Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area
Date: 2011-11-23
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU control, Euro Group (euro area), anti-crisis plan, budget deficit, budgetary equilibrium, economic recession, economic stabilisation, public debt, stability pact

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 23.11.2011 
COM(2011) 821 final 

2011/0386 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring 
the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area 

 
 
  
 
2011/0386 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring 
the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area 

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Article 136 in combination with Article 121(6) thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, 

Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank, 

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national Parliaments, 

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

(2) 

The Treaty requires that Member States' regard their economic policies as a matter of 
common  concern  and  that  their  budgetary  policies  are  guided  by  the  need  for  sound 
public  finances  and  that  their  economic  policies  do  not  risk  jeopardising  the  proper 
functioning of Economic and Monetary Union. 

The  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  in  particular  Regulations  (EC)  No  1466/97  of  7  July 
1997  on  the  strengthening  of  the  surveillance  of  budgetary  positions  and  the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies1 and Council Regulation (EC) No 
1467/97  of  7  July  1997  on  speeding  up  and  clarifying  the  implementation  of  the 
excessive deficit procedure2, designed to secure budgetary discipline across the Union, 
sets out the framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficits. It 
has been further strengthened by Regulation No …/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies and Regulation (EU) No …/2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on 
speeding  up  and  clarifying  the  implementation  of  the  excessive  deficit  procedure. 
Regulation  (EC)  No  …/2011  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
effective  enforcement  of  budgetary  surveillance  in  the  euro  area  added  a  system  of 
effective,  preventive  and  gradual  enforcement  mechanisms  in  the  form  of  financial 
sanctions for the Member States whose currency is the euro. 

1 
2 

OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1. 
OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6. 

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(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

The amendments to the Stability and Growth Pact increase both the guidance, and, for 
the  Member  States  whose  currency  is  the  euro,  incentives  for  the  setting  and  the 
implementation  of  a  prudent  budgetary  policy, while avoiding excessive government 
deficits.  These  provisions  have  created  a  more  robust  framework  at  the  level  of  the 
Union for the surveillance of national economic policies. 

The Treaty allows the adoption of specific measures in the euro area which go beyond 
the  provisions  applicable  to  all  Member  States  in  order  to  ensure  the  proper 
functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union. 

Strong public finances are best ensured at the planning stage and gross errors should 
be  identified  as  early  as  possible.  Member  States  should  benefit  not  just  from  the 
setting  of  guiding  principles  and  budgetary  targets  but  also  from  a  synchronised 
monitoring of their budgetary policies.  

Setting-up  a  common  budgetary  timeline  for  Member  States  whose  currency  is  the 
euro  should  better  synchronize  the  key  steps  in  the  preparation  of  national  budgets, 
thus  contributing  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  European  semester  for  budgetary  policy 
coordination.  Adopting  a  common  budgetary  timeline  should  lead  to  stronger 
synergies by facilitating policy coordination among Member States whose currency is 
the  euro  and  ensure  that  the  Council  and  Commission  recommendations  are 
appropriately integrated in the national process for budget adoption.  

There is strong evidence showing the effectiveness of rules-based fiscal frameworks in 
supporting  sound  and  sustainable  fiscal  policies.  The  introduction  of  national  fiscal 
rules that are consistent with the budgetary objectives set at Union level should be a 
crucial  element  to  ensure  the  respect  of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  provisions.  In 
particular, Member States should put in place structural balanced budget rules which 
transpose into national legislation the main principles of the Union fiscal framework. 
This  transposition  should  be  effective  through  binding  rules  preferably  of  a 
constitutional  nature  so  as  to  demonstrate  the  strongest  commitment  of  national 
authorities in relation to the Stability and Growth Pact. 

Biased  and  unrealistic  macroeconomic  and  budgetary  forecasts  can  considerably 
hamper the effectiveness of budgetary planning and consequently impair commitment 
to budgetary discipline. Forecasts from independent bodies can provide unbiased and 
realistic macroeconomic forecasts. 

This  gradually  strengthened  surveillance  will  further  complement  the  existing 
provisions  of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  and  strengthen  the  surveillance  of 
budgetary  discipline  in  Member  States  whose  currency  is  the  euro.  A  gradually 
enhanced monitoring procedure should contribute to better budgetary outcomes to the 
benefit  of  all  Member  States  whose  currency  is  the  euro.  As  part  of  a  gradually 
strengthened procedure, a closer monitoring is particularly valuable to Member States 
that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure.  

(10)  As demonstrated by the sovereign debt crisis, and in particular by the need to put in 
place  common  financial  backstops,  Member  States  whose  currency  is  the  euro  share 
enhanced  spillovers  from  their  budgetary  policy.  Each  of  the  Member  States  whose 
currency is the euro should consult the Commission and other Member States whose 
currency is the euro before the adoption of any major fiscal policy reform plans with 

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potential  spillover  effects,  so  as  to  give  the  possibility  for  an  assessment  of  possible 
impact for the euro area as a whole. They should consider their budgetary plans to be 
of common concern and  submit them to  the Commission for monitoring purposes in 
advance  of  the  plans  becoming  binding.  The  Commission  should  be  in  a  position,  if 
necessary, to adopt an opinion on the draft budgetary plan, that the Member State and 
in particular budgetary authorities should be invited to take into account in the process 
of  the  budget  law  adoption.  Such  an  opinion  should  ensure  that  Union's  policy 
guidance  in  the  budgetary  area  is  appropriately  integrated  in  the  national  budgetary 
preparations. In particular, this opinion should include an assessment of whether or not 
the budgetary plans appropriately address the recommendations issued in the context 
of the European semester in the budgetary area. The Commission should stand ready 
to present this opinion to the Parliament of the Member State concerned at its request. 
The  extent  to  which  this  opinion  has  been  taken  into  account  should  be  part  of  the 
assessment,  if  and  when  the  conditions  are  met,  leading  to  the  decision  to  place  the 
concerned  Member  State  in  excessive  deficit  procedure,  where  no  follow-up  to  the 
early  guidance  from  the  Commission  should  be  considered  as  an  aggravating  factor. 
Also, based on an overall assessment of the plans by the Commission, the Eurogroup 
should discuss the budgetary situation and prospects for the euro area. 

(11)  Member  States  whose  currency  is  the  euro  and  which  are  subject  to  an  excessive 
deficit  procedure  should  be  monitored  more  closely  to  secure  a  full  and  timely 
correction of the excessive deficit. A closer monitoring should ensure early correction 
of any deviations from the Council recommendations to correct the excessive deficit. 
Such  monitoring  should  complement  the  provisions  set  out  in  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1467/97. The modalities of this closer monitoring should be graduated depending on 
the stage of  the  procedure the  Member State is subject to, as provided for in  Article 
126 of the Treaty. 

(12)  The  closer  monitoring  for  Member  States  subject  to  an  excessive  deficit  procedure 
should allow the identification of risks in the compliance of a Member State's deadline 
to  correct  the  excessive  deficit.  In  the  event  of  such  risks  being  identified,  the 
Commission should issue a recommendation to the Member State for measures to be 
taken  within  a  given  timeframe  that  should  be  presented  to  the  Parliament  of  the 
Member State concerned at its request. This assessment should allow rapid correction 
of any developments putting at risk the correction of the excessive deficit within the 
established  deadline.  Assessment  of 
this  Commission 
recommendation  should  be  part  of  the  continuous  assessment  made  by  the 
Commission of effective action to correct an excessive deficit. When deciding whether 
effective action to correct the excessive deficit has been taken, the Council should also 
base its decision on whether or not the Member State complied with the Commission 
recommendation. 

compliance  with 

(13) 

In  order  to  enhance  the  dialogue  between  the  Union  institutions,  in  particular  the 
European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  Commission,  and  to  ensure  greater 
transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament 
may  offer  the  opportunity  to  the  Member  State  concerned  by  a  Commission 
recommendation to participate in an exchange of views, 

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HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Chapter I 

General provisions 

Article 1 
Subject matter and scope 

1. 

This Regulation sets out provisions for enhanced monitoring of budgetary policies in 
the euro area by: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

complementing  the  European  semester  as  defined  in  Article  2a  of  Regulation 
(EC) 1466/97 with a common budgetary timeline; 

complementing  the  multilateral  surveillance  system  of  budgetary  policies  as 
established  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  1466/97  with  additional  monitoring 
requirements  in  order  to  ensure  that  Union  policy  recommendations  in  the 
budgetary  area  are  appropriately 
the  national  budgetary 
preparations;  

integrated 

in 

complementing  the  procedure  for  correction  of  a  Member  State's  excessive 
deficit  as  established  by  Article  126  of  the  Treaty  and  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1467/97 by a closer monitoring of budgetary policies of Member States subject 
to an excessive deficit procedure in order to secure a timely durable correction 
of excessive deficits.  

2. 

This Regulation shall apply to Member States whose currency is the euro. 

Article 2 
Definitions 

1. 

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

"independent fiscal council" means a body endowed with functional autonomy 
vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member State in charge of monitoring the 
implementation of national fiscal rules; 

"independent  macroeconomic  forecasts"  means  the  macroeconomic  and/or 
budgetary forecasts produced by an independent body or a body endowed with 
functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member State; 

"medium-term  budgetary  framework"  has  the  meaning  set  out  in  point  e  of 
Article 2 of the Council Directive […/…]; 

"stability programme" has the meaning set out in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) 
1466/97; 

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(5) 

"government"  and  "deficit"  have  the  meaning'  set  out  in  Article  2  of  the 
Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  

2. 

The definition of general government  and of sub-sectors  of general government set 
out in point 2.70 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 shall also apply.  

Chapter II 

Common Budgetary Provisions 

Article 3 
Common Budgetary Timeline 

1. 

2. 

3. 

1. 

2. 

Member  States  shall  make  public  annually  their  medium-term  fiscal  plans  in 
accordance  with  their  medium-term  budgetary  framework  based  on  independent 
macroeconomic  forecast  together  with  their  Stability  Programmes,  no  later  than  15 
April. 

Draft budget laws for the general government shall be made public annually no later 
than  15  October  together  with  the  independent  macroeconomic  forecasts  on  which 
they are based.  

Budget laws for the general government shall be adopted and made public annually 
no later than 31 December.  

Article 4 
Rules on the budgetary balance and independent national fiscal council 

Member States shall have in place numerical fiscal rules on the budget balance that 
implement  in  the  national  budgetary  processes  their  medium-term  budgetary 
objective as defined in Article 2a  of Regulation (EC)  No  1466/97.  Such  rules  shall 
cover the general government as a whole and be of binding, preferably constitutional, 
nature. 

Member States shall have in place an independent fiscal council for monitoring the 
implementation of national fiscal rules as referred to in paragraph 1. 

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Chapter III 

Monitoring and assessment of Member States draft budgetary 
plans 

1. 

2. 

3. 

Article 5 
Monitoring requirements  

Member States shall submit annually to the Commission and the Eurogroup a draft 
budgetary plan for the forthcoming year no later than 15 October.  

The draft budgetary plan shall be made public at the same time. 

The draft budgetary plan shall contain the following information for the forthcoming 
year: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

the  targeted  budget  balance  for  the  general  government  as  a  percentage  of 
Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP),  broken  down  by  sub-sector  of  general 
government; 

the  projections  at  unchanged  policies  for  expenditure  and  revenue  as  a 
percentage of GDP for the general government and their main components.; 

the  targeted  expenditure  and  revenue  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  for  the  general 
government and their main components, taking into account the conditions and 
criteria  to  establish  the  growth  path  of  government  expenditure  net  of 
discretionary  revenue  measures  under  Article  5(1)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1466/97; 

a detailed description and a well-documented quantification of the measures to 
be  included  in  the  budget  for  the  year  to  come  in  order  to  bridge  the  gap 
between  the  targets  referred  to  in  point  (c)  and  the  projections  at  unchanged 
policies  provided  in  accordance  with  point  (b).  The  description  may  be  less 
detailed for measures with a budgetary impact estimated to be lower than 0.1% 
of  GDP.  Particular  attention  shall  be  paid  to  major  fiscal  policy  reform  plans 
with potential spillover effects for other Member States whose currency is the 
euro. 

(e) 

the  main  assumptions  about  expected  economic  developments  and  important 
economic  variables  which  are  relevant  to  the  achievement  of  the  budgetary 
targets.  These  assumptions  shall  be  based  on  independent  macroeconomic 
growth forecast; 

(f)  where  applicable,  additional  indications  on  how  the  current  recommendations 
addressed to the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 121 of the 
Treaty in the budgetary area will be met. 

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4. 

5. 

Where the budgetary targets reported in the draft budgetary plan in accordance with 
points (a) and (c) of paragraph 3 or the projections at unchanged policies differ from 
those in the most recent stability programme, the differences shall be duly explained. 

Where  the  Commission  identifies  particularly  serious  non-compliance  with  the 
budgetary  policy  obligations  laid  down  in  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  it  shall, 
within two weeks from the submission of the draft budgetary plan, request a revised 
draft budgetary plan from the Member State concerned. This request shall be made 
public.  

Paragraphs 2 to 4 shall apply in case of revised draft budgetary plan.  

6. 

The Commission shall specify the content of the draft budgetary plan referred to in 
paragraph 1. 

Article 6 

Assessment of the draft budgetary plan 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

1. 

2. 

The Commission shall, if necessary, adopt an opinion on the draft budgetary plan by 
30 November. 

The Commission opinion shall be made public and, at the request of the Parliament 
of  the  Member  State  concerned,  shall  be  presented  by  the  Commission  to  the 
Parliament concerned. 

The  Commission  shall  make  an  overall  assessment  of  the  budgetary  situation  and 
prospects in the euro area as a whole. The assessment shall be made public.  

The Eurogroup shall discuss opinions of the Commission on the national budgetary 
plans  and  the  budgetary  situation  and  prospects  in  the  euro  area  as  a  whole  on  the 
basis  of  the  overall  assessment  made  by  the  Commission  in  accordance  with 
paragraph 3. The assessment shall be made public. 

Chapter IV 

Ensuring the correction of excessive deficit 

Article 7 
Closer monitoring for Member States in excessive deficit procedure 

When  the  Council  decides  in  accordance  with  Article  126(6)  of  the  Treaty  that  an 
excessive  deficit  exists  in  a  Member  State,  the  Member  State  concerned  shall  be 
subject  to  paragraphs  2  to  5  of  this  Article,  until  the  abrogation  of  its  excessive 
deficit procedure. 

The  Member  State  subject  to  closer  monitoring  shall  without  delay  carry out  a 
comprehensive  assessment  of 
the  general 
government and its sub-sectors. The financial risks associated to government-owned 

in-year  budgetary  execution  for 

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3. 

4. 

5. 

entities  and  government  contracts  shall  also  be  covered  by  the  assessment  to  the 
extent that they may contribute to the existence of an excessive deficit. The result of 
this assessment shall be included in the report submitted in accordance with Article 
3(4a)  or  5(1a)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  1467/97  on  action  taken  to  correct  the 
excessive deficit. 

Member  State  shall  report  regularly  to  the  Commission  and  to  the  Economic  and 
Financial Committee or any sub-committee it will designate for that purpose, for the 
general  government  and  its  sub-sectors,  the  in-year  budgetary  execution,  the 
budgetary  impact  of  discretionary  measures  taken  on  both  the  expenditure  and  the 
revenue  side,  targets  for  the  government  expenditure  and  revenues,  as  well  as 
information on the measures adopted and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the 
targets. The report shall be made public. 

The Commission shall specify the content of the report referred to in this paragraph. 

If the Member State concerned is subject of a Council recommendation under Article 
126(7) of the Treaty, the report in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article shall 
be submitted for the first time 6 months after the initial report provided for in Article 
3(4a) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, and thereafter on a 6-month basis.  

If the Member State concerned is subject of a Council notice under Article 126(9) of 
the Treaty, the report in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article shall also contain 
information  on  the  actions  being  taken  in  response  to  the  specific  Council 
recommendations.  It  shall  be  submitted  for  the  first  time  3  months  after  the  initial 
report provided for in Article 5(1a) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, and thereafter on 
a quarterly basis.  

6. 

On request and within the deadline set by the Commission, the Member State subject 
to closer monitoring shall: 

(a) 

carry out and report on a comprehensive independent audit of the accounts of 
the general government conducted in coordination with national supreme audit 
institutions,  aiming  at  assessing  the  reliability,  completeness  and  accuracy  of 
these  public  accounts  for  the  purposes  of  the  excessive  defiocit  procedure.  In 
this context, the Commission (Eurostat) shall assess the quality of data reported 
by  the  Member  State  concerned  in  accordance  with  Regulation  (EC)  No 
679/20103; 

(b)  provide  additional  information  for  the  purposes  of  monitoring  the  progress 

towards the correction of the excessive deficit. 

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Article 8 
Member States at risk of non-compliance with their obligation under their excessive deficit 
procedure  

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

When  assessing  whether  compliance  with  the  deadline  to  correct  the  excessive 
deficit, as established by the current Council recommendation under Article 126(7) 
of  the  Treaty  or  Council  notice  under  Article  126(9)  of  the  Treaty,  is  at  risk,  the 
Commission shall also base its assessment on the reports submitted by the Member 
States in accordance with Article 7(3) of this Regulation. 

In case of risks of non-compliance with the deadline to correct the excessive deficit, 
the Commission shall address a recommendation to the Member State concerned for 
adoption of further measures within a timeframe consistent with the deadline for the 
correction of its excessive deficit referred to in paragraph 1. The recommendation by 
the  Commission  shall  be  made  public,  and,  at  the  request  of  the  Parliament  of  the 
Member  State  concerned,  shall  be  presented  by  the  Commission  to  the  Parliament 
concerned. 

Within  the  timeframe  set  by  the  Commission  recommendation  referred  to  in 
paragraph  2,  the  Member  State  concerned  shall  report  to  the  Commission  on 
measures  adopted  in  response  to  this  recommendation  together  with  the  reports 
provided  for  in  Article  7(3).  The  report  shall  include  the  budgetary  impact  of  all 
discretionary measures taken, targets for the government expenditure and revenues, 
information on the measures adopted and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the 
targets,  as  well  as  information  on  the  other  actions  being  taken  in  response  to  the 
Commission recommendation. The report shall be made public. 

The competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to 
the Member State concerned by a recommendation in accordance with paragraph 2 to 
participate in an exchange of views in accordance with Article 2a of Regulation (EC) 
No 1467/97. 

On  the  basis  of  the  report  referred  to  in  paragraph  3,  the  Commission  shall  assess 
whether  the  Member  State  has  complied  with  the  recommendation  made  in 
accordance with paragraph 2. 

Article 9 
Impact on the excessive deficit procedure 

1. 

The  extent  to  which  the  opinion  referred  to  in  Article  6(1)  has  been  taken  into 
account by the Member State concerned shall be taken into account by: 

(a) 

the Commission when conducting a report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty 
and  when  recommending  the  imposition  of  a  non-interest  bearing  deposit  in 
accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No XXX/2011; 

(b) 

the  Council  when  deciding  whether  an  excessive  deficit  exists  in  accordance 
with Article 126(6) of the Treaty. 

2. 

The closer monitoring established by Articles 7 and 8 of this Regulation shall be an 
integral part of the regular monitoring, as provided for in Article 10(1) of Regulation 

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(EC)  No  1467/97,  of  the  implementation  of  action  taken  by  the  Member  State 
concerned in response to recommendations made under Article 126(7) of the Treaty 
or notices given under Article 126(9) of the Treaty to correct the excessive deficit.  

3. 

When  considering  whether  effective  action  has  been  taken  in  response  to  the 
recommendations  made  in  accordance  with  Article  126(7)  of  the  Treaty  or  to  the 
notices  in  accordance  with  126(9)  of  the  Treaty,  the  Commission  shall  take  into 
account the assessment referred to in Article 8(5) in this Regulation and recommend, 
as  appropriate,  to  the  Council  possible  decisions  under  Article  126(8)  or  Article 
126(11) of the Treaty.  

Article 10 
Consistency with Regulation No XXX on the strengthening of economic and budgetary 
surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with 
respect to their financial stability in the euro area  

Member  States  subject  to  a  macro-economic  adjustment  programme  in  accordance  with 
Article 6 of Regulation No XXX shall not be subject to Article 5 and 7 of this Regulation.  

Chapter V 

Final provisions 

Article 11 
Review 

1. 

By  [same  date  as  in  Article  13  of  sanctions  Regulation]  and  every  five  years 
thereafter,  the  Commission  shall  publish  a  report  on  the  application  of  this 
Regulation. 

That report shall evaluate, inter alia: 

(a) 

the effectiveness of this Regulation; 

(b) 

the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic policies and sustained 
convergence  of  economic  performances  of  the  Member  States  in  accordance 
with the Treaty. 

Where appropriate, the report referred to in paragraph 1 shall be accompanied by a 
proposal for amendments to this Regulation. 

The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council. 

2. 

3. 

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Article 12 
Transitional provisions 

1. 

2. 

3. 

This  Regulation  shall  apply  to  the  Member  States  that  are  already  subject  to  an 
excessive deficit procedure at the time of the entry into force of this Regulation.  

By derogation from paragraph 1, Article 7(2) shall not apply to Member States for 
which  the  Council  has  already  decided  that  effective  action  has  been  taken  in 
accordance with Article 4(2) and Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. 

Member States shall comply with Article 4 at the latest by [6 months after adoption 
of this Regulation]. 

Article 13 
Entry into force 

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union. 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in 
accordance with the Treaties.  

Done at Brussels, 

For the European Parliament 
The President 

For the Council 
The President 

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