Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 October 2011 on early intervention measures and on amendments to the resolution and winding-up regime for credit and financial institutions subject to supervision by the Banco de Portugal (CON/2011/83)
Date: 2011-10-19
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: EU banking union, Portugal, central bank, credit institution, financial stability, financial supervision, liquidation, national law

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 19 October 2011  

on early intervention measures and on amendments to the resolution and winding-up regime for 

credit and financial institutions subject to supervision by the Banco de Portugal 

(CON/2011/83) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 4 October 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Portuguese Ministry of 

Finance for an opinion on a draft Government decree-law (hereinafter the ‘draft decree-law’) amending 
(i) the Legal Framework for Credit and Financial Institutions1, (ii) Decree-Law No 345/98 of 9 November 

regulating the Mutual Agricultural Credit Guarantee Fund, (iii) Decree-Law No 199/2006 of 25 October 

on the winding up of credit and financial institutions , and (iv) the Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal.  

The  Portuguese  Constitution  requires  prior  Parliamentary  approval  of  the  scope  and  terms  of  such 

delegated legislation by means of an enabling law on which the ECB is not being consulted.  

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

functioning  of  the  European  Union  and  on  the  third  and  sixth  indents  of  Article 2(1)  of  Council 

Decision 98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions2, as the draft decree-law relates to the Banco de Portugal 

and  to  the  rules  applicable  to  financial  institutions  insofar  as  they  materially  influence  the  stability  of 

financial  institutions  and  markets.  In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article 17.5  of  the  Rules  of 

Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose and contents of the draft decree-law  

The purpose of the draft decree-law is to amend several laws to, inter alia: (i) reinforce the supervisory 

powers  of  the  Banco  de  Portugal  by  empowering  it  to  act  in  case  of  financial  distress  of  an  institution 

under its supervision, namely through a set of reinforced and expanded preventive and early intervention 

measures  and  also  through  specific  resolution  measures;  (ii)  establish  a  resolution  fund  to  finance  the 

application of the resolution measures provided for in the draft decree-law; (iii) adapt the rules applicable 

to  the  deposit  guarantee  schemes  (DGSs);  and  (iv)  amend  the  winding-up  regime  for  supervised  credit 

and financial institutions to cover reorganisation aspects.  

1  
2  

Approved by Decree-Law No 298/92 of 31 December. 
OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.  

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

1.1  Preventative and early intervention measures 

The  supervisory  powers  of  the  Banco  de  Portugal  are  reinforced  through  an  amendment  to  its 

Organic  Law  and  several  amendments  and  additions  to  the  Legal  Framework  for  Credit  and 

Financial Institutions regarding bank reorganisation and resolution.  

The  proposed  early  intervention  measures  are  intended  to  prevent  the  aggravation  of  developing 

signs of financial distress and must be implemented as soon as a credit institution fails to meet, or 

is at risk of not meeting, any of the legal or regulatory requirements governing its activity.  

In  particular,  the  draft  decree-law  empowers  the  Banco  de  Portugal  to  require  all  authorised 

institutions to draw up and submit for its approval contingency plans for recovery and resolution 

scenarios, under the conditions and within the deadlines specified by the Banco de Portugal. Such 

plans  should  aim  at  restoring  in  a  timely  manner  the  financial  situation  of  a  credit  institution 

showing  signs  of  distress  (recovery)  and,  if  necessary,  at  ensuring  the  orderly  winding-up  of  the 

credit institution before entering into liquidation (resolution).  

At  the  early  intervention  stage,  the  Banco  de  Portugal  may  adopt  the  following  measures  with 

regard to an  institution: (i) to appoint, early on, own representatives and/or interim members of the 

management  board,  whose  performance  will  be  subject  to  its  guidelines;  (ii)  to  appoint  new 

auditors;  (iii) to  impose  restrictions  on  the  granting  of  credit  and  the  investment  of  funds  by  the 

credit  institution,  especially  in  the  context  of  intra-group  or  offshore  transactions;  (iv)  to  impose 

additional reporting requirements; (v) to require the submission of a debt restructuring plan to be 

negotiated with the creditors; (vi) to require an independent general or partial audit of the business 

of  the  authorised  institution,  at  the  latter’s  expense;  and/or  (vii)  to  call  a  general  meeting  of  the 

shareholders of the authorised institution and to submit proposals to it. 

1.2  Resolution measures  

Currently  only  the  judicial  liquidation  of  already  insolvent  credit  institutions  is  regulated  in 

Portugal.  The  Legal  Framework  for  Credit  and  Financial  Institutions  is  now  being  amended  to 

introduce  resolution  mechanisms  for  the  orderly  winding-down  of  a  credit  institution  in  serious 

financial distress as a going concern under official control, to promote financial stability, prevent 

systemic risk and protect public funds and depositors. Therefore, the draft decree-law provides that 

whenever  remedial  actions  do  not  achieve  the  financial  recovery  of  the  credit  institution,  or  if  a 

credit institution does not comply with an approved recovery plan and fails to meet, or is at risk of 

not  meeting,  its  licensing  requirements,  the  Banco  de  Portugal  may:  (i)  withdraw  the  banking 

license,  which  will  automatically  lead  to  judicial  liquidation;  or  (ii)  appoint  a  new  interim 

administration  whose  members  will  have  additional  powers  and  duties,  without  prejudice  to  its 

right to order the transfer of the business (total or partial sale of assets and liabilities, off-balance 

sheet commitments and assets under management) to other duly authorised credit institutions or to 

one  or  more  bridge  banks  (fully  held  by  the  Resolution  Fund  and  authorised  by  the  Banco  de 

Portugal) independently of, or in addition to, imposing any other corrective measure.  

2 

ECB-PUBLIC 

1.3  Establishment of a resolution fund within the Banco de Portugal to finance the resolution measures 

The draft decree-law establishes a resolution fund as an independent public institution with its head 

office at the premises of the Banco de Portugal, to provide financial assistance for the application 

of  the  resolution  measures  adopted  by  the  Banco  de  Portugal.  The  draft  decree-law  regulates  the 

composition, administration and funding regime of the Resolution Fund, specifying that financial 

resources may not be granted by the Banco de Portugal.  

1.4  Further amendments to the Legal Framework for Credit and Financial Institutions: 

The draft decree-law sets out early reporting obligations, and penalties for failure to contribute to 

the  Deposit  Guarantee  Fund  or  to  the  Resolution  Fund  and  for  non-compliance  with  reporting 

requirements, corrective action or resolution measures imposed by the Banco de Portugal.  

1.5   Deposit Guarantee Funds 

The  roles  of  the  DGSs  (Deposit  Guarantee  Fund  and  Guarantee  Fund  for  Mutual  Agricultural 

Credit Institutions) are enhanced, the protection of guaranteed depositors is strengthened, and the 

rules applicable to both schemes are harmonised. On request by the Banco de Portugal and under 

certain conditions, the funds may be involved in the resolution of distressed credit institutions, in 

particular by cooperating with the Resolution Fund in the sale of insured deposits or in the transfer 

of insured deposits to a bridge bank. Guaranteed depositors and/or the funds (directly or through 

subrogation)  are  granted  priority  ranking  over  unsecured  creditors  in  the  credit  institution’s 

insolvent estate. 

1.6  Amendment to the Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal 

Article  17  of  the  Organic  Law  of  the  Banco  de  Portugal  is  amended  to  reinforce  its  supervisory 

powers by authorising it to apply preventive, corrective and resolution measures.  

2. 

General observations  

2.1  The draft decree-law is a structural benchmark under the EU/IMF support programme to Portugal, 

in  particular  with  regard  to  strengthening  the  framework  for  early  intervention,  resolution  and 
deposit insurance3. 

2.2  The  ECB  welcomes  the  introduction  of  a  comprehensive  bank  resolution  framework,  aiming  at 

safeguarding the financial soundness of credit institutions, the interest of guaranteed depositors and 

the stability of the financial system. This Opinion proposes technical improvements to the overall 

good quality of the draft decree law.     

2.3  The ECB understands that the enactment of a legal framework on bank recovery and resolution is 

somewhat  complicated  due  to  the  absence  of  a  stable  legislative  proposal  at  Union  level,  and 

invites  the  consulting  authority  to  review  the  content  of  the  law  in  light  of  the  future  Union 

regulatory framework on bank recovery and resolution, in particular with regard to resolution tools 

3  

the 

Economic  Adjustment 

See 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp83_en.pdf, 
paragraph 22 of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies.  

Programme 

Portugal 

First 

for 

– 

review, 
and 

available 
in 

at 
particular 

3 

 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

and powers of resolution authorities, and of the forthcoming recast Directive on deposit guarantee 

schemes.  

2.4  The ECB also notes that while the Legal Framework for Credit and Financial Institutions applies to 

credit  and  financial  institutions,  the  extent  to  which  each  measure  of  the  draft  decree-law  would 

apply to both types of supervised entities depends on the concrete provision relating to the measure 

concerned.  

2.5  While the ECB takes note of the Portuguese authorities’ wish to address the legal matters related to 

bank recapitalisation by a separate law, it notes with some concern that Law No 63-A/2008 of 24 

November establishing the legal framework for mandatory recapitalisation of credit institutions is 

in force only until 31 December 2011. The ECB expects the Portuguese authorities to take urgent 

steps to adopt the new legal framework before the end of the year, after having consulted the ECB. 

This would, inter alia, facilitate Portugal’s recourse to the Bank Solvency Support Facility in line 

with the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies. 

2.6  The  ECB  notes  that,  for  legality  and  consistency  reasons,  the  contents  of  the  enabling  law,  on 

which it is not being consulted, may need to be amended in the light of this opinion.  

3. 

Preventative and early intervention (corrective action) measures 

The  draft  decree-law  requires  deposit-taking  credit  institutions  to  prepare  and  submit  recovery  and 

resolution  plans  to  the  Banco  de  Portugal. However,  as  regards  the  resolution  plans,  the ECB 

understands that such  plans will  be thoroughly  reviewed  by  the  Banco  de  Portugal,  as  the  resolution 
authority, based on the information provided and regularly updated by the credit institution4. 

4. 

Resolution measures 

4.1  According to proposed Article 145-D(1), the application of a resolution measure by the Banco de 

Portugal automatically leads to the suspension of the members of the management and supervisory 

boards, and possibly also the auditors, of the credit institution. The Banco de Portugal is invited to 

consider  whether  in  certain  cases  the  retention  of  key  members  of  the  management  may  at  least 

temporarily be helpful to the resolution process and to ensuring continuity of banking services.    

4.2  The ECB welcomes that pursuant to proposed Article 153-C, resolution measures are financed by 

the Resolution Fund. Along these lines, the ECB understands that the reference in proposed Article 

145-F(7)  to  the  fact  that  the  Banco  de  Portugal  ‘may  invite’  the  Deposit  Guarantee  Fund  or  the 

Guarantee Fund for Mutual Agricultural Credit Institutions, as the case may be, to cooperate in the 

sale of insured deposits, is to be interpreted as conferring a limited role for the Deposit Guarantee 

Fund. In particular, it is understood that this possibility can be activated only (i) on the basis of a 

thorough  evaluation  by  the  Banco  de  Portugal,  (ii)  following  an  autonomous  decision  by  the 

relevant  fund’s  management  committee,  (iii)  taking  into  account  the  limits  on  the  amount  of 

4  

European Commission’s public consultation on the technical details of a possible EU framework for bank recovery and 
resolution  - ESCB Contribution, May 2011. 

4 

 
 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

permissible financing by the Deposit Guarantee Fund set forth in proposed Article 167-A, and (iv) 

provided  that  the  participation  of  the  Deposit  Guarantee  Fund  in  the  financing  of  resolution 

measures does not jeopardise its original mission.  

4.3  The ECB draws the attention of the consulting authority to the possibility of improving the wording 

of proposed Article 145-G, by expressly providing that, as regards the disposal of the shares of the 

bridge bank which are fully owned by the Resolution Fund, the Resolution Fund should abide by 

the instructions of the Banco de Portugal.   

4.4  Concerning the sale of the portfolio of the bridge bank, the ECB notes that pursuant to proposed 

Article 145-I(6), if it is not possible to sell the business transferred to the bridge bank, the Banco de 

Portugal may decide to put the bridge bank into voluntary winding up. If the Banco de Portugal - as 

the resolution authority - considers that there are serious public interest grounds, such as financial 

stability,  for  the  bridge  bank  to  continue  in  existence,  it  should  not  be  obliged  to  liquidate  the 

bridge bank.  

5.  

Broad temporary waiver 

Among the other measures which the Banco de Portugal may take under proposed Article 145-J, support 

resolution measures, is ‘temporary waiving of compliance with prudential rules’. The ECB considers that 

such a broad temporary waiver is inappropriate and is not mandated by either Directive 2006/48/EC of 

the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the 
business of credit institutions5 or the Commission’s proposed legislative package to strengthen regulation 
in the banking sector6. Although the measures in proposed Article 145-J are not in themselves resolution 

measures,  they  are  strictly  linked  with  the  adoption  of  resolution  measures,  subject  to  the  restrictive 

conditions  laid  down  in  Article  145-A  and  Article  145-C(1)  and  (2),  and  therefore  must  satisfy  the 

objectives and pre-conditions for resolution measures, such as public interest. Thus, when applying any 

waiver of compliance with prudential rules, the Banco de Portugal is under a legal obligation to comply 

with  mandatory  Union  law  requirements.  Furthermore,  the  draft  decree  law  should  clarify  that  any 

temporary waiver of compliance with prudential rules must be limited not only in time, but also in scope. 

That is, such waiver must clearly indicate which specific prudential rules are being waived and to what 

extent. 

6.   Deposit Guarantee Fund and Resolution Fund  

6.1  The  ECB  acknowledges  that  proposed  Article  166-A  of  the  draft  decree  law  provides  for 

preferential ranking of claims in respect of deposits covered by the Deposit Guarantee Fund. Such 

5  
6  

OJ L 177, 30.6.2006. 
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions 
and investment firms, COM(2011) 452 final and proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms 
amending  Directive  2002/87/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  supplementary  supervision  of 
credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate, COM(2011) 453 final. 

5 

 
 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

claims will rank above other preferential rights, but below those related to judicial costs, claims of 

the financial institution’s employees arising from employment contracts and the tax claims of the 

State, local authorities and social security entities. This provision is in line with the requirements 

set out in the economic adjustment programme for Portugal. Proposed Article 166-A furthermore 

provides  for  preferential  ranking  of  claims  of  the  Deposit  Guarantee  Fund  and  of  the  Resolution 

Fund arising from the financial support provided for application of resolution measures. 

6.2  Directive  94/19/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  May  1994  on  deposit-
guarantee  schemes7  does  not  provide  for  any  harmonisation  of  matters  related  to  ranking  of 

depositor claims and/or DGSs. The only harmonisation in this context is contained in Article 11 of 

Directive 94/19/EC – schemes which make payments under guarantee have the right of subrogation 

to  the  rights  of  depositors  in  liquidation  proceedings  for  an  amount  equal  to  their  payment.  The 
latest available proposal for a recast directive on deposit guarantee schemes8 does not provide for 

any further harmonisation regarding the ranking of claims. The proposed recast Directive, however, 

considerably  strengthens  and  harmonises  the  funding  requirements  applicable  to  DGSs:  (i)  DGS 

members will be required to pay extraordinary contributions up to 0,5% of eligible deposits; (ii) a 

mutual  borrowing  scheme  between  DGSs  may  be  activated,  provided  such  arrangements  are 

established  on  a  voluntary  basis  and  that  the  borrowed  funds  are  only  used  for  payment  of 
depositors claims9; and (iii) Member States will ensure that DGS have in place adequate alternative 

funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding where necessary to meet claims 

against  those  DGSs.  The  above  provisions,  once  transposed  by  the  Member  States,  will 

significantly  improve  the  ability  of  the  DGS  to  always  meet  their  obligations  vis-à-vis  the 

guaranteed  depositors.  Such  ex  ante  funding  arrangements  for  DGSs  strengthen  their  capacity  to 

ensure  that  depositor  claims  are  adequately  covered.  From  this  perspective,  the  introduction  of 

depositor preferences may be seen as aligned with the objectives of the recast Directive. 

6.3  Currently, four Member States – Bulgaria10, Latvia11, Romania12 and recently also Greece13 – have 

granted priority ranking to claims that the DGS has acquired by subrogation after having paid out 

the amounts corresponding to covered deposits, thus further contributing to ensuring that sufficient 

funding is always available to the DGS.  

6.4  Views  on  the  impact  of  granting  preferential  ranking  are  highly  divergent,  as  it  is  believed  that 

preferential ranking of depositors may have an impact on the funding costs available to banks and 

that greater efforts will be made by other creditors to secure their claims.  On the other hand, this 

would be somewhat mitigated to the extent that priority claims extend to guaranteed deposits only. 

7 
8 

9  
10  
11  
12  

13  

OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5. 
COM(2010) 369 final; SEC(2010)834; SEC(2010)835 final available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/20100712_proposal_en.pdf. 
CON/2011/12, paragraph. 9.2. 
See Article 94 of the Law on bank bankruptcy. 
See Article 192 of the Law on credit institutions. 
See  Article  38  of  Government  Ordinance  No  10/2004  on  the  proceedings  of  judicial  reorganisation  and  bankruptcy  of 
credit institutions. 
See Article 4(16) of Law No 3746/2009. 

6 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

Furthermore,  a  legal  regime  that  establishes  priority  ranking  of  guaranteed  depositors  should 

facilitate  the  use  of  resolution  measures  provided  for  in  proposed  Article  145-C  of  the  Legal 

Framework  for  Credit  and  Financial  Institutions  (total  or  partial  sale  of  business  to  another 

authorised credit institution or to a bridge bank). From a financial stability perspective, the priority 

claim  in  respect  of  the  covered  deposits  is  also  supported  as  it  reduces  the  risks  of  bank  runs, 

potential losses of the insured depositors in a liquidation phase as well as the excessive depletion of 

the DGS. 

7. 

Protection for whistleblowers 

According  to  proposed  Article  116-F,  there  is  a  duty  to  communicate  information  to  the  Banco  de 

Portugal about the financial distress of an institution or the risk thereof and about other situations and any 

serious irregularities within the management of the credit institution. According to the draft decree-law, 

the persons to whom this duty applies are protected from disciplinary sanctions by the credit institutions, 

but this protection may not be sufficient. To facilitate the communication of necessary information and 

the reporting of breaches, it would be necessary to provide appropriate protection for all persons within 
the  credit  institution  who  denounce  breaches  committed  within  the  institution14.  For  example,  the 

conditions  under  which  this  communication  will  not  give  rise  to  any  sanctions  or  liability  could  be 

clarified. Furthermore, the extent to which it is appropriate to impose sanctions on persons who do not 

have any high level managerial responsibilities, where there is failure to report promptly to the Banco de 

Portugal, should be examined. 

8. 

Independence of the Banco de Portugal  

8.1  The  draft  decree-law  specifies  in  proposed  Article  92  that  powers  conferred  to  the  Banco  de 

Portugal by the draft decree-law will not affect its independence in the performance of functions as 

a central bank and as a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Although the 

proposed Article 92 does not expressly refer to the Treaty principle of central bank independence, 

or provide that it prevails over any incompatible decree-law provision, the ECB understands that 

Article  92  confirms  the  obligations  arising  under  the  Treaties,  including  the  protection  of  central 

bank independence.  

8.2  Further,  and  more  specifically,  the  requirement  in  proposed  Article  153-P  that  the  Banco  de 

Portugal provides technical and administrative services for the regular operation of the Resolution 

Fund should not affect the Banco de Portugal’s ability to carry out its ESCB-related tasks from an 

operational and financial point of view. The involvement of the Banco de Portugal in the operation 

of the Resolution Fund must be compatible with the institutional and financial independence of the 

14  

See Article 70(2)(b) of the Commission’s proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending  Directive  2002/87/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  supplementary  supervision  of 
credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate COM(2011) 453 final, which 
mandates appropriate protection for employees of institutions who denounce breaches committed within the institution. 

7 

 
 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

Banco  de  Portugal,  and  to  this  end  it  is  recommended  that  the  Banco  de  Portugal  be  ensured 

adequate financial and human resources. The ECB has consistently underscored that an NCB must 
have  sufficient  means  not  only  to  perform  its  ESCB-related  tasks,  but  also  its  national  tasks15. 

Additional tasks under national law need to be accompanied by the allocation of adequate human 

and financial resources allowing for such tasks to be carried out in a manner which will not affect 
the  Banco  de  Portugal’s  operational  and  financial  capacity  to  carry  out  its  ESCB-related  tasks16.  

The  ECB  understands  that  Article  153-P  will  be  implemented  with  due  respect  of  the  Banco  de 

Portugal’s financial and institutional independence.   

8.3  Proposed Article 153-E provides that the members of the management committee of the Resolution 

Fund  will  remain  in  office  for  a  renewable  term  of  three  years.    One  member  of  the  Board  of 

Directors of the Banco de Portugal is a member of the management committee. Moreover, the term 

of office as a member of the Board of Directors of the Banco de Portugal is five years, renewable 

once. The ECB notes that because of the inconsistency in the terms of office, in practice the same 

member of the Board of Directors of the Banco de Portugal could not, generally, have a renewed 

term of office of three years as a member of the management committee of the Resolution Fund. 

The draft-decree law should be clarified as regards the application of Article 153-E to the members 

of the Board of Directors of the Banco de Portugal.  

9. 

Prohibition on monetary financing  

9.1  

It is important to safeguard compliance with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 

of  the  Treaty.  This  prohibition  is  designed  to  prevent  central  banks  from  providing  overdraft 

facilities or any other type of credit facility to the public sector, which includes any financing of the 

public  sector’s  obligations  vis-à-vis  third  parties.  The  only  compatible  forms  of  central  bank 

financing of DGSs are: (a) intraday credit in line with the general rules on provision of such credit 

by  the  central  bank,  and  (b)  short-term  emergency  liquidity  financing  under  strict  conditions 

established in the ECB’s Convergence Reports, i.e. if such funding is short term, addresses urgent 
situations, systemic stability aspects are at stake and decisions are at the NCB’s discretion17. These 
conditions need to be listed in national law18 in the cases where emergency liquidity financing of 

the DGS is foreseen by the national legal system. 

9.2   Proposed Article 162(8) of the Legal Framework for Credit and Financial Institutions approved by 

Decree-Law  No  298/92  of  31  December)  and  Article  10(7)  of  the  draft  decree-law  (amending 

Decree-Law No 345/98 of 9 November) list conditions for loans from the Banco de Portugal to the 

Fund. It is understood that these conditions are intended to ensure compliance with the monetary 

financing prohibition. In this respect, the condition that loans are granted at the full discretion of the 

15  

16  
17  
18  

See  the  ECB’s  Convergence  Report,  May  2010,  p.  21.  All  ECB  documents  are  available  on  the  ECB’s  website  at 
www.ecb.europa.eu. 
See for instance paragraph 3.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2011/76. 
See ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2010, p. 25.  
See paragraphs 2.2 to 2.8 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/5.  

8 

 
                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

Banco  de  Portugal  would  need  to  be  included  in  the  draft  decree-law.  When  exercising  its 

discretion to grant a loan, the Banco de Portugal has to ensure that by doing so it is de facto not 

taking over a State task. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 October 2011. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Jean-Claude TRICHET 

9