Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020’ COM(2011) 398 final — 2011/0177 (APP) and on the ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A budget for Europe 2020’ COM(2011) 500 final
Date: 2012-05-24
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: Community budget, Structural Funds, aid to agriculture, economic recession, financial autonomy, less-favoured region, rural development, rural region, single payment scheme








C_2012229EN.01003201.xml










31.7.2012   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 229/32





Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020’
COM(2011) 398 final — 2011/0177 (APP)
and on the ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A budget for Europe 2020’
COM(2011) 500 final
2012/C 229/06
Rapporteur: Mr PALMIERI

Co-rapporteur: Mr KRAWCZYK

On 29 June 2011, the Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on the

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A budget for Europe 2020

COM(2011) 500 final.
On 19 October 2011, the Council decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on the

Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020

COM(2011) 398 final — 2011/0177 (APP).
The Section for Economic and Monetary Union Economic and Social Cohesion, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 7 May 2012.
At its 481st plenary session, held on 23 and 24 May 2012 (meeting of 24 May 2012), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 165 votes to 9 with 5 abstentions.
1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1   The Committee understands the Commission's attempt to strike a balance on the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) and reconcile two opposing demands in a complex social, economic and political climate. On the one hand, there is the desire of some Member States to limit the public funds committed in the wake of the crisis, which will inevitably continue to weigh upon the debate and the substance of the final agreement. On the other hand, we have the need to effectively and appropriately tackle the ambitious challenges facing the EU, stemming from both the Lisbon Treaty and the Europe 2020 strategy.
1.2   Indeed, Europe is in difficulty because of both the acute financial and economic crisis and the lack of a concerted response to that crisis from the Member States. The danger is that this could jeopardise the actual functioning of the European Union (EU) and even its very future.
1.3   The Committee has stated in previous opinions and reiterates here – in line with the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions – that the ambitious challenges facing the EU make it not only desirable but also necessary to increase the size of the EU budget so as to revitalise economic growth and employment. The Committee endorses the message that more (and better) Europe is needed – not less. Conversely, freezing the MFF in real terms at current levels would mean failing to address many of the challenges that the EU will have to cope with in the coming years.
1.4   The Commission's proposal thus seems excessively geared towards preserving the status quo, in terms of both the resources allocated and the budget structure. This has resulted in a mismatch between the nature and scale of the new challenges facing the EU and the resources available – i.e. between Europe's ambitions and the means to achieve them.
1.5   Moreover, the Committee thinks that discussion on revising the EU budget must focus on how effective it is in terms of the EU's political project, which is now being seriously questioned as a result of the crisis. Any assessment of the MFF should be based on the degree to which it gives the EU the wherewithal to pursue its strategic priorities without increasing the fiscal burden on the public and businesses, i.e. its ability to provide added value (1) at European level with Europe's citizens sharing the burden equally.
1.6   Going into the detail of the proposal, the Committee welcomes the moves to improve and simplify the structure of the EU budget, so as to substantially deflate the issues of fair return and horizontal fairness between the Member States, focusing instead on effectively achieving Europe's strategic objectives.
1.7   A major innovation on the revenue side is the proposal to introduce a new system of own resources, arising from a modified VAT resource and the financial transaction tax (FTT).The Committee has previously endorsed returning to the original spirit of the Treaty of Rome (2) and thus giving the EU proper financial autonomy.
1.7.1   The Committee supports the proposal to modify the VAT own resource insofar as it would contribute to the development of the EU's internal market and prevent economic distortions within the Member States. It points out, however, that the Commission's proposal is short on specifics as regards changes to the structure of the VAT resource and on how this would translate in monetary terms for the individual Member States. While reiterating the need to secure global application of the FTT, the Committee believes that introducing an FTT at EU level would help (by means of a minimum rate for all Member States) increase the contribution of the financial sector to the EU and Member States' budgets and reduce the economic volatility brought about by purely speculative actions.
1.8   Achieving the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy will require vast resources beyond the provisions of the MFF; the Committee thus advocates exploring the idea of creating innovative financial instruments to cover those investments (project bonds), subject, however, to a detailed assessment of the potential consequences and of the possible transfer of risk to the public sector.
1.9   On the expenditure side, the priorities identified by the Commission require responses which can only be mounted at EU level: this is specifically the ‘added European value’, where a euro spent at EU level is more effective than one spent at national level. These concern ‘European public goods’, which cannot be supplied effectively at national level (because of market failures or economies of scale that cannot be reproduced at national level) and so require effective EU intervention.
1.10   In this regard, the Committee welcomes the CAP reform, which is intended to deliver an efficient and effective European model of agriculture and genuine added value for the EU. The Committee has expressed before, and reiterates here, its firm belief that the CAP – together with the common fisheries policy (CFP) – should be designed in such a way as to strengthen the link between agriculture, forestry and fisheries on the one hand, and environmental protection and the sustainability of natural resources on the other. This will ensure not only that good environmental practices are promoted, but that the economic viability and competitiveness of farms and fisheries is also supported, against the backdrop of highly volatile primary commodity prices.
1.11   As regards the direct payments system, the Committee emphasises that achieving the goal of harmonising competitive conditions for European farmers and increasing the integration of the new Member States must also involve a careful assessment of the potential effects on all Member States. In order to avoid distorting competition, which could have social consequences, it must be ensured that no country's direct payments are under 90 % of the average of the 27 EU Member States at the end of the financial framework for the period 2014-2020.
1.12   Article 174 of the Lisbon Treaty should be the guiding principle for the future of the cohesion policy: ‘… the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions.’
1.13   With regard to cohesion policy, while the focus on a few core EU priorities is convincing, the Committee is, however, opposed to the idea of applying macroeconomic conditionality to the disbursement of cohesion policy funds. It maintains, moreover, that the introduction of the new category of transition regions in place of the current phasing-out and phasing-in system should not penalise the resources for the least developed regions, and that the Cohesion Fund should not be used inappropriately for purposes that fall outside of its original remit. However, by way of exception, funds left over from the 2007-2013 programming period could be used to finance a European plan for growth launched by the Union. The same could be done for a limited period, the first three years for example, with funding for the next period (2014-2020).
1.14   The Committee believes that, if the objectives of the new MFF are to be duly achieved, the EU budget should be exemplary, efficient, effective and transparent, so that it gains credibility in the eyes of the European public and serves as a clear illustration of both the advantages of Europe and the costs of ‘non-Europe’. The Committee therefore stresses the need for a system to be set up or implemented to monitor the results of all EU policies, in order to assess their social, economic and regional impact.
1.15   Deeming the Commission's proposal to be a starting point for current negotiations, and on the basis of the recommendations made in this opinion, the Committee pledges to monitor progress and give its input regarding how it translates into legislative changes.
2.   The European Commission's proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020

2.1   This Committee opinion concerns the Proposal for a Council Regulation COM(2011) 398 final, which is the implementing act of Communication from the European Commission COM(2011) 500 final of 29 June 2011 – A budget for Europe 2020 and as such establishes the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014-2020.
2.2   Overall, the MFF involves EUR 1 025 bn, which is equal to 1,05 % of the EU's gross national income (GNI), plus a further EUR 58,5 bn for non-MFF costs (European Development Fund and European Globalisation Adjustment Fund). The total is almost the same – discounting inflation – as the MFF for the previous period (2007-2013), which was set at EUR 994 bn.
2.3   The changes on the expenditure side are:






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simplification through fewer programmes and goals in order to cut red tape for recipients and facilitate impact assessment;










—


a cut in resources for the Structural Funds (ERDF, ESF and the Cohesion Fund) – not taking account of the Connecting Europe Facility – from EUR 355 bn to 336 bn, with the creation of a new ‘transition region’ category to replace the current phasing-out and phasing-in system;










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the creation of a common strategic framework for the Structural Funds and for rural development and fisheries, and Horizon 2020, covering research and innovation, with a key role for the European Institute for Technology;










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a new Connecting Europe Facility for large-scale transport, energy, and ICT networks (EUR 40bn + EUR 10bn from the Cohesion Fund);










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launching of CAP reform and a slight cut in its size as a percentage of the total budget (EUR 60 bn annually) and in real terms (3), as well as closer linkage to environmental change (greening) and a commitment to greater flexibility; and










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an increase in funding for research and innovation and for education and training (EUR 80 bn).




2.4   On the revenue side, a gradual shift is proposed from a budget dominated by contributions based on gross national income (GNI) towards a streamlined one founded on genuine own resources and with revamped correction mechanisms. In particular, the Commission proposes scrapping current VAT-based own resources and putting in their place – from 2018 at the latest – a system of own resources based on the introduction of a financial transaction tax (FTT) and a new value-added tax (VAT) resource which would improve harmonisation of the various national systems and jettison the exemptions and derogations.
3.   General comments

3.1   The Commission is clearly trying to strike a balance on the new MFF at a particularly difficult time for the functioning and future of the EU, given both the financial and economic crisis in Europe and the lack of a concerted political response from the Member States. This is a balance between opposing demands that are both compelling: on the one hand, the climate of austerity arising from the crisis, and the consequent desire to limit the public funds committed, which will inevitably continue to weigh upon the debate and the substance of the final agreement; on the other hand, the availability of adequate financial resources to effectively tackle the ambitious challenges facing the EU.
3.2   The Commission's A budget for Europe 2020 proposal must therefore be seen in the context of the current economic and political situation. While any discussion of what form the EU budget should take has to question the role of EU integration today so that we can face the new challenges raised by a world in transition, we also have to understand how far the Member States really intend to acknowledge and secure that role of the EU.
3.2.1   The fraught negotiations that led to the MFF 2007-2013, as well as the difficulties in adopting the EU 2011 budget and the letter to the Commission president Mr Barroso signed – in summer 2011 – by nine Member State heads of government (4), suggests that at least a significant number of countries would like to see a minimum possible European financial commitment, which is likely to lead – once again – to delicate and complex negotiations.
3.3   However, in a situation in which the EU is facing more and tougher challenges (economic, financial and social crisis, competitiveness, climate change, etc.), the Commission's proposal seems excessively geared towards preserving the status quo. It appears, in other words, to embody a mismatch between the nature and scale of the new challenges facing the EU and the resources available – i.e., between Europe's ambitions and the means to achieve them.
3.4   The Committee has previously stated (5) and reiterates here that increasing the EU budget is not only desirable but also necessary, given the scale of the new challenges which require a joint response: The EU budget review is not a question of figures but rather a tool serving a political project. Today the European Union does not have the budgetary means to implement either its political strategy or the commitments deriving from the new Lisbon Treaty.
3.4.1   We would reiterate here the European Parliament's position that more Europe – not less – is the solution to the crisis and the challenges facing the EU. From its perspective, freezing the MFF in real terms at current levels – as the Commission proposes – means failing to address many of the challenges that the EU will have to cope with in the coming years. It has accordingly called for a 5 % increase in resources in the next MMF, challenging the Council – should it decide otherwise – to clearly identify the political priorities and the projects that will have to be dropped, notwithstanding their proven European added value, in the period 2014-2020 (6).
3.4.2   By the same token, the Committee of the Regions believes that the level of financing proposed should be seen as the absolute minimum required to deliver the ambitions the Member States have agreed for the EU, and that there is a need to bring about a change in perception, particularly amongst national treasuries, so that the EU's core tasks are considered an investment rather than an expense (7).
3.4.3   Furthermore, the changes introduced by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union mean that establishing the MFF 2014-2020 is no longer the exclusive responsibility of the Commission and the Member State governments, since the European Parliament has a greater say in a context of greater democratic accountability. This new set-up provides opportunities for civil society – and thus particularly for the Committee – to monitor preparation of the new MFF and to take an active part in the debate in close coordination with the European Parliament.
3.5   Accordingly, the Committee pledges to monitor progress and give its input into the negotiation process that will see the Commission proposal translate into legislative changes. The MFF's role is to give the EU what it needs to pursue its priorities without increasing the fiscal burden on the public and businesses: it must be judged in this light.
3.6   Focusing more on results must, then, shift attention from the formal respect of the rules – all about the amount of expenditure – to real control over how well and effectively funds are used and to achieving results, especially where cohesion policy and the CAP are concerned. This change in vision, explicitly formulated in the idea of increasing the added value of EU spending, thus necessitates a coherent approach in both management and control mechanisms.
3.7   We must not lose sight of the fact that, although the EU budget amounts to around l.1 % of EU GNI, over the period 2007-2013 it has still constituted a significant allocation of resources for investment, which, if put to good use, can provide a crucial lever for the EU's economic growth. This is why the Committee thinks it expedient to consolidate appropriate synergies between the EU budget and national budgets in implementing Europe's major strategic objectives.
3.8   It is crucial, the Committee believes, that the MFF 2014-2020 inspires the confidence of Europe's citizens and gains credibility in their eyes, underlining both the advantages of Europe and the costs of ‘non-Europe’. To achieve this, the EU budget must be:






—


well managed and not entail excessive administration costs;










—


efficient in terms of savings made compared to the current MFF;










—


effective in facilitating delivery of the goals fixed and in making a visible impact on the lives of Europeans;










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transparent and monitorable in every aspect regarding costs, resources employed and results obtained; and










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geared to compliance with the EU principles of solidarity, fair competition and competitiveness.




3.9   The Committee believes discussion of the validity of the Commission's proposal is only possible if the proposal is assessed so as to ascertain:






—


its added European value and correct strategic priorities; and










—


its capacity to meet the challenges posed by the crisis by directing Europe towards a solidarity-based development strategy in the face of the current trend in the Member States of cutting back national public spending.




3.9.1   Regarding added European value, the Commission identifies important priorities for which responses can only be mounted at EU level. These concern ‘European public goods’ – areas of intervention where a euro spent at EU level is more effective than one spent at national level.
3.9.2   European public goods include research and development, common defence, food security, immigration and the right of asylum, climate change responses, and pan-European infrastructure investment in energy, communications and the single market (which still has to be completed). The MFF 2014-2020 has significant increases in the budget allocations for these strategic areas compared with its 2007-2013 predecessor, notwithstanding the austere budget.
3.9.3   Although the Committee acknowledges the important innovation in the Commission proposal, it must, however, point out that there has been absolutely no debate on these priorities. The resulting risk is that the EU budget will fail to address head on the critical issues arising from the current economic and financial crisis and continue to come under pressure from special interest groups.
3.10   In this delicate context the EESC reiterates (8) that the EU's budget policy must be defined consistently with the fundamental choice between federalism and an intergovernmental system, and hence with the desired degree of integration pursued. In particular, the principle of fair return for the Member States is based on accounting for financial resources in terms of national GDP, which runs counter to the letter and spirit of the EU treaties.
3.10.1   The current system of resources, based on Member State contributions, is complex and lacks transparency, and this undermines democratic oversight over the system itself. Moreover, the system does not help highlight the underlying commitment to European integration. It creates a perception that contributions to the EU are a further burden on national budgets, thus limiting the resources available for EU policies. It is also out of keeping with the need to create a direct link between the EU and citizens.
3.11   The Committee reiterates (9) that – far from increasing the fiscal burden on the public and business revenue – the new system must link EU budget expenditure with the commitment to implement the EU's own political strategy and commitments arising from the new Lisbon Treaty. It has to make sure that all Member States are treated fairly and it must be much more transparent, simplified and comprehensible to the public.
4.   Specific comments

4.1   With the new MFF, the Commission is proposing significant changes to the way in which the EU budget is funded. These changes are based primarily on increasing financial autonomy by introducing a new system of own resources that can ensure fairer treatment of the Member States. The new proposal provides for a change in the model: breaking the EU's dependency on contributions from the Member States and gradually moving towards financial self-sufficiency.
4.1.1   At the heart of the proposed new system of own resources is the modified VAT resource and the introduction of the FTT. The new system would make the EU budget more balanced, so that around 40 % is financed by the new own resources, 20 % by traditional own resources and 40 % by Member State contributions based on GNI (10). The advantage of the new system would lie in reducing the perception among Member State governments that national contributions are raised as a tax on their product, which in turn triggers claims for a fair return, the granting of which restores equilibrium in terms of economic benefits.
4.1.2   The Committee reiterates its support (11) for the creation of the new VAT resource to replace the current one which is now inadequate, insofar as it would contribute to the development of the EU's internal market and prevent economic distortions within the Member States. It points out, however, that the Commission's proposal is short on specifics as regards changes to the structure of the VAT resource and on how this would translate in monetary terms for the individual Member States. It also points to the need for this to be accompanied by measures aimed at eradicating VAT fraud.
4.1.3   Although it is still under discussion, the Commission proposal makes an interesting innovation with the FTT. While reiterating the need to secure global application of the FTT, the Committee has welcomed the proposal to introduce a financial transaction tax at EU level (12). The EESC would underline the need to manage the macro- and microeconomic consequences of the application of the FTT very carefully and thus calls for ongoing monitoring and subsequent annual assessment of the effects of its introduction.
4.1.4   The FTT would serve at least three goals:






—


increasing the share of the financial sector's contribution to the EU and national budgets (it is estimated that the tax should yield EUR 57 billion) (13);










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modifying the behaviour of financial operators, reducing the volume of high-frequency and low-latency trading which, within the EU Member States, comprises a share of between 13 and 40 % of the volume of trade (14); and










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fixing a minimum rate of financial taxation for all Member States.




4.1.5   Reform of correction mechanisms and the replacement of existing mechanisms with lump-sum reimbursements are also conducive to the desired streamlining and greater transparency, especially since the economic conditions of the Member States are now entirely different from when this system was launched in 1984. As previously highlighted by the Committee (15), the impact of this reform still needs to be more fully ascertained, as it is so far unclear what volume of funds would be involved or how the proposed system would compare with the current situation.
4.2   The Committee very much welcomes the moves to improve the structure of the EU budget with Europe's citizens sharing the burden equally. This will substantially deflate the issues of fair return and horizontal fairness between the Member States. Evaluation would focus instead on how efficient and effective EU expenditure was (in both meeting the needs of the European public and businesses and matching benefits obtained with outlay). However, the Committee again expresses regret (16) that the Commission proposal deals only with the internal architecture of the budget and does not refer to the new own resources in order to address the key issue of the size of the budget, in terms of its role as an instrument serving a political endeavour, namely the ambitions of the EU.
4.3   As the European Parliament has stressed, the EU budget is essentially an ensemble of investments that can activate further resources from public or private sources (17). In this regard the Committee thinks that – in order to overcome the quantitative limits and the legislative constraints of the EU budget – some forms of project bond could be tried out for financing specific infrastructure and education projects (18) in line with the 2020 Project Bonds initiative launched by the Commission (19).
4.3.1   The project bonds could provide important leverage for Europe's economic development through the spillover effects they would create and which are at present stymied by the inelasticity of Member State budgets as they struggle to cope with the consequences of the economic crisis and to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
4.3.2   Nevertheless, the Committee highlights the need for a detailed assessment of possible innovative financing arrangements outside of the MFF, since the experience with public-private partnership demonstrates the possibility of transferring risk to the public sector (20).
4.4   The Commission's proposal does not call into question the EU's biggest expenditure items, namely cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy (CAP). The emphasis generally is on new arguments – in the context of the Europe 2020 strategy – for ensuring an efficient and effective spending policy and the added value of existing expenditure instruments.
4.4.1   The Committee welcomes the CAP reform intended to adjust its proportion of the total EU budget and to bolster the link between EU spending and the common goods produced by the farming sector, as called for by the Commission itself in The CAP towards 2020
 (21). When, as now, resources are scarce, the CAP – together with the common fisheries policy (CFP) – should be measured against the goals and functions laid down in the Lisbon Treaty: improving the environment (biodiversity, water, land, air), landscape conservancy, keeping rural areas alive, animal welfare, and food safety and sustainability (22).
4.4.2   The Committee has stated (23) that agriculture, forestry and fisheries play a key role in environmental protection and the sustainable management of natural resources. The Committee therefore, while welcoming the approach introduced by the Commission of ‘greening’ the CAP, stresses that particular attention must be paid to ensuring that the review process does not disrupt the objectives and financing mechanisms of the CAP and its support for operators along the agricultural, food and environmental supply chain.
4.4.3   The Committee is concerned about the Commission's attempt to reduce the CAP's share of the budget by assigning to other instruments – such as the European Social Fund and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund – new tasks related to food and agricultural objectives.
4.4.4   The Committee believes that achieving the goal of harmonising competitive conditions for European farmers and increasing the integration of the new Member States, through the system of direct payments, must also involve a careful assessment of the potential effects on all Member States. The Committee emphasises the importance of efforts to close the gap between the level of support received by farmers in the different Member States. The EESC has already (24) recommended redistribution of national direct payment envelopes based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria and an appropriate transition period for the planned fair convergence away from the historical reference principles. The goal is to ensure that no country's direct payments would be under 90 % of the average of the 27 EU Member States at the end of the financial framework for the period 2014-2020.
4.4.5   In the Committee's view, the new MFF must ensure that the CAP and the CFP can deliver:






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a secure food supply;










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a competitive and innovative agri-food sector;










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profitable agricultural and fisheries industries; and










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a fair income for the EU's farmers and fishermen.




By pursuing these lines of action – against the backdrop of highly volatile agricultural commodity prices – it will be possible to emphasise the dual nature of the CAP, in promoting good environmental practices whilst supporting the economic viability and competitiveness of farms, thereby reviving its historic mission of producing healthy and nutritious food in sufficient quantities and at affordable prices for Europeans.
4.5   There must be the same efficiency in projects funded under cohesion policy, which remains crucial for increasing the integration of the new Member States and which – as the Barca report affirms (25) – must be focused on a few relevant EU priorities, the impact of which on the social, economic and territorial context must be carefully assessed, with ex ante, in itinere and ex post evaluations. At the same time, these evaluations should never result in more red tape.
4.5.1   The Committee is, however, opposed to the idea of applying macroeconomic conditionality to the disbursement of cohesion policy funds, in order not to place a further burden on the Member States in a difficult social and economic climate. It maintains, moreover, that the introduction of the new category of transition regions in place of the current phasing-out and phasing-in system should not penalise the resources for the least developed regions. Finally, while endorsing the proposed Connecting Europe Facility, the Committee points out that this facility should not be receiving some EUR 10 billion of funding from the Cohesion Fund, as the fund should not be used inappropriately for purposes that fall outside of its original remit.
4.6   Article 174 of the Lisbon Treaty should be the guiding principle for the future of the cohesion policy: ‘… the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions.’
Therefore:






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Safeguard and widen the cohesion policy investments with the focus on the convergence objective.










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For Member States, whose average GDP growth in the period 2007-2009 is negative and who have demonstrated a good absorption rate in the current period, the capping rate will be set at least at the level of current period for the cohesion policy.




4.7   The Committee would like to see increased monitoring of the results of EU policies – especially the CAP and Cohesion Funds given their share of the total budget – so that the efficacy of EU spending and capacity for achieving the key goals the EU has set itself – starting with the Europe 2020 strategy – can be evaluated (26). One way to do this is through a combination of sanctions for failure to reach fixed benchmarks and financial incentives for those Member States that have achieved the best results.
4.7.1   In this context, the Committee would nevertheless like to see local and regional authorities being supported and more closely involved at national and EU level so that they have every opportunity to operate and implement the programmes funded under cohesion policy and the CAP, by means of suitable training programmes on EU procedures regarding programming, support, monitoring and assessment.

Brussels, 24 May 2012.


The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Staffan NILSSON




(1)  ‘The value resulting from an EU intervention which is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by Member State action alone’, (COM(2010) 700 final; SEC(2011) 867) final.

(2)  Article 201.

(3)  In nominal terms, the CAP budget is not reduced but remains constant over the programming period; thus, in real terms, it will contract compared to 2012.

(4)  www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/eu-countries-call-slim-eu-budget-news-507532.

(5)  OJ C 248, 25.8.2011 p. 75.

(6)  European Parliament Resolution INI/2010/2211 of 8 June 2011 on Investing in the future: a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for a competitive, sustainable and inclusive Europe.

(7)  CoR opinion on The new multiannual financial framework post-2013; OJ C 54, 23.2.2012, p. 40.

(8)  EESC opinion on The system of own resources of the European Union, OJ C 181, 21.6.2012 p. 45.

(9)  OJ C 248, 25.8.2011 p. 75.

(10)  COM(2011) 510 final, page 5. Currently, Member States' contributions based on GNI amount to 70 % of the total EU budget, traditional own resources (customs duties and the tax on sugar) account for 14.1 %, value-added tax provides 11.2 % and the other resources (surplus from the previous years) 4.7 % (SEC(2011) 876 final).

(11)  EESC opinion on The system of own resources of the European Union, OJ C 181, 21.6.2012 p. 45.

(12)  EESC opinion on a Common system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC adopted at the plenary session on 29 March 2012, OJ C 181, 21.6.2012 p. 55.

(13)  SEC(2011) 1103 final.

(14)  European Commission, 8 December 2010, public consultation on the Review of the Markets in Financial Instrument Directive (MiFID). Directorate-General for Internal Market and Services.
SEC(2011) 1226 final.

(15)  EESC opinion on The system of own resources of the European Union, OJ C 181, 21.6.2012 p. 45.

(16)  EESC opinion on The system of own resources of the European Union, OJ C 181, 21.6.2012 p. 45.

(17)  European Parliament resolution, cit.

(18)  Haug J. et al., op. cit., chap. 4.

(19)  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/consultation/index_en.htm.

(20)  OJ C 143, 22.05.2012, p. 134.

(21)  COM(2010) 672 final.

(22)  Hart K. – Baldock D. (eds): What Tools for the European Agricultural Policy to Encourage the Provision of Public Goods, European Parliament, July 2011.

(23)  OJ C 132, 3.5.2011, p. 63.

(24)  EESC opinion NAT/520 on the CAP towards 2020, OJ C 191, 29.6.2012 p. 116.

(25)  Barca F. (ed.): An agenda for a reformed cohesion policy. A place-based approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations; report for DG REGIO, 2009.

(26)  Chambon N. and Rubio E.: In search of ‘the best value for money’: analyzing current ideas and proposals to enhance the performance of CAP and cohesion spending; workshop. The post 2013 financial perspectives: Re-thinking EU finances in times of crisis, Turin, 7-8 July 2011.