COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2011-12-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU financing, environmental risk prevention, international cooperation, nuclear accident, nuclear power station, radioactive waste, the EU's international role

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1472 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety and Cooperation 

{COM(2011) 841 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1473 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties.............................................. 4 

Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 4 

Consultation and expertise (public and internal) ......................................................... 4 

Impact Assessment Board............................................................................................ 5 

Problem definition ....................................................................................................... 6 

The problem requiring action and the scope of the instrument regulation .................. 6 

Review of evaluation reports ....................................................................................... 9 

2.2.1.  Results of mid-term review of the financial instruments for external actions (2009) . 9 

2.2.2.  Study on legal instruments - linking evaluation results (2006-2011) to the legal 

instruments objectives................................................................................................ 11 

2.3. 

2.4. 

2.5. 

2.6. 

3. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

3.3. 

3.4. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

4.4. 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

Review of lessons learnt ............................................................................................ 12 

The underlying drivers of the problem ...................................................................... 13 

Legal base for EU action............................................................................................ 14 

Added value of the EU action .................................................................................... 14 

Objectives .................................................................................................................. 16 

Policy framework and objectives............................................................................... 16 

Consistency with external action priorities................................................................ 18 

Consistency with other EU policies........................................................................... 18 

Geographical/thematic coverage................................................................................ 18 

Policy options............................................................................................................. 18 

Option 0: No further EU action (no Nuclear Safety Instrument)............................... 18 

Option 1: ’No change’ (cooperation with third countries would continue in the 
framework of the existing INSC Regulation) ............................................................ 19 

Option 2: Amend the INSC Regulation ..................................................................... 19 

Option 3: New instrument.......................................................................................... 20 

Analysis of Impacts.................................................................................................... 20 

Likely economic, social and environmental impacts of each of the options ............. 20 

Impacts on external action, in particular on Policy Coherence for Development ..... 20 

Impact in terms of management / implementation modalities................................... 20 

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6. 

Comparing the options............................................................................................... 21 

6.1.  Weighing of positive and negative impacts per option.............................................. 21 

6.2. 

6.3. 

7. 

7.1. 

7.2. 

Trade-offs and synergies associated with the options................................................ 22 

Preferred option ......................................................................................................... 22 

Monitoring and evaluation......................................................................................... 22 

Core indicators of progress towards objectives ......................................................... 22 

Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements ................................................ 24 

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1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

1.1. 

Organisation and timing 

The  drafting  of  the  Impact  Assessment  for  the  EU  external  action  instruments  for  the 
period  2014-2020,  including  this  document1,  has  been  coordinated  by  a  Task  Force 
composed  by  services  in  charge  of  EU  external  action  and  the  Legal  Service.  The 
drafting  teams,  appointed  on  7  June  2011,  have  duly  taken  into  consideration  the 
consultations,  reviews  and  studies  mentioned  in  Section  2  and  have  liaised  with  other 
Commission services to ensure consistency with other EU policies. The Task Force has 
met with the drafting team in charge of this Impact Assessment on 7 June, 29 June, 14 
July and 2 August 2011 for organisational and quality-check purposes. 

An Impact Assessment Steering Group, composed by the members of the Task Force 
and  representatives  of  interested  Directorates  General  and  the  Secretariat  General,  was 
launched on 22 June 2011. It has met twice, on 13 and 26 of July 2011. 

The review of this Impact Assessment by the Impact Assessment Board is scheduled 
on 14 September 2011. 

In line with article 27 of the Financial regulation (Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002)  and  article  21  of  the  Implementing  rules  of  the  financial  Regulation 
(Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002), the present impact assessment 
is the ex-ante evaluation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation. 

1.2. 

Consultation and expertise (public and internal) 

Public consultations 

The  Commission  held  a  public  consultation  on  future  funding  for  EU  external  action 
between 26 November 2010 and 31 January 2011. This process was based on an online 
questionnaire accompanied by a background paper 'What funding for EU external action 
after  2013?'  prepared  by  Commission  services  and  the  European  External  Action 
Services  involved.  The  220  contributions  received  to  the  public  consultation  reflect  a 
broad  and  diverse  spectrum  representing  the  variety  of  structures,  views  and  traditions 
characterising the external action community.  

A  majority  of  the  respondents  (around  70%)  confirmed  that  EU  financial  intervention 
provides  a  substantial  added  value  in  the  main  policy  areas  supported  through  EU 
financial instruments for external action2. The criterion of EU added value is put forward 

1 

2 

The  instruments  are  the  following:  Internal  Agreement  for  the  11th  European  Development  Fund,  Development 
Cooperation Instrument, Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance, European Neighbourhood Instrument, Instrument for 
Stability,  Instrument  for  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation,  European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and  Human  Rights, 
Partnership  Instrument  and  the  instruments  for  the  EU-Greenland  Partnership.  The  Macro-Financial  Assistance 
instrument,  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy,  the  Humanitarian  aid  instrument  and  the  Civil  Protection 
mechanism are not part of this joint exercise. 
i.e.  peace  and  security,  poverty  reduction,  humanitarian  aid,  investing  in  stability  and  growth  in  enlargement  and 
neighbourhood  countries,  tackling  global  challenges,  promoting  EU  and  international  standards and  values,  and 
supporting growth and competitiveness abroad. 

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by  many  respondents  as  the  main  driver  for  the  future:  the  EU  should  exploit  its 
comparative advantage linked to its global field presence, its wide-ranging expertise, its 
supranational nature, its role as facilitator of coordination, and to the economies of scale.  

Nearly  all  respondents  (92%)  support  a  more  differentiated  approach,  tailored  to  the 
situation of the beneficiary country, based on sound criteria and efficient data collection, 
to be used as a way to increase the impact of EU financial instruments.  

Over  two  thirds  of  respondents  believe  that  EU  interests  are  sufficiently  taken  into 
account in its external action, and that the latter should be based to a larger extent on EU 
values and principles, and on development objectives of the partner countries. Inversely, 
a  minority  considers  that  EU  external  action  should  concentrate  more  on  EU's  own 
interests in the global economy, particularly towards emerging economies.  

A majority of respondents agree that joint programming and co-financing with Member 
States  can  increase  the  impact  and  the  coherence  of  EU  external  action,  simplify  the 
delivery of aid and reduce overall transaction costs.  

Regarding like-mindedness and conditionality, there is wide support among respondents 
for exploring conditionality based on the beneficiary country's respect for human rights, 
minorities,  good  governance  and  diversity  of  cultural  expressions  (78%),  or  on  the 
quality  of  its  policies  and  of  its  ability  and  willingness  to  implement  sound  policies 
(63%).  However,  a  majority  of  respondents  is  critical  towards  basing  external 
cooperation on the EU's own interests. 

A vast majority of respondents support a stronger focus on monitoring and evaluations 
systems in the future instruments and in projects/programmes implementation.  

As  concerns  the  means  to  enhance  the  visibility  of  EU  external  funding,  a  majority  of 
stakeholders support increasing efforts for information and communication activities, in 
particular in beneficiary countries; however EU visibility appears to be better served by 
effective policies, strategies and presence in third countries, than by additional spending 
for communication. The ideas of reinforcing EU's coordinating role among other donors 
and  of  ensuring  that  implementing  partners  give  more  visibility  to  EU  funding  also 
obtain a strong support from stakeholders. 

1.3. 

Impact Assessment Board 

The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation's draft impact assessment was submitted 
to the Impact Assessment Board on 5 August 2011. The Board issued its opinion on 09 
September 2011. The Board recommended hat the report should be improved in various 
respects in particular as regards: 

1 Problem analysis, setting of the objectives, policy choices 

2 Analysis of impact, illustrate with examples 

3 Improve presentation and shorten the text 

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2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION  

2.1. 

The problem requiring action and the scope of the instrument regulation 

Definition of the problem 

Nuclear safety3 and safeguards4 are issues of paramount importance, both in connection 
with  the  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants  and  other  nuclear  installations,  as  well  as, 
more generally, any other radiological practice. 

The Chernobyl accident in 1986 and the Fukushima-Daiichi accident in 2011 highlighted 
the  global importance  of  nuclear  safety.  In  order  to  fulfil  the  objective  of  the  Euratom 
Treaty  to  create  the  conditions  of  safety  necessary  to  eliminate  hazards  to  the  life  and 
health of the public, the European Atomic Energy Community (the ‘Community’) should be 
able to support nuclear safety in third countries. 

There is also a particular need for the Community to continue its efforts in support of the 
application of effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries, building on its own 
safeguard activities within the European Union. 

The EU established a Community framework for nuclear safety of nuclear installations 
through  the  adoption  of  the  Council  Directive  2009/71/Euratom  of  25  June  2009.  A 
Council directive approved on 19 July 2011 established a Community framework for the 
responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. It is important to 
ensure that third countries adhere to comparable principles.  

The  commitment  of  third  countries  to  implement  the  highest  safety  standards  and 
safeguards can be considered partly fulfilled by them  joining  the  relevant  international 
convention and treaties (e.g. the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Non Proliferation 
Treaty).  However,  some  third  countries,  particularly  in  the  EU  neighbourhood,  have 
shown  difficulties  in  complying  with  the  terms  laid  down  in  the  international 
conventions  and  treaties  they  did  adhere  to.  In  addition,  not  all  third  countries  which 
may  give  cause  for  safety  concerns  to  the  EU  citizens  have  joined  the  relevant 
international Conventions. 

The promotion and enforcement of the highest standards of nuclear safety and radiation 
protection within the boundaries of the EU may not be sufficient to suitably protect the 
general  public  and  the  environment.  Therefore  action  with  third  countries  needs  to  be 
envisaged.  In  parallel,  action  is  also  required  to  help  ensuring  effective  nuclear 
safeguards in third countries. 

Some major achievements of the nuclear safety instrument 

3 

4 

Nuclear  safety  concerns  the  achievement  of  proper  operating  conditions,  prevention  of  accidents  or 
mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment  
The safeguards system comprises an extensive set of technical measures by which the IAEA [and Euratom 
within the EU] independently verify the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States 
about their nuclear material and activities. 

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Three major projects implemented under the instrument illustrate the achievements and 
impact of the INSC on nuclear safety in the neighbourhood. 

The Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF): 

The CSF managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
provides  the  financing  of  major  projects  at  the  Chenobyl  site  (including  the  New  Safe 
Confinement  (NSC)).  The  finalisation  of  the  NSC  has  been  delayed  due  to  unforeseen 
technical  difficulties  which  resulted  in  increased  cost.  The  Commission  has  set  up  a 
contact group within EBRD with the other G8 donors to monitor the implementation of 
the  project.  The  EU  as  major  donor  to  the  fund  through  the  INSC  also  became  the 
driving  force  for  the  success  of  the  April  2011  pledging  conference  to  ensure  the 
completion of the project. The Shelter Fund can be a model for developing similar major 
nuclear safety projects financed by the future INSC 

The Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 

The Medzamor NPP is one of the first generation nuclear reactors of Russian design in 
the EU neighbourhood. This power plant presents nuclear safety risks due to its design, 
its location in a highly seismic area and also to  the  lack of proper maintenance by the 
Armenian operator. Under the coordination of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), together with other donors, the INSC has set up a major assistance programme 
to  resolve  the  major  safety  issues  of  the  plant.  Only  6  years  were  needed  from  the 
evaluation  of  the  safety  issues  and  their  classification  in  the  IAEA  urgency  scale 
(Categories  1  to  4).and  the  implementation  of  the  projects.  This  cooperation  with  the 
IAEA may serve as example for future cooperation with Agency and other donors 

The evaluation of the safety of the Ukrainian nuclear power plants 

Following  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  signed  between  Ukraine  and  the  EU,  an 
evaluation  of  the  safety  of  the  Ukrainian  NPPs  was  performed  under  a  joint  project 
Ukraine-EU-IAEA. The project was co-financed by the Commission (mostly the INSC) 
and the IAE . The result of the evaluation demonstrated that the Ukrainian Regulator has 
in pace a comprehensive regulatory system with a sound legal infrastructure respecting 
the  relevant  international  conventions  in  force.  It  also  concluded  that  the  design  and 
operational safety of the Ukrainian NPPs were compliant with the majority of the IAEA 
safety  requirements.  The  progress  noticed  by  the  IAEA  was  very  often  the  result  of 
projects funded under the Tacis and INSC programmes. 

The  INSC  has  started  to  expand  its  activities,  based  on  lessons  learned  in  projects  as 
described above. This experience in large scale and multi-donor projects may be useful 
in future when the instrument will be faced to the results of the stress tests conducted in 
third countries.. 

Scope of the current instrument 

The  above  objectives  are  being  pursued,  in  the  period  2007  to  2013  through  the 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), adopted through Council Regulation 
(EURATOM) No 300/2007 of 19 February 2007. The implementation of the measures 
foreseen under the INSC was founded on the prior experience gained by the European 

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Commission  in  assisting  countries  in  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS), 
through the TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme.  

The scope of the INSC covered the following main areas:  

•  Promotion of the highest standards of nuclear safety and radiation protection to be 
applied  to  nuclear  facilities  and  other  radiological  practices  outside  of  the  EU,  in 
view of safeguarding the health of the citizens and the environment.  

•  Responsible approach to nuclear safety aspects related to the environment (disposal 
of spent fuel, waste management, decommissioning of installations, restoration of 
sites, etc.).  

•  International  cooperation  on  nuclear  safety  to  ensure  that  the  highest  and  most 

robust levels of nuclear safety are in place and implemented. 

•  The opportunity to encourage and assist other countries to adopt the highest nuclear 
safety  standards  and  responsible  radioactive  waste  and  spent  fuel  management 
taking  into  account  the  common  frameworks  developed  in  the  EU  (EU  directives 
on nuclear safety and radioactive waste and spent fuel management). 

•  Promotion of an effective framework and methodologies for the implementation of 

nuclear safeguards worldwide. 

The current instrument has enlarged its geographical area from the countries of the CIS 
(Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Uzbekistan) to 13 additional third countries (status 
in  2011)  from  the  Southern  Mediterranean  neighbourhood  and  Middle  East  (Jordan, 
Iraq,  Egypt,  Morocco),  Asia  (Philippines,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  China,  Mongolia  and 
Vietnam) and Latin America (Brazil, Argentina and Mexico). 

This  scope  should  be  expended  under  the  new  instrument,  with  a  revision  of  the 
geographic scope (see paragraph 4.3 here below). 

Evolution since the adoption of the present instrument 

It  is  expected  that  over  the  period  2014  to  2020,  the  above  motivations  to  engage  in 
cooperation  with  third  countries  in  the  domains  of  nuclear  safety,  radiation  protection 
and nuclear safeguards will remain valid.  

Some  major  projects  carried  out  under  the  INSC  (in  particular  those  related  to  the 
remediation  of  the  Chernobyl  site5  and  nuclear  plant  improvement  projects)  will  have 
been  mostly  completed  by  2014.  However  other  important  projects  concerning 
restoration  of  mining  sites  (legacy  of  uranium  mining,  which  did  not  respect  basic 
environmental  requirements),  disposal  of  spent  fuel,  waste  management  and 
decommissioning of installations will need to be dealt with as a programme priority.  

5 

The major Chernobyl projects, which are financed through EBRD managed funds, are currently scheduled 
to  be  completed  in 2015.  The  international  donors (mostly  G8  and  the EU) have  already  pledged  enough 
funds  to  cover  the  cost  of  the  projects.  No  further  sums  are  planned  for  the  EBRD  managed  funds  for 
Chernobyl over the period 2014-2020. 

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The lessons learnt in the wake of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident will play an important 
role  in  the  improvement  of  nuclear  safety  in  the  coming  years.  The  results  of  the  EU 
Member  States  comprehensive  and  transparent  risk  and  safety  assessments  (“stress 
tests”),  which  are  due  to  be  extended  to  the  EU  neighbouring  countries  and  possibly 
other third countries, are expected to have a considerable impact in the design, operation, 
maintenance  and  regulation  of  nuclear  power plants.  The  experience  gained  within  the 
EU will be important to other third countries. The experience gained in the coordination 
of activities with IAEA and other donors will also help to optimise the impact on safety 
of the undertaken measures. 

2.2. 

Review of evaluation reports 

Some reviews on a number of policy areas have been undertaken e.g. 

2.2.1.  Results of mid-term review of the financial instruments for external actions (2009) 

Annual reports on the progress achieved in the implementation of the INSC have been 
submitted  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  as  per  Article  18  of  Council 
Regulation  No  300/20076.  These  reports  have  shown  a  regular  implementation  of  the 
actions  foreseen  in  the  first  Annual  Action  Programmes,  and  a  regular  commitment  of 
the budget allocated to the instrument. 

In  addition,  a  report  evaluating  the  implementation  of  the  Regulation  in  the  first  three 
years has been prepared, to be submitted in the near future to the European Parliament 
and  the  Council  (as  per  Article  21  of  the  Regulation).  This  report  was  based  on  an 
assessment of the programme carried out by a team of independent experts appointed by 
the Commission. 

The Article 21 report concluded that each of the specific measures foreseen in the INSC 
has  been  addressed  by  one  or  more  projects  adopted  in  the  period  2007  to  2009. 
However limited attention has so far been paid to nuclear safeguards, to the development 
and  implementation  of  strategies  for  decommissioning  existing  installations  and  to  the 
remediation  of  former  nuclear  sites  (with  the  exception  of  the  Chernobyl  site  though 
bilateral and multilateral initiatives). 

The report found also that the INSC implementation was well targeted and the projects 
well conceived. When successfully implemented, the projects are expected to contribute 
significantly  to  enhance  nuclear  safety  and  nuclear  safety  culture.  The  INSC  projects 
with  focus  on  exchange  of  know-how  and  practices  were  found  to  be  particularly 
appreciated  by  partners  in  target  countries.  …The  concerns  which  were  raised  in 
respect of the implementation of the INSC Regulation, and how they might be mitigated, 
can be addressed within the existing provisions of the Regulation. Consequently, there is 
no  need  for  a  legislative  proposal  to  be  introduced  [to  modify  the  Instrument]  as 
foreseen in Article 21 of the INSC.  

6 

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety 
Cooperation,  First  Report  -  Annual  Action  Programmes  for  2007,  2008  and  2009.  Ref.  COM(2011)  111 
final, SEC(2011) 284 final. 

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Interface with the Instrument for Stability (IFS)  

Nuclear safeguards cooperation falls under the INSC scope, however safeguards projects 
are also eligible under the Instrument for Stability (IFS) (established by Regulation (EC) 
No  1717/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  November  2006). 
The  overlap  is  apparent  in  the  control  of  illicit  trafficking  of  radiological  and  nuclear 
materials which falls in the framework of Priority 1 (chemical, biological, radiological, 
and  nuclear  (CBRN)  risk  mitigation)  of  the  IFS;  however  the  establishment  of  the 
necessary  regulatory  framework  and  methodologies  for  the  implementation  of  nuclear 
safeguards is clearly identified in the framework of the INSC.  

In  order  to  prevent  overlap  and  to  enhance  complementarity  of  the  two  instruments  in 
this regard, it was recommended to clarify in the relevant Strategy Papers which kind of 
nuclear  safeguards  cooperation  activities  were  eligible  under  each  instrument.  The 
matter  needs  to  be  reconsidered  in  the  context  of  the  new  instruments  for  the  period 
2014-2020. 

Delay on implementation of projects 

The  relatively  long  time  elapsed  between  the  conception  of  new  project  proposals  and 
the  start  of  the  actual  implementation  of  the  relevant  actions  was  identified  as  a 
significant  issue.  An  investigation  of  the  causes  of  such  delay  was  recommended  in 
order to adopt appropriate corrective measures. In some circumstances e.g. inspection of 
the  primary  circuit  of  the  Armenian  nuclear  power  plant,  the  delays  between  project 
definition and implementation have been reduced to less than12 months. 

Suspension of the cooperation with the Russian Federation 

Failure  in  concluding  Financing  Agreements  with  the  Russian  Federation  related  to 
adopted Annual Action Programmes for 2007 and 2008 led to the suspension of nuclear 
safety  cooperation  with  Russia  under  the  INSC7.  This  was  identified  as  an  issue  of 
concern as it prevents new cooperation between the EU and Russia under the INSC. To 
date,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  Commission  to  establish  a  renewed  cooperation 
framework,  a  solution  does  not  appear  at  hand.  Nevertheless,  this  interruption  of 
cooperation  does  not  affect  the  implementation  of  projects  on  installations  of  Russian 
design  in  other  countries.  Russian  Institutes  and  manufacturers  can  continue  to 
participate in the INSC awarding procedures. 

Simplification 

Programming and implementation of the INSC could be simplified by a better definition 
of the thematic and geographic priorities for the selection of cooperation projects. 

7 

Limited  cooperation  continued  under  the  INSC  in  order  to  complete  ongoing  projects,  for  which  a  new 
Financing Agreement was not required, however this will cease once the projects are completed. 

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2.2.2. 

Study  on  legal  instruments  -  linking  evaluation  results  (2006-2011)  to  the  legal 
instruments objectives8  

The Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learnt from the Evaluations analysed how 
the following major objectives of the INSC were being fulfilled: 

i) Existence of an effective nuclear safety culture; 

ii) Protection of EU citizens against radiation; 

iii) Establishment of safeguards for accounting and control of fissile material; 

iv) Prevention of nuclear accidents; 

v) Mitigation of the consequences of nuclear accidents; 

vi) EU cooperation with the IAEA. 

Most  of  the  results  were  positive;  however  the  report  also  noted  mixed  results 
concerning nuclear safety culture and safeguards suggesting that the actions in question 
were not yet assured. 

The evaluation reports recognize that the EU has made useful contributions to promoting 
nuclear safety principally in neighbourhood countries and that it has in fact a record of 
being  one  of  the  largest  foreign  contributors.  The  EU’s  contribution  was  particularly 
noteworthy  in  addressing  the  aftermath  of  the  Chernobyl  disaster  where  it  acted 
effectively  in  an  emergency  situation  and  at  an  appropriate  scale  by  providing  up  to 
50%9 of the international funding required.  

At  the  same  time,  ,  the  evaluators  also  recognize  that  progress  cannot  be  purely 
attributed  to  the  EU’s  input  nor  is  there  much  certainty  as  to  the  longer-term 
sustainability of the  impact.  One  of the results also specifically mentions that ‘Overall 
progress  in  nuclear  safety  is  very  hard  to  evaluate,  as  no  risk  assessment  has  been 
conducted recently’.  

Identification of Any Overall Trends or Lessons Learnt 

It  is  apparent  from  the  Energy  Thematic  Evaluation  (2008)  that  the  European 
Commission’s  has  built  up  considerable  expertise  and  credibility  in  the  sector  and  a 
good  network  of  collaborating  institutions  both  within  the  EU  at  national  level  and 
internationally under the auspices of the IAEA. hTerefore a good basis exists on which 
to  build  further  EU  work  in  this  area.  However  the  evaluators  of  the  2008  study  also 
noted a number of points which are important to stress for the future: 

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Ref. Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learnt from the Evaluations Managed by the Joint Evaluation 
Unit,  based  on  an  evaluation  carried  out  by  the  European  Centre  for  Development  Policy  Management. 
Draft Final Report, March 2011. 
The  EU  is  the  largest  contributor  to  the  Chernobyl  Funds  managed  by  the  EBRD,  these  were  set  up  to 
finance projects at the site costing about EUR 2 billion. The EU's contributions to these Funds amount to 
some 25% of the total. In addition the EU financed directly other specific projects at the Chernobyl site.(EC 
Services' note). 

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(1) 

(2) 

Over time without the crystallizing effect of a major nuclear disaster, such as 
Chernobyl, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the European Commission 
to build consensus around the policies it proposes to the Council10. 

There is clearly still considerable work to be done to achieve the full “Effective 
nuclear  safety  culture”  that  the  INSC  instrument  talks  about  as  “…partner 
governments seem less convinced than the EU of the necessity of promoting the 
independence  and  the  technical  and  institutional  strengthening  of  the 
Regulatory Authorities.”  

Although no strong overall conclusion can be drawn on the effect of the INSC due to the 
limited  evidence  emerging  from  the  evaluations,  the  limited  evidence  is  positive.  The 
EU is now an experienced and credible actor in the field. Yet there are clearly continuing 
issues  to  be  tackled  and  not  all  of  them  will  be  straightforward.  On  the  basis  of  the 
evidence available therefore it appears to be important to maintain an EU budget in this 
area. 

. 

Having  argued  that  the  INSC  should  probably  be  maintained  as  a  separate  instrument 
does  not  mean  however,  that  no  improvements  could  be  made  to  the  instrument.  In 
particular  the  paucity  of  results  identified  in  the  evaluation  reports  does  suggest  that 
there is a case for strengthening the evaluation of EU work financed from the INSC. The 
clear  reference  to  the  need  for  an  overall  risk  assessment  of  nuclear  safety  would  also 
support such a conclusion. 

2.3. 

Review of lessons learnt 

The root causes of the major nuclear accidents have been mainly lack of nuclear safety 
culture11, design safety (safety aspects of the plant design) and operational safety. It was 
therefore considered appropriate that the nuclear safety cooperation programmes of the 
European Union addressed the nuclear operators, to improve the situation on the ground, 
and the nuclear regulators to ensure that they had the required technical capability and 
independence to enforce adherence to appropriate nuclear safety standards. 

In the CIS, , under the Tacis nuclear safety programme, safety related equipment had to 
be supplied to ensure that urgent cases were promptly resolved. However, as these cases 
have  been  addressed  and  the  programmes  are  guided  by  the  principle  of  the  most 
efficient use of resources and avoidance of practices which might have commercial and 
competition implications, supply of equipment has, in general, been discontinued under 
the INSC. 

Under the INSC, cooperation was initiated with a number of third countries which intend 
to use nuclear energy as part of their energy mix (the so called 'emerging countries'). The 
cooperation  covered  mainly  the  building  up  of  the  capacity  of  the  regulators,  the 

10 
11 

The situation changed considerably after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident. (EC Services note). 
Safety culture was originally defined in IAEA's INSAG 4 as “that assembly of characteristics and attitudes 
in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues 
receive the attention warranted by their significance.” 

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regulatory infrastructure and waste management strategies to ensure that a nuclear safety 
culture  and  framework  is  developed  at  a  sufficiently  early  stage.  The  selection  of  the 
countries followed the criteria proposed by the Council. This has become an important 
part of the programme which should be continued, but may require a clearer definition 
of the criteria. 

The consequences of nuclear accidents can, to some extent, be mitigated by emergency 
preparedness. Therefore, emergency preparedness needs to remain an important part of 
the programme.  

Major  accidents  with  radiological  consequences  have  required  the  help  of  the 
international  community  to  the  affected  population  and  to  restore  the  sites  to  an 
environmentally  safe  situation.  This  was  the  case  with  Chernobyl  where  the  major 
construction projects are entering the final phase. The possibility should be left in future 
programmes to cooperate with third countries in this respect, if needed and appropriate. 

Past  activities  related  to  the  nuclear  fuel  cycle,  the  use  of  nuclear  powered  ships  and 
submarines  and  radioisotopes  have  not  always  been  up  to  the  standards  required  to 
protect  the  population  and  the  environment.  Governments  and  local  authorities  have 
been  left  with  the  difficult  task  of  restoring  affected  sites  to  an  environmentally  safe 
situation  and  the  disposal  of  nuclear  spent  fuel  and  waste,  for  which  international 
cooperation  may  be  required.  This  part  of  the  nuclear  safety  programme  should  be 
among the instrument’s priorities in the future. 

In  order  that  spent  nuclear  fuel  and  nuclear  waste  be  dealt  with  in  a  proper  and 
responsible  way,  the  nuclear  safety  programmes  have  provided  for  cooperation  with 
third countries to establish national strategies for the spent fuel and nuclear waste. As the 
European  Union  has  just  adopted  a  radioactive  waste  and  spent  fuel  management 
directive,  third  countries  should  continue  to  be  encouraged  to  adopt  similar  high 
standards, cooperation in this field should also be continued as a matter of priority. 

The promotion of international cooperation will remain essential to ensure coordination 
of activities by the different actors and the best use of resources. The IAEA will continue 
to  play  a  fundamental  role  in  this  respect,  particularly  to  enhance  the  Global  Nuclear 
Safety  Regime  (the  framework  for  achieving  the  worldwide  implementation  of  a  high 
level of safety at nuclear installations). Support to IAEA activities, particularly those of 
global or regional nature should continue to be envisaged, with the appropriate visibility 
for the EU actions /contributions. 

2.4. 

The underlying drivers of the problem 

• 

• 

Following  the  Fukushima-Daiichi  accident,  issues  related  to  risk  and  safety 
assessments of operating nuclear power plants (‘stress tests’) are likely to become 
more  relevant  and  to  be  extended  to  other  nuclear  facilities,  including  research 
reactors,  spent  fuel  interim  storage  facilities,  radioactive  waste  storage  and 
disposal facilities. 

Cooperation  with  nuclear 
technical  support 
organizations) should remain at the centre of the nuclear safety cooperation, while 

(including 

regulators 

their 

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cooperation  with  nuclear  operators  needs  to  be  reconsidered  taking  into  account 
the performance and results of the ‘stress tests’ and specific circumstances.  

Disposal  of  spent  fuel,  waste  management,  decommissioning  of  installations, 
restoration  of  sites  have  gained  increased  relevance  over  the  years.  Future 
cooperation in these areas should be treated as a programme priority12. 

Geographical  proximity 
(pre-accession  countries  and  EU 
neighbourhood)  should  remain  a  priority.  Nevertheless,  it  should  not  be  an 
exclusive criterion..  

the  EU 

to 

The  evolution  of  the  international  situation  requires  a  change  in  focus  and  in 
priorities rather than a change in the broader scope of nuclear safety cooperation. 

• 

• 

• 

2.5. 

Legal base for EU action 

The  legal  base  of  the  INSC  (Regulation  No  300/2007)  is  the  Euratom  Treaty  (in 
particular  the  Article  203).  Considering  the  legislative  framework  for  nuclear  safety  at 
EU  level,  this  should  remain  the  case  with  the  future  regulation,  unless  the  scope  is 
enlarged (see discussion on different options under paragraph 4. here below). 

2.6. 

Added value of the EU action  

Nuclear safety 

With  a  large  number  of  commercial  nuclear  power  plants  (146  out  of  436  worldwide) 
and  nuclear  power  providing  for  about  30%  of  the  electricity  generation,  the  EU  has 
accumulated  a  long  experience  in  the  domain  of  nuclear  safety,  including  in 
decommissioning of nuclear installations and radioactive waste management. As a result 
a wide expertise in all the domains of nuclear safety is available in EU Member States. 
The  diversity  of  technologies,  which  requires  different  approaches,  allows  for  the 
necessary flexibility in addressing the needs of third countries.  

The  EU  has  adopted  common  legal  frameworks  concerning  nuclear  safety  and 
radioactive  waste  and  spent  fuel  management.  In  this  respect,  the  EU  has  set  up  an 
example and expects to persuade others to adopt similar high standards. 

Global Challenges, Global Response and Global Leadership 

12 

Possible projects may include, inter alia, the remediation of uranium legacy sites in Central Asia (object of 
an international initiative strongly supported by the UN organisations and by the Governments of the region, 
to which the Commission already participates through the INSC); the recovery, processing and storage of 
sunken objects in the Arctic Sea (nuclear submarines and other objects containing spent nuclear fuels and 
radioactive  waste,  part  of  the  Soviet  Union's  nuclear  legacy);  and  issues  related  to  the  responsible 
management  of  radioactive  waste  in  countries  that  do  not  presently  have  any  nuclear  power  generation 
capacity or consider developing it. A symbolic case in this respect is Iraq, with a comprehensive programme 
for  the  dismantling  of  its  shut-down,  heavily  damaged,  nuclear  installations  and  the  management  of  the 
resulting  radioactive  waste.  Other  third  countries  also  face  problems  related  to  the  management  of 
radioactive waste deriving from practices not related to power production (e.g. in the medical sector), which 
need  to  be  properly  addressed  at  the  level  of  their  nuclear  regulatory  authorities  and  organizations 
responsible for waste management. 

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In  the  face  of  increasingly  complex  challenges,  none  of  the  EU's  internal  priorities  – 
security,  growth  and  job  creation,  climate  change,  access  to  energy,  health  and 
pandemics and migration - will be achieved in isolation from the wider world. In times 
of economic crisis, a more coordinated and integrated approach between the EU and its 
Member States through joint programming will bring about more added value, increased 
strength and legitimacy, and more impact and effectiveness. 

The EU is in a uniquely neutral and impartial position to deliver on external action on 
behalf of and with Member States, giving enhanced credibility in the countries in which 
it works. It is best placed to take on the role of global leader on behalf of its citizens. 

The critical weight of the EU 

With 27 Member States acting within common policies and strategies, the EU alone has 
the  critical  weight  to  respond  to  global  challenges,  while  the  action  of  Member  States 
can  be  limited  and  fragmented,  with  projects  which  are  often  too  small  to  make  a 
sustainable difference in the field. This critical mass also puts the EU in a better position 
to  conduct  policy  dialogue  with  partner  governments.  This  is  reflected,  for  example  in 
the  strong  position  of  the  EU  in  discussions  and  negotiations  with  the  G8  and  the 
European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  (EBRD),  which  manages  large 
nuclear safety funds on behalf of international donors. 

The INSC should remain an instrument accompanying the EU policy dialogue with third 
countries. 

When programming its cooperation, the EU pays particular attention to the structural as 
well  as  economic  capacity  of  the  countries  concerned.  The  possibility  to  react  to 
unforeseen  needs  is  envisaged  within  the  current  INSC  regulation  and  was  made 
available to Japan after the Fukushima accident. 

The EU is best placed to coordinate 

The  EU  has  a  network  of  international  agreements  all  over  the  world,  not  matched  by 
individual  Member  States,  which  gives  them  influence  in  almost  all  fields  of 
international  relations,  including  nuclear  safety.  The  EU  plays  a  major  role  in  this 
domain but needs to continue enhancing its visibility.  

The EU can do more than other international organisations as it has a holistic approach 
to development and external relations. 

Division  of  labour  through  the  EU  is  a  crucial  component  of  its  added  value.  With  its 
network of international agreements with partners and organisations all over the world, 
the  EU  is  a  natural  coordinator,  and  can  influence  almost  all  fields  of  international 
relations,  which  individual  Member  States,  acting  within  common  policies  and 
strategies, cannot do alone. 

Furthermore,  at  a  time  of  budgetary  restrictions,  when  several  Member  States  are 
compelled  to  exit  entire  sectors  and  countries,  the  EU  is  able  to  continue  playing  an 
active role. 

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3. 

OBJECTIVES  

3.1. 

Policy framework and objectives 

.  

The need to adopt the highest nuclear safety standards worldwide has recently become 
even more evident in the wake of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident 

The  health,  environmental,  social  and  economic  impact  of  nuclear  accidents  in  third 
countries in the EU has been confirmed to be potentially very high. The need to establish 
effective  cooperation  aimed  at  preventing  accidents  through  the  establishment  of  high 
levels of nuclear safety is being reaffirmed. 

. While the EU recognizes that the use of nuclear power is a sovereign decision, it is in 
the  EU’s  best  interest  that  nuclear  installations  are  operated  safely,  in  particular  in  the 
EU neighbourhood, and that nuclear materials are properly accounted for. The EU will 
cooperate with third countries and organizations in these respects. 

General objectives 

• 

• 

Cooperate  in  the  implementation  of  the  highest  nuclear  safety  standards  in  third 
countries in order to create the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards 
to  the  life  and  health  of  the  public,  as  nuclear  accidents  have  trans-boundary 
consequences (Euratom Treaty). 

Cooperate  with  third  countries  to  make  certain,  by  appropriate  supervision,  that 
nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for which they are 
intended (Art. 2b of the Euratom Treaty). 

Specific objectives  

•  Support  the  promotion  and  implementation  of  the  highest  standards  of  nuclear 
safety and radiation protection in nuclear installations and radiological practices in 
third countries. 

•  Support the development and implementation of responsible strategies concerning 
the disposal of spent fuel, waste management, decommissioning of installations and 
restoration of former nuclear sites.  

•  Support international cooperation on nuclear safety to ensure that the highest and 

most robust levels of nuclear safety are in place and implemented. 

•  Support 

the  promotion  and 

implementation  of  effective  frameworks  and 

methodologies for the improvement of nuclear safeguards worldwide. 

).  

Operational Measures to be implemented to support the objectives 

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The following measures are of particular importance for supporting the achievement of 
the above objectives. 

(a) 

the  promotion  of  an  effective  nuclear  safety  culture  at  all  levels,  in  particular 
through:  

– 

– 

– 

– 

continuous  support  for  regulatory  bodies,  technical  support  organisations, 
and  the  reinforcement  of  the  regulatory  framework,  notably  concerning 
licensing activities, including the review and follow up of the risk and safety 
assessments (‘stress tests’);  

Cooperation  with  third  countries  in  the  domain  of  radioactive  waste  and 
spent  nuclear  fuel  management  (i.e.  transport,  pre-treatment,  treatment, 
processing, storage and disposal) and development of specific strategies for 
the responsible management of spent nuclear fuel and waste; 

the  development  and  implementation  of  strategies  for  decommissioning 
existing  installations  and  the  remediation  of  former  nuclear  sites;  the 
recovery and safe disposal of nuclear objects sunken in the sea or dispersed 
on land;l 

support for the performance of effective and comprehensive safety and risk 
assessments  (in  line  with  the  specifications  adopted  by  the  EU  Member 
States) and incorporation of the lessons learnt, so that high safety levels can 
be achieved; 

the  promotion  of  effective  regulatory  frameworks,  procedures  and  systems  to 
ensure adequate protection against ionising radiations from radioactive materials, 
in particular from high activity radioactive sources, and their safe disposal; 

the  establishment  of  the  necessary  regulatory  framework  and  methodologies 
(including  nuclear  forensics  methods)  for  the  implementation  of  nuclear 
safeguards13, including for the proper accounting and control of fissile materials at 
State and operators level; 

the  establishment  of  effective  arrangements  for  the  prevention  of  accidents  with 
radiological consequences  as well as  the  mitigation of such consequences should 
they  occur  (monitoring  the  environment  in  case  of  releases,  design  and 
implementation  of  mitigation  and  remediation  activities),  and  for  emergency-
planning, preparedness and response, civil protection and rehabilitation measures; 

measures  to  promote  international  cooperation  (including  in  the  framework  of 
relevant international organisations, notably IAEA) in the above fields, including 
the  implementation  and  monitoring  of  international  Conventions  and  Treaties, 
exchange of information capacity building and training in the domain  of nuclear 
safety and research. 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

13 

Cooperation  in  this  domain  is  limited  to  the  technical  aspects  of  safeguards,  the  non-proliferation  aspects 
should be dealt within the framework of the IFS. 

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The  above  measures  should  not  be  limited  to  countries  operating  (or  with  foreseen) 
nuclear  power  plants,  but  also  include  those  having  civil  nuclear  installations  and 
radiological  practices, 
laboratories, 
radioactive  waste  management  facilities,  uranium  ore  mining  and  processing  sites.  As 
such,  cooperation  will  extend  to  countries  that  may  neither  have  nor  have  planned  the 
construction of nuclear power plants. 

inter  alia,  research  reactors  and 

including, 

3.2. 

Consistency with external action priorities 

The measures adopted in the framework of cooperation in the domain of nuclear safety 
must be consistent with the EU’s overall strategic policy framework. In particular they 
must  be  consistent  with  the  overall  cooperation  framework  established  with  single 
partner countries. 

3.3. 

Consistency with other EU policies 

Consistency  with  the  measures  envisaged  in  the  domain  of  chemical,  biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation, in the framework of the IFS must be 
ensured,  particularly  those  related  to  nuclear  safety,  including  countering  illicit 
trafficking  of  nuclear  and  radiological  materials,  border  control  and  emergency 
preparedness. 

3.4. 

Geographical/thematic coverage 

The need to focus the nuclear safety cooperation in the EU neighbourhood and accession 
countries  is  obvious.  Nevertheless,  it  should  not  exclude  the  possibility  for  actions  in 
other  geographical  areas,  as  appropriate  (in  particular  if  EU  overseas  territories  are 
concerned). Criteria concerning the prioritization of cooperation with third countries, the 
specific topics to be addressed (safety/safeguards/environmental remediation/other) and 
the  type  of  beneficiary  need  to  be  more  clearly  established  in  the  context  of  a  new 
regulation. 

Today, the INSC covers activities in 18 countries (see above 2.1). It could be expended 
to several (up to 10 more) additional countries of the CIS and of the neighbourhood or 
accession countries (in particular those maintaining research reactors or having no policy 
for hospital or industrial nuclear waste). 

The  specific  domains  of  nuclear  safety  listed  in  paragraph  3.1  above  should  all  be 
covered in the new regulation.  

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS  

Possible options including a 'no EU action' and a 'no change' option are discussed below. 
These  options  must  be  linked  to  the  estimated  budget  allocated  to  the  new  instrument 
(EUR 631 million). 

4.1. 

Option 0: No further EU action (no Nuclear Safety Instrument) 

Some  cooperation  activities  in  nuclear  safety  could  be  included  in  the  geographical 
cooperation  instruments  and  be  implemented  as  such.  However  this  would  create 

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difficulties regarding the legal basis of the respective instruments, as nuclear safety falls 
under the Euratom framework. 

4.2. 

Option  1:  ’No  change’  (cooperation  with  third  countries  would  continue  in  the 
framework of the existing INSC Regulation) 

The  necessary  fine-tuning  of  the  cooperation  framework,  in  view  of  the  developments 
and lessons learnt as well as the need to refocus the implementation  of the Regulation 
could be taken account of in the preparation of the Strategy Papers. However this option 
would  not  allow  for  a  revision  of  the  geographic  scope  and  for  a  new  setting  of  the 
criteria  for  cooperation  and  priorities  in  the  regulation.  In  addition,  it  would  not  be  in 
line with the proposed budget. 

4.3. 

Option 2: Amend the INSC Regulation 

An  amended  Regulation  may  provide  for  taking  into  account  the  evolution  of  the 
international  situation  on  nuclear  safety,  for  incorporating  the  lessons  learnt  and  the 
criteria  for  cooperation.  This  would  permit  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  limits  of 
intervention  when  considering  cooperation  projects,  leading  to  a  simplification  and  a 
more efficient decision-making process than is the case for the existing regulation. 

The amended regulation could also provide for a revision of the geographical scope to 
include the countries in the pre-accession process (currently covered by the Instrument 
for  Pre-Accession  (IPA))  whenever  such  an  extension  proves  to  be  relevant  (e.g.  for 
supporting  nuclear  regulations  for  countries  which  decided  to  embark  into  nuclear 
energy  production,  prevention  of  illicit  trafficking  of  nuclear  materials).  However  IPA 
will  continue  to  be  used  for  actions  that  support  the  candidate  countries  and  potential 
candidates in order to be eventually in line with the EU acquis, i.e. the Euratom Treaty 
and related Euratom Council Directives plus the International Conventions to which the 
EU is a party. 

The geographic scope would thus include all ‘third countries’ (non EU Member States) 
which satisfy the  criteria for cooperation. This option would include countries covered 
by  the  IPA  as  well  as  industrialized  /  high  income  countries.  The  latter  should  be 
included only to allow for exceptional measures to be undertaken, for example following 
major  nuclear  accidents,  as  in  the  case  with  Fukushima  in  Japan,  if  needed  and 
appropriate. 

In addition, an amended Regulation could provide for more clarification on the range of 
cooperation  with  countries  that  neither  have  nuclear  power  plants  in  operation  nor  are 
expected to embark into nuclear power programmes, but seek nonetheless cooperation in 
the  domain  of  the  management  of  radioactive  waste,  decommissioning  and  the  related 
licensing issues. 

A  specific  mandate  to  cooperate  in  large  scale and long-term projects  for  the  recovery 
and  management  of  sunken  radioactive  objects  in  the  Arctic  Sea  or  on  sites  with 
dispersed  radioactive  sources  and  to  address  the  remediation  of  uranium  legacy  sites 
(worldwide)  could  be  included.  Participation  in  international  funds  to  address  these 
issues would be fully possible within the foreseen budgets. 

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Detailed guidance on criteria for cooperation with third countries and the priorities could 
be provided in an annex to the regulation. 

4.4. 

Option 3: New instrument 

Safety,  security  and  safeguards  are  complementary.  Clearly  security  (protection)  and 
safety  are  closely  related  as  safety  necessarily  contributes  towards  protection.  A  new 
instrument  could  provide  for  a  unified  approach  towards  nuclear  safety,  security  and 
safeguards (the ‘3S’) and further explore the synergies between the INSC and the IFS. In 
this case, the issues related to radiological and nuclear materials risk mitigation, which 
are presently addressed in the framework of the IFS, would be covered by an ‘extended’ 
INSC Regulation. 

5. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

5.1. 

Likely economic, social and environmental impacts of each of the options 

Nuclear  accidents  may  have  dramatic  economic,  social  and  environmental  impacts,  as 
demonstrated  by  the  Chernobyl  accident  (1986)  and  the  Fukushima  accident  (2011). 
They  may  affect  also  the  health  of  populations.  Both  accidents  produced  large 
contaminated  areas,  fatalities,  displacement  /  resettlement  of  affected  population  and 
resulted  in  the  need  to  decommission  /  dismantle  very  expensive  nuclear  power  plants 
and to replace the lost power generating capacity. Such accidents disrupt economic and 
social  life  and  affect  the  choices  concerning  the  energy  mix  in  some  countries 
(moratorium or phasing out nuclear energy). Furthermore they may have an impact on 
the  environment  as  the  replacement  power  plants may  require, for example,  the use of 
fossil fuels or hydropower.  

The  EU  proposed  actions  are  intended  to  help  prevent  the  occurrence  of  nuclear 
accidents  and  to  minimize  and  mitigate  their  consequences  (through  emergency 
preparedness  measures)  should  they  occur.  Each  of  the  above  options  pursues  these 
objectives.  However,  option  0  would  be  likely  to  discontinue  most  of  the  on-going 
actions undertaken by the EU on nuclear safety. 

5.2. 

Impacts on external action, in particular on Policy Coherence for Development 

Except for option 0, which would discontinue cooperation on nuclear safety with third 
countries, no specific impacts are anticipated on Policy Coherence for Development. 

However  the  external  action  in  the  domain  of  nuclear  safety  would  appear  to  be  more 
effective if an amended Regulation is adopted which would resolve the shortcomings of 
the present INSC. 

5.3. 

Impact in terms of management / implementation modalities 

There  appears  to  be  no  major  differences  in  the  implementation  modalities  of  the 
Options  1,  2  and  3  outlined  above.  Option  3  would  maintain  the  present  situation  and 
role of the EEAS, but Options 1 and 2, concerning regulations whose legal basis is the 
Euratom  Treaty,  would  imply  a  leading  role  for  the  Commission  services  both  at  the 

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policy definition level and at the implementation level. In any case, coherence with EU’s 
external action and external policy strategies must be ensured. 

Option  0  would  raise  major  problems  with  the  legal  basis  as  well  as  implementation 
issues due to the difficulties in mobilising the necessary resources and specific expertise 
in the context of the geographic instruments.  

6. 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS  

6.1.  Weighing of positive and negative impacts per option 

Option  0  -  limited  cooperation  might  still  be  possible  in  the  framework  of  the 
geographical instruments, but it would likely lead to the discontinuation of most of the 
on-going  actions  on  nuclear  safety,  including  cooperation  with  nuclear  regulatory 
authorities  in  the  EU  neighbourhood  countries.  It  would  have  a  definite  impact  on  the 
credibility of the EU vis-à-vis the partner countries with which it is already engaged in 
cooperation in the domains of nuclear safety and safeguards.  

This  option  would  require  a  multiple  legal  basis.  During  the  implementation  phase  it 
may raise difficulties due to the requirement for specific competences on nuclear safety 
as well as in coordination. The fragmentation would also lead to a possible reduction in 
the visibility of the EU actions. 

Should  this  option  be  pursued,  the  basic  objectives  and  the  underlying  issues  risk  not 
being addressed by the EU.  

Option 1 - would simply extend the application of the INSC through the period 2014-
2020.  It  would  basically  leave  the  situation  as  it  is,  with  the  current  problems  of 
interpretation  and  implementation  not  being  addressed  in  the  Regulation  but  left  to  be 
defined  in  high-level  programming  documents  (e.g.  Strategy  Paper  and  Multi-Annual 
Indicative  Programme),  whose  definition  might  remain  controversial  and  time-
consuming.  

This option has the advantage of simplifying discussion and using the current structure 
and experience gained in the previous period. However it would miss the opportunity to 
provide  a  clearer  mandate  to  address  consequences  of  nuclear  accidents  (through 
dedicated mitigation activities), to better define the scope currently covered by the INSC 
and  IFS  concerning  issues  related  to  nuclear  safeguards  and  to  clarify  the  criteria  and 
priorities for cooperation with third countries.  

Should this option be pursued, the outstanding issues in the implementation of the INSC 
would not be addressed or resolved. 

Option 2 - would allow the present uncertainties and inconsistencies to be resolved and 
provide  the  opportunity  to  clearly  establish  the  future  focus  of  EU  cooperation  in  the 
domain of nuclear safety and safeguards. A revised Regulation would provide a clearer 
basis  for  the  development  of  the  Strategy  papers  and  Multi-annual  Indicative 
Programmes. The clearer definition of geographic and thematic objectives and priorities 
in  the  regulation  itself  would  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  implementation  of  the 

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instrument.  A  more  effective  and  timely  management  of  the  project  cycle  could 
therefore be expected. 

In  comparison  with  options  0  and  3,  it  would  allow  for  continuity  and  the  use  of  the 
experience of a well tried system, while resolving a number of issues which have been 
identified.  This,  as  well  as  the  utilization  of  a  single  legal  basis,  would  simplify  the 
approach  and  the  discussions  on  the  new  instrument.  This  appears  to  more  than 
compensate for a possible greater coherence to be gained by an entirely new instrument 
covering nuclear safety, security and safeguards (option 3).  

Option  3  -  could  provide  for  a  unified  approach  towards  nuclear  safety,  security  and 
safeguards  (the  ‘3S’)  and  resolving  the  outstanding  overlapping  /  conflict  between  the 
INSC and the IFS. However, while resolving the overlapping / conflict of interpretation 
between  nuclear  safeguards  and  nuclear  security  measures  (which  might  include  not 
only  illicit  trafficking  but  also,  e.g.,  nuclear  forensics),  it  would  maintain  the  need  for 
close coordination with other risk mitigation actions (chemical and biological).  

In  addition,  the  discussion  of  such  a  new  instrument  would  likely  be  problematic  and 
time-consuming due to the complexity of the dual legal basis and the prerogatives of the 
EU  Member  States  on  security  matters.  The  adoption  of  a  dual  legal  basis  might  also 
have  an  impact  on  the  consistency  with  the  approach  on  matters  under  the  exclusive 
competences established under the Euratom Treaty (nuclear safety and safeguards). 

It  appears  preferable  to  resolve  the  identified  issues  by  better  coordination  during  the 
elaboration of strategy papers and the implementation phase of separate regulations for 
the INSC and IFS. 

6.2. 

Trade-offs and synergies associated with the options 

Option  2  can  be  regarded  as  an  improvement  of  the  situation  relative  to  option  1.  If 
adopted, it is expected to simplify the implementation of future cooperation on nuclear 
safety and safeguards with third countries.  

Option  3  would  take  advantage  of  the  synergies  between  the  actions  currently 
undertaken  in  the  context  of  the  INSC  and  IFS,  however  it  would  require  complex 
negotiations and might not lead to a major simplification of the current situation (option 
1). 

6.3. 

Preferred option 

Option 2 appears to be the one offering the most advantageous solution while providing 
for  continuity  of  the  EU’s  actions  and  resolving  the  problems  experienced  in  the 
implementation of the current Regulation.  

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION  

7.1. 

Core indicators of progress towards objectives  

The INSC is an enabling Regulation establishing the essential elements and the basis for 
the EU intervention. The annual action programmes detail the activities to be carried out 

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by the EU, including the objectives pursued by the respective actions and the expected 
results.  Specific  indicators  are  defined  prior  to  implementation,  having  in  mind  the 
particularities of each action.  

The  implementation  of  the  actions  complies  with  performance-based  management. 
which serves the following purposes: 

– 

– 

– 

making the most of limited resources; 

improving decision making processes and decisions; 

achieving transparency and accountability. 

A  performance  management  system  involves  the  setting  of  objectives,  the  decision  of 
how  to  measure  progress  and  the  selection  of  indicators.  This  implies  a  three  stage 
process, firstly a sound analysis of the policies with a common understanding – through 
policy  dialogue  –  of  the  objectives  and  of  the  logical  linkages  between  the  objectives, 
activities and outcomes. Next comes the question of identifying what can be measured in 
relation  to  the  objectives,  which  of  the  purposes  above  it  serves  and  the  availability, 
reliability and precision of statistical data, including such questions as the frequency of 
measurement and the use of proxy indicators. Finally the decisions need to be codified to 
the link between the programmes, the methods of calculation, the interpretive framework 
and the allocation of responsibility for their provision. 

The success of the nuclear safety cooperation with third countries in achieving the above 
objectives may be assessed, inter alia, through the following results indicators. 

Results indicators 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

Number  and  importance  of  issues  identified  during  IAEA  Integrated 
Regulatory  Review  Service 
(concerning  nuclear 
regulators); 

(IRRS)  missions 

Number and importance of issues identified during IAEA Operational Safety 
Review Team (OSART) missions (concerning nuclear operators); 

Number  and  importance  of  reported  nuclear  safety  incidents,  by  the 
respective country; 

Signature and ratification of international treaties and conventions; 

Status  of  development  and  implementation  of  spent  fuel  and  nuclear  waste 
strategies; 

For ‘emerging countries’, number and importance of issues identified during 
IAEA IRRS missions and progress in ‘Establishing the Safety Infrastructure 
for Nuclear Power Programme’ (Ref IAEA DS 424). 

– 

Number and importance of irregularities in IAEA nuclear safeguards reports. 

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7.2. 

Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements  

The  European  Commission's  Monitoring  and  Evaluation  systems  are  increasingly 
focussed on results. They involve internal staff as well as external expertise.  

in  Delegations  and  Headquarters  continuously  monitor 

the 
Task  Managers 
implementation  of  projects  and  programmes  in  various  ways,  including  wherever 
possible  through  field  visits.  Monitoring  provides  valuable  information  on  progress;  it 
helps managers to identify actual and potential bottlenecks, and to take corrective action. 

External,  independent  experts  are  contracted  to  assess  the  performance  of  EU  external 
actions through three different systems. These assessments contribute to accountability, 
and  to  the  improvement  of  ongoing  interventions;  they  also  draw  lessons  from  past 
experience  to  inform  future  policies  and  actions.  The  tools  all  use  the  internationally-
recognised OECD-DAC evaluation criteria including (potential) impact. 

Firstly,  at  the  project  level,  the  Headquarters-managed  Results  Oriented  Monitoring 
(ROM)  system  provides  a  brief,  focused  snapshot  of  the  quality  of  a  sample  of 
interventions.  Using  a  highly  structured,  standardised  methodology,  independent  ROM 
experts attribute grades which highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the project and 
give recommendations on how to improve effectiveness.  

Project-level evaluations, which are managed by the EU Delegations (when they are in 
charge  of  the  projects),  deliver  a  more  detailed,  in  depth  analysis  and  help  project 
managers  to  improve  ongoing  interventions  and  prepare  future  ones.  External, 
independent  experts  with  thematic  and  geographic  expertise  are  hired  to  conduct  the 
analysis  and  gather  feedback  and  evidence  from  all  stakeholders,  not  least  the  final 
beneficiaries. 

The Commission also conducts strategic evaluations of its policies, from programming 
and strategy to the implementation of interventions in a specific sector (such as health, 
education etc), in a country or region, or of a specific instrument. These evaluations are 
an  important  input  to  the  formulation  of  policies  and  the  design  of  instruments  and 
projects.  These  evaluations  are  all  published  on  the  Commission's  website  and  a 
summary  of  the  findings  is  included  in  the  Annual  Report  to  the  Council  and  the 
European Parliament. 

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