COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2011-12-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU financial instrument, cross-border cooperation, international trade, sustainable development, third country

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1475 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

on establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries 

{COM(2011) 843 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1476 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
Table of Contents 

1. 

2. 

1.1. 
1.2. 
1.3. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES .............................. 3 
ORGANISATION AND TIMING................................................................................................................. 3 
CONSULTATION AND EXPERTISE (PUBLIC AND INTERNAL) .................................................................... 3 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT BOARD ............................................................................................................... 4 
PROBLEM DEFINITION.......................................................................................................................... 5 

2.2. 
2.3. 
2.4. 
2.5. 

THE PROBLEM REQUIRING ACTION AND THE SCOPE OF THE CURRENT INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES 

2.1. 
INSTRUMENT (ICI) .............................................................................................................................................. 5 
2.1.1.  Defining the problem....................................................................................................................... 5 
2.1.2. 
Scope of current Instrument (ICI) ................................................................................................... 6 
2.1.3.  How is the money spent today? ....................................................................................................... 6 
2.1.4.  Evolution of the overall context since the adoption of the current Instrument................................ 7 
REVIEW OF EVALUATION REPORTS AND LESSONS LEARNT .................................................................... 7 
THE UNDERLYING DRIVERS OF THE PROBLEM ....................................................................................... 9 
LEGAL BASE FOR EU ACTION.............................................................................................................. 10 
EU ADDED VALUE ............................................................................................................................. 10 
3.  OBJECTIVES............................................................................................................................................ 11 
POLICY CONTEXT................................................................................................................................ 11 
OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................................................ 12 
CONSISTENCY WITH EXTERNAL ACTION PRIORITIES............................................................................ 13 
CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER EU POLICIES............................................................................................ 13 
GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE AND SCOPE.............................................................................................. 15 
4.  OPTIONS ................................................................................................................................................... 17 

3.1. 
3.2. 
3.3. 
3.4. 
3.5. 

5.  ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS ....................................................................................................................... 18 
LIKELY ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS.............................................................. 19 
IMPACT IN TERMS OF MANAGEMENT / IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES................................................ 23 
6.  COMPARING THE OPTIONS ............................................................................................................... 23 

5.1. 
5.2. 

7.  MONITORING AND EVALUATION .................................................................................................... 24 
CORE INDICATORS OF PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVES .................................................................... 25 
MONITORING ...................................................................................................................................... 26 

7.1. 
7.2. 

ANNEXES .................................................................................................................................. 28 

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1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  

1.1. 

Organisation and timing 

The drafting of the Impact Assessment for the EU external action instruments for the period 
2014-2020,  including  this  document1,  has  been  coordinated  by  a  Task  Force  composed  by 
services  in  charge  of  EU  external  action  and  the  Legal  Service.  The  drafting  teams, 
appointed on 7 June 2011, have duly taken into consideration the consultations, reviews and 
studies  mentioned  in  Section  2  and  have  liaised  with  other  Commission  services  to  ensure 
consistency with other EU policies. The Task Force has met with the drafting team in charge 
of this Impact Assessment on 7 June, 30 June, 14 July and 2 August 2011 for organisational 
and quality-check purposes. 

An Impact Assessment Steering Group, composed by the members of the Task Force and 
representatives  of  interested Directorates General and the Secretariat General, was launched 
on 22 June 2011 It has met twice, on 13 and 26 of July 2011. 

The review of this Impact Assessment by the Impact Assessment Board is scheduled on 14 
September 2011. 

In  line  with  Art  27  of  the  Financial  regulation  (Council  Regulation(EC,  Euratom)  No 
1605/2002) and article 21 of the Implementing rules of the Financial Regulation (Commission 
Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  No  2342/2002),  the  present  impact  assessment  is  the  ex-ante 
evaluation of the Partnership Instrument (PI). 

1.2. 

Consultation and expertise (public and internal) 

The  European  Commission  held  a  public  consultation  on  future  funding  for  EU  external 
action between 26 November 2010 and 31 January 2011. This process was based on an online 
questionnaire accompanied by a background paper 'What funding for EU external action after 
2013?' prepared by Commission and EEAS services involved. The 220 contributions received 
to the public consultation reflected a broad and diverse spectrum representing the variety of 
structures, views and traditions characterising the external action community. 

A  majority  of  the  respondents  (around  70%)  confirmed  that  EU  financial  intervention 
provided substantial added value in the main policy areas supported through EU Financial 
Instruments for external action2. The criterion of EU added value was put forward by many 
respondents as the main driver for the future: they considered that the EU should exploit its 
comparative  advantage  linked  to  its  global  field  presence,  its  wide-ranging  expertise,  its 
supranational nature, its role as facilitator of coordination, and exploit economies of scale.  

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The  instruments  are  the  following:  Internal  Agreement  for  the  11th  European  Development  Fund,  Development  Cooperation 
Instrument,  Instrument  for  Pre-Accession  assistance,  European  Neighbourhood  Instrument,  Instrument  for  Stability,  Instrument 
for  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation,  European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and  Human  Rights,  Partnership  Instrument  and  the 
instruments  for  the  EU-Greenland  Partnership.  The  Macro-Financial  Assistance  instrument,  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security 
Policy, the Humanitarian aid instrument and the Civil Protection mechanism are not part of this joint exercise. 
i.e. peace and security, poverty reduction, humanitarian aid, investing in stability and growth in enlargement and neighbourhood 
countries,  tackling  global  challenges,  promoting  EU  and  international  standards and  values,  and  supporting  growth  and 
competitiveness abroad 

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Nearly  all  respondents  (92%)  supported  a  more  differentiated  approach,  tailored  to  the 
situation  of  the  beneficiary  country,  based  on  sound  criteria  and  efficient  data  collection,  in 
order to increase the impact of EU financial instruments. 

Opinions  were  mixed  on  simplification  of  the  Instruments  and  the  balance  between 
geographic and thematic Instruments. Many feared that possible reduction in the number of 
EU  thematic  programmes  could  imply  a  decrease  in  the  overall  amount  available  for 
thematic  action,  and  instead  called  for  a  simplification  of  the  rules  governing  access  and 
implementation  of  thematic  funding.  Increased  flexibility  of  the  geographic  limits  of  EU 
Instruments was supported by a significant majority of respondents as a way to respond to 
interregional challenges.  

When  asked  to  prioritise  among  different  areas  of  interests,  most  interested  persons  and 
stakeholders indicated 'macro-economic and financial stability, economic growth', 'promotion 
of  trade  and  investments',  followed  by  'energy,  resource  efficiency  and  climate  change'  and 
'employment and social issues (inclusive growth and decent work)'. 

A vast majority of respondents also agreed that private sector is the main engine for economic 
development  and  thus  contributes  significantly  to  sustainable  growth.  For  this  reason  they 
advocate a more extensive EU engagement with the business community as a partner in 
the  EU  and  in  third  countries  in  order  to  involve  increasingly  the  private  sector  –  both 
financially and in terms of knowledge gathering - as a driver for sustainable development. 

Many  respondents  agreed  that  joint  programming  and  co-financing  with  Member  States 
could increase the impact  and  the coherence of EU  external  action, simplify the delivery of 
aid and reduce overall transaction costs. 

With  respect  to  performance  evaluation,  a stronger  focus  on  monitoring  activities  during 
project  and  programme  implementation  as  well  as  greater  simplification  of  the  rules 
governing external financing receive a wide approval of contributors as a means to ensure that 
EU external instruments deliver the expected impact. 

A larger part of stakeholders supported increasing information and communication activities 
to  enhance  the  visibility  of  EU  external  funding,  in  particular  in  beneficiary  countries; 
however  EU  visibility  appears  to  be  better  served  by  effective  policies,  strategies  and 
presence  in  third  countries,  than  by  additional  spending  for  communication.  The  idea  of 
reinforcing  the  EU's  coordinating  role  among  other  donors  and  of  ensuring  that 
implementing  partners  give  more  visibility  to  EU  funding  also  had  strong  support  from 
stakeholders. 

1.3. 

Impact Assessment Board  

The  Partnership  Instrument’s  draft  Impact  Assessment  was  submitted  to  the  Board  on  5 
August 2011. The Board issued its opinion on16 September 2011. The Board recommended 
that the Report should be improved in various respects in particular as regards:  

1) Strengthen the analysis of the problems  

2) Improve the design and the presentation of the policy options  

3) Analyze better the expected impacts 

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4) Expand the presentation of stakeholders’views 

5) Improve the procedure and presentation 

The  recommendations  of  the  Board  have  been  incorporated  into  the  present  version  of  the 
Report. 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION  

2.1. 

The  problem  requiring  action  and  the  scope  of  the  current  Industrialised 
Countries Instrument (ICI)  

2.1.1.  Defining the problem 

Through the changes over recent years, the world has seen the emergence of economies such 
as  India,  China  and  Brazil  which  are  playing  an  increasingly  important  role  in  the 
international economy and trade, in multilateral fora (UN, G-20) and in addressing challenges 
of global concern. These countries are progressively graduating from development status. 

The  EU  has  been  developing  broad  binding  agreements  with  key  partners  and  emerging 
economies – for instance, the Free Trade Agreement with Korea in 2011; the Partnership for 
Modernisation with Russia launched in 2010; the Strategic Partnership with Brazil in 2007 – 
to  address  matters  of  shared  responsibility  and  resolve  bilateral  issues.  It  is  also  defining 
concrete  proposals  –  as  an  example  the  Free  Trade  Agreement  and  parallel  broad  based 
Framework  Agreement  with  Japan  –  on  how  to  take  forward  these  bilateral  dynamic 
relationships  encompassing  aspects  of  economic  relations  as  well  as  other  important 
dimensions of partnership. 

The  financing  Instrument  for  Cooperation  with  Industrialised  and  other  high  income 
countries  and  territories  (ICI)3,  which  came  into  force  in  2007,  has  been  the  EU’s  main 
vehicle  for  collaboration  with  highly  developed  countries.  It  has  a  wider  scope  than  its 
predecessor (Council Regulation 382/2001)4 which was limited to 6 countries and covered a 
smaller  range  of  activities.  The  ICI  has  constituted  an  effective  toolbox  in  providing  a 
differentiated and appropriate response to widen and deepen the cooperation with 17 countries 
(industrialised countries and high-income territories in North America, the Asia-Pacific region 
and the Gulf region). However, as it is due to expire by end 2013, a new financial instrument 
is needed to cover post-2013 cooperation with these countries. 

In 2007 and 2008, the EU budgetary authority took a step further by adopting Preparatory 
Actions  for  cooperation  with  China,  India  and  with  middle-income  countries  in  Latin 
America, Asia and South Africa in areas such as economic and business relations as well as 
in  research.  These  Preparatory  Actions  are constrained  in  time  as  they  are  limited  to  three 
years. A legislative follow-up has been proposed in 2009 to extend the ICI to these countries 
(ICI+) and it is expected to be adopted by the Parliament and the Council by the end of 2011. 

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USA, Japan, Canada, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New  Zealand); certain Asian industrialised countries and territories 
which are excluded from the DAC list of recipient countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Brunei) as well as the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) similarly excluded from 
the DAC list of ODA recipients. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2001R0382:20051212:EN:HTML  

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Although  these  activities  have  considerably  helped  the  EU  to  pursue  its  priorities  through 
bilateral cooperation and strengthened relations, they are limited by their geographical scope 
and areas of intervention and financial resources. 

2.1.2. 

Scope of current Instrument (ICI) 

The  overall  aim  of  the  current  ICI  Instrument  is  to  strengthen  the  EU’s  relationship  with 
highly developed countries and to promote its place as a key player in the global economic 
and  political  arenas  through  the  funding  of  cooperation  projects  covering  areas  of  mutual 
interests. Given the limited resources available to the ICI, achievements of the objectives are 
focused on the following areas: public diplomacy and outreach, economic partnership and 
business cooperation, and people-to-people links. 

For more details on the ICI see Annex 1. 

2.1.3.  How is the money spent today? 

For the period 2007-2013, the budget of the ICI Instrument amounts to EUR 172 million (for 
ICI+,  the  proposal  was  EUR  176  million  over  2010-2013,  but  the  Regulation  is  still  under 
discussions).  The  individual  annual  funding  allocations  are  linked  to  the  life  cycle  of  the 
programmes/projects financed under the Instrument.  

Breakdown of the budget per group of countries: 

10.400.000; 9%

7.920.000; 7%

22.205.000; 18%

80.223.000; 66%

United States
and Canada

Japan, Republic of Korea,
Australia and New Zealand

Newly industrialised
Asian countries and territories

GCC countries

Breakdown per group of activities: 

28.528.838; 24%

4.636.000; 4%

32.060.000; 27%

55.523.162; 45%

Public Diplomacy

Business cooperation

People to People links

Small-scale cooperation projects

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2.1.4.  Evolution of the overall context since the adoption of the current Instrument 

The fundamental challenge the proposed Partnership Instrument addresses is a consequence of 
globalisation: the texture of the world economy is changing, power is shifting and prosperity 
is diffusing; new players increasingly shape the international agenda. The G-20 is one symbol 
of  this  change:  the  perception  that  a  new  international  order  is  slowly  replacing  the  former 
power  structure  is  very  much  grounded  in  reality,  even  if  the  pace  of  the  change  may 
sometimes be overstated. 

In particular 

• 

• 

• 

The EU has developed broad based binding agreements with key partners and emerging 
economies to address bilateral issues and matters of global concern. The implementation 
of these agreements requires a toolbox, a dedicated financing instrument so that the EU 
has  the  means  to  promoting  its  interests  worldwide,  and  to  deal  with  global  issues 
wherever the need arises. 

The emergence of new powers such as India and China, or South Africa and Brazil, has 
changed the international order as these countries are playing an increasingly important 
role  in  international  economy  and  trade,  in  multilateral  fora  (UN,  G-20)  and  in 
addressing  challenges  of  global  concern.  Whilst  development  and  poverty  alleviation 
remain  key  concerns,  these  countries  are  progressively  leaving  behind  the  status  of 
developing nations.  

The current Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised (ICI) countries has a limited 
geographical scope; it covers only 17 countries and high income territories; whereas the 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) covers countries such as India, China, South 
Africa and Brazil but only for official development assistance expenditure. 

•  Relations  and  economic  ties  between  the  EU  and  Russia  have  evolved  considerably 
underlining  the  importance  of  Russia  as  a  strategic  partner  far  beyond  development 
cooperation. The need for financial assistance has declined. Russia aspires to a balanced 
relation  and  is  becoming  a  donor  itself.  The  proposed  Partnership  Instrument  would 
become the main instrument for cooperation with Russia.  

2.2. 

Review of evaluation reports and lessons learnt 

The Mid-Term Review (MTR) (COM/2009/196) of the financial Instrument for external 
actions,  carried  out  in  2009,  concluded  that  the  limited  scope  of  the  Development 
Cooperation  Instrument  (DCI)  was  impeding  the  financing  of  activities  which  were  not 
partner-focused  assistance  that  is  the  basis  of  Official  Development  Assistance  (ODA),  but 
were of mutual benefit in the context of the globalisation. This limitation was affecting the 
most dynamic regions of the world (e.g. Latin America, Asia, South Africa) and requires 
an  adapted  enabling  Instrument.  Indeed,  the  Instrument  for  Development  Cooperation 
(DCI) is not suitable for addressing the problem for two reasons:  

• 

firstly, it enables funding only of activities that have the promotion of the economic 
development  and  welfare  of  developing  countries  as  their  main  objective,  more 
specifically the eradication of poverty in partner countries and regions in the context 
of sustainable development, including the pursuit of the Millennium Development 

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Goals (DCI Article 1). Moreover, the EU does not dispose of any other means to 
promote its own interests in these countries. 

• 

secondly, emerging  economies  are  progressively  being  graduated  from  the  DCI 
Instrument, without an instrument to support the evolution of the relationships.  

Based  on  the  experience  of  the  Preparatory  Actions  (see  2.1  above),  the  European 
Commission  proposed  a  legislative  follow  up  to  allow  the  financing  of  such  measures  in 
countries falling under the DCI Regulation. The legislative proposal was tabled in April 2009 
(COM/2009/197). The proposal, known as ICI+, aims to extend the geographical scope of the 
current Industrialised Countries Instrument (ICI) to developing countries (including emerging 
economies) of Asia and Latin America, and to Iran, Iraq, Yemen and South Africa.  

The Mid-Term Review (MTR) also recognised that the ICI, on which the current proposal 
for a  new instrument builds on,  has provided a flexible basis to develop cooperation with a 
wider number of industrialised and high-income territories, although the financial envelope is 
rather limited.  

Even  though  there  has  been  no  strategic  evaluation  of  the  ICI,  evaluations  of  its  flagship 
programmes the “EU Gateway programme for Japan and the Republic of Korea” (financing 
EU pavilions in trade fairs) and the EU Centres (university consortia delivering "EU studies" 
modules and disseminating key information on the EU to a very broad audience) have been 
carried out in the past years and were very positive. 

Regarding  the  Executive  Training  Programme  (ETP)  (language  and  training  programmes 
for managers), the evaluation conducted in 20105 has shown that the ETP presents a unique 
offering  in  terms  of  programme  structure  (familiarity  with  Japanese  and  Korean  business 
culture are invaluable attributes) and target audience (both large and small and medium sized 
companies  value  the  programme).  It  provides  an  opportunity  to  potential  participants  from 
Member States who offer no similar initiative. Moreover, it provides a good visibility for the 
EU. The ETP has had a positive impact on EU companies committed to establishing/growing 
their business activities with Japan and Korea in terms of assisting the EU company to access 
Japanese/Korean markets; bringing sustained impact on EU companies’ business, rather than 
a short term and temporary effect, and in terms of broadening the business possibilities of EU 
companies in other Asian countries. 

The evaluation, conducted in 20106, on EU Centres (dedicated to public diplomacy) Initiative 
has shown that “the Centres are adding real value and that the Commission benefits from the 
Initiative to a great extent. The amount of work conducted by the Centres compensates by far 
the  costs  that  the  Commission  incurs  on  the  programme”.  The  programme  has  achieved  a 
solid base in those countries that have been pioneers to the Initiative (USA and Canada) and is 
successfully striving towards higher levels of maturity in Australia and New Zealand. The EU 
funding has the capacity to act as seed money, mainly by attracting other sources of funding 
that are pulled towards the Initiative to ensure its long term sustainability. 

Further information on these successful ICI programmes is detailed in Annex 2. 

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Ref  Evaluation:  Intermediate  evaluation  of  the  Executive  Training  Programme  in  Japan  and  Korea.  February  2010.  Deloitte 
consulting. 
Ref Evaluation: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/eu-centres/docs/2010_evaluation_en.pdf 

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The evaluation of the results of the Preparatory Actions7 can only be tentative as they were 
set  up  in  the  2007  and  2008  budget  procedures.  The  Preparatory  Actions  concern  four 
domains identified by the EU budgetary authorities: economic and business relations (China 
and India), research, and integrative approach to the development and practice of policy for 
EU-Asia. They cover cooperation measures, in middle income countries and other developing 
countries in Asia and Latin America, which are not fully in line with the stated objective of 
the DCI (poverty eradication in the context of sustainable development). On the whole, there 
is  no  doubt  that  the  actions  meet  genuine  and  strategic  European  needs  and  it  has  already 
become obvious that Europe needs to be able to stay the course over the medium to long term 
to achieve sustainable impact.  

2.3. 

The underlying drivers of the problem 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

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Rise of emerging economies  
Emerging  economies  are  playing  an  increasingly  important  role  in  international 
economy  and  trade,  in  multilateral  fora  (UN,  G-20)  as  well  as  in  addressing 
challenges of global concern. 

Existing instruments’ lack of flexibility 
Current Instruments lack the flexibility to bring forward bilateral agendas with these 
countries  in  a  number  of  areas  where  the  EU  needs  to  respond  swiftly  to  new 
situations while promoting its interests worldwide (Annex 3). 

Evolution of the relationship with Russia 
In recent years relations and economic ties between the EU and Russia have evolved 
considerably  underlining  the  importance  of  Russia  as  an  important  strategic 
partner. Given  the  significant  improvements  in  Russia’s  economy,  the  need  for 
financial assistance has declined. In fact, Russia aspires to a balanced relation and is 
becoming  a  donor  itself.  Thus,  the  ENPI  is  dated  in  terms  of  EU-Russian  bilateral 
financial  cooperation  and  is  not  adapted  to  meet  the  objectives  defined  in  the 
roadmaps of the EU-Russia Common Spaces and the Partnership for Modernisation. 
The main reason for bilateral cooperation with Russia to take place on the framework 
of  the  Partnership  Instrument  would  therefore  be  the  need  to  continue  cooperation 
with the EU in areas of common interests and support to civil society  (more on EU-
Russia relations in Annex 3). 

ICI’s limited geographical scope 
The  current  Instrument  for  Cooperation  with  Industrialised  (ICI)  countries  has  a 
limited  geographical  scope;  it  covers  only  17  countries  and  high-income  territories 
(industrialised countries and high-income in North America, the Asia-Pacific region 
and  the  Gulf  region).  This  does  not  allow  the  EU  to  engage  with  other  partner 
countries  that  are  interested  in  fostering  a  relationship  of  “equals”  with  the  EU.  Its 
current scope stems from this geographical limitation and is also limited in terms of 
areas of intervention and budget. 

DCI’s limited scope   
The current Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI) includes countries such 

Business  and  scientific  exchanges  with  India;  business  and  scientific  exchanges  with  China;  cooperation  with  middle-income 
group countries in Asia; and cooperation with middle-income group countries in Latin America. 

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as  India,  China,  Brazil,  and  South  Africa;  however  its  geographic  cooperation  can 
only be used for aid that meets the stated objective of the DCI (poverty eradication in 
the  context  of  sustainable  development).  Therefore  its  scope  is  restricted  as  it  does 
not  allow  engagement  with  such  countries  in  programmes  beyond  the  development 
cooperation agenda. 

• 

Preparatory Actions’ limitations in time 
These Actions were set-up as a response to the limited scope of the DCI. They are, 
however,  constrained  in  time  to  three  years.  In  2009,  the  Commission  tabled  a 
legislative  proposal,  known  as  the  ICI  +,  extending  the  geographical  scope  of  the 
current  ICI  to  DCI  developing  countries  (including  emerging  economies),  namely 
Asia, Latin America, and to Iran, Iraq, Yemen and South Africa. 

2.4. 

Legal base for EU action  

In the framework of the discussions set-up by the legislative authority on the Commission’s 
proposal  on  the  ICI+  (COM/2009/1978,  see  Section  2.2  of  this  Report),  and  following  the 
entry  into  force  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  an  understanding  on  the  use  of  Articles  207(2)9  and 
209(1)10  to  carry-out  such  activities  in  developing  countries  has  been  reached  between  the 
three  Institutions.  For  countries  “other  than  developing  countries”,  Article  212(2)11  of  the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE)12 is used.  

Further  to  that  agreement,  the  proposed  new  comprehensive  Instrument  would  therefore  be 
based on the combination of the following three articles of the TFUE: Articles 212(2), 207(2) 
and 209(1). 

2.5. 

EU Added Value  

The EU has numerous international agreements with partner countries all over the world, not 
matched by individual Member States, which gives them all influence in virtually all fields of 
international relations. With 27 Member States acting within common policies and strategies, 
only the EU has the critical weight to respond to global challenges. The EU as a global player 
has the credibility and neutrality which are not available to individual Member States. The EU 
is also in a unique position to promote EU norms and turn them into global standards through 
international cooperation.  

The proposed Partnership Instrument will demonstrate enhanced added value compared with 
the existing situation as it embraces the Europe 2020 Strategy based on green growth oriented 
cooperation,  a  stronger  emphasis  on  EU  interests  in  cooperation  with  emerging  and 
industrialised  countries  and  a  stronger  focus  on  improving  the  climate  for  business, 
investment, trade and research and innovation. It should develop a proactive agenda of mutual 
interests with partner countries with a specific focus on EU Strategic Partners. 

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12  

http://www.europeanlawmonitor.org/legislation/2009/COM2009197text.pdf 
Article 207(2) of the TFUE: The  European Parliament and the Council, acting by  means of regulations in accordance with the 
ordinary  legislative  procedure,  shall  adopt  the  measures  defining  the  framework  for  implementing  the  common  commercial 
policy. 
Article  209(1)  of  the  TFUE:  The  European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  acting  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  legislative 
procedure,  shall  adopt  the  measures  necessary  for  the  implementation  of  development  cooperation  policy,  which  may  relate  to 
multiannual cooperation programmes with developing countries or programmes with a thematic approach. 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures 
necessary for the implementation of paragraph 1. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF 

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The  new  Partnership  Instrument  would  also  better  honour  the  EU’s  commitments  towards 
third  countries  with  which  it  has  concluded  Partnership  and  Cooperation/Framework 
Agreements.  It  adds  credibility  and  consistency  to  the  EU  external  policy  of  linking  the 
promotion  of  its  values  and  interests  with  specific  cooperation  activities.  Within  the 
framework of the agreements, the Partnership Instrument could also act as a catalyst for joint 
EU and Member States projects as the EU and Member States are bound by their provisions. 
Finally,  it  would  support  the  EU’s  regional  and  bilateral  policies,  as  well  as  the  EU’s 
commitments towards regional and international cooperation processes and bodies such as the 
Arctic Council13. 

The  EU’s  economic  cooperation  activities,  business  dialogues  and  other  forms  of  external 
economic actions could be a powerful foreign policy tool. They could contribute to project the 
EU’s visibility and influence externally. It may support Europe’s ambition to become a key 
economic  and  political  actor  on  the  international  scene  both  bilaterally  and  through 
multilateral bodies such as the G-20. 

Moreover,  joint  actions  with  EU  Member  States  and  innovative  resource  mobilization 
modalities  may  become  more  frequent  and  feasible  under  the  Partnership  Instrument  as 
compared to the current situation under the ICI. More money will be available to support co-
financing  operations  implemented  in  cooperation  with  EU  Member  States  bilateral  aid  or 
financial  bodies  or  agencies.  Multiannual  programming  would  allow  more  structured  and 
integrated  business.  Public  and  private  partnerships  may  be  more  achievable,  involving 
several  actors  of  the  European  business  community.  Blending  grants  and  loans  also  may 
become a preferred option whenever relevant.  

3. 

OBJECTIVES 

3.1. 

Policy context 

In  light  of  the  evergrowing  globalisation  in  which  many  challenges  of  worldwide  concern 
have  arisen,  including  the  economy,  trade,  the  environment  and  climate  change  as  well  as 
social issues, and in order to live up to its commitments (Europe 2020 Strategy) as well as to 
promote  its  interests  overseas,  the  EU  needs  to  equip  itself  with  an  appropriate  range  of 
financial instruments. 

The Partnership Instrument would build on established frameworks and past activities carried 
out in recent years while embracing new cooperation activities to bring forward the bilateral 
agenda  and  to  support  the  implementation  of  bilateral  agreements  (Partnership  and 
Cooperation/Framework  Agreements  (PCAs),  Free  Trade  Agreements  (FTAs),  Joint  Action 
Plans, Policy Dialogues, Summits and Thematic Dialogues) with third countries. 

The Instrument should respond to the need to promote the European Union's interests globally 
and to strengthen links and to engage further with strategic partners on a bilateral, regional or 
multilateral  basis  in  order  to  create  a  more  favourable  and  transparent  environment  for  the 
development of relations between the European Union and its partner countries. 

13  

http://www.arctic-council.org/  

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3.2. 

Objectives 

General objective 

The overall aim of the Partnership Instrument is to advance and promote EU and mutual 
interests  and  to  give  the  Europe  2020  Strategy  a  global  reach,  by  responding  in  an 
effective  and  flexible  manner  to  cooperation  objectives  arising  from  the  Union's  bilateral 
relationship with partner countries and by addressing challenges of global concern, with a 
specific focus on strategic partners.  

Specific objectives 

The  Partnership  Instrument  will  be  the  main  instrument  to  support  the  cooperation  with 
industrialised countries, Russia, emerging economies. It will also support ad-hoc cooperation 
with developing countries within its scope. 

It will pursue the following specific objectives: 

a) 

b) 

c) 

implementing  the  international  dimension  of  the  “Europe  2020”  strategy  by 
supporting  EU  bilateral,  regional  and  inter-regional  cooperation  partnership 
strategies,  by  promoting  policy  dialogues  and  by  developing  collective 
approaches and responses to challenges of global concern;  

improving  market  access  and  developing  trade,  investment  and  business 
opportunities  for  European  companies,  in  particular  SMEs,  by  means  of 
economic partnerships and business and regulatory cooperation; 

enhancing  widespread  understanding  and  visibility  of  the  Union  and  its  role  on 
the world scene by  means of public diplomacy, education/academic cooperation 
and outreach activities to promote Union’s values and interests. 

Operational Objectives as regards the drivers of the problem (section 2.3) 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Respond  to  the  rise  of  emerging  economies  by  developing  cooperative  interaction 
with  partner  countries  in  order  to  address  challenges  of  worldwide  concern  and 
manage globalisation by maximising its benefits in a more sustainable manner. 

Enhance  flexibility  compared  to  the  existing  instruments  to  be  able  to  respond 
swiftly to new situations in partner countries and to bring forward bilateral agendas 
while promoting EU interests worldwide. 

React to the evolution of the relationship with Russia and meet its aspiration to reach 
a harmonious association. 

Respond  to  the  ICI’s  limited  geographical  scope  and  areas  of  intervention  by 
enabling  full  engagement  with  partner  countries  who  are  interested  in  fostering 
balanced relations with the EU. 

Address  the  more  limited  objectives  of  the  DCI  in  order  to  support  bilateral 
cooperation  not  aimed  at  development  aid.  This  also  responds  to  the  challenge  of 
advancing EU interest towards countries where development assistance is no longer 
needed and should be reduced or reoriented. 

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• 

Meet  the  Preparatory  Actions’  limitations  in  time  by  supporting  cooperation 
measures  in  middle  income  countries  and  other  developing  countries  in  Asia  and 
Latin America which are not priorities for ODA. 

3.3. 

Consistency with external action priorities 

The Lisbon Treaty sets out common principles and objectives and defines a new institutional 
framework  for  the  Union’s  external  action  (notably  the  European  External  Action  Service 
(EEAS)) leading to high expectations in the field of external action both internally within the 
EU and by partners at national and regional level, including in the multilateral context. 

It should also be noted that the Council and the European Parliament have also clearly called 
for keeping separated ODA money from non-ODA money. This has to be seen in the context 
of the pledge of the Member States and the EU on ODA target.       

The  Instrument  will  be  an  integrative  element  in  the  overall  architecture  of  external  action 
Financial  Instruments  organised  around  four  main  chapters:  a  policy-based  chapter  aiming 
primarily  at  cooperation  with  partner  countries  at  the  bilateral,  regional  and  international 
level; as well as chapters on working on cross-cutting priorities and values: human rights and 
democracy, humanitarian assistance and civil protection, crisis management and prevention. 

The Instrument’s main objective is to project EU policies in support of the EU 2020 agenda, 
addressing major global challenges, developing a proactive agenda of EU and mutual interests 
with  industrialised  countries  and  emerging  economies,  with  a  specific  focus  on  Strategic 
Partners. 

The  proposed  PI  also  allows  considering  triangular  cooperation  of  a  kind  that  no  other 
instruments could cater for, and which may well prove to be a substantial part of future action: 
co-operation  between  the  EU,  a  country  of  the  traditional  industrialised  world  and  a  newly 
emerged power.  Currently, it is extremely difficult for the EU and the US  to  fund  a  project 
together involving, for example, the monitoring of climate change in South Africa. Nor could 
we contribute to a centre in Korea that promotes biodiversity in developing countries in Asia. 
Since  the  DCI  cannot  apply  to  countries  such  as  the  United  States  and  Japan,  and  since 
triangular cooperation is increasingly a policy option, the fact that the Partnership Instrument, 
as  envisaged,  would  be  truly  global  in  geographical  scope  would  be  a  decisive  operational 
advantage. 

3.4. 

Consistency with other EU policies 

One  of  the  key  priorities  of  the  Europe  2020  Strategy  is  to  restore  growth.  The  agenda 
recognises that fast-growing emerging economies with an expanding middle class will play a 
critical  role  in  sustaining  European  export  of  goods  and  services  in  which  the  EU  has  a 
comparative  advantage.  The  Partnership  Instrument  should  be  instrumental  in  supporting 
trade policy14, in particular as regards the strategic economic partners. The support to market 
access for European companies will complement actions financed under the competitiveness 
and SME programme.  

Emerging economies play an increasingly important role as responsible partners in addressing 
challenges  of  global  concern.  Issues  such  as  poverty  alleviation,  migration,  competitiveness 

14 

"Trade,  Growth  and  World  Affairs  -  TRADE  POLICY  AS  A  CORE  COMPONENT  OF  THE  EU’S  2020  STRATEGY" 
(COM/2010/612) of 9.11.2010 

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and trade liberalisation, environment, climate change, energy, enhancing digital literacy skills 
and inclusion, pandemics, cyber security, terrorism and organised crime can only be tackled 
in an international context. Against the backdrop of accelerating globalisation, it is essential 
that  the  internal  agenda  of  securing  sustainable  growth  and  jobs  in  Europe  and  the  EU's 
internal  policies  in  general  are  complemented  by  an  external  dimension.  This  external 
dimension  of  internal  policy  should  enhance  the  consistency  and  coherence  of  EU  external 
action and should complement it, while avoiding duplication of efforts. 

The  Partnership  Instrument  will  give  priority  to  supporting  the  external  dimension  of  EU 
policies  on  climate  change,  environment,  energy,  and  information  and  communication 
technologies: 

The  EU  has  already  designed  arguably  the  most  sophisticated  set  of  incentives,  rules  and 
regulations  to  facilitate  our  own  transition  to  low  carbon  economy  and  unilaterally  adopted 
ambitious  targets.  This  framework  provides  comprehensive  and  concrete  policy  insight  that 
could  and  should  be  used  to  facilitate  similar  ambitions  by  our  key  strategic  partners.  Such 
action  would  clearly  be  good  for  the  environment  while  acting  as  catalyst  for  broad  based 
investment  in  research  and  innovation,  new  greener  technologies  and  providing  commercial 
openings  for  EU  industry.  For  the  Partnership  Instrument,  climate  mainstreaming  and 
climate  objectives  will  be  particularly  relevant  to  activities  enabling  policy  dialogue  with 
industrialised and emerging economies. 

Resource  efficiency  will  be  crucial  to  ensuring  that  economic  growth  remains  sustainable 
within  environmental  planetary  constraints.  The  EU  is  adopting  a  Resource  Efficiency 
Strategy as one of the Flagships of the 2020 Strategy. This will, inter alia, affect EU norms 
and  will  only  be  truly  effective  if  resource-efficient  practices  are  adopted  by  all  major 
economies. Emerging economies have the opportunity to leapfrog the polluting unsustainable 
consumption  and  production  patterns  so  often  followed  by  the  EU  and  other  advanced 
economies during our industrialisation and the EU has every interest in helping them to do so. 
However,  emerging  economies  especially  India  and  China  also  have  large,  absolutely  poor 
populations reliant on healthy ecosystems such as clean water and productive seas and forests 
for  their  livelihoods  while  Brazil,  South  Africa,  India  and  China  are  mega-biodiverse. 
Dialogue  and  cooperation  on  the  economics  of  protecting  and  sustainable  managing 
ecosystems is in the mutual interest of the EU and its partners.  

Dialogue and practical co-operation with the key global energy producers and consumers is 
essential  to  address  the  challenge  of  ensuring  the  EU's  energy  security,  particularly  as  the 
EU  becomes  more  import  dependent,  as  well  as  promoting  a  global  low-carbon  agenda, 
sustainable  energy  policies,  transparency  and  predictability  on  global  energy  markets  and 
technology cooperation. 

States leaving developing country status request new forms of cooperation in technological 
and innovative areas. To remain a strategic partner in these fields and continue to be a leader 
in the promotion of global standards, the EU must be able to set up cooperation partnerships 
in these areas. 

To sum up, the external projection of the EU's internal policies will be fully integrated in the 
programming  of  the  Partnership  Instrument that  will  also, within  its  limited  financial 
envelope, complement the external dimension of internal policies conducted under other EU 
programmes (such as action under the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and 
Innovation, the Competitiveness and SME Programme including cooperation on Tourism, the  
"Erasmus for all" Programme, the Migration Fund and the Internal Security Fund) in order to 
avoid  any duplication.  Coherence  and  complementarity  with  other  external  action 
geographical  instruments, in  particular the  Development  Cooperation  Instrument,  will  be 

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14 

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taken  into  account  throughout  the  programming  stage  while  integrating  the  principles  of 
differentiation and concentration. 

3.5. 

Geographical coverage and scope 

The geographical scope of the Instrument should be global, i.e. covering all non-EU countries 
(non-developing  and  developing)15.  This  represents  an  important  change  compared  to  the 
existing  Industrialised  Countries  Instrument  (ICI,  covering  only  17  industrialised  and  high-
income countries and territories). This will provide the necessary flexibility to respond to the 
fast changing nature of partner countries, to the global nature of key challenges, and to fill the 
legislative gap identified in the Mid Term Review of the financial Instruments. 

Even  though  its  reach  will  be  global,  the  Partnership  Instrument  will  particularly  focus  on 
strategic partners, including Russia, and emerging economies. It will be the main vehicle 
for fostering EU relations with the traditional big, industrialised economies and new relations 
with emerging economies. It will also cover bilateral cooperation with Russia. Although the 
EU has already established Strategic Partnerships (SP) with a number of third countries, the 
concept  has  never  been  fully  developed.  The  process  started  with  the  European  Security 
Strategy (end 2003) indicating the need to develop strategic partnerships with Russia, China, 
Canada, India, in addition to the US. To date the EU has designated several Strategic Partners: 
the US, Canada, Japan, Russia, South Korea, China, India, South Africa, Brazil and Mexico.  

Special and privileged relationships and partnerships are recognised between the EU and the 
acceding and neighbourhood countries and some other countries (e.g. ACP countries) but not 
as “strategic” partners. Finally, a few regional groupings and international organizations are 
qualified  as  EU  Strategic  Partners  too  (LAC,  Africa,  NATO,  ASEAN,  UN  bodies).  The 
strengthening of the EU's competitiveness and the generation of jobs and growth, as set out in 
the Europe 2020 agenda, is at the core of this exercise. 

Besides these countries - and without prejudice to the priority of development cooperation in 
the  Development  Cooperation  Instrument  (DCI)  and  the  European  Development  Fund  -  the 
new  Instrument  should  also  serve  to  promote  EU  interests  and  values  in  all  developing 
countries where and when necessary. 

In  order  to  achieve  a  significant  impact,  cooperation  activities  would  focus  on  a  limited 
number of priorities in the following categories: 

a) Bilateral cooperation and common approaches to challenges 

The Instrument will provide a differentiated and appropriate response to widen and deepen the 
the 
cooperation  with  partner  countries,  focusing  on  emerging  powers,  supporting 
implementation of agreements (such as Partnership and Cooperation/Framework Agreements, 
Free  Trade  Agreements,  Joint  Action  Plans,  Policy  Dialogues,  Summits  and  Thematic 
Dialogues) and fostering common and more effective approaches to key international policy 
challenges, including coordination of positions in international and regional fora (e.g. climate 
change,  biodiversity  and  sustainable  energy,  resource  efficiency  and  green  economy).  It 

15 

Including Oversea Countries and Territories (OCTs) 

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15 

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should  also  support,  where  necessary,  the  EU’s  commitments  to  regional  and  international 
cooperation processes and bodies such as the Arctic Council. 

The Instrument should be able to finance specific actions and activities tailored to supporting 
political priorities and promoting the bilateral agenda with these countries, including in those 
sectors of particular interest for the EU. Both quick impact responsive events (e.g. this years 
symposia on aviation and illicit networks) and longer term programmes will be needed (e.g.: 
action to promote the effective implementation of the comprehensive civil aviation agreement 
signed  in  March  2011  with  Brazil,  or  actions  create  a  proper  policy  and  regulatory 
environment for electronic communications, to promote the opening up of public procurement 
or a more effective enforcement of intellectual property rights in China, or sustainable energy 
initiatives such as the clean energy centre also in China).  

The  focus  will  be  on  areas  with  a  clear  mutual  interest  such  as  (but  not  limited  to):  smart 
sustainable and inclusive growth or green economy, resource efficiency energy, and climate 
change,  biodiversity  policy,  information  and  communication  technologies,  aviation  and 
maritime  transport,  standardisation,  promotion  of  rule  of  law  and  legal  cooperation,  public 
health, development, medicine.  

b) Economic partnership and business cooperation  

European business interests - exports, investment flows and economic partnerships – need to 
be  supported  within  a  more  strategic  approach.  Countries  to  be  covered  by  the  instrument 
represent existing and potential markets for European products, services and direct investment 
flows. However, certain markets are difficult for European countries to access for structural 
reasons. The  key  objectives  of the EU trade and investment  strategy to be  supported by the 
Partnership Instrument are: 

• 

• 

to facilitate and enhance market access for European companies (including relevant 
regulatory  support  in  relation  to  trade  barriers),  notably  through  programmes 
assisting them to overcome obstacles to entering the market and by complementing 
actions financed under the Competitiveness and SME programme; 

to  promote  advanced  business  education  and  exchanges  for  European  managers 
building up capacity through executive training programmes; 

The  programmes  should  deliver  concrete  opportunities  for  improved  business  cooperation, 
increased  turnover  and  investments  in  target  areas  and  greater  trade  flows  with  the  partner 
countries.  Resources  shall  be  focused  on  countries  where  interventions  can  increase  the 
participation of European companies.  

The programmes will be complementary to and interconnected with existing support measures 
with the Enterprise Europe Network, currently providing business and innovation support in 
49 countries, including most of the industrialised countries and emerging economies.  

Activities  aimed  at  achieving  these  objectives  would  consist  of  facilitating  partnerships  and 
joint 
initiatives  between  European  and  partner  countries’  companies  and  business 
management  training  programmes  (see  Annex  2:  Executive  Training  Programme  (ETP)  and 
EU Gateway Programme both in Japan and Korea).  

c) Public diplomacy, education/academic cooperation and outreach  

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Europe’s  strong  presence  in  the  global  economy  and  its  role  on  the  world  stage  need  to  be 
matched by a better understanding of the European Union in partner countries. By supporting 
public  diplomacy,  outreach  activities  and  networks  it  can  respond  to  the  low  level  of 
knowledge of the EU in partner countries and promote its values and interests. The objectives 
here are: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

to increase mutual understanding through academic and cultural exchanges; 

to  share  EU  expertise  with  partners  to  promote  environmentally  sustainable  and 
resource efficient development of emerging economies; 

to promote widespread understanding and visibility of the EU;  

to  promote  the  EU’s  views  on  important  policy  issues,  by  positively  influencing 
policy  debate  and  encouraging  greater  engagement  with  the  EU  in  support  of  EU 
policy objectives; 

to promote reflection and discussion about the EU and its policies, and its relations 
with partner countries; 

to promote the exchange of best regulatory practices in key sectors. 

Activities in support of these objectives could consist of: the consolidation and expansion of 
existing  EU  Centres  (see  Annex  2)  and  the  establishment  of  new  centres  in  other  partner 
countries;  the  development  of  activities  that  encourage  policy,  the  support  to  platforms  for 
exchange  and  dialogue  between  regulators,  research  and  debate  by  think  tanks  and  other 
organisations on areas of mutual interest; well targeted information campaigns; and, finally, 
“people-to people" contacts among promising young citizens active in cultural spheres. These 
activities would enhance the knowledge and understanding of the EU to a wide audience, and 
this, in itself, will have a beneficial effect on the economic and political relationships with its 
partners.  

4. 

OPTIONS 

(a) 

Option 0: “Zero Option” 

A “zero option” implies that assistance under the current ICI instrument would be phased out 
as of 31 December 2013. By then the EU cooperation/dialogues with 17 advanced countries 
and territories would be terminated and funding would no longer be available to support EU 
dialogues with them. No new EU cooperation would be feasible (outside poverty alleviation) 
with other third countries around the world.  

(b) 

Option 1: “No change” 

Under  this  option,  the  ICI  Regulation  would  cover  only  traditional  industrialised  and  high-
income countries (.i.e. 17 countries) and the DCI Regulation would remain the only financial 
instrument, focused on development cooperation, to cover cooperation with some countries of 
great importance in terms of economics, demographics, and politics.  

(c) 

Option 2: “Maintain ICI as such and amend DCI” 

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17 

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This  option  would  maintain  the  ICI  in  its  current  form  and  insert  a  window  for  economic, 
financial and technical cooperation of a non developmental nature with third countries within 
the  DCI.  Under  this  option,  geographical  coherence  would  be  ensured  under  a  single 
instrument, but for DCI countries the Regulation would include two different objectives: one 
objective  of  poverty  eradication  (ODA)  and  one  objective  of  fostering  EU  interests  (non-
ODA). 

(d) 

Option 3: “Table a new Instrument building on ICI/ICI+” 

This  option  would  build  on  the  ICI  and  ICI+  proposal  to  provide  a  new  Instrument  with  a 
global reach. This option allows for a clear distinction with Development Cooperation money 
and  respects  the  Commission’s  intention  to  increase  coherence  and  consistency  through  a 
major simplification of the Instruments. It allows a response to the underlying drivers of the 
problem as identified under section 2.3. 

The possibility of trade offs between the global scope of the Partnership Instrument and the 
potential  dilution  of  funds,  will  be  addressed  at  the  programming  stage  by  implementing  a 
selective  and  scrupulous  objective  country/project  selection  criteria  in  accordance  with  the 
objectives of the Instrument. Approaches and operations would be kept flexible and would be 
adapted to specificities of countries, EU policy priorities and changes in the world. 

The  table  below  clearly  expresses  what  differentiates  the  ICI,  the  ICI+  and  the  Partnership 
Instrument  and,  by  doing  so,  it  highlights  the  strengths  and  possibilities  of  the  latter  as 
opposed to the other two’s limitations. 

Regulation No 

Duration 

Geographical Scope 

Budget EUR 

Objective 

ICI  

EC 1934/2006 

2007-2013 

17 countries and high 
income territories16 

172 million 

Support economic, financial and 
technical cooperation and other 
forms of cooperation falling within 
its spheres of competence. 

ICI+   COM 2009/197 

2011-2013 

(not yet adopted) 

176 million 

Same as above. 

Same as above + 
countries listed in 
South America, Asia, 
Central Asia, the 
Middle East and South 
Africa17 

PI 

Drafting ongoing 

2014-2020 

global 

1 billion 

• Improve market access through 

economic partnerships and 
business cooperation. 

• Project Europe 2020 Strategy; 
policy support; address global 
challenges. 

• Promote EU values and interests 
through public diplomacy and 
outreach. 

5. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

16 

17  

USA, Japan, Canada, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New  Zealand); certain Asian industrialised countries and territories 
which are excluded from the DAC list of recipient countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Brunei) as well as the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). 
See Annex 2 of  COM/2009/197  “List of developing countries covered by this Regulation”. 

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5.1. 

Likely economic, social and environmental impacts  

(a) 

Option 0: “Zero Option” 

EU dialogue and cooperation with the US, Japan, Australia, the GCC countries, etc, would no 
longer be supported by any financial instrument under the Heading 4 (Global Europe)18 of the 
EU budget and no new EU cooperation with the emerging economies in the fields of industry, 
business, economy, finance, culture, research and innovation, and so on, would be feasible in 
the foreseeable future. 

Since no new and broader instrument would be introduced as an ICI successor, the scope of 
future EU cooperation with developing countries (and especially emerging economies) would 
be  limited,  focusing  only  on  development  cooperation.  This  would  be  implemented  under  a 
new DCI for 2014-2020. 

The disadvantages of such an option could be high and it exposes the EU to five major risks:  

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

A  political  risk,  as  EU  partner  countries  would  not  understand.  EU  bilateral 
agreements, policies and dialogues in crucial sectors would no longer be supported in 
the context of a medium-term global (and EU) recovery cycle. By doing so, Europe 
would be perceived as not being able (or determined enough) to defend its external 
and domestic interests.  

Fragmentation  of  budgets  and  instruments  to  support  the  external  dimension  of 
internal  policies:  this  would  pose  new  challenges  to  the  EU  in  terms  of  political 
guidance, synergies (optimum use of funds), coordination and coherence.  

DCI  funds  might  be  used  to  finance  such  activities  by  interpreting  extensively  the 
scope of the Development Cooperation Instrument. These interpretations could lead 
to challenges by the legislative authority, thus hampering such cooperation.  

In the absence of a tailor-made instrument, the European Parliament and the Council 
might request the Commission to implement additional “ad hoc” preparatory actions, 
limited in time and with small budgets and impact. Fragmentation and lack of a clear 
strategy  could  lead  to  serious  management  problems  during  the  implementation 
phase.  

If  a  zero  option  prevailed,  it  would  lead  to  the  lessening  of  Europe‘s  capacity  to 
protect  its  interests  and  entertain  mutually  advantageous  dialogues  with  third 
countries  in  several  key  sectors  or  domains  which  are  crucial  to  its  external 
“projection” and its ambition to become a global player.  

(b) 

Option 1: “No change” 

Under  the  « no  change »  option,  the  EU  would  continue  to  engage  in  policy  and  business 
dialogues,  public  diplomacy  and  other  forms  of  cooperation  in  research  and  innovation, 
finance, economy, culture with a restricted number of advanced partner countries.  

18  

establishing  a  coherent  role  for  Europe  on  the  global  stage  –  inspired by  its  core  values –  in  the  way  it  assumes  its  regional 
responsibilities, promotes sustainable development and contributes to civilian and strategic security. 

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19 

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This would certainly be rewarding for Europe as it would continue to project its values and 
protect  its  interests’  vis-à-vis  this  group  of  advanced  countries  playing  a  key  role  in  the 
current post-crisis  recovery  and globalisation process. However, the  major drawback  of this 
option  is  that  it  does  not  respond  to  the  underlying  drivers  of  the  problem  identified  under 
section  2.3.  The  lack  of  a  “tailor  made”  instrument  would  be  an  obstacle  for  Europe  in 
supporting  the  Europe  2020  Strategy  and  developing  more  strategic  relations  with  the  most 
dynamic  and  fast-growing  economies  in  the  world  having  great  weight  in  terms  of 
multilateralism,  GDP  growth,  consumption,  investment,  imports,  research  and  innovation 
capacity,  technology,  finance,  culture/education,  business  development,  FDI,  environmental 
and climate pressures, etc.  

(c) 

Option 2: “Maintain ICI as such and amend DCI” 

According  to  option  2,  the  DCI  would  have  two  different  “windows”  (and  sub-budgets) 
coexisting side-by-side. These two components (basically ODA and non ODA budgets for the 
sake of simplification) would necessarily have different objectives and follow different modus 
operandi  and  country  allocation  criteria  which  would  prove extremely  challenging:  how  to 
create  a  synergy  between objectives which  are  radically  different  and,  thus,  not  inherently 
compatible? 

The economic, social and environmental impact of this option is not expected to differ greatly 
compared to option 3. The major drawback would be that the co-existence of these two very 
different  financial  “windows”  could  prove  more  difficult  than  originally  foreseen.  The 
fundamental  differences  between  its  goals  would  result  in  major  problems  ranging  from 
management  and  decision-making  (on  what  could  be  financed  under  each  window  for 
instance) to implementation, as a paramount issue that could arise may well be the preference 
given to some objectives to the detriment of others. With regards to resources, it also concerns 
various  areas  of  expertise  and  resource  mobilisation  could  be  delayed  with  negative  socio- 
economic environmental and policy impacts and adverse consequences for dialogues between 
the EU and its main partner countries. 

It should also be kept in mind that the Council and the European Parliament have specifically 
called  for  keeping  separate  instruments  for  development  cooperation  and  non  development 
cooperation.  

(d) 

Option 3: “Table a new Instrument building on ICI/ICI+” 

Considering the underlying drivers of the problem as identified under section 2.3, this option 
would allow an innovative instrument able to support the policies of the EU in the world. No 
direct,  precise  impacts  can  be  assessed  given  the  nature  of  the  Instrument,  however  an 
indicative economic, social and environmental impact assessment is provided below.  

Impact on the EU economy and EU economic dialogues with partner countries 

The  implementation  of  a  new  Partnership  Instrument  would  provide  the  EU  with  another 
window of opportunity to promote its enterprises (SMEs in particular) and products. It would 
create the financial possibility to support EU business in third countries, providing incentives 
for  EU  competitiveness  and  innovation  in  a  way  that  should  remain  complementary  to  the 
actions  financed  under  the  Competitiveness  and  SME  programme  and  under  Horizon  2020 
(research and innovation), support EU international trade and investment which, in turn, could 
lead  to  the  facilitation  of  foreign  investment  into  the  EU.  Numerous  areas  of  cooperation 
could  be  pursued  including  climate  change,  environment,  approximation  of  technical 

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regulations  and  standardisation,  corporate  social  responsibility,  intellectual  property  rights, 
protection of personal data, best practises in economic, trade and financial matters. Thus, the 
EU’s  economic  security  could  be  strengthened  and  possibly  new  jobs  created  which, 
ultimately, would contribute to economic growth. 

This  Instrument  could  reinforce  EU  trade  relations  with  partner  countries  having  a  positive 
impact  on  the  EU  balance  of  payments,  economic  and  trade  relations  with  the  rest  of  the 
world  while  being  consistent  with  market  access/open  market  principles.  As  such,  it  could 
also  contribute  to  lessen  the  risk  of  protectionism  as  well  as  supporting  international 
competitiveness  and  the  ongoing  globalisation  process  while  making  sure  that  all  countries 
benefit in line with the principles of the Europe 2020 Strategy. 

The  new  Partnership  Instrument  would  also  contribute  to  support  the  EU’s  competitiveness 
through  targeted  human  resource  development:  the  availability  of  highly  skilled  people  and 
their capacity to innovate is a prerequisite for economic prosperity. 

Economic Impact on partner countries  

The new Instrument could foster well developed forms of economic cooperation between the 
EU and partner countries. In this context, it would allow the EU to ensure that environmental, 
sustainable energy, social, employment and other welfare values are adequately considered in 
policy programme design and implementation. 

Increased  investment  by  EU  companies  would  also  contribute  to  economic  growth  in  the 
hosting  country.  Actions  aiming  at  promoting  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  will  improve 
social, labour and environmental rules and implementation in the partner country. 

By contributing technical assistance, the Instrument could identify sustainable paths for fiscal 
consolidation of growth, thus helping countries in efforts to gain control of their accounts. It 
could  also  support  initiatives  to  improve  administrative  efficiency,  the  productive  use  of 
workers’ remittances and to promote new investments and transfers of technology in national 
industrialisation  programmes  or  infrastructural  developments  in  order  to  promote  resource 
efficiency and sustainability, including in the production and use of energy. 

Impact on economic governance 

The Partnership Instrument is also expected to have an impact on economic governance. With 
the crisis, hard lessons have been learnt about the limits of markets. It has called for revisiting 
the  role  of  government,  redefining  the  balance  between  state  and  market  and  searching  for 
ways to boost citizens’ trust in both. 

The  crisis  demonstrated  that  public  policies  are  the  critical  anchor  of  national  economies  in 
times  of  economic  unrest  as  governments  halted  financial  market  freefall  and  avoided 
financial catastrophe. However, the ensuing fiscal pressures in many countries have increased 
the need to cut public expenditures, which in  most  cases means streamlining  the  state. This 
effort  calls  for  reassessing  the  role  of  government  intervention  to  achieve  better  and  more 
effective governance, sound institutions and effective rules and procedures.  

Another important governance issue refers to anti-corruption, transparency and integrity. The 
new  Instrument  could  be  directed  to  improving  anti-corruption  tools  and  reinforcing  their 
initiatives  could  enhance  coordination  of  anti-corruption  and 
implementation.  New 

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transparency  actions  worldwide  as  well  as  compliance  with  relevant 
conventions, “best practices” and guidelines. 

international 

Finally  promoting  the  full  engagement  of  strategic  partners  in  global  environmental  policy 
making and governance especially with regard to Multilateral Environmental Agreements will 
be crucial to promoting sustainable economic change. 

Social impact on the EU economy  

The EU's ambition is to address interlinked social policies and identify strategic orientations 
going  beyond  growth.  This  could  be  enhanced  by  economic  cooperation  with  partner 
countries, strengthening national and international regulatory frameworks and contributing to 
improved national, regional or global economic governance. These strategies and approaches 
could have a positive impact on EU employment and social policies such as the EU welfare 
model  of  social  protection,  the  creation  of  “green”  jobs,  the  “EU  2020”  social  agenda  etc. 
Growing  competition  from  emerging  economies  could  also  act  as  a  strategic  incentive  for 
Europe  to  allocate  more  resources  to  training  and  re-training,  improving  the  quality  of 
teaching and research and to the reform of domestic welfare systems.  

Social impact on partner countries 

By  harmonising  the  EU  and  EU  Member  States’  financing  instruments  and  by  supporting 
joint activities with other bilateral and multilateral donors, the new Instrument could have an 
important impact  on  the social fabric of emerging countries. It could provide support to the 
reform  of  welfare  systems,  national  employment  policies,  national  training  and  skills’ 
development  policies,  education,  research  and  innovation  programmes  as  well  as  the 
strengthening  of  national  safety  “nets”.  Its  contribution  to  extra  “green”  jobs  creation, 
income-per-capita increases and effective social cohesion and poverty alleviation strategies at 
national  level  will  be  relevant.  In  this  respect  it  would  contribute  to  the  successful 
implementation of the international social agenda promoted by the UN International Labour 
Organisation and G8/G20.  

Environmental impact on EU and partner countries  

Making “green” growth work, implementing the strategy and supporting partner countries in 
their policies for a more ecological growth path will figure among the top strategic priorities 
of the new Instrument for the coming years. 

EU partnerships through the new Instrument will aim at encouraging and supporting growth 
and long-term environmental sustainability. In this respect, the new Instrument is expected to 
play  a  key  role  in  providing  support  for  both  EU  and  partner  countries’  environmental  and 
climate change-related actions and policy dialogues. 

The  Instrument  could  support  a  low-carbon  business  model  by  providing  incentives  to  the 
European  private  sector.  Building  on  the  successful  results  of  the  COP-16  United  Nations 
Conference on Climate Change in Cancún, it could be used to help EU business to develop 
effective  and  least-cost  policies  to  achieve  environmentally  friendly  goals  in  the  partner 
countries.  It  will  also  help  partner  countries’  economies  to  reap  the  full  environmental, 
ecological and energy-efficient benefits of innovation. 

The Instrument could allow cooperation to better understand the economic and social costs of 
biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation in countries of global significance.  

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5.2. 

Impact in terms of management / implementation modalities 

justifies 

substantial  volume 

sound  and  cost-efficient 

Where 
local  management, 
deconcentration (i.e. management in EU Delegations instead from Headquarters) should apply 
and  EU  Delegations  should  be  equipped  with  the  necessary  human  resources  for  project 
management  responsibilities.  In  any  case,  EU  Delegations  will  be  able  to  manage,  for 
example, small scale actions within the scope of the Partnership Instrument (e.g.: workshops 
to  explain  to  EU  companies  based  in  Korea  the  implications  of  the  Free  Trade  Agreement 
concluded  with  this  country).  The  EU  Seoul  Delegation  is  logically  better  placed  than 
Commission  services  in  Brussels  to  procure  these  types  of  actions  (knowledge  of  the  local 
market  conditions,  familiarity  with  potential  bidders,  no  language  barrier,  access  to 
stakeholders  and  government  authorities,  etc).  In  view  of  the  above,  a  part  of  the  financial 
envelope will be set aside for administrative support expenditure, including human resources 
linked to the implementation of the instrument. 

On programming: 

• 

• 

multi-annual programming should remain applicable for most components within the 
scope of the Instrument as it is the case with the current ICI. Indeed, activities in the 
fields of business cooperation, public diplomacy and networks (such as EU Centres) 
represent  long  term  investments  and  operate  on  cyclical  bases  which  make  multi-
annual  programming  essential  to  ensure sound  and  efficient  management  of  the 
programmes. 

non-programmable  components  need  to  be  foreseen  as  the  Partnership  Instrument 
should  provide  swift  response  to  changing  situations,  especially  in  the  area  of 
bilateral cooperation and policy dialogues. Such flexibility is necessary to ensure that 
cooperation activities remain fully in line and in time with policies and strategies.  

6. 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS  

The effectiveness of each option is measured in relation to its response to the drivers 
identified above (see section 2.3): 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

the strong emergence of certain countries; 

the lack of flexibility of current Instruments to promote bilateral agendas; 

the specific relationship with Russia; 

the confined geographical scope of the ICI; 

the DCI's limited scope; 

the 3 year time constraint on Preparatory Action. 

a) 

Option 0 is not considered a valid one if the EU wants to play its role in the world as 

explained under section 5.1. 

b) 

Option 1 is not considered worth pursuing given the need to fill the legislative gap. 
Challenges linked to globalisation require an enabling instrument covering the most 
dynamic  regions  of  the  world.  It  would  not  meet  expectations  of  partner  countries 

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c) 

d) 

who want to engage further with the EU in various areas. It would not allow the EU 
to project its interests and policies abroad. 

Option  2  would  enhance  simplification  and  harmonisation.  However,  this  would 
eliminate the advantages of having policy-driven instruments ensuring the adequate 
mix of objective and principles relevant for each policy. After the reshuffle of 2007, 
the structure of the current instruments broadly reflects EU priorities as well as the 
differential  treatment  of  countries  according  to  common  characteristics  and 
challenges.  This  option  would  not  necessarily  reflect  the  institutional  changes 
brought by the Lisbon Treaty in a clear and structured manner and could dilute the 
overall development objective of the Development Cooperation Instrument. 

Option 3 is assessed as the best option. There is a large consensus on building on the 
current set of financial instruments, although it is necessary to reflect the institutional 
changes brought by the Lisbon treaty. Under this option, the current structure of the 
instruments, which has been considered pertinent and adequate by stakeholders and 
EU Member States, would remain largely unchanged. However, such new instrument 
with  a  global  reach  in  scope  and  focused  objectives  will  contribute  to  adapt 
thoroughly the existing methods of conceiving, programming and delivering results. 
It appears clearly as the preferred option.  

This is also indicated in the table below where the options are assessed against three 
criteria  of  which  effectiveness  must  be  taken  into  account  as  a  necessary  condition 
therefore outweighing the other two. 

(i)  Coherence means possibilities to create synergies in terms of programming and 
delivery  towards  achieving  the  agreed  objectives  and  to  avoid  negative 
consequences and overlaps which would adversely affect the implementation of 
the policies. This is particularly significant when two different instruments have 
the same geographical coverage.  

(ii)   Effectiveness  means  doing  the  right  things,  that  is  setting  the  right  goals  and 

objectives and making sure they are accomplished. 

(iii)  Efficiency  means  doing  things  right,  in  other  words  it  is  getting  the  most  from 
your resources: that encompasses organisational aspects and the gains from the 
simplification of the instruments. 

Option 0 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Coherence 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

- 

- 

- 

= 

= 

- 

+ 

 ++ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The European Commission's Monitoring and Evaluation systems are increasingly focused on 
results. They involve internal staff as well as external expertise.  

Task Managers in Delegations and Headquarters continuously monitor the implementation of 
projects  and  programmes  in  various  ways,  including  wherever  possible  through  field  visits. 

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Monitoring  provides  valuable  information  on  progress;  it  helps  managers  to  identify  actual 
and potential bottlenecks, and to take corrective action. 

External, independent experts are contracted to assess the performance of EU external actions 
through  three  different  systems.  These  assessments  contribute  to  accountability,  and  to  the 
improvement of ongoing interventions; they also draw lessons from past experience to inform 
future  policies  and  actions.  The  tools  all  use  the  internationally-recognised  OECD-DAC 
evaluation criteria including (potential) impact. 

Firstly,  at  the  project  level,  the  Headquarters-managed  Results  Oriented  Monitoring  (ROM) 
system provides a brief, focused snapshot of the quality of a sample of interventions. Using a 
highly  structured,  standardised  methodology,  independent  ROM  experts  attribute  grades 
which  highlight  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  project  and  give  recommendations  on 
how to improve effectiveness.  

Project-level evaluations, which are managed by the EU Delegation in charge of the project, 
deliver  a  more  detailed,  in  depth  analysis  and  help  project  managers  to  improve  ongoing 
interventions  and  prepare  future  ones.  External,  independent  experts  with  thematic  and 
geographic expertise are hired to conduct the analysis and gather feedback and evidence from 
all stakeholders, not least the final beneficiaries. 

The  Commission  also  conducts  strategic  evaluations  of  its  policies,  from  programming  and 
strategy to the implementation of interventions in a specific sector (such as health, education, 
etc),  in  a  country  or  region,  or  of  a  specific  Instrument.  These  evaluations  are  an  important 
input to the formulation of policies and the design of Instruments and projects. They are all 
published  on  the  Commission's  website  and  a  summary  of  the  findings  is  included  in  the 
Annual  Report  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament.  Such  an  evaluation  of  the 
Partnership  Instrument  will  be  launched,  no  later  than  the  end  of  2017,  to  formulate 
recommendations with a view to improving future operations, programme design and resource 
allocation with, if appropriate, a legislative proposal introducing the necessary modifications. 

7.1. 

Core Indicators of progress towards objectives 

The Partnership Instrument shall be an enabling Regulation establishing the essential elements 
and  the  basis  for  the  EU  intervention.  The  exact  actions  are  defined  through  annual  action 
programmes  detailing  the  activities  to  be  carried  out  by  the  EU,  including  the  operational 
objectives  and  the  expected  results.  Operational  indicators  are  fixed  at  that  moment,  taking 
into account the particularities of the action in question.  

Progress towards the three specific objectives (see section 3.2) will be monitored through core 
indicators covering the following areas:  

1) Influence of EU  policies  on  policy  formulation in key strategic  partner countries covered 
by this instrument. 

2)  EU  share  in  world trade  as  well  as  in  trade  with  countries  targeted  by  actions  under  this 
instrument.  

3) Perception of EU in key strategic partner countries covered by this instrument. 

Implementation of the actions will comply with performance-based management.  

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Performance based management serves several purposes: 

• 

• 

• 

making the most of limited resources; 

improving decision making processes and decisions; 

achieving transparency and accountability. 

A performance management system involves the setting of objectives, the decision of how to 
measure progress and the selection of indicators. This implies a three stage process, firstly a 
sound analysis of the policies with a common understanding – through policy dialogue – of 
the  objectives  and  of  the  logical  linkages  between  the  objectives,  activities  and  outcomes. 
Next  comes  the  question  of  identifying  what  can  be  measured  in  relation  to  the  objectives, 
which  of  the  purposes  above  it  serves  and  the  availability,  reliability  and  precision  of 
statistical  data,  including  such  questions  as  the  frequency  of  measurement  and  the  use  of 
proxy  indicators.  Finally  the  decisions  need  to  be  codified  to  the  link  between  the 
programmes,  the  methods  of  calculation,  the  interpretive  framework  and  the  allocation  of 
responsibility for their provision. 

The EU has committed itself to mainstreaming action on climate and biodiversity and for this 
to be meaningful it needs to be accompanied by an obligation to identify relevant programmes 
so  that  the  EU  is  able  to  set  out  clearly  how  much  of  its  spending  relates  to  these  global 
challenges.  Clear  benchmarks,  monitoring  and  reporting  rules  need  to  be  established. 
Expenditure that promotes climate action19 or energy efficiency as well as the protection and 
sustainable management of biodiversity and ecosystems, will be tracked using a system that 
reflects the established OECD methodology (‘Rio markers’). 

7.2.  Monitoring 

Typical indicators to measure the impact of the Partnership Instrument’s activities will be the 
number  of  participant  enterprises,  the  extent,  relevance  and  sophistication  of  support 
activities,  the  degree  of  cooperation  within  the  European  business  network  and  division  of 
labour,  entrepreneurial  user  satisfaction  and  achievement  of  economic  targets,  i.e.  the 
measurable impact on job creation, turnover, foreign direct investment of EU enterprises and 
overall EU exports to target markets. Indicators to measure the impact of these activities, both 
qualitative and quantitative, will be related to the trends in knowledge exchange, the number 
of participants in programmes, scholarships and joint research and academic projects. 

The results will also be measured by the frequency and quality of media coverage, the local 
demand for EU sponsored activities, the participation rate at EU events. 

19 

Regarding instruments under the EU budget, in order to reach the Europe 2020 objectives and to help other parts of the world to 
step up their efforts to combat  climate change, the Commission has stated in the June 2011 Communication  on “A Budget for 
Europe 2020” that it intends to increase the proportion of climate related expenditure across the EU budget to at least 20%, with 
contribution from different policies, subject to impact assessment evidence. 

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Annex 1 

Description of the existing Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised countries (ICI) 

In  the  context  of  the  current  financial  period  (2007-2013),  the  Commission  accomplished  a 
simplification of the architecture of the legal framework for the delivery of EU external action 
objectives.  One  of  the  Instruments  that  resulted  from  the  rationalisation/simplification 
exercise focuses on the cooperation with industrialised and other high-income countries and 
territories (ICI)20.  

The ICI provided the legal base both in terms of targeted countries and fields of cooperation. 
It has a wider scope than the former Instrument for cooperation with industrialised countries 
(Council  Regulation  382/2001),  which  was  confined  to  6  countries  and  covered  a  more 
limited range of activities. The current ICI has focused on those partner countries with which 
the  EU  has  close  political,  economic  relations  who  at  the  same  time  are  important  trading 
partners as well as major players in the world scene; and on newly industrialised countries in 
Asia where it is important for the EU to engage further, to reinforce its economic and political 
links and to exert increasing influence.  

Cooperation with these countries responded to EU’s and partner countries shared interest to 
advance  their  common  agenda  laid  down  in  the  various  agreements,  declarations,  actions 
plans  that  govern  their  bilateral  relations.  The  ICI  has  constituted  an  effective  toolbox  in 
providing a differentiated and appropriate response to widen and deepen the cooperation with 
a  number  of  industrialised  countries  and  high-income  in  North  America,  the  Asia-Pacific 
region and the Gulf region, namely: key OECD member countries (USA, Japan, Canada, the 
Republic  of  Korea,  Australia  and  New  Zealand);  certain  Asian  industrialised  countries  and 
territories  which  are  excluded  from  the  DAC  list  of  recipient  countries  (  Singapore,  Hong 
Kong,  Macao,  Taiwan  and  Brunei)  as  well  as  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  countries  similarly 
excluded from the DAC list of ODA recipients (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates). 

It  came  into  force  in  2007  and  is  due  to  expire  along  with  the  rest  of  external  actions 
Instruments by the end of current financial period in 2013. 

The  overall  aim  of  the  current  ICI  Instrument  is  to  strengthen  the  European  Union’s 
relationship with highly developed countries and to promote its place as a key player in the 
global  economic  and  political  arenas  through  the  funding  of  cooperation  projects  covering 
areas of mutual interests. Given the limited resources available to the ICI, achievement of the 
objectives focused on a limited number of areas that can be summarized as follows: 

(a) Public diplomacy and outreach 

The key objectives are to enhance the profile of the EU, and to promote better understanding of the 
European  Union,  its  institutions,  its  history,  its  economy,  its  policies  and  its  positions  in  partner 
countries.  To  promote  awareness  and  better  understanding  of  the  EU  beyond  its  borders,  the  ICI 
supports  29  EU  Centres  world  wide;  the  EU  centres  are  all  located  in  Universities  in  eight 
industrialised countries spanning three continents: ten in the USA, five in Canada, four in Korea, four 
in Japan, three in Australia and one in New Zealand, Singapore and Taiwan. 

20 

Council Regulation (EC) N° 1934/2006 of 21 December 2006 (OJ) L-405, 30.12.2006, p.41) 

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(b) Economic partnership and business cooperation.  

The key objectives are to strengthen the presence of European companies in key markets facilitating 
market access for European companies, including small and medium-sized enterprises. To tackle those 
objectives, the ICI Instrument has supported two main programmes: the “EU Gateway programme for 
Japan and the Republic of Korea” and the “Executive Training programme in Japan and Korea” (ETP) 

The EU Gateway Programme for Japan and the Republic of Korea helps EU companies to understand 
the particularities of the Japanese and Korean market in view of establishing durable business relations 
with local companies.  

The ETP is an intensive professional human resources development programme targeted at executives 
from European companies that want to develop business with Japan and Korea, providing them with 
the  most  insightful  knowledge  of  the  Japanese  and  Korean  markets.  To  date,  1006  European 
executives  have  participated  in  ETP  Japan  and  65  in  ETP  Korea,  creating  a  European  pool  of  high 
level experts on Japanese, Korean and other Asian markets. 

(c) People-to-people links 

The main goals are to enhance mutual understanding between cultures and facilitate the exchange of 
knowledge.  To  this  end,  the  ICI  has  funded  initiatives  to  strengthen  cooperation  in  the  field  of 
education by funding bilateral cooperation projects to promote mutual understanding, to improve the 
quality  of  European  education  and  training  by  stimulating  balanced  partnerships  between  higher 
education  and  training  institutions  in  Europe  and  in  the  partner  countries.  Still  in  the  field  of 
Education,  Erasmus  Mundus  Partnerships  are  also  bringing  together  High  Education  Institutions 
(HEIs)  from  Europe  on  the  one  hand  and  from  a  particular  region  in  the  world  on  the  other  (multi-
lateral partnerships).  

The ICI has also funded initiatives to promote and strengthen civil society dialogues between members 
of EU and a certain number of industrialised countries’ civil society, encouraging the involvement of a 
broad  set  of  stakeholders  (non-governmental  organisations  and  interest  groups,  including  social 
partners,  representing  wide  constituencies),  complementing  the  formal  policy  dialogue  existing  at 
government level. 

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Examples of successful ICI programmes 

Annex 2 

Executive Training Programme (ETP) 

The  Executive  Training  Programme  in  Japan  and  Korea  (ETP)  is  an  intensive  professional  human 
resources  development  programme  targeted  at  executives  from  European  companies  that  want  to 
develop  business  with  Japan  and  Korea,  providing  them  with  the  most  insightful  knowledge  of  the 
Japanese and Korean markets. To date, 1006 European executives have participated in ETP Japan and 
65 in ETP Korea, creating a European pool of high level experts on Japanese, Korean and further on 
Asian  markets.  The  ETP  has  had  a  positive  impact  on  EU  companies  committed  to  establishing 
/growing  their  business  activities  with  Japan  and  Korea  in  terms  of  assisting  the  EU  company  to 
access Japanese/Korean markets; bringing sustained impact on EU companies’ business, rather than a 
short  term  and  temporary  effect;  and  in  terms  of  broadening  the  business  possibilities  of  EU 
companies in other Asian countries. To date, over 80% of the participants remain involved in business 
activities with Japan and Korea over ten years after completion of the programme, that demonstrate 
the  relevance  and  the  capacity  of  the  programme  to  train  real  European  experts  involved  in  a  long 
term issue with Asia. 

An extensive research carried out in 2010 regarding potential pan-European or national programmes 
that present similarities with ETP, has concluded that no similar programme to ETP exists at national 
level. Similar programmes such as the scholarships of the Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade, or the 
“Language  and  Practice  in  Japan”  managed  by  the  German  academic  exchange  service  (DAAD) 
target  graduates  and  not  executives  and  fail  to  provide  the  cornerstones  that  characterise  the  ETP: 
language training, business training and internship. The European nature of the programme not only 
enhanced the visibility of the EU in Japan and the Republic of Korea, it also ensures the participation 
of executives from all Member States. 

60% of ETP Alumni come from SMEs. This very significant figure is possible only because the ETP 
finances  100%  of  the  cost  of  the  training  and  a  scholarship.  Recent  survey  on  SME  perception 
regarding the ETP shows that financial support provided by the EU is 'vital' regarding the European 
SMEs willingness to penetrate Japanese or Korean markets. 

On average, companies double their turnover with Japan within 10 years following ETP. It is obvious 
that this result can be attributed to the sole impact of ETP but it can logically be deducted that this 
programme had in many cases a boosting effect on business evolution of European companies on this 
market. 

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EU Gateway Programme 

The EU Gateway Programme for Japan and the Republic of Korea aims at helping EU companies to 
understand the particulars of the Japanese and Korean market in view of establishing durable business 
relations  with  local  companies  on  (one of)  these  markets.  It  supports  a  series  of  one  week  business 
missions  that  bring  carefully  selected  companies  from  the  European  Union  to  Japan  or  to  Korea  to 
assist  them  in  observing  the  market.  The  missions  are  sector  specific.  The  sectors  are  fixed  for  the 
entire  programme  period  2009-2014;  they  were  defined  in  those  fields  where  opportunities  for  EU 
companies have the highest potential for cooperation opportunities.  

The EU Gateway Programme supports almost exclusively SMEs. The main target group for the EU 
Gateway  Programme  in  the  European  Union  is  the  range  of  Small  and  Medium  sized  enterprises 
which have an added value with regard to their product / technology range and who are economically 
fit to enter a remote market. However, SMEs very often do not have in-house expertise to develop a 
market  access  strategy  for  far-away  difficult  markets;  neither  do  they  have  (sufficient)  human  and 
financial resources to explore these markets. 

In contrast with business missions or initiatives organised by some of the EU Member States, the EU 
Gateway Programme is not a Trade  mission but an awareness building programme  with a focus on 
discovering  the  business  potential  of  a  given  market,  getting  acquainted  with  the  local  business 
culture and practice and learning how to develop a business strategy to access these markets taking 
account of the acquired knowledge from a Gateway business mission.  

Probably  the  most  unique  feature  of  the  EU  Gateway  Programme  is  the  individual  coaching  of  EU 
companies  by  a  specialised  contractor  during  the  entire  span  of  their  participation  in  EU  Gateway 
business  missions,  followed  by  the  logistic  support  provided  by  the  Programme  (financing  of  their 
accommodation  during  the  mission  week,  logistic  support  during  the  mission  week)  and  the 
individual follow up of the companies after their return from an EU Gateway event in Japan or Korea. 

The  EU  Gateway  Programme  is  an  EU  Commission  initiative  embedded  in  the  bilateral  relation 
agreements  between  the  EU  and  respectively  Japan  and  the  Republic  of  Korea;  it  is  one  of  the 
business oriented tools to help restoring the trade imbalance with these countries. Indeed still today 
EU companies (and mainly SMEs) are underrepresented on the Japanese and Korean markets; this is, 
to  a  large  extent,  explained  by  a  lack  of  understanding  and knowledge  of  these  markets,  despite  an 
often existing business potential. 

For  the  period  2009-2014,  there  will  in  total  be  33  missions  to  Japan,  thus  allowing  1.320  EU 
companies to participate, and 15 missions to Korea allowing in total 450 EU companies to participate. 

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EU Centres 

To promote awareness and better understanding of the EU beyond its borders, the ICI supports 29 EU 
Centres  world  wide;  the  EU  centres  are  all  located  in  Universities  in  eight  industrialised  countries 
spanning three continents: ten in the USA, five in Canada, four in Korea, four in Japan, and three in 
Australia and one in New Zealand, Singapore and Taiwan. 

Today the EU Centres receive over 3 million per year. The EU Centres all located in universities have 
created  so  far  over  260  new  EU  certificates  and  courses  and  enabled  42,000  graduates  to  build  up 
their knowledge of the EU. Moreover, the EU Centres have managed to reach audiences beyond the 
academic circle, i.e.: local organisations and businesses, government officials and media. EU Centres 
have  also  offered  a  platform  for  high  level  EU  representatives  to  reach  to  wider  audience.  The  29 
existing EU Centres in 8 ICI countries have recently being joined by 3 new EU Centres in Russia.  

Compared  to  others  means  of  implementation,  for  example  Think  Tanks,  NGOs  or  policy  research 
institutes, placing EU Centres within higher education institutions add value in attaining the overall 
programme  objectives  since  the  Universities  are  capable  of  building  on  the  three  pillars:  teaching, 
research and outreach.  

The EU Centres have had a considerable impact on the development of curricula on EU studies. The 
number of courses on offer has tended to increase over the successive funding cycles, with more than 
900 courses  offered in the aggregate.  The level of  demand has  also increased throughout the years. 
Even though there are no quantitative measures to support this finding, the feedback from many of the 
Centres  suggests  that  the  tendency  has  been  towards  an  increase  in  the  number  of  students  and 
beneficiaries participating from the activities of the Centres. 

The  EU  Centres  Initiative  across  the  countries  has  not  only  contributed  to  increase  the  level  of 
understanding and knowledge of the EU and its policies but it has enhanced beneficiaries’ interest on 
the  EU.  The  majority  of  stakeholders  value  the  work  of  the  EU  Centres.  Currently,  there  are  no 
consolidated  outcome  and  impact  indicators  allowing  for  systematic  monitoring  of  objectives  on  a 
comparative and aggregated fashion, but evaluation suggests that the EU is getting a good return on 
its investment for the EU Centres initiative in terms of enhancing awareness and knowledge of the EU 
in partner countries, and most notably among the academic community.  

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Examples of EU bilateral relations with some third countries 

Annex 3 

China 

With nearly 4000 years of continuous history, China is one of the world's oldest civilisations. It has 
now  re-emerged  as  the  world's  third  economy,  the  biggest  exporter  globally,  but  also  as  an 
increasingly  important  political  power.  China  is  the  single  most  important  challenge  for  EU  trade 
policy.  It  is  now  the  EU's  biggest  source  of  imports  by  far.  The  EU  is  also  China's  biggest  trading 
partner. 

EU relations with China were established in 1975 and are governed by the 1985 EU-China Trade and 
Cooperation  Agreement.  In  2010,  in  order  to  deepen  their  strategic  partnership,  China  and  the  EU 
decided  to  upgrade  their  bilateral  relations  on  a  number  of  areas  such  as  foreign  affairs,  security 
matters and global challenges including climate change and the recovery of the global economy. 

It is in the interest of both sides to further expand trade and investment. Reciprocity and mutual benefit 
should  be  the  guiding  principles  behind  opening  markets.  Furthermore,  the  promotion  of  EU 
commercial  and  investment  interest  in  China  could  be  boosted  by  the  development  of  areas  of 
common  pursuits  ranging  from  education  to  money  laundering  or  also  energy  efficiency,  culture, 
competition policy, intellectual property rights, etc. This type of dialogue is essential to give the EU 
the  visibility  it  needs  and  to  strengthen  its  advocacy  related  to  both  legislative  and  non-legislative 
measures affecting EU business interests. 

USA 

The  EU  and  the  US  enjoy  the  most  integrated  economic  relationship  in  the  world,  illustrated  by 
unrivalled levels of mutual investment stocks, reaching over 2.1 trillion EUR. Investments are thus the 
real  driver  of  the  transatlantic  relationship,  contributing  to  growth  and  jobs  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic. The EU and the US economies account together for about half of the entire world’s GDP. 

The  EU  and  the  US  established  diplomatic  relations  as  early  as  1953,  but  it  was  only  in  November 
1990 that the cooperation was formalised for the first time with the Transatlantic Declaration. Since 
December 1995, the New Transatlantic Agenda has provided the foundation for the relationship. 

In 2010, the EU-US Summit focused on three crucial areas of cooperation: economic growth, global 
challenges such as climate change, and international development and security, including co-ordinated 
responses to regional challenges (e.g. Middle East, Iran). Some important tasks need to be developed 
in  the  future  and  are  taken  in  charge  by  different  bodies  such  as  The  Transatlantic  Economic 
Council (TEC), the EU-US Energy Council and the EU-US Ministerial Dialogue on Development 
with a highlight on conflict prevention and crisis response. Other issues of growing importance such as 
the fight against terrorism, organised crime, cyber-security and cyber-crime are also addressed in the 
EU-US Dialogue. 

Successful programmes have been implemented in the field of people-to-people links and civil society 
dialogue.  The  EU  Centres  of  Excellence  activities  which  are  successful,  help  provide  wide 
geographical  outreach  for  the  EU  in  this  large  country.  Coordinated,  long-term,  public  diplomacy 
activities  are  required  to  promote  the  interests  and  the  image  of  the  EU  in  the  US,  and  taking  into 
account  the  importance  of  think-tanks  and  civil  society  in  the  North  American  context.  Specific 
actions should be tailored to supporting the political priorities outlined above, but also on long-term 
future-oriented  policy  challenges.  Experience  shows  that  most  value  is  added  by  favouring  projects 
highlighting topics of EU interest which lack profile in the host country, and by creating sustainable 
transatlantic networks. 

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Russia 

Russia is the EU’s third biggest trade partner, with Russian supplies of oil and gas making up a large 
percentage of Russia’s exports to Europe. The EU-Russia strategic partnership’s ongoing cooperation is 
based  on  4  specific  policy  areas  or  “common  spaces”:  common  economic  space;  common  space  for 
freedom, security, and justice; common space for external security; and common space for education, 
research  and  culture.  The  Partnership  for  Modernisation  launched  in  2010  reinforces  mutually 
beneficial cooperation in the common spaces and provides a framework for joint activities. Russia was 
not interested in being part of the ENP but wanted a relationship between equals with the EU, reflecting 
its size and importance. 

The  EU  and  Russia  cooperate  on  dealing  with  a  number  of  challenges,  both  at  international  level,  as 
well as in our common neighbourhood. These include  climate change, Arctic  ice  melting, sustainable 
energy, drug and human trafficking, organised crime, crisis management cooperation, North Africa and 
the Middle East Peace Process, and Iran. Regarding the cooperation programme, Russia insists that it 
should no longer be perceived as an EU assistance programme to Russia. Consequently, Russia presses 
that the programme implementation should be based on equality and partnership. By equality, it means 
an approach, in which both sides do not only identify projects jointly, but also obligatorily finance them 
jointly,  design,  manage  and  audit/evaluate  them  jointly.  Russia  is  an  emerging  donor  itself  and  it  is 
seeking to set up an external aid agency on its own. 

Hence,  the  problems  and  limits  mentioned  above  express  the  need  to  further  develop  EU-Russia 
cooperation in areas of EU or common interest such as societal, judicial and economic modernisation as 
developed in the Partnership for Modernisation, energy security, sustainability, research and innovation 
and technology co-operation, international challenges, cross border cooperation, education and support 
to civil society. 

India 

The EU-India Strategic Partnership is guided by the Joint Action Plan, adopted in 2005 and revised in 
2008. The EU's priorities in our cooperation with India are presently security (CT, counter piracy and 
cyber-security), economic and trade issues (FTA under negotiation and business/economic diplomacy), 
and energy/environment/climate change (efficiency, renewables/solar).  

Other sectoral areas of importance include research and innovation (a total of EUR 1 billion of projects 
are ongoing between EU and MS), transport (maritime as well as air transport), education and culture 
(MOUs  have  been  signed),  migration  (a  high  level dialogue  was  launched  in  October)  and  public 
diplomacy.  

Many of these areas could benefit from funding under the future Partnership Instrument, which would 
allow the EU and India to grasp opportunities for cooperation offered on both sides, as well as better 
respond to global challenges both partners have to face.  

India  has  traditionally  seen  the  EU  as  a  primarily  commercial  partner.  The  Instrument  could  serve  to 
change this perception and to profile the EU as a political partner of substance.  

Funding under this Instrument could be used to support the implementation of the Joint Action Plan and 
to underpin specific political priorities. 

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Brazil 

Brazil  is  one  of  the  world’s  fastest  growing  economies  and  its  economic  reforms  have  given  it  new 
international  recognition.  The  EU  and  Brazil  enjoy  historical,  cultural,  economic  and  political  ties. 
These ties were strengthened by the first EU-Brazil summit in Lisbon in July 2007, where a Strategic 
Partnership was established. 

A  three-year  Joint  Action  Plan  has  been  developed  and  implemented  for  the  period  2009-2011, 
identifying main priorities for cooperation and earmarking concrete actions for each priority. Bilateral 
relations  are  enhanced  through  sectoral  dialogues,  scholarship  programmes  and  European  Studies 
Institute.  Environment  and  trade  are  other  important  ongoing  dialogues  which  are  discussed  in  the 
yearly summit meetings. 

Other possible areas of cooperation could be developed, such as counternarcotics, actions to promote 
the  effective  implementation  of  the  comprehensive civil  aviation  agreement  signed  in  March  2011, 
support  EU  SMEs,  support  to  the  effective  implementation  of  the  Information  Society  dialogue, 
culture, public diplomacy. 

Japan  

Japan continues to be one of the largest economies in the world with which the EU has close relations. 
The  EU  and  Japan  enjoy  a  solid  relationship  encompassing  four  broad  objectives:  promoting  peace 
and  security,  strengthening  the  economic  and  trade  partnership,  managing  global  and  societal 
challenges and bringing together people and cultures.  

Cooperation takes the form of foreign policy dialogues, regional dialogues (East Asia, Central Asia) 
and thematic dialogues covering a wide spectrum of issues such as environment, energy, research and 
innovation,  transport.  Annual  Summits  are  held  to  discuss  current  international  issues  and  bring 
forward their bilateral agenda. 

In 2011, the EU-Japan Summit took the political decision to reinvigorate the bilateral relationship and 
start  preparatory  work  for  possible  negotiations of  a  Free  Trade  Agreement  and  a  parallel  broad 
based Framework Agreement. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear power plants, EU and Japanese 
leaders also decided to enhance cooperation on nuclear safety and energy more generally.  

Republic of Korea (South Korea) 

The EU and the Republic of Korea enjoy substantial trade and investment flows. South Korea is the 
EU's  fourth  largest  trading  partner  outside  Europe,  and  the  EU  is  South  Korea’s  2nd  trading  partner 
after China, The EU has been also the largest source of foreign direct investment in South Korea since 
the 1960s whilst South Korea has become a significant investor in Europe since the 1990s. 

The EU and South Korea have strengthened their close relationship, with the view to further boosting 
their vibrant economic ties and promoting their common interests on many areas such as research and 
innovation  and  technology,  education, environment,  development  assistance  and  global  issues, 
especially climate change. 

The  successful  negotiations  for  a  Free  Trade  Agreement  (FTA)  provisionally  applied  from  1  July 
2011and  a  new  Framework  Agreement;  confirm  the  dynamism  of  the  bilateral  relations  now 
considered as a "strategic partnership”. 

The  Republic  of  Korea  is  also  playing  an  increasing  role  in  the  world  scene  (within  the  G-20 
framework,  the  climate  change  international  negotiations  to  reduce  greenhouse  gas  emissions  and  is 
committed to a high level of official development assistance and supporting UN peace operations) 

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Canada 

Canada is one of the European Union’s oldest and closest partners. What started out in the 1950s as a 
purely  economic  relationship  has  evolved  over  the  years  to  become  a  close  partnership.  Canada  is 
currently the EU's 11th most important trading partner and the EU is Canada's second most important 
trading partner, after the U.S. 

The  EU  and  Canada  work  closely  together  on  global  challenges  such  as  the  environment,  climate 
change, Arctic ice  melting, energy security and regional stability throughout the world. In 2010, the 
EU-Canada  Summit  set  clear  priorities  and  there  is  a  new  political  context  with  the  ongoing 
negotiations on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the first of its kind 
with a G8 partner, and the imminent launch of negotiations on an upgraded Framework Agreement. 
Other  policy  sectors  are  also  important  in  the  relationship:  cooperation  in  justice  and  home  affairs, 
education & training, research and innovation, crisis management and election observation to name a 
few.  EU  and  Canada  also  closely  collaborate  on  a  number  of  regional  issues  such  as  Haiti 
reconstruction, and police and rule of law activities in Afghanistan. There will be a need to support the 
implementation  of  the  CETA  and  Framework  Agreements,  encompassing  events,  studies  and 
dialogues, with special attention given to supporting SMEs. 

Successful  programmes  have  been  implemented  in  the  field  of  people-to-people  links  and  public 
diplomacy  actions.  Co-ordinated,  long-term,  public  diplomacy  activities  are  required,  focused  on 
promoting the interests and the image of the EU in Canada. 

South Africa  

South Africa’s political transition from  apartheid during the 1990s has served  as a  model across the 
world. Although the largest African economy, South Africa still faces many development challenges, 
not least in fighting AIDS, poverty and high unemployment. Since 1994, the EU has vested a lot of 
hope and expectations in South Africa's role for the region and the African continent: as a beacon of 
democracy, a pole of stability, and as the region's economic powerhouse, SA has the potential to be an 
EU strategic ally at global level. 

EU-South  African  relations  have  flourished  since  1994,  and  both  sides  entered  into  a  Strategic 
Partnership in May 2007. In October 1999, South Africa and the EU signed a Trade, Development 
and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) which entered fully into force on 1 May 2004, even if some 
provisions  have  been  applied  since  1  January  2000.  The  TDCA  covers  political  dialogue,  the 
establishment  of  a  free  trade  area  over  an  asymmetrical  twelve-year  period,  in  development  and 
economic cooperation as well as a whole series of other areas. 

With  its  role  increasing  as  a  major  international  player,  South  Africa  is  asserting  the  link  between 
domestic,  socio-economic  priorities  and  international  relations  is  a  central  element  of  the  EU-South 
Africa agenda. The EU will continue to support South Africa's national priorities through dialogues on 
a broad range of policies (employment, health, research and innovation, space, environment, etc.) and 
development  programmes  and these ties could be complemented by activities of mutual interest and 
reciprocal exchanges in a number of areas covered by public diplomacy and education. 

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