COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Smart borders - options and the way ahead
Date: 2011-10-25
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU visa policy, Schengen Information System, border control, disclosure of information, external border of the EU, information technology applications, management information system

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 25.10.2011 
COM(2011) 680 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 

Smart borders - options and the way ahead 

 
 
 
 
  
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Free  movement  of  EU  citizens  and  the  abolition  of  checks  at  the  internal  borders  of  the 
Schengen  Area  are  among  the  most  tangible  achievements  of  the  European  Union.  The 
Commission  recently  made  proposals  to  strengthen  the  overall  governance  of  the  Schengen 
area1 so as to ensure that this major achievement is further enhanced and developed in a truly 
common European framework.  

The  integrity  of  the  Union’s  external  borders  is  a  prerequisite  for  the  Schengen  area  as  we 
know  it  today  and  will  remain  a  prerequisite  also  in  the  future.  Measures  to  manage  the 
external  borders  must  meet  the  dual  objectives  of  enhancing  security  and  facilitating  travel. 
The potential offered by new technologies in this regard was addressed in the Commission’s 
2008  Communication  "Preparing  the  next  steps  in  border  management  in  the  European 
Union"2,  setting  out  the  possible  components  of  what  has  become  known  as  the  "smart 
borders" initiative and inviting the views of the European Parliament and the Council.  

Further consultations with Member States both at expert and ministerial level, as well as with 
members of the European Parliament, took place in 2011. On 7 July 2011 the European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS), in his opinion3 on the communication of the Commission on 
Migration,4 stressed the need to assess the use of existing systems and to prove the necessity 
for an entry/exit system in particular. 

Taking these views into account, the Commission has now reached the stage where it could 
soon be ready to propose specific measures. However, in view of the long term commitment 
and the significant investment that would be involved, the Commission is first presenting this 
Communication which sets out the main options, summarises the main implications and the 
possible way forward. With this approach, the Commission also intends to promote a common 
understanding  of  the  issues  at  stake  and  the  decisions  to  be  taken.  It  does  not  prejudge  any 
future specific proposals, which will be accompanied by a full impact assessment.  

This Communication also provides the first response to the European Council which called, at 
its  meeting  on  23  and  24  June  20115,  for  work  on  “smart  borders”  to  be  pushed  forward 
rapidly.  

Finally,  as  also  foreseen  by  the  2008  Communication,  and  as  requested  by  the  Council,  the 
Commission  has  examined  the  feasibility  of  an  EU  Electronic  System  for  Travel 
Authorisation (ESTA). This Communication therefore also serves to reflect the results of this 
examination and the intended follow up.  

2. 

THE OBJECTIVES OF A SMART BORDERS INITIATIVE 

Every year, some 700 million external border crossings are made via land, sea and air borders. 
About a third of these border crossings are made by third country nationals who are checked 

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COM(2011)559 final, COM(2011)560 final,COM(2011) 561 final 
COM (2008) 69 final. 
C(2011)-0445 
COM(2011)248 final 
EUCO 23/11 

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thoroughly  at  the  border  crossing  point6.  Promoting  swift  and  secure  border  crossings  is  a 
common concern for the EU and its Member States and there is no doubt that border crossings 
will  continue  to  rise  significantly,  especially  at  airports.  In  the  most  likely  scenario, 
Eurocontrol expects an increase from 400 million in 2009 to 720 million border crossings at 
the  air  borders  in  20307  This  means  that  at  the  European  airports  in  2030,  720  million 
travellers must be checked. This major increase cannot be addressed only by hiring additional 
border guards.  

The development of the Union's policies on visas and relations with third countries must also 
be considered. Over recent years the Union has successfully lifted the visa obligation for the 
citizens  of  a  number  of  third  countries,  concluded  several  visa  facilitation  agreements,  and 
modernised  the  acquis  including  i.a.  providing  for  a  more  extended  use  of  multiple-entry 
visas. The visa liberalisation for the Western Balkans has been accompanied by a monitoring 
system with the support of FRONTEX and Europol to collect statistics on travel flows and to 
assess any risks of abuse. These efforts go a long way in improving access to the territory of 
the Union for large groups of travellers, but have so far not been matched by any efforts to 
simplify the actual border crossing for those groups. This raises several questions: 

- whether the development of the Union's policy on border control is at this point in time able 
to support its visa policies;  

-  whether  Member  States  have  the  capacity  to  manage  the  increased  travel  flows  that  these 
efforts will result in without longer waiting times at the border; and  

-  whether  the  Union  needs  to  improve  on  the  tools  at  its  disposal  to  gather  more  detailed 
information on travel flows into and out of the Schengen area. 

There are two challenges in particular: how to efficiently monitor travel flows and movements 
of  third-country  nationals  across  the  external  border  for  the  Schengen  area  as  a  whole,  as  a 
part of a comprehensive approach to the overall governance of the Schengen area and how to 
ensure that border crossings are fast and simple for the growing number of regular travellers 
that constitute the vast majority of border crossers, i.e. those fulfilling all entry conditions. 

Under current rules: 

•  The  same  checks  are  applied  to  third  country  nationals  entering  the  Schengen  area 

regardless of the level of risk e.g. of overstay of each individual traveller; 

•  There are no means to record a traveller’s cross border movements. The authorised stay is 
calculated based on manual stamps in the traveller’s passport or travel documents and the 
entry and exit dates are not centrally recorded. 

As a consequence, delays at border crossings can be long and information on “overstayers”, 
i.e. travellers who stay beyond their authorised stay, is often missing. This is a real problem as 
overstayers are the main source of irregular migration in the EU. Reliable data on the number 
of  irregular  immigrants  within  the  EU  is  not  available,  but  conservative  estimates  vary 

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Figures  based  on  statistics  of  the  External  Borders  Fund  and  on  data  from  a  data  collection  exercise 
carried out at all external border crossing points between 31 August and 6 September 2009. 
Eurocontrol's "long-term forecast for  the  next  20  years  (until  2030)"  was published on 17.12.2010: 
(http://www.eurocontrol.int/statfor/gallery/content/public/forecasts/Doc415-LTF10-Report-Vol1.pdf),  

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between 1.9 and 3.8 million8. In 2010 Member States (EU27) issued 540 000 orders to leave 
their territory but only 226 000 were effectively carried out.9  

The fact that all third-country nationals have to go through the same border checks, regardless 
of the level of risk they present or their frequency of travel, does not represent an efficient use 
of border guards. Seeking to increase security and to speed up travel flows just by increasing 
the number of border guards is not a viable option for many Member States as they strive to 
curb budget deficits.  

The long queues, especially at airports, present a poor image to visitors to the European Union 
and  both  airport  operators  and  airline  companies  consistently  request  faster  and  smoother 
passenger flows for increasingly shorter connection times. 

The  Smart  Borders  initiative  would  improve  the  management  and  control  of  travel  flows  at 
the  border  by  reinforcing  checks  while  speeding  up  border  crossings  for  regular  travellers. 
This  would  enable  border  guards  to  cope  with  the  ever-rising  number  of  border  crossings  - 
without  an  unrealistic  increase  in  human  resources  needed  for  border  control  and  without 
compromising  security.  It  has  two  components:  an  entry/exit  system  (EES)  and  a  registered 
traveller programme (RTP): 

An  EES  would  allow  the  accurate  and  reliable  calculation  of  authorised  stay  as  well  as  the 
verification of the individual travel history for both visa holders and visa exempted travellers 
as an essential part of first line risk-assessment. It would do so by replacing the current system 
of  stamping  passports  with  an  electronic  registry  of  the  dates  and  places  of  third  country 
national admitted for short stays. While the main purpose of the system would be to monitor 
respect of the authorised stay of third country nationals, the system would also contribute to 
optimising border check procedures and enhance the security at the moment of the crossing of 
the external borders.  

A  RTP  would  significantly  facilitate  border  crossings  for  frequent,  pre-vetted  and  pre-
screened  third-country  travellers  at  the  Schengen  external  border.  It  would  reduce  the  time 
spent  at  the  border  crossing  points  and  facilitate  travel  and  cross-border  contacts.  As  far  as 
possible, it would make use of new technologies such as Automated Border Control systems 
(used also for EU travellers).  

3. 

MOVING TOWARDS EU SMART BORDERS 

Before  looking  at  possible  new  systems,  and  with  a  view  to  limit  costs  as  far  as  possible, 
consideration needs  first to be given to whether the smart borders objectives  can  be  met  by 
means of existing systems or tools: 

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Results of the Clandestino project sponsored by the EU and implemented by the International Centre for 
Migration  Policy  Development.  Figures,  are  an  accumulated  total  at  the  time  of  the  study  (2008,  EU 
27). http://clandestino.eliamep.gr 
SEC (2011) 620, Table 2; Data provided by Eurostat and the European Migration Network (EMN). The 
reason for the discrepancy of the figures is not only a lack of information on overstayers but also other 
factors such as the lack of cooperation of certain third countries, humanitarian reasons etc. 

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3.1. 

Using existing European or national systems and tools 

3.1.1.  Visa policy and VIS 

3.1.1.1.  Visa Policy 

Increased  use  of  the  possibilities  offered  by  the  Visa  Code  to  issue  multiple-entry  visas,  as 
well as by visa facilitation agreements where relevant, can contribute to simplify and facilitate 
travel  for  greater  numbers  of  third-country  nationals.  However,  this  facilitation  is  only 
relevant for the pre-departure stage, relieving the third-country national from having to visit 
the consulate to get a new visa for each visit to the EU. Multiple-entry visas do not speed up 
the actual border crossing. 

3.1.1.2.  VIS 

The  Visa  Information  System  (VIS)  as  such  will  not  speed  up  entry  procedures  nor  help  in 
identifying overstayers. However, the fact that the biometric data of all visa  holders  will be 
registered in the VIS means that any undocumented visa holder found within the territory can 
be  more  easily  identified,  increasing  the  possibilities  for  return.  After  a  transitional  period, 
biometric data will also be used in the border check process, to verify that the person is the 
one to whom the visa has been issued.  

Expanding the VIS to encompass an EES and RTP is not a desirable option for three reasons. 
First  there  are  the  data  protection  implications  and  the  potential  "function  creep"  which  a 
system that included both visa holders and visa-exempt persons might lead to. Secondly the 
current  capacity  limitations  of  the  VIS  could  only  be  overcome  by  significant  further 
investments. Thirdly, purpose limitation restrictions would not allow the VIS to store data on 
visa-exempt  third  country  nationals.  Nevertheless,  in  developing  the  smart  borders  systems 
intelligent use could be made of possible synergies with technical equipment that is serving 
VIS purposes. 

3.1.2.  Schengen Information System (SIS) 

Relying  on  alerts  on  overstayers  in  the  SIS  will  have  limited  value.  It  will  not  help  in 
identifying  persons  present  in  the  Schengen  area  who  have  exceeded  their  authorised  stay. 
The main source of information for entering such alerts would be the exit controls, where a 
situation  of  overstay  can  be  detected  by  a  border  guard  by  checking  the  stamps  in  the 
passports of a given traveller. However, one detected overstay cannot in isolation lead to the 
issuance of an entry ban for a given period of time for that individual. The travel history taken 
as a whole of a given individual should be taken into account, together with all other relevant 
factors, when deciding whether to grant the person a visa and entry at the external border.  

The  use  of  the  SIS  (and  the  future  SIS  II)  is  therefore  not  an  alternative  to  an  entry/exit 
system. 

3.1.3.  Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record  

Data  collected  on  travellers  via  Advance  Passenger  Information  (API)  and  Passenger  Name 
Record  (PNR)  is  not  directly  relevant  for  the  entry/exit  system  and  the  registered  traveller 
programme. 

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Carriers  have  an  obligation  to  communicate  API  data  at  the  request  of  the  border  control 
authorities  of  the  Member  States  in  order  to  enhance  border  control  and  to  fight  irregular 
migration. The passenger data is transmitted by the end of check-in. As the data submitted is 
too  limited  and  sent  in  most  cases  already  after  departure  it  does  not  allow  any  appropriate 
pre-screening granting access to facilitated border control procedures. Data are collected from 
carriers or entered by the traveller himself; therefore the quality of the data does not meet the 
requirements of the entry/exit system or the registered traveller programme. Furthermore, it is 
not possible to apply the system to land borders. 

PNR data is collected and submitted to the Member States' competent authorities, notably to 
law enforcement authorities, by air carriers. The data are collected at the same time when the 
flight  is  booked  via  carriers'  reservation  systems.  The  aim  of  PNR  is  to  fight  terrorism  and 
serious crime; PNR is not a border control instrument. The data is sent 48 to 24 hours before 
the scheduled flight departure and immediately after flight closure. PNR data are not relevant 
for  the  entry/exit  system  and  the  registered  traveller  programme  for  the  same  reasons  as 
mentioned above. PNR does not give any confirmed information as to whether the person has 
actually crossed the border.  

3.1.4.  National Entry/Exit Systems and national Registered Travellers Programmes 

Eleven  Member  States10  are  currently  implementing  national  entry/exit  systems,  which 
systematically  collect  all  entry  and  exit  records  of  third-country  nationals  crossing  their 
respective  external  borders.  However,  entry  and  exit  records  can  be  matched  only  when  a 
person  lawfully  exits  in  the  same  Member  State  through  which  he  or  she  entered.  These 
national systems are not linked to similar systems in other Member States.  

Some  Member  States  are  speeding  up  border  checks  for  EU  citizens  by  implementing 
automated  border  checks  (e.g.  on  the  basis  of  e-passports)  or  establishing  other  systems  for 
pre-registered  travellers11.  Seven  Member  States  have  implemented  a  form  of  national  RTP 
for EU citizens12.  

These  systems  cannot  be  used  for  third-country  nationals.  Current  EU  rules  require  border 
guards to interview a traveller and manually stamp his/her travel document, processes which 
cannot be automated.  

Hence the only existing initiatives for third-country nationals involve semi-automated border 
checks,  i.e.  a  combination  of  automated  gates  and  a  manual  element  which  includes  the 
stamping and the possibility to ask questions as part of the thorough border check.  

A further limitation is that membership of a national RTP in one Member State will not allow 
the traveller to benefit from a facilitated border crossing in another. A third-country national 
frequently  travelling  to  several  Member  States  each  year  would  therefore  have  to  apply  for 
membership  in  the  national  RTP  of  each  Member  State,  which  would  be  costly  and 
cumbersome. 

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Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Portugal 
Germany, Spain, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Finland and United Kingdom. 
For example, the Netherlands (Privium), France (PARAFES), the United Kingdom (Iris) and Germany 
(ABG) have this kind of programme. 

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3.1.5.  Electronic System for Travel Authorisation (ESTA) 

Such  a  system  would  mean  that  a  traveller  would  need  to  apply,  via  the  internet,  for  an 
authorisation to travel based on certain criteria. Four options for an EU ESTA were examined 
in the study carried out for the Commission:  

• 
• 
• 
• 

An ESTA for visa-exempted third country nationals; 
An ESTA for certain countries whose nationals are visa-exempted; 
A combination of an ESTA with electronic visas; 
The substitution of the visa requirement by an ESTA. 

Based  on  the  results  of  the  study,  the  Commission  considers  that  the  establishment  of  an 
ESTA  for  visa-exempted  third  country  nationals  should  be  discarded  at  this  stage  as  the 
potential contribution to enhancing the security of the Member States would neither justify the 
collection  of  personal  data  at  such  a  scale  nor  the  financial  cost  and  the  impact  on 
international  relations.  As  for  the  gradual  substitution  of  the  visa  requirement  by  an  EU 
ESTA,  it  seems  unfeasible  for  the  foreseeable  future,  given  the  difficulty  to  assess  the 
migratory  risk  and  the  problems  linked  to  internet  access  and  the  use  of  electronic 
identification. In addition, for establishing an ESTA, a fully functioning EES would be a pre-
requisite.  

It is clear that any EU ESTA is not an alternative for an entry/exit system as it cannot be used 
to monitor actual border crossings. Neither is it relevant for facilitating such border crossings, 
as the use of biometrics would make a system of electronic applications impractical. Besides, 
in  accordance  with  the  rationale  for  an  RTP,  registered  travellers  should  in  principle  be 
exempt from the ESTA requirement.  

As  regards  the  contribution  an  EU  ESTA  could  make  to  the  further  development  of  the 
common visa policy, the Commission intends to revert to this issue at a later stage as foreseen 
by the Stockholm programme. It will therefore not proceed further with preparations for the 
development of an EU ESTA at this stage. 

3.2. 

Developing specific systems: EES and RTP 

The section above illustrated why existing systems  and tools cannot  meet  the smart borders 
objectives. This section addresses the implications, the costs and benefits and options where 
relevant, of developing an EES and an RTP. 

3.2.1.  Legal aspects 

Both systems would be founded on Regulations based on Article 77 of the TFEU (and thus 
require  adoption  by  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  by  ordinary  legislative 
procedure). For both systems the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code13 on border checks 
on persons would need to be amended. 

3.2.2.  Technical aspects 

A  fully  operational  and  developed  VIS  is  a  prerequisite  for  the  implementation  of  a  Smart 
Borders system. Indeed, the EES and the RTP would make maximum use of existing systems 

13 

Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 

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and  tools,  such  as  the  Biometric  Matching  System  which  underpins  the  VIS  and  the 
fingerprint scanners which are used for this system.  

From a legal and technical point of view, it would be possible to proceed with the Entry Exit 
System ahead of the Registered Travellers Programme. However, that would represent a one-
sided  development  of  the  EU's  border  management  policy  in  that  it  would  only  reinforce 
security without facilitating travel of third country nationals. As concerns the RTP facilitation 
is  linked  to  the  greater  use  of  automated  border  control.  The  only  way  to  monitor  the 
authorised  stay  of  registered  travellers  while  allowing  for  fully  automated  border  control 
would  be  to  record  the  entry  and  exit  dates  electronically.  This  would  need  to  occur  at  EU 
level to allow for matching an entry record from one Member State with an exit record from 
another.  Therefore,  setting  up  an  RTP  effectively  depends  on  setting  up  an  EES.  There  are 
also  significant  economies  in  total  development  costs  if  the  two  systems  are  built 
simultaneously, using similar infrastructure at the central level (see annex 1).  

In designing the systems, a number of key choices will need to be made: 

3.2.2.1.  Centralised or decentralised interoperable systems 

A  centralised  architecture  comprises  a  central  database  and  national  interfaces  of  Member 
States connected to it, whereas a de-centralised architecture requires setting up 27+ national 
systems and interconnecting them to each other. 

In  the  case  of  an  EES,  the  electronic  recording  of  the  entry  and  exit  information  at  central 
level would allow for automatically calculating the authorised length of stay of a person and it 
would  provide  all  Member  State  authorities at  the  same  time  with  accurate  information  on 
where  a  person  has  entered  the  Schengen  area  and  where  he/she  has  exited.  Recording  the 
entry  and  exit  information  at  national  level  first  would  necessitate  the  replication  of  this 
information  in  27+  other  national  systems  in  order  to  keep  them  all  updated  with  matching 
entry  and  exit  records.  This  might  be  burdensome  and  time-consuming  when  persons  enter 
and leave Schengen via different Member States.  

Similarly, in the case of an RTP, a decentralised architecture would mean that the registration 
of the traveller would occur in a national system and then be replicated in 27+ other national 
systems to take into account that the traveller can enter the Schengen area via any Schengen 
border-crossing point. 

In conclusion, a decentralised architecture would not be technically effective. 

3.2.2.2.  RTP: centralised or decentralised storage of data?  

There are two basic options for storing the data of registered travellers, data which must be 
available  at  any  border  crossing  point  of  the  Schengen  area  to  allow  for  an  automated 
verification of the identity of the traveller: either to store the alphanumeric and biometric data 
in a central database or on a token issued to the traveller. 

Both  approaches  have  advantages  and  disadvantages  in  terms  of  data  protection  and  data 
security.  With  a  token,  there  would  be  no  need  to  develop  a  central  database  at  EU  level. 
However, it has significant disadvantages with risks linked to missing, lost or stolen tokens, as 
well as cloning. The token option would also still have to be combined with storage of certain 
data in a database to allow for the overall management of applications and tokens. According 
to  recent  estimates,  although  the  total  cost  of  the  token  option  would  be  around  EUR  30 
million  cheaper  to  develop,  in  the  mid-  to  long-term  it  would  prove  more  expensive  to 

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operate, as it would have higher operating costs for the Member States in the order of EUR 20 
million per year (for the Member States together).14  

A way to avoid the negative effects and combine the advantages of these two options would 
be  to  opt  for  a  combination  of  a  central  data  base  with  a  token  containing  only  a  unique 
identifier (i.e. application number) to be issued to the Registered Traveller. Alphanumeric and 
biometric data would be stored centrally but separately and with separate and distinct access 
rights for designated competent authorities. The biometric data would be linked to the unique 
identifier of the token and would only be used in order to verify the identity of the traveller 
when crossing the border.  

This third option limits the data protection and data security drawbacks of the other options, 
but is around EUR 50 million more expensive to develop than the option with a centralised 
register.  

3.2.2.3.  EES: with or without biometrics and which type?  

The  system  could  either  only  record  alphanumeric  data  (e.g.  name,  nationality  and  passport 
number) or also include biometric identifiers. 

The  inclusion  of  biometrics  would  make  it  easier  for  a  system  to  identify  undocumented 
persons not requiring a visa (as visa holders can be identified  using the VIS). It would also 
provide  a  more  precise  matching  of  entry  and  exit  records  (e.g.  in  the  case  of  persons 
travelling with two passports) by linking the travel history to a specific individual on the basis 
of a unique property shown by the biometric identifier.  

On the other hand, a certain negative impact on border crossing times could occur because of 
requiring biometrics from all travellers not subject to the visa requirement. 

The best way forward would therefore be to start in a first phase with alphanumeric data only. 
The biometric identifiers could be activated at a later stage, based on first evaluation results 
both  in  terms  of  the  overall  impact  of  the  system  and  on  border  management.  The 
development  costs  for  such  a  transitional  approach  are  generally  comparable  to  activating 
biometrics from the start and only marginally more expensive than excluding biometrics from 
the start, a choice which cannot be reversed at a later stage. 

As to the choice of  biometric identifier,  in line  with the identifier used  for EURODAC, the 
VIS,  the  SIS  II,  passports  and  residence  permits,  the  most  commonly  used  and  reliable 
identifiers are fingerprints and (also in case a fingerprint is not available) a digital image of 
the  face.  This  choice  would  also  mean  that  full  use  could  be  made  of  already  installed 
equipment, bringing about significant cost savings.  

3.2.3.  Costs 

Costs  for  developing  the  systems  will  be  influenced  by  which  implementation  options  are 
chosen  and,  especially,  whether  the  systems  are  developed  together  or  separately.  While 
waiting  for  the  conclusion  of  an  impact  assessment  and  the  presentation  of  a  financial 

14 

For  28  countries  –  the  22  Member  States  and  3  associated  countries  currently  fully  participating  in 
Schengen plus Romania, Bulgaria and Liechtenstein. 

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statement  accompanying  the  future  legislative  proposals  on  the  EES  and  the  RTP  it  can  be 
noted that at any rate, initial investment costs will be significant. See annex 1. 

For an EES, development costs in total (three years) may be in the order of EUR 200 million. 
Over  75%  of  these  costs  relate  to  the  development  and  setting  up  of  the  necessary 
infrastructure in each Member State. Yearly operating costs may be in the order of up to EUR 
100 million, with a similar share of costs incurred at national level.  

For an RTP, calculations are similar, although the costs for this system are more influenced by 
the implementation options chosen; this applies both to total costs but in particular the share 
of costs related to investments and operations at national and European level respectively.  

These calculations do not include costs for examining applications for Registered Travellers 
status:  the  implementation  of  the  Registered  Travellers  Programme  would  foresee  an 
application fee, which should cover the administrative cost of handling RTP applications by 
the Member States. 

Implementing a Registered Travellers Programme in practice would also mean that Member 
States would increase their investments in automated gates at the border. There would be no 
need  to  decide  at  European  level  where  and  how  many  such  gates  should  be  installed,  and 
hence the total costs can only be estimated once the Member States will have decided upon 
the total number of these gates. However, the Commission will encourage Member States to 
install such gates where ever possible and reasonable to maximise the benefits of the RTP in 
practice.  Investments  in  these  gates  could  under  certain  conditions  be  co-financed  by  the 
future internal security fund.  

The  substantial  costs  forseen  at  this  stage  need  to  be  considered  alongside  the  benefits:  for 
example, together with automating a substantial share of all border crossings, the RTP could 
reduce border control resources needed by around 40% (equivalent to EUR 500 million/year). 
Even if the calculation is based on more modest savings of EUR 250 million/year, Member 
States could have net cost savings already after the second year of operation15.  

 The allocation proposed for the period 2014 – 2020 in the Commission proposals for the next 
MFF  for  the  internal  security  fund  takes  also  into  account  the  setting  up,  development  and 
initial operation of the two systems. The extent and share which the EU budget should cover 
of  the  costs  incurred  at  national  level  for  developing  and/or  operating  the  new  systems  will 
need  to  be  further  assessed,  and  will  be  discussed  with  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council.  

3.2.4.  Practical implementation: assessing effectiveness and impact 

Last  year’s  Communication  on  an  overview  of  information  management  in  the  area  of 
freedom, justice and security set the conditions which the Commission will apply to any new 
information management system16. The Communication establishes that development should 
not start until the system’s purpose, scope, functions and technical details have been decided 

15 

16 

Calculation of Commission services based on experiences and data provided by Member States already 
running RTP pilots. 
COM (2010)385 final 

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in  the  underlying  legislation.  The  Communication  also  sets  substantive  and  process 
principles17 to serve as a benchmark in this area.  

The  most  relevant  principles  to  assess  for  the  entry/exit  system  would  be,  firstly,  necessity. 
The  fact  that  an  entry/exit  system  as  such  would  solve  the  issue  with  monitoring  the 
authorised stay of registered travellers is not a sufficient justification in itself for setting up an 
EES, as it requires storing the entry and exit data of all travellers. Moreover, as a result of this 
the amount of data to be stored will be significant.  

An  entry/exit  system  should  allow  for  increasing  the  number  of  successful  returns  of 
irregularly  staying  third-country  nationals,  as  the  system  will  identify  those  that  have 
overstayed.  However,  it  will  be  difficult  to  predict  how  many  persons  will  actually  be 
apprehended as a result. However, the potential impact needs to be seen against the complete 
absence  of  data  on  overstayers  currently  available  to  the  responsible  national  authorities. 
Also, the system should be used in conjunction with other measures, notably identity checks 
within the Schengen territory and the possibility to identify undocumented persons using the 
VIS. 

Finally,  the  entry/exit  system  brings  benefits  in  terms  of  allowing  more  evidence-based 
policymaking,  for  example,  with  regard  to  visa  policy  and  visa  facilitation,  but  also  in  the 
framework of the Partnership for Migration, Mobility and Security with certain neighbouring 
countries. It can be seen as a responsibility of the EU, for example, to justify maintaining the 
visa requirement on the nationals of a given third country by showing that there is a problem 
of overstaying and/or to reintroduce visas in the case of abuse of a visa-free regime. 

The most relevant principles for a registered traveller programme would be, firstly, accurate 
risk management. The pre-screening will need to be sufficiently thorough to compensate for 
alleviating the border check process. The second key principle for this programme would be 
cost-effectiveness. The aim should be to facilitate travel for the greatest number of persons; 
eligibility criteria should therefore be wide, while pre-screening criteria needs to ensure a high 
level of security. 

3.2.5.  Data protection 

Union  legislation  dealing  with  personal  data  has  to  respect  the  principles  laid  down  in  the 
Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union  and  in  particular  Articles  7  and  8 
thereof. An EES and a RTP needs to respect the fundamental rights of all travellers including 
their right to data protection to the same extent. Therefore the legislation on smart borders has 
to  comply  with  the  legislation  and  the  principles  on  the  protection  of  personal  data.  Being 
useful  is  not  sufficient  to  justify  the  implementation  of  systems  like  an  EES  and  a  RTP. 
Systems  affecting  fundamental  rights  including  the  right  to  private  life  and  data  protection 
must  meet  the  standard  of  being  necessary  in  a  democratic  society  and  comply  with  the 
principle of proportionality. Furthermore the processing of data should be limited to the extent 
that is necessary to achieve the purposes of the system. "Privacy by design" should be one of 
the  leading  principles  when  elaborating  an  EES  and  a  RTP.  The  proposed  option  of 
combining a token with centrally stored data as described in section 3.2.2.2 for the RTP could 
be seen as an example of implementing this principle in practice. 

17 

(1) Safeguarding fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy and data protection; (2) necessity; 
(3) subsidiarity; (4) accurate risk management; (5) cost-effectiveness; (6) bottom-up policy design; (7) 
clear allocation of responsibilities; (8) and review and sunset clauses 

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Both  for  an  EES  and  a  RTP  data  would  only  be  collected  and  processed  by  the  designated 
competent  visa  and  border  authorities  at  consular  posts  and  at  border  crossing  points  to  the 
extent  necessary  for  the  performance  of  their  tasks.  Access  to  the  data  would  be  strictly 
defined and limited in compliance with current EU and national privacy and data protection 
legislation. Records of all data processing operations would be kept and be available for data 
protection monitoring. Measures for redress would be put in place to ensure that travellers can 
check and if necessary, rectify data contained in their Registered Traveller application or in 
their entry/exit record. Measures would be taken to ensure that the data is stored securely and 
to avoid any misuse. Data processing would be supervised by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor as far as EU institutions and bodies are involved, and by national data protection 
authorities,  as  far  as  Member  States'  authorities  are  involved.  Access  for  law  enforcement 
authorities  (to  the  EES)  could  only  be  foreseen  in  cases  clearly  defined  by  the  future  EU 
legislation and under the same strict rules. 

4. 

NEXT STEPS  

The  Union  must  continue  to  improve  the  management  of  its  external  borders.  The  smart 
borders concept as outlined in this Communication could be part of this.  

The implementation of an EES would provide the Union with accurate data on travel flows in 
and out of the Schengen area at all parts of its external borders and on overstayers. Evidence-
based  evaluation  of  visa  liberalisation  measures,  visa  facilitation  agreements,  and  roadmaps 
for  future  such  initiatives  would  become  possible.  In  conjunction  with  the  VIS,  this  would 
make the Union's efforts to address irregular migration and increase the number of successful 
returns more effective.  

The RTP would speed up the border crossings of 4-5 million travellers per year18 and lay the 
basis  for  enhanced  investments  in  automated  border  control  technologies  at  major  border 
crossing points. Based on the experiences of Member States having tested automated border 
control for EU citizens, the average time for border crossings can be cut from the current 1-2 
minutes to below 30 seconds. While many third countries are investing in automated border 
control  technology,  none  has  taken  a  step  equivalent  to  the  EU  RTP  outlined  in  this 
Communication: offering simplified automated border crossings to any third-country national 
meeting  the  defined  pre-screening  criteria,  providing  a  tangible  confirmation  of  the  EU's 
openness  to  the  world  and  commitment  to  facilitating  travel  and  cross-border  contacts 
including for business. 

Based  on  the  initial  assessment  of  options  in  this  Communication,  and  without  prejudice  to 
the full impact assessment which will accompany specific proposals, it appears that the best 
way  forward  involves  developing  the  Entry  Exit  System  and  the  Registered  Travellers 
programme  together,  to  activate  the  use  of  biometrics  in  the  Entry  Exit  System  after  a 
transitional  period,  and  to  use  a  combination  of  a  token  and  a  central  database  for  the 
Registered Travellers Programme. The choice of biometric identifier for both systems will be 
fingerprints and the digital facial image, following the choices  already  made in the relevant 
EU  legislation  adopted  by  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  by  the  EU  for 
EURODAC, the VIS, the SIS II, passports and residence permits. 

18 

On the assumption that at least 20% out of all persons issued a multiple-entry visa – yearly around 10 
million – would apply for RT status, and an equivalent number of persons not requiring a visa would 
apply also. 

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However, it must be stressed that no work will be done on the development of the EES and 
the RTP until the European Parliament and the Council have adopted the legal basis for the 
systems  setting  out  clearly  their  specifications.  Moreover,  in  order  to  ensure  the  highest 
quality and to limit possible risks such as those which have arisen during the development of 
the  SIS  II  and  the  VIS,  the  newly  established  IT  Agency  would  be  responsible  for  the 
development and operational management of the systems.  

The new systems' magnitude would require substantial investment by the EU and the Member 
States in terms of IT development and public expenditure and considerable efforts to ensure 
the  highest  level  of  standards  for  the  protection  of  personal  data.  Lessons  learned  from  the 
development of other large-scale IT projects like the SIS II and the VIS must also be taken 
into  account  for  the  future  development  of  the  systems.  At  the  same  time,  the  new  systems 
would offer significant opportunities to contribute to meeting the dual objective of enhancing 
security and facilitating border crossing. Moreover, with the expected growth in the number 
of  third  country  nationals,  including  those  who  do  not  need  a  visa,  the  systems  can  enable 
Member States to maintain efficient border crossings without having to incur unrealistic and 
very costly increase in staffing levels. 

The EU must prepare itself to meet the challenges of the increasing numbers of travellers in 
an  ever globalising  world. New technologies could  provide new opportunities  to meet these 
challenges.  The  Commission  looks  forward  to  further  discussions  with  the  European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Data Protection Supervisor and intends to present 
proposals for an EES and an RTP in the first half of 2012. 

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Annex - Estimated costs of the systems 

A  full  assessment  of  the  costs  of  a  number  of  options  will  be  contained  in  the  impact 
assessment accompanying specific proposals. The table  below, based  on a study  carried out 
for the Commission in 2010, sets out the one-time development costs for one of the options, 
the  yearly  recurring  costs  for  operations  and  the  accumulated  total  costs  for  three  years  of 
development followed by five years of operations. It is based on the option of implementing 
an  RTP  with  alphanumeric  data  stored  in  a  token  and  biometric  data  stored  in  a  central 
repository and implementing an EES as a centralised system with biometrics added later, 

The Commission legislative proposals could be presented in 2012; should the co-
legislators agree them by 2014, the development of the systems could start in 2015. These 
estimates are provided on an indicative basis only. The decisions to be taken by the co-
legislators on the nature of the systems could increase or decrease the costs.  

One-time development 
cost at central and 
national level 
(3 years of development)

Yearly operational cost 
at central and national 
level 
(5 years of operation) 

(in EUR million ) 

(in EUR million ) 

Total costs at 
central and 
national level  

(in EUR million )

207 

101 

712 

(MS- 164 – Central- 43) 

(MS- 81 – Central- 20) 

183 

88 

623 

(MS- 146 – Central- 37) 

(MS- 74 – Central- 14) 

RTP:  Option  – 
(unique 
Data 
number)  stored  in 
and 
a 
token 
(biometrics 
and 
from 
data 
applications)  in  a 
repository 

EES:  Option  – 
Centralised 
system 
with 
biometrics  added 
later 

The  total  costs  would  however  be  about  30%  lower  if  the  two  systems  were  to  be  built 
together (i.e. on the same technical platform). 

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