COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2011-10-13
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: European Commission, coordination of aid, coordination of financing, development aid, poverty

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 13.10.2011 
SEC(2011) 1172 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

accompanying the 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 

Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Angeda for Change 

{COM(2011) 637 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1173 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
Impact Assessment 
Communication: EU Development Policy  
"Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change" 

Disclaimer: This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation and does not prejudge the final form 
of any decision to be taken by the Commission. 

1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 2 
1.1 Timing .............................................................................................................................. 8 
1.2 Consultation ..................................................................................................................... 9 
2. Problem definition.............................................................................................................. 10 
2.1. Context of the problem.................................................................................................. 11 
2.2. Drivers of the problem .................................................................................................. 15 
2.2.1. Aid fragmentation .................................................................................................. 15 
2.2.2. High cost coordination efforts, lack of division of labour ..................................... 18 
2.2.3. Fragmentation of Commission-managed aid ......................................................... 20 
2.2.4. Other key drivers of the problem ........................................................................... 23 
3. Scope of the Communication............................................................................................. 26 
4. Analysis of subsidiarity...................................................................................................... 26 
5. Objectives of EU initiative................................................................................................. 27 
6. Policy options ...................................................................................................................... 28 
Option 1 Status quo .............................................................................................................. 29 
Option 2 Sectoral focus ........................................................................................................ 29 
Option 3 Geographical focus................................................................................................ 30 
Option 4 Sectoral and geographical focus............................................................................ 31 
7. Assessment of impacts........................................................................................................ 32 
Option 1................................................................................................................................ 32 
Option 2................................................................................................................................ 33 
Option 3................................................................................................................................ 34 
Option 4................................................................................................................................ 36 
8. Comparison of options ....................................................................................................... 38 
8.1. Risks .............................................................................................................................. 40 
8.2. Monitoring and evaluation ............................................................................................ 41 
9. Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 41 
Annex 1: List of acronyms and glossary .............................................................................. 43 
Annex 2: Summary of the public consultation .................................................................... 48 
Annex 3: EU country aid allocations (2007-2013) ............................................................... 53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 

Overall Policy Context 
The  European  Consensus  on  Development1,  which  is  the  cornerstone  of  EU  development 
policy,  defines  as  its  primary  objective  "the  eradication  of  poverty  in  the  context  of 
sustainable  development,  including  pursuit  of  the  MDGs".  This  objective  was  thereafter 
legally enshrined in Article 21 of the Treaty of European Union. The EU is fully committed to 
international  goals  and  objectives,  notably 
internationally-agreed  Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the principles on aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration, Accra 
Agenda for Action). 

the 

The  European  Consensus  has  been  reflected  in  various  instruments  and  geographic 
strategies.2.  A  set  of  specific  legal  instruments  provide  the  means  for  implementing  EU 
development  policy.  Comprehensive  relations  with  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP) 
countries  are  governed  by  the  Cotonou  Agreement3,  with  the  European  Development  Fund 
(EDF)  providing  the  resources  to  implement  development  policy.  In  other  regions,    EU 
development  policy  is  implemented  via:  the  Development  Cooperation  Instrument  (DCI) 
which covers country programmes with developing countries grouping Asia, Latin America, 
the Middle East, Central Asia and South Africa and thematic programmes with all developing 
countries,  including  the  ACP  group;  the  European  Neighbourhood  Partnership  Instrument 
(ENPI) which covers countries on the southern and eastern borders of the EU (principally in 
North  Africa  and  Eastern  Europe);  and  the  Instrument  for  Pre-Accession  (IPA),  which 
provides support to Candidate Countries for EU membership. The framework is completed by 
thematic instruments, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the 
Instrument for Stability and the Nuclear Safety Cooperation Instrument. 

Development is a shared competency. The EU acts as a donor (the "28th donor") alongside the 
Member States, implementing 20% of collective EU aid, but also has a role as a coordinator, 
convener  and  policy-maker  to  foster  better  integrated  European  policies  in  the  development 
field. The Member States have "parallel" powers with the EU (Article 4 TEU) and have their 
own  aid  programmes  and  policies,  but  should  ensure  that  these  complement  and  reinforce 
those of other Member States and the EU (Article 208 TFEU). The EU is mandated to take 
initiatives to promote such coordination (Article 210 TFEU). 

1 The European Consensus on Development (2005) is a policy statement jointly adopted by the Council, EU 
Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament.  It reflects the EU willingness to make a decisive 
contribution to the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf  
2 See e.g. Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf;  
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/files/europa_only/memo_africa_eu_relations.pdf.); EU-Latin America 
strategy  (Communication on “The European Union and Latin America: Global Players in Partnership”, 30 
September 2009); EU-Pacific strategy (Communication COM(2006) 248, 29 may.2006).  To these must be 
added the European Neighbourhood Policy (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf)  
as well as the EU pre-accession strategy. 
3"Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one 
part and the European Community and its Member States of the other part", signed in Cotonou, Bénin, on 23 
June 2000. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm.  

2

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
In the international platform, the EU has been instrumental in the achievement of ambitious 
global  agreements  (e.g.  Paris  Declaration  on  Aid  Effectiveness  in  2005).  Common  EU 
positions have  also been adopted ahead  of the relevant  High  Level  meetings  within  the  UN 
(e.g. High-Level Plenary Meeting on the MDGs in 2010 and LDC IV Conference in 2011) in 
order to contribute to both the quality and quantity of aid. The EU and several of its Member 
States are members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and of the G20, 
including its development working group.     

Over the last ten years, the EU and its Member States have maintained strong commitments to 
increase volumes of aid and improve aid effectiveness4. However, the implementation of such 
commitments has proved more problematic than anticipated5.  

The EU has been the leader in formulating the concept of Policy Coherence for Development 
(PCD)6  aimed  at  strengthening  synergies  between  non-aid  policies  and  development 
objectives.  First  reflected  in  the  Council  Conclusions  of  May  20057  and  the  European 
Consensus,  this  commitment  to  PCD  has  thereafter  been  codified  in  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon.8 
The  EU  has  elaborated  a  PCD  work  programme  for  the  period  2010-2013,  identifying  the 
priority  issues  and  outlining  how  the  EU,  through  all  its  instruments  and  processes,  can 
contribute to development objectives. 

Current challenges and the need for change 
There is wide consensus among development partners that accelerated action is needed if all 
the  MDGs  are  to  be  achieved  in  less  than  five  years'  time9.  The  EU  and  its  Member  States 
have already made a strong contribution, but there is potential for even greater impact. 

In looking at the impact of EU development policy, one must consider the multidimensional 
nature  of  policy  implementation  –  policy  is  implemented  not  just  through  aid  projects  and 
programmes  at  country  level,  but  also,  for  example,  via  PCD  efforts,  political  dialogue, 
influence in international institutions, etc..  

In  its  Practical  Guide  for  evaluating  EU  activities10,  the  Commission  distinguishes  several 
levels  in  the  so-called  "chain  of  results":  the  output  (a  product  under  direct  control  of  the 
manager – e.g. a road); the result/outcome (immediate or initial effect of an intervention – e.g. 
travel  time  and  cost  are  reduced  by  the  existence  of  the  road);  and  the  impact  (longer-term 
effect of an intervention – e.g. access to markets). 

4 More information on http://ec.europa.eu/development/how/aid_effectiveness_en.cfm 
5 Most recent data shows that over the period 2004-2009, the EU and its Member States accounted for 58% of 
net ODA to developing countries from all DAC donors, and for 65% of the global EUR 21.4 billion increase in 
ODA during this period. In 2010, the EU and its Member States missed their collective 2010 target of 0.56% by 
a wide margin (by almost EUR15 billion , but the positive trend continued and the EU and its Member States 
together  reached  the  highest  ODA/GNI  ratio  of  the  last  twenty  years,  i.e.  0.43%  ).  EU  Accountability  Report 
2011 on Financing for Development - Review of progress of the EU and its Member States.   
6 http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/policy_coherence_en.cfm 
7 May 2005 Council Conclusions on PCD. 
8 The latter states that "the Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and 
between these and its other policies" (Article 21 of Treaty of the European Union), and that the "Union shall take 
account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect 
developing countries" (Article 208 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union). 
9 See Global Monitoring Report 2011.Improving the Odds of achieving the MDGs. The World Bank, 2011.  
10 See "Evaluating EU activities – A practical guide for the Commission services", DG BUDGET, Evaluation 
unit, July 2004 

3

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The  higher  up  we  go  in  the  chain  of  results  (impact  level),  the  more  complex  is  the 
attribution/contribution linkage between a given EU intervention and the impact. 

At output and outcome level, the attribution link with an EU intervention can relatively easily 
be  made.  However,  at  impact  level,  numerous  other  interacting  factors  (other  actors,  other 
policies or changes in the context) must be taken into account, not least the leadership role of 
the partner country in defining their own reforms and policies and raising their own revenues 
for development, for example through taxation.  An EU intervention can, at best, contribute to 
impact. 

When  talking  about  the  impact  of  EU  development  policy,  we  must  therefore  pay  attention 
not only to the impact of EU aid programmes and projects, but also to the other aspects of EU 
development  policy  (such  as  policy  and  political  dialogue,  the  international  influencing 
agenda, norms setting, policy coherence for development). 

Furthermore, it must be noted that although the EU is an important development player and 
the  world's  largest  aid  donor,  it  remains  nonetheless  only  one  actor  among  a  multitude  of 
others, and provides only a part of the overall financial flows for development.  

to  require 

Development  assistance  will  continue 
long-term  financial  commitment. 
Demonstrating  this  increased  impact  will  have  the  additional  benefit  of  helping  to  maintain 
political  and  public  support  for  development.  In  many  donor  countries,  both  within  the  EU 
and  internationally,  the  legitimacy  of  aid  is  increasingly  open  to  challenge,  as  the  general 
public  and  politicians  question  the  value  of  development  expenditure  at  a  time  of  austerity 
measures at home; visibility, transparency, accountability, value for money and results have 
become  as  central  to  the  arguments  for  Official  Development  Assistance  (ODA)  as  moral 
obligations were in less austere times. EU development aid not only has to be spent wisely in 
order to ensure best value for money, but the EU and its Member States need to demonstrate 
the impact it has had. 

Moreover,  additional  new  challenges  are  complicating  an  already  difficult  situation.  The 
succession  of  recent  crises  (financial  and  economic  crises,  food  price  rises,  fuel  price 
volatility)  has  deeply  affected  developing  countries.  Added  to  this  are  issues  of  climate 
change and energy, security and fragility, instability and poor resilience to shocks, and food 
insecurity. There has been a growing recognition that, in an interconnected world, the EU will 
not achieve its own aims on issues like security, job creation, migration and climate change in 
isolation11.  Together,  these  additional  challenges  have  created  a  new  backdrop  for 
development policy.  

In this context, the question then becomes how to ensure that the development policy of the 
EU and its Member States has the greatest possible  impact on development  outcomes  –  i.e. 
how  to  maximise  our  contribution  to  the  achievement  of  the  MDGs  by  2015,  and  to  the 
eradication of poverty after 2015. 

With  a  view  to  exploring  the  ways  and  means  to  further  increase  the  impact  of  our 
development policy, the Commission published a Green paper on "EU development policy 
in  support  of  inclusive  growth  and  sustainable  development -  Increasing  the  impact  of 
EU development policy" in November 2010. The aim was to launch a public debate on how 

11 "Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth", COM(2010) 2020 final.  

4

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the  EU  could  best  support  developing  countries  in  mobilising  their  economic,  natural  and 
human resources in support of poverty reduction strategies.  

In parallel, two other public consultations have also been held: on the Green Paper on "The 
future of EU budget support to third countries"12 and on "What funding for EU external action 
after 2013?"13. 

Having analysed  the results of  these consultations, the Commission is planning to present a 
Communication on EU development policy in the third quarter of 2011. This Communication 
will  be  accompanied  by  a  Communication  on  Budget  Support  and  will  follow  the 
Commission proposals for financing external action post- 2013 (June 2011). The latter set out 
broad  budgetary  orientations  for  the  post-2013  period  together  with  proposals  for  the  new 
Multiannual  Financial  Framework.  Key  policy  options  currently  discussed  on  these 
Communications  have  informed  the  present  assessment.  Proposals  for  legal  instruments  to 
govern external expenditure will issue later in 2011 and have been subject to their own Impact 
Assessment processes. 

The  Communication  on  EU  development  policy  must  also  be  seen  in  conjunction  with  two 
other major Commission policy initiatives: 

-  First,  the  preparation  of  a  common  EU  position  for  the  Fourth  High  Level  Forum  on  Aid 
Effectiveness (Busan, November 2011), which will look at how to take forward the core aid 
effectiveness  principles  and  commitments.  A  Commission  Communication14  will  help  to 
define a common EU position for Busan. 
- Second, the preparation of a consistent EU position for the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (Rio de Janeiro, June 2012)15 aiming at an ambitious outcome with 
concrete policies and actions for greening the economy. 

Considering  the  global  nature  of  the  policy  content  of  this  Communication,  the  policy 
options  can  only  be  considered  in  the  broadest  terms.  While  development  policy  is  only 
partly  about  aid,  other  modalities  of  development  cooperation  (such  as  loans  or  technical 
cooperation) and policies (such as trade or fisheries policies) have an equally important part to 
play in the overall policy for promoting global development. This Impact Assessment focuses 
on Commission-managed aid as the main measurable indicator. Strengthened PCD, improved 
EU  coordination,  choice  of  aid  modalities  and  the  overall  levels  of  finance  available  for 
development are all factors which will also have an impact on the EU's success at meeting its 
development objectives, but these will be constants relevant to each of the options analysed 
and therefore these elements are not considered as part of the assessment of impact. 

Description of EU aid 
The EU collectively is the world's largest aid donor16 and is willing to play its full part on the 
global effort to reduce poverty. In addition, the EU is (and will remain) an important global 
player, notably through its participation in world trade and through its leadership in the area 
of global climate change action. 

12 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/green_paper_budget_support_third_countries_en.pdf  
13 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/green_paper_budget_support_third_countries_en.pdf  
14 Title to be confirmed; expected to issue in September 2011 
15 "Rio+20: Towards the green economy and better governance", COM(2011) 363 final. 
16 EU Accountability Report 2011 on financing for Development - Review of progress of the EU and its Member 
States.  

5

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Table 1 – ODA/GNI and ODA per capita of EU Member States and Non-EU DAC Members  
(at 2008 prices) 

Country 

EU 25/27 
EU 15 
EU 10/12 
USA 
Japan 
Canada 
DAC Non EU Members 
DAC Members 

ODA volumes 
(EUR billion) 
2010 
2004 
53.5
36.8
52.6
36.4
0.8
0.3
20.4
15.3
6.6
6.2
3.4
2.5
38.6
29.6
91.2
66.0

ODA per 
capita (EUR)
2010 
2004 
107
75
134
95
3
8
66
52
52
49
99
77
69
58
96
71

Source: OECD DAC  

ODA/GNI 
(%) 
2004  2010 
0.43 
0.46 
0.09 
0.21 
0.20 
0.33 
0.23 
0.32 

0.34 
0.35 
0.07 
0.17 
0.19 
0.27 
0.19 
0.25 

The current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) foresees Euro 108 billion for external 
assistance  for  the  period  2007-2013.    The  various  financial  instruments  have  been  shaped 
around  2  main  concepts:  "policy-driven"  geographical  instruments  supporting  directly  EU 
external  policies  and  "thematic  instruments"  addressing  crises/security  and  cross-cutting 
issues.  

Instruments17 such as the European Neighbouring Partnership Instrument (ENPI - Euro 11.2 
billion), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI - Euro 16.9 billion) and the European 
Development  Fund  (EDF  -  Euro  22.7  billion)  offer  a  specific  geographical  coverage,  while 
the thematic component of DCI (Euro 6.8 billion), the European Instrument for Human Rights 
and Democracy (EIDHR – Euro 1.1 billion) and the Instrument for Stability (IFS – Euro 2.1 
billion) have global coverage.  

The  full  scope  of  EU  collective  financing  for  development  can  be  found  in  the  2011  EU 
Accountability Report on Financing for Development.  

The European  Commission has  reported EUR 14.95 billion as ODA  net disbursements  for 
2010. The amount includes EUR 5.15 billion of concessional EIB loans of which 4.8 billion 
were  financed  through  own  resources;  the  recognition  of  this  type  of  loans  as  ODA  is 
currently being discussed with the OECD. Until this is solved, the EU institutions' recognised 
ODA is EUR 9.8 billion. 

Beyond being an important donor, the Commission also plays the important role of aspiring to 
bring together the EU and its Member States to form a single collective EU presence in the 
global scene, capable of playing the political role that the provider of more than 50% of global 
ODA should have. 

Commission-managed  aid  is  delivered  through  both  geographical  (country,  regional)  and 
thematic programmes.  

1) Sectoral distribution of EU aid 
The Commission's focus is primarily on support for social infrastructure, in areas like 
education and health, water, government and civil society. 

17 ICI (Instruments for Industrialised Countries) and the IPA (Pre-accession) are not considered. .  

6

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Clockwise: social infrastructures; economic infrastructures; production; multisector/crosscutting; budget support, 
food aid; humanitarian aid; other/unallocated. 
Source: "EU contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, Some key results from European Commission 
programmes", 2010. 

2) Geographic distribution of EU aid 
Currently EU aid (i.e. aid administered directly by the Commission) is provided to about 145 
countries18.  But  low-income  countries,  including  the  least  developed,  remain  the  biggest 
beneficiaries. Geographically, the bulk goes to Africa and to Europe's neighbours. 

18 As a matter of comparison, the World Bank –IDAs has 79 eligible countries.  

7

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
Clockwise:  Europe;  Africa  (North  of  Sahara);  Africa  (South  of  Sahara);  Asia  (Middle  East);  Asia  (South  & 
Central, far East); America; Oceania; Bilateral unallocated; Multilateral aid. 
Source: "EU contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, Some key results from European Commission 
programmes", 2010. 

1.1 Timing 
All  relevant  Commission  services  were  invited  to  participate  in  the  Impact  Assessment 
Steering Group (IASG), with meetings scheduled as follows:  

2 March 2011 – introduction and initial discussions  
25 March 2011 – intermediate discussion of draft IA report 
8 April 2011 – final meeting before submission to IA board  

The draft Impact assessment was then submitted to the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) on 15 
April 2011, in view of the IAB meeting on 18 May. The first opinion issued by the IAB made 
several  recommendations  in  view  of  improving  the  report,  insisting  notably  on  the  need  to 
further explain the problem definition and objectives of the initiative, as well as to describe 
better the various policy options and foreseen impact for each of them. 

A  revised  draft  was  submitted  to  the  IAB  on  20  June  taking  into  account  these  suggestions 
and  aiming  in  particular  at  providing  deeper  explanation  on  the  problem,  objectives  and 
envisaged options. 

8

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the second opinion of the IAB on 12 July, a revised draft was resubmitted with a 
view to providing further analysis of the problem and the policy context, a better explanation 
of the options and their impact as well as more information on different stakeholder's views. 

1.2 Consultation  

The public consultation requirements have been covered by a series of extensive debates that 
have taken place in the framework of the recently launched public consultations, respectively 
on the Green Paper on "EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable 
development – Increasing the impact of EU development policy"19, the Green Paper on "The 
future  of  EU  budget  support  to  third  countries"20  and  the  public  consultation  on  "What 
funding for EU external action after 2013?"21. 

EU Member States were consulted, both in writing and in various meetings and discussions at 
different  levels  (presentation  at  CODEV  on  11  November  2010;  EU  DGs  meeting  19 
November; Foreign Affairs Council  9 December; MS Experts meeting 9-10 February 2011; 
Informal Development Ministers meeting 22 February 2011). 

The  European  Parliament  was  also  included  in  the  consultation,  through  the  presentation  of 
the Green paper in the DEVE Committee (9 November 2010). 

In  addition,  the  Green  Paper  was  presented  and  discussed  with  different  categories  of 
stakeholders at a series of events, including a High Level Panel on “New Policy Challenges” 
during  the  European  Development  Days  (6  December  2010),  a  discussion  and  exchange  of 
views  with  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  (14  December  2010),  a  seminar  with  non-state 
actors and the European Economic and Social Committee (11 January 2011). 

Partner countries were consulted on the issues raised in the Green paper, both directly and via 
EU delegations22. 

The  results  of  the  public  consultation  on  the  Green  Paper  on  "EU  Development  Policy  in 
support  of  inclusive  growth  and  sustainable  development  –  Increasing  the  impact  of  EU 
development policy" have been published23 (see executive summary in annex). Overall, most 
commentators noted the considerable strengths of the EU's development policy and practice to 
date,  while  also  identifying  scope  for  improvements.  The  need  for  increased  sectoral  and 
geographic focus was promoted by a large number of commentators.  

In  addition  to  the  public  consultation  on  the  Green  Paper,  relevant  external  reviews  and 
literature  on  the  Commission's  performance  have  also  been  consulted  in  the  preparation  of 
this Impact Assessment. Notably, the UK carried out an extensive Multilateral Aid Review24 
in 2010, which assessed the performance of the EU alongside other international organisations 
(UN agencies, World Bank, GAVI, etc.).  The UK gave a favourable assessment of both the 

19 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm  
20 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/green_paper_budget_support_third_countries_en.pdf  
21 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EU_external_action_2013_background_paper.pdf  
22 30 EU delegations in partner countries have provided comments to the Green paper consultation 
23 Link to the full report of the public consultation on the Green Paper: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-
consultations/5241_en.htm  
24 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/About-DFID/Who-we-work-with/Multilateral-agencies/Multilateral-Aid-Review/ 

9

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
EDF  and  the  EU  budget  instruments  (DCI,  ENPI,  IPA,  EIDHR,  Stability  Instrument);  the 
EDF scored slightly higher than the budget instruments due to its stronger poverty focus – the 
budget  instruments  cover  a  broader  range  of  countries,  including  large  numbers  of  Middle 
Income Countries in particular in Latin America and the Neighbourhood, as well as the pre-
accession  countries,  and  have  wider-ranging  objectives  than  poverty  elimination.  From  the 
perspective of the UK taxpayer, it was concluded that the EDF provides "very good value for 
money" and the budget instruments "adequate value for money." It was recommended that the 
geographic focus of some budget instruments (notably the DCI) be tightened to better support 
poverty reduction, and that management for results be strengthened in both instruments.  

Views  from  important  stakeholder  NGOs  also  support  the  position  that  the  Commission's 
development programme to date has been strong and effective, although there is always scope 
to increase impact and results. For example, BOND has stated that ‘from the recipient’s point 
of view, aid given through the Commission is generally considered to be more effective and 
efficient than that given bilaterally from a number of different Member States,’ especially as it 
helps to reduce administrative burdens25. Likewise, Oxfam has emphasised that Commission 
aid  is  ‘some  of  the  best  multilateral  aid  in  the  world’  and  that  ‘the  EU’s  global  presence, 
promotion of policy coherence for development, specific competence and expertise, right of 
level,  facilitation  of  coordination  and  harmonisation,  and 
initiative  at  community 
supranational character’ make it a unique actor26. 

The  OECD-DAC  are  in  the  process  of  carrying  out  a  Peer  Review27  of  EU  development 
policies  and  programmes.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  results  of  this  Review  will  not  be 
known before mid-2012.  

2. Problem definition 

and 

regional 

conflicts 

international 

EU development policy is at crossroads. Against the backdrop of key international challenges 
(financial  crisis,  climate  change,  energy  access,  food  insecurity,  migration  pressures,  state 
new 
fragility, 
powers/investors/donors),  the  legitimacy  of  aid  discussion  (enhanced  by  fiscal  austerity  and 
competition for scarce resources at home) and the new contextual settings both at EU (post-
Lisbon external action framework) and international level (G20, IFIs, UN), there is a need for 
change to  “increase the impact of EU development policy.” The aim is to make the EU's 
development  policy  fit  to  meet  the  challenges  of  the  coming  decade,  and  to  help  partner 
countries  bring  about  the  changes  needs  to  accelerate  their  own  progress  towards  poverty 
reduction and the MDGs. 

emergence 

security, 

of 

The Commission will play its part in this endeavour by striving to increase the impact of the 
aid  that  it  manages  (i.e.  for  the  period  to  2013,  aid  allocated  under  Heading  4  of  the  EU 
Budget and from the 10th EDF; beyond 2013, aid allocated under the Multi-Annual Financial 
Framework).  

25 BOND European Group submission to DFID's Multilateral Aid Review (see footnote above). 
26 Oxfam submission to DFID's Multilateral Aid Review (see footnote above).  
27 Peer Reviews are carried out on a rotating basis on all 24 DAC members. Peer Reviews provide in-depth 
examinations of development systems and policies, including lessons learned. The Commission was last 
reviewed in 2007. http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3746,en_2649_34603_46582825_1_1_1_1,00.html 

10

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2.1. Context of the problem 

The  recent  dynamic  of  global  crises  (volatility  of  energy  and  food  prices,  financial  and 
economic crisis) has strongly affected developing countries and among them the poorest ones.   

While in the past decade economic growth has been robust in many parts of the world, a great 
deal still remains to be done and many developing countries risk lagging behind in recovering 
from the negative impacts of the global economic and financial crisis. In many of the LDCs, 
resilience  in  the  face  of  the  current  economic  crisis  has  been  fragile,  with  GDP  in  these 
countries generally declining in 2009.  

There is wide consensus among development partners that accelerated action is needed if all 
the  MDGs  are  to  be  achieved  by  201528.  The  number  of  poor  people  remains  high  and  is 
estimated by the World Bank at around 2 billion29. Some 48 countries, of about 880 million 
people, of whom 75 per cent are classified as poor, still belong to the UN category of LDCs. 
Moreover,  there  has  been  very  little  progress  in  the  MDGs  related  to  maternal  and  child 
mortality  and  quality  of  education,  and  prospects  for  access  to  sanitation  are  worrying30. 
Furthermore  progress  has  varied  greatly  between  regions  and  in  some  cases  the  benefits  of 
growth have not been felt by the wider population even in countries where economic growth 
is robust.   

The  UN  MDG  report  2011  recently  published  acknowledges  that  significant  progress  has 
been  made  towards  some  MDGs,  due  notably  to  continued  economic  growth  in  some 
developing countries, targeted interventions in critical areas and increased funding from many 
sources, but alerts that in several areas there is still long way to go, and achievement of MDGs 
is at risk. Concerns are particularly on the empowerment of women and girls, the promotion 
of sustainable development and the protection of the most vulnerable. 

The EU and its Member States have already made a strong contribution to the achievement of 
the  MDGs.31  For  example,  close  to  80%  of  projects  in  Africa  deliver  'significant  impact'.32 
There  is,  however,  always  scope  to  increase  performance  and  impact.  Furthermore, 
demonstrating  this  increased  impact  will  have  the  additional  benefit  of  helping  to  maintain 
political and public support for development. 

The  changing  global  context  offers  new  opportunities  for  more  effective  and  impactful 
development efforts. New development actors have emerged on the global scene.  

28 See Global Monitoring Report 2011.Improving the Odds of achieving the MDGs. The World Bank 2011.  
29 Data on poverty are taken from World Bank. Social Indicators 2010. Two poverty lines are considered  
defined as average level  
30 "Progress made on the Millennium Development Goals and key challenges for the road ahead", Commission 
Staff Working Document, SEC(2010) 418 final; "The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010", United 
Nations, 2010. 
31 See notably "EU contribution to the Millennium Development Goals – Some key results from European 
Commission programmes", 2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/188a_mdg_en.pdf  
32 EuropeAid Annual Report 2010, page 205 

11

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
BRICS estimated development assistance 200833,  

BRICS development assistance 2008

S. Africa, 109

Russia, 200

Brazil, 437

India, 610

China, 2400

Traditional donors still clearly dominate the global share of ODA flows. Among them the EU 
and its Member States account for nearly 60% of net ODA from all OECD DAC donors. The 
Commission manages some 20% of the EU total.  

However  the  share  of  emerging  partners  is  growing  fast.  According  to  the  OECD34,  all 
emerging partners together represented 5.6% of all ODA-equivalent flows to Africa in 2000-
2004, while this share has nearly doubled to 10.2% during the 2005-2010 period. Countries 
like China, India and Brazil are increasingly active in development cooperation. 

33 Source: "Beyond the DAC: The welcome role of other providers of Development Cooperation", OECD / DCD 
Issues Brief, May 2010, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/24/45361474.pdf  
34 OECD, African Economic Outlook 2011 - DRAFT 

12

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Overall Development Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF), Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), and trade volumes with developing countries 

ODA35 

OOF36 

Outward FDI37 

Merchandise 
Export volume 
to developing 
economies in 
200938 

Merchandise 
Import volume 
from developing 
economies in 
200939 

Brazil 

$1-1,275 bn 
(2010)40 

n/a 

$0.15 bn (2007) 

$87.3 bn 

$61 bn 

India 

$ 0.61 bn  (2009) 

$2 bn (2010)41 

$2.95 bn (2005) 

 [Africa $2.7 bn 
in 2008] 

$104 bn 

$164 bn 

China42 

$1.9-3 bn (2008) 

$10bn (2009)  

$13.26 bn (2009 

[Africa $6 bn in 
2009] 43 

[Africa $7.8 bn in 
2008] 

$556 bn 

$545 bn 

Saudi Arabia 

$2.01 bn (2006) 
$2.01 bn (2007) 
$5.5 bn (2008) 

n/a 

DAC members 

$120 bn (2009) 

$22 bn (2009) 
[$2.9 bn to 
Africa] 

n/a 

$141 bn 

$38 bn 

$158.9 bn (2009) 

$2002 bn 

$2536 bn 

EU 

$67 bn (2009)44 

$3.5 bn (2009)45 

$94 bn (2009) 

$717 bn 

$816 bn 

Multilateral 
Institutions 

(DAC ODA 
includes 
multilateral 
contributions) 

$53.8 bn (2009) 
[$6.1 bn to 
Africa] 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

35  Net  ODA.  All  data  from  OECD  (2010a).  Estimates  for  non-OECD  countries  from  OECD  (2010b),  unless 
otherwise indicated 
36 Gross OOF, DAC, EU and Multilateral Institution data from OECD 2010a. Estimates for non-OECD countries 
from OECD 2010b; loans are in many cases tied to goods and services of the lending EME 
37 UNCTAD (2010) and OECD (2010a). UNCTAD FDI data is collected for TNCs only. Data on DAC/EU is by 
OECD (2010a) and also includes SMEs 
38 UNCTAD 2010 
39 UNCTAD 2010 
40 Lower estimate by Overseas Development Institute (2010), upper estimate by German Development Institute 
(2010) 
41 Estimate by Indian officials at meeting with EU Delegation 
42  Note  that  Hong  Kong  SAR  had  TNC  FDI  of  $5.3  bn  into  Africa  in  2008  and  account  for  $219  bn  in 
merchandise  export  and  $289  bn  in  merchandise  import  volume  to  and  from  developing  countries.  It  is  not 
possible to separate mainland Chinese TNCs that might have subsidiaries in HK from other TNCs. 
43 Estimate by Deborah Brautigam, mostly market rate loans from state banks 
44 EU OECD Member States 
45 EU OECD Member States 

13

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Alongside  emerging  countries,  non-governmental  actors,  such  as  NGOs,  foundations  and 
private corporations, are also  responsible for a significant amount of  funds for development 
and  are  playing  a  growing  foreign  policy  role.  It  is  estimated  that  private  philanthropy 
foundations, from both developed and developing countries, may account for about US $ 60 
billion  annually46.  While  these  funds  are  of  a  distinct  nature  and  managed  differently  from 
ODA, together they could, if harnessed to complement ODA, better meet the need to foster 
development and tackle global challenges. 

The  EU  and  its  Member  States  already  have  a  sophisticated  policy  framework  in  place  to 
guide their joint work in helping their partner countries out of poverty, but a lot remains to be 
done.  

In addition, it must be noted that success of development endeavours is also a matter of shared 
objectives  between  the  donors  and  the  recipients  of  development  aid.  Recognising  that  its 
partner  countries  bear  primary  responsibility  for  defining  their  own  development  strategies 
while  emphasising  the  key  role  of  good  governance,  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  have 
moved from a donor-beneficiary type of relationship to a partnership47, involving contractual 
approaches, based on policy dialogue and linking results to specific cooperation programmes 
or instruments. 

Similar to other global challenges, in development, the EU as a whole has both an economic 
and  a  political  role.  These  two  aspects  of  EU  development  action  are  complementary. 
Politically,  the  EU  conducts  political  dialogue  both  at  the  bilateral  and  at  the  multilateral 
levels. The EU institutions are also actively participating in development policy discussions 
with other donors in multilateral fora (UN, OECD, G20, IFIs). Bilaterally, the EU institutions 
support key sectors and help developing countries set governance systems and policies as well 
as build capacities to create conditions for inclusive growth and sustainable development.  

The Lisbon Treaty and the new institutional setting for the EU's common foreign and security 
policy has opened the door for a sharpened, more strategic development policy in the wider 
framework  of  more  effective  EU  external  action.  The  European  External  Action  Service 
(EEAS)  allows  for  better  co-ordinated  EU  and  Member  State  policies,  programmes  and 
delivery. 

The  new  institutional  setting,  as  well  as  new  competences  in  areas  of  interest  for 
development48,  also  provides  opportunities  for  increased  coherence  between  external  policy 
objectives and development. Through article 208 TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty has indeed given 
an important role to the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) agenda, which should also 
contribute  to  improve  the  real  results  of  our  development  cooperation  by  reducing 
inconsistencies  and  promoting  synergies  between  the  objectives  of  internal  policies  and 
development objectives.  

With  this  new  institutional  set-up  for  EU  external  action  in  place,  and  a  Multi-Annual 
Financial Framework (MFF) to be agreed for the period after 2013, it is particularly opportune 

46 Wolfgang Fengler, blogs.worldbank.org 1/10/2010.  
47 In recent years, the EU has established various partnership agreements that govern its relations with 
developing and emerging countries such as the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, the revised Cotonou Agreement 
with ACP States, EU strategic partnerships with emerging and transition economies or the Central Asia Strategy. 
48 such as investment, migration 

14

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
to  examine  the  development  policy  framework  within  which  the  new  external  spending 
instruments will be developed49. 

2.2. Drivers of the problem 

Current research50 shows that since 2005, when the Paris Declaration was adopted, global aid 
allocation patterns have deteriorated. In general, aid fragmentation has increased in parallel to 
ODA  increases.  There  is  a  trend  to  deliver  assistance  in  smaller  parcels.  At  the  same  time, 
donor proliferation has increased: globally, donors are operating in more countries and, within 
these countries, in more sectors.  

2.2.1. Aid fragmentation 

The  Paris  Declaration  noted  that  "excessive  fragmentation  of  aid  at  the  global,  country  or 
sector level impairs aid effectiveness. It called for increased donor complementarity through 
delegated  authority  to  improve  division  of  labour  and  reduce  transaction  costs.  Division  of 
labour needs to be pursued both in-country and cross-country". 

Several studies point to the undermining effects of aid fragmentation and donor proliferation 
on  the  value  for  money  and  impact  of  aid.  Fragmentation  is  considered  to  be  a  problem 
because  its  costs  have  been  shown  to  be  very  large  for  recipients,  to  the  point  that  it 
significantly  reduces  aid  efficiency.  Having  to  deal  with  a  plethora  of  donor  missions, 
reporting requirements and consultants considerably reduces the value of aid for recipients. It 
forces  the  use  of  a  great  deal  of  administrative  resources  in  countries  where  these  are  often 
scarce and would be better employed elsewhere. 

Analysis  of  OECD/DAC  statistics  of  2008  and  the  sector  policies  of  EU  donors  in  three 
countries  (Ethiopia,  Vietnam  and  Zambia)  show  that  EU  donors  are  slowly  reducing  aid 
fragmentation  through  increased  specialisation  and  division  of  labour.  In  all  three  countries 
EU  donors  intend  to  limit  themselves  to  four  sectors  on  average,  close  to  the  aim  of  a 
maximum of three sectors as laid down in the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour. 

The Commission itself has committed to limit its engagement to two sectors per country, but 
this rule has not been uniformly applied. While there is a general consistency of approach in 
ACP countries, in non-ACP countries the EU country programme commonly either involves a 
large number of sectors, exceeding the two-sector limit, or those two sectors are so broadly 
defined  (e.g.  as  "human  development,"  "rural  development")  as  to  in  practice  mean 
engagement in a very large number of sectors.  

A  2009  study  on  the  'Benefits  of  a  European  Approach'51  shows  that  applying  the  aid 
effectiveness  principles  can  result  in  considerably  better  value  for  money.  The  study  states 

49 See results of the public consultation on "What funding for EU external action after 2013?" 
50 "Trends of In-country Aid Fragmentation and Donor Proliferation: An Analysis of Changes in Aid Allocation 
Patterns  between  2005  and  2009",  Report  on  behalf  of  the  OECD  Task  Team  on  Division  of  Labour  and 
Complementarity, First Draft – 24 March 2011, final version forthcoming 
51 "Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach", HTPSE Limited, October 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf  

15

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
that  if  improvements  were  made  in  terms  of  increased  predictability,  reduced  donor 
proliferation  and  a  further  untying  of  aid,  the  potential  benefits  from  a  European  approach 
towards  aid  effectiveness  could,  with  a  full  caveat  for  the  paucity  and  uncertainty  of  actual 
data, be estimated to be in the magnitude of 3 to 6 billion Euro per year or 15 to 30 billion 
Euro  over  the  period  of  2010  to  2015.  Of  this  amount  between  €  1  and  1.6  billion  of 
efficiency gains could be achieved by a reduction in aid fragmentation. 

Other  studies,  for  instance  by  the  OECD/DAC52,  also  point  to  huge  potential  gains  of 
reducing  aid  fragmentation.  The  OECD/DAC  calculated  that  the  traditional  bilateral  DAC 
donors established 3700 aid relationships in the world, leading to unmanageable numbers of 
donors  in  countries  and  across  sectors.  Not  counted  are  the  remaining  246  multilateral 
organisations,  emerging  donors  and  other  non-DAC  donors.  The  average  number  of 
"partners" per donor is 68, while the average number of donors that each partner has to deal 
with is 20 (10 bilaterals and 10 multilaterals). 

Map of total number of donors per recipient country (2009)53 

It  is  widely  accepted  that  these  inefficiencies  are  no  longer  sustainable.  Tackling  this 
proliferation and fragmentation is  made  even more urgent by the fact that additional  actors, 
such as emerging donors and private foundations, have entered the aid arena.  

52 2010 Report on Division of Labour "Addressing cross-country fragmentation and aid orphans", OECD, Paris  
53 Idem 

16

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Graph indicating the decrease in project size and the increase in the number of projects 
between 1995 and 2008 

54

To  address  the  problem  of  aid  fragmentation,  the  EU  Council  adopted  a  Code  of  Conduct 
(2007) and an Operational Framework (2009) on Division of Labour (DoL) which provide a 
comprehensive  approach  to  reducing  donor  proliferation  and  aid  fragmentation  through 
increased donor specialisation at EU level. 

After  almost  four  years  of  DoL  processes,  and  in  view  of  the  High  Level  Event  on  aid 
effectiveness in Busan, the EU is at crossroads on this issue. While the EU remains the most 
advanced  donor  community  on  DoL,  progress  has  been  too  slow55.  There  are  some  success 
stories, but these are rather the exceptions and mostly due to occasional leadership and local 
initiatives. 

Sectoral fragmentation 
At  the  sector  level  proliferation  is  also  rife:  forty-one  percent  of  all  sectors  in  recipient 
countries  had  recorded  disbursements  from  more  than  three  EU  donors  in  2007.  Forty-five 
percent of all EU donor sector programmes account for only twelve percent of total spending, 
implying that there are considerable economies of scale to be gained from rationalisation of 
projects and programmes.56 

In particular, a reduction in the fragmentation of aid from a large number of smaller projects 
into consolidated, longer term programmes, could increase this level of savings considerably. 
If, hypothetically, these fragmentation costs were  reduced  to  500  million  Euro  a  year  (for  a 
consolidation into some 750 programmes), the additional savings, above and beyond the 3 to 
6 billion amount, would be in the magnitude of 1.4 to 2.5 billion Euro a year. While it is not 
possible to operate with precise figures, it is possible to establish that the potential savings are 
substantial and to infer that the link between aid fragmentation and DoL needs to be tackled 
further.57 

Existing agreements between the EU and Member States to reduce in-country fragmentation 
of their aid through DoL have not (yet) yielded the expected results for a number of reasons: 

54  Fengler Wolfgang and Kharas Homi, "Delivering Aid Differently - Lessons from the Field", Brookings 
Institution Press 2010 c. 286pp. 
55 For more detailed information, refer to the three published Monitoring Reports on EU Fast Track Initiative on 
Division of Labour and Complementarity, January 2009, November 2009 and April 2011. 
56 "Aid effectiveness agenda: Benefits of the European Approach," European Commission, October 2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf  
57 idem  

17

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1.  Neither  the  EU  nor  all  Member  States  limit  their  aid  in  all  partner  countries  to  a 
maximum of three sectors of intervention, as agreed in the EU Code of Conduct. This 
may be due to political priorities, bilateral interests, visibility considerations, partner 
country requests or other reasons. 

2.  Member  States  and  EU  may  define  their  sectors  of  intervention  too  broadly  (e.g. 
"human  and  social  development"  in  the  EU  programme  in  Bangladesh),  which 
actually allows them to work in a very large number of traditional sectors (human and 
social development encompasses health, education, water and sanitation, etc.) 

3.  Vertical  funds  and  facilities  often  finance  projects  outside  agreed  sectors  of 

intervention and hence contribute to fragmentation of aid. 

4.  While the advantages of reduced fragmentation through DoL may be obvious (e.g. the 
savings  in  transaction  costs),  they  may  not  be  easily  quantifiable  or  immediately 
observable. On the other hand, more efficient DoL requires increased coordination and 
cooperation by donors, which is initially time consuming and labour intensive and thus 
can be considered a disadvantage. 

5.  While  lack  of  political  direction  (including  appropriate  communication  of  existing 
commitments to partner country level) may be one reason, the resistance to change by 
national administrations, implementing agencies and other interest groups that benefit 
from maintaining the status quo also plays an important role. 

6.  Some partner country governments seem reluctant to support DoL processes for fear 

of losing funding. 

2.2.2. High cost coordination efforts, lack of division of labour 

In the current setting, there is a high proliferation of donor – partner country relationships. At 
country  level,  this  results  in  high  coordination  efforts  which  burden  first  and  foremost  the 
partner  countries,  but  also  donor  representatives  in  the  field.  In  addition  to  these  traditional 
relationships, there are new ones emerging, such as South-South relationships or big private 
foundations. While the EU donors are partly responsible for a high level of fragmentation, the 
appetite  for  fragmentation  seems  to  have  levelled  off:  their  contribution  to  the  increase  in 
fragmentation is less than the global donor average. 

There are substantive global and EU-specific commitments to increase complementarity and 
enhance division of labour (DoL) among donors, as in the Paris Declaration (2005), the EU 
Code  of  Conduct  on  Division  of  Labour  (2007),  and  the  Accra  Agenda  for  Action  (2008). 
Better DoL between EU donors will increase transparency, reduce duplication and diminish 
the risk of corruption, and therefore would have a positive impact on development results.  

Specifically, EU donors set themselves an ambitious Code of Conduct on Division of Labour 
in 2007. In 2008, the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour was created, focusing on 
30  countries  with  often  very  high  fragmentation  levels  in  order  to  improve  DoL.  The  latest 
monitoring  report  of  the  Fast  Track  Initiative58  showed  mixed  results.  In  many  countries  of 
the  FTI,  the  technical  preparations  have  been  concluded  in  order  to  facilitate  good, 
measurable  re-organisation  of  labour  among  EU  donors.  There  is  widespread  use  and 
institutionalisation of donor mapping as an aid management tool and there is more agreement 
on  sector  definitions,  lead  donor  arrangements  etc.  Also  the  perceived  partner  country 

58 Third Monitoring Report and Progress Review of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour, Annex 5 
of the "EU Accountability Report 2011 on Financing for Development - Review of progress of the EU and its 
Member States", Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2011) 502 final 

18

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
commitment  to  DoL  processes  seems  to  be  improving.  However,  substantial  measurable 
changes  to  donor  behaviour  are  rare  as  a  result  of  these  preparations.  It  is  a  demanding 
approach that takes time to yield measurable results.  

There  is  a  natural  time  lag  between  policy  commitments  and  their  visible  effects  on  aid 
fragmentation statistics. Usually, if and when donors decide to exit a country or a sector in a 
country, they organise a careful exit phase that takes 3-5 years. That means the full effect of 
policy decisions taken on the basis of aid effectiveness commitments, or on the basis of the 
Code  of  Conduct  on  Division  of  Labour  of  2007,  are  likely  to  show  more  clearly  when  aid 
data for 2010 or 2011 becomes available. 

However, the trend seems to point to the fact that progress has been too slow, even if the EU 
remains  the  most  advanced  donor  community  on  DoL.  There  are  some  success  stories,  but 
these  are  rather  the  exceptions  and  mostly  due  to  occasional  partner  country  leadership. 
Technical approaches for pilot DoL exercises might have reached their limits, both in the field 
and headquarters. An agenda for change which emphasises greater EU coordination, including 
improved DoL, seems to be called for. 

Duplication of effort 
There is strong evidence of duplication of effort with other donors both inside and beyond the 
EU. Taking Bangladesh as an example, all 10 EU donors present in Bangladesh are active in 
the education sector. In Ethiopia, 11 of the 15 EU donors present crowd the health sector59. 
Individual  donors'  allocation  decisions  are  based  on  a  great  diversity  of  criteria,  often 
determined at headquarters' level and resulting in earmarking of funds at country level. This 
means that exits and entries from countries and sectors are hard to coordinate at country level 
and in partnership with the recipient governments. In many of these cases, information about 
each  other's  activities  is  abundant  and  coordination  a  daily  fact.  However,  behavioural 
changes as a result of this information are scarce. 

This  can  lead  to  duplications,  where  the  same  sector  and  type  of  projects  is  invested  in  by 
several donors, leading to a competition locally that hinders any conditionality and does not 
necessarily lead  to  an  improvement in quality. More importantly, it  can  also lead to sudden 
gaps in geographic/sector coverage, with costs in terms of lack of continuity and risks to the 
sustainability  of  achieved  advances  in  certain  sectors.  Moreover,  this  lack  of  coordination 
added to the proliferation of interventions and donors create an atmosphere of uncertainty for 
partner countries and the main beneficiaries in these countries, very often including the most 
vulnerable groups.  

This  complex  and  uncoordinated  nature  of  aid  allocation  patterns  not  only  creates  overlaps 
and  duplication  in  terms  of  too  many  donors  contributing  too  little  at  country  level,  it  also 
creates gaps in terms of overall supply of aid at country level (issue of under-aided countries, 
also known as "aid orphans"). 

59 According to OECD DAC Fragmentation tables, based on disbursement data of 2009 

19

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Donor orphans 
Lack  of  proper  coordination  among  donors,  both  at  EU  and  global  level,  leads  to 
unsatisfactory patterns of aid distribution. These trends are visible both at sector and country 
levels60. The resulting geographical and sectoral gaps are commonly called "aid orphans". 

The OECD61 indicated that such patterns generate inefficiency and inequities and can entail 
considerable global cost in delivering aid to the extent that the aid community as a whole fails 
to invest systematically where aid is expected to have the highest impact.  

This asymmetry is recognised in the Accra Agenda for Action and donors have committed "to 
start  dialogue  on  division  of  labour  across  countries  and  work  to  address  the  issues  of 
countries that receive insufficient aid"62. 

In the current climate of budgetary austerity in OECD countries, it is unlikely that the donor 
community can solve the problem of under-aided countries solely by providing aid resources 
that  are  additional  to  what  would  otherwise  have  been  provided.  Therefore,  meeting  aid 
orphans'  needs  from  scaled-up  resources  will  be  difficult.  Fragmentation  can  be  improved  by 
reducing  non-significant  aid  relations.  This  would  also  free  up  resources  that  could  be  used 
towards aid orphans (assuming that there is an ex ante agreement on which countries are aid 
orphans).  In  this  way,  re-allocating  resources  could  not  only  reduce  aid  fragmentation  and 
transaction  costs  in  partner  countries  where  donor  relations  are  non-significant,  but  at  the 
same time provide more aid to aid orphans. 

As  regards  cross-country  DoL,  which  aims  at  reducing  the  proliferation  of  aid  donors  in 
partner countries, there are also a number of reasons that have prevented progress: 

1.  Many  Member  States  consider  their  decisions  on  partner  country  selection  as  a 
sovereign act, which does not require EU coordination; equally partner countries see 
their relations with bilateral donors as a national prerogative. 
2.  Selection  of  partner  countries  and  country  allocations  is  seen  by  many  Member 
States as a national foreign policy instrument. 
3.  A  substantial  number  of  partner  country  governments  fear  losing  funding  and  are 
hence not supportive of cross-country DoL. 

2.2.3. Fragmentation of Commission-managed aid 

For  the  assessment  of  the  fragmentation  of  the  EC  aid  portfolio,  the  aid  statistics  of  the 
OECD/DAC provide a useful input. The DAC distinguishes 11 sectors63 at the aggregate level 
(including multi sector), and General Budget Support (GBS) as a 12th element. 

Furthermore, to identify fragmentation the DAC uses the concept of Country Programmable 
Aid (CPA), which only includes ODA which is programmed by the donor and excludes ODA 
which: 

60 "Will countries that receive insufficient aid please stand up"? Robert Utz, World Bank, 2009.   
61 OECD Development Brief, January 2009.  
62 Accra Agenda for Action, point 17 letter c) and d). September 2008 
63 Education; Health; Population policies and reproductive health; Water supply and sanitation; Other social 
infrastructure; Economic infrastructure; Agriculture; Other production sectors (e.g. forestry, fishing, industry, 
mining, trade policy and tourism); Environment; Government and civil society; Multisector; General budget 
support. 

20

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
is unpredictable by nature (humanitarian aid and debt relief); 

• 
•  entails no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion 

of development awareness, and research and refugees in donor countries); 

•  does not form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid and aid 

from local governments); and 
is not country programmable by the donor (e.g. core funding of NGOs). 

• 

With  regard  to  the  Commission  portfolio,  the  intention  had  been  to  reduce  fragmentation 
through the limitation of the number of focal sectors in the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). 
DAC 2009 data on aid flows show that EC aid is still fragmented by spreading the funding 
over  many  sectors.  On  average,  the  EC  is  spreading  its  aid  over  10  sectors  (GBS  not 
included), as illustrated in the 30 partner countries64 which are participating in the fast track 
approach for division of labour. The range is between 5 sectors (Mongolia) and 11 sectors (9 
countries). This is clearly much higher than the maximum of 3 focal sectors the EU Code of 
Conduct for Division of Labour called for in May 2007. Of these 10 sectors, the Commission 
provides  a  relatively  large  contribution  to  6  sectors  on  average,  which  indicates  that  the 
Commission  needs  to  spread  out  its  human  capacity  and  financial  resources  to  manage  the 
programmes in these sectors.  

Fragmentation at country level 

In some countries and regions, focal sectors are defined in a very open way, which often leads 
to  very  scattered  interventions.  Indeed,  there  are  cases  where  the  two  focal  sectors  may  be 
defined  as  "rural  development"  and  "urban  development",  or  as  "economic  integration"  and 
"political integration". This often leads to programmes covering many subsectors in fields that 
are as different as health, education, culture, infrastructures, environment, trade, etc., with a 
wide  variety  of  specialised  human  resources  needed  for  the  implementation  of  the 
programmes and numerous interlocutors. 

For  example,  in  a  northern  African  country  the  two  focal  sectors  of  EU  development 
cooperation  are  "sustainable  development  and  culture"  and  "economic  growth  and 
employment".  In  practice,  projects  approved  and  implemented  cover  all  the  following  sub-
sectors:  "culture  and  heritage",  "transport"  ,  "fisheries",  "trade",  "environment"  and  "socio-
economic  development",  all  requiring  very  different  expertises  and  dialogues  with  six 
different ministries. 

Another country,  further south in Africa, is in the same type a situation: 3 focal sectors but 
numerous sub-sectors, with not less than 22 ongoing projects. 

Examples of lack of concentration can also be found in other continents, like in one Middle 
Eastern  country  with  "administrative  reforms",  "economic  reforms"  and  "social  reforms"  as 
focal  sectors.  In  practice,  this  leads  to  programmes  being  implemented  in  "health", 
"education",  "justice",  "social  protection",  "vocational  training",  "support  to  civil  society", 
"support  to  private  sector",  "banking  reform",  "trade",  and  "administrative  reforms".  In  a 
Central Asian country, EU development aid gave rise to not less than 383 service contracts in 
a 6 year period. 

64 Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam and 
Zambia. 

21

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Further breakdown of EU65 presence shows that the EU is highly significant66 in 3.5 sectors 
(58% of funding) and reasonably significant in 2.5 sectors (12%). The EU is insignificant in 4 
sectors  (5%).  This  means  that  the  EU  is  significant  in  a  total  of  6  sectors,  while  being 
insignificant  in  3.5  sectors.  A  little  more  than  half  of  the  countries  receive  General  Budget 
Support, which accounts for the remaining 25% of the total funding, and which is significant 
across the board.  

Comparison of DAC statistics with Country Strategy Papers 

Additional analysis consists of a comparison between the actual presence in sectors according 
to  the  2009  DAC  data  and  the  sectors  as  laid  down  in  Country  Strategy  Papers  (CSPs).  In 
general, CSP sectors are broadly defined, so in some cases they overlap with more than one 
sector  in  the  DAC  definition  (for  instance,  a  CSP  refers  to  "social  sector"  which  involves 
Education and Health in the DAC sector definition). In most CSPs (25 out of 30) a distinction 
has been made between focal and non-focal sectors. In terms of share of the total funding it 
should  be  noted  that  the  3  focal  sectors  only  account  for  42%,  while  activities  in  non-focal 
sectors  and  other  areas  of  intervention  outside  the  CSPs  amount  a  considerable  33%  spread 
over  7 sectors on  average. This seems to be  an unbalanced  situation. In  the implementation 
phase of the CSPs more discipline is needed to keep spending focused on the defined (focal) 
sectors and resist the tendency to spread funding to other areas of intervention.  

There is thus considerable opportunity to further downsize the number of sectors by limiting 
or even abolishing the non-focal sectors in the country programming process. Furthermore, a 
more strict approach for defining focal sectors could be applied. 

Geographic dispersion of aid 
Commission-managed  aid  could  be  more  targeted  at  those  countries  that  need  it  most.  For 
instance, the DCI covers a wide range of countries falling under the OECD DAC definition of 
ODA recipients, from the LDCs to Upper Middle Income Countries. Hence, a certain amount 
of aid is being delivered to countries that have strong financing capacity (such as China and 
Turkey).  In  the  case  of  Angola  for  example,  all  aid  represents  less  than  1%  of  the  national 
budget. 67 For these countries, the benefit of EU development aid is likely to be minimal.  

Given the very different  development needs, performance and interests of each country, the 
DCI  does  not  allow  sufficient  differentiation  between  the  partners.  The  rise  of  several 
developing  countries  as  donors,  the  economic  and  social  disparities  amongst  the  partner 
countries and the development of new objectives beyond pure development assistance call for 
an enhanced flexibility in terms of objectives and cooperation modalities within the DCI68.  

Such fragmentation does not allow a critical mass to be obtained and so prevents large-scale 
projects in some countries where such projects would be the most appropriate. For example, 

65 In this context, "EU" refers to "Commission-managed aid." 
66 The DAC distinguishes between "significant" and "non-significant" contributions to a sector. Highly 
significant means that the donor has a relative large financial contribution to the sector both from the donor and 
the partner country perspective. Reasonably significant means either a large financial contribution from the 
donor or from the partner country perspective. Non-significant means that the financial contribution is relatively 
small from both perspectives.  
67 See Annex. 
68 Report of the Working Group – Multiannual Financial Framework, 'What works and what doesn't?' March 
2011, not published. 

22

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
in the Pacific region, while the EU strategy was relevant and in line with the national requests 
and needs, EU support was dispersed over too many sectors and islands and therefore impact 
and visibility were diluted. 

In 2007, the DAC Peer Review69 urged the Commission to work with the EU Member States 
to differentiate better their respective roles in countries and to prioritise the sectors it targets 
for assistance and slim downwards the number of countries to which it provides ODA. 

Lack of prioritisation  
The reasons for a lack of prioritisation are at least partly political, given that many Member 
States  see  the  Commission  as  the  donor  of  last  resort,  filling  the  gaps  and  ensuring  the  EU 
global presence.  

A  study  on  legal  instruments  for  external  action70  examining  57  evaluations  published 
between 2006 and 2010, found 130 results and impacts that were linked to the DCI; 40% of 
these  were  judged  to  be  relevant  though  ineffective  (e.g.  project-level  results  in  terms  of 
gender equality not translating into societal change; increases in school enrolment while the 
quality  of  education  remains  too  low  to  expect  literacy  rates  to  change),  or  were  too  small 
scale in terms of coverage or investment to really make a difference (roughly one third of the 
evidence). 

2.2.4. Other key drivers of the problem 
Other ways/tools/drivers to improve EU aid impact 

External factors 
EU development aid does not operate in an isolated environment. Other factors influence the 
final  results  and  the  capacity  of  EU  development  aid  to  generate  real  results  in  terms  of 
poverty eradication. Among these factors, many are outside of the EU's and/or Commission's 
direct control or influence. Most obvious would be natural or man-made disasters which can 
set developing countries back.  

Policy Coherence for Development 
In  terms  of  other  factors,  one  of  the  most  significant  is  the  seeming  inconsistencies  and 
incoherencies  between  the  effects  (and  side  effects)  of  non-development  policies  and  the 
objective of development policy. Policy coherence for development (PCD) approaches, which 
are  EU's  main  response  to  this  weakness,  are  not  new.  Looking  for  synergies  and  avoiding 
negative  impacts  of  non-development  policies  on  development  objectives  is  a  long  term 
process  and  continuous  activity  for  the  EU  (Commission  and  Member  States  alike)  that  is 
based  on  the  Treaty.  Furthermore,  the  ‘European  Consensus  on  Development’  reaffirms  the 
EU’s  commitment  to  promoting  PCD,  based  on  the  principle  of  ensuring  that  the  EU  shall 
take  account  of  the  objectives  of  development cooperation  in  all  policies  that  it  implements 
which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development 
objectives. This approach is to be encouraged and will have to be part of any final policy mix, 
no matter which future Option is selected. 

69 DAC Peer Review of the European Community 2007, p. 18, 39, 40, 43 
70 DCI, ENPI, EIDHR, INSC, Ifs and ICI 

23

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Country ownership 
Country ownership and good governance are key elements for success. Experience has shown 
that  without  them,  aid  programmes  will  not  produce  their  highest  impact.  Partner  countries 
bear  the  primary  responsibility  for  defining  their  own  development  strategies.  Limited 
progress in the past can, to a certain extent, be attributed to a lack of ownership and mutual 
accountability. 

As regards division of labour, an important lesson is that concrete progress is only possible 
with  country  ownership  and  flexibility  (i.e.  avoid  blueprint  approaches).  However,  most 
partner countries lack incentives because of fear of losing overall funding or reduced room for 
manoeuvre if donors work collectively. 

In  order  to  increase  the  impact  of  its  development  policy,  the  EU  and  its  partner  countries 
must  therefore  strengthen  their  partnerships,  focusing  on  results  and  ensuring  mutual 
accountability.  In  doing  so,  the  EU  can  better  leverage  policy  reforms,  notably  in  terms  of 
good governance. Again, these improvements would apply across the board, and not solely in 
relation to one or two of the Options considered in this Impact Assessment process.  

Other financial resources 
EU effort may leverage additional finance for development. A growing number of actors are 
playing an increasingly important role in development cooperation and are responsible for a 
significant amount of funds for development71. While these funds are of a distinct nature and 
managed differently from ODA, together they could, if harnessed to complement ODA, better 
meet  the  need  to  foster  development  and  tackle  global  challenges.  For  example,  the 
Commission  will  consider  developing  blending  mechanisms  to  boost  financial  resources  for 
development.  Certain  Options  may  allow  for  greater  resource  mobilisation  than  others,  as 
explained below.  

Partnerships with emerging donors  
The  most  important  missed  opportunity  from  our  lack  of  cooperation  with  emerging 
economies (EMEs) in other developing countries (especially a lack of cooperation with China 
in Africa) is the chance to support the key to Africa's future growth – regional integration72 – 
through  strategic  trilateral  cooperation  to  mobilise  European  excellence  in  the  creation  of  a 
single  market  and  China's  comparative  advantage  in  the  fast  construction  of  low-cost 
infrastructure.  In  that  regard,  the  EU  will  notably  explore  how  to  strengthen  strategic 
partnerships with emerging economies. 

71 For example, global remittances from migrants were expected to amount to around EUR 237 billion in 2010, 
private charities are by some calculations estimated to provide about EUR 35 billion annually; global Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) flows are about equal to ODA. 
72 The November 2010 communication on the future of EU-Africa relations reiterated the importance of regional 
integration in EU policies 

24

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Problem and its main drivers 

Policy focus: 
EU aid is too 
sectorally 
dispersed 

Aid effectiveness: 
Weak EU 
coordination & 
DoL with EU MS 

Differentiation: 
EU aid too 
geographically 
dispersed  

Aid modalities + 
instruments 

PROBLEM: 
Need to 
increase impact 
of COM 
managed aid

Implementation of 
PCD Agenda 

Partnerships with 
other actors / 
donors 

Leveraging 
additional 
financial 
resources 

Country 
ownership 

25

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Scope of the Communication 

Development policy is only partly about aid; other non-aid aspects (such as trade policy, loans 
and  other  financial  flows)  have  an  equally  important  part  to  play  in  the  overall  policy  for 
promoting  global  development.  This  Impact  Assessment  however  focuses  on 
the 
Commission-managed  aid  as  the  main  measurable  indicator  and  the  area  where  most 
significant change, as compared with the status quo, is proposed.  

The Impact Assessment thus deals with issues relating to EU institutions' aid, which are under 
Commission  competence,  and  through  which  the  Communication  can  have  the  most  direct 
impact.  

The Communication addresses specific drivers, based on the following criteria: 
1) Those on which Commission has an immediate and direct influence; 
2)  Those  that  are  not  dealt  with  in  other  policy  initiatives  (e.g.  governance,  PCD)  or  in 
forthcoming proposals (e.g. financial instruments, coordination & joint programming); 
3) Those that do not concern the implementation of policies. 

As  these  are  the  areas  of  significant  change  proposed  in  the  Communication,  the  Impact 
Assessment focuses on the following two drivers: 
- Policy focus: sectoral concentration of aid 
- Differentiation: geographical concentration of aid 

This focus of the Impact Assessment notwithstanding, all drivers of the problems should also 
be taken into consideration and acted upon in order to improve EU development policy and 
make it deliver improved results in terms of MDGs. In particular, non-development policies 
also have a strong bearing on the impact of aid.  

4. Analysis of subsidiarity 

Development  policy  is  a  shared,  "parallel"  competence  (Article  4  TFEU),  implying  that  the 
Member  States  have  parallel  powers  with  the  EU,  have  their  own  aid  programmes  and 
policies and exercise their powers, while ensuring that these complement and reinforce those 
of other Member States and the EU (Article 208 TFEU).  

EU necessity to act: 
The  Treaty  states  that  development  policy  is  a  shared,  parallel  competence  between  the 
Commission  and  Member  States;  it  reserves  a  specific  role  for  the  Commission  in 
development policy. 
Commission-managed  aid  has  to  be  spent  in  accordance  with  the  Treaty  development 
objectives (i.e. poverty reduction, cf. Art 21 TEU and 208 TFEU).  

EU  action  is  necessary  as  action  by  the  Member  States  alone  cannot  sufficiently  fulfil  this 
function. Given the Treaty call for complementarity between the EU and its Member States in 
development  cooperation,  the  EU  and  Member  States  are  committed  to  donor  coordination 
and the EU is mandated to take initiatives to promote such coordination (Art.210 TFEU).  

26

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU added value:  
The EU provides added value: 

(cid:131) 

through  its  global  network  of  delegations,  which  gives  it  a  political  presence  where 
Member States may not;  

(cid:131)  by championing PCD (especially given its exclusive competence in trade); 
(cid:131)  by promoting best development practice; 
(cid:131)  by facilitating coordination and harmonisation; 
(cid:131)  by acting as a delivery agent, particularly where size/critical mass are important; 
(cid:131)  by  promoting  certain  values  and  principles  (e.g.  democracy,  human  rights,  good 

governance, including transparency and anti-corruption); 

(cid:131)  by promoting and facilitating civil society participation and North-South solidarity. 

Coordinated  action  by  the  EU  as  a  whole  has  an  added  value  that,  in  terms  of  policy  and 
financial leverage, is bigger than the sum of individual action of 27 Member States and  the 
Commission.73 Beyond being itself an important donor, the EU also plays the important role 
of federating actions of the EU and its Member States towards a unified EU presence in the 
global scene, capable of playing the political role that the provider of more than 50% of global 
ODA  should  have.  The  EU  monitors  progress  and  proposes  possible  actions  to  Member 
States.  The  Commission  has  a  key  role  in  coordinating  EU  action,  proposing  common 
positions for international events74 and driving forward common approaches to, for example, 
aid  effectiveness  and  division  of  labour,  including  through  the  proposals  it  makes  for 
development policy via regular Communications to the Council.    

In  similar  vein,  a  recent  study  found  that  the  European  Consensus  has  a  greater  value  as  a 
single document than the sum of its individual elements, precisely due to its role in bringing 
Member States and the Commission together behind a single agenda and in giving the EU's 
development policy external visibility75.  

In  order  to  maximise  this  added  value,  greater  specialisation  and  better  division  of  labour 
could  lead  to  greater  efficiency,  economies  of  scale  and  lower  transaction  costs  whose 
benefits could be used to further reinforce the financial resources available and to enhance the 
EU's  negotiating/  bargaining  power,  thus  ensuring  that  the  EU  is  better  placed  to  play  a 
leading role at global level. 

5. Objectives of EU initiative 

As stated by the Treaty, the main objective of EU development policy is poverty reduction in 
the  context  of  sustainable  development.  The  internationally-recognised  targets  under  this 
objective,  subscribed  to  by  the  EU,  are  the  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs).Given 

73 As demonstrated above with reference to the study on the aid effectiveness agenda: benefits of the European 
Approach  from October 2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf  
74EU positions have helped to achieve ambitious global agreements (e.g. Paris Declaration in 2005; Accra 
Agenda for Action in 2008; Doha Financing for Development Conference in 2008). Common EU positions were 
also adopted ahead of the UN General Assembly High-Level Plenary Meeting on the MDGs in 2010 and the 
LDC IV Conference in 2011. 
75 Feasibility Study for the Future Evaluation of the Implementation of Part II of the  
European Consensus on Development, ECDPM for the European Commission, November 2010.  

27

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the  effort  still  needed  if  the  MDGs  are  to  be  reached  by  2015,  the  EU  needs  to  rapidly 
increase  the  impact  of  its  aid  on  poverty  reduction.  Beyond  2015,  the  EU  will  need  to 
continue to support the global effort until poverty is eliminated completely. The objective of 
the proposed change programme is therefore to ensure that every euro of EU development aid 
generates  the  greatest  possible  impact  on  poverty  in  developing  countries,  in  order  to 
maximise the contribution made by the EU to the MDGs and longer-term poverty elimination.  
One way of doing so is by sharpening the sectoral and/or geographical focus of EU aid. By 
focusing EU aid more strategically and concentrating on certain sectors and/or countries, the 
Commission  will  contribute  to  reducing  the  sectoral  fragmentation  and  geographical 
dispersion of EU aid, hence increasing impact.   

General objective 

Objectives table 

Poverty reduction in the context of sustainable development is the 
primary aim of EU development policy (Art 21 TEU, Art 208 TFEU). 
The MDGs constitute the most comprehensive set of internationally 
agreed benchmarks for development progress. 

Intermediate 
objective(s) 

Specific objectives 

Maximised impact of EU development aid on poverty reduction, 
MDGs achievement and sustainable development by 2015 and 
beyond (2020) 
Sharpened development policy focus for better results 

Operational 
objectives 

a)  Direct Commission-managed aid where it is most needed and 

where it has the greatest impact on poverty reduction  

b)  Use Commission's comparative advantage to focus Commission 

managed development aid 

c)  Increase the capacity of Commission managed aid to leverage 

financial resources for development. 

d)  Increase the capacity of Commission managed aid to leverage 

policy change. 

e)  Improve EU development policy coordination and division of 

labour 

f)  Strengthen legitimacy, credibility, visibility, relevance and public 
support for development aid (need to recognise the complexities 
of showing results of aid) 

g)  Improve results-monitoring and reporting to demonstrate 

achievements and constantly learn and improve development 
interventions for further improved results 

6. Policy options 

As  previously  stated,  the  policy  options  assessed  in  this  IA  focus  on  Commission-managed 
aid, as it is here that the most significant changes are proposed and which are at the core of 
the problematic. Whichever option is chosen, and in line with existing EU commitments, the 
main objective of EU development policy would remain poverty eradication, with the MDGs 

28

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as the main benchmarks against which to measure progress. PCD continues to be a necessary 
complement to reinforce EU development policy and aid effectiveness. Given that actions to 
improve PCD and aid effectiveness and the choice of aid modalities  are equally applicable to 
all options, the impact of changes in these areas is not assessed here. 

Option 1 Status quo 
The  aid  allocation  and  implementation  processes  would  not  change  from  the  current 
portfolio. The Commission would continue to allocate grant aid to, and intervene in, a great 
variety  of  sectors  and  all  countries.  In  other  words,  the  EU  would  continue  to  do 
"everything everywhere". 

Commission-managed  aid  programmes  are  aimed  at  the  achievement  of  MDGs,  and  in  line 
with  the  European  Consensus  on  Development,  cover  a  wide  array  of  sectors76  (e.g.  health, 
education, environment, agriculture, infrastructure, etc.). In addition to the 9 sectors listed in 
the  European  Consensus,  the  EU's  offer  depends  on  the  demand  expressed  in  the  dialogue 
with each developing country. 

Commission-managed  aid  would  continue  to  be  allocated  to  all  ODA-eligible  countries77, 
including Middle Income Countries (MICs) and emerging donors. 

In such a scenario, there would be no geographical differentiation of aid and the Commission 
would continue to act as a donor of last resort, maintaining a global EU development presence 
and providing development aid where other donors (including Member States) do not. 

Option 2 Sectoral focus 
In order to reduce the sectoral dispersion of EU aid, the Commission would focus mainly 
on a limited number of sectors, but would continue to provide aid to all countries ranging 
from the LDCs to BRICS. 

In  order  to  move  towards  sharpened  sectoral  concentration  and  specialisation,  Commission-
managed aid would be focused on a limited number of sectors (i.e. the "offer" is reduced). 

The EU would use its comparative advantage wherever possible in the context of country-led 
dialogues, in line with the principle of ownership. 

Many respondents to the public consultation on the Green Paper on EU development policy 
insisted on the need for a more focused EU aid and a consolidation of the more than 45,000 
projects funded by EU donors, combined with further division of labour among EU donors. 
Furthermore, the public consultation on future funding for EU external action has underlined 
that  the  EU  should  exploit  its  comparative  advantage  linked  to  its  global  field  presence,  its 
wide-ranging expertise, its supranational nature, its role as facilitator of coordination, and to 
the economies of scale. 

76 The European Consensus states for example that the Community will concentrate its activities in the following 
areas:  trade  and  regional  integration;  the  environment  and  the  sustainable  management  of  natural  resources; 
infrastructures;  water  and  energy;  rural  development,  agriculture,  and  food  security;  governance,  democracy, 
human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms; prevention of conflicts and of state fragility;  
human development; and social cohesion and employment but the list of sectors is not exhaustive 
77 As per the DAC definition of ODA recipients 

29

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
In that regard, areas of specialisation for policy focus could be determined by the following 
criteria: 

-  Where  the  EU  has  a  good  track  record:  focusing  on  sectors  where  the 
Commission  has  acquired  sound  experience  and  knowledge  and  where  EU  action 
has produced good and sustainable results (e.g. governance, education). 

-  Where  the  EU  has  gained  significant  expertise  internally:  focusing  on  sectors 
where  the  EU  can  provide  useful  support  based  on  its  own  successful  experience 
(e.g. regional integration) 

-  Where  the  EU  wants  to  be  active:  focusing  on  sectors  which  are  considered 

priorities for the EU (e.g. food security; climate change) 

-  Where MS alone cannot make the difference: focusing on sectors where there is 
clear  added  value  for  EU  coordinated  action  in  terms  of  policy  and  financial 
leverage (e.g. support to large-scale sectoral programmes) 

-  Demand  by  partner  countries:  focusing  on  priority  sectors  as  determined  in  the 

context of country-led dialogues. 

-  Growth  generating  sectors:  focusing  on  sectors  which  can  induce  strong  and 

sustained inclusive growth (e.g. agriculture; energy) 

In  order  to  be  effective  and  avoid  any  "orphan  sectors",  the  Commission's  limited  sectoral 
offer  will  need  to  be  complemented  by  other  donors  or  other  instruments.  This  implies 
reinforced  coordination  and  division  of  labour  between  the  Commission  and  the  Member 
States so as to ensure that demand and needs of partner countries are satisfied.  

Under this option, no geographical differentiation would be made in terms of aid recipients: 
Commission-managed  development  aid  would  continue  to  be  allocated  to  all  developing 
countries. 

Option 3 Geographical focus 
In order to reduce the geographical dispersion of EU aid, the Commission would target its 
grant aid towards on a limited number of countries (depending on their needs, capacities, 
and  commitments  and  potential  impact),  but  would  continue  to  have  a  wide  sectoral 
coverage. 

The Commission would apply a differentiated approach to aid allocation and partnerships, 
based on a comprehensive political and policy dialogue with all partner countries through 
which the EU will define the most appropriate form of cooperation, leading to informed and 
objective decisions on the most effective policy mix, aid levels, financial instruments and aid 
arrangements.  A vast majority of respondents to the public consultation on future funding for 
EU external action support the need for a more differentiated approach, tailored to the 
situation of the beneficiary country, based on sound criteria and efficient data collection, to be 
used as a way to increase the impact of EU financial Instruments. 

Many respondents to the public consultation on the Green paper on EU development policy 
have stressed that traditional ODA should be primarily reserved for the poorest countries.  

In  that  regard,  EU  development  aid  could  be  allocated  according  to  needs,  capacities  and 
performance and to potential EU impact. 

30

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  Country needs will be assessed on the basis of several indicators, taking into account, 
inter  alia,  their  economic  and  social/human  development  and  growth  path,  so  as  to 
distinguish  between  those  already  on  a  strong  and  sustained  path  and  those  yet  to 
reach such a stage. The EU will also pay special attention to vulnerability and fragility 
indicators. 

-  Capacities and resources will be assessed according to a country's ability to generate 
sufficient  financial  resources,  notably  domestic  resources,  and  its  access  to  other 
sources  of  finance,  such  as  international  markets,  private  investments  or  natural 
resources. 

-  Country commitments and performance: aid allocations will be adapted to reward 
investment in education and health, progress on the environment, democracy and State 
effectiveness, sound economic and fiscal policies and absorption capacities. 

-  Potential  EU  impact  will  be  measured  through  two  horizontal  objectives:  1) 
Increasing the extent to which the EU's cooperation promotes and supports economic, 
social  and  environmental  policy  reforms  in  partner  countries;  2)  Increasing  the 
leveraging effect that EU aid can have on other sources of finance for development, in 
particular private investment. 

Through comprehensive political and policy dialogue with all partner countries, the EU would 
define the most appropriate form of cooperation, leading to informed and objective decisions 
on the most effective policy mix, aid levels, financial instruments and aid arrangements. 

For  some  countries  (notably  emerging  economies  and  a  number  of  upper  middle-income 
countries), this may result in the cessation or lowering of EU development assistance, and the 
pursuit of a different cooperation relationship based on loans, technical cooperation or support 
for  trilateral  cooperation,  as  well  as  on  a  shared  agenda  around  common  interests  and  for 
global public goods (e.g. climate change, migration), while supporting them as they become 
donors themselves. 

In such a scenario, the Commission no longer provides aid as a gap-filler in countries where 
there are no other donors (no longer donor of last resort/default donor), and no longer ensures 
a global EU aid presence. 

Commission-managed  development  aid  would  still  cover  a  wide  array  of  sectors  depending 
on the demand as established by the dialogue with each developing country. 

Option 4 Sectoral and geographical focus 
The EU would focus both sectorally and geographically (combination of Options 2 and 3) 

Under  this  final  Option,  Commission-managed  aid  not  only  would  be  focused  on  a  limited 
number of sectors but would also be targeted to a limited number of countries. 

The choice of sectors would be made as under Option 2. 

The choice of countries to receive grant aid would be made as under Option 3.  

A basic assumption of this option is that Commission-managed aid would be complemented 
by  other  donors  or  other  instruments.  This  implies  reinforced  coordination  and  division  of 
labour among the Commission, Member States and other donors to ensure that the demands 

31

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and needs of partner countries are met. Such reinforced coordination would also be required 
under Options 2 and 3, but the picture will be more complex, and the importance greater, in 
the  case  of  Option  4,  where  both  sectoral  and  geographic  portfolios  need  to  be  considered; 
this  implies  not  just  in-country  DoL  but  also  cross  country  DoL  and  well-informed  and 
coordinated exit and entry strategies.  

7. Assessment of impacts 

Each of the four options is assessed against the following appraisal criteria: 
- EU presence and influence; 
- EU expertise/specialisation; 
- Dispersion and fragmentation of EU aid (sectorally and/or geographically); 
- Validity of current policy framework and agreements; 
- Potential leverage effect of EU aid / EU critical mass; 
- EU visibility, reputation, credibility and legitimacy; 
- EU commitments (ODA, aid effectiveness, MDGs). 

Option 1 – Status quo option 

Under  the  status  quo  option,  Commission-managed  aid  would  continue  to  be  delivered  to  a 
wide  range  of  sectors  and  beneficiary  countries.  The  Commission  would  thus  maintain  a 
global and cross-sectoral presence potentially giving it influence across the board and possible 
leverage  effect  in  all  countries.  This  status  quo  option  does  not  tackle  the  problem  of  aid 
dispersion  and  fragmentation,  thereby  increasing  the  risks  of  inefficiency.  Moreover,  scarce 
aid  resources  continue  to  be  spread  too  thinly,  resulting  in  reduced  impact  and  a  missed 
opportunity to increase the relevance, legitimacy and visibility of EU aid.  

STRENGTHS 

WEAKNESSES 

Global EU development presence is 
maintained (political visibility) 
Global presence allows access & potential 
influence in all countries, and possible 
leverage effect on non-aid issues 
Commission continues to be donor of last 
resort, reassuring for developing countries 

Global presence allows flexibility and 
capacity to react to crises on the ground 
everywhere 
European Consensus remains valid 
No need for change in current agreements 
(e.g. Cotonou Agreement) 

Fragmentation and dispersion of aid is not 
tackled (missed opportunity) 
Scarce resources spread too thinly (no critical 
mass), resulting in low impact.  

Aid continues to be allocated to countries that 
either do not need or deserve it, thus 
encouraging moral hazard (beneficiary 
countries assume they will all receive aid, 
creating less incentive for reform) 
Impact of aid in certain countries  remains 
negligible (waste of resources + reputational 
risk)  
Poor articulation of countries' specific needs  
High risks of inefficiency, affects COM/EU 
reputation 
COM expertise spread too thinly 
Division of labour & donor coordination 
made more complex leading to administrative 

32

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRENGTHS 

WEAKNESSES 
burden & high transaction costs (both for EU 
and partner countries) 
Risk of aid dependency 
Difficulty in meeting the EU's commitments 
for Sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs as aid is 
spread too thinly  
Inability to do large-scale projects as funds 
per country are too small 
In the long run, EU aid loses relevance and 
legitimacy because of lack of impact 

Winners/losers 

Winners: BRICS & Middle Income developing countries (who continue to receive aid); 
Member States (who can still count on the Commission to fill gaps);  

Losers: poorest and fragile countries (from whom aid is being diverted); EU taxpayers (sub-
optimal value for money) 

Option 2 – Sectoral focus  

Sectoral  concentration  runs  the  risk  of  creating  a  possible  mismatch  between  the 
Commission's  limited  offer  and  demand  from  partner  countries.  This  could  result  in 
difficulties  in  spending  all  resources.  In  addition,  a  top-down  approach  to  sectoral 
concentration would undermine country ownership (a key ingredient for aid effectiveness and 
overall  success  of  development).  This  said,  the  Commission  would  maintain  its  global 
development  presence,  thus  allowing  it  to  maintain  its  potential  influence  and  possible 
leverage effect in all countries. 

Sharpened  sectoral  focus  would  however  contribute  to  higher  impact  of  EU  aid  by 
concentrating resources on a limited number of sectors, thus increasing the EU's critical mass. 
This could also increase specialised expertise, visibility and reputation of the EU in a number 
of sectors where it has recognised comparative advantage. With proper division of labour at 
country level, the problem of mismatch with country needs is likely to be mitigated.  

This  option  would  likely  require  a  significant  reorganisation  of  human  resources  in  both 
DEVCO headquarters and in delegations, to ensure sufficient skills in the focal sectors and to 
reallocate  staff  away 
from  non-focal  sectors.  Significant  capacity-building/training 
programmes  are  likely  to  be  required.  The  successful  implementation  of  this  Option  would 
rest on rapid redeployment of staff and appropriate up-skilling.  

STRENGTHS 

WEAKNESSES 

Critical mass through concentration of 
resources on limited number of sectors 
(potential for much greater impact) 
Concentration of aid and better division of 
labour among donors reduces aid 
fragmentation and transaction costs of both 

Aid still goes to countries that don't need it 
and/or don't deserve it (waste of resources + 
reputational risk) 
Danger of aid dependency and lowered 
incentive for reform (every country 
automatically receives aid) 

33

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRENGTHS 

the Commission and partner countries, 
thereby increasing the efficiency of aid 
Global presence allows flexibility and 
capacity to react to crises on the ground 
everywhere 

Increased visibility and reputation in certain 
key sectors 

In the long-run, specialised expertise and 
staff (leads to more efficiency), could 
enhance reputation 
No a priori reduction in global presence  

Easier to monitor impact/results 

WEAKNESSES 

Scarce resources & COM expertise continue 
to be spread too thinly geographically (waste 
of resources, potential for impact self-
limiting) 
Possible mismatch between EU's limited offer 
and demand from developing countries, which 
could ultimately make global presence 
impossible (notably from countries whose 
needs don't match EU offer) 
Top-down approach undermines aid 
effectiveness principles (+knock-on negative 
effect on EU reputation) 
In the long run, EU aid loses relevance and 
legitimacy + risk of losing credibility in 
representing the EU at large on EU 
development policy (loss of intellectual 
leadership) 
Could undermine MDG commitments 
(notably in those sectors where EU will no 
longer be present and especially without 
adequate DoL which could see Member States 
concentrate on those sectors where the EU 
can no longer be active) 
Risk of losing market share by specialising 
too much (vis-à-vis other donors, notably 
BRICS) 
Problem of spending all resources (may lead 
to an inflation of vertical funds and 
programmes + competition with vertical 
funds) 
European Consensus would need revision (if 
Commission chooses to focus its offer on 
certain sectors exclusively) 

Winners/losers 

Winners: Developing countries whose demand fits EU offer; Member States who can focus 
on other sectors (complementarity); NGOs who implement programmes in the EU's priority 
sectors. 

Losers:  Developing  countries  whose  demand  doesn't  match  EU  offer;  NGOs  who  received 
money  until  now  but  whose  sectors  of  intervention  no  longer  match  EU  sectors  of 
concentration/priority;  Member  States  who  rely  on  the  Commission  to  act  in  sectors  where 
they cannot act themselves, but which they consider important for the MDGs 

Option 3 – Geographical focus 

34

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geographical  focus  might  run  the  risk  of  weakening  EU  influence  and  leverage  effect  in 
certain countries and regions where it no longer delivers grant aid. This problem will likely be 
mitigated  by  strategies  of  gradual  exit  and  the  continuation  of  non-aid  development 
relationships with those countries where the EU ceases to have a grant aid programme (e.g. 
loans, trilateral cooperation, knowledge transfer). Member States may also take over the aid 
programme  in  countries  where  the  Commission  can  no  longer  act,  thus  maintaining  EU 
presence and influence. 

This  said,  in  the  absence  of  enhanced  coordination  and  division  of  labour  between  EU  and 
Member  States,  this  Option  risks  widening  the  gap  between  donor  darlings  and  donor 
orphans,  especially  at  a  time  when  an  increasing  number  of  EU  donors  are  reducing  their 
portfolio and exiting from a number of developing countries. Improved information exchange, 
active coordination and phased exits and entries, with flexibility offered by the EU and MS if 
required, should mitigate against this problem.  

The  greatest  advantage  of  a  sharpened  geographical  focus  is  that  is  would  target  limited 
resources  to  those  countries  where  they  are  needed  most  and  where  they  have  the  greatest 
impact, thus avoiding wastage of taxpayers' money and allowing critical mass to build up in 
certain of the most needy or vulnerable countries, including donor orphans.  The Commission 
would  in  turn  likely  receive  a  boost  to  its  reputation  as  a  strategic  player  focused  on 
eliminating  poverty  and  not  shying  away  from  working  in  the  poorest,  most  vulnerable  and 
most difficult countries. It could enhance its global reputation as a donor with the specialised 
knowledge and skills to work in specific countries or regions. 

As  with  Option  2,  this  Option  will  require  significant  reorganisation  of  human  resources 
within DEVCO and delegations.  

WEAKNESSES 
In absence of efficient division of labour and 
donor coordination, risk of creating more 
donor orphans and donor darlings 

Possible loss of EU influence in certain 
regions and countries 

COM resources still dispersed in many sectors
Uncertainty over addressing sub-regional & 
cross-regional challenges (if the EU has a 
patchy country coverage in a region) 
Uncertainty of criteria for differentiation 
(higher risk of real or perceived 
politicisation/polarisation of aid) 

STRENGTHS 
Targeted aid to those countries which need it 
the most and where the impact will be 
greatest, giving greater value for money and 
reduced wastage 
Opportunity for more modern relationships 
with wealthier developing countries, 
including spin-offs in terms of positive 
impacts on global public goods 
Increased critical mass in certain countries 
Reinforces the role of the COM as 
coordinator for DoL 

EU more likely to meet its commitments for 
Sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs 

Strengthened legitimacy in policy debates on 
countries where COM is present (intellectual 
leadership) 
Allows COM to achieve a more balanced and 
strategic role as donor (less open to criticism)
Over time, COM will strengthen its 

35

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRENGTHS 

WEAKNESSES 

knowledge and understanding of specific 
focal countries/regions, thereby improving 
the appropriateness of its work, its local 
relationships and influence, and ultimately 
development results.  

Winners/losers 

Winners: Mostly LDCs/LICs who may see aid allocation increasing; NGOs in relevant focal 
countries 

Losers: Mostly MICs who may see their aid allocation declining; potentially, segments of 
poor people in wealthier MICs if their governments prove unwilling or unable to support them 
in lieu of donor resources; NGOs focused on these countries and regions and which will no 
longer receive financing; Member States who rely on the EU to deliver "their" aid in countries 
where they no longer operate themselves.  

Option 4 – Sectoral and geographical focus 

This  Option  combines  the  benefits  of  Options  2  and  3.  By  concentrating  its  resources  on  a 
limited number of sectors and by targeting resources to those countries where they are most 
needed and where they have greatest impact, the Commission could ensure a more strategic 
use and allocation of scarce aid resources, which is more in tune with the global context and 
the needs of both partner countries and the EU itself, as well as ensuring improved value for 
money for the European taxpayer.   

Several  of  the  limitations  of  Options  2  and  3  stemmed  from  the  fact  that  they  were  partial 
options, tackling only one aspect of the problem, rather than the problem of fragmentation and 
proliferation as a whole; some elements of a partial option could also prove unworkable (e.g. 
Option 2: if the principle of ownership were to be fully respected, but the EU's sectoral offer 
limited  to  only  a  few  sectors,  there  may  be  countries  where  there  is  no  match  between  the 
EU's offer and the country's demand, thus making an aid programme impossible and a global 
presence therefore unachievable).  

Option  4,  by  combining  sectoral  with  geographic  focus  in  a  strategic  decision-making 
process,  would  lead  to  a  streamlined  and  coherent  allocation  of  EU  resources  in  favour  of 
enhanced results and impact. The EU's grant aid footprint would be reduced and aid resources 
concentrated  on  a  limited  number  of  significant  country  programmes,  but  the  EU's  overall 
global  footprint  would  be  maintained  via  non-aid  development  relationships  with  those 
countries where the grant aid programme ceases. The overall impact on the EU's reputation as 
a  global  development  player  is  likely  to  be  enhanced  by  this  more  focused  and  modern 
approach. 

Ensuring  close  coordination  and  effective  division  of  labour  between  the  Commission  and 
Member States is a sine qua non condition for such this option. By leading by example, the 
Commission  can  increase  the  visibility  and  legitimacy  of  its  own  aid  and  encourage  EU 
Member States to do likewise. This would strengthen the Commission's role of convener and 
coordinator.  

36

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As  with  Options  2  and  3,  Option  4  would  have  implications  for  the  distribution  of  human 
resources. This impact is likely to be greater than in the case of the partial options due to the 
double-focusing process. Those delegations where the aid programme is significantly reduced 
or  stopped  would  need  skills  in  managing  exit  strategies  and  then  in  forging  new  non-aid 
relationships with the partner government (e.g. based on trilateral cooperation or loans); this 
will  require  a  significantly  different  skill  set  from  the  implementation  of  grant  aid 
programmes.  Those  delegations  where  the  aid  programme  is  stepped  up,  but  where  the 
sectoral focus is tightened, may need new sectoral skills. All delegations will need enhanced 
skills in coordination.  

STRENGTHS 
Increased critical mass in certain countries, 
ability to do larger-scale projects, value for 
money 
In the long-run, lower transaction costs for 
the Commission and partner countries (no 
need to negotiate in how many sectors we 
intervene) 
Strengthened role for COM in initiating and 
coordinating DoL 
Opportunity for more advanced and 
meaningful relationships with wealthier 
developing countries, with benefits for the 
EU (global public goods) as well as for the 
partner country 
Allows COM to achieve a more balanced and 
strategic role as donor (less open to criticism)
Reinforces the role of the COM as 
coordinator for DoL  
 Increased visibility and reputation in certain 
areas 
More likely to meet the commitments for 
SSA and LDCs 
 Easier to monitor impact/ results 

Winners/losers 

WEAKNESSES 

In the short to medium term, higher 
transaction costs for Member States and for 
COM (transfer and training of staff) 
May create more gaps (orphans – countries 
and sectors) when offer doesn't match the 
demand of countries 

Loss of COM expertise and competence in 
certain sectors 
Reputational risk, reduced credibility for the 
COM to represent the EU in all sectors 
globally 

Possible loss of EU influence in certain 
regions and countries 
Uncertainty over addressing sub-regional & 
cross-regional challenges 
Higher risk of real or perceived politicisation 
of aid (uncertainty of criteria for 
differentiation) 

Winners: Mostly LDCs/LICs who may see aid allocation increasing; Member States who can 
focus on other sectors and countries (complementarity); NGOs operating in focal sectors and 
countries 

Losers: Developing countries that lose a significant part (most/all) of aid; some poor people in 
wealthier MICs; NGOs who received money until now but whose sectors and/or regions of 
intervention no longer match Commission priorities 

37

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Comparison of options  

Objective/ 
Criteria 

Option 1 – 
Status Quo 

Option 2 – 
Sectoral 
focus 

Option 3 – 
Geographical 
focus 

Option 4 – 
Sectoral and 
geographical 
focus 

Maximise the 
impact of EU 
development 
aid on 
poverty 
reduction 
Sharpen 
development 
policy focus 
for better 
results 

Direct 
Commission 
managed aid 
where it is 
most needed 
and where it 
has the 
greatest 
impact on 
poverty 
reduction  
Use 
Commission's 
comparative 
advantage to 
focus 
Commission 
managed 
development 
aid 

(-) 

(+) 

(+) 

(+) 

(-) 
Scarce 
resources 
spread too 
thinly, 
resulting in 
negligible 
impact 

(-) 
Scarce 
resources 
spread too 
thinly, 
resulting in 
negligible 
impact 

(-) 
Scarce 
resources 
spread too 
thinly, 
resulting in 
negligible 
impact 

(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries 

(+) 
Increased 
critical mass 
through 
concentration 
of resources on 
limited number 
of sectors 
(leading to 
increased 
impact) 

(-) 
Aid still goes 
to countries 
that don't need 
it  

(+) 
Targeted aid to 
those countries 
that need it the 
most  

(+) 
Increased 
critical mass 
through 
concentration 
of resources 
spread on 
limited number 
of sectors and 
limited number 
of countries 

(+)  
Strengthened 
focus on main 
priority 
countries and 
sectors. 

(+) 
Specialised 
expertise and 
staff, leading to 
more 
efficiency 

(-) 
Commission 
resources still 
dispersed in 
many sectors 

(+) 
Strengthened 
focus on 
sectors where 
Commission 
has expertise 
(cf. results of 
consultation) 

38

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objective/ 
Criteria 

Option 1 – 
Status Quo 

Option 2 – 
Sectoral 
focus 

Option 3 – 
Geographical 
focus 

(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries 

(-) 
Possible loss of 
EU influence 
in certain 
regions and 
countries 

Option 4 – 
Sectoral and 
geographical 
focus 

(+) 
Commission 
acting as a 
convener to 
catalyse 
significant 
resources for 
development 

(-) 
Lost 
opportunities 
in forging 
partnerships 
with other 
actors 
(including 
private sector, 
emerging 
economies) 

(-) 
Moral hazard: 
less incentive 
for reform 

Increase the 
capacity of 
Commission 
managed aid 
to leverage 
financial 
resources for 
development 

Increase the 
capacity of 
Commission 
managed aid 
to leverage 
policy change 

Improve EU 
development 
policy 
coordination 
and Division 
of Labour 

Strengthen 
legitimacy, 
credibility, 
visibility, 
relevance and 
public support 
for 
development 
aid 

(+) 
Increased 
visibility and 
reputation in 
certain key 
issues 

(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries 

(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries 

(-) 
Aid 
fragmentation 
and donor 
coordination 
aren't tackled 

(+) 
Strengthened 
role for 
Commission in 
initiating and 
coordinating 
DoL  

(+) 
Strengthened 
role for 
Commission in 
initiating and 
coordinating 
DoL  

(+) 
Strengthened 
role for 
Commission in 
initiating and 
coordinating 
DoL  

(-) 
In the long run, 
EU aid loses 
relevance and 
legitimacy 
because of lack 
of impact 

(+) 
Increased 
visibility and 
reputation in 
certain key 
issues 

(+) 
Increased 
visibility and 
reputation in 
certain sectors 
and countries 

(+) 
Strengthened 
legitimacy in 
policy debates 
on countries 
where 
Commission is 
present 
(intellectual 
leadership) 

The above analysis and this comparison table indicate that the preferred option is Option 4.  

39

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1. Risks 

Human  resources:  Implementation  of  any  of  the  Options  2,  3  or  4  will  require  significant 
shifts  in  the  pattern  of  human  resources  (personnel  and  skills)  in  DEVCO  headquarters  and 
delegations. If these changes are not implemented smoothly, or take too long, then there will 
be a mismatch between country programmes and staffing to implement them – i.e. the wrong 
people, with the wrong skills, will be in the wrong places.  

Reputation:  The  reputational  risks  of  not  making  a  change  outweigh  the  risks  of  making  a 
change. For the Commission to continue to be seen as a cutting-edge development actor, and 
for the EU to maintain its reputation not just for the quantity, but also the quality of its aid, 
change is required to make the EU development effort fit for the current decade and beyond. 
Failure to secure value for money for the European taxpayer, failure to be visible to the public 
in  developing  countries  and  internationally,  and  failure  to  monitor  results  and  continually 
learn  lessons  and  improve  the  EU's  programming  and  impact  would  all  lead  to  reputational 
losses. 

Political  risks:  The  proposed  agenda  for  change  will  require  political  agreement  by  the 
Member States in Council (Council Conclusions are foreseen for early 2012). Policy changes 
will  be  reflected  in  the  new  financial  and  legal  instruments  for  the  post-2013  Multi-Annual 
Financial  Perspective;  these  instruments  will  require  the  agreement  of  the  Council,  EEAS, 
Parliament  and  Commission.  Political  priorities,  particularly  the  geographic  interests  of 
certain  Member  States  and  Parliamentarians,  may  limit  the  scope  to  implement  objective 
decisions vis-à-vis sectoral specialisation and geographic differentiation.  

Implementation  risks:    The  changes  proposed  by  Options  2,  3  and  4  require  effective  EU 
and  wider  donor  coordination,  strong  information  bases  and  networks  (including  on  who  is 
doing what and where, and who plans to change their aid portfolios and when), and successful 
implementation of division of labour, which has to date been weak. Real political will on the 
part  of  Member  States  will  be  needed  to  overcome  current  limitations  in  this  area;  the 
Commission  must  take  forward,  and  be  allowed  to  take  forward,  its  enhanced  coordinating 
role as mandated in the Lisbon Treaty. 

Financial risks: The timing of these proposals is sensitive, given the negotiations on the MFF 
taking place in 2011.  

Impacts  at  partner  country  level:  While  partner  country  ownership  will  be  central  to  the 
EU's  decisions  on  re-profiling  its  portfolio,  there  remains  a  risk  of  mismatch,  at  least  in 
certain countries, between the EU's sectoral offer and the demand/needs of partner countries. 
EU  joint  programming  will  go  a  long  way  towards  mitigating  against  this  risk,  but  certain 
sectors may no longer be supported by the EU (sector orphans).  

None of these risks are "killer" risks, but the design of the proposed agenda for change (as 
set  out  in  the  Communication  and  subsequently  in  the  legal  instruments  and  regulations  for 
the post-2013 MFF), as well as the implementation of an internal change programme (human 
resources) will be critical.  

40

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additionally,  further  studies  may  be  useful  to  help  identify  appropriate  mitigation 
strategies:  

Firstly, as regards sector focus, analysis of the risks of certain sectors no longer being directly 
supported  (sector  orphans)  by  Commission-managed  aid.  This  analysis  should  notably  take 
into  consideration  the  extent  to  which  such  an  approach  could  potentially  affect  the 
comprehensiveness of EU development policy (multidimensional poverty) and the reputation 
of the EU. 
Secondly, as regards differentiation, analysis of the risks of some poor population groups in 
several countries (such as MICs) no longer being targeted by Commission-managed aid. This 
analysis should take into consideration the extent to which such an approach could potentially 
affect EU global presence and lead to a loss of influence in certain countries and regions. 

Thirdly, an analysis from a legal, economic and fiduciary risk point of view, of the types of 
cooperation and partnership frameworks that the EU should establish with other key 
stakeholders such as emerging economies and donors, large international private foundations 
and the business sector. 

8.2. Monitoring and evaluation 

The Commission already has regular monitoring and evaluation systems in place, covering the 
breadth  of  its  aid  programme.  The  information  gathered  enables  the  regular  assessment  of 
progress  towards  objectives  and  results  to  be  achieved,  aiming  to  improve  the  quality, 
effectiveness  and  consistency  of  implementation.    National  monitoring  systems  as  well  as 
joint monitoring systems with partner countries, Member States, international organisations or 
other bodies are particularly considered.  

The Commission currently evaluates country and thematic strategies, individual programmes 
and projects. Larger evaluation exercises assess the complementarity and synergy between the 
different legislative instruments, including non-spending activities. Complex evaluations may 
also cover overarching political objectives as laid down in relevant political processes as well 
as  address  cross-cutting  and  transversal  issues  relevant  to  all  or  several  legislative 
instruments. 

As far as possible, the Commission associates all relevant stakeholders in the evaluation phase 
of the EU assistance, including joint evaluations.  

The  Communication  will  be  implemented  via  the  legal  instruments  for  the  post-2013  MFF 
(e.g. future equivalents of the DCI, EDF10, ENPI, etc). These instruments would be expected 
to include a mid-point or similar review or evaluation.  

9. Conclusion 

The Impact Assessment concludes that a sharpened focus, both sectoral and geographical, is 
the best option in view of increasing the impact of Commission-managed aid.  

Increased  specialisation  and  better  division  of  labour  should  lead  to  greater  efficiency, 
economies  of  scale  and  lower  transaction  costs  whose  benefits  could  be  used  to  further 

41

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reinforce  the  financial  resources  available  and  to  enhance  the  EU's  negotiating/bargaining 
power.  In  doing  so,  the  Commission  will  remain  a  key  global  actor  on  development  issues, 
while  concentrating  its  aid  on  those  sectors  and  countries  where  impact  is  the  highest, 
assuring EU visibility and reputation. 

. 

42

 
 
 
Annex 1: List of acronyms and glossary 

Acronyms: 

BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 

CODEV: Working Party on Development Cooperation 

CSP: Country Strategy Paper  

DAC: Development Assistance Committee 

DCI: Development Cooperation Instrument 

DEVE: Committee on Development (European Parliament) 

DoL: Division of Labour 

EDF: European Development Fund 

EEAS: European External Action Service 

EIDHR: European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy 

EMEs: Emerging Economies 

ENPI: European Neighbouring and Partnership Instrument 

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment 

FTI: Fast Track Initiative  

GDP: Gross Domestic Product 

GNI: Gross National Income  

IAB: Impact Assessment Board 

IFIs: International Financial Institutions 

IFS: Instrument for Stability 

LDCs: Least Developed Countries 

LICs: Low Income Countries 

MDGs: Millennium Development Goals  

MFF: Multi-Annual Financial Framework 

ODA: Official Development Assistance 

OOF: Other Official Flows 

PCD: Policy Coherence for Development  

SSA: Sub-Saharan African countries 

TNCs: Transnational Corporations 

43

 
 
 
 
 
 
Glossary: 

Accra Agenda for Action: (2008) Designed to strengthen and deepen implementation of the 
Paris Declaration, it takes stock of progress and sets the agenda for accelerated advancement 
towards  the  Paris  targets. It  proposes  three  main  areas  for  improvement,  i.e.  ownership, 
inclusive partnerships and delivering results78. 

Aid Fragmentation: the report considers mainly fragmentation of aid across countries. It is 
different from fragmentation of aid within countries, usually measured by donor spread across 
sectors at country  level and small  project size.  An associate concept is  that of proliferation, 
i.e.  number  of  Donors  providing  ODA  to  a  given  beneficiary  country  in  specific  sectors. 
Fragmentation is also associated with the number of aid activities (i.e. number of projects'). 

Code  of  Conduct  on  Complementarity  and  the  Division  of  Labour  in  Development 
Policy:  (2007)  With  a  view  to  improving  the  performance  of  European  Union  (EU) 
cooperation policy, the Commission is proposing a voluntary Code of Conduct for better DoL 
among  the  EU  donors  in  developing  countries.  The  Code  is  based  on  eleven  principles 
designed  to  reduce  the  administrative  formalities,  to  use  the  funds  where  they  are  most 
needed, to pool aid and to share the work to deliver more, better and faster aid79. 

OECD  DAC  members:  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, 
Germany,  Greece,    Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  United  Kingdom,  United  States,  European 
Commission. 

Development  effectiveness:  The  term  development  effectiveness  is  meant  to  describe  the 
level of achievement of overall development goals which are affected by a host of different 
factors. By adding the notion of effectiveness to the term development, the idea is to assess 
cooperation against official, long term and quantifiable development goals (e.g. the MDGs or 
national goals).  

DCI  (Development  Cooperation  Instrument):  (2007)  instrument  which  replaces  a  wide 
range  of  geographic  and  thematic  ones.  Under  this  instrument,  the  EU  finances  measures 
aimed  at  supporting  geographic  and  thematic  cooperation  with  developing  countries  (as 
included in the list of aid recipients complied by the Development Assistance Committee of 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC). It covers three 
components: 1)geographic programmes supporting cooperation with 47 developing countries 
in Latin America, Asia and Central Asia, the Gulf region (Iran, Iraq and Yemen) and South 
Africa; 2)thematic programmes benefiting all developing countries and supporting actions in 
the  fields  of  investing  in  people,  environment  and  sustainable  management  of  natural 
resources  including  energy;  non-state  actors  and  local  authorities  in  development,  food 
security, migration and asylum; 3) programme of accompanying measures for the 18 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific(ACP) Sugar Protocol countries, in order to help them adjust following 
the reform of the EU sugar regime. The budget allocated under the DCI for the period 2007-
2013 is €16.9 billion 80. 

78 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html#Paris 
79 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r13003_en.htm 
80 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/dci_en.htm 

44

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
EIDHR  (European  Instrument  for  Human  Rights  and  Democracy):  (2007)  instrument 
used  to  provide  support  for  the  promotion  of  democracy  and  human  rights  in  non-EU 
countries. For the period 2007-2013 the EIDHR has a budget of €1.104 billion 81 

EDF  (European  Development  Fund):  (1959)  it  is  the  main  instrument  for  providing 
Community development aid in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the 
overseas countries and territories (OCTs). The 10th EDF (2008-2013) has a budget of €22 682 
million82.  

ENPI  (European  Neighbourhood  and  Partnership  Instrument):  is  the  main  source  of 
funding for the 17 partner countries (10 Mediterranean and 6 Eastern European countries, plus 
Russia), replacing the co-operation programmes TACIS (for the Eastern European countries) 
and  MEDA  (for  the  Mediterranean  countries).  The  ENPI  has  a  financial  envelope  of  €11.2 
billion for the period 2007-201383. 

EU Development Policy: refers to the total of collective and individual development policies 
of  EU  and  its  Member  States,  with  the  same  scope  as  the  current  European  Consensus  on 
Development.  

Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour: (2008) the purpose of the FTI DoL is to help 
implement  the  EU  Code  of  Conduct  on  Division  of  Labour  adopted  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers  in  May  2007.  It  intends  to  support  a  selected  group  of  partner  countries  in  the 
process of implementing in-country DoL84. 

Country  in  situation  of  Fragility:  State  fragility  is  here  defined  as  a  lack  of  capacity  to 
perform basic state functions, where “capacity” encompasses (a) organisational, institutional 
and financial capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and territory, and 
(b) the state’s ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society 
(OECD 2010). 

Green  paper  "EU  development  policy  in  support  of  inclusive  growth  and  sustainable 
development - Increasing the impact of EU development policy": The objective of this Green 
Paper  was  to  launch  a  debate  on  how  the  EU  can  improve  the  impact  of  its  development 
policy,  and  how  it  can  best  support  poorest  countries'  efforts  in  promoting  inclusive  and 
sustainable growth, including by leveraging new opportunities to speed up progress towards 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and to reduce poverty85. 

Impact:  the  end-result  of  an  analytical  evidence-based  process  by  which  the  effect  of  aid 
activities  is  quantified,  where  possible.  Impact  may  refer  to  programme  targeting:  how  to 
reach the poorest and most vulnerable, to programme scaling. 

Inclusive and sustainable Growth: the meaning is generally referred to the labour intensity 
of growth, its geographical or distributional impact or its sectoral pattern. It supports the case 
that  growth  associated  with  progressive  distributional  changes  will  have  greater  impact  in 

81 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm 
82 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/edf_en.htm 
83 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/enpi_en.htm 
84 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/35/46836584.pdf 
85 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm 

45

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
reducing  poverty86.  The  concept  of  sustainability  implies  the  idea  that  growth  needed  to 
satisfy  present  needs  should  not  compromise  the  ability  of  future  generations  to  meet  their 
own needs. 

IFS: (2007) The Instrument for Stability (IfS) is a strategic tool designed to address a number 
of global security and development challenges in complement to geographic instruments87.  

Least Developed Countries: they represent the poorest countries as identified periodically by 
the  UN  on  the  basis  of  established  criteria  (low  income,  weak  human  assets,  economic 
vulnerability). The current list of LDCs includes 48 countries; 33 in Africa, 14 in Asia and the 
Pacific and one in Latin America88.  

MDGs:  Adopted  by  world  leaders  in  the  year  2000  and  set  to  be  achieved  by  2015,  the 
Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs)  provide  concrete,  numerical  benchmarks  for 
tackling  extreme  poverty  in  its  many  dimensions.  They  also  provide  a  framework  for  the 
entire  international  community  to  work  together  towards  a  common  end  –  making  sure  that 
human development reaches everyone, everywhere89.  

ODA:  Flows  of  official  financing  administered  with  the  promotion  of  the  economic 
development  and  welfare  of  developing  countries  as  the  main  objective,  and  which  are 
concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent 
rate of discount)90. 

Paris  Declaration:  (2005)  it  lays  out  a  practical,  action-oriented  roadmap  to  improve  the 
quality  of  aid  and  its  impact  on  development.  It  puts  in  place  a  series  of  specific 
implementation  measures  and  establishes  a  monitoring  system  to assess  progress and  ensure 
that  donors  and  recipients  hold  each  other  accountable  for  their  commitments.  The  Paris 
Declaration outlines five fundamental principles for making aid more effective which are:  

1) Ownership: Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies and strategies and co-ordinate development actions  
2)  Alignment:  Donors  base  their  overall  support  on  partner  countries'  national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures  
3) Harmonisation: Donors' actions are more harmonized, transparent and collectively 
effective  
4)  Managing  for  Results:  Managing  resources  and  improving  decision-making  for 
results  
5)  Mutual  Accountability:  Donors  and  partners  are  accountable  for  development 
results91. 

Policy Coherence for Development: The EU seeks to build synergies between policies other 
than  development  cooperation  that  have  a  strong  impact  on  developing  countries,  for  the 
benefit of overseas development. In 2005, the EU agreed to apply the Policy Coherence for 
Development  approach  in  12  policy  areas  (trade,  environment  and  climate  change,  security, 

86 Many factors affect the distribution of income or consumption, and there is no clear link between economic 
growth and changes in income distribution.  World Bank Social Indicators Report 2010.  
87 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/ifs_en.htm 
88 http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/ 
89 http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml 
90 www.oecd.org 
91 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html 

46

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
agriculture,  bilateral  fisheries  agreements,  social  policies,  migration,  research/innovation, 
information  technologies,  transport  and  energy)  that  could  accelerate  progress  towards 
the Millennium development goals for development92. 

92 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/policy-coherence/index_en.htm 

47

 
 
 
                                                 
Annex 2: Summary of the public consultation  

Green Paper on "EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable 
development – Increasing the impact of EU development policy"93 

There was a rich and healthy participation in the public consultation on the Green Paper “EU 
Development Policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable development – Increasing 
the  impact  of  EU  development  policy.”  The  public  consultation  was  launched  after  the 
publication  of  the  Green  paper  on  the  Europa  website  and  ran  for  the  period  15  November 
2010 – 17 January 2011. In addition to the questionnaire contained in the Green Paper itself, 
several events were organised in parallel to present and discuss the Green Paper with different 
categories of stakeholders.  

240 written responses were received. The total documentation of responses amounted to more 
than  2,000  pages.  All  contributions  have  been  made  publicly  available  on  the  Commission 
EuropeAid website94. The following table lists the number of responses by each category of 
respondent. 

CATEGORIES 

# responses 

MEMBER STATES 
  CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS/MINISTRIES 
  NATIONAL AGENCIES 
LOCAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES 
PARLIAMENTS 
NON-EU DONORS 
NON-STATE ACTORS 
   NGOs 
   TRADE UNIONS / PROFESSIONAL BODIES 
   PRIVATE SECTOR / BUSINESS 
   THINK TANKS/ ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS 
INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
PARTNER COUNTRIES 
   GOVERNMENTS/MINISTRIES 
   LOCAL/REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 
INDIVIDUALS 
   EU 
   NON-EU 
OTHER/UNSPECIFIED 
Total 

22 
3 
17 
6 
3 

97 
7 
24 
16 
8 

8 
3 

14 
5 
7 
240 

93 The full report is accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm  
94 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm  

48

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The Green Paper contained 26 open questions relating to a set of four main concerns: 
• 
• 
• 
• 

How to ensure high EU impact development policy; 
How to facilitate more, and more inclusive, growth in developing countries; 
How to promote sustainable development as a driver for progress; and 
How to achieve durable results in the area of agriculture and food security 

The following report summarises the main issues raised in the responses. 

General comments/cross-cutting issues 

The EU is the world’s largest provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA), totalling 
almost  €  54  billion  in  2010.  It  is  also  the  world’s  largest  economic  bloc  with  501  million 
inhabitants  and  a  total  GDP  of  over  €  12  tr illion  in  2009;  its  annual  imports  from  third 
countries exceed € 1.3 trill ion (Euro zone only).  

Most  respondents  welcomed  the  Green  Paper  as  a  very  timely  initiation  of  a  broader 
reflection and debate on EU development policy, especially against the backdrop of recent 
geopolitical  and  institutional  as  reflected,  inter  alia,  in  the  setting  up  of  the  G20  and  the 
creation of the new European External Action Service. The consultation also tied in with the 
discussions that precede the next EU financial framework 2014-2020.  

Respondents recognised that the current financial and economic crisis creates additional need 
to ensure that ODA funds, since they derive from donor governments’ budgets, are used with 
the aim of maximizing the impact on poverty. This will be necessary to secure continued 
support from taxpayers for future increases in development aid.  

Most  respondents  therefore  endorsed  the  increased  emphasis  on  inclusive  economic 
development, growth and employment creation for which ODA plays a catalytic part, since 
it mobilises additional domestic and international funding needed to achieve the MDGs and 
the ultimate goal of eliminating poverty. This was, however, contested by some respondents, 
especially from the NGO community, who pointed out that there is little evidence to suggest 
that economic growth without active redistributive policies and social protection systems 
has had an impact on poverty in the past. 

A  number  of  respondents  stated  that  the  Green  Paper  provided  insufficient  analysis  and 
evaluation  of  the  impact  of  current  policies.  Many  of  the  terms  used  in  the  Green  Paper 
needed  definition  and  further  clarification,  including  “high  impact”,  “added  value”  and 
“inclusive growth”, none of which appear in current EU development policy legislation.  

Several respondents therefore called for current policies to remain in place as outlined in 
the  Lisbon  Treaty  and  the  European  Consensus  on  Development.  These  define  the 
eradication of poverty as the overarching objective for the use of EU ODA. Policy coherence 
should  be  assessed  against  this  goal  alone,  it  was  argued.  In  addition,  some  contributions 
recalled  that,  while  the  Treaty  calls  for  the  EU  and  Member  States  development  policy  to 
complement and reinforce each other, development is not, unlike trade and climate change, an 
EU responsibility. 

Furthermore,  it  was  argued  that  the  EU  is  a  value-based  organisation  and  that  its 
development policies should be based on promotion of democracy, fundamental human rights 
and freedoms, including those of women, children, disabled people and minorities. 

49

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most of the Member States underscored in their contributions that they saw the Green Paper, 
together  with  the  consultations  on  the  funding  of  EU  external  action  after  2013  and  on  EU 
budget support, as the starting points of a longer process of elaborating and agreeing a new 
EU  development  policy.  Development  research  institutions  call  for  the  EU  to  take  the 
intellectual leadership in this process. 

1. 

High Impact development policy 

Many  respondents  underlined  that  ODA  constitutes  only  a  fraction  of  funding  for 
development,  and  needs  to  be  seen  as  a  complement  to  domestically  mobilised  resources, 
foreign  investments,  trade  and  remittances.  At  the  same  time,  in  low-income  and/or  fragile 
countries ODA can provide up to half of development resources available. These respondents 
therefore called for traditional ODA development programmes to be primarily reserved 
for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). However, they also called for an overhaul and 
redefinition of the classification of countries that are eligible to receive ODA, as it is defined 
by the OECD-DAC. 

Consistent  with  the  call  for  reserving  ODA  for  the  LDCs  was  the  demand  for  greater 
coherence in EU development policy especially with regards to MICs. The establishment of 
the  EEAS  provides  an  opportunity  for  a  more  holistic  approach  to  external  action, 
including  all  aspects  of  EU  action:  trade,  commerce,  agriculture,  fisheries,  intellectual 
property, security, climate change etc.  

Many answers endorsed the notion of more focused aid and a consolidation of the currently 
more than 45,000 projects funded by EU donors, combined with further cross-country and in-
country division of labour among EU donors. Aid should be consolidated into multi-donor, 
sector/thematic sector wide approaches (SWAp) with long-term, predictable and reliable 
funding  commitments  based  on  strengthened  PEFA  and  other  assessment  systems.  Apart 
from  education  and  health,  energy  infrastructure,  agriculture/food  security  and  aid  for  trade 
are identified as focus areas. 

While joint EU country programming of assistance was endorsed in principle, it should be 
introduced gradually starting with countries where it would yield demonstrable added value. 
Conflict  analysis  should  be  a  mandatory  part  of  the  joint  assessments  that  precede  country 
programming exercises. 

A number of contributions underlined that development cooperation must be a reciprocal 
partnership. In exchange for long-term EU commitments, partner countries need to commit 
to  allocating  a  sufficient  part  of  their  budgets  to  priority  areas  such  as  social  sector  reform, 
health and education.  

Many  respondents  called  for  increased  direct  involvement  by  elected  parliamentary 
assemblies at national, regional and local levels in both EU and partner countries as part of a 
broadened  partnership  between  democratic  institutions.  There  were  equally-strong  calls  for 
broader  involvement  of  civil  society  organisations  –  North  and  South  –  including  private 
sector organisations, in the programming, monitoring and evaluation of assistance. 

50

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. 

Inclusive and sustainable growth 

While  most  respondents  recognised  economic  growth  as  a  necessary  condition  for 
development,  many  also  pointed  out  that  growth  alone  is  not  sufficient.  International 
agreements on transparency, decent work and environmental standards, as well as effective, 
transparent  monitoring  of  actual  behaviour  combined  with  effective  sanctions  should  form 
part  of  EU  development  policy,  as  outlined  for  example  in  the  Initiative  on  Extractive 
Industries. 

However,  there  was  almost  universal  support  for  active  promotion  of  local  SMEs, 
especially  in  the  agricultural  sector,  by  supporting  necessary  infrastructure  in  transport, 
energy and communications (ICT). Even more important, is the strengthening of the legal and 
financial frameworks that are necessary to entice the informal sector into the official economy 
and to broaden the development resource base. 

A  case  was  made  for  reinvigorating  the  creation  of  cooperative  enterprises,  especially 
producer-cooperatives in the agricultural and fisheries sectors, as a stakeholder alternative to 
the shareholder company model currently predominant in the West. It was pointed out that the 
democratic structure of cooperatives brings with it in-built training in participatory democracy 
and governance. 

Many  respondents  called  for  increased  ODA  support  for  direct  funding  of  social 
protection systems, especially targeted to the poor. 

3. 

Sustainable development 

Some respondents suggested that the term “green development” should replace “sustainable 
development” because it has greater universal recognition. 

Climate  change  adaptation  was  seen  as  a  priority  and  the  work  of  OECD/DAC  in 
developing guidelines and accounting rules for assistance to climate change was considered of 
particular relevance to promote coherence and to leverage financing. 

It  was  suggested  that  the  EU  should  conform  to  the  Natural  Resource  Charter  when 
providing  development  assistance.  Equally,  the  EU  should  support  the  goal  of  the  CBD 
Nagoya Strategic Plan towards stopping global deforestation by 2020. 

There were diverging views on how to strike the right balance between support for mitigation 
and adaptation measures in the area of climate change.  Programmes  need to be designed 
for different circumstances in different countries. However, countries’ exposure to natural 
hazards is generally not underlined to the extent it should be in Country Strategy Papers, with 
disaster risk reduction – or prevention - measures rarely included in agreed programmes. 

Support to sustainable energy cannot be seen  apart from the EU strategy on  climate change 
and development. There are Council Conclusions (May 2009) and an Energy Facility, which 
should be implemented.  

It was pointed out that reliable, sustainable, and renewable sources of energy are among the 
necessary conditions for enhancing economic activities and reduction of poverty. The priority 
of the EU’s efforts should therefore be support for accessible sources of energy at the local 

51

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
level,  energy  self-sufficiency,  with  emphasis  on  the  diversification  of  energy  sources,  clean 
technologies,  emission  reduction,  know-how  exchanges  in  the  sphere  of  energy  efficiency, 
and the sustainable use of water and soil, including minerals. 

Many respondents, especially NGOs, advocated that all actions relating to Climate Change 
measures should be funded separately from ODA and not counted under ODA. 

4. 

Agriculture and Food Security 

Most  respondents  strongly  endorsed  incorporating  sustainable  agriculture  and  food 
security in the priority areas for EU development policy. Strategic areas should encompass 
support  for  smallholders,  including  land  tenure  rights  and  provision  of  knowledge,  supplies 
and equipment.  

It was pointed out that the EU possesses extensive expertise relating to sustainable agriculture 
under  changing  conditions,  which  it  should  use  to  support  initiatives  in  poor  countries  with 
the  aim  of  optimising  use  of  agricultural  production  means,  integrated  plant  protection, 
improved land and water resource management and the introduction of resistant species. 

EU  countries  have  broad  experience  when  it  comes  to  carrying  out  systemic  and 
economic  transformations,  also  in  the  agricultural  sectors.  In  developing  countries,  such 
experience should be used to promote ownership relations and the right to use land for rural 
populations. These are pre-requisites for greater efficiency. 

Support  for  agro-ecological  solutions,  applied  research  and  capacity  building  for  extension 
services  were  emphasised  as  priority  areas.  Support  to  smallholder  farmers  was  widely 
endorsed as well as the special targeting of women farmers.  

5. 

Missing areas 

Many  respondents  pointed  out  that  the  Green  Paper  did  not  pay  sufficient  attention  to 
fundamental issues, such as democracy and human rights, the important role of women 
in  development,  or  to  the  rights  of  children,  minorities,  indigenous  peoples  or  the 
disabled. Similarly, it was felt that issues related to HIV/AIDS, pervasive corruption and lack 
of transparency were inadequately covered in the Paper. 

52

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3: EU country aid allocations (2007-2013) 

Country 

Pop 

GNI 

Total 
ODA 

ODA 

ODA  HDI 

mill 

capita  million $ 

per Capita  %GNI  Ranking 

EU AID 
Country 
envelope  

mill EURO  

ACP  

1  Angola 

2  Antigua e Barbuda 

3  Bahamas 

4  Barbados 

5  Belize 

6  Bénin 

7  Botswana 

8  Burkina Faso 

9  Burundi 

10  Cameroun 

11  Cap Vert 

12  République Centrafricaine 

13  Tchad 

14  Comores 

15  RDC 

16  Congo 

17  Cook (islands) 

18  Cote d Ivoire 

19  Cuba 

20  Djibouti 

21  Dominica 

22  République Dominicaine 

23  East Timor 

24  Guinée Equatoriale 

25  Eritrea 

26  Ethiopia 

27  Fiji 

28  Gabon 

29  Gambia 

30  Ghana 

31  Grenada 

32  Guinea 

33  Guinea-Bissau 

34  Guyana 

35  Haiti 

36 

Jamaica 

37  Kenya 

38  Kiribati 

39  Lesotho 

40  Liberia 

41  Madagascar 

42  Malawi 

43  Mali 

44  Marshall Island 

45  Mauritania 

18,5 

$3.490 

0,1 

0,3 

0,3 

0,3 

8,9 

1,9 

15,8 

8,3 

19,5 

0,5 

4,4 

11,2 

0,7 

66 

3,7 

n.a. 

21,1 

11,2 

0,9 

0,1 

10,1 

1,1 

0,7 

5,1 

82,8 

0,8 

1,5 

1,7 

23,8 

0,1 

10,1 

1,6 

0,8 

10 

2,7 

$12.070 

$21.390 

$9.140 

$3.740 

$750 

$6.240 

$510 

$150 

$1.170 

$3.010 

$450 

$610 

$870 

$160 

$1.830 

n.a. 

$1.060 

n.a 

$1.280 

$4.870 

$4.510 

n.a. 

$12.420 

n.a. 

$330 

$3.950 

$7.370 

$440 

$700 

$5.550 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

$4.490 

39,8 

$770 

0,1 

2,1 

4 

19,6 

15,3 

13 

0,1 

3,3 

$1.890 

$1.030 

$160 

n.a. 

$280 

$680 

$3.060 

$960 

239 

6 

n.a. 

12 

28 

683 

290 

1084 

549 

649 

196 

237 

561 

51 

$12,92 

$60,00 

0,4 

0,6 

$40,00 

$93,33 

2,0 

$76,74 

10,3 

$152,63 

$68,61 

$66,14 

$33,28 

$392,00 

$53,86 

$50,09 

$72,86 

2,5 

13,5 

41,2 

3,0 

13,1 

11,9 

9,2 

9,2 

2354 

$35,67 

23,5 

283 

n.a. 

$76,49 

4,7 

8,0 

2366 

$112,13 

10,7 

116 

162 

36 

120 

217 

32 

145 

$10,36 

$180,00 

$360,00 

$11,88 

$197,27 

$45,71 

$28,43 

n.a 

14,5 

10,1 

0,3 

n.a. 

0,5 

n.a. 

3825 

$46,20 

13,4 

71 

78 

128 

1586 

48 

215 

146 

173 

1121 

150 

1788 

27 

123 

505 

445 

778 

988 

59 

287 

$88,75 

$52,00 

$75,29 

$66,64 

$480,00 

$21,29 

$91,25 

$216,25 

$112,10 

$55,56 

$44,92 

2,3 

0,8 

18,5 

10,4 

8,3 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

1,1 

5,9 

$270,00 

115,4 

$58,57 

$126,25 

$22,70 

$50,85 

$76,00 

$590,00 

$86,97 

5,8 

78,3 

n.a. 

17,6 

11,0 

32,1 

9,4 

LHD 

n.a. 

HHD 

HHD 

HHD 

LHD 

MHD 

LHD 

LHD 

LHD 

MHD 

LHD 

LHD 

LHD 

LHD 

MHD 

n.a. 

LHD 

n.a 

LHD 

n.a. 

MHD 

MHD 

MHD 

n.a. 

LHD 

MHD 

MHD 

LHD 

LHD 

n.a. 

LHD 

LHD 

MHD 

LHD 

HHD 

LHD 

n.a. 

LHD 

LHD 

LHD 

LHD 

LHD 

n.a. 

LHD 

173,0 € 

3,4 € 

4,7 € 

9,8 € 

9,8 € 

267,0 € 

56,0 € 

423,0 € 

150,5 € 

190,8 € 

38,4 € 

109,0 € 

299,0 € 

45,0 € 

514,0 € 

85,0 € 

3,0 € 

218,0 € 

40,5 € 

5,7 € 

179,0 € 

63,0 € 

12,5 € 

122,4 € 

644,0 € 

?? 

40,8 € 

63,2 € 

282,0 € 

6,0 € 

189,6 € 

77,0 € 

40,8 € 

291,0 € 

110,0 € 

306,0 € 

10,6 € 

108,8 € 

119,6 € 

462,0 € 

349,0 € 

426,5 € 

4,5 € 

124,8 € 

53

 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
Country 

Pop 

GNI 

Total 
ODA 

ODA 

ODA  HDI 

mill 

capita  million $ 

per Capita  %GNI  Ranking 

1,3 

0,1 

22,9 

2,2 

n.a. 

15,3 

$7.240 

$2.220 

$440 

$4.290 

n.a. 

$340 

156 

121 

2013 

326 

24 

470 

154,7 

$1.140 

1680 

46  Mauritius 

47  Micronesia 

48  Mozambique 

49  Namibia 

50  Nauru 

51  Niger 

52  Nigeria 

53  Niue 

54  Palau 

55  Papua New Guinea 

56  Rwanda 

57  St. Kitts and Nevis 

58  St. Lucia 

St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 

59 

60  Samoa 

61  Sao Tome and Principe 

62  Senegal  

63  Seychelles 

64  Sierra Leone 

65  Solomon Island 

66  Somalia 

67  South Africa 

68  Sudan 

69  Suriname 

70  Swaziland 

71  Tanzania 

72  Togo 

73  Tonga 

74  Trinidad and Tobago 

75  Tuvalu 

76  Uganda 

77  Vanuatu 

78  Zambia 

79  Zimbabwe 

ENPI  

1  Algeria 

2  Armenia 

3  Azerbaijan 

4  Belarus 

5  Egypt 

6  Georgia 

7 

8 

Israel 

Jordan 

9  Lebanon 

10  Libya 

11  Moldova 

12  Morocco 

Occupied Palestinian 
Territory 

13 

$120,00 

$1.210,00 

$87,90 

$148,18 

$30,72 

$10,86 

$61,79 

1,8 

44,7 

20,8 

3,5 

n.a. 

8,9 

1,1 

n.a. 

18,3 

5,3 

$0,00 

18,7 

$205,00 

$310,00 

$385,00 

$155,00 

$81,76 

$230,00 

$76,67 

$412,00 

$72,75 

$21,87 

$54,11 

$314,00 

$48,33 

$67,19 

$75,61 

$400,00 

$5,38 

$54,62 

$515,00 

$98,60 

$58,96 

$9,14 

$170,32 

$26,36 

$10,10 

$11,14 

$211,16 

$126,83 

$152,62 

$6,09 

$68,06 

$28,50 

$756,50 

$11,61 

1,1 

4,7 

5,5 

16,1 

15,7 

7,9 

3,5 

23,0 

42,8 

n.a. 

0,4 

4,6 

n.a. 

2,1 

13,6 

17,5 

12,4 

0,0 

n.a. 

11,6 

16,4 

11,2 

n.a. 

0,2 

5,9 

0,6 

0,2 

0,5 

8,6 

n.a 

3,3 

1,8 

0,1 

4,2 

1,0 

n.a. 

0,5 

HID 

MHD 

LHD 

MHD 

n.a. 

LHD 

LHD 

n.a. 

n.a. 

LHD 

LHD 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

MHD 

LHD 

n.a. 

LHD 

MHD 

LHD 

MHD 

LHD 

MHD 

MHD 

LHD 

LHD 

HHD 

HHD 

n.a. 

LHD 

n.a 

LHD 

LHD 

HHD 

HHD 

HHD 

HHD 

MHD 

HHD 

VHHD 

HHD 

HHD 

MHD 

MHD 

n.a. 

MHD 

9 

35 

414 

6 

41 

31 

77 

31 

1022 

23 

437 

206 

662 

1078 

2289 

157 

58 

2936 

499 

40 

7 

18 

1786 

103 

1272 

737 

319 

528 

232 

98 

925 

908 

n.a 

761 

641 

39 

245 

912 

3026 

245 

n.a. 

n.a. 

6,7 

10 

n.a. 

0,2 

0,1 

0,2 

0,2 

12,5 

0,1 

5,7 

0,5 

9,1 

49,3 

42,3 

0,5 

1,2 

43,7 

6,6 

0,1 

1,3 

n.a. 

32,7 

0,2 

12,9 

12,5 

34,9 

3,1 

8,8 

9,7 

83 

4,3 

n.. 

6 

4,2 

6,4 

3,6 

32 

4 

n.a. 

$8.940 

$1.180 

$460 

$10.100 

$5.170 

$5.110 

$2.840 

$1.140 

$1.030 

$8.480 

$340 

$910 

n.a. 

$5.770 

$1.220 

n.a. 

$2.350 

$500 

$440 

$3.260 

$16.490 

n.a. 

$460 

$2.620 

$970 

n.a. 

$4.420 

$3.100 

$4.840 

$5.540 

$2.070 

$2.530 

n.a 

$3.740 

$7.970 

$12.020 

$1.590 

$2.790 

n.a. 

14  Syria 

21,1 

$2.410 

EU AID 
Country 
envelope  

mill EURO  

39,6 € 

?? 

482,0 € 

82,6 € 

2,2 € 

366,0 € 

677,0 € 

2,4 € 

2,4 € 

108,0 € 

290,0 € 

4,5 € 

8,1 € 

7,8 € 

30,0 € 

17,1 € 

288,0 € 

5,9 € 

242,0 € 

13,2 € 

212,0 € 

980,0 € 

258,0 € 

19,8 € 

63,0 € 

555,0 € 

123,0 € 

5,9 € 

25,5 € 

5,0 € 

439,0 € 

21,6 € 

475,0 € 

129,6 € 

392,0 € 

255,4 € 

214,5 € 

84,2 € 

1.007,0 € 

300,7 € 

20,0 € 

488,0 € 

337,0 € 

60,0 € 

482,8 € 

1.234,5 € 

??? 

259,0 € 

54

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
Country 

Pop 

GNI 

Total 
ODA 

ODA 

ODA  HDI 

mill 

capita  million $ 

per Capita  %GNI  Ranking 

EU AID 
Country 
envelope  

mill EURO  

15  Tunisia 

16  Ukraine 

10,4 

46 

$3.720 

$2.800 

474 

668 

$45,58 

$14,52 

1,3 

0,6 

HHD 

HHD 

540,0 € 

964,1 € 

65,0 € 

249,0 € 

61,0 € 

41,0 € 

160,0 € 

34,0 € 

20,0 € 

137,0 € 

121,0 € 

135,0 € 

223,0 € 

55,0 € 

214,0 € 

38,0 € 

117,0 € 

132,0 € 

31,0 € 

40,0 € 

1.030,0 € 

403,0 € 

14,0 € 

152,0 € 

173,0 € 

470,0 € 

494,0 € 

HHD 

MHD 

HHD 

HHD 

HHD 

HHD 

n.a. 

HHD 

MHD 

MHD 

MHD 

HHD 

MHD 

HHD 

MHD 

HHD 

HHD 

HHD 

LHD 

LHD 

n.a. 

MHD 

MHD 

MHD 

MHD 

DCI 

1  Argentina G20 

2  Bolivia 

3  Brazil G20 

4  Chile 

5  Colombia 

6  Costa Rica 

7  Cuba 

8  Ecuador 

9  El Salvador 

10  Guatemala 

11  Honduras 

12  Mexico 

13  Nicaragua 

14  Panama 

15  Paraguay 

16  Peru 

17  Uruguay 

18  Venezuela 

19  Afghanistan 

20  Bangladesh 

21  Bhutan 

22  Cambodia 

23  China G20 

24 

25 

India G20 

Indonesia G20 

26  Korea Dem People 

27  Laos 

28  Malaysia 

29  Maldives 

30  Mongolia 

31  Myanmar/Burma 

32  Nepal 

33  Pakistan 

34  Philippines 

35  Sri Lanka 

36  Thailand 

37  Vietnam 

38  Kazakhstan 

39  Kyrgyz Republic 

40  Tajikistan 

41  Turkmenistan  

42  Uzbekistan 

43 

44 

Iran  

Iraq 

45  Oman 

46  Saudi Arabia G20 

40,3 

9,9 

193,7 

17 

45,7 

4,6 

11,2 

13,6 

6,2 

14 

7,5 

107,4 

5,7 

3,5 

6,3 

29,2 

3,3 

28,4 

29,8 

162,2 

0,7 

14,8 

$7.570 

$1.620 

$8.040 

$9.420 

$4.930 

$6.230 

n.a. 

$3.920 

$3.370 

$2.620 

$1.820 

$8.920 

$1.000 

$6.710 

$2.270 

$4.150 

$9.360 

$10.150 

n.a 

$590 

$2.020 

$650 

1331,5 

$3.590 

1155,3 

$1.180 

230 

23,9 

6,3 

27,5 

0,3 

2,7 

50 

29,3 

169,7 

92 

20,3 

67,8 

87,3 

15,9 

5,3 

7 

5,1 

27,8 

72,9 

31,5 

2,8 

n.a. 

$2.230 

n.a. 

$880 

$7.230 

$3.870 

$1.630 

n.a. 

$440 

$1.020 

$1.790 

$1.990 

$3.760 

$1.010 

$6.740 

$870 

$700 

$3.420 

$1.100 

$4.530 

$2.210 

n.a. 

n.a. 

128 

726 

338 

80 

1060 

109 

116 

209 

277 

376 

457 

185 

774 

66 

148 

444 

51 

67 

6070 

1240 

125 

722 

1153 

2453 

1050 

67 

420 

144 

33 

372 

357 

855 

2816 

310 

704 

-77 

3744 

298 

315 

409 

40 

190 

93 

2791 

212 

n.a. 

$3,18 

$73,33 

$1,74 

$4,71 

$23,19 

$23,70 

$10,36 

$15,37 

$44,68 

$26,86 

$60,93 

$1,72 

0,0 

4,4 

0,0 

0,1 

0,5 

0,4 

n.a. 

0,4 

1,3 

1,1 

3,2 

0,0 

$135,79 

13,3 

$18,86 

$23,49 

$15,21 

$15,45 

$2,36 

$203,69 

$7,64 

$178,57 

$48,78 

$0,87 

$2,12 

$4,57 

$2,80 

$66,67 

$5,24 

$110,00 

$137,78 

0,3 

1,0 

0,4 

0,1 

0,0 

n.a 

1,2 

9,5 

7,5 

0,0 

0,2 

0,2 

7,2 

0,1 

2,6 

9,4 

$7,14 

n.a. 

$29,18 

$16,59 

$3,37 

$34,68 

-$1,14 

$42,89 

$18,74 

$59,43 

$58,43 

$7,84 

$6,83 

$1,28 

$88,60 

$75,71 

6,7 

1,6 

0,2 

1,7 

0,0 

4,2 

0,3 

7,1 

8,3 

0,2 

0,6 

0,0 

4,5 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

VHHD 

n.a. 

MHD 

HHD 

MHD 

MHD 

LHD 

LHD 

MHD 

MHD 

MHD 

MHD 

MHD 

HHD 

MHD 

MHD 

MHD 

MHD 

HHD 

n.a. 

n.a. 

HHD 

41,0 € 

17,0 € 

10,0 € 

29,0 € 

65,0 € 

120,0 € 

398,0 € 

130,0 € 

112,0 € 

17,0 € 

304,0 € 

74,0 € 

106,0 € 

128,0 € 

53,0 € 

74,8 € 

n.a. 

58,7 € 

??? 

??? 

55

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
Country 

Pop 

GNI 

Total 
ODA 

ODA 

ODA  HDI 

mill 

capita  million $ 

per Capita  %GNI  Ranking 

47  Yemen 

48  South Africa 

23,6 

49,3 

$1.060 

$5.770 

500 

1078 

$21,19 

20,0 

$21,87 

0,4 

LHD 

MHD 

EU AID 
Country 
envelope  

mill EURO  

130,0 € 

980,0 € 

CSPs for Libya, Cuba, Iraq cover only the years 2011-2013 

56