COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2011-12-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU financial instrument, economic development, pre-accession aid, regional cooperation, social development, third country

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1463 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

establishing and Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) 

{COM(2011) 838 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1462 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
1. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION  

Article  49  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  stipulates  that  any  European  State  which 
respects  the  EU  values  referred  to  in  Article  2  of  the  Treaty  and  is  committed  to 
promoting  them  may  apply  to  become  a  member  of  the  Union.  The  rationale  for 
continuing with the enlargement of the EU was re-affirmed in the Council conclusions of 
14 December 2010: “Enlargement reinforces peace, democracy and stability in Europe, 
serves  the  EU’s  strategic  interests,  and  helps  the  EU  to  better  achieve  its  policy 
objectives  in  important  areas  which  are  key  to  economic  recovery  and  sustainable 
growth”.  

Currently,  the  EU  is  negotiating  or  has  association  agreements  with  5  candidate 
countries1 and 4 potential candidates2. Before 2014, at least one candidate country should 
become a Member State, and some potential candidates may become candidate countries. 
With the exception of Iceland, the level of socio-economic development in enlargement 
countries  is  generally  well  below  the  EU  average.  There  is  a  need  for  substantial 
investments  to  align  their  legislation  and  institutions  to  EU  standards,  to  allow  them  to 
withstand  the  competitive  pressures  of  the  single  market  and  to  take  onboard  the 
obligations  of  membership.  In  addition,  political  stability,  democracy,  the  respect  of 
human rights and good governance – all fundamental values of the EU – still need to be 
strengthened. Weak public institutions and administrative capacity and gaps in the level 
of  human  resources  development  affect  negatively  the  effective  and  sustainable 
deployment of EU assistance.  

Enlargement  countries  cannot  sustain  alone  the  cost  of  all  the  reforms  and  investments 
needed for joining the EU. It is equally in the own interest of the EU that these countries 
benefit from efficient and effective support in preparation for eventual membership. As 
the needs of each country and their ‘path to accession’ vary markedly, a one-size-fits-all 
approach to delivery of the assistance as foreseen by the current pre-accession instrument 
is not the most efficient solution since it does not take into account each country’s own 
reform priorities. In addition, in order to increase effectiveness, the strategic and result-
oriented character EU assistance needs to be further reinforced.  

2. 

ANALYSIS OF SUBSIDIARITY  

Enlargement policy is part of the external action and contributes to meeting the common 
objectives in terms of global challenges, global response and global leadership.  

The successive enlargement of the EU is by its very nature a common task which can be 
pursued  only  at  EU  level.  Only  the  Member  States  acting  together  can  decide  on  the 
accession requests by new candidates. The pre-accession assistance provided through the 

1 
2 

Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Turkey 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia as well as Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99 

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2 

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EU budget is designed to help candidate countries/potential candidates prepare for future 
membership: the instrument for pre-accession assistance is built to give countries a “test 
run”  of  obligations  of  membership  before  accession.  No  other  multilateral  or  bilateral 
instrument can provide such a comprehensive toolbox, and only the EU can define what 
kind of assistance is needed to prepare for taking over the acquis. 

to  candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates,  acknowledging 

In  recent  years  EU  Member  States  have  been  reducing  the  level  of  their  bilateral 
that 
assistance 
coordinated  action  at  EU  level  is  more  effective.  About  half  of  the  overall  financial 
assistance  of  the  EU  to  the  enlargement  countries  in  recent  years  came  from  the  EU 
budget. Multilateral donor organisations have largely phased out their support and those 
that remain have now aligned their programmes to the EU's priorities. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES OF EU INITIATIVE 

The  new  instrument  should  continue  to  pursue  the  general  objective  of  supporting 
candidate countries and potential candidates in their preparations for EU membership and 
help  the  progressive  alignment  of  their  national  systems/economies  with  the  standards 
and policies of the European Union, according to their specific needs and adapted to their 
individual enlargement agenda.  

In  terms  of  results  and  impacts  to  be  achieved,  the  new  instrument  should  have  the 
following specific policy objectives: 

–  Support political reforms needed to meet the criteria for accession; 

–  Support  economic,  social  and  territorial  development  and  reforms,  aiming  at  a 

sustainable, smart and inclusive growth;  

–  Increase beneficiary countries' ability to assume the obligations of membership; 

–  Regional integration and territorial cooperation. 

In addition, with regard to how the new instrument should work in order to achieve the 
specific policy objectives, the following methodological ('Regulation specific') objectives 
should be pursued: 

–  Strengthen  further  the  link  between  financial  assistance  and  the  Enlargement  policy 

agenda, making the assistance more strategic;  

–  Increase  further  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  assistance  and  bring  more 

tangible and sustainable results and impact;  

–  Allow  for  increased  flexibility  in  the  way  the  instrument  operates  and  allocates  the 
assistance,  whilst  preserving  ownership  and  accountability  by  the  beneficiary 
countries for each policy area;  

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–  Leverage  more  funds  from  other  donors  or  the  private  sector  by  using  innovative 

financing instruments; 

–  Pursue simplification and reduction of the administrative burden linked to managing 

the financial assistance. 

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS  

In  light  of  the  problem  identified  and  in  order  to  achieve  the  specific  policy  and 
methodological  objectives,  the  Commission  considered  the  following  options  for  the 
future instrument for pre-accession assistance:  

Option 1 - “No change": keep the current component structure and its focus.  

Option 2 - “Amend the existing Regulation”, with the following alternatives: 

–  Sub-option  2.1  -  "Reduce  scope  and  keep  implementation  arrangements”, 
focusing  on  the  necessary  legal  and  institutional  changes  needed  to  comply  with  the 
accession  criteria,  without  committing  any  significant  funds  for  co-financing  public 
investment for socio-economic development.  

–  Sub-option  2.2  -  “Keep  the  component  structure  and  add  more  focus  on 
investments”  in  order  to  increase  the  socio-economic  impact  in  the  beneficiary 
countries and to speed up their preparation for managing structural, cohesion and rural 
development funds.  

–  Sub-option  2.3:  “Maintain  the  scope  and  adjust  implementation  arrangements”, 
covering both compliance with the accession criteria and support for socio-economic 
development. In addition, adjust aspects of the current IPA set-up and implementation 
modalities.  

Option 3: "Design a new instrument". This option was not analysed in detail. 

5. 

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS  

The economic impact of the various options was assessed in terms of the likelihood that 
the options would: i) delay or accelerate enlargement and therefore the positive economic 
impact of the expansion of the internal market; ii) maintain or reduce costs to the EU and 
Member  States  in  terms  of  security  measures  and  risks,  border  controls  and  irregular 
migration; iii) constrain or improve the possibilities for better economic integration, e.g. 
through improved integration with the Trans-European Networks; iv) affect positively or 
negatively the confidence of donors and investors in the beneficiary countries.  

The  social  impact  of  the  various  options  was  assessed  in  terms  of  the  likely  effect  on 
poverty and exclusion in the enlargement countries linked to progress towards accession 
and the creation of conditions for improved economic performance and policy measures 

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that could address these issues. Likely effects in terms of risks that the rights in the area 
of  justice  and  the  rule  of  law  could  be  jeopardised  in  the  beneficiary  countries  as  a 
consequence of delays in and risks to accession taking place were also considered.  

The  environmental  impact  of  the  options  was  assessed  in  terms  of  the  likelihood  that 
environmental costs would accrue if enlargement was delayed or put at risk, due to lower 
environmental  standards  being  used  for  generating  competitive  advantage  in  the 
beneficiary countries and/or to delays in implementing the expensive investments needed 
to align with the EU environmental acquis. 

Reducing  the  scope  of  the  instrument  and  keeping  the  implementation  arrangements 
(option 2.1) was assessed to have more negative impacts than the no change (baseline) 
scenario with regard to reducing the development gap between the beneficiary countries 
and  the  EU,  therefore  delaying  enlargement  and  the  related  positive  economic  benefits. 
On  the  other  hand  this  option  would  be  effective  in  helping  achieve  political  reforms 
needed for accession. Compared to this option and the 'no change' option, more positive 
impacts  were  expected  to  accrue  from  the  other  two  options,  ie  either  keeping  the 
component structure and adding more focus on investments (option 2.2), or maintaining 
the scope and adjusting implementation arrangements (option 2.3), though with different 
scores  for  the  individual  aspects.  The  improved  modalities  for  delivering  the  assistance 
foreseen  under  option  2.3,  increasing  the  focus,  coherence,  efficiency,  effectiveness, 
leverage  and  impact  of  the  assistance,  and  the  reinforced  emphasis  on  public 
administration reform supporting more sustainable results, were assessed to bring overall 
more  positive  impacts  than  those  resulting  from  increased  investments  for  socio-
economic development under option 2.2.  

6. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS  

The  following  table  provides  a  comparison  of  the  policy  options  as  to  how  they  would 
influence the underlying drivers of the problem that they would address: 

Negative or very negative impact: 
Neutral impact: 
Positive or very positive impact: 

- or -- 
0 
+ or ++ 

Effect on the underlying driver of 
the problem 

Option 1 
(no change) 

Option 2.1 
(reduced scope) 

Option 2.2 
(focus on 
investments) 

Efficiency 
Effectiveness 
Coherence 
Reduced development gap 
Reinforced institutions 
Addresses heterogeneity 
Assistance becomes more: 

strategic and result oriented

- 
+ 
- 
- 
++ 
0 

+ 

- 
+ 
- 
++ 
0 
+ 

+ 

- 
0 
- 
+ 
+ 
0 

0 

5 

EN 

Option 2.3 
(adjust 
implementation 
arrangements) 
++ 
++ 
++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 

+ 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
flexible and tailor-made
simplified, efficient, effective 

0 
0 

0 
0 

0 
0 

+ 
+ 

In conclusion, maintaining the scope and adjusting implementation arrangements (option 
2.3) is preferred as it would combine the benefits (and impacts) of the current scope of 
pre-accession  assistance  (accession  driven  with  socio  economic  development  impact) 
while  improving  the  implementation  modalities  of  the  instrument  to  make  it  more 
strategic, result-oriented, flexible and tailor-made to needs.  

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

Under the selected option, monitoring and evaluation arrangements will be reinforced in 
comparison  to  the  current  situation.  The  proposed  changes  will  improve  the  focus  on 
results  and  alignment  with  the  Europe  2020  strategy.  They  will  -  as  called  for  by  the 
budget review - provide for the definition of specific, measurable, achievable objectives 
as well as for appropriate indicators. The main macro-indicators would be:  

–  Progress  toward  meeting  the  accession  benchmarks  (chapters  opened/closed)  or 
implementation  of  the  Association  Agreements  as  reflected,  among  others,  by 
positive  Progress  Reports,  survey-based  indices  compiled  by  reputable  international 
organisations in areas such as government effectiveness; political stability and absence 
of violence; the rule of law; 

–  Socio-economic  evolution,  as  measured  by  impact  indicators  such  as  the  UNDP's 
human  development  index  as  a  general  measure  of  prosperity;  unemployment  rates; 
foreign direct investment inflows; trade; 

–  Regional  cooperation  and  integration,  as  measured  by  survey-based  indices 
reflecting perceptions on the level (trend) of security and stability; political, economic 
and  cultural  interactions,  as  well  as  by  measures  reflecting  the  integration  of  Trans 
European Networks.  

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