COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2011-12-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: democracy, equal treatment, financial instrument, foreign aid, fundamental rights, human rights

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1478 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights 
worldwide 

{COM(2011) 844 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1479 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

1.1. 

Organisation and timing 

The drafting of the Impact Assessment for the EU external action instruments for the period 
2014-2020,  including  this  document1,  has  been  coordinated  by  a  Task  Force  composed  by 
services  in  charge  of  EU  external  action  and  the  Legal  Service.  The  drafting  teams, 
appointed on 7 June 2011, have duly taken into consideration the consultations, reviews and 
studies  mentioned  in  Section  2  and  have  liaised  with  other  Commission  services  to  ensure 
consistency with other EU policies. The Task Force has met with the drafting team in charge 
of  this  Impact  Assessment  on  7  June,  30  June,  14  July  and  2  and  4  August  2011  for 
organisational and quality-check purposes. 

An Impact Assessment Steering Group, composed by the members of the Task Force and 
representatives  of  interested  Directorates  General and the Secretariat General, was launched 
on 22 June 2011 It has met twice, on 13 and 26 of July 2011. DG DEVCO, BUDG, SG, LS, 
EAC, FPI and EEAS were particularly involved. 

This review of this Impact Assessment by the Impact Assessment Board is scheduled on 14 
September 2011. 

In  line  with  article  27  of  the  Financial  Regulation  (Council  Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  No 
1605/2002) and article 21 of the Implementing rules of the Financial Regulation (Commission 
Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  No  2342/2002),  the  present  impact  assessment  is  the  ex-ante 
evaluation of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). 

1.2. 

Consultation and expertise (public and internal) 

The Commission held a public consultation on future funding for EU external action between 
26 November 2010 and 31 January 2011. This process was based on an online questionnaire 
accompanied  by  a  background  paper  'What  funding  for  EU  external  action  after  2013?' 
prepared by Commission and EEAS services involved. The 220 contributions received to the 
public consultation reflect a broad and diverse spectrum representing the variety of structures, 
views and traditions characterising the external action community. 

A majority of the respondents (around 70%) confirms that EU financial intervention provides 
a  substantial  added  value  in  the  main  policy  areas  supported  through  EU  financial 
instruments  for  external  action2.  The  criterion  of  EU  added  value  is  put  forward  by  many 
respondents as the main driver for the future: the EU should exploit its comparative advantage 

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2 

The  instruments  are  the  following:  Internal  Agreement  for  the  11th  European  Development  Fund,  Development 
Cooperation Instrument, Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance, European Neighbourhood Instrument, Instrument 
for Stability, Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, 
Partnership  Instrument  and  the  instruments  for  the  EU-Greenland  Partnership.  The  Macro-Financial  Assistance 
instrument,  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy,  the  Humanitarian  aid  instrument  and  the  Civil  Protection 
mechanism are not part of this joint exercise. 
i.e. peace and security, poverty reduction, humanitarian aid, investing in stability and growth in enlargement and 
neighbourhood  countries,  tackling  global  challenges,  promoting  EU  and  international  standards and  values,  and 
supporting growth and competitiveness abroad 

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linked to its global field presence, its wide-ranging expertise, its supranational nature, its role 
as facilitator of coordination, and to the economies of scale. 

Nearly  all  respondents  (92%)  support  a  more  differentiated  approach,  tailored  to  the 
situation of the beneficiary country, based on sound criteria and efficient data collection, to be 
used as a way to increase the impact of EU financial instruments. 

Over two thirds of respondents believe that EU interests are sufficiently taken into account 
in its external action, and that the latter should be based to a larger extent on EU values and 
principles,  and  on  development  objectives  of  the  partner  countries.  Inversely,  a  minority 
considers that EU external action should concentrate more on EU's own interests in the global 
economy, particularly towards emerging economies. 

Regarding simplification of instruments, as concerns the balance between geographic and 
thematic instruments, opinions are mixed regarding a review of EU thematic programmes 
and a possible reduction in number; many fear that this could imply a decrease in the overall 
amount  available  for  thematic  action,  and  rather  call  for  a  simplification  of  the  rules 
governing  access  and  implementation  of  thematic  funding.  Several  thematic  issues  are 
highlighted as important such as the reinforcement of the European Instrument for Democracy 
and  Human  Rights,  climate  financing  or  the  current  DCI  thematic  programmes.  Increased 
flexibility of the geographic limits of EU instruments is supported by a significant majority 
of respondents as a way to respond to interregional challenges. 

A  majority  of  respondents  agree  that  joint  programming  and  co-financing  with  Member 
States can increase the impact and the coherence of EU external action, simplify the delivery 
of aid and reduce overall transaction costs. 

Regarding like-mindedness and conditionality, there is wide support among respondents for 
exploring  conditionality  based  on  the  beneficiary  country's  respect  for  human  rights, 
minorities, good governance and diversity of cultural expressions (78%), or on the quality of 
its policies and of its ability and willingness to implement sound policies (63%). However, a 
majority  of  respondents  is  critical  towards  basing  external  cooperation  on  the  EU's  own 
interests. 

A  vast  majority  of  respondents  support  a  stronger  focus  on  monitoring  and  evaluations 
systems in the future instruments and in projects/programmes implementation. 

As  concerns  the  means  to  enhance  the  visibility  of  EU  external  funding,  a  majority  of 
stakeholders  support  increasing  efforts  for  information  and  communication  activities,  in 
particular  in  beneficiary  countries;  however  EU  visibility  appears  to  be  better  served  by 
effective policies, strategies and presence in third countries, than by additional spending for 
communication. The ideas of reinforcing EU's coordinating role among other donors and of 
ensuring that implementing partners give more visibility to EU funding also obtain a strong 
support from stakeholders. 

Various  stakeholders  consultations  on  the  future  pre-accession  financial  instrument  beyond 
2013 conducted in early 2011, in particular with Members of the European Parliament's DROI 
Committee,  the  five  related  key  networks  of  NGOs  (i.e.  HRDN,  EPLO,  ENOP,  ETUC  and 

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CONCORD) confirmed support for continuity with the current structure of instruments 
for  EU  external  action,  but  with  simplified  implementing  rules,  more  flexibility  and 
enhanced  strategic  orientation  in  the  allocation  of  assistance  and  generalised  multiannual 
programming. 

Regarding EU external action on human rights and democracy, all respondents highlighted 
the  need  to  further  promote  and  support  these  objectives  worldwide  both  by  mainstreaming 
them within all EU policies and actions and by upholding them in a dedicated, separate but 
complementary,  financial  instrument.  The  European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and  Human 
Rights is highly valued and all stakeholders asked the EU to enhance its potential, safeguard 
its added value and further develop its speed of delivery, in particular for the most difficult 
and urgent cases 

1.3. 

Impact Assessment Board 

The  Impact  Assessment  Board  (IAB)  met  on  the  14  September  2011  and  requested  further 
clarifications,  references  and  evidences  supporting  the  various  analysis  and  options  put 
forward to the decision makers. These additions have been added to the Impact Assessment. 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

“Humanity  will  not  enjoy  security  without  development,  it  will  not  enjoy  development 
without security, and it will not enjoy either without respect for human rights”3. 

2.1. 

The problem requiring action and the scope of the instrument regulation 

Definition 

Human rights are universal and indivisible. The European Union therefore actively promotes 
and defends them both within its borders and in its relations with third countries, living up to 
its commitments under the EU Fundamental Rights Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human  Rights4.  Article  21  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union5  explicitly  states  that  “the 
Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired 
its own creation, development  and enlargement, and which  it seeks to advance in the  wider 
world:  democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  the  universality  and  indivisibility  of  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms,  respect  for  human  dignity,  the  principles  of  equality  and  solidarity, 
and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.” 

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the comprehensive package of EU instruments dedicated to 
the implementation of the Union’ external action6 has always comprised a specific financing 
instrument to support the EU’s ambition and interest in advocating universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms worldwide.  

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5 
6 

UN report « in larger freedom », by UNSG K. Annan 21 March 2005 
UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948 
Title V / Chapter 1 - General provisions on the Union’s external action.-  
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (1996-2000)(2000-2006), European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (2007-2013) 

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In  following  up  its  predecessor,  the  European  Initiative  for  Democracy  and  Human  Rights, 
launched in 2006, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is a 
unique expression of this strong EU commitment to democracy and human rights reflecting its 
own core values and founding principles, as well as those underlying the international legal 
order. 

The  EIDHR  inserts  itself  in,  and  operationally  complements,  the  wide-ranging  EU  box  of 
tools  supporting  and  promoting  democracy  and  human  rights  worldwide,  including  through 
diplomatic dialogues and consultations, multilateral action in the UN, the Council of Europe 
or OSCE, public statements and declarations, Council guidelines on human rights, restrictive 
and other legal measures, or human rights clauses in agreements with third countries.  

Evolution of the context 

While in recent years a number of countries have moved towards more open societies, fairer 
electoral processes and greater commitment to respect for human rights, multiple challenges 
remain. Many countries are still autocracies or de facto dictatorships where basic rights and 
freedoms  are  systematically  violated  and  repressed.  Elsewhere,  despite  electoral  processes 
and some political competition, power holders revert to repression of dissent and opposition 
voices  and  legal  and  administrative  restrictions  are  being  incrementally  used  to  reduce  the 
space  for  democracy  and  civil  society  in  a  worrying  manner.  Furthermore,  certain  regimes 
violate the rights to freedom of expression by arbitrarily depriving or disrupting their citizen's 
access to IT means of communication for political purposes. 

Challenges to freedom of expression and media pluralism are still very frequent and include: 
political  interference,  economic  challenges  including  issues  of  ownership  and  competition, 
harassment,  including  violence  against  journalists,  considering  defamation  as  a  criminal 
offence. 

Moreover, the existence in many continents of long-standing internal or cross-border conflicts 
or of structurally failed states continues to generate serious human rights violations. Foremost, 
however, the need and interest to back up emerging democracies, in particular in the wake of 
the Arab Spring, makes comprehensive support to democracy and human rights an essential 
part of the EU’s response to the international challenges in the period 2014-2020. 

The  European  Consensus  on  Development7  also  reaffirms  that  promotion  of  respect  for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms is a common value in the EU vision of development. 
It stipulates that the promotion of democracy, human rights, good governance and respect for 
international law, with special attention given to transparency and anti-corruption, is a clear 
added value and a comparative advantage for the EU. 

The  recent  review  of  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  underlines  that  a  functioning 
democracy,  respect  for  human  rights  and  the  rule  of  law  are  fundamental  pillars  of  the  EU 
partnership with its neighbours. It confirms the EU’s commitment to provide greater support 
to partners engaged in building deep and sustainable democracy – the kind that lasts because 
partner governments are committed to holding regular democratic elections and to guarantee 

7 

Joint  Declaration  by  the  Council  and  the  representatives  of  the  governments  of  the  Member  States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the development policy of 
the European union entitled " The European Consensus" – Official Journal C 46 of 24.2.2006. 

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the freedoms of association, assembly and expression, including free media, and the rights to 
receive  impartial  justice  from  independent  judges,  security  from  democratically  accountable 
police  and  armed  forces,  access  to  a  competent  and  non-corrupt  civil  service  —  and  other 
fundamental rights such as freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief8. 

Scope of the Instrument 

Democracy  and  Human  Rights  are  inextricably  linked.  The  fundamental  freedoms  of 
expression  and  association  are  the  preconditions  for  political  pluralism  and  true  democratic 
process,  whereas  democratic  control  and  separation  of  powers  are  essential  to  sustain  an 
independent judiciary and the rule of law, which in turn are required for effective protection 
of human rights9. Only in a democracy can individuals fully realize their human rights; only 
when human rights are respected can democracy flourish10. 

It is therefore deemed essential that the future instrument keeps a large scope encompassing 
the existing wide array of activities of advocacy, core support and field operations supporting 
all  fundamental  rights  inherent  in  democracy  and  other  human  rights.  It  is  a  guarantee  for 
policy rationality, comprehensiveness of approach, coherence of operations and economies of 
scale. 

The scope of the EIDHR covers five objectives since 2007: 

Enhancing  respect  for  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  in  countries  where 
they are most at risk; 

Strengthening  the  role  of  civil  society  in  promoting  human  rights  and  democratic 
reform,  in  supporting  the  peaceful  conciliation  of  group  interests  and,  in 
consolidating political participation and representation; 

Supporting  actions  on  human  rights  and  democracy  issues  in  areas  covered  by  EU 
Guidelines, including on human rights dialogues, on human rights defenders, on the 
death penalty, on torture, on children and armed conflict, on the rights of the child, 
on  violence  against  women  and  girls  and  combating  all  forms  of  discrimination 
against them, on International Humanitarian Law and on possible future guidelines; 

Supporting  and  strengthening  the  international  and  regional  framework  for  the 
protection and promotion of human rights, justice, the rule of law and the promotion 
of democracy; 

Building confidence in and enhancing the reliability and transparency of democratic 
electoral processes, in particular through election observation. 

Communication “A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood” of 25/05/2011, COM(2011) 303 
Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on 
establishing  a  financing  instrument  for  the  promotion  of  democracy  and  human  rights  worldwide  - 
OJEU L 386/1- Whereas (8) 
EU  Agenda  for  Action  on  Democracy  Support  in  EU  External  Relations,  adopted  as  annex  of  the 
Council conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations, 17 November 2009 

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The response strategy11 under the EIDHR builds on working predominantly with and through 
civil  society  organizations,  aimed  at  defending  the  fundamental  freedoms  which  form  the 
basis for all democratic processes and helping civil society to become an effective force for 
political reform and defense of human rights. In this way, it complements the new generation 
of  geographical  programmes,  which  increasingly  mainstream  democracy  and  human  rights, 
though focusing primarily on public institution-building. 

A growing number of projects and requests for more 

In total, between 2007 and 2011, more than 1600 EIDHR projects have been launched and are 
presently  operating  on  the  ground.  The  Instrument  is  encountering  an  ever  growing  interest 
and demand. 

In  2010  only,  512  contracts  opening  projects  in  the  field  were  signed.  The  country  based 
support  scheme  has  increased  from  €  31  millio n  in  2007  to  €  67  million  in  2010  and  from 
being  used  by  45  delegations  in  2007  to  81  delegations  in  2011.  Since  2007,  162  calls  for 
proposals  have  been  launched  and  concluded.  3012  concept  notes  were  analyzed,  including 
1279 for the sole objective of addressing the countries and situations most at risk. 

Since  2007,  41  EU  Election  Observation  Missions  (EU  EOM)  were  deployed  in  nearly  all 
continents and more than fifty election related missions have taken place, including technical 
assessment missions. Indeed, the EU received more invitations to observe elections than it had 
the means to accept and carry out and therefore was unable to observe all elections that could 
have merited observation. 

EIDHR  Partners  are  90  %  Civil  Society  Organisations  (CSOs)  and  10%  International 
Organisations. In 2009-2010 more than 900 CSOs were awarded projects for more than € 240 
million. 

A sample of projects and results are described in annex of this Impact Assessment. 

2.2. 

Review of evaluation reports 

There was no evaluation of the Instrument as a whole. Nevertheless, several evaluations were 
conducted to assess the global and local impact of the EIDHR. They form a good basis for an 
aggregated  evaluation  of  most  the  EIDHR's  components.  Evaluations  took  stock  of  core 
thematic activities of the EIDHR such as human right defenders12, prevention of torture and 
support for torture rehabilitation centres13 or support to the International Criminal Court14, as 
well as EIDHR country based activities such as in Ukraine15, Angola16 or Sri Lanka17. Three 
additional important evaluations are ongoing related to the impacts of the EU’s overall human 
rights  policy,  the  EIDHR  Country  Based  Support  Scheme,  and  the  operations  related  to 
countries and situations most at risk. 

11 
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13 
14 
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Commission Communication of 25 January 2006 
Evaluation on Human Rights Defender HRD, May 2010 - available at www.eidhr.eu 
Evaluation on anti-torture activities, June 2008 – available at www.eidhr.eu  
Evaluation on the support to the ICC, December 2008 - available at www.eidhr.eu 
Evaluation on EIDHR support in Ukraine, August 2006 – available at www.eidhr.eu  
Evaluation of EIDHR support in Angola, March 2010 - available at www.eidhr.eu 
Mid Term evaluation of EIDRH micro-programme in Sri Lanka 

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While  largely  positive,  these  evaluations  have  led  to  the  identification  of  necessary 
improvements that are proposed below. 

The mid-term review of the instrument was completed in 2010. It was a stocktaking exercise 
of delivery with more than 100 local and central calls for proposals 400 worldwide projects, 
representing  more  than  300  local  civil  society  projects  in  70  third  countries,  40  projects  in 
countries  and  regions  where  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  are  most  at  risk,  13 
projects on the fight against death penalty, 32 projects on the fight against torture, 11 large-
scale  projects  with  emergency  support  mechanisms  to  support  human  rights  defenders,  5 
projects  regarding  global  civil  society  campaigns  in  support  of  the  ICC,  20  targeted  actions 
with key international strategic partners (e.g. Council of Europe or UN), support to the Master 
programme of the European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation 
(EIUC) and four regional Master programmes on human rights and democratisation in South 
East Europe, Latin America/Caribbean, Africa and Asia-Pacific. 

The  review  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  second18  EIDHR  strategy  paper  for  2011-201319. 
Several lessons learnt have led to the identification of various improvements that are proposed 
below 

It is suggested that the future EIDHR regulation entails a dedicated new Article committing to 
an  evaluation  report  (by  2017)  to  assess  the  achievement  of  the  objectives  of  the  measures 
adopted on the basis of this Regulation, the efficiency of the use of resources and its European 
added  value,  in  view  of  a  decision  on  the  renewal,  modification  or  suspension  of  the 
measures. 

2.3. 

Review of lessons learnt 

Reviews and evaluations underlined several strengths 

The  EIDHR  offers  independence  of  action,  allowing  working  without  the  need  for 
government consent, which is a critical feature especially in the sensitive areas of democracy 
and human rights. Thus, the instrument supports democratic education e.g. at graduate level of 
future  young  Belarusian  leaders  abroad  or  tries  to  mitigate  unfair  criminalization  of 
democratic  activists  imprisoned  for  being  in  the  opposition.  The  defenders  of  the  victims, 
such as lawyers, have in turn to be defended (through the Human Right Defender system) as 
they risk imprisonment for taking up the cases of pro-democracy activists or rights defenders. 

The  EIDHR  offers  more  flexibility  and  capacity  to  respond  to  changing  circumstances, 
contrasting with the long-term programming approach of the geographical programmes. Thus, 
in the context of the evolving Arab Spring, an immediate assistance was made available to the 
reform  committee  in  Tunisia  to  design  the  roadmap  for  transition  and  help  civil  society 
contribute to the process. The EIDHR will also provide democracy training for political party 
activists, support free press and independent pluralistic media- both traditional and ICT-based, 
including  censorship-free  and  undisrupted  electronic  communications  technologies-  and 
support  civic  education  on  democracy  in  Tunisia.  The  EIDHR  might  also  be  available  for 
strengthening the production capacities of media and training of the journalists. In view of the 

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First strategy covered 2007-2010 
EIDHR Strategy paper 2011-2013, COM(2010)2432 of the 21.04.2010 

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upcoming elections, it is providing training to thousands of local observers and will fund the 
envisaged EU Election Observation Mission. 

The EIDHR also works in the most difficult environments where basic rights and freedoms 
are most at risk. In order to protect the physical safety of activists and others whose lives may 
be  seriously  endangered,  the  details  of  such  projects  cannot  be  made  public.  The  European 
Commission reports on these projects to authorized persons in the Council, the Parliament and 
the EEAS on a “need to know” basis and may only commend the courage of such dedicated 
activists. 

These  difficult  cases  represent  about  20  %  of  EIDHR  activities.  Since  2007,  the  EIDHR 
supported  more  than  100  such  projects  (€  60  million  worth).  In  particular,  supported  by  its 
network  of  Human  Rights  Defenders  (HRD),  the  EIDHR  backed  19  HRD  projects  (€  13.5 
million worth) in more than 45 countries. 

In  those  contexts,  the  EIDHR  acts  as  a  breath  of  fresh  air  with  most  projects  focusing  on 
helping  the  survival  of  weakened  or  shattered  civil  society  and  media,  thereby  opening  the 
door  to  dialogue  and  change.  It  offers  the  chance  for  democratic  education  of  students  and 
vulnerable  groups,  often  based  abroad.  It  helps  the  advocacy  of  civil  society  and  diasporas 
abroad. Sometimes it simply tries to protect and, if needed, to bring victims of repression out 
of the country into safety. 

The “Jasmine revolution” means that the EIDHR may now reveal its involvement in Tunisia 
in  2010  where,  prior  to  transition,  it  supported  activities  of  the  Tunisian  League  of  Human 
Rights  (LTDH),  the  Association  of  Democratic  Women  (AFTD),  Trade  Unions  (UGTT), 
Judges’  and  Lawyers’  Associations  and  others,  which  at  the  time  was  not  authorized  in  the 
country. Lack of publicity concerning its involvement at the time could have been interpreted 
as a lack of responsiveness; in fact, the EIDHR was very active. 

Reviews and evaluations have also highlighted four blocks of questions 

First,  broadly  defined  objectives  and  strategies  have  caused  a  certain  fragmentation  of 
approaches  and  some  lack  of  legibility  of  the  Instrument,  creating  risks  of  duplication, 
difficulties  in  measuring  the  impact  of  the  activities  and  a  certain  weakening  of  the 
complementarity. 

Second,  while  in  the  most  difficult  countries  the  official  project  description  has  often  been 
disguised in more traditional development activities terms to protect the project from a hostile 
environment, this has sometimes led to EIDHR resources being devoted to “soft” issues, such 
as health or sanitation, and not the most pressing priorities, thereby creating a risk of being 
used for non-priority activities in terms of the scope of the instrument. Therefore qualitative 
supports were established 

Third,  there  is  a  clear  need  to  increase  the  flexibility  of  the  instrument.  This  is  particularly 
true for the limited part of the instrument addressing the toughest situations in terms of human 
rights violations and urgency of cases, for which a system of open calls seems inadequate. 

Fourth,  the  budget  of  the  EIDHR  is  too  limited  given  its  vast  geographical  and  thematic 
scope. The EIDHR is the smallest of the existing EU instruments and only represents 1% of 
the overall EU Official Development Assistance. The qualitatively acceptable, yet unsatisfied 
requests received represent 2-3 times more than the current funding capacities allow to cover, 

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proving  a  high  relevant  absorption  potential.  Similarly,  more  EU  Election  Observation 
Missions could be carried out if more funding were available. 

2.4. 

The underlying drivers of the problem 

It is essential that the EIDHR keeps its dual capacity (i) on the one hand, to support long term 
and in depth comprehensive efforts to promote democracy and human rights and (ii) on the 
other  hand,  to  quickly  respond  to  urgent  cases  of  violations,  often  in  very  difficult 
environments 

The  European  Commission’s  proposal  for  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework,  tabled  in 
June, foresees already to mitigate the issue of the currently tight resources for the EIDHR. It 
proposes a somewhat increased budget allowing to enhance the EU response and to bring it 
closer  to  the  level  of  the  requests.  The  potential  absorption  capacity  and  the  level  of  good 
project submissions correspond approximately to 3 times the current available budget (€ 150 
million  a  year).  However,  a  budget  increase  to  such  a  level  (€  450  million  a  year)  is  not 
deemed  feasible  in  times  of  austerity.  The  current  Commission  proposal  aims  at  reaching  a 
reasonable benchmark of around € 200 million a  year for a total instrument budget of € 1,400 
million  over  the  period  2014-2020  (2011  current  prices).  This  corresponds  to  a  realistic 
increase (20%). The EIDHR will have conducted an estimated total of 2500 projects between 2007-
2013. Such an increase would allow for an estimated of 3000 additional key projects between 2014-
2020. 

First driver: lack of focus 

Broadly defined EIDHR objectives and strategies have caused some degree of fragmentation 
of  approaches  and  some  lack  of  legibility  of  the  Instrument  creating  risks  of  duplication, 
difficulties  in  measuring  its  impact  and  a  certain  weakening  of  the  complementarity.  Some 
delegations have also used the flexibility of the instrument to deliver developmental projects 
with  only  a  partial  human  right  component,  though  sometimes  to  “disguise”  the  project  in 
countries with difficult political environments. 

While the scope of activities covered by the EIDHR needs to stay large and open, the broad 
definition of objectives in the current EIDHR regulation allows for a dispersion of efforts and 
strategies. The effectiveness of the instrument has been negatively affected as a result of not 
being enough of an enabling tool focused around the main types of activities to be conducted 
and their enabling environment. 

Second driver: red tape 

While the results achieved and the important role played by the existing flexibilities is to be 
commended, one also needs to note that at times the EIDHR’s reactivity has been either too 
slow or achieved at high transaction costs due to red tape. It is therefore important to further 
increase  the  flexibility  of  the  instrument  in  order  to  enhance  its  reactivity  for  though  and 
urgent  situations.  The  length  of  calls  for  proposals,  from  the  launch  of  the  call,  to  the 
contractualisation  of  selected  beneficiaries  of  grant,  imposed  by  the  steps  foreseen  in  the 
Financial Regulation, is incompatible with fast delivery. It can indeed take up to 12 months. 

While the majority of the activities should remain demand-driven to ensure their feasibility, to 
avoid  “white  elephants”  and  to  ensure  ownership  by  the  actors,  this  approach  can  be 
sometimes  impossible  to  implement  in  the  most  difficult  situations.  Indeed,  as  an  example, 

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one  cannot  expect  threatened  and  frightened  civil  society  actors  that  live  under  immediate 
pressure to answer public and publicised calls for proposals, which might jeopardise their own 
safety.  As  an  example,  a  public  call  for  proposal  aiming  at  the  selection  of  projects  to 
strengthen Human Rights in North Korea cannot take place without serious political risks and 
risks for the potential beneficiaries. Therefore, the issue of how to bring EIDHR action to bear 
effectively  in  the  most  difficult  cases  is  certainly  an  area  that  would  justify  additional 
flexibility measures. 

The  implementation  of  some  procedures,  such  as  call  for  proposals,  also  represents 
transaction  costs  and  administrative  burden  that  should  be  limited  when  not  necessary  or 
counterproductive to the achievement of the objectives of the instruments. 

2.5. 

Legal base for EU action 

The legal bases for the instrument are Article 209.1 TFEU (ex 179 EC) and Article 212.2 (ex 
181a EC). 

In  addition,  the  policy  proposed  is  based  on  Article  21  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union 
which  provides  that  “the  Union's  action  on  the  international  scene  shall  be  guided  by  the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks  to  advance  in  the  wider  world:  democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  the  universality  and 
indivisibility  of  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms,  respect  for  human  dignity,  the 
principles  of  equality  and  solidarity,  and  respect  for  the  principles  of  the  United  Nations 
Charter and international law." 

2.6. 

EU added value 

On  the  background  of  its  own  accomplishments  in  conflict  solution,  peace  building  and 
prosperity creation, the EU would seem to be in an excellent position to deliver on external 
action,  on  behalf  of  and  with  its  Member  States,  generally  enjoying  high  credibility  in  the 
countries where it works in. It is well placed to take on the role of a global leader on behalf of 
its  citizens,  in  particular  in  its  support  and promotion  of  democracy  and  human  rights.  Yet, 
European  added  value  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  balance  sheet:  contributing  to  peace  building 
worldwide,  assisting  the  world's  poorest  people  and  supporting  democratisation  and  human 
rights  respect  are  indisputable  demonstrations  of  how  the  EU  adds  value  through  its  work 
every  day.  This  is  precisely  where  the  priorities  of  the  next  financial  instruments  on  EU 
external action will lie. 

With 27 Member States acting within the framework of common policies and strategies, the 
EU has the critical weight to respond to global challenges, such as fostering the universality 
of  human  rights  for  all  people.  The  EIDHR  is  actually  the  only  sizable  EU  instrument  to 
address  specifically  human  rights,  and  most  Member  States  only  have  limited  funds,  in 
comparison, supporting human rights and democracy related activities. 

Due to its large scale the EU can deliver help in the world's most remote areas, where most 
Member States have little strategic interest, only limited presence and reduced capacity to act. 
Thanks  to  EU  action  in,  for  example,  Fiji,  Vanuatu  or  Timor  Leste  where  recently  new 
funding  for  stable  democracy  and  sustainable  development  was  provided,  aid  reaches  the 
people that need it most, but who otherwise would remain without it. 

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At a time of budgetary restrictions, when several MS are compelled to exit entire sectors and 
countries, the EU continues to be able to play an active role in promoting peace, democracy, 
solidarity,  stability,  prosperity  and  poverty  reduction  in  our  immediate  neighbourhood  and 
worldwide. In this context, it makes more sense than ever from a purely economic perspective 
to invest money at EU level where a real difference can be made. In fact, acting through the 
EU can actually save money for MS. Certain aid effectiveness reforms, especially in terms of 
division  of  labour,  could  add  up  to  potential  savings  of  between  3  and  6  billion  a  year, 
according to a recent independent study (The Benefits of a European Approach, by HTSPE). 

Working with the EU is also cheaper. Administrative costs – estimated at 5.4% on the basis of 
2009 data - are lower than the average administrative costs of the principal donors for bilateral 
aid. The administrative rules that apply are intended to make sure that EU taxpayers' money is 
properly spent, using strict criteria, which can be monitored. 

In addition, the European Commission is one of the most transparent aid bodies in the world. 
Such  transparency  is  in  itself  an  important  tool  to  ensuring  effective  value  for  money.  This 
has been recognised by the organisation "Publish what you Fund" which ranked the European 
Commission in 4th position (out of 30) in it is first Aid transparency Assessment of donors in 
February this year. Further improvements are continuing to be made. 

In a recent Green Paper consultation carried out to find out views from stakeholders on our 
development policy, all those who responded agreed on the positive role that the EU played in 
supporting good governance (including participation of civil society), security, human rights 
and gender equality. 

As an example, for the Arab Spring, and in particular the Libyan crisis, the complementary 
activities of ECHO, IfS and EIDHR have formed the core of the exemplary civilian pillar of 
the EU response to humanitarian need (i.e. Echo), crisis (i.e. IfS) and support to democratic 
transition (i.e. EIDHR). 

3. 

OBJECTIVES 

3.1. 

General objectives of the instrument 

The  goal  pursued  by  the  EIDHR  is  to  contribute  to  the  development  and  consolidation  of 
democracy  and  the  rule  of  law  and  to  promoting  respect  for  fundamental  freedoms  and  all 
human rights, within the overall framework of the EU’s policy on development cooperation 
and  economic,  financial  and  technical  cooperation  with  third  countries,  and  consistent  with 
the EU’s foreign policy and external action as a whole. This objective is to be maintained. 

3.2. 

Specific objectives of the revision 

First, it is important to note upfront that this proposal for the revision of the EIDHR is based 
on the premise of keeping the existing efficient principles that are key to ensure the reality of 
the EIDHR mandate and its added value: 

• 

To  maintain  a  separate,  stand-alone  instrument  that  acts  in  complementarity  with 
other  instruments  which  mainstream  human  rights  (i.e.  focus  on  human  rights 
defenders and most difficult environments) 

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• 

• 

• 

• 

To  work  autonomously,  without  host  country  government  consent  (i.e.  partial  EU 
restricted) 

To maintain a worldwide coverage (i.e. also active in the US or Japan) 

To  maintain  existing  procedural  flexibilities  (i.e.  re-granting,  informal  partnerships, 
small grant) 

To keep a strong focus on local activities and CSOs 

Indeed,  complementarity  is  the  basis  for  human  rights  mainstreaming  and  the  EIDHR’s 
leverage effect, working without host country consent is a guarantee to avoid censorship and 
undue interference in sensitive and difficult environments, worldwide coverage is a reflection 
of  the  universalism  of  human  rights  and  the  existing  flexibilities  are  ensuring  a  minimum 
potential  of  reactivity.  These  principles  have  been  recognised  and  commended  by  all  stake 
holders in various consultations and therefore should not be subject to change 

The  specific  objectives  of  the  EIDHR’s  revision  are  twofold  and  pursue  the  aim  to  build  a 
better enabling regulation 

On one hand, to focus on enabling working axis serving a scope of activities that stays broad 
and  even  enlarged  in  the  currently  too  weak  area  of  economic  and  social  rights.  The  future 
EIDHR would aim at a more operational definition of the objectives of the regulation along 
four  axes  of  work,  representing  focused  process  oriented  categories  of  activities  described 
hereafter in section 3.5 (i.e. geographical/thematic coverage 

On the other hand, to increase the flexibility of the instrument by applying a full untying of 
EIDHR  funding  to  restrictive  rules  of  nationality  and  origin,  a  condition  consistent  with  its 
worldwide mandate, and by applying, when appropriate, the procedures of the Instrument for 
Stability (i.e. direct grants based on concept notes) within a limited funding envelope under 
the instrument dedicated to the most difficult cases and to emergencies (+/- 20%). 

3.3. 

Consistency with external action priorities 

Advocacy  and  support  of  democracy  and  for  the  respect  of  human  rights  are  enshrined  as 
primary guiding principles of the EU’s external action in Articles 2 V and 21 of the Treaty on 
European  Union.  They  are  also  enshrined  as  a  key  overarching  element  in  the  European 
Consensus for Development, the new Neighbourhood Policy and in all EU partnerships, the 
DCI and the EDF. It is also a key criterion for the enlargement process 

3.4. 

Consistency with other EU policies 

As a consequence of this clear-cut Treaty mandate, promotion and support of democracy and 
human rights is to be integrated and mainstreamed in all EU policies 

The  EIDHR  is  part  of  the  architecture  of  different  external  action  financial  instruments 
proposed  jointly  by  the  European  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  for  CFSP.  It 
complements long term instruments by focussing on CSO activities in the field of democracy 
and human rights, addressing the most difficult situations, financing EU Election Observation 
Missions  and  supporting  local,  regional  and  worldwide  campaigns  on  key  human  rights 
issues.  It  is  an  essential  part  of  the  wider  external  action  toolbox  to  promote  and  safeguard 
human rights respect. It also complements the toolbox of crisis management and prevention 

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alongside  with  humanitarian  aid,  CFSP  operations  and  the  Instrument  for  Stability  by 
providing  rapid  support  in  cases  of  urgent  human  rights  violations.  It  also  acts  as  a  link  to 
relief,  rehabilitation  and  development  activities  by  offering  the  possibility  for  providing 
physical and mental rehabilitation and reinsertion to victim of abuses or assist human rights 
defenders in urgent protection need. As an example, in Libya, the EIDHR will help bring back 
to  schools  children  that  were  sheltered  by  ECHO,  offering  a  democratic  curriculum  and 
specific psychological rehabilitations. Later on, the ENPI, will follow and help with more in-
depth reforms of the education system 

It  has  been  essential  to  ensure  on  the  ground,  in  a  pragmatic  manner,  the  coordination  with 
and  a  proper  division  of  labour  between  the  EIDHR  and  other  interacting  instruments,  in 
particular  in  the  needs  assessments  phase  of  cases.  Indeed,  the  EIDHR  complements 
humanitarian  aid  operations,  as  refugees  and  beneficiaries  of  humanitarian  relief  are  often 
victims of human rights violations that need to be documented, registered and treated. Strong 
synergies  and  mutual  reinforcement  exist  with  the  Instrument  for  Stability  (e.g.  in  case  of 
emergencies),  Non  State  Actor  line  (e.g.  support  to  CSOs),  Investing  in  People  Line  (e.g. 
gender  and  disenfranchised  groups)  and  in  the  future  the  new  Neighbourhood  Civil  Society 
Facility.  As  an  example,  in  Haiti,  in  respect  of  the  2010  general  elections,  while  the  IfS 
provided  support  to  the  organisation  of  elections  and  the  NSA  supported  civil  society 
capacity, the EIDHR provided EU observation missions, local domestic observation as well as 
protection against human rights Abuses. 

3.5. 

Geographical/thematic coverage 

The EIDHR should continue to have a worldwide geographical coverage, outside of the EU, 
and  be  able  to  act  potentially  in  any  region  or  country  of  the  world.  While  the  thematic 
coverage of the future EIDHR should remain wide, it would focus on four enabling axis 

thematic campaigns, mixing advocacy and field operations for major issues (e.g. international 
justice) and addressing serious violations of rights (e.g. torture, death penalty, discrimination, 
etc..), as well as providing core support to key actors and related civic education; 

targeted support to the development of thriving civil societies, empowering it in its quest for 
and  defence  of  democracy  and  human  rights  and  to  their  specific  role  as  actors  for  positive 
change; 

reinforced  capacity  for  the  EU  to  be  able  to  react  quickly  to  human  rights  urgencies  and 
establishment of a comprehensive EU Human Rights Defender mechanism; 

strengthened  and  better  integrated  approach  to  democratic  cycles,  through  election 
observation and other types of support to democratic and electoral processes; 

Further details, sub-objectives and targets (i.e. which funding envelope for which major issue) 
will  be  determined  in  the  multi-annual  strategies  and/or  annual  action  plans.  They  will  also 
take  account  of  the  priority  setting  under  the  Human  Rights  Country  Strategies  currently 
under elaboration and validation. 

The  case  of  the  EU  Election  Observation  Missions  (EU  EOMs)  is  peculiar  in  terms  of 
geographical  coverage.  Indeed,  EU  EOMs  do  not  take  place  in  the  countries  of  the  OSCE 
membership (including the EU’s own Member States). This is a measure of division of labour 
and sound financial approach, as the OSCE is already organizing its own election observation 

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missions,  with  a  methodology  compatible  with  that  for  EU  EOMs  (the  OSCE  has  endorsed 
the same Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation as the EU) and with 
the  financial  support  of  EU  Member  States.  That  is  why  it  is  not  envisaged  at  this  stage  to 
change this peculiar geographical coverage of EU EOMs. 

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

While the comparative advantage of the EIDHR as such does  not seem controversial  at EU 
level, it is essential to base the future instrument on lessons learnt. This implies, on the one 
hand, to keep the proven added value and recognised working principles and specificities of 
the EIDHR. It also implies, on the other hand, to introduce amendments and changes to the 
delivery  mechanisms  of  the  instrument,  in  order  to  further  improve  its  reactivity,  flexibility 
and impact on the ground. 

4.1. 

Option 0 – No regulation 

One  could  envisage  cancelling  the  EIDHR  and  decide  either  not  to  address  democracy  and 
human rights or to mainstream relevant activities within other instruments. 

4.2. 

Option 1 - No change to the existing regulation 

The  EIDHR  would  remain  the  same  in  terms  of  its  geographical  and  thematic  scope,  its 
objectives and its operational principles. The proposed increase of the budget allocation will 
allow to catch up with inflation since 2007 (14%) and to conduct more operations. 

4.3. 

Option 2 - Building a better enabling regulation 

While the option to table an entirely new instrument is not  proposed, the second option put 
forward is to aim at an amended EIDHR regulation reflecting lessons learnt and the various 
changes proposed. This revision would target the establishment of a better enabling and more 
process oriented regulation, entailing 5 sub-options to be discussed. 

Sub-option 1 – Focussing on enabling working tools axis 

Built as a better enabling regulation, the question is whether the approach should be to keep 
the existing regulation and introduce change in strategies and practices or whether to revise 
the instrument and introduce changes to help focus it on its four different windows: 

• 

• 

• 

thematic  campaigns,  mixing  advocacy  and  field  operations  for  major  issues(e.g. 
international  justice)  and  addressing  serious  violations  of  rights  (e.g.  torture,  death 
penalty,  discrimination,  etc..),  as  well  as  providing  core  support  to  key  actors  and 
related civic education; 

targeted  support  to  the  development  of  thriving  civil  societies  empowering  it  in  its 
quest  for  and  defence  of  democracy  and  human  rights  and  to  their  specific  role  as 
actors for positive change; 

reinforced capacity for the EU to be able to react quickly to human rights urgencies 
and establishment of a comprehensive EU Human Rights Defender mechanism; 

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• 

strengthened  and  better  integrated  approach  to  democratic  cycles,  through  election 
observation and other types of support to democratic and electoral processes; 

Sub-option 2 – Maintaining the insertion of EU Elections Observation Missions (EOMs) 

EU Election Observation Missions have always formed a relevant and important part of the 
EIDHR  activities.  The  question  has  been  raised  about  their  potential  insertion  into  the 
Instrument  for  Stability  or  in  geographical  instruments  and  relevant  country  financial 
envelopes. 

Sub-option 3 – Maintaining the exclusion of political parties 

The direct funding of political parties is prohibited in the current regulation. Regular requests 
by political parties and/or affiliated bodies to lift this prohibition have been received. 

Sub-option 4 – Further untying 

The  instrument  applies  the  common  level  of  untying  for  EU  instruments.  The  question  has 
been  raised  whether  it  is  coherent  with  the  EIDHR  worldwide  mandate  Sub-option  5  -  Add 
new flexibilities for most difficult countries/situations. 

The  question  has  arisen  whether  a  limited  (in  terms  of  amount)  use  of  the  direct  award  of 
grants  as  practiced  by  the  IfS  could  be  applied,  if  appropriate,  to  the  most  difficult 
countries/situations and cases of urgency. 

5. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

5.1. 

Likely economic, social and environmental impacts of each of the options 

The  promotion  of  democracy  and  human  rights  has  a  direct  economic,  social  and 
environmental  impact,  which  is  extremely  difficult  to  quantify.  Nevertheless,  improvements 
of  an  individual’s  situation  in  terms  of  human  rights  and  democratic  participation  certainly 
have a direct impact on his/her economic and social life, as well as on the likelihood of better 
environmental protection measures being taken. 

Indeed, supporting activists or human rights defenders involved in the defence of economic, 
social or environmental rights has a strong impact locally and also generates political pressure 
on  governments  to  observe  the  commitments  made  by  a  given  country  in  these  areas, 
therefore tending to improve the situation in this regard. 

The various options have different qualitative impacts. 

One  can  expect  that  many  stakeholders  would  view  option  0  (no  regulation)  as  a 
renouncement  by  the  EU  of  promoting  its  own  core  values  and  relevant  international 
standards.  It  will  certainly  have  a  very  negative  impact  in  terms  of  the  EU’s  image  both  at 
home and on the international scene. 

While option 1 (no change) will allow for the existing economies of scale of a self-standing 
instrument, it will miss those resulting from the proposed rationalisation of the process and its 
improved rapidity through additional flexibility (option 2). Indeed, a faster and more reactive 

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mechanism  can  make  a  difference  when  saving  the life  of  a  victim  is  a  question  of  days  or 
even hours. 

5.2. 

Include  impacts  on  external  action,  in  particular  on  Policy  Coherence  for 
Development 

The integration of democracy and human rights activities within other instruments (option 0) 
will allow a direct integration with other policies. However, it will certainly reduce the profile 
of the EU’s human rights and democracy support, as well as risk to create incoherencies of 
action between regions and thematic areas and lead to diverging or double standards. 

A revision limited to an increased EIDHR budget (option 1)  will allow to respond better to 
requests, in particular those emerging from EU delegations in the field that are well placed to 
assess the field reality and coherence on the ground. It will not allow benefiting from other 
possible improvements. 

An improved EIDHR (option 2) will allow to better impact on the other policies. It will help 
further  ensure  the  Policy  Coherence  for  Development  as  there  is  no  development  without 
rights and no rights without development. 

5.3. 

Impact in terms of management / implementation modalities 

An  increased  EIDHR  budget  will  impose  additional  managerial  constraints  if  it  is  not 
accompanied  by  additional  flexibility.  A  part  of  the  financial  envelope  will  have  to  be 
earmarked  for  support  expenditure  which  should  follow  the  percentage  of  the  operational 
credit increase. 

An improved EIDHR and/or faster and more flexible implementing modalities as proposed in 
4.2  (option  2)  will  allow  reducing  transaction  costs  of  implementation  while  increasing  the 
impact and therefore the instrument’s value for money. It will also allow for faster delivery in 
an area where often, timing is of the essence for a positive result. 

6. 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS 

6.1.  Weighting of positive and negative impacts per option 

6.1.1.  Option 0 (No regulation) 

Not having a specific regulation on democracy and human rights will imply either that the EU 
will not undertake the activities previously conducted within the scope of the instrument, or 
that these activities will have to be mainstreamed within other instruments. 

Cancelling existing activities out of the EU portfolio will greatly endanger the EU’s standing 
and  leadership  in  the  field  of  human  rights  and  democracy  and  its  capacity  to  underpin  its 
policy  dialogues  with  concrete  operations.  Moreover,  it  will  result  in  thousands  of  persons 
across the world, either human rights activists or victims of abuses, being without means and 
protection while often in precarious situations or even sometimes in lethal danger. 

The inclusion of democracy and human rights activities within other instruments (EFF, ENPI 
or DCI) could be seen as a positive sign of mainstreaming. Nevertheless, the suppression of a 

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self standing instrument will lead to the abolition of the specific, valuable working principles, 
such as the absence of consent of the host country or targeting civil society actors. Therefore 
this  option  will  impede  most  activities  and  reduce  the  delivery  to  the  easiest  or  show  case 
activities.  It  will  lower  efficiency  of  operational  delivery  (e.g.  reduced  geographical  scope, 
lower  economies  of  scales,  higher  cost)  and  create  certainly  a  strong  loss  of  visibility  and 
positive reputation (i.e. secondary rather than complementary). 

6.1.2.  Option 1 (No change) 

The option of no change would result in activities remaining strictly in the framework of the 
existing EIDHR Regulation.  

This  option  would  ensure  the  continuity  of  the  instrument,  as  well  as  an  improved 
understanding  (through  an  effect  of  repetition)  of  its  activities.  It  would  maintain  the  good 
principles of the existing EDIHR. It would also maintain the EU as one of the biggest donors 
in the field of human rights and democracy. 

While this option would allow maintaining the performing existing instrument, it would not 
allow  facing  new  challenges  adequately,  correcting  lessons  learnt  and  answering  new 
demands. 

6.1.3.  Option 2 (Revised regulation) 

Sub-option 1 - Focussing on enabling working tools axis 

Built as a better enabling regulation, the revised instrument set up as a process oriented tool 
would focus on the four different windows set out under point 4.3. 

The  four  categories  discussed  above  correspond  roughly  to  the  type  of  activities  that  are 
delivered by the current EIDHR. However, adapting the delivery mechanisms will allow for 
improved  efficiency  and  impact  on  the  ground.  Two  major  changes  are  needed.  First  the 
update of several articles to insert in the regulation various enhanced flexibilities developed in 
the new Financial Regulation, as well as several modalities allowing, in accordance with the 
EU  commitment  on  aid  effectiveness,  to  improve  joint  activities  and  programming  with  the 
Member States and other donors. Second, to adapt specific flexibilities for the most difficult 
cases as described in sub-option 5. Due to the highly sensitive nature of the issue (i.e. most 
difficult countries are high on the EU diplomatic agenda) this additional enabling flexibility is 
presented as an independent option. 

Sub-option 2 – Maintaining the insertion of EU Elections Observation Missions (EOMs) 

The  coherence  between  EOMs,  diplomatic  agendas  and  long  term  engagement  with  partner 
countries  might  benefit  from  the  insertion  of  EOMs  in  the  concerned  country's  envelope 
within geographical instrument. 

The  insertion  of  EOMs  within  the  Instrument  for  Stability  could  allow  enhancing  the 
deployment of EOM in post-conflict or quasi conflict situation and its link as a tool to address 
crisis agendas or negotiations for transition. 

Nevertheless, EOMs are a flagship of the EU external action and their current methodology 
and  the  independence  of  the  EIDHR  as  the  financing  basis  guarantee  in  turn  the  EOM’s 

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independence  and  their  high  degree  of  credibility.  This  makes  them  an  important  tool  in 
bbuilding confidence in and enhancing the reliability and transparency of democratic electoral 
processes,  detached  from  any  political  agenda  (i.e.  almost  an  evaluation  of  the  electoral 
situation and related democratic processes). 

It  is  proposed  to  maintain  the  existing  insertion  of  the  EOMs  as  an  important  pillar  of  the 
EIDHR.  The  question  has  been  also  been  discussed  in  the  IfS  Impact  Assessment  and  the 
potential options for its revision, with similar conclusions and reasoning. 

Sub-option 3 - The exclusion of political parties 

Political parties are essential actors of the democratic cycle and real actors of change and of a 
grass  root  democracy.  The  direct  funding  of  political  parties,  despite  their  role  as  important 
actors of the civil society is currently prohibited by the existing instrument. Allowing them as 
potential beneficiaries of the EIDHR would include a key category of actor that is excluded 
and might meet the agreement of parts of the Members of the European Parliament. However, 
this exclusion was carefully thought through and agreed by the EU as a guarantee for the non–
partisan approach pursued by the Union under the EIDHR. Until this approach is not changed, 
the  insertion  of  political  parties  as  direct  beneficiaries  would  be  in  contradiction  with  this 
principle. 

The recent announcement of the envisaged set up of a European Endowment for Democracy 
potentially focussing precisely on political parties, society and actors, detached from the non 
partisan  principle  under  which  the  EIDHR  works,  also  calls  for  not  duplicating  in  this 
direction. 

It is recommended for this exclusion to be maintained. It is important to note that this does not 
exclude  activities  targeting  political  parties  in  a  non-partisan  manner  (such  as  democracy 
related  training),  but  direct  party  funding  should  be  excluded.  By  contrast,  the  eligibility  of 
independent political foundations would remain unaffected by this exclusion, in line with the 
current regulation. 

Sub-option 4 – Further untying 

The proposal for the Future Basic Acts aims at a further gradual untying of aid to the rules of 
origin and /or nationality corresponding to the EU political commitments made at this point in 
time. The worldwide nature of the EIDHR calls a full untying of aid, as was the case already 
for  the  preceding  European  Initiative  on  Democracy  and  Human  Rights.  It  has  imposed  a 
constant use of the derogation measures allowed in the regulation to further untie the EIDHR 
resources. Cases are recurrent such as campaigns against death penalty in USA or Japan, use 
of  Switzerland  based  international  NGOs,  or  projects  by  diaspora  groups  that  fled  highly 
repressive countries to non EU countries. 

Therefore,  regular  activities  impose  derogations  to  the  existing  rules  on  rule  of  origin  and 
nationality.  The  adoption  or  not  of  the  complete  untying  of  the  regulation  does  not  have  a 
direct impact on the derogation possibilities that exit and are regularly used. It would have an 
impact on the administrative cost of projects and allow reducing red tape, representing a direct 
gain of resources. While the previous European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights 
was already fully untied, this would represent a precedent for the entire EU assistance. 

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In  accordance  with  the  aim  of  the  two  EU  regulations  on  the  untying  of  aid,  it  is 
recommended that the future EIDHR is fully untied and the eligibility of project exclusively 
based on the balance between their relevance, quality and price. 

Sub-option 5 - Add new flexibilities for most difficult countries/situations. 

The  necessity  to  increase  the  flexibility  of  the  instrument  is  important  in  order  to  gain 
additional reactivity in the toughest cases and in situations of urgency. Indeed, the possibility 
to award direct grants on the basis of needs assessment missions and practical concept notes 
as  the  basis  for  an  informed  decision,  without  using  a  formal  tendering  process  or  call  for 
proposals for amounts up to 2 millions € (i.e. IfS  procedures), would lead to a real capacity 
gain  of  fast  reactivity  in  relevant  cases  of  human  rights  urgencies.  It  would  also  allow 
mitigating  the  situation  of  the  most  difficult  countries  where  open  calls  for  proposals  are 
incompatible with the repressive nature of the regime. 

On the other hand, such a facility could undermine the demand driven nature and NGO owned 
aspect of the projects. It could also create tension on the non competitive nature of the award 
and favour certain types of NGOs. 

It  is  therefore  proposed  that  only  a  limited  part  of  the  EIDHR  funds,  dedicated  to  most 
difficult situations/countries and/or human rights defenders in urgent protection need, would 
benefit  from  the  possibility  to  award  direct  grants  in  a  non-publicised  manner  applying  a 
similar  methodology  as  that  used  for  the  Instrument  for  Stability.  This  would  represent  +/-
20% of the EIDHR activities. 

6.2. 

Highlight trade-offs and synergies associated with the options 

The  zero  option  (no  regulation)  will  integrate  Human  Rights  activities  within  other 
instruments as a positive sign of mainstreaming. Nevertheless, the abolition of a self standing 
instrument  will  suppress  specific  working  principles,  such  as  the  absence  of  host  country 
consent,  thereby  impeding  most  activities  and  reducing  the  delivery  to easiest  or  show  case 
activities.  It  will  lower  efficiency  of  operational  delivery  (e.g.  reduced  geographical  scope, 
lower  economies  of  scales,  higher  cost)  and  create  certainly  a  strong  visibility  issue  (i.e. 
secondary rather than complementary). 

The  first  option  (no  change)  maintains  the  key  elements  of  an  EIDHR  added  value  i.e.  its 
working  principles.  It  will  allow  benefiting  from  a  rolling  experience  and  helping  outreach 
through  a  cumulative  identification  over  the  year.  It  will  avoid  cost  of  reform  and  focus  on 
day to day improvements. On the other hand it will not allow addressing the identified drivers 
of problem in a structural manner. 

The second option (enabling regulation), while keeping the existing added values, will allow 
for a faster reaction and reactivity, in particular to important crisis and cases of violations. It is 
nevertheless important that the Instrument remains involved in long term support and in depth 
activities that have grass root level impact and a lasting effect and does not focus exclusively 
on  day  to  day  crisis  management.  Increased  coordination  with  humanitarian  aid  operations 
and the Instrument for Stability will have to be set up. 

6.3. 

Preferred option 

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It is proposed to build on the solid foundations that have been developed and recognised and 
to  maintain  the  core  principles  of  the  instrument  while  amending  its  priorities,  simplifying 
procedures  and  delivery  and  further  strengthening  its  efficiency  and  reactivity.  The  positive 
adoption of the second option is therefore proposed with the application of its 5 sub options. 

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

7.1. 

Core indicators of progress towards objectives 

The EIDHR is an enabling Regulation establishing the essential elements and the basis for the 
EU  intervention.  The  exact  actions  are  defined,  first,  through  the  Strategy  Papers  and 
subsequently through the annual action programmes detailing the activities to be carried out 
by  the  EU,  including  the  objectives  pursued  by  the  actions  in  question  and  the  expected 
results. Specific indicators are fixed at that moment, having in mind the particularities of the 
action in question. 

The  implementation  of  these  actions  complies  with  performance-based  management. 
Performance based management serves several purposes: 

- making the most of limited resources; 

- improving decision making processes and decisions; 

- achieving transparency and accountability. 

However,  the  field  of  human  rights  and  democracy  is  complex.  What  matters  about 
performance in this field cannot be captured in one or even a dozen performance measures. 
Yet these are important tools designed to bolster improvements in planning, risk management 
and  accountability.  Good  quality  information  enables  people  to  participate  in  programmes, 
and equips managers to drive improvement. 

The objective of identifying indicators for democracy and human rights projects is to improve 
the management of projects by measuring their impact and the extent to which the impact of 
specific projects can be linked to overall changes in the situation of Democracy and Human 
Rights in a country. 

Indicators are an important tool for signposting objectives and measuring their attainment in 
all parts of project management. They describe the project’s objectives in terms of quantity, 
quality,  target  group(s),  time,  and  place.  They  are  the  operational  description  of  the  overall 
objectives of a project, its specific objective, and its results, activities and resources. 

An indicator is a measure that helps ‘answer the question of how much, or whether, progress 
is being made toward a certain objective’. It measures the performance of a specific program 
by  comparing  actual  results  with  expected  results.  It  does  not  answer  the  question  of  why 
progress is or is not being made. A good indicator should relate closely to a desirable change 
defined as an objective, of which it is a manifestation; be verifiable within acceptable costs; 
be linked to a timeframe, target group, and geographical or institutional. 

Intended results 

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To  support  tangible  results  in  the  promotion  and  support  of  democracy  and  human  rights 
worldwide. 

Main expenditure related outputs 

Timely launch of project, including fast reaction mechanism for urgent cases of violation and 
human rights defenders. Timely follow-up, addendum, payment and closing. 

Indicators of results 

The structure of  the  EIDHR into four axes of work, each with specific objectives, has been 
described above. Each project implementing these campaigns will fine-tune indicators such as 
the following: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

Number  of  campaigns  launched,  including  number  of  advocacies,  number  of 
international conventions ratification, number of specific field operations Number of 
citizens, professionals and students trained, 

Number of key actors supported, 

Number of civil society project conducted, at global and at local level, 

Number of Human Rights Defender cases followed, 

Number of projects in most difficult countries and situations, 

Number  of  electoral  process  and  democratic  cycles  supported,  observed,  and 
followed. 

7.2. 

Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements 

The European Commission's Monitoring and Evaluation systems are increasingly focussed on 
results. They involve internal staff as well as external expertise. 

Task Managers in Delegations and Headquarters continuously monitor the implementation of 
projects  and  programmes  in  various  ways,  including  wherever  possible  through  field  visits. 
Monitoring  provides  valuable  information  on  progress;  it  helps  managers  to  identify  actual 
and potential bottlenecks, and to take corrective action. 

External, independent experts are contracted to assess the performance of EU external actions 
through  three  different  systems.  These  assessments  contribute  to  accountability,  and  to  the 
improvement of ongoing interventions; they also draw lessons from past experience to inform 
future  policies  and  actions.  The  tools  all  use  the  internationally-recognised  OECD-DAC 
evaluation criteria including (potential) impact. 

Firstly,  at  the  project  level,  the  Headquarters-managed  Results  Oriented  Monitoring  (ROM) 
system provides a brief, focused snapshot of the quality of a sample of interventions. Using a 
highly  structured,  standardised  methodology,  independent  ROM  experts  attribute  grades 
which  highlight  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  project  and  give  recommendations  on 
how to improve effectiveness. 

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Project-level evaluations, which are managed by the EU Delegation in charge of the project, 
deliver  a  more  detailed,  in  depth  analysis  and  help  project  managers  to  improve  ongoing 
interventions  and  prepare  future  ones.  External,  independent  experts  with  thematic  and 
geographic expertise are hired to conduct the analysis and gather feedback and evidence from 
all stakeholders, not least the final beneficiaries. 

The  Commission  also  conducts  strategic  evaluations  of  its  policies,  from  programming  and 
strategy to the implementation of interventions in a specific sector (such as health, education 
etc),  in  a  country  or  region,  or  of  a  specific  instrument.  These  evaluations  are  an  important 
input  to  the  formulation  of  policies  and  the  design  of  instruments  and  projects.  These 
evaluations are all published on the Commission's website and a summary of the findings is 
included in the Annual Report to the Council and the European Parliament. 

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