Case C-248/12 P: Appeal brought on 22 May 2012 by Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 6 March 2012 in Case T-453/10: Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development v European Commission
Date: 2012-05-22
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: EAGGF Guarantee Section, EAGGF Guidance Section, European Regional Development Fund, eligibility criteria








C_2012200EN.01000902.xml










7.7.2012   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 200/9





Appeal brought on 22 May 2012 by Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 6 March 2012 in Case T-453/10: Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development v European Commission
(Case C-248/12 P)
2012/C 200/17
Language of the case: English

Parties


Appellant: Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (represented by: K.J. Brown, Departmental Solicitor's office, D. Wyatt QC, V. Wakefield, Barristers)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claim that the Court should:






—


the Order of the General Court be set aside;










—


DARD's action for annulment be declared admissible and the case be referred back to the General Court so that it may examine the substance of DARD's action for annulment;










—


the Commission be ordered to pay DARD's costs of the present proceedings and those arising at first instance relating to the plea of inadmissibility; and










—


costs be reserved as to the remainder.





Pleas in law and main arguments


First plea, that the General Court failed to identify and apply the proper legal test, namely that Piraiki-Patraiki and Dreyfus are merely examples of a broader principle of law, namely that a Union measure will be treated as of direct concern to those whose legal situation it affects where its implementation in that way is a ‘foregone conclusion’, or any other possibility is ‘purely theoretical’, or it is ‘obvious’ that any discretionary power will be exercised in a certain way. That principle must be applied to the facts of each case.

Second plea, that the General Court committed an error of law, and acted contrary to the principle of legal certainty, in its attempts to limit the scope of Piraiki-Patraiki and Dreyfus (in particular by restricting the former to cases in which the Union measure is adopted in response to a request by a Member State, and by restricting the latter to cases with a ‘very specific factual context’).

Third plea, that the General Court committed an error of law in narrowing the test for standing under Article 263. This is contrary to the proper interpretation of Article 263 as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, in particular by reference to its purpose and to the principle of effective judicial protection.

Fourth plea, that if the General Court had applied the correct legal principles to the present case, DARD would have been found to be ‘directly concerned’. In particular, the constitutional position in the United Kingdom is that the devolved administration — in this case DARD — is directly responsible for bearing the cost of the disallowance. The chain of causation is direct and automatic. The United Kingdom devolutionary arrangements are well established (see Case C-428/07 Horvath [2009] ECR 1-6355) and any argument that their application is less than a ‘foregone conclusion’ should fail.