Eastern borders annual overview 2012.
Date: 2012-03-05
Institutions: Frontex
Subjects: European security, Frontex, border control, external border of the EU, frontier migration, illegal migration

Eastern Borders  
Annual Overview 2012

Eastern Borders  
Annual Overview 2012

1 of 42

Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations 
and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. The Eastern Borders Annual Over-
view 2012 and other risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow 
drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cycli-
cal nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational 
response.  The  triangle  is  a  symbol  of  ideal  proportions  and  knowledge,  reflecting  the  pur-
suit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the 
intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to 
be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is 
meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities. 

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation  
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

Rondo ONZ 1 
00-124 Warsaw, Poland
T +48 22 205 95 00 
F +48 22 205 95 01
frontex@frontex.europa.eu 
www.frontex.europa.eu

Warsaw, July 2012 
Risk Analysis Unit 
Frontex reference number: 10367

DISCLAIMERS
This is a Frontex staff working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the 
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of 
any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers 
or boundaries.

All maps included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is 
prohibited. Frontex disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and desig-
nations used on the maps.

The  contents  of  open-source  boxes  are  unverified  and  presented  only  to  give  context  and 
media representation of irregular-migration phenomena.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012 has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis 
Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside 
contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

2 of 42

Table of contents

Executive summary  #5

1.  Background and methodology  #7

1.1.  Data collection and additional information  #7
1.2.  Quality of available data   #8
1.3.  Application of the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)  #9

2.   Overview of irregular migration situation at the common borders  #10

3.   The context – factors impacting the regional migratory movements  #13

4. Risk assessment   #18

4.1.   Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green/blue borders as a 

point of entry for smuggled goods  #19

4.2.  Risk of significant irregular migration flows from non-CIS countries  #26
4.3.   Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from CIS countries  #30

5.  Outlook  #34

6.  Statistical annex  #35

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Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

List of abbreviations used

European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
euro
Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation
Frontex Risk Analysis Network
Focal Point
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
gross domestic product
Joint Operation
local border traffic
local border traffic agreement

  European Union 

  border-crossing point
  Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
  Commonwealth of Independent States

BCP 
CIRAM 
CIS 
Eastern Borders
EB  
Eastern Borders Conference
EBC 
EB-RAN   Eastern Border Risk Analysis Network
EU  
EUBAM   
EUR    
FMS   
FRAN  
FP  
fYROM   
GDP   
JO  
LBT 
LBTA   
MS 
OCG   
RAU   
RFI 
SIS  
THB 
UAE 
UEFA  
UK  
USD   
VIN 

Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
request for information
Schengen Information System
trafficking in human beings

  United Arab Emirates
  Union of European Football Associations
  United Kingdom
  United States dollar

  Member State
  organised crime group

vehicle identification number

4 of 42

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive summary

The overall situation at the common and re-
gional borders* between the Eastern Border 
Risk  Analysis  Network  (EB-RAN)  members 
(Belarus,  Moldova,  Ukraine),  the  Russian 
Federation**  and  the  neighbouring  Mem-
ber  States  (Poland,  Slovakia,  Finland,  Nor-
way, Lithuania, Romania, Latvia, Hungary and 
Estonia)  did  not  change  significantly  com-
pared to 2010.

Analysis of the available statistical data, ad-
ditional information provided by the EB-RAN 
countries and relevant Frontex-coordinated 
Joint Operations clearly indicate that the main 
challenges are linked to growing cross-bor-
der movements of regular travellers and illicit 
goods. Increasing passenger traffic is a de-
rivative of several Local Border Traffic Agree-
ments  and  relatively  high  demand  for  EU 
visas in the EB-RAN countries. The expand-
ing flow of illicit goods, on the other hand, 
is caused predominately by price differentials 
between the two sides of the common bor-
ders for a wide range of products, in partic-
ular excise goods. 

Price  differentials  and  economic  disparities 
in the border zones are the main drivers of 
smuggling activities. These remain the single 
largest threat to border security at the com-
mon borders between EU Member States, the 
Russian  Federation  and  EB-RAN  countries. 
Cigarettes and fuel continue to be smuggled 
mostly towards the EU, while smuggling of 
stolen  vehicles,  household  goods  (ranging 
from  groceries  to  electronics)  follows  the 
opposite direction.

Available data indicate that the Russian Fed-
eration,  Belarus  and  Ukraine  remain  mar-
kets with significant purchasing power and 
high demand for second-hand vehicles such 

as  motorbikes,  cars,  heavy  machines  (ag-
ricultural  and  construction  machines)  and 
lorries. Due to these market needs the modi 
operandi of smugglers of vehicles are varied 
and change rapidly. 

The threat of irregular migration is consid-
ered  somewhat  smaller  in  its  magnitude 
when  compared  to  the  above  mentioned 
border security threats. Analysis of EU Mem-
ber States and EB-RAN members’ statistical 
data  clearly  points  to  two  main  migratory 
systems  affecting  the  common  borders. 
The  first  one  is  linked  to  nationals  beyond 
the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS)***, mostly Afghans and Somalis (non-
CIS flow) trying to migrate to the EU using 
the EB-RAN countries as transit points. De-
tection  figures  from  Ukraine  suggest  that 
these  migrants  usually  arrive  in  Ukraine 
through legal travel channels (business, stu-
dent or tourism visa) or indirectly from the 
Russian Federation.

The second, more traditional, migration sys-
tem  is  linking  nationals  from  CIS  countries 
with the Russian Federation as their main des-
tination and to lesser extent also with the EU.

During 2011 the Slovakian-Ukrainian border 
remained  the  most  affected  section  of  the 
common borders in terms of irregular migra-
tion. Almost 30% of the total detections of 
illegal border-crossing at the common bor-
ders  took  place  there.  This  border  section 
was followed by a migration route, observed 
already during 2010, linking Belarus to Lith-
uania  (21%  of  the  total  detections  of  illegal 
border-crossing  at  the  common  borders). 
The  two  flows  were  different  in  composi-
tion, modi operandi and the required facilita-
tion services (or lack thereof). 

* Common and regional 
borders are outlined in the 
map in Figure 2 (page 11).

** The Russian Federation 
is not part of the EB‑RAN 
information exchange.

*** Commonwealth of 
Independent States; 
for the purpose of this 
document, Georgian 
nationals are considered 
as CIS nationals 
regardless of the fact that 
Georgia formally ended 
its membership in CIS on 
18 August 2009.

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Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Ukraine  remains  the  main  transit  country 
for both CIS and non-CIS irregular migrants 
aiming to reach the EU through its eastern 
borders. In addition, Ukraine is also the ma-
jor route for migrants from the Caucasus re-
gion  and  Central  Asian  countries  travelling 
towards (or from) the Russian Federation. It 
remains difficult to ascertain to what extent 
the two flows are linked.

Importantly,  detections  for  illegal  stay  on 
exit from the EU towards the neighbouring 
EB-RAN countries more than doubled in 2011 
(from  around  3  300  to  around  6  900).  The 
most significant increases were reported by 
Poland and Hungary and were largely linked 
to Ukrainian nationals. This trend could be a 
further  indication  of  worsening  job  oppor-

tunities  within  the  traditional  destination 
Member  States  for  Ukrainian  migrants,  i.e. 
Italy, Germany and Spain. 

Finally, Poland and Ukraine hosted the UEFA 
Football Championship in June and beginning 
of  July  2012.  Although  the  number  of  bor-
der  security  incidents  related  to  the  event 
was not foreseen to increase, traffic at the 
common land borders between Poland and 
its  neighbours  was  expected  to  grow  dra-
matically during the event. Both Poland and 
Ukraine planned joint activities to smoothly 
manage the traffic of supporters through the 
common borders, including simplification of 
border  checks,  which  could  have  been  ex-
ploited by networks organising irregular mi-
gration and engaging in smuggling activities.

6 of 42

1. Background and methodology

The European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union (Frontex) created the concept of 
the Eastern Borders Conference (EBC) in Au-
gust 2008. The EBC was designed as a regu-
lar activity/forum where specific challenges 
related to irregular migration at the eastern 
borders of the EU could be addressed by rep-
resentatives  of  FRAN  (Frontex  Risk  Analy-
sis Network) and the relevant neighbouring 
third countries.

By  2009  Frontex  had  signed  cooperation 
arrangements  with  Ukraine,  the  Russian 
Federation,  Moldova  and  Belarus.  Subse-
quently, Frontex proposed to set up a perma-
nent Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network 
(EB-RAN), to be comprised of the competent 
Border  Control  Authorities  from  the  men-
tioned four countries and the Risk Analysis 
Unit of Frontex.

Additional agreements were later signed al-
lowing  for  the  establishment  of  regular  in-
formation  exchange  and  joint  analytical 
activities: with Moldova in March 2009 (Co-
operation  Plan),  with  Ukraine  in  November 
2010 (Mechanism on information exchange 
for risk analysis cooperation) and with Belarus 
in November 2010 (Memorandum on regular 
exchange information and joint analytical ac-
tivities). The Russian Federation opted to stay 
out of the EB-RAN information exchange.

1.1.  Data collection and 
additional information

The core of the overview are the EB-RAN and 
monthly statistical data provided by neigh-
bouring  FRAN  members:  Poland,  Slovakia, 
Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Romania, Latvia, 
Hungary and Estonia (only common borders) 
covering the year 2011. There are six key in-
dicators of irregular migration: (1) detections 
of illegal border-crossing, (2) detections of fa-
cilitators, (3) detections of illegal stay, (4) re-
fusals of entry, (5) asylum applications, and 
(6) detections of false documents.

In  addition,  the  2012  Annual  Overview  in-
troduces the notion of risk as defined by the 
updated  Common  Integrated  Risk  Analysis 
Model  (CIRAM,  see  below).  To  reflect  this 
novel approach, all EB-RAN countries were 
addressed,  prior  to  the  expert  meeting  of 
15 March 2012, with a Request for Information 
(RFI) together with a voting matrix. 

Other  sources  used  included,  in  particular, 
bi-monthly analytical reports from Member 
States,  FRAN  Quarterlies,  several  Tailored 
Risk Analyses produced in 2011 and Frontex 
reporting from different Joint Operations co-
ordinated by Frontex. 

Open sources of information were also effec-
tively exploited. Among others, these sources 
included reports issued by government agen-
cies, EU institutions and international or non-
governmental organisations.

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Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Figure 1.  The Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)

risk

Threat

Vulnerability

Impact

Magnitude &
Likelihood

Level of vulnerability 
(EU, MS of entry/destination)

Level of impact of the threat 
(EU, MS of entry/destination)

Modus operandi

Who, where, when

Trends and predictions
(increase, decrease, 
stable, historical)

Push factors

Routes (difficulty and distance),
access to facilitation

Border permeability 
(terrain, infrastructure,
capabilities, ﬂows)

Operational activities 
(staff, training, 
interoperability)

Effectiveness of 
countermeasures

Pull factors

Border and internal security

Ability to manage 
legitimate passenger ﬂow 
at border

Humanitarian impact

1.2.  Quality of available data 

Consistent with other law-enforcement indi-
cators, variation in administrative data related 
to border control depends on several factors. 
In this case, the number of detections of ille-
gal border-crossing and refusals of entry are 
both functions of the amount of effort spent 
detecting migrants and the flow of irregu-
lar migrants. For example, increased detec-
tions of illegal border-crossing might be due 
to an actual increase in the flow of irregular 
migrants, or they may in fact be an outcome 
of more resources made available to detect 
migrants. In exceptional cases, an influx of re-
sources may produce an increase in reported 
detections while effectively masking the ac-

tual decrease in the flow of migrants, result-
ing from a strong deterrent effect. 

Similar issues should be taken into account 
regarding the number of detections of cross-
border crime at the borders. Higher numbers 
of detection at a particular border-crossing 
point  might  indicate  a  surge  in  criminality, 
but may also be the result of more efficient 
border controls and/or the presence of spe-
cialists whose expertise in a certain area (the 
identification of stolen vehicles, for instance) 
may lead to a higher number of detections.

8 of 42

1.3.  Application of the Common 
Integrated Risk Analysis Model 
(CIRAM)

A key development in the CIRAM update re-
leased in 2011 is the adoption of a manage-
ment approach to risk analysis that defines 
risk as a function of threat, vulnerability and 
impact. Such an approach endeavours to em-
phasise risk analysis as a key tool in ensur-
ing the optimal allocation of resources within 
constraints of budget, staff and efficiency of 
equipment.

According to the model, a ‘threat’ is a force 
or pressure acting upon the external borders 
that is characterised by both its magnitude 
and likelihood; ‘vulnerability’ is defined as the 
capacity of a system to mitigate the threat 
and ‘impact’ is determined as the potential 
consequences of the threat. In this way, the 
structured and systematic breakdown of risk 
is presented in the risk assessment and con-
clusions chapters. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the present report meant for public 
release does not discuss vulnerabilities.

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Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

2.  Overview of irregular 
migration situation 
at the common borders

In light of the data collected within EB-RAN, 
as well as during Frontex-coordinated Joint 
Operations and from other sources*, the larg-
est  threats  to  border  security  at  the  com-
mon borders include the smuggling of excise 
goods, stolen vehicles, attempts to evade tax-
ation and trafficking in human beings (THB). 

In contrast to other sections of the external 
borders  of  the  EU,  this  long  border  section 
has no hotspots of irregular migration. In fact, 
during 2011, less than 1% of all detections of 
illegal  border-crossings  in  the  EU  occurred 
at the external EU borders with the Russian 
Federation, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.

Statistical indication of the migration pres-
sure  is  best  represented  through  an  analy-
sis of several FRAN and EB-RAN indicators 

(see  Tab.  1).  As  mentioned  earlier,  less  than 
1% of all illegal border-crossings at external 
EU borders during 2011 were reported from 
the common borders. On the other hand, the 
importance of efforts to limit possible abuse 
of stay is best represented by the fact that 
more than one quarter (26%) of all refusals 
of entry in the EU during 2011 were issued by 
the authorities at the eastern land external 
borders. Detections of false travel documents 
amounted to 11% of all detected false docu-
ments within EU.

Importantly,  detections  of  illegal  stay  on 
exit from the EU towards the neighbouring 
EB-RAN countries more than doubled in 2011 
(from  around  3  300  to  around  6  900).  The 
most significant increases were reported by 
Poland and Hungary and were largely linked 

Table 1. Summary of FRAN, EB-RAN* and selected Member States’** indicators for 2011

EU Totals

 EU MS (eastern land 
borders only)

% of EU total

EB-RAN

Indicator

Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

140 980

Clandestine entries

Facilitators

Illegal stay

Refusals of entry

Applications for asylum

False travel documents

Return decisions issued

Effective returns

 282

6 957

350 944

118 104

254 054

9 682

231 276

148 853

 990

 0

 76

6 883

30 848

24 042

1 104

36 973

20 461

1%

0%

1%

2%

26%

9%

11%

16%

14%

4 307

 14

 72

27 027

27 282

 68

 285

n.a.

n.a.

*  2011 data from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine 
** Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania

Source: EB-RAN and FRAN data as of 12 March 2012

* For example EUBAM 
reports, FRAN bi‑
monthlies, national 
analytical reports and 
open sources

10 of 42

Narva

Estonia

Latvia

Terehova

Lithuania

Medininkai

Minsk

Belarus

9.5

Kuźnica

Poland

Terespol

Dorohusk

Korczowa

Medyka

Ubla

é Nemeck

é

Vysn
Záhony

Slovakia

Hungary

Main BCPs between 
EB-RAN countries and the EU

Regional borders

Common borders

Pan-European Transport Corridors

Moscow

Russia
138.1

Population in millions

Kiev

Ukraine
44.9

Chişinău

Sculeni

Albita

Moldova
3.7

Romania

Galati

Source: open sources

Figure 2. General overview map of the EU’s eastern border 

11 of 42

 
Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Figure 3. Border-crossing point in Korczowa (Poland-Ukraine). It 

handled more than 2 million travellers in 2010 and 1.1 million during 

the first six months of 2011

to Ukrainian nationals. This trend could be a 
further indication of worsening job opportu-
nities within traditional destination Member 
States for Ukrainian migrants (Italy, Germany 
and Spain). 

Increasing traffic of regular passengers was 
largely driven by different Local Border Traf-
fic Agreements (LBTAs) between the EB-RAN 
countries  and  the  neighbouring  Member 
States. Likewise, the available data point to 
an increasing number of transported goods 
and imported cars at the common borders.

Source: Polish Border Guard 2012

Goods flow through the Polish borders

Just one Customs Chamber in Przemyśl (Polish border with Ukraine) registered more 
than 38 500 used car declarations (33 480 in 2009). Surprisingly, most of the traffic of 
lorries  was  reported  by  Białystok  (Polish-Belarusian  border)  with  432  900  lorries  in 
both directions, while the Polish-Ukrainian border ranked second with 246 500 lorries 
registered by customs officers at the border-crossing points.

Source: GUS – Polish Central Statistical Office (http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_11951_PLK_HTML.htm)

12 of 42

3.  The context – factors 

impacting the regional 
migratory movements

The  available  statistical  data  clearly  point 
to the existence of two migratory systems, 
affecting  both  EB-RAN  countries  and  the 
neighbouring Member States. The two sys-
tems are driven by economic realities, geog-
raphy and important historical or linguistic 
ties. Importantly, the first one attracts mi-
grants to the Russian Federation, while the 
other draws migrants to the EU.

Destination: the Russian Federation

The  Russian  Federation,  after  experiencing 
economic downturn in 2008 and 2009, came 
out  of  the  crisis  with  a  4.3%  GDP  growth 
rate in 2011. In an attempt to further stim-
ulate economic growth, the Russian Feder-
ation  plans  to  modernise  and  privatise  the 
main branches of its national economy. The 
growing economy is pulling in labour migrants 
from  the  whole  CIS  area.  Moreover,  during 
2011 the unemployment rate in the Russian 
Federation fell to 7.8%, while the average sal-
ary increased by 3.4%. 

Immigration laws in the Russian Federation 
are  changing,  which  usually  means  the  in-
troduction of more restrictions. Neverthe-
less, during the first half of 2011, the Federal 
Migration Service (FMS) reported less than 
16 000 expulsions from the total number of 
500 000 persons. Namely, the most com-
mon  procedure  used  by  the  FMS  is  to  fine 
and later release migrants coming from CIS 
countries. 

ducing entry bans for those who repeatedly 
violate immigration law, higher penalties for 
facilitators, biometric registration for all le-
gal labour migrants and the possible intro-
duction of language tests. 

Regardless of these new restrictions, the mo-
bility of persons and goods has been further 
enhanced  after  the  Customs  Union  of  the 
Russian Federation, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 
entered into force on 1 July 2011. Belarus and 
the Russian Federation abolished controls of 
goods on their common borders in April 2011 
and, in July 2011 customs controls were also 
abolished at the Russian Federation-Kazakh-
stan  border.  Furthermore,  additional  steps 
have been taken by the Russian Federation 
to agree with Belarus and Kazakhstan on a 
common visa policy, most notably with re-
gards to Georgian nationals. 

During the first half of 2011 the Russian Fed-
eration started bilateral talks with Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan and offered also Ukraine to par-
ticipate  in  the  Customs  Union.  In  February 
2012 Kyrgyzstan submitted an official request 
to join in early 2013, while the date has not yet 
been  set  for  Tajikistan.  Three  other  Central 
Asian countries, i.e. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, were also invited to join the 
Customs Union, which the Russian authorities 
refer to as a future Eurasian Union (by 2015). 

Destination: the European Union

Further plans to change the Russian Federa-
tion’s immigration policy are aimed at intro-

This migratory system is driven by economic 
realities and seasonal demand for labour. The 
destination countries in the EU can be divided 

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Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

into those in the immediate proximity (Po-
land, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Romania) and those hosting significant dias-
pora communities from Ukraine and Moldova 
(Italy, Spain, the UK, Germany). This distinc-
tion  is  important  in  terms  of  intended  du-
ration  of  migration,  with  those  preferring 
neighbouring Member States clearly engaged 
in a more circular migratory pattern.

2013. The economic slowdown is causing an 
additional tightening of immigration policies 
in some EU Member States. 

On the contrary, Poland, Germany, Belgium 
and Austria reported lower unemployment 
rates in 2011. 

Local border traffic agreements (LBTAs)

Europe’s economic crisis entered its third year 
in 2012 and a modest recovery is forecast for 

The local border traffic agreements are signed 
with an intent to increase mobility of peo-

Latvia

Lithuania

Moscow

Belarus
387 USD million

Russian Federation

Poland

Slovakia

Hungary

Serbia

FYROM

Greece

5590 USD million

Ukraine
5289 USD million

Moldova

1316 USD million

Romania

Bulgaria

Georgia

Turkey

Azerbaijan

N/D

Turkmenistan

GDP growth rate
 in 2011

< 0.1%

0.2% - 5.0%

5.0% - 7.5%

7.5% - 10%

> 10%

Libya

Egypt

Custom Union of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia

Chad

Sudan

Syria

Iraq

Jordan

Iran

Saudi
Arabia

Kazakhstan

131 USD million

Remittances in 2010

Mongolia

Kyrgyzstan
1037 USD million

N/D

Uzbekistan

Tajikistan

2065 USD million

China

Afghanistan

Russian 
Federation

Pakistan

824 USD million

Georgia

Nepal

Bhutan

Armenia

India

824 USD million

1472 USD million

Azerbaijan

Turkey

Oman

Iran

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2012; World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. ESRI Geodata.

Figure 4. The economy in the neighbourhood of the Russian Federation – the percentage of the remittances in 

countries’ GDP (background colour, data for 2010), with indication of value of remittances sent by migrants to source 

countries (in millions of USD, in 2010) and comparison of GDP growth in 2011

14 of 42

ple living in the border areas. The Ukraine-
Poland LBTA that entered into force on 1 July 
2009 can serve as a good example. Namely, 
the Ukrainian zone under the LBTA (see Fig. 5) 
includes a total area of 24 000 square kilo-
metres with over 1.2 million inhabitants. The 
agreement was intended to allow Ukrainian 
nationals living in the border areas to cross 
the  border  using  a  simplified  procedure.  In 
essence, the LBTA introduced a sort of visa-

free travel with elements of trusted travel-
ler programmes given that LBT permits are 
issued by the Polish consular authorities for 
a limited period and after vetting the appli-
cants.  LBT  permit  has  a  clear  geographical 
limitation  allowing  travellers  from  Ukraine 
to stay in the immediate border areas of Po-
land (30 kilometres inland).

100 km

30 km
(LBTA)

Share of the total number 
of Ukrainians crossing the border 
according to their destination 

30km strip of Local Border 
Traffic Agreement (LBTA): 51.9%

70km contiguous 
with the LBTA zone: 37.7% 

Dorohusk

Zosin

Poland

Hrebenne

Korczowa

Medyka

Krościenko

Ukraine

87% of Ukrainians 
crossing the border 
come from within 
the 100 km buffer 
zone contiguous 
with the border

Slovakia

Sources: Urząd Statystyczny w Rzeszowie, ESRI geodata.

Figure 5. LBTA between Poland and Ukraine 

15 of 42

Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Specimens of Local Border Traffic Permits – planned 
Lithuanian and working Polish:

Source: Lithuanian and Polish Ministries of Internal Affairs

Unsurprisingly, the LBTA led to significant in-
creases of the overall passenger flows at the 
Polish-Ukrainian border, in particular in 2010. 
While in 2009 roughly 3 million Ukrainian en-
tries were recorded by Poland, the number 
rose  by  40%  to  more  than  4.2  million  dur-
ing 2010 and is expected at around 5 million 
in  2011  (+27%).  Consequently,  the  share  of 
Ukrainian  entries  recorded  under  the  LBTA 
rose from slightly more than 30% during Q1 
2010  to  exactly  50%  in  the  last  quarter  of 

16 of 42

2010.  This  quarterly  share  has  since  stabi-
lised at the level of around 50%.

Several new local border traffic agreements 
are expected to enter into force during 2012. 
Those  include  Poland-the  Russian  Federa-
tion (Kaliningrad Oblast), Norway-the Rus-
sian  Federation  and  LBTA  between  Latvia 
and Belarus. The planned LBTA with Belarus 
are  effectively  put  ‘on-hold’  after  the  most 
recent  diplomatic  dispute  between  the  EU 
and Belarus.

Visa liberalisation process

The EU is currently engaged in visa dialogues 
with  the  Russian  Federation,  Ukraine  and 
the  Republic  of  Moldova.  Experience  with 
other LBTAs in the past has shown that im-
portant changes in the level of border traf-
fic  intensity  can  be  expected,  should  visa 
obligation be abolished for the three men-
tioned countries.

In addition, future improvements of road in-
frastructure have the capacity to significantly 
increase  the  share  of  travellers  beyond  the 
immediate common borders areas. Therefore, 
the regular passenger flow to the EU has sig-
nificant potential for growth. In terms of ab-
solute numbers, most of the growth will be 
limited to the common land borders.

Both Belarus and Ukraine plan to finalise bi-
lateral  agreements  with  Turkey  on  the  in-
troduction of visa-free regime during 2012.

UEFA Football Championship 2012

The  tournament  was  held  between  8  June 
and  1  July  2012,  with  the  opening  match  in 
Poland and the final game played in Ukraine. 
The number of foreign spectators according 
to the pool of tickets and other factors (in-
cluding  rising  prices  of  hotel  and  air  ticket 
in Ukraine) was expected to reach between 
200 000 and 400 000 spectators.

Only three non-EU countries qualified to the 
tournament (including hosting Ukraine) and 
two  of  them  played  the  first  round  of  the 
tournament in Poland, i.e. the Russian Fed-
eration and Croatia. Therefore, most of the 
traffic  was  expected  to  affect  the  Polish-
Ukrainian land border, air borders in Poland 
and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  Slovenian  and 
Hungarian borders with Croatia.

Both countries cooperated on traffic simpli-
fication including one-stop control (so called 
’green  lanes’  or  ‘euro  lanes’)  with  Polish  and 
Ukrainian border and customs services work-
ing together at one spot on the Polish side 
of the border. An agreement on a simplified 
visa regime for UEFA EURO 2012 supporters 
and participants was also concluded. 

At the end of April 2012 Poland took the de-
cision to temporarily introduce border con-
trols at its borders with Lithuania, Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic and Germany from 4 June 
to 1 July 2012. 

Frontex prepared a Tailored Risk Analysis of 
the  UEFA  Football  Championship  2012  and 
launched Joint Operation EuroCup 2012 aimed 
at supporting the Polish Border Guard dur-
ing the event. Although a lot of efforts were 
made by both Ukraine and Poland to prepare 
for the event, past experience had shown that 
the number of irregular migration incidents 
did not in fact increase during sports events. 
This was particularly applicable to this event, 
as  the  host  countries,  Poland  and  Ukraine 
held the majority of the tickets. 

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Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

4. Risk assessment 

The  following  risk  assessment  is  guided  by 
the  CIRAM  working  definition  of  risk  as  a 
function of three main components: threat, 
vulnerability and impact. A systematic exam-
ination of each component allows for clas-
sifying risks into categories of significance. 

1. 

 Risk  of  cross-border  smuggling  and  ex-
ploitation of green borders as a point of 
entry for smuggled goods

2.   Risk of increased irregular migration flows 

from non-CIS countries

3.   Risk of sustained irregular migration flows 

Establishing a general context in which bor-
der authorities from EB-RAN countries and 
the  neighbouring  Member  States  operated 
during 2011 is therefore important for iden-
tifying the main border (regional and com-
mon)  security  risks.  In  addition,  the  results 
from  the  voting  matrix  exercise  were  also 
used  to  identify  the  following  main  three 
risks (in order of importance):

from CIS countries

Each identified risk is described in detail, bro-
ken down by its main components. As this 
report is meant for public release, vulnera-
bilities  are  not  discussed  here.  A  summary 
risk  table  at  the  beginning  is  added  to  of-
fer a quick overview of the issues at stake.

1
1

0
2

x
e
t
n
o
r
F
©

18 of 42

 
 
4.1.   Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green/blue 

borders as a point of entry for smuggled goods

Table 2. Summary risk table

Risk name

Threat

Impact

Mitigation

Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green/blue borders as a point of 
entry for smuggled goods

Smuggling of tobacco, oil products and other excise goods to the EU countries and 
trafficking of stolen vehicles on exit from Europe 

•   Allocation of adequate equipment and personnel at the external eastern borders of the EU 
•   Cooperation between border control authorities and customs services in Members States
•   Queues and safety measures at different BCPs

Regular cooperation of Member States with EB countries; joint operations of border control 
authorities, customs services, police and EB countries targeted on dismantling organised 
crime groups dealing with smuggling of cigarettes and stolen vehicles.

4.1.1. Description of the threat

Data collected within the EB-RAN, as well as 
information from Frontex-coordinated Joint 
Operations and various open sources, clearly 
indicate that cross-border criminality, mainly 
large- and small-scale smuggling of tobacco 
products, trafficking in stolen vehicles (cars 
and  heavy  machinery  on  exit  from  the  EU) 
and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  smuggling  of  drugs 
and  petroleum  products  remain  the  most 
significant  threat  to  border  security  at  the 
common borders.

Smuggling of tobacco

Monitoring of the situation at the land bor-
ders during Frontex-coordinated Joint Oper-
ation Focal Points Land 2010 and 2011 shows 
that  the  common  borders  are  one  of  the 
most  important  entry  points  for  smuggled 
cigarettes  to  the  EU,  followed  by  the  East-
ern  Balkans  (border  with  Turkey)  and  the 
Western Balkans. 

Tobacco smuggling continues to be lucrative 
due to price differences between the EU and 
third countries. Main destination countries for 
smuggled cigarettes are western European 
countries  such  as  the  UK,  Ireland,  France, 
Belgium,  Germany  and  the  Member  States 
located along the eastern borders of the EU. 

In the case of Romania and Lithuania, an es-
timated 60–70% of all smuggled cigarettes 
are sold there while the rest are smuggled to 
other European countries. Similar estimates 
are also valid for Poland. 

Western  European  countries  are  destina-
tion  markets  for  both  cigarettes  smuggled 
from third countries to Member States but 
also  those  illegally  produced  on  the  terri-
tory of the EU.

Intelligence  collected  during  investigations 
by the Polish Border Guard shows that cig-

Figure 6. Detections of smuggled cigarettes among the EU 

external border sections during JO Focal Points Land 2010 and 2011 

(accordingly left and right).

Western
Balkans
5%

Western
Balkans
4%

Eastern
Balkans
35%

2010

Eastern
Borders
60%

Eastern
Balkans
38%

2011

Eastern
Borders
58%

Source: JO Focal Points Land 2010 and 2011

19 of 42

Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Cigarette smuggling through Lithuania

In September 2011, the Polish Border Guard, while perform-
ing  routine  control  of  vehicles  in  border  areas,  discovered 
two lorries fully packed of smuggled cigarettes. According 
to  international  consignment  documents,  the  two  lorries 
were carrying industrial soot. The third lorry belonging to 
the same shipment was detected after investigation. In to-
tal, 170 000 cartons of cigarettes were detected. 

All  detained  smugglers  were  Polish  citizens.  Five  persons 
were accused of taking part in organised crime group (OCG), 
smuggling cigarettes from the Russian Federation. Lorries 
were professionally prepared for smuggling as each vehicle 
weight was according to declared content of the shipment. 

2
1

0
2
d
r
a
u
G
r
e
d
r
o
B
h
s
i
l

o
P

:
e
c
r
u
o
S

Source: Polish Border Guard, Podlaski Regional Unit

arettes for the western European market are 
also ‘produced’ by illegal factories on the ter-
ritory of Poland. Those cigarettes are simi-
lar  in  quality  to  the  genuine  brands  which 
are believed to be preferred by western con-
sumers over those produced outside the EU. 

As the cases detected by the Polish authori-
ties show, some detections of smuggled cig-
arettes in 2011 also occurred inland (see box 
on the right). 

20 of 42

During JO Focal Points Land 2011 a great major-
ity of detections of smuggled cigarettes were 
reported at the land border between (in de-
creasing order) Ukraine and Poland, Romania 
and Moldova, Belarus and Poland, the Russian 
Federation and Lithuania, the Russian Federa-
tion and Poland, Ukraine and Hungary, and the 
Russian Federation and Finland. The highest 
number of smuggling incidents was reported 
at the eastern borders of Poland , followed by 
the eastern borders of Romania.

Although the number of cigarette smuggling 
cases decreased compared to previous year, 
the actual number of pieces seized soared by 
96.5%. This means that smugglers attempted 
to traffic larger amount of cigarettes per ship-
ment, which may be indicative of an increas-
ing engagement of organised crime groups in 
cigarette smuggling.

Modi operandi of cigarette smugglers used at the 
land border remain quite diverse. Compared to 
2010, no major changes were detected, apart 
from some minor novelties in regard to the 
use of rail and maritime shipments. 

Smuggling  ranges  from  operations  carried 
out by individuals (so called ‘ant smugglers’) 
to large scale enterprises involving organised 
groups  that  use  private  cars,  buses,  lorries 
and trains. Minivans and lorries with custom-
built hidden compartments (i.e. false floors, 
walls and double-walled fuel tanks) are es-
pecially popular. 

As during previous years, smugglers were re-
ported using off-road vehicles and tractors at 
different green borders as well as small boats 
along the River Nemunas or the River Bug. 

According to available information from Lat-
via, Lithuania and Romania, the number of cig-
arette smuggling incidents fluctuates widely: 
in  the  autumn-winter  season  smuggling  of 
cigarettes decreases when compared to the 
spring-summer period. This is mainly due to 

 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of number of incidents and cigarettes seized during JO Focal Points 

Land 2011

number of cases detected

number of pieces seized (in thousands)

Zahony

Vysne Nemecke

Medyka

Korczowa

Dorohusk

Kapitan Andreevo

Roszke

Moravita

Kelebia

Vaalimaa

Kybartai

Bezledy

Sculeni

Galati

Albita

Obrezje

Moravita

Gruskovje

Terespol

R
K
U

R
U
T

B
R
S

S
U
R

A
D
M

V
R
H

R
L
B

Source: JO Focal Points 2011

cold and rainy weather and seasonally dete-
riorating condition of secondary roads along 
different regional green borders. 

Detections of cigarettes smuggled through 
the Belarusian border hidden in rail freights 
was also reported in 2011. In particular, inci-
dents during the third quarter included car-
tons of cigarettes hidden in the cargo of iron 
ore transported by rail and packed into card-
board boxes wrapped up with black foil.

Price difference 

Price  differential  remains  the  most  impor-
tant driver for smuggling tobacco and pet-
rol products through the common borders. 

Similar to 2010, monitoring of cigarette prices 
in 2011 shows a significant price difference be-
tween Member States and EB-RAN countries 
(see Fig. 8). The greatest price divergence was 
observed in Ireland, the UK, Sweden, France, 
Denmark, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Germany.

21 of 42

Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

of a pack of 20 premium 

Price
 cigarettes (in EUR)

< 1.00€

1.00€ - 2.50€

2.50€ - 4.00€

4.00€ - 6.00€

> 6.00€ 

5.42 €

5.00 €

2.21 €

2.21 €

8.55 €

6.27 €

3.75 €

3.90 €

5.10 €

0.65 €

2.16 €

0.61 €

4.73 €

4.95 €

3.60 €

5.40 €

4.35 €

2.32 €

0.77 €

0.53 €

2.66 €

4.00 €

2.49 €

2.42 €

2.08 €

3.06 €

1.80 €

1.09 €

3.90 €

1.49 €

2.00 €

2.70 €

2.20 €

3.29 €

2.97 €

4.00 €

3.27 €

Source: European Commission's publication Excise Duty Tables. Part III - Manufactured Tobacco. July 2011; CISStat 2011; 
Open Source Data. ESRI Geodata.

Figure 8. Prices of one 20-piece pack of premium cigarettes in Member States and third countries in 2011

In 2011 the largest price difference of oil prod-
ucts  was  reported  between  the  Member 
States  neighbouring  with  Belarus  and  the 
Russian Federation. Due to increasing prices 
of oil products in Ukraine and Moldova, pet-
rol smuggling from these countries is becom-
ing less profitable. 

Market demand for tobacco and oil 
products

Demand  for  both  cheap  tobacco  and  pe-
troleum products is significant both in the 
neighbouring  and  other  Member  States. 
Free movement of people and goods within 
the  Schengen area creates a great oppor-
tunity  for  smugglers  to  intensify  trade  in 
smuggled goods. The demand for cheap cig-
arettes is also related to significant popula-

22 of 42

 
A stolen BMW detected at the Lithuanian-Russian border at Medininkai BCP

Thorough control of one car (see the photo) at the 
Lithuanian-Russian border revealed that the driver 
was not the owner of the car, the insurance of the 
car had expired and another international insurance 
certificate, bearing the VIN of the car, was found 
in the vehicle. The new insurance had been issued 
in the name of a third person, neither the owner 
nor the driver. As the documents and the identi-
fication elements on the vehicle were genuine, a 
query of databases was made about the driver. It 
was discovered that the driver had exited Lithua-
nia with 8 different vehicles over the past 7 months. 

Source: JO Focal Points Land 2012

tion of eastern European nationals working 
in the Western European countries. They are 
the main consumers of smuggled cigarettes 
and  sometimes  also  engage  in  distribution 
of tobacco products.

Smuggling of vehicles

The EU borders in the east are increasingly 
important exit points for stolen vehicles from 
the EU (Fig. 10). Most stolen vehicles were 
reported at the Polish land border with Be-
larus and Ukraine , followed by the Hungar-
ian border with Ukraine .

2
1

0
2
d
r
a
u
G
r
e
d
r
o
B
h
s
i
l

o
P

:
e
c
r
u
o
S

Vehicles were mainly stolen in Austria, Bel-
gium, Germany, France, Italy and the Neth-
erlands.  The  most  commonly  used  modus 
operandi was the transit of vehicles with falsi-
fied documents. This was followed by smug-
gling  of  vehicles  dismantled  into  parts  (see 
box overleaf), transportation of vehicles on a 
platform trailer or train, abuse of lease agree-
ments and, less frequently, also altering ve-
hicle identification numbers (VIN number). 

In 2011, stolen heavy vehicles, machines, buses 
and trailers were increasingly reported at the 
common borders. The detected vehicles were 
mostly transported to Belarus and Ukraine. 
Stolen  agricultural  machines  (tractors)  and 
excavators were also reported. 

Figure 9. In August 2011 Polish Border Guards from Dorohusk BCP 

detained a Polish citizen who attempted to smuggle 1 600 cartons of 

cigarettes across the River Bug

Figure 10. Detections of stolen vehicles on exit from the EU (by border 

section) during JO Focal Points Land 2010 and 2011

Eastern
Balkans
14%

Eastern
Balkans
13%

2010

Eastern
Borders
49%

2011

Eastern
Borders
59%

Western
Balkans
28%

Western
Balkans
37%

These  and  similar  types  of  heavy  vehicles/
machinery are very attractive to smugglers, 

Source: JO Focal Points Land 2010 and 2011

23 of 42

 
 
 
 
Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Case studies of stolen vehicles smuggled in parts during JO Focal Points Land 2011

In January 2011 a lorry loaded with used spare parts 
was submitted to second line control at Kukuryki BCP 
(border between Poland and Belarus). The checks re-
vealed that the shipment contained complete parts 
of 13 luxury cars for which alerts had been issued in 
the SIS. The overall value of the vehicles was esti-
mated at more than EUR 1 million. Cases of motor 
vehicle smuggling using a similar modus operandi have 
been detected at the Hungarian border with Ukraine 
in the area of FP Zahony.

Source: JO Focal Points Land 2012

In February 2011 eight motorbikes stolen in Italy (see photo) were found dismantled 
in a Mercedes Sprinter returning from Italy to Ukraine. The van was carrying parcels 
which were arranged like a wall in order to conceal the motorbikes. In March eight 
additional motorbikes stolen in Italy and then dismantled were being transported 
in a Mercedes Sprinter returning to Ukraine, also covered by parcels.

as they are of high value. The vehicles were 
predominantly transported from France and 
Germany via Poland, the Czech Republic or 
Hungary to Ukraine, Belarus and further on-
wards to the Russian Federation, as well as 
Kazakhstan. 

4.1.2. Impact

Allocation of adequate equipment and 
personnel and cooperation between 
border control authorities and customs 
services

The flow of excise goods and smuggling of 
stolen vehicles on exit from the EU requires 
sufficient allocation of equipment and experi-
enced border control officers to properly ad-
dress this threat.

The detection of drugs and smuggled excise 
goods also requires a close cooperation be-
tween  border  control  authorities  and  cus-
toms services. 

In 2011, the Ukrainian Parliament (Verk-
hovna Rada) adopted amendments to the 
Ukrainian Customs Code. The new regu-
lation was aiming at reducing the number 
of cases of confiscation of vehicles used 
for transporting contraband goods. In line 
with the changes, vehicles should be con-
fiscated for smuggling of drugs, weapons 
and explosives. New regulation was ex-
pected to come into force on 1 January 
2012, but has been delayed.

24 of 42

Queues and safety measures at BCPs

Table 3. Price of Euro-Super 95 fuel in 2011 in Member States and 

neighbouring third countries and respective price differences

Depending on the infrastructure of the bor-
der  checkpoint,  smuggling  of  excise  goods 
can  create  queues  and  affect  the  safety  of 
the border-crossing point.

Queues created by fuel smugglers do have an 
impact on the management of the border by 
increasing waiting times but also present a 
safety hazard since fuel smugglers’ vehicles 
are often modified and may potentially catch 
fire or even explode (see box on the right).

Border

Finland-Russian Federation

Lithuania-Belarus

Estonia-Russian Federation

Poland-Russian Federation

Slovakia-Ukraine

Poland-Belarus

Hungary-Ukraine

Greece-Albania

Poland-Ukraine

Greece-fYROM

Romania-Ukraine

Romania-Moldova

Hungary-Serbia

Hungary-Croatia

Slovenia-Croatia

Romania-Serbia

Bulgaria-fYROM

Bulgaria-Serbia

Greece-Turkey

Bulgaria-Turkey

Price  
in EU country  
in EUR 

Price  
in third country 
in EUR

Price  
difference gap  
in EUR

1.56

1.36

1.26

1.25

1.41

1.27

1.33

1.67

1.33

1.56

1.25

1.24

1.37

1.37

1.39

1.22

1.18

1.18

1.53

1.16

0.67

0.74

0.66

0.66

0.84

0.74

0.84

1.23

0.96

1.19

0.89

0.92

1.31

1.31

1.38

1.28

1.29

1.31

1.68

1.75

0.89

0.62

0.61

0.59

0.57

0.53

0.49

0.44

0.38

0.36

0.36

0.33

0.07

0.07

0.01

-0.06

-0.11

-0.13

-0.15

-0.60

Source: European Commission Oil Bulletin (average prices for 2011 - No. 1550, 1562, 1574, 
1586), open source data for third countries

Car explosion at the 
Polish border with 
the Russian Federation 
(Gołdap-Gusiev 
checkpoint)

A  car  with  Polish  regis-
tration  plates  exploded 
at the Russian side of the 
Gołdap-Gusiew border checkpoint located at the border with 
Poland (April 2011). The explosion started a fire that reduced 
the car to its metal frame. In addition, the fire spread to the 
nearby building, which housed a duty-free shop, burning its 
roof. Illegal adaptation of the car for the purpose of pet-
rol smuggling was indicated as the most probable cause 
of the accident.

25 of 42

Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

4.2.  Risk of significant irregular migration flows from non-CIS 

countries

Table 4. Summary risk table

Risk name

Risk of significant irregular migration flows from non-CIS countries

Threat

Impact

Mitigation

Use of false documents, abuse of visas, asylum policy, illegal border-crossing by migrants; 
establishing of new OCGs producing false documents, facilitating migration from CIS to EU 
and EB-RAN countries

•   More second-line checks
•   Staff redirected to surveillance
•   Abuse of social benefits system
•   Internal security 

Focus on main identified modi operandi, cooperation with neighbouring countries and with 
destination countries on ongoing investigations against facilitators/OCGs

4.2.1. Description of the threat

Illegal border-crossings between BCPs

In 2011 the total number of detections of il-
legal  border-crossing  by  non-CIS  migrants 
increased  by  20%  compared  to  2010.  Simi-
lar to 2010, the Slovakian-Ukrainian border 
remained  the  most  affected  section  of  the 
common borders, accounting for 32% of the 
total non-CIS detections. 

In  contrast  to  2010,  the  peak  in  detections 
of non-CIS nationals occurred in the fourth 
quarter of 2011. This could be linked to a very 
late  change  of  weather  given  that  heavy 
snowfall and winds only started in the mid-
dle of December 2011.

The  migration  flow  of  non-CIS  nationals 
reflected  in  illegal  border-crossing  mainly 
consists of two nationalities – Afghans and 
Somalis (together accounting for almost 60%, 
or 460 of the total of 813 non-CIS migrants).

Yearly  comparison  shows  that  Afghan  na-
tionals remained the dominant group of non-
CIS  migrants  with  stable  overall  numbers 
(259  in  2010  and  267  in  2011),  while  Soma-
lis increased their relative share (from 127 in 
2010 to 193 in 2011).

Most of the Afghan nationals were reported 
at the Ukrainian borders with Slovakia, Hun-
gary and Poland. In 2011, the number of Af-
ghans  reported  at  the  Belarus-Lithuania 
border doubled. At the same time, Ukraine 
reported a decrease in detections of Afghan 
nationals  at  the  border  with  the  Russian 
Federation. 

Afghans  and  Somalis  are  detected  mostly 
during  late  night  hours  in  small  groups  of 
two to five. 

In Ukraine, the main nexus points of irregu-
lar migration are two cities – Uzhgorod and 
Mukachevo,  where  migrants  are  provided 
with accommodation before attempting the 
border  -crossing. Uzhgorod is the main stop-
over for non-CIS nationals travelling by public 
transport (trains) with the intention to cross 
into  the  EU.  After  reaching  Uzhgorod  mi-
grants are often taken by private cars closer 
to the border with Slovakia. 

Detection figures from Ukraine suggest three 
main  ways  that  non-CIS  migrants  use  to 
reach Ukraine: (a) direct arrival, using legal 
travel channels (business, student or tourist 
visa), (b) indirect arrival, transiting through 
the Russian Federation, and (c) via Ukraine’s 
Black Sea ports.

26 of 42

Facilitation networks in Belarus and Lithuania

The Belarusian State Border Service informed in 
September  2011  of  the  investigation  conducted 
at the Belarus-Lithuania border. The uncovered 
facilitation network was composed of nationals 
of Lithuania, Belarus and the Russian Federation. 
The  Belarusians  were  professional  drivers  and 
Russian guides were ex-soldiers with specialised 
skills. The network recruited Afghan nationals al-
ready living in the Russian Federation. Migrants 
were coming to Minsk (Belarus) on regular buses. 
They were then taken by the Belarusian facilita-
tors to the suburbs of Minsk and transported by 
car to the Lithuanian border (Grodno and Voro-
nava regions). After the crossing, on the Lithua-
nian side another group of facilitators took them 
to Poland in minivans. 

Source: Belarusian State Border Service, September 2011

Photos disclosed by Belarus State Border Service from the 
investigation. 
Photos disclosed by Belarus State Border Service from the 
investigation. 

Source of the photos: http://gpk.gov.by/press_center/news/interaction/10041/

The  third  nationality  in  2011,  following  the 
same migration routes as Afghans and So-
malis,  were  Vietnamese  (42).  However,  the 
number of Vietnamese migrants decreased 
by 38% compared to 2010. Vietnamese mi-
grants were reported at the Ukrainian bor-
der with the Russian Federation and Poland 
and Slovakia. In 2011, Vietnamese also were 
reported  at  the  Estonian  land  border  with 
the Russian Federation.

In conclusion, Ukraine (and to a much lesser 
extent  Belarus)  is  the  main  transit  coun-
try  for  non-CIS  irregular  migrants  aiming 
to reach the EU through the common bor-
ders. However, when compared with other 
migration routes towards the EU, the flow 
through  Ukraine  can  be  considered  mod-
est at best. 

The  highest  number  of  facilitators  in  2011 
was reported by Lithuania and Belarus (27), 
which is almost double the figure reported 
in 2010 (16). However, the majority of facili-
tators, according to information provided by 

e
c
i

v
r
e
S

r
e
d
r
o
B
e
t
a
t
S
n
a
n
a
r
k
U

i

i

:
e
c
r
u
o
S

Figure 11. One of the detected groups of 

Afghans near Novoselica

UKR-SVK: one of the detected groups of Afghans near 
Novoselica. Source: Ukrainian SBS 

27 of 42

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

at the Slovakian-Ukrainian and Hungarian-
Ukrainian borders (16 persons).

The abuse was largely linked to Belgian doc-
uments  (122),  followed  distantly  by  Italian 
(24), French (19) and Greek documents (16). 
As  reported  by  Latvia,  Estonia  and  Poland, 
migrants presented original passports with 
forged Belgian aliens’ registration certificates 
or residence permits (see photo in box). Po-
land  also  reported  the  use  of  stolen  blank 
documents. 

The main route of entry for migrants origi-
nating from the Russian Federation is through 
land borders, using international train and bus 
connections. As observed by Latvia, most of 
the cases were detected on the international 
trains going through just one train BCP. Af-
ter detection, migrants always claimed asy-
lum in order to avoid readmission back to the 
Russian Federation. Furthermore, migrants 
from  African  countries  were  also  reported 
at several air borders en route from the Rus-
sian Federation.

Migrants  from  the  Democratic  Republic  of 
Congo  (Kinshasa),  Congo  (Brazzaville)  and 
Cameroon were staying legally in the Rus-
sian  Federation  (short-term  Russian  visas), 
where they subsequently obtained false res-
idence permits or other documents.

4.2.2. Impact

Geographical proximity to the Schengen area 
seems to be the main driver for non-CIS mi-
grants towards the EU. Visa policy in EB-RAN 
countries could also be pointed out here, al-
lowing specific groups of migrants easy ac-
cess to the external land borders of the EU. 

Most non-CIS migrants are undocumented, 
which complicates possible returns to their 
countries of origin.

Example of false Belgian residence permit

Source: Estonian presentation, EB-RAN meeting in Warsaw 21 June 2011

both countries, were mainly detained after 
criminal investigations. Most of the facilita-
tors were Lithuanians and Russians, but there 
were also individual cases of Polish, Kyrgyz, 
Belarusian, Afghan and Turkish nationals.

Use of false travel documents and 
impostors 

A  new  modus  operandi  was  reported  in  2011 
consisting  in  the  use  of  false  travel  docu-
ments by nationals from the Central Africa 
(mainly  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo 
and Cameroon).

In  2010,  the  number  of  detections  of  false 
documents  used  by  non-CIS  countries  na-
tionals totalled 129. This number rose to 360 
during  2011,  with  almost  50%  reported  by 
Latvia alone.

The new phenomenon in 2011 was concen-
trated mainly at the borders with the Russian 
Federation, although a small percentage of 
all detected African nationals were reported 

28 of 42

Given the relatively low numbers, the impact 
of  non-CIS  migration  remains  fairly  limited 
and is mainly linked to the allocation of re-
sources and equipment. 

Moldova case – clandestine entry

Moldova  reported  nine  Turkish  nationals  trying  to  enter 
Romania hidden in a camper-van in mid-January 2011. The 
camper was driven by a German national, accompanied by 
Moldovan  passengers.  The  clandestine  Turkish  nationals, 
discovered hiding in the van, had original travel documents 
with valid Moldovan visas.

Passports of irregular migrants from Turkey and the camper with Ger-

man number plates

Source: Serviciul Grăniceri al Republicii Moldova

29 of 42

Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

4.3.  Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from CIS countries

Table 5. Summary risk table

Risk name

Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from CIS countries

Threat

Impact

Abuse of documents, illegal border-crossing

•   Second-line checks
•   Staff redirected to surveillance
•   Internal security by extensive efforts to combat transborder or local OCGs

Mitigation

Cooperation with neighbouring countries and with destination countries, return

4.3.1. Description of the threat

CIS nationals attempting to illegally enter the 
Schengen area tend to use different modi op-
erandi depending on the nationality. For ex-
ample, Russians apply for asylum. Georgians 
frequently try to cross the border legally first 
and only claim asylum or try to illegally cross 
the  green  border  to  the  EU  when  refused. 
Others, like Armenians, often use legal travel 
channels to enter the EU and subsequently 
claim asylum. Moldovans mainly attempt to 
illegally cross through different green borders, 
while Ukrainians often try to obtain genuine 
visas under false pretences.

Illegal border-crossing between BCPs 

In 2011 the total number of detections of il-
legal  border-crossing  of  CIS  migrants  re-
ported at the common borders decreased by 
13% compared to 2010. This trend was driven 
by developments at the Slovakian-Ukrain-
ian border, where detections of illegal bor-
der-crossing dropped by an impressive 43%. 
At the same time, the Lithuanian-Belarusian 
border recorded a more than 100% increase 
(albeit from a low base).

With 415 CIS migrants, the Belarus-Lithuania 
border ranked first, followed by the Ukraine-
Slovakia  (326)  and  Ukraine-Poland  borders 
(275). The shift from Ukraine to Belarus was 
mainly  caused  by  Georgians  using  a  direct 
flight connection from Tbilisi to Minsk, from 

where they further travelled by train to the 
main rail BCPs on the Belarusian border with 
Lithuania.

The  most  affected  regional  borders  were 
those between Ukraine and the Russian Fed-
eration (1 101), and between Ukraine and Mol-
dova (1 019). However, at these border sectors 
and also at the Ukrainian-Belarusian border 
most cases of illegal border-crossing can be 
attributed to local inhabitants. According to 
information provided by Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine, these cases are largely connected to 
smuggling activities, illegal logging and ille-
gal fishing or hunting.

Ukrainian and Moldovan nationals remained 
the top two nationalities with the joint share 
of more than 65% of all illegal border-cross-
ings made by CIS nationals (down from 3 648 
in 2010 to almost 3 000 in 2011). However, as 
mentioned above, a large majority of illegal 
border-crossings at the regional borders are 
not linked to irregular migration. 

Russian nationals are the third top national-
ity (13%; decreasing trend), followed by Geor-
gians (12%; increasing trend). Amongst other 
CIS  nationalities,  Armenians  ranked  sixth 
with 55 migrants detected crossing the bor-
der illegally.

The characteristics of CIS migrants are very 
different from non-CIS nationals. They mainly 
cross  the  border  in  very  small  groups  (of 

30 of 42

2–3 persons), often individually. CIS migrants 
rarely use facilitation; they are prepared and 
equipped with maps, compasses, clothes to 
change and they are able to communicate in 
Russian, which is the main reason why they 
do not use facilitators’ network.

Obtaining visas under false pretences

Obtaining visas under false pretences is one 
of the most often used modi operandi associ-
ated with CIS migrants. This method is also 
used by Ukrainians travelling with tourist or 
business visas.

According to available information, the Lo-
cal Schengen Cooperation Meetings in Kiev 
have repeatedly addressed the issue of visa 
shopping. The so-called ’visa traders’ engage 
with their clients on the Internet, via email 
or through leaflet offers to arrange Schen-
gen visas.  

There  are  also  companies  and  individuals 
in EU Member States who, in exchange for 
money, provide Ukrainian visa applicants with 
the necessary documents or even fictitious 
invitation letters. 

It  is  assessed  that  the  majority  of  Member 
States are faced with such practices, which 
are  fuelled  by  the  differences  in  respective 
rejection  rates  and  many  obstacles  to  the 
prosecution of ’visa traders’. Member States’ 
consular authorities in Ukraine seek to coun-
ter visa shopping with strengthening the ca-
pacity of their staff at consular sections and 
improving the technical equipment needed 
to detect false documents.

Transit abuse

Furthermore,  statements  received  during 
second-line  interviews  of  Ukrainians  who 
were refused entry to Poland because they 
could not properly justify the purpose of their 
stay, corroborate the extent of the unlawful 

transit  issue  problem.  The  interviewed  mi-
grants admitted that their real destinations 
– mainly Germany, Italy or Austria – were al-
most always different to the one claimed in 
their visa application.

Refusals  of  entry  at  the  external  border  of 
the EU are therefore a very good indication 
of the extent of this type of abuse. Ukraini-
ans are traditionally the most refused nation-
ality at the external land borders of the EU. 

Inland controls

Regional units of the Polish Border Guard, which performs 
checks  on  the  main  international  road  and  railway  routes 
leading from Germany, France, Italy and Austria, published 
on their websites summary results of their controls under-
taken as compensatory measures. According to this infor-
mation, all units ‘bordering’ with other Member States in the 
west and south of Poland detect a consistently high num-
ber of CIS countries’ nationals travelling from EU countries. 
In most cases, they are transiting Ukrainians or Moldovans 
coming back from western EU countries where they work, 
yet they only hold visas allowing them to work or conduct 
business activities in Poland. According to information col-
lected during interviews, they had originally applied for Pol-
ish visas with the intention to work in other EU countries.

2
1

0
2
d
r
a
u
G
r
e
d
r
o
B
h
s
i
l

o
P

:
e
c
r
u
o
S

Source: Polish Border Guard, Silesian Regional Division

www.slaski.strazgraniczna.pl

31 of 42

 
 
 
 
Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Visas issued to nationals of EB-RAN countries
in 2010

Russian Federation

Ukraine

Belarus

Moldova

Source: The European Commission, February 2012

Figure 12:  By and large, nationals of the Russian Federation were the largest group of visa receivers

32 of 42

False documents

False entry/exit stamps

According to FRAN data, between 2010 and 
2011  there  was  just  a  1.4%  increase  in  the 
number  of  individuals  detected  using  false 
(forged or counterfeit) documents to enter 
the EU; this is a steady trend despite reports 
of a widespread shift away from false-doc-
ument  towards  genuine-document  abuse, 
which includes impersonation, fraudulently 
obtained  documents  and  abuse  of  legal 
channels.

Nearly  half  of  all  detections  of  false-docu-
ment users were of nationals from just five 
countries – Ukraine, Albania, Morocco, Iran 
and  Nigeria;  of  the  remaining  nationalities, 
around  150  were  detected  at  very  low  fre-
quencies.  Ukrainian  nationals  were  mostly 
detected in Poland with Polish documents.

At  the  common  borders  almost  90%  of  all 
false documents were used by nationals from 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. 

Multipersons*

Although  this  modus  operandi  is  not  com-
monly used, it mainly concerns nationals of 
CIS  countries,  who  have  the  possibility  to 
officially change names or surnames. In 2011 
Poland regularly detected CIS migrants try-
ing to enter presenting new passports issued 
with changed personal data. Biometric check 
often reveals that the new passport holder 
has an active entry ban to Poland.

False  stamps  confirming  the  fulfilment  of 
the  conditions  of  stay  are  mainly  detected 
at the Polish, Hungarian and, to a lesser ex-
tent, also Slovakian border with Ukraine. The 
main reason for falsifying these stamps is to 
fabricate evidence that the migrant had not 
overstayed on his/her last visit when apply-
ing for a new visa.

However,  many  stamps  were  forged  so  as 
to appear that the migrants had left the EU 
(while in fact they had been overstaying), in 
an attempt to legalise their status by obtain-
ing a visa for a fictitious ‘re-entry’. 

Given  the  visa-free  regime  in  the  vast  CIS 
area, migrants can have easy access to the ex-
ternal borders of the EU. Factors such as the 
geographical  proximity,  good  public  trans-
port and the widespread use of the Russian 
language in the CIS area often result in only 
limited  need  for  facilitation  services,  since 
migrants  are  normally  able  to  travel  with-
out any assistance. 

When it comes to fraudulently obtained visas, 
EU consular authorities report that it is rela-
tively easy for migrants to get hold of fraud-
ulent supporting documents. 

4.3.2. Impact

The impact of CIS migration to the EU could 
be assessed based on the number of refus-
als issued to CIS nationals.  

* Modus operandi involving 
‘change of identity’ by 
using a new legally issued 
passport with altered 
personal data, such 
as changed names or 
alternative transliteration 
of names from the 
Cyrillic into Latin 
alphabet. By pretending 
to be a different person, 
migrants try to avoid an 
existing entry ban.

33 of 42

Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Belarusian plans to introduce visa obligation 
for Georgian nationals have not yet been im-
plemented; however, Belarus announced its 
intention  to  introduce  visa-free  travel  for 
Turkish nationals. Ukraine has already signed 
such  an  agreement  with  Ankara,  expected 
to enter into force before the June-July 2012 
UEFA Football Championship.

The new wave of return migration, mostly in-
volving Ukrainian nationals, is likely to con-
tinue, though at a more moderate pace. As 
reported mainly by Hungary and Poland, the 
number of overstayers detected on exit from 
the EU doubled in 2011 compared to a year 
before. This especially concerned those who 
had entered the EU between 2003 and 2007 
using false entry/exit stamps.

The  ongoing  diplomatic  dispute  between 
the EU and Belarus could cause some unin-
tended consequences. The transiting routes 
could shift, with non-CIS migrants increas-
ingly entering Belarus before illegally cross-
ing into the EU.

5. Outlook

Cross-border crime

Cross-border crime will remain the main chal-
lenge for the common borders. Available data 
from EB-RAN participants suggest that the 
same issue is also a primary concern in the 
case of regional borders.

Cross-border crime will continue to be driven 
mainly by small-scale smugglers of cigarettes, 
petrol  and  stolen  vehicles.  Local  demand-
supply circumstances such as price differen-
tial, changes in the legal framework and the 
amount of effort that can be put into detect-
ing smuggling will continue to govern the ex-
tent of the phenomenon. 

As the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova 
and Belarus will remain important markets 
for stolen vehicles (ranging from spare parts, 
motorbikes, luxury cars, lorries to specialised 
vehicles), new methods of smuggling will cer-
tainly be developed.

Irregular migration 

The  common  borders  will  likely  remain 
impacted  by  mainly  two  routes:  (1)  tradi-
tional route from Ukraine to Slovakia, which 
is  mainly  used  by  migrants  from  Afghani-
stan,  Somalia  and,  in  smaller  numbers,  by 
Moldovans; and (2) new routes that emerged 
during 2010-2011 in Baltic countries. One ex-
ample is the route from the Russian Federa-
tion through Latvia, where the modus operandi 
to enter the EU includes both abuse of doc-
uments (DR Congo and Cameroon) and ille-
gal crossing through the green border after 
refusal of entry is issued (Georgian, Russian, 
and Armenian migrants).

34 of 42

6. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations:    n.a.  not applicable

: 

  data not available

Source:    EB-RAN and FRAN data as of 12 March 2012, unless otherwise indicated

Note:   ‘Member  States’  in  the  tables  refer  to  FRAN  Member  States,  including  both 

27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

 Each section in the tables (Reporting Country, Border Type, Place of Detection, 
Top Five Border Sections and Top Ten Nationalities) refers to total detections 
reported by EB-RAN countries and to neighbouring land border detections 
reported by EU Member States.

35 of 42

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Annex Table 1. Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Detections reported by top five border sections and top ten nationalities 

2010

2011

% change 
on prev. year

per cent of total

Top Five Border Sections

Ukraine-Russia

Ukraine-Moldova

Slovakia – Ukraine

Lithuania – Belarus

Ukraine-Belarus

Others

Top Ten Nationalities

Ukraine

Moldova

Russia

Georgia

Afghanistan

Belarus

Somalia

Armenia

Vietnam

Lithuania

Others

Total

1 398

1 442

 877

 272

 307

1 904

2 068

1 933

 677

 431

 259

 237

 127

 77

 58

 33

 300

1 129

1 056

 669

 494

 389

1 976

1 980

1 368

 590

 544

 268

 266

 201

 56

 42

 35

 363

6 200

5 713

-19

-27

-24

82

27

3,8

-4,3

-29

-13

26

3,5

12

58

-27

-28

6,1

21

-7,9

20

18

12

8,6

6,8

35

35

24

10

9,5

4,7

4,7

3,5

1

0,7

0,6

6,4

36 of 42

Annex Table 2. Illegal border-crossing at BCPs

Detections reported by top five border sections and top ten nationalities 

2010

2011

% change 
on prev. year

per cent of total

Top Five Border Sections

Ukraine-Belarus

Ukraine-Russia

Romania – Moldova

Poland – Ukraine

Ukraine-Moldova

Others

Top Ten Nationalities

Ukraine

Moldova

Russia

Tajikistan

Kyrgyzstan

Romania

Belarus

Not Specified

Turkey

Germany

Others

Total

680

757

195

202

325

331

1 175

580

187

118

99

42

62

48

12

9

158

2 490

919

713

346

288

268

530

1 715

649

149

99

90

77

45

32

29

17

162

3 064

35

-5.8

77

43

-18

60

46

12

-20

-16

-9.1

83

-27

-33

142

89

2.5

23

30

23

11

9.4

8.7

17

56

21

4.9

3.2

2.9

2.5

1.5

1.0

0.9

0.6

5.3

37 of 42

Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Annex Table 3. Facilitators

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring Member States, place of detection and top

ten nationalities 

2010

2011

% change 
on prev. year

per cent of total

Place of Detection

Land

Air

Sea

Top Ten Nationalities

Ukraine

Lithuania

Russia

Romania

Moldova

Poland

Turkey

Vietnam

Belarus

Malaysia

Others

Total

248

13

3

92

10

24

54

29

16

1

1

4

0

33

264

160

6

0

53

20

17

14

13

10

6

5

3

2

23

166

-35

-54

n.a.

-42

100

-29

-74

-55

-38

500

400

-25

n.a.

-30

-37

96

3.6

32

12

10

8.4

7.8

6.0

3.6

3.0

1.8

1.2

14

38 of 42

Annex Table 4. Applications for asylum

Detections reported top ten nationalities 

Top Ten Nationalities

2010

2011

% change 
on prev. year

per cent of total

Russia

Somalia

Afghanistan

Georgia

Eritrea

Iraq

Algeria

Serbia

Iran

Syria

Others

Total

Note:

6 019

2 127

2 478

1 622

1 728

1 216

248

1 309

710

229

7 192

24 878

5 076

2 776

2 421

2 363

1 266

1 116

719

709

578

523

6 642

24 189

-16

31

-2.3

46

-27

-8.2

190

-46

-19

128

-7.6

-2.8

21

11

10

9.8

5,2

4.6

3

2.9

2.4

2.2

27

Applications for asylum from EU Member States include all applications received in the territory of the countries, not 
limited to those made at the eastern borders.

39 of 42

Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Annex Table 5. Illegal stay

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities 

2010

2011

% change 
on prev. year

per cent of total

Place of Detection

Land

Air

Between BCP

Inland

Sea

Top Ten Nationalities

Ukraine

Russia

Georgia

Moldova

Uzbekistan

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Lithuania

Turkey

Others

Total

18 238

12 387

1 055

102

477

4 230

5 318

6 110

3 556

1 279

1 312

1 371

948

814

711

 6 610

32 259

20 448

11 810

878

613

565

6 114

5 842

4 977

2 539

1 587

1 480

1 388

1 232

894

777

7 484

34 314

12

-4.7

-17

501

18

45

9.9

-19

-29

24

13

1.2

30

9.8

9.3

13

6.4

60

34

2.6

1.8

1.6

18

17

15

7.4

4.6

4.3

4.0

3.6

2.6

2.3

22

40 of 42

Annex Table 6. Refusals of entry

Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities 

Border Type

Land

Sea

Air

Not specified

Top Ten Nationalities

Ukraine

Russia

Belarus

Moldova

Georgia

Lithuania

Uzbekistan

Poland

Armenia

Kyrgyzstan

Others

Total

2010

2011

% change 
on prev. year

per cent of total

65 417

3 297

 2 840

 9

18 823

7 652

5 736

 9 202

4 668

2 472

6 272

 810

1 667

 1 542

12 719

71 563

52 813

3 140

 2 657

 0

16 303

7 506

 5 947

 5 387

 4 178

 3 942

 1 903

 1 050

 1 014

 921

 10 432

58 610

-19

-4.8

-6.4

n.a.

-13

-1.9

3.7

-41

-10

59

-69

30

-39

-40

-18

-18

90

5.4

4.5

8,6

28

13

10

9.2

7.1

6.7

3.3

1.8

1.7

1.6

18

41 of 42

Frontex  ·  Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012

Annex Table 7. Persons using false documents

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring Member States, border type and top ten nationalities

2010

2011

% change 
on prev. year

per cent of total

Border Type

Land

Air

Sea

Top Ten Nationalities

Ukraine

Congo (Democratic Republic)

Belarus

Moldova

Cameroon

Georgia

Russia

Turkey

Congo

Armenia

Others

Total

1 351

167

 20

1 092

2

47

130

5

30

77

21

4

11

 119

1 538

1 314

140

 8

 757

 159

 124

 71

 43

 43

41

24

19

17

164

1 462

-2.7

16

-60

-31

7 850

164

-45

760

43

-4.7

14

375

55

38

-4.9

90

9.6

0.5

52

11

8.5

4.9

2.9

2.9

2.8

1.6

1.3

1.2

11

42 of 42

European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union

For Public Release

Risk Analysis Unit

Reference number: 10367 

Warsaw, July 2012

Rondo ONZ 1 
00-124 Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 205 95 00 
F +48 22 205 95 01

frontex@frontex.europa.eu 
www.frontex.europa.eu

ISBN 978-92-9471-018-5     doi:10.2819/935157 

TT-02-17-959-EN-N