COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2011-12-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: environmental risk prevention, health risk, international cooperation, nuclear accident, nuclear power station, radiation protection, radioactive waste

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1473 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 

{COM(2011) 841 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1472 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The  Chernobyl  accident  in  1986  and  the  Fukushima-Daiichi  accident  in  2011  highlighted  the 
global importance of nuclear safety. In order to fulfil the objective  of  the Euratom Treaty to 
create the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of the public, 
the  European Atomic Energy Community (the ‘Community’) should  be  able  to  support  nuclear 
safety in third countries. 

There  is  also  a  particular  need  for  the  Community  to  continue  its  efforts  in  support  of  the 
application of effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries, building on its own 
safeguard activities within the European Union. 

The  above  objectives  were  supported  in  the  past  by  the  TACIS  and  PHARE  nuclear  safety 
programmes  and,  since  2007,  by  the  INSC  in  'third  countries'  and  the  Instrument  for  Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA) for the countries engaged in the process of accession to the EU.  

1. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

The  promotion  and  enforcement  of  the  highest  standards  of  nuclear  safety  and  radiation 
protection  within  the  boundaries  of  the  EU  may  not  be  sufficient  to  suitably  protect  the 
general  public  and  the  environment.  Recent  history  has  clearly  confirmed  that  the 
consequences of a nuclear accident on public health, social life, the environment and economy 
may extend their impact well beyond national borders and, potentially, worldwide. Therefore 
action  with  third  countries,  particularly  those  in  the  EU  Neighbourhood,  needs  to  be 
envisaged with the overall objective of promoting a high level of nuclear safety and radiation 
protection  worldwide.  In  parallel,  action  is  also  required  to  help  ensure  effective  nuclear 
safeguards in third countries. 

Review of lessons learnt and evolution of the international situation 

The  root  causes  of  the  major  nuclear  accidents  have  been  mainly  lack  of  nuclear  safety 
culture,  design  safety  (safety  aspects  of  the  plant  design)  and  operational  safety.  The  EU 
nuclear safety cooperation programmes provided for assistance/cooperation with the operators 
of  nuclear  installations,  to  improve  the  situation  on  the  ground,  and  with  the  nuclear 
regulators  to  ensure  that  they  had  the  required  technical  capability  and  independence  to 
enforce  adherence  to  appropriate  nuclear  safety  standards.  Cooperation  with  nuclear 
regulators should remain at the centre of the nuclear safety cooperation. In specific situations, 
the  possibility  for  cooperation  with  nuclear  operators  should  also  be  maintained  for  the 
performance  and  results  of  the  comprehensive  and  transparent  risk  and  safety  assessments 
('stress tests'), developed in the EU after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident..  

Cooperation on spent fuel and radioactive waste management and disposal as well as on the 
restoration of former nuclear sites to an environmentally safe situation, for which international 
cooperation is required, have been an important part of the programme and should be among 
the instrument’s priorities in the future. 

The promotion of international cooperation, notably through the IAEA will remain essential 
to ensure coordination of activities by the different actors and the best use of resources. 

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2. 

ANALYSIS OF SUBSIDIARITY 

With 27 Member States acting within common policies and strategies, the EU alone has the 
critical  weight  to  respond  to  global  challenges,  while  the  action  of  Member  States  can  be 
limited  and  fragmented,  with  projects  which  are  often  too  small  to  make  a  sustainable 
difference  in  the  field.  This  critical  mass  also  puts  the  EU  in  a  better  position  to  conduct 
policy dialogue with partner governments. This is reflected, for example in the strong position 
of  the  EU  in  discussions  and  negotiations  with  the  G8  and  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction  and  Development  (EBRD),  which  manages  large  nuclear  safety  funds  on 
behalf of international donors. Furthermore, the EU is a natural coordinator and can influence 
almost all fields of international relations, which individual Member States, in general, cannot 
do alone.  

3. 

OBJECTIVES OF EU INITIATIVE 

The current INSC provides for the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety and radiation 
protection, as well as the implementation of effective nuclear safeguards in third countries.  

It is proposed that the general objective and scope of the new instrument be identical to the 
current  INSC:  The  Community  shall  finance  measures  to  support  the  promotion  of  a  high 
level  of  nuclear  safety,  radiation  protection  and  the  application  of  efficient  and  effective 
safeguards of nuclear material in third countries. This will be pursued through the following 
specific objectives: 

•  Support the promotion and implementation of the highest standards of nuclear safety and 
radiation protection in nuclear installations and radiological practices in third countries. 

•  Support  the  development  and  implementation  of  responsible  strategies  concerning  the 
disposal  of  spent  fuel,  waste  management,  decommissioning  of  installations  and 
restoration of former nuclear sites.  

•  Support  the  promotion  and  implementation  of  effective  frameworks  and  methodologies 

for the improvement of nuclear safeguards worldwide. 

However, the priorities and the criteria for the EU actions will be redefined in more specific 
terms in the context of the new instrument. 

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

The  impact  assessment  reviews  four  options:  i)  no  further  EU  action  (no  Nuclear  Safety 
Instrument);  ii)  ’no  change’  (cooperation  with  third  countries  would  continue  in  the 
framework of the existing INSC Regulation); iii) amend the INSC Regulation and iv) a new 
Instrument, which could include the current INSC scope plus part of the scope of the existing 
Instrument for Stability (IFS). 

The amended regulation was the option assessed in greater detail. It could provide for taking 
into  account  the  evolution  of  the  international  situation  on  nuclear  safety  and  incorporating 
the  lessons  learnt,  and  would  also  allow  clarification  of  the  criteria  for  cooperation  and  the 
priorities.  The  geographic  scope  could  be  revised  to  cover  all  ‘third  countries’  (non  EU 

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Member States) which satisfy the criteria for cooperation, including countries covered by the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) as well as industrialized / high income countries.  

The  legal  basis  of  the  current  INSC  Regulation  is  the  Euratom  Treaty.  Considering  the 
legislative  framework  for  nuclear  safety  at  EU  level,  this  should  remain  the  case  with  the 
future Regulation, unless an enlarged scope would require a multiple legal basis. 

5. 

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS 

Nuclear accidents may have dramatic health, social, environmental and economic impacts as 
demonstrated  by  the  Chernobyl  accident  (1986)  and  the  Fukushima  accident  (2011).  Both 
accidents produced large contaminated areas, fatalities and displacement / resettlement of the 
affected  population  and  resulted  in  the  need  to  decommission  /  dismantle  very  expensive 
nuclear power  plants  and to  replace  the lost power generating capacity. Such accidents also 
affect the choices concerning the energy mix in  some  countries  (moratorium  or  phasing  out 
nuclear  energy)  with  possible  consequential  impact  on  the  environment  as  the  replacement 
power plants may require, for example, the use of fossil fuels or hydropower.  

The  EU  proposed  actions  are  intended  to  help  prevent  the  occurrence  of  nuclear  accidents, 
minimize  their  consequences  (through  emergency  preparedness  measures)  and  mitigate  the 
consequences  of  accidents  should  they  occur.  Each  of  the  options  considered  pursues  these 
objectives. However, the 'no further EU action' (no Nuclear Safety Instrument) would likely 
discontinue most of the on-going external actions undertaken by the EU on nuclear safety. 

6. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 

The option to amend the Regulation would allow the present uncertainties and inconsistencies 
to be resolved and provide the opportunity to clearly establish the focus of EU cooperation on 
nuclear  safety  and  safeguards.  The  clearer  definition  of  geographic  and  thematic  objectives 
and priorities in the regulation itself would improve the efficiency of the implementation of 
the instrument. A more effective and timely management of the project cycle could therefore 
be expected. 

In comparison with options 'no change' and 'a new Instrument', it would allow for continuity 
and the use of the experience of a well tried system, while resolving a number of issues which 
have been identified. This, as well as the utilization of a single legal basis (as compared with 
the  'new  Instrument'  option),  would  simplify  the  approach  and  discussions.  This  appears  to 
more  than  compensate  for  a  possible  greater  coherence  to  be  gained  by  a  'new  instrument' 
covering nuclear safety, security and safeguards.  

A redefinition of the geographic scope as well as the criteria and priorities for cooperation in 
the  context  of  the  'amended  INSC'  would  permit  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  limits  of 
intervention. 

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The INSC is an enabling Regulation establishing the essential elements and the basis for the 
EU intervention. The annual action programmes detail the activities to be carried out by the 

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EU,  including  the  objectives  pursued  by  the  respective  actions  and  the  expected  results. 
Specific indicators are defined prior to implementation, having in mind the particularities of 
each action.  

The  implementation  of  the  actions  complies  with  performance-based  management,  which 
serves the following purposes: 

– 

– 

– 

making the most of limited resources; 

improving decision making processes and decisions; 

achieving transparency and accountability. 

The European Commission's Monitoring and Evaluation systems are increasingly focussed on 
results (Result Oriented Monitoring). They involve internal staff as well as external expertise. 
Task Managers in Delegations and Headquarters continuously monitor the implementation of 
projects  and  programmes  in  various  ways,  including  wherever  possible  through  field  visits. 
External, independent experts are contracted to assess the performance of EU external actions 
through  three  different  systems.  These  assessments  contribute  to  accountability,  and  to  the 
improvement of ongoing interventions; they also draw lessons from past experience to inform 
future  policies  and  actions.  The  tools  all  use  the  internationally-recognised  OECD-DAC 
evaluation criteria including (potential) impact. 

The  Commission  also  conducts  strategic  evaluations  of  its  policies,  from  programming  and 
strategy to the implementation of interventions in a specific sector. These evaluations are an 
important  input  to  the  formulation  of  policies  and  the  design  of  instruments  and  projects. 
These  evaluations  are  all  published  on  the  Commission's  website  and  a  summary  of  the 
findings is included in the Annual Report to the Council and the European Parliament. 

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