COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2011-12-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU financing, development aid, economic development, economic recession, establishment of peace, international security, stability programme

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1482 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

establishing an Instrument for Stability 

{COM(2011) 845 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1481 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
1. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION  

Crises  and  conflicts  affect  countries  world-wide  and  pose  a  risk  to  global  security  and 
stability. Conflicts are often linked to state fragility and exacerbated by weak governance and 
poverty.  Responding  to  these  structural  challenges  requires  a  significant  collective  effort, 
based  on  strong  partnerships  with  other  states,  civil  society  actors,  multilateral  and  regional 
partners to create the conditions for supporting countries to avoid the relapse into conflict.  

To  support  countries  stricken  by  political  conflicts  or  natural  disasters  the  EU  essentially 
needs more flexibility, beyond humanitarian and civil protection assistance aiming at saving 
lives and relief human suffering, to swiftly fill the gaps in crisis response, complement crisis 
management  operations  (including  those  under  CFSP)  and  facilitate  a  better  link  between 
early  recovery,  reconstruction  and  longer-term  development,  as  necessary  for  the  lasting 
stabilization of the countries concerned.  

Furthermore,  natural  or  man-made  disasters,  drug  trafficking,  organized  crime,  terrorism, 
cyber  security  threats,  hamper  development,  weaken  the  rule  of  law  and  contribute  to 
worldwide  instability.  Human,  environmental,  climate  change  and  security  risks  associated 
with  chemical,  biological,  radioactive  and  nuclear  materials  (CBRN)  also  transcend  national 
and regional frontiers. 

To address the multiple drivers of instability that can lead to conflicts and growing security 
challenges and for the EU to fully play its role on the world stage promoting EU’s values and 
interests, the Instrument for Stability needs to further enhance it effectiveness in terms of  

(a) 

(b) 

Speed of assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis  

Development  of  EU’s  own  capacities  and  EU’s  partners  capabilities  for  conflict 
prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building and  

(c) 

c) Addressing a wider range of global trans-national security threats.  

2. 

ANALYSIS OF SUBSIDIARITY  

As a global player, the EU has credibility and a perception of neutrality as an honest broker 
that  provides  a  comparative  advantage  to  intervene  to  prevent  conflict.  Crisis  response 
actions when addressed at EU level maximise the coherence of response and aid efficiency. In 
this  regard,  it  should  be  noted  that  a  very  limited  number  of  EU  Member  States  operate  a 
crisis response or peace-building facility comparable in scope to the Instrument for Stability. 

In the face of increasingly complex challenges, none of the EU's internal priorities – security, 
growth  and  job  creation,  climate  change,  access  to  energy,  health  and  pandemics  and 
migration - will be achieved in isolation from the wider world.  

3. 

OBJECTIVES OF EU INITIATIVE  

The  new  Treaty  on  the  European  Union  (Article  21)  has  defined  common  overarching 
principles and objectives for the external action of the Union, inter alia to “preserve peace, 

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prevent  conflicts  and  strengthen  international  security  and  to  assist  populations,  countries 
and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; 

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The specific objectives of the new Instrument for Stability are:  

1.  In situations of crisis or emerging crisis either man-made or as a result of a natural 
disaster,  to  contribute  to  stability  by  providing  an  effective  response  to  help  preserve, 
establish  or  re-establish  the  conditions  essential  to  the  proper  implementation  of  the 
Union’s development and cooperation policies. 

2.  to  ensure  the  preparedness  of  the  EU  and  its  partners  to  prevent  conflicts  and 
address pre- and post-crisis situations in close coordination with international, regional 
and sub-regional organisations, state and non state actors. 

3.  to  address  global  and  trans-national  security  threats  that  pose  a  risk  to  peace  and 

stability.  

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS  

To increase the efficiency, effectiveness and coherence of EU action on Peace and Security 
thereby increasing EU presence, four options were considered. 

–  Option 0: Not having a new Instrument after 2013  

–  Option  1:  Status  quo:  Maintain  the  Instrument’s  current  scope  and  a  similar 

financial envelope compared to the 2007-2013 financial perspectives  

–  Option  2:  A  revised  Instrument,  broadly  maintaining  its  current  scope  but 
increasing where possible, flexibility provisions, with a moderate increase of its 
financial  envelope  enabling  the  EU  to  appropriately  assume  its  growing 
responsibilities in the area of Peace and Security. 

–  Option  3:  A  new  or  new  Instruments 

the  following 
considerations (a) to tackle separately Crisis Response and Preparedness issues 
from security-related issues, notably terrorism, trans-regional threats and CBRN 
risks  (b)  to  encompass  EU  external  action  tools  currently  carried  out  under 
other Instruments (e.g. EU Electoral Observation Missions or the African Peace 
Facility). 

incorporating 

5. 

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS  

There is a general consensus on the need for the EU to maintain the main characteristics that 
have  led  to  its  success.  The  policy  options  considered  are  intended  to  consolidate  and 
wherever possible, improve the current IfS features. Because of the nature of the Instrument, 
the choice of any of the four options listed above (except for option 0) is not likely to lead to 
significant  differences  in  terms  of  “external”  impacts  (economic,  social  or  environmental). 
Nonetheless, the final choice made would have important consequences in terms of increasing 
the efficiency, effectiveness and coherence with all other external instruments.  

A  more  efficient  instrument  should  lead  to  increased  EU  activity  on  crisis  prevention, 
preserving peace and strengthening international security, including enhancing EU’s capacity 
for crisis preparedness.  

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6. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 

The table below summarizes the pros and cons of different options. 

The options are assessed against the following three criteria:  

Coherence  means  here  the  possibilities  to  create  synergies  in  terms  of  programming  and 
delivery  towards  achieving  the  agreed  objectives  and  to  avoid  negative  consequences  and 
spillovers  which  would  adversely  affect  the  implementation  of  the  policies.  This  is 
particularly significant when two different instruments have the same geographical coverage. 

Effectiveness  means  doing  the  right  things,  setting  the  right  goals  and  objectives  and  then 
ensuring that they are accomplished.  

Efficiency  means  doing  things  right,  and  obtaining  the  most  from  deployed  resources:  this 
includes  organizational  aspects  as  well  as  the  expected  gains  from  the  simplification  of  the 
Instrument.  

Impacts 

Effectiveness 

 Coherence 

 Efficiency  

0. - No Instrument 

1. - No change from today's situation 

2. - A revised Instrument 

3. - A new Instrument or Instruments 

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A) splitting current instrument 

B) adding new scope 

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Option 0: Because of the obligations incumbent on the European Union under Article 21 of 
the  Treaty  and  the  political  guidance  provided  by  Council  on  inter  alia  Security  and 
Development  (2007),  European  Security  Strategy  (2008)  and  on  conflict  prevention  (2011), 
recourse  to  this  option  is  not  politically  possible  without  the  EU  loosing  international 
credibility and capacity to defend its interests.  

Option 1: IfS could still remain relevant by delivering responses as it has been doing since 
2007. However, an opportunity to improve and enhance the Instrument’s value on the basis of 
experience would be missed especially in terms of effectiveness and efficiency 

Option  2:  to  maintain  the  main  features  and  characteristics  of  IfS,  while  streamlining  its 
provisions  to  increase  its  flexibility  and  effectiveness  thereby  enabling  the  EU  to  swiftly 
respond  to  future  international  peace  and  security  challenges.  A  more  efficient  instrument 
should lead to increased EU activity on crisis prevention, preserving peace and strengthening 
international security, including enhancing EU’s capacity for crisis preparedness. 

The  IfS  would  continue  to  finance  actions  complementary  to  or  in  support  of  measures 
financed  under  other  external  instruments  and  if  need  be,  used  as  a  substitute  whenever  the 
latter  cannot  be  deployed  rapidly.  The  example  of  unforeseen  elections  whose  observation 
could not be planned in advance comes to mind or whose preparation requires immediate EU 

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support to ensure better conditions for free and fair results, acceptable to the majority of the 
population  so  as  to  avoid  disputed  results  leading  to  potential  conflict  (Tunisia,  Egypt  in 
2011)  

Option 3: A new Instrument or Instruments, providing for  

(a) 

the  set  up  two  new  Instruments  providing  for  split  between  crisis  response  and 
preparedness, on the one hand, and global and trans-national security threats on the 
other, is not advisable.  

It is important to highlight the links that exist between crisis response and pre- and 
post-crisis capacity building, on one hand, and addressing global and trans-national 
threats  on  the  other.  Together,  they  form  the  backbone  of  EU  external  action  on 
Peace  and  Security  issues  (along  with  other  instruments  such  as  EIDHR).  The 
possible  costs  in  terms  of  loss  of  coherence  by  separating  these  components  from 
each other cannot be underestimated. 

Besides  running  against  the  overall  aim  of  rationalising  the  number  of  existing 
instruments,  it  could  result  in  a  less  coherent  and  complementary  interaction  in 
addressing drivers of conflict;  

(b) 

broadening  the  scope  of  the  new  Instrument  to  achieve  greater  coherence  in  the 
deployment  of  the  different  EU  interventions  can  also  be  disregarded  given  the 
difficulty of reconciling different legal basis and decision-making processes under a 
single legislative Instrument. Such option would not be efficient. 

On  the  contrary,  there  would  be  a  risk  that  some  of  the  flexibility  achieved  under 
current  arrangements  could  be  lost  if  other  instruments  and  working  methods  were 
brought  under  the  same  regulatory  umbrella.  The  decision-making  processes  for 
Electoral  Observation  Missions  for  instance,  are  hardly  compatible  with  the  speed 
required when dealing with unforeseen elections following a political crisis. Some of 
the actions financed under the African Peace Facility (e.g payment of allowances to 
African  soldiers  in  AU  Peace  Keeping  Operations)  which  are  possible  under  the 
EDF,  would  be  impossible  to  finance  under  the  EU  budget.  These  are  just  two 
examples  showing  that  such  a  merger  would  be  very  complicated  to  implement  in 
practice.  

In summary, option 2 appears to be the optimal choice.  

On  the  basis  of  the  above  analysis,  Option  2  appears  to  be  the  optimal  choice.  A  revised 
Instrument, broadly maintaining its current scope but increasing its flexibility to enable the 
EU  to  more  effectively  and  rapidly  respond  to  future  international  peace  and  security 
challenges.  

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION  

The European Commission's Monitoring and Evaluation systems are increasingly focused on 
results. They involve internal staff as well as external expertise. These assessments contribute 
to  accountability  and  to  the  improvement  of  ongoing  interventions;  they  also  draw  lessons 

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from  past  experience  to  inform  future  policies  and  actions  taking  into  account  INCAF1 
criteria. 

1 

OECD DAC's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)  

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