COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT on the interim report on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments (&quot;stress tests&quot;) of nuclear power plants in the European Union
Date: 2011-11-24
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: international cooperation, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, nuclear test

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 24.11.2011 
COM(2011) 784 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 

on the interim report on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments ("stress tests") 
of nuclear power plants in the European Union 

{SEC(2011) 1395 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Nuclear  safety  and  security  are  of  utmost  importance  to  the  EU  and  its  people. 
Hence,  ensuring  the  highest  possible  standards  of  nuclear  safety,  security  and 
emergency preparedness and response is a central concern of nuclear energy policy, 
as much in Europe as globally. The accident that occurred at the Fukushima-Daiichi 
nuclear  power  plant  in  Japan,  following  the  earthquake  and  tsunami  of  11  March 
2011,  has  renewed  political  attention  in  the  measures  needed  to  minimise  risk  and 
guarantee the most robust levels of nuclear safety, security and non proliferation. 

First and foremost, the EU, immediately acting in solidarity, mobilised its expertise 
and resources to assist Japan in containing and overcoming the consequences of the 
disaster. The May 2011 EU-Japan Summit was dedicated to coordinating follow up 
actions, in particular the implementation of measures on nuclear safety cooperation. 

The Commission response to the events at Fukushima was immediate. Together with 
national regulators1 and the nuclear industry, the Commission launched a process to 
carry  out  EU-wide  comprehensive  risk  and  safety  assessments  of  nuclear  power 
plants ("stress tests"). The initiative was supported by the European Parliament and 
endorsed  by  the  European  Council  at  its  meeting  of  24  –  25  March  20112.  The 
European  Council  also  asked  the  Commission  to  "review  the  existing  legal  and 
regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and to "propose by the 
end of 2011 any improvements that may be necessary". Finally, given the potential 
cross-border  implications  of  nuclear  accidents,  the  European  Council  asked  the 
Commission  to  invite  EU  neighbouring  countries  to  take  part  in  the  stress  test 
process. 

This  is  the  first  time  that  all  stakeholders  in  the  EU  have,  on  a  voluntary  basis, 
entered  into  a  comprehensive  and  coordinated  process  of  reviewing  the  safety  and 
security  of  nuclear  power  reactors.  The  human  and  financial  resources  made 
available to the exercise, as well as the willingness of participants to work together at 
each  step  of  the  process,  underline  the  importance  of  nuclear  safety  for  the  EU. 
Moreover, there are clear benefits of joint EU-level action in this area. Nuclear safety 
has  been  recognised  throughout  the  EU  as  an  issue  of  European,  rather  than  only 
national  dimension.  In  addition,  the  recent  Communication  on  external  energy 
policy3  clearly  demonstrates  commitment  to  strengthening  international  nuclear 
safety cooperation. 

In parallel, the Commission has been working to ensure maximum protection for EU 
citizens.  Particular  focus  has  been  put  on  specific  areas,  such  as  the  regulatory 
framework  governing  controls  on  imports    of  products  originating  from  radiation 
prone  areas,  as  well  as  recommendations  to  customs  authorities  and  work  to 
strengthen scientific research and environmental monitoring. 

1 

2 
3 

National  nuclear  safety  regulators  meet  in  the  European  High  Level  Group  on  Nuclear  Safety  and 
Waste  Management.  This  group  was  set  up  through  the  Commission  Decision  2007/530/Euratom  of 
7 July  2007  (O.J.  L  195/44,  27.7.2007,  p.  44  –  46).  The  group  later  adopted  the  acronym  ENSREG 
(European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group). 
EUCO 10/11 (paragraph 31) 
COM(2011) 539 final 

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This Communication summarises the work carried out to date to reassess the safety 
and security of nuclear power plants operating in the EU. It is based on the progress 
reports made available by Member States by 15 September and on the interim report 
prepared  by  the  Council  Ad  Hoc  Group  on  Nuclear  Security  (AHGNS).  It  also 
provides the Commission's initial assessment of the current situation, as well as some 
preliminary ideas for future work. 

2. 

THE  NUCLEAR  STRESS  TESTS:  APPROACH,  METHODOLOGY,  PROGRESS  TO  DATE 
AND NEXT STAGES 

2.1. 

Approach and Methodology 

The European Council invited the Commission and ENSREG, to analyse  the lessons 
to be learnt from the Fukushima events and to reassess the safety margins of the EU 
nuclear  power  plants.  This  should  be  done  on  the  basis  of  a  methodology  shared 
among  the  Member  States,  thereby  ensuring  full  transparency  for  the  public.  The 
mandate from the European Council to the Commission comprised: 

(a) 

the definition of a methodology, and the implementation of comprehensive risk 
and  safety  assessments  of  nuclear  power  plants,  to  be  undertaken  in 
collaboration with the national nuclear safety regulators; 

(b) 

a reassessment and a revision of the EU nuclear safety legislation in place; 

(c) 

the invitation for EU neighbouring countries to take part in the process. 

The Commission and ENSREG4 agreed to work on two parallel tracks: 

• 

• 

A  Safety  Track  to  assess  how  nuclear  installations  can  withstand  the 
consequences  of  various  unexpected  events.  These  can  range  from  natural 
disasters to human error or technical failure and other accidental impacts, such 
as transport accidents. 

A  Security  Track  to  analyse  security  threats  and  the  prevention  of,  and 
response to, incidents due to malevolent or terrorist acts. 

While  nuclear  operators  and  the  national  regulators,  in  close  collaboration  with  the 
Commission, were in charge of aspects relating to nuclear safety, it was decided that 
Member States, assisted by the Commission, would be in charge of assessing nuclear 
security.  To  that  end,  the  Council  set  up  the  Ad-hoc  Group  on  Nuclear  Security 
(AHGNS).  Progress  made  on  this  security  strand  is  reported  in  an  annex  to  this 
document. 

All  fourteen  EU  Member  States  that  operate  nuclear  power  plants5  plus  Lithuania6 
are participating in the nuclear stress test exercise. Switzerland and the Ukraine have 

4 

5 

ENSREG  meeting of 12  – 13  May  2011, based  on  the  technical  specifications  proposed by WENRA 
(Western European Nuclear Regulators Association). See ENSREG declaration on www.ensreg.eu  
Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Hungary,  Netherlands,  Romania, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 

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also accepted to take part as neighbouring countries. Several countries7 decided – in 
addition  to  the  agreed  requirements  –  to  include  not  only  operating  nuclear  power 
plants but also decommissioned plants or other nuclear facilities.  

Specifications  on  the  safety  track  of  the  stress  tests8  define  three  main  areas  to  be 
assessed: extreme natural events (earthquake, flooding, extreme weather conditions), 
response of the plants to prolonged loss of electric power and/or loss of the ultimate 
heat sink (irrespective of the initiating cause) and severe accident management. The 
methods  of  investigation  are  defined  nationally  and  are  under  the  responsibility  of 
the national regulators.  

The stress test process is organised in three phases: 

• 

• 

• 

Self  assessments  by  nuclear  operators.  Nuclear  operators  were  asked  to 
produce  progress  reports  by  15  August  2011  and  final  reports  by  31  October 
2011; 

Review of the self assessments by national regulators. National regulators will 
review  the  information  supplied  by  operators  and  prepare  national  reports 
(progress reports by 15 September 2011, final reports by 31 December 2011); 

Peer  reviews  of  the  national  reports,  conducted  by  national  and  European 
Commission experts in the period January – April 2012. 

The deadline to start the assessments was 1 June 2011. In compliance with the agreed 
deadlines, all the participating Member States have submitted their progress reports 
to the Commission. These form the basis of the present interim report. 

However,  the  major  deliverables  are  still  outstanding.  In  order  to  achieve  the 
necessary level of confidence in the results, the final national reports (due at the end 
of  this  year)  and  the  peer  review  process  which  will  scrutinise  the  results  are 
essential. 

2.2. 

Initial findings from the interim safety assessments  

All progress reports indicate that nuclear operators are following and implementing 
the  agreed  methodology.  However,  the  format,  content,  and  level  of  detail  of  the 
national reports vary quite substantially. An annex to this Communication9 provides 
a summary of the findings contained in each of the national reports. 

Even  if  the  assessment  is  still  ongoing,  the  progress  reports  identify  a  number  of 
issues  that  deserve  an  in-depth  analysis.  They  also  show  a  proper  degree  of 
convergence by the national regulators on  the measures to  be  taken. Some  national 
regulators  have  already  considered  revising  the  safety  margins  which  they  apply  to 

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8 
9 

Despite closure of the last unit in Ignalina in 2009 in fulfillment of the EU Accession obligations, there 
are still site-specific operating licenses in place as well as significant amounts of spent fuel stored on-
site. 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Lithuania, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom. 
Annex I of the ENSREG declaration of 12 – 13 May 2011. 
Commission  Staff  Working  Paper  "Technical  Summary  of  the  national  progress  reports  on  the 
implementation of comprehensive risk and safety assessments of the EU nuclear power plants" 

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the  installations.  Areas  of  attention  include:  increasing  the  robustness  of  plants 
against  flooding10,  Loss  of  Power11,12  and  Loss  of  Ultimate  Heat  Sink13,  as  well  as 
increasing the robustness of plants against Beyond-Design-Basis earthquakes14. 

Some  reports  indicate  potential  improvements  in  the  spent  fuel  pools,  that  would 
enable  them  to  handle  events  for  which  they  were  not  designed15.  Furthermore, 
several  reports  identify  possible  ways  to  improve  the  management  of  severe 
accidents and emergency procedures16. 

However,  certain  differences  among  Member  States  are  already  apparent.  For 
example: 

– 

– 

– 

Seismic  risks  appear  to  be  dealt  with  very  differently  in  different  countries, 
quite independent of the actual seismicity of the regions concerned. Significant 
differences  appear  in  both  underlying  methodologies17  and  acceptance 
criteria18. Some countries are currently reviewing the level of seismicity which 
is considered in the plant design.  

Some  countries19  have  already  implemented  Severe  Accident  Management 
Guidelines (SAMG)20, while others have not. 

Some  countries21  have  started  to  evaluate  emergency  management  provisions 
under  "beyond  design-basis"  accident  conditions  (i.e.  accidents  which  are 
possible, but were not fully considered in the design because they were judged 
to be too unlikely) and identified possible improvements. 

2.3. 

The next stage: peer reviews and validation of the results  

Based  on  the  European  Council  request,  the  Commission,  together  with  national 
safety  regulators,  have  decided  to  perform  a  peer  review  of  the  final  results  of  the 
national  assessments  based  on  an  agreed  methodology22.  Thus,  the  final  national 
reports  due  for  end  of  2011  will  have  to  follow  a  prescribed  structure  in  order  to 
maximise coherence and comparability. 

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13 
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15 
16 
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20 

21 
22 

e.g. Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland 
Including Loss of Offsite Power and Station Blackout 
e.g. Finland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain 
e.g. Finland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
e.g. Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
e.g. Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia 
e.g. Germany, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden 
For  example,  whether  or  not  to  perform  a  full  Seismic  Probabilistic  Safety  Assessment  (PSA). 
Periodically revised Seismic-PSAs are, for example, performed in Finland, Slovenia and Switzerland - 
quite independent of the relatively low or high levels of seismicity in these countries. 
e.g. maximum peak ground acceleration at certain probabilities. 
e.g. Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Spain 
SAMGs are site-specific procedures to help the operators  minimize potential off-site doses in case of 
emergencies. 
e.g. Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom 
ENSREG meeting of 11 October 2011 

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The  peer  review  process,  due  to  start  in  early  2012,  will  provide  a  complementary 
assessment of the national results at the European level, whilst ensuring the highest 
levels of objectivity and neutrality in order to build confidence in the results.  

The process will be organised in two phases: 

– 

– 

A  peer  review  related  to  horizontal  topics,  comparing  the  consistency  of  the 
national  approaches  and  findings  in  three  key  areas:  extreme  natural  events, 
loss  of  safety  functions  and  severe  accident  management.  A  panel  of  senior 
regulatory experts will verify the relevant sections of the national reports. The 
final  report  will  present  draft  conclusions  in  the  key  areas,  as  well  as 
differences in methodology or evaluation. 

A vertical (national) peer review, assessing the national reports as a whole. The 
vertical peer reviews will take place in the Member States, to facilitate contacts 
of the peer teams with specialised staff from the regulators and with operators, 
and to facilitate access to nuclear power plants. The results of the peer reviews 
on horizontal topics, as well as the expertise gained during the process, will be 
used as input for the national reviews. 

Peer  review  teams  are  composed  of  nuclear  safety  experts  from  all  EU  Member 
States. The secretariat of the peer review is provided by the Joint research Centre of 
the Commission. 

The national reports, the progress reports, and the results of the peer reviews will be 
made public23. 

The Commission will present the results of the peer reviews in a final report for the 
European Council meeting of 28 – 29 June 2012.  

2.4. 

Initial findings from the preliminary security assessments24 

Nuclear  security  aims  at  preventing  intentional  acts  that  might  damage  a  nuclear 
facility or result in the theft or dispersion of nuclear materials. Nuclear safety25 and 
nuclear  security  are  closely  related.  Consequently,  no  assessment  of  the  safety  of 
nuclear power plants can be complete if there is not a similar analysis carried out on 
security  aspects.  Therefore,  this  safety  assessment  has  been  extended  to  nuclear 
security.  

In  the  EU,  few  of  the  national  safety  regulators  have  specific  responsibility  for  the 
security  of  nuclear  power  plants.  Security  competencies  in  the  Member  States  are 
spread among different bodies. 

Nuclear power plants benefit from sophisticated and comprehensive safety and non-
proliferation regimes that have evolved over the years. At the international level, the 

23 
24 

25 

www.ensreg.eu 
This  section  is  based  on  information  received  from  the  Council  Ad-hoc  Group  on  Nuclear  Security 
(AHGNS). 
Nuclear safety corresponds to the achievement of proper operating conditions of nuclear power plants, 
prevention of accidents or mitigation of their consequences, resulting in the protection of workers, the 
public and the environment from undue radiation hazards. 

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security  regime  for  nuclear  power  plants  is  less  developed26.  However,  in  recent 
years  security  issues  generally  have  come  under  greater  scrutiny  worldwide, 
particularly since the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 in the USA..  

In order to assess the methodology on nuclear security for nuclear power plants, the 
Council  has  set  up  an  Ad-hoc  Group  on  Nuclear  Security  (AHGNS)  made  up  of 
Member  State  experts  with  the  participation  of  the  European  Commission.  The 
progress  report  of  the  group  is  attached  to  this  Communication27  presenting  its 
preliminary conclusions. 

The AHGNS work programme is articulated in three stages:  

– 

– 

Collecting  information,  e.g.  through  a  questionnaire  distributed  to  Member 
States,  

Processing  information,  i.e.  identifying  key  topics  for  recommendations  on 
good practice and synthesising the outcome of the questionnaire,  

– 

Preparing the progress and final reports.  

The  questionnaire  focuses  on  a  series  of  questions  relating  to  the  national  legal 
framework  governing  nuclear  security,  the  general  national  security  framework, 
design  basis  threats  (risks  from  unforeseeable  malicious  acts),  nuclear  security 
culture  and  emergency  planning.  As  the  Member  States  did  not  indicate  that  any 
significant  issue  should  be  added  to  these  questions,  the  interim  report  focuses  on 
these  questions  and  their  responses.  The  latter  highlight  a  need  to  enhance 
international  cooperation  including  international  peer  review  missions  for  verifying 
the level and efficiency of physical protection measures for nuclear power plants. 

Given  their  commitment  to  nuclear  security,  Member  States confirm  their  ambition 
to  make full  use  of  and  strengthen  relevant  international  regimes,  but  also  to 
disseminate good practice at the EU level. Their responses epmphasise the close link 
between the nuclear safety and security dimensions, as well as the interfaces between 
nuclear  security  and  counterterrorism  strategies.  There  is  a  need  to  continually  re-
assess nuclear security and the adequacy of measures, systems and security concepts 
in  light  of  evolving  threats.  The  reports  also  show  that  there  is  a  common 
understanding concerning the importance of developing and implementing  adequate 
processes for risk management and the need to bridge the gaps between the relevant 
expert communities.  

In the context of its ongoing reflection on nuclear security matters, the Commission 
will fully take into account the findings and recomendations of the final report of the 
AHGNS due in June 2012. 

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For example, the IAEA has developed over decades a wide ranging set of guidance for safety, whereas 
its security related guidance is comparatively sparse. 
Interim report on nuclear security 17061/11 AHGNS 8 ATO 134 

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3. 

STRENGTHENING THE EU NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 

In  parallel  to  carrying  out  the  stress  tests,  the  Commission  has  started  to  reflect  on 
the EU legal framework for nuclear safety, based on the preliminary findings of the 
national reports, the discussions at international level (IAEA) and stakeholders' input. 
The  Commission's  preliminary  analysis  indicates  that  the  national  regulators  have 
different approaches to safety and use varying criteria to define safety improvements. 

Based on these initial reflections, the Commission sees scope for improving the legal 
framework  at  EU  and  national  level  in  the  following  areas:  1)  improving  technical 
measures  for  safety,  and  improving  the  necessary  oversight  to  ensure  full 
implementation,  2)  improving  the  governance  as  well  as  the  legal  framework  of 
nuclear  safety,  3)  improving  emergency  preparedness  and  response,  4)  reinforcing 
the  EU  nuclear  liability  regime  and  5)  enhancing  scientific  and  technological 
competence.  However,  the  starting  point  is  the  full  implementation  of  existing  EU 
rules. 

3.1. 

Implementing the existing nuclear safety legislative framework 

The adoption by the Council in 2009 of the Nuclear Safety Directive28 was a major 
step  forward  in  the  EU's  nuclear  safety  regime.  This  Directive  creates  a 
comprehensive and legally binding Community framework for the nuclear safety of 
nuclear  installations.  It  defines  basic  principles  and  obligations  governing  nuclear 
safety  in  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  (Community,  or  Euratom).  It 
transposes  into  Community  law  the  requirements  of  the  main  international 
the  Safety 
instruments,  namely 
Fundamentals30 established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

the  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety29  and 

The  deadline  for  Member  States  to  complete  the  implementation  of  the  Nuclear 
Safety  Directive  at  national  level  was  22  July  2011.  The  Commission  has  started 
infringement proceedings against the twelve Member States that have not complied 
with this deadline31. Those Member States which have not yet done so should ensure 
the transposition of the Directive as a matter of priority. 

3.2. 

Improving the legislative framework for nuclear safety  

The  Commission  is  studying  two  approaches  aiming  to  improve  the  nuclear  safety 
framework, as requested by the European Council: 

– 

– 

(i) legislative amendments, to reinforce the existing Community nuclear safety 
legislative framework and 

(ii)  improvements  in  the  implementation  of  existing  mechanisms,  as  well  as 
enhanced coordination between the Member States. 

28 

29 
30 
31 

Council  Directive  2009/71/Euratom  of  25  June  2009  establishing  a  Community  framework  for  the 
nuclear safety of nuclear installations (OJ L 172, 2.7.2009, p.18 – 22) 
INFCIRC 449 of 5 July 1994. The Community and all the EU Member States are Contracting Parties 
Fundamental safety principles, IAEA Safety Standard Series No. SF-1 (2006) 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and the 
United Kingdom 

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The nuclear safety framework will have to be reviewed both at the Community and 
the  national  level,  in  full  compliance  with  the  subsidiarity  principle.  Within 
international  institutions,  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  will  have  to  act 
together  to  ensure  that  developments  of  the  international  nuclear  safety  framework 
are consistent with Community and national legislation. 

3.2.1.  Technical improvements and oversight 

Under current Euratom and national legislation, the prime responsibility for nuclear 
safety  lies  with  the  licensee  (the  operator  of  the  power  plant).  National  regulators 
require license holders to make technical improvements to their facilities as a follow-
up to safety assessments, which includes the ongoing stress tests exercise. National 
regulators have to ensure that the required measures are implemented correctly.  

At present, there are no common safety standards or criteria for nuclear power plants 
in the EU. 

The  preliminary  results  of  the  stress  tests  show  that  there  is  no  consistency  in  the 
handling of safety margins across nuclear power plants in Europe. Depending on the 
final  results  of  the  EU  stress  tests  process,  as  well  as  on  lessons  learnt  from  the 
Fukushima  nuclear  accident,  an  EU-wide  set  of  basic  principles  and  requirements 
could be envisaged, together with associated minimum technical criteria in the areas 
of  siting,  design  &  construction  and  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants32.  EU 
principles  and  requirements  will  have  to  be  reflected  in  national  regulatory  actions 
and decisions and ultimately be implemented by plant operators. 

An  EU  wide  set  of  criteria  for  the  definition  of  site  characteristics,  licensing 
requirements  and  operational  checks  would  require  plant  operators  to  converge 
towards  best  practices  for  new  nuclear  power  plants  that  are  to  be  built  in  the  EU. 
Such  requirements  already  exist  in  international  and  EU  practice33.  Although  the 
choice of technical measures will also depend on the final results of the stress tests, 
these could be brought into the EU legislative acquis.. Moreover, there seems to be a 
case  for  extending  best  practices  already  covered  in  the  present  Nuclear  Safety 
Directive. For example, international peer reviews, at present limited to the national 
legal  and  regulatory  framework,  could  be  broadened  to  include  design  safety  and 
operational safety of nuclear power plants34. 

A range of actors should be involved in finalising the set of recommendations for the 
new  European  nuclear  safety  architecture,  including  the  national  regulators,  the 
nuclear  industry  as  well  as  the  scientific  and  technical  community,  represented  for 
example by the European Technical Support Organisations Network (ETSON).  

32 

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The  Court  of  Justice  (Ruling  C  29/99,  European  Court  reports  2002,  Page  I-11221)  of  the  EU  has 
recognised that Euratom possess shared competencies in these subjects 
WENRA has developed Reactor Safety Reference Levels (2008) as an instrument to develop a common 
approach  on  the  harmonisation  of  nuclear  safety  and  its  regulation  in  the  EU  countries.  In  2010, 
WENRA adopted safety objectives for new nuclear power plants on the basis of the IAEA Fundamental 
Safety Principles. WENRA is a network of Chief Regulators of EU countries with nuclear power plants 
and Switzerland as well as of other interested European countries with observer status. 
For example, operational safety is subject of IAEA peer review missions (OSART). 

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3.2.2.  Nuclear safety governance 

One  of  the  key  lessons  learnt  from  the  Fukushima  accident  is  that  the  effective 
independence of the national regulatory authorities must be ensured. In the EU, this 
could  be  further  strengthened  by  making  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Nuclear 
Safety Directive35 more explicit and defining criteria for the effective independence 
of the national regulatory authorities. In addition, the Nuclear Safety Directive could 
clarify minimum regulatory competencies that national authorities must possess. 

At  present,  in  some  Member  States  the  regulatory  responsibility  is  split  between 
several  entities  or    is  given  to  Ministries,  rather  than  being  given  to  a  single 
independent authority. 

In  line  with  its  mandate,  ENSREG  has  provided  the  EU  institutions  with 
recommendations on nuclear safety since 2007. It is time to reflect on its future role, 
taking into account the experience gained. 

Transparency  requirements  could  be  further  specified,  by  extending  these  beyond 
existing  general  obligations  to  inform  the  public36  and  employees  of  nuclear 
operators. In line with this, national regulatory authorities could be asked to inform 
the  public  on  the  reasons  behind  their  regulatory  decisions.  Confidentiality  clauses 
would protect information with security implications. 

3.3. 

Enhancing emergency preparedness and response 

Actions  to  prevent,  prepare  for  and  deal  with  nuclear  and  radiological  emergencies 
are  often  taken  at national level.  However, at Community level, there is a range of 
legislative  instruments  and  mechanisms37  and  special  provisions  relating  to  nuclear 
accidents38. Several Community mechanisms can be activated in such events. 

In December 2010, the Commission, in close collaboration with the Member States, 
issued  Guidelines  on  national  risk  assessments  for  disaster  management.  Member 
States  have  voluntarily  committed  to  prepare  and  submit  their  national  risk 
assessments  by  the  end  of  2011.  Nuclear  safety  and  public  health  threats  are 
important elements of a comprehensive risk assessment. 

In order to better prepare for a nuclear emergency and to coordinate response actions, 
cross-border nuclear risk management plans could be put in place (possibly including 
EU  neighbouring  countries).  These  need  to  be  linked  to  an  enhanced  European 
disaster response to nuclear emergencies. It is also important to ensure availability of 
equipment  for  emergency  measures  (including  heavy  equipment  such  as  backup 
generators) that can be shared as needed, as well as site restoration plans. 

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38 

Art. 5(2) therein 
Art. 8 Nuclear Safety Directive 
Including  the  Basic  Safety  Standards  Directive,  the  Public  Information  Directive,  the  ECURIE 
Decision,  the  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  legislation,  as  well  as  the  foodstuffs  and  feeding  stuffs 
regulations following the Chernobyl accident and the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station 
Legislation  on  maximum  permitted  levels  of  radioactive  contamination  of  foodstuffs  and  of 
feedingstuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency 

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Following  the  Commission  Communication  "Towards  a  stronger  European  disaster 
response:  the  role  of  civil  protection  and  humanitarian  assistance"39,  work  is  in 
progress  to  create  a  European  Emergency  Response  Capacity  of  Member  States' 
assets,  to  establish  a  fully-functional  24/7  Emergency  Response  Centre,  and  to 
develop  European  contingency  plans  for  the  main  types  of  disasters,  including 
nuclear.  The  Commission  will  present  proposals  to  include  these  elements  in  the 
European Civil Protection Mechanism legislation. 

3.4. 

Clarifying questions of nuclear liability 

The  question  of  nuclear  liability  in  the  case  of  a  nuclear  accident  is  crucial.  The 
Commission's Communication Energy 2020 - A strategy for competitive, sustainable 
and secure energy states that: "The legal framework for nuclear safety and security 
will be further enhanced through (…) a proposal for a European approach on nuclear 
liability regimes."  

The  Euratom  Treaty40  also  stipulates  that  Member  States  are  to  "take  all  measures 
necessary to facilitate the conclusion of insurance contracts covering nuclear risks."  

Most  Member  States  have  chosen to  rely on  a number of international  conventions 
(Paris Convention/Brussels Supplementary Convention and Vienna Convention), but 
some are not a Party to any. This has led to a "legal patchwork" within the EU. Legal 
coherence  in  the  EU  could  be  improved  on  two  fronts:  i)  victim  protection  in 
different  Member  States,  particularly  to  improve  victims’  compensation  in  the  EU, 
irrespective  of  their  country  of  residence,  and  ii)  the  potential  impact  on  the 
functioning of the internal market, particularly where diverging financial liabilities of 
operators could distort competition. 

3.5. 

Enhancing scientific and technological competence 

The Commission has launched a "Training and Information programme, drawing the 
lessons  from  Fukushima"  for  the  next  4  years,  jointly  funded  by  the  EU  and  the 
Euratom Framework Programmes41. 

The aim is to foster awareness of the importance of nuclear safety and to share best 
practice  of  risk  governance  amongst  nuclear  experts  and  policy  makers.  The 
programme  will  also 
improve  collaboration  between  universities,  research 
organisations,  public  bodies  and  industry  in  synergy  with  the  EU  platforms,  in 
particular  the  Sustainable  Nuclear  Energy  Technology  Platform  (SNE-TP)  and  the 
European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF). 

As  concerns  nuclear  research  to  be  programmed  under  the  next  EU  Multiannual 
Financing  Framework  ("Horizon  2020"),  there  is  still  a  need  to  focus  on  nuclear 
safety,  to  retain  nuclear  expertise  in  the  EU  and  to  strengthen  the  competencies  of 
nuclear operators and regulators. 

39 
40 
41 

COM(2010) 600 final 
Euratom Treaty, Art. 98 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/euratom-fisshome.hmtl 

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4. 

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION  

4.1. 

Involvement of third countries in risk and safety assessments 

4.1.1.  EU Neighbouring Countries 

The European Commission encouraged all countries operating nuclear power plants 
to carry out, as soon as possible, risk and safety assessments similar to those under 
way in the EU, in order to strengthen nuclear safety worldwide. 

The Commission has taken steps to extend assessments to EU neighbouring countries 
that  operate  or  own  nuclear  power  plants:  Switzerland,  the  Russian  Federation, 
Ukraine, Armenia and Croatia, as well as countries that have advanced plans for the 
development of nuclear power, namely Turkey and Belarus. 

On 23 June 2011, a joint statement was agreed with the above mentioned countries 
on  a  common  approach  to  stress  tests.  While  Switzerland  and  the  Ukraine  are 
integrated  in  the  EU  stress  test  process,  other  countries  are  working  with  different 
timetables. However, there is a shared commitment to carry out safety reassessments 
by the end of 2012. 

The EU will continue to encourage all EU neighbouring countries to get involved in 
the  stress  tests  exercise,  and  ensure  that  all  efforts  are  made  to  create  the  best 
conditions for nuclear safety both inside the EU and at its borders. 

4.1.2.  Cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the G8/G20 

The  IAEA  Action  Plan  on  Nuclear  Safety,  adopted  in  September  2011,  encourages 
all  IAEA  Member  States  to  undertake,  and  act  upon,  a  national  assessment  of  the 
design  of  nuclear  power  plants  against  site-specific  extreme  natural  hazards.  The 
European  Commission  will  provide  input  to  IAEA  work  on  developing  a 
methodology  that  can  be  used  by  other  States,  and  is  ready  to  assist  the  IAEA  in 
advising or helping to assess third countries in this area. 

The  Commission  fully  participated  in  the  G8/G20  process  preparing  the  IAEA 
Ministerial  conference  of  June  2011,  which  endorsed  the  IAEA  action  plan  on 
nuclear  safety.  The  Commission  will  do  its  utmost  to  achieve  further  progress  in 
these international initiatives.  

4.2. 

Proposed improvements in the global legal framework on nuclear safety  

Events  at  Fukushima  highlighted  the  need  to  strengthen  the  international  legal 
framework  for  nuclear  safety.  Through  the  IAEA,  the  main  instruments  governing 
nuclear  safety  are 
internationally  agreed  safety  standards  and  International 
Conventions,  in  particular  the  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety  (CNS)  and  the 
Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Emergency. 

IAEA  Member  States  generally  acknowledge  the  need  to  revise  the  international 
nuclear  safety  framework,  especially  the  CNS,  with  the  aim  of  increasing  its 

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effectiveness, governance and enforceability. The Commission intends to contribute 
to updating the CNS on behalf of the Euratom Community42. 

The  CNS  should  be  updated  in  line  with  the  latest  IAEA  safety  standards,  which 
should become legally binding and should be further developed.  

As  a  minimum,  the  EU  should  seek  to  bring  the  CNS  in  line  with  the  existing 
Nuclear Safety Directive in terms of scope and obligations. The revised CNS would 
then  cover  all  types  of  nuclear  facilities,  with  compulsory  regulatory  reviews  on  a 
periodic  basis.  It  should  also  include  criteria  for  regulatory  independence  and 
enforcement mechanisms such as mediation, conciliation or arbitration. 

The  CNS  provisions  for  emergency  preparedness  also  need  to  ensure  a  more 
effective and coordinated emergency response as well as assure a coherent interface 
with other international conventions43. 

4.3. 

External nuclear safety cooperation 

Improving  nuclear  safety  in  third  countries  has  been  an  essential  part  of  the 
Community’s work since the early 1990s. The TACIS and Phare programmes made 
it possible to provide assistance to Central and Eastern European and former Soviet 
Union  countries  for  fifteen  years.  From  2007,  nuclear  safety  cooperation  was 
extended  to  other  third  countries  under  the  Instrument  for  Nuclear  Safety 
Cooperation  (INSC).  The  Communication  on  the  external  dimension  of  energy 
policy44  calls  for  greater  convergence  of  international  regulatory  frameworks  and 
seeks to promote binding international standards for nuclear safety.  

The  present  INSC  will  provide  support  to  third  countries  that  have  committed  to 
participate  in  the  stress  tests45  and  will  take  full  account  of  the  progress  of  the 
ongoing  exercise  when  discussing  further  cooperation  for  the  period  2012  –  2013. 
The  Commission  has  proposed  a  new  INSC  for  the  period  2014  –  2020.  The  new 
proposed instrument needs to take stock of the experience gained by the EU exercise, 
and  take  into  account  in  its  implementation  the  priorities  emerged  from  the  stress 
tests carried out in neighbouring countries. The new INSC needs to be integrated into 
a  comprehensive  and  coherent  strategy  of  nuclear  safety  cooperation,  taking  into 
account international actions in the IAEA framework. 

5. 

CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD  

In the aftermath of Fukushima, the EU and its Member States committed to carrying 
out a comprehensive assessment of the nuclear power plants in Europe. By bringing 
together for the first time power plant operators, national regulators and authorities, 
and EU institutions, the process highlighted the added value of EU coordination and 

42 
43 

44 
45 

Art. 101, Euratom Treaty 
Convention  on  Early  Notification  of  a  Nuclear  Accident  (INFCIRC/335  of  18  November  1986)  and 
Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (INFCIRC/336 
of 18 November 1986) 
COM(2011)539 final of 7 September 2011 
Project proposals for Armenia and Ukraine are included in the 2011 INSC Action Programme 

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cooperation, to ensure that the EU's high standards of nuclear safety and security are 
maintained and further improved where necessary. 

This exercise is all the more important given the age of many reactors in the EU, and 
the  interest  some  Member  States  and  neighbouring  countries  have  in  building  new 
nuclear  capacity.  The  results  of  the  stress  tests  are  expected  to  provide  timely, 
objective  and  scientifically  sound  information,  which  will  help  to  strengthen  the 
safety  parameters  with  regard  to  the  siting,  design,  operation,  maintenance  and 
regulation of existing and planned nuclear power plants. 

Initial findings suggest areas for possible improvement both at national and EU level. 
Member  States  will  decide  how  to  follow  up  the  assessment  nationally.  The 
Commission  welcomes  the  steps  already  taken  by  some  Member  States  in  this 
direction.  In  this  Communication,  the  Commission  has  outlined  some  initial 
orientations  for  strengthening  the  EU  nuclear  safety  framework  and  for  enhancing 
the coordination of existing instruments or mechanisms. 

These  preliminary  indications  will  need  to  be  further  reviewed  and  followed  up  in 
light of the final findings of the stress tests. The Euratom Treaty provides a flexible 
and comprehensive legal basis to implement, where necessary, improvements in the 
nuclear safety legislation. 

Member States are expected to submit their final risk and safety assessment reports 
to  the  Commission  by  31  December  2011.  Peer  reviews  will  be  carried  out  from 
January to April 2012. The Commission will present a final report on the Stress Tests 
to  the  European  Council  for  their  meeting  of  28-29  June  2012,  including  possible 
legislative  initiatives  aiming  to  further  strengthen  the  nuclear  safety  framework  in 
Europe. 

The Commission is committed to ensuring openness and transparency throughout the 
stress  test  process.  It  will  continue  to  work  closely  with  the  full  range  of 
stakeholders, including Non Governmental Organisations, and will present the results 
of the peer reviews in a public meeting. 

Furthermore, before making any legislative proposals as a follow up to the stress test 
exercise,  the  Commission  will  hold  a  public  consultation  and  will  involve  all  key 
stakeholders, beyond the main experts' groups in the nuclear area (i.e. ENSREG, the 
European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) and WENRA).  

In  the  context  of  its  collaboration  with  third  countries  and  with  international 
organisations  that  are  active  in  the  field  of  nuclear  energy,  in  particular  with  the 
IAEA,  the  EU  will  share  its  experience  gained  with  the  stress  tests,  in  order  to 
reinforce the international legislative and regulatory regime for nuclear safety. 

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