COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2011-12-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: European cooperation, development aid, economic development, economic recession, establishment of peace, international security, stability programme

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1481 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

establishing an Instrument for Stability 

{COM(2011) 845 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1482 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties .............................................. 3 

Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 3 

Consultation and expertise (public and internal) ......................................................... 3 

Impact Assessment Board ............................................................................................ 4 

Problem definition........................................................................................................ 5 

The problem requiring action and the scope of the instrument regulation .................. 5 

Outcomes of evaluation reports and lessons learned ................................................... 8 

2.2.1.  Outcomes from evaluations.......................................................................................... 8 

2.2.2.  Lessons Learned......................................................................................................... 10 

2.3. 

2.4. 

2.5. 

3. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

3.3. 

3.4. 

4. 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

6. 

7. 

7.1. 

7.2. 

The underlying drivers of the problem....................................................................... 11 

Legal base for EU action............................................................................................ 13 

EU added value .......................................................................................................... 13 

Objectives................................................................................................................... 14 

Policy framework and objectives ............................................................................... 14 

Consistency with external action priorities ................................................................ 14 

Consistency with other EU policies ........................................................................... 15 

Geographic/thematic coverage................................................................................... 15 

Policy options............................................................................................................. 16 

Analysis of impacts .................................................................................................... 16 

Likely economic, social and environmental impacts ................................................. 16 

Impact on external action ........................................................................................... 17 

Impact in terms of management and implementation ................................................ 17 

Comparing the options ............................................................................................... 20 

Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 23 

Core indicators of progress towards objectives ......................................................... 23 

Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements ................................................ 24 

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1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  

1.1. 

Organisation and timing 

The drafting of the Impact Assessment for the EU external action instruments for the period 
2014-2020,  including  this  document1,  has  been  coordinated  by  a  Task  Force  composed  by 
services  in  charge  of  EU  external  action  and  the  Legal  Service.  The  drafting  teams, 
appointed on 7 June 2011, have duly taken into consideration the consultations, reviews and 
studies  mentioned  in  Section  2  and  have  liaised  with  other  Commission  services  to  ensure 
consistency with other EU policies. The Task Force has met with the drafting team in charge 
of this Impact Assessment on 7 June, 4 and 15 July and 2 August 2011 for organisational and 
quality-check purposes. 

An Impact Assessment Steering Group, composed by the members of the Task Force and 
representatives  of  interested Directorates General and the Secretariat General, was launched 
on 22 June 2011 It has met twice, on 13 and 26 of July 2011. 

This review of this Impact Assessment by the Impact Assessment Board took place on 14 
September 2011. 

In  line  with  article  27  of  the  Financial  Regulation  (Council  Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  No 
1605/2002)  and  article  21  of  the  Implementing  Rules  of  the  Financial  Regulation 
(Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002), the present impact assessment is the 
ex-ante evaluation of the Instrument for Stability.  

1.2. 

Consultation and expertise (public and internal) 

The  European  Commission  held  a  public  consultation  on  future  funding  for  EU  external 
action between 26 November 2010 and 31 January 2011. This process was based on an online 
questionnaire  accompanied  by  a  background  paper  'What  funding  for  EU  external  action 
after  2013'  prepared  by  Commission  and  EEAS  services  involved.  The  220  contributions 
received  to  the  public  consultation  reflected  a  broad  and  diverse  spectrum  representing  the 
variety  of  structures,  views  and  traditions  characterising  the  external  action  community. 
Regarding EU external action on peace and international security, the strengthening of EU 
peace-building  and  crisis  preparedness  is  mentioned  as  a  primary  objective  for  the  next 
Multiannual Financial Framework. The importance of investing in long-term stability, human 
rights  and  economic  development  was  also  underlined  by  many  respondents.  As  regards 
specifically the Instrument for Stability (IfS)2 the public consultation showed that the (IfS) is 
highly valued and many respondents urge the EU:  
1) to enhance its potential, in particular as regards the capacity building for crisis prevention  
2) to safeguard the key advantages of the Instrument for Stability (IfS), namely the speed of 
delivery and direct financing”. 

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2 

The  instruments  are  the  following:  Internal  Agreement  for  the  11th  European  Development  Fund,  Development 
Cooperation Instrument, Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance, European Neighbourhood Instrument, Instrument 
for Stability, Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, 
Partnership  Instrument  and  the  instruments  for  the  EU-Greenland  Partnership.  The  Macro-Financial  Assistance 
instrument,  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy,  the  Humanitarian  aid  instrument  and  the  Civil  Protection 
mechanism are not part of this joint exercise. 
Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 
establishing an Instrument for Stability (OJ L327 of 24.11.06, p.1) 

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In  terms  of  expertise,  a  comparative  review  between  the  Instrument  for  Stability,  the  UN 
Peacebuilding  Fund,  and  the  World  Bank’s  State-building  and  Peace-building  Fund  was 
commissioned  by  the  UK  Department  for  International  Development  in  2010.  It  concluded 
that  the  IfS  enables  the  EU:  “…to  contribute  in  fragile  post-conflict  transitions,  and 
complement  (its)  broader  institutional  capacity  and  engagement  in  such  contexts.  The 
potential  of  (the  IfS)  to  mobilise  significant  technical  and  financial  resources  in  support  of 
state-building  and  peace-building  processes  and  reconstruction  efforts,  including  the 
strengthening  of  key  institutions  and  systems,  and  to  link  up  to  longer  term  development 
programmes is a clear comparative advantage”. The study highlighted also the governance 
and  decision-making  arrangements  of  the  IfS  as  particularly  effective  because  of  the  direct 
linkage at the level of the EU Political and Security Committee, thereby allowing for political-
risk management judgment as well as increased coordination with EU partners.  

The European Parliament’s External Relations Committee (AFET) has been supportive of the 
IfS for its value-added in the range of instruments for supporting external actions. The AFET 
has established a specific Working Group on Crisis, Security and Development.  

Member  States  have  consistently  recognised  the  value  of  the  IfS  as  an  efficient  means 
allowing the EU to rapidly intervene in crisis situations with strategically important actions. A 
high  degree  of  political  coordination  has  been  developed  at  the  level  of  the  Political  and 
Security  Committee  (PSC)  between  the  Commission  departments  in  charge  of  IfS  and 
Member  States,  which  has  resulted  in  politically  consensual  interventions  through  this 
Instrument. 

In addition, it is strongly supported and utilised by civil society groups active in the areas of 
conflict  resolution  and  development  as  well  as  many  of  the  EU’s  key  external  partners, 
notably the World Bank and UN-family organizations.  

In looking forward, a high level seminar on the use of the Instrument for Stability to address 
long  term  security  threats  took  place  on  the  2nd  and  3rd  December  2010  and  a  Consultation 
Meeting on the Instrument for Stability (IfS) Crisis Preparedness Component (Article 4.3) on 
24  January  2011  concluded  that  there  is  a  general  consensus  on  the  need  for  the  EU  to 
continue strengthening its capacities and to further increase its presence in this area.  

1.3. 

Impact Assessment Board 

The Impact  Assessment Board  recommended that the report explain better the nature of the 
Instrument  for  Stability  to  clarify  how  it  links  with  and  complements  other  EU  financial 
instruments.  The  problem  definition  should  be  strengthened  by  presenting  the  results  of  the 
2011  Programme-level  Evaluation  in  greater  detail  and  by  clearly  identifying  issues  and 
objectives.  The  presentation  of  policy  options  should  provide  more  detailed  information  on 
available policy alternatives and clearly identify which elements of the current Instrument will 
be  changed.  The  report  should  also  better  differentiate  the  expected  impacts  of  different 
policy options. All of the above remarks have been incorporated into a revised version of the 
report. 

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2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION  

2.1. 

The problem requiring action and the scope of the instrument regulation 

Definition 

Crises  and  conflicts  affect  countries  world-wide  and  pose  a  risk  to  global  security  and 
stability. Conflicts are often linked to state fragility and exacerbated by weak governance and 
poverty.  Responding  to  these  structural  challenges  requires  a  significant  collective  effort, 
based  on  strong  partnerships  with  other  states,  civil  society  actors,  multilateral  and  regional 
partners to create the conditions for supporting countries to avoid the relapse into conflict.  

In  this  context,  the  EU  must  be  able  to  play  its  part  and  respond  in  a  fast  and  in  a  flexible 
manner to evolving circumstances. This requires a capacity to decide quickly on interventions 
along  with  the  mobilization  of  the  resources.  The  EU  cooperation  financial  instruments  are 
not designed to provide such response: they aim to long-term investment in collaboration with 
the beneficiary country and predictability of the assistance is important. These instruments are 
subject to multi-annual programming and cannot be mobilized sufficiently fast for situations 
of emerging conflict or crisis.  

To  support  countries  stricken  by  political  conflicts  or  natural  disasters  the  EU  essentially 
needs more flexibility, beyond humanitarian and civil protection assistance aiming at saving 
lives and relief human suffering, to swiftly fill the gaps in crisis response, complement crisis 
management  operations  (including  those  under  CFSP)  and  facilitate  a  better  link  between 
early  recovery,  reconstruction  and  longer-term  development,  as  necessary  for  the  lasting 
stabilization of the countries concerned.  

Furthermore,  natural  or  man-made  disasters,  drug  trafficking,  organized  crime,  terrorism, 
cyber  security  threats,  hamper  development,  weaken  the  rule  of  law  and  contribute  to 
worldwide  instability.  Human,  environmental,  climate  change  and  security  risks  associated 
with  chemical,  biological,  radioactive  and  nuclear  materials  (CBRN)  also  transcend  national 
and regional frontiers. 

To address these challenges, under the 2007-13 financial framework, a new Instrument – the 
Instrument for Stability – was adopted to contribute to developing a comprehensive response 
with regard to conflict prevention and peace-building, crisis management and relevant global 
and transregional security-related threats. In just under four years, the IfS has proven to be an 
effective instrument to respond to emerging and existing crises as well to address long-term 
challenges affecting wider global security.  

However, to address the multiple drivers of instability that can lead to conflicts and growing 
security challenges and for the EU to fully play its role on the world stage promoting EU’s 
values and interests, the Instrument for Stability needs to further enhance it effectiveness in 
terms of  

a speed of assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis  

b) development of EU’s own capacities and EU’s partners capabilities for conflict prevention, 
crisis preparedness and peace-building and  

c) addressing a wider range of global trans-national security threats.  

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Scope of the current Instrument  

The scope of the Instrument is worldwide and its interventions are not bound by OECD DAC 
criteria.  Its  double  Treaty  legal  basis  (“development  cooperation”  and  “economic,  financial 
and  technical  cooperation  with  third  countries”)  allows  the  EU  to  effectively  tackle  the 
security and development nexus. 

The specific objectives of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) under the current Regulation3 are: 

(a)  in  a  situation  of  crisis  or  emerging  crisis,  to  contribute  to  stability  by  providing  an 
effective  response  to  help  preserve,  establish  or  re-establish  the  conditions  essential  to  the 
proper implementation of the development and cooperation policies; 

(b) in the context of stable conditions for the implementation of cooperation policies in third 
countries,  to  help  build  capacity  both  to  address  specific  global  and  trans-regional  threats 
having a destabilising effect and to ensure crisis preparedness.  

As a ‘subsidiary’ instrument, the IfS addresses needs that cannot otherwise be tackled under 
any other instrument either because of (a) the urgency of the response, (b) the global or trans-
regional  nature  of  the  problem,  exceeding  the  scope  of  a  geographic  instrument;  (c)  the 
exclusion  of  the  supported  area  from  funding  under  ODA-bound  instruments  (e.g.,  counter-
terrorism),  or  (d)  the  non-country  specific  nature  of  the  assistance  (e.g.  projects  to  develop 
international standards or policies in the field of conflict prevention and peace-building). 

In order to respond to crisis and/or to rapidly intervene to preserve peace and prevent conflict, 
the  instrument  allows  inter  alia  support  for  international  state  and  non-state  actors  in 
promoting confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation; the establishment and 
the functioning of interim administrations mandated in accordance with international law; the 
development  of  democratic,  pluralistic  state  institutions,  including  measures  to  enhance 
civilian  administrations  and  the  role  of  women;  international  criminal  tribunals  and  ad  hoc 
national  tribunals,  truth  and  reconciliation  commissions;  civilian  measures  related  to  the 
demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants into civil society as well as measures 
to  reintegrate  victims  of  armed  conflict  including  gender-based  violence  and  the  specific 
needs of women and children and measures in response to natural or man-made disasters in 
the absence of or as a complement to humanitarian assistance.  

Over  the  four-year  period  2007-2010,  the  IfS  crisis  response  component  has  been  called  to 
intervene  in  48  countries,  mobilizing  EUR  521  million  in  total  for  154  individual  actions 
worldwide.  Examples  of  interventions  financed  by  the  IfS,  all  relating  to  decisions  taken  in 
2010, are described below: 

Haiti  Earthquake:  An  IfS-financed  ‘Post-Disaster  Needs  Assessment’  (PDNA) 
identified €25M earmarked for improvement  of the disaster preparedness capacities 
of  Haitian  Civil  Protection  services,  and  is  providing  the  Haitian  leadership  with 
strategic  advice  on  reconstruction,  with  a  further  €5m  in   support  for  elections,  in 
addition to an EU Election Observation Mission.  

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Pakistan:  Two  emergency  response  measures  have  responded  to  (a)  the  political 
crisis  in  the  north-west  region  bordering  on  Afghanistan  (€15m)  and  (b)  the  floods 
(€18m). 

Sudan: With a January 2011 referendum on self determination for southern Sudan, a 
€15m  IfS  Financing  Decision  provided  s upport  to  organisation  of  the  referendum 
process  and  the  conduct  of  negotiations  between  the  north  and  south  on  post 
referendum arrangements and for population of South Sudan basic services, bridging 
a gap until EDF funding could take over later in 2011. 

Philippines:  Following  Council  agreement  that  the  EU  contribute  to  their  MILF 
peace process, an IfS action (€3m) was put in place to supp ort the monitoring of the 
parties'  compliance  with  their  commitments  on  humanitarian,  rehabilitation,  and 
development  activities;  monitor  protection,  and  support  the  international  political 
support to dialogue. 

Somali  Piracy  Crisis:  joint  EU-UNODC  support  to  piracy  trials  in  Kenya  and  the 
Seychelles complementing the CSDP Atalanta naval operation. 

Further  details  of  the  type  of  financed  activity  under  the  Instrument  can  be  found  in  the 
Annual  Reports  from  the  Commission  to  the  EP,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions4. 

Evolution of the Context 

UN estimates show that at least 80 countries will face the prospects of prolonged deadlock or 
potentially violent internal tensions and instability beyond 2014. Other factors such as climate 
change and natural disasters add to the potential for further global instability. 

The  most  critical  security  challenges  the  world  faces  today  are  interconnected  and 
increasingly  complex,  impacting  on  both  developing  and  industrialized  countries  alike  and 
require concerted efforts to combat these threats. 

The  new  Treaty  on  the  European  Union  (Article  21)  has  defined  common  overarching 
principles and objectives for the external action of the Union, inter alia to “preserve peace, 
prevent  conflicts  and  strengthen  international  security”.  This  is  also  supported  by  various 
Council  Conclusions  concerning  the  effectiveness  of  external  action  (2004),  Security  and 
Development  (2007)  and  General  Conclusions  (2010)  the  latter  calling  for  further 
reinforcement  of  EU  crisis  management  tools  to  support  Common  Security  and  Defense 
Policy. Additional political guidance was given by the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions 
on conflict prevention of 20 June 2011. 

Following  the  Council  conclusions  of  2008  and  2009  on  reinforcing  the  Union’s  disaster 
response capacity, the Commission has prepared an implementation plan for the EU Strategy 
for  supporting  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  in  developing  countries5,  which  identify  the 

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IfS 2007 Annual Report COM(2008)181 of 11 April 2008 with annexes (DTS) SEC(2008) 446 
IfS 2008 Annual Report COM(2009) 341 of 09 July 2009 with annexes (DTS) SEC(2009) 932 
IfS 2009 Annual Report COM(2010) 512 of 28 September 2010 with annexes (DTS) SEC(2010) 1114  
IfS 2010 Annual Report : COM (2011) 494 of 16 August 2011 
SEC(2011) 215 final 

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development of Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNAs) as a priority to integrate disaster 
risk reduction into the recovery frameworks of the affected countries and encourage resilience 
and crisis preparedness.  

The  2008  implementation  review  of  the  European  Security  Strategy  (ESS)  identified  major 
new  security  threats  such  as  Cyber  security  (and  cybercrime),  which  did  not  have  the  same 
dimension  when  the  IfS  Regulation  was  adopted  in  2006.  The  review  of  the  ESS  and  the 
March  2008  report  from  the  High  Representative  and  the  Commission  to  the  Council 
concluded that the security implications of climate change have taken on a new urgency.  

Climate and security nexus was identified as a key area for further work in the context of the 
recent  EEAS-Commission  reflection  paper  on  climate  diplomacy,  as  reflected  by  the 
conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council on 18 July 2011. Accordingly the Instrument for 
Stability  should  make  most  of  the  opportunities  presented  for  advancing  coordinated  EU 
efforts in this respect. 
In  addition,  the  ruling  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  on  the  so-called  ECOWAS  case6 
allows the future Instrument to unrestrictedly address the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons. 

2.2. 

Outcomes of evaluation reports and lessons learned  

2.2.1.  Outcomes from evaluations 

A Mid-Term Review of the IfS Regulation (MTR) was carried out in 2009 alongside that 
for the other external action financial instruments for the period 2007-2013 (Report evaluating 
the  implementation  of  the  financial  instruments  for  external  actions:  SEC/2009/530).  The 
MTR  concluded  that  IfS  provisions  were  adequate  to  pursue  its  objectives.  Some  technical 
amendments  were  proposed  along  with  an  amendment  to  take  into  account  the  European 
Court of Justice Judgment on small arms and light weapons (SALW). The legislative proposal 
was tabled in 2009, but it is still under discussion by the legislative authority. 

Member  States  have  consistently  recognized  the  value  of  the  Instrument  for  Stability7  and 
specific  evaluations  of  EU  interventions  demonstrated  IfS  catalytic  effect,  recognizing  its 
added-value in preparing and improving the delivery of EU long-term external assistance and 
CFSP actions8. 

During  2011,  the  IfS  carried  out  a  Programme-level  Evaluation  of  its  crisis  response  and 
crisis preparedness components (Articles 3 and 4.3) in order to gauge the results achieved to 
date and enhance IfS approaches to future crisis response measures and strategies for future 
crisis  preparedness  programming.  The  evaluation  concludes  that  the  IfS  is  “a  unique 

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ECJ Case C-91/05 ECOWAS 
A comparative review of the Instrument for Stability, the UN Peace Building Fund, and the World Bank’s State-
building and Peace-building Fund commissioned by the UK Department for International Development in 2010. 

A 2009 publication of the EU Institute for Security Studies providing the first comprehensive review of the ESDP 
operations  between  1999  to  2009  states  that  “the  creation  of  the  Instrument  for  Stability  (IfS)  represented  an 
important  innovation  in  order  to  improve  the  Commission’s  crisis  response  capacity  and  to  foster  cooperation 
between first and second pillar instruments” and that “Experience so far has been quite constructive with regard to 
both process, in terms of engagement of EU institutions and Member States, and substance, with a view to concrete 
crisis response initiatives. 

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Instrument within the EU peace, security and development architecture. Articles 3 and 4(3) 
fill  an  important  strategic,  funding  and  capacity  gap,  and  allow  the  EU  to  support  a  broad 
range of critical crisis preparedness and response initiatives. The design and management of 
the Instrument has led to a significant number of achievements that should be recognized and 
are  important  contributions  to  peace  and  stability  globally.  Initiatives  funded  by  the  crisis 
response and crisis preparedness components have contributed to: 

–  Expanding  and  scaling  up  EU  capacity  to  intervene  in  crisis  situations  from  a 
geographic,  thematic,  funding  and  time-horizon  viewpoint,  particularly  through 
Article 3; 

–  Leveraging  and  enhancing  the  coherence  and  effectiveness  of  the  EU  peace, 
security  and  development  instruments  and  initiatives  in  support  of  critical  crisis 
prevention, stabilisation, peace building initiatives;  

–  Providing relevant policy input at a high-level and helping to kick-start important 
reforms while highlighting EU visibility and political leverage in third countries; 
and 

–  Enhancing the capacities of partners to prepare for and respond to crisis. 

In addition, the IfS has enabled the EU and key partners (UN, World Bank and civil society 
organisations)  to  support  national  stakeholders  in  responding  early  to  crisis.  Initiatives  in 
this area include the development of tools, capacities and provision of funds to undertake Post 
Conflict and Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PCNA/PDNA). 

While largely positive about the implementation to date, several areas for improvements were 
highlighted. They specifically refer to speed of deployment of the Instrument, increasing its 
overall  flexibility  with  regard  to  implementation  timeframes  of  exceptional  assistance 
measures and interim response programmes.  

The  Evaluation  concluded  that  “given  the  nature  of  crises  and  frequent  setbacks  in 
stabilisation efforts, there is a need for both more flexibility in the IfS timeframes (currently 
set  at  an  18-month  limit)  and  for  more  attention  to  monitoring  and  linking  the  IfS  to  other 
instruments  so  that  informed  decisions  can  be  taken  on  how  and  when  to  move  from  one 
instrument to another. Although the rationale for the IfS is rooted in helping address, and, as 
far  as  possible,  stabilise  a  crisis  until  other  instruments  can  come  into  play,  often  it  is 
unrealistic  to  expect  other  instruments  to  come  up  with  programming  until  a  degree  of 
stability  (and  predictability)  is  reached.  This  can  take  a  varying  amount  of  time,  in  most 
instances, more than a year. This suggests the need for greater flexibility in implementation 
timeframes – and a clearer articulation of criteria within the IfS decision-making process on 
how and when to move from the IfS to other EU Instruments….Whenever an IfS intervention 
builds on a previous Exceptional Assistance Measure, demonstrating the rationale and need 
for the continuation of the intervention, slim procedures could be followed and the adoption 
of Interim Response Programme should not be a requirement.” 

The  Evaluation  also  suggested  reviewing  the  threshold  amounts  and  increase  financial  and 
human resources. 

There have been no external evaluations under  Article  4.1 (threats to law and order, to 
the  security  and  safety  of  individuals,  to  critical  infrastructure  and  to  public  health). 

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Ongoing  programmes  include  programmes  fighting  organised  crime  along  the  cocaine  and 
heroin routes; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; capacity building in regions 
afflicted  by  terrorism  and  enhancing  maritime  security  and  safety  along  critical  maritime 
routes.  These  programmes  focus  on  security-related  capacity  building  in  close  consultation 
with beneficiary countries. Under a tailored approach, key countries in a region are identified 
and the capacities of local law enforcement and security units strengthened by setting up or 
enhancing specialised inter-agency units.  

Evaluations  under  Article  4.2  (Chemical  Biological  Radiological  and  Nuclear  materials 
risk mitigation actions) showed the importance Member States attached to the EU having its 
own programme to help build capacity in partner countries to fight proliferation of sensitive 
CBRN  materials  and  expertise.  This  enabled  a  number  of  the  smaller  EU  countries  to  join 
such  work  even  though  they  themselves  did  not  have  either  the  technical  or  financial 
resources to implement autonomous outreach programmes. CBRN risk mitigation actions are 
one  of  the  main  ways  the  EU  can  collectively  (MS  and  the  Commission)  contribute  to 
reducing the threat of malevolent uses of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials and 
know-how. 

In 2009, a stock-taking and scoping study of the IfS crisis preparedness component under 
Article 4.3 (the ‘Peace-building Partnership’) recommended to: 

i)  increase  focus  on  transversal  and/or  thematic  issues  relating  to  both  long-term  and  short-
term conflict prevention and peace-building which demonstrate a clear synergy with other EU 
supported activities and policy priorities; 

ii) increase emphasis on organisations working in various geographical contexts in relation to 
thematic  or  transversal  issues  that  support  capacity  building  of  local  partners  and  generate 
learning -benefits for the peace-building sector as a whole;   

iii) foster policy dialogue with non-state actors on peace-building issues. 

These  recommendations  have  started  to  be  implemented  in  subsequent  Annual  Action 
Programmes  in  2010  and  2011.  However,  in  order  to  fully  exploit  the  possibilities  of 
engagement with civil society actors in this field, a more flexible approach is required for the 
funding of these organizations and for EU Member States to benefit of this assistance. 

The study also recommended that building capacities of local organizations should happen at 
country and regional level. This requires the de-concentration of the management of funds to 
EU Delegations.  

2.2.2.  Lessons Learned 

Four years after its launch in 2007, the Instrument for Stability is now well established as a 
highly  complementary  EU  crisis  response  tool.  To  date,  the  IfS  has  been  successful  in 
enabling the EU to fund a broad range of critical conflict-prevention, crisis preparedness and 
response initiatives as part of its peace, security and development policy framework, when no 
other  EU  cooperation  instruments  was  available  or  complementing  interventions  carried  out 
under other instruments.  

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However,  it  needs  to  speed  up  its  deployment  and  increase  its  overall  programming  and 
implementation  flexibility  in  order  to  better  respond  to,  inter  alia,  political  guidance  from 
Council and meet future peace and security challenges in sustainable manner.  

For instance, experience has shown that if follow up of an exceptional assistance measures ( 
of maximum duration of 18 months) is urgently needed, the timing of adoption of an Interim 
Response Programmes (5-7 months on average) is not compatible with the speed required for 
crisis  response.  Only  in  the  case  of  protracted  conflicts,  where  need  for  continuation  of 
assistance  can  be  foreseen  sufficiently  on  advance,  the  preparation  of  Interim  Response 
Programmes  as  follow  up  to  exceptional  assistance  measures  can  be  realistically  envisaged 
(e.g 2010 Interim Response Programmes for support to Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon 
and emergency stabilisation support in Gaza). Additional flexibility as regards continuation of 
exceptional assistance measures and lead-times would therefore enhance effectiveness. 

With  regard  to  conflict  prevention,  crisis  preparedness  and  peace-building  activities,  overall 
concerted effort in anticipating, preventing and/or responding to conflict and natural disasters 
situations  requires  the  further  development  of  common  standards  and  compatible  working 
practices within the EU and with multilateral, international, regional and local partners. This 
is  very  important  to  improve  aid  effectiveness  and  the  speed  of  operational  deployment. 
Therefore, there is a continuing need to build up the EU’s own capacities in this regard and to 
both develop concepts and operational models for EU actions in conflict and crisis situations 
and to ensure their compatibility and inter-operability with those of other relevant actors.  

The  maximum  amount  set  under the Regulation for actions in  relation to threats  to  law  and 
order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health 
has proven insufficient. Ceilings in relation to global threats to the security (including as well 
risk  mitigation  and  preparedness  measures  relating  to  chemical,  biological,  radiological  and 
nuclear materials or agents) should be reviewed in line with the Commission proposal in the 
framework  of  the  2009  Mid-Term  Review  of  the  Regulation  or  abolished,  to  have  the 
flexibility to respond to evolving threats in an adequate manner. 

2.3. 

The underlying drivers of the problem  

The EU as such is a relatively new actor in the international Peace and Security arena. Since 
the mid-1990s, the EU has given itself an increasing number of tools to contribute to preserve 
peace  and  strengthen  international  security.  Today,  there  is  a  general  consensus,  inside  and 
outside Europe, that the EU should continue strengthening its capacities to further increase its 
presence in this area.  

In  a  multi-polar  world,  concerted  multilateral  action  is  required  to respond  to  international 
crises  in  an  effective  manner. The  challenges  to  international  peace  and  security  cannot  be 
efficiently  tackled  by States  acting  individually.  Furthermore, time  is  of  essence  in  taking 
action  to diffuse  conflict  or  to  respond  in  a  conflict  or  a  post-natural  disaster  theatre.  Swift 
response  and  flexibility  to  adapt  to  evolving  scenarios  and  capacity  to  fill  the  gaps  in  the 
aftermath  of  a  conflict  are  the  biggest  problems  confronted  when  deploying  traditional 
programmable aid instruments.  

Since its creation in 2007, the Stability Instrument has been one of the main EU tools used to 
address these problems as it enhances EU capacity to undertake both urgent short-term crisis 
response  and  crisis  prevention  measures  and  medium-term  actions  addressing  international 
security  threats.  The  2011  Programme-level  Evaluation  (see  2.2  above)  confirmed  IfS 

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relevance and usefulness to date while also identifying several ways in which IfS efficiency 
could be further strengthened thereby contributing to enhancing the EU’s role in the theatres 
where  the  Instrument  is  deployed.  Some  of  these  improvements  refer  to  internal  processes 
which  can  be  put  in  place  without  the  need  for  any  modification  to  the  IfS  Regulation. 
However, for certain other recommendations, changes to our future legal instrument will be 
required.  

In  order  to  fulfil  its  new  political  mandate  under  the  Treaty  on  the  European  Union  and  to 
adapt  to  a  changed  policy  context  as  explained  above  under  section  2.1,  the  EU  needs  to 
continue to build on the IfS experience of recent years to address the following problems or 
‘drivers’  in  a  more  effective  manner.  The  instrument  post-2013  should  therefore  provide 
solutions to the following drivers:  

Drivers identified through external Evaluations: 

•  Lack of flexibility to adapt to rapidly evolving circumstances on the ground; 

Given the frequent setbacks encountered in stabilization efforts and the highly contextualized 
nature  of  crises,  he  2011  Programme-level  Evaluation  cited  a  need  for  more  flexibility  in 
deployment  timeframes  beyond  the  current  limit  of  18  months  for  Exceptional  Assistance 
Measures  under  Article  3.  In  this  regard,  the  Evaluation  stated  …”whenever  an  IfS 
intervention  builds  on  a  previous  Exceptional  Assistance  Measure,  demonstrating  the 
rationale and need for the continuation of the intervention, slim procedures could be followed 
and the adoption of Interim Response Programme should not be a requirement.” 

•  Need  to  improve  sustainability  of  short-term  interventions  by  better  linkage  with 

long-term development. 

Given  the  need  to  prepare  as  far  as  possible  for  post-crisis  stabilization  scenarios,  the  2011 
Programme-level Evaluation also cited the need to better link the IfS to other instruments so 
as  to  expedite  and  facilitate  informed  decisions  on  how  and  when  to  move  from  one 
Instrument to another.  

This will allow for the preparation of medium to long-term post-crisis assistance programmes 
whose design can take a varying amount of time, in most instances, more than a year. In this 
regard, the Evaluation stated “This suggests the need for greater flexibility in implementation 
timeframes – and a clearer articulation of criteria within the IfS decision-making process on 
how and when to move from the IfS to other EU Instruments . 

•  Speed  of  response  to  crisis  in  exceptional  and  unforeseen  situations  including  the 

possibility of resource deployment with a very short period of time ; 

Given  the  dynamic  nature  of  crises  in  which  the  EU  is  called  upon  to  intervene,  the  2011 
Programme-level  Evaluation  considers  that  the  deployment  time  of  2-  4  months  for  the 
Instrument  (i.e.  the  period  leading  up  to  the  identification  of  IfS  measures)  needs  to  be 
shortened and accelerated to take account of unforeseen crisis scenarios . In this regard, the 
Evaluation  stated  that:  “given  the  nature  of  crises  and  frequent  setbacks  in  stabilisation 
efforts, there is a need for more flexibility in the IfS timeframes  

Drivers identified through experience of IfS implementation:  

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•  Insufficient 

civilian  EU 

and 

international 

community 

expertise 

conflict 

prevention,pre- and post-crisis preparedness, and peace-building. 

In  order  to  contribute  to  anticipating  instability  and  potential  triggers  for  conflict,  the  EU’s 
conflict prevention capacities require reinforcement by developing the relationship with those 
other  actors  (civil  society,  international  and  regional  organizations,  bodies  in  EU  Member 
States) who are working on early warning and peace building activities (e.g mediation) and on 
ensuring that these can feed the EU’s decision-making process and are transformed into early 
action; 

The EU’s own capacities to participate in pre- and post- crisis scenarios also require further 
attention.  Currently,  there  are  no  established  mechanisms  to  allow  pre-positioned  surge 
capacity in terms of expertise and equipment that could facilitate the swift transition from the 
humanitarian  to  the  early  recovery  phase.,  Moreover,  the  further  development  of  common 
bench-marking, guidelines, standards and compatible working practices - notably in relation 
to post-disaster situations - and enhanced co-operation with other international organizations 
who  are  involved  in  fielding  stabilization  missions  (UN,  OSCE,  AU,  etc.)  needs  to  be 
undertaken  in  order  to  ensure  inter-operability  in  terms  of  training  and  the  development  of 
policy  guidelines  on  conflict-related  issues  (Needs  assessments,  Security  sector  reform; 
Disarmament, de-mobilization and re-integration, etc.). 

•  Insufficient  funding  to  adapt  and  keep  pace  with  the  fast-developing  security 
threats,  such  as  those  to  the  security  and  stability  of  the  Information  Communication 
Technologies  (ICT)  as  well  as  the  operation  networks  and  infrastructures,  such  as 
energy and transportation, on which the global community increasingly relies. 

These  two  drivers  are  linked  to  the  level  of  resources.  Given  the  Instrument  for  Stability’s 
particular political role in the global peace and security architecture, an increase in its overall 
budget  should  be  considered  alongside  an  appropriate  increase  in  staff  resources  and 
capacities. An increase in funds would help to bolster impact and would enable IfS to respond 
to what is likely to be an increasing demand for crisis preparedness and strategic responses to 
emerging global threats in whatever shape they may emerge. 

2.4. 

Legal base for EU action 

The legal bases are Article 209.1 TFEU (ex 179 EC) and Article 212.2 (ex 181a EC).  

2.5. 

EU added value 

As a global player, the EU has credibility and a perception of neutrality as an honest broker 
hat provides a comparative advantage to intervene in many conflict areas to avoid escalation 
or to offer good offices in preventing conflict. When conflict has erupted, an increased level 
of  impact  is  achieved  when  the  response  is  provided  at  EU  level,  as  our  combined  efforts 
provide  increased  leverage  over  authorities  and  international  partners. Crisis  response 
actions when  addressed  at  EU  level  maximise the  coherence  of response  and  aid  efficiency. 
Synergies and cooperation are increasingly needed at international level, as donors are facing 
similar  problems  in  terms  of  scarce  resources.  In  this  regard,  it  should  be  noted  that  a  very 
limited  number  of  EU  Member  States  operate  a  crisis  response  or  peace-building  facility 
comparable in scope to the IfS. 

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In the face of increasingly complex challenges, none of the EU's internal priorities – security, 
growth  and  job  creation,  climate  change,  access  to  energy,  health  and  pandemics  and 
migration - will be achieved in isolation from the wider world. In times of economic crisis, a 
more  coordinated  and  integrated  approach  between  the  EU  and  its  MS  through  joint 
programming will bring about more added-value, increased strength and legitimacy, and more 
impact and effectiveness.  

The  Instrument  for  Stability  has  demonstrated  a  catalytic  effect  in  preparing  and  improving 
the delivery of EU long-term external assistance and actions adopted by the EU in pursuit of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives within the framework of Title V of the TEU. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES 

3.1. 

Policy framework and objectives 

IfS enables the EU to strengthen security, preserve peace and prevent conflict worldwide in a 
timely,  efficient  and  more  coordinated  manner,  acting  when  no  other  EU  cooperation 
instruments  are  available,  or  when  it  is  necessary  to  complement  interventions  carried  out 
under other geographic and thematic instruments. Because of its nature, it has no direct link 
with the Europe 2020 Strategy as such. 

General Objectives 

The  Instrument  for  Stability  is  designed  to  contribute  to  a  comprehensive  response  with 
regard  to  conflict  prevention  and  peace-building,  crisis  management  and  relevant  security-
related threats.  

Specific Objectives 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

In  situations  of  crisis  or  emerging  crisis  either  man-made  or  as  a  result  of  a 
natural disaster, to contribute to stability by providing an effective response to help 
preserve, establish or re-establish the conditions essential to the proper implementation 
of the Community’s development and cooperation policies. 

to ensure the preparedness of the EU and its partners to prevent conflicts, build 
peace  and  address  pre-  and  post-crisis  situations  in  close  coordination  with 
international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non state actors. 

to address global and trans-national security threats that pose a risk to peace and 
stability.  

3.2. 

Consistency with external action priorities 

The Treaty on the European Union (Article 21) has defined common overarching objectives 
for  the  external  action  of  the  Union  inter  alia  to  “preserve  peace,  prevent  conflict  and 
strengthen  international  security  and  assist  populations,  countries  and  regions  confronting 
natural or man-made disasters; 

The  Instrument  for  Stability  supports  EU  action  to  strengthen  security,  preserve  peace  and 
prevent  conflict,  and  as  any  EU  external  cooperation  instrument,  to  safeguard  EU  values, 
notably  human  rights  and  democracy.  It  contributes  to  a  complementary  and  coherent  EU 

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response  to  crisis,  and  in  this  framework,  is  available  for  deployment  alongside  CFSP 
operations,  the  provision  of  Humanitarian  Aid  and  Civil  Protection  assistance,  Macro-
Financial  Assistance  and  the  Instrument  for  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation.  The  IfS  equally 
contributes 
in  synergy  with 
mainstream  EU  geographic  instruments  (ENPI,  DCI,  EDF,  IPA)  and  thematic  instruments 
such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).  

to  conflict  prevention, peace-building and  state-building 

It complements the independent and apolitical delivery of EU Humanitarian Aid  

following  political  crisis  or  natural  disasters,  where,  for  example,  it  can  be  called  upon  to 
intervene inter alia to finance actions that link humanitarian assistance and development aid 
(Linking  Relief  Rehabilitation  and  Development  or  LRRD)  in  a  subsidiary  manner,  i.e. 
whenever the main geographical or thematic instruments cannot be mobilised in good time or 
require  complementary  interventions  to  provide  an  efficient  response.  IfS  also  can  be 
deployed  in  such  cases  to  fill  gaps  than  can  jeopardise  transition  towards  stability  and 
development. 

3.3. 

Consistency with other EU policies 

Obvious links exist between the EU external action on crisis response and prevention and/or 
on addressing global security threats with internal EU policies on migration, justice, freedom 
and  security.  The  Council  Conclusions  on  enhancing  links  between  Internal  and  External 
Aspects of Counter-Terrorism of 9 June 2011 is of particular relevance alongside the Working 
Method for Closer Cooperation and Coordination in the Field of External Security of 6 June 
2011. 

Considering  that  many  trans-regional  threats  and  risks  are  also  top  EU  external  security 
priorities,  the  Instrument  would  also  contribute  to  the  implementation  of  the  European 
Security Strategy (as revised in 2008) and to addressing the “external dimension” of the EU’s 
Internal Security Strategy (2010), which are important EU policies. 

Natural  disasters,  environmental  degradation  and  competition  for  resources  exacerbate 
conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, 
political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change poses a risk 
to biodiversity and acts as a ‘threat multiplier’ that can also lead to disputes over trade routes, 
maritime  zones  and  access  to  resources.  The  IfS  can  enhance  the  external  dimension  of  EU 
policy on climate change and the environment in line with the Council Conclusions of 18 July 
2011. 

3.4. 

Geographic/thematic coverage 

Given the global nature of the problems it intends to address, the Instrument needs to retain 
world  wide  coverage  and  maintain  the  same  broad  thematic  coverage  of  the  current 
Instrument with an additional provision to support measures to limit the proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons in the light of the 2008 judgement of the European Court of Justice on 
the  ECOWAS  case.  It  is  also  important  to  maintain  flexibility  with  the  scope  of  possible 
future  interventions  and  to  allow  for  financing  of  other  type  of  measures  not  explicitly 
mentioned  within  the  terms  of  Article  3  of  the  current  Instrument  in  order  for  the  EU  to 
effectively respond to a given crisis.  

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With regard to security programmes, while such assistance very often qualifies as ODA and is 
reported as such, the instrument should not be bound to ODA-eligibility criteria, as this would 
reduce the EU’s ability to effectively tackle the security and development nexus9.  

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS  

In order to increase the efficiency and coherence of EU action on Peace and Security thereby 
increasing EU presence, the following four options were considered. 

– 

– 

– 

– 

Option  0:  Not  having  a  new  Instrument  after  2013  Only  the  geographical 
instruments  could  intervene  in  crisis  theatres,  but  with  the  limitations  described 
under section 2 which have led to the creation of the IfS. 

Option  1:  Status  quo:  maintain  the  Instrument’s  current  scope  and  the.  size  of  its 
financial  envelope  at  the  same  level  2007-2013  (€  2,062  billion  for  the  7  year 
period).  

Option 2: A revised Instrument, broadly maintaining its current scope but increasing 
its flexibility provisions and with a moderate increase of its financial envelope. This 
option will allow adjusting the legal provisions to tackle the identified shortfalls. 

Option 3: A new or new Instruments incorporating the following considerations  

a)  to  split  Crisis  Response  and  Preparedness  issues  (Articles  3  and  4.3)  from 
security-related  issues,  notably  terrorism,  trans-regional  threats  and  CBRN  risks 
(Articles.  4.1  and  4.2)  in  two  instruments  to  provide  sharper  focus  on  the  security 
dimension of the EU external action and separate attention to crisis management.  

b)  to  encompass  EU  external  action  tools  currently  carried  out  under  other 
Instruments: Bringing together the different Peace and Security instruments currently 
scattered across several geographical and thematic budget lines to add coherence to 
the different actions the EU can deploy in a crisis scenario. Candidates for this type 
of merger, along with the IfS, would be the African Peace Facility (EDF), the part of 
the EIHDR dealing with electoral observation, and, to a lesser extent, certain parts of 
thematic  budget  lines  which  can  also  be  called  upon  to  intervene  in  crisis  contexts 
(e.g. migration, human rights).  

5. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS  

5.1. 

Likely economic, social and environmental impacts 

There is a general consensus on the need for the EU to maintain the main characteristics that 
have  led  to  its  success  (see  Section  1.2).  The  policy  options  considered  are  intended  to 
consolidate and wherever possible, improve the current IfS features. Because of the nature of 
the Instrument, the choice of any of the four options listed above (except for option 0) is not 
likely  to  lead  to  significant  differences  in  terms  of  “external”  impacts  (economic,  social  or 

9 

Such  requirement  would  exclude  any  form  of  counter-terrorism  assistance  from  the  scope  of  the 
instrument. 

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environmental).  Nonetheless,  the  final  choice  made  would  have  important  consequences  in 
terms  of  increasing  the  efficiency,  effectiveness  and  coherence  with  all  other  external 
instruments.  

A  more  efficient  instrument  should  lead  to  increased  EU  activity  on  crisis  prevention, 
preserving peace and strengthening international security, including enhancing EU’s capacity 
for crisis preparedness.  

5.2. 

Impact on external action  

Given its ability as a subsidiary instrument to “fill the gaps” by financing actions which no 
other instrument could otherwise support, the IfS contributes to improve the EU response to 
conflicts and large-scale natural disasters and to address global and trans-regional threats as 
well  as  to  facilitate  the  Union’s  responsiveness  to  changing  political  circumstances  in  crisis 
areas. 

Option  0  would  have  an  impact  on  external  action.  The  political  leverage  of  the  instrument 
would be lost and the EU would not have any instrument to mobilize resources for the types 
of interventions that the IfS finances.  

The  other  options  are  neutral  since  they  will  enable  the  EU  to  fill  its  role  and  political 
mandate in this area.  

5.3. 

Impact in terms of management and implementation 

Option 0: Not having a new Instrument after 2013. In crisis and post-crisis situations, EU 
funds  would  only  be  provided  from  geographic  instruments  that  would  require  re-
programming and from CFSP budget in case of unanimity decisions by the Council 

This option will not allow the EU to play its role as set in the EU Treaty. No EU resources 
would  be  available  such  impeding  the  EU  to  contribute  to  stabilization  in  countries  and 
regions affected by man-made or natural disasters. Such role would be filled only by the UN 
and other regional organizations and other donors. The EU would not be able either to fund 
civil  society  organizations  which  are  important  players  in  crisis  preparedness  and  peace-
building initiatives. No EU assistance would be provided to counter global and trans-national 
security threats as they cannot be addressed under instruments that have limitations in terms 
of geographic coverage (e.g IPA, EDF, DCI).  

Option  1:  In  a  scenario  of  “no  change  from  today’s  situation”  the  IfS  could  deliver 
responses as it has been doing since its establishment, acting as a useful EU policy tool  

We  would  however  be  missing  an  opportunity  to  improve  the  Instrument  on  the  basis  of 
experience of the last 3 years which has shown that some minor changes could significantly 
enhance  the  value  of  the  IfS  (in  particular  those  highlighted  by  the  2011  Programme-level 
Evaluation).  Furthermore,  if  the  financial  envelope  would  remain  constant  at  €2.1  million, 
would  not  allow  to  tackle  fully  the  drivers  of  the  problem,  in  particular  as  regards  the 
expected increase in the number of crises and the need to strengthen capacity building in crisis 
prevention and global threats . 

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Option 2: A revised Instrument, broadly maintaining its current scope but increasing where 
possible  its  flexibility  provisions  and  its  financial  envelope  would  better  enable  the  EU  to 
assume its growing responsibilities in the area of Peace and Security.  

Under  this  Option,  the  Commission  would  maintain  the  main  features  of  the  Instrument  for 
Stability  while  introducing  new  provisions  to  increase  its  efficiency  and  deployment  to 
complement other EU instruments. These modifications, which partly reflect the problems or 
‘drivers’ highlighted in Section 2 concern: flexibility arrangements, the speed of deployment, 
the financing of human resources as well as an increased financial envelope.  

a) Flexibility arrangements: 

Ceilings for maximum amount and duration of Exceptional Assistance Measures.  

External Assistance Measures up to €20 millio n can be adopted by the Commission without 
commitology but with prior information to the Council. 

The current limit of € 20 million (beyond which  an Interim Response Programme is required 
to  follow  up  an  intervention)  have  proved  insufficient  in  cases  of  major  political  crisis  (e.g 
Georgia in 2008) or in cases where an intervention in areas of early recovery or LRRD was 
necessary (e.g Haiti or Pakistan in 2010).. Therefore, it is proposed that a new limit be set at € 
30 million. It is worth noting, however that large programmes constitute the exception in IfS. 
In most cases, only small and rapid interventions paving the way for the larger programmes 
financed under other EU instruments, would be required. The average size of IfS programmes 
in 2010 has been roughly €3 million.  

Similarly, the maximum duration for an Exceptional Assistance Measure, currently set at 18 
months  (extendable  under  certain  circumstances  to  24)  has  proved  to  be  too  short;  in  fact 
many IfS programmes have recourse to a six-month extension. The earlier reasoning behind 
this  short  period  was  that  there  would  have  been  enough  time  for  the  main  geographical 
instruments to come on stream after 18 months. However, experience has shown that this is 
often not the case. Changing a strategy paper and putting its new programmes in place takes 
often  longer  than  18  months,  especially  in  a  country  in  crisis,  with  fragile  government 
structures. New timeframe limits would be set at 24 months extendable to 30 months (under 
certain exceptional and duly justified circumstances).  

Additional Exceptional Assistance Measures.  

Art.  6.4  of  the  current  IfS  Regulation  sets  out  that  programmes  which  build  on  a  previous 
Exceptional  Assistance  Measure  shall  be  adopted  as  Interim  Response  Programmes  (i.e 
requiring  commitology  and  a  much  longer  approval  process  ranging  in  the  order  of  5-7 
months)  

This is based on the understanding that the Commission would have sufficient time during the 
implementation of the first Exceptional Assistance Measure (typically 18 months) to prepare 
any  required  follow-up.  However,  this  logic  cannot  be  applied  in  all  circumstances.  Very 
often,  the  need  for  a  follow-up  measure  only  becomes  apparent  towards  the  end  of  the 
implementation  period.  This  is  particularly  the  case  for  programmes  implemented  under 
rapidly-changing political circumstances which is often the case in IfS programmes. In such 
cases, opting for an Interim Response Programme creates a gap in our intervention which can 
be very detrimental to EU efforts in the concerned theatre of operations (disengagement of the 

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parties, loss of momentum, dismantlement of teams, etc.). Such risks could be addressed and 
offset if the Commission were allowed to propose a second Exceptional Assistance Measure 
building on the results of the initial one, particularly in cases where the need for a consequent 
follow-up could not be foreseen in good time. 

b) Speed of deployment  

The average time for adopting a new measure under the IfS crisis response component ranges 
between 2 and 4 months. As pointed out by the 2011 Programme-level Evaluation, it would 
be appropriate to try and shorten this period, thereby accelerating deployment.  

In  certain  contexts,  a  much  faster  deployment  is  essential  such  as  for  initial  post-crisis 
measures  requiring  support  for  mediation  processes,  confidence  building,  assistance  in  the 
organisation  of  electoral  processes,  etc.  In  such  cases,  being  able  to  deploy  initial  tangible 
support  in  a  matter  of  days  can  prove  crucial  and  would  certainly  place  the  EU  in  a  much 
better strategic position in the political process addressing the crisis in question. 

Under the standard IfS decision-making, the approval period cannot be reduced further as any 
IfS measure requires prior information to the Council. However, the possibility to adopt initial 
measures without prior Council information could be envisaged under this Option. It would 
obviously  involve  an  added  provision  obliging  the  Commission  to  report  Council  on  the 
measure(s) adopted ex-post. This innovation would allow the EU to deploy initial support to 
react to a crisis within a period of some 48- 72 hours. In addition to the many advantages this 
would bring to the EU as a political actor, it would also enable the deployment of experts on 
the ground which would contribute with first hand information to a better identification of the 
main IfS or other EU-funded measures that would immediately follow thereafter. 

c) Human Resources  

The 2011 Programme-level Evaluation also highlighted that current staff resources allocated 
to the management of the crisis response component are inadequate, notably in Headquarters. 
The  current  team  of  7  crisis  response  planners  falls  short  in  terms  of  management  of  the 
current  budget  (some  €  200  million  in  2011)  and  will  clearly  struggle  in  the  future  when 
budgets  rise  as  foreseen  to  some  €  350  million  a  year.  This  problem  would  be  particularly 
acute  with  the  identification  and  adoption  of  larger  IfS  programmes  (currently  some  25  a 
year),  which  is  mostly  undertaken  at  Headquarters  along  with  the  monitoring,  audit  and 
control of all on-going programmes. 

In  order  to  address  this  problem,  this  option  would  allow  the  for  administrative  support 
expenditure  directly  linked  to  the  implementation  of  the  instrument  to  finance  staff  at 
Headquarters  and  in  Delegations  in  order  to  ensure  sound  financial  management  over  the 
period. 

d) Budget 

One  of  the  five  strategic  objectives  set  for  the  EU  external  policy  during  the  next  financial 
framework is to improve crisis prevention and resolution capacities. In order to achieve this, it 
is  clear  that  a  moderate  increase  in  the  IfS  budget  would  be  needed.  In  order  to  keep  this 
increase  to  manageable  levels,  it  is  proposed  that  the  level  of  the  2013  budget  becomes  the 
baseline  for  the  IfS  annual  budget  as  of  2014.  The  budget  would  then  stay  stable  over  the 
period.  

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Option 3: A new Instrument or Instruments, providing for  

a) A split between crisis response and preparedness from security-related issues: This Option 
foresees the separation of the crisis response component of the IfS –(Article 3) together with 
the  programmable  component  on  crisis  preparedness  (Article  4.3)  from  the  programmable 
components on security-related threats – Articles 4.1 and 4.2) under two separate legislative 
instruments providing for clearer and more streamlined conceptual separation between crisis 
and security threats. Allocation of funds between the two instruments would be clearer with 
separate management, reporting and evaluation arrangements. 

b)  Incorporation  of  other  tools  of  EU  external  action  currently  carried  out  under  other 
instruments (e.g. African Peace Facility (EDF), the part of the EIHDR dealing with electoral 
observation, etc): This Option suggests the appropriateness of bringing together the different 
instruments  working  on  the  Peace  and  Security  field  currently  scattered  across  several 
geographical and thematic budget lines. It would add coherence to the different actions that 
the  EU  can  deploy  in  a  crisis  scenario  and  simultaneously,  rationalise  the  number  of 
instruments  and  budget  lines  involved.  Obvious  candidates  for  this  type  merger,  along  with 
the Stability Instrument, would be the African Peace Facility (EDF), the part of the EIHDR 
dealing with electoral monitoring, and to a lesser extent certain parts of thematic budget lines 
which can also be called upon to intervene in crisis contexts (migration, human rights, etc.) 
By  bringing  all  of  the  above  under  the  same  umbrella,  gains  would  be  realised  in  terms  of 
coherence  and  in  terms  of  the  timing  of  their  deployment.  Improvements  would  also  be 
possible on EU visibility as well as flexibility in the allocation of financial resources to the 
different sub-components. 

6. 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS  

The options are assessed against the following three criteria:  

Coherence  means  here  the  possibilities  to  create  synergies  in  terms  of  programming  and 
delivery  towards  achieving  the  agreed  objectives  and  to  avoid  negative  consequences  and 
spillovers  which  would  adversely  affect  the  implementation  of  the  policies.  This  is 
particularly significant when two different instruments have the same geographical coverage. 

Effectiveness  means  doing  the  right  things,  setting  the  right  goals  and  objectives  and  then 
ensuring that they are accomplished .  

Efficiency  means  doing  things  right,  and  obtaining  the  most  from  deployed  resources:  this 
includes  organizational  aspects  as  well  as  the  expected  gains  from  the  simplification  of  the 
Instrument.  

Impacts 

0. - No Instrument 

1. - No change from today's situation 

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2. - A revised Instrument 

3. - A new Instrument or Instruments 

A) splitting current instrument 

B) adding new scope 

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Option 0: Because of the obligations incumbent on the European Union under Article 21 of 
the  Treaty  and  the  political  guidance  provided  by  Council  on  inter  alia  Security  and 
Development  (2007),  European  Security  Strategy  (2008)  and  on  conflict  prevention  (2011), 
recourse  to  this  option  is  not  politically  possible  without  the  EU  loosing  international 
credibility and capacity to defend its interests.  

Option 1: IfS could still remain relevant by delivering responses as it has been doing since 
2007. However, an opportunity to improve and enhance the Instrument’s value on the basis of 
experience would be missed especially in terms of effectiveness and efficiency 

Option  2:  to  maintain  the  main  features  and  characteristics  of  IfS,  while  streamlining  its 
provisions  to  increase  its  flexibility  and  effectiveness  thereby  enabling  the  EU  to  swiftly 
respond  to  future  international  peace  and  security  challenges.  A  more  efficient  instrument 
should lead to increased EU activity on crisis prevention, preserving peace and strengthening 
international security, including enhancing EU’s capacity for crisis preparedness. 

The  IfS  would  continue  to  finance  actions  complementary  to  or  in  support  of  measures 
financed  under  other  external  instruments  and  if  need  be,  used  as  a  substitute  whenever  the 
latter  cannot  be  deployed  rapidly.  The  example  of  unforeseen  elections  whose  observation 
could not be planned in advance comes to mind or whose preparation requires immediate EU 
support to ensure better conditions for free and fair results, acceptable to the majority of the 
population  so  as  to  avoid  disputed  results  leading  to  potential  conflict  (Tunisia,  Egypt  in 
2011)  

Option 3: A new Instrument or Instruments, providing for  

a)  the  set  up  two  new  Instruments  providing  for  split  between  crisis  response  and 
preparedness, on the one hand, and global and trans-national security threats on the other, is 
not advisable.  

It is important to highlight the links that exist between crisis response and pre- and post-crisis 
capacity building, on one hand, and addressing global and trans-national threats on the other. 
Together, they form the backbone of EU external action on Peace and Security issues (along 
with other instruments such as EIDHR). The possible costs in terms of loss of coherence by 
separating these components from each other cannot be underestimated. 

Besides running against the overall aim of rationalising the number of existing instruments, it 
could result in a less coherent and complementary interaction in addressing drivers of conflict;  

b)  broadening  the  scope  of  the  new  Instrument  to  achieve  greater  coherence  in  the 
deployment of the different EU interventions can also be disregarded given the difficulty of 

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reconciling  different  legal  basis  and  decision-making  processes  under  a  single  legislative 
Instrument. Such option would not be efficient. 

On  the  contrary,  there  would  be  a  risk  that  some  of  the  flexibility  achieved  under  current 
arrangements could be lost if other instruments and working methods were brought under the 
same regulatory umbrella. The decision-making processes for Electoral Observation Missions 
for  instance,  are  hardly  compatible  with  the  speed  required  when  dealing  with  unforeseen 
elections  following  a  political  crisis.  Some  of  the  actions  financed  under  the  African  Peace 
Facility  (e.g  payment  of  allowances  to  African  soldiers  in  AU  Peace  Keeping  Operations) 
which  are  possible  under  the  EDF,  would  be  impossible  to  finance  under  the  EU  budget. 
These  are  just  two  examples  showing  that  such  a  merger  would  be  very  complicated  to 
implement in practice.  

In summary, option 2 appears to be the optimal choice.  

Under this option, the recommendations resulting from the 2011 Programme-level Evaluation 
would need to be streamlined, as follows:  

a)  Flexibility  arrangements:  By  its  very  nature,  the  IfS  is  designed  to  simplify  and  render 
more flexible EU interventions in the field of external action. The intention is to broadly re-
conduct current provisions with improvements to the existing Comitology threshold and the 
duration limits as follows: 

•  Exceptional Assistance Measures (EAM), ceilings should be increased from €20 to €30 

million and their duration currently at 18 months (should be extendable twice for further 
six months -up to 30 months- under certain duly justifiable circumstances, namely in the 
case of objective and unforeseen obstacles to their implementation or need to bridge the 
gap until cooperation or thematic instruments can intervene, provided that the financial 
amount of the measure does not increase)10.  

•  The  Commission  should  be  also  allowed  in  cases  of  protracted  crisis  to  propose  a 
second  Exceptional  Assistance  Measure  building  on  the  results  of  a  previous  one. 
Currently,  the  Regulation  requires  that  this  second  measure  is  adopted  as  an  Interim 
Response  Programme  (Article.  6.4)  which  is  a  much  heavier  decision-making 
procedure, as it requires comitology. Interim Response Programmes would then concern 
measures  going  beyond  30  million  or  with  where  more  than  2  Exceptional  Assistance 
measures become necessary. 

•  Programmes related to crisis preparedness and addressing global security threats would 
continue to be adopted following normal Commission procedures (comitology, etc.) but 
strategic  planning  requirements  would  need  to  be  further  streamlined.  Increased 
flexibility for engagement with civil society partners and recognition of EU institutions 
and Member States officials as beneficiaries of capacity building assistance also needs 
to be factored in. 

•  The need for increased flexibility in the scope of the Regulation to address other forms 
of trans-regional illicit trafficking (beyond drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, 

10 Article 6.2 of IfS Regulation 1717/2006 of 15 November 2006 OJL327 of 24.111.2006 

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and trafficking in firearms and explosive materials) such as trafficking in precursors or 
in counterfeit medicines should also be properly addressed. 

b) Speed of deployment. The Commission should be empowered to approve measures up to 
a certain limit (e.g. € 3 million) without the need for  prior information to the Council. This 
would enable the EU to deploy initial measures in 48-72 hours after a crisis which in certain 
circumstances  may  turn  out  to  be  critical  to  the  success  of  the  measure  and  to  the  EU’s 
strategic position in responding to the crisis in question. 

c)  Subsidiarity:  Retaining  overall  added-value  as  a  subsidiary  instrument  also  implies  that 
the future IfS should continue to exclude from support those issues that can be better targeted 
at  country-level  under  geographical  or  thematic  cooperation  instruments,  even  if  they  are 
security-related (e.g. mine action).  

d)  Sustainabilty:  To  facilitate  the  possibility  of  investing  in  sustainable  crisis  response 
actions  in  the  field  of  counter-terrorism  in  individual  countries  (eg  Pakistan,  Yemen),  the 
current  priority  given  to  trans-regional  actions  under  Article  4.2  of  the  current  Instrument 
should  not  be  applicable  to  counter-terrorism,  as  it  is  not  possible  to  provide  this  kind  of 
support at country level under geographical development instruments (EDF, DCI) due to their 
tying to ODA eligibility criteria, which explicitly excludes counter terrorism assistance. 

e)  Reporting:  a  review  of  the  Reporting  requirements  under  the  Regulation  is  necessary  to 
ensure most effective use of personnel and operational resources. 

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION  

7.1. 

Core indicators of progress towards objectives  

Intended results 

• 

• 

• 

• 

To  contribute  to  an  EU  comprehensive  response  to  address  situations  of
 fragility and instability, e.g. emerging crises, natural disasters, with targeted 
and complementary measures under the IfS crisis response.  

To  enhance  EU’s  capacity  to  effectively  contribute  to  multilateral  and 
international efforts for global conflict prevention and resolution. 

To  support  conflict  prevention  and  peace-building  with  a  view  to  reduce  the 
number  of  armed  conflicts  worldwide  and  diminish  the  number  of  countries 
that relapse into conflict. 

To  address  global  and  trans-regional  threats  complementary  with  other  EU 
instruments and international actors, through capacity building aimed at better 
integration  of  beneficiaries 
international  community.  (including 
development  of  networks,  improved  capacity  to  collect  and  exchange 
information, support to regional cooperation and platforms).  

the 

in 

Main expenditure-related outputs 

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Timely  and  effective  launch  of  projects  in  situations  of  crisis  or  emerging  crisis  (projects 
launched, a concrete number of project cannot be foreseen given the nature of the instrument) 
Percentage of projects launched within 3 months of crisis context. 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

Indicators 
(given  the  nature  of  the  instrument  defining  a  baseline  and  a  target  for 
indicators is not appropriate) 

Number of interventions where IfS has enabled the EU to efficiently contribute 
to the prevention, resolution or stabilization of a particular crisis. 

Increased  EU  ability  to  cooperate  effectively  with  international  and  regional 
organizations in crisis preparedness and response situations. 

Number  of  policy  dialogues  and  civil  society  engagement  actions  on  conflict 
prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building. 

Increased  integration  of  beneficiary  countries  in  the  International  Community 
and  increased  compliance  with  the  relevant  international  legal  frameworks 
addressing global and trans-regional threats, enhanced cooperation within and 
regional 
between 
cooperation  platforms,  increased  participation  of  beneficiaries  in  existing 
relevant networks and increased mutual flows of information.  

regions,  development  or  establishment  of 

targeted 

For the climate mainstreaming11 commitment to be meaningful this needs to be accompanied 
by a cross-cutting obligation to identify where programmes promote climate action or energy 
efficiency so that the EU is able to set out clearly how much of its spending relates to such 
issues.  Clear  benchmarks,  monitoring  and  reporting  rules  for  all  relevant  EU  policy 
instruments need to be established. In this respect, tracking of climate-related expenditure will 
be performed based on the established OECD methodology (‘Rio markers’).  

In line with the Commission's broader commitment to mainstreaming the OECD DAC marker 
will also be applied for tracking progress on biodiversity and desertification mainstreaming  

7.2. 

Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements  

The European Commission's Monitoring and Evaluation systems are increasingly focused on 
results. They involve internal staff as well as external expertise.  

Task Managers in Delegations and Headquarters continuously monitor the implementation of 
projects  and  programmes  in  various  ways,  including  wherever  possible  through  field  visits. 
Monitoring  provides  valuable  information  on  progress;  it  helps  managers  to  identify  actual 
and potential bottlenecks, and to take corrective action. 

External, independent experts are contracted to assess the performance of EU external actions. 
These  assessments  contribute  to  accountability  and  to  the  improvement  of  ongoing 

11 

Regarding instruments under the EU budget, in order to reach the Europe 2020 objectives and to help 
other parts of the world to step up their efforts to combat climate change, the Commission has stated in 
the June 2011 Communication on “A Budget for Europe 2020” that it intends to increase the proportion 
of  climate  related  expenditure  across  the  EU  budget  to  at  least  20%,  with  contribution  from  different 
policies, subject to impact assessment evidence. 

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interventions;  they  also  draw  lessons  from  past  experience  to  inform  future  policies  and 
actions taking into account, inter alia, INCAF12 criteria. 

Project-level evaluations, which are managed by the EU Delegation in charge of the project, 
deliver  a  more  detailed,  in  depth  analysis  and  help  project  managers  to  improve  ongoing 
interventions and prepare future ones. The Commission also conducts strategic evaluations of 
its  policies,  from  programming  and  strategy  to  the  implementation  of  interventions  in  a 
specific  sector  in  a  country  or  region,  or  of  a  specific  instrument.  These  evaluations  are  an 
important input to the formulation of policies and the design of instruments and projects and 
are published on the relevant Commission website. A summary of the findings is included in 
the Annual Report to the Council and the European Parliament. 

A report evaluating the implementation of the new Regulation in its first three years will be 
submitted to the Council and to the Parliament which will include, if appropriate, a proposal 
for introducing changes or modifications to the Regulation. 

12 

OECD DAC's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)  

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