COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY_OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2011-12-14
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: conservation of resources, environmental impact, exhaustion of resources, fishing rights, over-exploitation of resources, resources of the sea, sea fish

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 14.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1575 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY_OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and of the Council  

on certain measures directed to non-collaborating countries for the purpose of the 
conservation of fish stocks. 

{COM(2011) 888 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1576 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY_OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and of the Council  

on certain measures directed to non-collaborating countries for the purpose of the 
conservation of fish stocks. 

1. PROBLEM DEFINITION: WHAT IS PRECISELY THE PROBLEM, WHO IS MOST AFFECTED 

AND WHY IS PUBLIC INTERVENTION NECESSARY? 

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea1 as well as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement2 
require coastal states and states fishing for such stocks on adjacent high seas to cooperate 
in  managing  responsibly  straddling  and  highly  migratory  fish  stocks  in  order  to  ensure 
their long-term sustainability, either by direct consultation amongst each other or via the 
appropriate Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). 

It may happen that a third country fails to cooperate on the management of a straddling 
and highly migratory fish stock in which the EU shares an interest and, more importantly, 
that the attitude of such country, by action or by omission, poses a risk of overfishing. It 
becomes then imperative to use all possible means to convince the country in question to 
abandon  that  risky  attitude.  If  the  customary  consultations  and  technical  exchanges  do 
not succeed, a clear option would be to implement trade-related restrictions, but the EU 
does not have a fast mechanism allowing their adoption in useful timeframes. 

At present the EU faces the immediate threat of overexploitation of the stock of mackerel 
due to management measures adopted byIceland and Faroe Islands without due regard to 
the  rights  of  other  coastal  States  and  tose  of  the  EU.  The  sooner  the  EU  is  enabled  to 
react  appropriately,  the  more  efficiently these  problems  and  other  potential  ones  would 
be dealt with. 

The problem of overfishing due to non-cooperation by third countries affects nearly all 
actors within the fisheries domain: 

The fishing industry, both in the short and long term: competition for the limited market 
and the decrease of yields due to resource depletion may lead to important economic and 
job loses. 

1 
2 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. 
The  United  Nations  Agreement  for  the  Implementation  of  the  Provisions  of  the  United  Nations 
Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  of  10  December  1982  relating  to  the  Conservation  and 
Management  of  Straddling  Fish  Stocks  and  Highly  Migratory  Fish  Stocks  (in  force  as  from  11 
December 2001) 

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2 

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The processing industry might have an increased availability of supply of raw material at 
low  prices  in  the  short  term,  but  would  suffer  in  the  medium  to  long  term  the 
consequences of the depletion of the stock. 

The  consumers  will  not  likely  benefit  from  the  increased  supply  in  the  short  term;  the 
effects  in  prices  will  probably  be  neutralized  by  increased  earnings  and  jobs  in  the 
processing  and  distribution  industries.  They  will,  in  turn,  feel  the  effects  of  decreased 
supply in the long term by paying higher prices. 

The EU and national administrations would be seen, both in the short and long terms, as 
incapable of dealing with the problem. Lack of confidence in public institutions will be 
reflected  in  opinion  polls  and  this  may  have  important  repercussions  in  other  policy 
fields. 

In  defence  of  the  long-term  interests  of  these  actors,  public  authorities  have  a  primary 
responsibility to act. 

2.  Analysis  of  subsidiarity:  Is  EU  action  justified  on  grounds  of  subsidiarity 
(Necessity and EU value added)? 

The  ultimate  purpose  of  the  intended  instrument  is  to  avoid  overexploitation  of  certain 
straddling  and  highly  migratory  fish  stocks  in  the  context  of  the  EU  common  fisheries 
policy, but the intended instrument (restriction or prohibition of imports) falls under the 
competence  of  the  common  commercial  policy.  Both  policies  fall  under  the  exclusive 
competence of the EU, and therefore the principle of subsidiarity does not apply in this 
case.  

3. Objectives of EU initiative: What are the main policy objectives? 

The  underlying  general  policy  objective  of  this  initiative  is  to  contribute  to  the 
conservation  of  fish  resources,  which  is  the  main  objective  of  the  common  fisheries 
policy. The operational objective is to provide the EU with a trade-based instrument to 
contribute to that general objective. 

4.  Policy  options:  Which  options  have  been  considered  and  which  have  been 
assessed 

The following five options were analysed:  

(1) 

To take no action; 

(2) 

(3) 

to take measures in the form of non-legislative instruments, such as mechanisms 
of the type "blame and shame", sustainability labels or diplomatic démarches in 
different forms; 

to  provide  the  common  fisheries  policy  with  a  regulatory  instrument  allowing  a 
quick  response  to  the  problem  by  imposing  a  ban  on  trade  on  fish  products 
derived  from  the  relevant  fish  stock  and  that  have  an  origin  in  the  country 
concerned; 

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(4) 

(5) 

to  impose  limited  trade  restrictions  including  only  easily  identifiable  fish 
products; 

to issue a regulatory instrument providing for "counter-measures" in response to 
an "internationally wrongful act" committed by another State. 

5. Assessment of impacts: What are the main economic, environmental and social 
impacts of each option particularly in terms of (quantified/monetised) benefits and 
costs (including estimates on administrative burden), other compliance costs and 
implementation cost for public administrations? 

In  order  to  better  address  the  environmental,  economic  and  social  impacts  of  these 
options, the analysis of these options was done for the mackerel situation as a case study. 
This case corresponds to the current dispute on the management of the stock of North-
east  Atlantic  mackerel,  where  Iceland  and  the  Faroe  Islands  have  adopted  measures 
without  due  regard  to  the  rights  of  other  coastal  States  and  that  put  in  jeopardy  the 
sustainability  of  the  fishery.  The  data  and  information  available  on  this  stock  allow 
conducting a comparative analysis of the options above mentioned. 

To the extent possible, the analysis included a simulation of the evolution of the fishery 
in the next twelve years, based on the results of the most recent scientific assessment of 
the  stock.  It  also  included  ad-hoc  estimations  of  administrative  burden  and  other 
considerations about possible advantages and drawbacks. 

The results of the analysis show that  

–  Option 1 (the no-action option) is not acceptable. The EU should act. 

–  While non-legislative action (Option 2) may potentially help in some cases, the option 
to  take  decisive  legal  action  is  highly  preferable  in  most  cases.  Even  if  it  were 
preferable  in  few  cases,  this  would  justify  the  adoption  of  the  necessary  legal 
mechanism so the action could really be implemented in such few cases. 

–  A brief summary of the impacts of Options 3, 4 and 5 is given in the table below: 

Environmental, 
economic and social 
effects 

Option 3 
•  Very rapid recovery 
to desired levels 

•  No risks of 
depletion(*) 
•  MSC certification 

Option 4 
•  As Option 3, but 
effect perhaps 
delayed 

Option 5 
•  As Option 3, perhaps 
in a more effective 
manner 

• 

maintained 
Improved confidence 
in managers 
Improved wages 
after recovery 
•  Better prices for 
consumers 

• 

• 

1 

1 

2 

4 

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RANK: 

Administrative burden 

RANK 

Main drawbacks 

Heavy: very detailed 
legislation (traceability), 
monitoring of many 
products 

Light: simpler 
legislation, less products 
to monitor 

Heavier than for Option 
1: more detailed range 
of measures; 
controversial legislation, 
complex monitoring 

2 

1 

3 

•  Difficulties related 
to determination of 
products containing 
the species 

•  Prove of respect of 
proportionality and 
equity of measures 

•  No major 

difficulties. Easier to 
prove respect of 
proportionality and 
equity 

•  As for Option 3, but 
more complex set of 
measures faces more 
complex difficulties 
of compatibility with 
law.  

2 

1 

3 

RANK 

(*) In the case study of mackerel, of SSB falling below the limit value of 1.7miot 

6.  Comparison  of  options:  What  is  the  preferred  option  on  the  basis  of  which 
criteria/justification? 

The  environmental,  economic  and  social  effects  are  very  closely  interlinked  and  very 
similar  to  the  three  options;  the  only  difference  is  that  it  is  expected  Option  4  may 
produce effects a given time later, since the measures adopted are not as stringent as in 
options 3 and 5. The lesser effectiveness of Option 4 is however compensated by a much 
easier application both in terms of drafting of legislation and of actual enforcement. The 
cumulated  rankings  (5,  4,  7)  does  not  give  dramatic  results  allowing  either  to  select  or 
deselect one or another option. 

It is moreover difficult to generalize the analysis made above for mackerel to other future 
cases.  There  could  be  situations  where  Option  3  is  not  applicable  in  cases  where  the 
imported goods made from the species in question have undergone substantial processing 
or transformation. In other cases, trade measures would be inapplicable (for example, if 
the  species  in  question  is  not  subject  to  trade)  but  there  is  scope  to  adopt  counter-
measures for which an effective EU legal mechanism is lacking. 

With  this  in  mind,  it  has  been  concluded  that  the  best  option  would  perhaps  be  one 
sufficiently flexible to absorb the main advantages of the 3 options above and capable to 
minimize their drawbacks and administrative costs. A possible description of that option 
would be an EU legal instrument with the following characteristics: 

(a) 

Primarily  based  on  Article  207  TFEU;  other  basis  are  also  conceivable  if 
measures envisaged are not trade-related 

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(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

(h) 

Describing  its  field  of  application  as  for  this  exercise:  situations  of  lack  of 
cooperation in fisheries management and adopting measures that go far against 
common international sharing practice and threaten sustainability. 

Establishing  a  list  of  possible  measures  to  apply,  from  trade  restrictions  to 
counter-measures of diverse nature. 

Setting  out  the  main  principles  and  criteria  upon  which  these  measures  should 
apply: effectiveness, proportionality, equity, compatibility with law, etc; 

Giving the Commission implementing powers to apply the appropriate measures 
to the appropriate solution, in accordance with the above-mentioned criteria; 

Setting out the specific mechanisms for control by Member States in accordance 
with the new Comitology Regulation;  

Establishing  clear  rules  for  the  automatic  or  very  rapid  suspension  of  the 
measures  when  the  non-cooperating  State  has  adopted  appropriate  corrective 
measures; 

The  Commission  would  also  be  authorised  to  create,  where  necessary,  new 
monitoring mechanisms whenever the existing ones would be insufficient. 

The field of application should clearly exclude the cases covered by the IUU legislation 
and by other instruments. The list of measures should be sufficiently wide ranging so it 
would  not  exclude  newly  conceived  effective  and  uncontroversial  measures  whenever 
these arise. The principles and criteria under d) should instead be very strict so that the 
margin of manoeuvre for the Commission is clearly established. 

7.  Monitoring  and  evaluation:  What  are  the  arrangements  to  establish  the  actual 
costs and benefits and the achievement of the desired effects 

The objective of the whole exercise (see section 3) is to contribute to the conservation of 
fish resources and to bring them to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield. 
The indicators commonly used to monitor the status of fish resources are the spawning 
stock  biomass  (SSB),  i.e.,  the  amount  of  fish  that  is  ready  to  spawn  at  the  time  of 
spawning and the fishing mortality (F), which indicate the rate at which fish is removed 
from the stock by the fishing activity. Other indicators exist that complement these and 
that illustrate the extent to which fishing activities do not just have an effect on the stocks 
targeted,  but  also  on  other  fish  or  marine  organisms  that  are  incidentally  captured  or 
damaged. 

At  present  there  is  a  highly  sophisticated  system  designed  to  guarantee  a  timely  and 
scientifically-based monitoring. The system includes the collection of data on the fishing 
activity,  sampling  and  collection  of  biological  data,  scientific  surveys  at  sea  using 
research vessels and a framework for the international collaboration of fisheries scientists 
allowing to collate and exchange data and information, conducted fish stock assessments 
and  provide  scientific  advice  for  fisheries  management.  In  the  case  of  the  North-east 
Atlantic,  most  of  these  activities  are  coordinated  by  the  International  Council  for  the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES). Similar bodies exist for other fishing areas of EU fishing 
interest. 

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The current framework for the collection of data for scientific analysis3 and the mandate 
of the Scientific and Technical Committee for Fisheries also provide a routine basis for 
the  production  of  economic  data  useful  to  monitor  the  performance  of  the  intended 
measure  by  indicators  such  as  economic  yields,  turnover  of  EU  fleets  and  their 
dependence  from  one  or  another  fish  stock. Follow-up  of  imports  is  also  routine  work. 
There is no reason therefore, for the time being, to create new systems or reinforce any of 
the existing systems to monitor the state of fish resources. 

3 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 199/2008  of  25  February  2008  concerning  the  establishment  of  a 
Community framework for the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector and 
support for scientific advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy 

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