COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment
Date: 2011-12-12
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: European cooperation, border control, exchange of information, external border of the EU, illegal migration, prevention of delinquency

1. 

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 12.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1537 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment 

Accompanying the document 

PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 

establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) 

{COM(2011) 873 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1536 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1538 final} 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION 

This impact assessment report has been prepared by DG HOME to accompany the legislative 
proposal on the establishment of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).  

EUROSUR can be described as a set of measures enhancing the cooperation and information 
exchange  of  border  control  authorities  at  national  and  European  level  as  well  as  when 
cooperating  with  neighbouring  third  countries,  with  the  result  that  the  situational  awareness 
and reaction capability of these authorities would be considerably increased when combating 
irregular migration and cross-border crime. Hence EUROSUR should be seen in the context 
of the progressive establishment of a European model of integrated border management.  

The  works  carried  out  between  2008  and  2011  for  the  development,  testing  and  gradual 
establishment  of  EUROSUR  are  based  on  a  roadmap  presented  in  a  Commission 
Communication  in  2008.1  In  its  conclusions  of  June  2011  the  European  Council  stated  that 
EUROSUR "will be further developed as a matter of priority in order to become operational 
by  2013  and  allow  Member  States'  authorities  carrying  out  border  surveillance  activities  to 
share operational information and improve cooperation."  

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1. 

General problems faced in border surveillance 

Irregular migration 

The  EU  faces  considerable  pressure  from  irregular  migration  at  its  external  borders.  During 
the  first  six  months  of  2011,  74  300  unauthorised  border  crossings  were  detected,  of 
which over 96 % took place at the external borders of Spain, Malta, Italy and Greece. Despite 
the  coordination  efforts  of  Frontex  Member  States'  border  control  authorities  often  face 
difficulties  to  agree  on  a  common  approach  and  usually  need  considerable  time  to  find  an 
appropriate operational response. 

Loss of life of migrants at sea 

The use of  small  unseaworthy  boats has increased dramatically  the number  of migrants and 
refugees  drowning  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  between  Africa  and  the  Canary  Islands  and  in  the 
Mediterranean Sea. This tragic death toll must be significantly reduced. 

Cross-border crime 

Criminal networks involved in the smuggling of migrants are often using the same routes and 
methods for cross-border crime activities, such as trafficking in human beings and drugs. An 
improved  interagency  cooperation  between  border  control  and  police  authorities  should 
contribute significantly to fighting such serious crimes at the external borders. 

2.2. 

Specific problems faced in border surveillance 

There  are  a  number  of  reasons  why  criminal  networks  are  often  faster  and  more  flexible  in 
changing  their  routes  and  methods  for  irregular  migration  and  cross-border  crime  than 
Member States' authorities in reacting to changed situations. 

1  

COM(2008) 68 final of 13.2.2008 (‘EUROSUR roadmap’). 

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Insufficient interagency cooperation at national level 

In some Member States, up to six different authorities are directly involved in the surveillance 
of  maritime  borders.  While  some  Member  States  have  established  a  single  national 
surveillance system, in other Member States different authorities have set up parallel systems, 
without clear rules and workflows for cooperation and information exchange among them. 

Insufficient information exchange between Member States 

In the field of border surveillance there is not only a lack of coordination inside some Member 
States, but also in between Member States, due to the absence of proper procedures, networks 
or communication channels to exchange information. 

Insufficient cooperation with neighbouring third countries 

The migration pressure presents considerable challenges also for the third countries located on 
the  southern  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  cooperate  more 
closely with the countries of origin and the countries of embarkation of irregular migrants. 

Insufficient situational awareness in the maritime domain 

The fact that traffickers are currently using small wooden and glass-fibre boats for smuggling 
irregular  migrants  and  illicit  drugs  poses  a  major  challenge  to  law  enforcement  authorities 
because it is extremely difficult to detect, identify and track such small boats on the high seas. 

2.3 

Baseline for the EUROSUR legislative proposal 

The EUROSUR project has been on-going since 2008. Significant progress has already been 
made and this development is expected to continue.  

3. 

ANALYSIS OF SUBSIDIARITY 

3.1. 

The EU's right to act 

The EUROSUR legislative proposal would be based on Article 77 (2) (d) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, constituting a development of provisions of the Schengen 
acquis. 

3.5. 

Subsidiarity 

In line with the principle of subsidiarity, EUROSUR follows a decentralised approach, with 
the  national  coordination  centres  forming  the  backbone  of  the  EUROSUR  cooperation.  The 
intention is to make best use of existing systems as well as recent technological developments. 

4. 

OBJECTIVES 

4.1. 

General objectives 

By establishing an information exchange and cooperation mechanism, EUROSUR shall 

1)  Contribute  to  the  management  of  migration  flows  by  reducing  the  number  of  irregular 

migrants entering the Schengen area undetected; 

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2)  Protect  and  save  lives  at  the  external  borders  by  diminishing  considerably  the 

unacceptable death toll of migrants at sea; 

3)  Increase  the  internal  security  of  the  European  Union  by  preventing  serious  crime  at  the 

external borders of the Schengen area; 

4.2. 

Specific and operational objectives 

In order to achieve the general objectives, EUROSUR shall increase the situational awareness 
and reaction capability of the Member States' border control authorities and Frontex. 

1)  Situational awareness: 

a.  Improved  interagency  cooperation  by  streamlining  structures  and  interlinking 

systems in the law enforcement domain; 

b.  The use of data fusion combined with modern technological capabilities for detecting 

and tracking in particular small vessels; 

c.  Cross-sectoral information exchange with other actors in the maritime domain, such 

as transport, customs, fisheries control and defence; 

d.  Improved information exchange with neighbouring third countries. 

2)  Reaction capability: 

a.  Exchange  of  data,  information  and  intelligence,  thereby  moving  to  a  more 

intelligence driven approach based on risk analysis; 
b.  Effective management of personnel and resources; 
c.  Effect measurement, evaluating the effect of border surveillance activities.  

5. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

The  question  to  be  answered  in  this  impact  assessment  is  how  the  different  components  of 
EUROSUR  should  be  implemented.  To  this  end,  three  policy  options  have  been  identified, 
following a  

(cid:131) 
fully decentralised (policy option 1),  
(cid:131)  partly centralised (policy option 2) and  
(cid:131) 
(cid:131) 

fully centralised (policy option 3) approach. 

In  particular  it  should  be  assessed  which  responsibilities  could  be  given  to  the  national 
coordination centres (NCCs), such as: 

(cid:131) Coordination of the surveillance of land and maritime borders (Policy Option 1.1); 
(cid:131) Command & control competencies for the surveillance of land and maritime borders 

(Policy Option 1.2); 

(cid:131) Command & control competencies for border control2 (Policy Option 1.3). 
(cid:131)  

The different policy options for setting up the EUROSUR network take into account whether 
the NCCs and Frontex use it for: 

(cid:131)  Decentralised and unclassified information exchange (Policy Option 2.1); 
(cid:131)  Decentralised and classified information exchange (Policy Option 2.2); 
(cid:131)  Centralised and classified information exchange (Policy Option 2.3). 
(cid:131) 

2  

Surveillance of land, maritime and air borders and border checks at border crossing points. 

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Policy Option 2.2 assesses also the impact of costs for including the information exchange on 
cross-border crime and of providing the Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture (CPIP). 

Furthermore,  it  is  assessed  whether  information  between  the  EUROSUR  network  and 
neighbouring third countries could be exchanged via 

(cid:131)  National coordination centres, serving as a 'hub' for regional networks and bilateral 

information exchange with neighbouring third countries (Policy Option 3.1); 

(cid:131)  National  coordination  centres,  serving  as  a  'hub'  for  regional  networks  with 
neighbouring  third  countries,  with  a  new  regional  network  to  be  set  up  in  the 
Mediterranean region (Policy Option 3.2); 

(cid:131)  Frontex only (Policy Option 3.3). 
(cid:131) 

Finally  it  is  scrutinized  whether  the  service  for  the  common  applications  of  surveillance 
tools at EU level should be provided by 

(cid:131)  External service providers to each concerned NCC directly (Policy Option 4.1); 
(cid:131)  Frontex together with EUSC,3 EMSA4 and GMES5 (Policy Option 4.2); 
(cid:131)  Frontex alone (Policy Option 4.3). 

6. 

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS 

Each sub-option in the policy options is screened according to the following criteria: 
1.  Effectiveness:  The  extent  to  which  the  proposal  can  be  expected  to  achieve  the  general, 
specific and operational objectives. 

2.  Consistency:  The  extent  to  which  options  are  consistent  with  the  overall  EUROSUR 
approach, other EU policies and activities, including their acceptance by Member States. 

3. Costs: The extent to which the general policy objectives can be achieved for a given level 
of resources/at the least cost (cost-effectiveness). 

4. Impact on fundamental rights, in particular on the protection of personal data. 

6.1. 

Sub-options 1.1 to 1.3 for national coordination centres 

6.1.1.  Effectiveness 
Taking  into  account  the  multitude  of  national  authorities  involved  in  maritime  border 
surveillance,  limiting  the  role  of  the  NCC  to  coordination  functions  -  as  envisaged  in 
Option 1.1  -  would  be  more  easily  accepted  by  competing  authorities.  Giving  all  NCCs 
command & control functions – as foreseen under Option 1.2 - would allow for a more rapid 
response  to  an  identified  threat.  Including  air  border  surveillance  and  border  checks  as 
proposed  in  Option  1.3  would  have  the  advantage  of  giving  the  NCC  a  better  situational 
awareness for all aspects of border control.  

3  
4  
5  

EU Satellite Centre. 
European Maritime Safety Agency. 
EU programme for Global Monitoring for Environment and Security. 

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6.1.2.  Consistency 
Option  1.1  is  fully  consistent  with  the  overall  EUROSUR  approach,  which  aims  at 
establishing  a  cooperation  mechanism  for  all  authorities  involved  in  border  surveillance. 
Giving  the  NCCs  command  &  control  functions  as  envisaged  in  Options  1.2  and  1.3  could 
undermine this aim. 

6.1.3.  Costs 
The financial costs needed in 2011-2020 for setting up, upgrading and maintaining the NCCs 
and  the  Frontex  Situation  Centre  are  estimated  to  amount  to  M€  195,2  for  option  1.1, 
M€ 401,4 for option 1.2 and M€ 747,3 for option 1.3. 

6.1.4.  Fundamental rights 
The information exchange and cooperation mechanism as envisaged under EUROSUR does 
not involve the handling of personal data. Since it might be difficult to guarantee that the any 
handling of personal data is fully excluded, it has to ensured that the processing of personal 
data  is  adequate,  relevant  and  not  excessive  in  relation  to  purposes  for  which  they  are 
collected and processed. 

6.2. 

Sub-options 2.1 to 2.3 for the EUROSUR network 

6.2.1.  Effectiveness 
The  limitation  to  unclassified  information  exchange  in  Option  2.1  would  exclude  the 
information  exchange  on  cross-border  crime,  which  is  usually  regarded  as  sensitive 
information.  The  encryption  of  the  data  flow  under  Option  2.2  would  allow  the  Member 
States  to  share  such  sensitive  information,  which  is  also  a  pre-condition  for  exchanging 
intelligence  in  the  Common  Pre-Frontier  Intelligence  Picture  (CPIP).  A centralised  system  - 
as envisaged under Option 2.3 – would allow a better control of the data flow.  

6.2.2.  Consistency 
The disadvantage of Option 2.3 is the lack of consistency: EUROSUR follows a decentralised 
federation  of  systems  approach.  Furthermore,  several  Member  States  have  difficulties  to 
accept to store their information centrally on a system that they do not manage. 

6.2.3.  Costs 
The  financial  costs  in  2011-2020  for  the  EUROSUR  network  in  line  with  Option  2.1  are 
estimated to amount to M€ 42, increasing to M€ 46 for Option 2.2  and to M€ 49 for Option 
2.3.  The  costs  of  the  analytical  layer  of  the  CPIP,  as  included  under  Options  2.2  and  2.3, 
amount to M€ 29. 

6.2.4.  Fundamental rights 
The  handling  of  personal  data  under  Option  2.1  is  excluded,  because  the  network  is 
unclassified. The accreditation process of a protected network as envisaged under Options 2.2 
and  2.3  ensures  that  procedures  would  be  in  place  not  only  for  the  handling  of  security 
sensitive data, but sensitive data in general, such as the handling of personal data.  

6.3. 

Sub-options 3.1 to 3.3 for cooperation with third countries 

6.3.1.  Effectiveness 
Option 3.1 would lead to an improvement of the situational awareness in the Baltic Sea, the 
Black  Sea  and  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  around  the  Canary  Islands,  because  the  three  existing 

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regional  networks  SEAHORSE,  CoastNet  and  BSCF  would  be  interlinked  with  the 
EUROSUR network, with the NCCs serving as a 'hub' for the information exchange. 

Option 3.2 is the preferred option, because it delivers the capability required for EUROSUR 
to cooperate with third countries in the Mediterranean region. 

Under  Option  3.3  Frontex  would  have  to  re-negotiate  all  the  agreements  already  concluded 
between Member States and third countries under the above mentioned regional networks. 

6.3.2.  Consistency 
Options 3.1 and 3.2 build largely on existing capabilities, allowing Member States and third 
countries  to  take  into  account  regional  priorities  and  specificities.  Option  3.3  is  not  in  line 
with the EUROSUR approach of making best use of existing infrastructures and systems. 

6.3.3.  Costs 
There is no cost related to Option 3.1, because a connection from all three regional networks 
to their respective NCCs was established before the end of 2011. Concerning Option 3.2, the 
costs  for  establishing  and  maintaining  the  SEAHORSE  Mediterraneo  in  2011-2020  are 
estimated  at  M€  5,37.  With  regard  to  Option  3.3 ,  the  costs  for  replacing  the  three  regional 
networks by the EUROSUR network are around M€ 25,29. 

6.3.4.  Fundamental rights 
Cooperating  with  third  countries  in  order  to  prevent  irregular  migration  could  have  a 
significant  negative  impact  on  fundamental  rights  in  case  the  third  country  authorities  use 
such  information  to  identify  persons  or  groups  of  persons  which  are  likely  to  be  subject  to 
torture,  inhuman  and  degrading  treatment.  The  legislative  proposal  on  EUROSUR  must 
therefore provide the appropriate safeguards in order to prevent such a situation.  

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6.4. 

Sub-options 4.1 to 4.3 for the common application of surveillance tools 

6.4.1.  Effectiveness 
Option  4.1  would  envisage  that  Member  States  use  individually  existing  capabilities 
established  by  the  EU  Satellite  Centre  (EUSC)  and  the  European  Maritime  Safety  Agency 
(EMSA).  Option  4.2  would  be  more  efficient  than  Option  4.1,  because  Frontex  would 
coordinate the requests coming from the national coordination centres. In Option 4.3 Frontex 
would  establish  such  a  service  on  its  own,  which  would  be  difficult  to  achieve  in  the  mid-
term. 

6.4.2.  Consistency 
Option 4.2 would be more consistent with the objective of promoting interagency cooperation 
than Options 4.1 and 4.3. Due to its multi-purpose and cross-sectoral approach, EU funding 
provided by the GMES programme for such a service can be justified.  

6.4.3.  Costs 
The  total  costs  in  2012-2020  for  Option  4.1  are  estimated  at  M€  80,  with  almost  similar 
amounts for Option 4.2 (M€ 62,1) and Option 4.3 (M€ 62,3).   

6.4.4.  Fundamental rights 
Option  4.1  would  have  the  disadvantage  that  legal  frameworks  may  not  be  established  to 
enable commercial operators to monitor activities in third countries and store information in 
line with data protection laws. 

7. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS AND IDENTIFICATION OF PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

In line with the assessment in section 6, the following options would be the preferred ones: 

With regard to the establishment of NCCs, Option 1.1 is the preferred option, because it does 
not  require  Member  States  to  restructure  their  national  administrations  and  thus  could  be 
easily implemented. 

Following  the  decentralised approach  for setting up EUROSUR, the  preferred  policy option 
for the EUROSUR network is Option 2.2.  

Taking into account the urgent need for enhancing border control in the Mediterranean region, 
Option  3.2  provides  the  best  answer  on  how  to  promote  the  cooperation  with  neighbouring 
third countries. However, the willingness of northern African countries to cooperate is a pre-
condition for the implementation of Option 3.2. 

For  the  common  application  of  surveillance  tools,  Option  4.2  is  the  option  providing  most 
added value. 

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Costs, responsibility and source of funding for the preferred option 

Step 

Component 

PO x.1 
Decentralised 
approach 

M€ 99,6 

M€ 95,6 
M€ 42,4 

€ 0,0 
€ 0,0 

1  NCCs 

FSC 
1 
2, 7  Network 

6 
3 

5 

CPIP (RAU) 
3rd countries 

Common 
application of 
surveillance tools 

PO x.2 
Partly 
centralised 
approach 
M€ 271,6 

M€ 129,8 
M€ 46,7 

M€ 29,3 
M€ 5,4 

PO x.3 
Centralised 
approach 

M€ 610 

M€ 137 
M€ 49,3 

M€ 29,2 
M€ 25,3 

M€ 80,5 

M€ 62,1 

M€ 62,3 

Preferred option 
Funding 
To be 
via 
set up 
by 
Member 
States 
Frontex  Frontex 
Frontex  Frontex 

EBF 

Frontex  Frontex 
Member 
States 
Frontex 
EUSC 
EMSA 

DCI, 
EBF 
Frontex 
and FP7/ 
GMES 

Total 
Preferred Option 

M€ 318,1 

M€ 544,9 
M€ 338,7  

M€ 913 

Combining the preferred options, the costs of EUROSUR would amount to M€ 338,7. 

8. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

Frontex  shall  ensure  that  methods  are  in  place  to  monitor  the  functioning  of  EUROSUR 
against the main policy objectives. Two years after EUROSUR is fully operational and every 
year  thereafter,  Frontex  shall  submit  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the 
Comission a report on the functioning of EUROSUR.  

Moreover  three  years  after  the  EUROSUR  system  would  have  started  all  its  operations  and 
every  four  years  thereafter,  the  Commission  shall  produce  an  overall  evaluation  of 
EUROSUR,  accompanied,  where  necessary,  by  appropriate  proposals  to  amend  the 
Regulation establishing EUROSUR.  

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