COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)
Date: 2011-12-12
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: border control, cross-border cooperation, external border of the EU, illegal migration, migratory movement, prevention of delinquency

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 12.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1536 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR) 

{COM(2011) 873 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1537 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1538 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
Accompanying document to the 

PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL ON 

Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation and does not 
prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission. 

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Table of contents 

1. 

2. 

3. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

3.3. 

3.4. 

3.5. 

Introduction...................................................................................................................3 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties...............................................5 

Problem definition ........................................................................................................7 

Border surveillance.......................................................................................................7 

General problems faced in border surveillance ............................................................8 

Specific problems faced in border surveillance............................................................9 

Does the EU have the right to act? .............................................................................11 

Subsidiarity .................................................................................................................11 

3.6.  What is the baseline situation for implementing EUROSUR? ...................................12 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

5.4. 

5.5. 

6. 

6.1. 

6.2. 

6.3. 

6.4. 

6.5. 

7. 

8. 

Objectives ...................................................................................................................18 

General objectives ......................................................................................................18 

Specific and operational objectives ............................................................................18 

Policy options .............................................................................................................19 

Overview of policy options ........................................................................................19 

Policy options for setting up the national coordination centres..................................22 

Policy options for setting up the EUROSUR network ...............................................24 

Policy options for cooperating with neighbouring third countries .............................26 

Policy options for the common application of surveillance tools at EU level............27 

Assessment of the impacts of policy sub-options.......................................................28 

Assessment criteria .....................................................................................................28 

Sub-options 1.1 to 1.3 for national coordination centres............................................29 

Sub-options 2.1 to 2.3 for the EUROSUR network....................................................31 

Sub-options 3.1 to 3.3 for cooperation with third countries .......................................33 

Sub-options 4.1 to 4.3 for the common application of surveillance tools ..................35 

Comparison of options and identification of preferred policy option ........................38 

Monitoring and evaluation..........................................................................................40 

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Lead DG: 
Associated DG: 

Home Affairs 
Maritime Affairs 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

This  impact  assessment  report  is  prepared  by  DG  HOME  to  accompany  the  legislative 
proposal  on  the  establishment  of  a  European  Border  Surveillance  System  (EUROSUR). 
EUROSUR can be described as a set of measures enhancing the cooperation and information 
exchange  of  border  control  authorities  at  national  and  European  level  as  well  as  when 
cooperating  with  neighbouring  third  countries,  with  the  result  that  the  situational  awareness 
and reaction capability of these authorities would be considerably increased when combating 
irregular migration and cross-border crime. Hence EUROSUR should be seen in the context 
of the progressive establishment of a European model of integrated border management.  

The  works  carried  out  between  2008  and  2011  for  the  development,  testing  and  gradual 
establishment  of  EUROSUR  are  based  on  a  roadmap  presented  in  a  Commission 
Communication in 2008.1 This roadmap has been endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council in its conclusions of June 2008 and February 2010 and by the Stockholm Programme 
and the Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme. In its conclusions of June 2011 
the European Council stated that EUROSUR "will be further developed as a matter of priority 
in  order  to  become  operational  by  2013  and  allow  Member  States'  authorities  carrying  out 
border surveillance activities to share operational information and improve cooperation."  

In its 2008 EUROSUR  roadmap  the  Commission  proposed to establish EUROSUR  in three 
phases, consisting of eight steps: 

Phases 

Phase I 

Interlinking and 
streamlining existing 
surveillance systems 
at national level 

Phase II 

Development of 
common tools for 
border surveillance at 
EU level 

Phase III 
Creation of a 
common information 
sharing environment 
for the EU maritime 
domain  

Steps 

Step 1: Setting up of national coordination centres (NCCs) for border 
surveillance in the Member States located at the eastern and southern 
Schengen external borders. 
Step 2: Setting up of the EUROSUR network.  
Step 3: Cooperation with neighbouring third countries to enhance their 
capacity to manage their own borders, fight cross-border crime and fulfil 
their search and rescue responsibilities.  
Step 4: Exploitation of R&D (FP7) to improve and test the performance of 
surveillance tools, e.g. to detect small boats. 
Step 5: Setting up of a service for the common application of surveillance 
tools (satellites, ship reporting systems, etc.). 

Step 6: Setting up of the Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture 
Step 7: Creation of a common information sharing environment for 
internal security purposes covering the southern maritime borders. 
Step 8: Creation of a common information sharing environment for the 
EU maritime domain, covering all maritime activities (border control, law 
enforcement, customs, maritime safety, marine environment, fisheries 
control, defence).  

Steps and phases identified in the 2008 EUROSUR roadmap 

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COM(2008) 68 final of 13.2.2008 (‘EUROSUR roadmap’). This Communication was elaborated on the 
basis of the MEDSEA and BORTEC studies carried out by Frontex. For further details see Annex 1.1. 

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Table illustrating the 7 Steps of the EUROSUR roadmap

 
  
 
The  eight  separate,  but  interlinked  steps  are  being  developed  and  implemented  in  parallel, 
thereby  reducing  the  risk  in  case  one  step  is  delayed  or  even  fails.  The  development  of 
EUROSUR  also  takes  into  account  that  Member  States  are  responsible  for  their  national 
security  and  for  controlling  their  external  borders.  Therefore  the  aim  is  not  to  set  up  a 
centralised border surveillance system at EU level which would replace national systems, but 
to make best use of existing structures and modern technology. 
The  2008  roadmap  was  accompanied  by  an  impact  assessment2  identifying  several 
shortcomings3  and  three  objectives4,  which  remain  valid  for  the  current  impact  assessment, 
and presenting four policy options: 

Policy Option 1 
Policy Option 2 
Policy Option 3 
Policy Option 4 

No changes are made to the current situation. 
Phase 1 (Steps 1 to 3) 
Phases 1 and 2 (Steps 1 to 6) 
Phases 1, 2 and 3 (Steps 1 to 7) 

Policy options of the 2008 EUROSUR impact assessment 

Under the 2008 impact assessment, the preferred policy actions were Steps 1 to 7 as proposed 
under  policy  option  4.  In  its  conclusions  of  June  2008  and  February  2010  the  Justice  and 
Home Affairs Council gave a clear political mandate to develop and implement Steps 1 to 7, 
while  Step  8  is  being  developed  in  the  framework  of  the  EU  Integrated  Maritime  Policy. 
Under  the  leadership  of  the  Commission  the  relevant  concepts  for  Steps  1  to  7  have  been 
defined between 2008 and 2011, thereby determining the technical and operational framework 
of  EUROSUR.5  In  parallel,  Frontex  launched  pilot  projects  to  test  and  validate  selected 
EUROSUR components. Furthermore, several Member States have established their national 
coordination centres with EU funding received under the External Borders Fund.  

While the impact assessment presented in 2008 assessed the different components proposed in 
Steps 1 to 7 of the EUROSUR roadmap, thereby identifying 'what' should be done, the current 
impact assessment assesses 'how' these components should be implemented until 2013 on the 
basis of the works carried out between 2008 and 2011.  

2. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

The Commission has taken into account the opinions and concerns of the stakeholders – the 
border  control  authorities  of  Member  States.  In  the  two  progress  reports  on  EUROSUR 
published  by  the  Commission  the  public  has  been  informed  on  the  development  of 
EUROSUR. In 2008-2011, DG Home Affairs and Frontex gave several presentations on the 
EUROSUR development to the Council,6 the European Parliament7 and EU agencies.8  

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4 

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SEC(2008) 151. 
The  following  shortcomings  had  been  listed:  lack  of  interagency  cooperation  and  of  exchange  of 
relevant  information,  in  particular  when  it  comes  to  maritime  border  surveillance;  current  technical 
limitations in detecting and tracking small vessels; lack of preparedness to quickly respond to changing 
routes and methods used for irregular migration and cross-border crime etc. 
1) Reduce number of irregular migrants entering the Schengen area undetected; 2) Reduce loss of lives 
of migrants at sea; 3) Increase the internal security of the EU by combating cross-border crime. 
See  also  Commission  Staff  Working  Paper  determining  the  technical  and  operational  framework  of 
EUROSUR and actions to be taken for its establishment, SEC(2011) 145 final of 28.1.2011. 
E.g. Council Working Group on Frontiers, Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal 
Security (COSI), EU Military Staff etc. 

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During  this  time  EUROSUR  has  also  been  presented  and  discussed  during  conferences  and 
meetings with other stakeholders, such as non-governmental organisations and academia, the 
research  community9  and  the  private  sector  organisations.10  As  a  result,  hundreds  of  people 
with  personal  and  professional  interest  in  border  surveillance  have  been  informed  in  detail 
about  the  EUROSUR  initiative  and  their  input  and  expertise  have  been  taken  into  account. 
Since  2008  the  Commission  and  Frontex  have  set  up  technical  expert  groups,  carried  out 
technical  studies  and  initiated  pilot  projects  to  develop,  test  and  validate  the  different 
components  of  EUROSUR.11  The  active  participation  of  Member  States  in  these  actions 
clearly  demonstrates  their  full  support  and  dedication  to  EUROSUR  both  at  political  and 
operational level. 

1) Technical expert groups 

Since 2008, six different technical expert groups have been established in order to develop the 
technical  and  operational  framework  of  EUROSUR,12  with  the  EUROSUR  Member  States' 
expert group being the most important one. Having met 13 times since June 2008, this group 
is  chaired  by  DG Home  Affairs  of  the  European  Commission  and  consists  of  border 
surveillance experts from the Member States, Frontex and the Commission.  

2) Technical studies 

Between January 2009 and January 2010, the EUROSUR technical study was carried out by 
an external contractor in order to develop the key concepts of EUROSUR.13 These included 
technical  and  management  concepts  for  national  border  surveillance  systems  and  national 
coordination  centres,  the  system  architecture  for  the  EUROSUR  communication  network  as 
well  as  the  system  architecture  for  the  Common  Pre-frontier  Intelligence  Picture. 
Furthermore,  between June and September 2011, the technical  study assessing the financial 
impact of establishing EUROSUR was carried out, which provided detailed cost estimates for 
the policy options identified in this impact assessment.14 

3) Testing and validation 

Thirdly,  the  different  technical  components  of  EUROSUR  need  to  be  tested  and  validated 
among  Member  States  and  Frontex  before  making  them  operational.  For  example,  the 
EUROSUR  network  is  currently  being  tested  on  a  pilot  basis  between  Frontex  and  selected 
Member  States.15  Furthermore  the  7th  EU  Framework  Programme  for  research  and 

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13 

14  

15  

E.g.  European  Parliament  Seminar  on  Collaboration  in  Space  for  International  Global  Maritime 
Situational Awareness (C-SIGMA), Brussels, 16.11.2010. 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), EU Satellite Centre (EUSC), European Defence Agency 
(EDA), European Space Agency (ESA). 
E.g. 2008 and 2010 EU Security Research Conferences. 
E.g. in the context of the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) and the European 
Organisation for Security (EOS). 
Summaries of the most relevant documents can be found in Annex 1. 
An overview these groups can be found in Annex 2. 
Technical study on developing concepts for border surveillance infrastructure, a secure communication 
network  and  a  pre-frontier  intelligence  picture  within  the  framework  of  a  EUROSUR  (EUROSUR 
technical  study).  Main  contractor:  ESG.  Subcontractors:  EADS,  SELEX,  Thales.  Consultants: 
SECUNET, University of the German Army. Budget: M€ 1, 8, funded under External Borders Fund. 
Technical  study  assessing  the  financial  impact  of  establishing  EUROSUR.  Main  contractor:  GHK. 
Subcontractors: UNISYS and Euroconsult. Budget: € 144 150, funded by DG Home Affairs. 
For this purpose, Frontex uses an external contractor (GMV; budget: M€ 1,5) and is supported by the 
Member States' expert group on the EUROSUR pilot project as a platform for technical discussions. In 
2011, Finland, France, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Spain will be connected to the EUROSUR network. 

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development  (FP7)  is  being  used  since  2008  to  improve  the  performance  and  test  the 
combination of surveillance tools in close cooperation with the private sector.16  

4) Links to other EU policies 

EUROSUR  will  enhance  interagency  cooperation  between  national  law  enforcement 
authorities  (border  guards,  police,  customs,  etc.).  It  is  therefore  intrinsically  linked  to  the 
Internal Security Strategy of the EU. By improving the cross-sectoral information exchange 
between different authorities with interests in the EU maritime domain, it also supports and 
forms part of the Integrated Maritime Policy of the EU, which is coordinated by DG Maritime 
Affairs (MARE). 

Since  2008  DG  HOME  has  worked  closely  with  DG Enterprise  and  Industry  (ENTR),  DG 
Maritime  Affairs  (MARE),  DG  Mobility  and  Transport  (MOVE),  DG Justice  (JUST),  DG 
External Relations (RELEX) and the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in developing EUROSUR. 
This  cooperation  was  formalised  in  an  inter-service  steering  group  with  these  General-
Directorates  on  14 September  2011,  involving  also  the  Legal  Service  (SJ),  the  Secretariat-
General  (SG)  and  DG  Taxation  and  Customs  Union  (TAXUD).  This  interservice  group,  to 
which the European External Action Service (EEAS) has also been invited, met again on on 
20  September  2011  and  6  October  2011,  discussing  legal  and  technical  issues  linked  to  the 
establishment  of  EUROSUR,  such  as  the  protection  of  personal  data  and  the  access  to  ship 
reporting systems.  

The Impact Assessment Board (IAB) reviewed the draft impact assessment and delivered its 
opinion on 21 October 2011. The recommendations for improvement were accommodated in 
the final version of this document. In particular, the following changes were made:  

Firstly, in Chapters 3.2 and 3.3 the problem drivers have been more fully described to clarify 
how a lack of rules hinders cooperation and how irregular migration and cross-border crime 
could evolve in future. In Chapter 6, when assessing the different options a closer link to the 
baseline  scenario  has  been  established.  Secondly,  in  Chapter  6.5  a  deeper  analysis  of  the 
impacts  of  third  country  cooperation  options  to  underpin  the  choice  of  the  option  in  this 
regard.  Thirdly,  monitoring  indicators  haven  been  included  ub  Chapter  8.  Fourthly,  the 
scoring  of  the  options  in  Chapter  6  has  been  revised,  systematically  taking  the  baseline 
scenario as a reference.  

Finally, it was clarified that the selected options were also the ones supported by a majority of 
Member States during the process of developing the different components of EUROSUR in 
the relevant technical expert groups in 2008-2011.  

3. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

As explained further below, the absence of a common regulatory basis for Member States to 
exchange  information  and  cooperate  in  the  area  of  border  surveillance,  especially  at  the 
external  maritime  borders  of  the  EU,  means  that  unauthorised  border  crossings  and  cross-
border  crime  may  go  undetected.  Moreover  the  already  unacceptable  death  toll  of  migrants 
drowning when trying to reach EU shores might even further increase. 

3.1. 

Border surveillance 

The  EU  has  some  7  400  km  of  external  land  borders  and  57 800  km  of  external  maritime 
borders  and  coastlines  According  to  EU  law,  border  control  consists  of  border  checks  and 

16  

See Annex 1.5. 

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border  surveillance.  Border  surveillance  covers  the  control  of  land  and  maritime  borders 
between  the  border  crossing  points  where  border  checks  are  carried  out.  Whereas  border 
checks are specifically regulated in the Schengen Border Code, the code and accompanying 
guidance  contains  only  general  provisions  for  border  surveillance.17  According  to  Article 
12(1)  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code,  the  main  purpose  of  border  surveillance  is  to  prevent 
unauthorised  border  crossings,  to  counter  cross-border  criminality  and  to  take  measures 
against persons who have crossed the border illegally.18 

3.2. 

General problems faced in border surveillance19 

3.2.1. 

Irregular migration 

The  EU  faces  pressure  from  irregular  migration  at  its  external  borders.  Over  100  000 
unauthorised border crossings were detected at the land and maritime external borders of the 
EU  in  2009  and  in  2010.  During  the  first  six  months  of  2011,  74  300  unauthorised  border 
crossings  were  detected,  of  which over  96  %  took  place  at  the  external  borders  of  Spain, 
Greece,  Italy  and  Malta.  There  is  currently  no  estimate  of  the  annual  flow  of  irregular 
migrants managing to cross the external borders undetected. However, certain indicators may 
provide  guidance.  In  2009,  the  number  of  illegally  staying  third  country  nationals 
apprehended inside the Member States was about 570 000 and Member States returned about 
250 000 persons.20 Furthermore, it is assumed that the majority of migrants illegally present in 
the  EU  Member  States,  which  are  estimated  to  vary  between  three  to  six  million,  are 
overstaying after having entered legally. 

No  matter  whether  migrants  cross  the  external  borders  of  the  Member  States  legally  or 
irregularly, the reasons for leaving one's country of origin are often similar, ranging from war 
and persecution to natural disasters, famine, pollution and poor living conditions. In addition, 
there  are  a  number  of  corresponding  pull-factors,  which  make  Member  States  attractive  for 
these migrants, such as better job opportunities and living conditions, political and religious 
freedom,  superior  education  and  medical  care,  security  and  also  family  links.  For  these 
reasons irregular migration cannot be regarded as an isolated problem, but must be embedded 
into a comprehensive European migration policy, as pursued for instance by the Union under 
the 'Global approach to migration'.  

Taking  into  account  differences  in  political  stability,  living  conditions  and  demographic 
developments in the EU compared to several other regions in the world, it is likely that the 
numbers  of  persons  seeking  international  protection  or  simply  a  better  life  will  rise  in  the 
future.  A  better  capability  to  manage  migration  flows  and  prevent  unauthorised  border 
crossings could also raise the willingness of EU citizens to accept increased numbers of legal 
migrants,  taking  also  into  account  that  many  EU  Member  States  are  facing  shrinking  and 
ageing populations. 

On the basis of EU and national legislation, border guard, police and other law enforcement 
authorities are taking measures against irregular migration both at the external borders as well 
as inside the territories of Member States. Irregular migration is largely facilitated by criminal 
networks,  which  are  highly  innovative  and  flexible  in  finding  new  methods  and  quick  in 
redirecting migration routes. As a result, during the last years relatively short stretches of the 

17 
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19  

20  

References to and excerpts of these legal acts can be found in Annex 1.1. 
For further details see Annex 1.1.  
For further details see the impact assessment accompanying the EUROSUR roadmap, SEC(2008) 151 
final of 13.2.2008, 6-16. 
Commission Communication on Migration, COM(2011) 248final of 4.5.2011, 8-9. 

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external borders, such as the Straits of Gibraltar, the Canary Islands, Lampedusa, Malta and 
the Greek land border with Turkey have received thousands of irregular migrants within a few 
weeks or months. Despite the coordination efforts of Frontex Member States' border control 
authorities  often  face  difficulties  to  agree  on  a  common  approach  and  usually  need 
considerable time to find an appropriate operational response. 

3.2.2.  Loss of life at sea 

Many  irregular  migrants  and  persons  in  need  of  international  protection  are  travelling  in 
conditions of extreme hardship and are taking great personal risks in their attempts to cross 
the  Schengen  external  borders  clandestinely.  In  particular  the  practice  of  using  small 
unseaworthy boats, which are overcrowded and without any safety equipment or illumination, 
has  increased  dramatically  the  number  of  migrants  and  refugees  drowning  in  the  Atlantic 
Ocean between Africa and the Canary Islands and in the Mediterranean Sea. It is impossible 
to  determine  the  total  number  of  migrants  having  lost  their  lives  when  trying  to  reach  the 
shores  of  the  EU  Member  States.  However,  it  can  be  assumed  that  over  the  years  their 
numbers has grown into the thousands.21  

3.2.3.  Cross-border crime 

Criminal networks involved in the smuggling of migrants are often using the same routes and 
methods  for  cross-border  crime  activities,  such  as  trafficking  in  human  beings,  illicit  drug 
trafficking,  illicit  arms  trafficking,  trafficking  in  radioactive  and  nuclear  substances,  and 
terrorism. An effective border surveillance system both at national and European level as well 
as an improved interagency cooperation between border control and police authorities should 
contribute significantly to fighting such serious crimes at the external borders. 

3.3. 

Specific problems faced in border surveillance 

There  are  a  number  of  reasons  why  criminal  networks  are  often  faster  and  more  flexible  in 
changing  their  routes  and  methods  for  irregular  migration  and  cross-border  crime  than 
Member States' authorities in becoming aware of and reacting to these changed situations. 

3.3.1. 

Insufficient interagency cooperation and information sharing at national level 

involved 

in  border  surveillance  have  set  up  different 
Member  States’  authorities 
organisational structures at land and maritime borders. Whereas at the external land borders 
professional  border  guards,  occasionally  closely  cooperating  with  police  and  customs,  are 
responsible  for  border  surveillance,  different  solutions  have  been  found  in  each  of  the 
Member  States  for  the  question  of  who  is  responsible  for  the  surveillance  of  maritime 
borders.22  

In some Member States, up to six different authorities are directly involved in the surveillance 
of  maritime  borders,  including  various  police  forces,  coast  guards,  customs,  navies  and  air 
forces. In addition, other national agencies such as fisheries control and maritime authorities 
have strong interests in maritime surveillance. Consequently, structures and systems used for 
maritime surveillance are different in every Member State. While some Member States have 
established  a  single  national  maritime  surveillance  system  serving  all  involved  national 

21 

22  

A list of press reports can be found on http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2006/02/immigrants-dead-at-
frontiers-of-europe_16.html , estimating that around 12 943 migrants died in the Mediterranean Sea and 
around the Canary Islands between 1988 and the end of July 2011, with 1931 alone in 2011.  
An overview can be found in Annex 4.2. 

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authorities,  in  other  Member  States  different  authorities  such  as  border  guards,  maritime 
authorities and navies have established parallel systems and control centres. As a result of the 
EUROSUR  development,  many  Member  States  are  in  the  process  of  establishing  a  joint 
coordination  centre  for  maritime  surveillance,  from  which  the  different  national  authorities 
coordinate  their  activities.  However,  in  several  Member  States,  national  authorities  still 
operate  two  or  more  surveillance  systems  and  corresponding  control  centres  in  parallel, 
without  clearly  determined  rules  and  workflows  for  cooperation  and  information  exchange 
among them. Due to the absence of binding rules at EU level, the pressure to streamline and 
interlink such historically grown administrative structures could be too low for leading to the 
necessary adaptations. 

3.3.2. 

Insufficient  information  exchange  between  Member  States,  leading  to  a  reduced 
reaction capability 

In the field of border surveillance there is not only a lack of coordination inside some Member 
States, but also in between Member States, due to the absence of proper procedures, networks 
or communication channels to exchange information. For example, in several Member States 
national authorities do not automatically share the location of their patrols with each other, in 
particular when it comes to maritime surveillance operations. The same applies to patrols of 
different Member States operating in neighbouring border sections or maritime areas, so that 
it  can  happen  that  in  case  of  an  incident  no  proper  coordination  of  the  patrols  nearby  takes 
place.  Appropriate  communication  channels,  workflows  and  operating  procedures  should 
therefore be established to enhance the cooperation between Member States.  

3.3.3. 

Insufficient cooperation with neighbouring third countries 

The  migration  pressure  presents  considerable challenges  not  only  for  the  Member  States  on 
the  northern,  but  also  for  the  third  countries  located  on  the  southern  shores  of  the 
Mediterranean Sea in terms of detection, apprehension, reception and further processing and 
readmission  of  migrants.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  include  these  areas  into  surveillance 
activities  and  to  support  and  to  cooperate  more  closely  with  the  countries  of  origin  and  the 
countries of embarkation of irregular migrants. 

3.3.4. 

Insufficient situational awareness in the maritime domain, and in particular to detect 
and track small boats used for irregular migration and illicit drug smuggling 

From  a  technical  point  of  view,  maritime  border  surveillance  is  more  demanding  than  land 
border  surveillance.  The  maritime  borders  are  a  vast  space,  which  is  filled  with  a  huge 
number  of  legitimate  activities  such  as  fishing,  commercial  shipping  and  pleasure  boating. 
The fact that traffickers are currently using small wooden and glass-fibre boats for smuggling 
irregular  migrants  and  illicit  drugs  poses  a  major  challenge  to  law  enforcement  authorities 
because it is extremely difficult to detect, identify and track such small, non-metallic boats on 
the high seas. Technical solutions have to be found to improve the situational awareness in the 
maritime domain and detect these small boats, such as the use of earth observation satellites 
and  unmanned  aerial  vehicles  in  combination  with  ship  reporting  systems.  Taking  into 
account  that  the  practice  of  using  small,  unseaworthy  boats  is  the  main  reason  for  the  huge 
loss  of  lives  of  migrants  at  sea,  such  a  capability  would  also  contribute  to  considerably 
reducing the loss of lives at the external borders.  

EN 

10 

   EN 

 
3.4. 

Does the EU have the right to act? 

The  EUROSUR  legislative  proposal  would  be  based  on  Article  77  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). According to Article 77(1)(b) and (c) TFEU the 
EU  shall  develop  a  policy  with  a  view  to  efficient  monitoring  of  the  crossing  of  external 
borders  and  the  gradual  introduction  of  an  integrated  management  system  for  external 
borders.23  According  to  Article  77(2)(d)  TFEU  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures concerning 
any measure necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for 
external  borders.24  Article  12  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  deals  in  general  terms  with 
border surveillance and delegates implementing powers to the Commission. The mandate of 
Frontex  covers  border  management  in  general  and  therefore  provides  that  Frontex  can  take 
measures related to operational coordination, exchange of information, risk analysis as well as 
research and development for border surveillance. 

The  establishment  of  EUROSUR  will  not  result  in  the  development  of  a  new  area  of  EU 
policy  but  it  forms  part  of  a  policy  aimed  at  reinforcing  the  management  of  the  external 
borders  of  the  Member  States.  Hence  EUROSUR  will  constitute  a  new  policy  instrument 
which  will  streamline  cooperation  and  enable  systematic  information  exchange  between 
Member States on border surveillance, something which currently does not exist at EU level. 
Once adopted, the legislative act on EUROSUR would constitute a development of provisions 
of the Schengen acquis, in which the United Kingdom and Ireland are not participating, but 
which  is  applicable  to  four  associated  countries  (Norway,  Iceland,  Switzerland  and 
Liechtenstein25).  Schengen  states  are  committed  to  maintaining  common  standards  for 
external border controls. 

3.5. 

Subsidiarity 

In line with the principle of subsidiarity, EUROSUR follows a decentralised approach, with 
the  national  coordination  centres  for  border  surveillance  forming  the  backbone  of  the 
EUROSUR  cooperation.  This  means  that  in  quantitative  terms  most  information  would  be 
managed  in  the  national  coordination  centres,  without  Frontex  being  able  to  see  this 
information.  Only  selected  information  of  strategic  relevance  would  be  shared  with  and 
analysed by Frontex. Hence EUROSUR does not affect the division of competences between 
the EU and its Member States. The intention is to make best use of existing national border 
control  infrastructures  in  combination  with  operational  international  and  European  systems 
(e.g. AIS, SafeSeaNet) as well as recent technological developments (e.g. use of satellites). 

By  interlinking  existing  national  and  European  systems  and  developing  new  capabilities, 
EUROSUR  enables  Member  States'  border  control  authorities  and  Frontex  to  communicate 
and exchange information in order to have better situational awareness at the external borders, 
thus bringing true added value to border surveillance. Better information sharing will help to 
identify  targets  such  as  boats  used  for  irregular  migration  and  cross-border  crime  more 
accurately  and  therefore  allow  a  more  targeted  timely  and  cost-efficient  use  of  available 
equipment for interception. This is an objective which cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States alone and which can be better achieved at Union level.  

23 
24  

25  

Compare also Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 67 TFEU. 
Compare also Article 79 TFEU on developing a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring the 
efficient management of migration flows and the prevention of illegal immigration and trafficking in 
human beings and Article 87 TFEU on police cooperation. 
Liechtenstein is expected to join the Schengen area until the end of 2011. 

EN 

11 

   EN 

 
                                                 
3.6.  What is the baseline situation for implementing EUROSUR? 

The  EUROSUR  project  has  been  on-going  since  2008,  based  on  its  roadmap  agreed  by  the 
Council  and  taken  forward  at  technical  level  in  relation  to  each  step  of  that  roadmap. 
Significant  progress  has  already  been  made  and  this  development  is  expected  to  continue. 
Against this background the baseline scenario described below takes into account the progress 
already made in developing EUROSUR so far in general as well as the current state-of-play in 
relation to each of the specific problems identified. The baseline scenario with regard to the 
specific problems identified in sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.3 is described in sections 3.6.3 to 3.6.6. 

3.6.1.  Technical and operational framework of EUROSUR 

The  'technical  and  operational  framework  of  EUROSUR'  presented  by  the  Commission  in 
January 201126 interlinks the different steps identified in the 2008 EUROSUR roadmap in a 
coherent  manner  and  identifies  the  short-term  and  long-term  actions  which  still  need  to  be 
taken  for  establishing  EUROSUR.  Therefore  this  framework  represents  the  baseline  for 
implementing EUROSUR.  

The key components of the EUROSUR technical framework are the following: 

–  A national coordination centre (NCC), to be set up and properly managed by each Member 
State  participating  in  EUROSUR,  shall  coordinate  24/7  the  activities  of  all  national 
authorities carrying out external border surveillance tasks and exchange information with 
the national coordination centres in other Member States, as well as with Frontex. Similar 
centres should also be set up in neighbouring third countries, communicating with Member 
States via regional networks. 

–  The  Frontex  Situation  Centre  (FSC)  shall  provide  the  national  coordination  centres  with 

pre-defined services such as the common application of surveillance tools. 

–  The EUROSUR network shall provide communication tools and enable secure exchange of 
security  sensitive  data  and  information  between  the  national  coordination  centres  and 
Frontex, which should technically administer the network. 

The  EUROSUR  operational  framework  should  consist  of  rules  for  collecting  and  sharing 
information via the following common 'situational pictures' and services: 

–  Each  national  coordination  centre  shall  manage  a  National  Situational  Picture  (NSP), 
which consists of information collected from local situational pictures and from different 
national authorities, as well as intelligence gathered, for example, from the Common Pre-
Frontier Intelligence Picture and the cooperation with third countries. 

–  Frontex  shall  manage  the  European  Situational  Picture  (ESP),  which  shall  consist  of 
aggregated  information  from  e.g.  open-source  intelligence,  the  National  Situational 
Pictures,  the  Common  Pre-Frontier  Intelligence  Picture  and  the  service  for  the  common 
application of surveillance tools. 

–  Frontex  shall  also  manage  the  Common  Pre-Frontier  Intelligence  Picture  (CPIP),  which 
should include information and intelligence on the pre-frontier area which is of relevance 
for the prevention of irregular migration and cross-border crime. 

26  

Compare SEC(2011) 145 final of 28.1.2011. 

EN 

12 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
TECHNICAL 
FRAMEWORK

NCC

NCCs

NCC

NCC

NCC

NCC

NCC

NCC

NCC

NCC

NCC

NCC

NCC

EUROSUR

Network

NCC

NCC

NCC

OPERATIONAL 
FRAMEWORK

National 
Situational 
Picture
shared via NCC

European 
Situational 
Picture
shared via Frontex

Common Pre-
frontier Intelli-
gence Picture
shared via Frontex

Common 
application of 
surveillance tools
via Frontex

EN 

13 

EN 

 
  
 
–  Via  the  service  for  the  common  application  of  surveillance  tools  (e.g.  satellites,  ship 
reporting  systems),  Frontex  shall  provide  national  coordination  centres  with  surveillance 
information on their borders and on the pre-frontier area on a frequent, reliable and cost-
efficient basis. 

This common technical and operational framework shall considerably improve the situational 
awareness and the reaction capability of national authorities surveying the Schengen external 
borders.  

By merging the different components into one common framework, it shall lead over time to a 
unified approach of actors at tactical, operational and strategic levels, allowing for informed 
and  timely  decision  making  and  coherent  execution  based  on  the  seamless  and  efficient 
sharing and exploitation of information by properly tailored processes and networks. 

3.6.2. 

Scope of EUROSUR27 

The  EUROSUR  framework  should  allow  to  focus  on  the  relevant  needs  of  border  control 
authorities  and  on  the  information  to  be  exchanged  between  them.  This  ensures  that  the 
measures adopted for the establishment of EUROSUR do not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to achieve the objectives identified in the next section. 

Initially  EUROSUR  should  be  limited  to  the  18  Member  States  and  associated  countries 
located  at  the  eastern  and  southern  Schengen  external  borders,28  because  problems  with 
irregular  migration  and  cross-border  crime  mainly  occur  at  these  borders.  Once  EUROSUR 
has been established in 2013, it should be quickly extended to all 24 Schengen countries with 
land and maritime external borders,29  taking into account that routes might shift as a result of 
improved surveillance at the southern and eastern borders. Air border surveillance and border 
checks shall be out of scope of EUROSUR for the time being.30 

When  carrying  out  border  surveillance  activities  at  the  external  borders,  Member  States' 
authorities  have  to  fulfil  their  obligations  which  arise  from  international  instruments,31 
including the prohibition on sending a person back to a country where he or she risks being 
exposed  to  torture  or  to  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment  (principle  of  non-
refoulement).32  Therefore  EUROSUR  aims  in  particular  at  improving  the  detection, 
identification  and  tracking  of  small  boats,  thereby  supporting  search  and  rescue  missions 
without prejudice to the functions and tasks of the responsible Rescue Coordination Centres.33  

27  
28  

29  
30  

31 

32 

33  

An overview table on the scope of EUROSUR can be found in Annex 3. 
Norway,  Finland,  Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Hungary,  Romania,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus, 
Greece, Slovenia, Malta, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal.  
Thus also including Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium. 
Thus Austria, Czech Republic, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Switzerland would not actively take part 
in EUROSUR. 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982; Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS), 1974; International Convention on Maritime Research and Rescue (SAR), 1979. 
Articles  4  and  19(2)  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU;  Article  3  of  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture; Article 33 of the  UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of  Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto. 
Compare  also  Council  Decision 2010/252/EU  of  26  April  2010  supplementing  the  Schengen  Borders 
Code  as regards  the  surveillance of  the  sea  external borders  in  the  context of operational  cooperation 
coordinated by Frontex, OJ L 111 of 4 May 2010, 20. See Annex 1.1. 

EN 

14 

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3.6.3.  Baseline scenario for national coordination centres and the Frontex situation centre 

Since 2008, Member States have been using the External Borders Fund (EBF) for setting up 
their  national  coordination  centres  (NCCs).  In  order  to  "support  the  development  and 
implementation  of  the  national  components  of  EUROSUR",  the  EBF  foresees  up  to  75% 
EU funding  for  "investments  in  establishing  or  upgrading  a  single  national  coordination 
centre,  which  coordinates  24/7  the  activities  of  all  national  authorities  carrying  out  external 
border control tasks (detection, identification, and intervention) and which is able to exchange 
information with the national coordination centers in other Member States".34 It is up to each 
Member State to determine the authority responsible for the NCC, which sometimes requires 
intensive negotiations between different national authorities and ministries. 

Table: Overview of current and planned responsibilities of NCCs35 

Responsibilities of NCCs 
of 24 Member States located 
at land and maritime external 
borders with regard to 
Maritime border surveillance 
Air border surveillance 
Land border surveillance 
Border checks 

n
o
i
t
a
n
i
d
r
o
o
C

Other national authorities 
Third countries 
Local/regional centres 
Other national 
coordination centres 
Frontex 

Command and control 

e
g
n
a
h
c
x
e
n
o
i
t
a
m
r
o
f
n
I

Up to the level of EU 
Top Secret 
EU Secret 
EU Confidential 
EU Restricted 
Unclassified, but 
protected 
Unclassified 
Handling personal data 

Responsible  Planned

Not 
responsible 

No 
reply 

Not  
applicable 

13 
6 
7 
12 
17 
12 
14 
12 

12 
12 
2 

3 
1 
5 
6 

3 
9 

5 
6 
3 
2 
3 
4 
2 
6 

5 
3 
1 

- 
5 
5 
- 

- 
- 

- 
8 
1 
6 
- 
4 
4 
2 

3 
5 
- 

- 
- 
- 
- 

- 
6 

4 
4 
1 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 

4 
4 
4 

4 
4 
4 
4 

4 
9 

2 
- 
12 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

- 
- 
- 

- 
- 
- 
- 

- 
- 

Following  a  detailed  questionnaire  sent  by  the  Commission  in  2008,  Member  States  and 
Frontex  elaborated  a  first  description  of  the  tasks  of  NCCs  in  2009.  In  parallel,  Frontex 
carried  out  an  assessment  determining  those  parts  of  the  external  borders  that  should  be 
covered by a stationary border surveillance system.36 On the basis of these works, a technical 
study  was  carried  out  by  an  external  contractor  in  2009-2010  in  order  to  develop  the  key 
concepts of EUROSUR, such as technical and management concepts for NCCs and national 
border  surveillance  systems,  leading  to  a  revised  version  of  the  description  of  the  tasks  of 
NCCs in 2010.  

34  
35  
36  

Commission Decision 2007/599/EC of 27 August 2007 (EBF strategic guidelines, priority 2). 
A more detailed overview can be found in Annexes 4.1 to 4.5. 
This  assessment  also  included  a  comparison  with  the  plans  presented  by  the  Member  States  in  the 
context of the External Borders Fund, showing that they generally match with the assessment. 

EN 

15 

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These  'EUROSUR  guidelines'  are  currently  being  used  by  Member  States  and  Frontex  on  a 
voluntary  basis  for  setting  up  the  relevant  components  of  EUROSUR.  Using  the  financial 
support  given  under  the  External  Borders  Fund,  between  2008  and  2010  13  out  of  the  18 
Member States located at the southern and eastern Schengen external borders have established 
their  NCCs,  with  the  majority  of  them  becoming  operational  in  2011.  This  number  will 
increase to 16 by the end of 2011.37  

The table above shows that the basic responsibilities of NCCs differ widely between Member 
States  which  is  a  considerable  obstacle  in  the  daily  cooperation  and  information  exchange. 
With regard to the 18 Member States located at the southern and eastern external borders, the 
table above can be summarised as follows: 

As  far  as  the  responsibilities  and  competencies  of  the  18  NCCs  located  at  the  southern  and 
eastern  Schengen  external  borders  are  concerned,38  10  NCCs  are  already  responsible  and 
5 NCCs  are  planned  to  become  responsible  for  maritime  border  surveillance.39  7  of  these 
18 NCCs  are  by  now  responsible  and  3  NCCs  are  intended  to  become  responsible  for  land 
border surveillance.40 5 NCCs out of the 18 NCCs are responsible for air border surveillance 
and another 6 NCCs planned to become responsible for air border surveillance. However, in 
641  out  of  the  remaining  7 Member  States  this  is  not  envisaged.  Furthermore,  out  of  the  18 
NCCs 10 are responsible and another 2 are planned to become responsible for border checks, 
while for 5 NCCs nothing is planned in this regard.42 Finally, 11 out of these 18 NCCs have 
already  command  and  control  functions,  and  3  are  planning  to  get  them,  while  3  Member 
States43 exclude this possibility.  

M€  40  have  been  spent  between  2007  and  201 0  in  setting  up  and  upgrading  the  13 NCCs 
established until the end of 2010, using national funding, but also funding from the External 
Borders Fund and the Schengen Facilities.44  

The  counterpart  for  the  NCCs  in  Frontex  is  the  Frontex  Situation  Centre  (FSC)  which  has 
been set up in 2008. In the context of EUROSUR, the FSC shall serve as the single point of 
contact  in  Frontex  for  the  information  exchange  and  cooperation  with  the  NCCs.  The  total 
cost of establishing the FSC amounted to M€ 2.2 between 2008 and 2010.  

3.6.4.  Baseline scenario for the EUROSUR network and the situational pictures 

The  goal  is  to  set  up  a  secured  communication  network  which  will  provide  communication 
tools  and  enable  electronic  data  exchange  in  order  to  send,  receive  and  process  information 
24/7 close-to-real time between the national coordination centres as well as with Frontex. In 
2009-2010  the  system  architecture  of  the  EUROSUR  network  as  well  as  the  content  of  the 
National and European Situational Pictures and the Common Pre-Frontier Intelligence Picture 
have been defined in the EUROSUR technical study and in the EUROSUR guidelines.  

37  
38  
39  

40  

41  
42  
43  
44  

Greece plans to make its NCC operational in 2013. Norway could not provide a reply at this stage. 
See overview in Annex 4.1. 
Of the 4 remaining Member States, 2 (Hungary and Slovakia) do not have any maritime borders. One 
country (Norway) could not provide a reply at this stage. 
Of the remaining 8 Member States, 6 do not have any land border, while one (Romania) replied that its 
NCC is not planned to become responsible for land border surveillance and another country (Norway) 
could not provide a reply at this stage. 
Cyprus, France, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. Norway could not provide a reply at this stage. 
Norway could not provide a reply at this stage. 
France, Italy and Poland. Norway could not provide a reply at this stage. 
The  costs  ranged  from  €  22 514  in  Romania  to  M€  18,8 in  Slovakia.  An  overview  of the  2007-2010 
NCC costs can be found in Annex 4.4. 

EN 

16 

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Between November 2010 and May 2012, based on a Memorandum of Understanding Frontex 
carries out a pilot project in order to test the network and the information exchange via 
situational pictures with initially six Member States45 in daily practice. This pilot project is 
being funded by Frontex with M€ 1, 5, using an external contractor. 

3.6.5.  Baseline scenario for the cooperation with third countries 

A  well-structured  and  permanent  cooperation  and  information  exchange  with  neighbouring 
third  countries,  in  particular  in  the  Mediterranean  region,  is  a  key  factor  for  the  success  of 
EUROSUR, but also a goal which will be achieved neither quickly nor easily.  

In  2011  the  EU  has  made  EUROSUR  a  targeted  initiative  in  the  Thematic  Programme  for 
Migration and Asylum,46 reserving considerable funding for 2011-2013 for the third countries 
situated  along  the  southern  and  south-eastern  maritime  borders  of  the  EU  which  accept  to 
cooperate in the framework of EUROSUR.  

A concrete example how such support could lead to an enduring and steady cooperation and 
information  exchange  between  Member  States  and  neighbouring  third  countries  are  the 
following three existing regional networks:47 

o  SEAHORSE  is  a  network  between  border  control  authorities  in  Spain,  Portugal, 
Mauretania,  Morocco,  Senegal,  Gambia,  Guinea  Bissau  and  Cap  Verde  for  exchanging 
information  on  irregular  migration  and  criminal  activities  at  the  Western  and  North-
Western African coasts (Canary Islands). 

o  The Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC) is a regional tool for daily 
inter-agency  (police,  customs,  coast  guards  and  border  guards)  interaction  in  the  Baltic 
Sea to combat cross-border crime. In the BSRBCC Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Norway,  Poland,  Russia  and  Sweden  are  exchanging  relevant 
information via a dedicated network called COASTNET.  

o  Within the framework of the Black Sea Littoral States Border/Coast Guard Cooperation 
Forum  (BSCF),  border  and  coast  guards  from  Bulgaria,  Romania,  Ukraine,  Russia, 
Georgia  and  Turkey  are  exchanging  information  with  regard  to  illegal  activities  via  the 
Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center (BBCIC) at Bourgas/Bulgaria.  

The  BSRBCC/COASTNET  and  BSCF/BBCIC  have  been  gradually  established  since  2005 
and SEAHORSE since 2006. The overall costs for setting up, upgrading and maintaining the 
technical infrastructure of these regional cooperation centres is M€77 in 2007-2010. 

3.6.6.  Baseline scenario for the common application of surveillance tools at EU level 

In 2008-2009, the GMES48 border surveillance working group elaborated the GMES concept 
in  support  to  EUROSUR,49  focusing  in  particular  on  the  use  of  satellites  and  other 
surveillance  tools  for  the  tracking  of  vessels  and  the  punctual  monitoring  of  neighbouring 

45  
46  

47  
48  

49  

Spain, France, Italy, Slovakia, Poland and Finland. 
Commission Decision C(2011)2304 of 7.4.2011 adopting the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-
2013  for  the  Thematic  Programme  'Cooperation  with  Third  Countries  in  the  areas  of  Migration  and 
Asylum". 
For further details see Annex 6.1. 
GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) is the European Initiative for the 
establishment of a European capacity for Earth Observation. More information can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/gmes/index_en.htm and http://www.gmes.info. 
See Annex 1.6. 

EN 

17 

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third  country  ports  and  coasts,  which  are  known  as  departure  points  for  irregular  migration 
and narcotics trafficking.  
Due  to  the  high  costs  and  the  lack  of  ready-made  solutions  only  a  few  Member  States50 
currently use satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles and aerostats on an occasional, usually test 
basis  for  border  surveillance  purposes.  Since  uncertainty  as  to  the  performance  and 
operational reliability of such technologies is high, a number of FP7 funded research projects 
are currently going on in order to improve and verify the technological capabilities for using 
such surveillance tools for border security purposes.51 

4. 

OBJECTIVES 

4.1. 

General objectives 

By establishing an information exchange and cooperation mechanism, which allows national 
authorities  carrying  out  border  surveillance  activities  and  Frontex  to  exchange  information 
and to cooperate at tactical, operational and strategic level, EUROSUR shall 

1)  Contribute to the management of migration flows by reducing the number of irregular 

migrants entering the Schengen area undetected; 

2)  Protect  and  save  lives  at  the  external  borders  by  diminishing  considerably  the 

unacceptable death toll of migrants at sea; 

3)  Increase the internal security of the European Union and of the people residing in the 

EU by preventing serious crime at the external borders of the Schengen area; 

The general objectives 1 and 3 should be seen as a contribution to providing EU citizens with 
an  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice  without  internal  frontiers,  in  which  the  free 
movement  of  persons  is  ensured  in  conjunction  with  measures  for  external  border  controls 
and the prevention and combating of crime.52 

4.2. 

Specific and operational objectives 

In order to achieve the general objectives, EUROSUR has two specific objectives, namely to 
significantly increase the situational awareness and reaction capability of the Member States' 
border control authorities and Frontex, so that in a best case scenario any new route or method 
for irregular migration and cross-border crime is identified and disrupted shortly after it has 
been established. 

1)  Situational awareness measures how the authorities are capable of detecting cross-border 
movements  and  finding  reasoned  grounds  for  control  measures.53  This  can  be 
accomplished by achieving the following operational objectives at national and European 
level: 

a.  Improved  interagency  cooperation  by  streamlining  structures  and  interlinking 

systems in the law enforcement domain; 

50  
51  
52  
53 

E.g. Spain, Italy, Malta. 
See Annex 1.5. 
Article 3(2) TEU and Article 67(2)TFEU. Compare also Article 77(1)(b) and (c) and 77(2)(c) TFEU. 
Full situational awareness is only needed at tactical and operational level (e.g. in the local and regional 
coordination centre) in order to take real-time operational decisions. At strategic level (e.g. in the NCC 
and in Frontex) only a subset of the data is needed to take decisions. 

EN 

18 

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b.  The  use  of  data  fusion  combined  with  modern  technological  capabilities  for 
detecting and tracking cross-border movements, in particular (small) vessels;54 
c.  Cross-sectoral information exchange with other actors in the maritime domain, 

such as transport, customs, fisheries control and defence; 

d.  Improved information exchange with neighbouring third countries. 

2)  The  reaction  capability  measures  the  lapse  of  time  required  to  reach  any  cross-border 
movement to be controlled and also the time and the means to react adequately to unusual 
circumstances.  The  following  operational  objectives  should  therefore  be  attained  at 
national and European level: 

a.  Exchange  of  data,  information  and  intelligence  in  close-to-real  time  and  - 
whenever  needed  -  in  a  secure  manner,  thereby  moving  from  a  patrolling 
driven to a more intelligence driven approach based on risk analysis; 

b.  Effective  management  of  personnel  and  resources,  including  sensors  and 

patrols; 

c.  Effect  measurement,  evaluating  the  effect  of  border  surveillance  activities, 
thereby  providing  a  new  baseline  for  risk  assessment  and  re-arrangement  of 
priorities.  

Table interlinking problems, objectives and actions 

Specific objectives 
1a - Streamlining structures and interlinking systems 
at national level. 

Actions envisaged 
Establishment of a national 
coordination centre (NCC). 

Specific problems 
Insufficient interagency 
cooperation and 
information exchange 
at national level. 

Insufficient information 
exchange between 
Member States. 

Insufficient cooperation 
with neighbouring third 
countries. 

2a - Effective management of personnel & resources. 

2c – Effect measurement. 

2a - Exchange of data, information and intelligence in 
close-to-real time. 

1d - Improved information exchange with 
neighbouring third countries. 

Setting up of the EUROSUR 
network, interlinking NCCs 
and Frontex. 

Interlinking EUROSUR with 
regional networks set up 
between Member States and 
neighbouring third countries. 

Setting up of a service for 
the common application of 
surveillance tools at EU 
level. 

Insufficient situational 
awareness in the 
maritime domain (e.g. 
detection of small 
boats). 

1b - Use of data fusion combined with technological 
capabilities for detecting and tracking cross-border 
movements. 

1c - Cross-sectoral information exchange with other 
actors in the maritime domain 

5. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

5.1. 

Overview of policy options 

The first option to be addressed is not to take any further action at EU level. As described in 
the baseline in section 3.6, not taking any coordinated action at EU level would mean that the 
different steps identified in the 2008 EUROSUR roadmap will continue to be implemented in 
a  non-coherent  manner,  resulting  in  overlaps  and  reduced  efficiency  when  addressing  the 
problems described in section 3.2. Furthermore, the problems described in sections 3.3 would 
be  insufficiently  addressed,  because  there  would  no  clear  rules  on  the  criteria  for 

54  

E.g.  by  combining  data  and  information  derived  from  different  civilian  and  military  ship  reporting 
systems, patrol assets, satellites and other surveillance tools. 

EN 

19 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
implementation  of  the  individual  steps  as  well  as  on  the  obligations  of  Member  States  and 
Frontex, including on how they should contribute to and benefit from EUROSUR. Hence, this 
option is being discarded as ineffective for achieving the objectives outlined in section 4.  

The  question  to  be  answered  in  this  impact  assessment  is  not  which,  but  how  the  different 
components  of  EUROSUR  as  identified  in  Steps  1,  2,  3,  5,  6  and  7  of  the  EUROSUR 
roadmap55  should  be  implemented.  To  this  end,  three  policy  options  have  been  identified, 
following a  

(cid:131) 

fully decentralised (policy option 1),  

(cid:131)  partly centralised (policy option 2) and  

(cid:131) 

fully centralised (policy option 3) approach. 

In line with Step 1 of the EUROSUR roadmap and the specific problems identified in section 
3.3.1,  the  responsibilities  to  be  given  in  the  EUROSUR  legislative  proposal  to  the  national 
coordination centres could include:56 

(cid:131) Coordination of the surveillance of land and maritime borders (Policy Option 1.1); 

(cid:131) Command & control competencies for the surveillance of land and maritime borders 

(Policy Option 1.2); 

(cid:131) Command & control competencies for border control57 (Policy Option 1.3). 

With  regard  to  Step  2  of  the  EUROSUR  roadmap  and  the  specific  problems  identified  in 
section  3.3.1,  the  different  policy  options  for  setting  up  the  EUROSUR  network  are  being 
assessed, taking into account whether the NCCs and Frontex use it for: 

(cid:131)  Decentralised and unclassified information exchange (Policy Option 2.1); 

(cid:131)  Decentralised and classified information exchange (Policy Option 2.2); 

(cid:131)  Centralised and classified information exchange (Policy Option 2.3). 

In  line  with  Steps  6  and  7  of  the  EUROSUR  roadmap,  Policy  Option  2.2  assesses  also  the 
impact  of  costs  for  including  the  information  exchange  on  cross-border  crime  and  of 
providing the Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture (CPIP). 

In line with Step 3 of the EUROSUR roadmap and the specific problems identified in section 
the  EUROSUR  network  and 
information  between 
3.3.3, 
neighbouring third countries could be exchanged via 

is  assessed  whether 

it 

(cid:131)  National coordination centres, serving as a 'hub' for regional networks and bilateral 

information exchange with neighbouring third countries (Policy Option 3.1); 

(cid:131)  National  coordination  centres,  serving  as  a  'hub'  for  regional  networks  with 
neighbouring  third  countries,  with  a  new  regional  network  to  be  set  up  in  the 
Mediterranean region (Policy Option 3.2); 

(cid:131)  Frontex only (Policy Option 3.3). 

55 

56  
57  

Step 4 on research for border surveillance is focusing on the development, testing and validation of the 
other steps before them being implemented. Step 8 is being carried out in the framework of the EU 
Integrated Maritime Policy and does not form part of this impact assessment. 
Policy Options 1.1 and 1.2 shall be understood as minimum requirements. 
Surveillance of land, maritime and air borders and border checks at border crossing points. 

EN 

20 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
2008 IA: WHAT? 
Objective:  
Setting up of  

National 
Coordination 
Centres (NCC) 
EUROSUR network 
. 

Cooperation with 
neighbouring third 
countries 

Research & 
development 
Common 
application of 
surveillance tools 
CPIP58 
CISE59 for internal 
security 

Step 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

Policy option 1 
Decentralised approach 
1.1 NCC coordinates the surveillance of 
land & maritime external borders 

2.1 Network is used for decentralised & 
unclassified information exchange on 
(cid:131) 
Irregular migration at external 
borders; 
Info is shared in decentralised 
manner, using internet without 
encryption; 

(cid:131) 

(cid:131)  Frontex administers the network. 
(cid:131)  Frontex provides services (audio/ 

video conferencing). 

2011 Impact Assessment: HOW? 
Policy option 2 
Partly decentralised approach 

1.2 NCC has command & control (C2) 
competencies for the surveillance of land & 
maritime external borders 
2.2 Network is used for decentralised & 
classified information exchange (up to EU 
Restricted) on 
(cid:131) 

Irregular migration & serious crime at 
external borders; 
Info is shared in decentralised manner, 
using internet with encryption; 
(cid:131)  Frontex administers the network;  
(cid:131)  Frontex provides in a centralised manner 
services (CPIP, satellite imagery). 

(cid:131) 

Policy option 3 
Centralised approach 
1.3 NCC has C2 competencies for border 
control (maritime, land & air border 
surveillance and border checks). 
2.3 Network is used for centralised & 
classified information exchange (up to EU 
Restricted) on 
(cid:131) 

Irregular migration & serious crime 
at external borders; 
Info is shared in centralised manner, 
using a central data base and intranet; 

(cid:131) 

(cid:131)  Frontex administers the network; 
(cid:131)  Frontex provides products & services 

like in 2.2. 

3.1 NCCs act as a 'hub' for exchanging 
information between the EUROSUR 
network, existing regional networks and 
the bilateral cooperation of Member 
States with third countries. 
Using FP7 funding, Step 4 is used for developing and testing the technical capabilities envisaged in the other steps. 

3.2 NCCs act as a 'hub' for exchanging info 
between EUROSUR network and regional 
networks. An additional network is established in 
the Mediterranean region, complementing 
bilateral cooperation. 

3.3 Frontex acts as a hub for exchanging 
info between NCCs and third countries, 
by connecting third countries directly to 
the EUROSUR network. 

4.1 This service is provided by external 
service providers directly to each NCC 
on basis of bilateral contracts. 
The impact of the CPIP is assessed under Step 2. 
The impact of the exchange of information on combating serious crime at the EU external borders between border guards and other law 
enforcement authorities is assessed under Step 2. 

4.2 This service is provided by Frontex in 
cooperation with EMSA and EUSC and funded 
by GMES. 

4.3 This service is provided by Frontex 
alone (without other EU agencies). 

58  
59  

EN 

Common Pre-Frontier Intelligence Picture. 
Common Information Sharing Environment. The CISE for the EU maritime domain (Step 8) is developed in the framework of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy. 

21 

EN 

 
  
 
                                                 
With  regard  to  Step  5  of  the  EUROSUR  roadmap  and  the  specific  problems  identified  in 
section  3.3.2,  it  is  scrutinized  whether  the  service  for  the  common  applications  of 
surveillance tools at EU level should be provided by 

(cid:131)  External service providers to each concerned NCC directly (Policy Option 4.1); 

(cid:131)  Frontex together with other European agencies and GMES (Policy Option 4.2); 

(cid:131)  Frontex alone (Policy Option 4.3). 

The  three  policy  options  are  examined  in  the  context  of  each  component  (national 
coordination centre, EUROSUR network etc.) and then compared with each other. 

5.2. 

Policy options for setting up the national coordination centres 

With  a  view  to  streamlining  the  interagency  cooperation  at  national  level,  the  goal  is  to 
establish one national coordination centre (NCC) for border surveillance first in each of the 
18 Schengen  countries  located  at  the  eastern  and  southern  external  borders  of  the  Schengen 
area and later on in all 24 Schengen countries with external land and maritime borders.  

Table illustrating Policy Options 1.1 to 1.3 

EN 

22 

   EN 

 
 
The existing or planned NCCs could be categorised as follows:60 

Policy options applied to 18 NCCs 

Policy Option 1.1 
NCC coordinates (at least) 
the surveillance of land and 
maritime surveillance 

Policy Option 1.2 
NCC has command & 
control competencies for (at 
least) land and maritime 
surveillance 

Policy Option 1.3 
NCC has command & 
control competencies for 
border control 

Italy, France, Netherlands, 
Belgium and Poland 

Cyprus, Spain, Hungary, 
Malta, Romania, Greece, 
Slovenia and Slovakia 

Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal 
and Finland 

Since responsibilities and competencies of NCCs differ considerably from one Member State 
to another, there is a need to clarify and harmonise the responsibilities and competencies of 
NCCs and Frontex, in this manner facilitating and streamlining their daily cooperation. 

5.2.1.  Policy Option 1.1: NCC coordinates land and maritime border surveillance 

Giving  the  NCC  a  coordination  function  for  all  national  authorities  involved  in  border 
surveillance would in particular increase the situational awareness at maritime borders, taking 
into account that in some Member States up to six different national authorities are involved 
in  maritime  border  surveillance,  sometimes  running  parallel  systems  and  centres.  The 
question  of  who  should  manage  the  NCC  is  to  be  decided  by  each  Member  State.  This 
question might be answered more easily in case the NCC has only a coordination role. 
Making  the  NCC  responsible  for  land  and  maritime  border  surveillance  would  take  into 
account that routes can change quickly between land and maritime borders, as demonstrated 
at the Greek-Turkish border. 

 Policy Option 1.2: NCC has command & control competencies for the surveillance of 

5.2.2. 
land and maritime borders 

Under this policy option, the NCC does not only provide situational awareness of conditions, 
activities  and  developments  along  the  external  land  and  maritime  borders,  but  has  also 
command and control functions to ensure an immediate reaction. Command and control (C2) 
is the common term for the effective management of personnel and resources. Command and 
through  an  arrangement  of  personnel,  equipment, 
control  functions  are  performed 
communications, facilities and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. 
5.2.3.  Policy Option 1.3: NCC has command & control competencies for border control61 

Including  air  border  surveillance  would  also  cover  the  use  of  small  planes  for  cross-border 
crime.  In  particular  Spain  is  recently  facing  a  growing  number  of  small  low-flying  planes 
coming from Northern Africa, either landing on unmarked airfields or dropping drugs while 
flying over its territory. There is the risk that this practice could spread also to other Member 
States. 

Including  border  checks  would  have  the  advantage  of  giving  the  NCC  full  situational 
awareness and reaction capability for all aspects of border control. 

60  
61  

Based on replies received from 20 Member States in August 2011. 
Surveillance of land, maritime and air borders and border checks at border crossing points. 

EN 

23 

   EN 

 
                                                 
5.3. 

Policy options for setting up the EUROSUR network 

Table illustrating Policy Options 2.1 to 2.3 

5.3.1. Policy Option 2.1: Network used for decentralised & unclassified information exchange  

Setting  up  the  EUROSUR  network  in  a  decentralised  manner  would  mean  that  the 
information would be physically managed by each NCC. From a technical point of view, the 
parameters of the pilot project mentioned in the baseline scenario would apply to Option 2.1, 
meaning that the network is  

•  Technically administrated by Frontex; 

•  Used for unclassified and decentralised information exchange on irregular migration,  
•  Using internet without encryption;62 

•  Providing communication services, such as audio/video conferencing.  

However, there would be three major differences: 

o  The information exchange in the EUROSUR network would be based on EU legislation, 
providing a firm and permanent legal basis instead of the Memorandum of Understanding 
signed between Frontex and the Member States participating in the pilot project. 

o  Not only six,  but in 2012 the 18 Schengen countries located at the southern and eastern 
external borders and in 2014 all  24 Schengen countries with land and maritime external 
borders would connect their NCCs to the network to exchange information. 

62  

But password protected and using https. 

EN 

24 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
o  Not only Frontex, but another 4 EU agencies63 would be connected to the network in 2012 

and an additional 2 European agencies64  in 2014. 

5.3.2. Policy Option 2.2: Network used for decentralised & classified information exchange  

Option 2.2 would be an extended version of Option 2.1 and therefore using the same technical 
parameters. In addition, under Option 2.2 the network would be used also for exchange of 

•  classified information via internet with encryption tools (up to the level EU Restricted); 

• 

• 

information concerning cross-border crime; 
the Common Pre-Frontier Intelligence Picture (CPIP).65 

Including  the  possibility  of  exchanging  classified  information  in  a  secure  manner  allows 
exchanging sensitive information related to cross-border crime and intelligence as envisaged 
under the CPIP. 

5.3.3. Policy Option 2.3: Network used for centralised & classified information exchange  

While  again  using  similar  technical  parameters,  Option  2.3  would  be  a  fully  centralised 
version of Option 2.2 for 

•  Sharing unclassified and classified information via Frontex (NCC – Frontex – NCC); 

•  Sharing information up to the level of EU Restricted. 

the 
Making  Frontex  responsible  for  a  centralised 
management of hardware and software, would facilitate the daily management and also future 
technical upgrades of the network. 

information  exchange, 

including 

In addition to the above mentioned sup-options, one could also consider to give the technical 
administration of the EUROSUR network to the Large Scale IT Agency, which is expected to 
become operational in autumn 2012 in order to manage the Schengen Information System II, 
the  Visa  Information  System  and  EURODAC.  Tasking  this  agency  to  administrate  also  the 
EUROSUR  network  could,  however,  considerably  slow  down  the  daily  operation  of 
EUROSUR, because the situational pictures used for exchanging information in EUROSUR 
need  to  be  updated  permanently  and  in  close  to-real-time.  This  would  the  task  of  Frontex, 
which  might  loose  precious  time  and  resources  in  coordinating  with  the  Large  Scale  IT 
Agency,  also  taking  into  account  that  in  EUROSUR  information  would  be  exchanged  in  a 
decentralised manner and not be stored centrally. Hence this option has been discarded. 

63  

64  

65  

EU  Satellite  Centre,  European  Maritime  Safety  Agency,  European  Fisheries  Control  Agency, 
EUROPOL.  
Centre  de  Coordination  pour  la  lutte  antidrogue  en  Méditerranée  (CeCLAD-M)  and  the  Maritime 
Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N). 
The  National  Situational  Pictures  are  supposed  to  be  managed  by  the  NCCs  and  the  European 
Situational Picture by the Frontex Situation Centre (FSC). Therefore they are not assessed separately. 
Their costs have been included in the cost estimates for the NCCs and the FSC. 

EN 

25 

   EN 

 
                                                 
5.4. 

Policy options for cooperating with neighbouring third countries 

Table illustrating Policy Options 3.1 to 3.3 

5.4.1.  Policy Option 3.1 (bilateral approach) 

Under Option 3.1, the Member States' NCCs would act as a 'hub' for exchanging information 
between  the  EUROSUR  network  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Member  States'  information 
exchange with neighbouring third countries on the other hand, carried out on a bilateral basis 
as well as in the framework of the three regional networks mentioned above. 
In  comparison  to  the  baseline  scenario,  Option  3.1  would  bring  the  three  existing  regional 
networks (SEAHORSE, CoastNet, BSCF), which have been set up by Member States on their 
own initiative, into the EU framework, allowing to exchange information between EUROSUR 
and neighbouring third countries via the national coordination centres. 

5.4.2.  Policy Option 3.2 (regional approach, including the setting up of a new network) 

Like under Option 3.1, the national coordination centres would act as a 'hub' for exchanging 
information  between  the  EUROSUR  network  and  regional  networks.  In  addition,  a  new 
regional  network  called  'SEAHORSE  Mediterraneo'  would  be  set  up,  enabling  the  Member 
States  in  the  Mediterranean  region,  which  for  the  time  being  exchange  information  with 
neighbouring third countries only on a bilateral basis, to intensify the regional cooperation.  

5.4.3.  Policy Option 3.3 (centralised approach) 

Under this option, Frontex would centralise the information exchange with neighbouring third 
countries by connecting them directly to the EUROSUR network, thereby replacing bilateral 
cooperation and the above mentioned regional networks. 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
 
5.5. 

Policy options for the common application of surveillance tools at EU level  

Table illustrating Policy Options 4.1 to 4.3 

5.5.1.  Policy Option 4.1 (bilateral approach) 

Policy  Option  4.1  assumes  that  Member  States  would  'work  in  isolation'  when  using  tools 
such as earth observation satellites for border surveillance. Whereas in the baseline scenario 
Member States cooperate with private sector providers and national space agencies, under this 
option they would also take advantage of the capabilities provided by the EU Satellite Centre 
(EUSC) and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA): 

•  EMSA  provides  technical  assistance  and  support  on  maritime  safety,  pollution  by 
ships  and  maritime  security.  For  this  purpose,  EMSA  operates  inter  alia  systems  on 
vessel traffic reports (LRIT, SafeSeaNet) and satellite monitoring (CleanSeaNet). 

•  The  EUSC  is  an  Agency  of  the  European  External  Action  Service.  The  staff  of  the 
Centre consists of image analysts, geospatial specialists and supporting personnel from 
EU Member States. 

Under this option each NCC would have to negotiate separately with EMSA and the EUSC, 
which could be difficult due to the fact that border surveillance is not covered by the mandate 
of  these  two  agencies.  The  NCCs  would  also  have  to  fully  cover  the  costs  for  using  the 
services,  including  the  setting  up  of  dedicated  communication  lines.  The  processing  of  the 
information  and  the  updating  of  the  National  Situational  Picture  would  be  undertaken  at 
national level. 

EN 

27 

   EN 

 
 
5.5.2.  Policy Option 4.2 (cooperative approach) 

Policy Option 4.2 would envisage that Frontex would provide for a common application of 
surveillance tools (e.g. satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, aerostats, ship reporting systems 
etc.) at EU level. This option has been described in detail in the Concept of operations 
(CONOPS) for the common application of surveillance tools, which has been finalised by the 
GMES border surveillance group in July 2011.66 The service described in the CONOPS 
would allow Frontex to provide NCCs via the EUROSUR network with surveillance 
information on a frequent, reliable and cost-efficient basis. Frontex would closely cooperate 
with EMSA and the EUSCmaking best use of already existing operational capacities, thereby 
avoiding duplication and extra costs. The financial costs for this European service would be 
covered initially by Frontex and later on by GMES. 

5.5.3.  Policy Option 4.3 (centralised approach) 

Under this option, the services described in the CONOPS would be provided only by Frontex. 
Frontex  would  contract  directly  private  sector  service  providers,  because  it  would  not  be 
cooperating with the EUSC and EMSA. 

6. 

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF POLICY SUB-OPTIONS 

6.1. 

Assessment criteria 

Each sub-option in the policy options is screened according to the following criteria: 

1. Effectiveness: The extent to which the proposal can be expected to achieve the general, 
specific and operational objectives. 

2. Consistency: The extent to which options are consistent with the overall EUROSUR 
approach, other EU policies and activities, including their acceptance by Member States. 

3. Costs: The extent to which the general policy objectives can be achieved for a given level 
of resources/at the least cost (cost-effectiveness) as well as the extent to which costs could be 
covered by EU financial programmes and by Member States. 

4. Impact on fundamental rights, in particular on the protection of personal data. 

Taking into account that the different components of EUROSUR concern mainly interagency 
cooperation and information, the environmental impact is only marginal. No legal information 
obligations except the ones mentioned in Chapter 8 are envisaged. 

As far as the economic impact is concerned, the decentralised step-by-step approach in 
EUROSUR could possibly have a favourable impact on small and medium sized entreprises, 
because the implementation is done largely by the individual Member States and the Frontex, 
with the result that a multitude of smaller contracts will be concluded in line with the EU 
public procurement rules. Since this approach has been followed for all suboptions, the 
economic impact is similar for all of them.  

For each of the sub-options described in section 5, the anticipated impact has been assessed 
against these criteria on a nine-point scale, using the following symbols: 

- - 

Negative impact/cost 

66  

See Annex 1.6. 

EN 

28 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
- 

0 

+ 

++ 

Slightly negative impact/cost  

Baseline or equivalent to baseline 

Slightly positive impact/savings 

Positive impact/savings 

The  cost  estimates  provided  herein  have  been  developed  on  the  basis  of  data  provided  by 
Member States, EU agencies and the private sector and verified by the external contractor for 
the  technical  study  assessing  the  financial  impact  of  EUROSUR  (GHK).  They  constitute  a 
best estimate of costs of implementing the policy options under consideration on the basis of 
their  description  in  the  2008  EUROSUR  roadmap  and  subsequent  technical  documents. 
Adjustments  to  the  scope,  organisational  and  governance  structures,  technical  requirements, 
nature of the provision of services and phasing of implementation of the EUROSUR roadmap 
would be expected to lead to changes in the costs of providing those services. 

6.2. 

Sub-options 1.1 to 1.3 for national coordination centres 

Effectiveness

Comparative assessment of Policy Options 1.1 to 1.3 
Fundamental 
rights 
0 

Consistency 

Costs 

0 

0 

0 

+ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

-.- 

-.- 

++ 

-  

- -  

+ 

+ 

+ 

The NCCs and Frontex have the 
following functions: 
Baseline scenario: Different 
functions in each Member State 
1.1. Coordination of land and 
maritime border surveillance 

1.2. Command & control for land 
maritime border surveillance 

1.3. Command & control for 
border control67 

6.2.1.  Effectiveness 

In comparison to the baseline scenario, all three sub-options have a positive impact because 
they clearly contribute to achieving the general objectives of reducing irregular migration, the 
loss of migrants at sea and cross-border crime. However, there are differences with regard to 
improving the situational awareness and the reaction capability: 

Taking  into  account  the  multitude  of  national  authorities  involved  in  maritime  border 
surveillance,  limiting  the  role  of  the  NCC  to  coordination  functions  -  as  envisaged  in 
Option 1.1 - would be more easily accepted by competing authorities and would improve their 
willingness  to  participate  in  or  cooperate  with  such  a  centre,  in  particular  when  it  comes  to 
civil-military  cooperation.  Therefore  Option  1.1  would  the  preferred  option  for  promoting 
interagency  cooperation  and  cross-sectoral  information  exchange,  thereby  increasing 
considerably the overall situational awareness.  

On the other hand, Option 1.2 would have clear advantages over Option 1.1 when it comes to 
the  reaction  capability:  Giving  all  NCCs  command  &  control  functions  would  allow  for  a 
more rapid, efficient and cost-effective response to an identified threat than giving the NCC 
only a coordination role.  

67  

Land, maritime and air border surveillance as well as checks at border crossing points. 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
                                                 
For example, putting the NCC on top of a centralized command structure, combined with a 
decentralized  execution,  would  ensure  that  all  available  national  personnel  and  resources 
would be used in the most efficient manner to react in a crisis situation. Finally, a NCC with 
such functions would be in a better position for evaluating the effects of the measures taken. 
However, during the discussions in 2008-2011 several Member States have clearly expressed 
their  concern  that  in  case  the  NCC  would  have  command  &  control  functions,  not  all 
authorities in border surveillance (e.g. navies) would agree to cooperate, which the result that 
the objectives of EUROSUR would be undermined. 

Including air border surveillance and border checks as proposed in Option 1.3 would have in 
principle  the  advantage  of  giving  the  NCC  a  better  situational  awareness  for  all  aspects  of 
border  control.  However,  air  border  surveillance  is  usually  a  military  competence. 
Furthermore, a some Member States rejected this option during the discussions in 2008-2011, 
because in their national administrations the competencies for border surveillance (e.g. navy, 
coast guard) and border checks (e.g. police) are strictly divided, making it difficult to improve 
interagency  cooperation  and  cross-sectoral  information  exchange  when  the  NCC  has 
command & control functions.68 

6.2.2.  Consistency 

Option  1.1  is  fully  consistent  with  the  overall  EUROSUR  approach,  which  aims  at 
establishing an information exchange and cooperation mechanism for all authorities involved 
in  border  surveillance.  Giving  the  NCCs  command  &  control  functions  as  envisaged  in 
Options  1.2  and  1.3  could  not  only  undermine  this  aim,  but  could  also  be  regarded  as 
interfering into the competencies of other policy fields.  

This is also one of the main reasons why during the discussions in the EUROSUR Member 
States' expert group in 2008-2010 several Member States fiercely rejected the option of giving 
NCCs command and control competences.  

However,  Option  1.1  should  be  seen  as  a  minimum  requirement,  which  would  not  prevent 
Member States from giving their command and control competencies as it was already done 
or is planned in a majority of Member States. 

6.2.3.  Costs 

With  regard  to  the  baseline  scenario,  Member  States  estimated  that  the  costs  for  setting  up, 
upgrading  and  maintaining  their  NCCs  amount  to  M€  309  in  2011-2020. 69  However,  these 
figures  do  not  provide  a  firm  basis  for  proper  cost  estimates,  because  Member  States  have 
given or are planning to give different responsibilities and competences to their NCCs, which 
are  in  different  stages  of  implementation.  Taking  into  account  that  they  have  provided 
complete and well-justified cost estimates, for Option 1.1 the NCCs of France and Belgium, 
for Option 1.2 the NCCs of Cyprus and Slovakia and for Option 1.3 the NCC of Finland have 
been selected as a basis for calculating the overall cost estimates. The cost estimates for the 
Frontex situation centre (FSC) have been provided by Frontex.70 

68  

69  

70 

A fourth option – giving the NCC a coordination function for border control, including border checks – 
has  not  been  assessed,  because  in  all  Member  States  border  guards/police,  which  always  have  a 
centralised command structure, are responsible for border checks. 
For  the  NCC  cost  estimates  provided  by  Member  States  in  August  2011  in  the  framework  of  the 
technical  study  assessing  the  financial  impact  of  establishing  EUROSUR,  see  Annex  4.6.  The  2017-
2020 figures have been based upon the 2016 figures as provided by Member States. 
For the calculation of the NCC cost estimates see Annex 4.7. For the FSC cost estimates see Annex 4.8. 

EN 

30 

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Cost comparison between policy options 1.1 to 1.3 (2011-2020) 

Policy Option 1.1 
Decentralised 0ption 

Policy Option 1.2 
Partly centralised 
option 

Policy Option 1.3 
Centralised option 

NCC costs71 

FSC costs 

Total costs 

M€ 99,7 

M€ 95,5 

M€ 195,2 

M€ 271,6 

M€ 129,8 

M€ 401,4 

M€ 610,4 

M€ 136,9 

M€ 747,3 

The  financial  costs  needed  in  2011-2020  for  setting  up,  upgrading  and  maintaining  such 
centres  in  the  24  Member  States  and  associated  countries  located  and  land  and  maritime 
Schengen external borders and for the FSC are estimated to amount to M€ 195,2 for option 
1.1, M€ 401,4 for option 1.2 and M€ 747,3 for option 1.3. 

6.2.4.  Fundamental rights 

The information exchange and cooperation mechanism as envisaged under EUROSUR does 
not involve the handling of personal data. However, several NCCs intend to handle personal 
data, in particular when the NCC is also made reponsible for border checks as proposed under 
Option 1.3. But also NCCs set up in line with Options 1.1 and 1.2 might - in the context of 
border surveillance - handle personal data at national level, for instance when collecting data 
on  people  related  to  a  suspicious  vessel  being  tracked  (ownership,  operators,  passengers, 
crew, agents, etc.).  

However, under all three sub-options it might be difficult to guarantee that the any handling 
of  personal  data  is  fully  excluded,  in  particular  when  information  is  being  sent  from  the 
national to the European level. To ensure that the principles of personal data protection law 
applicable  in  the  European  Union  are  being  observed72,  safeguards  should  be  introduced  to 
guarantee that personal data is processed fairly and lawfully, collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. 
It  also  has  to  ensured  that  the  processing  of  personal  data  is  adequate,  relevant  and  not 
excessive in relation to purposes for which they are collected and processed. For Frontex the 
given legal limitations apply.73  

6.3. 

Sub-options 2.1 to 2.3 for the EUROSUR network 

Effectiveness

Comparative assessment of Policy Options 2.1 to 2.3 
Fundamental 
rights 
0 

Consistency 

Costs 

0 

0 

0 

+ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

- - 

- 

- - 

- -  

0 

+ 

++ 

The EUROSUR network is being 
used by the NCCs and the FSC for: 

Baseline scenario 

2.1. Decentralised and unclassified 
information exchange 

2.2. Decentralised and classified 
information exchange 

2.3. Centralised and classified 
information exchange 

71  
72 

73  

For all 24 Schengen countries with land and maritime external borders. 
Cf. Directive 95/46/EC (OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31); Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, 
p. 1); Council of Europe Convention of 28.1.1981 (ETS 108).  
For Frontex the given legal limitations apply. See Articles 11a ff of Regulation (EU) No …/2011 of … 
amending Council Regulation No 2007/2004 establishing Frontex, OJ … 

EN 

31 

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6.3.1.  Effectiveness 

In comparison to the baseline scenario, under which a network is currently being set up on a 
pilot  basis  between  Frontex  and  six  Member  States,  all  three  options  would  improve  the 
effectiveness of this pilot network by further developing it. When comparing Option 2.1 with 
Option 2.2, the following can be concluded: 

The limitation to unclassified information exchange in Option 2.1 would largely exclude the 
information  exchange  on  cross-border  crime,  which  is  usually  regarded  as  sensitive 
information.  This  means  that  the  general  objective  of  preventing  cross-border  crime  would 
not be met under Option 2.1, which can therefore be discarded. 

The  encryption  of  the  data  flow  under  Option  2.2  would  allow  the  Member  States  to  share 
more  sensitive  information  including,  once  the  system  is  accredited,  EU  Restricted  data, 
thereby  improving  the  situational  awareness  at  the  external  borders.  The  possibility  for  a 
classified  information  exchange  is  also  a  pre-condition  for  exchanging  intelligence  on 
developments and events occurring in the pre-frontier area, as envisaged under the Common 
Pre-Frontier Intelligence Picture (CPIP). Adding the CPIP services and products enables the 
sharing  of  information  and  intelligence  on  threats  emerging  in  the  pre-frontier  area,  thereby 
giving  the  border  control  authorities  additional  time  for  coordinating  necessary  counter-
measures, which would considerably improve their reaction capability. 

However,  Option  2.2  is  more  demanding  and  time  consuming  to  manage  than  Option  2.1, 
requiring  Frontex  to  set  up  and  maintain  a  number  of  services  in  close-to-real  time.  The 
benefits  of  Option  2.3  over  Option  2.2  are  mainly  linked  to  its  effectiveness:  A centralised 
system  allows  a  better  control  of  the  data  flow  between  Member  States.  It  is  also  easier  to 
query  one  centralised  database  than  to  broadcast  a  query  to  all  NCCs,  thereby  enabling  the 
exchange and fusion of data, information and intelligence in close-to-real time. 

6.3.2.  Consistency 

The  disadvantages  of  Option  2.3  in  comparison  to  Option  2.2.  are  the  lack  of  consistency: 
The overall  system  architecture  of  EUROSUR  follows  a  decentralised federation  of  systems 
approach.  The  decentralised  approach  in  Option  2.2  promotes  the  cooperation  between 
Member  States  at  operational  and  regional  level,  while  avoiding  an  information  overload  in 
Frontex,  thereby  possibly  slowing  down  the  reaction  capability.  Even  with  considerably 
increased  human  and  financial  resources,  Frontex  might  not  be  able  to  deliver  such  the 
centralised network solution envisaged under Option 2.3 (and also under Option 3.3), thereby 
putting  at  risk  achieving  the  general  objectives.  Several  Member  States  have  difficulties  to 
accept to store their information centrally on a system that they do not manage.74  

6.3.3.  Costs 

The  financial  costs in  2011-2020  for  setting  up  and  maintaining  the  EUROSUR  network  in 
line with the decentralised Option 2.1 are estimated to amount to M€ 42. These costs would 
increase  to  M€  46  for  the  partly  centralised  Option  2.2   and  to  M€  49  for  the  centralised 
Option 2.3.75  

Cost comparison between policy options 2.1 to 2.3 (2011-2020) 

Policy Option 2.1 

Policy Option 2.2 

Policy Option 2.3 

74  

75  

Instead of a centralised repository the central part could be limited to a central repository of indexes. 
Such a system would require a lower volume of data transfer and lower central database capability and 
it could still be regarded as a decentralised system. 
For detailed cost estimates see Annexes 5.1 to 5.3. 

EN 

32 

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Decentralised option 

Partly centralised 
option 

Centralised option 

Network costs 

M€ 42,4 

€0 

M€ 46,74 

M€29, 29 

M€ 49,32 

M€ 29,29 

CPIP costs 
(Frontex 
RAU76) 

Total costs 

M€ 42,4 

M€ 76,03 

M€ 78,61 

These  estimates  include  the  costs  for  setting  up,  upgrading  and  maintaining  the  EUROSUR 
network  and  extending  it  from  6  to  18  NCCs  in  2012  and  to  another  6  NCCs  in  2014. 
Furthermore, the estimate takes also into account the costs for an extension from 1 EU agency 
(Frontex) to 4 other EU agencies77 in 2012 and additional 2 European agencies78 in 2014.  

The  network  cost  estimates  between  the  three  options  differ  only  slightly,  which  makes 
Options  2.2  and  2.3  more  interesting,  since  they  provide  considerable  added  value  with 
relatively little additional costs. 

The  Common  Pre-Frontier  Intelligence  Picture  (CPIP)  will  consist  of  an  event,  operational 
and analytical layer managed by Frontex:79 The costs for the FSC in providing the event and 
operational  layers  of  the  CPIP  are  already  included  in  the  cost  estimates  for  the  FSC  under 
Policy  Options  1.1  to  1.3.  Therefore  only  the  estimated  costs  of  the  analytical  layer  of  the 
CPIP,  which  will  be  provided  by  Risk  Analysis  Unit  (RAU)  of  Frontex,  are  shown  under 
Options 2.2 and 2.3, amounting to M€ 29. 80 

6.3.4.  Fundamental rights 

The  handling  of  personal  data  under  Option  2.1  is  excluded,  because  the  network  is 
unclassified. The accreditation process of a protected network as envisaged under Options 2.2 
and  2.3  ensures  that  rules  and  procedures  would  be  in  place  not  only  for  the  handling  of 
security sensitive data, but sensitive data in general, such as the handling of personal data.  

In the context of EUROSUR the focus is on exchanging operational information, whereas the 
exchange  of  personal  data  is  not  envisaged.  In  case  the  EUROSUR  network  would 
exceptionally  be  used  for  exchanging  personal  data  on  the  basis  of  existing  legislation,  the 
limitations and safeguards for the handling of personal data mentioned in Section 6.2.4 would 
fully apply. From a data protection standpoint, centralising the data as envisaged under Option 
2.3 has advantages because it means that there is no need to duplicate it on multiple national 
systems. 

6.4. 

Sub-options 3.1 to 3.3 for cooperation with third countries 

Comparative assessment of Policy Options 3.1 to 3.3 

76  
77  

78  

79  
80  

Risk Analysis Unit. 
EU  Satellite  Centre,  European  Maritime  Safety  Agency,  European  Fisheries  Control  Agency, 
EUROPOL.  
Centre  de  Coordination  pour  la  lutte  antidrogue  en  Méditerranée  (CeCLAD-M)  and  the  Maritime 
Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N). 
For CPIP concepts see Annex 1.7. 
For detailed cost estimates on the CPIP see Annex 5.4.  

EN 

33 

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Effectiveness

Consistency 

Costs 

Fundamental 
rights 

0 

+ 

++ 

++ 

0 

++ 

++ 

- -  

0 

0 

- 

- - 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Information between the 
EUROSUR network and third 
countries is exchanged via: 

Baseline scenario: 3 regional 
networks outside EU framework 

3.1. NCCs as 'hub' to the regional 
networks 

3.2. Like 3.1, plus a new regional 
network for the Mediterranean  

3.3. Frontex only, replacing the 
regional networks 

6.4.1.  Effectiveness 

In comparison to the baseline scenario, Option 3.1 would lead to a considerable improvement 
of the situational awareness in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and in the Atlantic Ocean around 
the Canary Islands, because the three existing regional networks SEAHORSE, CoastNet and 
BSCF, which have been established outside the EUROSUR framework, would be interlinked 
with the EUROSUR network in an indirect manner, with the NCCs serving as a 'hub' for the 
information exchange. 

Option 3.1 is also the easiest one to establish in the short-term, since it builds on these three 
existing  networks  and  does  not  reconsider  these  cooperation  mechanisms  established  by 
Member States with third countries since 2005-2006. Especially it would also respect the fact 
that  different  solutions  have  been  found  with  regard  to  the  question  which  centre  in  these 
regional  networks  should  be  responsible  for  ensuring  the  information  exchange  with  one  or 
several  third  countries:  For  SEAHORSE  and  the  BSCF,  regional  coordination  centres  have 
been  established  for  this  purpose,  which  would  be  linked  under  Option  3.1  to  the  NCC  in 
which  they  are  located.  In  the  CoastNet  network,  no  such  centre  exists,  but  information  is 
being exchanged in a decentralised manner between the NCCs. 

However,  Option  3.1  would  entail  a  less  coherent  approach  in  the  cooperation  with 
neighbouring  third  countries  in the Mediterranean region, which would undermine the three 
general objectives of EUROSUR in this region.  

Option  3.2  is  the  preferred  option  with  regard  to  effectiveness,  because  it  delivers  the 
capability required for  EUROSUR to exchange surveillance information and cooperate with 
third countries also in the Mediterranean region while being the most cost-efficient. Under the 
leadership  of  Spain,  Italy,  Malta,  Portugal  and  Cyprus  are  currently  preparing  a  project 
proposal for a 'SEAHORSE Mediterraneo' network, which would enable the northern African 
countries and Member States to exchange information on irregular migration and cross-border 
crime in the Mediterranean region. Option 3.2 is more challenging than Option 3.1, because it 
requires  the  agreement  of  the  northern  African  countries  to  join  the  'SEAHORSE 
Mediterraneo network'.  

Option  3.3  would  offer  more  potential  than  the  other  two  options  in  terms  of  information 
management,  allowing  for  a  centralised  and  possibly  classified  information  exchange. 
However,  Option  3.3  would  be  even  more  difficult  to  achieve  than  Option  3.2,  because 
Frontex would have to re-negotiate also all the agreements concluded between Member States 

EN 

34 

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ten 

and 
Consequently, it would achieve the general objectives of EUROSUR only in the long-term.  

the  networks  CoastNet,  BSCF  and  SEAHORSE.81 

third  countries  under 

6.4.2.  Consistency 

Options 3.1 and 3.2 build largely on existing capabilities, allowing Member States and third 
countries  to  take  into  account  regional  priorities  and  specificities.  Option  3.3  is  not  in  line 
with  the  EUROSUR  approach  of  making  best  use  of  existing  infrastructures  and  systems. 
Furthermore, making Frontex the 'hub' for the information exchange between Member States 
and  third  countries  –  as  envisaged  under  Option  3.3  -  has  been  rejected  by  Member  States 
when discussing this issue in the relevant working groups in 2010-2011. 

6.4.3.  Costs 

Cost comparison between policy options 3.1 to 3.3 (2011-2020) 

Policy Option 3.1 
Decentralised option 

Policy Option 3.2 
Regional option 

Policy Option 3.3 
Centralised option 

Total costs 

M€ 0,0 

M€ 5,37 

M€ 25,29 

There  is  no  cost  related  to  Option  3.1,  because  from  a  financial  point  of  view  it  does  not 
constitute  a  change  from  the  baseline,  since  a  connection  from  all  three  regional  networks 
with their respective NCCs was established before the end of 2011. Concerning Option 3.2, 
the  costs  for  establishing  and  maintaining  the  SEAHORSE  Mediterraneo  in  2011-2020 
between three third countries and Member States in the region are estimated at M€ 5,37. 82 

With  regard  to  Option  3.3,  the  costs  for  replacing  the  three  regional  networks  by  the 
EUROSUR network are around M€ 25,29, taking into  account the cost estimates elaborated 
for Policy Option 2.2 and assuming that about 15 third countries would be connected directly 
to the EUROSUR network. The decommissioning costs for the existing networks have been 
estimated to 10% of the annual average baseline costs of the three networks83. 

6.4.4.  Fundamental rights 

Under  Option  3.1  Member  States'  authorities  are  exchanging  in  the  regional  networks 
SEAHORSE,  CoastNet  and  BSFC  operational  information,  but  no  personal  data  with 
neighbouring third countries.  

The same would apply to Options 3.2 and 3.3. Cooperating with third countries on in order to 
prevent  irregular  migrants  from  entering  the  Schengen  area  undetected  could  have  a 
significant  negative  impact  on  fundamental  rights  in  case  the  third  country  authorities  use 
such  information  to  identify  persons  or  groups  of  persons  which  are  likely  to  be  subject  to 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or any other violations of fundamental rights.  

The legislative proposal on EUROSUR must therefore provide the appropriate safeguards in 
order to prevent such a situation.  

6.5. 

Sub-options 4.1 to 4.3 for the common application of surveillance tools 

Comparative assessment of Policy Options 4.1 to 4.3 

81  

82  
83  

Russia,  Ukraine,  Georgia,  Turkey,  Morocco,  Mauretania,  Senegal,  Cape  Verde,  Gambia  and  Guinea 
Bissau. For details see Annex 6.1. 
The concerned countries are not named, because negotiations are still going on. 
This assumption is in line with the standard assumption for calculation decommissioning costs in the IT 
industry, 

EN 

35 

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Effectiveness

Consistency 

Costs 

Fundamental 
rights 

0 

+ 

++ 

++ 

0 

- - 

++ 

- 

0 

- -- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

+ 

+ 

The service for the common 
application of surveillance tools at 
EU level is provided by: 

Baseline scenario 

4.1. External service providers to 
each concerned NCC directly 

4.2. Frontex together with EMSA 
and EUSC 

4.3. Frontex alone 

6.5.1.  Effectiveness 

As  described  in  the  baseline  scenario,  due  to  the  high  costs  and  the  lack  of  ready-made 
solutions only a few Member States currently use satellites for border surveillance purposes, 
utilizing private sector providers and national space agencies. Due to a diversified approach of 
Member States the overall coverage and therefore detection and response to relevant threats 
would be less effective.  

Option 4.1 would envisage that Member States use existing capabilities established by the EU 
Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The benefits of 
cooperating  with  the  EUSC  and  EMSA  would  be  as  follows:  The  EUSC  could  help  in 
particular with regard to the detection and identification of small boats leaving third-country 
coasts,  which  requires  very  high  resolution  imagery.  The availability  of  such  imagery  is 
restricted,  because  it  is  often  collected  for  national  defence  purposes.  Therefore  it  is  not 
always available and if so, under strict license conditions. The added value of EMSA is that it 
manages  ship  reporting  systems,  such  as  SafeSeaNet,  containing  AIS  data  that  can  be  to  a 
large  extent  commercially  purchased,  but  (unlike  in  SafeSeaNet)  does  not  have  quality 
control. LRIT data is owned by Flag States (governments) and is not commercially available. 
This means that the remote maritime traffic picture cannot be composed in a similar way by 
commercial companies since access to data is limited. 

However, under Option 4.1 there would be still a considerable risk of duplication of efforts, 
both  between  the  two  agencies  which  have  developed  operational  services  for  the  use  of 
satellite imagery as well as between Member States, because they would task EMSA and the 
EUSC in parallel and without coordination among them. 

Option 4.2 would be even more efficient than Option 4.1, because Frontex would coordinate 
the  requests  coming  from  the  national  coordination  centres  as  well  as  the  services  to  be 
provided  from  the  EUSC  and  EMSA,  while  combining  it  with  other  surveillance  activities, 
such as Frontex joint operations and the use of Frontex owned technical equipment.  Such a 
coordinated  approach  could  in  particular  improve  the  capability  to  detect  and  track  small 
vessels used for irregular migration and cross-border crime.  

Member States have shown a clear preference for Option 4.2, which the result, that a Concept 
of Operations for the common application of surveillance tools has been elaborated in 2011,84 
which shall be tested between Frontex, EMSA and the EUSC in 2012. 

84  

See Annex 1.6. 

EN 

36 

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In Option 4.3 Frontex would not take advantage of existing capabilities set up by the EUSC 
and EMSA, but establish the service for the common application of surveillance tools on its 
own.  Since  it  is  likely  to  take  considerable  time  for  Frontex  to  accumulate  the  same 
knowledge  and  expertise  as  the  EUSC  and  EMSA,  it  would  be  difficult  to  implement 
Option 4.3 and to achieve full operational effectiveness in the short to mid-term. 

6.5.2.  Consistency 

The  biggest  advantage  of  Options  4.1  and  4.2  would  be  that  it  takes  into  account  that 
substantial  investments  in  space  infrastructure  and  know-how  already  undertaken  by 
GMES/ESA, EMSA and the EUSC. Option 4.2 would be more consistent with the objective 
of  promoting  interagency  cooperation  than  Options  4.1  and  4.3,  envisaging  a  European 
capability for the common application of surveillance tools which could not only be used for 
border  surveillance,  but  also  for  other  purposes,  such  as  law  enforcement  and  defence  and 
thereby representing an important component in establishing the common information sharing 
environment  for  the  EU  maritime  domain85.  Due  to  its  multi-purpose  and  cross-sectoral 
approach, EU funding provided by the GMES programme for such a service can be justified.  

6.5.3.  Costs 

Cost comparison between policy options 4.1 to 4.3 (2011-2020) 

Policy Option 4.1 
Decentralised option 

Policy Option 4.2 
Partly centralised 
option 

Policy Option 4.3 
Centralised option 

Total  

M€ 80,5 

M€ 62,1 

M€ 62,3 

The  total  costs  in  2012-2020  for  Option  4.1  are  estimated  at  M€  80,  with  almost  similar 
amounts for Option 4.2 (M€ 62,1) and Option 4.3 (M€ 62,3). 

86  

The  costs  of  Option  4.1  are  not  only  higher,  but  this  option  is  not  cost-efficient,  since  the 
processing  of  data  would  be  undertaken  at  national  level,  which  implies  a  multiplication  of 
staff,  activities  and  associated  fixed  costs  (i.e.  buildings,  offices  and  equipment),  with  the 
result  that  the  different  NCCs  would  replicate  what  could  be  done  better  at  EU  level. 
Option 4.2  would  build  not  only  on  the  existing  experience,  know-how  and  capabilities  of 
EMSA, EUSC and GMES, but existing contracts with service providers and data distributors 
could  be  used,  involving  cost  reductions.  In  the  long-term,  Option  4.3  provides  potential  in 
benefiting  from  significant  economies  of  scale  because  of  having  a  single  centralised  actor 
(Frontex),  which  also  explains  why  the  cost  estimates  are  almost  identical  with  Option  4.2, 
which largely builds on existing capabilities. 

6.5.4.  Fundamental rights 

Option 4.1 would also have the disadvantage that legal frameworks may not be established to 
enable commercial operators to monitor activities in third countries and store information in 
line with data protection laws. 

85  

86  

Step 8 of the 2008 EUROSUR roadmap. Compare Commission Communications COM(2009) 538 final 
of 15.10.2009 and COM(2010) 584 final of 20.10.2010. 
For detailed cost estimates see Annexes 7.1 to 7.3.  

EN 

37 

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7. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS AND IDENTIFICATION OF PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

In line with the assessment in section 6, the following options would be the preferred ones: 

With regard to the establishment of NCCs, Option 1.1 is the preferred option, because it does 
not  require  Member  States  to  restructure  their  national  administrations  and  thus  could  be 
easily  implemented.  However,  Option  1.1,  giving  the  NCCs  coordination  functions  for  land 
and  maritime  border  surveillance,  should  be  regarded  only  as  a  minimum  requirement,  not 
preventing  Member  States  from  giving  their  NCCs  additional  competencies  as  discussed 
under Options 1.2 and 1.3. 

Following  the decentralised approach for setting up EUROSUR,  the  preferred policy option 
for  the  EUROSUR  network  is  Option  2.2.  Frontex  is  already  setting  up  the  EUROSUR 
network on a pilot basis with selected Member States, focusing currently on the exchange of 
unclassified information. The security accreditation for exchanging information at the level of 
EU  Restricted  is  a  long  process,  which  might  lead  to  delays.  This  choice  also  takes  into 
account the relatively small difference in network costs and the need for exchanging sensitive 
information when setting up the Common Pre-Frontier Intelligence Picture.  

Taking  into  account  the  urgent  need  for  enhancing  the  situational  awareness  and  reaction 
capability for border control in the Mediterranean region, Option 3.2 provides the best answer 
on  how  to  promote  the  cooperation  with  neighbouring  third  countries.  However,  the 
willingness  of  northern  African  countries  to  cooperate  is  a  pre-condition  for  the 
implementation of Option 3.2. 

For  the  common  application  of  surveillance  tools,  Option  4.2  is  the  option  providing  most 
added value. The testing and validation of the cooperation between Frontex, EMSA and the 
EUSC is planned for 2012 as well as foreseen in a number of FP7 projects starting in 2013. It 
is envisaged for this service to be funded by the GMES programme as of 2014. 

The  options  selected  above  have  also  been  the  ones  preferred  by  Member  States  when 
developing  the  different  steps  and  components  of  EUROSUR  in  2008-2011.  Taking  into 
account  that  EUROSUR  is  supposed  to  be  set  up  in  a  decentralised  manner,  EU legislation 
would  guarantee  that  each  of  the  steps  and  components  would  be  implemented  in  the  same 
way. Furthermore, it would ensure that the different steps would complement each other in a 
coherent manner, thereby increasing their overall efficiency.  

With regard to Options 1.1 and 2.2, the EU legislation should focus in particular on the tasks 
and functions of national coordination centres, Frontex and the EUROSUR network as well as 
on  common  rules  for  the  exchange  of  information  between  the  NCCs  and  Frontex.  When 
being consulted in  2008-2011,  Member States clearly expressed  the  need for EU legislation 
on  EUROSUR,  because  the  Updated  EU  Schengen  Catalogue  on  External  borders  control, 
Return  and  readmission  includes  only  recommendations  and  best  practices  on  border 
surveillance, but no binding rules.87  

With  regard  to  Options  3.2,  the  legal  basis  for  the  establishment  of  the  SEAHORSE 
Mediterraneo network would be an agreement between the countries. Concerning Option 4.2, 
Frontex,  EMSA  and  EUSC  would  regulate  the  cooperation  with  regard  to  the  common 
application of surveillance tools in a service-level agreement. 

87 

References to and excerpts of these legal acts can be found in Annex 1.1. 

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Costs, responsibility and source of funding for the preferred option 

Step 

Component 

PO x.1 
Decentralised 
approach 

M€ 99,6 

M€ 95,6 
M€ 42,4 

€ 0,0 
€ 0,0 

1  NCCs 

1 
FSC 
2, 7  Network 

6 
3 

5 

CPIP (RAU) 
3rd countries 

Common 
application of 
surveillance tools 

PO x.2 
Partly 
centralised 
approach 
M€ 271,6 

M€ 129,8 
M€ 46,7 

M€ 29,3 
M€ 5,4 

PO x.3 
Centralised 
approach 

M€ 610 

M€ 137 
M€ 49,3 

M€ 29,2 
M€ 25,3 

M€ 80,5 

M€ 62,1 

M€ 62,3 

Preferred option 
Funding 
To be 
via 
set up 
by 
Member 
States 
Frontex  Frontex 
Frontex  Frontex 

EBF 

Frontex  Frontex 
Member 
States 
Frontex 
EUSC 
EMSA 

DCI, 
EBF 
Frontex 
and FP7/ 
GMES 

Total 
Preferred Option 

M€ 318,1 

M€ 544,9 
M€ 338,7  

M€ 913 

Combining the preferred options, the costs of EUROSUR would amount to M€ 338,7. 

EUROSUR will not require additional EU funding. Member States would continue using the 
EBF in this regard. Furthermore, considerable FP7 funding is being used for developing and 
testing selected EUROSUR components. 

In line with the principle of subsidiarity, EUROSUR would be a decentralised system, leaving 
Member  States  fully  in  charge  of  controlling  the  external  borders  and  cooperating  with 
neighbouring  third  countires,  while  selected  components,  such  as  the  EUROSUR  network, 
would  be  provided  centrally  by  Frontex,  thereby  generating  added  value  for  all  EUROSUR 
stakeholders.  

Most Member States already have the minimum infrastructure in place and therefore it is not 
envisaged  that  they  would  encounter  difficulties  in  upgrading  and  connecting  their  national 
infrastructures.  The  difficulties  which  some  Member  States  may  meet  are  more  of  a 
organisational  than  technical  nature,  e.g.  when  determining  which  national  authority  should 
be responsible for the national coordination centre.  

The role of Frontex in EUROSUR would grow steadily when administering the EUROSUR 
network  as  well  as  providing  the  common  application  of  surveillance  tools.  Frontex  would 
fulfil  these  tasks  in  line  with  its  mandate  as  amended  in  2011,  which  allows  the  Agency  to 
purchase and own its own technical assets, to process under certain conditions personal data 
obtained during operations and to provide technical assistance to third countries. 

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8. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

Frontex  shall  ensure  that  methods  are  in  place  to  monitor  the  functioning  of  EUROSUR 
against the main policy objectives. Two years after EUROSUR is fully operational and every 
year  thereafter,  Frontex  shall  submit  to  the  Comission  a  report  on  the  technical  and 
operational functioning of EUROSUR, taking into account the following indicators: 
Impact indicators88 

1.  Reduced number of irregular migrants entering the Schengen undetected; 

2.  Reduced death toll of migrants at sea; 

3.  Reduced cross-border crime, in particular of drugs smuggled across the external borders. 

Result and output indicators 

1.  Increased situational awareness at the external borders and in the pre-frontier area; 

2.  Improved interagency cooperation at national level; 

3.  Improved cooperation between Member States as well as with Frontex; 

4.  Increased cooperation with neighbouring third countries. 

5.  Increased technical and operational capability to detect and track small boats; 

6.  Increased exchange of unclassified and classified information in close-to-real time; 

7.  Increased capability to react to alerts, incidents and other events at the external borders. 

Moreover  three  years  after  the  EUROSUR  system  would  have  started  all  its  operations  and 
every  four  years  thereafter,  the  Commission  shall  produce  an  overall  evaluation  of 
EUROSUR,  including  examining  results  against  objectives  and  assessing  the  continuing 
validity of the underlying rationale. The fist evaluation is expected to take place in 2016 under 
the  condition  of  EUROSUR  becoming  operational  as  of  2013.  The  Commission  should 
submit  the  reports  on  the  evaluation  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council, 
accompanied,  where  necessary,  by  appropriate  proposals  to  amend  the  Regulation 
establishing EUROSUR.  

88  

These indicators will also dependent on factors outside of EUROSUR, such as changes in the political 
and economic situation in neighbouring third countries. 

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