COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2011-12-07
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU financing, cooperation policy, developing countries, development aid, economic situation, human rights, social situation

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1469 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation 

{COM(2011) 840 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1470 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

2. 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties .............................................. 6 

Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 6 

Public consultation ....................................................................................................... 6 

Impact Assessment Board ............................................................................................ 7 

Problem definition........................................................................................................ 7 

2.1. 

The problem requiring action and the scope of the instrument regulation .................. 7 

2.1.1.  Problems requiring action ............................................................................................ 7 

2.1.2.  Scope of the present Development Cooperation Instrument ("DCI").......................... 8 

2.1.3.  Areas for improvement linked to the scope of the DCI ............................................. 10 

2.2. 

Mid-term reviews and lessons learnt.......................................................................... 11 

2.2.1.  Results of the mid term review of the financial instruments for external actions...... 11 

2.2.2.  Review of the lessons learnt....................................................................................... 12 

2.3. 

The underlying drivers of the problem....................................................................... 14 

2.3.1.  Driver 1 - DCI objectives are not fully aligned to the latest policy development 

trends .......................................................................................................................... 14 

2.3.2.  Driver 2 - The DCI does not contain strong mechanisms to ensure significant 

differentiation amongst partner countries. ................................................................. 15 

2.3.3.  Driver 3 - Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law are not 

sufficiently embedded in the cooperation mechanisms of the DCI. .......................... 15 

2.3.4.  Driver 4 - The current architecture of EU external action instruments does not 

provide the appropriate framework to support strategic cooperation with Africa as a 
whole .......................................................................................................................... 15 

2.3.5.  Driver 5 - Thematic programmes are too fragmented to tackle global issues in a 

comprehensive and global manner............................................................................. 15 

2.3.6.  Driver 6 - The specificities of crisis, post-crisis and states in situation of fragility are 

insufficiently taken into account in the current DCI.................................................. 16 

2.3.7.  Driver 7 - Insufficient flexibility with regards to fund-allocation ............................. 16 

2.3.8.  Driver 8 - A complex and rigid programming process and stringent implementation 

rules ............................................................................................................................ 16 

2.4. 

2.5. 

Legal base for EU action............................................................................................ 17 

EU Value Added ........................................................................................................ 17 

2.5.1.  Global Challenges, Global Response & Global Leadership ...................................... 17 

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2.5.2.  The critical mass of the EU........................................................................................ 18 

2.5.3.  The EU is best placed to coordinate........................................................................... 18 

2.5.4.  Acting as one makes financial sense.......................................................................... 19 

2.5.5.  Greater accountability ................................................................................................ 19 

3. 

Objectives................................................................................................................... 20 

3.1. 

Policy framework and objectives ............................................................................... 20 

3.1.1.  Policy framework ....................................................................................................... 20 

3.1.2.  Objectives................................................................................................................... 20 

3.1.2.1.  Global objectives of the development policy under the instrument........................... 20 

3.1.2.2.  Objectives related to the review of the instrument itself............................................ 20 

3.2. 

3.3. 

3.4. 

4. 

4.1. 

Consistency with external action priorities ................................................................ 22 

Consistency with other EU policies ........................................................................... 22 

Geographical/thematic coverage................................................................................ 24 

Policy options............................................................................................................. 24 

Option 1:"No change": cooperation with the countries concerned remains strictly in 
the framework of the existing DCI Regulation .......................................................... 24 

4.1.1.  Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development policy 

(Objective 1)............................................................................................................... 24 

4.1.2.  Establish strong mechanisms to ensure significant differentiation amongst partner 

countries (Objective 2)............................................................................................... 25 

4.1.3.  Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3) ....... 25 

4.1.4.  Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 

(Objective 4)............................................................................................................... 25 

4.1.5.  Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic programmes 

(Objective 5)............................................................................................................... 25 

4.1.6.  Better address the specific needs of countries in crisis, post crisis and fragile situation 
(Objective 6)............................................................................................................... 25 

4.1.7.  Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) ............................................................... 26 

4.1.8.  Simplified programming and flexibility in implementation, in consistency with the 

principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8).............................................................. 26 

4.2. 

Option 2: Amend the DCI Regulation ....................................................................... 26 

4.2.1.  Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development policy 

(Objective 1)............................................................................................................... 26 

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4.2.2.  Establish strong mechanisms to ensure significant differentiation amongst partner 

countries (Objective 2)............................................................................................... 27 

4.2.3.  Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3) ....... 28 

4.2.4.  Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 

(Objective 4)............................................................................................................... 28 

4.2.5.  Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic programmes 

(Objective 5)............................................................................................................... 29 

4.2.6.  Better address the specific needs of countries in crisis, post crisis and fragile situation 
(Objective 6)............................................................................................................... 29 

4.2.7.  Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) ............................................................... 30 

4.2.8.  Simplified programming and flexibility in implementation, in consistency with the 

principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8).............................................................. 30 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

Analysis of impacts .................................................................................................... 31 

Option 1: No Change ................................................................................................. 31 

Option 2: Amend the DCI Regulation ....................................................................... 32 

5.2.1.  Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development policy 

(Objective 1)............................................................................................................... 32 

5.2.2.  Establish strong mechanisms to ensure significant differentiation amongst partner 

countries (Objective 2)............................................................................................... 33 

5.2.3.  Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3) ....... 34 

5.2.4.  Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 

(Objective 4)............................................................................................................... 34 

5.2.5.  Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic programmes 

(Objective 5)............................................................................................................... 35 

5.2.6.  Better address the specific needs of countries in crisis, post crisis and fragile situation 
(Objective 6)............................................................................................................... 36 

5.2.7.  Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) ............................................................... 36 

5.2.8.  Simplified programming and flexibility in implementation, in consistency with the 

principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8).............................................................. 37 

6. 

Comparing the options ............................................................................................... 38 

6.1.  Weighing-up of positive and negative impacts per option......................................... 38 

6.2. 

Preferred option.......................................................................................................... 39 

7. 

Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 40 

7.1. 

Core indicators of progress towards objectives ......................................................... 40 

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7.2. 

Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements ................................................ 40 

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1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

Organisation and timing 

1.1. 
The drafting of the Impact Assessment for the EU external action instruments1 for the period 
2014-2020,  including  this  document,  has  been  coordinated  by  a  Task  Force  composed  of 
services in charge of EU external action and the Legal Service. The drafting teams, appointed 
on  7  June  2011,  have  duly  taken  into  consideration  the  consultations,  reviews  and  studies 
mentioned  in  Section  2.2  and  have  liaised  with  other  Commission  services  to  ensure 
consistency with other EU policies. The Task Force met with the drafting team in charge of 
this Impact Assessment on 7 June, 1 July, 14 July and 4 August 2011 for organisational and 
quality-check purposes. 

An  Impact  Assessment  Steering  Group,  composed  of  the  members  of  the  Task  Force  and 
representatives  of  interested Directorates General and the Secretariat General, was launched 
on 22 June 2011. It has met twice, on 13 and 26 July 2011. 

The  review  of  this  Impact  Assessment  by  the  Impact  Assessment  Board  took  place  on  14 
September 2011. 

In  line  with  article  27  of  the  Financial  Regulation  (Council  Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  No 
1605/2002) and article 21 of the Implementing rules of the Financial Regulation (Commission 
Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  No  2342/2002),  the  present  impact  assessment  is  the  ex-ante 
evaluation of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). 

1.2. 

Public consultation 

The Commission held a public consultation on future funding for EU external action between 
26 November 2010 and 31 January 2011. This process was based on an online questionnaire 
accompanied by a background paper 'What funding for EU external action after 2013?'. The 
consultation  covered  all  instruments  for  external  action,  but  many  issues  have  been  directly 
relevant to the DCI and are detailed below. 

A  majority  of  the  respondents  (around  70%)  confirmed  that  EU  financial  intervention 
provided  a  substantial  added  value  in  the  main  policy  areas  supported  by  EU  financial 
instruments for external action2. Many respondents confirmed that the EU should make good 
use of its comparative advantage linked to its global field presence, its wide-ranging expertise, 
its supranational nature and its role as a facilitator of coordination.  

Nearly  all  respondents  (92%)  supported  a  more  differentiated  approach,  tailored  to  the 
situation  of  the  beneficiary  country,  in  order  to  increase  the  impact  of  EU  financial 

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The  instruments  are  the  following:  11th  European  Development  Fund,  Development  Cooperation  Instrument, 
Instrument  for  Pre-Accession  Assistance,  European  Neighbourhood  Instrument,  Instrument  for  Stability, 
Instrument  for  Nuclear  Safety Cooperation,  European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and  Human  Rights,  Partnership 
Instrument and the instruments for the EU-Greenland Partnership. The Macro-Financial Assistance Instrument, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Humanitarian Aid Instrument and the Civil Protection Mechanism are 
not part of this joint exercise. 

i.e. peace and security, poverty reduction, humanitarian aid, investing in stability and growth in enlargement and 
neighbourhood  countries,  tackling  global  challenges,  promoting  EU  and  international  standards and  values,  and 
supporting growth and competitiveness abroad. 

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instruments.  

Over two thirds of respondents believed that EU interests are sufficiently taken into account 
in its external action, and that the latter should be based on EU values and principles, and on 
development objectives of the partner countries. A number of contributions underscored that 
development cooperation should be based on a mutual partnership. 

A  majority  of  respondents  agreed  that  joint  programming  and  co-financing  with  Member 
States  could  increase  the  impact  and  the  coherence  of  EU  external  action,  simplify  the 
delivery of aid and reduce overall transaction costs. 

A  vast  majority  of  respondents  supported  stronger  monitoring  and  evaluation  systems  in 
future instruments and in the implementation of projects/programmes. 

A majority of stakeholders supported increasing information and communication activities to 
enhance  the  visibility  of  EU  external  funding,  in  particular  in  the  beneficiary  countries; 
however EU visibility is regarded as being better served by effective policies, strategies and 
active presence in third countries, than by additional spending for communication. 

1.3. 

Impact Assessment Board 

Following  the  comments  of  the  Impact  Assessment  Board  meeting  held  on  14  September 
2011, the present Impact Assessment report was improved as followed: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

An explanation of the legal and policy framework determining the content of the next 
development cooperation instrument is introduced (cf. section 2.1.2). 

The explanation of problems identified and drivers is improved, with concrete cases 
and examples (cf. sections 2.3, 2.2 and 2.3). 

The  options  are  redefined  to  i)  exclude  the  options  already  predetermined  by  the 
legal framework, ii) reinforce the "baseline-scenario" option and introduce  the sub-
options  considered  for  a  possible  change  in  the  current  development  cooperation 
instrument and iii) introduce more details on how the options would work in practise 
(cf. section 4). 

The comparison between pros and cons and assessment of the impacts are improved 
(cf. section 5 and 6). 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1. 

The problem requiring action and the scope of the instrument regulation 

2.1.1.  Problems requiring action 

The EU Treaty explicitly states that the Union shall define and pursue common policies and 
actions and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, 
in  order  to  "foster  the  sustainable  economic,  social  and  environmental  development  of 
developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty". 

Poverty remains a major problem in developing countries. Most of them are off-track towards 

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the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals ("MDGs")3 and they are not enjoying 
a sustainable development.  While  significant advances towards the  MDGs have  been  made, 
there is still a long way to go in several areas, and strong commitment is required on the part 
of  developing  countries  and  donors  to  achieve  the  MDGs  and  eradicate  poverty.  The  EU  is 
committed  to  helping  developing  countries  address  these  problems.  In  fact,  the  EU  is  a  key 
actor helping developing countries to achieve the mentioned goals. The EU is currently the third 
largest  donor  worldwide,  and  together  with  its  Member  States  counts  for  50%  of  global  Official  Development  Aid. Given 
this  significant  share  in  development  financing,  it  is  therefore  necessary  for  the  EU  to 
continue  to  support  developing  countries'  efforts  to  reduce  and  eventually  eradicate  poverty 
while  attaining  the  objectives  of  sustainable  development  and  gradual  integration  into  the 
world economy4. 

The  definition  of  the  MDGs,  progress  towards  targets  and  shortcomings  are  presented  in 
Annex I. 

In  addition,  global  challenges  continue  to  be  prominent  and  developing  countries  were  hit 
hard by the succession of recent crises (financial and economic crises, food price rises, fuel 
price volatility) resulting in social and economic instability, forced migration, food insecurity 
and  in  general  a  state  of  increased  vulnerability  to  external  shocks.  The  continued 
unsustainable exploitation of natural resources on which the poor depend (land, water, forests, 
etc…)  and  loss  of  biodiversity  are  other  global  challenges  which  need  urgent  attention  if 
development  is  to  become  sustainable.  The  environment  and  natural  resources  are 
increasingly being recognized as vital for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction 
meaning that sustainable development requires good environmental management. Ecosystems 
and  natural  resources  are  a  significant  part  of  the  national  income  and  wealth  of  less 
developed  economies,  making  them  a  strategic  resource  for  development.  Furthermore, 
climate  change  and  energy  issues,  including  access  to  energy,  exacerbate  an  already  fragile 
and  difficult  situation  and  risk  to  undoing  some  development  achievements  if  they  are  not 
properly addressed. 

Against the above-mentioned background and as the world's population continues to grow, it 
is  clear  that  more  action  is  needed  to  increase  developing  countries'  resilience  to  external 
challenges particularly in the case of the most disadvantaged countries. 

2.1.2. 

Scope of the present Development Cooperation Instrument ("DCI") 

The  EU  has  the  competence  to  carry  out  activities  under  its  own  common  development 
policy; this does not prevent however EU Member States from exercising their own national 
development policy (cf. Article 4(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)).  This  is  why  coordination  amongst  EU  and  its  Member  State  is  particularly 
important in this policy area (see "How does the DCI work in practise?" below) in line with 
Article 210 TFEU. 

In  the  current  2007-2013  period,  the  DCI  has  a  budget  (reference  amount)  of  €16.9  billion 

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The  development  objectives  were  defined  by  donors  in  the  UN's  Millennium  Development  Goals 
("MDGs") in 2000.  
Last year, the EU strongly reaffirmed its commitment to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs, 
including the reaffirmation of the collective target of devoting 0.7% of its GNI to ODA by 2015. Even 
beyond 2015  and  even  when some  or  all of  the  MDGs have been  achieved,  continued  efforts will  be 
needed to eliminate poverty. 

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representing 32% of Heading IV.  

The DCI was established with the primary and overarching objective of eradicating poverty in 
partner countries and regions in the context of sustainable development, including the pursuit 
of the MDGs as well as the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human 
rights  and  the  rule  of  law.  The  DCI  is  one  of  the  EU's  key  instruments  for  providing 
development  assistance  to  non-European  countries  alongside  the  European  Development 
Fund  ("EDF"),  covering  the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  ("ACP")  countries  and  the 
European  Neighbourhood  Partnership  Instrument  ("ENPI").  All  these  instruments  cover 
different  geographic  areas.  The  DCI  is  structured  into  three  categories  of  programmes  (see 
Annex II for the envelopes per programme). 

Bilateral and regional geographic programmes  

The DCI geographic programmes encompass cooperation with partner countries and regions 
selected on a geographical basis over five regions, namely: Latin America, Asia, Central Asia, 
the Middle East and South Africa. These five regions in the world still contained 70% of the 
world's people living on less than $1.25 per day5 and over 68% of the world's hungry people 
in 20106. The range of countries supported by DCI bilateral cooperation is highly diversified 
(see annex II). 

Cooperation with partner countries and regions encompasses a wide range of objectives, apart 
from  supporting  the  MDGs  and  the  promotion  of  democracy,  good  governance,  the  rule  of 
law and human rights including gender equality. It fosters sustainable development, including 
political,  economic,  social  and  environmental  aspects.  It  encourages  the  integration  of  the 
partner countries in the world economy, but also supports measures to preserve and improve 
the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources. It serves 
to  strengthen  the  relations  between  the  EU  and  partner  countries  and  regions.  The  scope  of 
possible areas of action is very comprehensive, though there are priorities defined per region. 
The geographic measures shall fulfil the criteria for Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
established by OECD/DAC. 

Thematic programmes 

The instrument has five thematic programmes: i) investing in people, ii) the environment and 
the  sustainable  management  of  natural  resources  including  energy  (which  includes  climate 
change),  iii)  Non-State  Actors  (NSA)  and  Local  Authorities,  iv)  food  security,  and  v) 
migration  and  asylum.  They  complement  the  geographic  programmes  by  covering  specific 
areas which are of interest to a group of partner countries not determined by geography. They 
encompass not only the countries eligible for geographic cooperation under the DCI, but also 
the ACP and EU neighbouring countries. 

Thematic  programmes  play  a  major  role  in  supporting  the  external  dimension  of  the  EU's 
policies. They are critical for addressing challenges in countries where geographic assistance 
is, for whatever reason (security, fragility, political), not programmable. 

Sugar accompanying measures  

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2005 - WB 2008 report - last global data available. 
FAO – 2010. 

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The temporary Accompanying Measures for former Sugar Protocol countries within the DCI 
cover  an  appropriate  period  for  adjustment  of  ACP  countries  following  the  2006  EU  Sugar 
Reform. No further funds are foreseen for the next financial perspectives.  

How does the DCI work in practise? 

As  all  the  regulations  for  EU  external  action,  the  DCI  is  an  enabling  and  not  prescriptive 
instrument  for  EU  development  cooperation.  This  means  that  the  DCI  provides  the  general 
framework  for  EU  intervention  in  third  countries  (general  policy  objectives,  general 
principles,  possible  areas  of  intervention,  conditions  and  decision-making  mechanisms),  but 
they do not define in detail the exact sector/area or type of intervention in each of the partner 
countries  or  regions  concerned.  Such  level  of  detail  is  contained  in  the  multiannual 
programming documents.  

Multiannual  programming  documents  detail per country/region  (geographic  programmes) or 
per theme (thematic programmes), the sectors/areas of intervention, the type of assistance, the 
specific  objectives,  the  expected  results,  the  performance  indicators,  the  amounts  involved, 
etc.  Before  their  adoption  by  the  Commission,  these  documents  are  subject  to  a  political 
dialogue  with  the  relevant  partner  countries,  civil  society,  donors  (including  EU  Member 
States) and other stakeholders. This is in line with the principles of ownership and alignment 
to the development policies of partner countries and with division of labour and coordination 
amongst donors. After these documents have been adopted, the Commission may decide on 
the implementation of specific projects or programmes. The concrete projects or programmes 
that  the  EU  intends  to  initiate  in  a  given  year  are  grouped  per  country,  region  or  theme  in 
action  programmes  adopted  every  year  by  the  Commission.  Both  the  multiannual 
programming  documents  and  the  annual  action  programmes  are  discussed  with  Members 
States (through the so-called "comitology" process). 

Generally,  the  revision  of  the  DCI  would  mainly  imply  reviewing  the  enabling  framework 
provided  by  this  instrument  in  order  to  increase  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  EU 
assistance. 

2.1.3.  Areas for improvement linked to the scope of the DCI 

In 2008 the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union 
confirms poverty eradication as one of the main objectives of EU external action and Article 
208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union places it as the primary objective 
of development policy. The Commission's Communication "A Budget for Europe 2020"7 has 
further  confirmed  the  need  for  the  European  Union  to  have  a  specific  development 
cooperation  instrument  during  the  next  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  (MFF),  with  a 
proposed budget of €20.6 billion in 2011 prices. 

New challenges, together with the priorities set in the Europe 2020 Strategy, have prompted 
the Commission to make proposals to review and adapt the EU’s development policy given 
the  urgent  need  to  speed  up  progress  towards  the  MDGs  and  to  achieve  inclusive  and 
sustainable growth globally. Following the public consultation on the Green Paper published 
in  November  2010,  a  Communication  on  EU  development  policy  entitled  "Increasing  the 
Impact  of  EU  Development  Policy:  An  Agenda  for  Change"  will  be  adopted  by  the 

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COM(2011)500, adopted on 29 June 2011. 

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Commission in 2011. While this Communication will not propose a change in the overarching 
objective of the EU's development cooperation, which will remain the fight against poverty, 
an  adaptation  of  EU  development  policy  is  proposed  in  order  to  meet  the  challenges  of  the 
coming decade, mainly:  

(i) the need to focus more on helping to strengthen governance and inclusive and sustainable 
growth  in  developing  countries,  while  continuing  to  support  basic  social  services.  Those 
objectives should be translated into specific objectives of the DCI. 

(ii)  to  take  into  consideration  the  increasing  differentiation  of  beneficiary  countries:  Apart 
from  Least  Developed  Countries  and  Low  Income  Countries  which  get  50%  of  funds  for 
bilateral  cooperation,  the  DCI  provides  assistance  to  several  middle  income  countries, 
including  OECD  members  –  Chile  and  Mexico.  The  list  of  beneficiaries  includes  emerging 
world powers: China, Brazil and India, as well as other G20 countries, namely South Africa 
and Indonesia. Some of the emerging powers have in recent years become significant donors 
themselves  and  are  not  aid  dependent  even  though  they  still  acknowledge  high  social 
disparities.  The  DCI  may  ensure  sufficient  and  adequate  differentiation  amongst  partner 
countries  taking  into  account  economic  and  social  disparities  amongst  and  inside  partner 
countries and the development of new objectives beyond pure development assistance. 

(iii)  to  ensure  a  strong  link  between  EU  development  assistance  and  partner  countries' 
commitment to key reforms. It could take better into account the partner countries' progress 
on democratisation and respect for basic human rights. 

Finally, in a number of regions covered by different EU instruments, it has been difficult to 
support cross-regional or continent-wide initiatives because of the different nature, scope and 
objectives  of  the  external  assistance  instruments.  This  applies  to  all  regions  but  concerns  in 
particular the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy ("JAES"), adopted in 2007. The 
expected mainstreaming of the support to the JAES in existing EU (EDF, ENPI and DCI) and 
Member State instruments has largely failed to materialise despite the recent reconfirmation 
of  the  JAES  at  the  2010  Africa-EU  Summit.  The  Commission's  Communication  "A  Budget 
for Europe 2020" specifically states that the DCI will support the JAES. 

2.2.  Mid-term reviews and lessons learnt 

2.2.1.  Results of the mid term review of the financial instruments for external actions 

A  mid-term  review  has  been  conducted  for  each  of  the  EU  external  action  financial 
instruments for the period 2007-2013, including the DCI. It has been agreed that the general 
structure of these instruments are adapted to their purpose and that no major change should be 
introduced  at  that  stage.  Nevertheless,  an  enlargement  of  the  scope  of  the  Industrialised 
Countries  Instrument  (ICI)  has  been  proposed  in  order  to  support  programmes  of  mutual 
interest with developing countries that could not be funded under the DCI. For the new MFF 
the Commission proposes establishing a new instrument, the Partnership Instrument ("PI"), as 
a successor to the ICI. The proposed DCI together with the PI will enable the EU to develop a 
comprehensive strategy for developing countries that will take into account the development 
needs of the beneficiary countries, as well as wider EU interests and objectives. 

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2.2.2.  Review of the lessons learnt 

In  the  preparation  process  of  the  new  MFF,  an  internal  review  of  the  different  reports 
(evaluations, audits, studies, mid-term reviews,) has been undertaken, looking at what worked 
and  what  did  not  work,  and  drawing  lessons  to  be  taken  into  account  when  designing  the 
instruments for the next MFF (see Annex III for a more detailed account of lessons learnt and 
Annex IV for a list of reports reviewed). 

The  evaluations,  Court  of  Auditors  reports,  as  well  as  mid-term  reviews  of  the  geographic 
programmes, show that progress towards several MDGs in the developing DCI countries was 
achieved with DCI support, as one of the most important financial instruments in the world 
supporting  these  objectives8.  However,  pursuant  to  the  principle  of  ownership  it  is  for  the 
beneficiary governments to adopt and implement the necessary reforms and policies that were 
the driving force of these achievements. 

The DCI allows for a more strategic approach in planning and implementing EU aid, through 
a  clear  definition  of  sectors,  objectives  and  expected  results  (set  out  in  Strategy  Papers, 
Multiannual  Indicative  Programmes  and  Annual  Action  Programmes  as  opposed  to  the 
previous variety of self-standing actions adopted individually) leading to an agreement with 
the  beneficiary  country.  The  DCI  puts  the  beneficiary  countries  in  the  driving  seat,  and 
requires EU/donors to support the beneficiary's development strategy, policies and reforms. 

The  new  implementation  modalities  in  the  DCI,  such  as  budget  support  and  sector-wide 
approach,  have  allowed  for  a  deeper  level  of  cooperation  with  partner  countries:  there  is  a 
clear link between the level of policy dialogue with beneficiary countries and the modality of 
delivering assistance. Also, the new implementing modalities have rendered possible a more 
efficient  division  of  labour  by  allowing  co-financing  amongst  donors.  New  financial 
instruments foreseen in the DCI, such as blending mechanisms, could be used further where 
appropriate.9 

Thematic  programmes  provided  the  Commission  some  additional  flexibility  in  dealing  with 
specific  challenges  and  also  provided  a  useful  instrument  to  complement  the  geographic 
programmes in areas such as: 

– 

– 

– 

8 

9 

investing in people allowing responses to emerging priorities in line with the Europe 
2020 Strategy, e.g. social inclusion of disabled persons and increasing the number of 
persons treated, tested and counselled for AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 

addressing environment and sustainable management of natural resources including 
energy, allowing the EU to support key EU and international policy initiatives in the 
area of environment and development, including climate change, such as the Global 
Climate  Change  Alliance  (GCCA)  and  the  REDD+  piloting  and  Forest  Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT); 

improving food security for the poorest and most vulnerable, this programme being 
recognised for the relevance of its interventions; 

As mentioned before, the EU is the third largest donor worldwide, and together with its Member States counting for 50% of global ODA which is 
primarily delivered through DCI and EDF. Hence, it can be concluded that DCI supports the progress on MDG. 
Final report of the Working Group on the additionality of grants in the framework of blending 
mechanisms of 18 December 2009: http://www.dev-
practitioners.eu/fileadmin/Redaktion/GroupsFolders/Division_of_Labour/Loans_and_grants/WGBlending_FINAL_complete_report_181209.pdf. 

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– 

supporting third countries in their efforts to ensure a better management of migratory 
flows : this programme enjoys significant flexibility and scope of action and allows 
for an increased integration of migration and asylum issues in development policies. 

Notwithstanding the above, a number of factors where identified as areas for improvement to 
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the DCI. 

In  a  globalised  environment,  different  internal  EU  policies  (such  as  climate  change, 
environment, energy, water, justice and security, research, information society, immigration, 
fisheries, etc) are increasingly becoming part of the EU's external action, and in line with the 
EU  2020  agenda  and  the  Lisbon  Treaty  a  mutual  reinforcement  of  internal  and  external 
actions is needed. The starting point is that integration, and not duplication, must be the key 
word.  However,  the  existing  fragmented  architecture  of  the  DCI  with  several  thematic 
programmes  was  not  adequate  to  allow  the  Commission  to  intervene  swiftly  on  a  sufficient 
scale  even  though  this  was  critical  to  ensuring  the  effectiveness  of  internal  EU  policies.  In 
some cases the thematic programmes were not sufficiently flexible to respond to recent global 
crises (e.g. the food price crisis, avian flu) or to international engagements taken at the highest 
political level (e.g. biodiversity and climate change). The thematic envelope therefore needs 
more flexibility in order to allow for a more predictable long-term engagement in response to 
global  public  goods  and  challenges,  and  to  react  to  the  various  shocks  affecting  the  poorest 
population.  A  global  thematic  envelop  would  enhance  flexibility,  timeliness,  effectiveness, 
and sustainability of EU response to such crises. 

The food crisis  

To  respond  to  the  food  crisis  in  the  second  half  of  the  last  decade,  the  Commission  had  to  adopt  a 
specific  Regulation  to  tackle  the  food  crisis  in  2008  since  the  existing  thematic  programmes  of  the 
existing DCI were excessively pigeonholed to provide for a comprehensive coverage for such global 
challenge. 

The avian flu' crisis 

Avian  Flu is  a  development  issue  as  it  disproportionately  affects  less  developed  countries,  which 
have often  limited  resources  to  fight  the disease  and  who  suffer  more  from  trade  restrictions  due  to 
H5N1. The  spread  of  avian  flu  is  facilitated  by  traditional  husbandry  methods  of  small poultry 
breeders,  whose  livelihoods are  particularly  affected  by  poultry  losses.  It  is  also in  developing 
countries that  promiscuity  with  poultry,  lower  hygiene  and  education  favour  the  contamination  of 
humans. The risk of an evolution to pandemic forms of influenza (mutation/recombination), resulting 
in very  high  numbers  of  human  illness  and  deaths, remains.  Other  human  diseases  are  emerging  of 
animal (zoonotic) origin and have also the potential for crises as they would spread rapidly across the 
world in a globalised context. So far the Commission has been contributing large amounts to the fight 
against avian flu in third countries, however through various separate external assistance instruments 
(DCI-Asia, ENPI, EDF) and different mechanisms:  for example,  through a Multi Donor Trust Fund 
with  the  World  Bank  (AHIF),the  programme  Highly  Pathogenic  and  Emerging  Disease  (HPED)  in 
Asia,  a  programme  implemented  by  the  African  Union  and  through  national  envelopes  in  some 
countries in Africa, etc. Therefore EU response has been fragmented in geographical coverage, scope, 
and duration, and entailing constraints in coordination and reporting.  

Development cooperation still remains too fragmented and over-ambitious. The resources, if 
too  thinly  spread,  do  not  always  reach  the  required  critical  mass  and  do  not  allow  for  the 
necessary  leverage  to  reach  all  the  expected  results.  The  recent  increase  of  economic  and 
social  disparities  amongst  partner  countries  and  the  development  of  new  objectives  beyond 
pure  development  assistance  calls  for  further  differentiation  amongst  such  countries.  The 

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application  of  geographical  differentiation  becomes  of  key  important  to  ensure  that  EU 
financing is concentrated in countries that need it the most (such as least developed countries, 
fragile states/countries in crisis, etc) thus increasing the impact of EU assistance. 

The review of lessons learnt also shows that, under the present DCI the specific provisions on 
fragile states / countries in post-crisis situation are not sufficient, underestimating the need to 
support  political  processes,  strengthening  the  rule  of  law  and  governance.  Addressing 
transition challenges requires a set of responses at country level, based on specific needs and 
related  to  a  common  strategy  (holistic  approach).  The  specific  needs  of  countries  in  crisis, 
post-crisis and fragile situations were not sufficiently taken into account and the rigidity of the 
decision-making  process  for  fund-allocation,  programming  and  implementation  made  it 
difficult for the EU to swiftly respond to a rapidly evolving situation. 

The  DCI  had  indicative  allocations  per  region,  without  keeping  any  unallocated  envelope, 
thus leaving limited possibility to mobilise resources to respond to unforeseen needs, like new 
political priorities and natural or man-made disasters. No un-programmed envelope was left to 
be used as a reserve. With very limited possibility to mobilise resources from outside the DCI 
instrument  (except  humanitarian  assistance  and  IfS  to  respond  to  crises),  the  only  way  to 
ensure funding in response to unforeseen needs is to review and cut some country allocations. 

Finally,  the  current  programming  and  implementation  process  foreseen  for  the  DCI  is  too 
complex, does not permit the alignment of the EU programming cycle to those of its partners, 
and also does not sufficiently facilitate joint programming with Member States. Furthermore, 
it  does  not  allow  swift  adaptation  where  so  required,  due  to  political  or  factual  (e.g.  crisis, 
fragility) requirements.  

Example of lack of flexibility of fund allocation and decision-making: The "Arab spring" 

Current situation in Yemen (as well as those of several other countries in the region) demonstrated the 
need for more flexibility in the implementation of cooperation in countries in crisis, as well as the need 
for having at disposal a reserve for unforeseen needs. Before the political crisis erupted in Yemen, the 
adopted  annual  action  programme  included  concrete  cooperation  activities  that  were  to  be 
implemented  through  the  government.  Given  the  popular  uprising  and  the  repression  by  the 
authorities it has been later decided that EU cooperation would need to be refocused to other areas of 
intervention  that  would  not  include  the  government.  In  this  specific  case  it  is  planned  to  focus  on 
social  welfare  through  a  programme  implemented  by  the  World  Bank.  Nevertheless,  given  the  long 
and cumbersome procedures to modify the action Programme the EU is missing the opportunity to act 
where it is most needed at this important moment in Yemen, as well as it risks loosing the funding due 
to  annuality  of  the  budget.  Unallocated  reserve  and  flexible  procedures  to  adjust  the  multiannual 
programming  would  further  increase  the  EU  capacity  to  act  immediately  when  an  opportunity  to 
strengthen the long term development process would arise, as it did not in Yemen. 

2.3. 

The underlying drivers of the problem 

On  the  basis  of  the  above  analysis  and  aforementioned  reports,  the  following  drivers  have 
been identified as hindering the objectives or limiting the impact of the DCI: 

2.3.1.  Driver  1  -  DCI  objectives  are  not  fully  aligned  to  the  latest  policy  development 

trends 

The  evolution  of  development  policy,  as  reflected  namely  in  the  upcoming  Commission 
Communication "Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: An agenda for change", 

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are not adequately reflected in the existing DCI. In particular, EU development policy should 
give  sufficient  recognition  to  inclusive  and  sustainable  growth  in  partner  countries,  as 
identified in the EU 2020 strategy, while assisting in reducing partner countries' vulnerability 
and exposure to global shocks by addressing problems related to global public goods. 

2.3.2.  Driver  2  -  The  DCI  does  not  contain  strong  mechanisms  to  ensure  significant 

differentiation amongst partner countries. 

The  DCI  covers  a  wide  range  of  countries  falling  under  the  OECD/DAC  definition  of 
developing  countries,  from  the  Least  Developed  Countries  to  Upper  Middle  Income 
Countries. Each category has very different development needs, capacities, performance level 
and  interests.  Although  the  DCI  refers  to  the  differentiation  principle  and  the  need  to  give 
priority to the Least Developed Countries and Low-Income Countries, it provides no further 
guidance on how to do so. Such guidance would allow the EU to concentrate funds where the 
EU would have more impact and to apply an adequate policy/aid methodology mix depending 
on the needs, capacities and specific circumstances of each partner country. 

2.3.3.  Driver 3 - Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law are not 

sufficiently embedded in the cooperation mechanisms of the DCI. 

Respect for good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law remain issues of 
concern, as achieving the MDGs is often hampered by the fact that in a number of countries 
the  democratic  institutions  are  still  weak,  or  the  power  is  in  the  hands  of  undemocratic  or 
corrupt  regimes.  In  some  cases  this  was  further  exacerbated  by  a  weak  security  situation  in 
partner countries.  

2.3.4.  Driver  4  -  The  current  architecture  of  EU  external  action  instruments  does  not 
provide the appropriate framework to support strategic cooperation with Africa as a 
whole 

The geographically and thematically fragmented coverage of the existing instruments (EDF, 
ENPI,  DCI)  does  not  allow  a  African-wide  response  to  challenges  of  continental  scope,  as 
required  by  the  Joint  Africa-EU  Strategy  (JAES).  It  has  proven  difficult  to  mobilize  ENPI 
contributions,  despite  the  fact  that  North-African  countries  play  a  key  role  in  the  thematic 
partnerships. EDF-resources have been inadequate to cover innovative activities through pre-
established  national  and  regional  programming.  Due  to  the  lack  of  alternatives,  intra-ACP 
funds have de facto become the main source of financing for the JAES'. However, they do not 
allow the Commission to cover all thematic priorities, they are insufficient to fund the broad 
range of Action Plan activities, and they do not cover Northern Africa. This failure to live-up 
to the joint Summit commitments has negatively affected relations with Africa, and has been 
detrimental to the EU's own interests to cooperate more effectively with African partners in 
tackling global challenges. 

2.3.5.  Driver  5  -  Thematic  programmes  are  too  fragmented  to  tackle  global  issues  in  a 

comprehensive and global manner 

The  current  structure  of  the  DCI,  with  strictly  separated  thematic  programmes,  hampers  the 
EU's capacity to react promptly and substantially to achieve the required impact, as was the 
case for instance during both the recent food crisis and the avian flu outbreak. Implementation 
is difficult since the scope of each thematic programme is often too narrow. 

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2.3.6.  Driver 6 - The specificities of crisis, post-crisis and states in situation of fragility10 

are insufficiently taken into account in the current DCI 

Countries in  crisis, post-crisis and  fragile states have specific long-term, development needs 
and requirements such as supporting state-building, peace processes, the rule of law, security 
sector reform and governance (short-term and immediate needs are covered by humanitarian 
aid  and  the  Instrument  for  Stability).  These  are  by  nature  fast-evolving  situations  requiring 
appropriate  flexibility  to  respond  to  these  countries'  needs  in  a  timely  manner.  The  current 
lack of flexibility within the DCI significantly impacts EU intervention in those situations.  

Additional flexibility in programming for countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile situations 
would  allow  for  a  quick  adaptation  of  the  EU  response  to  the  changing  environment  and 
needs,  without  going  through  lengthy  and  cumbersome  programming  review  procedures. 
Some  flexibility  exists  in  the  current  DCI  in  this  regard,  as  it  is  possible  to  finance  ad  hoc 
measures outside the programming documents in exceptional and unforeseen circumstances. 
The application of this flexibility is limited, however, because of the lack of un-programmed 
envelopes of funds which could be used to respond to such unforeseen needs (see driver 7). 

2.3.7.  Driver 7 - Insufficient flexibility with regards to fund-allocation 

The  DCI  does  not  contain  any  unallocated  envelopes,  thus  leaving  limited  possibility  to 
mobilise resources to respond to unforeseen needs, such as new political priorities and natural 
or man-made disasters. 

At  the  programming  of  the  Multiannual  Indicative  Programme  for  2011-2013,  no  un-
programmed  envelope  was  left  to  be  used  as  a  reserve.  The  only  way  to  ensure  funding  in 
response to unforeseen needs is to review and cut country allocations. However, taking into 
account that the DCI requires the EU to agree on the focal areas, objectives and allocations 
with  the  beneficiary  countries,  cutting  country  allocations  after  completion  of  the 
programming stage, proved to be politically difficult.  

Flexibility  is  also  important  for  thematic  programmes.  During  the  last  few  years,  several 
shocks have hit developing countries. The “food price crisis” required funding superior to the 
overall  envelope  devoted  to  thematic  programmes  under  the  DCI  and  led  to  a  complex  and 
lengthy process that was in contradiction to the urgency of the situation. 

2.3.8.  Driver 8 - A complex and rigid programming process and stringent implementation 

rules 

The  DCI  rules  on  programming  and  implementation  with  regards  to  the  adoption  and 
amendment of decisions such as annual action programmes are rather rigid (e.g. extensive use 
of  ex  ante  "comitology"  process).  Moreover,  they  systematically  require  the  adoption  of 
specific EU programming in the form of Country Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative 
Programmes  per  country/region.  This  may  be  difficult  to  conciliate  with  a  number  of 
objectives agreed by the Commission under international and European commitments on Aid 
Effectiveness (OECD's Paris Declaration, European Consensus for Development), requiring i) 

10 

The notion of crisis, as well as that of post-crisis and fragility are defined inter alia in article 168(2) of 
the Implementing Rules of the EU Financial Regulation and in the Commission Communication of 25 
October 2007 – Towards an EU response to situations of fragility – engaging in difficult environments 
for sustainable development, stability and peace. 

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better division of labour and coordination amongst donors, which includes the possibility for 
joint  programming  between  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  and  ii)  alignment  with 
development strategies/programmes elaborated by partner countries (e.g. Action Plans). Such 
programming  modalities,  not  facilitated  under  the  current  DCI  as  it  imposes  specific 
programming rules and documents, are already practiced by donors including the EU in some 
countries (e.g. joint donors response strategies, defining division of labour among donors, EU 
Action Plan partially covering the national development strategy). By acting as one, the EU 
and  its  Member  States  would  have  more  weight  and  leverage  in  policy  dialogue  with  the 
partner countries and in the donor community.  

The  role  of  the  private  sector  and  financial  institutions  within  development  strategies  is  not 
sufficiently encouraged to support public and private investments within partner countries as 
well as sustainable, inclusive and smart growth and the insertion of developing countries into 
the global economy. 

2.4. 

Legal base for EU action 

The specific legal bases for EU action in the development field are articles 208 to 210 of the 
Treaty on the functioning of the EU. In particular article 209, which establishes the need for 
the European Parliament and the Council to adopt measures necessary for the implementation 
of  development  cooperation  policy,  serves  as  the  legal  basis  for an  instrument  to  replace  or 
amend the existing DCI. 

2.5. 

EU Value Added 

2.5.1.  Global Challenges, Global Response & Global Leadership 

As  the  world's  largest  donor,  the  EU  and  Member  States  provide  more  than  half  (56%)  of 
global aid to developing countries. The EU provides aid to the poorest people on the planet in 
more than 150 countries worldwide and is committed to achieving the MDGs on time by the 
end of 2015. The European Commission's official development aid alone11 represents 20% of 
total EU aid. In view of increasingly complex challenges, none of the EU's internal priorities 
– security, smart, inclusive and sustainable growth and job creation, climate change, access to 
energy,  resource  efficiency,  including  the  protection  of  biodiversity,  safe  management  of 
chemicals  and  waste,  health  and  pandemics,  education  and  migration  -  will  be  achieved  in 
isolation from the wider world. 

The EU is in a uniquely neutral and impartial position to deliver on external action on behalf 
of and with Member States, giving enhanced credibility in the countries where it works. It is 
best  placed  to  take  on  the  role  of  global  leader  on  behalf  of  its  citizens,  for  instance  in  its 
contribution to the achievement of the MDGs. 

Another  example  for  the  EU's  leading  role  on  the  international  scene  is  its  effort  to  combat 
climate  change.  In  order  to  help  other  parts  of  the  world  to  step  up  their  efforts  to  combat 
climate  change,  the  Commission  intends  to  increase  the  proportion  of  climate  related 
expenditure across the EU budget to at least 20%, with contribution from different policies.12 
EU  Heads  of  State  have  also  agreed  'stepping  up  the  EU  contributions  to  averting  global 

11 
12 

Including EDF. 
COM (500) 2011. 

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biodiversity  loss.  In  particular  the  Commission  and  member  states  will  contribute  their  fair 
share  to  international  efforts  to  significantly  increase  resources  for  global  biodiversity,  and 
will  improve  the  effectiveness  of  EU  funding  for  global  biodiversity'13.  Preserving  and 
enhancing biodiversity and ecosystem services will contribute to poverty alleviation and boost 
the green economy. Coherence with the Europe 2020 strategy should be sought as far as its 
smart  growth  priority  is  concerned,  promoting  support  to  S&T,  innovation  and  information 
and  communication 
technologies  (ICT)  capacities  as  catalysts  for  socio-economic 
development. 

2.5.2.  The critical mass of the EU 

With 27 Member States acting within common policies and strategies, the EU alone has the 
critical mass to respond to global challenges, such as poverty reduction and climate change. 
The action of individual Member States can be limited and fragmented, with projects which 
can be too small to make a sustainable difference in the field. 

This critical mass also puts the EU in a better position to conduct policy dialogue with partner 
governments.  In  a  recent  Green  Paper  consultation  carried  out  to  find  out  views  from 
stakeholders on our development policy, all those who responded agreed on the role that the 
EU  played  in  supporting  good  governance  (including  the  participation  of  civil  society),  the 
rule of law, security, human rights and gender equality. The responses also showed that the 
people believe that the EU has a comparative advantage in the areas of energy, infrastructure, 
including  ICT,  agriculture  and  aid  for  trade.  Similarly,  in  the  UK's  Department  for 
International  Development's  recent  Multilateral  Aid  Review,  EU  work  in  fragile  states  was 
commended. 

Thanks to the large scale of the EU, it can deliver help to the poor in some of the world's most 
remote areas, where most of the Member States have no strategic interest and their presence is 
limited. 

2.5.3.  The EU is best placed to coordinate 

The  EU  has  a  network  of  international  agreements  all  over  the  world,  not  matched  by 
individual  Member  States,  which  gives  them  influence  in  almost  all  fields  of  international 
relations. The EU plays a multi-faceted role in development: as an implementing agent of EU 
aid and as an EU coordinator and policy-maker in the development field, as an economic and 
trade  partner,  through  security  policy  and  political  dialogue,  as  well  as  through  other  EU 
sector  policies  –  such  as  migration  and  asylum,  climate,  information  and  communication 
technologies,  environment  or  energy.  The  EU  can  do  more  than  other  international 
organisations,  because  of  its  holistic  approach  to  development  and  external  relations,  in 
addition  to  instruments  for  the  promotion  of  democracy,  and  mechanisms  to  respond  to  a 
crisis.  This  horizontal  approach,  especially  in  areas  like  trade,  where  the  EU  can  negotiate 
trade  agreements  on  behalf  of  the  entire  EU,  puts  the  EU  in  a  better  position  than  Member 
States to make the most of the development budget. 

The  EU  also  has  a  long  standing  reputation  and  role  as  a  promoter  of  inclusiveness  and 
multilateralism.  Its  efforts  in  pursuing  a  comprehensive  international  climate  regime  in  the 
context of the international UN climate negotiations and through bilateral dialogues, as well 

13 

COM (2011) 244 final. 

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as its leadership in multilateral environment agreements, have reflected positively on the EU 
external identity. The EU has also constructed arguably the most sophisticated set of policies, 
incentives and standard to facilitate its economy's transition to low carbon and is working to 
achieve resource efficiency by 2020. These experiences and lessons should be made available 
to developing partners to advance their integration in global markets. 

Division of labour through the EU is a crucial component of its added value. With its network 
of  international  agreements,  the  EU  is  a  natural  coordinator,  and  can  influence  almost  all 
fields  of  international  relations,  which  individual  Member  States,  acting  within  common 
policies and strategies, cannot do alone. 

2.5.4.  Acting as one makes financial sense 

Acting as one, EU can have greater impact and more leverage in policy dialogue and donor 
cooperation. At a time of budgetary restrictions, when several Member States are compelled 
to  exit  entire  sectors  and  countries,  the  EU  is  able  to  play  an  active  role  in  promoting 
democracy,  peace,  solidarity,  stability,  prosperity  and  poverty  reduction  worldwide.  In  this 
context, it makes more sense than ever from a purely economic perspective to invest money at 
EU level where a real difference can be made. Certain aid effectiveness reforms, especially in 
terms  of  division  of  labour,  could  add  up  to  potential  savings  of  between  3  and  6  billion  a 
year, according to a recent independent study14. 

Working  with  the  EU  is  also  more  cost  effective.  Commission  administrative  costs  – 
estimated at 5.4% on the basis of 2009 data - are lower than the average administrative costs 
of the principal  bilateral aid donors. Furthermore, thanks to development cooperation, some 
issues  can  be  tackled  in  advance  and  save  money.  By  investing  in  developing  countries, 
migration and asylum, climate change, ecosystem degradation, food security, piracy, security, 
sexual violence and many other issues are addressed. It is often far cheaper to eliminate the 
root causes of insecurity and poverty than deal with its symptoms further down the line. 

2.5.5.  Greater accountability 

Every euro spent on development is scrutinised by the European Parliament and the Court of 
Auditors, and also by every Member State. In addition, the European Commission is one of 
the most transparent aid donors in the world. Transparency is in itself an important tool for 
ensuring effectiveness and value for money. This has been recognised by the UK organisation 
"Publish what you Fund" which ranked the European Commission in 4th position (out of 30) 
in it is first Aid Transparency Assessment of donors in February 2011.  

14 

See The Benefits of a European Approach, by HTSPE. 

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3. 

OBJECTIVES 

3.1. 

Policy framework and objectives 

3.1.1.  Policy framework 
The  'European  Consensus'15  adopted  in  2005  together  with  the  Code  of  Conduct16  provides 
the general framework, orientations and focus to steer the implementation of EU cooperation 
with partner countries and regions. The communication on EU development policy ('Agenda 
for change') is expected to be adopted by the Commission during the autumn 2011, whereby 
the revised policy objectives of EU development policy will be further specified. This policy 
framework,  together  with  the  EU  Treaty,  determines  the  objectives  of  EU  development 
policy, applicable also to the successor of the DCI. 

3.1.2.  Objectives 

3.1.2.1.  Global objectives of the development policy under the instrument 

The overarching objective of the EU development policy should be reducing and, in the long 
term, eradicating poverty in partner countries and regions, with a special emphasis on: 

– 

– 

promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance; 

supporting  inclusive  and  sustainable  growth-oriented  development,  including  inter 
alia environmental and climate smart sustainability. 

On  that  basis,  the  EU  will  continue  supporting  the  MDGs,  which  provides  well-established 
performance  indicators,  while  ensuring  consistency  with  the  upcoming  Commission 
Communication  on  the  EU  development  policy  "Increasing  the  impact  of  EU  Development 
Policy: An agenda for change". 

3.1.2.2.  Objectives related to the review of the instrument itself 

• 

Objective 1- Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development 
policy (cf. driver 1) 

In addition to the overarching objective of the current DCI, the revised instrument should be 
able  to  properly  project  the  EU's  internal  policies  into  its  external  dimension  by  elevating 
sustainable and inclusive growth to the level of driver for achieving the primary objective of 
poverty  alleviation,  in  order  to  increase  its  response  capacity  to  global  challenges  and  the 
protection  of  public  goods  that  would  properly  take  into  account  EU  internal  policy 
objectives. 

15 

16 

Joint  statement  by  the  Council  and  the  representatives  of  the  governments  of  the  Member  States 
meeting with the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on EU development policy of 
20 December 2005. 
The Code of Conduct was agreed in 2007 (COM/2007/72) and presents operational principles for EU 
donors  regarding  complementarity  in  development  cooperation.  Their  aim  is  to  enhance  effectiveness 
by improving overall development results and impact for poverty reduction and reducing the transaction 
costs, through a division of labour between donors. For instance, it was agreed each donor will work in 
3 sectors only, plus General Budget Support if applicable and support to civil society organisations. 

EN 

20 

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• 

Objective  2  -  Establish  strong  mechanisms  to  ensure  significant  differentiation 
amongst partner countries (cf. driver 2) 

The revised instrument should allow a more differentiated approach amongst partner countries 
in order to respond to the specific situation of each country, taking into account their needs, 
capacities and performance, and the potential impact of EU aid.  

• 

Objective  3  -  Strengthen  the  inclusion  of  good  governance,  democracy,  human 
rights, and the rule of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms 
(cf. driver 3) 

The  revised  instrument  should  foresee  an  increased  degree  of  linkage  between  the  fund 
allocation/programming  and  respect  for  EU  values,  namely  good  governance,  democracy, 
human  rights  and  the  rule  of  law,  providing  incentives  to  concerned  partner  countries  to 
improve governance. The revised instrument should have the necessary flexibility to engage 
and support such processes in the concerned partner countries.  

• 

Objective 4 – Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
(JAES) (cf. driver 4) 

The  revised  instrument  should  provide  an  adequate  legal  basis  and  coverage  for  the 
implementation of the JAES.  

• 

Objective  5  -  Reduce  the  fragmentation  of  and  enhance  the  focus  of  thematic 
programmes (cf. driver 5) 

The  added  value  of  a  thematic  programme  is  its  ability  to  project  EU  core  values  (gender, 
social inclusion, etc) and to allow the EU to intervene more efficiently on global public goods 
such  as  research,  biodiversity  and  global  crises  (e.g.  avian  flu)  where  the  action  of  the 
Commission should also benefit countries without bilateral co-operation. The flexibility of the 
instrument  should  be  sufficient  to  mobilise  significant  resources  to  address  these  issues 
whenever needed (e.g. food price crises, climate change). 

• 

Objective 6 - Better address the specific needs of countries in crisis, post crisis and 
fragile situation (cf. driver 6) 

The  revised  instrument  should  ensure  the  necessary  flexibility  in  terms  of  strategies, 
programming  and  implementation  procedures  in  countries  in  crisis,  post-crisis  and  fragile 
situations to allow for the quick adaptation of the EU response to their changing environment. 

• 

Objective 7 - Increase flexibility of fund allocation (cf. driver 7) 

The allocation of funds between regions/countries/themes should be flexible enough to allow 
a  swift  re-attribution  of  funds  in  case  of  unexpected  needs  requiring  a  rapid  reaction  (e.g. 
crisis/post-crisis/fragile  states,  new  political  priorities,  the  need  to  apply  the  differentiation 
and mutual accountability principles as well as the conditionality for good governance, etc).  

• 

Objective  8  -  Simplify  programming  and  increase  flexibility  of  implementation,  in 
consistency with the principles of aid effectiveness (cf. driver 8) 

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21 

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The programming and decision-making process should be simplified and flexible, making it 
possible for the EU to make use of joint programming and alignment with the programming 
cycle of partner countries.  

Finally,  the  new  instrument  should  provide  the  legal  basis  to  allow  the  EU  to  use/increase 
innovative  instruments  allowing  the  involvement  of  the  private  sector  and  financial 
institutions in the implementation of EU assistance in partner countries. 

3.2. 

Consistency with external action priorities 

In  the  context  of  the  principles,  objectives  and  the  new  institutional  framework  set  by  the 
Lisbon Treaty development cooperation must be mutually coherent with other initiatives for 
external action. The revised instrument will be an integral part of the overall architecture of 
external  action  financial  instruments  which  will  be  organised  around  four  main  chapters:  a 
policy-based  chapter  aiming  primarily  at  cooperation  with  partner  countries  within  and 
outside  the  budget;  working  on  cross-cutting  priorities  and  values;  humanitarian  assistance 
and civil protection; and crisis management. 

Moreover  for  every  country,  development  cooperation  will  be  complementary  to  the  new 
“Partnership Instrument”. Interaction between the DCI, EDF and the ENPI will be particularly 
strong under the DCI thematic envelopes which will cover and/or complement actions in the 
geographical  zones  covered  by  these  respective  instruments  in  the  field  of:  support  to  civil 
society and local authorites, climate change, energy, food security, human development and 
migration. 

Interaction  with  the  Trade  policy,  in  particular  GSP/GSP  plus  and  Everything  But  Arms 
schemes,  but  also  trade  agreements  will  remain  particularly  important  with  Aid  for  Trade  / 
Trade Related Assistance actions funded under DCI, both at bilateral and regional level.  

The programming principles and approaches of the DCI shall be adjusted to better respond to 
the  dynamic  developmental  challenges  of  the  21st  century,  such  as  scarcity  of  natural 
resources,  ecosystem  degradation,  population  pressures  and  climate  change.  The 
omnipresence  of  these  phenomena  and  the  risks  they  pose  to  development  progress  will 
undermine  efforts  to  reduce  poverty  and  reach  the  MDGs  if  they  are  not  comprehensively 
incorporated into the development cooperation programmes and approaches.17 

3.3. 

Consistency with other EU policies 

As  laid  out  under  chapter  2.2.2  the  integration  of  different  internal  EU  policies  is  a  key 
priority.  The  main  arguments  are:  i)  coherence  of  our  external  action;  ii)  aid  effectiveness, 
notably the commitment to reduce the number of actors and programmes; and iii) maximising 
synergies between policy objectives.  

In  order  to  ensure  the  coherence  and  consistency  of  the  EU's  overall  policy,  there  are 
important arguments in favour of continuing the current approach of financing such aspects of 

17 

The  onus  for  more  robust  and  climate  resilient  development  planning  rests  on  the  national  governments.  However,  the  EU,  as  the  strongest  proponent  of 

international and inclusive climate action, can promote policies in this respect and ensure its own country programming incorporates climate action. Similarly, 

support for natural capital assessments to show the value of supposedly free ecosystem services and for measuring the health effects of pollution to show the 

costs of inaction will help our partners pay more attention to the environmental base for sustainable development which in turn should lead to cooperation on 
environmental protection. 

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22 

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internal  EU  policies  mainly  under  Heading  4  of  the  EU  budget  through  the  geographical 
external  programmes  (i.e.  mainstreaming)  or  through  thematic  programmes  (environment, 
climate change, energy).  

By  mainstreaming  internal  EU  policies  through  geographical  programmes,  the  external 
dimensions  of  internal  policies  can  be  included  in  the  agreements  concluded  with  third 
countries and become part of the policy dialogue with them. These aspects are at the centre of 
EU  country  and  regional  programming  in  areas  such  as  standards  setting,  infrastructure 
networks, including ICT, trade, business frameworks, energy, education and research, justice 
and  home  affairs  activities  etc.  The  MFF  Communication18  specifically  suggests  to  commit 
the  EU  to  mainstreaming  climate  change  and  biodiversity  throughout  the  budget.19 
Mainstreaming  ensures  coherence,  fosters  ownership  and  ultimately  enhances  effectiveness 
and impact.  

While  the  "mainstreaming  approach"  was  already  followed  for  the  currentMFF,  it  can  be 
further  improved.  At  the  level  of  country  programming,  internal  policy  priorities  should  be 
taken into account more explicitly in the process of designing geographic programmes, while 
also respecting the country ownership principle and alignment on development strategies. For 
example Ministries in partner countries responsible for environment and climate are often left 
out of discussions on development strategies and aid allocation even though these issues have 
cross-cutting  implications  for  all  sectors  as  well  as  being  important  development  issues  in 
their own right. 

Furthermore,  this  highlights  the  EU  commitment  to  advancing  on  Policy  Coherence  for 
Development  ("PCD").  This  requires  that  the  objectives  of  development  cooperation  be 
considered  in  all  EU  policies  which  are  likely  to  affect  developing  countries.20  The  PCD 
strategy  was  adopted  to  overcome  potential  negative  impacts  of  internal  policies  on 
developing  partners  but  needs  to  become  a  mechanism  for  the  mutual  reinforcement  and 
integration  of  policies.  It  requires  that  the  design  of  every  EU  sectoral  policy  avoid 
incoherence with the EU development policy.  

Finally, aid alone cannot bring the necessary change on a scale sufficient to pull countries out 
of  poverty.  Private  sector  development  through  the  development  of  trade  and  investment  is 
essential. Aid in general should facilitate reform to foster services to the population but also 
support private sector development and trade integration. Economic activity is affected by the 
institutional, legal and political conditions prevalent in third countries, including development 
ones,  such  as  the  existence  of  functioning  market  institutions  and  a  sound  economic 
governance. The EU actively encourages its trading partners to establish competition regimes 
and this objective also includes developing countries. Along with other policy objectives such 

18 
19 

20 

COM (500) 2011. 
The Lisbon Treaty made combating climate change at international level a specific EU objective. The EU is determined to deliver on its international climate 

finance commitments.  Already today, a proportion of the EU budget is related to climate mainstreaming and thus contributes to Europe's transition to a low 

carbon and climate resilient society. The Commission intends to increase the proportion to at least 20%, with contribution from different policies, including 

from the external instruments. Equally EU Heads of State have to step up the EU contribution to averting global biodiversity loss and improve the effectiveness 

of such EU funding, commitments that will be further defined in the preparations for the next Conference of the Parties of the Biodiversity Convention in 2012 
which is due to agree on mobilising resources to implement the global biodiversity strategy adopted in Nagoya. 
May 2005 Council Conclusions confirm the EU is committed to the implementation of the objectives 
contained in the Commission's Communication on PCD dealing with the areas of trade, environment, 
climate  change,  security,  agriculture,  fisheries,  social  dimension  of  globalisation,  employment  and 
decent work, migration, research and innovation, information society, transport and energy. 

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23 

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as  a  well-functioning  public  administration  and  an  independent  judiciary  safeguarding  the 
enforceability  of  contracts,  an  effective  competition  policy  creates  a  business  environment 
facilitating  economic  growth  in  developing  countries  (set  of  transparent  rules,  competition 
authorities  as  arbiters  on  anti-competitive  behaviour,  reduced  policy  risk  and  stimulated 
foreign investments due to clear rules of the game). 

3.4. 

Geographical/thematic coverage 

The  legal  base  should  allow  for  all  policy  areas  and  activities  of  external  action  to  be 
promoted  in  third  countries  with  the  appropriate  mix  of  sectors  and  modalities  determined 
specifically  per  country,  on  the  basis  of  an  analysis  of  needs,  capacities,  interests, 
commitments and potential EU impact. 

Geographic  cooperation  will  focus  on  poverty  reduction  in  the  context  of  inclusive  and 
sustainable development but also on promoting the principles of good governance, the rule of 
law  and  respect  for  human  rights,  including  protection  of  minorities  and  other  vulnerable 
groups and will cover the developing countries outside those covered by the ENPI, EDF and 
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA). In the current DCI, the European Parliament requested at 
least 20% of funding to be spent on health and education. The draft Communication on EU 
development  policy  ('Agenda  for  Change')  indicates  that  a  similar  funding  target  for  social 
and human development will be maintained by the Commission. 

The  thematic  envelope  under  DCI  will  focus  on  (i)  the  support  for  civil  society  and  local 
authorities  and  (ii)  global  public  goods  and  challenges  notably  environment  especially 
biodiversity,  climate  change,  energy,  water,  human  and  social  development  (especially 
education,  health,  social  protection,  employment  and  gender  equality),  food  security  and 
migration and will seek in particular to mainstream EU policies into development cooperation 
while increasing flexibility across themes to promote a "holistic approach". In order to live up 
to  its  international  commitments  under  the  UNFCCC  and  UNCBD  namely  to  increase 
substantially  the  mobilisation  of  financial  resources  for  climate  change  and  for  global 
biodiversity  by  2020,  the  EU  should  aim  to  spend  no  less  than  25%  of  the  programme  for 
"Global  Public  Goods"  on  climate  change  and  environmental  objectives.  The  thematic 
envelope  encompasses  not  only  the  countries  eligible  for  geographic  cooperation  under  the 
DCI,  but  also  the  ACP  and  EU  neighbouring  countries.  Furthermore,  thematic  programmes 
should be in coherence with the overall approach to partner countries and regions. 

The instrument will also support the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. 

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

4.1. 

Option  1:"No  change":  cooperation  with  the  countries  concerned  remains 
strictly in the framework of the existing DCI Regulation 

DCI would  be  extended for the 2014-2020 period with no further amendments. Each of the 
identified objectives is assessed against this backdrop. 

4.1.1.  Align  the  objectives  of  the  DCI  with  the  new  trends  in  EU  development  policy 

(Objective 1) 

The  overarching  principle  of  eradicating  poverty  in  the  context  of  sustainable  development 
and  consolidating  and  supporting  democracy,  good  governance,  human  rights,  equal 

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24 

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opportunities and the rule of law would continue. No reference to the objectives related to the 
evolved  EU  development  policy  as  defined  in  the  Communication  "Agenda  for  Change" 
would be included, in particular to sufficiently address global challenges.  

Not  changing  the  objectives  would  ensure  the  familiar  focus  with  which  stakeholders  are 
already acquainted and comfortable. Nevertheless, this would not allow the EU to sufficiently 
tackle the newly arising EU and global priorities and commitments in the area of development 
aid. 

4.1.2.  Establish  strong  mechanisms  to  ensure  significant  differentiation  amongst  partner 

countries (Objective 2) 

The current DCI includes differentiation as a general principle (art. 3.2). This principle is also 
reflected in the programming, as the multiannual indicative allocations are based on needs and 
performance of the partner country (art. 18).  

While the basic principles for differentiation would continue to play a role in the DCI, status 
quo would not reinforce it by sending a clearer message of intention, nor would it be coupled 
with a clear, strong mechanism for its implementation. In addition, many developing countries 
wish  to  move  beyond  pure  development  assistance  and  are  thus  becoming  less  interested  in 
DCI funding. 

4.1.3. 

Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3) 

The  current  DCI  includes  these  principles  as  part  of  the  objectives  of  the  instrument. 
Nevertheless, status quo would mean that programming and allocation would be carried out 
without  having  a  clear  mechanism  for  supporting  and  rewarding  progress  towards  better 
governance and the reinforcement of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  

4.1.4.  Ensure  support  for  the  implementation  of  the  Joint  Africa-EU  Strategy  (JAES) 

(Objective 4) 

The  financing  of  the  Pan-African  strategy  would  need  to  be  funded  through  three  different 
instruments:  the  European  Development  Fund  for  Sub-Saharan  countries,  the  European 
Neighbourhood  Instrument  for  North  Africa  and  the  DCI  for  South  Africa.  Until  now  this 
proved  to  be  extremely  difficult  and  keeping  the  same  structure  would  endanger  a  coherent 
and comprehensive implementation of the commitments in the Joint Strategy. 

4.1.5.  Reduce  the  fragmentation  of  and  enhance  the  focus  of  thematic  programmes 

(Objective 5)  

Under this option the five thematic programmes would remain. The problem of implementing 
programmes  with  elements  from  the  different  thematic  programmes  would  remain,  causing 
EU assistance to be fragmented, less coherent and less efficient 

4.1.6.  Better  address  the  specific  needs  of  countries  in  crisis,  post  crisis  and  fragile 

situation (Objective 6) 

In case of no change of the DCI, EU would not be able to take into account the full extent of 
the changes taking place in countries in crisis, post crisis and fragile situation beyond initial 
planning.  EU  would  be  severely  limited  to  adapt  and  react  to  any  developments  that  would 

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25 

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take place in such vulnerable countries during the time that the DCI would be in force. 

4.1.7.  Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) 

The current situation would be maintained, meaning that the share of un-programmed funds 
would  be  extremely  limited.  Funding  outside  programmable  funds  would  remain  possible 
only  through  the  adoption  of  special  measures  in  the  event  of  unforeseen  and  duly  justified 
needs  related  to  natural  disasters,  civil  strife  or  crisis.  In  many  cases  the  lack  of  reserves 
implies that indicative amounts need to be reduced to some countries and regions, bring about 
important  political  implications  (example  –  the  Arab  Spring  and  the  need  for  identifying 
additional funds for this region at the expense of some other regions).  

4.1.8. 

Simplified  programming  and  flexibility  in  implementation,  in  consistency  with  the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8) 

The current complex and stringent programming procedure, which systematically requires the 
adoption of EU-specific Country Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative Programmes in 
all cases and following the EU's programming cycle would remain. The instrument would not 
foresee  the  possibility  to  move  away  from  the  EU  specific  programming  documents, 
continuing the duplication of development strategy formulation with the member states. 

While  not  preventing  other  modalities,  the  status  quo  would  rely  on  the  usual  and  tested 
modes of implementation of the EU assistance. Not introducing or promoting new modalities 
could be perceived as simpler for the implementation of EU aid. However, it would not take 
account  of  the  need  to  seek  more  innovative  approaches  in  the  programming  (e.g.  joint 
programming with the Member States) and in the implementation stage (e.g. twinning), which 
could ensure higher added value for the delivered aid. 

4.2. 

Option 2: Amend the DCI Regulation 

4.2.1.  Align  the  objectives  of  the  DCI  with  the  new  trends  in  EU  development  policy 

(Objective 1) 

• 

Sub-option 1A – Align the objectives of the instrument with the EU Treaties 

The  objectives  would  reflect  the  latest  evolution  of  EU  legislation,  in  particular  the  Lisbon 
Treaty –arts 21(2) TUE and 208(1) TFEU. While this would put the instrument in line with 
the wide objectives of the Lisbon Treaty, it would lack the necessary focus that an instrument 
for  development  needs.  This  would  also  imply  that  the  priorities  could  change  with  each 
additional  interpretation  of  the  Treaty  or  seem  as  ‘cast  in  stone’.  Neither  would  ensure  the 
required mix of flexibility and predictability. 

• 

Sub-option  1B  –  Align  the  objectives  of  the  instrument  with  the  latest  trends  of 
development policy 

The objectives would be updated to reflect the latest evolution of EU legislation and policy, in 
particular  with  regards  to  inclusive  and  sustainable  development  which  would  become  a 
general  objective  of  the  instrument,  in  particular  the  Lisbon  Treaty  –arts  21(2)  TUE  and 
208(1)  TFEU  but  also  i)  the  Europe  2020  strategy;  ii)  the  Communication  "A  Budget  for 
Europe 2020" and iii) the future Communication "Increasing the impact of EU Development 
Policy: an Agenda for Change"). This option would ensure a transparent interpretation of the 
objectives of the EU development policy and signal a clear framework for their identification 

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26 

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and formulation of potential changes. 

4.2.2.  Establish  strong  mechanisms  to  ensure  significant  differentiation  amongst  partner 

countries (Objective 2) 

• 

Sub-option 2A - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
objective statistical data on their development level 

This option would enable establishing a clear cut and criteria that would determine on which 
countries  EU  development  assistance  would  be  focused.  Nevertheless,  in  many  cases 
statistical  data  do  not  paint  the  entire  picture  of  the  situation  in  a  country.  Indeed,  many 
countries’  statistics  are  done  on  different  premises  and  are  thus  not  fully  comparable.  In 
addition  many  wealthier  countries  face  challenges  and  constraints  similar  to  those  of  the 
poorest and least developed countries.  

• 

Sub-option 2B - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
a combination of objective quantitative and qualitative data 

The criteria for a differentiated EU approach would be based on the criteria identified in the 
Communication "An agenda for change". Under this option, the Commission may decide not 
to allocate funds to a number of countries. These criteria are: 

(a) 

(b) 
(c) 
(d) 

Country needs 

Capacities  
Country commitments and performance 
Potential EU impact on policy reform and on leverage of EU Aid 

This  type  of  focus  should  enable  to  concentrate  funds  in  those  countries  where  they  are 
needed most, yet still provide a framework for development aid around specific cooperation 
areas and modalities that are necessary in all developing countries. 

In  principle,  grant-based  aid  should  not  feature  as  the  primary  vehicle  in  cooperation  with 
more  advanced  developing  countries  already  on  sustained  growth  paths  and/or  able  to 
generate enough of their own resources. However, they should benefit from grant-based aid 
under thematic and/or regional programmes, in particular under the new investment facilities. 
Grant funds should be secured so that activities such as the transfer of know-how under the 
new blending schemes can be implemented in the more advanced developing countries.  

The  above  mentioned  criteria  would  also  be  applied  to  define  the  level  of  allocations  from 
which  each  country  would  benefit  under  bilateral  cooperation.  This  includes  inter  alia 
favouring  countries  with  governments  which  take  a  strong  lead  and  which  assume 
responsibility for the development of their country21, apply sound policies and are accountable 
to their people through the democratic process. The policy mix would thus allow for a greater 
country-based approach, looking at needs, capacities, interests and commitments. 

Foreseeing an envelope of funds for performance-based incentive distribution would allow the 
necessary flexibility, improve value for money and strengthen the role of policy dialogue. 

21 

In  particular  in  areas  of  public  finance  management  including  the  income  side,  public  administration 
reform and institutional development, strengthening their social policies and improving framework for 
private sector development. 

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4.2.3. 

Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3) 

• 

Sub-option 3A – Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law as 
key parameters in the fund allocation mechanisms 

This sub-option would imply that any country that would no follow these principles would be 
completely excluded from EU development assistance. This could be assessed together with 
relevant international organisations and institutions (e.g. UN). While this would send a clear 
signal  on  the  importance  the  EU  attaches  to  these  issues,  it  could  prove  counterproductive 
when  trying  to  engage  with  some  of  these  countries,  with  the  final  price  being  paid  by  the 
populations.  

• 

Sub-option 3B – Strengthening the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law in the fund allocation mechanisms 

Recognising  that  aid  alone  cannot  bring  the  necessary  change  on  a  scale  sufficient  to  pull 
countries out of poverty, EU cooperation would further integrate such development drivers as 
the rule of law, good governance, democracy and human rights. There would be some degree 
of  linkage  between  fund  allocation  and  the  respect  of  universal  values,  namely  good 
governance,  democracy,  human  rights  and  the  rule  of  law,  yet  this  would  not  be  the  only 
parameter  in  defining  the  available  funds.  Insufficient  progress  would  not  prevent  the  EU 
from  continuing  cooperation,  but  in  such  cases  strategy  would  be  adapted  (e.g.  cooperating 
exclusively with the civil society, limiting cooperation to the social sectors). 

4.2.4.  Ensure  support  for  the  implementation  of  the  Joint  Africa-EU  Strategy  (JAES) 

(Objective 4) 

• 

Sub-Option 4A: Pan-African programme established in the DCI that would cover all 
activities of the JAES 

Ensuring  a  complete  coverage  of  the  JAES  through  one  single  instrument  would  add  to  the 
coherence and flexibility of the financed activities, as well as add to their overall efficiency. 
Nevertheless,  an  important  problem  of  potential  duplication  with  the  EDF  would  arise.  In 
addition  the  financial  reality  of  DCI  is  such  that  it  would  not  be  possible  to  finance  the 
complete JAES in a comprehensive manner only through DCI.  

• 

Sub-Option  4B:  Pan-African  programme  established  in  the  DCI  that  would  cover 
only continental activities of the JAES 

An amount would be allocated under the new DCI to only support the implementation of the 
continental activities of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its successive Action Plans, as well 
the 
as  other  relevant  African-wide 
implementation  of  the  Strategy  through  other  components  of  the  DCI  or  through  other 
instruments  such  as  the  EDF  or  the  European  Neighbourhood  Instrument.  Indeed,  the  Pan-
African  Programme  would  be  complementary  to  activities  financed  through  these  other 
instruments,  in  order  to  ensure  a  comprehensive  and  efficient  implementation  of  JAES 
commitments. 

initiatives.  This  does  not  prevent  supporting 

4.2.5.  Reduce  the  fragmentation  of  and  enhance  the  focus  of  thematic  programmes 

(Objective 5) 

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• 

Sub-Option 5A: Increase flexibility and reduce the number of thematic programmes 
to one 

This sub-option would offer significant flexibility in the implementation as it would cover all 
types  of  thematic  activities  under  one  umbrella.  This  would  prevent  fragmentation  of  EU 
assistance  in  cases  where  the  programme  would  contain  elements  of  different  thematic 
priorities  (e.g.  the  case  of  avian  flu  and  food  crisis  in  2008).  The  danger  of  this  approach 
would  be  to  loose  visibility  and  effectiveness  of  some  important  elements  of  the  current 
thematic programmes, in particular the Non-State Actors and local authorities programme.  

• 

Sub-Option 5B: Increased flexibility and reduced number of thematic programmes 

This  sub-option,  like  the  previous  one,  would  reduce  the  fragmentation  of  the  thematic 
programmes  and  increase  the  flexibility  of  the  DCI  in  responding  to  unforeseen  events. 
Nevertheless, in order to take into account in particular the needs of the Non-State Actors and 
local authorities programme, different themes should be brought together under no more than 
two main thematic programmes covering: (i) civil society organisations22 and local authorities 
and (ii) global public goods and challenges. 

4.2.6.  Reduce  the  fragmentation  of  and  enhance  the  focus  of  thematic  programmes 

(Objective 5)  

• 

Sub-Option 5A: Increase flexibility and reduce the number of thematic programmes 
to one  

This sub-option would offer significant flexibility in the implementation as it would cover all 
types  of  thematic  activities  under  one  umbrella.  This  would  prevent  fragmentation  of  EU 
assistance  in  cases  where  the  programme  would  contain  elements  of  different  thematic 
priorities  (e.g.  the  case  of  avian  flu  and  food  crisis  in  2008).  The  danger  of  this  approach 
would  be  to  loose  visibility  and  effectiveness  of  some  important  elements  of  the  current 
thematic programmes, in particular the Non-State Actors and local authorities programme.  

• 

Sub-Option 5B: Increased flexibility and reduced number of thematic programmes 

This  sub-option,  like  the  previous  one,  would  reduce  the  fragmentation  of  the  thematic 
programmes  and  increase  the  flexibility  of  the  DCI  in  responding  to  unforeseen  events. 
Nevertheless, in order to take into account in particular the needs of the Non-State Actors and 
local authorities programme, different themes should be brought together under no more than 
two main thematic programmes covering: (i) civil society organisations23 and local authorities 
and (ii) global public goods and challenges. 

4.2.7.  Better  address  the  specific  needs  of  countries  in  crisis,  post  crisis  and  fragile 

situation (Objective 6) 

• 

22 
23 

Sub-Option 6A: Introduction of complete flexibility for countries in crisis, post crisis 
and fragile situation 

Civil society organisations better describes the targeted groups than non-state actors. 
Civil society organisations better describes the targeted groups than non-state actors. 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
                                                 
This sub-option would imply that for countries that would be characterised as in crisis, post-
crisis  or  in  fragile  situation,  no  annual  programming  would  be  required,  and  all  proposed 
activities  would  be  proposed  outside  of  any  existing  programming  document.  While  this 
would allow important flexibility and swift reaction in the implementation phase, it would not 
provide the necessary level of accountability and quality control. 

• 

Sub-Option  6B:  Increased  flexibility  in  programming  and  in  implementation 
procedures 

Provisions  allowing  a  more  flexible  and  rapid  (re)programming  for  fragile  states,  states  in 
crisis and post-crisis situations through quicker programming procedures, tailor made ad-hoc 
reviews as well as specific implementation procedures would be introduced in the regulation. 
Such  provisions  would  ensure  the  EU  to  act  swiftly  and  with  sufficient  flexibility  in  cases 
such  as  the  Arab  Spring,  while  not  compromising  on  the  accountability  and  quality,  as  the 
procedures  would  keep  the  regular  comitology  and  democratic  scrutiny  as  the  rule,  even  if 
introducing a type of ex post control.  

4.2.8.  Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) 

• 

Sub-Option 7A: Introducing further flexibility through an un-programmed reserve at 
the country level 

A  reserve  of  un-programmed  funds  would  be  foreseen  at  the  level  of  each  country  strategy 
and  indicative  programme.  This  would  increase  the  capacity  to  act  in  cases  of  unforeseen 
events and opportunities (positive conditionality) in these countries. There could be potential 
difficulties  in  cases  of  major  national  or  regional  disasters  (the  2004  tsunami  in  South  East 
Asia) or global crisis (food crisis in 2008) where the availability of funds could prove as too 
limited for the scale of the disaster. In addition, the reserve would be set to each individual 
country,  potentially  exhausting  it  too  early  in  some,  while  not  benefiting  from  it  in  other 
countries.  

• 

Sub-Option  7B  –  Introducing  further  flexibility  through  an  un-programmed  reserve 
at the level of the instrument 

A reserve of un-programmed funds would be foreseen at the level of the instrument in order 
to allow a swift re-allocation of funds in case of unexpected needs and opportunities requiring 
a rapid reaction. While this sub-option would clearly increase the flexibility at the level of the 
instrument,  the  decision  to  leave  certain  amount  of  funds  unallocated  would  consequently 
somewhat  reduce  predictability  as  less  of  the  total  DCI  envelope  would  be  long  term 
programmed. 

4.2.9. 

Simplified  programming  and  flexibility  in  implementation,  in  consistency  with  the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8) 

• 

Sub-Option  8A:  Introduction  of  simplification  and  flexibility  in  the  programming 
and  implementation  rules  by  introducing  obligatory  Joint  Programming  and 
Alignment 

Joint Programming with Member States and alignment with the beneficiary countries would 
significantly  improve  the  coherence  and  effectiveness  of  total  EU  development  assistance, 
putting in practice the principles of aid effectiveness. Making these elements obligatory would 
ensure that these principles are fully respected in all EU development cooperation assistance. 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
At the same time, making these arrangements obligatory for the delivery of EU development 
cooperation aid could significantly complicate the programming and implementation process, 
in particular for cases where it would be difficult to find a common language between the EU 
and  various  Member  States,  where  it  would  not  be  effective  to  align  to  the  national 
development plan or where quick re-programming decisions would need to be taken. In this 
cases we would even risk failing to implement planned cooperation.  

• 

Sub-Option 8B: Introduction of simplification and flexibility in the programming and 
implementation rules to enable Joint Programming and Alignment 

To  simplify  the  decision-making  process  and  improve  aid  effectiveness,  the  DCI  would 
integrate two elements which would facilitate a better Division of Labour between the EU and 
its Member States as well as joint programming namely: 

– 

– 

simplification of programming by not requiring Country Strategy Papers when other 
valid  strategic  documents  exist  (e.g.  EU  documents,  joint  programmes  agreed  with 
EU Member States, partner country's own development strategy); 

alignment of EU assistance with the development cycle of partner countries. 

By introducing provisions of the aid effectiveness agenda, the coherence and effectiveness of 
the total EU development aid could significantly be improved.  

5. 

ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

This chapter analyses the global impact of the options and sub-options in terms of their likely 
economic, social and environmental impacts as well as the achievement of policy objectives 
of the instrument and the likely impact on efficiency and management. The different options 
have been qualitatively assessed based on the Commission Services' qualitative appreciations 
of the likely impact. 

5.1. 

Option 1: No Change 

In  general,  this  option  would  not  address  any  of  the  other  aforementioned  objectives  and 
consequently  would  not  address  any  of  the  lessons  learnt  and  areas  for  improvements 
mentioned  in  Section  2.  For  instance,  EU  assistance  is  currently  thinly  spread  throughout 
almost all countries eligible for ODA assistance leading, in part, to limited result and impact, 
and  high  fragmentation  of  development  assistance.  With  no  additional  changes,  the  DCI 
would not live up to the evolved EU development policy, as defined in the Communication 
"Agenda for Change", nor would it be fit to sufficiently address global challenges. It would 
increase management risks as the EU would continue to try to do "everything everywhere". It 
would continue to promote predictability sometimes at the cost of flexibility, and in particular, 
it  would  be  difficult  to  change  and  adapt  policy  to  current  political  priorities.  Introducing 
more flexibility for all countries, especially when dealing with states in situation of crises or 
fragility, and facing unforeseen needs require amendments to the DCI.  

EN 

31 

   EN 

 
Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Pertinent  framework  for  development  aid  in  numerous 
countries 

Does  not  address  the  identified  lessons  learnt  and  areas  of 
improvement  

Increase  management  risks  as  the  EU  would  continue  to  try 
to do "everything everywhere" 

Continue  to  promote  predictability  sometimes  at  the  cost  of 
flexibility  which  is  necessary  for  tackling  crisis,  unforeseen 
needs and new global challenges 

Not  in  line  with  current  political  development  priorities 
(Agenda for Change) 

5.2. 

Option 2: Amend the DCI Regulation 

5.2.1.  Align  the  objectives  of  the  DCI  with  the  new  trends  in  EU  development  policy 

(Objective 1) 

In  addition  to  the  overarching  principle  of  eradicating  poverty  and  consolidating  and 
supporting  democracy,  good  governance,  human  rights,  equal  opportunities  and  the  rule  of 
law,  a  reference  to  global  public  goods  and  resources  would  allow  inclusive  and 
environmentally sustainable growth as a primary objective for development. In this manner, 
development  policy  could  properly  project  the  EU's  internal  policies  and  values  into  its 
external dimension, in terms of volume of aid as well as in geographical coverage in order to 
increase its response capacity to global challenges and the protection of public goods. 

• 

Sub-option 1A – Align the objectives of the instrument with the EU Treaties 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

The  objectives  would  reflect  the  latest  evolution  of  EU 
legislation,  in  particular  the  Lisbon  Treaty  –arts  21(2) 
TUE and 208(1) TFEU 

Does not sufficiently take into account the specificities of the 
development cooperation instruments 

• 

Sub-option  1B  –  Align  the  objectives  of  the  instrument  with  the  latest  trends  of 
development policy 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

With time, changes in development policy might no longer be 
reflected in the DCI Objectives and will need to be adapted 

Incorporate latest evolution of EU legislation and policy, 
in  particular  with  regards  to  inclusive  and  sustainable 
development, but as well regarding the Lisbon Treaty and 
the EU 2020 Strategy 

Clearer 
development policy  

interpretation  of 

the  objectives  of  EU 

Clear framework for the identification and formulation of 
potential  changes  of  the  objectives  of  EU  development 
policy 

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
 
5.2.2.  Establish  strong  mechanisms  to  ensure  significant  differentiation  amongst  partner 

countries (Objective 2)  

Differentiation would have a clear positive impact both for the beneficiary countries in need 
(focus on poverty), EU Policy Coherence (aid assistance to emerging countries in particular in 
view of European economic difficulties) and on human resource management in Headquarters 
and Delegations (high administrative costs due to fragmentation of aid). Focusing EU aid on a 
limited  number  of  countries  will  allow  the  EU  to  reach  a  critical  mass  to  achieve  change, 
expected results and impact, leading to a reduction of poverty, an improvement of access to 
and the quality of social services and an improvement – where relevant – of the environmental 
sustainability of development. It will give the EU sufficient leverage in policy dialogue with 
partner countries. 

While  differentiation  (and  consequent  concentration  of  EU  aid)  may  be  welcomed  by 
countries that would benefit from it, it may cause some political uneasiness in countries that 
would no longer benefit from bilateral grant-based assistance as mentioned in the description 
of this option. Also, one can claim the EU will lose leverage in relations with the emerging 
countries  and  other  wealthy  countries.  However,  cooperation  with  such  countries  should  be 
based more on partnership than development, which may be particularly welcomed by these 
countries  which  want  to  be  treated  by  the  EU  as  partners  on  an  equal  footing  rather  than 
recipients  of  EU  aid.  Furthermore,  these  countries  would  still  benefit  from  regional  and 
thematic programmes. The transition from grants to other aid modalities could be gradual in 
order to smoothen the political impact of the new orientations. Non-grant based instruments, 
such  as  blending  of  grant  and  loans,  may  still  be  used  with  such  countries  and  would  also 
prove to be particularly adapted in such cases. 

Finally,  concentration  of  aid  shall  allow  for  the  improvement  of  the  quality  of  management 
and further strengthening of the EU comparative advantage in a number of areas. 

• 

Sub-option 2A - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
objective statistical data 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Clear  cut  criteria  that  determine  on  which  countries  we 
would focus EU development assistance 

Using solely statistical data does not reflect the entire picture 
of the situation in a country 

• 

Sub-option 2B - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
a combination of objective quantitative and qualitative data 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Concentrate funds in those countries where they are most 
in  need:  focus  on  poorest  countries  and  away  from 
emerging powers  

Impact on bilateral relations with some countries who would 
no  longer  benefit  from  development  aid,  particularly  for 
developing countries with large population of poor 

Adapt  aid  modalities  to  countries  (grant  aid  not  primary 
modality for more advanced developing countries)  

Reduced global EU reach  

Allows 
for 
distribution  

funds 

for  performance-based 

incentive 

Concentration  of  aid  can 
to  strengthen  EU 
comparative advantage and leverage in a number of areas 

lead 

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
 
5.2.3. 

Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3)  

Promoting  good  governance  shall  lead  to  an  improvement  for  EU  cooperation  results  and 
impact  in  economic,  social  and  environmental  areas.  It  shall  promote  good  performance, 
while not neglecting countries in crisis or post-crisis situations. 

On the other hand, the use of such mechanism would be perceived as a political tool by which 
the  EU  may  loose  its  neutrality,  which  is  often  an  important  asset  for  EU  cooperation.  The 
risks  of  partially  losing  credibility  as  a  neutral  actor  in  some  countries  would  be  largely 
compensated  by  the  improved  coherence  of  EU  policy  with  EU  values,  which  needs  to  be 
promoted in the world as underlined by the Lisbon Treaty. It also would enhance the overall 
credibility  and  legitimacy  of  the  EU  development  policy  vis-à-vis  EU  external  partners  as 
well as European citizens. 

In the case of countries with deteriorating human rights situation, directing aid through civil 
society,  non  state  actors  and  international  organisations  unavoidably  leads  to  an  increase  of 
management costs, which in such specific cases is justified. 

• 

Sub-option 3A – Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law as 
key parameters in the fund allocation mechanisms 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Clear message on the paramount importance of respect for 
human  rights,  rule  of  law  and  promotion  of  good 
governance 

Restrictive  and  possibly  static  approach:  this  might  be 
counterproductive when engaging countries showing progress 
(countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile situation) 

• 

Sub-option 3B – Strengthening the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law in the fund allocation mechanisms 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Fund  allocation  and  continued  cooperation  would  reflect 
the importance of those values  

Does not neglect countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile 
situation 

Improved coherence of EU policy with EU values 

Enhance  overall  credibility  and  legitimacy  of  the  EU 
development policy vis-à-vis EU external partners as well 
as European citizens 

Development  cooperation,  on  its  own,  cannot  bring  the 
necessary change on a scale sufficient to pull countries out of 
poverty 

Development  cooperation  might  be  perceived  as  a  political 
tool: loss of credibility as a neutral actor 

5.2.4.  Ensure  support  for  the  implementation  of  the  Joint  Africa-EU  Strategy  (JAES) 

(Objective 4) 

Establishing a Pan African programme within the DCI will have a positive economic, social 
and environmental impact, both for African beneficiaries and for the EU. It will increase the 
policy  impact  and  the  operational  results  in  the  Joint  Strategy's  successive  Action  Plans,  in 
particular  in  the  relevant  thematic  partnerships  such  as  Trade  and  Regional  Integration, 
Climate  Change  and  Environment,  Energy,  Migration,  Mobility  and  Employment,  but  also 
Democratic  Governance,  MDGs,  and  Science  and  Information  and  Communication 
Technologies. The mechanism is politically feasible, based on the relevant conclusions of the 
2007 and 2010 Africa-EU Summits. It will contribute to greater policy coherence at the EU 
level  and  will  lead  to  better  coordination  and  complementarity  of  action  between  EU 

EN 

34 

   EN 

 
institutions, Member States and IFIs. Finally, it will have a positive impact on management 
and implementation issues, as it will reduce overlap and competition with other instruments. 

• 

Sub-Option 4A: Pan-African programme established in the DCI that would cover all 
activities of the JAES 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Coherence  and  flexibility  of  the  financed  activities,  as 
well as add to their overall efficiency 

Risk of duplication with other instruments such as the EDF or 
the ENI 

New  area  with  possible  impact  on  fund  allocation  for  other 
DCI priorities 

• 

Sub-Option  4B:  Pan-African  programme  established  in  the  DCI  that  would  cover 
only continental activities of the JAES 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Coherence  and  flexibility  of  the  financed  activities,  as 
well as add to their overall efficiency 

Complex follow up to ensure good complementarity between 
EDF, ENI and DCI 

5.2.5.  Reduce  the  fragmentation  of  and  enhance  the  focus  of  thematic  programmes 

(Objective 5) 

Designing  flexible  mechanisms  able  to  respond  quickly  and  substantially  will  be  of  crucial 
importance  for  the  EU  to  have  sufficient  impact  in  its  response  to  these  challenges  and  in 
support of the poorest segment of the population. The sub-options would allow reducing the 
fragmentation  of  thematic  programmes  and  increasing  their  flexibility  in  responding  to 
unforeseen events. Aid cooperation needs to be dynamic: recent events and scientific evidence 
call for maximum response flexibility: the role of civil society continues to grow; while some 
countries evolve out of poverty others continue to struggle with their recurrent fragile state; 
climate  change  is  resulting  in  unpredictable  weather  patterns  as  shown  by  the  increasing 
number of extreme weather events; biodiversity is declining, affecting the natural adaptation 
capacity  of  eco-systems;  the  world  population  continues  to  grow  putting  heavy  pressure  on 
scarce  natural  resources  already  deficient  in  certain  parts  of  the  world,  which  results  in 
humanitarian crises; there are waves of migration resulting from multiple causes; food prices 
continue  to  be  the  source  of  instability;  risks  of  pandemics  are  real,  etc.  Designing  flexible 
mechanisms capable of responding quickly will be of crucial importance in order for the EU 
to  have  sufficient  impact  in  its  response  to  these  challenges  and  in  support  of  the  poorest 
segment of the population. Reducing the number of and adjusting the areas (concentration on 
a reduced number of areas) will lead to further a focus on clear value added interventions. In 
this  context,  placing  higher  emphasis  on  public  knowledge  goods  is  a  pragmatic  way  to 
enhance  cost-effectiveness.  It  will  also  allow  focusing  on  political  priorities,  increasing 
responsiveness,  enhancing  subsidiarity  of  thematic  programmes  to  geographic  programmes, 
building  in  synergies  within  programmes  and  ensuring  more  coherent  support  to  sectoral 
policies at global/transnational level. 

• 

Sub-Option 5A: Increase flexibility and reduce the number of thematic programmes 
to one 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Increased flexibility and possibly reduced fragmentation 

Potential loss of visibility for stakeholders 

EN 

35 

   EN 

 
• 

Sub-Option 5B: Increased flexibility and reduced number of thematic programmes 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Increased flexibility and possibly reduced fragmentation 

Potential loss of visibility for stakeholders 

Two  comprehensive  thematic  programmes  allows  the 
coverage of current and future challenges  

public 

Higher  flexibility  will  strengthen  reduced  fragmentation: 
although  enhanced  flexibility  will  allow  for  swift 
responses  to  new  global  challenges,  the  programme  for 
be 
and 
global 
complementary  to  geographic  programmes  and  target 
mainly  at  addressing  climate  change,  environment, 
energy, human development, food security, and migration 
while  ensuring  coherence  with  the  poverty  reduction 
objective. 

challenges  will 

goods 

5.2.6.  Better  address  the  specific  needs  of  countries  in  crisis,  post  crisis  and  fragile 

situation (Objective 6) 

Increased Flexibility for countries in crisis, post crisis and fragile situation would allow for a 
quicker adaptation of the EU response and an improved EU capacity to ensure an appropriate 
response to the specific needs of countries in crisis, post-crisis and  fragile  situation  through 
increased flexibility as regards programming, re-programming and implementation. 

• 

Sub-Option 6A: Introduction of complete flexibility for countries in crisis, post crisis 
and fragile situation 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Swift reaction to crisis, post crisis and fragile situations 

Accountability and control 

• 

Sub-Option  6B:  Increased  flexibility  in  programming  and  in  implementation 
procedures 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Balanced  approach  between  a  swifter  reaction  to  crisis, 
post  crisis  and  fragile  situations  and  accountability  and 
control 

Procedure slightly longer than with full flexibility 

5.2.7.  Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) 

Measures to increase flexibility of fund allocation such as a reserve of un-programmed funds 
would facilitate swift response to unexpected, unplanned needs, whether of a political nature 
or due to man-made or natural disasters. As a result the beneficiary countries would receive 
assistance in a timely manner tackling the needs at hand. It would also allow for the provision 
of  financial  incentives  taking  into  account  the  performance  and  commitment  of  partner 
countries. 

However,  care  should  be  taken  that  these  responses  to  unexpected  events  are  without 
detriment  to  long  term  issues  such  as  climate  change  and  environment  (and  the  political 
commitments of the Commission and the European Council in this regard). 

EN 

36 

   EN 

 
 
 
• 

Sub-Option 7A: Introducing further flexibility through an un-programmed reserve at 
the country level 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Increased  flexibility  and  capacity  to  address  unforeseen 
needs in a timely manner 

Funds  might  be  "trapped"  in  a  country  while  other  country, 
regions could efficiently use the funds 

Use  of  positive  conditionality  for  well  performing 
countries 

Unprogrammed funds might decrease predictability of funds 

• 

Sub-Option  7B  –  Introducing  further  flexibility  through  an  un-programmed  reserve 
at the level of the instrument 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

Increased  flexibility  and  capacity  to  tackle  unforeseen 
needs in a timely manner 

Management rules to be established to avoid possible loss of 
funding at end of programming cycle 

Use  of  incentive  based-allocations  for  well  performing 
countries 

A larger overall reserve can enable improved handling of 
major crisis and unforeseen needs 

Risk of competition for accessing funds in the reserve  

5.2.8. 

Simplified  programming  and  flexibility  in  implementation,  in  consistency  with  the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8) 

Simplifying the programming process would significantly improve EU added value though an 
improved division of labour and a faster response. Where appropriate, no extensive analytical 
work  would  be  required  for  partner  countries  that  have  their  own  coherent  development 
policy/strategy (national development plan, PRSP  or  similar).  A  simplification  of  the  multi-
annual  programming  cycle  would  facilitate  joint  programming  with  EU  Member  States  and 
possibly  with  like-minded  donors.  Alignment  with  the  partner  country's  programming  cycle 
would  also  become  possible  and  would  be  in  line  with  the  ownership  and  aid  effectiveness 
principles.  For  the  beneficiary  country,  the  advantages  would  be  both  economic  (lower 
economic  costs,  efficient  resources  used  with  donors  cooperation)  and  social  (donors  will 
focus  better  on  a  limited  number  of  sectors).  Simplification  in  programming  would  have  a 
positive balance in terms of human resources and time consumption. Joint programming could 
however  lead  to  complex  situations  for  coordination  with  Member  States  both  at  local  and 
capital level.  

Finally,  the  introduction  of  innovative  instrument  such  as  blending  and  Private  Public 
Partnerships,  which  could  attract  private  sector  and  financial  institutions,  may  increase  the 
critical  mass  of  EU  assistance  to  address  larger-scale  and  innovative  projects.  Such 
instruments, usually applied through regional or thematic instruments, could also benefit those 
DCI  partner  countries  which,  as  a  result  of  the  application  of  the  differentiation  principle, 
would no longer receive bilateral grant-based EU assistance.  

Finally, this sub-option also permits to better take into account the specificities of countries in 
crisis, post crisis and fragile situation. 

• 

Sub-Option  8A:  Introduction  of  simplification  and  flexibility  in  the  programming 
and  implementation  rules  by  introducing  obligatory  Joint  Programming  and 
Alignment 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

EN 

37 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Compulsory  nature  would  ensure  the  principles  of  aid 
effectiveness:  improved  coherence  and  effectiveness  of 
total EU development assistance 

Reciprocity  on  Joint  Programming  necessary  from  Member 
States providing bilateral aid 

Complex  and  lengthy  programming  and  implementation 
process  

Negotiation  process  with  Members  States  for  each  partner 
country required  

Risk on timely implementation of assistance 

• 

Sub-Option 8B: Introduction of simplification and flexibility in the programming and 
implementation rules to enable Joint Programming and Alignment 

Strengths 

Weaknesses 

and 

Gradual 
programming  and  aligning  EU  assistance 
development cycle of the partner countries 

approach  by 

enabling 

simplifying 
the 
to 

Full  Joint  Programming  with  Members  States  will  require 
political agreement and time  

6. 

COMPARING THE OPTIONS  

6.1.  Weighing-up of positive and negative impacts per option  

Objective 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 2 

No Change (= Status 
quo) 

(-) 

No Change (= Status 
quo) 

(-) 

No Change (= Status 
quo) 

(-) 

No Change (= Status 
quo) 

(-) 

No Change (= Status 
quo) 

(-) 

No Change (= Status 
quo) 

(-) 

Sub-Option A 

Sub-Option B 

EU Treaty  

(+) 

Latest trends of development 
policy 

(++) 

Based on statistical data 

(-) 

Based on a combination of 
objective quantitative and 
qualitative data 

(++) 

Key parameter of fund allocation 

Driver of fund allocation 

(--) 

(++) 

Cover all activities 

Cover continental activities 

(+) 

(++) 

One thematic programme 

Two thematic programmes 

(+) 

(++) 

Complete flexibility 

Increased flexibility 

(+) 

(++) 

1  Align  the  objectives 
of  the  DCI  with  the 
new 
in  EU 
trends 
development policy 

2  Establish 
strong 
mechanisms  to  ensure 
significant 
differentiation 
amongst 
countries 

partner 

of 

Strengthen 

the 
good 

3 
inclusion 
governance, 
democracy, 
human 
rights,  and  the  rule  of 
law 

4  Ensure  support  for 
the  implementation  of 
the  Joint  Africa-EU 
Strategy 

5 
the 
Reduce 
fragmentation  of  and 
enhance  the  focus  of 
thematic programmes 

6  Better  address  the 
specific 
of 
crisis, 
countries 
post  crisis  and  fragile 
situation 

needs 
in 

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38 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
7  Flexibility  of  fund 
allocation 

No Change (= Status 
quo) 

Un-programmed reserve at 
country level  

Un-programmed reserve at 
instrument level 

(-) 

(+) 

(+++) 

No Change (= Status 
quo) 

(-) 

Obligatory Joint Programming  

(--) 

Simplification and flexibility 
to enable Joint Programming 

(++) 

Simplified 
8 
and 
programming 
in 
flexibility 
implementation, 
in 
consistency  with  the 
aid 
principles 
effectiveness 

of 

6.2. 

Preferred option 

On  the  basis  of  the  analysis  of  underlying  drivers  of  the  problems,  the  policy  options 
developed  and  their  impacts,  all  sub-options  B  of  Option  2  appear  to  be  the  optimal 
choice:  

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The  DCI  Objectives  need  to  be  aligned  with  current  trend  in  development  policy 
(sub-option 1B). 

On differentiation, using a combination of objective quantitative and qualitative data 
will enable to reduce the scope of countries and improve the means to concentrate on 
EU added value aid assistance in a comprehensive manner (sub-option 2B) 

Good  governance,  democracy,  human  rights  and  the  rule  of  law  can  best  be  taken 
into account with sub-option 3B.  

Sub-option 4B, the Pan-African programme focused on continental activities is the 
response  for  the  implementation  of  the  Joint  Africa-EU  Strategy  given  the 
complexity of procedures and to avoid potential duplication of funds 

Regarding fragmentation of aid assistance, sub-option 5B would enable an increased 
flexibility  within  the  thematic  envelopes  (in  particular  Global  Public  Goods)  for  a 
better  EU  response  to  political  priorities  and  better  complementarity  to  geographic 
programmes  for  an  increased  leverage,  while  leaving  the  possibility  to  particularly 
address civil society organisations and local authorities.  

Situations of fragility, crisis and post-crisis will be better addressed with sub-option 
6B: a set of specific rules and objectives, mainly on flexible (re-)programming while 
keeping an effective level of accountability and control. 

The reserve at the instrument level in sub-option 7B enables the EU to better cope 
with  unforeseen  needs  and  to  promote  mutual  accountability  with  partner  countries 
(incentive based-allocations) and avoids "trapping" funds in a specific country. 

On  simplification  and  flexibility  of  programming  and  implementation,  sub-option 
8B  would  provide  the  elements  to  simplify  procedures  and  provide  the  required 
flexibility  for  allowing  Joint  Programming  and  Alignment,  which  would  enable  a 
better Division of Labour with Member States (and possible like-minded donors) and 
improved  complementarity  with  partner  countries.  Such  enhanced  aid  effectiveness 
may be achieved through the use of innovative instruments. 

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7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

7.1. 

Core indicators of progress towards objectives 

The DCI is an enabling Regulation establishing  the essential elements and the  basis for  EU 
intervention.  The  exact  actions  are  defined  through  multiannual  programming  and  annual 
action  programmes  detailing  the  activities  to  be  carried  out  by  the  EU,  including  the 
objectives pursued by the actions in question and the expected results. Specific indicators are 
fixed at that moment, having in mind the particularities of the action in question. 

Internationally agreed targets and indicators on the MDGs24 and climate change are already 
known.  Clear  benchmarks,  monitoring  and  reporting  rules  for  all  relevant  EU  policy 
instruments  need  to  be  established.  The  disaggregation  of  indicators  will  be  important  in 
monitoring the achievement of equitable outcomes for the most vulnerable groups in society 
for social inclusion. 

For the objective of  reducing and, in the long term, eradicating poverty  in partner countries 
and  regions,  the  MDG  indicators  for  Goal  1  may  be  used,  along  with  other  indicators 
Internationally agreed by all donors: 

• 

• 

Target 1a: Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day: 
(i.e. proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per day; poverty gap ratio and share of 
poorest quintile in national consumption). 

Target  1c:  Reduce  by  half  the  proportion  of  people  who  suffer  from  hunger  (i.e. 
prevalence  of  underweight  children  under-five  years  of  age  and  proportion  of 
population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption). 

The  EU  has  committed  itself  to  mainstreaming  action  on  climate25  and  biodiversity  and  for 
this  to  be  meaningful  it  needs  to  be  accompanied  by  an  obligation  to  identify  relevant 
programmes so that the EU is able to set out clearly how much of its spending relates to these 
global challenges. Clear benchmarks, monitoring and reporting rules need to be established. 
Expenditure  that  promotes  climate  action  or  energy  efficiency  as  well  as  the  protection  and 
sustainable  management  of  biodiversity  and  ecosystems,  will  be  tracked  based  on  the 
established OECD methodology (‘Rio markers’). 

7.2. 

Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements 

The European Commission's Monitoring and Evaluation systems are increasingly focused on 
results. They involve internal staff as well as external expertise.  

Task Managers in Delegations and Headquarters continuously monitor the implementation of 
projects  and  programmes  in  various  ways,  including  wherever  possible  through  field  visits. 

24 
25 

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm  
Regarding instruments under the EU budget, in order to reach the Europe 2020 objectives and to help 
other parts of the world to step up their efforts to combat climate change, the Commission stated in the 
June 2011 Communication on “A Budget for Europe 2020” that it intends to increase the proportion of 
climate  related  expenditure  across  the  EU  budget  to  at  least  20%,  with  contribution  from  different 
policies, subject to impact assessment evidence. 

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Monitoring  provides  valuable  information  on  progress;  it  helps  managers  to  identify  actual 
and potential bottlenecks, and to take corrective action. 

External, independent experts are contracted to assess the performance of EU external actions 
through  three  different  systems.  These  assessments  contribute  to  accountability,  and  to  the 
improvement of ongoing interventions; they also draw lessons from past experience to inform 
future  policies  and  actions.  The  tools  all  use  the  internationally-recognised  OECD-DAC 
evaluation criteria including (potential) impact. 

Firstly,  at  the  project  level,  the  Headquarters-managed  Results  Oriented  Monitoring  (ROM) 
system provides a brief, focused snapshot of the quality of a sample of interventions. Using a 
highly  structured,  standardised  methodology,  independent  ROM  experts  attribute  grades 
which  highlight  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  project  and  give  recommendations  on 
how to improve effectiveness. 

Project-level evaluations, which are managed by the EU Delegation in charge of the project, 
deliver  a  more  detailed,  in  depth  analysis  and  help  project  managers  to  improve  ongoing 
interventions  and  prepare  future  ones.  External,  independent  experts  with  thematic  and 
geographic expertise are hired to conduct the analysis and gather feedback and evidence from 
all stakeholders, not least the final beneficiaries. 

The  Commission  also  conducts  strategic  evaluations  of  its  policies,  from  programming  and 
strategy to the implementation of interventions in a specific sector (such as health, education 
etc),  in  a  country  or  region,  or  of  a  specific  instrument.  These  evaluations  are  an  important 
input  to  the  formulation  of  policies  and  the  design  of  instruments  and  projects.  These 
evaluations are all published on the Commission's website and a summary of the findings is 
included in the Annual Report to the Council and the European Parliament. 

A  study  on  legal  instruments  and  lessons  learnt  from  the  evaluations  managed  by  the  joint 
evaluation  unit  of  the  external  relations  services  was  undertaken.  The  findings  of  this  study 
provided  some  valuable  insight  into  the  functioning  of  the  current  DCI  and  have  been 
reflected in the preparation of its successor. It is possible to do a similar exercise sufficiently 
in time for the preparation of the MFF post-2020.  

The current system of monitoring and evaluation covering various levels can generate ample 
information. However, it should be kept in mind that the instrument covers a wide variety of 
countries  and  situations.  Indicators  which  are  regularly  used  to  measure  the  efficiency  and 
effectiveness  of  aid  delivery  and  financial  management  could  support  the  measuring  of  the 
objectives related to the review of the instrument itself. 

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Detailed analysis of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 

In  the  year  2000  the  UN  General  Assembly  agreed  on  eight  specific  development  goals  to  be 
achieved by 2015. These MDG are: 

Annex I 

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
2. Achieve universal primary education 
3. Promote gender equality and empower women 
4. Reduce child mortality 
5. Improve maternal health 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
7. Ensure environmental sustainability 
8. Develop a global partnership for development 

The UN MDG progress report of 7 July 2011 acknowledges significant progress made towards 
some  MDGs,  namely  fighting  poverty  and  hunger,  ensuring  universal  education,  child  and 
maternal health as well as combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases due to the continued 
economic  growth  of  some  developing  countries,  targeted  interventions  in  critical  areas  and 
increased funding from many sources. The report alerts however that in several areas there is still 
a long way to go, and the achievement of the MDGs is at risk. This concerns in particular access 
to  quality  education,  educating  and  empowering  women  and  girls,  promoting  sustainable 
development and protecting the most vulnerable groups.  

Despite  significant  setbacks  after  the  2008-9  economic  downturn  and  food  and  energy  crisis, 
developing countries are on track to reach and even exceed the poverty reduction target of 23% as 
the global poverty rate is expected to fall to 15% by 2015. Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, 
South  Africa  and  Latin  America  covered  by  the  DCI  together  still  contain  around  70%26  of  all 
poor people worldwide. Despite the reduction in poverty, the number and proportion of hungry 
people stagnated at 16% worldwide, with South Asia scoring the highest rate of undernourished 
children under 5 (43%), almost double in the rate Sub-Saharan Africa. Due to rising food prices 
and economic crisis, it will be difficult to meet the hunger reduction target in many regions of the 
world. 

In general, the UN MDG progress report acknowledges that “progress tends to bypass those who 
are  lowest  on  the  economic  ladder  or  are  otherwise  disadvantaged  because  of  sex,  disability  or 
ethnicity”.  In  most  of  the  developing  countries,  economic  growth  has  not  benefited  all  parts  of 
society  and  was  indeed  achieved  at  the  cost  of  rising  social  disparities.  Low  labour  and 
production  costs  remain  the  key  factor  in  developing  countries'  investment  policies.  The 
inequality GINI index27 has not dramatically changed for most DCI countries in the period 2006-
2009, presenting slight improvement in 16 countries and deterioration in 11 countries. 

There are huge disparities between the urban and rural areas, the latter disadvantaged as regards 
access  to  public  services  such  as  health  and  education,  sanitation  and  access  to  safe  drinking 
water.  On  the  other  hand,  despite  a  decrease  of  the  proportion  of  the  urban  population  in 
developing countries living in slums to 32,7% in 2010, due to a global increase in the number of 

26 

27 

The  Millennium  Development  Goals  Report  2010,  UN;  Achieving  the  Millennium  Development  Goals  in  an  Era  of 
Global Uncertainty: Asia Pacific Regional Report, 2009/2010, ESCAP. 
World Data Bank. 

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urban dwellers the global number of urban residents living in slum conditions continues to grow 
(828  m  in  2010  as  compared  to  767  m  in  2000  and  657  m  in  1990).  Improving  their  living 
conditions remains a tremendous challenge and will require redoubled efforts. 

While MDGs  are  a useful instrument to measure  progress  in  development,  they  do  not  provide 
the full picture and set objectives only for a part of the most affected populations. Notably they 
do not measure progress on key aspects of development such as good governance and respect for 
human rights, the rule of law and institutional development. While measuring progress in access 
to education or health, they do not measure progress in quality. Relying only on statistical data 
does  not  give  the  complete  picture  of  the  development  problems  of  a  country:  looking  at  the 
baseline values, the dynamics of change and the underlying reasons for slow or lack of progress 
has proved to be of key importance for the success of EU development cooperation. 

Moreover,  insufficient  attention  to  strengthening  the  capacity  to  do  and  use  research  has  been 
shown  to  be  associated  with  low  development  performance  in  meeting  basic  needs  in  health, 
food, and the protection of the environment and the public goods and services it provides and on 
which poor people depend disproportionately. 

The report of the 7 July 2011 is based on better statistical information than in the past but there is 
still  a  long  way  to  go  for  many  countries  to  develop  a  stable  statistical  system  capable  of 
providing reliable statistical information for MDG measurement purposes. 

- MDG1 – End poverty and hunger 

In 2005, Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest rate of poor people (51%), followed by South Asia 
(39%),  South-East  Asia  and  Central  Asia  (19%)  and  East  Asia  (16%).  Asia,  Central  Asia,  the 
Middle  East,  South  Africa  and  Latin  America  together  still  regroup  around  70%  of  all  poor 
people  worldwide.  The  prevalence  of  vulnerable  employment  (usually  without  formal  working 
arrangements,  without  adequate  social  protection  and  bad  working  conditions)  is  linked  to  the 
poverty situation. 

In  2009,  nearly  25%  of  children  in  the  developing  world  were  underweight,  with  the  poorest 
children  most  affected.  The  proportion  of  undernourished  children  under  5  is  highest  in  South 
Asia  (43%),  almost  double  the  rate  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (22%),  which  is  followed  by  South-
East Asia (18%). Such a high rate of malnourished children is due to a combination of factors: 
shortage of quality food, poor feeding practices and inadequate sanitation. Trends in South East 
Asia, East Asia and Latin America indicate they are likely to meet the hunger reduction target, 
the former due to the performance of China, Indonesia and the Philippines. 

- MDG2 - Universal Education 

Many  of  the  poorest  countries  have  made  significant  progress  in  education,  but  progress  has 
slowed  since  2004,  dimming  the  prospect  of  reaching  that  MDG.  The  quality  of  education  in 
developing  countries  is  often  poor,  which  is  not  reflected  in  the  MDGs  but  what  undermines 
people's chances for employment and social advancement. According to a UN report, nearly 90% 
of all illiterate people are concentrated in 2 regions – South Asia (65 m) and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(47 m). 

- MDG3 - Gender equality 

While girls are gaining ground as regards access to education, the progress is unequal with South 
Asia,  West  Asia  and  Sub-Saharan  Africa  lagging  behind.  The  progress  in  girls'  access  to 

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education does not however translate into improvement in women's access to full and productive 
employment. 

In  at  least  half  of  all  regions,  following  significant  job  losses  in  2008-9,  the  growth  of 
employment in 2010 was lower for women than for men.  

- MDG4 – Child health 

Child mortality has been diminished due to immunisation, improved access to health services and 
the level of education of women. Nevertheless the level of mortality of children under five is still 
unacceptably  high,  the  highest  in  South  Asia  (69  per  1000)  after  Sub-Saharan  Africa  although 
both regions have made the greatest progress. Most affected are poor rural areas. In number of 
DCI  countries  with  the  highest  children  mortality  rates  (exceeding  40  per  1000  live  births), 
namely  Bangladesh,  Laos  and  Nepal,  these  rates  have  been  reduced  by  more  than  half. 
Afghanistan remains the only country outside Sub-Saharan Africa, with more than 100 deaths per 
1000 births. UN estimates the MDG targets can still be achieved, provided that substantial and 
accelerated action is taken to eliminate the leading killers of children. 

- MDG5 - Maternal health 

Major progress has been made in North Africa and Asia, but South Asia still remains the region 
with the highest number of maternal deaths (280) after Sub-Saharan Africa (640), which is linked 
with the lowest ration of deliveries attended by skilled health personnel, access to health services 
during  pregnancy,  adolescent  fertility  and  access  to  family  planning  aid,  and  generally  weak 
public health services.  

- MDG6 - Combat HIV/AIDs, malaria and other diseases 

Good progress has been made on MDG6. Targeted interventions allowed for a 20% cut in deaths 
from malaria since 2000, the largest in Africa. As far as HIV/AIDS is concerned, thanks to the 
expansion of major programmes which increased the number of people receiving anti-retroviral 
therapy,  a  19%  decline  in  deaths  was  recorded  from  2004  to  2009  and  the  number  of  new 
infections in 2009 was 21% lower than in the peak year of 1997. Finally, the number of deaths 
due to tuberculosis was brought down by one third during the 1990-2009 period. 

- MDG 7 - Environmental sustainability 

The progress towards environmental sustainability is mixed. Despite the world economic crisis, 
global  greenhouse  gas  emissions  continue  to  grow,  with  the  most  rapid  growth  taking  place  in 
East  Asia  and  South  Asia  even  though  the  industrialised  countries  continue  to  be  the  biggest 
greenhouse  gases  producers  per  capita.  Furthermore,  the  depletion  of  global  marine  resources 
continues. Climate change, while affecting all regions, is a particular threat for the Arctic, small 
islands and big deltas in Asia and all of Africa, since the populations there have the least capacity 
to adapt. The rate of deforestation is slowing down, though it remains alarmingly high. Net gains 
in  forest  cover  have  been  recorded  in  Asia,  due  to  China,  while  the  deforestation  of  South 
America  and  Africa  continues.  Between  12%  and  55%  of  selected  vertebrate,  invertebrate  and 
plant groups are threatened with extinction. Some 20% of tropical coral reefs have already been 
lost and an additional 50% are at risk. Only 0.7% of the oceans are protected and the depletion of 
global marine resources continues. The 2011 UN MDG report states there is a need to take more 
decisive steps to protect the ecosystems which support economic growth, sustain life on earth and 
are  of  particular  importance  to  the  livelihood  of  the  poor.  The  UN  Conference  on  Sustainable 
Development  in  2012,  “Rio  +  20”  will  provide  a  good  opportunity  to  tackle  these  challenges. 

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Inter alia it will seek to reach agreement on promoting green growth  and encouraging resource 
efficiency which are essential means of avoiding future food and energy shocks.  

- MDG 8 – Global partnership for development 

As far as MDG8 is concerned, Information and Communication Technology (ICTs) penetration 
had  enjoyed  a  breathtaking  growth  in  developing  countries  since  the  adoption  of  the  MDGs  in 
2000; there were at that time 740 million mobile subscribers and nearly 400 million internet users 
worldwide; we are now at 5 billion mobile users and around 2 billion internet users worldwide, 
and developing countries had by far the highest penetration growth rates.  

A  first  wave  of  policy  reforms  triggering  private  investments  are  at  the  origin  of  such  growth, 
making  those  technologies  more  accessible  and  affordable.  In  just  10  years,  the  situation  has 
dramatically  changed,  and  the  growing  access  to  the  internet  and  the  near  ubiquity  of  mobile 
phones  have  opened  radically  new  ways  to  anticipate,  support  and  leapfrog  development 
objectives. In this context, further support is needed to expand access to ICTs and as well as to 
expand the availability of ICT infrastructures and services, as these are an essential prerequisite 
in these countries for the provision of services such as health, education or banking, to name just 
a few sectors. 

For more detailed information on these trends, see the 2011 Development Goals Report published 
by the UN, on the following website: 

http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Data/2011%20Stat%20Annex.pdf 

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1. Financial breakdown of the DCI 

Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI) 

Of which: 

Geographic programmes: 

Latin America 

Asia 

Central Asia 

Middle East 

South Africa 
Thematic programmes28: 

Investing in people 

Environment and sustainable management of natural resources, 
including energy 

Non-State actors and local authorities in development 

Food security 

Migration and asylum 

ACP Sugar Protocol countries: 

2. Countries eligible under the DCI geographic programmes 

Annex II 

16.9 

10.057 

2.690 

5.187 

0.719 

0.481 

0.980 

5.596 

1.060 

0.804 

1.639 

1.709 

0.384 

1.244 

Latin America 
1. Argentina 
2. Bolivia 
3. Brazil 
4. Chile 
5. Colombia 
6. Costa Rica 
7. Cuba 
8. Ecuador 
9. El Salvador 
10. Guatemala 
11. Honduras 
12. Mexico 
13. Nicaragua 
14. Panama 
15. Paraguay 
16. Peru 
17. Uruguay 

28 

An indicative amount of € 465 million is earmarked to  finance activities benefiting ENPI countries (art. 38 
of DCI). 

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18. Venezuela 

Asia 
19. Afghanistan 
20. Bangladesh 
21. Bhutan 
22. Cambodia 
23. China 
24. India 
25. Indonesia 
26. Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
27. Laos 
28. Malaysia 
29. Maldives 
30. Mongolia 
31. Myanmar/Burma 
32. Nepal 
33. Pakistan 
34. Philippines 
35. Sri Lanka 
36. Thailand 
37. Viet Nam 

Central Asia 
38. Kazakhstan 
39. Kyrgyz Republic 
40. Tajikistan 
41. Turkmenistan 
42. Uzbekistan 

Middle East 
43. Iran 
44. Iraq 
45. Oman 
46. Saudi Arabia 
47. Yemen 

South Africa 
48. South Africa 

2. OECD-DAC List of Official Development Recipients 

(Effective for reporting on 2009 and 2010 flows) 

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/40/43540882.pdf 

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Review of lessons learnt 

Annex III 

A) The success of the DCI instrument: 

The geographical programmes 

Geographical  programmes  supported  the  pursuit  of  national  development  objectives  and  sector 
strategies.  The  progress  towards  the  MDGs  in  several  sectors  in  developing  countries  was 
achieved  with  EU  support  (for  example,  in  Asia,  child  and  maternal  mortality  in  Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh  and  Philippines,  access  to  education  in  Pakistan,  India,  Nepal,  Bangladesh, 
Burma/Myanmar  and  Indonesia,  improved  food  security  in  Bangladesh,  Nepal,  Pakistan, 
Afghanistan,  Burma/Myanmar).  In  several  countries  EU  assistance  helped  to  lay  solid 
foundations for key sector policies, namely health in Tajikistan, Vietnam and Philippines. 

Under  the  DCI,  there  was  an  incentive  to  take  a  strategic  approach  in  implementation.  This  is 
because it is expected that an agreement will be reached with the beneficiary government on the 
focal  areas  of  cooperation  as  defined  in  the  Strategy  Paper  and  the  Multiannual  Indicative 
Programme. 

Another  advantage  is  that  the  DCI  regulation  puts  the  beneficiary  countries  in  the  driving  seat, 
and requires EU/donors to support the beneficiary's development strategy, policies and reforms. 
This has led to a gradual change in the way programming documents and actions are prepared. In 
the  past,  the  choice  of  sectors  and  the  preparation  of  actions  had  often  been  done  by  the 
Commission. 

The DCI combined with new implementation modalities, such as Budget Support and sector-wide 
approaches, have allowed for a higher level of cooperation with partner countries: there is a clear 
link  between  the  level  of  policy  dialogue  with  beneficiary  countries  and  the  modality  of 
delivering assistance. In countries where Sector Budget Support is provided, the policy dialogue 
has been upgraded and this has allowed the Commission to work more strategically. 

The DCI regulation  allows the Commission to accept  funds  from  EU  Member  States  and  other 
donors for management, and to entrust EU Member States or other donors with implementation 
of EU assistance. This allows the Commission to receive funds, especially from smaller donors 
that do not have the capacity to manage themselves and this can enhance the profile of the EU as 
a  donor.  This  also  allows  the  Commission  to  be  less  dependant  on  International  Organisations 
and to draw more on the experience of EU Member States. 

The thematic programmes 

The  thematic  programmes  provided  the  Commission  with  additional  flexibility  in  dealing  with 
specific problems and were a useful means to complement the geographic programmes.  

(1) 

Investing in people 

The objective of this programme is to assist EU partner countries where they most need support 
in  achieving  the  MDGs  in  the  following  human  and  social  development  fields:  (i)  health;  (ii) 
education; (iii) gender equality and women empowerment; (iv) social inclusion, employment and 
decent  work;  (v)  children  and  youth;  (vi)  cultural  diversity.  The  array  of  delivery  methods  and 
potential activities ensure that the targeted groups are reached by the variety of objectives, either 

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through competitive global/regional calls for proposals or by co-funding international initiatives. 

This programme has allowed responses to emerging priorities in line with the 2020 Strategy, e.g. 
social inclusion of disabled persons. The evaluations of the global initiatives co-funded under the 
programme,  such  as  the  Global  Fund  to  Fight  AIDS,  Tuberculosis  and  Malaria,  as  well  as  the 
Education for All Fast Track Initiative, have returned positive results in terms of the number of 
persons treated, tested and counselled, the increasing number of children enrolled in schools, and 
gender parity. The programme mainly channels its support through International Organisations in 
global partnerships and through NSA, whose role in policy dialogue, implementation monitoring, 
and governance improvements in those specific areas is crucial. Moreover, they reach vulnerable 
populations in varied political and development aid contexts. The programme even 'fills the gap' 
when no bilateral programming is available, as was the case for Cuba in 2009 and 2010. 

(2) 

ENRTP 

This  programme  contributes  to  achieving  the  MDGs  and  favours  innovative  approaches  and 
support to policy-oriented initiatives at regional and global level, on environmental and climate 
change  aspect  of  development,  including  through  close  cooperation  with  the  UN  system.  This 
allows the EU to support key EU and international policy initiatives in the area of environment 
and  development  (including  climate  change).  The  programme  encompasses  complex  climate 
change-environment-energy  linkages  and  offers  the  Commission  an  opportunity  to  make  a 
difference at the international level in cooperation with developing countries. It has been flexible 
in  promoting  new  initiatives  such  as  the  Global  Climate  change  Alliance  (GCCA),  the  Global 
Energy  Efficiency  and  Renewable  Energy  Fund  (GEEREF)  and  Forest  Law  Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT). EU ability to involve partner countries in ambitious efforts to 
tackle  global  challenges  such  as  climate  change,  biodiversity  loss  and  ecosystem  degradation 
underlines the interdependencies between the EU and its key partners. The programme has also 
allowed the EU to promote its own environmental and climate change policies externally. This is 
particularly important in the context of Europe 2020, since without real efforts by key strategic 
partners, the EU's own strategies for economic recovery and innovation-led green and inclusive 
growth will be less effective. In addition, to achieve the objectives, increased support forthereof, 
on research and innovation capacity building is required. 

The EU has already irreversibly pegged its economic future to low carbon growth by unilaterally 
adopting  the  most  ambitious  emissions  reduction target in the world.  Accordingly, the EU2020 
Strategy  for  smart,  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth  includes  climate  change  and  renewable 
energy  targets  among  its  five  headline  objectives.  The  EU  has  confidence  in  the  low  carbon 
growth  model  and  this  must  be  projected  externally  to  ensure  meaningful  advancement 
internationally. 

(3) 

Non state actors and local authorities 

This programme is one of the few "actor-oriented" thematic programmes, giving a wide range of 
civil society actors and local authorities the exclusive opportunity (right of initiative) to propose 
actions  and  promoting  an  inclusive  and  empowered  local  society.  The  actions  implemented  do 
not necessarily have the backing of the host country government. 

The  Mid-Term  Review  recognises  that  "a  nucleus  of  high  quality  projects  have  been  funded 
under  all  three  programme  objectives  to  date".  The  Court  of  Auditors  report  on  NSA  and 
development  recognises  that  "projects  implemented  by  NSAs  are  relevant  and  are  likely  to 
produce the intended results".  

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With regard to "Development Education and Awareness Raising in Europe" (the second objective 
of this programme), it is worth underlining that this programme is unique insofar as it is the only 
one  in  Europe  that  supports  actions  aimed  at  convincing  Europeans  about  the  purpose  of  our 
development efforts.  

With regard to local authorities, their particular role in the context of development is recognised 
in the Communication from the Commission to the Council regarding local authorities. 

(4) 

Food security 

The objective of the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) is to improve food security for 
the poorest and vulnerable, and more broadly, to contribute to achieving MDG1 (on poverty and 
hunger).  Over  time,  the  FSTP  and  agricultural  research  for  development  has  been  performing 
better, partners are stronger, governance and networks are being strengthened, and standards and 
tools  are  being  shared  by  donors,  implementing  partners  and  recipient  countries.  The  enhanced 
involvement  of  local  civil  society  organisations  has  helped  to  better  respond  to  local  needs  in 
Linking  Relief  Rehabilitation  and  Development  (LRRD)  contexts.  The  programme  intervenes 
successfully  in  crisis  and  post-crisis  situations,  allowing  for  flexibility  in  linking  humanitarian 
and development operations. The Mid-Term review of the FSTP recognised the relevance of the 
interventions  financed  by  the  FSTP  and  recommended  maintaining  the  orientations,  while 
streamlining it in fewer areas. 

(5) 

Migration 

The  migration  and  asylum  programme's  main  objective  is  to  support  third  countries  in  their 
efforts  to  ensure  better  management  of  migratory  flows.  The  programme  covers  the  following 
five  major  fields  of  action:  (a)  fostering  the  links  between  migration  and  development,  (b) 
promoting well-managed labour migration, (c) preventing and curbing irregular immigration and 
facilitating the readmission of illegal immigrants, (d) protecting migrants against exploitation and 
exclusion, (e) promoting asylum and international protection. 

An  external  evaluation  of  the  programme  was  conducted  between  October  2009  and  February 
2010. Its assessment was positive and it highlighted the high quality of the technical assistance 
and capacity building provided through the projects. 

This thematic programme enjoys significant flexibility and scope of action. Above all, it allows 
for an increased integration of migration and asylum issues in development policies, matching the 
EU's  political  priorities  with  third  countries'  needs.  The  programme  also  stimulates  the 
coordination between actions in third countries funded through external instruments and actions 
funded under Member States' national programmes. 

B) Areas for improvement 

The geographical programmes 

The  current  DCI  objective  is  to  focus  on  poverty  eradication  (MDGs)  in  the  context  of 
sustainable development, while also promoting human rights, democracy, good governance and 
the specific objectives of the region. This objective should be  reformulated to highlight  a more 
comprehensive view of poverty, i.e. supporting reform and modernization efforts in developing 
countries  which  contribute  to  building  inclusive  and  cohesive  societies  and  reducing  social 
exclusion  and  poverty  and  protecting  the  natural  resource  base  on  which  economic  growth 
depends while ensuring that growth respects the environmental limits of the planet. 

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The DCI covers a wide range of countries falling under the OECD DAC definition of developing 
countries,  from  the  LDCs  to  upper  middle  income  countries.  Given  the  very  different 
development needs, performance and interests of each type of country, including in fragile states, 
the  DCI  does  not  allow  sufficient  differentiation  between  the  partners.  The  rise  of  several 
developing  partners,  the  economic  and  social  disparities  amongst  the  partner  countries  and  the 
development  of  new  objectives  beyond  pure  development  assistance  call  for  an  enhanced 
flexibility in terms of objectives and cooperation modalities within the DCI. 

Under the present DCI there is no specific chapter, nor measures on fragile states or countries in 
crisis, although there is a formal link with the Instrument for Stability (IfS). However, this link 
has  created  unjustified  expectations  that  any  action  supported  under  the  IfS  will  continue,  by 
default,  to  be  supported  under  the  DCI.  Addressing  transition  challenges  requires  a  set  of 
responses  at  country  level,  based  on  specific  needs  and  related  to  a  common  strategy  (holistic 
approach).  The  EU  needs  to  foster  coordination  and  complementarity  between  the  different 
instruments  and  between  donors.  This  effort  should  be  based  on  a  joint  framework  with  a 
common analysis of the challenges to be addressed. It should aim to improve the links between 
the  various  levels  of  intervention,  the  different  policies  involved  to  be  defined  and  the 
programming priorities. 

The intention to concentrate DCI cooperation strategically has only partially worked. In general, 
our development cooperation remains fragmented and over-ambitious. 

The thematic programmes 

For the thematic instruments in general, the following improvements should be considered: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

improving  coherence  between  actions  supported  by  geographical  and  thematic 
programmes; 

reducing  the  number  of  small  actions  resulting  in  ad  hoc  interventions  and  in  a 
disproportionate implementation workload; 

some  thematic  programmes  should  be  treated  within  the  country  bilateral  envelope  of 
EU assistance. 

more  support  should  be  granted  in  synergy  with  the  other  EU  policies  and  internal 
instruments  (e.g.  support  for  research  and  innovation  capacity  building  to  facilitate 
uptake  of  the  EU  research  and  innovation  framework  programme  Horizon  2020).  The 
same  is  valid  for  other  policies  and  their  funding  instruments  to  ensure  coherence  and 
complementarity. 

The issues for improvement more specific for each thematic instrument are: 

1. Investing in people:  

The area covered by the thematic programme "Investing in people" represents a high number of 
themes (and budget lines). The difficulty in programming and managing such a large number of 
possible actions is exacerbated by the implementation modalities chosen. A high number of calls 
for proposals with relatively small allocations may create frustration among applicants. 

The resulting perception that whatever cannot be financed elsewhere can be financed under the 
"Investing  in  people"  programme,  favouring  the  birth  of  pilot  budget  lines,  is  adding  technical 

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51 

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and  operational  difficulties  to  the  management  of  the  human  and  social  development  area. 
Investment in the capacity to engage in research and innovation and use it, is particularly relevant 
here. 

2. ENRTP: 

Because  of  the  wide  coverage  (biodiversity,  climate  change,  desertification,  forests,  hazardous 
substances,  sustainable  consumption  and  production,  energy,  environmental  governance  etc.)  it 
has not always been possible to have clear priorities.  

EU visibility is relatively weak as no promotion budget is foreseen.  

Actions under the programme are identified through a wide range of channels (calls for proposals 
EU  initiatives,  direct  discussions  with  international  organisations  and  partner  countries). 
Implementation modalities are diverse and cover the whole range of possibilities (grant contracts, 
contribution agreements, financing agreements, contributions to trust and equity funds, delegated 
cooperation),  offering  added  value  to  supporting  policy-oriented  initiatives  in  areas  which  are 
politically exposed and changing rapidly (FLEGT, climate change, in particular). To manage this 
diversity is a challenge.  

In turn, achieving these objectives requires support for research and innovation capacity building. 

3. Non state actors and local authorities: 

The  Court  of  Auditors76  has  noted  a  potentially  disruptive  side  effect  of  the  call  for  proposals 
procedure, contradicting such objectives as (i) “engaging civil society organisations of the South” 
and  (ii)  “capacity  building”.  Indeed,  project  proposals  submitted  by  "stronger"  organisations 
stand  a  much  higher  chance  of  being  selected,  while  as  a  result,  "weaker"  organisations  are 
increasingly left without being able to prove their capabilities. 

4. Food security: 

The programme is fragmented into many sub-components and projects. The Mid-Term review of 
the FSTP recognised the relevance of the interventions financed by the FSTP and recommended 
maintaining the orientations, while streamlining it in fewer areas. 

The following strategic challenges are being addressed: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

the  articulation  with  food  security  support  funded  by  geographic  instruments  must  be 
ensured  while  some  flexibility  needs  to  be  maintained  for  financing  as  a  follow  up  to 
crisis  situations  (linking  relief  to  rehabilitation  and  development)  and  in  cases  where 
geographical instruments can not operate; 

the  ability  of  the  instrument  to  react  to  crisis  situations  is  limited  by  the  scope  of  the 
programme; 

long  term  engagement  and  predictability  must  be  ensured  in  order  to  support  the 
provision  of  international  public  goods,  in  particular  pro-poor  demand  driven  research 
and innovation; 

the  involvement  of  civil  society  (including  farmers'  organisations)  in  food  security 
governance; 

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– 

– 

coordination, linkages with development (notably tools such as rural micro-finance), and 
regional  approaches  could  be  improved.  Nutritional  issues  have  been  overlooked  and 
private  sector  development  has  been  neglected.  Similarly,  local  authorities,  a  new 
partner for food security, are not supported sufficiently; 

a  "Joint  Humanitarian-Development  Framework"  was  designed  in  the  context  of  the 
"FSTP" decision C/2010/9263. It will now be tested in about 12 countries. The aim is to 
improve  coordination  with  humanitarian  and  geographical  instruments,  together  with 
other donor assistance. The joint LRRD framework will remain the base for action, and 
short  and  medium  term  activities  will  be  identified  to  guarantee  food  security  for  the 
poorest and most vulnerable.  

5. Migration 

Because of its flexibility, the programme finances innovative and pilot actions that can serve as 
examples  for  further  and  more  elaborate  initiatives.  Nevertheless,  the  thematic  programme 
should:  (a)  better  involve  governments  from  third  countries  as  active  stakeholders;  (b)  provide 
more  support  to  local  civil  society  organisations  and  local  authorities,  and  (c)  ensure  that  the 
highest  political  level  both  in  Europe  and  third  country  governments  is  fully  informed  of  the 
projects  being  implemented,  so  as  to  increase  the  Programme's  visibility  and  facilitate  political 
dialogue. 

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Bibliography 

Annex IV 

Reports covering the geographic/thematic areas of the DCI, supporting evidence to the 
Impact Assessment 

TITLE 

DATE OF 
PUBLICATION 

1 

Evaluations 

1.1  Country/Region Evaluations 

Evaluation  of  the  European  Commission's  co-operation  and  partnership  with  the 
People's Republic of China – Country level evaluation 

Evaluación de la cooperación regional de la CE en América Central 

Evaluation de la coopération de la Commission européenne avec la Bolivie 

Evaluation of the European Commission's support to the Republic of India 

Evaluation  of  the  Commission's  support  to  Southern  African  Development 
Community – SADC – Regional level evaluation 

April 2007 

Julio de 2007 

Juillet 2007 

August 2007 

October 2007 

Evaluation  of  the  Commission's  support  to  the  Region  of  Eastern  and  Southern 
Africa and the Indian Ocean – Regional level evaluation 

December 2008 

Evaluation of EC co-operation with the LAO PDR 

Evaluation of EC co-operation with ASEAN 

Evaluation of the European Commission's co-operation with Malaysia 

Evaluation of the European Commission's Cooperation with Vietnam 

Evaluation of the European Commission's co-operation with Thailand 

June 2009 

June 2009 

July 2009 

October 2009 

October 2009 

Evaluation of European Commission's Cooperation with Nicaragua 1998-2008 

November 2009 

Evaluation  of  European  Commission's  co-operation  with  El  Salvador  –  Country 
level evaluation 

March 2010 

Evaluation of the European Commission’s Co-operation with Maldives 

November 2010 

1.2 

Instruments / Sector / Thematic Evaluations 

Thematic evaluation of the EC support to good governance 

Thematic evaluation of the water and sanitation sector 

June 2006 

July 2006 

Joint evaluation of co-ordination of trade capacity building in partner countries 

November 2006 

Evaluation of the Commission Support for Statistics in Third Countries 

Evaluation thématique - Développement rural et agricole 

Evaluation of EC support to partner countries in the area of energy 

15/02/2007 

July 2007 

April 2008 

General Evaluation of Actions to Raise Public Awareness of Development Issues 
in Europe / Development Education EC 

December 2008 

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Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to Conflict Prevention 
and  Peace  Building  –  Preliminary  study:  scoping  and  mapping.  Final  Report  for 
the Preliminary Study 

July 2009 

The  Five-Year  Evaluation  of  the  Global  Fund  to  Fight  AIDS,  Tuberculosis,  and 
Malaria Synthesis of Study Areas 1, 2 and 3. 

March 2009 

Evaluation  of  the  AENEAS  Programme  –  Financial  and  technical  assistance  to 
third countries in the area of migration and asylum 2004-2006 

December 2009 

Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and 
Peace Building - Concept Study – Final Report for the Concept Study 

September 2010 

Qualitative Assessment of EC funded Drugs Related Projects 

Thematic  global  evaluation  of  EC  support  to  the  Education  sector  in  partner 
countries 

October 2010 

December 2010 

Lessons learned from evaluating EC interventions in the road sector (note ARES) 

15/12/2010 

Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learned from the Evaluations Managed 
by the Joint Evaluation Unit (draft desk report, vol. 1 & 2) 

January 2011 

1.3  Aid modalities Evaluations 

Evaluation  of  general  budget  support:  synthesis  report  –  A  Joint  Evaluation  of 
General Budget Support 1994-2004 

May 2006 

Evaluating  co-ordination,  complementarity  and  coherence  in  EU  development 
policy: a synthesis 

November 2007 

Evaluation  of  Commission’s  external  cooperation  with  partner  countries  through 
the organisations of the UN family 

May 2008 

Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery through Development banks and EIB 

November 2008 

Evaluation of EC aid delivery through civil society organisations 

Final  report  of  the  Experts  Working  Group  on  additionality  of  grants  in  the 
framework  of  blending  mechanisms,  established  following  a  decision  by  the 
ECOFIN Council in December 2008 

December 2008 

December 2009 

Evaluation  Methodology  &  Baseline  Study  of  European  Commission  Technical 
Cooperation support Inception Report - Final Version 

August 2010 

1.4.  Programme Evaluations 

Midterm evaluation of the Alfa II 

Midterm evaluation of EUROsociAL 

Midterm evaluation of URB-AL II 

Final evaluation of AL-INVEST III 

Final evaluation @lis 

2005 

November 2007 

2007 

2008 

2008 

Evaluation of the BOMCA Programme (Border Management in Central Asia) 

December 2010 

Midterm evaluation of the Alfa III 

Midterm evaluation of the Euro-Solar programme 

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2010 

2010 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Court of Audits Special Reports 

Special  report  No  6/2006  concerning 
Commission's development cooperation – OJ C 235 

the  environmental  aspects  of 

the 

29/09/2006 

Special report No 6/2007 on the effectiveness of technical assistance in the context 
of capacity development together with the Commission's replies – OJ C 312 

21/12/2007 

Special  report  No  6/2008  concerning  European  Commission  Rehabilitation  Aid 
following the tsunami and hurricane Mitch 

Special  report  No  4/2009 –  The  Commission's  management  of  Non-State  Actors' 
involvement in EC development cooperation 

Special  report  No  15/2009  –  EU  assistance  implemented  through  United  Nations 
organisations: decision-making and monitoring 

Special  report  No,  11/2010  -  Commission's  management  of  General  Budget 
Support in ACP, Latin American and Asian countries 

Special report No. 12/2010 - EU Development Assistance for Basic Education in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 

3 

Internal Audit Service Reports 

IAS-2005-AIDCO/ECHO-001  Implementation  of  the  framework  agreement  with 
UN agencies 

IAS-2006-AIDCO-003 Eligibility of Costs under the Financial and Administrative 
Framework Agreement with the United Nations by DG AIDCO 

AIDCO-2006-AIDCO/DEV-003 Audit on Budget Support – Pool Funds and Trust 
Funds 

IAS-2007-AIDCO-001 Audit on NGO's funding by DG AIDCO – Fup1 

IAS-2007-AIDCO-002  Financial  Management  of  main  programmes  within 
Directorate D 

IAS-2007-AIDCO-003 Financial Management of Regional Programmes 

IAS.B-2008-AIDCO-002  Financial  Management  of  main  programmes  within 
Directorate B 

IAS.B-2008-AIDCO/ECHO-001 Follow up of the FAFA implementation with UN 
in DGs AIDCO and ECHO 

IAS.B5-2009-AIDCO-004 Follow-up of Eligibility of Costs under FAFA with UN 

IAS.B5-2009-AIDCO-003  Second  Follow-up  of  Audit  in  NGO  Funding  by  DG 
AIDCO 

IAS.B5-2009-AIDCO-005 Audit on Thematic Budget lines 

IAS.B5-2010-AIDCO-001  Audit  on  Programmes  Estimates  financed  by  EU  and 
EDF Budget 

4 

Internal Audit Capability Reports 

Budget Support, pool and trust funds 

Budget Support Conditionality 

2008 

2009 

2009 

2010 

2010 

2005 

2006 

2006 

2007 

2007 

2007 

2008 

2008 

2009 

2009 

2009 

2010 

2007 

2008 

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Audit Report on Food Facility 

Audit Report on Aid Implementation under Crisis Situation 

2010 

2010 

5 

Synthesis based on Result Oriented Monitoring Reports 

Causes  underlying  Effectiveness  and  Impact  of  EC  Development  Projects  – 
Qualitative study based on ongoing and ex post ROM reports (2005-2007)  

May 2009 

Executive  Summary  (internal):  Towards  a  better  use  of  ROM  and  project 
evaluations 

September 2010 

6  Mid-Term/End-Term Review of Financial Instruments 

AIDCO  contribution  to  Mid-Term  Review  of  RELEX  financial  instruments, 
collection of status per instrument (note AIDCO/01 Adonis No 13280) 

Mid-term review of the financial instruments for external actions (COM(2009) 196 
- Communication from the Commission to the EP & the Council) 

Report  evaluating  the  implementation  of  the  financial  instruments  for  external 
actions (SEC (2009) 530 - Commission Staff working document accompanying the 
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  EP  &  the  Council  on  the  mid-term 
review of the financial instruments for external actions) 

16/06/2008 

21/04/2009 

21/04/2009 

Food  Facility: 
Communication from the Commission to the EP & the Council) 

report  on  Measures  Taken 

Interim 

(SEC  2010(245) 

- 

March 2010 

Minutes  of  the  3  meetings  of  internal  working  group  (AIDCO,  ELARG,  ECFIN, 
DEV and RELEX) in charge of analysing the governance structure of the existing 
loan-grant blending mechanisms in the external assistance field, held internally and 
with the main European Finance Institutions 

April and May 2010 

7  Mid-Term Reviews of Thematic Strategy Papers 

Food Security Thematic Programme mid-term review (2007-2009) 

Mid-Term Review of the thematic programme NSA/LA 

Review  of  the  ENRTP  (Environment  and  sustainable  management  of  natural 
resources, including energy) 

Mid-Term Review on the Thematic Programme Migration and Asylum 

Investing in people – Mid-term Review of Strategy Paper for Thematic Programme 
(2007 – 2013) 

September 2009 

December 2009 

December 2009 

March 2010 

November 2010 

8  Mid-Term Reviews of Country/Region Strategy Papers 

iQSG Progress Report on second-generation Country Strategy Papers 2007/8-2013 
(SEC(2009) 431 - Commission Staff working document) 

30/03/2009 

State of play of EU joint programming of external assistance – desk study of recent 
experiences 

09/12/2010 

Strategy Papers – Chapter on Lessons learnt: 
South Africa 
Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 

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Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Vietnam, , Yemen, Regional Central Asian Countries 
Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Regional Latin America, Regional Central 
America, Regional Comunidad Andina, Regional Mercosur 

9 

External Reviews 

IEG  Review  of  World  Bank  -  Engaging  with  Fragile  States  -  Support  to  Low-
Income Countries Under Stress 

OECD/DAC Peer review of the European Commission 

Multilateral  Organisations  Performance  Assessment  Network  (MOPAN)  Annual 
MOPAN Survey 2008 

2006 

2007 

2008 

IMF - Emerging from the Global Crisis: Macroeconomic Challenges Facing Low-
Income Countries  

October 2010 

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