COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENTAccompanying theProposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCILon the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime in the European Union
Date: 2012-03-12
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: associated action for damages, confiscation of property, fight against crime, injunction, judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU, money laundering, mutual recognition principle, organised crime, seizure of goods

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 12.3.2012  
SWD(2012) 32 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the 

Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE 
COUNCIL 

on the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime in the European Union 

{COM(2012) 85 final} 
{SWD(2012) 31 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the 

Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE 
COUNCIL 

on the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime in the European Union 

Disclaimer: This executive summary commits only the European Commission’s 
services involved in its preparation and does not prejudge the final form of any 
decision to be taken by the Commission 

1. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

In order to disrupt organised crime activities it is essential to deprive criminals of the proceeds 
of crime. Organised crime is essentially profit-driven. Seizing back as much of these profits as 
possible hampers criminal activities, deters criminality by showing that "crime does not pay" 
and provides funds to be re-invested into law enforcement or crime prevention initiatives.  

The  problem  addressed  by  this  impact  assessment  is  the  insufficient  recovery  of  criminal 
assets in the EU. To date, estimates of money lost to organised crime in the Member States, 
as  well  as  data  on  success  in  asset  recovery,  remain  limited.  Some  recent  reports  and 
unofficial  sources  estimated  the  annual  proceeds  from  organised  crime  in  some  Member 
States  as  very  high1.  The  figures  provide  a  striking  contrast  with  the  amounts  recovered 
annually in the Union2. Although only some Member States maintain statistics on the amounts 
recovered annually from crime, at present the number of freezing and confiscation procedures 
in the EU and the amounts recovered from organised crime seem insufficient if compared to 
the estimated revenues of organised criminal groups or to the number of criminal convictions 
decided by courts for serious crimes.  

Organised crime activities are often transnational in nature and the assets of criminal groups 
are increasingly invested in other Member States. Pursuing assets located abroad is invariably 
more  problematic,  due  to  the  increased  difficulties  in  tracing  them  and  to  legal  obstacles  in 
obtaining evidence and executing freezing or confiscation orders.  

Although asset confiscation has a basis in international law, EU law and Member State laws, 
these  laws  remain  underdeveloped  and  underutilised.  It  is  unlikely  that  any  Member  State 
confiscates  a  significant  proportion  of  criminal  assets  and  that  the  laws  are  achieving  their 
stated aim. 

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In  Italy  the  proceeds  of  organised  crime  laundered  in  2011  were  estimated  at  €  150  billion  (Bank  of 
Italy, 2011). In the UK an official estimate in 2006 put organised criminal revenue at £15bn per annum 
For example in 2009 €189m were recovered in the UK and €60m in the Netherlands. 

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2. 

ANALYSIS OF SUBSIDIARITY 

The  EU  has  already  passed  measures  relating  to  the  confiscation  and  recovery  of  criminal 
assets. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the legal basis to support action 
in this field can be found in Article 82, paragraphs (1) and (2), and Article 83 (1) TFEU. The 
most  appropriate  legal basis and  the extent  of the EU’s  power to harmonise will depend  on 
whether a specific provision relates to harmonisation or mutual recognition.  

Under Article 5(3) TEU, the Union shall only act if the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved  by  the  Member  States.  Article  67  TFEU  foresees  that  the  Union  shall  provide 
citizens  with  a  high  level  of  security  by  preventing  and  combating  crime.  Confiscating 
criminal  assets  is  increasingly  recognised  as  an  essential  tool  to  combat  organised  crime, 
which is very often transnational in nature and thus needs to be tackled on a common basis. 
This is all the more true in the EU, where the abolition of internal frontiers makes it easier to 
commit cross-border crimes.  

As  acknowledged  by  the  Stockholm  Programme  2010-2014,  the  Union  must  reduce  the 
number of opportunities available to organised crime as a result of a globalised economy, not 
least during a crisis that is exacerbating the vulnerability of the financial system. The EU is 
therefore better placed than individual Member States in sharpening more efficiently one of 
the most effective tools to fight organised crime groups. 

The  cross-border  dimension  of  organised  crime  assets  (increasingly  invested  outside  their 
home country and often in several countries) further justifies pan-European action. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES 

The overall long-term objective is the substantial reduction of organised crime revenues and 
accumulated wealth within the EU. The general objectives are to combat organised crime, to 
achieve  justice  for  victims  and  to  raise  public  confidence  in  the  criminal  justice  system.  In 
line with the underlying components  of  the  problem,  four specific policy objectives can  be 
defined: i) to increase the harmonisation of rules allowing to confiscate criminal assets, with 
due respect of fundamental rights ii) to provide minimum harmonised rules allowing Member 
States  to  freeze/seize  and  manage  criminal  assets  pending  confiscation,  with  due  respect  of 
fundamental  rights,  iii)  to  make  it  easier  for  Member  States  to  freeze/seize  and  confiscate 
assets across borders, and iv) to raise utilisation of freezing and confiscation tools by Member 
State agents. 

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

In  order  to  remedy  the  shortcomings  resulting  from  the  problem  definition,  21  EU-level 
policy actions were identified (some of which are complementary).  

Given  the  high  number  of  envisaged  policy  actions,  the  21  EU-level  actions  were  first 
screened individually against potential barriers to implementation, such as i) the existence of 
an  adequate  conferral  of  power  to  the  EU,  ii)  proportionality;  and  iii)  compatibility  with 
fundamental  constitutional  or  criminal  law  principles  of  the  Member  States.  The  impact  on 
fundamental  rights  was  also  analysed  in  detail,  based  on  the  relevant  jurisprudence  of  the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  Four  policy  actions  were  discarded  after  the  screening 
against the implementation barriers.  

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The  remaining  policy  actions  were  grouped  into  policy  options  representing  different 
degrees  of  EU-level  intervention:  a  non-legislative  option,  a  minimal  legislative  option 
(correcting deficiencies in the existing EU legal framework which inhibit it from functioning 
as intended) and a maximal legislative option (going beyond the aims of the existing EU legal 
framework). Within the latter, two maximal legislative sub-options are analysed, one with and 
one without EU level action relating to mutual recognition.  

4.1. 

Policy option 1 – Status quo 

This policy option would involve no new action at EU level, but constitutes the continuation 
of existing activities. No new action at EU level does not mean no change at EU level. Under 
the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  the  existing  EU  legal  framework  will,  on  1  December  2014,  become 
enforceable against Member States through infringement proceedings.  

4.2. 

Policy option 2 – Non-legislative option 

Under the non-legislative policy option, workshops would be used with a view to promoting 
implementation  of  existing  confiscation  obligations  (policy  action  1)  and  promoting 
implementation of existing mutual recognition obligations (policy action 12). Utilisation 
workshops  for  government  decision-makers  in  some  Member  States  on  the  profitability  of 
asset confiscation work (policy action 15) could increase utilisation of these tools and provide 
a forum for the sharing of knowledge and practitioner experience. 

4.3. 

Policy option 3 – Minimal legislative option 

This option consists of transposition and utilisation workshops plus additional policy actions 
addressing  identified  deficiencies  in  the  existing  legal  framework  on  mutual  recognition.  In 
relation  to  the  enforcement  of  confiscation  orders,  this  option  envisages  that  the  legal 
framework  could  be  simplified  by  consolidating  FD  2006/783/JHA  and  2005/214/JHA  and 
extending  their  scope  to  include  all  compensation  orders  made  in  the  context  of  criminal 
proceedings  (policy  action  14).  This  option  would  also  include  the  introduction  of 
consolidated  mutual  recognition  forms  (policy  action  19).  This  option  would  also  entail 
enforcing  the  primacy  of  mutual  recognition  over  mutual  legal  assistance  conventions  as 
regards requests between Member States (policy action 20). . 

4.4. 

Policy option 4.1 – Maximal legislative option without mutual recognition 

This  option  would  consist  of  all  policy  actions  which  do  not  involve  legislative  action  in 
relation to mutual recognition. 

In  order  to  enhance  confiscation  powers,  this  option  would  foresee  the  possibility  of 
confiscating  all  valuable  benefits,  including  indirect  proceeds  (policy  action  2)  by 
introducing a wide definition of "criminal proceeds".  

As a way to address the foreclosure of confiscation activities when the criminal procedure is 
concluded,  this  option  foresees  separating  confiscation  proceedings  from  criminal 
proceedings  (policy  action  4)  so  that  financial  investigations  can  be  carried  out  and 
unexecuted  orders  can  be  enforced  also  at  a  later  date  when  criminal  proceedings  are 
finalised. 

This option would also strengthen extended confiscation (policy action 5) by extending the 
scope  of  the  offences  to  which  it  applies  and  providing  for  it  at  least  where  a  court  finds  it 

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substantially  more  probable  that  the  assets  of  a  person  convicted  of  an  offence  covered  by 
Article 83(1) TFEU are derived from similar criminal activities.  

With a view to addressing barriers to prosecution, this option would include the introduction 
of  non-conviction  based  confiscation  in  limited  circumstances  (policy  action  6).  This 
would  make  confiscation  possible  in  circumstances  where  a  conviction  cannot  be  obtained 
because the suspect has died, fled prosecution or sentencing or is unable to stand trial due to 
mental illness. 

Criminals  often  transfer  their  assets  to  knowing  third  parties  as  soon  as  they  are  under 
investigation  in  order  to  avoid  confiscation.  This  option  would  also  include  third  party 
confiscation  (policy  action  7)  for  assets  received  for  less  than  market  value  and  which  a 
reasonable person in the position of the third party would suspect to be derived from crime. In 
relation  to  the  freezing/seizure  of  criminal  assets,  this  option  foresees  the  introduction  of 
harmonised  minimum  standards  (policy  action  8).  It  would  also  foresee  mechanisms  to 
safeguard  freezing  (policy  action  9),  so  that  Member  States  would  be  required  to  have  in 
place appropriate mechanisms to ensure that assets in danger of being hidden or transferred 
out  of  their  jurisdiction  can  be  frozen/seized  immediately  by  non-judicial  authorities  even 
prior to seeking a court order. 

With regard to asset preservation, this option would grant powers to realise frozen assets at 
least where they are liable to decline in value or uneconomical to maintain (policy action 10).  

In the area of utilisation of powers, this option would introduce reporting obligations (policy 
action 16) for Member States, which would help generate statistics which could be used for 
evaluation purposes.  

4.5. 

Policy option 4.2 – Maximal legislative option including mutual recognition 

This option consists of all the envisaged policy actions (but policy action 19 and 20 partly 
overlap).  Compared  to  option  4.1,  it  also  includes  the  Mutual  recognition  of  all  types  of 
orders  (policy  action  13).  This  option  would  also  entail  the  mutual  recognition  of 
compensation  orders  (policy  action  14)  by  consolidating  FD  2006/783/JHA  and 
2005/214/JHA  and  extending  their  scope  to  include  all  compensation  orders  made  in  the 
context  of  criminal  proceedings.  This  option  would  also  provide  for  consolidated  mutual 
recognition  forms  (policy  action  19)  and  for  measures  enforcing  the  primacy  of  mutual 
recognition (policy action 20). 

5. 

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS 

5.1. 

Analysis of Option 1 - Status Quo  

On  the  ‘do  nothing’  option,  slow  progress  can  be  predicted  towards  achieving  each  of  the 
specific  objectives  Its  economic  impact  is  expected  to  be  low,  resulting  from  natural 
progression  in  assets  recovered.  The  spread  between  criminally  owned  assets  and  assets 
recovered  by  governments  is  likely  to  increase.  Its  social  impact  is  likely  to  be  negligible, 
following a slight increase in criminal assets being recovered in favour of crime victims. This 
option would have no impact on criminal behaviour. Without additional action at EU level, 
criminals  are  likely  to  continue  investing  their  assets  in  other  Member  States,  thereby 
increasing  the  need  for  a  cross-border  dimension  of  confiscation  activities.  Overall, 
significant  gaps  would  remain,  mutual  recognition  instruments  would  remain  underutilised 

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and  the  amount  of  criminal  assets  confiscated  throughout  the  EU  would  remain  small 
compared  to  estimates  of  organised  criminal  turnover.  Whilst  the  situation  without  EU 
intervention  would  not  be  static,  the  pace  of  change  would  be  too  slow.  This  option  would 
therefore not achieve the objective of increasing the recovery of criminal assets in the Union. 
Member States support for this option is unlikely. The European Parliament would be totally 
dissatisfied with this solution. 

5.2. 

Analysis of Option 2 – Non-legislative option 

This  option  would  have  a  low  economic  impact.  Transposition  workshops  could  entail  a 
slight  positive  impact  on  transposition  for  the  Member  States  which  have  not  yet  fully 
transposed the relevant texts. The costs of utilisation workshop would be negligible and their 
usefulness  would  depend  on  the  scale  on  which  they  are  organised.  Given  the  severe 
underutilisation  of  confiscation  procedures,  utilisation  workshops  could  potentially  have  a 
more  significant  impact  upon  utilisation  and  avoid  that  decisions  may  continue  to  be  made 
based  on  the  assumption  that  asset  confiscation  work  is  unprofitable.  The  social  impact 
would  be  negligible  and  the  impact  on  criminal  behaviour  are  quite  limited.  Overall  the 
added value of the non-legislative option is likely to be low and its most promising aspect is 
the  utilisation  workshops.  This  option  would  hardly  achieve  the  objective  of  increasing  the 
recovery of criminal assets in the Union and would draw heavy criticism from the European 
Parliament. 

5.3. 

Analysis of Option 3 – Minimal legislative option  

In  addition  to  the  economic  impacts  of  transposition  workshops  and  utilisation  workshops, 
improving mutual recognition instruments would clearly increase the number of cross-border 
enforcement procedures and, to some extent, the value of the assets recovered. However, it is 
hard  to  assess  the  economic  added  value  of  even  a  significant  increase  in  the  utilisation  of 
mutual  recognition  instruments.  An  increased  utilisation  in  mutual  recognition  instruments 
would  shift  administrative  costs  from  central  authorities  to  local  judicial  authorities  and  the 
administrative  cost  of  handling  requests  from  other  Member  States  should  in  principle 
decrease. The time savings resulting from a wider use of mutual recognition (as opposed to 
mutual legal assistance) would allow faster cross-border execution and increase the chances 
of successful recovery by limiting the risks for asset dissipation. The envisaged consolidation 
of mutual recognition forms may require some initial training for the practitioners, the costs of 
which would be likely offset by the benefits. A moderate increase in the number and value of 
assets  recovered  should  logically  correspond  to  a  moderate  increase  in social  impact  in  the 
form of compensation to victims. Better enforcement of cross-border procedures would likely 
result in increased confidence in the national criminal justice systems and in the EU Area of 
Justice, Freedom and Security. In relation to fundamental rights a low impact on the right to 
property  is  expected.  A  slight  impact  on  criminal  behaviour  can  be  expected.  A  better 
enforcement  of  cross-border  procedures  may  have  some  displacement  effects,  resulting  in  a 
net capital flight of criminal money out of the EU, with a slight negative impact on the illicit 
economy  and  on  the  economies  of  third  countries.  Overall  the  added  value  of  the  minimal 
legislative option is likely to be moderate. This option would barely achieve the objective of 
increasing the recovery of criminal assets in the Union and would likely not be considered as 
an adequate response to the problem by the European Parliament. 

5.4. 

Analysis of Option 4.1 - Maximal legislative option without mutual recognition  

In  addition  to  the  transposition  workshops  and  utilisation  workshops,  most  policy  actions, 
considered  in  isolation,  would  have  at  least  a  moderate  economic  impact.  Because  of  the 

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number of policy actions and the severe lack of data on both the amounts frozen, confiscated 
and recovered and the costs of carrying out confiscation-related activities, it is not possible to 
provide a quantification of the cost of this option. Moreover, in many cases implementation 
costs may differ depending on the characteristics of the Member States.  

In  order  to  address  the  lack  of  data,  the  main  economic  analysis  presented  is  an  EU27 
profitability  estimate  based  on  a  model  which  uses  proxy  indicators  to  extrapolate  from  a 
detailed analysis of income and cost in the UK (the only Member State for which income and 
costs  for  all  elements  of  the  asset  confiscation  system  can  be  estimated  and  which  has  a 
confiscation system that is a reasonable approximation of the maximal legislative sub-option) 
Although  only  indicative,  the  results  of  this  exercise  are  encouraging:  21  of  27  Member 
States are indicated by the model to be profitable (many of them highly profitable) for this 
option.  The  fact  that  asset  confiscation  work  appears  to  be  potentially  profitable  in  most 
Member States pleads in favour of EU-level intervention. It can be assumed that recovering 
more assets in favour of the State will have a significant social impact as it will, at least in 
some  Member  States,  go  hand  in  hand  with  recovering  more  assets  in  favour  of  victims  of 
crime. Confiscating criminal assets will cause public confidence in criminal justice to rise.  

Actions  having  a  significant  positive  impact  upon  confiscation  tools  (eg  Actions  5  on 
extended  confiscation,  6  on  non-conviction  based  confiscation  or  7  on  third  party 
confiscation) are also those having the biggest impact on fundamental rights. A limitation 
of  the  right  to  property  and  right  to  a  fair  trial  of  the  defendant  must  be  justified,  respect 
proportionality and be accompanied by adequate safeguards. The European Court on Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has rendered many decisions, consistently upholding their application of non-
conviction based confiscation regimes in particular cases. However, it has avoided ruling on 
the  principled  question  of  their  compatibility  with  the  European  Convention  on  Human 
Rights.  Reversals  of  the  burden  of  proof  concerning  the  legitimacy  of  assets  have  so  far 
survived the scrutiny of the ECtHR, so long as they were applied fairly in the particular case, 
with adequate safeguards in place to allow the affected person to  challenge these rebuttable 
presumptions.  While  the  ECtHR  has  consistently  upheld  extended  confiscation  regimes  in 
specific  cases,  their  compatibility  with  the  Convention  is  assessed  on  a  case  by  case  basis. 
Again, the degree of procedural safeguards afforded to the defendant plays a determinant role 
in assessing the proportionality of the measure. A strong argument in favour of justifying third 
party confiscation is the case where assets are claimed both by the third party and by a victim. 
If  the  perpetrator  of  a  crime  has  insufficient  assets  to  meet  a  claim  (as  is  often  the  case), 
measures  in  favour  of  the  third  party  would  weaken  the  position  of  the  victim.  Temporary 
measures  such  as  freezing  orders  may,  due  to  their  provisional  character,  justify  further 
limitations of certain rights and principles of due process, provided that sufficient safeguards 
or  remedies  are  available  and  those  limitations  respect  the  essence  of  those  rights  and 
principles.  If  applied  with  proportionality  and  complemented  with  adequate  safeguards,  laid 
down  in  the  EU  legislative  proposals,  the  measures  in  this  policy  option  would  respect 
fundamental rights.  

The  impact  on  criminal  behaviour  of  this  option  would  be  significant,  as  non-conviction 
based confiscation (even in limited circumstances) and third party confiscation would oblige 
criminals  to  change  their  practices  and  make  it  more  difficult  for  them  to  hide  their  assets. 
This option could cause moderate capital flight of criminal money  to non-EU countries and 
have  a  significant  negative  impact  on  the  illicit  economy  and  on  the  economies  of  third 
countries. Overall the added value of this option is likely  to be significant.  The  immediate 
impacts  of  implementing  this  option  include  stronger  systems  for  confiscation,  freezing  and 
managing  assets.  However,  this  option  would  also  bring  an  important  impact  on  utilisation. 

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While utilisation workshops would inform Member State decision-makers about the potential 
profitability  of  asset  confiscation  work  and  thus  empower  them  to  promote  change,  more 
powerful  legislative  tools  would  encourage  utilisation  by  concretely  raising  the  chances  of 
successful  intervention.  Moreover,  harmonisation  of  confiscation  laws  can  also  de  facto 
promote mutual recognition by ensuring that incoming orders are compatible with the judicial 
system of the executing Member State. This option would achieve the objective of increasing 
the recovery of criminal assets in the Union. Most likely it would be moderately welcomed by 
the European Parliament. 

5.5. 

Analysis of Option 4.2 - Maximal legislative option including mutual recognition  

In terms of economic impact, adding EU-level action on mutual recognition would improve 
the results of the EU27 profitability analysis still further. However, given the scarcity of data 
on  the  number  and  amounts  of  orders  to  be  enforced  in  other  Member  States,  a  detailed 
profitability estimate by country for this policy option is not possible. The additional costs for 
Member  States  liable  to  receive  many  foreign  non-conviction  based  orders  for  execution 
would be fully offset by the existing provision (in FD 2006/783/JHA) that the Member State 
enforcing  a  confiscation  order  is  entitled  to  retain  50%  of  the  recovered  value.  The  social 
impact would be significant. In addition to the impacts of the maximal option without mutual 
recognition,  the  enhancements  on  mutual  recognition  can  be  expected  to  result  in  increased 
confidence  in  the  EU  Area  of  Justice,  Freedom  and  Security.  The  impact  on  criminal 
behaviour would also be significant. The measures in the maximal legislative option coupled 
with  a  significantly  improved  enforcement  of  cross-border  procedures  would  likely  oblige 
criminals  to  change  their  practices  and  could  have  displacement  effects,  resulting  in  a  net 
capital flight of criminal money out of the EU. This would result in an even more significant 
impact  on  the  illicit  economy  and  on  the  economies  of  third  countries.  Overall,  the  added 
value  of  this  option  is  likely  to  be  very  significant.  The  combined  effects  of  economic 
profitability, significant social impacts and greater utilisation are further enhanced by actions 
on  mutual  recognition  which  are  more  far-reaching  than  those  in  the  minimal  legislative 
option. This option would be fully consistent with the objective of increasing the recovery of 
criminal assets in the Union. It would likely be welcomed by the European Parliament. 

6. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 

The  preferred  policy  option  is  the  maximal  option  featuring  action  on  mutual 
recognition,  while  the  maximal  legislative  option  without  mutual  recognition  and  the 
minimal  legislative  option  are  ranked  equal  second.  The  preferred  option  respects  the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality because it does not go beyond what is needed to 
achieve the objectives described whilst respecting fundamental rights. It would considerably 
enhance the harmonisation of rules and enforcement of orders in the Member States, inter alia 
by amending existing provisions on extended confiscation and introducing new provisions on 
non-conviction based confiscation, third party confiscation introducing the mutual recognition 
of all types of orders (including non-conviction based orders). Its policy actions are calibrated 
in  order  to  be  proportionate  and  not  unduly  affect  fundamental  rights..  In  order  to  meet  the 
concerns expressed by defense lawyers, minimum safeguards at EU level are foreseen with a 
view to fully comply with the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. Monitoring and Evaluation 

The  implementation  of  the  preferred  option  should  be  subject  to  future  monitoring  and 
evaluation. . As a result of the lack of statistical data on asset confiscation and the poor quality 
of available data, it is currently not possible to carry out a proper evidence-based assessment 

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of  the  impact  of  new  policies/legislation  at  EU  level  or  at  Member  State  level  in  most 
countries. In addition, information on the extent to which mutual recognition facilitates cross-
border enforcement is not readibly available.  

For this reason, the preferred option includes the introduction of reporting obligations on the 
Member  States  in  relation  to  asset  confiscation  work.  Data  will  be  collected  by  judicial 
authorities  (courts,  prosecution  offices)  asset  management  offices  and  other  authorites  in 
charge  of  asset  disposal,  at  least  on  an  annual  basis.  The  data  so  collected  will  feed  into 
monitoring and evaluation activities and will allow the Commission to assess to what extent 
the  proposed  legislation  achieves  its  objectives.  Particular  attention  should  be  paid  to  those 
Member States where data collection is relatively under-developed.  

In order to monitor the effective implementation of the proposed legislation the Commission 
will  prepare  prepare  an  implementation  plan  and  produce  regular  implementation  reports 
based on consultations of the Member States and stakeholders. The first report is in principle 
foreseen three years after the entry into force of the legislation. The mapping exercise of the 
asset confiscation legislation in the Member States which was carried out in preparation for 
the present impact assessment could be used as a baseline for monitoring developments in law 
and utilisation in the Member States.  

Evaluations  will  also  be  carried  out  on  a  regular  basis,  the  first  report  being  foreseen  five 
years after the entry into force of the legislation. The evaluation reports could include a cost-
benefit modelling exercise to assess the current and estimate the future profitability of asset 
confiscation work.  

Transposition  workshops  and  other  expert  meetings  will  also  take  place  to  discuss 
implementation problems. The exchange of best practices in all the phases of the confiscation 
process will continue to take place within the EU Asset Recovery Offices Platform. 

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