COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT - 2011 review of the Civil Protection regulatory framework
Date: 2011-12-20
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU aid, EU financing, European cooperation, aid to disaster victims, civil defence, man-made disaster, natural disaster

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 20.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1632 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT - 2011 review of the Civil Protection regulatory framework 

Accompanying the document 

Decision of the European Parliament and the Council 

on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism and on establishing a Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument for the period 2014-2020 

{COM(2011) 934 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1630 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
Disclaimer: This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation 
and does not prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties .............................................. 6 

Consultation of interested parties................................................................................. 7 

The Impact Assessment Board..................................................................................... 8 

The problems to be addressed and subsidiarity............................................................ 8 

Overview of Mechanism operations and current activities financed by the CPFI....... 8 

Current disaster trends................................................................................................ 13 

Environmental, social and fundamental rights impacts of disasters .......................... 19 

The limitations of the current CP cooperation and the Mechanism........................... 20 

Baseline ...................................................................................................................... 28 

Justification for EU action and subsidiarity ............................................................... 31 

Objectives................................................................................................................... 32 

General objectives...................................................................................................... 32 

Specific objectives ..................................................................................................... 33 

Better response through planning and predictability ................................................. 34 

Specific objective: Shifting from a reactive and ad hoc coordination to a pre-planned, 
pre-arranged and predictable system.......................................................................... 34 

Policy options for better planning and availability of assets...................................... 35 

Analysis of impacts of options for a voluntary pool .................................................. 36 

Comparison of options ............................................................................................... 39 

Addressing capacity gaps........................................................................................... 40 

Specific objective: Identifying and filling critical gaps in response capacity............ 40 

Policy options for addressing gaps in capacities........................................................ 41 

Analysis of impacts .................................................................................................... 42 

Comparison of options ............................................................................................... 44 

Transport .................................................................................................................... 45 

Specific transport objectives ...................................................................................... 45 

Policy options............................................................................................................. 45 

Analysis of impacts .................................................................................................... 47 

1. 

2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

3. 

3.1. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

3.3. 

3.4. 

3.5. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

5.4. 

6. 

6.1. 

6.2. 

6.3. 

6.4. 

7. 

7.1. 

7.2. 

7.3. 

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7.4. 

Comparison of options ............................................................................................... 48 

8. 

8.1. 

8.2. 

8.3. 

8.4. 

9. 

9.1. 

9.2. 

9.3. 

9.4. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

Preparedness............................................................................................................... 49 

Specific preparedness objectives................................................................................ 49 

Preparedness policy options....................................................................................... 50 

Analysis of impacts of preparedness options ............................................................. 51 

Comparing preparedness options ............................................................................... 55 

Prevention .................................................................................................................. 55 

Specific prevention objectives ................................................................................... 55 

Prevention policy options........................................................................................... 56 

Analysis of impacts of options for an EU prevention policy framework .................. 58 

Comparing the prevention options ............................................................................. 63 

Summary of Options and Key Considerations for the Preferred Options.................. 64 

Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 65 

Legislative Proposal and further elements of CPFI Ex-Ante Evaluation .................. 65 

List of Acronyms........................................................................................................ 68 

List of Annexes .......................................................................................................... 69 

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1. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

INTRODUCTION 

The  aim  of  EU  action  in  the  field  of  civil  protection  (CP)  is  to  support  and 
complement  Member  States’  action  in  preventing,  preparing  for,  and  responding  to 
natural or man-made disasters. As the number, intensity, and complexity of disasters 
are rising, the current systems for preventing and protecting against disasters, and the 
current means of coordination at the EU level are not able to deal with the upcoming 
challenges  in  an  effective  and  efficient  way.  Eventually,  this  will  lead  to  a  lower 
level of protection of people, the environment and property in Europe and elsewhere 
in  the  world  where  European  CP  assistance  is  needed.  Moreover,  the  European 
cooperation  on  response,  preparedness  through  training  and  exercises  and  other 
measures, as well as prevention will make all the difference especially in the event of 
a high impact disaster, something that cannot be excluded in Europe 

Since 2001, the basis for EU civil protection cooperation is the EU Civil Protection 
Mechanism  (the  Mechanism)  decision,1  which  was  recast  in  2007.2  The  Civil 
Protection Financial Instrument (CPFI) provides a basis for funding of all activities 
under the Mechanism.3 The main role of the Mechanism is to support and coordinate 
the preparation and deployment of Member States' in-kind assistance (teams, experts 
and equipment) to countries requesting international assistance in major emergencies 
of all kinds, natural and man-made, within and outside the EU. Typical examples of 
CP assistance provided in the past include search and rescue after earthquakes, water 
purification and high capacity pumping during floods, field hospitals and medication, 
forest fire fighting with airplanes, emergency shelter and power generators. 

Starting with just a few operations in 2002-2003, the Mechanism is now activated in 
up to 30 emergencies per year. Recent operations include for example the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake, floods in Poland, the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident in 
Fukushima, Japan, as well as the explosion and energy shortage in Cyprus, to name 
but a few. 

The Commission has established and directly operates a Monitoring and Information 
Centre (MIC), which is accessible around the clock and acts as a communication hub 
among 31 Participating States of the Mechanism (PS),4 the affected country and the 
EU experts deployed in the field. It also plays a co-ordination role by matching offers 
of  assistance  put  forward  by  PS  to  the  needs  of  the  disaster-stricken  country. 
Through the MIC, the EU can also co-finance costs of transport of assistance to the 
disaster site. 

5. 

The  need  for  stronger  civil  protection  cooperation  at  EU  level  has  been  repeatedly 
recognised  and  emphasized  at  political  level.  Acknowledging  the  inherent  limits  of 

1 

2 

3 

4 

Community Mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions; 
Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom of 23 October 2001 (OJ L 297, 15.11.2001, p. 7). 
Council  Decision  2007/779/EC,  Euratom  of  8  November  2007  establishing  a  Community  Civil 
Protection Mechanism (recast) (OJ L 314, 1.12.2007, p. 9). 
Council  Decision  2007/162/EC,  Euratom  of  5  March  2007  establishing  a  Civil  Protection  Financial 
Instrument (OJ L 71, 10.3.2007, p. 9). 
EU-27, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Croatia. 

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the Mechanism, the Commission adopted in October 2010 a Communication to the 
European  Parliament  and  the  Council  'Towards  a  stronger  European  disaster 
response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance' presenting a broad 
vision  and  concrete  proposals  on  how  to  reinforce  in  particular  the  effectiveness, 
efficiency,  coherence  and  visibility  of  EU's  response  to  disasters.5  The  General 
Affairs  Council  welcomed  the  key  ideas6  and  the  substance  of  the  Commission's 
proposals  has  met  with  strong  support  by  the  European  Parliament.7  The  response 
options  developed  in  this  impact  assessment  were  included  in  the  Communication 
and its associated assessment of impacts. 

Preparedness  actions  are  directed  towards  national  CP  services.  Main  actions  to 
better  prepare  them  for  operations  outside  of  national  borders  and  coordination 
activities  currently  include  training  courses,  full-scale  field  exercises,  and  an 
exchange of experts programme.8 These preparedness actions are widely praised for 
their  important  contribution  to  improving  compatibility  and  complementarities 
between intervention teams operating in an international context. The 2008 Council 
conclusions on European disaster management training called for diversification and 
reinforcement of training.9 The Commission is also assisting PS in organising certain 
CP  resources  into  intervention  'modules'  that  are  interoperable  and  can  be  quickly 
deployed to the field. These modules are made up of national resources from one or 
more  PS.  A  technical  framework  has  been  put  in  place  for  seventeen  types  of  CP 
modules  and  more  than  130  intervention  modules  are  currently  registered  for 
information  in  a  Commission's  database.  Examples  of  types  of  modules  are  high 
capacity  pumping  water  purification,  heavy  and  medium  search  and  rescue,  and 
aerial fire fighting with airplanes. 

In 2007, the CPFI has enlarged the scope of CP cooperation to prevention projects. 
On the policy side, in line with requests from the European Parliament and Council, 
the  Commission  is  implementing  an  EU  disaster  prevention  framework10  and  has 
recently  issued  guidelines  on  risk  assessment  for  disaster  management.11  EU-level 
disaster  risk  management  policy  was  also  announced  in  the  Commission's  Internal 

of 

on 

2010, 

adopted 

14  December 

the  General  Affairs  Council, 

COM(2010)600  final.  The  Communication  was  accompanied  by  an  impact  assessment  analysing 
various options: SEC (2010) 1242 final.. 
Conclusions 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/118460.pdf. 
Report  ‘Towards  a  stronger  European  disaster  response:  the  role  of  civil  protection  and  humanitarian 
assistance’ 2011/2023 INI (Rapporteur E. Gardini), approved in the plenary of 27 September 2011. 
Commission  Decision  No.  2004/277/EC,  Euratom  of  29  December  2003  lays  down  the  rules  for  the 
implementation  of  the  Mechanism,  defining  its  duties  and  the  functioning  of  the  various  preparatory 
measures, including a training programme. 
27.11.2008 Conclusions called for: (1) Promoting consistency amongst national training programmes in 
support of disaster management and enabling the improvement of training programmes provided by PS, 
and (2) Offering a wide range of training opportunities at EU level for disaster management experts and 
intervention personnel, primarily by diversifying and reinforcing the existing training programme. 
COM(2009)82 final of 23.2.2009; The Communication on the Internal security strategy addressed the 
need for an integrated approach between security and other policies. 
Commission  Staff  Working  Paper  on  Risk  Assessment  and  Mapping  Guidelines  for  Disaster 
Management,  21  December  2010,  17833/10,  SEC(2010)  1626.  The  Commission  guidelines  were 
welcomed  by  related  Council  conclusions  on  Further  Developing  Risk  Assessment  for  Disaster 
Management within the European Union, adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 11-12 
April 2011. 

6. 

7. 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

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Security Strategy, which states that the EU should establish by 2014 a coherent risk 
management policy linking threat and risk assessments to decision making.12 

Disaster  prevention  policy  and  actions  have  become  important  themes  in  the 
European  CP  cooperation  (and  elsewhere),  not  least  because  of  the  close  links 
between prevention, preparedness and response actions. In a Union of solidarity that 
fosters  mutual  assistance  in  times  of  crises,13  it  is  crucial  that  each  PS  make  the 
corresponding efforts to prevent emergencies from occurring in the first place. There 
are  strong  demands  from  PS  stakeholders  to  support  and  complement  European 
cooperation  on  cross-sectoral  disaster  risk  management  policies  as  a  pre-condition 
for further solidarity on the response side. 

In addition to the Council conclusions on response, preparedness and prevention, and 
the  related  European  Parliament  resolutions  mentioned  above,  the  Council  has 
adopted a number of Conclusions recognizing the need for improvement and inviting 
the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  to  take  action,  in  particular  on  host  nation 
support14,  the  role  of  the  Mechanism  in  major  emergencies15,  EU  disaster 
management  training  arrangements16,  forest  fire  prevention17,  innovative  solutions 
for  financing  disaster  prevention18,  integrated  flood  management19,  on  further 
developing risk assessment20, and civil protection awareness-raising21. 

The Lisbon Treaty created a dedicated Title XXIII on civil protection in Article 196 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU), which also stresses the role of 
prevention actions in European CP cooperation. 

By  bringing  together  the  CP  capabilities  of  31  PS,  the  Mechanism  and  European 
prevention actions help to protect people,22 the environment and property in multiple 
ways: 

(1)  Monitoring  of  emergencies,  information  sharing,  and  coordination  of  actions 
increase  the  speed  and  effectiveness  of  CP  interventions  and  thereby  helps 
saving lives and protecting people, the environment and property;  

EU  Internal  Security  Strategy  In  Action:  five  steps  towards  a  more  secure  Europe,  COM(2010)  673 
final of 22.10.2010. Civil protection is also one of five major components in a shared EU agenda for 
increasing the security of EU citizens and in building resilience to natural and man-made disasters as an 
important  part  of  the  Stockholm  Programme:  ‘An  open  and  secure  Europe  serving  and  protecting 
citizens’ (document 2010/C 115/01). 
As stipulated by Article 222 TFEU (Solidarity Clause). 
Council Conclusions of 22 November 2010 on Host Nation support (document 15874/10). 
Council Conclusions on the psychosocial interventions in the event of emergencies and disasters and on 
the role of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism in major events.  
Council  Conclusions  of  14  November  2008  on  European  disaster  management  training  (document 
15520/08). 
Council Conclusions of 26 April 2010 on prevention of forest fires within the EU. 
Council Conclusions of 09 November 2010 on innovative solutions for financing disaster prevention. 
Council Conclusions of 12 May 2011 on integrated flood management within the EU. 
Council Conclusions of 12 April 2011 on further developing risk assessment for disaster management 
within the EU. 
Council Conclusions of 18 May 2009 on civil protection awareness raising (document 9976/09).  
This  applies  to  EU  citizens  inside  the  EU  and  travelling  abroad,  as  well  as  populations  of  third 
countries. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12 

13 
14 
15 

16 

17 
18 
19 
20 

21 
22 

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(2)  Pooling  of  assets,  and  of  knowledge,  information  and  expertise  leads  to 
economies  of  scale  and  better  cost-effectiveness,  and  allows  to  provide  for 
higher protection levels; 

(3)  Training  and  exercises  for 

international  assistance,  as  well  as  other 
preparedness  and  prevention  actions  reduce  the  risks  and  consequences  of 
disasters and raise awareness. 

12. 

13. 

While the Mechanism has performed well for what it was designed for in 2001, in its 
current set-up its effectiveness and efficiency is limited by a number of shortcomings 
related  notably  to  the  limited  response  planning  and  the  limited  integration  of 
preparedness and  prevention actions, thus  making  it increasingly  difficult  to  ensure 
an appropriate handling of the upcoming challenges. 

This  impact  assessment  will  examine  a  range  of  policy  options  to  improve  the 
functioning of the CP disaster management cooperation in Europe. Its scope covers 
five key areas:  

(1) 

Improved  disaster  response  through  better  planned  EU  coordination  and  a 
voluntary pool of pre-committed assets; 

(2)  Addressing critical response capacity gaps; 

(3)  Enhanced financial and logistical transport support; 

(4)  A more coherent European preparedness policy framework; and  

(5)  A  European  prevention  policy  framework  and  national  disaster  risk 

management plans integrated into the EU CP cooperation. 

As will be discussed in this report, these areas are interlinked, complementary and mutually 
support each other. 

2. 

14. 

15. 

23 

24 
25 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

This impact assessment report was prepared by the Commission Directorate-General 
responsible for humanitarian aid and civil protection (DG ECHO) to examine policy 
options  in  the  field  of  EU  CP  cooperation  and  their  impacts,  including  all  relevant 
aspects of an ex-ante evaluation.23  

The  impact  assessment  process24  was  accompanied  by  an  Impact  Assessment 
Steering  Group  involving  21  relevant  services25  and  benefitted  from  input  of  an 
external study.26  

Commission  Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  2342/2002  of  23.12.2002,  laying  down  detailed  rules  for  the 
implementation  of  Council  Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  No  1605/2002  on  the  Financial  Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ L 357, 31.12.2002, p.1).  
A summary list of steps taken and the timeline are included in Annex A. 
SG, SJ, DG BUDG, DG HOME, DG ENV, DG CLIM, DG RTD, DG JRC, DG MOVE, DG ENER, 
DG  REGIO,  DG  SANCO,  DG  AGRI,  DG  ENTR,  DG  INFSO,  DG  ELARG,  DG  DEVCO,  FPIS, 
EEAS. Reports of the three consultation meetings are in Annex B. 

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2.1. 

Consultation of interested parties 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

Three targeted  stakeholder  consultations were carried out, in addition to a series of 
stakeholder  events  preceding 
the  Commission's  2010  Disaster  Response 
Communication.  Two  with  a  wide  group  of  invitees27  and  one  with  national  CP 
authorities who are the key stakeholders.28 National authorities also provided input in 
other informal ways, taken into consideration in this impact assessment.29  

Other stakeholders interested in EU CP policy, all of whom were invited to provide 
comments,  are  professional  or  voluntary  organisations  active  in  the  field  of 
emergency  management,  the  humanitarian  community,  UNOCHA,30  UNISDR,31  as 
well as relevant players active in the research, internal security, environment, foreign 
policy,  and  other  related  areas.  Stakeholders  were  consulted  on  the  basis  of 
comprehensive consultation documents (Annex D).  

As concerns the different policy proposals, there was a common ground among the 
key stakeholders that the EU should advance advanced planning of operations under 
the Mechanism. A large majority of stakeholders expressed support for building the 
European Emergency Response Capacity in the form of a voluntary pool of Member 
States' assets on call for EU operations, while some pointing out certain reservations, 
depending  on  the  detailed  implementation  of  such  a  pool.  On  the  idea  to  provide 
possibilities  for  EU  funding  of  response  assets  (EU-funded  assets),  there  were 
stakeholder  reservations  that  this  should  not  lead  to  the  EU  owning  assets  or  a 
command  and  control  structure  at  EU  level.  Stakeholders  expressed  their  general 
satisfaction  with  the  current  system  of  transport  support  and  various  opinions  on 
different elements of it and strongly welcomed proposals to simplify procedures. 

On the preparedness actions, stakeholders expressed general satisfaction in particular 
the  current  training  and  exercise  arrangements  and  many  speakers  at  the  first 
stakeholder  meeting  expressed  the  view  that  the  scope  of  the  training  needed 
broadening  so  as  to  include  also  other  relevant  subject  matters  of  international 
cooperation.  On  the  importance  of  prevention  actions,  there  is  a  general  agreement 
among  all  stakeholders  that  it  needs  to  become  an  integral  part  of  a  balanced 
approach in moving EU civil protection forward. 

20. 

All comments by stakeholders were fully considered and are reflected in the specific 
sections of this report. 

26 

27 

28 

29 
30 
31 

Study  report  Annex  C.  Just  prior  to  the  impact  assessment,  DG  ECHO  has  been  carrying  out  a 
comprehensive evaluation of all EU CP activities in the years 2007-2009. The evaluation was supported 
by an external and independent evaluation study which included a comprehensive stakeholder survey: 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/evaluation/thematic_en.htm. 
General stakeholder meetings were held on 6 April and 17 June 2011 with 600 invited stakeholders and 
about 120 participants each.  
Meeting  of  CP  Directors-General  held  in  Budapest  on  23-25  May  2011.  Three  consultation  papers 
included a number of specific questions on the policy options in the field of prevention, preparedness, 
and response  (see  Annex  F).  MS  CP  authorities  have  regular  and  frequent  contact  among  themselves 
and with the Commission on all matters of policy, implementation, evaluation, and lessons-learned, etc. 
This includes a non-paper drafted by a group of Participating States in June 2011. 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction. 

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2.2. 

The Impact Assessment Board 

21. 

3. 

22. 

In  response  to  the  IAB's  opinion,  this  report  was  revised  to  improve  the  problem 
definition  by  providing  more  evidence  of  the  size  and  seriousness  of  the  problems. 
The  baseline  scenario  and  the  content  of  the  policy  change  options  was  clarified 
including  diverging  stakeholder  views.  Options  are  analysed  in  greater  detail  and 
their comparative advantages and value added of the preferred options is described in 
more  detail  using  a  clear  set  of  comparison  criteria.  Finally,  the  monitoring  and 
evaluation arrangements are spelled out in the text. 

THE PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED AND SUBSIDIARITY 

Without  renewal  the  CPFI  will  expire  at  the  end  of  2013.  But  beyond  the  mere 
renewal  and  a  possible  strengthening  of  the  CPFI,  the  Mechanism  is  evolving  in  a 
context of three major challenges:  

1) the continuing trend of increasing number, intensity, and complexity of disasters;  

2) budgetary constraints related to the current economic situation; and  

3) systemic limitations inherent in the current mandate of the Mechanism, restricting 
the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and visibility of EU's disaster response.  

3.1. 

Overview of Mechanism operations and current activities financed by the CPFI 

23. 

24. 

The  Mechanism  has  over  the  years  significantly  increased  its  activity,  gained  in 
professionalism,  and  has  become  an  important  component  of  international  disaster 
management.32  An  extensive  external  evaluation  of  the  Mechanism  for  the  years 
2007-2009 (Annex H) concluded that the current system of coordination among PS 
has led to a better response to disasters inside and outside the EU, while training and 
exercises have successfully raised the level of EU preparedness. The role of the MIC 
–  currently  reorganised  into  the  European  Emergency  Response  Centre  (ERC)  –  is 
particularly appreciated by PS. The UNOCHA, which has a central coordination role 
for disasters outside the EU, recognises the Mechanism as a model 'regional' disaster 
management  arrangement  and  cooperates  closely  with  the  MIC,  including  through 
joint expert missions. 

When comparing the Mechanism/CPFI budget of € 189 million for 2007-2013 with 
the available budgets for humanitarian aid of next to € 1 billion for the same period, 
it  needs  to  be  born  in  mind  that  the  Mechanism  is  essentially  a  coordination 
instruments  which  helps  channelling  the  national  CP  assistance,  which  in  terms  of 
volume  sometimes  reaches  a  substantial  share of  the  overall  relief  effort.  So,  when 
placing the Mechanism in the context of international relief efforts, it is clear that the 
monetary  contributions  of  the  Mechanism  are  modest,  but  the  coordination  role  is 
substantial. For example in the 2010 Haiti earthquake relief efforts, the Mechanism 
coordinated  the  involvement  of  25  European  countries  in  close  cooperation  with 
UNOCHA. 

32 

Evaluation of the Mechanism for the years 2007-2009 (see Annex H). 

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25. 

26. 

In the year 2010 the share between the different areas was as follows: € 4.5 million 
for  response,  € 8  million  for  transport,  € 10  million  for  preparedness,  and  € 2.3 
million for prevention. 

On  the  response  side  the  following  graphs  give  an  overview  of  the  Mechanism 
activities (until mid 2011). 

Total num ber of activations of the Mechanism

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

17

3

11

7

11

2
6

6

12

12

4
4

17

18

3

7

20

2
3

3
1

28

28

2
1

11

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Year

Request for assistance

Pre-alert Monitoring

27. 

Mechanism activations 2011 per types of hazards. 

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Mechanism activations for different types of hazards

1
8%

2
15%

3
23%

3
23%

Earthquake
Waste spill (MP)

Tropical storm
Volcano eruption
Civil unrest

Forest fires
Flood

1
8%

1
8%

2
15%

28. 

The  deployment  of  assessment  and  coordination  teams  of  experts  on  the  site  of  an 
emergency, upon the request of an affected state can be financed by the CPFI. 

55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Number of experts and MIC Liaison Officers deployed on 
assessment and coordination missions

38

34

36

48

40

7

2

0

9

3

0

7

3

1

9

17

11

10

14

11

12

16

4

3

1

5

6

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Number of missions Number of experts MIC LO s

29. 

Mechanism activations 2010. 

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UNITED STATES

US Oil Spill – Deep 
Horizon: 29.04 
(monitoring), 27.05 
(request for assistance)
- several PS offered 
assistance: DE, EMSA, 
FR, IE, NL, NO, SE –
sweeping arms, skimmers, 
containment boom, fire 
boom, busters
GUATEMALA

Tropical storm
Agatha:25.05.2010
AT provided 1,275 
kg of Sodium 
Dichloroisocyanurat
e (NaDCC) 
Granules 

HAITI

Earthquake: 12.01-06.04
- 26 PS 
- 3 EUCP teams (7 weeks, 
13 experts + 3 MIC LO)
- 12 USAR teams – 25% of 
all USAR deployed, 2 field 
hospitals, 43 AMPs & 
medical teams, water 
purification, 7 assessment 
teams, tents for 20.000 
people – 60% of all tents by 
31 Jan, 1 base-camp (300 
people capacity), € 4.37 mil 
for transport grants. 
- 3 PA* modules (TAST, field 
hospital, water purification 
unit)
Cholera 
outbreak/Hurricane
Tomas: 21.10

FRANCE
Forest fires: 30.08.2010
- EUFFTR (2 Can CL215)

FRANCE
Speleological 
Relief: 
04.10.2010
-IT sent a diver
team of 7 
people
-UK sent 2 
divers and a 
liaison officer

POLAND
Floods: 19.05 – 25.06.2010
- 8 PS (DE, FR, CZ, DK, NL, 
EE, LV, LT ): 50 high 
capacity pumps, 20 expert 
teams (over 250 rescuers)
- 1 MIC LO
- 1 PA* module (high 
capacity pumping)

HUNGARY

UKRAINE

Floods: 25.05 –
01.07.2010
- 3,408,000 sandbags 
have been accepted from 
8 PS (NO, SI, RO, NL, CZ, 
HR, DE, BG) and CH, MD, 
UA.

Environmental preparedn
mission: 01-09.03 – poten
tailing dam collapse (Kalu
- Joint UN-EU mission 
- 2 experts (NO) & 1 MIC 
- report underlines critical
threats and recommenda
for priority measures

PAKISTAN

Floods: 03.08 – 29.10.2010
- 1 EUCP team (5 experts, 
LO) 
- EU Air Bridge – 12 flights
BG, DE, DK, FR, IT, SE, U
shelter, water purification, 
medicines, NFI
- 3 flights co financed by C
FI
- 8 requests for transport c
financing
- several PS sent assistanc
BG, CY, DE, DK, ES, FR, G
HU, IT, LT, MT, NO, SE, S

PORTUGAL
1. For. fires, 25.07-02.08 
• IT: 2 Can CL415
2. For. fires, 10-20.08
• EUFFTR (2 CL415 FR)
3. For. Fires, 29.08-01.09 
• ES (2 Can CL215+415)

CHILE

Earthquake: 27.02-07.06
- 9 PS (AT, BG, SK, FR, 
DE, IT, ES, SE, UK): power 
generators, tents, water 
purification, experts 
(medical, USAR, etc), 8 
mechanical bridges, 1 field 
hospital with surgery 
rooms, other relief items
- 1 EUCP team (5 experts 
+ 1 MIC LO)
- 1 PA module (TAST)

November 2010

HUNGARY 

Alkali sludge accident: 
04.10.2010
1 EUCP team 
(DE,SE,FR,BE,AT,MIC)

BENIN

Floods: 06.10.2010
1 expert from FR as 
an associate member
to the UNDAC team

ALBANIA

Floods: 07-21.01
- 1 EUCP team (5 experts, 1 
MIC LO & 1 UNDAC 
associated expert)
- 8 PS (AT, GR, SI, IT, FR, 
HR, SK, BE) : water pumps, 
generators, medicines, 
helicopters, expert teams, 
boats, other relief items

ROMANIA
Floods: 02.07 – 16.07.2010
- 4 PS (AT, BE, DE, HU) 
provided assistance: pumps, 
pwr gen, geotextile
- other PS offered 
assistance: PL, EU RRC –
FR and BFC, BG, LU

Rep of MOLDOVA

Floods: 07.07 – 28.08.2010
- 1 EUCP team (3 experts, 1 M
LO) 
- 3 PS (AT, EE, RO): pumps, pw
gen, sandbags, plastic sheets, 
boats for shallow water
- COM mobilized EU RRC – BF
module (EE/LV/LT)

Monitoring status: Iceland volcano (15.04-18.05), Forest Fires in Russia (03.08.2010), Torrential rain in 
Malta (25-27/10)
Pre-alert (early warning message) status: Ukraine Floods (02.07.2010)
Mechanism activations (requests for assistance):
-not followed by delivering assistance or deploying experts through the Mechanism: Tajikistan floods 
(11.05);Cuba oil spill potential effects (25.06); 
-facilitating resource identification: UK salt for roads (09-26.01); Netherlands salt for roads (11-25.01).

30. 

For  transport  assistance,  a  maximum  of  €  90  million  can  be  used  under  the  CP 
Financial  Instrument  over  the  period  2007  to  2013.  The  total  of  CPFI  co-financing 
used since the start of the transport provisions up to the end of May 2011 amounts to 
around € 18,4 million, with 2010 and 2011 showing a marked increase in the number 
of  requests  for  pooling  and  financial  assistance.  In  2007,  there  was  one  request  for 
transport  financing  of  a  total  value  of  around  €  0.03  million;   the  total  value  of  the 
transport co-financing during 2008 and 2009 stayed at around € 0.4 million yearly; in 
2010, it reached around € 6.6 million (for 55  requests), and in 2011 it has increased 
to € 10.8 million (for 35 requests) so far.  

EN 

11 

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s
t
n
a
r
g
f
o
#

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

s
t
n
a
r
g
f
o
#

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

31. 

Overview of disasters for which transport grants were used
2010 to July 2011 (arranged chronologically)

600000

500000

400000

300000

200000

100000

0

# of grants

Average grant size

Distribution of grant sizes
2007 - July 2011

Less than 
5k

5k - 9k

10k - 29k

30k - 49k

50k - 99k

100k -
149k

150k -
249k

250k -
499k

500k+

Actions  are  eligible  for  financial  assistance  under  the  Instrument  only  if  certain 
criteria  are  met.  These  criteria  refer  to  (i)  the  additional  transport  resources  being 
necessary  for  ensuring  the  effectiveness  of  the  CP  response  under  the  Mechanism; 
(ii)  all  other  possibilities  for  finding  transport  under  the  Mechanism  have  been 
exhausted; (iii) the assistance to be transported: - has been offered to and accepted by 
a requesting country, - is necessary to meet vital needs arising from the emergency. 
In  order  to  fulfil  the  second  criterion  (prove  that  "all  other  possibility  for  finding 
transport under the Mechanism have been exhausted"), article 4 of the Commission 
Decision  2007/606/EC,  Euratom  provides  for  the  organisation  of  the  pooling 
procedure, and it also foresees that EU financing may become eligible only at the end 
of the pooling phase (which shall not exceed 24 hours from the notification, and may 

EN 

12 

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32. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

be shortened by the Commission to a minimum of 6 hours, where this is necessary in 
order to respond effectively to urgent and vital needs).  

For preparedness actions, the year 2010 training activities amounted to € 4.2 million, 
€ 3.3 for exercises, and € 0.6 million for the exchange of experts. 

At the end of May 2010 a total of 142 training courses had been  conducted  and in 
total some 2500 participants received training. Training courses currently include the 
following  types:  Community  Mechanism  Induction  Course  (CMI),  Operational 
Management  Course  (OPM),  High  Level  Coordination  Course  (HLC),  Assessment 
Mission  Course  (AMC),  Staff  Management  Course  (SMC),  Media  and  Security 
Strategy  Course  (MSC),  International  Coordination  Course  (ICC),  Operational 
Management Refresher Course (OPMR), High Level Coordination Refresher Course 
(HLCR), Modules Basic Course (MBC), Technical Experts Course (TEC). 

Overall, there have been more than 22 full-scale exercises since 2002 supported by 
the  Mechanism.  The  scenarios  were:  11  earthquakes  (incl.  3  CBRN),  7  floods,  5 
CBRN, 4 terrorism, 1 forest fire, 1 volcano. On average five countries participate in 
any  given  EU  exercise,  and  on  average  there  are  three  exercises  per  year.  On 
average,  14  mechanism  countries  (some  44  per  cent  of  Participating  States) 
participate annually in one or more simulation exercises. The most active countries 
are Germany, France, Sweden, Belgium, the UK and Italy. 

The exchange of experts programme allows qualified civil protection personnel and 
officials to spend a number of weeks in another host country civil protection system 
for the purpose of learning, exchange of experience and creating networks. By now, 
some 200 experts have made use of this possibility, which is co-financed by the EU. 

As regards prevention actions, the current Mechanism Decision makes no reference 
to  prevention  policy  as  part  of  the  Civil  Protection  Cooperation.  The  current 
legislative  provisions  in  the  CPFI  Decision  include  Article  1(2)(b)  and  Article  2(1) 
which  place  preventive  measures  within  the  scope  and  the  subject  matter  of  the 
CPFI. Consequently, the CPFI has financed a number of EU actions in this area. The 
eligible  actions  and  criteria  for  both  prevention  and  preparedness  are  specified  in 
Article 4(1). 

3.1. 

Current disaster trends 

37. 

The  impacts  of  disasters  in  Europe  have  been  very  substantial  in  the  past  and  this 
despite the fact that Europe has been spared in recent decades of the mega-disasters 
that other regions have experienced. A recent report by the European Environmental 
Agency assessed the occurrence and impacts of disasters and the underlying hazards 
such as storms, extreme temperature events, forest fires, water scarcity and droughts, 
floods,  snow  avalanches,  landslides,  earthquakes,  volcanoes  and  technological 
accidents in Europe for the period 1998-2009 (see figure below).33  

33 

EEA  Technical  Report  No  13/2010:  Mapping  the  impacts  of  natural  hazards  and  technological 
accidents in Europe; Link: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/mapping-the-impacts-of-natural. 

EN 

13 

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38. 

Thus,  for  the  period  1998-2009  total  disaster  impacts  in  the  EU  are  estimated  at 
almost 100.000 fatalities and close to € 150 billion in economic damage. 34 The most 
expensive individual European event was Winter Storm Xynthia, causing some € 4.5 
billion in losses in several countries. EU citizens are also exposed to disasters in third 
countries, such as the South-East Asian tsunami of December 2004.35  

39. 

Disaster impacts in Europe in the last ten years: 

Main types of impacts 

Impacts 1998-2009 EU 

Hazard 

Hazard type  Human 
fatalities 

Economi
c losses 

Eco-
system 
degradatio
n 

Event
s 

Fatalitie
s 

Economic 
losses 
million 
EUR1) 

Storms 

Hydro-
meteorologi
cal 

Extreme 
temperature 
events 

Hydro-
meteorologi
cal 

x 

x 

Forest fires  Hydro-

x 

meteorologi
cal 

Water 
scarcity  and 
droughts 

Hydro-
meteorologi
cal 

Floods 

Hydro-
meteorologi
cal 

Snow 
avalanches 

Geophysica
l 

x 

x 

x 

 155 

729 

44,338 

 101 

77,551 

9,962 

x 

x 

35 

191 

6,917 

8 

0 

4,940 

213 

1,126 

52,173 

8 

130 

742 

x 

x 

x 

34 

35 

EEA Report 13/2010: "Mapping the impacts of natural hazards and technological accidents in Europe" 
at http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/mapping-the-impacts-of-natural. 
For  more  on  consular  aspects  see  Communication  "Consular  protection  for  EU  citizens  in  third 
countries: state of play and way forward" [COM(2011) 149 final] and related impact assessment.  

EN 

14 

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Main types of impacts 

Impacts 1998-2009 EU 

Hazard 

Hazard type  Human 
fatalities 

Economi
c losses 

Eco-
system 
degradatio
n 

Event
s 

Fatalitie
s 

Economic 
losses 
million 
EUR1) 

Landslides   Geophysica

x 

l 

Earthquakes
/volcanoes 

Geophysica
l 

x 

x 

x 

Oil spills 

Technologi
cal 

Industrial 
accidents 

Technologi
cal 

Toxic spills  Technologi

cal 

X 

X 

X 

9 

212 

551 

46 

18,864 

29,205 

9 

n/a 

70,000 
tonnes 
spilled 

339 

169 

4 

n/a 

5  million 
m3 spilled 

928 

98,972 

148,831 

Total 

40. 

41. 

On  a  worldwide  scale,  in  just  the  one  year  2010  more  than  200.000  were  people 
killed in the earthquakes of Haiti, Chile and central China, the floods in Pakistan, and 
the heat wave in Russia; overall some 17% of worldwide economic losses incurred in 
Europe.36 The year 2010 demonstrated also the vulnerability of the networked global 
economy,  as  the  eruption  of  the  Eyjafjallajökull  volcano  in  Iceland  paralysed  the 
entire air traffic in Europe for days, leading to worldwide economic repercussions. 

Looking at the evolution over time we perceive a clear trend of increasing numbers, 
intensities, and complexity of disasters. The figures below provide a synthesis of the 
key data on disaster trends, showing in particular the continuous rise of the number 
of  people  affected  by  natural  disasters  in  the  last  decades  and  the  steep  rise  in 
economic damages. 

36 

Report of Munich Re: http://www.munichre.com/en/media_relations/press_releases/2011/2011_01_03_press_release_en.pdf. 

EN 

15 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Figures 2 and 3: Rising trends in disasters (people affected and damages caused by natural 
and technological disasters37 

37 

EM-DAR:  The  OFDA/CRED  International  Database  –  www.emdat.be  –  Université  Catholique  de 
Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. 

EN 

16 

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42. 

43. 

38 

The corresponding disaster figures for technological disasters display sudden surges 
but  an  overall  less  pronounced  rising  trend.  The  number  of  people  reported  killed 
from technological disasters started declining in the last decade. 

Contributing  to  these  rising  trends  is  a  number  of  new  risks  with  potentially 
devastating  effects  in  the  future.  According  to  recent  reports  and  studies38,  these 
include  complex  risks  such  as  the  interaction  between  physical  and  technological 
hazards.  Another  driving  factor  are  the  effects  of  climate  change,  and  its  potential 
future security implications.  

For  example,  2011  UNISDR  Global  Assessment  Report  on  Disaster  Risk  Reduction,  2010  European 
Commission's  5th  Report  on  Economic,  Social  and  Territorial  Cohesion,  CRED  Annual  Disaster 
Statistical  Review  2010,  Munich  RE  Natural  catastrophes  2010,  EEA  Report  on  the  European 
Environment: State and outlook 2010 etc. 

EN 

17 

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44. 

One of the main advantages of European CP cooperation resides in the advantages to 
collectively  prevent,  prepare  for  and  respond  to  very  large  disasters  that  are 
overwhelming  individual  PS.  The  extent  of  possible  problems  caused  by  such 
disasters will be illustrated below by reference to the recent triple disaster in Japan. 
The  earthquake-tsunami-nuclear  disaster  striking  Japan  in  March  2011  is  a  salient 
reminder  that  even  well  prepared  countries  can  be  overwhelmed  by  complex 
disasters.  Comparable  events  are  possible  also  in  Europe  at  any  moment  and  may 
lead  to  a  number  of  severe  consequences,  due  to  the  increased  vulnerability  of 
today's networked societies with their reliance on technologies and infrastructure.39 

Example: As was shown by the disaster in Japan, a mega-disaster within Europe may require 
the  urgent  mass  evacuation  of  tens/hundreds  of  thousands  of  inhabitants  and  give  rise  to 
enormous  temporary  shelter  needs  within  Europe.  They  may  also  give  rise  to  spontaneous 
population  movements,  with  large  groups  travelling  by  their  own  means  in  search  of  safety 
and  temporary  shelter.  Very  few  EU  MS  have  had  practical  experience  with  such  mass 
evacuations.  The  affected  country  may  loose  some  of  its  capacity  to  coordinate  the  overall 
response. It was for this reason that Japan requested a coordinated EU approach, pooling all of 
the assistance and taking care of its delivery on a door-to-door basis. Another major impact 
may  be  on  the  available  transport  infrastructure,  thus  negatively  impacting  the  capacity  to 
deliver essential relief supplies. This is one of the reasons why Japan requested the EU to try 
to  deliver  its  assistance  directly  to  the  beneficiaries  in  the  affected  municipalities. 
Furthermore,  modern  societies  tend  to  face  various  types  of  legal  obstacles  when  receiving 
external assistance in order to respond to mega-disasters and though the EU is based on the 
principle of free movement, a number of legal issues still constitute barriers to the free flow of 
assistance within the EU (and from non-EU country). The recent study carried out by the Red 
Cross, the Belgium Presidency Seminar on Host Nation Support (HNS) and the recent work 
on  the  HNS  guidelines  have  identified  various  legal  obstacles  that  need  to  be  further 
addressed40.  Furthermore,  the  events  of  such  scale  would  pose  cross-sectoral  issues  going 
beyond  the  'pure'  remit  of  Civil  Protection,  such  as  those  related  to  disruption  of  economic 
activity, massive movements of people, energy supply, law and order, security, even political 
issues etc. This would require extensive interaction and coordination between Civil Protection 
and  other  state  authorities,  businesses,  as  well  as  the  service.  In  some  MS,  civil  protection 
authorities  will  have  a  central  coordinating  role  during  major  crises,  bringing  together  the 
national  actors  across  the  various  sectors.  This  is  not  mirrored  at  EU  level,  where  the  civil 
protection  Mechanism  is  one  sectoral  instrument  next  to  others.  Finally,  the  additional 
challenge of rescue efforts under CBRN conditions may easily overwhelm national capacities. 

45. 

Somewhat different to the example above which deals with unknown disasters is the 
fact  that  Europe  faces  also  a  number  of  known  hazards  which  require  attention. 
European  countries  feature  ten  volcanoes  that  potentially  affect  population  centres 
with  a  total  of  1.3  million  inhabitants.  Vesuvius  is  the  most  dangerous  volcano  in 

39 

40 

The following example was discussed at the recent Directors-General meeting in Krakow in September 
2011.  Necessarily,  disaster  prevention,  preparedness  and  response  actions  are  concerned  with  future 
risks for which the exact impacts are to an extent hypothetical. 
Inter  alia,  recognition  of  qualifications  of  regulated  professions  (e.g.  doctors,  nurses,  paramedics, 
engineers, etc.), national cross border and transport regulations and restrictions, liability of international 
intervention  teams,  regulation  concerning  standards  for  food  and  medicines  in  emergency  situations, 
visas regulations for non-EU personnel, in-country taxation for international intervention teams, etc. 

EN 

18 

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Europe,  creating  life-threatening  hazards  to  more  than  one  million  people.41 
Moreover,  large  earthquake  events  are  expected  any  time  in  Lisbon  and  Istanbul. 
Such large events can by far overwhelm the capacities of individual countries. For an 
earthquake  magnitude  7.5  in  Istanbul,  public  estimates  expect  55000  or  more 
buildings destroyed or severely damaged, 73.000 fatalities, 120.000 severely injured 
inhabitants, 2 million homeless people, and economic damages of up to 60 billion €, 
i.e.  30%  of  Turkeys  gross  national  product.42  Considering  the  time-scales  of  geo-
physical phenomena, it is relevant to consider also the devastating effects of the 1755 
earthquake  causing  the  near  destruction  of  Lisbon.  Between  30  and  40  thousand 
people  (of  200  thousand)  lost  their  lives  and  85%  of  the  cities  buildings  were 
destroyed.  

46. 

While today's buildings and emergency procedures may be considered more resilient 
than at earlier times, the economic values at risk have increased significantly, as has 
the population at risk in dangerous places. Moreover, today's networked societies are 
vulnerable  to  many  severe  knock-on  effects,  e.g.  when  the  electricity  supply  is 
disrupted  for  longer  periods.  German  authorities  have  analysed  the  effects  of  a 
prolonged electricity blackout on the German society and concluded that the effects 
would be wide-ranging and heavily disrupting after only a few days, with significant 
risks also to human lives. 

3.2. 

Environmental, social and fundamental rights impacts of disasters 

47. 

48. 

49. 

41 

42 
43 

The impacts of natural and man-made disasters have immediate detrimental impacts 
on  the  environment  and  can  contribute  to climate  change.  The  impacts  can  include 
loss  of  bio-diversity  due  to  fires  and/or  floods.  For  example  over  3.5  million  ha  of 
forest  areas  were  burnt  by  forest  fires  in  Europe  2003-2009  of  which  over  half  a 
million hectares were located in protected ecosystems – Natura 2000 areas.43 Impacts 
of  forest  fires  on  ecosystems  are  widespread.  Other  environmental  impacts  can 
include  increased  water  pollution  due  to  floods,  as  well  as  industrial  and 
technological  disasters,  e.g.  if  waste  water  treatment  plants  are  inundated  or  when 
factories  holding  large  quantities  of  toxic  chemicals  are  also  affected.  In  addition 
forest fires can also contribute to increased CO2 emissions. 

Flooding  and  storms  are  the  most  important  natural  hazards  in  Europe  in  terms  of 
economic losses (over € 96 billion 1998-2009)  (EEA 2010) and the floods affecting 
Europe in recent decades have shown an increase in economic losses as a result of 
increased population and wealth in the affected areas (EEA 2010). 

At the same time vulnerability among people and territories affected by disasters is 
very heterogeneous throughout Europe, as highlighted by recent disasters. In the heat 
waves affecting France and other countries in the summer 2003, most of the fatalities 
were  elderly  people.  The  UK  floods  of  2007  affected  disproportionally  the  poorer 

Willis 

Europe, 

Spence, Robin; Gunesekara, Rashmin, and Zuccaro, Giulio: Insurance Risks From Volcanic Eruptions 
in 
2009: 
Research 
http://www.willisresearchnetwork.com/Lists/Publications/Attachments/64/WRN%20-
%20Insurance%20Risks%20from%20Volcanic%20Eruptions_Final.pdf. 
http://www.zukunftsforum-oeffentliche-sicherheit.de/downloads/ZOES-2-Wenzel.pdf. 
EFFIS, 2010European Forest Fires Information System: http://effis.jrc.ec.europa.eu. 

Network, 

October 

19th 

EN 

19 

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50. 

51. 

segments of people living in flood prone areas.44 Many of the deaths from flooding in 
Romania  and  other  Eastern  European  countries  occurred  in  rural  areas  with 
insufficient flood control and defences. As reported by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on  Climate  Change  in  2007  the  burden  of  disasters  including  their  health  impacts 
falls  disproportionately  on  vulnerable  populations  also  in  Europe,  namely  the  poor, 
ethnic minorities, old people and people with disabilities.45 

Involving  the  active  participation  of  local  communities,  business  and  non-
governmental  organisations  would  boost  the  social  impact  of  disaster  management. 
Positive  social  impacts  may  occur  in  particular  when  EU  citizens  experience 
increasingly  comparable  levels  of  protection,  irrespective  of  the  region  confronted 
with  comparable  risks.  In  terms  of  avoiding  fatalities  and  cost  damage,  positive 
benefits occur when reducing the number of deaths and injuries, reducing damage to 
infrastructure  and  buildings,  or  reducing  productivity  loss,  e.g.  in  industries  and 
agriculture  during  flooding.  A  significant  proportion  of  the  prevention  and 
preparedness funding will also contribute to combating climate change. 

Actions  that  reduce  casualties  and  minimize  harm  and  damage  to  individuals  and 
communities  have  a  positive  impact  on  a  number  of  rights  protected  under  the  EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular the right to life (article 2) and the right 
to  the  integrity  of  the  person  (article  3).  Such  actions  help  ensuring  an  improved 
access  to  health  (article  35)  and  enhanced  environmental  protection  (article  37). 
Improvements  in  the  EU  CP  may  also  positively  affect  the  consular  protection  of 
unrepresented EU citizens in third countries, therefore strengthening the fundamental 
right to consular protection (article 46). 

3.3. 

The limitations of the current CP cooperation and the Mechanism 

52. 

53. 

Current  disaster  trends  and  the  possible  event  of  a  mega-disaster  in  Europe  reveal 
that in its current set-up the Mechanism has a number of shortcomings related to the 
response  to,  preparedness  for  and  also  the  prevention  in  particular  of  large-scale 
disasters, making it difficult to respond effectively to the future challenges. However, 
when  considering  also  the  likely  limited  public  budgets  available  for  increased  CP 
actions, the European CP cooperation via the Mechanism must be seen as one of the 
most  effective  and  efficient  means  of  better  preparing  the  European  systems  for 
preventing and protecting to the future disaster landscape. 

When  a  disaster  hits  a  European  country,  a  great  deal  of  national  resources  can  be 
mobilised,  in  most  cases  including  the  military  and  sometimes  even  the  private 
sector.  However,  whenever  the  national  resources  would  be  overwhelmed,  it  is  the 
CP cooperation that may in most circumstances play the most effective and efficient 
role  considering  that  it  has  been  establishing  functioning  cooperation  modes  and 
participated  in  a  lot  of  training  and  exercises.  The  Mechanism  builds  on  this 
cooperation and tries to develop it further into a comprehensive disaster management 
cooperation system where the EU can play its role  to support and complement MS 

44 

45 

UK  Environment  Agency  'Addressing  Environmental  Inequalities:  Flood  Risk'  Science  Report: 
SC020061/SRI. For instance over half the population of Hull, heavily damaged in 2007 lived in areas 
that were amongst the 20% most deprived in England. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group II report, 2007, Climate Change: Impacts, 
Adaptation and Vulnerability, Geneva: United Nations. 

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efforts. As such it is not supposed to replace any regional cooperation that is already 
in place. But due to its larger scope of currently 31 PS it widens the scope of possible 
protection and is therefore more effective in the context of a larger disaster. 

3.3.1.  Reactive  and  ad  hoc  mechanics  of  the  EU  CP  cooperation  limit  the  effectiveness, 

efficiency and coherence of European disaster response 

54. 

55. 

56. 

The  current  Mechanism  has  been  set  up  as  a  monitoring  and  information  sharing 
platform, and is therefore dependent on voluntary and ad hoc offers of assistance by 
PS  (EU  does  not  have  own  assets).  It  is  not  in  a  position  to  guarantee  the 
availability of assistance when needed. This can lead to situations when life-saving 
assistance  is  not  available  or  delayed,  thus,  undermining  the  effectiveness  of  EU 
response.  

The ad hoc system also necessarily implies that the Mechanism is of a reactive rather 
than a pro-active nature. The impossibility of foreseeing exactly what and how much 
(if any), assistance will be offered for any given emergency means that a meaningful 
contingency  planning  for  deploying  assistance  cannot  be  done  for  operations 
under  the  Mechanism.  This  inevitably  leads  to  a  degree  of  improvisation  in  the 
immediate response phase, which denies the (economic) advantages of pooling and 
thus  negatively  affects  the  cost-effectiveness  of  overall  EU  response.  Furthermore, 
over  the  years  it  has  become  evident  that  the  ad  hoc  system  leads  to  a  degree  of 
fragmentation  of  assistance.  Given  that  PS  offer  assistance  without  necessarily 
taking  into  account  the  overall  EU  response  effort,  the  assistance  may  lack 
coherence. It has been a recurrent phenomenon that assistance provided by PS caters 
abundantly for some of the needs whilst unable to cover others.46  

An example of the past is the major forest fires in Bulgaria in the summer of 2007, 
where the request for assistance (fire fighting aircraft) was left unanswered by other 
PS, partly explained by the fact that their assets were either in use in other PS or on 
high  alert  to  react  domestically.  Looking  into  the  future,  in  an  extreme  case,  a 
deployed  field  hospital  could  be  rendered  virtually  useless  in  the  absence  of  water 
purification  support  if  access  to  clean  water  were  an  issue.  It  should  be  noted  that 
there  is  a  virtual  consensus  among  the  stakeholders  on  the  need  to  step  up  the 
planning of operations under the Mechanism.  

3.3.2.  Unavailability of critical response assets (capacity gaps) 

56.1. 

An  effective  EU  disaster  response  requires  that  assets  are  available  and  can  be 
quickly  mobilised.  Where  gaps  in  response  assets  exist  (which  could  be  either 
because  they  are  not  available  in  sufficient  quantities  or  not  available  for  sharing), 
critical  needs  of  disasters'  victims  may  not  be  met.  Gaps  can  occur  especially  with 
regard  to  assets  to  deal  with  low  probability/high  impact  risks,  when  the  risk  is 
considered too low for an individual country to justify investment, even though the 
impact could be huge (for instance in the case of a massive terrorist CBRN47 attack). 
Yet,  the  risk  for  the  EU  as  a  whole  may  in  certain  cases  justify  investing  in  such 
assets,  thus  filling  the  gap  (i.e.  situation  comparable  to  that  of  'market  failure').48 

46 
47 
48 

For details see Impact Assessment for 2010 Communication, SEC(2010)1243 – SEC (2010) 1242 final. 
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear. 
For a detailed economic rationale see external consultant's study, Annex C, section 4.4. 

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57. 

58. 

59. 

Some reports suggest that in some extreme scenarios Europe may face for instance a 
shortage of CBRN-related capacities and medical facilities for burnt victims.49 

Gaps  may  also  occur  with  regard  to  specialised  high-cost  assets,  when  initial 
investments  could  be  very  high  or  even  prohibitive.  In  such  cases  there  are  strong 
economic arguments to jointly invest in some ‘top-up’ European capacities that could 
be shared by all PS. One example is the oil pollution combating vessels managed by 
the  European  Maritime  Safety  Agency  (EMSA).  Another  example  could  be  aerial 
forest  fire-fighting.  While  all  PS  can  be  reasonably  expected  to  prepare  for  the 
average level of risk – past experience indicates that this is the case in practice the 
EU as a whole is sufficiently equipped to deal with average forest fires seasons – it 
would  be  economically  beneficial  to  develop  reserve  capacities  for  more  extreme 
seasons and to share the burden related to that.50  

Furthermore, some 'horizontal' assets by their very nature are such that they can be 
used in virtually every emergency and serve equally all actors involved, as  e.g. the 
Technical  Assistance  and  Support  Teams  (TAST)  that  provide  logistical  support 
(field  accommodation,  communications,  food  etc.)  to  any  expert  team  or  CP 
'module.'51  Similarly,  private-sector  stakeholders  pointed  that  the  same  rationale 
could  apply  to  heavy-lift  helicopters  that  can  be  used  for  a  variety  of  purposes  in 
almost every emergency involving the Mechanism.  

While  the  feasibility  and  usefulness  of  such  arrangements  has  been  successfully 
tested through pilot and preparatory action projects, the current CP legal basis does 
not allow the EU's support to filling such gaps and reaping benefits of economies of 
scale  associated  with  sharing  such  assets  at  EU  level,  rather  than  having  31  PS 
making parallel investments. In this regard is should be noted that a number of key 
stakeholders  felt  strongly  that  in  view  of  primary  responsibility  of  PS  for  the 
protection of their populations, it would be inappropriate for the EU to develops its 
'own' assets should it pose a risk of 'crowding out' the national capacities. 

3.3.3.  Limited transport solutions and heavy procedures hinder optimal response 

60. 

Transport  is  a  critical  element  in  ensuring  an  effective,  efficient  and  coherent 
response  to  disasters,  and  a  major  cost  and  logistical  challenge  for  PS.  The 
availability  of  means  and  funds  for  transport  is  usually  checked  at  PS  level  before 
making offers of assistance and often leads to delays in offering assistance, or offers 

49 

50 

51 

Study on Strengthening the EU capacity to respond to disasters: Identification of the gaps in the 
capacity of the CP Mechanism to provide assistance in major disasters and options to fill the gaps – A 
scenario-based approach, at http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protection/civil/prote/pdfdocs/Final%20Report%20-
%20scenario%20study.pdf, ECORYS 2009. 
This was successfully tested through a pilot and preparatory action projects on EU Forest Fire-fighting 
Tactical Reserve, whereas two CL215 fire-fighting aircraft were made available to assist all PS during 
2009 and 2010 summer seasons. In 2009, this reserve was used in 6 out of 9 EU operations in four PS, 
largely covering the difference between the requested capacities and offers from PS. 
EU aims to organise CP assets sent abroad into CP 'modules' that are fully interoperable and can be 
quickly deployed to the field, which is done on a voluntary basis. Technical specifications have been 
developed for 17 types of modules and more than 130 PS' intervention modules of various types are 
currently registered in the Commission's database. Examples of types of CP modules are high capacity 
pumping, water purification, heavy and medium search and rescue, and aerial fire fighting with 
airplanes. 

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61. 

62. 

63. 

not  being  made,  or  in  less  than  required  quantities.52  Likewise,  the  delivery  of 
assistance  has  often  become  a  critical  issue  when  unexpected  transport  costs  arise 
during an operation. 

The  access  to  transport  means  can  be  a  serious  issue.  In  a  number  of  past 
emergencies, the absence of good access to transport means precluded the provision 
of  assistance,  for  example  after  the  earthquake  in  Peru  (August  2007),  offers  from 
Germany,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  and  Slovakia  covering  medical  equipment, 
medicines,  and  other  relief  items  were  partly  not  delivered  because  of  lack  of 
transport. In addition, the broker53 was also activated by a PS that reimbursed 100% 
of  associated  costs  (Bulgaria  for  delivery  of  assistance  in  Pakistan,  2010),  thus 
confirming that the access to transport is a problem in itself that some CP authorities 
face.54 Sometimes only military transport means are available, while the situation in 
the affected country requires a cautious use of military means. 

PS  can  request  support  from  the  Mechanism  according  to  the  provisions  of  the 
revised  2007  CP  legislation  in  the  form  of  a  50%  transport  co-financing  or  the 
Commission's  activation  of  a  transport  broker.55  However,  the  current  burdensome 
procedures  and  the  maximum  50%  EU  transport  co-financing  clearly  represent  a 
bottleneck  in  certain  time-critical  deployments  of  assistance.  According  to  an 
extensive e-survey conducted for the 2010 CP Evaluation, 26 respondents considered 
that  the  existence  of  transport  provisions  have  a  decisive  impact  on  the  decision  to 
offer assistance, against 22 respondents who considered the contrary, and 18 whom 
did not know. 

Furthermore, the procedures for requesting EU financial transport assistance through 
grants  and  service  contracts  are  considered  administratively  burdensome  in  the 
context of quick response actions. This was the conclusion of last year's Evaluation, 
and a significant number of PS has expressed  it at the first stakeholder conference. 
To the extent that the administrative procedures deter PS from offering assistance, as 
explained  by  stakeholders,  the  current  transport  provisions  pose  a  problem  for  the 
future functioning of the Mechanism as an effective and efficient response tool. 

Administrative  procedures:  The  burdens  are  considered  excessive  for  both  the 
Commission and the PS. There are several specific issues: 1) if two or more countries 
pool  the  transport  of  their  assistance  a  corresponding  number  of  requests  for  co-
financing  have  to  be  submitted  (one  from  each  of  the  States  that  contribute  with 
assets and that wants to request co-funding), see example below; 2) the procedure for 
transport grant agreements is lengthy, involving 100% of transport costs being paid 
by  the  Commission  upon  the  signature  of  the  grant  agreement,  and  the  PS 
reimbursing  at  least  50%;  3)  organising  the  whole  logistical  chain  of  a  transport 
operation involving several PS poses significant challenges, as important time can be 

52 

53 

54 
55 

During some of the recent emergencies (e.g., Japan 2011, Tunisia evacuation 2011), there were cases 
when  some  PS  made  offers  of  assistance,  while  announcing  their  lack  of  financial  means  to  cover 
transport costs. 
When  requested  by  PS,  the  Commission  tries  to  identify  cost-efficient  transport  options  by  using  the 
services  of  a  transport  contractor  ("broker")  to  lease  transport  assets.  Such  operations  can  be  co-
financed by the Commission up to maximum 50 per cent.  
This disregards the (few) cases where offers from the broker were rejected. 
For details see Annex L. 

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wasted  and  administrative  and  logistical  costs  incur  when  trying  to  organise 
operations in airport hubs or in the affected country, due to the fact that EU transport 
co-financing  can  only  cover  a  maximum  of  50%  (meaning  that  administrative  and 
financial procedures have to be carried out  with  each  of  the  concerned  PS  for  very 
small  amounts),  see  example  below;  4)  an  affected  PS  cannot  benefit  directly  of 
transport services provided by the Commission (access is limited to offering states), 
which  can  translate  into  a  lengthy  administrative  procedure  if  the  offering  state 
engages  in  obtaining  part  of  the  transport  costs  from  the  Commission  and  the  rest 
from the affected state.  

64. 

65. 

One example is related to evacuating EU citizens from Libya (2011), for which the 
broker provided options. The operation did not take place inter alia due to the fact 
that there were more than four PS involved and some PS were reluctant to deal with 
the administrative process for sharing the 50% part.  

An  example  of  problems  in  managing  complex  operations  occurred  in  during  the 
Japan  earthquake  2011  (organising  storage  and  transport  from  Narita  airport  to  the 
affected  prefectures  of  assistance  from  three  PS),  and  the  Pakistan  floods  2010 
(organising  the  transport  chain  so  that  assistance  from  three  PS  gets  on  time  in  the 
common airport hub, making sure that all the assistance is packed in the right way 
and  fulfils  all  requirements  for  overseas  transport,  ensuring  storage,  loading  and 
unloading upon arrival). 

3.3.4.  Limited CP preparedness in training and exercises 

66. 

67. 

CP preparedness training consists of PS’ national training/exercises programmes and 
the  EU  training  courses.  The  latter  focuses  on  preparing  for  response  actions 
involving  the  Mechanism.  Other  preparedness  actions  include  the  development  of 
early  warning  systems  and  preparedness  projects,  as  well  as  assisting  PS  in 
organising their CP resources into intervention modules. 

As  mentioned  stakeholders  expressed  general  satisfaction  in  particular  the  current 
training  and  exercise  arrangements.  However,  since  national  trainings  have  been 
developing independently from each other, coordination and sharing of experience is 
limited. Each PS has its own individual set-up, which is developed, implemented and 
evaluated  independently  of  the  actions  and  programmes  of  other  PS.  There  is  no 
systematic exchange of experience or best practice between the PS (even if a number 
of  regional  and  neighbouring  arrangements  may  be  well  developed),  nor  does  any 
systematic  effort  for  interoperability  take  place  (even  if  there  may  be  specific 
examples  of  transfer  between  e.g.  neighbouring  countries  as  well  as  specific 
agreements  on  or  tradition  for  mutual  assistance).  Consequently,  emergency 
operations  across-borders  are  difficult  when  teams  from  different  states  operate 
together. Precious time is lost due to a lack of a common vocabulary, or incompatible 
operating  procedures.  Incompatibility  problems  have  arisen  for  equipment, 
cooperation procedures, individual preparedness, and a good understanding and trust 
into the partners' capabilities. Moreover, without a minimum of consistency between 
national systems, the sharing of experiences, good practices, and lessons learned will 
remain  under-developed.  The  current  situation  based  on  neighbouring  countries’ 
cooperation  is  not  reaping  the  important  benefits  and  synergies  of  closer  EU 
cooperation, which are therefore lost. Likewise, the EU CP preparedness programme 

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68. 

69. 

has  been  too  limited  in  terms  of  scope  to  bridge  this  gap,  in  particular  as  regards 
overwhelming events inside EU requiring international assistance.56 

Indeed,  the  current  EU  training  and  exercises  programmes  and  the  applicable  legal 
provisions  focus  on  coordination  tasks  and  have  not  yet  integrated  further 
developments  in  preparedness  cooperation,  including  training  on  prevention,  host-
nation support and consular support.57 Member State stakeholders have made strong 
request  to  broaden  the  scope  of  the  training  so  as  to  include  also  other  relevant 
subject  matters  of  international  cooperation,  and  to  develop  a  proper  training 
network. 

Finally,  in  the  stakeholder  consultations  several  PS  have  noted  that  without 
assistance from the EU they will not be able to substantially raise their preparedness 
levels  for  overwhelming  and  cross-border  events.58  The  challenges  are  particularly 
pronounced  for  receiving  incoming  assistance  in  the  event  of  an  overwhelming 
disaster,  so-called  “host  nation  support.”59  This  seems  to  be  the  case  for  most  PS, 
particularly for those with insufficient experience and financial capacity. 

3.3.5.  Lack of integration of prevention policies 

70. 

71. 

56 
57 

58 
59 

60 
61 

62 

63 

64 

EU prevention policy in the area of CP have led to some limited cooperation among 
PS  in  the  area  of  risk  assessments  and  a  number  of  policy  declarations.  The  latter 
included  the  2009  Commission  Communication  on  prevention  and  the  related 
Council  conclusions  in  200960,  201061,  and  201162.  The  2009  Communication  was 
also  endorsed  by  the  European  Parliament.63  However,  the  CP  cooperation  and 
progress in PS is uneven and slow, as will be explained below. 

The  drivers  behind  increased  prevention  activities  at  Member  State  level  have 
hitherto  been  sector-based  legislative  demands,  such  as  in  the  areas  of  critical 
infrastructures,  dangerous  substances,  electricity,  IT,  water,  transport,  agriculture, 
etc.  At  the  EU  level,  several  pieces  of  legislation  address  sector-based  hazards  and 
include detailed provisions on risk assessments, minimum prevention standards, and 
risk  management  plans.64  However,  separate  planning  and  isolated  action  (“silo” 

The CP Evaluation (see Annex H). 
The  need  for  more  inter-operability  between  CP  and  consular  experts  was  expressed  e.g.  at  recent 
consular seminar and workshop on the concept for common trainings for CP and consular experts. The 
issue is explained in an Impact assessment on the coordination and cooperation measures regarding the 
consular protection of unrepresented EU citizens prepared by DG JUST in parallel to this report. 
Most recently again in the interviews carried out by the external consultant, see Annex C. 
Idem.  The  report  which  reports  on  the  broad  agreement  among  MS  on  this  point.  These  recognised 
shortcomings have led to the work on related guidelines on host-nation support. 
On a Community framework on disaster prevention within the EU of 30.11.2009 (document 15394/09). 
On prevention of forest fires within the EU of 26.04.2010, and: On innovative solutions for financing 
disaster prevention of 09.11.2010.  
On further developing risk assessment for disaster management within the EU of 12.04 2011, and On 
integrated flood management within the EU of 12.05.2011.  
Resolution of 21 September 2010 on the Commission communication: A Community approach on the 
prevention of natural and man-made disasters (2009/2151(INI). 
Such  as  the  Directives  on  flood  risk  management  (2007/60/EC),  on  the  protection  of  critical 
infrastructures (2008/114/EC), on the control of major accident hazards (Seveso-96/82/EC), on drought 
management (2000/60/EC), as well as other initiatives on climate change, environment, land use policy, 
health,  nuclear  safety,  consular  protection  (incl.  Guidelines  on  consular  protection  of  EU  citizens  in 

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72. 

73. 

operations)  without  improved  coordination  will  prove  insufficient  to  prevent  the 
consequences of future disasters given the growing complexity of emergencies in our 
networked societies.65 What is missing is a general EU risk management framework 
where  the  different  elements  can  be  brought  together  to  better  link  the  prevention 
actions with those of preparedness and response. 

Furthermore,  the  sharing  of  experience  is  under-developed  in  Europe.  Most  PS  are 
developing  their  own  methods,  processes  and  knowledge  bases  for  assessment  and 
management  of  the  risks  they  are  exposed  to.  The  lack  of  minimum  comparability 
between  the  national  disaster  risk  management  systems  hinders  cross-border 
cooperation and the sharing of experience. There is a unanimous agreement among 
stakeholders that EU action would be the most efficient way to address this problem 
and  avoid  duplication  of  work.  During  stakeholder  consultations  for  this  impact 
assessment, as well as in a number of Council conclusions, PS have repeatedly called 
for  a  more  systematic  and  structured  approach  to  sharing  knowledge  and  best 
practices  across  national  borders,  an  view  that  is  shared  in  Parliament  reports.  One 
example  to  illustrate  the  importance  of  pooling  and  sharing  of  experience  and 
resources is the now possible use of satellite technology to provide European citizens 
with  an  optimum  of  protection  at  affordable  costs,  which  would  otherwise  not  be 
possible. Satellite technologies have helped save lives in the immediate aftermath of 
disasters, but are also used as predictive tools both for immediate preparedness and 
for longer term prevention issues. 

Prevention  generally  constitutes  a  good  investment  when  comparing  to  the  cost  of 
response  to  disasters.66  However,  the  costs  for  prevention  measures  are  immediate 
while the benefits lie in the future and are spread out over time. There is a general 
lack  of  awareness  among  the  population  and  decision-makers  on  the  possible 
devastating effects of disasters. Therefore, it is important to foster the awareness of 
stakeholders and to  raise  the  political will and vision to engage in  strategic longer-
term  investments.  Some  PS  explicitly  refer  to  insufficient  human  and  financial 
resources  as  a  barrier  for  introducing  proper  preventive  measures.67  The  lack  of 
coordination  between  national  authorities  and 
the  unclear  definition  of 
responsibilities  also  impede  necessary  investments  in  prevention.  The  current 
Mechanism  decision  lacks  any  reference  to  prevention  objectives,  and  thus  cannot 
contribute  to  implement  a  closer  link  between  prevention  and  response.  There  are 
currently a number of efforts ongoing at the EU level to better integrate prevention 
consideration  in  all  spending  programmes,  such  as  the  Structural  Funds.  However, 
the current Mechanism itself cannot be used as an instrument to reinforce prevention 
policies. 

third countries – Council documents 10109/2/06 and 15613/10 (not published), etc. Further descriptions 
available in Annex I. 
The impact assessment for the Floods directive concluded that the real added value of flood prevention 
is the integrated preventive approach, recognizing that local flood protection measures alone can have 
negative effects further downstream. It is therefore important to address the risk in an integrated manner 
and across administrative and geographical boundaries by integrated flood risk management plans. 
Literature gives strong indications that investments in prevention pay off; estimates quotes between 1:4 
and  1:7  when  comparing  prevention  costs  and  savings  due  to  preventive  efforts.  Natural  Hazards, 
UnNatural Disasters, The Economics of Effective Prevention, the World Bank and the UN, 2010. 
See external consultant's study, Annex C, section 2. 

65 

66 

67 

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Examples  of  prevention  benefits68:  Investment  in  various  types  of  early  warning 
systems can help save lives, protect property and the environment, and even more so 
if  integrated  with  relevant  preventive  risk  assessment  and  preventive  planning 
measures.  Global  studies  have  shown  that  benefits  of  weather-related  information 
and forecasts can be ten times as high as costs.69 

Mortality  in  the  United  States  has  declined  significantly  over  the  years  because  its 
early  warning  systems  for  recurring  hazards  such  as  lightning,  floods,  storms,  and 
heat waves have continually improved: mortality fell by 45 per cent and injuries by 
40 per cent in 15,000 tornadoes from 1986 to 1999.70 

Heat health warning systems have been particularly effective in reducing mortality. 
In France, after the 2003 heat wave that killed 15,000 corresponding to a 60 per cent 
increase  in  expected  mortality  in  France,  the  French  Institute  for  Public  Health 
Surveillance  elaborated  a  heat  health  watch  warning  system  based  on  bio-
meteorological indicators as well as a National Heat Wave Plan (NHWP). This was 
tested during the July 2006 heat wave, and despite the 2,000 extra deaths observed, 
an evaluation showed that approx. 4,000 premature deaths were avoided during the 
2006 event, most of which were probably due to public awareness and the NWPH. In 
operation from 1 June to 31 August, the French preventive warning system aims at 
modifying  the  behaviour  of  people,  health  institutions  and  health  authorities 
concerning  high  summer  temperatures  and  provides  special  communication  and 
assistance  to  people  at  risk71.  Efficient  and  timely  services  from  climate  and 
meteorological services to health authorities can thus to a large degree prevent heat 
waves from causing premature deaths.72 

In  2007,  the  Department  of  Health  and  the  Cabinet  Office  in  the  UK  developed  a 
national framework for responding to H1N1 pandemic flu. This framework included 
prevention,  preparedness  and  response  measures,  such  as  national  pandemic  flu 
services,  sleeping  contracts  with  vaccine  manufacturers,  stockpiles  of  antivirals,  as 
well as clear policies on how to behave during the pandemic. The national planning 
framework was informed by a number of exercises involving more than 5,000 people 
from government, industry, and third sector, in response to what was ranked as one 
of  the  top  risks  facing  the  UK  in  its  National  Risk  Register.  The  framework  was 
developed  based  on  the  assumption  that  it  would  not  be  possible  to  prevent  the 
pandemic, but focused on what could be done to slow down its spread and to prevent 
(delay)  its  arrival,  and  what  would  be  efficient  in  this  respect,  recognising  that 
efficient preparedness and response to a global health emergency depend on the level 
of  prevention  planning.  A  later  review  of  the  UK  pandemic  prevention  planning73 
concluded  with  respect  to  the  economic  review  of  the  business  case  (value  for 

68 
69 
70 

71 

72 

73 

Examples from the External study, See Annex C. 
Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters, the Economics of Effective Prevention, 2010. 
David  Rogers  and  Valdimir  Tsirkunov,  Cost  and  Benefits  of  Early  Warning  Systems,  2010,  Global  Assessment 
Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2011 (ISDR; The World Bank), referring to Teisberg and Weiher, 2009. 
Fouillet Anne, G.Rey, E.Jougla, D. Hémon, 2006b: Estimation de la surmortalité observée et attendue au cours de 
la vague de chaleur du mois de juillet 2006, Rapport remis à l’Institut de Veille Sanitaire, 6 Décembre 2006.   
David P. Rogers, Melvyn A. Shapiro et al., Health and Climate - opportunities, Procedia Environmental Sciences 1 
(2010) 37-54. 
Dame Deirdre Hine, The 2009 Influenza Pandemic, July 2010, which also presents further breakdown 
of costs. 

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money) that the  benefits  substantially outweighed the costs,  the  pandemic flue pre-
planning and preparedness programme offered significant value for money. Based on 
the  impact  of  the  -in  the  end  less  severe-  flu,  the  benefits  turned  out  to  be  smaller 
than  in  the  expected  severe  outbreak,  however  still  the  'value  for  money  case'  for 
maintaining substantial preparedness programme remained sound. The total costs of 
preparedness and response was estimated to be GBP 1242.13. The level of details in 
the framework pre-planning meant that all key issues were already outlined with 'to-
do-lists'  for  all  involved,  which  became  the  key  to  organising  a  rapid  response  and 
reduced pressure on the central decision-making process. 

The  link  between  prevention,  preparedness,  and  response  is  crucial.  In  a  Union  of 
solidarity that fosters mutual assistance in times of crises, it is self-evident that each 
PS makes the requisite efforts to prevent emergencies or disasters from occurring. As 
stressed  repeatedly  by  stakeholders74,  further  progress  in  the  development  of  CP 
cooperation  between  PS  requires  a  common  understanding  of  minimum  good 
practices in disaster prevention and of the challenges ahead. The current Mechanism 
Decision  has  not  established  a  clear  link  between  prevention,  preparedness  and 
response in line with the wording of Article 196 TFEU and by the above-mentioned 
Commission Communications and Council Conclusions. 

Under the current CPFI provisions, the development and implementation of disaster 
risk management plans at national or lower levels cannot be co-financed through the 
CPFI,  as  CPFI  co-financing  on  prevention  is  limited  to  studies,  surveys,  modelling 
and scenario building, demonstration projects and public awareness activities.  

Considering the above, and as clearly expressed by all stakeholder comments, further 
advances  in  cooperation  on  CP  response  are  only  possible  in  line  with  the 
development and integration of a more coherent EU prevention policy framework. 

74. 

75. 

76. 

3.4. 

Baseline 

77. 

78. 

79. 

The baseline implies that no changes to the Mechanism Decision would be made and 
that the CPFI would be renewed in its current form. 

Generally speaking, not adequately addressing the challenges and problems outlined 
above while bearing in mind the rising trends in disasters and limited public budgets, 
will result in: 1) widening gap between the needs of disaster-stricken populations and 
the provided assistance, 2) losing the economic benefits of European cooperation and 
pooling,  and  3) leaving  unexploited  the  potential  to  avert  the  most  severe 
consequences  of  disasters 
through  reinforced  prevention  and  preparedness 
cooperation. For the different areas, the following developments would constitute the 
baseline against which the different policy options will be compared. 

In  response  operations,  the  Mechanism  would  continue  its  work  coordinating  PS' 
assistance  offered  via  the  MIC,  offer  monitoring,  information  and  early  warning 
services, maintain a database of CP modules, develop guidelines on certain response 
issues, such as host-nation support or module requirements, and provide co-financing 
for  certain  transportation  needs.  However,  the  number,  intensity  and  complexity  of 

74 

See Annex E – stakeholder consultation meetings reports 

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28 

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80. 

81. 

82. 

disasters will increase and the expected investments in additional assets will remain 
limited.  In  these  circumstances,  PS  would  make  fewer  assets  available  for 
deployment  via  the  Mechanism  because  they  would  be  needed  domestically.  The 
Mechanism would more frequently fail to ensure an effective, efficient and coherent 
EU response to disasters. Consequently, the level of protection of European citizens 
would generally fall. The gap between the needs and the assistance actually provided 
would  gradually  widen.  This  would  in  particular  be  the  case  in  case  of  a  mega 
disaster hitting Europe. 

As  regards  the  transportation  of  assistance,  a  few  measures  can  be  implemented 
without  legislative  changes,  such  as  the  use  of  framework  partnership  agreements 
with PS,75 which may reduce the costs compared to processing individual transport 
grant  requests.  Other  simple  measures  may  include  fast-track  grant  procedures  and 
partnerships  for  cost-free  transport  by  private  companies.  These  measures  may 
reduce to a limited degree the administrative costs for PS and the Commission, but 
would  not  significantly  improve  the  availability  of  transport.  As  a  result,  the 
deployment  of  European  assistance  would  not  be  significantly 
improved. 
Consequently, transport-related problems are expected to be more pronounced in the 
future considering the rising disaster trends and the possible large disasters. 

EU preparedness actions would continue to further develop, but the convergence of 
national  preparedness  programmes  to  the  point  that  they  would  allow  for  smooth 
cooperation, cost-savings and effective sharing of experience is a very slow process 
with  no  defined  objective  or  benchmarks.  Without  setting  of  clear  objectives, 
broadening  the  scope  of  preparedness  actions  and  providing  additional  finance  via 
the  CPFI,  EU  preparedness  actions  will  not  be  able  to  accommodate  for  the  future 
needs. Some PS stakeholders expressed the view that individual Member States will 
not  be  able  to  lift  their  preparedness  sufficiently  in  relation  to  overwhelming  and 
cross-border events at a national level without assistance from the EU.76 In particular 
the  training,  exchange  of  experience,  and  policy  on  receiving  assistance,  on 
prevention  and  other  future  needs  could  not  be  pursued  with  the  requisite  financial 
push  from  the  EU-level,  which  will  leave  some  short-term  risks  (in  particular  of 
large-scale overwhelming disasters) largely unmanaged.  

Considering  the  limited  progress  achieved  so  far  in  further  developing  the 
cooperation  of  a  training  network  across  Europe  beyond  the  mere  co-financing  of 
MS training, exercises, and exchange of experts actions, the Council Conclusions of 
16  June  2008  remain  valid:  ´The  Council  of  the  European  Union  urges  the 
Commission  to  assess  a  wide  range  of  options  for  establishing  and  coordinating  a 
sustainable European Disaster Management Training Network, covering all phases of 
disaster  management,  and  to  present  proposals  for  such  a  network  as  soon  as 
possible´  (item  15).  Further,  the  Council  Decisions  also  welcomed  the  integrated 
approach to disaster prevention put forward by the Commission that covers the full 
disaster cycle. 

75 

76 

Under Article 6.3 of the Commission Decision 2007/606/EC, Euratom, the Commission may conclude 
framework partnership agreements as defined in Article 163 of Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 2342/2002 with the relevant competent authorities of PS. This provision has not been used yet.  
Study by the external consultant in Annex C. 

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29 

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83. 

84. 

85. 

86. 

Prevention:  The  current  Mechanism  Decision  makes  no  reference  to  prevention 
actions, while the CPFI has financed a number of EU actions in this area.77 Current 
prevention  actions  at  EU  level  mainly  address  four  areas  of  voluntary  cooperation 
and  there  is  a  minimal  amount  of  available  financing  and  resources  available: 
(1) actions to improve the knowledge base, (2) strengthening of national and EU risk 
assessment  and  mapping  capacities,  (3) providing  good  practice  examples  and 
minimum  prevention  standards,  and  (4) combining  all  of  these  elements  in  a  risk 
management policy.78  

Assuming that no further action is taken at the EU level, the trend towards partial and 
uneven  systems  of  national  risk  assessment  and  risk  management  procedures  are 
likely  to  continue.  Guidelines  will  be  issued  on  developing  national  disaster  risk 
management  plans  to  help  Member  States  in  their  efforts  to  draw  together  sectoral 
policies.  However  their  use  is  not  linked  to  any  legal  objective  in  the  EU  CP 
cooperation.  Even  though  a  few  advanced  Member  States  have  developed 
methodologies for risk assessment procedures at either horizontal or sectoral levels, 
the other Member States have no such systems or are developing these only at a very 
slow pace due to lack of political priority and resources.79 As there are no systematic 
and  comparable  prevention  approaches  across  borders,  cooperation  benefits  in 
prevention  are  left  under-utilised,  which  negatively  affects  the  cooperation  in  the 
areas  of  preparedness  and  response.  The  sharing  of  experiences  between  Member 
States  would  develop  in  an  uneven  manner,  slowing  down  overall  progress,  in 
particular where several countries are sharing the same risks. 

Assuming  that  the  policy  framework  is  not  developed  further,  the  opportunities  for 
better linking prevention and preparedness and response will not be fully explored. 

An  additional  dimension  to  effective  and  efficient  risk  management  procedures  is 
that  preventive  and  mitigating  action  should  reflect  expectations  of  actual  damage. 
Presently,  there  are  few  examples  of  cost  benefit  analyses  at  the  EU  level  of 
preventive efforts at Member State or EU level. Adopting a more global perspective, 
the  World  Bank's  recent  report  concludes,  "Prevention  is  often  possible  and  cost-
effective", and further "Prevention pays, but you do not always have to pay more for 
prevention.  A  relatively  easy  and  effective  measure  is  for  governments  to  make 
information  about  hazards  and  risks  easily  accessible  (such  as  maps  of  flood 
plains…)". The report also concludes that most governments do not routinely collect 
or  monitor  spending  on  disaster  prevention,  and  measuring  prevention  spending 
require  much  effort  and  considerable  judgment  to  identify  spending  across  sectors 
and levels of government and to collect budgeted amounts. Even though cost benefit 
analyses are useful as ex ante guides, and ex post evaluations ensure that lessons are 

77 
78 

79 

CPFI has co-financed some 20 prevention cooperation projects with more than € 5 million. 
In addition to these, there is also limited funding available for awareness actions. Further details of the 
prevention policies are included in Annex L. 
The external study estimated that the group of advanced countries include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France,  Germany,  Netherlands,  Sweden  and  UK.  The  group  of  medium  advanced  countries  include: 
Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Finland,  Greece,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain whereas the less advanced countries are assumed to be Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. 

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87. 

learned, these are only rarely used.80 Assuming that no further work is done on cost 
benefit  analyses  in  sector  risk  management  systems  as  well  as  horizontal  risk 
assessment systems, it appears to be difficult to persuade policy and decision makers 
to act on the insight that disaster prevention pays off. 

Considering  all  of  the  above  elements,  slow  progress  and  in  particular  lack  of 
comparability  and  coherence  would  likely  lead  to  prevention  and  preparedness 
achievements  that  are  insufficient  to  match  the  trend  of  increasing  numbers  and 
intensities  of  disasters  and  would  fall  behind  the  political  will  of  improving  such 
systems. As a result, the overall protection in Europe may even decrease as compared 
to current levels. Indeed, a number of PS stakeholders have already noted that it may 
be difficult to define appropriate disaster risk prevention measures without an overall 
disaster  prevention  framework.  Other  stakeholders  have  focused  more  on 
preparedness and response actions due to lack of resources. Finally, as clearly noted 
by a number of key PS stakeholders, absent further progress in the field of disaster 
prevention, where the biggest achievements can be made for protecting Europe from 
the consequences of disasters, further advancement in EU CP cooperation will not be 
possible. 

3.5. 

Justification for EU action and subsidiarity 

88. 

89. 

The Union's role in the field of civil protection at Treaty level is for the first time set 
out  in  Article  6(f)  TFEU,  according  to  which  the  Union  shall  have  competence  to 
carry  out  actions  to  support,  coordinate  or  supplement  the  actions  of  the  Member 
States, without thereby superseding their competence in this area. Article 196 TFEU 
provides  the  specific  legal  basis  which  sets  the  scope  and  arrangement  for  the 
exercise of the Union's powers in the civil protection policy. Accordingly, the Union 
shall inter alia support and complement Member States' action at national, regional 
and local level in preventing, preparing for and responding to natural or man-made 
disasters within the Union and promote consistency in international civil-protection 
work. Harmonization of Member States' laws and regulations is explicitly excluded.  

The  subsidiarity  principle  applies  insofar as  civil  protection  does  not  fall  under  the 
exclusive competence of the Union. To solve the problems presented in this impact 
assessment  an  EU-level  action  and  coordination  is  necessary  (necessity  test).  The 
Mechanism  was  established  because  major  disasters  can  overwhelm  the  response 
capacities  of  any  Member  State  which  can no  longer  cope  alone.  EU  action  in  this 
field  involves  managing  situations  with  a  strong  trans-/multinational  component, 
which  necessarily  require  an  overall  coordination  and  concerted  action  beyond  the 
national level. This is particularly relevant for the overall pre-planned EU response 
and the voluntary pool of assets. Likewise, sufficient level of preparedness for cross-
border  and  large-scale  disasters  cannot  be  achieved  only  at  Member  State  level.  In 
addition, the joint work on prevention and risk management has been carried out in 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  significant  progress  in  the  cooperation  between  the 
Member States needs to rely on reinforced coherence and coordination at EU level.  

80 

Natural Hazards, UnNatural disasters - The Economics of Effective Prevention, The International bank 
for Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank, 2010. 

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31 

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90. 

91. 

Taking  into  account  the  benefits  in  terms  of  reducing  the  loss  of  human  life, 
environmental,  economic  and  material  damage,  the  proposed  action  would  bring 
clear EU added value. It would allow Member States to contribute more effectively 
to  the  EU  assistance  under  the  Mechanism  and  to  benefit  from  improved 
coordination  and  cooperation  which  links  prevention,  preparedness  and  response. 
Simultaneously,  it  would  provide  Member  States  with  the  reassurance  of  a  more 
effective,  efficient,  coherent  and  visible  assistance  in  times  of  need,  an  increased 
level of preparedness and a more coherent disaster risk management policy.  

The  proposed  amendments  would  allow  Member  States  to  pursue  economies  of 
scale, such as cost-effective logistics and transport, coherent and effective response 
through the voluntary pool of assets and better use of scarce resources by sharing the 
EU-funded assets. The work on prevention and risk management would generate also 
economies of preventive action instead of post factum response to disasters. 

4. 

OBJECTIVES 

4.1. 

General objectives 

92. 

The general objective of the review of the CP legislative framework is to improve the 
arrangements  for  EU  CP  cooperation  enabling  it  to  face  future  challenges.  To 
encourage cooperation between MS in order to improve the effectiveness of systems 
for  preventing  and  protecting  against  natural  or  man-made  disasters,  ensure  an 
adequate  level  of  prevention,  preparedness  and  response  to  disasters,  and  promote 
swift,  effective  operational  cooperation  within  the  Union  between  national  civil-
protection services (Article 196 TFUE), EU CP should: 

(1)  Provide  more  effective  and  efficient  means  of  response  cooperation  through 

pre-planning and enhanced availability of assistance; 

(2)  Address critical gaps in response capacity; 

(3) 

Improve the response to major emergencies through better transport solutions; 

(4)  Support  and  complement  PS  actions  at  national,  regional,  and  local  level  by 

preparedness actions taken in advance; 

(5)  Support  and  complement  PS  actions  at  national,  regional,  and  local  level  by 

setting a more coherent prevention policy framework; 

while taking into account the recent experience  in  disaster  risk  management  and  in 
line with the new legal basis under Article 196 TFEU and the political commitments 
of the European Parliament and the Council. 

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32 

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4.2. 

Specific objectives 

93. 

94. 

The  specific  and  operational  objectives  and  options  and  their  impacts  will  be 
discussed below individually for each of the elements related to response, transport, 
preparedness, and prevention.81  

As  will  be  specifically  assessed  in  the  impacts  sections  for  each  option,  more 
effective  and  integrated  EU  support  for  disaster  management  including  risk 
management  planning  will  always  have  a  positive  impact  on  society  and  provide 
positive  environmental  impacts  including  contributing  to  adaptation  to  climate 
change.82 

95. 

The following table shows how the problems are linked with the specific objectives 
in the areas of response, transport, preparedness, and prevention. 

Problems 

General objectives 

Specific objectives 

Reactive and ad hoc mandate of the 
Mechanism limits the effectiveness, 
efficiency and coherence of the 
European disaster response 

Response 

(1) More effective and 
efficient response 
through planning and 
enhanced availability of 
assistance 

Shift from a reactive and ad hoc 
coordination to a pre-planned, pre-
arranged and predictable system 

Certain needs cannot be met due to 
unavailability of assets (capacity 
gaps) 

(2) Address critical 
gaps in response 
capacity 

Identify and fill critical gaps in disaster 
response capacity in a cost-effective way 

Limited financial and logistical 
transport solutions slow down or 
hinder optimal response 

Burdensome EU transport 
administrative procedures 

(1) Lack of consistency among 
national training programmes 
hinders the sharing of experience. 

(2) Limited scope of EU 
preparedness actions and limited 
link with national programmes lead 
to lower preparedness levels. 

(3) Uncertain preparedness for 
major emergencies leaves risks 
unmanaged.  

(1) Lack of coordination between 
sector-specific prevention policies. 

(2) Under-developed organisation 
for the sharing of experience. 

(3) Insufficient link between 

Transport 

(3) Improve the 
response to major 
emergencies through 
better transport 
solutions 

Preparedness 

(4) Support and 
complement PS actions 
preparedness actions 
with a more coherent 
EU preparedness policy 
framework 

Enhanced financial and logistical 
transport support. 

(A) Reduce bottlenecks posed by limited 
logistical and financial transport 
resources. 

(B) Simplify the transport provisions and 
streamline administrative procedures 

(1) Better link national preparedness 
systems by creating more consistency. 

(2) Enlarge the scope of current EU 
preparedness actions and link them 
better with national programmes. 

(3) Define preparedness considerations 
explicitly as one objective of the EUCP 
cooperation and provide sufficient 
funding.  

Prevention 

(5) Support and 
complement PS 
disaster risk 
management actions by 

(1) Foster the advancement of national 
disaster risk management planning. 

(2) Improve the sharing of experience by 
promoting a common understanding of 
disaster risk management practices and 

81 

82 

Social and economic impacts covering all the elements discussed in this report, as well as those on the 
fundamental rights, are discussed in a dedicated Chapter 9. 
EU  disaster  prevention  policies  work  in  close  cooperation  with  the  EU  policies  on  climate  change 
adaptation. 

EN 

33 

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prevention with preparedness and 
response. 

(4) Limited awareness, vision and 
strategic investments. 

a more coherent EU 
prevention policy 
framework 

provide funding for catching up to a high 
level of protection. 

(3) Integrate disaster prevention policies 
into the EU CP cooperation. 

(4) Strengthen the means in the EU for 
continuous support to prevention 
awareness raising. 

5. 

96. 

5.1. 

97. 

BETTER RESPONSE THROUGH PLANNING AND PREDICTABILITY 

The  overall  objective  stated  in  the  2010  Disaster  Response  Communication83  is  to 
improve the effectiveness (rapidity of deployment and appropriateness of action), the 
efficiency  (cost-effectiveness),  coherence  (among  the  various  CP  assets,  as  well  as 
with other actors, primarily with humanitarian aid) and visibility of EU response to 
disasters. It shall be noted that some actions proposed in the Communication, such as 
increasing the visibility of EU response through e.g. presenting aggregate figures or 
wearing  double  badges  (PS’  and  EU),  are  important  and  readily  achievable,  but 
would  not  have  sizeable  economic,  social  and  environmental  impacts  that  would 
justify  their  analysis  in  this  report.  The  same  applies  for  an  obligation  of  PS  to 
inform the ERC/other PS of all assistance they send to disaster-stricken countries, or 
the  clarification of procedures for  the use of the Mechanism  in support of consular 
operations, which also has some positive impacts for the EU citizens but do not have 
to be elaborated here.84 

Specific  objective:  Shifting  from  a  reactive  and  ad  hoc  coordination  to  a  pre-
planned, pre-arranged and predictable system 

The  2010  Communication  calls  for  a  shift  of  the  EU’s  disaster  response  from  the 
current ad hoc coordination towards a system that is pre-planned, pre-arranged and 
predictable.  This  shift  would  require  a  complex  of  measures  related  to  advance 
planning of operations, underpinned by a predictable and ensured availability of key 
response  assets.  This  includes  developing  reference  scenarios,  mapping  PS'  assets 
that  could  be  used  in  these  scenarios,  and  drawing  contingency  plans  for  their 
deployment.  To  increase  the  availability,  it  also  includes  developing  a  European 
Emergency Response Capacity in the form of a voluntary pool of pre-committed PS' 
assets  on  standby  for  European  operations,  as  well  as  creating  the  Emergency 
Response Centre, reinforcing and streamlining arrangements for the transportation of 
European  assistance  to  disaster  areas,  looking  into  areas  where  EU-funded  assets 
might usefully fill response capacity gaps, as well as other measures. Ultimately, this 
should ensure a higher level of protection for disaster-victims. 

83 
84 

COM(2010) 600 final. 
On consular support, see impact assessment currently being developed by DG JUST in parallel to this 
report. In particular it covers (a) the possibility of triggering the Mechanism for consular support by the 
Lead State (possibly in consultation with the Presidency), (b) including consular experts in the EU CP 
assessment/coordination  teams,  and  (c)  including  consular  issues  in  the  Mechanism  training 
programme. 

EN 

34 

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98. 

The idea of more planning, pre-arrangements and predictability is strongly supported 
by all stakeholders, including PS, European Parliament and the UN.85  

5.2. 

Policy options for better planning and availability of assets 

99. 

The  impact  assessment  preceding  the  Communication  already  looked  into  a  wide 
spectrum of options to achieve the stated objective. These ranged from the 'no-action' 
and  even  discontinuing  the  Mechanism  altogether  on  the  one  hand,  which  were 
discarded as not capable of delivering on the stated objectives, to a full-fledged EU 
CP  Force  (as  advocated  by  2006  Barnier  report  ‘for  a  European  Civil  Protection 
Force:  Europe  Aid’)  on  the  other  hand,  which  was  eliminated  due  to  subsidiarity/ 
proportionality  considerations,  as  well  as  prohibitive  costs  for  the  EU  budget.  This 
has left two realistic options, namely the strengthening of European disaster response 
through  (1)  the  EU-level  assets  (a  'top-down'  approach),  which  would  have  the 
advantage of effectiveness, and (2) a voluntary pool of committed PS' assets, which 
could  bring  about  the  advantage  of  cost-effectiveness  and  follows  a  'bottom-up' 
approach  favoured  by  the  stakeholders.  Having  considered  pros  and  cons  of  these 
options  in  detail,  the  impact  assessment  concluded  in  favour  of  the  latter,  while 
acknowledging the benefits of the former in some cases. The Commission in its 2010 
Communication therefore proposed strengthening the EU's disaster response capacity 
primarily through the development of a voluntary pool of pre-committed PS' assets, 
which  is  most  in  line  with  the  voluntary  spirit  of  the  Mechanism  as  it  is  today. 
Therefore, options related to the better planning and availability of assets analysed in 
this impact assessment centre around the voluntary pool of assets. 

100.  While assets committed by PS to the pool would remain under national direction and 
control, there would be an expectation that these assets would be made available for 
EU  operations,  unless  the  concerned  State  has  a  compelling  reason  to  refuse  their 
deployment  (for  instance  due  to  domestic  emergencies).  Notably,  these  capacities 
would  not  sit idle  in-between  the EU  operations, as PS would continue using them 
for national purposes. It is envisaged that the deployment of these on-call assets from 
the  pool  would  form  the  nucleus  of  any  EU  CP  operation,  which  would  be  further 
complemented by additional ad hoc offers provided in the same way in which the EU 
CP assistance is organised today.  

101. 

The system would require a hub at European level that can plan (before emergencies) 
and organise (during emergencies) the overall EU response in the most efficient way. 
Once  a  request  for  assistance  is  received,  this  hub  will  quickly  determine  the  core 
components of the European response (e.g. 2 SAR teams, 1 advanced medical post, 1 
water purification team and 1 TAST) and launch a call to the relevant pool members 
to mobilise these specific modules within a certain deadline. The concerned PS will 
take  the  go/no  go  decision  and  inform  the  hub  of  their  availability.  Where  more 
assets are available than necessary, the hub will make a selection based on different 
criteria,  including  cost-efficiency,  capacity,  transport  possibilities  and  logistical 
constraints.  The  ERC  could  meaningfully  play  the  role  of  a  central  hub  in  close 
partnership  with  PS,  since  such  a  role  for  the  MIC  has  been  already  successfully 

85 

It  is  recognised  that  the  UN/OCHA  (Office  for  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs)  is  the  central 
leading role for emergencies in the third countries. See e.g. European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. 

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35 

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102. 

tested thought pilot actions.86 To fulfil this role, the ERC will need to work in close 
partnership with PS. In this respect, the ERC could be reinforced by representatives 
of CP authorities of PS that contribute to the pool. These and other elements on the 
functioning of the pool would be detailed in implementing rules. 

The creation  of  a  voluntary pool of PS' assets on standby for EU operations would 
significantly  facilitate 
the  planning  of  operations  and  add  an  element  of 
predictability,  as  it  would  ensure  that  some  key  assets  can  be  relied  upon  when 
needed.  This  is  of  crucial  importance,  as  the  knowledge  of  which  assets  will  be 
available  in  crisis  is  key  for  a  meaningful  contingency-planning.  It  will  also  allow 
ensuring  an  adequate  EU  response  in  all  emergencies,  as  well  as  maximising 
synergies  among  the  various  deployed  assets.  It  can  be  foreseen  that  intervention 
modules  comprising  the  pool  would  need  to  comply  with  minimum  quality 
requirements  and  respect  the  applicable  international  and  EU  guidelines,  thus 
resulting  in  enhanced  quality  levels  of  the  overall  EU  response.  In  the  end,  this 
would deliver a more robust EU response capacity. 

103. 

It should be noted however that only a fully functioning and complete pool will lead 
to a  well planned,  quick  and effective response to disasters. It  is uncertain whether 
PS  will  be  prepared  to  provide  a  sufficient  number  of  assets  without  financial 
compensation for the use of their assets for EU operations.  

104.  With this in mind, policy options have been devised along the scope and degree of 
EU incentives that can be provided to PS for committing assets to the voluntary pool 
(VP):  

(1)  VP Option 1: Voluntary pool without EU co-financing;  

(2)  VP  Option  2: Voluntary  pool  with  a  limited  EU  co-financing  (covering  only 

deployment costs); and  

(3)  VP  Option  3: Voluntary  pool  with  a  higher  degree  of  EU  co-financing  (some 

development (including equipment) and standby costs, as well as deployment  

105. 

The underlying rationale behind this classification is that different types of cost may 
require a different approach: when the EU calls for the deployment of certain assets 
from the pool and the relevant PS is mobilising the asset as part of an EU operation 
and to the benefit of the EU as a whole, it is appropriate to cover the full deployment 
costs from the EU budget. Since the assets are developed, used and kept on standby 
for  both  national  and  EU  operations,  any  EU  co-financing  of  the  development  and 
standby  costs  should  in  principle  be  limited  to  the  portion  of  these  costs  that 
corresponds to their use for European operations.  

5.3. 

Analysis of impacts of options for a voluntary pool 

106. 

Impacts  of  the  options  are  drawn  and  the  options  are  compared  to  the  baseline  (no 
change  of  policy  option)  on  the  basis  of  multi-criteria  analysis  in  terms  of 

86 

This includes ca. 20 projects under the preparatory action on an EU's Rapid Response Capability (calls 
issued in 2008-2010; some projects continue until mid-2012), as well as pilot project on EU Forest Fire-
fighting Tactical Reserve (FFTR) implemented in 2008-2009. 

EN 

36 

   EN 

 
                                                 
107. 

108. 

109. 

110. 

effectiveness – the extent to which options achieve the specific objective, efficiency 
– the extent to which the objective can be achieved at least cost (cost-effectiveness), 
and coherence – the extent to which options would ensure a coherent EU response to 
disasters, while maximising possible synergies. 

As  outlined  in  the  impact  assessment  report  preceding  the  2010  Disaster  Response 
Communication,  the  pool  would  help  reducing  situations  of  non-deployment  or 
delayed  deployment  of  assistance,  thus  providing  benefits  in  terms  of  effectiveness 
(delivering  appropriate,  timely  and  quality  response)  and  cost-efficiency  of 
assistance provided. It will also produce economic gains deriving from pooling and 
sharing logistics and transport, which are easier to achieve in a pre-planned and pre-
arranged  system.  Furthermore,  the  voluntary  pool  will  deliver  important  synergetic 
effects  by  ensuring  the  availability  of  complementary  response  assets  that  support 
and mutually reinforce the effectiveness of other assets, as well as that of the EU and 
international humanitarian and, as well as more coherence in European assistance in 
general. 

In terms of costs for PS, the pool would be composed of assets that already exist in 
PS  and  would  therefore  not  have  significant  impacts  on  capital  investment.  The 
increased  use  of  these  assets  may  result  in  increased  wear  and  tear.  However,  this 
would need to be offset against the benefit of the increased visibility and additional 
'training' opportunities associated with more frequent deployments in live-emergency 
situations. As to the administrative burden related to setting up the pool, it should be 
noted  that  most  of  PS'  assets  that  are  likely  to  be  committed  are  already  registered 
(though without any commitment) in the CECIS87 database: the administrative effort 
involved in this registration has proven not to be prohibitive. Since assets committed 
to  the  pool  are  already  on  standby  for  national  purposes,  the  cost  of  extending  this 
function  to  a  broader  European  service  will  in  most  cases  be  limited  to  some 
additional training of personnel and will therefore not be excessive. Finally, since the 
commitment  of  assets  to  the  pool  is  voluntary,  there  would  be  no  obligation  for 
'unwilling' PS to carry out any action or bear any of corresponding costs. 

On the EU institutions' side, there would be some costs associated to the additional 
tasks  of  the  ERC  as  the  central  hub  for  the  pool  (including  developing  scenarios, 
mapping assets and contingency planning, which in itself will require a joint effort of 
the Commission and PS). The most significant cost element related to the operations 
from  the  pool  will  be  the  deployment/transport  costs,  especially  in  cases  of 
emergencies in far-away third countries. 

All  of  the  described  options  are  fully  coherent  with  overarching  EU  objectives, 
strategies and priorities. Depending on the option chosen, the pool would also have 
effects  on  equity  and  implications  for  the  EU  budget  (mostly  in  terms  of  shifts  of 
budgetary burden from PS to the EU level rather than an increase in absolute terms). 
The impacts of the options will differ from the baseline in the following way: 

87 

The Common Emergency Information and Communication System. 

EN 

37 

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5.3.1. 

Impacts of VP-Option 1: Voluntary pool without EU co-financing  

111. 

112. 

113. 

This option could be implemented without legislative changes or cold only introduce 
only essential elements and principles, and would not bring about any burden on the 
EU budget, except for some marginal costs  for running the system (e.g. training of 
staff and updating communications software).  

However  it  is  unlikely  that  a  purely  political  commitment  without  financial 
incentives from the EU can ensure the availability of a sufficient number of assets of 
various  types  in  a  sustainable  way.  It  is  unlikely  that  PS  would  commit  substantial 
assets to an unknown future, where they would need to be ready to cover costs that 
may be significant. The option is therefore not fully effective and sustainable. 

It should also be noted that VP Option 1 might have a negative impact on equity, in 
the  sense  that  it  would  imply  that  PS  committing  assets  to  the  pool  would  bear  a 
higher fraction of the costs of the overall European response than other PS. This can 
also  result  in  PS  not  committing  assets  to  the  pool  becoming  less  active  in  the  EU 
response and hence also less visible 'free-riders'. 

5.3.2. 

Impacts  of  VP-Option  2:  Voluntary  pool  with  limited  EU  co-financing  (covering 
deployment costs but not development or standby costs) 

114. 

Providing  EU  co-financing  for  deployment/transport  costs  will  enhance  the 
effectiveness of the pool. Compensating the costs of deployments will substantially 
reduce the financial constraints on PS, making it more feasible to contribute assets to 
the  pool.  In  order  to  provide  a  genuine  incentive,  the  co-financing  rates  should  be 
higher than those available under the present provisions (currently up to 50% of total 
transportation costs). Such a system would introduce a shift in burden-sharing where 
–  compared  with  today  –  a  higher  fraction  of  costs  of  providing  European 
coordinated  assistance  is  shared  through  the  EU  budget  rather  than  that  of  PS. 
Covering the deployment costs from the EU budget has the additional advantage of 
making  the  overall  EU  response  more  coherent  and  needs-based,  as  it  allows  the 
MIC to steer MS' response to those types of assets that are considered most urgent, 
avoid  duplication  and  encourage  complementarity.  Finally,  if  funding  for  the 
deployment is available from the EU budget, MS will be able to decide very quickly 
on deployment, which will result in a more rapid delivery of life-saving equipment, 
enhanced predictability of the assistance and overall efficiency gains.  

115. 

It is very difficult to estimate the annual costs associated with deployments/transport, 
as  variations  from  one  year  to  another  can  be  very  significant.  Transport  costs  can 
vary hugely depending on the distance, timing (prices for transport tend to rise in the 
wake  of  major  emergencies)  and  other  factors.  The  best  estimate  made  by  the 
consultant is that the budgetary shift from PS to the EU (rather than overall increase) 
for  having  the  voluntary  pool  up  and  running  in  line  with  this  option  (on  the 
assumption of 100% EU funding of deployment/transportation costs) would amount 
to around €6 million/year. 88  

88 

See external consultant's study Annex C, section 4.3. 

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38 

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116. 

VP-Option  2  would  effectively  achieve  the  stated  objective.  It  would  also  be  cost-
effective, especially if compared to achieving the objective through EU-level (owned 
or leased) assets, the costs of which would be prohibitive.89 

5.3.3. 

Impacts  of  VP-Option  3:  Voluntary  pool  with  higher  EU  co-financing  (full 
deployment costs plus some development and standby costs) 

117. 

The  same  arrangement  as  described  under  VP  Option  2  but  with  partial 
compensation  of  some  development  (including  equipment)  and  standby  costs  will 
have  comparable  economic  impacts.  To  the  extent  that  these  assets  are  also  being 
used for EU operations, it may be appropriate to also cover a corresponding part of 
the development and standby costs, including notably additional investments needed 
to ensure the full interoperability with other modules. This would further enhance the 
effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  the  pool,  as  it  would  more  quickly  result  in  a  fully 
functional pool with all the necessary types of response assets in sufficient numbers. 
The EU co-financing of costs other than those related to deployment, especially those 
related to standby costs, would further add to the 'European' dimension of the pool 
and  is  likely  to  result  in  a  stronger  commitment  from  PS  to  make  these  assets 
available  for  EU  operations.  The  consultant  considered  that  some  compensation 
arrangements  for  costs  not  related  to  deployments/transport  could  be  especially 
useful in cases where capital costs are high compared to deployment costs, such as in 
the case of aerial forest fire-fighting or CBRN teams.90  

118. 

It is estimated that VP-Option 3 would require the budgetary shift from PS to EU of 
around €9 million/year, of which around €1.6 million would cover the development/ 
equipment  costs  and  €1.4  million  standby  (based  on  assumption  that  25%  of 
development,  25%  of  standby  and  full  deployment  costs  are  covered).  This  higher 
budgetary shift appears to be reasonable compared to additional benefits gained. 

5.4. 

Comparison of options 

119. 

The impacts of options vis-à-vis the baseline are summarised below:  

Effectiveness 
Efficiency 
Coherence 
Social impacts 
Environmental impacts 
Ranking of options 

VP Option 2 
++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
2 
(++ = high benefits, + = benefits, 0 = no benefits, - = problematic) 

VP Option 1 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
3 

VP Option 3 
++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
1 

89 

90 

Report  ‘Assessing  costs  and  benefits  of  various  options  related  to  the  development  of  EU  Disaster 
Response Capacity’ by GHK Consulting & Crown Agents on behalf of EPEC, 2010 (not published).  
This  model  should  entail  safeguards  against  the  risk  of  distorting  the  balancing  act  performed  by  PS 
when deciding whether or not to invest in particular assets, e.g. by careful examination of candidates for 
such funding, minimum quality standards and not excessive co-financing rate. 

EN 

39 

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120. 

All the options are comparable in terms of coherence, but only VP Option 2 and VP 
Option 3 can however effectively achieve objectives sought. VP Option 3 is superior 
in terms of efficiency and is therefore ranked above the others. 

6. 

ADDRESSING CAPACITY GAPS 

6.1. 

Specific objective: Identifying and filling critical gaps in response capacity 

121. 

122. 

123. 

124. 

The primary responsibility for disaster preparedness and response lies with PS. It has 
to be recognised that PS are at different levels of development of their CP structures 
and capacities. An additional effort is required in some cases. These differences are 
best  addressed  through  the  Cohesion  Policy  instruments,  which  may  be  used  to  a 
certain  extent  and  subject  to  various  criteria  to  address  gaps  in  certain  MS’ 
preparedness  and  response  capacities.91  Overlaps  between  the  CPFI  and  those 
instruments need to be avoided.  

The CPFI may have a role to play in addressing more structural gaps at EU-wide or 
regional  level,  i.e.  cases  where  the  normal  mechanisms  fail,  where  the  sharing  of 
assets results in economic gains or where the gaps have a particular relevance to the 
EU cooperation. In their investment decisions, PS are (mostly) guided by economic 
considerations,  weighting  the  probability  of  certain  disaster  against  the  cost  of 
developing  the  appropriate  response  capacities.  A  protection  level  of  100  per  cent, 
which  would  imply  that  capacities  are  available  for  all  possible  disasters,  is  not 
realistic for any PS and some gaps are therefore inevitable. The objective here is to 
devise ways for the EU to support and facilitate filling capacity gaps – identified or 
potential  –  in  a  cost-efficient  way  to  enhance  the  overall  level  of  protection  across 
the EU.  

The work on gap analysis is closely linked to the ongoing work on risk assessments, 
scenario  development  and  mapping  of  PS’  assets,  as  well  as  the  development  of 
thresholds/determination of what would be an appropriate EU's protection level.92 At 
this stage, therefore, the proposal should focus on process rather than concrete gaps.  

Furthermore, the consultant's study points to the fact that in certain cases the cost of 
asset  development  would  be  more  or  less  the  same  irrespective  of  whether  the 
investment  is  done  at  PS  or  EU  level,  whereas  the  risk  against  which  the  asset  in 
question  can  be  used  would  be  much  higher  for  the  Union  taken  collectively.93  In 
addition,  central  procurement  may  strengthen  the  EU's  negotiation  power  on  the 
market,  resulting  in  further  economic  benefits.  In  such  cases  in  particular  burden-
sharing in the form of jointly developed assets and their common use can provide a 
higher level of protection across the EU in a cost-efficient way, as each PS would not 
need to invest in expensive assets individually.  

91 

92 

93 

The Commission intends to engage in awareness-raising activities in the relevant regions to ensure that 
disaster  management  needs  are  taken  into  account  when  setting  priorities  for  the  use  of  possible 
funding. 
Examples  include  Bulgaria  2007,  Portugal  2010  and  Poland  2010;  see  also  ECORYS  study  quoted 
above.  
See external consultant's report, Annex C, section 4.4.  

EN 

40 

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125. 

126. 

In general, three broad categories of assets have been identified where further work 
is  needed  to  determine  whether  burden  sharing  would  be  appropriate:  a)  assets  to 
deal  with  low  probability/high  impact  risks  (e.g.  specific  technical  equipment  to 
respond  to  solar  flares  or  volcanic  ash  cloud-like  situations;  b)  assets  performing 
horizontal  tasks,  thus  benefiting  equally  all  PS  and  other  actors  involved 
(assessment,  logistics  and  coordination,  such  as  TAST);  and  c)  tactical  reserves  of 
specialized  high-value  assets  (such  as  fire-fighting  aircraft,  or  EMSA  network  of 
ships to deal with marine pollution). In all of these cases, there is a strong argument 
for  EU  action  and  it  is  unlikely  that  the  objective  of  a  higher  protection  level  at 
acceptable  cost  could  be  achieved  on  a  pure  subsidiary  basis.  Decisions  on  burden 
sharing  would  need  to  be  taken  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  building  on  the  ongoing 
work on risk assessment and asset mapping. 

In view of PS’ already relatively high preparedness and ability to assist others, it is 
clear that assets developed through this gap-filling exercise would form only a very 
limited  part  of  all  emergency  response  assets  available  in  the  EU.  This  could  be 
further  limited  by  emphasising  MS'  primary  responsibility  to  prepare  for  risks 
occurring on their territory and by establishing clear criteria for the use of EU funds 
for  the  development  of  such  common  buffers.  In  addition,  the  decision  on  the 
development of such extra capacity, on tope of what MS are expected to do at their 
level,  should  be  based  on  a  thorough  economic  analysis  for  each  type  of  asset  and 
should be taken in close consultation with MS, preferably through comitology (with 
expert support). 

127. 

Therefore, the EU should develop a flexible mechanism that would allow identifying 
gaps, setting priorities and ensuring that they are filled in a cost-effective way. The 
essential  principles,  criteria  and  procedure  of  this  mechanism  could  be  usefully 
enshrined in the legislation itself, with details to be defined in implementing rules. 

6.2. 

Policy options for addressing gaps in capacities 

128. 

129. 

Critical capacity gaps can be filled by additional assets developed by PS or through 
EU-level  assets.  The  former  alternative  could  involve  EU  co-funding  or  not. 
Whichever  method  is  chosen,  PS  should  undertake  the  operational  management  of 
such  newly  developed  disaster  response  assets  –  if  needed  on  a  delegated 
management basis – as they are the most apt and best equipped for such a role.  

The assets developed to fill the gaps would be shared across the EU (or parts of it) 
and would be deployed in a similar way as those from the voluntary pool. When the 
assets are not required for EU operations, the PS managing the assets could use them 
domestically. Yet, wherever the EU funding is involved in the development of assets 
addressing  the  gaps,  it  would  be  reasonable  to  expect  that  in  cases  of  competing 
national and EU needs their use would be prioritised for the EU operations.  

130. 

The  following  options  should  be  considered  for  filling  the  critical  gaps  (CG)  in 
European disaster response capacities:  

(1)  CG Option 1: filling gaps by PS without EU co-financing;  

(2)  CG Option 2: filling gaps by PS with some EU co-financing; and 

EN 

41 

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6.3. 

131. 

• 

• 

• 

132. 

133. 

134. 

135. 

(3)  CG Option 3: filling gaps with EU-level assets. 

Analysis of impacts 

Impacts  of  the  options  are  drawn  and  the  options  are  compared  to  the  baseline  (no 
change of policy option) on the basis of multi-criteria analysis in accordance with the 
following criteria: 

effectiveness – the extent to which options achieve the specific objective.  

efficiency  –  the  extent  to  which  the  objective  can  be  achieved  at  least  cost  (cost-
effectiveness).  

coherence  –  the  extent  to  which  options  would  ensure  a  coherent  EU  response  to 
disasters, while maximising possible synergies.  

The  impacts  of  all  the  options  would  be  positive  to  the  extent  that  they  would  all 
contribute  to  avoiding  potentially  huge  economic,  social  and  environmental  losses 
due to disasters. It is impossible to quantify these losses and to compare them with 
costs of limiting them with a degree of precision due to the inherently unpredictable 
nature of disastrous events. The level of magnitude can however be illustrated by for 
instance  the  fact  that  following  the  devastating  forest  fires  in  2007,  Greece  was 
awarded  the  grant  of  €89.8  million  from  th e  Solidarity  Fund  (which  represents  a 
fraction of losses estimated at €2.1 billion). In comparison, th e cost of a single aerial 
fire fighting module amounts to roughly €4.5 million/year.  

The options involving EU support for the development of additional capacities (CG 
Option 2 and CG Option 3) offer a number of advantages over the CG Option 1. EU 
support may have an enabling effect, providing the necessary stimulus to engage in 
tasks  that  would  otherwise  be  considered  too  complex  (e.g.  in  the  case  of 
multinational  modules  developed  by  different  MS).  It  will  allow  MS  to  expand  the 
level  of  protection  they  can  ensure  by  taking  full  advantage  of  economies  of  scale 
and shifting action from the PS to the EU as a whole when individual action is not 
deemed  economically  feasible.  The  EU  support  will  also  guarantee  a  greater 
availability  of  the  assets  to  all  PS  and  result  in  closer  European  cooperation  in  the 
development and use of the assets. . 

It  has  to  be  noted  that  benefits  from  the  filling  of  gaps  with  additional  assets  to  a 
large  degree  are  subject  to  sharing  these  assets,  as  it  allows  optimising  their  use.94 
When this is achieved, the identification and filling of gaps will increase the overall 
level of protection against disasters across the EU. 

Considering  the  scope  of  the  exercise  limited  to  ‘topping-up’  PS’  assets  above  the 
‘normal’ preparedness level, the amount required for this purpose can be expected to 
be  at  the  level  of  magnitude  of  €5-10  million /year.95  Depending  on  the  option 
chosen, the costs would fall on PS or the EU budget, or be shared. The possible EU 

94 
95 

Idem. 
Idem.  Assumption  is  80-100%  co-financing,  i.e.  comparable  to  that  applied  during  the  preparatory 
action. 

EN 

42 

   EN 

 
                                                 
(co-)funding  would  mean  shifting  some  costs  from  PS  to  the  EU  level,  thereby 
creating a new model for burden-sharing among PS.  

136. 

The consultant's study explains that with regard to some types of assets investing into 
the  development  and  subsequent  EU-wide  sharing  of  assets  can  provide  important 
economic benefits and savings.96 The latter would however depend on a number of 
factors, such as the frequency of use of assets in question, their mobility, high or low 
probability  of  risk,  initial  capital  investment  costs  and  sharing  mechanism,  such  as 
for instance of CBRN scientific back-office or other assets for low probability/high 
impact risks. Even where the EU-wide sharing would not be economically justified, a 
case  for  a  regional  sharing  would  almost  always  be  present.  One  example  of  the 
latter could be the multinational BaltFlood high capacity pumping module developed 
and successfully tested by three PS in the framework of preparatory action.  

6.3.1. 

Impacts of CG Option 1: filling gaps by PS without EU co-financing 

137. 

Although  the  option  is  virtually  cost-free  from  the  EU  budget  perspective,  as  costs 
would be limited mostly to research and the organisation of meetings and workshops 
aimed at identifying the gaps and setting priorities, the effectiveness of this option is 
limited: even when an identified risk would be important for the EU as a whole, it 
could still remain below the threshold prompting individual PS to invest, especially 
in  cases  where  the  initial  capital  costs  are  high.97  The  only  multinational  module 
registered in CECIS database so far is the BaltFlood module developed with EU co-
financing.  It  should  be  noted  however  that  EU  funding  could  play  an  intermediate 
role to demonstrate the benefits from sharing, after which PS could continue jointly 
developing shared assets without EU financial support. 

138. 

CG  Option  1  would  imply  that  PS  investing  in  the  deficit  assets  would  bear  the 
whole burden of initial costs, although the availability of asset should benefit all or at 
least  a  group  of  PS.  Other  PS  not  investing  in  assets  in  question  but  nevertheless 
benefiting from them might be therefore perceived as taking undue advantage of the 
system. 

6.3.2. 

Impacts of CG Option 2: filling gaps with EU co-financing 

139. 

Some  EU  financing  would  effectively  lead  to  addressing  gaps  and  sharing  the 
developed assets across the EU, as compensating (some) of the related costs would 
reduce  financial  constraints  for  PS  to  invest  in  assets  in  question.  All  PS  could 
therefore  draw  on  these  assets  without  making  parallel  investments.  The  PS 
developing,  maintaining  and  deploying  such  assets  would  furthermore  receive 
benefits  of  visibility  and  prestige,  as  well  as  'training'  in  real-life  situations,  which 
would somewhat compensate for the part of investment it would need to cover. 

140. 

CG  Option  2  would  lead  to  a  more  equitable  model,  as  some  of  the  development 
costs  would  shift  from  PS  to  the  EU,  thus introducing a (partial) burden-sharing in 
which  all  PS  take  part.  Thus  the  relatively  modest  incentives  could  result  in 
significant improvements in the overall EU response capacity. 

96 
97 

Idem. 
Idem. 

EN 

43 

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141. 

Finally, as some PS are likely to benefit from some types of assets more than from 
the  others,  the  proposal  should  take  into  account  an  overall  balance  among 
competing priorities of various PS and regions. Thus it might be useful to decide on 
priorities  as  'packages'  rather  than  on  individual  basis.  Applicable  decision-making 
procedure could also be conducive to keeping this balance (e.g. comitology process 
supported by expert advice should ensure such a balanced technical/political input). 

6.3.3. 

Impacts of CG Option 3: filling gaps with EU-level assets 

142. 

143. 

Filling gaps with EU-level assets scores high in effectiveness, as it would allow the 
EU  taking  decisive  action  in  addressing  any  identified  gaps  in  a  timely  manner  – 
subject  to  budget  availability  of  course.  It  also  has  advantages  in  terms  of  cost-
efficiency, as economies of scale can be better pursued.  

However, the implications for the EU budget are also more prominent (depending on 
the number and type of gaps to be filled). The lease of one aerial forest fire-fighting 
module would be at the level of around €4.5 m illion/year, while other types of assets 
can  be  much  less  expensive,  as  for  instance  the  service  of  a  small-sized  TAST  for 
one  operation  would  bring  the  cost  of  approximately  €67,000. 98  Importantly, 
to 
however, 
subsidiarity/proportionality  considerations,  especially  if  some  PS/regions  would 
benefit more than others. Therefore, it can be concluded that CG Option 3 would be 
justified only in very limited cases, such as for horizontal assets/services benefiting 
all.  

stakeholders  would 

this  option  due 

few  key 

support 

6.4. 

Comparison of options 

144. 

The table below gives a comparison of the options with the baseline.. At this stage of 
analysis and given the eminently political choices involved, no clear preferences are 
expressed. Using some EU co-financing (CG Option 2) nevertheless appears to merit 
particular  attention,  especially  for  assets  dealing  with  low  probability/high  impact 
risks. CG Option 3 would appear justified for horizontal assets benefiting all actors, 
with smaller budgetary implications (such as TAST). 

Effectiveness 
Efficiency 
Coherence 
Social impacts 
Environmental impacts 

CG Option 1 
+ 
++ 
+ 
+ 
+ 

CG Option 2 
++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
++ 

CG Option 3 
++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
++ 

(++ = high benefits, + = benefits, 0 = no benefits, - = problematic) 

98 

Actual amount from a service contract signed under the preparatory action 2009 call. 

EN 

44 

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7. 

TRANSPORT 

7.1. 

Specific transport objectives  

145. 

146. 

147. 

Enhanced financial and logistical transport support and more cost-effective transport 
operations:  The  ultimate  goal  of  the  transport  provisions  is  to  improve  the  EU 
response to major disasters, by making it more coherent (making sure that all priority 
resources  are  deployed  at  the  right  moment  and  along  with  other  complementary 
assets),  more  efficient  (by  choosing  the  most  appropriate  and  least  costly  transport 
solution),  and  more  cost-effective  (in  terms  of  financial  and  human  resource 
requirements).  

The  operational  transport-related  objectives  include  reducing  the  bottlenecks  posed 
by limited logistical and financial transport resources, in particular for the delivery of 
the  most  urgent  priority  needs,  as  well  as  simplifying  the  transport  provisions  and 
streamlining the relevant administrative procedures. 

The voluntary pool of committed assets has the potential to significantly increase the 
availability of CP assets for operations conducted under the Mechanism, but it will 
probably not cover the entire range of the most urgent needs (e.g. generators, mobile 
laboratories, tents, medical supplies). Therefore, these needs will have to be covered 
through  additional  ad  hoc  offers  by  PS,  and  it  is  important  to  reduce  potential 
barriers to the deployment of these assets.  

7.2. 

Policy options  

148. 

Two  different  sets  of  options  were  identified  for  each  of  the  two  objectives  stated 
above:  

7.2.1.  Options to reduce bottlenecks posed by limited logistical and financial resources  

149. 

The  following  options  have  been  devised  to  reduce  bottlenecks  posed  by  limited 
logistical and financial resources:  

(1)  Transport  Option  A1:  a  discontinuation  of  the  scheme.  No  more  support  is 

provided at EU level in finding and financing transport activities.  

(2)  Transport  Option  A2  (baseline):  no  policy  change.  In  addition  to  the  current 
modus  operandi,  the  Commission  will  also  work  on  improving  the  current 
system within the limits of the existing legislative provisions. 

(3)  Transport Option A3: increase the EU transport maximum co-financing for the 
most urgent priority needs. The list of such needs would be set immediately in 
the wake of emergency based on the request for assistance and assessments on 
the ground (by EU CP Teams and humanitarian aid experts, UN reports and the 
like), and in the light of clear and transparent criteria defined in the legislation 
(e.g.  life-saving character, short supply, and rapid delivery (less than a week 
after  the  event),  etc.).  At  the  same  time,  the  Commission/ERC  will  consider 
introducing a cut-off date/time after which offers will no longer be eligible for 
transport funding. 

EN 

45 

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(4)  Transport  Option  A4:  increase  the  EU  transport  maximum  co-financing99 

across the board. This option concerns all transport operations. 

150. 

Stakeholders  have  generally  expressed  support  for  further  developing  the  transport 
support provided under the Mechanism, and therefore pursuing options A1 or A2 is 
not  desired.  A  more  consistent  use  of  private  cost-free  transport  solutions  was 
favoured  by  some  PS  as  an  additional  tool  (it  is  part  of  the  baseline  scenario). 
Stakeholders'  opinions  on  the  increase  of  the  co-financing  rate  were  rather  split,  as 
some  PS  representatives  see  this  as  the  right  step  forward,  while  others  favour 
avoiding  additional  transport  support  and  ensuring  cost-effective  CP  operations, 
cautioning  against  false  incentives  from  overly  cheap  transport,  to  the  detriment  of 
local/regional procurement. 

7.2.2.  Options for simplifying and streamlining EU transport provisions 

151. 

The  following  options  have  been  devised  to  simplify  and  streamline  EU  transport 
provisions:  

(1)  Transport  Option  B1:  no  policy  change  is  the  baseline  scenario.  In  terms  of 
simplification, the only development as compared to the current situation will 
be the use of framework partnership agreements with PS.  

(2)  Transport  Option  B2:  simplification  of  the  current  transport  provisions,  with 
the  aim  of  reducing  the  overall  burden  on  the  PS  and  the  Commission.  Five 
elements  are  included  in  this  option:  1)  introducing  the  possibility  of  a 
coordinating country to request transport grants when several PS are involved, 
which  would  allow  one  of  the  States  contributing  to  a  transport  operation  to 
apply on behalf of all of the States; 2) further simplification for the financing of 
small value transport grants and services; 3) paying the entire EU co-financing 
amount  for  a  transport  grant  at  the  end  of  the  transport  operations  (it  means 
replacing the current system of the Commission pre-financing 100% followed 
by  a  reimbursement  by  the  beneficiary  of  minimum  50%,  and  sometimes 
followed  by  recovery  of  undue  amounts);  4)  increased  financing  rate  up  to 
maximum 100% for local transport and other logistical operations in the airport 
hubs or in the affected countries to allow an effective and smooth delivery of 
assistance;  5)  more  extensive  use  of  the  transport  broker  and  framework 
arrangements  with  service  providers;  6)  affected  PS  being  able  to  request 
transport support at EU level.100 The latter proposal (6) under option B2 would 
facilitate the organisation of transport operations inside EU. This is relevant for 
cases  when  an  offering  PS  cannot  organise  or  pay  transport  costs.  It  would 
allow  the  organisation  of  door-to-door  deliveries  during  an  emergency 
(organised through the Commission broker).  

152. 

As part of transport Option B2, other small revisions will also be proposed in order 
to bringing more clarity (e.g. in case of support to consular assistance operations).  

99 

100 

This option refers exclusively to the delivery of assistance that is not included in the voluntary pool. For 
the pool, a full financing (100%) is being proposed (see chapter 6). 
The co-financing rate would be according to the rules in force for any other operation.  

EN 

46 

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7.3. 

153. 

Analysis of impacts  

Impacts  of  the  options  are  drawn  and  the  options  are  compared  to  the  baseline  (no 
change  of  policy  option)  on  the  basis  of  multi-criteria  analysis  in  terms  of 
effectiveness – the extent to which options achieve the specific objective, efficiency 
– the extent to which the objective can be achieved at least cost (cost-effectiveness), 
and coherence – the extent to which options would ensure a coherent EU response to 
disasters, while maximising possible synergies.  

7.3.1. 

Impacts of Transport Options A1-A4 

154. 

155. 

156. 

157. 

158. 

Transport Option A1: Discontinuing the transport support at EU level would strongly 
undermine the achievement of the CP objectives and of the specific and operational 
transport  objectives.  It  would  go  against  the  results  of  the  2010  evaluation  and 
against most stakeholders' views, which support further development of the transport 
provisions.  

Transport Option A2: The baseline includes relying on private cost-free solutions and 
on  PS  offering  transport  to  each  other,  which  are  both  relatively  neutral  from  a 
financial impact perspective, as these solutions could be offered in limited cases. The 
main  drawback  is  the  lack  of  certainty  on  whether  transport  solutions  will  be 
provided in specific situations, in sufficient quantity, and under time pressure.  

Transport  Option  A3:  Increasing  the  maximum  EU  co-financing  rate  for  a  limited 
part  of  the  European  response  -  the  most  urgent  priorities  will  reduce  the  barriers 
related to financing transport, and it is expected to reduce the decision-making time 
in  the  PS  when  offering  assistance.  It  will  make  the  overall  response  needs-based, 
with a greater focus on priority needs. The financial impact is estimated on the basis 
of  the  previous  operations  and  considering  on  average  5  priority  deployments  per 
disaster, for 10 disasters per year, with a value of €50,000  per deployment. Increased 
transport co-financing of up to 85% would lead to an increase of the transport budget 
with  €875,000  yearly.  100%  tran sport  financing  would  lead  to  an  increase  of  the 
transport budget with €1.25 million yearly. The  financial impact of both possibilities 
is considered acceptable for the benefits that would be reached. 

Transport  Option  A4:  The  financial  impact  of  Transport  Option  A4  (increased 
maximum EU co-financing across the board), judging from the 2010 experience and 
as  compared  to  the  2010  budget,  ranges  between  €1.1  million/year  increase  (for  a 
increase  up  to  85%),  and  €1.6  million/year  (for  a  increase  up  to  100%).  The  main 
risk  associated  with  this  option  is  that  overly  cheap  transport  might  lead  to  non-
essential  goods  being  deployed.  This  would  need  to  be  balanced  by  stricter  needs 
assessments under the Mechanism.  

Administrative costs, for the Commission, associated with Transport Options A3 and 
A4  would  presumably  be  negatively  affected,  due  to  the  potential  increase  of  the 
number of grants and services, but in view of the use of the framework partnership 
agreements  these  costs  should  be  limited.  The  administrative  burden  on  external 
partners is likely to remain the same for these two options. The introduction of the 
concept of the "most urgent priority needs" leads to a need for clarifying it within an 
implementing act, thus having a limited impact from a simplification perspective.  

EN 

47 

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7.3.2. 

Impacts of Transport Options B1-B2 

159. 

160. 

Transport  Option  B1  is  expected  to  yield  benefits  in  particular  to  countries  which 
regularly request transport co-financing, as it simplifies the settling of accounts. For 
countries which only rarely offer assets, however, the effort to conclude a framework 
contract with the Commission may be less obvious compared to the present practice 
of  individual  requests.  Transport  Option  B1  is  not  considered  sufficient  to  yield 
significant improvements of the system. The budgetary impact is considered small. 

Transport Option B2: The elements proposed under the simplification option are all 
expected to contribute to reducing the administrative costs for the Commission and 
the  PS.  They  are  coherent  with  the  Commission's  better  regulation  objective.  They 
will  also  contribute  to  achieving  a  faster  response  (through  smoother  transport 
procedures), and to achieving the overall transport and response specific objectives. 
As  the  various  elements  complement  each  other  and  have  overall  limited  impacts, 
except for the simplification results, they are proposed as one single option, instead 
of  separate  options.  Allowing  an  affected  PS  the  possibility  to  request  transport 
support  is  likely  to  have  a  low  financial  impact,  taking  into  account  that  so  far, 
during the four years of implementation, there was only one request for grant inside 
the  Mechanism.  It  could,  however,  have  important  positive  impacts  for  an  affected 
PS in cases of low probability/high impact crises, as the affected state could ask the 
Commission  to  arrange  door-to-door  delivery  of  the  most  needed  assistance  and 
could also benefit of transport co-financing.101 Stakeholders are generally in favour 
of the simplification process.  

161. 

The overall financial impact of Transport Option B2 is estimated at around €300,000 
per year, resulting mainly from the 100% financing proposed for local transport and 
other  logistical  operations  in  airport  hubs  or  in  the  affected  countries.102  This  is 
considered justified, in view of the benefits gained.  

7.4. 

Comparison of options 

162. 

Concerning the options for reducing the bottlenecks posed by limited logistical and 
financial transport resources, on the basis of the  impacts assessed above and of the 
analysis  below,  Transport  Options  A3  and  A4  are  the  highest  ranking  options. 
Taking  into  account  the  risk  associated  with  Transport  Options  A4,  Transport 
Options  A3  is  preferred.  Within  Transport  Options  A3,  the  financial  impact  of  the 
two sub-options (85% and 100% financing rates) is comparable, while the maximum 
of  advantages  can  be  reached  if  full  financing  is  provided.  Therefore,  Transport 
Options A3 with the 100% financing rate is preferred.  

163. 

The  options  for  simplification  are  straight-forward  and  the  choice  is  easy  to  make. 
Thus, the simplification Transport Options is the preferred one.  

A1 

A2 

A3 

A4 

B1 

B2 

101 

102 

When  organised  through  the  Commission  broker,  the  Commission  is  paying  100%  of  the  transport 
operation,  while  the  requesting  state  is  reimbursing  at  a  later  stage  the  co-financing  amount.  During 
crisis times, this support can be significant for the affected state.  
Based  upon  experience,  the  order-of-magnitude  of  local  costs  as  compared  to  other  transport  costs  is 
typically quite small, ranging between €25.000-50.000.  

EN 

48 

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Effectiveness 
Efficiency 
Coherence 
Social impacts 
Environmental impacts 

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 

++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
++ 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 

(++ = high benefits, + = benefits, 0 = no benefits, - = problematic) 

164. 

The social and environmental costs and benefits of the options are directly linked to 
achieving the objectives of improved provision of transport to the disaster site, and 
thus to the effectiveness criteria discussed above. This means that Transport Options 
A3, A4 and B2 score high, while Transport Options A2 and B1 score low. 

8. 

PREPAREDNESS 

8.1. 

Specific preparedness objectives 

165. 

166. 

167. 

(1) To  address  the  lack  of  consistency  among  national  training  programmes,  which 
hinders the sharing of experience, it is a specific objective of the EU CP regulatory 
review  to  better  link  national  preparedness  systems  by  creating  more  consistency. 
This linking of national preparedness systems can be best realised by work at the EU 
level.  Even  though  currently  there  is  some  cooperation  among  some  neighbouring 
MS in their CP preparedness efforts, MS cannot individually arrange for other MS to 
accept  and  adhere  to  a  common  understanding  of  methods  and  procedures  for 
international  coordination  and  cooperation.  The  system  is  dependent  on  common 
actions  at  the  EU  level,  where  MS  can  develop  together  the  necessary  common 
understanding on: (1) minimum quality levels of training, (2) mutual recognition of 
training  based  on  feasible,  adequate  and  recognised  standards  and  principles, 
(3) cooperation  in  sharing  of  good  practices  and  lessons  learned  through  a  network 
structure, and (4) interoperability of equipment and experts. 

(2) To address the limited scope of current EU preparedness actions and the limited 
link with national programmes, it is a specific objective of the legislative changes to 
enlarge  the  scope  of  current  EU  preparedness  actions  and  link  them  better  with 
national programmes, including an established training network. Additional training 
programmes  may  include  training  on  prevention,  host-nation  support,  and  consular 
support.  The  training  network  should  focus  on  the  preparedness  for  large-scale 
disaster events. 

(3) To  address  the  uncertain  preparedness  for  large-scale  disasters,  it  is  a  specific 
objective of the legislative review to raise the level of preparedness for such disasters 
within  the  EU  by  further  integrating  preparedness  objectives  into  the  EU  CP 
cooperation  and  provide  for  sufficient  preparedness  funding.  Adequate  previous 
training  and  exercises  will  significantly  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  response 
resources  available  within  Europe.  Integrating  EU  CP  preparedness  actions  better 
into  the  EU  CP  regulatory  framework  will  reinforce  the  link  between  prevention, 
preparedness and response. 

EN 

49 

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8.2. 

Preparedness policy options 

168. 

In the framework of the Training Policy Group (TPG) the Commission and the MS 
have made plans to develop guidance on enhanced national  preparedness  for  large-
scale disasters. The place of possible guidelines is illustrated in the picture below: 

169. 

170. 

Because there is broad support for further developing EU CP preparedness policy, as 
recently  reiterated  in  stakeholder  meetings,  and  when  considering  the  general 
agreement on  substance, the legislative  review focussed its reflection of options on 
the implementation options and the most appropriate levels of EU financial support. 

It  is  noted  that  an  option  to  introduce  binding  legislation  or  binding  standards  or 
quality labels has been discarded at an early stage of the assessment as these would 
not  be  possible  by  the  legal  basis  of  Article  196  TFEU,  which  excludes 
harmonisation. Likewise, the option of discontinuing the CPFI which would stop all 
EU  CP  related  activities  was  discarded  early  on  in  the  assessment  as  it  is 
unacceptable to the MS stakeholders and would go contrary to the Treaty provisions 
of Articles 196 and 222 TFEU. 

171. 

Considering that a certain baseline level of preparedness policy work will be carried 
forward  in  any  case,  including  the  development  of  guidance  on  CP  training  and 
exercises, the options considered for the impact assessment are the following: 

(1)  Preparedness Option 1: No new EU legislation related to preparedness will be 
proposed. The Commission would issue non-binding guidelines on training and 
exercises,  including  (1) minimum  quality  levels  of  training,  (2) mutual 
recognition  of  training  based  on  feasible,  adequate  and  recognised  standards 
and principles, (3) cooperation in sharing of good practices and lessons learned 
through a network structure, and (4) interoperability of equipment and experts. 
The CPFI budgetary proposals would be at current spending levels. 

(2)  Preparedness  Option  2:  The  Mechanism  decision  would  pronounce  a  general 
EU  preparedness  policy  framework  (objectives,  slightly  enlarged  scope)  but 
contain  no  binding  provisions  for  PS.  Supplementary  EU  financial  assistance 
would support the establishing of a training network and other actions.  

EN 

50 

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172. 

173. 

(3)  Preparedness  Option  3:  In  addition  to  the  policy  framework  and  the 
supplementary funding under Prevention Option 2, EU support for CP training 
would  be  made  conditional  on  PS  training  centres  meeting  certain  minimum 
requirements, which could be set out in Commission guidelines.103 

Stakeholders  generally  welcomed  the  proposals  for  further  development  of  the 
training and exercises arrangements.104 A formal quality label for training centres as 
envisaged  under  Preparedness  Option 3  received  mixed  reactions,  with  some 
representatives  of  MS  expressing  strong  scepticism  on  any  mandatory  standard. 
Participants  also  expressed  overall  support  for  the  need  for  training/exercises  to  be 
linked  to  the  new  developments  in  response  and  prevention  policy,  such  as  the 
outputs from risk assessments.  

There  seemed  to  be  general  agreement  on  the  need  to  broaden  the  scope  of  the 
training. There were several requests from MS representatives for the EU to do more 
to  support  training  for  the  general  population,  in  particular  in  tourist  areas  where 
European  citizens  from  many  different  countries  may  be  affected  by  a  disaster, 
including in third countries.  

174. 

Finally, a number of MS representatives expressed their support for a future training 
network system for a better exchange of knowledge, and one also stressed the value 
of informality in such a network. 

8.3. 

Analysis of impacts of preparedness options 

175. 

The effectiveness of the options was assessed according to four criteria: 

(1)  To  what  extent  does  the  option  maximise  the  consistency  between  national 
systems  within  the  limits  of  the  mandate  of  the  CP  mechanism  and  with  due 
respect to the principle of subsidiarity? 

(2)  To what extent is the option likely to reinforce and ensure the rapid response to 

emergencies? 

(3)  To  what  extent  does  the  option  contribute  to  the  integration  of  further 

developments in preparedness cooperation? 

The efficiency of the options was assessed mainly in terms of reaching the specific 
objectives  at  minimal  costs  for  the  MS  authorities  and  the  EU  budget.  For  this 
purpose  an  economic  assessment  of  the  costs  compared  to  the  benefits  has  been 
carried out by the external study. For this purpose an analysis of the impacts of the 
options on the preparedness levels was carried out, as follows.  

The benefits ideally would be measured at the level of each type of natural and man-
made  disaster  in  each  MS.  Some  MS  have  already  more  of  a  habit  of  international 
cooperation  and  may  require  only  little  supplementary  efforts  to  bring  their 
preparedness  to  a  higher  standard.  Moreover,  the  exposure,  vulnerability,  and 

176. 

177. 

103 

104 

Budgetary  proposal  as  in  Option  2,  but  PS  training  centres  must  meet  minimum  requirements  to  be 
eligible for funding. 
Report from the 1st stakeholder meeting, Annex E. 

EN 

51 

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resilience  to  different  types  of  mega-disasters  requiring  international  intervention 
vary  between  MS.  The  results  of  the  analysis  at  the  level  of  each  MS  may  be 
summarized for the whole of Europe to isolate the estimations of costs and benefits 
for  each  of  the  options.  The  difficulty  in  assessing  the  impacts  for  the  future 
preparedness  policy  framework  lies  in  the  fact  that  PS  organise  their  preparedness 
systems  in  many  different  ways;  some  have a bottom-up approach where local and 
regional  actors  (private  and  public)  play  the  core  role.  Other  PS  have  a  more 
centralised approach. Furthermore, PS have a different focus – it can be primarily on 
assets  or  it  can  be  primarily  on  using  already  existing  resources  (including  private 
companies, NGOs and volunteers). In this situation it is a challenge to decide which 
gains  could  be  achieved  for  a  number  of  different  countries  and  different  disaster 
types  for  the  options  assessed.  The  consultants  have  carried  out  a  number  of 
interviews  with  key  MS  and  noted  broad  agreement  that  there  is  still  room  for 
improvement. From these interviews the study concludes that efficiency gains in the 
order of 20% could be gained by achieving faster and more targeted assistance inside 
Europe.  On  a  number  of  real-life  sample  cases  and  using  the  revealed  preferences 
method, the consultant then illustrates the value added that can be achieved by better 
preparedness, which can be easily in the area of € 100000 for particular cases when 
using extremely prudent valuation methods. A full account of the methodology and 
the sample cases are reported in Annex C. An overview of the results of the study is 
provided in Annex G. 

178. 

The  coherence  of  the  options  was  assessed  in  terms  of  the  achievement  of  more 
consistency  between  national  training  systems  enabling  an  improved  level  of 
cooperation and the effective sharing of experience. 

8.3.1. 

Impacts  of  Preparedness  Option  1  (baseline):  No  legislative  change,  Commission 
guidelines 

179. 

180. 

181. 

182. 

183. 

This baseline scenario without legislative change of the Mechanism Decision would 
require  the  CP  Financial  Instrument  to  recycle  the  current  provisions  and  budgets 
into the next programming period. EU guidelines would be non-binding.  

This  option  would  result  in  the  continuing  development  of  inconsistent  national 
preparedness  systems  that  cannot  interface  easily  in  times  of  emergencies.  As  the 
cooperation remains limited, and progress very slow, the option would likely lead to 
widely  varying  preparedness  levels  in  the  different  MS.  Therefore,  for  the 
Preparedness Option 1 the effectiveness is considered low.  

Considering that the current budget levels will be spent also in a renewed CPFI and 
contrasting these costs with the limited benefits in terms of effectiveness as outlined 
above, Preparedness Option 1 is considered inefficient. 

Preparedness  Option  1  will  result  in  little  achievements  for  more  consistency 
between national training systems enabling an improved level of cooperation and the 
effective sharing of experience. Therefore the coherence of the option is low. 

Expressed in terms of environmental and social impacts Preparedness Option 1 will 
lead to overall low levels of preparedness in Europe for people and the environment 
as  compared  to  the  other  options.  These  aspects  will  be  further  elaborated  in  the 
discussions of the other two options below. 

EN 

52 

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8.3.2. 

184. 

185. 

186. 

187. 

188. 

Impacts  of  Preparedness  Option 2:  General  EU  preparedness  policy  framework 
(objectives, scope) plus dedicated funding for the establishing of a training network 
and other actions 

Given that the PS understand, organise and focus differently as regards preparedness, 
the  implementation  of  guidelines  will  have  different  implications  depending  on  the 
individual PS. The costs involved for each PS will differ accordingly. The funding to 
be  provided  would  thus  enhance  the  number  of  PS  which  would  work  to  meet  the 
standards  of  the  guidelines.  For  those  PS  who  decide  to  voluntarily  adhere  to  a 
common minimum understanding, the preparedness levels will increase (for targeted 
areas)  resulting  in  enhanced  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  preparedness  systems. 
This  would  include  improved  host  nation  support.  The  overall  higher  preparedness 
levels  would  however  be  dependent  on  a  sufficiently  critical  mass  of  PS  to  opt  for 
adhering  to  the  guidelines  for  any  considerable  impact  to  be  obtained.  If 
neighbouring countries and/or countries with similar risk profiles and ability to assist 
in  relevant  disasters  do  not  decide  to  adhere  to  guidelines,  then  the  benefit  is 
minimal. This would be the case for economic, environmental and social impacts.  

Providing funding for PS to adhere to the guidelines would most likely increase the 
effect  of  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  preparedness  systems.  The  impact  would 
depend  on  the  target  of  the  funding  and  the  degree  of  funding.  The  enhanced 
readiness for effective response during cross-border events or large events will result 
in  a  better  protection  of  EU  citizens,  environment,  infrastructure  and  buildings,  in 
particular for less affluent societies.  

Considering all of the above Preparedness Option 2 is rather effective, as it increases 
the  consistency  between  national  systems,  improves  preparedness  cooperation  so 
some degree and is likely to reinforce and ensure the rapid response to emergencies. 

In  some  PS,  cost  of  training,  exercises  etc  may  increase  as  the  requirements  may 
introduce  new  contents  that  were  not  there  before,  or  that  were  covered  to  a 
significantly lower extent before. It is reasonable to assume, that those PS that would 
incur  most  costs  by  adhering  to  the  guidelines  may  be  less  willing  than  those 
suffering less costs. For the PS where financing is provided by the EU, the cost will 
instead  be  incurred  by  the  EU  (to  a  certain  extent  depending  on  the  degree  of 
financing foreseen). The consultant notes that increased sharing of best practices and 
common training activities can also reduce Member States expenses on own training. 

Due to the lack of data and the inherent uncertainty in the modelling of this policy 
option,  the  external  study,  despite  best  efforts,  was  unable  to  provide  quantitative 
evidence. However, the consultant estimates that the value of the reduced damage is 
likely to be much higher than the examples provided though this was not quantified. 
Assuming  10-15  smaller  intra  EU  deployments  per  year  means  that  the  value  of 
improved preparedness could be in excess of € 1-3 million per year. 

189. 

Considering  that  with  limited  extra  budgetary  spending  in  MS  and  through  the 
increased  CPFI  finance,  a  number  of  clear  benefits  in  terms  of  effectiveness  as 
outlined above can be achieved, Preparedness Option 2 is considered efficient. 

EN 

53 

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190. 

191. 

8.3.3. 

192. 

193. 

194. 

195. 

The coherence of the option is good because Preparedness Option 1 will result more 
consistency  between  national  training  systems  enabling  an  improved  level  of 
cooperation and the effective sharing of experience. 

The  administrative  burden  is  considered  low,  as  there  would  be  no  systematic 
reporting requirement over and above what MS have already agreed in the baseline. 
Finally,  environmental  and  social  impacts  of  Preparedness  Option  2  will  lead  to 
overall  higher  levels  of  preparedness  in  Europe  for  people  and  the  environment  as 
compared to Preparedness Option 1, and are thus positive. 

Impacts  of  Preparedness  Option  3:  EU  support  for  CP  training  conditional  on  PS 
training  centres  meeting  certain  minimum  requirements  that  could  be  set  out  in 
Commission guidelines 

The  guidelines  on  preparedness  would  in  this  option  be  compulsory  for  all  PS  as 
would  the  'ownership'  and  responsibility  for  the  network  structure.  The  network 
structure  should  have  the  ability  to  facilitate  exchange  of  knowledge  and  methods 
among PS also with a view to relevant external institutions. 

The  assessment  of  impacts  would  suggest  significantly  enhanced  effectiveness  and 
efficiency  in  response  operations  where  two  or  more  PS  are  involved,  due  to 
adherence  to  common  principles,  common  knowledge  and  better  interoperability. 
This includes also the effect through the 'bigger resource pool'. Economies of scale: 
costs related to developing and updating curricula may be less for each PS and the 
quality  may  be  improved  as  the  more  joint  development  can  ease  the  bringing  on 
board of 'best practices'.  

Considering  the  above,  Preparedness  Option  3  is  very  effective  in  achieving 
increased  levels  of  consistency  between  national  systems,  improved  preparedness 
cooperation, and reinforced rapid response to emergencies. 

Preparedness  Option  3  is  also  more  expensive.  Network  costs  at  EU  level  may 
include  additional  costs  up  front  for  designing  the  network  and  some  limited 
operation  costs  for  ongoing  coordination  and  exchange  through  the  network. 
Implementation  cost  in  MS/PS  will  relate  to  meeting  standards  for  curricula  and 
other minimum requirements. Due to the lack of data and the inherent uncertainty in 
the  modelling  of  this  policy  option,  the  external  study  was  unable  to  provide 
quantitative evidence of these benefits and costs. It has estimated benefits and costs 
of the Preparedness Options as follows: 

 Preparedness Option 1 
 Preparedness Option 2 
 Preparedness Option 3 

Benefits 

Costs 

Effectiveness of 
response 
+ 
++ 
+++ 

Efficiency of  
training etc 
0/+ 
+ 
+ 

Cost to PS  Cost to EU 

0 
-/0 
-/0 

0 
- 
- 

196. 

In  any  case,  increased  adherence  to  common  principles,  common  knowledge  and 
better  interoperability  will  involve  substantial  expenses  in  MS  which  need  to  be 
balanced  against  the  additional  benefits  in  terms  of  effectiveness.  The  assessment 
concludes  that  Preparedness  Option  3  would  score  well  in  terms  of  efficiency,  but 

EN 

54 

   EN 

 
 
 
197. 

198. 

because  of  higher  costs  not  necessarily  significantly  better  than  Preparedness 
Option 2. 

The  coherence  of  the  option  is  very  good  because  it  will  result  more  consistency 
between national training systems enabling an improved level of cooperation and the 
effective sharing of experience. 

The  administrative  burden  under  this  option  may  be  more  significant  as  the 
adherence  to  the  standards  and  the  fulfilment  of  the  requirements  will  likely  entail 
considerable  extra  reporting  costs  for  MS  as  compared  to  the  baseline.  Finally, 
environmental and social impacts of Preparedness Option 3 will lead to overall much 
higher levels of preparedness in Europe for people and the environment as compared 
to Preparedness Option 2, and are thus positive. 

199. 

As mentioned, this option has met reservations from stakeholders and may therefore 
not find the necessary political backing. 

8.4. 

Comparing preparedness options 

200. 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  over  the  estimated  benefits  of  each 
Preparedness Option: 

Effectiveness 
Efficiency 
Coherence 
Social impacts 
Environmental impacts 

Preparedness 
Option 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

Preparedness 
Option 2 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 

Preparedness 
Option 3 
++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
++ 

(++ = high benefits, + = benefits, 0 = no benefits, - = problematic) 

201. 

It must be noted that in the world of CP which relies on the voluntary cooperation of 
Member  States,  setting  standards  that  are  hard  to  achieve  for  some  countries  could 
lead to the counter-productive result that it would exclude them from participation in 
the preparedness cooperation. Standards therefore have to remain achievable for all 
countries. 

202.  When  comparing  the  three  options,  Preparedness  Options  2  and  3  provide  better 
results  as  regards  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence,  as  compared  to  the 
baseline  scenario  (Preparedness  Option  1).  Preparedness  Option  3  would  lead  to 
greater effectiveness and coherence in the EU preparedness policy. However, it has 
met  significant  reservations  from  stakeholders  and  may  eventually  not  find  the 
necessary political backing.  

9. 

PREVENTION 

9.1. 

Specific prevention objectives 

203. 

(1) To  address  the  lack  of  coherence  and  coordination  between  sector-specific 
policies, it is a specific objective of the legislative review to complement the sector-

EN 

55 

   EN 

 
 
 
204. 

205. 

206. 

specific work by combining them for major disaster risks into national disaster risk 
management  plans  allowing  for  the  necessary  overview  and  coordination.  Risk 
management  plans  are  based  on  risk  assessments  and  guide  the  decision-making 
processes  on  developing,  selecting,  and  implementing  measures  to  reduce  and 
mitigate risks cost-effectively. 

(2) To  address  the  under-developed  organisation  of  sharing  of  experience  among 
MS,  national  disaster  risk  management  plans  should  be  developed  according  to  a 
minimum  common  understanding  of  what  are  the  guiding  principles,  objectives, 
methods,  and  processes  to  be  employed.  It  is  therefore  a  specific  objective  of  the 
legislative review to define appropriate ways to ensure the use of minimum standards 
and  disaster  risk  management  planning  in  the  EU  CP  legislation  and  provide 
sufficient  funding  via  the  CPFI  allowing  for  a  generally  high  level  of  protection  in 
Europe and for certain countries to catch up. 

(3) To address the insufficient link between prevention and preparedness/response it 
is  a  specific  objective  of  the  legislative  review  to  integrate  disaster  prevention 
policies into the EU CP cooperation.105 

(4) To  address  the  limited  awareness  and  vision  of  the  value  of  prevention  and 
consequential strategic investments, it is a specific objective of the legislative review 
to  strengthen  the  means  in  the  EU  for  continuous  support  to  prevention  awareness 
measures.106 Wide dissemination and awareness-raising are important steps to further 
develop  and  fully  integrate  a  risk  management  and  prevention  culture  into  sector 
policies, and for creating a strong prevention culture in Europe in view of an overall 
higher level of protection for EU citizens and elsewhere in the world. This policy aim 
should be an objective of the EU CP cooperation. 

9.2. 

Prevention policy options 

207. 

The proposed EU-level prevention policy has met great support by all stakeholders 
along  the  way  and  in  the  recent  stakeholder  consultations.  Indeed,  as  regards  the 
necessity and the contents of disaster management plans and the general prevention 
policy  agenda,  stakeholders  have,  in  reply  to  several  questions  to  this  effect, 
unambiguously  welcomed  and  endorsed  the  Commission’s  considerations.  A  few 
MS have merely cautioned that the Commission’s guidance would need to find the 
right level of detail and remain flexible enough to provide added value to all MS. 

208. 

In  many  sector-specific  policy  areas  it  seems  generally  understood  that  it  is  CP 
policy  that  can  be  the  platform  where  the  work  of  different  sectors  and  policies  on 
disaster  risk  management  can  be  integrated  into  an  overall  risk  management  policy 
framework. 

105 

106 

The  link  derives  from  the  objectives  of  Article  196  TFEU,  as  well  as  Council  Conclusions  and 
Parliament resolutions, which will be a basis for further advances in the operational cooperation in EU 
CP. 
This  should  include  the  development  of  coherent  cross-sector  national  risk  management  plans  on  the 
basis  of  sound  national  risk  assessments.  Risk  management  plans  necessarily  improve  the  awareness 
and understanding of decision makers, stakeholders and interested parties of the risks a country faces, 
and bring them into a better position to determine the best prevention measures. The mere process of 
developing the plans is beneficial to the awareness and vision of public authorities, businesses, NGOs, 
and the general public alike.  

EN 

56 

   EN 

 
                                                 
209. 

Because  of  this  broad  support  and  agreement  on  substance,  the  Commission  has 
focussed its considerations of the possible ways forward in the legislative review on 
the legal implementation of the prevention policy and the most appropriate level of 
EU financial support. The range of options that can be analysed is in any case strictly 
limited  by  the  fact  that  harmonisation  is  explicitly  ruled  out  by  the  provisions  of 
Article  196  TFEU.  Therefore,  a  Directive,  for  instance,  is  not  possible,  and  also 
further details on the contents of the risk management plans cannot form part of the 
options. 

210. 

The  following  options  thus  present  the  full  range  of  legally  possible  ways  of 
supporting and complementing PS disaster management actions by a more coherent 
EU prevention policy framework: 

(1)  Prevention  Option  1  (baseline):  No  new  EU  legislation  related  to  prevention 
will  be  proposed.  The  Commission  would  issue  in  2012  guidelines  on 
minimum  national  prevention  standards  which  would  also  address  national 
disaster  risk  management  plans.  The  CPFI  budgetary  proposals  would  be  in 
line with current spending levels. 

(2) 

In  Prevention  Option  2,  the  revised  Mechanism  decision  will  pronounce  a 
general  EU  prevention  policy  framework  stating  the  objectives  of  EU 
prevention  policy  in  the  context  of  the  Mechanism  and  the  actions  to  be 
pursued  by  the  Commission  and  the  MS.  These  would  include  Commission 
actions on the knowledge base, on national risk assessments, on an overview of 
EU  risks,  awareness-raising  measures,  and  other  actions.  Member  States 
actions  would  include  the  adoption  and  regular  update  of  national  risk 
management plans and other appropriate actions. None of these actions would 
be binding on the Member States. However, limited additional supplementary 
EU  financial  assistance  via  the  CPFI  would  support  the  development  and 
implementation  of  national  risk  management  plans  and  the  meeting  of 
minimum standards. 

(3)  Under Prevention Option 3, the revised Mechanism Decision would pronounce 
a general EU prevention policy framework and increase funding as laid out in 
Prevention Option 2 above, and Member States would be required to draw up 
their national disaster risk management plans by a certain date, e.g. 2016, i.e. 
as  early  as  possible  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  revised  Mechanism 
Decision. As in Prevention Option 2, the Commission would issue guidelines 
on certain characteristics of the plans. 

211. 

Stakeholders  have  commented  in  very  positive  ways  on  these  options  which  were 
first presented already in this form in April 2011. Many stakeholders spoke in favour 
of Prevention Options 1 and 2.107 A few PS advocated mandatory risk management 
planning at national level (Prevention Option 3). Eight PS expressed reservations in 
respect  of  legal  obligations,  highlighting  inter  alia  difficulties  where  the  planning 
competence resides at sub-national level. 

107 

Report from the 1st and 2nd stakeholder meetings (see Annex E). 

EN 

57 

   EN 

 
                                                 
212. 

There  was  full  agreement  among  stakeholders  that  sharing  experiences  and  good 
practices  is  an  essential  component  of  prevention  policy,  as  well  as  developing  a 
prevention culture that is shared by all actors. Finally, many stakeholders expressed 
support for the necessity to create more balance in the EU CP co-operation between 
prevention, preparedness and response actions. The Commission concluded that there 
was  strong  support  for  the  risk  management  planning  agenda,  including  guidance 
from  the  Commission;  as  well  as  for  integrating  prevention  considerations  into  the 
Mechanism decision, making it an objective of EU CP policy. 

9.3. 

Analysis of impacts of options for an EU prevention policy framework 

213. 

The effectiveness of the options was assessed according to four criteria: 

214. 

215. 

(1)  To  what  extent  does  the  option  reinforce  the  coordination  between  sector-
specific  policies  within  the  limits  of  the  mandate  of  the  Mechanism  and  the 
existing legislation? 

(2)  To  what  extent  does  the  option  contribute  to  the  development  of  cooperation 

and sharing of experience between PS? 

(3) 

In  how  far  does  the  option  maximise  the  common  understanding  of  good 
practices and challenges and thus generally raise the level of prevention across 
Europe? 

(4)  To what extent is the option likely to contribute to raise the political will and 
vision for more investments and cooperation in the area of prevention?  

The efficiency of the options was assessed mainly in terms of reaching the specific 
objectives  at  minimal  costs  for  the  MS  authorities  and  the  EU  budget.  For  this 
purpose  an  economic  assessment  of  the  costs  compared  to  the  benefits  has  been 
carried out by the external consultant.  

The  external  study  focussed  its  economic  analysis  on  the  impacts  of  the  additional 
funding under Prevention Option 2 or the binding nature under Prevention Option 3 
on  the  benefits  of  higher  prevention  levels,  as  compared  to  the  costs  of  achieving 
them.  Benefits  would  result  from:  (1) better  decision-making  on  the  most  cost-
effective  preventive  measures,  (2) saving  costs  of  preparedness,  response  and 
recovery  actions,  and  (3) saved  lives,  economic  and  social  costs  and  avoided 
environmental damage. The benefits ideally would be measured at the level of each 
type of natural and man-made disaster108 in each PS. Concretely, for each hazard the 
existing and likely future disaster management planning in each PS is considered in 
response  to  the  supporting  regulatory  framework  at  EU  level.  The  assessment  of 
achievable  protection  levels  in  PS  needs  to  consider  also  the  size  and  the  internal 
organisation  of  the  country,  its  exposure,  vulnerability,  and  resilience  to  different 
types of disasters. In addition to the analysis at PS level, costs and benefits should be 
also estimated at EU level and overall costs and benefits determined in the end. To 
simplify  the  analysis,  the  external  study  has  clustered  PS  into  three  groups  with 
respect  to  their  current  level  of  advancement  in  horizontal  risk  assessment  and 

108 

Storms,  extreme  temperatures,  forest  fires,  water  scarcity/droughts,  floods,  landslides,  earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions, oil spills, industrial accidents, toxic spills, and others. 

EN 

58 

   EN 

 
                                                 
prevention  planning.  Accordingly,  8  MS  may  be  considered  advanced,  13  medium 
advanced, and 6 less advanced. The detailed results of the consultant’s analysis are 
available in Annex C. An overview of study results is presented in Annex G. 

The  cost-benefit  calculations  of  the  external  study  are  based  on  a  number  of 
interviews  with  representatives  from  different  Member  States  institutions  in  a 
selected number of national administrations in order to learn about their challenges, 
views,  experience,  costs  and  potential  benefits.  The  interviews  focused  on  those 
Member  States  which  already  have  produced  or  carried  out  considerable  risk 
assessment and mapping in this areas, such as UK, NL, DE, and SE.  

Based upon this insight, the study has:  

(1) Grouped Member States according to the current level of progress with regard to 
prevention into three groups: Very advanced, Medium advanced, and Less advanced.  

(2) Assumptions:  the  advanced  countries  would  achieve  a  100%  implementation  in 
all  three  Prevention  Options;  moving  from  Prevention  Option  1  to  Option  2  (i.e. 
providing  co-financing  in  support  of  the  efforts)  would  provide  an  additional  20 
percentage point increase in implementation for both the medium advanced and the 
less  advanced  Member  States.  The  specific  effect  of  Option  2  in  terms  of  more 
prevention  will  depend  on  political  decisions  and  priorities  within  each  Member 
State.  This  is  difficult  to  predict  and  hence,  the  20%  effect  is  an  assumption  to 
illustrate  a  likely  order  of  magnitude.  Option  3  would  provide  for  100% 
implementation for all Member States as it is mandatory. 

(3) The  study  was  able  to  obtain  an  estimate  of  the  costs  from  two  of  the  highly 
advanced Member States. Assuming a linear relation between implementation level 
and the cost level, cost estimates were developed for Prevention Option 1, 2 and 3. 

The study then applied a break even assessment. For the effort to be worth the costs, 
the benefits should at least correspond to the costs. A recent European Environmental 
Agency study provides a minimum estimate of the costs of natural hazards in Europe 
over a decade. Comparing the cost calculations to these estimates indicated that if the 
better prevention resulting from the initiatives under consideration can reduce these 
costs by less than 1%, the initiative can be justified from cost-benefit arguments.  

The study has supplemented the above generic calculations with specific examples to 
illustrate the benefits from prevention. 

Uncertainties:  Given  the  difficulties  in  obtaining  cost  data,  the  study  opted  for  a 
methodology that was simple and transparent. Further refinements and work on the 
method  would  have  added  only  little  to  the  analytical  results  and  would  not  have 
made the analysis more robust. 

The  key  message  that  the  analysis  brings  is  that  it  would  only  demand  a  slight 
reduction in damage costs to justify the initiative. 

216. 

The  coherence  of  the  options  was  assessed  in  terms  of  the  achievement  of  a 
minimum common understanding which would be required for an improved level of 
cooperation and the effective sharing of experience. 

EN 

59 

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9.3.1. 

Impacts  of  Prevention  Option  1  (baseline):  No  legislative  change  but  Commission 
guidelines 

217. 

218. 

9.3.2. 

219. 

220. 

This  baseline  scenario  would  not  require  any  legislative  change  in  the  Mechanism 
Decision  but  would  presume  the  renewal  of the  CP  Financial  Instrument  at  current 
funding  levels.  EU  guidelines  would  be  non-binding.  This  option  may  lead  to 
varying planning intensities in the different MS, some of which may opt not to have 
a  disaster  risk  management  plan  or  minimum  prevention  standards  at  all.  To  the 
extent that the Commission guidelines are likely not widely applied and there will be 
very different standards pertaining in MS, this option would contribute only little to 
coordination  between  sector-specific  policies,  cooperation  between  MS  and  a 
common understanding of good practices. It will not help to raise the political will 
and  vision  for  longer-term  investments  in  sensible  prevention  policies.  Prevention 
Option  1  would  therefore  score  low  in  terms  of  effectiveness.  Because  the 
comparability  will  be  low,  the  sharing  of  knowledge  will  stay  limited.  This  option 
therefore scores also low in terms of coherence.  

As  there  would  be  no  closer  link  between  prevention  with  preparedness  and 
response, this option would also slow down progress in these other fields of EU CP 
cooperation.  Less  progress  in  all  of  these  areas  will  lead  to  more  costly  policies  in 
most  countries  and  Europeans  will  be  less  well  protected.  This  option  is  therefore 
also inefficient, as MS will still incur disaster costs without the adequate benefits of 
cooperation. Expressed in terms of environmental and social impacts this option will 
lead  to  low  levels  of  protection  in  Europe  for  people  and  the  environment  as 
compared  to  the  other  options.  These  aspects  will  be  further  elaborated  in  the 
discussions of the other two options below. 

Impacts  of  Prevention  Option  2:  General  EU  prevention  policy  framework,  plus 
dedicated funding for the development and implementation of national disaster risk 
management plans 

The  main  result  from  Prevention  Option  2  will  be  a  faster  implementation  of  the 
disaster risk management planning guidelines based on the assumption that PS will 
apply for EU funding where possible and/or that the financial assistance will be made 
available for those countries facing the biggest challenges on implementation of the 
guidelines.  In  addition,  the  better  link  with  the  Mechanism  will  ensure  that 
prevention considerations can become an integral part of the EU CP cooperation and 
further develop in the future. 

To  the  extent  that  the  Commission  guidelines  would  be  applied  sooner  and  more 
consistently due to the additional funding available that can help some MS to catch 
up  on  their  prevention  agenda,  this  option  would  significantly  contribute  to 
coordination  between  sector-specific  policies,  cooperation  between  MS  and  a 
common understanding of good practices. It will also help to raise the political will 
and  vision  for  longer-term  investments  in  sensible  prevention  policies.  Prevention 
Option 2 would therefore score well in terms of effectiveness.  

221. 

Prevention  Option  2  could  be  very  effective  also  in  the  sense  that  guidelines  and 
national  risk  management  plans  could  be  developed  from  early  on,  rather  than  be 
linked  to  a  deadline  set  out  in  legislation  (Prevention  Option  3),  which  after 
negotiations  between  the  EU  institutions  may  be  quite  far  in  the  future  or  not 

EN 

60 

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accepted  at  all.109  Earlier  preparation  of  risk  management  plans  would  provide 
opportunities  for  some  implementing  measures  to  be  supported  by  the  next 
generation of EU Structural Funds and could lead to a more rapid development of a 
risk management culture.  

The  stakeholder  consultation  shows  overwhelming  support  from  the  PS  and  other 
stakeholders for the development of national risk management plans accompanied by 
guidelines from the Commission. Preparatory work could start before adoption of the 
revised legislation and Participating States could voluntarily commit to develop such 
plans over the next three to four years. The experience of the voluntary approach on 
risk assessments should be taken into account. Guidelines110 have been prepared and 
all  PS  are  committed  (voluntarily)  to  prepare their  national  risk  assessments  within 
relatively short deadlines. 

Because the comparability of MS's prevention approaches will increase, the sharing 
of knowledge will be much improved. This option therefore scores well also in terms 
of coherence.  

The  general  EU  prevention  policy  framework  would  create  a  closer  link  between 
prevention with preparedness and response. Prevention Option 2 would thus enable 
progress also in these other fields of EU CP cooperation.  

In terms of costs of implementation by MS and the EU budget, and thus the measure 
of efficiency, the external economic study has carried out an estimate with available 
data.  According  to  the  external  study,  few  examples  exist  today  where  cost-benefit 
analyses of preventive efforts have been carried out at PS or EU-level. The analysis 
therefore provided a number of illustrative examples, which make a compelling case 
for the immediate benefits of preventive measures based on integrated approaches.111 
Good examples of  such  benefits and  cost savings can be  seen in  the areas  of flood 
risk  management,  early  warning  systems,  flu  pandemic  prevention  and  climate 
change adaptation, discussed in more detail in Annex C. Using a rough estimation of 
reduction  of  total  losses  that  is  gained  by  implementing  the  option,  the  study  has 
arrived  at  simulated  benefits  between  €16  million  and  €157  million  for  Prevention 
Option  2  as  compared  to  Prevention  Option  1  and  between  €35  million  and  €350 
million for Prevention Option 3 compared to Prevention Option 1.  

The  costs  of  Prevention  Option  2  will  depend  on  the  level  of  EU  co-funding 
available. Whereas this option may imply no extra costs or very little for advanced 
PS  who  already  have  a  comprehensive  disaster  risk  management  system  in  place, 
other  PS  starting  from  a  low  level  of  prevention  will  have  to  invest  substantial 
administrative  resources  to  introduce  horizontal  risk  assessment  systems.  Based  on 
available  information  on  the  state  of  play  and  starting  point  in  different  PS,  the 

Note e.g. long implementation periods agreed in the Directive on Flood Risk Management (6-8 years). 
Commission Staff Working Paper: Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management 
SEC(2010) 1626 final. 
From  a  more  global  perspective,  the  World  Bank's  recent  report  concludes:  "Prevention  is  often 
possible  and  cost-effective.  [It]  pays,  but  you  do  not  always  have  to  pay  more  for  prevention.  A 
relatively easy and effective measure is for governments to make information about hazards and risks 
easily  accessible  (such  as  maps  of  flood  plains…)."  Natural  Hazards,  UnNatural  disasters…  quoted 
above. 

222. 

223. 

224. 

225. 

226. 

109 
110 

111 

EN 

61 

   EN 

 
                                                 
external study has estimated average costs per one million inhabitants and additional 
implementation  costs  depending  on  the  level  of  advancement  of  the  national 
horizontal risk assessment This option would entail 13% higher costs than Prevention 
Option 1, but as pointed out in the study the increase affects in most cases PS where 
public budgets are already constrained. Considering average implementation costs of 
€ 50,000  per  person-year  (staff  costs),  this  option  may  be  up  to  € 13  million  more 
expensive  than  Prevention  Option  1.  If  EU  co-financing  would  be  provided  up  to 
50%,  the  additional  budgetary  requirements  would  amount  to  a  maximum  of  € 6.5 
million, which could be spread over several years.112 These economic estimates can 
merely provide an order of magnitude, as they are based on strong assumptions. 

Considering the costs of the option (€ 13 million) in relation to its possible benefits 
(between € 16 million and € 157 million), th

e efficiency of the option is good. 

The  administrative  costs  of  additional  reporting  for  public  and  private  operators 
under  this  option  are  considered  low,  as  there  would  be  no  systematic  reporting 
requirement over and above what PS have already agreed in the baseline. 

The social and environmental costs and benefits must be considered overall positive 
for Prevention Option 2 as it will lead to a higher state of prevention, preparedness, 
and  ultimately  also  better  response  in  Europe  and  elsewhere  in  the  world.  Indeed, 
more  effective  and  integrated  EU  support  for  disaster  management  including  risk 
management  planning  will  have  a  positive  impact  on  society  and  provide  positive 
environmental impacts including contributing to adaptation to climate change. 

227. 

228. 

229. 

9.3.3. 

Impacts of Prevention Option 3: Legal requirement to establish a national disaster 
risk management plan by the end of 2015, plus the Commission’s guidelines 

230. 

231. 

232. 

Prevention Option 3 would, in addition to the policy framework and the funding of 
Prevention Option 2, oblige PS to elaborate disaster risk management plans based on 
an all hazard approach by a certain date.113 The Commission would issue guidelines 
on the content of risk management plans and minimum prevention standards. 

As  disaster  risk  management  will  in  this  option  no  longer  be  optional,  Prevention 
Option 3 would likely provide for a more comparable, consistent and equal approach 
throughout  the  EU,  in  the  medium-term  probably  above  the  level  that  can  be 
achieved  by  Prevention  Option 2.  This  option  may  lead  to  a  higher  degree  of 
ambition  and  higher  protection  levels  than  the  previous  options,  and  a  better 
understanding between PS of the common challenges and priorities.  

However,  the  implementation  may  be  delayed  due  to  the  length  of  the  legislative 
processes and the difficulty to agree on a common target date. This may also make it 
more  difficult  to  reap  the  benefits  of  early  implementation  and  damage  some  good 
will  of  PS.  A  risk  may  also  be  that  those  PS  that  have  already  advanced  and  well-
functioning horizontal risk management systems will have to align with a proposed 

112 

113 

It should be noted that the costs are mainly due to the faster implementation of comprehensive disaster 
prevention policies and would level off over the years. 
This option may be considered more in line with Article 222(4) TFEU, as well as the Internal Security 
Strategy. 

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233. 

234. 

235. 

236. 

237. 

new  system,  which  should  therefore  provide  sufficient  flexibility  accommodate 
current well-functioning risk management systems.  

Overall  Prevention  Option  3  is  considered  to  lead  to  a  very  high  level  of 
effectiveness and coherence in terms of achieving the specific objectives. 

The assessment of costs and benefits by the external study has arrived at simulated 
benefits  between  € 35  and  € 350  million  fo r  Prevention  Option  3  compared  to 
Prevention  Option  1  (baseline).  As  for  Prevention  Option  2,  this  option  may  imply 
little  additional  costs  for  advanced  PS  which  already  have  comprehensive  risk 
assessment  systems  in  place.  However,  other  MS  starting  from  a  low  level  of 
prevention planning would have to invest substantial administrative resources. This 
may  in  particular  affect  MS  where  public  budgets  are  constrained.  With  the 
assumptions  mentioned  above, 
the  additional  costs  of 
implementing this option would be in the order of 33% higher than Prev. Option 1, 
equal to some € 29 million. A 50% maximum  EU co-financing rate would thus lead 
to total EU budget expenditure of € 14.5 million. 

the  study  estimate 

Considering the costs of the option (€ 29 million) in relation to its possible benefits 
(€ 35 and € 350 million), the efficiency of the option is good .  

The  social  and  environmental  costs  and  benefits  of  the  option  is  directly  linked  to 
achieving  the  objectives  of  better  disaster  prevention,  and  thus  to  the  effectiveness 
criteria discussed above.  

The  administrative  burden  of  additional  reporting  for  public  and  private  operators 
under this option are still considered relatively low, as the requirement for setting up 
a  planning  programme  will  entail  little  extra  reporting  costs  to  MS  over  and  above 
what is already agreed in the baseline.114 

9.4. 

Comparing the prevention options 

238. 

The  following  table  summarises  the  estimated  impacts  of  the  different  options,  as 
discussed above: 

Effectiveness 
Efficiency 
Coherence 
Social benefits 
Environmental benefits 

Prevention 
Option 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

Prevention 
Option 2 
++ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 

Prevention 
Option 3 
++ 
+ 
++ 
+ 
+ 

(++ = high benefits, + = benefits, 0 = no benefits, - = problematic) 

239.  While Prevention Option 1 is problematic as concerns effectiveness and coherence of 
European  prevention  policy,  Prevention  Options 2  and  3  would  provide  better 

114 

Administrative  burden  has  been  estimated  with  the  Commission  Calculator  of  Administrative  Costs 
(AC) & Administrative Burdens (AB) on Public authorities. Amount for the 27 MS are about € 500 per 
state, i.e. a total of € 13500 per year, and another € 2000 per year for the other 4 Participating States: 
See full calculation at: http://adminburden.sg.cec.eu.int/Public administrations/ECHO/ 

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benefits  in  terms  of  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence.  However,  Prevention 
Option 3 was rejected by eight key PS at the stakeholder meetings. 

240. 

In  terms  of  social  and  environmental  costs  and  benefits  Prevention  Option  3  may 
reach a slightly better score in the medium-term as compared to Prevention Option 2, 
but the results are too uncertain to sufficiently distinguish it. 

10. 

SUMMARY OF OPTIONS AND KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PREFERRED OPTIONS 

241. 

The  following  table  summarizes  the  Options  and  key  considerations  leading  to  the 
preferred option 

Response-
Voluntary Pool 

Response-EU-
funded assets 

Transport  
Co-financing 

Transport-
Administration 

Preparedness 

Options 

VP-Option 1: Voluntary pool without 
EU co-financing. 
VP-Option 2: Voluntary pool with 
limited EU co-financing (covering 
only deployment costs).  
VP-Option 3: Voluntary pool with 
higher EU co-financing 
(deployment, as well as (some) 
development and stand-by costs).  

CG-Option 1: Filling gaps by 
Participating States (without EU co-
financing).  
CG-Option 2: Filling gaps with 
(some) EU co-financing.  
CG-Option 3: Filling gaps with EU-
level assets.  

Transport-Option A1: 
Discontinuation of the scheme.  
Transport-Option A2: No policy 
change. 
Transport-Option A3: Increase EU 
transport max co-financing for the 
most urgent priority needs 
Transport-Option A4: Increase EU 
transport max co-financing across 
the board 
Transport-Option B1: No policy 
change (some improvements in the 
limits of the current provisions).  
Transport-Option B2: Simplification 
(incl. "coordinating country 
concept", 100% financing for local 
transport and other logistical 
operations, further simplification for 
low value grants, paying the entire 
EU co-financing at the end of 
operations, EU affected state 
becoming eligible)  
Preparedness Option1: No 
legislative change, Commission 
guidelines.  

Key considerations / comparison of 
options 
Certain options (discontinuation, no-action, 
pool of EU-level assets and fully-fledged 
EU CP Force) discarded earlier in the 
impact assessment for 2010 Disaster 
Response Communication. Among the 
remaining 3 realistic options considered 
here, VP-Options 2 and 3 are superior in 
terms of effectiveness and efficiency, with 
benefits under VP-Option 3 more 
pronounced. 
CG-Option 2 merits attention, notably with 
regard to assets for low probability/high 
impact risks, as well as those performing 
horizontal tasks (such as TAST), while CG-
Option 1 can be implemented without 
legislative changes and is the least costly 
for EU budget, but is weak in terms of 
effectiveness; CG-Option 3 did not receive 
sizeable support of key stakeholders. 
Transport-Options A3 and A4 both score 
relatively high on effectiveness, efficiency 
and coherence. Taking into account the 
high risk associated with Transport-Option 
A4 (overly cheap transport might lead to 
non-essential goods to be deployed), 
Transport-Option A3 is preferred. 

Transport-Option B1 is not considered 
sufficient to yield significant improvements 
of the system. The elements proposed 
under the simplification option (Transport-
Option B2) are all expected to contribute to 
reducing the administrative costs for the 
Commission and the PS. They are coherent 
with the Commission's better regulation 
objective. Therefore, Transport-Option B2 is 
the preferred one.  

Preparedness Options 2 and 3 provide 
better benefits in terms of efficiency and EU 
added-value. Preparedness Option 3 is 

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Prevention 

Preparedness Option 2: General EU 
preparedness policy framework + 
dedicated funding. 
Preparedness Option 3: EU support 
for CP training conditional on MS 
training centres meeting certain 
minimum requirements (to be set 
out in Commission guidelines). 
Prevention Option 1: No new 
legislation but Commission 
guidelines. 
Prevention Option 2: General EU 
prevention policy framework + 
dedicated funding for the 
development and implementation of 
national disaster risk management 
plans (CPFI).  
Prevention Option 3: Legal 
requirement to establish a national 
disaster risk management plan by 
the end 2015, + Commission 
guidelines & dedicated funding.  

likely to be superior in terms of 
effectiveness and coherence, but it has met 
reservations from stakeholders. 

Prevention Options 2 and 3 provide better 
benefits in terms of effectiveness, efficiency 
and coherence. They present different 
advantages. Prevention Option 2 can be 
implemented more speedily, while 
Prevention Option 3 may lead in the 
medium-term to more coherent 
implementation of disaster risk 
management plans in the longer term. 

11. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

242. 

243. 

In  order  to  improve  the  implementation  and  facilitate  the  evaluation  of  the  CP 
system, the Commission will collect a limited, continuous series of monitoring and 
result  indicators,  as  well  as  a  number  of  baselines  in  terms  of  coordination 
mechanisms,  time  of  response,  coverage  of  preparedness  and  prevention  measures, 
etc. (see Annex K for details). 

On the basis of the monitoring information, as well as any other additional evaluation 
work, the Commission will evaluate the implementation of the legislation not earlier 
than  three  years  after  the  coming  into  force  of  the  new  EU  legislation,  in  order  to 
allow for enough time for the results of the implementation to become measurable. 
On  the  basis  of  the  baselines  established the  appraisal  will  identify  implementation 
results that are an effect of the new EU regulatory framework, from other effects that 
would  have  come  about  in  any  case  (baseline  scenario),  and  will  compare  it  with 
established benchmark levels and criteria (see below). 

244.  Moreover, on the basis of the monitoring indicators collected, the Commission will 
assess  the  evolution  in  the  implementation  of  individual  operations  in  the  field  of 
prevention,  preparedness  and,  notably,  response,  by  comparing  them  with  the 
baselines identified at the beginning of the implementation of the measures. 

12. 

245. 

LEGISLATIVE  PROPOSAL  AND  FURTHER  ELEMENTS  OF  CPFI  EX-ANTE 
EVALUATION  

On disaster response, it is proposed to include the essential elements and principles 
on  the  voluntary  pool  of  assets,  as  well  as  those  on  the  EU-funded  assets,  with  a 
reference to the implementation rules. Furthermore, it would include some additional 

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246. 

247. 

248. 

249. 

250. 

elements without sizeable economic, social and environmental impacts and thus not 
covered  in  this  report.  To  enable  financing  or  related  activities,  this  would  require 
adapting the CPFI accordingly. 

On transport support at EU level, it is proposed to revise some of the  current legal 
provisions,  to  increase  the  maximum  EU  financing  rate  for  transport  operations 
(under specific conditions), and to simplify the applicable administrative procedures.  

On disaster prevention and preparedness, it is proposed to integrate into the revised 
Mechanism  Decision  a  general  EU  prevention  and  preparedness  policy  framework 
(definition of objectives and scope) and announce Commission guidelines. The latter 
could  also  be  contained  in  a  future  Commission  Recommendation.  Furthermore,  a 
legal  requirement  to  develop  national  disaster  risk  management  plans  should  be 
considered.  Supplementary  EU  financial  assistance  would  support  the  development 
and  implementation  of  national  risk  management  plans  and  minimum  standards,  as 
well as a training network and other actions. The funding would require changes to 
the CPFI, which should also continue all actions currently stipulated under Article 4 
CPFI, although with shifted priorities.  

Elements of the ex-ante evaluation115 for the CPFI, which are not yet addressed in the 
earlier  parts  of  the  impact  assessment,  concern  in  particular  the  most  appropriate 
method  of  implementation  for  the  preferred  options,  the  internal  coherence  of  the 
proposed programme or activity and its relations with other relevant instruments, and 
an indication of the volume of appropriations. 

Given that no substantial modification in the implementation of the CPFI would be 
introduced,  the  management  method  would  continue  to  be  the  existing  one,  i.e., 
direct  centralised  management  in  the  sense  of  art.  53a  of  the  Financial  Regulation. 
The  annual  work  programme  would  be  implemented  through  calls  for  proposals, 
direct grants, procurement and reimbursement of expenses. 

There are close links and coordination between the internal CPFI and the following 
instruments: the Solidarity Fund supports recovery investments in the EU following a 
disaster; the Structural Funds support risk prevention and preparedness investments 
in  MS,  including  infrastructure  measures  to  prevent  disasters;  EU  RTD  framework 
programmes  provide  significant  support  to  help  develop  tools  and  methods  for 
improved  disaster  management;  under  the  new  GMES  regulation  support  will  be 
provided for mapping and early warning services for disaster response; other funding 
instruments  with  which  CPFI  is  coordinated  include  the  environment  instrument 
LIFE+,  and  the  Specific  Programme  Prevention,  Preparedness  and  Consequence 
Management of Terrorism and other security related risks. 

251. 

The  proposed  breakdown  of  CP  budgets  is  in  line  with  the  financial  envelope 
foreseen  for  the  next  MFF  2014-2020  (Communication  2011/500  of  29/06/2011). 
The following comparison table shows the additional funding needed for Options 2 
and 3 as compared to the current situation (baseline). 

115 

Commission Regulation 2342/2002 EC, Euratom, laying down detailed rules for the implementation of 
Council Regulation 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget.  

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[€ million]  

Now 

Response 

Voluntary Pool 
Capacity Gaps 

Preparedness 
Prevention 
Administrative 
Other 
Total inside EU 

4.0 

10.5 
 2.5 
 0.5 
 1.0 
18.5 

Response outside EU 
Transport new 

19.0116 

Total outside EU 

19.0 

Additional funding 
for Option 2 

Additional funding 
for Option 3 

+ 2 
+ 5 
+ 2 
+ 1 
+ 0 
+ 1 
+11 
Total Option 2  
+29.5 
+ 4 (Vol. Pool) 
+ 1.6 
+ 5.6 
Total Option 2  
+ 24.6 

+ 5 
+10 
+ 2 
+ 2 
+ 0 
+ 1 
+20 
Total Option 3 
+38.5 
+ 4 (Vol. Pool) 
+ 1.9 
+ 5.9 
Total Option 3 
+ 24.9 

252. 

Total  funding  for  proposed  options  (grey  in  table  above):  € 58.4  million  =  € 33.5 
million inside EU + € 24.9 million outside EU. 

116 

The  estimate  of  € 19.0  million  for  EU  co-financing   of  transport  operations  is  based  on  the  budget 
figures for the year 2011 (status: October 2011). 

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13. 

LIST OF ACRONYMS 

CBRN 

CECIS 
CP 
CPFI 

DG ECHO 
DG RTD 
EEA 
EMSA 
ERC 

ERC 
EU  
GBP 
GMES 
H1N1 
HNS 
IAB 
MFF 
MIC 
MS 
NHWP 
PS 
SAR team 
SILO 
TAST 
TFEU 
TPG 
UNISDR 
UNOCHA 

Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear 

Common Emergency Communication and Information System  
Civil Protection 
Civil Protection Financial Instrument 
Commission Directorate-General responsible for Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection 
Directorate-General for Research and Innovation 
European Economic Area 
European Maritime Safety Agency 
European Emergency Response Centre 

European Emergency Response Centre 
European Union 
British Pound 
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security 
Hemagglutinin type 1 Neuraminidase type1 
Host Nation Support 
Impact Assessment Board 
Multiannual Financial framework 
Monitoring and Information Centre 
Member States 
National Heat Wave Plan 
Paticipating States 
Search and Rescue team 
Separate Planning and Isolated Actions 
Technical Assistance and Support Teams 
Treaty on the Functioning of the Union 
Training policy Group 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 

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14. 

LIST OF ANNEXES 

Annex A: Impact Assessment summary list of steps and timeline 

Annex B: Meeting minutes from the three Impact Assessment Steering Group meetings 

Annex C: Impact Assessment external study final report by COWI 

Annex D: Stakeholder meetings consultation papers 

Annex E: Stakeholder meetings reports 

Annex F: Consultation of CP Directors-General, consultation papers and meeting report 

Annex G: Summary of results of the external study by COWI 

Annex H: Evaluation of EU CP external study final report (plus web link) 

Annex I: Examples of policies featuring risk management plans 

Annex J: Main components of disaster risk management plans 

Annex K: Criteria for monitoring and evaluation of implementation 

Annex L: Current legislative and policy framework 

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