  by  the 
European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural 
Development (EAFRD), COM(2011)627 

DE  Bundesrat  (joint  with 
COM(2011)625) 
LU Chambre des Députés 

the  reasoned  opinion  on 

Regulation  on  the  distribution  of  food 
products  to  the  most  deprived  persons  in 
the Union, COM(2011)634 

Contractual relations in the milk and milk 
products sector, COM(2010)728 

Financing  of  the  common  agricultural 
policy, COM(2010)745 

Jurisdiction  and 
recognition  and 
the 
enforcement  of  judgments  in  civil  and 
commercial matters, COM(2010)748 

SE Riksdag 
UK House of Lords 

PL Sejm 

PL Senat 

Both NL Chambers 

Interconnection  of  central,  commercial 
and companies registers, COM(2011)79 

PL Sejm 

Jurisdiction,  applicable 
the 
recognition  and  enforcement  of  decisions 
in  matters  of  matrimonial  property 
regimes, COM(2011)126 

law  and 

Food  intended  for  infants  and  young 
children  and  on  food  for  special  medical 
purposes, COM(2011)353 

Definition, 
labelling 
geographical 

description, 
the 

and 

protection 

presentation, 
of 
of
products, 

indications 
wine 

aromatised 

COM(2011)530 

Information  exchange  mechanism  with 
regard  to  intergovernmental  agreements 
between  Member  States 
third 
countries 
energy, 
COM(2011)540 

field  of 

and 

the 

in 

IT Senato della Repubblica 

IT Senato della Repubblica 

LU Chambre des Députés 

LU Chambre des Députés 

EN 

12 

   EN 

 
 
26. 

27. 

28. 

European  Union  Programme  for  Social 
Change and Innovation, COM(2011)609 

SE Riksdag  

LU Chambre des Députés  

IT Camera dei Deputati 

provisions 

concerning 

Specific 
the 
European  Regional  Development  Fund 
and  the  Investment  for  growth  and  jobs 
goal  and  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1080/2006, COM(2011)614 

Fund, 

Common  provisions  on  the  European 
Regional  Development 
the 
European  Social  Fund, 
the  Cohesion 
Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural  Development  and  the  European 
Maritime  and  Fisheries  Fund  covered  by 
the  Common  Strategic  Framework  and 
laying  down  general  provisions  on  the 
European  Regional  Development  Fund, 
the 
the  European  Social  Fund  and 
Cohesion  Fund  and  repealing  Regulation 
(EC) No 1083/2006, COM(2011)615 

EN 

13 

   EN