FRAN Quarterly. Issue 2, April–June 2012.
Date: 2012-02-10
Institutions: Frontex
Subjects: EU migration policy, European security, Frontex, border control, external border of the EU, human rights, illegal migration, illicit trade, serial publication, trafficking in human beings

FRAN Quarterly

Issue 2  •  April–June 2012

Q1
Q2
Q3 Q4

FRAN Quarterly

Issue 2  •  April–June 2012

1 of 70

Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations 
and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. FRAN Quarterlies and other risk 
analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with 
a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis 
processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a 
symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth 
and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal 
point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and 
shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to 
form a reliable basis for its operational activities.

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation  
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

Rondo ONZ 1 
00-124 Warsaw, Poland
T +48 22 205 95 00 
F +48 22 205 95 01 
frontex@frontex.europa.eu 
www.frontex.europa.eu

Warsaw, October 2012 
Risk Analysis Unit 
Frontex reference number: 16022

DISCLAIMERS
This is a Frontex staff working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the 
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of 
any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers 
or boundaries.
All maps included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is 
prohibited. Frontex disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and desig-
nations used on the maps.
The  contents  of  open-source  boxes  are  unverified  and  presented  only  to  give  context  and 
media representation of irregular-migration phenomena.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The FRAN Quarterly has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course 
of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their 
assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

2 of 70

Table of contents

Executive summary  #5

1.  Introduction  #8

2.  Methodology  #9

3.  Summary of FRAN indicators  #10

4.  Situational picture in Q2 2012  #12

4.1.  Detections of illegal border-crossing  #13
4.2.  Routes  #17
4.3.  Clandestine entry (1B)  #33
4.4.  Detections of facilitators  #34
4.5.  Detections of illegal stay  #36
4.6.  Refusals of entry  #37
4.7.  Asylum claims  #40
4.8.  Document fraud  #40
4.9.  Returns  #44
4.10. Other illegal activities at the border  #46

5.  Statistical annex  #59

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List of abbreviations used

BCP    
BCU   
CeCLAD-M  
CIESTCA  
COD, DRC   
COG   
EC  
EDF 
EDF-ARA 
EDF-RAN 
EMSA 
EPN 
EU  
EUR    
FRAN  
fYROM   
ID  
IOM   
JO  
MS 
RAU   
SIS  
TRA   
TRACECA 
UEFA Euro   
UK  
UNHCR   
US  
USD   
VIS 
WB 
WB-ARA 
WB-RAN 

 border-crossing point
 border control unit
 Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Anti-Drogue en Méditerranée
 International Centre for Tourism Studies of the Canary Islands
 Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-Kinshasa)
 Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville)
 European Commission
 European Union Document-Fraud
 European Union Document-Fraud Annual Risk Analysis
 European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
 European Maritime Safety Agency
 European Patrol Network
 European Union 
 euro
 Frontex Risk Analysis Network 
 former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
 identity document
 International Organization for Migration
 Joint Operation
 Member State
 Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
 Schengen Information System
 Tailored Risk Analysis
 Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia
 European Football Championship of the Union of European Football Associations
 United Kingdom
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
 United States of America
 United States dollar
 Visa Information System
 Western Balkans
 Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis
 Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network

4 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive summary

Taken as a whole, in Q2 2012, detections of il-
legal border-crossing were reduced by nearly 
half compared to the same quarter in 2011 due 
to the simultaneous effects of the winding 
down of the Arab Spring and fewer Albanian 
circular migrants entering Greece. However, 
detections at the undisputed long-term hot-
spot for irregular migration – the Greek land 
border with Turkey – were some 25% higher 
than during the same period in 2011 due to 
increased detections of migrants from Bang-
ladesh and particularly Syria.

Based on detections of illegal border-crossing 
and on refusals of entry, irregular migration 
pressure at the external border of the EU in-
creased seasonally during the second quar-
ter of 2012. Indeed, the seasonal increase of 
more  than  two-thirds  in  detections  of  ille-
gal border-crossing was the most significant 
change in any indicator at the EU level. Other 
indicators exchanged by the FRAN commu-
nity, such as detections of facilitators and il-
legal  stayers,  applications  for  international 
protection and effective returns, suggested 
stable  or  declining  trends  compared  to  re-
cent reporting periods. 

Consistent  with  the  majority  of  reporting 
periods either side of the Arab Spring, at the 
EU  level  the  migrants  most  commonly  de-
tected illegally crossing the external border 
were from Afghanistan with 20% of the to-
tal and a steady trend compared to the year 
before. Of all detected Afghans, the majority 
were detected at the land border between 
Greece and Turkey, and are believed to have 
been previously resident in Iran, where per-
missions to stay have been increasingly re-
voked. At the EU level, Afghans were also the 
nationality that (1) submitted the most appli-
cations for international protection, mostly 

in  Germany  and  also  with  a  steady  trend; 
(2)  were  most  often  detected  during  clan-
destine entry, mainly into Hungary; (3) were 
most frequently detected as illegal stayers, 
primarily  at  their  point  of  entry  –  Greece; 
and  (4)  were  subject  to  the  most  decisions 
to leave – chiefly in Greece.

In contrast to the steady trends reported for 
the most commonly detected nationality, de-
tections of all other top-six nationalities of 
illegal  border  crossers  increased  compared 
to  a  year  before.  These  included:  migrants 
from Bangladesh (+35%), who departed from 
countries around the Persian Gulf where they 
had been working legally in the construction 
business; migrants from Syria (+639%), who 
do not require visas to enter Turkey and so 
only needed facilitation from Istanbul in order 
to reach Greece; and migrants from Somalia 
(+62%) who were mostly detected arriving at 
the blue border of Malta on boats from Libya. 

Without question in Q2 2012, the most sig-
nificant  development  in  terms  of  irregular 
migration  to  the  EU  was  increased  detec-
tions of migrants from Syria where the secu-
rity situation has progressively deteriorated 
since  the  failure  of  Kofi  Annan’s  ‘six  point’ 
plan proposed in late March 2012. For exam-
ple,  in  Q2  2012  Syrians  showed  the  highest 
rate of increase in detections of illegal bor-
der-crossing, and they were increasingly de-
tected as illegal stayers, in both cases these 
indicators were almost exclusively reported 
by Greece. Furthermore, following recent in-
creases Syrians were ranked second among 
applicants for international protection, mostly 
in  Sweden  and  Germany,  where  it  was  re-
cently declared that Syrian nationals claiming 
for asylum would be automatically granted 
refugee status. Elsewhere, most EU Member 

5 of 70

States  have  refrained  from  forcibly  repatri-
ating Syrians back to their country. 

Subsequent to the current reporting period 
a male migrant claiming to be a Syrian na-
tional  stated  that  he  arrived  in  Greece  just 
24 hours after leaving Syria by using an in-
ternal  flight  in  Turkey  among  his  modes  of 
transport, showing how little time could pass 
between events in Syria and arrivals in Eu-
rope. The situation in Syria is likely to remain 
volatile for the foreseeable future. Currently, 
there  are  no  plans  for  multilateral  military 
intervention with sufficient support among 
the  international  community.  In  terms  of 
secondary movements from Greece, Syrians 
were also detected on exit from Greece and 
on entry to German, Belgian and Dutch air-
ports using counterfeit EU residence permits 
and forged Greek and Bulgarian travel doc-
uments. Consistent with other nationalities 
entering via Greece, Syrians were also increas-
ingly detected in the Western Balkans espe-
cially at the Croatia-Serbia border.

Other nationalities were also detected mak-
ing secondary movements from Greece. For 
example, Afghans were the most commonly 
detected nationality in the Western Balkans 
most  of  whom  are  assumed  to  have  origi-
nally entered the EU in Greece. At the Roma-
nian border with Serbia detections increased 
more  than  five-fold  since  the  same  period 
last  year,  mainly  of  Algerians  and  Moroc-
cans also making secondary movements from 
Greece. Many more migrants were detected 
attempting clandestine entry having crossed 
the Western Balkans, which suggests that this 
is becoming the modus operandi of choice for 
over-land  secondary  movements.  As  men-
tioned in previous FRAN quarterlies, the de-
tections in the Greek-Turkish land border also 
have a direct impact on detections in the Io-
nian Sea. In 2011, it was estimated that more 
than 15% of migrants reported at the Greek-
Turkish land border were detected soon af-
ter in Apulia and Calabria.

At the EU level, the second most affected bor-
der section after the Greek-Turkish border was 
the Greek-Albanian border. Albanian circular 
migrants were detected crossing the border 
illegally  and,  increasingly,  using  counterfeit 
border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel his-
tories and extend periods of stay. The sharp 
increase in detections of this modus operandi 
by Greece rendered Albanians the national-
ity  most  commonly  detected  with  fraudu-
lent  documents  at  the  external  EU  border. 
Other important trends in document abuse 
to enter from a third country included Paki-
stanis  mostly  detected  in  Greece,  followed 
by migrants from Morocco mostly detected 
in  Spain,  and  Nigerians  mostly  detected  in 
France. Overall there was an increase in the 
use of forged passports (British followed by 
French) and visa fraud continued to decline, 
possibly in anticipation of the Visa Informa-
tion System.

In the Central Mediterranean, where detec-
tions peaked in 2011 during the Arab Spring, 
migrants from Somalia were increasingly de-
tected in Malta. Specifically, in May 2012 the 
arrival of Somali migrants in Malta increased 
significantly while Italy registered a decrease 
in  the  number  of  Somali  migrants  appre-
hended in Sicily and the Pelagic Islands. The 
detected Somalis were mainly young males 
many of whom had been imprisoned by police 
or military forces during their travels through 
Libya.  Taking  into  account  the  professional 
planning of the trips, it is assumed that the 
modus operandi has changed and that Malta 
is now targeted on purpose, thereby replac-
ing Italy as the preferred destination country 
for this nationality. The reason for this change 
has not yet been confirmed; however, in the 
past Malta resettled some Somali migrants 
in the United States and in some EU Member 
States, which might be acting as a pull fac-
tor. Also, there is some evidence that facili-
tation networks located in Malta have tried 
to forward migrants to Sicily. 

6 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Elsewhere, the external borders were affected 
by migrants both from far afield as well as mi-
grants from neighbouring regions. For exam-
ple, the Western Balkans route was affected 
by secondary movements of migrants from 
Algeria and Afghanistan and also by local mi-
grants from Serbia; the Eastern land borders 
were increasingly affected by long-distance 
migrants from Afghanistan and Somalia but 
also  local  migrants  from  Moldova  and  in-
creasingly from Georgia. 

The Western Mediterranean route was ap-
parently dominated by local migrants from 
Morocco  and  Algeria  but  with  large  num-
bers of unknown nationalities it is assumed 
that local migrants were also accompanied 
by  long-distance  migrants  probably  from 
sub-Saharan Africa. In this region there was 
a  new  modus  operandi  involving  facilitators 
dropping  off  migrants  in  the  Chafarinas  Is-
lands, a Spanish archipelago 2 nautical miles 
away from the Moroccan coastline.

The sharpest increase in refusals of entry was 
for  Georgian  nationals  at  the  Polish  border 

with Belarus (+236 % increase compared to 
Q1 2012 and a +162% increase compared to the 
same quarter a year ago). In a similar pattern 
observed in 2009, this increase corresponds 
to an increase in asylum applications of Geor-
gian nationals in Poland. This phenomenon 
is  likely  to  lead  to  an  increase  in  Georgians 
staying  illegally  in  other  Member  States,  in 
particular  Sweden  and  Germany.  The  East-
ern Borders also continued to be the region 
most affected by cross-border crime. For ex-
ample, smuggling of cigarettes, petrol, drugs 
and other excise goods constitute the main 
challenges to effective border management 
at this section of the border. The exit of ve-
hicles stolen within the European Union en 
route to destinations in the Russian Federa-
tion, Ukraine and Central Asia is also a major 
concern. In early July 2012, authorities in Slo-
vakia also discovered a 700-metre-long tun-
nel leading from the western Ukrainian city 
of Uzhorod into Slovak territory used for the 
smuggling  of  cigarettes.  The  tunnel  was  a 
sophisticated construction and contained a 
rudimentary railway line for swift transpor-
tation under the border. 

7 of 70

1.  Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the 
Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) and provide 
a regular overview of irregular migration at 
the EU external borders, based on the irreg-
ular-migration data exchanged among Mem-
ber State border-control authorities within 
the  cooperative  framework  of  the  Frontex 
Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its sub-
sidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud 
Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies 
is to provide:
1. 

 feedback to the FRAN community in the 
context of information exchange;

2.   a  periodic  update  to  the  situational  pic-
ture of irregular migration at the EU level; 
and

3.   material for constructive discussion on re-
porting protocols and related trends and 
patterns.

The  report  is  intended  to  simultaneously 
serve  two  objectives:  first  –  to  provide  a 
clear summary of the situation at the exter-
nal border of the EU and second – to serve 
as an archive for future reference and com-
parative analyses. Consistent with standard 
archival techniques, some information is re-
peated among sections to serve as context.

8 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 20122. Methodology

The present 16th issue of the FRAN Quarterly 
is a comparative analysis of FRAN data col-
lected between April and June 2012, based on 
data and information provided by 30 Member 
State  border-control  authorities  within  the 
framework of the FRAN. The report presents 
results of statistical analysis of quarterly var-
iations in eight irregular-migration indicators 
and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the 
level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical re-
ports were also used for interpretative pur-
poses and to provide qualitative information, 
as were other available sources of information 
such as Frontex Joint Operations.

External borders refer to the borders between 
Member States and third countries. The bor-
ders between the Schengen Associated Coun-
tries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and 
third countries are also considered as external 
borders. The borders between the Schengen 
Associated Countries and Schengen Member 
States are considered as internal borders. For 
the indicators on detections of facilitators, ille-
gal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported 
for detections at the land borders between the 
Schengen Member States and Schengen can-
didates (Bulgaria, Romania) or non-Schengen 
Member States (the UK, Ireland), so that a total 
for EU Member States and the Schengen Asso-
ciated Countries as a whole can be presented. 
It was not possible to make this distinction for 
air and sea borders because Member States do 
not habitually differentiate between extra-EU 
and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend 
to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-
country nationalities, a large percentage usually 
falls under the category ‘Other (not specified)’ 
or ‘Unknown’. It is expected that the percent-
age reported under these categories will de-
crease with time as Member States improve 
the quality and speed of their identification, 

Monthly  data  on  the  following  indicators  were  exchanged 
among the FRAN community:
1A  detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs
1B  detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
2   detections of suspected facilitators
3  detections of illegal stay
4   refusals of entry
5   asylum applications
6   document fraud (EDF)
7A return decisions for illegally staying third-country nationals
7B  effective returns of illegally staying third-country 

nationals

FRAN data used in the tables and charts are as of 6 August 2012

data collection and reporting practices; na-
tionalities  are  often  reported  as  ‘Unknown’ 
if an individual’s nationality cannot be estab-
lished before reports are submitted.

This issue of the FRAN Quarterly also includes 
main  findings  of  Frontex-coordinated  Joint 
Operations active in Q2 2012. Namely, for sea 
borders they were JO Indalo 2012, JO Posei-
don  Sea  2012,  JO  Focal  Points  Sea  2012;  for 
land  borders  –  JO  Eurocup  2012  (combined 
land and air), JO Poseidon Land 2012, JO Focal 
Points 2012 Land, JO Neptune 2012; and for the 
air border – JO Focal Points Air 2012, Pilot Pro-
ject Flexi Force 2012.

Both primary data sources, such as interviews 
with irregular migrants, and secondary data 
sources, such as reports of intelligence ana-
lysts,  daily  reports  of  deployed  officers  and 
analytical products (weekly and bi-weekly an-
alytical reports for each abovementioned op-
eration), were used to provide an exhaustive 
overview of the situation at the external bor-
ders of the EU. Additionally, open source data 
were researched as background information 
for the present analysis.

9 of 70

3. Summary of FRAN indicators

Table 1:  Summary of FRAN indicators

Detections or cases as reported by Member States

2011

2012

2012 Q2

FRAN indicator

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

% change on

prev. year prev. qtr

1A Illegal entries between BCPs

32 923

41 273

38 530

28 325

13 635

23 092

1B Clandestine entries at BCPs

2

3

4

5

Facilitators

Illegal stay

Refusals of entry

Applications for asylum

7A Return decisions issued

7B Effective returns

 74

1 856

82 327

28 699

53 193

50 970

34 745

 60

1 941

86 750

30 076

61 574

55 716

35 076

 64

1 546

88 037

30 325

67 413

57 389

37 639

 84

1 614

93 834

29 011

71 874

67 310

41 585

103

2 107

88 455

24 635

56 854

69 904

40 229

126

1 785 

84 076

28 244

57 989

67 891

40 299

-44

110

-8.0

-3.1

-6.1

-5.8

22

15

69

22

-15

-5.0

15

2.0

-2.9

0.2

Source: FRAN data as of 6 August 2012

10 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Figure 1.  Evolution of FRAN indicators

Detections or cases, as reported by Member States, in thousands

Line sections in lighter blue mark changes between first and second quarters

1A   Illegal entries between BCPs

2   Facilitators

45 

35 

25 

15 

5 

0 

120 

110 

100 

90 

80 

70 
0 

75 

70 

65 

60 

55 

50 

45 

40 

3.5 

3.0 

2.5 

2.0 

1.5 

1.0 

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

3   Illegal stay

4   Refusals of entry

36 

34 

32 

30 

28 

26 

24 

22 

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

5   Applications for asylum

7B  Effective returns

44 

42 

40 

38 

36 

34 

32 

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

Source: FRAN data

11 of 70

4. Situational picture in Q2 2012

n   Afghans  also  submitted  the  most  appli-
cations for international protection, were 
most  often  detected  during  clandestine 
entry, were most frequently detected as 
illegal  stayers,  and  were  subject  to  the 
most decisions to leave

n   All other top six nationalities of migrants 
were  detected  in  much  higher  numbers 
than the year before; these included mi-
grants  from  Bangladesh  (+35%),  Syria 
(+639%),  Algeria  (+88%),  Albania  (+55%) 
and  Somalia  (+62%),  all  of  whom  were 
mostly detected in Greece

n   Following recent and previously reported 
increases, the second most-commonly de-
tected nationality of migrant detected at 
a single border section was Bangladeshis 
detected  at  the  Greek  land  border  with 
Turkey

n   The second most affected border section 
was between Greece and Albania, which 
was  still  a  significant  location  for  illegal 
border-crossings,  albeit  of  mostly  Alba-
nian circular migrants

n   Overall, in Q2 2012 there were 23 092 de-
tections of illegal border-crossing at the 
EU-level, which is a considerable seasonal 
increase compared to the previous quarter

n   Detections  of  illegal  border-crossing  in 
Q2 2012 were lower than in any other sec-
ond quarter since FRAN reporting began,  
probably due to the overlapping effects of 
the end of the Arab Spring and far fewer 
detections of circular Albanian migrants 
in Greece

n   In contrast to the EU decrease in detec-
tions of illegal border-crossings, in Greece, 
where two-thirds of all detections at the 
EU-level were reported, there was a 29% 
increase compared to the year before

n   Without  question  the  most  significant 
development was increased detection of 
migrants  from  Syria  including  the  high-
est rate of increase in detections of illegal 
border-crossing  and  increasing  detec-
tions as illegal stayers. Syrians were also 
ranked second among applicants for in-
ternational protection, mostly in Sweden 
and Germany 

n   In Q2 2012 the majority of detections (56%) 
were restricted to a single border section 
–  the  land  border  between  Greece  and 
Turkey,  where  detections  were  actually 
25% higher compared to the same period 
in 2011 

n   Consistent with most previous reporting 
periods,  in  Q2  2012  the  most  commonly 
detected  nationality  at  a  single  border 
section  was  Afghan  migrants  detected 
at the Greek land border with Turkey

12 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 20124.1. Detections of illegal 
border-crossing

Overall, in Q2 2012 there were 23 092 detec-
tions of illegal border-crossing at the EU level, 
which is a considerable if somewhat expected 
seasonal increase compared to the previous 
quarter,  and  a  44%  decrease  compared  to 
the same period in 2011 amidst the influx of 
migrants  during  the  Arab  Spring.  Taken  as 
a whole, detections of illegal border-cross-
ing in Q2 2012 were lower than in any other 
second quarter since FRAN reporting began. 
Most probably, the low number of detections 
was  due  to  the  overlapping  effects  of  the 
end of the Arab Spring in its initial countries 
(Egypt,  Libya,  Tunisia)  and  far  fewer  detec-
tions of circular Albanian migrants in Greece. 
The vast majority of detections were at the 
EU external land border (77%).

While  useful  for  summary  purposes,  these 
EU-level figures conceal considerable varia-
tion within and among Member States, na-
tionalities and the major irregular migration 
routes. For example, in Q2 2012 the majority 
of detections (57%) were restricted to a sin-
gle border section – the land border between 
Greece  and  Turkey,  where  detections  were 

actually  25%  higher  compared  to  the  same 
period in 2011 following increased detections 
of Bangladeshis, Algerians and Syrians.

The  second  most  affected  border  section 
was between Greece and Albania, which was 
still a significant location for illegal border-
crossings, albeit of mostly Albanian circular 
migrants.  Ranked  third  among  border  sec-
tions in Q2 2012 was the blue border of Sic-
ily,  where  Tunisians,  Egyptians  and  Somalis 
were increasingly detected. The border sec-
tion that reported the most notable increases 
compared to the year before was the Roma-
nian border with Serbia, where detections in-
creased more than five-fold, mainly involving 
Algerians and Moroccans making secondary 
movements  after  having  originally  entered 
the Schengen area in Greece.

Consistent with the majority of reporting pe-
riods both before and after the Arab Spring, 
at the EU level the most commonly detected 
migrants were from Afghanistan, with little 
change in the number of detections compared 
to the year before. In contrast, all other top 
six nationalities of migrants were detected in 
much higher numbers than the year before; 
these  included  migrants  from  Bangladesh 

Figure 2.   In Q2 2012 detections of illegal border-crossing were lower than in any previous 

second quarter

Total quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, split between detections at the land and sea borders

60 000  

50 000  

40 000  

30 000  

20 000  

10 000  

 0  

Land 

Sea 

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3 

Q4 

Q1  Q2 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

Source: FRAN data

13 of 70

Figure 3.   Despite increased detections in 

most Member States, there was an overall 

decrease at the EU level, driven by far fewer 

detections in Italy

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q2 2011 
and 2012 for nine Member States shown by circle size; 
gradient of lines indicates percentage change

Romania 

Lithuania 

Poland 

Slovakia 

Greece 

Malta 

Spain 

Slovenia 

Italy 

2011 Q2

2012 Q2

Source: FRAN data

(+35%),  Syria  (+639%),  Algeria  (+88%),  Alba-
nia (+55%) and Somalia (+62%), all of whom 
were mostly detected in Greece.

14 of 70

Figure  2  shows  the  evolution  of  the  FRAN 
Indicator  1A  –  detections  of  illegal  border-
crossing,  and  the  proportion  of  detections 
between the land and sea borders of the EU 
per quarter since the beginning of 2008. The 
second quarter of each year is usually asso-
ciated  with  improving  weather  conditions 
more  favourable  for  approaching  and  ille-
gally crossing the external border of the EU. 
Moreover, conditions that are more favour-
able for illegal border-crossing are also more 
favourable for detection. The combination of 
these two effects tends to produce the high-
est number of detections during the second 
quarter of each year.

The 23 092 detections of illegal border-cross-
ing in Q2 2012 were the result of combined de-
tections in 15 Member States, many of which 
experienced  differing  trends.  Figure  3  illus-
trates the number of detections of illegal bor-
der-crossing among Member States during the 
second  quarters  of  both  2011  and  2012  (size 
of circles), and also the degree of change be-
tween the two reporting periods (slopes). In 
Q2 2012 twelve Member States experienced 
increased detections of illegal border-cross-
ing  compared  to  the  same  period  last  year 
but many from relatively low bases. In con-
trast, just three Member States reported re-
ductions  but  this  group  of  Member  States 
included Italy, where the absolute reduction 
was the largest change overall.

Figure  4  shows  detections  of  illegal  bor-
der-crossing  in  Q2  2012  distributed  among 
Member States. Greece was the only country 
placed in the highest category (darkest col-
ouring) as two thirds of all detections were 
reported by Greece. Despite a reduction com-
pared  to  the  year  before  during  the  Arab 
Spring,  in  Q2  2012  Italy  still  ranked  second 
among  Member  States  followed  by  Spain 
with a steady trend and Malta with a signif-
icant increase. Following increases in Hun-
gary and particularly Romania and Bulgaria, 
these Member States were assigned to the 

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Detections of illegal border-crossing
in Q2 2012

highest

lowest

Sources: Frontex Risk Analysis Unit – FRAN data, ESRI geodata

Figure 4.   In Q2 2012, all but three Member States reported increased detections of illegal border-crossing compared to 

the same period in 2011

third category in Figure 4. According to this 
interpretation all other Member States were 
in the lowest category of detections of illegal 
border-crossing in Q2 2012, despite a suite of 
considerable increases among these Mem-
ber States.

As  well  as  looking  at  the  variation  among 
Member States, it is informative to illustrate 
the same data by nationality of migrants. Fig-
ure 5 illustrates the number of detections of il-
legal border-crossing among top nationalities 
during the second quarters of both 2011 and 

15 of 70

Figure 5.   A steady trend of detections of migrants from Afghanistan 

contrasts with mixed trends of migrants from different regions, with 

increased detections of migrants from Syria representing the most 

significant increase during the reporting period

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q2 2011 and 2012 for the top ten nationalities 
shown by circle size; gradient of lines indicates percentage change

Syria 

Algeria 

Somalia 

Albania 

Bangladesh 

Afghanistan 

Pakistan 

Tunisia 

Nigeria 

Ghana 

2011 Q2

Source: FRAN data

2012 Q2

16 of 70

2012 (size of circles) and the degree of change 
between these reporting periods (slopes). With 
20%  of  total  detections  and  a  steady  trend 
compared to the same period in 2011, in Q2 2012 
the most commonly detected migrants at the 
EU-level  were  from  Afghanistan  (Fig.  5).  Of 
these Afghan migrants, four-fifths were de-
tected at the land border between Greece and 
Turkey. Although a high proportion, this rep-
resents a reduction compared to the end of 
2011 when 90% of all Afghans were detected 
at the land border between Greece and Tur-
key.  This  slightly  more  dispersed  detection 
profile was due to increased detections of Af-
ghan migrants at the Hungarian and Roma-
nian land borders with Serbia and the Polish 
land border with Belarus in Q2 2012.

Without question, during the second quarter 
of 2012 the migrants that were detected with 
the  most  increasing  frequency  were  those 
from  Bangladesh  (+35%),  Somalia  (+62%), 
Algeria  (+88%)  and  Syria  (+639%)  (Fig.  5). 
In fact, more migrants from Syria were de-
tected than ever before (2 024). Detections of 
most of these nationalities were concentrated 
at the Greek land border with Turkey, with 
the exception of Somalis, who were mostly 
detected in Malta. Indeed, Somalis were par-
ticularly notable in that their detections were 
distributed  across  a  very  wide  range  of  lo-
cations; as well as Malta and the Greek land 
border with Turkey, they were also detected 
in Sicily, Lampedusa and the Slovakian land 
border with the Ukraine.

Following recent and previously reported in-
creases, the second most-commonly detected 
nationality of migrants detected at a single 
border  section  were  Bangladeshi  migrants 
detected at the Greek land border with Tur-
key, but the largest and most significant in-
crease  was  in  detections  of  migrants  from 
Syria at the same location. Neither of these 
two nationalities were detected crossing il-
legally  other  border  sections  in  any  signif-
icant  numbers.  In  contrast,  migrants  from 

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Algeria were not only increasingly detected 
at the Greek land borer with Turkey, but also 
in  the  Spanish  maritime  region  of  Almeria 
and at the Romanian land border with Ser-
bia. The latter case is assumed to represent 
secondary movements through the Western 
Balkans region.

As  illustrated  in  Figure  6,  the  Eastern  and 
Central Mediterranean routes reported the 
most detections of illegal border-crossing in 
the second quarter of 2012, and were char-
acterised with seasonal increases consistent 
with previous years, aside the Central Med-
iterranean region during the Arab Spring.

4.2. Routes

In 2011, detections of illegal border-crossing 
on the Central Mediterranean route peaked 
briefly during the period of turbulent socio-
political developments in North Africa, known 
as the Arab Spring. In contrast, on the East-
ern  Mediterranean  route,  detections  have 
followed a remarkably seasonal pattern over 
the last two years. Throughout 2011 detec-
tions in the Western Mediterranean (land and 
sea borders with Spain) steadily increased.

In Q2 2012, there were 14 125 detections of il-
legal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediter-
ranean route, an increase of 27% compared 
to the same period in 2011 (Fig. 6) rendering 
this region the undisputed hotspot for ille-
gal entries to the EU during the current re-
porting period. Elsewhere, detections in the 
Central Mediterranean showed a seasonal in-
crease but were much reduced (-86%) com-
pared  with  the  dramatic  peak  during  the 
same  period  in  2011.  Indeed,  in  the  second 
quarter of 2012 detections in this region re-
sembled the pre-Arab Spring levels reported 

Figure 6.   The second quarter of 2012 was characterised by seasonal increases on most major 

irregular migration routes

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main irregular migration routes

Eastern Mediterranean route

Central Mediterranean route

Western Mediterranean route

30 000  

27 000  

24 000  

21 000  

18 000  

15 000  

12 000  

9 000  

6 000  

3 000  

 0  

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 

Q1 

Q2 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

Source: FRAN data

17 of 70

during the summer of 2010. Detections in the 
Western Mediterranean were almost equally 
comparable to Q2 2011, whereas detections 
increased to a large degree, yet from lower 
bases, on the Eastern Borders route (+103%), 
Western Balkans route (+50%) and Western 
African route (+29%).

These routes not only differed in their mag-
nitudes over time but also in the composi-
tion of detected nationalities. Consistent with 
previous periods, detections on the Eastern 
Mediterranean route were dominated by mi-
grants from Afghanistan, and more recently 
Bangladesh,  Algeria  and  Syria.  The  Central 
Mediterranean was recently affected by in-
creased detections of Somalis, and a steady 
trend of Tunisians and Egyptians.

The  Western  Balkans  and  Eastern  Borders 
routes were affected both by migrants from 
far  afield  (that  in  many  cases  would  have 
originally  entered  the  Schengen  area  and 
been detected in Greece) as well as migrants 
from neighbouring regions. For example, the 
Western Balkans route was affected by sec-
ondary movements of migrants from Algeria 
and Afghanistan and also by local migrants 
from Serbia; the Eastern land borders were 
increasingly  affected  by  long-distance  mi-
grants  from  Afghanistan  and  Somalia  but 
also  local  migrants  from  Moldova  and  in-
creasingly from Georgia; the Western Med-
iterranean route was apparently dominated 
by local migrants from Morocco and Algeria 
but with large numbers of unknown nation-
alities it is assumed that local migrants are 
also accompanied by other long-distance mi-
grants probably from sub-Saharan Africa. The 
exception was the much less used Western 
African route, which was exclusively affected 
by local migrants from Morocco.

4.2.1. Eastern Mediterranean route

Since  data  collection  began  in  early  2008, 
the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained 

its status as a major hotspot of irregular mi-
gration. Detections have followed a remarka-
bly seasonal pattern invariably peaking in the 
third quarter of each year and concentrated 
at  the  border  between  Greece  and  Turkey, 
with a shift from the sea border to the land 
border visible in late 2009 (Fig. 7). Unusually, 
at the end of 2011 detections of illegal bor-
der-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean 
route remained almost constant between the 
third and final quarters of the year, resulting 
in the first recorded example of a sustained 
peak of detections at that time of year. This 
was due to an unexpected increase in detec-
tions at the Greek land border with Turkey, 
particularly in October.

According to the FRAN data, during the sec-
ond quarter of 2012 pressure on this route was 
increased by 27% compared to the same pe-
riod in 2011, mostly due to more detections 
of  Bangladeshis,  Syrians  and  Algerians,  off-
set against fewer detections of Pakistanis.

Figure 8 overleaf illustrates a selection of third 
countries coloured with respect to the num-
ber  of  nationals  detected  at  the  Greek  and 
Bulgarian land borders with Turkey in Q2 2012 
under JO Poseidon Land. The countries with 
the most detections are marked with darker 
shading, while those with fewer detections are 
indicated by lighter shades. The map clearly 
shows the very wide geographic range of third 
countries whose citizens were detected ille-
gally crossing the EU border from Turkey. This 
range of nationalities may be particularly wide 
because  this  region  has  long  been  an  entry 
point to the EU and so has gained broad ap-
peal over time, both in terms of attractiveness 
for migrants and facilitation infrastructure in 
place. According to operational data, the most 
commonly detected migrants were from Af-
ghanistan and Bangladesh with 31% and 20% 
of the total detections during the operation, 
respectively.  However,  consistent  with  the 
FRAN data, the most significant increase was 
in numbers of detected migrants from Syria.

18 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Figure 7.   In the Eastern Mediterranean region, the second quarter of 2012 was characterised 

by a seasonal increase in detections of illegal border-crossing

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs and at the Greek land and sea borders with Turkey

Land
Sea
Total

24 000  

21 000  

18 000  

15 000  

12 000  

9 000  

6 000  

3 000  

 0  

Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 

Q1 

Q2 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

Source: FRAN data

During  both  JO  Poseidon  2011  Land  and  JO 
Poseidon  2012  Land  several  migrants  from 
Pakistan and Bangladesh claimed that they 
had been kidnapped and sometimes beaten 
by facilitators en route to Greece. Apparently, 
this was an attempt to extort money from the 
migrants’ relatives. For example, one Bang-
ladeshi male, who departed from Abu Dhabi, 
agreed to be facilitated to Iran for EUR 1 000, 
but once the migrant arrived in Iran and his 
father paid the amount via the Hawala sys-
tem*, the migrant was offered further facili-
tation to Greece for an additional EUR 2 000. 
He agreed, but in Istanbul he was detained 
in  a  safe  house  together  with  a  mixed-na-
tionality  group  of  ~70  other  migrants  who 
were told that they would not be permitted 
to leave the house until their relatives paid 
additional funds of around EUR 4 000. After 
a two-week ordeal the money was eventu-
ally transferred and the migrant was facili-
tated along the rest of the way to Greece.

ure 9 (page 22) illustrates monthly detections 
of the top six nationalities at the land border 
between Greece and Turkey according to the 
FRAN data. This graph clearly shows the sea-
sonal detection peak in 2011 of migrants from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the variation in 
the extent to which detections of each nation-
ality increased during the second quarter of 
2012. This seasonal increase was particularly 
apparent for migrants from Afghanistan and 
Bangladesh, which ranked first and second, re-
spectively, at this border section. Detections of 
migrants from Syria and Bangladesh increased 
the  most,  relative  to  the  detections  during 
the second half of 2011, and unusually, detec-
tions of migrants from Algeria peaked late in 
2011 and fluctuated throughout the first half 
of 2012. Detections of migrants from Pakistan, 
which reached a high point in the final quarter 
of 2011, have so far been much reduced in 2012.

Migrants from Afghanistan

In  an  attempt  to  compare  temporal  varia-
tion in detections of several nationalities, Fig-

Some reports state that in Iran there are cur-
rently 2–4 million displaced Afghan nation-

*  http://globalsecuritystudies.com/
Faith%20Hawala%20FINAL.pdf

19 of 70

Total number of detections of
 irregular migrants
Q2 2012

>1000

500 - 1000

250 - 499

50 - 249

< 49

JO Poseidon Land

Ukraine

Morocco
4%

Western
Sahara

Algeria
9%

Mauritania

Mali

Senegal

Gambia

Guinea

Burkina
Faso

Nigeria

Serbia

Tunisia

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Turkey

Lebanon

Palestine
2%

Libya

Egypt

Sudan

Tajikistan

Afghanistan
31%

Iran

Syria
15%

Iraq
4%

Jordan

Kuwait

Eritrea
2%

Pakistan
9%

Yemen

Somalia
4%

Ind

Sr
Lan

Sierra
Leone

Liberia

Cote
d'Ivoire

Ghana

Central African

Cameroon

Ethiopia

Togo

Gabon

Congo

Congo, 
DRC
Rwanda

Uganda

Tanzania

Angola

Kenya

Comoros

Central & South America

Dominican
Republic

Jamaica

Dominica

Ecuador

Colombia

Mongolia

China

n

Nepal

India

Bangladesh
20%

Laos

Myanmar

Vietnam

Sri Lanka

Frontex, August 2012 

The map of nationalities of irregular migrants apprehended along the Greek-Turkish 
and Bulgarian-Turkish border during Q2 2012.The percentage of total is shown for the top ten nationalities.

Source: Frontex Situation Centre – JO Poseidon Land, ESRI geodata

Figure 8.   In Q2 2012, the most commonly detected migrants during JO Poseidon Land were from Afghanistan and 

Bangladesh, followed by increasing numbers from Syria

20 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Afghan Refugees in Iran

At  a  recent  conference  in  Geneva,  the  international  community  en-
dorsed a ‘solutions strategy’ for millions of Afghan refugees and those 
returning to Afghanistan after years in exile. The plan, drawn up be-
tween Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and UNHCR, aims to support repa-
triation, sustainable reintegration and assistance to host countries.

It will benefit refugee returnees to Afghanistan as well as 3 million Af-
ghan  refugees,  including  1  million  in  Iran  and  1.7  million  in  Pakistan. 
Many of the refugees in Iran have been living there for more than three decades.

Young Afghan refugees play in a classroom in Mashhad, 
Iran

Source www.unhcr.org, 1 August 2012

a
r
a
h
e

i

l

.

.

a
S
H
M
/
R
C
H
N
U
©

als who have been residing there for several 
years.  However,  an  agreement  of  the  Ira-
nian  government  to  provide  Afghans  with 
documents to legalise their stay and provide 
permission to work has recently ceased, ren-
dering many Afghan nationals as illegal stay-
ers in Iran. Some of them work in the black 
market, but the Iranian government blocks 
their  children  access  to  education.  Hence, 
many  now-irregular  migrants  in  this  situ-
ation are coming to the EU for educational 
and family reasons. This problem has further 
been exacerbated by the fact the certain sub-
sidised programmes for Afghan nationals in 
Iran were also terminated in November 2011. 
Consequently,  it  is  likely  that  more  Afghan 
families residing in Iran will arrive in Greece 
in the near future.

Open sources* recently reported that during 
the  month  of  June,  both  Pakistan  and  Iran 
started to deport illegally-staying Afghan na-
tionals. According to the Information Minister 
of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pa-
kistan, where some 400 000 undocumented 
Afghan migrants are thought to reside, the 
authorities set the deadline of 30 June 2012 
for UNHCR to repatriate irregular migrants.
As soon as this date passed law enforcement 
agencies were ordered to compile lists of ir-
regular Afghans, arrest them, bring them be-
fore the court and subsequently deport them 
to Afghanistan.

However,  open  sources  also  indicated  that 
even  though  undocumented  Afghans  were 
threatened with deportation, no increase in 

President  of  Pakistani  Community  in  Greece  Ar-
rested for Human Trafficking

The  President  of  the  Pakistani 
Community  in  Greece,  Javet 
Aslam,  was  arrested  Monday 
morning  following  an  Inter-
pol  warrant  that  was  pending 
against  him  for  human  traf-
ficking  involving  Asian  illegal 
immigrants.

Greek policemen arrested Javet in his residence in Kolonos, 
Athens, Monday [6 August 2012] and he’s been held in prison 
since. The Interpol warrant had been issued after request of 
the Pakistani authorities that accuse Javet of having received 
money  to  contribute  in  the  transfer  of  illegal  immigrants 
from Pakistan to Greece. Aslam was taken to the Appeals 
prosecutor where he filed a request to be granted political 
asylum, which will be examined in the next few days by the 
Appeals Council.

Source: greece.greekreporter.com, 16 May 2012

deportations  was  noted  compared  to  pre-
vious months.

Migrants from Pakistan

The  general  profile  of  migrants  coming  to 
the EU or the Schengen area from Pakistan 
via  the  Greek-Turkish  land  border  is  as  fol-
lows:  single,  male  adults  aged  between  21 
and 29, unskilled Urdu-speaking workers or 
students. When illegally crossing the exter-

*  http://www.nation.com.pk/
pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-
english-online/editorials/01-
Jul-2012/illegal-afghan-migrants; 
http://www.mideastdaily.
org/entry/iran-adament-to-
relinquish-migrants-afghan-
pleas-to-cut-short-the-returns/; 
http://dawn.com/2012/06/29/
afghans-face-mass-deportation-
from-pakistan/

21 of 70

 
Figure 9.  In Q2 2012, detections of migrants from Syria and 

Bangladesh illegally crossing the Greek land border with Turkey rose 

more than expected by seasonal variation, whereas detections of 

migrants from Pakistan were much lower

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs for the top six nationalities

Somalia

Algeria

Pakistan

Syria

Bangladesh

Afghanistan

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9  10  11  12  1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

2011 

2012 

nal border they tend to travel undocumented; 
the passports are withheld by facilitators in 
Turkey with the assurance that they will be 
forwarded on to other facilitators in Greece.

*  FRAN Quarterly Q3 2011, 
Ref: R123, Fig. 22, p. 57

As reported in previous FRAN Quarterlies*, 
the most frequent place of origin is still the 
northern part of the Punjab province. Accord-

22 of 70

ing to the statements provided in interviews, 
the  main  destination  countries  are  Greece, 
Italy and Spain, but considering the number 
of returned Pakistani nationals the UK could 
be the main destination country. In any case, 
destination countries are determined by the 
residence of their relatives. The main reason 
why Pakistanis choose to migrate to the EU 
is economic due to a lack of employment op-
portunities in Pakistan. 

Migrants from Bangladesh

Most  of  the  Bangladeshi  migrants  inter-
viewed  after  having  illegally  crossed  the 
Greek-Turkish land border claimed that they 
had departed from countries around the Per-
sian Gulf (Fig. 10), where they had been le-
gally  working  in  the  construction  business. 
Following  the  economic  crisis  in  the  area, 
salaries  fell  and  fewer  jobs  were  available; 
consequently, many migrants decided to try 
to reach Europe in search of better employ-
ment  opportunities.  In  earlier  interviews  it 
was established that facilitators working in 
the  Gulf  area  deceptively  assured  the  mi-
grants that there were plenty of good jobs 
and high salaries in Greece.

Migrants from Syria

Groups of irregular migrants originating from 
Syria were mainly comprised of males (aged 
20–28), but there were also mixed-sex groups, 
generally aged between 25 and 60 years, in-
cluding  cases  of  three-generation  families 
travelling  together.  Syrians  do  not  require 
visas to enter Turkey and only need facilita-
tion from Istanbul onwards in order to reach 
Greece illegally. While the increasing number 
of illegal border-crossings is generally linked 
to the internal situation in Syria, the prevail-
ing profile of Syrians detected at the Greek-
Turkish border remains somewhat different 
to  the  refugee  flow  from  Syria  into  Turkey. 
Also, the screening activities in the context 
of  Frontex  coordinated  Joint  Operation  At-

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012.

i

m
o
c
e
t
i
n
v
o
n
w
w
w
©

.

tica 2012 indicated that roughly 15% of Syrians 
detected at the Greek-Turkish border during 
2012 were in fact not native to Syria. These 
false claims of nationality (nationality swap-
ping) often occur in conjunction with new or 
emerging crises and are linked to nationalities 
with common linguistic and/or geographical 
circumstances. In this case, migrants falsely 
claiming Syrian nationality were mostly Ira-
qis and to a lesser extent also Egyptians, Mo-
roccans, Libyans and Tunisians.

Syrians  detected  in  Greece  were  predomi-
nantly  male  (74%),  while  the  UNHCR  data 
for  the  refugee  flow  into  the  neighbouring 
countries suggest that 75% were women and 

Istanbul

Orestiada

Turkey

Van

Teheran

Cyprus

Bandar-E-Abbas

United Arab Emirates

Oman

Source: Poseidon Land weekly reports

First-ever  Joint  Operation  between 
Hellenic Police and Turkish Military.

Based upon intelligence gathered dur-
ing debriefing activities, the first-ever 
Joint  Operation  between  Hellenic  Po-
lice (The Special Team of Alexandroup-
olis) and Turkish Military was launched 
in  June  2012.  First,  in  June  a  bilateral 
meeting took place between Greek and 
Turkish authorities to discuss a specific 
facilitation network operating in Turkey 
adjacent to the area of BCU Ferres. The 
network was helping irregular migrants 
across the River Evros on a daily basis 
but  the  facilitators  themselves  never 
crossed the river.

To  apprehend  the  facilitators  a  Joint 
Operation was launched the following 
day,  by  Greek  officers  who  were  ob-
serving the area while keeping mobile-
phone contact with their counterparts 
in the Turkish military. At approximately 
13:00 hrs a group of 5-10 migrants were 
offloaded  in  the  area  and  facilitators 
started to guide them towards the river. 
The Hellenic Police officers alerted the 
Turkish military and as a result all the 
migrants  were  apprehended.  Regret-
tably, on this occasion the facilitators 
evaded capture but nevertheless, this 
first Joint Operation is considered to be 
a  very  important  step  towards  closer 
cooperation between Greek and Turk-
ish authorities in the operational area.

Source: Frontex Weekly Analytical Reports

Figure 10.  Most migrants from Bangladesh detected during JO 

Poseidon Land travelled overland from the Gulf States

23 of 70

 
for their final destinations as those who enter 
Greece. In Q2 2012 these movements tended 
to be reflected in the detections of:
1)   illegal  border-crossing  throughout  the 

Western Balkan land borders,

2)   migrants  landing  at  the  blue  border  of 
the southern Italian regions of Apulia and 
Calabria

3)   clandestines and document fraudsters on 
board ferries to Italy (Ancona, Venice)
4)   document-fraudsters travelling on flights 
from  Greek  airports  to  many  major  EU 
airports.

Western Balkans: In Q2 2012, there were in-
creased detections of illegal border-crossing 
throughout  the  Western  Balkans  land  bor-
ders  compared  to  the  same  period  in  2011, 
particularly from Serbia to Hungary, and in-
creasingly Romania. For example, among the 
most commonly detected non-local nation-
alities at a single border section were Algeri-
ans and Moroccans at the Romanian border 
with Serbia, followed by Afghans and Paki-
stanis at the Hungarian border with Serbia 
(see Section 4.2.6. Western Balkans).

Italian  Ionian  Coast:  For  some  time  there 
has been a steady flow of Afghans and, to a 
lesser extent, Pakistanis arriving in the South-
ern Italian blue borders of Calabria and Apulia 
with some increases during Q2 2012.

Subsequent  to  the  reporting  period  (July 
2012), JO EPN Aeneas 2012 was launched and 
is currently scheduled to run until the end of 
October 2012. There are two operational ar-
eas,  Apulia  and  Calabria,  covering  the  sea-
shore  along  the  Ionian  Sea  and  part  of  the 
Adriatic Sea. 

According to Croatian open sources* in July, 
some  65  Asian  and  African  migrants  pre-
sumed  to  be  heading  to  Italy  were  found 
drifting some 47 nautical miles south of Du-
brovnik due to a broken engine (Fig. 12). They 
had been drifting for two days. The migrants, 

.

.

g
r
o
n
u
w
w
w
©

Figure 11.  A Syrian refugee camp in Turkey

children (Fig. 11). While there were also fam-
ily units detected, the majority of Syrians ar-
riving in Greece were youths aged between 
20 and 28. The main reason for migration is 
in almost all cases economic, combined with 
the conflict as the final motivator. There were 
only  few  cases  when  Syrian  nationals  de-
clared political reasons for their decision to 
migrate. Almost half of them have relatives 
in the EU, with Germany and Sweden being 
their main destination countries.

A German court ruled earlier in 2012 that Syr-
ian nationals applying for international pro-
tection are to be granted automatic refugee 
status  on  the  grounds  that  the  very  act  of 
leaving  Syria  presumably  illegally,  and  then 
asking for international protection may, upon 
return to Syria, result in torture and impris-
onment.  Sweden  also  declared  that  Syrian 
nationals claiming for asylum will be auto-
matically granted refugee status, while other 
Member  States are reviewing their policies 
(see Section 4.7. Asylum claims).

Secondary movements

Greece is currently the main entry point for 
illegal border-crossers. However, it is a Schen-
gen exclave and a transit rather than desti-
nation country for the majority of migrants. 
Thus, the secondary movements originating 
in Greece are characterised by a similar com-
position of nationalities of migrants attempt-
ing  to  re-enter  the  Schengen  area  heading 

*  http://www.index.hr/
vijesti/clanak/imigranti-
iz-dubrovnika-pod-
policijskom-pratnjom-
krenuli-u-prihvatni-
centar-za-strance-u-
jezevu/624240.aspx

24 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012 
.

g
r
o
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e
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i

.

i
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©

Figure 12.  An adrift sailing boat rescued by 

Croatian authorities in the Adriatic Sea, 

carrying migrants hoping to land in Italy

who had departed from Greece, did not want 
to be rescued by the Croatian authorities as 
they wanted to go to Italy. After several hours 
of negotiations, the authority for search and 
rescue towed the sailing boat to the nearest 
Croatian port.

There was also a recent increase in the num-
bers of Bangladeshis, Iraqis, Moroccans and 
Syrians  arriving  in  Apulia  from  Greece  but 
these detections were in much lower num-
bers than other nationalities.

Intra-Schengen flights: There have been re-
ports of large numbers of document-fraud-
sters travelling on flights from Greek airports 
to many major EU airports. This trend was 
reduced in the second quarter of 2012, prob-
ably due to the increased price of flights re-
sulting from tourism to Greece at this time 
of year. According to EDF data, Afghans, Ira-
qis and increasingly Syrians were detected on 
exit  from  Greece  and  on  entry  to  German, 
Belgian and Dutch airports. 

4.2.2. Central Mediterranean route

Irregular migration in the Central Mediterra-
nean massively fluctuated in size and compo-
sition during 2011, largely due to the political 
and civil unrest across North Africa, particu-
larly in Tunisia and Libya. Since Q4 2011, the 
situation has significantly improved follow-

ing better cooperation between Italian and 
Tunisian authorities concerning the return of 
Tunisian nationals.

According  to  FRAN  data,  in  Q2  2012  there 
were just 3 685 reported detections of ille-
gal border-crossing on the Central Mediter-
ranean route, a massive decrease compared 
to the peak in last year in Q2 2011 but an in-
crease compared to late 2011 and early 2012. 
The increase was almost entirely due to more 
detections of migrants from Somalia (1 094) 
combined with a steady stream of migrants 
still arriving from Tunisia. Several national-
ities  previously  detected  in  high  numbers 
particularly in 2011 were not detected in sig-
nificant numbers, including Bangladeshis (72) 
and Nigerians (19).

Migrants from Somalia

During  May  2012,  the  arrival  of  Somali  mi-
grants in Malta increased significantly while 
Italy registered a decrease in the number of 
Somali  migrants  apprehended  in  Sicily  and 
the Pelagic Islands. In most cases, groups of 
males, females and minors (or families) were 
found  on  board  rubber  dinghies  with  out-
board motors. A few of the boats were de-
tected  in  Italian  territorial  waters  in  some 
distress  after  the  migrants  had  called  the 
Italian authorities for help using satellite tel-
ephones. The boats that recently headed for 
Malta were either intercepted by Maltese pa-
trol boats or made it to the island without 
being intercepted.

Detected Somalis were mainly young males 
(aged 18–24) with secondary education and 
low or no income. The main reason for the 
migration was socio-economic, but in some 
cases it was military conflict. In Q2 2012, there 
were no Joint Operations running in the Cen-
tral Mediterranean Sea, therefore Frontex and 
the  FRAN  community  are  unable  to  utilise 
intelligence obtained through the direct de-
briefing  of  migrants.  However,  valuable  in-

25 of 70

 
formation has been obtained from interviews 
carried out by the Maltese authorities. Such 
preliminary  interviews  revealed  that  some 
of the Somali migrants arriving in Malta had 
been promised that they would be brought 
to Italy. They departed from an unknown lo-
cation in Libya and travelled for up to three 
days in boats before either being intercepted 
by Maltese authorities or reaching the shore. 
The average fare was said to be around USD 
1 000 per person.

Migrants from Tunisia

Most  Tunisian  migrants  detected  arriving 
in  the  Central  Mediterranean  Region  were 
young (18–35 years) unmarried males with a 
primary level of education and low previous 
incomes (EUR 80–180 per month). All inter-
viewed migrants declared to have relatives 
or friends already in the EU, especially in It-
aly, and they arrived on boats containing on 
average 20 migrants (Fig. 13).

Figure 13.  A fishing boat from Tunisia

Throughout the quarter, Italy and Tunisia co-
operated efficiently to repatriate Tunisian na-
tionals and so most migrants typically arrived 
undocumented  to  delay  readmission.  Sub-
sequent to the reporting period, JO Hermes 
2012 was launched on 2 July and is currently 
planned to run until 31 October 2012 as a con-
tinuation  of  the  deployment  of  JO  Hermes 
Extension 2011, which ended just before the 
reporting period, on 31 March 2012. JO Hermes 
2012 has been established to support the Ital-

26 of 70

ian authorities in tackling maritime irregular 
migration along the coasts of Sicily, Pantel-
leria and the Pelagic islands (Lampedusa, Li-
nosa, Lampione).

4.2.3. Western Mediterranean route

Irregular migration in the Western Mediterra-
nean region increased throughout 2011 from 
just 890 detections in Q1 2011 to 3 568 detec-
tions in Q3. In Q2 2012, there were 1 549 de-
tections  which  almost  exactly  corresponds 
to  the  number  of  detections  the  year  be-
fore in Q2 2011 (1 569). As was the case a year 
ago, most detections were of Algerians fol-
lowed  by  migrants  of  unknown  nationali-
ties (presumed to be sub-Saharan Africans) 
and Moroccans.

Recently, the size of the sub-Saharan popu-
lation coming from Algeria has increased in 
different  settlements  adjacent  to  the  Me-
lilla  border  fence.  Criminal  networks  oper-
ate more easily in this north eastern region of 
Morocco and the Spanish authorities treat a 
large-scale illegal crossing of the fence to the 
Spanish side as a real possibility. Attempts to 
cross have been made in the past involving 
groups of dozens or even hundreds.

JO  EPN  Indalo  2012  started  on  16  May  and 
is currently scheduled to run until 31 Octo-
ber 2012. So far the number of irregular mi-
grants apprehended in the operational areas 
is almost double that of the same period in 
2011. Analysis of the information provided by 
the Spanish authorities also indicates a new 
increasing  trend  in  the  number  of  Algerian 
and  Moroccan  migrants  per  boat  since  the 
beginning of 2012. The improvement of the 
weather  and  sea  conditions  during  the  re-
porting  period  impacted  on  the  number  of 
boats  detected,  with  a  gradual  increase  of 
the number of arrivals during the peak pe-
riod, which according to data from the last 
two years is from May to October.

2
1

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2

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Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012 
 
 
 
Migrants from Algeria 

According  to  information  gathered  during 
interviews, most Algerians were single male 
adults aged 19–36 on average, but there were 
also a few females and minors in good health. 
Most migrants belonged to the lower mid-
dle class and, despite having a high level of 
education compared to sub-Saharan nation-
als, they suffered from a generalised lack of 
opportunities,  welfare  and  access  to  public 
health  services.  Nearly  all  the  Algerian  mi-
grants spoke Arabic with a few French and 
English speakers, but all were undocumented 
to avoid repatriation after arriving in Spain. 
The  majority  had  relatives  or  friends  in  EU 
Member States, mainly in France and Spain, 
who could help them to find a job and set-
tle  within  the  ethnic  communities  already 
established in these countries.

4.2.4. Western African route

In  the  second  quarter  of  2012,  there  were 
just  31  detections  of  illegal  border-crossing 
in this region, almost exclusively of Moroc-
can nationals.

As  reported  in  the  previous  FRAN  Quar-
terly*, in February 2012 Moroccan and Spanish 
Ministers  of  Interior  signed  a  police  agree-
ment  to  create  two  joint  police  stations  in 
the Spanish (Algeciras) and Moroccan (Tan-
giers) territories to cooperate by exchanging 
operational  information  and  best  practices 
between different police services. The goal 
of this cooperation is to strengthen the ef-
forts and improve the results against organ-
ised  crime  operating  on  both  sides  of  the 
Strait of Gibraltar involved in the smuggling 
of  drugs,  international  terrorism,  irregular 
migration and trafficking in human beings. 
Following these developments, both Inter-
national Police Cooperation Centres became 
operational during May 2012 (Fig. 14). The In-
ternational Joint Police Stations are going to 
be integrated with National Police / Guardia 

.

s
e
b
o
g
.
r
o
i
r
e
t
n

i
.

w
w
w
©

Figure 14.  The Spanish Minister for Home 

Affairs and the Moroccan Home Affairs 

Minister opened the Police Coordination 

Centres in Tangiers (Morocco) and Algeciras 

(Cadiz)

Civil  (Spain)  and  General  Direction  for  Na-
tional Security (Police) / Royal Gendarmerie 
(Morocco) staff for a rapid and effective ex-
change of information.

As  reported  in  previous  FRAN  Quarterlies, 
the  Western  African  route  from  the  north 
of Mauritania to the Western Sahara terri-
tory  is  being  reopened  by  illegal  migration 
facilitation  networks.  It  has  been  inactive 
for  years  but  recently  an  estimated  2  000 
sub-Saharans  (particularly  from  Senegal) 
settled in the Western Saharan coastal cit-
ies of El Aaioún and Dakhla and in the last 
few months ~20 000 Senegalese nationals 
have entered Mauritania along these routes 
to the north.

During  the  reporting  period  there  was  no 
Frontex operation relevant for the Western 
African Route.

4.2.5. Eastern land borders

The Eastern land borders route is, in effect, 
an amalgam of detections of illegal border-
crossing reported by Lithuania, Slovakia, Ro-
manian,  Hungary,  Poland,  Estonia,  Finland 
and Latvia. Despite the total length of all the 
border sections, detections tend to be lower 
than  on  other  routes  possibly  due  to  per-

*  FRAN Quarterly Q1 2012, 
Ref: R034, p. 30

27 of 70

 
meability issues and the long distances be-
tween major hubs and many of the border 
sections. In Q2 2012, there were just 549 de-
tections of illegal border-crossing at the east-
ern land borders of the EU, which is double 
the figure recorded in Q2 2011 and the high-
est figure since 2008. This increase was due 
to more detections of Georgians in Lithuania; 
Somalis in Slovakia; Afghans in Poland and –
to a lesser extent – in Lithuania and Slova-
kia; and Bangladeshis in Romania.

On 26 April 2012 the President of Belarus de-
cided to relocate some forces from the well-
established western border to the south as 
an answer to EU sanctions against Belarus. 
Belarus is mainly performing border checks 
on entry to the country rather than on exit. 
At the same time, Belarusian border author-
ities  have  ceased  any  form  of  cooperation 
with the EU.

Bordering  countries  appealed  to  Belarus, 
complaining  that  the  border  had  been  left 
wide open. The Belarusian President stated 
they  had  no  money  for  border  control  and 
asked  for  financial  help  in  this  regard.  Be-
larus started negotiations with the Russian 
Federation in order to get the railway trans-
portation tariffs reduced and allow Russian 
Baltic  ports  to  handle  their  cargo.  At  the 
same  time,  Belarus  and  Ukraine  concluded 
an  agreement  to  raise  the  volume  of  ship-
ment via southern ports.

The main points of exit from Belarus to the EU 
are Focal Point Terespol at the Polish-Belaru-
sian border and Focal Point Medininkai at the 
Lithuanian-Belarusian border. The Focal Point 
Terespol is located at the main road and rail-
way transport route from Moscow and Minsk 
to Poland and the Focal Point Medininkai at 
the  main  road  and  railway  connection  be-
tween Minsk and Kaliningrad.

UEFA  Euro  2012:  In  2012  Frontex  launched 
JO Eurocup 2012 designed to strengthen bor-

der  security  measures,  by  implementing  a 
Joint  Operation  in  close  cooperation  with 
Poland and Ukraine including the coordina-
tion of enhanced border checks at selected 
external land and air borders of the European 
Union (Fig. 15). The Joint Operation was im-
plemented in Poland, at the external air and 
land  borders  with  the  Russian  Federation, 
Ukraine and Belarus and in Ukraine. In addi-
tion, the operation was implemented at the 
airports  of  the  Czech  Republic,  Italy,  Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands.

Overall  some  134  experts  were  deployed 
within the Joint Operation, including experts 
for border surveillance, border checks, doc-
ument experts and observers from Ukraine, 
the Russian Federation and Croatia. The op-
eration was linked with JO Focal Points 2012 
Land due to the fact that several Focal Points 
at  EU  eastern  land  borders  were  included 
in the operational area of JO Eurocup 2012.

The busiest BCP was Medyka-Shegini, where 
a  third  of  all  checks  were  performed.  The 

s
r
e
d
r
o
b

e
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t

t
a

y
a
p

l

r
i

a
F
–
o
e
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i

v

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©

Figure 15.  Separate lanes and deployed 

Guest Officers during the UEFA Euro 2012 

championship enhanced border checks and 

ensured fewer queues

28 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New Local Border traffic Agreements* 

Poland-Kaliningrad

The Polish-Russian Local Border Traffic Regime entered into force on 27 July 2012. Instead of the regular 30 km 
on both sides of the border, the new agreement covers the whole 
area of the Kaliningrad region and a corresponding territory on the 
Polish side. The visa-free movement between Poland and Kalinin-
grad  concerns  specific  border-crossing  points.  People  living  in  the 
territory  for  at  least  3  years  will  be  authorised  to  obtain  permis-
sion for crossing the Polish-Russian border in the framework of the 
agreement after paying 20 EUR. The first permission will be issued 
for two years, next – for five years. The holder will be able to spend 
30 days in the counterpart border zone, for no more than 90 days 
in every half of the year.

Poland

Kaliningrad

Russia

Source: ????????????

Norway-Russian Federation

In May, a Local Border Traffic Regime was implemented allowing residents in Norway 
and  the  Russian  Federation  living  within  30  km  of  the  border,  as  well  as  in  the  en-
tire territory of Korzunovo municipality, to apply for a local border traffic permit. The 
holder will be permitted to stay for up to 15 days at a time in the counterpart border 
zone without a visa. About 9 000 persons in Sør-Varanger municipality on the Norwe-
gian side and 45 000 persons in Pechenga rayon on the Russian side are covered by the 
agreement. However, uptake has been lower than expected, possibly because Norway’s 
visa-office in Murmansk is only open during the day when most people are at work, 
or because many prefer to apply for a Schengen visa valid for most of Europe instead of the border-zone card.

*  Regulation (EC) No 
1931/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 December 
2006 laying down rules 
on local border traffic at 
the external land borders 
of the Member States and 
amending the provisions of 
the Schengen Convention

Sources: www.barentsobserver.com, 2 July 2012; biuletynmigracyjny.uw.edu.pl (No. 37, August 2012); www.kaliningradkg.polemb.net

heaviest  period  of  traffic  was  observed 
around  the  matches  in  Lviv,  a  city  located 
some 70 km from the Polish-Ukrainian bor-
der.  As  predicted,  the  traffic  of  supporters 
coincided  with  the  seasonal  migration  of 
Ukrainians and Moldovans to EU countries, 
which resulted in a number of refusals and 
visa cancellations.

During Eurocup 2012, only one irregular mi-
grant (Moldovan national) was detected in 
the operational area, while 27 irregular mi-
grants were reported within JO Focal Points 
2012,  mostly  at  the  Lithuanian-Belarusian 
border with Georgians as the top national-

ity.  During  JO  Eurocup  2012  only  seven  ap-
plications for international protection were 
submitted  within  the  operational  area.  In 
contrast, there were 335 detected overstay-
ers,  mostly  Ukrainian  nationals,  who  were 
also the nationality most frequently detected 
with fraudulent documents.

4.2.6. Western Balkans

During the second quarter of 2012 there were 
almost  8  600  illegal  border-crossings  be-
tween BCPs reported from both sides of com-
mon  and  regional  borders  (see  Fig.  16  for 
definition of common and regional borders). 

29 of 70

Letenye

Hungary

Gruskovje

Slovenia

Obrezje

Jelsane

Zagreb

Croatia
4.5

Kelebia

Röszke

Moravita

Romania

Belgrade

Serbia
7.3

Bosnia &
Herzegovina
4.6

Sarajevo

Montenegro
0.7

Podgorica

Pristina

Kosovo
1.8

Kalotina

Bulgaria

Skopje

Italy

population in milions

Tirana

Albania
3.0

fYROM
2.0

Kristallopigi

main BCPs between WB countries and EU Member States

regional borders

administrative boundary line

common borders

Pan-European Transport Corridor X

other major roads

Source: CIA Factbook 2012, ESRI geodata

Kakavia

Greece

Figure 16.  General map of the Western Balkans indicating main trade routes, main BCPs, population size, and regional 
and common borders

30 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012 
 
 
 
In line with the expected seasonal variations, 
this number was more than one-third larger 
than during the first three months.

Compared to the same period in 2011 though, 
the increase was even more pronounced at 
52%  (see  Fig.  17  overleaf).  In  other  words, 
apart from the border between Hungary and 
Serbia, all other top five border sections ex-
perienced various degrees of increases com-
pared to 2011. Most notably, the increase was 
the highest in the case of the Romanian-Ser-
bian  border,  while  the  border  between  the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Serbia reported the highest increase in ab-
solute terms.

Both  developments  continue  to  be  directly 
linked  with  secondary  movements  of  mi-
grants who have initially entered the EU at 
the Greek-Turkish border. As during the first 
three  months  of  2012,  two  thirds  of  all  de-
tected migrants in the Western Balkans re-
gion  were  composed  of  claimed  Afghans, 
Pakistanis,  Algerians,  Moroccans,  Somalis 
and Syrians.

Importantly, with 234 detections, detections 
of  Syrian  nationals  increased  by  a  massive 
220% compared to the previous quarter, by 
far the highest relative increase for any na-
tionality. The increase was mainly limited to 
the Croatian-Serbian border and was a mirror 
image of the same trend for Syrian nation-
als at the Greek-Turkish border that already 
commenced during March 2012.

In any case, Albanian nationals were again the 
top detected nationality with almost 2 000 
cases or 18% more than during the same pe-
riod in 2011. The increase was largely due to 
more Albanians wanting to avoid Schengen 
entry bans by going to Greece illegally, either 
directly or indirectly through the former Yu-
goslav Republic of Macedonia.

Serbia remained the most affected regional 
country with 42% share of all detections for 
illegal  border-crossing  (the  same  share  as 
in Q1 2012).

Hiding in vehicles: modus operandi on the rise

Roughly  twenty  times  fewer  persons  were 
detected at BCPs compared to those detected 
between BCPs; however, annual comparison 
suggests  that  more  migrants  en  route  from 
Greece are now opting to cross the regional 
and common borders hidden in vehicles (re-
ported in the WB-ARA 2012).

Similarly to illegal border-crossing between 
BCPs, Serbia detected the largest share  of 
all  illegal  border-crossing  at  BCPs.  Most 
were detected at the border between Ser-
bia  and  Hungary,  followed  by  the  one  be-
tween Croatia and Slovenia where the largest 
increase was reported compared to the pre-
vious  quarter  and  the  same  three  months 
in 2011 . Importantly, the border section be-
tween Serbia and the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia was relegated from the 
top position for the first time since the first 
quarter of 2011.

Afghans  remained  the  top  nationality  de-
tected with 39% share (172 cases). They were 
the top nationality on all major border sec-
tions  en  route  from  Greece  to  Hungary  or 
Slovenia.

Asylum applications indicate changes in 
routing

Claiming asylum while en route from Greece 
through the Western Balkans remained a part 
of the well-known modus operandi. As during 
the first quarter of 2012, there were significant 
difference  in  trends  reported  by  WB-RAN 
countries  and  the  neighbouring  EU  Mem-
ber  States.  For  example,  Slovenia  reported 
declines  both  compared  to  2011  and  to  the 

31 of 70

Austria

Hungary

Slovenia

3
-25%

361
-12%

Croatia

163
+14%

Bosnia &
Herzegovina

956
-5%

1 075
+31%

24
+100%

Romania

1157
+405%

Total number of detections

Percentage change since 
the same period last year

Serbia

29
+190%

78
+420%

Montenegro

44
+57%

2 216
+86%

10
+400%

Bulgaria

165
+313%

77
+88%

fYROM

2
-60%

Albania

175
-13%

2 050
+39%

Greece

13 145
+26%

Turkey

Total number
of detections
(WB land borders only)

%
2
5
+

5 631

8 585

Apr-Jun
2011

Apr-Jun
2012

Source: FRAN and WB-RAN data as of 15 August 2012

Figure 17.  The increased flow at the Greek-Turkish border still has a critical impact on detections at different border 

sections in the Western Balkans and the neighbouring EU Member States

32 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012previous quarter, while in Romania the two 
trends were completely opposite.

Most worryingly, apart from the former Yu-
goslav Republic of Macedonia, all other west-
ern  Balkan  countries  reported  significant 
increases,  both  compared  to  the  same  pe-
riod  last  year  and  the  first  quarter  of  2012. 
Most  notably,  asylum  applications  in  Mon-
tenegro were five times higher compared to 
2011 and a further twelve times compared to 
the first three months of 2012. Most of the 
increase was due to applications from per-
sons claiming Algerian origins, pushing this 
nationality into the top three ranking for the 
region. These trends are indicative of possi-
ble changes in routing.

Detections of false documents indicate 
attempts to circumvent entry/length of 
stay provisions in the Schengen area

The six WB-RAN countries reported almost 
140 cases of persons using false documents 
during  the  second  quarter  of  2012.*  Detec-
tions in Albania accounted for more than half 
of this number, followed distantly by Croa-
tia and Serbia.

Compared to the same period in 2011, detec-
tions grew by 55%, largely due to more Al-
banian nationals using false Greek entry/exit 
stamps in an attempt to hide the fact that 
they have overstayed in Greece. In fact, most 
detections  were limited to only two nation-
alities:  Albanian  and  Serbian  (please  note 
that more than 70% of detections reported 
under Nationality as ‘Serbia’ are in fact per-
sons coming from the territory of Kosovo**).

In terms of the document type,  most detec-
tions were linked to false passports, followed 
by entry/exit stamps, residence permits and 
identity cards. Detections of false visa stick-
ers were negligible. Half of all detected false 
passports  were  used  by  Serbian/Kosovo** 
nationals.  They  were  mainly  abusing  Alba-

nian, Slovenian, the former Yugoslav Repub-
lic  of  Macedonia  and  Bulgarian  passports, 
detected by Albanian authorities on exit to-
wards Italy (sea borders).

4.3. Clandestine entry (1B)

Restricting Indicator 1B (detections of illegal 
border-crossing at BCPs) to the external land 
and sea borders of the EU, and also to detec-
tions that are confirmed clandestine entries 
(hiding in transport or other means), results 
in extremely low detections for the whole of 
the EU in Q2 2012 (126). However, this is still 
the second highest figure since data collec-
tion began in 2008.

Hungary detected the most clandestine en-
tries at the external border mostly of Afghans 
at the border with Serbia, followed by Slo-
venia, where Afghans and Serbs were both 
detected at the border with Croatia. In both 
cases,  the  Afghans  were  thought  to  have 
originally entered the Schengen area via the 
Greek-Turkish land border.

In contrast to the low number of detections 
of  clandestine  entry  at  the  external  border 
(126),  there  was  a  higher  number  of  detec-
tions within the EU (571) split between the 
land (293) and sea (278) borders. These de-
tections  can  often  shed  light  on  secondary 
movements and the final destinations of spe-
cific nationalities. For example, Italy, the UK 
and  Romania  detected  the  most  internal 
clandestine migrants, mostly of Afghans, Al-
banians  and  Algerians,  respectively.  In  the 
case  of  Italy,  most  Afghans  were  detected 
making secondary movements on ferries ar-
riving  in  Ancona  and  Venice  from  Greece, 
where they are often detected with fraudu-
lent documents.

In the UK, Albanians were detected attempt-
ing clandestine entry at land-border controls 
in  mainland  Europe  and  the  Schengen  area, 
where  they  enjoy  visa  free  travel.  Recently, 

*  Please note that 
analysis of this indicator 
is now limited to WB-
RAN countries only, 
given that EU Member 
States have transitioned 
to European Union 
Document-Fraud (EDF) 
reporting scheme.

**  This designation is without 
prejudice to positions on 
status, and is in line with 
UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo 
declaration of independence.

33 of 70

Albanians  have  been  detected  travelling  in 
large groups hidden aboard vehicles and at-
tempting to breach the controls at Coquelles. 
Although in most cases the individuals were 
young  males;  family  groups  were  also  en-
countered travelling with very young children. 

At the Romanian land border, Algerians were 
frequently detected on exit to Hungary. These 
migrants are assumed to have originally en-
tered the Schengen area at the Greek-Turk-
ish land border.

4.4. Detections of facilitators

Notwithstanding an increase during the first 
few  months  of  2011,  detections  of  facilita-
tors of irregular migration have been falling 
steadily for the last two years. According to 
some reports, this long-term decline may in 
part be due to a widespread shift towards the 
abuse of legal channels and document fraud 
to mimic legal entry to the EU, which results 
in facilitators being able to operate remotely 
and inconspicuously rather than accompany-
ing migrants during high-risk activities such 
as  border-crossing.  In  Q2  2012,  there  were 
1 785 detections of facilitators of irregular mi-
gration, which is an 8% reduction compared 
to the same period the year before in 2011.

The total EU-level detections of facilitators 
of irregular migration tend to be made up of 
several disparate trends involving unrelated 
nationalities  detected  in  different  Member 
States. For example, despite a decline in de-
tections of 25% compared to the year previ-
ously, France reported the most detections 
of facilitators of irregular migration, whereas 
Spain, ranked third at the EU level detected 
50% more facilitators over the same period 
(Fig. 18). Also, facilitators tend to be detected 
most frequently in their home countries. For 
example, in Q2 2012, the most significant de-
tections were of Spanish, Chinese and French 
facilitators,  who  were  detected  most  fre-
quently  in  Spain,  Italy  and  France,  respec-

tively,  who  in  turn  are  the  Member  States 
that detected the most facilitators.

The biggest increases in detections of facil-
itators of irregular migration were reported 
from the Polish land border with the Ukraine, 
and the Slovenian land border with Croatia. 
In both cases it was mostly domestic facil-
itators  that  contributed  to  the  increases, 
with the addition of facilitators from neigh-
bouring Croatia also being increasingly de-
tected in Slovenia.

Over the last year, Spain has detected stead-
ily increasing numbers of domestic (Spanish) 
facilitators.  These  were  almost  exclusively 
detected inland. One criminal organisation, 
which  facilitated  the  irregular  migration  of 
Iranian  nationals  to  the  UK,  was  disman-
tled  on  Tenerife,  the  last  point  of  embar-
kation  towards  several  British  airports.  In 
total nine of the top members of the crime 
group were arrested (four in Tenerife and five 
in  Madrid)  and  imprisoned,  but  this  organ-
ised  group  had  members  posted  in  several 
other Member States. The Iranian irregular 
migrants were hosted for some days in dif-
ferent  apartments  in  Tenerife,  which  were 
all owned by the mafia and then they were 
provided  with  false  passports  to  fly  to  the 
UK. In most cases the passports were Brit-
ish,  but  Italian  passports  were  also  seized 
during a number of house searches. Organ-
isation  members  owned  other  apartments 
in Madrid, which were also searched and a 
range of false passports and tools and mate-
rials for the falsifications were seized.

Also  in  Spain,  since  the  beginning  of  2011  a 
Police  investigation  has  been  developed  in 
the Canary Islands, with a relevant collabo-
ration of several Spanish Embassies posted 
in South America, due to a sharp increase of 
South American students enrolled in CIESTCA 
(International Centre for Tourism Studies of 
the Canary Islands) to pursue a Master’s de-
gree  in  tourism,  gastronomic  catering  and 

34 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Detections of facilitators
in Q2 2012

highest

lowest

Sources: Frontex Risk Analysis Unit – FRAN data, ESRI geodata

Figure 18  Despite decreases compared to the year before, France and Italy still detected the most facilitators, but the 

largest increases were reported by Slovenia and Poland mostly of domestic facilitators

hotel  management  in  the  Canary  island  of 
Tenerife, which included ‘placements’ in sev-
eral hotels located in the South of the island. 
All hypothetical students had applied for stu-
dent visas in the Spanish General Consulates 
in Colombia and Venezuela (countries with 
direct  flight  connections  to  The  Canary  Is-
lands), but also in Mexico, Peru, Ecuador and 
Bolivia.  The  Police  discovered  a  well-struc-
tured criminal organisation composed of re-
cruiters in South America and receivers and 

exploiters in final destinations. The network 
favoured clandestine migration and dealt with 
illegal labour using document fraud and vic-
tim deception.

Spanish police found that CIESTCA was able 
to offer private studies, but several master’s 
degrees offered by CIESTCA (Fig. 19) did not 
have any official status and so could not be 
used as justification for obtaining a student 
visa. However, the migrants were convinced 

35 of 70

been facilitated across the green border from 
Belarus. According to the FRAN data, in Q2 
2012 the most commonly detected national-
ity of facilitator in Lithuania was Latvian, ex-
clusively from the land border with Belarus.

4.5. Detections of illegal stay

In Q2 2012, there were 84 076 detections of 
illegal stay in the EU, which is a stable trend 
compared  to  the  year  before  (-3%).  This  is 
consistent with a stable but slightly declin-
ing longer-term trend over the last two years. 
However, this long-term decline masks much 
variation among Member States.

For the first time since data collection began 
in 2008, Greece ranked first, ahead of Spain, 
in detections of illegal stay. The increase was 
mostly due to Pakistanis, whose detections 
doubled between Q1 and Q2. In Greece, Pa-
kistani nationals ranked first for detections 
of illegal stay, while Afghans ranked second. 
While  ranking  at  a  distance,  detections  of 
illegal stay of Syrians doubled from Q1 2012 
to Q2 2012.

Spain ranked second for detections of illegal 
stay. A decrease was widespread across all 
nationalities, which points to a change in law 
enforcement practices. The decrease started 
in April 2012, and the three monthly reports 
for the second quarter being the lowest re-
ported by Spain since data collection began.

Detections  of  illegal  stay  reported  by  Ger-
many have increased since Q3 2011. This rise 
is mostly due to a higher number of Afghans, 
which  started  to  soar  between  Q2  and  Q3 
2010  following  the  dismantlement  of  the 
so-called ‘Calais jungle’ in northern France, 
which was used as a hub by facilitators of il-
legal migration to the UK, mainly catering for 
Afghan nationals. This also corresponded to 
increases in detections of Afghans in Greece, 
Austria and Sweden as illustrated in Figure 21 
overleaf.

t
r
o
p
e
R

l

a
c
i
t
y

l

l

a
n
A
y
h
t
n
o
m
-
i
B
h
s
i
n
a
p
S
©

Figure 19.  A fake master’s degree certificate issued by 

the International Centre for Tourism Studies of the Canary Islands 

(CIESTCA). Enrolment on courses like these was used as justification 

for issuing student visas

of the legality of the actions at the Consulates 
and  used  to  pay  the  organisation  EUR  300 
every month for the duration of the course 
once in Spain and worked in several hotels 
in very crowded tourist areas of the isle for 
a little money as a practice period to com-
plete  the  academic  formation  of  the  pupils 
once the theoretical part of the master’s pro-
gramme had finished.

In  Q2  2012,  both  France  and  Italy  detected 
fewer of their own citizens as facilitators of 
irregular migration compared with the same 
period the year before in 2011.

Though  Georgian  nationals  are  usually  as-
sociated  with  non-facilitated  illegal  entries 
across  the  green  border  between  Lithua-
nian  and  Belarus,  according  to  the  Lithu-
anian  bi-monthly  report  there  was  a  case 
of a criminal intelligence-led operation, re-
sulting in the detection of five Georgian na-
tionals, whose illegal entry to Lithuania had 

36 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012 
 
 
 
Figure 20.  Data reported by Member States on Syrians for detections of illegal border-

crossing, illegal stay and asylum applications have followed similar trends since early 2011, 

with asylum applications remaining above the levels of detections for illegal border-crossing 

or illegal stay

Asylum
Illegal stay
Illegal border-crossing

1 900

1 800

1 600

1 400

1 200

1 000

800

600

400

200

0

M1  M2  M3  M4  M5  M6

M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12

M1  M2  M3  M4  M5  M6

2011 

2012 

Source: FRAN data

Regarding Syrians, their increase for detec-
tions  of  illegal  border-crossing  and  asylum 
applications  that  started  in  early  2011  also 
corresponded to a steady increase of illegal 
stay, with a sharp rise after April 2012, coin-
ciding  with  a  deterioration  of  the  situation 
in the country. The largest detections of il-
legal  stay  have  been  reported  by  Sweden, 
followed by Greece and Germany. A similar 
trend was also noted in asylum applications, 
as illustrated in Figure 20.

4.6. Refusals of entry

Georgians in Poland at the land border with 
Belarus and of Albanians in Greece at the land 
border with Albania (Fig. 21 overleaf).

The  sharpest  increase  was  the  increase  in 
refusal of entry of Georgian nationals at the 
Polish border with Belarus. In a similar pat-
tern observed in 2009, this increase corre-
sponds to an increase in asylum applications 
of  Georgian  nationals  in  Poland.  This  phe-
nomenon is likely to lead to an increase in 
Georgians illegally staying in other Member 
States, in particular Sweden and Germany.

In Q2 2012, a total of 28 244 refusals of entry 
were issued at the external borders of the EU. 
This represents around a 6% decrease com-
pared to the year before in Q2 2011. As in all 
previous quarters since 2010, there were more 
refusals at the land border (15 262, 54% of the 
total) than at the air border (10 863, 38% of 
the total). In fact, the difference between land 
and air borders was one of the largest since 
2010, due to increase of refusals of entry of 

Greece reported a significant increase of re-
fusals of entry of Albanians at the land border 
with Albania. This increase corresponds to an 
increase  in  refusals  of  entry  on  the  ground 
of  not  having  sufficient  means  of  subsist-
ence  in  relation  to  the  period  of  stay.  This 
represents almost half of all refusals of en-
try, as well as an increase in the detection of 
persons presenting false/counterfeit/forged 
travel documents. In contrast, the numbers 

37 of 70

Refusals of entry
in Q2 2012

highest

lowest

Sources: Frontex Risk Analysis Unit – FRAN data, ESRI geodata

Figure 21.  Poland reported by far the most refusals of entry and one of the most significant increases compared to the 

previous year

of refusals of entry for alert in SIS continue 
to decrease (Fig. 22).

At the air borders, consistent with previous 
reporting periods, refusals of entry decreased 
by 3% compared to previous quarter and 6% 
compared to one year ago. The decrease cor-

responds  to  decreases  in  refusals  of  entry 
in the UK and in Spain, mostly due to fewer 
refusals of entry to Brazilians. This decrease 
corresponds  to  a  decrease  in  detections  of 
illegal stay for Brazilians and is explained by 
stronger economic growths in Brazil, provid-
ing more job opportunities than in the EU.

38 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Figure 22.  In Q2, refusals of entry of Albanians increased at the Greek land border, and the 

lack of sufficient means was the main reason for refusing Albanians. The Greek authorities 

also reported an increase in refusals of entry of Albanians for presenting counterfeit 

documents (not shown)

No sufficient means (reason G)
Alert (reason H)

1 200

1 100

1 000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

M1  M2  M3  M4  M5  M6

M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12

M1  M2  M3  M4  M5  M6

2011 

2012 

Source: FRAN data

Consistent with previous quarters, most re-
fusals  of  entry  (33%)  were  issued  for  third-
country nationals requiring visa to enter the 
EU who presented themselves without visa. 
The second reason was for passengers with-
out appropriate documentation justifying the 
purpose  and  conditions  of  stay  (22%).  Pas-
sengers  refused  entry  for  presenting  false 
visa represented less than 1% of all refusals 
of entry (see Fig. 23).

Following  the  roll  out  of  the  VIS,  on  11  Oc-
tober 2011 with North African countries, the 
number  of  north  Africans  refused  entry  on 
the  ground  of  false/counterfeit/forged  visa 
(or  resident  permit)  decreased  to  69  cases 
compared  to  89  the  quarter  before.  In  Q2 
2011,  before  the  VIS  roll  out,  there  were  68 
cases reported by Member States.

Figure 23.  In Q2 2012, as in previous 

quarters, most refusals were issued for 

lacking visa or lacking justification for the 

purpose of stay. The grounds least reported 

was for false visa, representing less than 1%

D
false visa

I
threat

B
false doc

F 
in 3 months

A 
no valid doc

C 
no visa

H 
alert

G 
no means

E 
no justiﬁcation

Source: FRAN data

39 of 70

4.7. Asylum claims

The number of claims for international pro-
tection was relatively stable in Q2 2012, with 
57 989 applications, which is a stable trend 
compared  to  the  previous  quarter  and  the 
same period in 2011.

Consistent  with  most  reporting  periods, 
Germany received the most applications for 
international  protection  (however  not  tak-
ing into account asylum applications filed in 
France  elsewhere  than  at  the  border,  data 
not  reported  to  the  FRAN).  As  in  previous 
years, applications in Germany decreased be-
tween Q1 and Q2. The decrease was mostly 
due to fewer applications submitted by Ser-
bian nationals.

The largest increase compared to the previ-
ous quarter was reported by Austria, mostly 
due to an increase in Afghans, Russians and 
Pakistanis. At the EU level, the migrants that 
submitted the most applications for inter-
national protection were from Afghanistan 
(6 736). Syrians now ranked second among 
Member States with 3 532 applications, after 
an increase of 44% compared to the previ-
ous quarter, the largest reported increase in 
this quarter. Syrians applied mostly in Ger-
many  and  Sweden,  together  accounting 
for  57%  of  all  asylum  applications  of  Syri-
ans at EU level.

The  reason  that  Syrians  are  (currently) 
concentrating their applications on a small 
number  Member  States  which  they  feel 
promise a higher chance of success. A Ger-
man  court  recently  ruled  that  Syrian  na-
tionals applying for refuge are to be granted 
automatic status on the grounds that the 
very act of exiting Syria in an irregular way 
and asking for international protection may 
upon  return  to  Syria  result  in  torture  and 
prison  sentences.  Sweden  declared  that 
Syrian nationals claiming for asylum will be 
automatically granted refugee status, while 

other  Member  States  are  reviewing  their 
policies. In general, EU Member States have 
refrained from forcibly repatriating Syrians 
back to their country.

Another reason for the high number of asy-
lum applications by Syrian nationals filed in 
Germany and in Sweden might be the pres-
ence of established diaspora communities. 
For  example,  according  to  German  figures 
there  are  significant  communities  in  Ger-
many, Sweden and France. These communi-
ties are characterised by a specific ethnicity; 
the Syrian community in Germany is mostly 
Kurdish and correspondingly so are the asy-
lum seekers.

Migrants from Somalia were ranked fourth 
at the EU level in terms of the number of ap-
plications submitted in Q2 2012, with around 
a third of applications submitted in Sweden, 
followed by Norway.

4.8. Document fraud

Frontex  and  the  FRAN  community  have 
been  exchanging  data  on  detections  of 
false-document  users  since  the  beginning 
of 2009. However, it soon became apparent 
that this indicator had become insufficient 
to effectively describe and analyse increas-
ingly complex modi operandi related to doc-
ument fraud. Hence, following a brief pilot 
project in 2011, in January 2012 Frontex and 
the FRAN community embarked on a much 
more detailed and ambitious data-exchange 
project  in  the  field  of  document  fraud,  to 
be  overseen  by  a  new  specialist  sub-net-
work of the FRAN known as the European 
Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Net-
work (EDF-RAN).

Overall the migrants most associated with 
document fraud in Q2 2012 were from Alba-
nia, Afghanistan, the Ukraine and increas-
ingly Syria.

40 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Migrants from Syria

According to a sample of 26 Member States 
and Schengen Associated Countries, migrants 
from Syria were increasingly detected as doc-
ument fraudsters across the EU.

4.8.1. Entry to the EU/Schengen area 
from third countries

According to a sample of 26 Member States 
and  Schengen  Associated  Countries,  in 
Q2 2012 there were 2 433 detections of doc-
ument fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen 
area  from  third  countries.  Although  long-
term  comparisons  were  not  possible  for 
Member States new to the EDF, or for those 
currently unable to meet the strict report-
ing protocols, it is clear that at the EU level 
document fraud to enter the EU and Schen-
gen area from third countries is increasing. 
However,  much  of  this  increase  was  due 
to a single phenomenon; the use of coun-
terfeit border-crossing stamps by Albanian 
nationals to fabricate travel history and ex-
tend periods of stay. Indeed, Greece reported 
two-thirds of all fraudulent stamps in  the 
current reporting period and, correspond-
ingly the most commonly detected nation-
ality was Albanian, and the most commonly 
detected documents were counterfeit Greek 
and Albanian stamps.

Aside  from  Albanians  using  counterfeit 
stamps, ranked second at the EU level were 
Pakistanis both mostly detected in Greece, 
followed by migrants from Morocco mostly 
detected in Spain, and Nigerians mostly de-
tected in France. Ukrainians have tradition-
ally  been  detected  in  very  high  numbers 
using counterfeit stamps at the Polish bor-
der (as well as fraudulently obtained visas 
not  currently  covered  by  the  EDF).  How-
ever,  in  Q2  2012  there  was  a  reduction  of 
more than half in the number of detected 
Ukrainians.

A people-smuggling gang has been dismantled 
after 3 men were sentenced for a total of 

12 years imprisonment in the Netherlands.

The trio were found guilty of helping up to 50 Iranian mi-
grants to reach the UK illegally following a joint investiga-
tion by the UK Border Agency and Dutch police.

The  3  men,  all  Dutch  citizens  of  Iranian  origin  …  master-
minded  their  illegal  business  from  their  base  in  the  Neth-
erlands… and are believed to have smuggled, or attempted 
to smuggle, up to 50 Iranian nationals into the UK via the 
Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Austria.

UK Border Agency officers, based at Schiphol airport in the 
Netherlands, identified similarities in cases involving Iranian 
nationals travelling from Amsterdam to the UK with forged 
and counterfeit documents.

A  search  of  the  men’s  properties  uncovered  professional 
equipment to produce forged Dutch ID cards, stolen pass-
ports, as well as cash, gold and laptops. Since the ring was 
disrupted, the number of Iranian passengers attempting to 
travel  from  the  Netherlands  to  the  UK  without  adequate 
documentation has dropped significantly.

Source: www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk, 17 July 2012

A  decrease  in  the  extent  to  which  forged 
passports  were  detected  was  reported  in 
2011. At the time, this was interpreted as a 
move away from more sophisticated docu-
ments such as passports towards ID cards 
and  visas.  However,  since  that  time  there 
has  been  an  increase  in  the  number  (and 
overall proportion) of detected forged pass-
ports. For example, in Q2 2012 there were 
305 detections of forged passports which is 
a 50% increase compared to the same pe-
riod in 2011. In contrast, the number of sto-
len blank passports declined over the same 
period, resulting in a stable trend of pass-
ports  overall.  Several  Member  States  that 
have exchanged high quality data over an 

41 of 70

Nineteen visa applicants arrested in Bangladesh

Nineteen London-bound visa applicants have been arrested 
in Bangladesh following 
a joint operation involv-
ing US and Bangladeshi 
police.

The group were arrested 
on suspicion of fraud at 
the  UK  Border  Agency 
in Dhaka. The applicants 
were suspected of pro-
viding forged documen-
tation and false bank statements with their business visitor 
visa applications to attend the Boishaki Mela in East Lon-
don as stall holders.

The  Bangladeshi  police  worked  in  close  cooperation  with 
[UKBA]  officers  in  Dhaka,  discovering  that  the  applicants 
had misrepresented their employment status and produced 
forged bank statements.

The  group  admitted  that  they  had  paid  agents  up  to 
GBP  10  000  each  to  facilitate  their  visa  applications  and 
provide forged documents.”

Source: www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk, 29 May 2012

extended  period  clearly  report  increased 
document fraud. For example, in Italy many 
more migrants from Bangladesh were de-
tected using fraudulent documents, and in 
the UK more Albanians were reported.

In Spain, where it is currently not possible to 
differentiate between detections on entry 
and on exit, detections of fraudulent doc-
uments fell by nearly half compared to the 
same period in 2011.

Detections also nearly halved in Poland com-
pared to the same period in 2011, mostly due 

42 of 70

to  fewer  Ukrainians  detected  with  coun-
terfeit stamps. 

At the land border between Slovakia and the 
Ukraine, the use of false residence permits 
by COD and COG nationals continued dur-
ing  Q2  2012.  The  false  permits  used  by  ir-
regular migrants were for Belgium, France 
and Italy, but also Sweden.

The EDF-ARA 2012 included details of a re-
markable  number  of  COD  nationals,  at-
tempting  to  gain  entry  with  false  travel 
documents at the border between the Rus-
sian  Federation  and  Latvia  in  2011.  In  re-
sponse,  Lithuanian  border  guards  were 
especially  focused  on  profiling  passengers 
of COD nationality. 

Document fraud is not only detected on en-
try to the EU and Schengen area, but also 
very frequently on exit. Also on exit, several 
irregular  migrants  were  detected  leaving 
Schiphol airport towards a range of desti-
nations such as Mexico and Turkey. In the 
former case, two Dutch facilitators of Turk-
ish origin were apprehended accompanying 
a single female irregular migrant, also from 
Turkey, and using a counterfeit Bulgarian ID 
card and passport. According to her state-
ment she lost her own Turkish ID card and 
bought the counterfeit Bulgarian passport 
for EUR 1 000 from a Bulgarian woman. The 
flight tickets had been paid for by the ap-
prehended facilitator.

Between the EU and the Schengen area

In  Q2  2012  there  were  450  detections  of 
fraudulent  documents  made  at  the  bor-
ders between the Schengen area and non-
Schengen  EU  Member  States.  The  vast 
majority of detections were made on entry 
to the EU from the Schengen area (mostly 
reported by the UK) and on exit from the 
Schengen area towards non-Schengen EU 
Member States (reported by a wide range 

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012of  Member  States).  Overall,  these  flows 
were  reduced  compared  to  the  year  pre-
viously in Q2 2011.

Despite some decline, the most significant 
phenomenon between the EU and Schen-
gen area was Albanian migrants attempt-
ing entry to the UK, often leaving from Italy 
and increasingly Germany, and often trav-
elling via Ireland. The most common doc-
uments used were forged Italian ID cards. 
Dutch reports included information on Al-
banians detected travelling from Spain to 
the UK via Schiphol.

In contrast to the declining trend of Alba-
nians, there was a marked increase in the 
number of migrants from Iran detected on 
entry to the UK from the Schengen area. 
They were detected with a wide range of 
documents  including  forged  Italian  pass-
ports  and  on  exit  from  a  wide  range  of 
Schengen states, but mostly Germany. Also 
increasing were the numbers of Indians and 
Afghans attempting entry to the UK and/or 
Ireland  from  Italy  using  British  passports 
with new bio-pages.

Also on exit from the Netherlands, a Dutch 
male  facilitator  of  Afghan  origin  was  ap-
prehended on exit from Eindhoven Airport 
to Dublin accompanying an irregular male 
migrant  from  Afghanistan.  The  migrant 
was  using  a  counterfeit  Hungarian  pass-
port.  According  to  his  statement,  he  had 
paid USD 20 000 for his journey to the UK 
from Afghanistan.

4.8.2. Intra-Schengen

There  was  an  increased  flow  of  Ukrain-
ian, Russian and Georgian migrants enter-
ing Germany from Poland during the first 
4 months 2012. The prevailing pattern for 
Ukrainian migrants is still to misuse their 
Polish visas issued for work reasons, which 
they  obtain  to  be  employed  by  a  specific 

company.  As  they  hold  complete  docu-
ments, is it extremely difficult for the Polish 
border guard to determine their true inten-
tions when they cross the Polish-Ukrainian 
border. When identified in Germany – par-
ticularly  by  mixed  German-Polish  patrols 
–  they  are  not  able  to  provide  the  name 
of  their  supposed  employer,  its  location 
or  even  the  job  itself.  Instead,  they  often 
claim tourist reasons for their travel or ap-
ply for work in a Schengen country other 
than Poland. With respect to Russian na-
tionals,  they  still  tend  to  attempt  family 
reunification or facilitation of compatriots, 
there may be some effects in the future re-
ferring to the continuing ‘brain drain’ de-
scribed in the media.

In the direction from Germany to Poland, the 
effects of the Polish legalisation scheme* are 
still  visible,  though  at  a  lower  scale.  Simi-
larly, to the previous reporting period, mi-
grants detected at the German border with 
Poland  were  mostly  Pakistanis.  In  general 
in May and June 2012 the detections on en-
try  to  Germany  from  Poland  were  higher 
than  in  the  direction  to  Poland.  Irrespec-
tive  of  the  nationality,  most  migrants  still 
tried to enter by car or by bus. Only in some 
cases they used rail connections. However, 
it seems that facilitators increasingly opted 
for a step-by-step method, i.e. using differ-
ent means of transport through Poland and 
Germany. They often entered at the Tere-
spol BCP.

In  Q2  2012,  most  detections  of  document 
fraud at the Polish air border were related to 
intra-Schengen travel. Detections included 
British passports used to fly between War-
saw and Paris, an Indian passport detected 
on a flight from Athens, and an Italian res-
idence permit on a bus between Germany 
and  Poland.  However,  as  was  the  case  in 
Germany  most  cases  of  document  fraud 
involved  intra-Schengen  flights  Athens  – 
Warsaw.  In  May  a  migrant  was  detected 

* Following on similar 
legalisation programmes in 
2003 and 2007, between 
1 January and 1 July 2012 
Polish authorities held 
an amnesty for irregular 
migrants residing in Poland 
(without breaks) since 2007 
and those seeking refugee 
status whose applications 
were rejected after 1 January 
2010. In the amnesty period, 
almost 10 000 migrants 
applied for legalisation, 
most of them Vietnamese, 
Ukrainian, Bangladeshi and 
Armenian nationals.

43 of 70

using a false Bangladeshi passport (forged 
bio page and substituted photo) containing 
a Greek permit of stay.

Also  in  May,  a  Pakistani  migrant  was  de-
tected with a false Pakistani passport (new 
bio page) issued by the Pakistani Embassy in 
Athens containing a Greek permit of stay. Ac-
cording to the migrant’s statement, he was 
the  owner  of  the  document  and  arrived  in 
Poland for visit purposes. However, personal 
search revealed an ID card and two expired 
Pakistani passports, both also issued in the 
Pakistani Embassy in Athens.

Greece to deport 1 600 immigrants arrested in 
Athens

creasing.  Slovenian  reports  include  details 
of increased activity of crime groups work-
ing as bogus travel agencies to fraudulently 
obtain  residence  permits.  Most  of  the  de-
tected  groups  were  located  in  Kosovo  and 
served  to  enable  Kosovo  citizens  to  obtain 
residence  permits.  A  vast  majority  of  such 
residence  permits  were  issued  for  the  pur-
pose  of  labour  and  employment  and  were 
linked to fake companies established in Slo-
venia  to  simulate  demand  for  labour  force. 
People in possession of such residence per-
mits  were  often  not  aware  of  the  aim  and 
purpose  of  the  residence  and  work  permit 
issued to them.

Detections of fraudulently obtained visas on 
entry to Schiphol airport increased by more 
than a third during the first 6 months of 2012 
compared to the same period in 2011.

Greek police say more than 1 600 illegal immigrants will be 
deported following a major crackdown in Athens in recent 
days. More than 6 000 people have been detained, though 
most were released.

4.9. Returns

4.9.1. Decisions to return

Public  Order  Minister  Nikos  Dendias  defended  the  crack-
down. He said Greece’s economic plight meant it could not 
afford  an  ‘invasion  of  immigrants’.  He  called  the  immigra-
tion issue a ‘bomb at the foundations of the society and of 
the state’. ‘Unless we create the proper structure to handle 
immigration, then we will fall apart,’ he said. Some 88 ille-
gal immigrants were sent back to Pakistan on Sunday. The 
Greek authorities have increased the number of guards at 
the border with Turkey amid fears there may be a sudden 
influx of refugees entering Greek territory as the situation 
in Syria deteriorates. More than 80% of migrants entering 
the European Union do so through Greece, which is in the 
grip of its worst recession in decades.

Source: www.bbc.co.uk, 6 August 2012

4.8.3. Legal channels

Many reports conclude that the abuse of le-
gal  channels  to  enter  the  EU  illegally  is  in-

44 of 70

In Q2 2012, there were 67 891 third-country 
nationals subject to an obligation to leave the 
EU  as  a  result  of  an  administrative  or  judi-
cial decision, which was rather similar to the 
previous quarter (-3%). Excluding Italy, which 
changed its reporting definition for 2012, the 
total a year ago also remained relatively stable 
(+6%). However, this figure is an underestima-
tion of the total number of decisions reached 
in the EU, as data on decisions were unavail-
able from, inter alia, France and the Nether-
lands, where it is assumed that relatively high 
numbers of decisions were reached.

Nearly 60% of the total reported decisions at 
the EU level were in just three Member States: 
Greece, Italy and the UK. In Greece, most de-
cisions  were  taken  for  Afghans,  who  were 
also  ranking  first  for  illegal  border-crossing 
and second for illegal stay, while in Italy, most 
decisions were taken for Tunisians. It should 
be noted that Greece did not report any de-

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012cisions to return Pakistanis for the month of 
June, while there was a large number of re-
turns reported for April and May 2012.

bers  were  rather  stable  in  most  Member 
States, Greece reported a sharp increase in 
returns of Syrians as of June 2012 (Fig. 24).

4.9.2. Effective returns

In  Q2  2012,  there  were  40  299  third-coun-
try national effectively returned outside the 
EU,  the  same  number  as  in  Q1.  This  total 
does not include effective returns between 
Member States, but only outside the EU. The 
UK  was  the  Member  State  conducting  the 
largest  number  of  returns,  mostly  to  India 
and Pakistan.

At the EU level, Albanians were returned in 
the largest number, mostly by Greece, where 
they were reported as the top fifth nationality 
for illegal stay and for illegal border-crossing. 
By contrast, Sweden reported a large increase 
in detections of Albanians staying illegally, but 
did not report any effective returns.

Syrians  were  not  returned  in  large  number 
(less than 300 persons), but while the num-

There was much variation among Member 
States in the extent to which return decisions 
translated into effective returns. For example, 
as was the case throughout 2011, in Q2 2012 
Greece implemented by far the lowest num-
ber of effective returns per decisions reached. 
In fact, there are two significant flows into 
Greece: nearly all the return decisions reflect 
migrants detected at the Greek border with 
Turkey, while nearly all the effective returns 
were of Albanians who originated from the 
Greek border with Albania.

Among  the  large  increases,  Portugal  re-
ported a large number of effective returns 
of  Brazilians.  At  EU  level,  Brazilians  stay-
ing  illegally  are  mostly  reported  by  Por-
tugal,  showing  a  steady  decreasing  trend 
since early 2011.

Figure 24.  A relatively low number of Syrians has been returned since early 2011, but Greece 

sharply increased the number of Syrians returned in June 2012

EU (except Greece)
Greece

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

M1  M2  M3  M4  M5  M6

M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12

M1  M2  M3  M4  M5  M6

2011 

2012 

Source: FRAN data

45 of 70

4.10. Other illegal activities at 
the border

Cross-border  criminal  activity  represents  a 
significant challenge to the effective manage-
ment of the external border of the EU. The 
smuggling  of  tobacco  products,  drugs  and 
trafficking in stolen vehicles continue to be 
the most widespread illegal activities along 
the external border in Q2 2012.

Examples of criminal activity uncovered dur-
ing  Q2  2012  demonstrate  the  use  of  highly 
complex modi operandi by criminal groups in 
order to evade detection and maximise prof-
its. Illustrative examples include the use of a 
purpose-built railway tunnel used for smug-
gling cigarettes between Ukraine and Slova-
kia and a sophisticated trafficking network 
transporting victims from the Dominican Re-
public via Turkey and Greece to Spain, where 
they are exploited as sex workers.

4.10.1. Types of illegal activities

Smuggling of tobacco, petrol, weapons 
and other illicit goods

The smuggling of tobacco products remains 
the most frequently detected and widespread 
criminal activity along the external border of 
the  EU.  Detections  of  cigarette  smuggling 
during JO Focal Points Land 2012 were almost 
equally  split  between  the  Eastern  Borders 
route, primarily Moldova, Belarus & Ukraine, 
and the Eastern Mediterranean route along 
the borders with Turkey (Fig. 25).

Overall the volume of detected smuggled to-
bacco products in Q2 2012 decreased mini-

mally  compared  to  Q1  2012  possibly  due  to 
a shift in reporting priorities and a decrease 
in local traffic along the border with Ukraine 
preceding  and  during  the  UEFA  Euro  2012, 
which took place in June 2012. However, the 
overall number of incidents of tobacco smug-
gling increased significantly due to increased 
detections at the Bulgarian border with Tur-
key and Romania’s border with Ukraine.

Smuggling of drugs

Known  to  be  particularly  profitable,  the 
smuggling of drugs continued to be a major 
challenge to border security along the exter-
nal  borders.  For  example,  the  trafficking  of 
heroin from Central Asia into the EU particu-
larly affected the border with Turkey, while 
the Western Mediterranean route was used 
primarily for the smuggling of cocaine origi-
nating in South America, and marijuana from 
African suppliers. There are indications that 
hashish originating from Morocco is smuggled 
through the Eastern Mediterranean Route in 
addition to the traditional Western Mediter-
ranean and Western African routes.

EU  international  airports  continued  to  be 
under strain from frequent attempts of drug 
smuggling. The Netherlands reported an in-
crease  in  attempts  to  smuggle  heroin  via 
cargo transports originating in Asia.

Stolen vehicles

Stolen  vehicles  detected  on  exit  from  the 
EU were primarily reported along the East-
ern border, the Western Balkans Route and 
at the border with Turkey. 

46 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Frontex receives study on anti-corruption measures in EU border control

The Sofia-based think-tank Center for the Study of Democracy* has delivered a study on 
corruption perception and attitudes among the border guard community across Europe. 
The report was commissioned by Frontex and explores both corruption and anti-corrup-
tion measures in border guard authorities across EU Member States.

With border guards frequently exposed to bribing attempts in order to facilitate illegal 
entry or the smuggling of illicit goods, corruption is thought to be a serious issue in bor-
der security. Cases in previous years have shown that criminal networks actively seek out 
and approach border guards with monetary offers in exchange for assistance in the smug-
gling of cigarettes, petrol or irregular migrants. Any corruption among border guards po-
tentially enables uninhibited and profitable cross-border criminal activities, and thus has the potential to gravely 
undermine the efforts of Member States and Frontex to secure the external border. The proceeds of illegal ac-
tivity facilitated by corruption provide additional capital for organised criminal groups, which can be invested 
in other activities and criminal undertakings.

This extensive new study aims to classify types of corruption, identify environmental factors enabling corrup-
tion and compile information on existing anti-corruption policy approaches. Corruption pressures and oppor-
tunities represent the main factors enabling corrupt practices among border guards. These include institutional 
and social factors such as cultural and institutional acceptance of corruption, income disparities and the wide-
spread presence of criminal networks.

The study sets out a number of key anti-corruption measures specifically addressing the operational needs of 
border guard authorities addressing personnel and deployment management, discipline and integrity testing, 
internal audit and electronic surveillance. Many of these measures are already shared across the EU member 
state border authorities and serve as examples of best practice.

The study based its findings on a comprehensive survey sent to all EU member states focusing on current prac-
tices and perceptions, rather than measuring the possible extent of corruption among border guards along spe-
cific border sections. The report recommends the establishment of common anti-corruption principles across 
the EU and the inclusion of corruption issues in border security risk assessments.

http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Research/AntiCorruption_Measures_in_EU_Border_Control.pdf

*  www.csd.bg

Trafficking in human beings

Trafficking in human beings continues to pose 
a challenge to border authorities across Eu-
rope. Criminal networks continue to be en-
gaged in this activity and in this quarter there 
have been reports describing a sophisticated 
organised criminal group trafficking victims 
from  the  Dominican  Republic  to  Spain  via 

Turkey and Greece. Overall, law enforcement 
agencies  across  the  EU  suffer  from  a  lack 
of  reliable  intelligence  regarding  this  activ-
ity.  Contrary  to  some  media  reports,  there 
was  no  reported  increase  in  the  detection 
of trafficking victims prior to and during the 
UEFA Euro 2012.

47 of 70

ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURESIN EU BORDER CONTROLCENTER FORTHE STUDY OFDEMOCRACYANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURESIN EU BORDER CONTROLJoint Operation Eurocup 2012

Frontex’s Joint Operation Eurocup 2012 aimed to strengthen border security during the European Football Cham-
pionship 2012 and to enhance operational cooperation with Poland and Ukraine. The results of JO Eurocup 2012 
demonstrate that concerns over a potential significant increase in criminal cross-border activity voiced in the 
media prior to the event in July 2012 were largely unfounded. The Joint Operation’s outcomes were largely in line 
with the conclusions drawn in Frontex’s Tailored Risk Analysis drawn up prior to the UEFA Championship 2012 
predicting detections of stolen vehicles and cases of cigarette smuggling.

During the operation, only 80 cases involving the smuggling of goods and 44 detections of stolen vehicles were 
reported. A majority of the smuggling cases were reported at the border with Belarus – 50 incidents (49 cases 
of cigarette smuggling and 1 case of smuggling explosives), followed by the border section between Poland and 
Ukraine (18 cases – only tobacco and cigarette smuggling).

Polish, Bulgarian and Spanish border guards at BCP Korczowa during 
JO Eurocup 2012

Joint duty of Guest Officer and Polish border guard in Krościenko 
during JO Eurocup 2012

During the single month of JO Eurocup 2012, BCPs reported the detection of 44 stolen vehicles, of which 15 were 
registered as stolen in the SIS. In 19 cases border guard officers found altered vehicle identification numbers 
(VIN). Reports from JO Eurocup 2012 also show an increasing number of stolen motorbikes, carried in a hidden 
compartment of lorries or mini-vans. The five BCPc with the highest number of reported stolen vehicles were: 
Dorohusk (11), Medyka (10), Korczowa (4), Hrebenne (3) and Terespol (3).

Source: Polish Border Guard, Bieszczadzki Regional Unit - www.bieszczadzki.strazgraniczna.pl

4.10.2. Irregular migration routes

4.10.2.1. Eastern Borders Route

Unique  among  border  sections,  the  East-
ern Borders of the EU are considered to be 
more  vulnerable  to  cross-border  criminal 
activity than irregular migration. For exam-
ple,  smuggling  of  cigarettes,  petrol,  drugs 
and other excise goods constitute the main 
challenges to effective border management 
at this section of the border. The exit of ve-
hicles stolen within the European Union en 
route to destinations in the Russian Federa-
tion, Ukraine and Central Asia is also a ma-
jor  concern.  During  the  second  quarter  of 

2012 there were a number of Frontex coor-
dinated operations along the eastern borders 
including Focal Points Land 2012 and JO Eu-
rocup 2012 (see box).

Smuggling of tobacco products

The  smuggling  of  tobacco  remained  the 
most prevalent offence at the eastern border 
(Fig. 25) despite the overall detected volume 
of smuggled tobacco and cigarettes decreas-
ing from the first quarter in 2012. Significant 
price differentials for tobacco products be-
tween EU Member States and neighbouring 
third countries continued to drive smuggling 
activity along the border.

48 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012The external border section with Ukraine re-
mained particularly affected by this problem. 
For example, in Q2 2012 Hungary, Slovakia and 
Poland all reported frequent incidents of cig-
arette smuggling along their border sections 
with Ukraine. Although there was an over-
all decrease in the share of detections at the 
border with the Ukraine during Q2 2012, the 
smuggling of tobacco products remained a 
significant problem at these border sections. 
This decrease might be explained by a shift 
in reporting priorities during the UEFA Euro 
2012, which took place in Ukraine and Poland, 
as  well  as  an  associated  substantial  reduc-
tion in the local cross-border traffic at Pol-
ish  BCPs  with  Ukraine.  Long  queues  at  the 
border caused by football fans travelling be-
tween Eurocup match locations in Poland and 
Ukraine, combined with more intensive con-
trols at the border most likely deterred local 
traffic and individual smugglers throughout 
May and June resulting in a drop in detections. 
It is expected that the number of detections 
will pick up again immediately subsequent to 
the reporting period.

The Romanian border section with Moldova 
reported an increase in the number of detec-
tions  in  Q2  compared  to  Q1  2012;  the  num-
ber of incidents increased two-fold while the 
quantity of seized tobacco products rose sub-
stantially. However, this increase in detections 
should not be overstated as it may be attrib-
uted to the deployment of additional border 
guards to BCPs newly participating in JO Fo-
cal Points Land 2012 along this border section. 
Detections of cigarette and tobacco smuggling 
were primarily made during searches of private 
cars, often revealing hidden compartments in 
doors, fuel tanks or the vehicle’s wheels.

There  was  increased  attention  paid  to  the 
problem  of  smuggling  of  tobacco  products 
in  the  media  with  reports  of  a  record  high 
in the consumption of illicit cigarettes in the 
EU.* While some of this increase in availabil-
ity and consumption of illicit tobacco can be 

Figure 25.  There was an increase in 

detections of cigarette smuggling at the 

border with Moldova and a substantial 

reduction at the border with Ukraine

Share of detected incidents of smuggling of tobacco 
products in Q4 2011, Q1 & Q2 2012 by borders with 
third countries

Others
4%

Serbia
4%

Belarus
4%

Q4 2011

Ukraine
55%

Moldova
33%

Others 
1%

Moldova
12%

Belarus
18%

Q1 2012

Turkey
43%

Ukraine
26%

Ukraine
6%

Others 
9%

Russian 
Federation
7%

Turkey
45%

Q2 2012

Belarus
14%

Moldova
19%

Source: JO Focal Points Land 2012

*  http://euobserver.com/22/116712

49 of 70

Slovak Authorities Discover Sophisticated Smuggling Tunnel

In early July 2012, authorities in Slovakia also discovered a 700-metre-long tunnel leading from the western Ukrain-
ian city of Uzhorod into Slovak territory used for the smuggling of cigarettes. The tunnel was a sophisticated 
construction and contained a rudimentary railway line for swift transportation under the border. During their 
raid, Slovak police also seized 2.5 million contraband cigarettes. Slovak Finance Minister Peter Kazimir stated that 
‘We can assume excise tax evasion could reach up to 50 million euros, in case the tunnel was used for a year.’

Further information received from Slovak authorities contradicted media reports and confirmed that the tun-
nel was not used for trafficking human beings or the smuggling of irregular migrants. The cigarettes seized as 
part of the police operation were intended for distribution in the Slovak market as well as other EU countries, 
primarily the Czech Republic and Germany. The investigation of two Slovak suspects is still underway.

The tunnel crossed the border of Slovakia and Ukraine and featured a railway line to transport illicit goods

Sources: www.michalovce.korzar.sme.sk, reuters.com, Kyiv Post

attributed to illegal tobacco factories in Po-
land and the Baltic States, the smuggling of 
tobacco products across the Eastern Borders 
is  also  a  significant  factor  in  this  develop-
ment. There has been an increase in the de-
tection of smuggled cigarettes and tobacco 
from the Russian Federation over the past 6 
months. These smuggled cigarettes are des-
tined for the German and UK markets via Po-
land and Lithuania.

smugglers’  frequently  cross  the  border  car-
rying relatively small quantities of cigarettes, 
while organised crime syndicates aim to smug-
gle large quantities of cigarettes/tobacco with 
fewer border crossings in order to reduce the 
probability  of  detection.  Large  quantities  of 
illicit tobacco goods were often concealed in 
commercial vehicles such as lorries, busses or 
trains and there were continued reports of de-
tections of this modus operandi.

There were no significant changes in modi op-
erandi used in smuggling cigarettes; depending 
on  the  nature  and  size  of  smuggling  activi-
ties, smugglers continue to employ a range of 
suitable modi operandi. So-called individual ‘ant 

The  smuggling  of  larger  quantities  of  ciga-
rettes in regular passenger vehicles contin-
ued to be detected with frequency. In these 
cases it is not always clear whether the per-
petrators operate as individuals or as mem-

50 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012bers of a larger criminal network. Passenger 
vehicles  smuggling  large  amounts  of  cig-
arettes  were  also  detected  at  the  Polish-
Ukrainian border.

Figure 26.  The distribution of detections 

of stolen vehicles on exit among border 

sections varied little over the last three 

reporting periods

According to information submitted by Polish 
border guards as part of JO Focal Points Land 
2012, there were also repeated detections of 
smugglers attempting to conceal large quan-
tities of cigarettes in railway engines on trains 
passing from Belarus to Poland.

Stolen vehicles

The exit of stolen vehicles and machinery along 
the Eastern Borders destined for markets in the 
Russian Federation, Ukraine and Central Asia 
remained  a  significant  problem.  Detections 
have  steadily  increased  during  the  first  half 
of 2012. The Eastern Borders Route accounts 
for 60% of all detections of stolen vehicles on 
exit from the EU during JO Focal Points Land 
2012 in Q2 2012.

The border with Ukraine remains the main exit 
point for vehicles stolen in the EU with a 40% 
share of detections of all stolen vehicles de-
tected on exit during Focal Points Land 2012. 
In Q2 2012 the distribution of border sections 
where stolen vehicles were detected on exit re-
mained roughly the same as in Q1 2012 (Fig. 26).

The smuggling of vehicles in parts, particu-
larly motor bikes, or with the aid of document 
fraud and use of cloned genuine documents 
continued to feature as popular modi operandi. 
For example, during May and June 2012 Polish 
authorities stopped and detained several lor-
ries on exit to the Russian Federation carrying 
parts of complete stolen vehicles. The smug-
glers were identified to be of Polish, Czech and 
Ukrainian nationalities making it difficult to 
profile at-risk nationalities for searches. 

The theft of agricultural and industrial vehicles 
is becoming an increasing problem in Member 
States of the EU. Media reports and police sta-

Share of detected vehicles on exit in Q4 2011, Q1 & Q2 
2012 by borders with third countries

Turkey
4%

Serbia
6%

Belarus
14%

Croatia
22%

Q4 2011

Ukraine
54%

Turkey
3%

Moldova
3%

Belarus
15%

Serbia
17%

Others 
6%

Turkey
9%

Q1 2012

Ukraine
42%

Croatia
20%

Ukraine
46%

Q2 2012

Belarus
12%

Serbia
13%

Croatia
15%

Source: JO Focal Points Land 2012

51 of 70

tined for the Russian Federation and Ukraine 
exiting  the  EU  at  the  Eastern  Borders.  Few 
identification marks on these unfamiliar ve-
hicles render the detection of stolen vehicles 
difficult. Police and industry are cooperating 
to make it easier to identify specific vehicles 
once reported stolen. In April 2012 Polish bor-
der guards identified and recovered a stolen 
JCB digger worth approximately EUR 40 000 
during the attempted exit to the Russian ex-
clave of Kaliningrad (Fig. 27).

t
i
n
U

l

i

a
n
o
g
e
R

i

k
s
r
u
z
a
M

,

d
r
a
u
G
r
e
d
r
o
B
h
s
i
l

o
P
©

Figure 27.  A recovered stolen excavator 

at BCP Grzechotki (Poland-Russian 

Petrol smuggling

Federation)

tistics from Germany indicated an increase in 
the theft of agricultural machinery in the bor-
der regions with Poland and the Czech Repub-
lic. Similarly to passenger cars, it is suspected 
that these stolen vehicles were mostly des-

Compared to Q1 2012, overall petrol prices in 
Member States along the Eastern Borders de-
creased  during  Q2  2012,  however  price  dif-
ferentials  along  some  border  sections  still 
deliver a significant profit incentive for pet-
rol smugglers (Tab. 2 & Fig. 28).

Table 2:  An overall decrease in petrol prices in Member States at the external border of the EU somewhat reduced the 

profit incentive of petrol smuggling

Price of Euro-Super 95 fuel in Q2 2012 in Member States and neighbouring third countries and respective price differences; Comparison of price differential 
between Member States and third countries in Q1 2012 and Q2 2012 as well as percentage change (in EUR)

Border

Finland-Russia

Lithuania-Belarus

Poland-Belarus

Estonia-Russia

Poland-Russia

Slovakia-Ukraine

Greece-Albania

Hungary-Ukraine

Greece-fYROM

Poland-Ukraine

Romania-Ukraine

Romania-Moldova

Hungary-Serbia

Hungary-Croatia

Slovenia-Croatia

Bulgaria-Serbia

Romania-Serbia

Bulgaria-fYROM

Greece-Turkey

Bulgaria-Turkey

2012 Q1

2012 Q2

EU Country

Third Country

Price difference

EU Country

Third Country

Price difference

Change in price 
differential  
Q1 to Q2 2012

1.70

1.43

1.40

1.42

1.4

1.57

1.82

1.51

1.82

1.40

1.28

1.28

1.51

1.51

1.49

1.31

1.28

1.30

1.82

1.30

0.74

0.68

0.68

0.74

0.74

1.09

1.37

1.09

1.42

1.09

1.09

1.11

1.36

1.49

1.49

1.36

1.36

1.42

1.94

1.94

0.96

0.75

0.72

0.68

0.66

0.48

0.45

0.42

0.40

0.31

0.19

0.17

0.15

0.02

0

-0.05

-0.08

-0.12

-0.12

-0.64

1.62

1.36

1.35

1.31

1.35

1.54

1.68

1.46

1.68

1.35

1.25

1.25

1.46

1.46

1.41

1.21

1.25

1.21

1.68

1.21

0.73

0.58

0.58

0.73

0.73

1.10

1.39

1.10

1.22

1.10

1.10

1.05

1.36

1.34

1.34

1.36

1.36

1.22

1.93

1.93

0.89

0.78

0.77

0.58

0.62

0.44

0.29

0.36

0.46

0.25

0.15

0.20

0.1

0.12

0.07

-0.15

-0.11

-0.01

-0.25

-0.72

-7.3%

4.0%

6.9%

-15%

-6.1%

-8.3%

-36%

-14%

15%

-19%

-21%

18%

-33%

500%

n/a

200%

38%

-92%

108%

13%

Source: European Commission Oil Bulletins (26/03/2012 and 25/06/2012) and open source data for third countries.

52 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost of 1 litre of petrol

Source: European Commission Oil Bulletin (25/06/2012) and open source data for third countries, ESRI geodata

FRONTEX, August,2012

Figure 28.  Petrol price differentials increasing the profit incentive of smuggling into the EU were most apparent 
between Member States and Belarus and Russia

53 of 70

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explosives found by Polish Border Guards during UEFA Euro 2012

On June 27 2012, Polish border guards on patrol discovered a suspicious 
package on a raft floating on the Polish side of the River Bug (see photo). 
The  package  reportedly  contained  ‘some  explosives  and  a  cell  phone 
that had the photo of Warsaw’s National Stadium in its memory’. The 
raft also carried a quantity of contraband cigarettes.

The River Bug demarcates a section of the border between Poland and 
the Ukraine. The river is a popular crossing point for smugglers trans-
porting illicit tobacco products from Ukraine to Poland. Rafts are com-
monly used by these smugglers. However, until now no link between 
explosives and cigarette smuggling has emerged.

2
1

0
2

x
e
t
n
o
r
F
©

Poland’s easternmost point, the River Bug bend, Polish-
Ukrainian borderland

The  incident  caused  concern  among  the  Polish  security  community  and  prompted  the  elevation  of  national 
threat levels from one to four on four-scale. ‘We have received certain information that pointed to a potential 
appearance of a terrorist threat,’ said Interior Minister Jacek Cichocki. ‘But there is no indication of a concrete 
danger for a specific place or person.’ The ministry said the decision was preventative and was only meant to 
ensure that ‘the services responsible for security are on high alert’. 

Sources: football.uk.reuters.com; www.thenews.pl, 28 June 2012

Specifically, an increase in the price of fuel in 
Ukraine during Q2 reduced the profitability of 
petrol smuggling by more than 20%. The price 
differentials  between  Poland  and  Ukraine, 
Romania  and  Ukraine,  as  well  as  Hungary 
and Ukraine dropped by 19%, 21% and 14%, re-
spectively. Decreasing petrol prices in Esto-
nia, Finland, Lithuania and Poland cut profit 
margins on petrol smuggled in from the Rus-
sian Federation, where prices remained at a 
level similar to Q1 2012.

Smuggling of drugs

The  Eastern  Borders  route  is  not  currently 
a  major  entry  point  for  drugs  into  the  EU. 
However, detections in previous quarters in-
dicate that there is some cross-border smug-
gling of narcotics from Poland towards the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine – particu-
larly  amphetamines  produced  in  the  Polish 
border region.

Focal Points Land 2012 registered a serious in-
cident at the Romanian border with Moldova 
when  border  guards  discovered  3  840  pills 
of anabolic steroids on a Bulgarian national.

Trafficking in human beings

Organised  crime  groups  continued  to  use 
the Eastern Borders route for trafficking hu-
man beings for the purposes of prostitution 
or  forced  labour.  However,  in  recent  years 
the importance of Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation  as  source  and  transit  countries 
for trafficking victims heading to the EU has 
somewhat  decreased.  Due  to  the  ease  of 
access  and  less  stringent  intra-EU  border 
checks,  traffickers  have  in  recent  years  fo-
cused  their  activities  on  Romania  and  Bul-
garia, which have consequently emerged as 
the primary source countries for victims of 
trafficking in the EU.

54 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012 
 
4.10.2.2. Western Balkans route

Smuggling of drugs

The  smuggling  of  drugs,  particularly  mari-
juana, along the Western Balkans route is less 
prevalent compared to the Eastern or West-
ern Mediterranean routes. However, Albania 
remains a significant producer of marijuana 
intended  for  distribution  in  the  EU.  Mari-
juana from Albania is smuggled into the EU 
along the Western Balkans Route and des-
tined for sale in Germany and France. Focal 
Points Land 2012 recorded several detections 
of  smaller  quantities  of  marijuana  smug-
gled  by  individuals  of  varying  nationalities. 
The  small  quantities  involved  indicate  that 
the drugs seized were intended for personal 
consumption rather than street distribution.

Previously  there  have  been  reports  of  fre-
quent  detections  of  smaller  quantities  of 
drugs such as amphetamine, diazepam and 
other substances both on exit from and entry 
to the EU along the Western Balkans region.

Smuggling of weapons

An  abundance  of  arms  of  all  sizes  ranging 
from  rifles  and  guns  to  high-grade  explo-
sives stemming from the Balkan conflicts of 
the 1990s is still readily available on the black 
markets of former Yugoslav states and some 
weapons continue to be smuggled into the 
EU via the Western Balkans route. Accord-
ing to the Slovenian bi-monthly report, dur-
ing the reporting period there was a major 
case of arms smuggling at the border with 
Serbia. Slovenian border guards found sev-
eral assault rifles, hand guns and ammuni-
tion in the trunk of a passenger car driven 
by a Serbian national. Hence, Slovenian au-
thorities  believe  that  the  Western  Balkans 
route  is  still  an  active  route  for  the  smug-
gling of arms into the EU.

s
n
o
m
m
o
C
a
d
e
p
k
W

i

i

i

:

©

Figure 29.  Telescopic truncheon 

Several  seizures  of  ammunition  during  Q2 
2012 at the Slovenian border to Croatia and 
the Hungarian border to Serbia would sup-
port  this  view.  However,  the  extent  and 
nature of the smuggling activity is unclear. 
There is a lack of intelligence as to whether 
smuggling  is  largely  restricted  to  ammu-
nition  with  some  exceptional  incidents  in-
volving the transfer of weapons or whether 
this activity is driven by individuals or larger 
criminal networks.

The  majority  of  illegal  weapon  detections 
at the border were of telescopic truncheons 
(Fig. 29) at the border between Slovenia and 
Croatia. Telescopic truncheons are illegal in 
Slovenia and routinely confiscated when dis-
covered upon entry to the country.

Stolen vehicles

In  Q2  2012  the  Western  Balkans  Route  ac-
counted for 30% of all stolen vehicles detected 
on exit from the EU as part of JO Focal Points 
Land  2012.  Detections  were  shared  equally 
between the border sections of Hungary-Ser-
bia and Slovenia-Croatia. Most of the stolen 
cars were luxury passenger vehicles of expen-
sive makes such as BMW, Mercedes or Audi. 
There was no significant change in the mo-
dus operandi employed by smugglers of sto-
len vehicles. 

55 of 70

 
 
Smuggling of petrol

High petrol prices in Serbia compared to EU 
Member States along the Western Balkans 
route, with the exception of Hungary, makes 
petrol smuggling an unprofitable activity. In 
contrast, price differentials of petrol are most 
significant between Greece and fYROM; how-
ever, there have been no reported incidents 
of petrol smuggling as part of Focal Points 
Land  Borders  2012  in  the  current  reporting 
period. Previously reported increases in the 
price differential between Greece and Alba-
nia have somewhat receded due to an over-
all decrease in petrol prices both in Albania 
and Greece during Q2 2012.

Petrol prices in Croatia are minimally cheaper 
compared to Hungary and Slovenia, however, 
it is unclear if this minimal difference is suf-
ficient incentive for petrol smugglers to op-
erate  along  this  border  section  particularly 
in light of overall falling petrol prices on both 
sides of the borders.

4.10.2.3. Eastern Mediterranean route

Cross-border  criminal  activity  on  the  East-
ern Mediterranean route largely consists of 
the smuggling of drugs, cigarettes and sto-
len vehicles on exit from the EU. There are 
reports that this route is also used as an en-
try point to the EU by organised crime groups 
engaging in the trafficking in human beings.

Smuggling of drugs

The smuggling of narcotics on this route re-
mains a major concern. Heroin produced in 
Central Asia (primarily Afghanistan) transits 
through Turkey and enters the EU concealed 
in commercial and private vehicles as well as 
trains. Improvements in the transportation 
infrastructure linking south-east Europe, Tur-
key and Central Asia (TRACECA) contributed 
to an increase in overall legitimate traffic and 
trade, but also the smuggling of drugs along 

this route. The smuggling of large quantities 
of heroin in lorries or on trains remains pop-
ular reducing the probability of detection. In 
April Turkish authorities seized a lorry driven 
by a Turkish national transporting 72.3 kg of 
heroin hidden in a concealed compartment 
amongst furniture. The heroin was destined 
for the European street market and author-
ities were able to establish that the lorry en-
tered Turkey at the Turkish-Iranian border.

Bulgarian authorities ceased a record amount 
of  12  tons  worth  some  EUR  360  million  of 
hashish  in  a  warehouse  outside  of  Sofia 
(Fig.  30).  The  drugs  were  thought  to  have 
originated  in  Morocco  and  were  smuggled 
to Bulgaria by fishermen arriving at a Black 
Sea port. Official reports indicated that the 
drugs were stored at the warehouse prior to 
their transport to and distribution in Belgium 
and the Netherlands. This seizure and other 
operations  suggest  that  some  drugs  previ-
ously smuggled through the Western Med-
iterranean  and  Western  African  routes  are 
being diverted to enter the EU via the East-
ern Mediterranean route.

g
b
.
r
v
m

.
s
s
e
r
p
©

Figure 30.  A total of 12 tonnes of hashish 

have been discovered in a tool warehouse 

in the village of Mirovyane, near the capital 

Sofia in Bulgaria, destined for distribution 

in the EU

56 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012 
The difficult truth about trafficking

Commission strategy aims to tackle trafficking.

There are no EU-wide standards for data-collection. As a consequence, there are ‘significant intelligence 
gaps’ on human trafficking, according to Europol, the EU’s police co-operation agency.

‘Assessments of the level of trafficking throughout the EU are based on incomplete data and are, at best, 
partially informed estimates,’ Europol wrote in a report last September. As a result, neither Europol nor the 
European Commission wants to hazard a guess as to how many people are trafficked each year. The Euro-
pean Commission on Tuesday (19 June 2012) adopted a strategy that it hopes will help combat human traf-
ficking. It sets five broad priorities, including the prevention of trafficking, the provision of assistance to 
victims, and better prosecution of traffickers. It proposes a range of measures to be taken by the Commis-
sion or other parties. Implementation on the Commission side will rest with Myria Vassiliadou, the Com-
mission’s anti-trafficking co-ordinator, who started in her newly created post one year ago.

Drafted by the team of Cecilia Malmström, the European commissioner for home affairs, the strategy is care-
ful to stress the primary responsibility of the European Union’s member states for dealing with the crime of 
trafficking. But there is a certain impatience among EU officials with the slow pace of legal harmonisation 
and other forms of co-operation between the member states. 

Source: www.europeanvoice.com, 21 June 2012

Smuggling of tobacco products

Along the Eastern Mediterranean Route, cig-
arette smuggling was almost exclusively de-
tected at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. This 
border  section  alone  accounted  for  45%  of 
all detected incidents of cigarette smuggling 
during JO Focal Points Land 2012 in Q2 2012, 
this share remains unchanged from Q1 2012. 
Smugglers were mostly Bulgarian nationals 
carrying either relatively small quantities of 
cigarettes or larger quantities of up to sev-
eral kilos of loose tobacco.

Smuggling of petrol & alcohol

Petrol  prices  in  Turkey  are  generally  higher 
than  in  either  Greece  or  Bulgaria  providing 
little incentive for petrol smuggling into the 
EU in this region. However, the petrol price 

differential between Bulgaria and Turkey may 
actually render petrol smuggling out of the 
EU a profitable prospect (Tab. 2).

Isolated cases of alcohol smuggling at the Bul-
garian-Turkish border indicate that this was 
not a widespread problem. However, in Q2 
2012 a single Bulgarian national was appre-
hended at Lesovo BCP attempting to smug-
gle  a  large  quantity  of  alcohol  (916  l)  from 
Turkey to Greece via Bulgaria.

During Q2 2012, the border section between 
Turkey and Bulgaria also saw several attempts 
of the smuggling of precious metals such as 
gold and silver in considerable quantities. In 
two incidents 2.5 kg of gold and 2.4 kg of sil-
ver were seized by border guards.

57 of 70

2
1

0
2
o
a
d
n

l

I

O

J

,

x
e
t
n
o
r
F
©

Figure 31.  A pleasure boat and rubber dinghy with high-powered engine, both detected 

smuggling drugs during JO Indalo 2012

4.10.2.4. Western Mediterranean and 
Western African routes

The Western Mediterranean and Western Af-
rican  routes  are  major  entry  routes  for  the 
smuggling  of  drugs  into  Europe.  The  drugs 
tend to originate in South and Central Amer-
ica (cocaine) as well as Northern and Western 
Africa (hashish/marijuana) and are smuggled 
into the EU for street distribution.

May 2012 saw the launch of Joint Operation 
Indalo 2012, which covers large parts of the 
Western Mediterranean sea. JO Indalo is the 
first  EU  inter-agency  cooperation  involving 
Frontex, EMSA, Europol and CeCLAD-M; al-
most  immediately  the  operation  produced 
promising  results.  For  example,  in  Q2  2012, 
some 35 arrests were made following 21 in-
cidents of detected drug smuggling, and the 
amount of seized drugs (hashish) exceeds 12 
tonnes  with  an  estimated  market  value  of 
EUR  18.8  million.  Despite  the  detection  of 
hashish originating from Morocco along the 
Eastern  Borders  Route,  the Western  Medi-
terranean  Route  appears  to  remain  a  pop-
ular  route  for  drug  smugglers  transporting 
hashish  from  North  Africa  to  Spain  for  dis-
tribution in Europe.

It  is  believed  that  the  seized  hashish  orig-
inated  almost  exclusively  from  Morocco. 
Smugglers  of  mostly  Spanish  or  Moroccan 
nationalities  used  both  pleasure  boats  as 
well as rubber dinghies (Fig. 31) to transport 
drugs  from  the  North  African  coast  to  an 
area just outside Spanish jurisdiction on the 
seas.  Here  drug  packages  are  lowered  into 
the  water,  waiting  to  be  picked  by  associ-
ates on the Spanish coast.

International airports in the EU remain tran-
sit and entry points for drugs originating in 
Africa and South America. For instance, the 
Netherlands reported an increase in attempts 
to smuggle heroin via cargo transports orig-
inating in Asia.

4.10.2.5. Central Mediterranean route

The Central Mediterranean Route is typically 
associated with irregular migration originat-
ing  in  Northern  Africa.  However,  the  route 
continues to be used by criminal networks in 
the smuggling of cocaine and hashish, traf-
ficking in human beings and the smuggling 
of tobacco and counterfeit goods. 

58 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012 
 
 
 
5. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations:  n.a.  not applicable

:  data not available

Source:  FRAN data as of 6 August and EDF data as of 17 August 2012, unless otherwise 

indicated

Note:   ‘Member States’ in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 

27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

59 of 70

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 1:  Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

All Borders

Afghanistan

Bangladesh

Syria

Algeria

Albania

Somalia

Pakistan

Tunisia

Morocco

Egypt

Others

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

1 764

 562

 126

 908

1 017

 573

1 051

20 476

 747

 390

4 606

1 799

 274

1 066

1 156

1 035

2 821

4 489

 847

 727

9 323

1 370

 602

1 613

1 411

 604

5 629

3 573

1 031

 482

5 309

22 453

12 892

7 301

1 192

 614

2 570

1 554

 799

5 874

 291

1 155

 624

6 351

2012

Q1

2 153

1 407

 715

1 275

1 177

1 017

1 045

 493

 612

 246

4 529

2 435

2 024

2 000

1 797

1 673

1 650

 832

 823

 626

3 495

4 703

Total All Borders

32 923

41 273

38 530

28 325

13 635

23 092

Land Borders

Afghanistan

Bangladesh

Syria

Albania

Algeria

Pakistan

Morocco

Somalia

Not specified

Iraq

Others

1 344

3 986

 556

 88

1 014

 678

 943

 516

 153

 299

 207

 763

 188

1 144

 760

2 136

 519

 279

 580

 189

2 737

3 224

8 355

1 176

 400

1 379

1 069

5 154

 453

 380

1 131

 326

3 289

6 711

1 080

 578

1 539

2 164

5 548

 748

 686

 737

 372

1 775

1 392

 676

1 176

1 227

 915

 425

 464

 307

 156

3 963

2 348

1 918

1 736

1 481

1 189

 570

 567

 463

 387

4 301

2 690

3 180

Total Land Border

8 535

13 768

23 112

24 464

11 203

17 802

Sea Borders

Somalia

Tunisia

Afghanistan

Egypt

Algeria

Pakistan

Morocco

Eritrea

Syria

Bangladesh

Others

 420

20 245

 756

4 298

 224

3 374

 420

 321

 230

 108

 231

 538

 38

 6

 620

 658

 306

 685

 328

 112

 86

1 036

 968

 425

 544

 475

 578

 25

 202

 194

1 831

18 620

8 409

 113

 96

 590

 544

 406

 326

 407

 5

 36

 112

1 226

 553

 357

 378

 186

 48

 130

 187

 39

 39

 15

 500

1 106

 685

 566

 533

 519

 461

 253

 223

 106

 87

 751

Total Sea Border

24 388

27 505

15 418

3 861

2 432

5 290

60 of 70

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

-1.7

35

639

88

55

62

-42

-81

-2.8

-14

-79

-44

-0.6

208

920

52

95

-44

9.8

103

-20

105

-1.4

29

46

-84

-8.7

-19

70

-33

-23

99

23

-92

-96

-81

110

73

183

57

53

65

58

69

34

154

35

69

123

69

184

48

21

30

34

22

51

148

18

59

100

92

50

187

981

255

35

472

172

480

50

118

20

11

8.8

8.7

7.8

7.2

7.1

3.6

3.6

2.7

20

22

13

11

9.8

8.3

6.7

3.2

3.2

2.6

2.2

18

21

13

11

10

9.8

8.7

4.8

4.2

2.0

1.6

14

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Annex Table 2:  Clandestine entries at BCPs

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2012

Q1

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Border Type

Land

Sea

Top Ten Nationalities

Afghanistan

Serbia

Pakistan

Algeria

Morocco

Guinea

Syria

Iraq

Iran

Albania

Others

Total

 27

 47

 7

 1

 1

 25

 5

 0

 0

 1

 4

 2

 28

 74

 29

 31

 3

 0

 2

 11

 4

 0

 1

 6

 0

 1

 32

 60

 40

 24

 18

 1

 2

 13

 2

 0

 0

 1

 0

 1

 26

 64

 63

 21

 67

 36

 106

 20

266

-35

 30

 50

 2

 5

 6

 4

 0

 5

 6

 1

 5

 20

 84

 8

 0

 8

 3

 2

 1

 4

 0

 3

 24

 103

 52

 16

 11

 10

 10

 5

 4

 3

 3

 3

 9

 126

1633

n.a.

450

-9.1

150

n.a.

300

-50

n.a.

200

-72

110

58

-44

4.0

100

n.a.

25

233

150

300

-25

n.a.

0

-63

22

84

16

41

13

8.7

7.9

7.9

4.0

3.2

2.4

2.4

2.4

7.1

Annex Table 3:  Facilitators

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2012

Q1

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Place of Detection

Inland

Land

Land Intra-EU

Sea

Air

Not specified

Top Ten Nationalities

Spain

China

France

Egypt

Morocco

Italy

Pakistan

Not specified

Algeria

Romania

Others

Total

1 498

 112

1 521

 159

 79

 49

 91

 27

 51

 146

 131

 39

 120

 180

 64

 57

 26

 65

 89

 65

 80

 27

 66

 72

 133

 53

 93

 138

 84

 62

 38

 77

1 013

 195

 103

 117

 88

 30

 92

 52

 76

 52

 86

1 114

 159

 94

 93

 108

 46

 111

 105

 64

 29

 91

 51

 48

 23

 68

 38

 88

 48

 58

1 489

1 254

 216

 138

 129

 82

 53

 140

 88

 95

 37

 90

 59

 88

 42

 136

1 130

 177

 122

 116

 70

 46

 144

 101

 99

 99

 95

 94

 82

 77

 57

 55

 882

 977

1 125

 882

 848

1 856

1 941

1 546

1 614

2 107

1 785

 116

 134

 202

-18

11

37

78

-13

70

118

40

-26

87

2.2

-32

-2.4

24

50

-29

-22

-8.0

-16

-18

-12

-10

-15

-13

2.9

15

4.2

168

5.6

-53

39

-13

36

-60

-22

-15

70

9.9

6.8

6.5

3.9

2.6

8.1

5.7

5.5

5.5

5.3

5.3

4.6

4.3

3.2

3.1

49

61 of 70

Annex Table 4:  Illegal stay

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2012

Q1

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Place of Detection

Inland

Air

Land

Land Intra-EU

Sea

Between BCP

Top Ten Nationalities

Afghanistan

Morocco

Pakistan

Tunisia

Algeria

Albania

Serbia

Ukraine

Russia

Nigeria

Others

Total

67 161

70 063

69 572

76 512

72 520

68 204

7 328

2 814

2 787

1 768

 469

4 947

5 789

2 476

3 533

3 840

2 216

2 990

2 416

2 433

2 376

7 452

4 353

2 772

1 981

 129

5 822

5 497

2 838

7 682

3 623

2 524

2 838

2 906

2 281

2 169

9 361

5 259

2 032

1 519

 292

6 777

5 026

3 720

5 289

3 925

2 382

2 596

3 788

3 173

2 054

8 985

5 214

1 639

1 325

 159

7 750

5 575

3 587

6 360

4 010

3 085

4 360

3 737

2 427

2 191

8 687

4 731

1 347

1 040

 130

6 345

6 047

3 752

4 705

4 247

3 167

3 784

3 202

2 363

2 438

8 380

4 766

1 427

1 084

 212

6 160

5 643

5 084

4 226

4 044

3 613

3 541

3 033

2 422

2 152

49 311

48 570

49 307

50 752

48 405

44 158

82 327

86 750

88 037

93 834

88 455

84 076

-2.7

12

9.5

-49

-45

64

5.8

2.7

79

-45

12

43

25

4.4

6.2

-0.8

-9.1

-3.1

-6.0

-3.5

0.7

5.9

4.2

63

-2.9

-6.7

36

-10

-4.8

14

-6.4

-5.3

2.5

-12

-8.8

-5.0

81

10

5.7

1.7

1.3

0.3

7.3

6.7

6.0

5.0

4.8

4.3

4.2

3.6

2.9

2.6

53

Annex Table 5:  Applications for asylum

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

6 427

1 358

2 123

2 559

1 825

2 830

2 599

3 757

4 425

1 909

7 067

1 517

2 530

3 705

1 505

2 733

2 376

3 380

2 814

3 040

8 552

2 750

3 778

3 288

1 460

3 643

3 012

4 159

2 832

2 191

7 626

2 555

3 904

3 714

4 172

3 730

3 276

3 503

6 937

2 053

2012

Q1

6 306

2 447

3 126

2 820

3 895

2 697

2 488

2 660

4 259

2 129

23 381

30 907

31 748

30 404

24 027

25 208

53 193

61 574

67 413

71 874

56 854

57 989

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

6 736

3 532

3 519

3 294

3 073

2 775

2 669

2 579

2 380

2 224

-4.7

133

39

-11

104

1.5

12

-24

-15

-27

-18

-5.8

6.8

44

13

17

-21

2.9

7.3

-3.0

-44

4.5

4.9

2.0

12

6.1

6.1

5.7

5.3

4.8

4.6

4.4

4.1

3.8

43

Top Ten Nationalities

Afghanistan

Syria

Pakistan

Somalia

Not specified

Russia

Iran

Iraq

Serbia

Eritrea

Others

Total

62 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Annex Table 6:  Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

All borders

Ukraine

Albania

Russia

Georgia

Serbia

Belarus

Morocco

Croatia

Brazil

fYROM

Others

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

3 529

4 943

1 832

 421

1 962

1 318

 831

1 051

1 373

 928

3 861

4 513

2 465

 686

1 685

1 501

1 112

1 072

1 230

 817

4 499

3 550

2 710

 558

1 816

1 549

1 211

 766

1 103

 794

3 921

2 941

2 214

1 136

1 743

1 615

1 014

 867

1 071

 672

10 511

11 134

11 769

11 817

2012

Q1

3 788

2 261

1 839

 567

1 555

1 106

1 058

1 032

1 012

 508

9 909

3 994

3 737

2 335

1 692

1 326

1 116

1 081

1 048

 859

 655

10 401

Total All Borders

28 699

30 076

30 325

29 011

24 635

28 244

Land Borders

Ukraine

Albania

Russia

Georgia

Belarus

Serbia

Croatia

Morocco

fYROM

Bosnia and Herzegovina

3 337

2 876

1 178

 375

1 300

1 601

 987

 520

 764

 350

3 561

3 057

1 431

 635

1 462

1 298

1 013

 787

 667

 402

4 191

1 884

1 794

 496

1 504

1 483

 713

 869

 680

 424

3 608

1 161

1 510

1 065

1 574

1 394

 815

 651

 537

 343

Others

1 152

1 252

1 791

1 100

3 503

1 192

1 289

 493

1 080

1 288

 979

 666

 400

 347

 832

3 723

2 587

1 630

1 620

1 086

1 080

1 002

 708

 506

 346

 974

Total Land Border

14 440

15 565

15 829

13 758

12 069

15 262

Air Borders

Brazil

Albania

United States

Not specified

Nigeria

Russia

Algeria

Turkey

India

Morocco

Others

1 358

1 204

1 079

1 056

1 003

 827

 495

 273

 406

 266

 218

 362

 320

 246

 736

 562

 352

 357

 386

 236

 328

 283

 229

 796

 605

 397

 393

 459

 233

 282

 233

 244

 944

 557

 508

 388

 348

 504

 331

 213

 288

 617

 461

 435

 374

 373

 269

 355

 203

 254

 841

 638

 484

 458

 435

 389

 356

 352

 286

 259

7 232

7 609

7 374

7 902

6 879

6 365

Total Air Border

12 003

12 282

12 095

13 039

11 223

10 863

Sea Borders

Albania

Philippines

Russia

Not specified

Morocco

India

Syria

Iraq

Ukraine

Serbia

Others

Total Sea Border

1 240

 170

 388

 26

 65

 11

 8

 8

 17

 34

 720

 85

 648

 61

 96

 38

 33

 7

 53

 21

 870

 254

 457

 34

 98

 42

 42

 33

 56

 78

 836

 230

 356

 29

 75

 44

 19

 35

 29

 77

 452

 130

 177

 40

 138

 26

 7

 35

 12

 34

 512

 371

 316

 117

 114

 89

 56

 47

 42

 39

 289

2 256

 467

2 229

 437

2 401

 484

2 214

 292

1 343

 416

2 119

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

3.4

-17

-5.3

147

-21

-26

-2.8

-2.2

-30

-20

-6.6

-6.1

4.5

-15

14

155

-26

-17

-1.1

-10

-24

-14

-22

-1.9

-30

-13

-14

30

22

0.8

51

7.3

1.1

13

-16

-12

-29

336

-51

92

19

134

70

571

-21

86

-11

-4.9

5.4

65

27

198

-15

0.9

2.2

1.6

-15

29

5.0

15

6.3

117

26

229

0.6

-16

2.3

6.3

27

-0.3

17

26

-16

3.4

5.0

5.3

16

4.3

32

-0.8

41

2.0

-7.5

-3.2

13

185

79

193

-17

242

700

34

250

15

42

58

14

13

8.3

6.0

4.7

4.0

3.8

3.7

3.0

2.3

37

24

17

11

11

7.1

7.1

6.6

4.6

3.3

2.3

6.4

7.7

5.9

4.5

4.2

4.0

3.6

3.3

3.2

2.6

2.4

59

24

18

15

5.5

5.4

4.2

2.6

2.2

2.0

1.8

20

63 of 70

Annex Table 7:  Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

Refused  
persons  
Total

Top Ten Nationalities

2012 Q2 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

n.a.

Ukraine

Albania

Russia

Georgia

Serbia

Belarus

Morocco

Croatia

Brazil

fYROM

Others

Total

3 994

3 737

2 335

1 692

1 326

1 116

1 081

1 048

859

655

10 401

 16

 47

 177

 2

 47

 0

 422

 364

 4

 14

 905

 21

 422

 2

 0

 5

 0

 25

 0

 12

 5

1 312

 41

1 573

1 532

 236

 584

 101

 15

 76

 45

 514

2 810

28 244

1 998

1 006

8 325

 5

 49

 28

 2

 9

 0

 18

 0

 0

 0

 263

 374

1 640

 158

 481

 228

 37

 97

 121

 162

 26

 270

 168

2 473

 60

 12

 0

 310

 4

 5

 211

 21

 98

 264

 559

1 370

 224

1 113

 143

 11

 147

 314

 42

 35

 66

 125

 590

 134

 124

 458

 72

 255

 147

 111

 198

 450

5 703

1 143

3 402

3 286

17

73

83

0

28

29

60

238

9

18

261

816

53

119

34

1

9

10

6

15

291

3

Total  
Reasons

4 005

3 775

2 414

1 709

1 346

1 134

1 096

1 051

860

674

2 152

10 682

2 693

28 746

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:
A  has no valid travel document(s);
B  has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
C  has no valid visa or residence permit;
D  has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
E  has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
F  has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
G  does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
H 
I 

is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
 is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European 
Union.

64 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Annex Table 8:  Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and reasons for refusal

All borders

C) No valid visa

E)  No justification

G) No subsistence

H) Alert issued

Reason not available

A) No valid document

F)  Over 3 month stay

B) False document

I)  Threat

D) False visa

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

5 934

6 130

2 686

6 455

3 183

1 544

1 556

 696

 709

 490

7 147

6 584

3 174

5 338

3 296

2 172

1 256

 676

 707

 398

8 982

6 331

2 799

4 480

3 344

2 186

1 333

 675

 581

 403

7 803

6 888

2 965

3 970

3 038

1 908

1 337

 752

 838

 527

2012

Q1

5 981

6 108

2 512

3 353

2 540

1 791

1 479

 913

 762

 374

8 325

5 703

3 402

3 286

2 693

1 998

1 143

1 006

 816

 374

Total All Borders

29 383

30 748

31 114

30 026

25 813

28 746

Land Borders

C) No valid visa

G) No subsistence

E)  No justification

H) Alert issued

F)  Over 3 month stay

A) No valid document

I)  Threat

B) False document

D) False visa

Reason not available

3 450

1 753

2 331

4 318

1 239

 689

 521

 104

 104

 1

4 411

2 098

2 454

3 921

1 064

1 039

 540

 60

 81

 0

5 874

1 867

2 452

3 005

1 137

1 037

 428

 138

 141

 0

4 760

1 977

2 192

2 523

1 137

 749

 606

 80

 179

 0

3 689

1 730

2 184

2 168

1 221

 913

 475

 310

 75

 0

5 528

2 487

2 259

2 183

 925

 896

 529

 464

 109

 0

Total Land Border

14 510

15 668

16 079

14 203

12 765

15 380

Air Borders

E)  No justification

Reason not available

C) No valid visa

G) No subsistence

H) Alert issued

A) No valid document

B) False document

I)  Threat

D) False visa

F)  Over 3 month stay

3 690

3 071

2 092

 818

1 000

 498

 575

 186

 367

 312

3 983

3 152

2 250

 963

 804

 526

 575

 158

 246

 180

3 732

3 200

2 386

 829

 747

 627

 519

 145

 246

 193

4 475

2 939

2 456

 872

 803

 673

 642

 220

 331

 194

3 815

2 466

1 991

 731

 721

 600

 568

 276

 277

 257

3 316

2 568

2 050

 821

 644

 589

 518

 267

 246

 213

Total Air Border

12 609

12 837

12 624

13 605

11 702

11 232

Sea Borders

C) No valid visa

A) No valid document

H) Alert issued

E)  No justification

Reason not available

G) No subsistence

B) False document

I)  Threat

D) False visa

F)  Over 3 month stay

 392

 357

1 137

 109

 111

 115

 17

 2

 19

 5

 486

 607

 613

 147

 144

 113

 41

 9

 71

 12

 722

 522

 728

 147

 144

 103

 18

 8

 16

 3

 587

 486

 644

 221

 99

 116

 30

 12

 17

 6

 301

 278

 464

 109

 74

 51

 35

 11

 22

 1

 742

 513

 454

 128

 125

 94

 22

 20

 18

 4

Total Sea Border

2 264

2 243

2 411

2 218

1 346

2 120

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

16

-13

7.2

-38

-18

-8.0

-9.0

49

15

-6.0

-6.5

25

19

-7.9

-44

-13

-14

-2.0

673

35

n.a.

-1.8

-17

-19

-8.9

-15

-20

12

-9.9

69

0

18

-13

53

-15

-26

-13

-13

-17

-46

122

-75

-67

-5.5

39

-6.6

35

-2.0

6.0

12

-23

10

7.1

0

11

50

44

3.4

0.7

-24

-1.9

11

50

45

n.a.

20

-13

4.1

3.0

12

-11

-1.8

-8.8

-3.3

-11

-17

-4.0

147

85

-2.2

17

69

84

-37

82

-18

300

58

29

20

12

11

9.4

7.0

4.0

3.5

2.8

1.3

36

16

15

14

6.0

5.8

3.4

3.0

0.7

0

30

23

18

7.3

5.7

5.2

4.6

2.4

2.2

1.9

35

24

21

6.0

5.9

4.4

1.0

0.9

0.8

0.2

Highest share

Nationality

Russia (19%)

Ukraine (29%)

Albania (40%)

Albania (34%)

United States (15%)

Morocco (21%)

Serbia (27%)

Albania (42%)

Croatia (29%)

Albania (13%)

Nationality

Georgia (27%)

Albania (49%)

Ukraine (68%)

Albania (28%)

Serbia (31%)

Morocco (45%)

Croatia (45%)

Albania (88%)

Albania (43%)

Nationality

Brazil (8.1%)

United States (16%)

Russia (9.3%)

Albania (9.4%)

Albania (25%)

Unknown (37%)

Unknown (17%)

Suriname (15%)

Philippines (15%)

Serbia (10%)

Nationality

Philippines (42%)

Russia (31%)

Albania (72%)

Albania (51%)

Albania (18%)

Albania (80%)

Unknown (64%)

Albania (70%)

Morocco (56%)

Morocco (50%)

65 of 70

Annex Table 9:  Document fraud

Fraudulent documents detected at BCP reported by border type and top ten nationalities claimed

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2012

Q1

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Highest share

15

134

-2.7

2175

143

-36

35

-57

61

300

88

-63

28

-5.8

46

1.9

43

6.8

158

67

-57

-29

-52

-16

106

195

-26

3.8

-7.5

17

Nationality Claimed

Pakistan (8.4%)

Albania (80%)

Morocco (42%)

Nationality Document

Greece (73%)

Greece (46%)

Spain (24%)

France (30%)

Poland (58%)

Germany (17%)

Greece (25%)

Italy (50%)

France (17%)

United Kingdom (38%)

Italy (17%)

52

44

4.5

37

4.4

3.5

3.2

3.0

2.7

2.6

2.5

2.4

2.3

36

100

Top Ten Nationalities Claimed

Border Type

Air

Land

Sea

Albania

Pakistan

Morocco

Nigeria

Ukraine

Iran

Syria

Bangladesh

Unknown

Afghanistan

Others

Total

1 177

1 096

1 093

1 196

1 240

 387

 92

 35

 41

 163

 80

 162

 68

 14

 32

 111

 40

 910

 453

 113

 40

 44

 132

 57

 170

 41

 16

 33

 155

 43

 931

 571

 167

 49

 27

 253

 74

 243

 118

 23

 14

 129

 30

 871

 494

 145

 75

 28

 211

 63

 144

 84

 33

 18

 151

 22

1 006

 740

 103

 353

 64

 197

 108

 151

 79

 31

 21

 78

 53

1 263

1 060

 110

 910

 107

 84

 77

 73

 66

 64

 62

 58

 55

 948

 877

1 656

1 662

1 831

1 835

2 083

2 433

66 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Annex Table 10:  Document fraud

Fraudulent documents detected at BCP reported by type of document and type of fraud

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2012

Q1

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

 654

 229

 178

 67

 159

 18

 3

 210

 88

 56

 20

 33

 8

 5

 191

 102

 28

 52

 6

 3

 0

 268

 107

 56

 65

 18

 22

 0

 179

 140

 0

 39

 154

 57

 6

 84

 1

 3

 3

 644

 195

 168

 89

 170

 17

 5

 243

 115

 46

 22

 49

 9

 2

 191

 119

 38

 21

 4

 9

 0

 285

 132

 53

 69

 15

 16

 0

 244

 171

 2

 71

 55

 36

 4

 10

 2

 3

 0

 723

 228

 199

 119

 165

 11

 1

 284

 113

 84

 24

 50

 12

 1

 178

 123

 22

 16

 9

 8

 0

 297

 150

 61

 56

 19

 10

 1

 279

 195

 11

 73

 70

 30

 5

 32

 2

 0

 1

 721

 285

 220

 74

 135

 7

 0

 257

 110

 77

 19

 39

 12

 0

 176

 112

 37

 18

 6

 3

 0

 384

 179

 71

 85

 24

 24

 1

 225

 160

 8

 57

 72

 52

 8

 5

 0

 6

 1

 705

 268

 192

 98

 133

 14

 0

 238

 131

 71

 11

 12

 12

 1

 183

 118

 17

 28

 11

 8

 1

 345

 172

 59

 71

 27

 16

 0

 577

 502

 0

 75

 35

 16

 9

 2

 2

 0

 6

 674

 305

 157

 103

 98

 11

 0

 258

 117

 54

 44

 23

 19

 1

 171

 93

 27

 25

 14

 12

 0

 331

 144

 81

 56

 34

 15

 1

 960

 934

 26

 0

 39

 18

 12

 5

 3

 1

 0

1 656

1 662

1 831

1 835

2 083

2 433

4.7

56

-6.5

16

-42

-35

n.a.

6.2

1.7

17

100

-53

111

-50

-10

-22

-29

19

250

33

n.a.

16

9

53

-19

127

-6.3

n.a.

293

446

1,200

-100

-29

-50

200

-50

50

-67

n.a.

46

-4.4

14

-18

5.1

-26

-21

n.a.

8.4

-11

-24

300

92

58

0

-6.6

-21

59

-11

27

50

-100

-4.1

-16

37

-21

26

-6.3

n.a.

66

86

n.a.

-100

11

13

33

150

50

n.a.

-100

17

per cent 
of total

Highest share

Nationality Document

100

United Kingdom (7.9%)

45

23

15

15

1.6

0

100

45

21

17

8.9

7.4

0

100

54

16

15

8.2

7.0

0

100

44

24

17

10

4.5

0

100

97

2.7

0

100

46

31

13

7.7

2.6

0

United Kingdom (8.9%)

Morocco (8.3%)

Italy (21%)

United Kingdom (12%)

Germany (45%)

n.a.

Italy (35%)

Italy (41%)

Spain (37%)

Italy (20%)

Italy (39%)

Italy (84%)

Bulgaria 

France (34%)

France (47%)

France (30%)

Italy (48%)

Czech Republic (50%)

Italy (75%)

n.a.

Greece (27%)

Italy (44%)

Greece (74%)

Spain (39%)

Greece (50%)

Belgium (33%)

Germany 

Greece (68%)

Greece (69%)

Greece (27%)

n.a.

Italy (41%)

Italy (39%)

Italy (67%)

Greece (20%)

Belgium 

Spain 

n.a.

Document Type

Passports

Forged

Authentic

Counterfeit

False-no more details

Stolen blank

Pseudo

ID Cards

Counterfeit

Authentic

Forged

False-no more details

Stolen blank

Pseudo

Visa

Counterfeit

False-no more details

Forged

Stolen blank

Authentic

Pseudo

Residence Permits

Counterfeit

Stolen blank

Authentic

Forged

False-no more details

Pseudo

Stamps

Counterfeit

Forged

False-no more details

Other

Counterfeit

Authentic

Forged

Pseudo

False-no more details

Stolen blank

Total

Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit. 

Note: 
* 
**  2012 Q1 data for Sweden only include fraudulent documents detected in March 
***  Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France has been excluded from this table. 

In 2011, 2 962 fraudulent documents were detected at their external borders, For the period January-May 2012, this figure amounted to 970.

67 of 70

 
Annex Table 11:  Return decisions issued

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

Top Ten Nationalities

Afghanistan

Pakistan

Albania

Morocco

Algeria

Bangladesh

Tunisia

Serbia

India

Nigeria

Others

Total

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

4 400

3 580

2 153

2 413

2 180

1 470

 787

1 898

2 151

2 103

6 423

5 382

2 411

2 914

2 916

2 074

1 260

1 599

1 996

1 743

7 243

8 569

1 506

2 392

2 667

1 924

1 475

1 332

2 091

1 610

9 208

9 073

2 140

3 465

4 573

2 427

1 638

1 585

2 579

1 901

2012

Q1

6 421

5 854

3 568

4 214

3 696

3 495

3 103

2 559

3 088

2 455

27 835

26 998

26 580

28 721

31 451

29 434

50 970

55 716

57 389

67 310

69 904

67 891

12

7.4

72

38

36

63

119

56

24

29

9.0

22

12

-1.2

16

-4.6

7.0

-3.2

-11

-2.7

-20

-8.3

-6.4

-2.9

11

8.5

6.1

5.9

5.8

5.0

4.1

3.7

3.6

3.3

43

Annex Table 12:  Effective returns

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago

prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2 829

1 784

1 216

1 866

1 774

1 202

 416

1 703

1 478

1 557

2 887

2 145

1 297

1 604

1 712

1 474

2 452

1 378

1 583

 903

3 386

1 951

1 547

1 926

1 582

1 861

2 579

1 300

1 605

1 241

3 597

2 037

2 193

2 271

1 837

1 963

3 176

1 683

1 555

1 444

2012

Q1

3 034

2 505

2 381

2 424

2 089

1 557

1 641

1 386

1 758

1 759

18 920

17 641

18 661

19 829

19 695

19 374

34 745

35 076

37 639

41 585

40 229

40 299

6.4

33

91

37

17

29

-25

19

-2.8

54

9.8

15

1.2

14

4.1

-9.1

-3.9

22

12

18

-12

-21

-1.6

0.2

7.6

7.1

6.2

5.5

5.0

4.7

4.6

4.1

3.8

3.4

48

Top Ten Nationalities

Albania

Serbia

Pakistan

India

Morocco

Ukraine

Tunisia

Brazil

Russia

China

Others

Total

68 of 70

7 198

5 782

4 149

4 022

3 955

3 382

2 761

2 490

2 467

2 251

3 071

2 854

2 479

2 204

2 008

1 905

1 835

1 642

1 539

1 388

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012Annex Table 13:  Effective returns by type of return

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

TyPE OF RETURN

Forced

Enforced by Member State

Not specified

Enforced by Joint Operation

Voluntary

Others

IOM Assisted

Not specified

Not specified

TOTAL

TOP TEN NATIONALITIES

Forced

Albania

Pakistan

Tunisia

Serbia

Afghanistan

India

Morocco

Nigeria

Bangladesh

Algeria

Others

2011

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

17 692

14 932

2 508

 252

19 462

16 844

2 370

 248

20 203

17 464

2 383

 356

23 452

20 742

2 266

 444

14 075

12 501

14 936

15 658

8 196

3 133

2 746

2 978

6 643

3 269

2 589

3 113

8 494

3 531

2 911

2 500

8 807

3 975

2 876

2 475

2012

Q1

19 625

17 077

2 211

 337

17 708

10 171

4 254

3 283

2 896

21 273

18 423

2 241

 609

16 440

9 577

3 852

3 011

2 586

34 745

35 076

37 639

41 585

40 229

40 299

2 740

 575

 341

 925

 777

 649

 691

 806

 349

 489

2 791

 901

2 088

1 039

 647

 755

 656

 711

 390

 422

3 265

 968

2 067

 983

 703

 696

 649

 721

 392

 552

3 436

1 494

2 783

1 213

1 053

 766

 856

 874

 650

 609

2 871

1 574

1 277

1 047

 891

 843

 870

 586

 669

 624

2 864

1 759

1 511

1 369

 950

 872

 847

 774

 706

 615

9 350

9 062

9 207

9 718

8 373

9 006

Total Forced Returns

17 692

19 462

20 203

23 452

19 625

21 273

Voluntary

Ukraine

Serbia

India

Russia

Brazil

China

Pakistan

Iraq

fYROM

Nigeria

Others

 829

 853

1 208

1 192

 904

 918

 626

 465

 326

 609

1 005

1 100

 832

1 250

 657

 449

 384

 594

 448

 347

1 380

 967

1 223

1 278

 637

 685

 561

 522

 564

 466

1 502

 822

1 500

1 224

 979

 798

 659

 625

 404

 534

1 208

1 454

1 572

1 420

 773

1 064

 785

 728

 395

 442

1 482

1 482

1 328

1 171

 981

 759

 697

 568

 442

 419

6 145

5 435

6 653

6 611

7 867

7 111

Total Voluntary Returns

14 075

12 501

14 936

15 658

17 708

16 440

2012 Q2

% change on

Q2

year ago prev. qtr

per cent 
of total

9.3

9.4

-5.4

146

32

44

18

16

-17

15

2.6

95

-28

32

47

15

29

8.9

81

46

-0.6

9.3

47

35

60

-6.3

49

69

82

-4.4

-1.3

21

31

32

8.4

7.9

1.4

81

-7.2

-5.8

-9.4

-8.3

-11

0.2

-0.2

12

18

31

6.6

3.4

-2.6

32

5.5

-1.4

7.6

8.4

23

1.9

-16

-18

27

-29

-11

-22

12

-5.2

-9.6

-7.2

53

46

5.6

1.5

41

24

9.6

7.5

6.4

7.1

4.4

3.7

3.4

2.4

2.2

2.1

1.9

1.8

1.5

22

53

3.7

3.7

3.3

2.9

2.4

1.9

1.7

1.4

1.1

1.0

18

41

69 of 70

For the data concerning detections of illegal 
stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections 
at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) 
at the external EU borders are not disaggre-
gated  by  reason  of  refusal  for  Ireland  and 
the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land 
borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the is-
suance of a refusal form) are reported sepa-
rately and are not included in the presented 
FRAN data.

The  data  on  applications  for  international 
protection  (FRAN  Indicator  5)  are  not  dis-
aggregated by place of application (type of 
border  on  entry  or  inland  applications)  for 
Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For 
these countries, only the total number of ap-
plications is reported. For France, only asy-
lum applications at the external borders are 
reported, not inland applications. For Swit-
zerland,  requests  for  asylum  at  the  Swiss 
Embassies abroad are also reported and con-
sidered  as  inland  applications  in  the  FRAN 
data.  For  the  UK,  data  reported  for  appli-
cations at air BCPs also include applications 
at sea BCPs.

Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the ex-
ternal borders of the EU, some of the border 
types are not applicable to all FRAN Mem-
ber States. This pertains to data on all FRAN 
indicators  since  the  data  are  provided  dis-
aggregated  by  border  type.  The  definitions 
of  detections  at  land  borders  are  therefore 
not applicable (excluding borders with non-
Schengen  principalities)  for  Belgium,  the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border re-
fers to the Green Line demarcation with the 
area  not  under  the  effective  control  of  the 
government  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus.  For 
sea borders, the definitions are not applica-
ble for land-locked Member States including 
Austria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Lux-
embourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal bor-
der-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are 
not  available  for  Iceland,  Ireland  and  Spain 
and in Greece, these detections are included 
in the data for Indicator 1A Data for Norway 
only  includes  detections  of  illegal  border-
crossing  at  land  and  sea  BCPs  (1B),  not  be-
tween BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing 
at  sea  BCPs  are  only  reported  for  intra-EU 
border-crossing  from  Greece.  Data  on  de-
tections  of  illegal  border-crossing  between 
sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of 
facilitators is not available for Ireland. For It-
aly, the data are not disaggregated by border 
type,  but  are  reported  as  total  apprehen-
sions (not specified). Data for Italy and Nor-
way also include the facilitation of illegal stay 
and  work.  For  Romania,  the  data  include 
land intra-EU detections on exit at the bor-
der with Hungary.

70 of 70

Frontex · FRAN Quarterly · q2 2012European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union

For Public Release 

Risk Analysis Unit

Reference number: 16022

Rondo ONZ 1 
00-124 Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 205 95 00 
F +48 22 205 95 01

frontex@frontex.europa.eu 
www.frontex.europa.eu

Warsaw, October 2012

TT-AF-12-002-EN-N 

ISSN 2363-0566