COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER External evaluation report on the implementation of Council Regulation (EURATOM) N.300/20047 (Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation) in the period 2007-2009
Date: 2011-10-18
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU programme, Latin America, South-East Asia, developing countries, environmental risk prevention, former socialist countries, nuclear accident, radiation protection, radioactive waste, radioactivity, technical cooperation

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 18.10.2011 
SEC(2011) 1199 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

External evaluation report on the implementation of Council Regulation (EURATOM) 
N.300/20047 (Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation) in the period 2007-2009 

Accompanying the document 

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
evaluation of the implementation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 
(INSC) during its first three years (2007-2009) 

{COM(2011) 648 final} 

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EVALUATION  

OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF  

THE COUNCIL REGULATION (EURATOM) No 300/2007   

(INSTRUMENT FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY COOPERATION) 

IN THE PERIOD 2007 – 2009 

Prepared by: 

Jan VRIJEN , Neale KELLY, Maurice LEROY 

March 2011 

The contents of the present report do not necessarily reflect the official views, opinions or policies of DG Aidco 
of the European Commission. The opinions and conclusions contained within the report represent the views of 
the individual authors only. 

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Table of Contents 

INTRODUCTION 

1.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 

2.  COOPERATION WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 

3.  COOPERATION TO STRENGTHEN REGULATORY AUTHORITIES 

3.1.  ENP-East and Central Asia 

3.1.1.  Ukraine 

3.1.2.  Other ENP-East and Central Asia 

3.2.  ENP-South and Middle East 

3.3.  Latin America 

3.4.  South-East Asia 

3.5.  China 

3.6.  Multi-country project 

4.  COOPERATION TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL SAFETY 

4.1.  ENP-East and Central Asia 

4.1.1.  Ukraine 

4.1.2.  Other ENP-East and Central Asia 

4.2.  ENP-South and Middle-East 

4.3.  Latin America 

4.4.  South-East Asia 

5.  COOPERATION TO STRENGTHEN NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS 

6.  COOPERATION TO DEVELOP RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT  OF 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 

6.1.  ENP-East and Central Asia 

6.1.1.  Ukraine 

6.1.2.  Other ENP-East and Central Asia 

6.2.  ENP-South and Middle-East 

6.3.  Latin America 

6.4.  South-East Asia 

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6.5.  Multi-country project 

7.  COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA 

8.  COOPERATION ON OTHER ISSUES 

9.  DEVELOPMENT, ACHIEVEMENTS AND IMPACT 

10.  DISCUSSING INSC PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION 

11.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

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31 

Abbreviations 

Appendix I - Categorisation of projects 

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INTRODUCTION 

The Nuclear Safety component of the TACIS programme1 started in 1991 as a priority area 
for  assistance  to  the  nuclear  facilities  in  the  Former  Soviet  Union  (FSU)  countries.  It  was 
replaced  in  2007  by  a  new  Instrument  for  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation  (INSC)  with  global 
coverage.  

This  INSC  is  established  in  Council  Regulation  No.  300/20072  for  the  period  2007  –  2013. 
Some 524 MEuro are foreseen for its implementation. 

The general objectives of the INSC Regulation are: 

- 

- 

- 

the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety; 

radiation protection, and 

the  application  of  efficient  and  effective  safeguards  of  nuclear  material  in  third 
countries. 

The Regulation specifies eight measures that can be supported within INSC. These are: 

1.  Promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture at all levels, in particular through: 

(i) 

(ii) 

(iii) 

(iv) 

continuous support for regulatory bodies, technical support organisations, and 
the  reinforcement  of  the  regulatory  framework,  notably  concerning  licensing 
activities, 
drawing  notably  on  the  experience  of  the  operators,  on  site  and  external 
assistance  programmes  as  well  as  consulting  and  related  activities  aiming  at 
safety  improvements  of  the  design,  operation  and  maintenance  of  nuclear 
power plants that are currently licensed and other existing nuclear installations 
so that high safety levels can be achieved, 
support for the safe transport, treatment and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and 
radioactive waste, and 
the  development  and  implementation  of  strategies  for  decommissioning 
existing installations and the remediation of former nuclear sites; 

2.  Promotion of effective regulatory frameworks, procedures and systems to ensure adequate 
protection  against  ionising  radiations  from  radioactive  materials,  in  particular  from  high 
radioactive sources, and their safe disposal; 

3.  Establishment  of  the  necessary  regulatory  framework  and  methodologies  for  the 
implementation  of  nuclear  safeguards,  including  the  proper  accounting  and  control  of 
fissile materials at State and operators level; 

4.  Establishment of effective arrangements for the prevention of accidents with radiological 
consequences as well as the mitigation of such consequences should they occur, and for 
emergency-planning,  preparedness  and  response,  civil  protection  and  rehabilitation 
measures; 

1 TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) is the European Commission programme to assist 12 countries 
of  Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia  (Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Georgia,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Moldova,  Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) and Mongolia in their transition to democratic market-oriented economies. 

2 Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 300/2007 

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5.  Measures  to  promote  international  cooperation  (including  in  the  framework  of  relevant 
the 
international  organisations,  notably  IAEA) 
implementation  and  monitoring  of  international  Conventions  and  Treaties,  exchange  of 
information and training and research. 

the  above  fields, 

including 

in 

The activities of INSC are implemented by the European Commission Services (AIDCO) by 
centralised  management.  Detailed  programming  is  performed  on  an  annual  basis  through 
annual  Action  Programmes  (APs)  containing  the  projects  defined  jointly  by  the  Partner 
Countries'  Organisations  and  the  Commission  Services.  The  content  of  the  APs  follows  the 
orientations  given  in  the  Nuclear  Safety  Strategy  for  Community  Cooperation  Programmes 
2007 – 2013 and the multi-annual Indicative Programme 2007 – 2009, previously adopted by 
the  Commission,  after  consultation  of  the  EU  Member  States  in  the  INSC  Committee.  The 
content  of  the  AP  2010  was  developed  in  accordance  with  the  revised  strategy  of  the 
Commission  for  the  period  2010-2013  and  the  subsequent  Indicative  Programme  2010  – 
2011. The awarding of contracts follows the rules and procedures laid down in the European 
Commission Financial Regulations.   

The Joint Research Centre Institutes3  provide technical support to the Commission External 
Services in the definition and implementation of the projects.   

During the TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme 857 MEuro was spent on hundreds of projects 
in various technical and administrative areas to improve nuclear safety in these countries.  

In the first three years of implementing the INSC programme 193 MEuro has been allocated 
to  50  projects  in  12  countries;  in  the  fourth  year  (i.e.  AP  2010)  a  further  61  MEuro  for  16 
projects in 10 countries has been approved. 

This  report  summarises  an  evaluation  of  the  implementation  of  the  INSC  Regulation  in  the 
first three years 2007 – 2009, as required in the Regulation4. 

1. 

METHODOLOGY AND DATA 

Article 21 of the INSC Regulation requires an evaluation of the implementation of the INSC 
Regulation  in  its  first  three  years  together  with,  if  appropriate,  a  legislative  proposal 
introducing the necessary modifications to the Instrument. 

This report provides an overview of the projects accepted within the first three years, 2007-
2009, of INSC programming, as well as their actual status of implementation.  The evaluation 
has also taken into account the indicative programming for the period 2010-2011, in particular 
AP  2010  in  order  to  assess  strategic  changes  regarding programme objectives, the extent of 
global coverage and its evolution.  

This  overview  of  projects  and  their  status  is  outlined  in  the  Sections  3  –  8,  whereas  the 
developments,  achievements  and  impact  are  discussed  in  Section  9.  In  Section  10  the 
organisation of the implementation of the INSC Regulation is evaluated. The conclusions and 
recommendations of this evaluation are presented in Section 11. 

3  Institute  for  Energy,  Petten  (NL);  Institute  for  Transuranium  Elements  Institute,  Karlsruhe  (DE);  Institute  for  the  Protection  and  the 

Security of the Citizens, Ispra (IT). 
4 Council Regulation No 300/2007, article 21. 

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The evaluation addresses the following main issues:  

(i) 

(ii) 

(iii) 

(iv) 

the extent to which the approved projects comply with the INSC objectives;  

the coverage of the various objectives and measures of the INSC Regulation by 
the  approved  projects,  both  technically  and  geographically  and  how  this  is 
evolving;  

the efficacy of programme implementation, and 
the extent to which recommendations made in a review5 of the TACIS Nuclear 
Safety  Programme  for  improving  implementation,  in  particularly  in  the 
regulatory  area,  have  been  taken  into  account  in  the  implementation  of  the 
INSC Regulation. 

For  the  purpose  of  this  evaluation  the  eight  measures  for  support,  foreseen  in  the  INSC 
Regulation, were grouped into the following four main areas of cooperation, namely:  

- 

- 

- 

- 

Strengthening regulatory authorities; 

Improving operational safety of nuclear facilities; 

Strengthening nuclear safeguards, and 

  Developing  responsible  management  of  spent  nuclear  fuel  and  radioactive 
waste,  

decommissioning and site remediation.  

For each of these four areas of cooperation an evaluation of cooperation was made separately 
for  each  of  the  main  geographical  regions.  Exceptions  are  made  for  the  Russian  Federation 
where cooperation, across all technical areas, is covered in one single, self contained section 
(Section 2) and for the cooperation to strengthen nuclear safeguards, which is also covered by 
a single section (Section 5).   

Projects  that  do  not  fall  within  one  or  other  of  the  four  main  areas  of  cooperation  are 
evaluated in Section 8. 

The evaluation is based on an analysis of programme documentation including Commission 
Strategic  Papers  concerning  the  INSC  programme,  the  Annual  Action  Plans,  the  project-
specific  Action  Fiches,  the  Terms  of  Reference  of  the  Technical  Specifications,  Result 
Oriented  Monitoring  Reports,  project-specific  reports  from  contractors,  unpublished  letters 
and protocols from meetings.  In addition, information on financial and organisational aspects 
of  the  projects  was  obtained  from  the  database  of  the  European  Commission  and  from 
Commission officers. 

For each of these four areas of cooperation the number of projects in each cooperation area 
accepted  in  each  AP,  the  budget  and  the  number  of  countries  involved  are  summarised 
below6.  

AP 2007*** 

AP 2008 

AP 2009 

Total 2007-2009 

AP 2010 

5 The TACIS Nuclear Safety Review Report, May 2010, by Italtrend. European Commission, EuropeAid Co-operation Office (AIDCO A4 ) 

contract N° 172067. (Report presented by the Commission to the INSC Committee). 

6 A detailed categorisation of the projects according to the eight measures, outlined in the INSC Regulation, is presented in Appendix I.  

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budget 

number 

budget 

number 

budget 

number 

budget 

number 

budget 

number 

M€ 

projects  countries 

M€ 

projects  countries

M€ 

projects  countries

M€ 

projects 

M€ 

projects  countries

4.6 

3 

3** 

11.2 

8 

5** 

10.7 

6 

6 

26.5 

17 

13.0 

27.8 

4* 

4** 

79.6 

16* 

16.0 

7 

3 

7 

3** 

30.9 

8* 

- 

- 

11.5 

2* 

3 

- 

1 

20.9 

4 

0.5 

1 

36.7 

5* 

3 

1 

2 

- 

- 

31.7 

5 

1.5 

1 

2** 

2.0 

1 

1** 

3.5 

2 

- 

3 

1 

0.5 

1 

- 

- 

- 

79.9 

12* 

32.6 

6 

5** 

7.0 

4 

- 

- 

- 

48.5 

14* 

4** 

71.3 

19* 

8** 

73.7 

17* 

10** 

193.5 

50* 

61.6 

16 

10** 

Regulatory 
Authorities 

Operational 
Safety 

Nuclear 
Safeguards 

Waste 
Management 
etc 

Others 

Total 

*)     

Some projects have been split into several different sub-projects, which are contracted separately. 

**)   

Some projects concern more than one country.  

***) 

Budget for AP 2007 is exclusive the funds (28.3 M€) allo cated to cooperation projects with the Russian Federation. 

2. 

COOPERATION WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 

The  2007  and  2008  annual  Action  Plans  for  the  Russian  Federation  contained  eleven 
cooperation projects aimed at strengthening the capabilities of the regulatory body, improving 
operational safety of NPPs and improving radioactive waste management, decommissioning 
and remediation activities.  Failure to conclude the necessary Financing Agreements for AP 
2007 and AP 2008 resulted in these important projects being cancelled by the Commission. 
All of these projects had a lengthy history, were well prepared and fully compliant with INSC 
objectives  and  were  intended  to  further  improving  nuclear  safety  and  the  nuclear  safety 
culture in the Russian Federation. 

The funding foreseen for these cancelled projects was 28.3 MEuro in 2007 and 13.5 MEuro in 
2008.    The  former  was  lost  from  the  budget  available  for  INSC  programming  but  the  latter 
was  saved  by  reallocation  to  projects  in  other  countries.  Since  then  no  new  proposals  for 
cooperation within INSC have been developed with the Russian Federation but the situation 
remains under continuing review. 

Implementation of several soft and hard7 OSA projects of the AP’s 2004, 2005 and 2006 for 
cooperation  with  the  Russian  Federation  within  the  TACIS  programme  was  ongoing  in  the 

7 Hard-OSA projects are characterised by the delivery of specific components or equipment intended to enhance the safety and/or reliability 
of the nuclear power plant or related systems.  

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early years of the INSC programme. Therefore, several soft on-site assistance contracts with 
EU Utilities were renewed for those NPPs where such projects were ongoing, in particular the 
following:  

Kola NPP: The soft OSA activities being implemented under INSC are all on schedule. Regarding the 
underlying ongoing Plant Improvement Project (PIP) at Kola NPP, good results have been reported:  
Factory  Acceptance  Testing  (FAT)  has  been  completed  for  the  supply  of  special  valves  and  for  the 
supply of a radiation monitoring system. The quality of the results for the methodology and dosimetric 
equipment supply of an ALARA improvement project was excellent. 

Kalinin  NPP:  Implementation  of  an  ongoing  PIP  at  Kalinin  NPP  was  delayed  by  a  year  due  to  the 
poor  quality  of  the  equipment  and  software  provided  by  Russian  subcontractors.  The  renewed  soft 
OSA  contract  under  INSC  will  guide  the  further  completion  of  this  PIP  and  provide  the  transfer  of 
operational experience on the following: severe accident management; development of a human factor 
approach; risk analysis in work preparation; and training and exchange of experience.  The transfer of 
knowledge  and  methodology  has  been  very  efficient  consequent  upon  the  long  term  cooperation 
between the teams from Kalinin and Tihange NPP. 

including: 

improvement  of  safety  organisation; 

Beloyarsk and Smolensk NPP: A wide range of soft OSA topics are being addressed in this 
follow-on  project 
inspection  and 
instrumentation  and  safety  systems;  development  of  a  near  miss  reporting  system; 
enhancement of safety culture; review of plant maintenance according to OSART guidelines; 
and a continued programme of exchange of operators.  In addition, support is being provided 
for  Plant  Improvement  Projects  at  the  respective  NPP.    These  are  concerned  with  the 
replacement of safety related parts of the Fast Breeder Reactor BN-600 at Beloyarsk and the 
design  of  a  new  Radwaste  Treatment  Facility  and  equipment  for  analysis,  process  and 
monitoring  control  at  Smolensk.  Most  activities  are  on  schedule  and  there  is  a  strong 
commitment of the local experts to ensuring the success of the projects.  

The  contract  for  the  Joint  Management  Unit,  JMU,  in  Moscow,  an  implementation-support 
and liaison office for nuclear safety issues, was  renewed by  the end of 2009,  though  scaled 
down substantially in size, scope and duration.  

Monitoring reports on these follow-on soft OSA and JMU services are very positive regarding 
the  quality  of  services  provided,  their  punctuality  and  their  positive  impact  on  the  ongoing 
projects and negotiations related to a possible restart of cooperation within INSC.  

 This  discontinuation  of  cooperation  with  the  Russian  Federation  is  a  most  unfortunate 
development in the steady improvement of the safety culture and nuclear safety in the Russian 
Federation  that  started  with  the  TACIS  programme  in  the  early  90’s.  Considering  the 
neighbourhood aspects, the fact that the RF is a substantial exporter of nuclear technology and 
given the considerable mutual benefits that would result from further cooperation between the 
EU and the RF on improving nuclear safety and further developing the nuclear safety culture 
in the RF within the scope of the INSC programme, the Commission should be encouraged to 
continue exploring mechanisms that could end the current impasse. 

Soft-OSA  projects  are  characterised  by  an  exchange  of  knowledge  towards  key  personnel,  based  on  training,  quality  assurance, 
documentation systems, and improvement of safety awareness, safety management, and project management in general, as well as a whole 
host of similar activities provided by or facilitated by the on-site assistance Utility. 

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3. 

COOPERATION TO STRENGTHEN REGULATORY AUTHORITIES 

3.1. 

3.1.  ENP-East and Central Asia 

Cooperation  with  regulatory  bodies  in  countries  covered  by  the  European  Neighbourhood 
Policy  –  East  (ENP-East)  and  Central  Asia  was  well  established  during  the  TACIS 
programme.  It is being further consolidated under INSC and extended to other countries in 
Central Asia. 

3.1.1. 

3.1.1. Ukraine 

Cooperation  with  Ukraine  was  the  most  extensive  in  this  region  in  the  past  and  is  likely  to 
continue  under  the  current  INSC  strategy  for  2007  -  2013  (as  well  as  under  the  revised 
strategy  for  2010  –  2013)  given  the  scale  and  diversity  of  the  nuclear  installations  in  the 
country, the continuing legacy of the Chernobyl accident and plans to expand significantly the 
installed nuclear energy capacity.  Six cooperation projects have been approved in the annual 
AP  2007  –  2009  but  none  has  yet  begun  with  all  still  being  at  one  or  another  stage  of  the 
procurement  process.  Ukraine  is  also  involved  in  a  regional  cooperation  project  with 
Armenia. All of the projects are very well conceived and are more strategically focused than 
in  the  past.  They  can  be  expected  to  make  a  major  contribution  to  achieving  the  national 
strategy8 of enhancing  the  capabilities of the regulatory body and  in harmonising Ukrainian 
regulatory approaches with best international practice. 

Cooperation is foreseen across a wide range of important areas including: the development of 
regulatory frameworks for research reactors, the control of highly active radioactive sources 
and the transport of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste; the use of more risk informed 
approaches to regulation; developing regulatory requirements for severe accident management 
and  for  assessing  the  safety  of  reactor  pressure  vessels;  the  installation  of  the  RODOS 
decision  support  system9  for  the  management  of  any  future  nuclear  accident;  strengthening 
the  regulatory  capacity  for  assessing  the  safety  of  and  licensing  all  types  of  waste 
management facilities; and harmonising regulatory requirements with the Western European 
Nuclear Regulatory Authorities (WENRA). 

The  success  of  some  project  tasks  will  require  effective  cooperation  with  operational  safety 
projects being implemented in parallel (see Section 4).  Difficulties were encountered in the 
TACIS  programme  with  the  effective  integration  of  interlinked  regulatory  and  operational 
safety  projects  but  procedures  were  developed  to  overcome  them,  albeit  not  always  fully 
implemented. Steps should be taken to ensure that these procedures are properly followed in 
relevant ongoing and future INSC projects. 

3.1.2. 

3.1.2. Other ENP-East and Central Asia 

Armenia: 

Cooperation  with  the  Armenian  regulatory  body,  ANRA,  covers  a  wide  range  of  topics 
including  emergency  planning  and  preparedness,  training  of  new  staff,  developing  licensing 
and inspection procedures, reviewing probabilistic safety analyses, licensing numerous safety 

8 SNRCU, Programme for Development and Improvement of Ukraine’s Nuclear Regulatory System (Strategy Paper), 2005. 
9 RODOS is the Real time On-line  DecisiOn  Support system, developed with support from  the EURATOM  research programme and is 

used to support the management of emergency situations in NPPs in several European countries.  

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improvements  on  the  operating  reactor,  evaluating  improvements  in  seismic  safety,  and 
quality management. Two cooperation projects have been accepted in AP 2007 and AP 2009; 
the former began in late 2008 and the latter is still to be implemented. 

Cooperation  could  be  more  strategically  focused  in  future.    The  quasi-continuous  support 
being provided in ongoing projects by EU consultants to senior management in ANRA will 
help in this respect.  Some concerns persist over the absorption capacity of ANRA given the 
scale  and  diversity  of  the  cooperation  but  these  have  moderated  following  more  recent 
improvements  in  staffing  levels;  this  issue,  however,  warrants  continuing  oversight.  The 
licensing  of  the  numerous  safety  improvement  measures,  many  of  which  are  being 
implemented  in  operational  safety  projects  (see  Section  4)  is  the  most  challenging  and 
important issue in the short term.   

Belarus: 

Cooperation with Belarus is a continuation of that begun under the TACIS programme, albeit 
at a much enhanced level following the decision of the Belarus government to proceed with 
the  exploitation  of  nuclear  energy.    The  focus  of  the  foreseen  cooperation  is  on  the 
establishment of legislative and regulatory frameworks for nuclear safety that are broadly in 
accord  with  best  international  practice.    Two  projects  (AP  2008  and  AP  2009)  have  been 
accepted and are in one or another stage of the contracting phase. Both are well conceived and 
are addressing key issues.  A national action plan will be developed for establishing a strong, 
independent  and  competent  regulatory  body.    The  functions  in  the  key  areas  of  licensing, 
inspection  and  enforcement  will  be  established  along  with  capabilities  for  carrying  out 
regulatory  reviews  of  safety  analyses  reports,  environmental  impact  assessments  and 
probabilistic safety analyses. The sole aspect of the ongoing cooperation that is questionable 
is  the  support  foreseen  for  the  purchase  of  radiological  monitoring  equipment.    While  such 
equipment will doubtless  be  useful,  it  is arguable whether it is a priority at this time and/or 
whether the timing of its purchase could have been better optimised.  

Georgia: 

Cooperation with Georgia is a continuation of that started in the TACIS programme.  It has a 
narrower  scope  than  that  in  most  other  countries  and  focuses  on  the  development  of 
regulations  for  the  use  of  radiation  in  medicine  and  for  waste  management,  training  in 
regulatory  practice  and  safety  evaluation,  and  supporting  the  re-assessment  of  the  safety  of 
existing  waste  management  facilities,  all  of  which  are  important  issues  in  the  Georgian 
context.  Implementation  of  the  project  has  been  delayed  due  to  the  very  limited  absorption 
capacity of the Georgian regulatory body.  

Regional activities: 

In  addition  to  the  projects  in  each  country,  an  important  regional  project  involving  Ukraine 
and Armenia is being undertaken.  Policy and technical advice and training are being provided 
to support the two regulatory bodies in the preparation of future INSC cooperation projects.  
An  assessment  is  also  being  made  of  the  impact  of  previous  nuclear  safety  projects.    The 

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project is about half completed and appears to be making reasonable progress. However, this 
can only be assessed later in terms of tangible improvements in the quality of future proposals 
for cooperation and whether the indicators used to measure impact can be used more widely 
(i.e., for INSC).    

3.2. 

3.2.  ENP-South and Middle East 

Egypt, Jordan and Morocco: 

Egypt,  Jordan  and  Morocco  are  at  varying  stages  in  the  development  of  nuclear  energy  for 
electricity  production  and/or  water  desalination.    In  parallel,  strong,  able  and  independent 
nuclear regulatory authorities are being established and underpinned by appropriate legislative 
provisions.    Cooperation  with,  and  transfer  of  knowledge  and  experience  from,  regulatory 
bodies in the EU will facilitate these developments and ensure that the regulatory approaches 
adopted reflect best international practice. 

Cooperation with Egypt and Jordan began in late 2009 and early 2010, respectively; that with 
Morocco is expected to begin in 2011.  Broadly comparable projects are being implemented 
in  each  country,  albeit  with  some  differences  in  scope  and  content  reflecting  national 
specificities and needs.  The projects are focusing on a number of key preparatory issues, in 
particular  the  development  of  a  strategy  for  establishing  a  competent  and  independent 
regulatory  body  and  how  cooperation  under  INSC  can  facilitate  its  achievement,  the 
establishment of a regulatory framework, development of criteria for prospective tendering of 
a  NPP,  and  enhancing  and  strengthening  professional  knowledge  on  regulatory  matters.  
Initial  monitoring  of  progress  in  both  the  Egyptian  and  Jordanian  projects  has  been 
undertaken.    Both  were  found  to  have  been  well  designed  and  were  being  implemented 
effectively.  The commitment, at both policy and operational levels in each country, and the 
large and active participation of national experts in workshops held so far, augurs well for the 
success and sustainability of both projects.  

Continuity of cooperation is critical at this formative stage and preparations are already well 
advanced  for  follow  on  projects  in  both  Egypt  and  Jordan  to  begin  in  late  2011  and  early 
2012, respectively.  These follow-on projects will focus on further refining the strategy of the 
regulatory body taking account of actual needs, providing more comprehensive training and 
knowledge  transfer  on  a  broad  range  of  regulatory  issues  (i.e.,  licensing,  inspection, 
enforcement,  establishing  a  ‘regulatory  pyramid’  of  regulations  and  associated  guidance, 
methods  for  reviewing  safety  assessments,  environmental  impact  statements,  siting  studies, 
etc).   

3.3. 

3.3.  Latin America 

Nuclear  energy  is  used  in  several  Latin  American  countries  (Argentina,  Brazil  and  Mexico) 
for the generation of electricity and its future use is under consideration by others (e.g., Chile, 
Venezuela).    Increases  in  the  installed  capacity  are  planned  in  Argentina  and  Brazil.  
Cooperation  with  regulatory  bodies  in  Latin  American  countries  has  been  evaluated  and 
priority given to those countries with existing reactors.  Projects with Brazil and Mexico are at 
an  advanced  state  of  preparation  and  cooperation  with  Argentina  is  currently  being  actively 
explored.  Cooperation with other countries is being considered and, if needed, is likely to be 
implemented  through  the  Ibero-American  Forum  of  Nuclear  and  Radiological  Regulators 
(FORO) of which Spain is an active member. 

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Mexico: 

Cooperation  in  Mexico  will  focus  on  issues  identified  in  a  recent  review  of  its  regulatory 
body,  CNSNS,  by  IAEA.    The  project  will  have  a  major  strategic  focus  involving  the 
development  of  knowledge  management,  training  strategies  and  a  Quality  Management 
System.    In  addition,  a  strategy  or  action  plan  for  further  enhancing  the  capabilities  of  the 
regulatory  body  will  be  developed  and  used  as  the  basis  for  identifying  priorities  for  future 
cooperation.  The project is expected to make a major contribution to the resolution of issues 
raised by the IAEA review and is likely to begin in 2011.  

Brazil: 

Cooperation  in  Brazil  will  address  a  number  of  issues  where  the  regulatory  body,  CNEN, 
needs to enhance its capabilities in order to effectively regulate improvements being made to 
the existing reactors and license a new reactor under construction.  The main objective will be 
to establish a sustainable capacity within CNEN for carrying out independent assessments, as 
part  of  the  licensing  process,  of:  the  safety  of  digital  I&C  systems;  severe  accident 
management  strategies/guidelines;  and  deterministic  assessments  of  fuel  performance.  
Training  will  be  a  key  element  of  this  project,  both  for  existing  staff  and  new  recruits  who 
will be increasingly needed in the next few years to replace an ageing workforce.  As in most 
other cooperation projects, a strategy or action plan for further enhancing the capabilities of 
the regulatory body will be developed and used to guide future cooperation.  The project will 
be highly beneficial to CNEN but its efficacy may be diminished by possible constraints on its 
recruitment  of  new  personnel.  The  project  is  ready  to  begin  as  soon  as  the  Financing 
Agreement is signed. 

3.4. 

3.4.  South-East Asia 

An evaluation10 was made, in terms of the Council criteria11, of the potential for cooperation 
with  regulatory  bodies  in  a  number  of  countries  in  South  East  Asia,  namely  Indonesia, 
Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singapore,  Thailand  and  Vietnam.    Vietnam  and  the  Philippines 
were identified as priorities for cooperation consequent upon a governmental decision in the 
former  to  use  nuclear  energy  for  electricity  production  and,  in  the  latter,  to  evaluate  the 
feasibility of refurbishing the ‘mothballed’ Bataan NPP which, if successful, may be followed 
by  an  application  for  regulatory  approval  for  its  licensing  and  operation.    Cooperation  on 
regulatory or policy aspects of waste management was also identified as a priority in many of 
the  countries,  albeit  for  the  longer  term  and  customised  to  the  specificities  of  each  country.  
Cooperation  between  regulatory  authorities  on  emergency  management  within  a  South-East 
Asian regional context was also judged to be desirable. 

10 Assistance to the European Commission in the Preliminary Definition and Critical Assessment of Proposals for Cooperation in the Field 
of  Nuclear  Safety  in  China  and  South  East  Asia  –  Needs  and  Potential  Areas  for  Cooperation  between  EC  and  Indonesia, 
Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singapore,  Thailand  and  Vietnam  in  the  Area  of  Nuclear  Safety,  Contract  NSI  2008/168-930,  Final 
Report, ATOS Origin, May 2009. 

11 Council Conclusions on assistance to third countries in the field of nuclear safety and security, 2913th Transport, Telecommunications and 

Energy Council meeting, Brussels, 9 December 2009. 

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Vietnam and the Philippines: 

Cooperation  projects  in  both  Vietnam  and  the  Philippines  are  at  an  advanced  stage  of 
development  and  are  expected  to  begin  in  2011,  subject  to  signature  of  the  respective 
Financing Agreements.  

Both  projects  will  focus  on  developing  and/or  strengthening  the  legal  framework  and 
managerial  and  technical  capabilities  of  the  respective  regulatory  bodies  and  their  technical 
support organisations.  The two projects will have many common elements, in particular the 
development of a strategy or action plan for the further development of the regulatory body 
and  a  cooperation  plan  to  facilitate  its  achievement,  improving  the  regulatory  framework, 
enhancing  the  capability  for  independent  review  of  deterministic  and  probabilistic  safety 
assessments, and a human resources plan and training programme for regulatory staff. 

Both projects and any necessary follow-up should provide a high degree of assurance that the 
regulatory approaches followed will be broadly comparable with best international practice. 

3.5. 

3.5.  China 

A  project  to  enhance  the  capabilities  of  the  technical  support  organisations  supporting  the 
Chinese  regulatory  authority  was  accepted  in  AP  2010.    The  project  will  focus  on  capacity 
building  in  a  broad  range  of  safety  and  regulatory  functions,  standards  development  and 
radioactive  waste  management.    The  project  will  fund  specified  activities  within  a  broader 
Technical Cooperation Programme agreed between China and IAEA. In addition to its direct 
benefits,  the  project  will  broaden  insights  that  will  enable  more  informed  judgements  to  be 
reached on the needs and potential scale and nature of future cooperation with China.  

3.6. 

3.6.  Multi-country project 

A  multi-country  project  concerned  with  developing  training  and  tutoring  (or  mentoring)  for 
experts from regulatory bodies and their technical support organisations was accepted in AP 
2010. It will be coordinated with ongoing IAEA activities in this area.  This is an ambitious 
project with the potential to make a major contribution to enhancing regulatory capabilities in 
a sustainable manner.  There is, however, a risk of overlap with training in individual INSC 
country projects given that training is a key element of most, if not all, of these projects.  This 
risk  is  recognised  and,  in  principle,  will  be  avoided  by  focusing  on  more  generic 
training/tutoring in the multi-country project leaving more specific or specialised training to 
individual country projects.  In practice, maintaining such a clear separation may be difficult 
and appropriate programming and management arrangements should be put in place to ensure 
that it is achieved.   

4. 

COOPERATION TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL SAFETY 

4.1. 

4.1.  ENP-East and Central Asia 

4.1.1. 

4.1.1. Ukraine 

Ukraine has 15 nuclear power units operated by NNEGC Energoatom at four sites. Numerous 
improvements  have  been  made  to  the  safety  of  the  operating  NPPs  in  recent  years,  several 
with  support  from  the  TACIS  programme.  Physical  protection  of  nuclear  facilities  and  the 
establishment  of  a  national  infrastructure  for  personnel  training  have  been  a  main  concern. 

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The  operational  safety  projects  implemented  within  the  INSC  programme  are  a  logical 
continuation of the previous actions but now emphasise the ‘soft’ approach. 

Seven  projects  have  been  accepted  in  AP  2007  to  AP  2010.    Three  are  currently  being 
implemented and the others are at various stages of development.  The scope and progress of 
each is summarised below. 

The first project began in June 2008 and is a continuation of a previous utility OSA project at 
South Ukraine NPP. It includes both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ elements.  The soft activities include: 
severe  accident  management:  approach  to  human  factors  in  event  analysis;  adaptation  of 
software for optimisation of the documentation of the behaviour of the plant reactor core, and 
support  to  seismic  qualification  of  the  structures,  systems  and  components.    The  hard 
activities include follow-up of the ongoing PIP during the warranty period till signature of the 
Final Acceptance Certificates.  This project has progressed effectively and is on schedule.  It 
is expected to achieve all foreseen outcomes by the project completion date.  

The second project is also a continuation of a previous utility OSA project and is concerned 
with  safety  improvements  (ongoing  PIP)  at  Khmelnitsky  NPP.  It  began  in  November  2008 
and is scheduled for three years. Its main activities include: the development and introduction 
of  an  operator  information  and  support  system;  risk-informed  optimisation  of  technical 
maintenance  and  repair  of  safety  systems;  and  safety  improvement  during  operation  and 
maintenance  of  facilities  for  low  radioactive  waste  treatment.    The  project  has  progressed 
effectively and is on schedule. The PIP involves upgrading of the electrical equipment of the 
reactor  control  protection  system  and  the  neutron  flux  monitoring  system  and  is  proceeding 
well. 

The third project is key for the sustainable implementation of a safety culture in Ukraine.  It 
involves  the  completion  of  the  National  Maintenance  and  Management  Training  Centre  at 
Zaporozhe NPP.  This Centre has been under development since 1992 but its completion has 
been delayed on several occasions for economic reasons. Major construction activities began 
in 2002 but were suspended in 2004. In 2007 a decision was taken to restart the construction 
with  completion  foreseen  for  the  end  of  2011.  This  completion  will  be  supported  within 
INSC.    The  project  began  in  2009  and  is  being  implemented  in  three  parts.    The  first  part 
comprises a review of best international practices in maintenance and management training, 
an  analysis  of  training  needs  for  maintenance  and  management  personnel,  the  development 
and  delivery  of  training  programmes  and  materials,  the  development  of  specifications  for 
technical  training  tools  of  a  general  and  specific  nature,  and  training  of  trainers  and 
implementation  of  pilot  training  courses.  The  inception  report  for  this  part  was  strongly 
criticised and a revised version was prepared in February 2010.  The second part involves the 
supply  of  general  equipment  (e.g.,  projectors,  computers,  office  devices,  furniture,  standard 
tools,  instruments,  etc)  for  pre-simulator  training  and  specialised  classrooms.  The  third  part 
involves the supply of more specialised equipment including full-scope and local simulators.  
In  principle,  no  institutional  or  financial  problems  are  foreseen  on  the  Ukrainian  side 
regarding the implementation of the project. Contracting the supply of these second and third 
parts of the project has, however, been delayed. 

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Terms of Reference for the fourth project were issued in December 2010 and project start is 
expected in 2011. The project is concerned with the development of a strategy for long-term 
safety  management  of  Ukrainian  NPPs  in  accordance  with  best  international  practice.    It 
comprises the following elements: recommendations and practices for pilot plants (including 
ageing  management  programmes  and  ageing  related  topics  of  the  Periodic  Safety  Review; 
recommendations  for  the  scope  of  Systems,  Scope  and  Components  subject  to  ageing 
management and on the capabilities and organisational structure of utility’s technical support 
organisations; development of methodological guidance for ageing management programmes 
for  SSCs  at  pilot  plants;  development  of  a  database  to  support  plant  ageing  management 
programmes;  training  of  personnel;  and  development  of  a  programme  to  disseminate  the 
results of the project to other (non-pilot) plants. 

The  fifth  project  is  concerned  with  improving  operational  and  maintenance  procedures  and 
safety management. Its results will be implemented at a ‘pilot’ NPP first and subsequently be 
‘rolled out’ to the other NPPs.  The following aspects will be addressed:  guidelines for severe 
accident  management;  operation  of  reactor  equipment  during  shutdown;  improvement  of 
NDT methodologies for in-service inspection of safety-important components; improvement 
of training for operators; and improvement of the control and minimisation of discharges of 
tritium and carbon-14. Terms of Reference for this project were completed in July 2010. 

The  remaining  two  projects  are  at  varying  stages  of  development  following  their  approval.  
They  are  concerned  with  making  improvements  in  each  of  the  following  areas  at  NNEGC 
Energoatom and its NPPs: operational and maintenance procedures and safety management; 
cultural, procedural and technical capabilities; and enhancing the effectiveness of operations, 
safety performance and human resources. 

4.1.2. 

4.1.2. Other ENP-East and Central Asia 

Armenia: 

The Armenian NPP uses a WWER-440/230 reactor of the so called ‘first generation’ which cannot be 
upgraded under reasonable economic conditions to current safety standards due to its specific design. 
The EU has taken the firm position that it should be shut down as soon as possible. However, due to 
the  lack  of  replacement  electricity  generation  capacity  and  the  country’s  needs,  the  Armenian 
Government decided that the power plant would need to continue operating for several more years. A 
Joint Donors Working Group was set up in 2005, at the initiative of the IAEA, to agree on priorities 
and provide funding for urgent nuclear safety improvements (IAEA Category II to IV safety issues) 
while the plant remains in operation.  

Three larger projects in the area of operational safety were accepted in the APs 2007-2009. 

One project consisting of six sub-projects in the area of operational safety has been accepted in the AP 
2007. These six sub-projects deal with modernization measures in the following areas: primary circuit 
in-service  inspection;  steam  generator  in-service  inspection;  sump  clogging  prevention;  analysis  and 
provision for the design solution of the high energy pipe integrity; and boron concentration monitoring 
system.  95%  of  the  budget  of  6.4  MEuro  has  been  contracted  and  all  sub-projects  except  one  are 
largely completed. 

The  second  project  consisting  of  several  sub-projects  in  the  area  of  operational  safety  has 
been  accepted  in  the  AP  2008.  The  sub-projects  are  concerned  with  improvements  in  the 

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following  areas:    operation  of  the  emergency  core  cooling  system  in  the  long  term  cooling 
mode; upgrading of the radiation protection system at ANPP which was installed in 1976 and 
which  is  deficient  in  many  respects;  installation  of  a  remote  shutdown  panel  and  a  post 
accident monitoring system; and enhancing the functioning of the main control room during 
both  the  operating  life  and  in  the  post-shutdown  phase  until  the  plant  is  decommissioned.  
Improvements in remote shutdown and post accident monitoring and in the functioning of the 
main  control  room  have  been  identified  by  IAEA  as  safety  critical  issues.  In  the  latter  case 
improvements are needed in instrumentation and control, in fire safety, in safe shutdown and 
protection from external hazards.  The upgrading of the radiation protection system is almost 
largely  completed.  Implementation  of  the  three  other  sub-projects  is  expected  to  begin  in 
2011.    

The  third  project,  concerned  with  supporting  the  nuclear  operator  has  been  accepted  in  AP 
2009.  This  support  involves:  improving  the  training  of  the  main  control  room  operators; 
improving  maintenance  practices;  development  of  a  decommissioning  concept  and  related 
licensing  documents;  implementation  of  a  pilot  decommissioning  project  and  improving  the 
reactor confinement spray system. The Financing Agreement was signed in September 2010 
and the project details are currently being developed.  

4.2. 

4.2.  ENP-South and Middle-East 

No  proposals  for  cooperation  have  yet  been  developed  with  ENP  South  and  Middle-East 
countries for the improvement of operational safety. 

4.3. 

4.3.  Latin America 

Cooperation on the improvement of operational safety has been agreed with Brazil. Initial discussions 
have been held with Mexico and Argentina and are expected to come to successful conclusion in 2011. 

Brazil: 

Brazil  has  a  medium-sized  civilian  nuclear  sector  with  activities  of  research  or  operational 
nature covering many stages of the fuel cycle.  It has developed a National Energy Strategy 
(10  years  energy  expansion  starting  in  2014)  which  includes  the  construction  of  several 
nuclear  power  plants.    The  nuclear  operator,  Eletronuclear,  is  part  of  Eletrobras  S.A.,  the 
Brazilian  state  company  for  the  production  and  distribution  of  electricity.  Eletronuclear 
operates the Angra 1 and Angra 2 NPPs and has Angra 3 NPP, a replica of Angra 2, under 
construction.  Electronuclear is facing a number of major challenges consequent upon the lack 
of investment over the past 20 years and an ageing workforce that will need to be replaced.  
There  is  a  pressing  need  for  a  number  of  modernisation  activities  and  training  of  new 
personnel,  in  particular  in  the  field  of  nuclear  safety.    This  has  motivated  their  interest  in 
cooperation under the auspices of INSC.  

One project, consisting of three sub-projects has been accepted for cooperation in AP 2009.   

The  first  sub-project  is  concerned  with  severe  accident  management  guidelines  for  Angra  2 
and  aims  to:  transfer  best  international  practice  and  experience  in  NPP  safety  assurance  at 
design and beyond design basis; reduce the probability of human errors during diagnosis and 
decision  making  while  responding  to  severe  accidents;  integration  of  the  severe  accident 
management  guidelines  into  the  emergency  documentation  system  thereby  improving  the 
effectiveness of the Electronuclear accident management strategies and of defence in depth. 

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The second sub-project is concerned with safety assessment of human factors engineering for Angra-1. 
Its  objectives  are:  to  ensure  that  Angra-1  incorporates  the  most  important  lessons  learned  from  the 
Three Miles Island accident (TMI, USA, 1979) and is adopting best international practice concerning 
human  factors  engineering  and  safety  upgrades,  in  particular  as  implemented  in  similar  modern 
nuclear  power  plants;  to  contribute  to  improving  safety  performance  and  management  during 
operations and maintenance; and to enhance the overall safety culture. 

The  third  sub-project  is  concerned  with  improving  safety  through  an  upgrade  of  the 
Instrumentation  and  Control  (I&C)  system  for  Angra-2.    This  sub-project  will  enable  the 
transfer of best EU and international know-how on operational safety culture to the Brazilian 
utility. Suitable I&C equipment and technical and regulatory requirements will be identified 
and  a  replacement  strategy  developed  to  upgrade  the  existing  (obsolete)  I&C  systems 
important  for  safety.  It  is  expected  that  modern  digital  technology  will  be  recommended  to 
replace  the  existing  system  and  that  this  will  be  in  compliance  with  current  licensing 
requirements, whilst having a minimal impact on plant operation.  Based on the outcome of 
this sub-project, Angra-2 NPP will develop documentation necessary for tendering the supply 
of the I&C equipment.  

Terms  of  Reference  have  been  agreed  and  these  sub-projects  are  ready  to  start  subject  to 
signing of the Financing Agreement. 

4.4. 

4.4.  South-East Asia 

No  proposals  have  yet  been  developed  with  countries  in  South-East  Asia  regarding 
cooperation on the improvement of operational safety. 

5. 

COOPERATION TO STRENGTHEN NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS  

One  project,  accepted  in  AP  2008,  is  concerned  with  strengthening  nuclear  safeguards  in 

Armenia.  

The  Terms  of  Reference  for  this  project  are  currently  under  preparation  and  tendering  is 

envisaged for  

2011.   

Other  accepted  (AP  2008)  nuclear  safeguard  activities  were  cancelled  due  to  failure  to 
conclude the related Financing Agreement.  

The Instrument for Stability, IFS12, is also concerned with cooperation aimed at strengthening 
safeguards. The strategies of the INSC and IFS would benefit from clarifying which measures 
are eligible for support from these programmes.   

12 Regulation (EC) No. 1717/2006 

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6. 

COOPERATION TO DEVELOP RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT   OF 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 

6.1. 

6.1.  ENP-East and Central Asia 

6.1.1. 

6.1.1. Ukraine 

Cooperation  projects  in  Ukraine  regarding  the  management  of  spent  nuclear  fuel  and 
radioactive waste and nuclear decommissioning are implemented through multi-lateral or bi-
lateral cooperation with the Ukraine. Multi-lateral cooperation concerning the Chernobyl site 
is  implemented  through  financial  contributions  to  funds  which  are  implemented  through 
EBRD.  Bi-lateral  cooperation  is  implemented  through  AidCo.  One  bi-lateral  cooperation 
project comprises several sub-projects, one of which is also a multi-lateral project aiming at 
improving the management of spent high radioactive sources in Ukraine.    

Multi-lateral projects implemented through EBRD: 

Two international donor funds have been established to support major investment projects at 
the  Chernobyl  site.  These  are  the  Chernobyl  Shelter  Fund  and  the  Nuclear  Safety  Account. 
Both  funds  are  managed  by  the  EBRD.    In  the  period  2007  –  2009  the  Commission 
contributed 15 MEuro to the NSA and 45.4 MEuro was contributed to the Chernobyl Shelter 
Fund. This brings the total financial contribution of the Commission to the Chernobyl Shelter 
Fund to 239.6 MEuro.  

In AP 2010 a further 17 MEuro is scheduled to be contributed to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund.   

Additional  funding  will  be  required  due  to  important  delays  and  cost  overruns.    Current 
estimates are that there is a financial gap of 740 MEuro overall. 

The Court of Auditors, in an audit in 2008, recommended that the Commission should seek 
for a greater involvement in the management of the Fund. A response of the Commission and 
of  other  donors  has  resulted  in  the  establishment  in  October  2009  of  a  G8  NSSG  –  EBRD 
Chernobyl Contact Group. The purpose of the Contact Group is to ensure an efficient, more 
detailed and continuous exchange of information to achieve a common understanding among 
donors and the EBRD on the technical issues, corresponding cost implications and associated 
risks.  A complete overview of the situation concerning cost and schedule is being prepared.  

Bi-lateral projects, implemented through AidCo: 

Four  cooperation  projects  regarding  the  management  of  radioactive  waste  have  been 
developed within the APs 2007-2009. 

The  project  initiated  in  2007  involves  the  supply  of  additional  equipment  for  the  ICSRM 
project in Chernobyl and providing additional services.  This project is split into two parts: a 
contract  or  the  supply  of  a  ventilation  system  for  a  facility  in  Chernobyl  for  the  temporary 
storage  of  high  radioactive  waste  and  a  service  contract  supporting  the  licensing  and 
providing supervision of the hot testing of the ICSRM facility. The Technical Specifications 
of  the  supply  contract  were  approved  by  the  end  of  2008,  subsequently  contracted  and 

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completed  successfully  by  the  end  of  2010.  The  service  contract  was  also  contracted  and  is 
still ongoing. 

Two other projects, initiated in 2008, are focusing on improving the long term management of 
radioactive  waste.  The  first  is  concerned  with  improving  radwaste  classification  and 
management in Ukraine. Its Financing Agreement was signed in December, 2009. The latter 
concerns cooperation with the development of a feasibility study and a preliminary design for 
a  near-surface  facility  for  the  long-term  interim  storage  (ISF)  of  long-lived  and  high  level 
radioactive waste at the Vektor complex in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. 

The first project is split into several subprojects.  

The contract for the first sub-project was signed in April 2010 and is part of a multi-lateral 
cooperation  to  improve  the  system  for  the  management  of  highly  active  spent  radioactive 
sources in the Ukraine. Its implementation is coordinated  by  the  Department  of  Energy  and 
Climate Change, DECC, in the UK. 

The second sub-project concerns the improvement of the infrastructure for radioactive waste 
management  in  the  Chernobyl  Exclusion  Zone.  This  requires  additional  facilities  for  the 
Buriakovka  radioactive  waste  disposal  site  which  are  needed  to  meet  present  and  future 
demands. The envisaged enlargement of the site must enable the safe disposal of the expected 
waste  generated  in  the  decommissioning  of  the  Chernobyl  NPP  and  in  the  frame  of  other 
major  radioactive  waste  management  projects  in  the  Chernobyl  Exclusion  Zone  and  also 
improve the overall safety of the operation of the disposal site. This sub-project encompasses 
amongst  others  a  feasibility  study  of  the  potential  solutions,  the  development  of  the  basic 
design of the intended interim storage facilities,  the  preparation  of an environmental impact 
study,  a  safety  assessment  report  and  the  development  of  the  necessary  licensing 
documentation. 

The third sub-project is concerned with the improvement of radioactive waste management by 
supporting  the  preparation  of  a  radwaste  classification  scheme.  The  latter  will  be  in 
accordance with the internationally agreed safety standards and based primarily on long term 
safety considerations and final disposal routes. It is expected to contribute to the reduction in 
costs by enabling the more efficient management of waste.  

The  fourth  sub-project  is  dedicated  to  the  development  of  recommendations  to  improve  the 
existing  radioactive  waste  treatment  system,  minimise  the  operational  waste  generated,  and 
implement  integrated  systems  for  radioactive  waste  accounting  and  control  at  Ukrainian 
nuclear power plants and for radioactive waste arising from shut-down and decommissioning 
of  nuclear  power  plants  in  Ukraine.  Recommendations  will  be  developed  on:  available 
technologies  for  the  decontamination  of  metallic  components,  civil  structures,  and  large 
components  and  for the treatment of liquid effluents; detailed indication and analysis of  the 
characteristics of the technologies available on the market and cost-benefit analysis, as well as 
a concept for the transport of large contaminated components. Training of nuclear power plant 
staff  in  waste  minimisation  procedures,  waste  pre-treatment  and  treatment  techniques  will 
also be included. 

The fifth sub-project will contribute to the improvement of operational safety for the transfer 
of  processed  radioactive  waste  to  the  Exclusion  Zone  disposal  and  storage  facilities  in 
Ukraine.  A feasibility study and a cost-benefit analysis will be prepared for the construction 

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of  a  railway  branch  connecting  the  Vektor  and  Buriakovka  sites  with  the  national  railway 
system.  

The  Terms  of  Reference  for  these  latter  four  sub-projects  have  been  developed  in  2010.  Tendering 
started in the summer of 2010 and implementation is expected to start in 2011. 

The second project of AP 2008 concerns cooperation on the development of a feasibility study and a 
preliminary design for a near-surface facility for the long-term interim storage (ISF) of long-lived and 
high level radioactive waste at the Vektor complex in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. The radioactive 
waste  to  be  stored  will  include  that  generated  as  a  result  of  the  construction  activities  for  the 
Chernobyl  Shelter  and  the  dismantling  operations  of  units  1  to  3  of  the  Chernobyl  NPP.  The  ISF  is 
intended to provide for the reliable and safe storage of LL-ILW and HLW for up to 100 years.  The 
Terms  of  Reference  for  this  project  were  endorsed  in  May  2008.  Because  the  Financing  Agreement 
covering  this  project  had  not  been  concluded  by  March  2010,  derogation  was  granted  to  start 
procurement. Tendering took place in summer 2010 and implementation is expected to start in 2011.  

The  project  accepted  in  AP  2009  will  support  the  establishment  of  a  national  waste  management 
organisation and the improvement of the radioactive waste management infrastructure in Ukraine. 
The Terms of Reference for this project have been drafted and the Financing Agreement was signed in 
November 2010. 

In AP 2010 a project was accepted to provide support for radioactive waste management in 
Ukraine. This will be elaborated in 2011. 

6.1.2. 

6.1.2. Other ENP-East and Central Asia 

Project  proposals  regarding  cooperation  in  the  improvement  of  radioactive  waste  and  spent 
nuclear fuel management in other countries in ENP-East and Central Asia have been included 
in the APs 2008, 2009 and 2010. 

Armenia: 

A  project  aimed  at  establishing  a  radioactive  waste  management  strategy  in  Armenia  was 
accepted  in  AP  2009.    It  will  address  the  responsible  management  of  all  radioactive  waste 
generated in Armenia with special emphasis on the wastes arising during the future shutdown 
and decommissioning  of  ANPP  at  Medzamor.  The Terms of  Reference are currently being 
developed. 

Georgia: 

A project aimed at improving the management of radioactive waste in Georgia was accepted 
in  AP  2008.  A  survey  and  strategic  assessment  of  the  currently  operated  radwaste  disposal 
and interim storage sites will be made with the aim of improving their safety.  A mission to 
analyse  the  situation  in  more  detail  took  place  October,  2010.    This  analysis  confirmed  the 
scope  of  this  project  and  it  concluded  that  further  discussions  would  be  needed  to  avoid 
duplication  with  support  from  other  donors  and  to  fill  gaps.  A  meeting  between  donors  is 
envisaged in January 2011. Terms of Reference are currently being drafted. 

A second cooperation project on the same subject is included in AP 2009. This project aims to 
support the operators in the preparation of safety assessment reports for the radwaste disposal 

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and interim storage sites. Its implementation is likely to be delayed as it is dependent on the 
availability of data being collected in the first project.  

Central Asia: 

No  projects  have  been  developed  for  Central  Asia  within  the  first  three  years  of 
implementation of the INSC programme. Two cooperation projects have been accepted in AP 
2010  concerning  the  remediation  of  uranium  production  legacy  sites.  The  first  project 
involves cooperation with Uzbekistan for an integrated environmental impact assessment and 
feasibility  study for  the management and remediation  of uranium production legacy sites of 
Charkesar and Yangiabad.  The second project involves regional cooperation in establishing a 
legislative  and  regulatory  framework  for  the  remediation  of  uranium  mining  legacy  sites  in 
Central Asia, establishing a regional watershed monitoring system and for capacity building 
in analytical techniques, training and education and information exchange. 

Both  projects  are  expected  to  begin  in  2011  or  2012,  the  actual  timing  being  largely 
determined by when the Financing Agreements are signed. 

6.2. 

6.2.  ENP-South and Middle-East 

No  proposals  have  yet  been  developed  with  ENP  South  and  Middle-East  countries  in  this 
area. 

6.3. 

6.3.  Latin America 

Preparatory discussions were held with Argentina and Brazil in 2009 and 2010 but an agreed 
proposal  for  cooperation  in  this  area  of  cooperation  has  yet  to  materialise.  Potential 
cooperation will be further explored in both countries in 2011. 

Mexico: 

There is currently no national policy for the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive 
waste  in  Mexico  resulting  in  several  radiological  liabilities  and  unclear  responsibilities.  
Parliament  has  requested  the  government  to  develop  a  national  policy.  This  has  led  to  a 
request to the Commission for cooperation within INSC.  A project has been accepted in AP 
2010 aiming at the development of a policy and strategy for the management of spent nuclear 
fuel  (including  provisions  for  its  safe  interim  storage)  and  radioactive  waste  in  Mexico  in 
cooperation  with  international  experts.  The  Terms  of  Reference  for  this  project  have  been 
drafted  and  are  being  discussed  with  the  Partner  country.  Project  start  is  expected  in  2011.  
The  project  will  enable  the  effective  transfer  of  the  development  of  legislation  and  of 
experience  gained.    It  is  likely  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  national  waste  management 
policy.   

6.4. 

6.4.  South-East Asia 

No proposals have yet been developed with countries  in  South-East  Asia for cooperation in 
this  area.  Cooperation  on  waste  management  was,  however,  identified  as  a  priority  in  a 

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number of countries in South-East Asia during a recent evaluation of regional needs, albeit on 
a longer timescale than for other areas of nuclear safety (see Section 3.4). 

6.5. 

6.5.  Multi-country project 

A multi-country project was approved in AP 2010 with the objective of connecting existing 
networks  for  enhancing  communication  and  training  in  radioactive  waste  management, 
decommissioning and environmental radiation.  IAEA is carrying out related activities in this 
area and appropriate coordination will be established.   

7. 

COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA 

The  global  reach  of  the  INSC  programme  places  even  greater  importance  on  establishing 
effective coordination and/or cooperation with other organisations concerned with promoting 
nuclear safety, notably the IAEA.  This need is fully recognised and measures are being taken 
to exploit synergies and existing structures within the Commission and IAEA. Cooperation is 
in place at various levels ranging from discussion of needs and identifying priorities, through 
joint  development  of  project  specifications,  to  the  co-financing  and  joint  management  of 
projects.  Maintaining effective cooperation between the Commission and IAEA, particularly 
regarding  the  INSC  programme,  will  be  challenging  but  is  in  the  mutual  interest  of  both 
entities and, more importantly, that of potential beneficiary countries.   

IAEA  is  implementing  a  number  of  multi-country  projects  with  INSC  support.  These  are 
being implemented under IAEA’s contracting arrangements but are jointly managed with the 
Commission. These multi-country projects are generally more ambitious in scope and content 
and,  as  a  consequence,  are  often  more  demanding  in  terms  of  project  management  and 
ensuring effective oversight and control.   

Three  such  projects  have  so  far  been  programmed  and  are  at  varying  stages  of 
implementation.  They  are  concerned  with  enhancing  national  and  regional  preparedness  for 
responding to radiation incidents and emergencies and contributing to projects being carried 
out  by  IAEA  within  their  Technical  Cooperation  and  Nuclear  Installations  Safety 
programmes, respectively.  The first project has a narrow focus while the other two address a 
wide  range  of  disparate  issues  including:  safety  culture  and  the  management  of  safety  in 
operating  NPP  in  Latin  America;  enhancing  the  safety  of  research  reactors  in  Uzbekistan; 
enhancing  seismic  safety  through  support  for  the  International  Seismic  Safety  Centre; 
strengthening regulatory capabilities for countries embarking on nuclear power, in particular 
in North Africa; regional capacity building in Asia, in particular building on the success of the 
Asian  Nuclear  Safety  Network  (ANSN);  advising  Central  Asian  countries  affected  by  the 
legacy of uranium mining and processing; transfer experience on occupational exposure in the 
nuclear industry and in other uses of radiation; supporting African countries, in particular in 
complying  with  the  Code  of  Conduct  on  research  reactors;  promoting  compliance  with  the 
Code  of  Conduct  on  the  safety  and  security  of  radioactive  sources  in  the  Mediterranean 
region;  and  reinforcing  the  regulatory  framework  in  countries  within  Eastern  Europe,  the 
southern Caucasus and Central Asia. 

All of the topics included within these multi-country projects are priorities within the INSC 
programme and the projects can reasonably be expected to make a significant contribution to 
enhancing  radiation  protection  and  nuclear  safety  in  the  countries  concerned.    In  practice, 
success  will  depend  on  the  efficacy  of  programming,  project  management  and  timely  and 
rigorous  external  monitoring,  all  of  which  will  be  challenging  given  the  scale  and  diversity 

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(both  geographically  and  technically)  of  the  issues  being  addressed.  The  current  project 
specifications, understandably at this stage, are concerned with broad objectives and contain 
little by way of detail on what will be done and where.  More detailed specification of each 
sub-project  will  be  needed  prior  to  its  start  and  should  be  subject  to  careful  scrutiny,  in 
particular ensuring clarity over what is to be achieved, when and with measurable outcomes.       

Many of the topics being addressed in the multi-country projects are also being addressed in 
past,  ongoing  or  planned  INSC  cooperation  projects  with  individual  countries.    Appropriate 
programme management and oversight arrangements will be needed to avoid duplication and 
ensure complementarity.     

In  addition  to  the  multi-country  projects,  IAEA  was  also  responsible  for  implementing  a 
single  country  project  in  Ukraine  concerned  with  assessing  compliance  of  Ukrainian  NPP 
with  IAEA  safety  standards  in  the  areas  of  design  safety,  operational  safety,  waste 
management  and  decommissioning  and  regulatory  issues.  This  project,  which  was  jointly 
managed with the Commission, was completed successfully and concluded that the Ukrainian 
NPPs  and  the  regulatory  body  were  compliant  with  by  far  the  majority  of  the  IAEA  safety 
standards and that the level of safety being achieved was satisfactory.  In all cases of non- or 
partial-compliance measures were being taken to remedy the situation.  

8. 

COOPERATION ON OTHER ISSUES 

A  regional  project,  which  commenced  in  June  2009,  is  being  implemented  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine  through  UNICEF  with  the  objective  of  improving  the  health  status  of  children, 
women  and  families  living  in  Chernobyl-affected  territories  of  Belarus  and  Ukraine.  A 
number  of  initiatives  are  being  taken  including  greater  provision  of  quality  health  care  for 
babies,  access  to  better  parenting  programmes,  prevention  of  iodine  deficiency  diseases 
through increased use of iodised salt in households, greater access to youth friendly services 
providing  information  and  knowledge  on  the  prevention  of  STI  and  HIV  infections,  the 
supply  of  medical  equipment  to  children’s  hospitals,  maternity  centres  and  youth  friendly 
health centres, and capacity building among health care professionals.  

The  project  builds  on  previous  initiatives.  It  was,  however,  contracted  rather  late  due  to 
difficulties  in  establishing  effective  cooperation  with  UNICEF  and  ensuring  appropriate 
visibility for the contribution of the Commission. It now appears to be proceeding well and is 
expected to result in significant improvements in the health of those targeted.   

However,  many  of  the  health  conditions  being  addressed  have  no  known  association  with 
exposure to radiation. Moreover, the health problems experienced in these Chernobyl affected 
regions  are  not  unique  and  occur  in  other  economically  and  socially  deprived  areas  of  both 
countries.   

It  is  arguable,  therefore,  whether  cooperation  on  this  issue  within  the  INSC  programme  is 
appropriate.  In future, it may be more effective to address this issue at a national level and 
seek assistance from organisations whose role is specifically focused on the improvement of 
health.    Such  an  approach  would  have  the  further  benefit  of  ensuring  that  resources  were 
allocated to where there was greatest health need.    

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9. 

DEVELOPMENT, ACHIEVEMENTS AND IMPACT 

Regulatory Assistance: 

All  of  the  24  accepted  projects  in  the  regulatory  assistance  area  (AP  2007  –  2010)  are  well 
conceived and fully compliant with the objectives of the INSC Regulation.   

Five  projects  have  already  been  contracted  and,  based  on  limited  monitoring  information, 
appear to be proceeding well. The remaining 19 projects are at one or another stage in their 
development and/or procurement process.    

The time between acceptance (annual  Action Plan) of a project and its start (contract) appears to be 
unduly long in many cases. For the five projects that have already been contracted, the average time to 
start  is  about  two  years,  albeit  with  wide  variation  between  projects  ranging  from  1  to  3  years.  The 
average time of project start for those yet to begin is likely to be of a similar magnitude or even longer 
(i.e., many of the projects approved in AP 2008 have yet to start some two years after their approval). 
The  time  taken  to  sign  Financing  Agreements  (typically  about  one  year,  albeit  with  significant 
variation between countries) is a major contributor to delay between the acceptance of a project and 
the start of its implementation.  Other factors, however, are also important given that the average time 
between signature of a Financing Agreement and project start is also about 1 year, albeit again with 
significant variation between projects.  The length of this further delay is surprising, in particular for 
regulatory assistance projects which are not subject to a tendering process and are concluded by direct 
agreement.   

Overall, a well conceived but slow start has been made in the regulatory assistance area of the 
programme.    In  addition  to  continued  cooperation  with  countries  that  participated  in  the 
former  TACIS  programme  (except  RF),  cooperation  with  a  further  eight  new  countries  has 
been  achieved.  This  is  a  commendable  outcome  in  the  relatively  short  time  since  the  INSC 
programme  began,  in  particular  given  the  challenges  of  establishing  effective  working 
relationships  at  both  policy  and  operational  levels  with  new  countries  and  the  perceived 
complexity  of  the  contracting  and  financial  arrangements.    These  new  countries  are  fully 
compliant with the criteria of eligibility as laid down in the Council Conclusions on assistance 
to third countries10; most are either embarking on new nuclear energy programmes or are in 
the process of expanding their programmes after a long period of stagnation.  

Operational safety: 

All  19  projects  accepted  in  the  area  of  operational  safety  are  well  conceived  and  are  fully 
compliant with the INSC objectives.  

Those  concerned  with  the  continuation  of  soft  on-site  assistance  in  support  of  Plant 
Improvement Projects (PIPs) at NPPs have been contracted on time, are progressing well and 
are providing effective support in implementing these PIPs.   

The  other  projects  in  the  area  of  operational  safety  are  suffering  from  slow  or  delayed 
implementation (see Section 4). Very few of the accepted projects have so far been contracted 
and  this  is  a  matter  of  concern  given  the  importance  of  the  projects  for  improving  nuclear 
safety  and  the  considerable  time  that  has  elapsed  since  their  acceptance.  Late  signing  of 
Financing Agreements is an important contributory factor as is the time spent in developing 

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Terms  of  Reference  compliant  with  AidCo  procurement  rules,  at  least  for  many  of  the 
projects.  

Nuclear safeguards: 

The sole project on nuclear safeguards, accepted in AP 2008, is still at a preparatory stage of 
development. Other approved nuclear safeguard activities were cancelled due to the failure to 
conclude  the  Financing  Agreements.  Strengthening  safeguards  is  also  eligible  for  support 
through another rather new instrument, the Instrument for Stability, IFS. The INSC and IFS 
strategies should be clarified with respect to the nature of cooperation in the area of nuclear 
safeguards that will be eligible for support from the respective programmes.  

Management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste: 

All  18  projects  accepted  in  AP  2007  –  AP  2010  to  support  the  development  of  responsible 
management  of  radioactive  waste  and  spent nuclear  fuel,  decommissioning  and  remediation 
of polluted sites are well conceived and fully compliant with the objectives of the Instrument 
for Nuclear Safety Cooperation. 

During  the  period,  2007  –  2010,  cooperation  on  the  management  of  radioactive  waste  and 
spent nuclear fuel gradually shifted towards support for the development or improvement of 
national  strategies  and  management  systems  rather  than  support  for  individual  nuclear 
facilities.  This  is  fully  compliant  with  the  INSC  objectives  and  also  in  line  with  the 
recommendations made in the TACIS Overall Review Report4.   

The time taken to implement these projects, following approval of the respective annual AP, 
appears  to  be  unduly  long.  Apart  from  the  financial  contributions  to  the  ongoing  larger 
construction  projects  in  Ukraine,  implemented  under  the  responsibility  of  the  EBRD,  and  a 
small  bi-lateral  sub-project  for  the  supply  of  a  ventilation  system  none  of  the  bi-lateral 
projects of AP 2007 or later have yet been completed. And apart from one multi-lateral sub-
project, to be implemented under coordination of DECC, none of the 6 projects accepted in 
AP  2008  or  later  were  contracted  by  summer  2010.  Consequently,  it  is  not  possible  at  this 
stage to make an evaluation of their actual achievements or monitored impact.  

Cooperation with IAEA: 

Synergies  between  INSC  and  IAEA  programmes  have  been  exploited  through  the 
establishment of effective coordination mechanisms.  These are to the mutual benefit of the 
Commission  and  IAEA  and,  more  importantly,  the  potential  beneficiaries.    Maintaining 
effective  coordination  with  IAEA  will  be  important  given  the  global  reach  of  INSC  and 
ensuring that targeted resources are effectively used for improving nuclear safety. Careful and 
timely  oversight  will  be  needed  of  the  larger  and  generally  multi-country  projects  being 
implemented  by  IAEA  with  INSC  support,  in  particular  to  ensure  that  the  sub-projects  are 
well 
to  avoid  duplication  and  ensure 
complementarity with other past or ongoing INSC projects.        

implemented  effectively, 

formulated  and 

The global development of the INSC programme: 

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The global character of the INSC programme is developing steadily.  

Cooperation  within  INSC  started  in  2007  with  four  partner  countries  (Armenia,  Belarus, 
Ukraine  and  the  Russian  Federation).  In  2010  cooperation  has  been  expanded  to  more  than 
fifteen countries (Armenia, Belarus, Brazil, China, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, 
Philippines,  Ukraine,  Uzbekistan,  Vietnam,  the  Russian  Federation  and  several  countries  in 
Central Asia). Cooperation with other countries is being explored.  

The initial focus for cooperation with new countries was strengthening regulatory authorities 
but progressively cooperation is being extended to improvement of operational safety and the 
development  of  responsible  management  of  spent  nuclear  fuel  and  radioactive  waste, 
decommissioning and site remediation. 

10. 

DISCUSSING INSC PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION 

Compliance of projects with INSC objectives: 

Nearly all projects accepted in the APs 2007 – 2009 appear to comply with the objectives set 
out in the INSC Regulation. 

Perhaps one exception (see Section 8) is the project aimed at improving the health of children 
living  in  areas  affected  by  the  Chernobyl  accident.    Unfortunately,  the  health  problems  in 
these areas are not unique and are prevalent in other economically and socially deprived areas 
in  the  affected  countries.    Consequently,  it  may  be  more  effective  in  future  to  address  this 
issue in a broader context and seek assistance or cooperation from organisations whose role is 
specifically focused on the improvement of health. Such an approach would have the further 
benefit of ensuring that resources were allocated to where there was greatest health need. 

Coverage of the various measures, eligible for support within INSCs: 

The first three INSC measures within “promotion of an effective safety culture” are used well 
in  many  of  the  projects  accepted  in  the  APs  2007  –  2009.  Only  the  fourth  INSC  measure, 
“development  and  implementation  of  strategies  for  decommissioning  existing  installations 
and  the  remediation  of  former  nuclear  sites”  has  been  used  well  by  Ukrainian  projects  but 
hardly not by projects of other countries. This is improving for projects accepted in AP 2010. 

The  fifth  INSC  measure,  “promotion  of  measures  to  ensure  adequate  protection  against 
ionising radiation from radioactive materials, in particular from high radioactive sources”, is 
also well used by several projects.  

The  sixth  measure,  “establishing  the  necessary  measures  for  the  implementation  of  nuclear 
safeguards”, is to date being addressed by only one project, which has yet to be implemented. 
Other projects in this area were accepted but subsequently cancelled. Consideration needs to 
be  given  to  whether  the  resources  being  allocated  to  this  area  are  commensurate  with  its 
relative  importance  in  the  overall  INSC  strategy  for  cooperation  and  the  need  for 
improvements.   The Instrument for Stability, IFS, is also concerned with cooperation aimed 
at strengthening nuclear safeguards at national and supra-national levels. The INSC and IFS 
strategies should be clarified with respect to the nature of cooperation in nuclear safeguards 
that will be eligible for support from the respective programmes. 

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The  seventh  measure,  “establishment  of  effective  arrangements  for  the  prevention  of 
accidents and mitigation of their consequences and for emergency-planning, preparedness and 
response,  civil  protection  and  rehabilitation  measures”  is  also  well  used  by  a  few  accepted 
projects.   

The  eighth  measure,  “measures  to  promote  international  cooperation  (including  in  the 
framework of relevant international organisations, notably IAEA), etc” has been widely used 
through  the  establishment  of  effective  coordination  between  the  Commission  and  IAEA.  
Cooperation  is  in  place  at  various  levels  ranging  from  discussion  of  needs  and  identifying 
priorities,  through  joint  development  of  project  specifications,  to  the  co-financing  and  joint 
management of projects.   

During  the  period,  2007  –  2010,  cooperation  on  the  management  of  radioactive  waste  and 
spent nuclear fuel gradually shifted towards support for the development or improvement of 
national  strategies  and  management  systems  rather  than  support  for  individual  nuclear 
facilities. Also in the area of regulatory assistance much greater strategic focus in projects has 
been achieved.  

Efficacy of programme implementation: 

All bi-lateral cooperation projects in all main areas of cooperation the time taken between the 
approval  of  the  well  prepared  project  proposals  and  the  start  of  their  implementation 
(contracting) appears to be unduly long. On average, this period is about two years but varies 
significantly between projects and in some cases even exceeds three years. Only few bi-lateral 
projects have so far been contracted. This is a matter of concern given the importance of the 
projects  for  improving  nuclear  safety  and  the  considerable  time  that  has  elapsed  since  their 
approval.  

The underlying causes for these delays could not be established within the constraints of this 
evaluation. It is therefore strongly recommended that these be investigated by the EC with a 
view to identifying measures to improve the overall performance in this regard.      

Some observations are: 

-  Late signing of Financing Agreements seems to be a major but not sole contributor 

to these delays. 

-  The  time  taken  to  develop  Terms  of  Reference  compliant  with  EC  procurement 

rules seems to be a further contributor, at least for several of the projects.  

Some suggestions could be: 

-  While the concluding of Financing Agreements is largely outside of the control of 
the  Commission,  the  time  needed  for  signature  could  be  reduced  by  starting  the 
preparation  of  the  Financing  Agreements  and  activating  the  related  procedures 
earlier in the process.  

-  An improvement might be that an interested country in sending its formal request 
for  cooperation  within  INSC  to  the  Commission,  should  already  commit  its 
Government to cooperate in timely signing related Financing Agreements.  
Initiating  the  preparation  of  Terms  of  Reference  as  soon  as  the  related  AP  is 
accepted also has the potential to significantly reduce the lead time before projects 
can actually start.  

- 

-  A  clear  distinction  should  be  maintained  between  those  projects  whose  start  has  been 
deliberately delayed (i.e., to ensure the availability of sufficient absorption capacity within 

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a  regulatory  body,  in  particular  those  with  limited  resources,  or  to  enable  effective 
scheduling and interfacing between an ongoing and follow-on projects) and those where 
undue  delay  has  resulted  from  weaknesses  or  deficiencies  in  procedures  and/or  their 
implementation.  

-  Due  account  should  be  taken  of  constraints  on  absorption  capacity  at  the  time  when 
decisions  are  taken  to  include  a  project  in  a  particular  AP.  When  absorption  capacity 
complications cannot be excluded it is recommended to allocate such projects to a later AP 
and to utilise available budgets to “more ready” projects.  

Improvements  in  the  INSC  implementation  in  comparison  to  implementing  the  TACIS 
programme: 

In  a  recent  review4  of  the  TACIS  nuclear  safety  programme,  a  number  of  issues  were 
identified where improvements could potentially be made to how the programme was being 
implemented in the area of regulatory assistance.  The more significant are addressed below, 
in particular in the context of changes or further developments that have since been made in 
the implementation of the INSC programme. 

The need for greater strategic focus: 

The lack of a strategic focus was identified as a significant weakness for a number of TACIS 
projects which appeared to have been selected on an ‘ad hoc’ basis as opposed to addressing 
strategically  important  needs.  This  failing  has,  in  principle,  been  overcome  in  the  INSC 
programme where there is now an obligation on the regulatory body to develop a strategy for 
its improvement together with an action plan on how this is to be achieved.  The strategy and 
action  plan  will  underpin  cooperation  within  INSC  and  facilitate  decisions  on  when 
cooperation in one or other area can be sensibly concluded. 

These  plans  will  be  key  to  successful  cooperation  and  should  be  subject  to  rigorous  and 
continuing scrutiny to ensure they remain of high quality throughout the cooperation.  

Longer term presence of EU experts in beneficiary countries and vice versa: 

The need for EU experts to spend longer periods in a beneficiary country and for regulators 
from  the  beneficiary  country  to  spend  longer  periods  working  with  EU  regulators  was 
identified  in  the  TACIS  review  as  an  important  means  of  enhancing  the  efficacy  of 
cooperation. Improvements can be expected in both respects during the implementation of the 
INSC  programme.  Explicit  reference  is  made  in  the  indicative  INSC  programme  for  2010-
2011 to the need for ‘… long term training of experts in the EU Member States…..’ and for 
‘… the long term presence of European experts in the beneficiary countries….’.  Furthermore, 
the successful provision of quasi-continuous support to senior management in the Ukrainian 
regulatory body in a recent project is being ‘rolled out’ elsewhere.   This  is  to  be welcomed 
and its use should be encouraged more widely unless there are contrary indications. 

 The inclusion of explicit targets in ToR on the expected duration of stays of EU experts in 
beneficiary  countries  and  vice  versa  is  recommended  along  with  related  performance 
indicators and their active monitoring.      

Inclusion of measurable performance indicators: 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
 
Performance  indicators  were  not  required  nor  explicitly  included  in  a  number  of  TACIS 
projects in the regulatory assistance area.  In their absence, the efficacy of both the internal 
management of projects and their external review/monitoring was impaired.  This deficiency 
appears  to  have  been  rectified  in  INSC  where  all  projects  now  include  measurable 
performance indicators. 

Proliferation in the number of EU organisations participating in projects: 

The number of EU organisations participating in some TACIS projects appeared to be larger 
than was strictly necessary or optimal and, in some cases, may have been detrimental to the 
effectiveness of the transfer of know-how and experience. These concerns have been largely 
overcome by the development of guidance in INSC on the preferred and/or maximum number 
of partners in projects depending on their size.  

Use of a single contractor for implementing regulatory assistance projects:  

Almost  all  of  the  regulatory  assistance  projects  within  TACIS  were  implemented  using 
RISKAUDIT  as  the  project  manager.  In  the  TACIS  review  it  was  recommended  that  this 
process be opened to competition in future; notwithstanding this, a decision has been taken to 
continue using RISKAUDIT in this role, in particular at a time when cooperation with many 
countries  is  at  a  formative  or  early  stage  of  implementation.    RISKAUDIT  projects  are, 
however, presently being subjected to enhanced contractual scrutiny and negotiation to ensure 
that they remain fully compliant with the requirements of the Terms of Reference as well as 
cost effective. 

The current practice of using a single contractor for project managing all regulatory assistance 
projects  should  be  kept  under  continuing  review  to  ensure  it  remains  optimal  and  well 
conceived.  Two  aspects  warrant  particular  consideration:  firstly  the  undoubted  benefits  that 
would  result  from  competition  and,  secondly,  the  need  to  ensure  that  suitably  qualified  and 
experienced  project  management  will  continue  to  be  available  for  these  projects  in  future. 
Increasing  demands  for  the  services  of  organisations  such  as  RISKAUDIT  are  likely  to  be 
experienced  as  a  result  of  the  nuclear  renaissance.    Moreover  the  global  reach  of  the  INSC 
programme will bring increased challenges, both geographical and cultural, for RISKAUDIT 
well  beyond  those  encountered  in  the  TACIS  programme.    In  this  context,  the  capacity  of 
RISKAUDIT to effectively manage an increasing number of geographically widely dispersed 
projects should be carefully monitored.  

INSC committees and the role of the Regulatory Authorities Management Group (RAMG): 

The arrangements for supporting the Commission in managing the TACIS programme have 
been  used,  largely  unchanged,  in  implementing  the  INSC  programme  to  date.    These 
arrangements  are  currently  being  revised  in  order  to  reinforce  the  role  of  the  INSC 
Management  Committee,  streamline  the  existing  technical  advisory  structures  and  provide 
more strategic and independent advice in the broader field of nuclear energy. 

The main changes being proposed are: 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
 
 
- the  INSC  Management  Committee  will  typically  meet  twice  per  year  and  give  formal 
opinions on Annual Action Programmes and Action Fiches proposed by the Commission.   
- the European Nuclear Safety Regulator Group (ENSREG) will provide strategic advice to 

INSC on nuclear safety 

- the  Nuclear  Safety  Expert  Group  (NSEG),  comprising  members  acting  in  a  personal 
activity,  will  take  account  of  strategic  advice  on  nuclear  safety  from  ENSREG  and  will 
advise the Commission technically on the preparation of all matters to be submitted to the 
Management Committee for a formal opinion 

- RAMG will cease to exist.  Its former role concerned with the provision of technical advice 
on regulatory issues will be carried out by NSEG and, that concerned with the provision of 
strategic and policy advice on nuclear safety by ENSREG. 

These  new  proposed  arrangements  are  well  conceived  and  should  achieve  the  goals  set  for 
their revision.  They will also largely remove concerns regarding potential conflicts of interest 
within RAMG.  

11. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The  evaluation  presented  in  this  report,  in  particular  of  achievements  and  impact,  has 
necessarily been limited in scope because of the relatively early stage in the implementation 
of the INSC programme. Only a few projects have so far been contracted and even fewer have 
been  completed.      Much  of  the  review  has  therefore  focused  on  the  extent  to  which  the 
approved projects comply with the scope and objectives of the INSC Regulation, the coverage 
of  the  programme  both  geographically  and  technically,  and  the  efficacy  of  programme 
implementation  and  how  it  has  responded  to  recommendations  made  in  a  review  of  the 
TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme, in particularly in the regulatory area. 

Some 50 projects have so far been accepted in the APs 2007-2009 and are at various stages of 
implementation  in  a  large  number  of  countries.  Several  of  these  projects  are  split  into  a 
number of  different sub-projects  for separate contracting A further 16 projects have already 
been accepted in AP 2010 and contracting documents are currently under preparation.  

All projects (with possibly one exception) are fully compliant with the objectives of the INSC 
Regulation.   

Each of the specific INSC measures is being addressed by one or more projects accepted in 
AP 2007 - 2009, though limited attention has so far been given to two aspects:  

(i) 

(ii) 

nuclear safeguards, and  

the  development  and  implementation  of  strategies  for  decommissioning 
existing  installations  and  the  remediation  of  former  nuclear  sites  (except  for 
several projects accepted for Ukraine).   

Whether  this  is  a  reflection  of  the  interests,  needs  or  priorities  expressed  by  cooperating 
countries or prioritisation by the Commission and/or its advisory bodies is not apparent. The 
balance  of  the  programme  between  areas  should  be  the  subject  of  continuing  review,  albeit 
remaining responsive to the needs and priorities of the potential beneficiaries and of the INSC 
programme.  

One  nuclear  safeguards  project  has  been  accepted  and  implementation  is  ongoing;  other 
approved  nuclear  safeguards  activities  have  been  cancelled  by  failure  of  signing  Financing 

EN 

31 

   EN 

Agreements.  Since  2006  safeguards  projects  are  also  eligible  for  cooperation  within  the 
recently established Instrument for Stability (IFS).  

In  order  to  prevent  overlap  and  to  enhance  complementarity  of  these  two  Instruments  in 
this regard it is recommended to clarify in the strategies for INSC and IFS which kind of 
nuclear safeguarding activities are eligible for cooperation within INSC and which might 
be eligible for cooperation within IFS. 

In  AP  2010  several  bi-lateral  projects  have  been  accepted  concerning  cooperation  on 
developing  strategies  for  decommissioning  and  site  remediation  in  countries  other  than 
Ukraine.  

The  geographical  coverage  of  the  programme  has  increased  steadily  from  four  countries  in 
2007  to  more  than  fifteen  countries  in  2010  and  cooperation  with  others  is  being  explored. 
The initial focus for cooperation with new countries was strengthening regulatory authorities 
but progressively cooperation is being extended to improvement of operational safety and the 
development  of  responsible  management  of  spent  nuclear  fuel  and  radioactive  waste, 
decommissioning and site remediation. 

Significant  improvements  have  been  and  continue  to  be  made  in  the  implementation  of  the 
INSC  programme  in  light  of  experience  of  the  TACIS  programme  and  in  response  to 
recommendations  made  in  a  review  of  the  latter.    These  will  enhance  the  quality  and 
independence  of  technical  and  policy  advice  being  provided  to  the  programme,  ensure  that 
future projects are more strategically focused and are responsive to more pressing needs. 

The  relatively  long  time,  apparently  ‘required’,  to  start  many  projects  following  their 
acceptance is a matter of concern identified in the evaluation of bilateral cooperation projects 
in all of the main technical areas.  Typically, this is currently taking two to three years which 
is  not  in  general  commensurate  with  projects  aiming  to  make  significant  and  needed 
improvements  in  nuclear  safety.    The  reasons  for  these  long  delays  are  not  fully  clear  but 
these  delays  need  to  be  reduced.  The  underlying  causes  for  these  delays  could  not  be 
established within the constraints of this evaluation.  

It is therefore strongly recommended that these be investigated by the Commission with a 
view to identifying measures to improve the overall performance in this regard.      

Another  matter  of  concern  is  the  discontinuation  in  the  cooperation  with  the  Russian 
Federation in strengthening its regulatory body, in the improvement of operational safety and 
in  establishing  responsible  management  of  radioactive  waste,  decommissioning  and 
remediation  activities.  Major  improvements  in  nuclear  safety  and  in  the  safety  culture  in 
nuclear  facilities  in  the  Russian  Federation  have  been  achieved.  Further  improvements  are, 
however, needed and continued cooperation on nuclear safety is in the mutual interest of the 
EU  and  the  Russian  Federation.  In  particular  the  strengthening  achieved  of  the  regulatory 
authorities needs to be consolidated and hardly any cooperation has yet been achieved in the 
development  of  a  consistent  and  coherent  national  strategy  and  proper  organisation  of 
responsible  management  of  radioactive  waste  and  spent  nuclear  fuel,  decommissioning  and 
site remediation.  

Considering  the  needs  identified,  considering  the  neighbourhood  aspects  and  considering 
the  fact  that  the  Russian  Federation  is  an  exporter  of  nuclear  technology,  it  is 
recommended  that  the  Commission  continues  exploring  mechanisms  that  could  end  the 
current impasse.   

EN 

32 

   EN 

Within INSC no bi-lateral cooperation has yet been initiated with Kazakhstan, except for its 
partnership  in  a  regional  project  concerning  uranium  mining  liabilities,  though  this  country 
was  one  of  the  priority  targets  under  TACIS.  Considering  the  status  of  its  nuclear  activities 
and  their  remains  it  is  recommended  that  the  Commission  strengthens  its  cooperation  with 
Kazakhstan and prioritises its cooperation objectives based on the EU policy objectives and 
Kazakhstan’s national strategy. 

The overall conclusions of this evaluation are that the INSC implementation is well targeted, 
the approved projects are well conceived and that the projects, once contracted are developing 
well.  When  successfully  implemented  these  can  be  expected  to  contribute  significantly  in 
enhancing nuclear safety and nuclear safety culture. 

The  few  concerns  raised  in  respect  of  implementing  the  INSC  Regulation,  and  how  they 
might  be  mitigated,  can  be  effectively  addressed  within  the  existing  provisions  of  this 
Regulation.  

Consequently  there  is  no  need  for  a  legislative  proposal  to  introduce  modifications  to  the 
Instrument. 

 Abbreviations 

AIDCO   

EuropeAid Cooperation Office 

ALARA  

As Low As Reasonably Achievable 

ANPP 

Armenian Nuclear Power Plant 

ANRA 

Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority 

ANSN 

Asian Nuclear Safety Network 

AP 

CIS 

Action Programme 

Commonwealth of Independent States 

CNEN 

Brazilian Nuclear Regulatory Authority 

CNSNS   

Mexican Nuclear Regulatory Authority 

CSF 

Chernobyl Shelter Fund 

CUBA 

Curves Book Automated Software 

DECC 

EBRD 

ENP 

Department of Energy and Climate Change (UK) 

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 

European Neighbourhood Policy 

NSREG  

European Nuclear Safety Regulator Group 

EU 

European Union 

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33 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NSEG 

FORO 

FSU 

HFE 

HIV 

IAEA 

I&C 

Nuclear Safety Expert Group 

Ibero-American Forum of Nuclear and Radiological Regulators 

Former Soviet Union 

Human Factors Engineering 

Human Immunodeficiency Virus 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

Instrumentation and Control 

ICSRM   

Industrial Complex for Solid Waste Management 

IFS 

INSC 

ISF 

ISI 

JMU 

JRC 

JSO 

MCR 

NDT 

NPP 

NSEG 

NSSG 

OBE 

OISS 

OSA 

Instrument for Stability 

Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 

Interim Storage Facility 

In-Service Inspection 

Joint Management Unit 

Joint Research Centre 

Joint Support Organisation 

Main Control Room 

Non Destructive Testing 

Nuclear Power Plant 

Nuclear Safety Experts Group 

Nuclear Safety and Security Group 

Operating Basis Earthquake 

Operator Information and Support System 

On-Site Assistance 

PAMS 

Post-Accident Monitoring System 

PIP 

PSR 

Plant Improvement Project 

Periodic Safety Review 

RAMG   

Regulatory Authorities Management Group 

RF 

Russian Federation 

RODOS  

Real time On-line Decision Support system 

RSP 

Remote Shutdown Panel 

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34 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SAM 

Severe Accident Management 

SNRCU  

Ukrainian Nuclear Regulatory Authority 

SSC 

SSE 

STI 

Structures, Systems and Components 

Safe Shutdown Earthquake 

Sexually Transmitted Infections 

SUNPP   

South-Ukrainian NPP 

TACIS   

Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States 

TCP 

TMI 

ToR 

TS 

Technical Cooperation Programme of the IAEA 

Three Miles Island 

Terms of Reference 

Technical Specifications 

WENRA 

West European Nuclear Regulatory Authorities 

WM 

(Radioactive) Waste Management 

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35 

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Appendix I – Categorisation of projects 

In  the  Indicative  Programme  of  INSC  the  projects  of  AP  2007  –  AP  2009  are  categorised 
according  to  the  intervention  areas  as  defined  in  the  INSC  Regulation.  The  budgetary 
consequences of this categorisation are summarised in the following table 2:  

Table 2. Summary of the budgets (Million €) of the projects, accepted in AP 2007 – AP 2009, 
as categorised according to the intervention areas as outlined in the  Indicative Programme of 
INSC.  

AP 2007 

AP 2008 

AP 2009 

Total 

Operational Safety/Design Safety* 

20,9 

Regulatory Authorities 

Waste Management etc.** 

Nuclear Safeguards 

Multi-Country/ Regional projects 

4,6 

1,5 

0,0 

1,5 

13,9 

11,2 

11,0 

0,5 

0,0 

26,5 

10,7 

7,0 

0,0 

0,0 

Chernobyl 

IAEA 

Others* 

Total 

10,0 

25,7 

24,7 

2,0 

0,0 

1,0 

8,0 

6,5 

3,5 

48,5 

71,3 

73,7 

193,5 

64,1 

26,5 

19,5 

0,5 

1,5 

60,4 

9,5 

11,5 

*)  

In AP 2008 “Others”encompasses JMU(3,5), JSO (3,5) and other accompanying measures (1,0),  

whereas 2009 encompasses Technical Support (JRC; 2,5) and other accompanying measures (1,0) 

For the purpose of evaluating the implementation of the INSC programme for the APs 2007 – 
2009 the individual projects have been categorised more functionally into four main areas of 
cooperation, as described in Section 2 of this Evaluation Report. The budgetary aspects of this 
categorisation are summarised in the following table1:  

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Table  1.  Summary  of  the  budgets  (Million  €)  of 
the  projects,  accepted  in  the  APs  2007  – 
2009, as categorised  by the evaluators of all projects into the four main areas of cooperation 
as  described in Section 2 of the Evaluation Report.  

Operational Safety/Design Safety* 

Regulatory Authorities 

Waste Management etc.** 

Nuclear Safeguards 

Others 

Total 

AP 2007 

AP 2008 

AP 2009 

Total 

30,9 

4,6 

11,5 

0,0 

1,5 

20,9 

11,2 

36,7 

0,5 

2,0 

27,8 

10,7 

31,7 

0,0 

3,5 

79,6 

26,5 

79,9 

0,5 

7,0 

48,5 

71,3 

73,7 

193,5 

*) 

OSA/DS covers also the JMU and JSO extension contracts and the two cooperation projects with the 

 IAEA concerning safety of Nuclear Installations Safety (2007 and 2009) 

**) 

WM covers also the Chernobyl projects 

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   EN