COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Date: 2011-07-13
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: common fisheries policy, conservation of fish stocks, fishery management, fishing regulations, sustainable development

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 13.7.2011 
SEC(2011) 892 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 

SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying the document 

PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 

on the Common Fisheries Policy 

{COM(2011) 425 final} 
{SEC(2011) 891 final} 

 
 
 
 
  
 
1. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

1.1. 

The CFP has failed to perform  

The  current  CFP  has  failed  to  ensure  sustainable  exploitation  of  living  aquatic  resources 
despite  the  new  management  tools  introduced  in  2002:  Long  Term  Management  Plans 
intended  to  exploit  fish  stocks  at  sustainable  levels  and  to  rebuild  overfished  stocks,  and 
Regional  Advisory  Councils,  intended  to  foster  dialogue  among  stakeholders  and  with  the 
Commission.  

The problems underlying this failure are interdependent. Overcapacity is the main driver for 
overfishing.  However,  the  reduction  of  quotas,  intended  to  curb  overfishing,  has  increased 
overcapacity still further. Similarly, overcapacity implies the poor economic performance of 
the catching sector — but poor economic performance incentivises overfishing as a short-term 
fix for diminishing revenues. It also results in the industry's repeated calls for public financial 
support, which maintains overcapacity, and encourages deviation from scientific advice when 
setting TACs. With these links in mind, the problems can be ranked as follows:  

•  The  main  problem  of  the  CFP  is  the  lack  of  environmental  sustainability  due  to 
overfishing.  All  other  problems  contribute  to  this.  Fleet  overcapacity,  deviation  from 
scientific  advice  while  setting  TACs,  and  a  lack  of  prioritisation  when  setting  objectives 
are  the  main  drivers  for  overfishing.  Relative  stability,  the  high  level  of  discards,  poor 
compliance and the lack of sufficient scientific advice are additional drivers. 

•  The  second  problem  is  poor  economic  sustainability,  particularly  for  the  catching  sector. 

Many fleets are unprofitable and vulnerable to external shocks (eg high fuel prices).  

•  The third problem is the lack of social sustainability, which primarily affects the catching 
sector and areas dependent on fishing. Low wages and serious safety hazards mean that the 
catching sector is not a source of attractive jobs to potential new generations of fishermen. 
As a result, employment, particularly in the catching sector, has been declining for the last 
15 years in many areas dependent on fisheries. 

•  Fourth, the CFP has a very complex legal framework, which fosters micromanagement and 

impedes achieving environmental sustainability. 

•  The external dimension of the CFP has also performed worse than expected, particularly as 

regards environmental sustainability, but also in terms of international governance. 

1.2.  Who is affected by the CFP and how? 

Stakeholder 

Catching sector 
in the EU 

Dependent 
businesses & 
communities  

Description 

Key interests 

EC vessel owners and crew 

Maintaining profitability and livelihoods 

Business and communities dependent upon 
fisheries 

Maintaining profitability and livelihoods 

Processing sector  Those processing raw material both imported and 

caught within EC waters 

Maintaining profitability and livelihoods, stable 
supplies 

Sector regulators  National, regional and local bodies regulating 

Ensuring an efficient, effective and practical 

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fishing  

Sector research 

Scientific research bodies contributing to the 
conservation and management of stocks 

Consumers 

Those consuming fisheries products 

Non-EU 
countries 

Fishing sector in competition with EU fleets. 
Aquaculture producers, exporters to the EU. 
Authorities in non-EU countries getting payments 
under FPA 

management framework that balances a wide 
range of stakeholder needs 

Contribution to an effective fisheries management 
regime through timely access to high quality, 
robust data 

Availability, cost, quality and nutritional values of 
fisheries products with varying degrees of 
environmental scrutiny 

Conflicting interest between those who see the EU 
as a very important export market and as a source 
of revenue, and small local fishing communities 
that face competition from EU fleets in non-EU 
fisheries over access to local resources 

NGOs, civil 
society and EU 
citizens 

NGOs advocating sustainable management of 
fisheries 

To maintain fish populations, marine bio-diversity, 
and the amenity value of oceans, rivers and lakes 

The wider public with an interest in and concern 
for fisheries and the marine environment 

1.3.  Why is public intervention necessary? 

Fisheries are characterised by the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’: Individuals operating in their 
own  interests  tend  to  overexploit  a  common  pool  resource,  rivalling  others  as  they  capture 
'their'  share.  What  one  fisherman  takes  today  cannot  be  caught  tomorrow  by  another.  The 
harvesting  costs  imposed  on  others  (fewer  fish  to  catch,  damage  to  the  habitat,  etc)  are  not 
taken  into  account  by  fishermen  when  they  make  their  fishing  decisions.  In  the  absence  of 
regulatory intervention regarding access, stocks will be exploited at levels which will lead to 
their  decline  and  commercial  extinction.  That  justifies  regulatory  intervention  and  implies 
discarding the ‘No EU action’ option. 

2. 

THE RIGHT FOR THE EU TO ACT 

According to Article 3 (d) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), the Union shall 
have exclusive competence in the conservation of marine biological resources under the CFP. 
According to Article 4 (2d) the Union has shared competences for the rest of the CFP.  

The  last  reform  of  the  CFP  took  place  in  2002.  It  was  implemented  by  Council  Regulation 
(EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002. Article 35 thereof contains a specific provision for 
a review by end of 2012 with respect to Chapters II [Conservation and sustainability] and III 
[Adjustment of Fishing Capacity]. However, the conclusions of the 2007 Court of Auditors’ 
special report on the CFP as well as the Commission’s own assessment of the current CFP, 
led it to go beyond that obligation and propose a thorough reform of the CFP. 

3. 

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CFP 

3.1. 

The objectives of the CFP according to the Treaty 

The objectives of the CFP are set out in articles 3(d) and 4 (d) and 38 and 39 of the TFEU. 
Article 11 is also relevant, as it stipulates that environmental protection requirements must be 
integrated  into  the  definition  and  implementation  of  the  Union’s  policies  and  activities, 
particularly with a view to promoting sustainable development. According to Article 39, the 
CFP’s objectives, which are the same as for agriculture, are: 

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•  to  increase  agricultural  productivity  by  promoting  technical  progress  and  by 
ensuring  the  rational  development  of  agricultural  production  and  the  optimum 
utilisation of the factors of production, particularly labour; 

•  to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 

increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; 

•  to stabilise markets; 

•  to assure the availability of supplies; 

•  to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 

These  objectives  are  the  same  as  those  for  the  Common  Agriculture  Policy  but  have  to  be 
seen in the specific context of the fisheries sector. 

3.2. 

The general objectives of the reform 

The reformed CFP will achieve environmental, economic and social sustainability as regards 
exploiting  fisheries  resources.  From  a  legal  perspective,  these  objectives  are  all  equally 
important, and none can be achieved in isolation. 

However,  environmental  sustainability  is  the  keystone  for  the  success  of  the  CFP.  The 
analysis  in  the  impact  assessment  confirmed  that  ‘without  more  marked  improvements  in 
stock status, economic and social sustainability will remain limited’. The problem definition 
outlined the poor situation of many stocks. Solving the problem will require aligning fishing 
pressure with environmental sustainability.  

3.2.1.  Environmental sustainability 

Environmental sustainability is understood as the exploitation of stocks in a way that does not 
prejudice their future exploitation. This amounts to applying fishing pressure consistent with 
their maximum sustainable yield (MSY), ‘with the aim of achieving these goals for depleted 
stocks on an urgent basis, and where possible not later than 2015’. Achieving environmental 
sustainability will also ensure compliance with the obligation that marine environments attain 
good environmental status by 2020, as set out in the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. 

Achieving environmental sustainability implies: 

(a) Eliminating overfishing in the short term; 

(b) Reducing overcapacity and discards as much as possible; 

(c)  Putting  in  place  a  decision-making  system  consistent  with  long-term  sustainability, 
flexible and adaptable to local conditions;  

(d)  Encouraging  industry  to  take  more  responsibility  for  outcomes  and  to  comply  with 
legislation; 

(e) Improving the availability of scientific advice and economic data. 

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3.2.2.  Economic sustainability 

Economic sustainability means having profitable fleets that are economically viable over the 
long term. The same applies to related processing, ancillary and aquaculture activities, acting 
within  the  limits  set  by  environmental  sustainability,  operating  in  the  context  of  the 
competitive global market and evolving consumption patterns. 

3.2.3. 

Social sustainability  

Social  sustainability  means  transforming  fisheries  and  related  activities  into  a  source  of 
attractive jobs that enable a fair standard of living for those who depend on them and ensure 
the  viability  of  fishing  communities.  Social  sustainability  in  these  areas  must  rely  on 
economic diversification into related maritime activities as well as fishing itself. 

3.2.4.  Other objectives: simplification and reduction of administrative burden 

The reform of the CFP will need to contribute to the general objectives of the EU as regards 
cutting  red  tape.  Simplification  implies  reducing  the  number  of  regulations  and  their 
complexity,  and  integrating  public  funding  into  one  financial  instrument.  As  regards  the 
administrative burden, the reform does not include any quantifiable macro-objective because 
the current Commission’s policy in that field is due to expire by the end of 2012. 

4. 

THE POLICY OPTIONS 

Option  Status  Quo  (SQ)  is  continuing  the  current  CFP,  but  taking  into  account  recent 
legislation,  in  particular  LTMPs  in  the  pipeline,  the  Control  Regulation  and  the  IUU 
Regulation.  The  SQ  amounts  to  the  CFP  as  it  will  be  in  January  2013.  This  serves  as  a 
benchmark for all reform options. 

Option  1  seeks  to  achieve  environmental  sustainability  within  a  flexible  time  horizon 
while limiting short-term negative economic and social impacts.  

Its main components are: 

a) achieving Fmsy as soon as possible, but with a maximum inter-annual TAC reduction of -
25 % (as in current LTMPs). As a result, some stocks will reach Fmsy after 2015 (but no later 
than 2020). 

b) use of the ‘most valuable’ rule for mixed fisheries; 

c)  use  of  Individual  Transferable  Rights  (ITRs)  to  eliminate  overcapacity.  ITR  would  be 
compulsory for industrial fleets and voluntary for small-scale fleets, and will be implemented 
over four years. Transferability will be limited to within MS; 

d) public financial support focused on the reform; fleet subsidies (Axis 1 of the current EFF) 
will be discontinued; 

e) the CMO focused on marketing, promotion and local product market differentiation; 

f) costs of fishing licences under the Fishery Partnership Agreements (FPA) will be gradually 
borne by ship-owners. 

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Option 2 seeks to achieve environmental sustainability without any flexibility regarding 
time horizon. This option aims to achieve environmental sustainability by the end of 2015, 
irrespective  of  the  short-term  economic  and  social  impacts.  It  includes  the  very  strong 
assumption that sufficient scientific advice will be available within this very short time frame.  

Its main components are: 

a) Fmsy to be achieved within four years from the start of the reform. 

b) use of the ‘most sensitive’ rule for mixed-fisheries; 

c) use of ITR to eliminate overcapacity, but with intra-MS transferability; 

d) public financial support and CMO discontinued and  

e) FPAs to be gradually terminated. 

Option  3  seeks  to  achieve  environmental  sustainability  within  a  time  framework  while 
minimising negative social impacts. This option minimises short-term economic and social 
impacts by allowing the sector extra time to reach Fmsy and to implement ITR. 

Its main components are: 

a) achieving Fmsy as soon as possible but with a maximum inter-annual TAC reduction of -
15 %, so that more stocks would reach Fmsy levels only towards the end of the period. 

b) use of ‘most valuable’ rule for mixed fisheries; 

c) use of ITR as in Option 1, but with a longer implementation period; 

d)  public  financial  support  focused  on  the  reform  but  with  more  attention  given  to  social 
issues; 

e) limited overhaul of the CMO, leaving some forms of market intervention. 

Option  4  seeks  to  achieve  environmental  sustainability  within  a  flexible  time  horizon 
while limiting short-term negative economic and social impacts but without EU-led ITR. 
This option is equivalent to Option 1, but without ITRs addressing overcapacity. MS are free 
to decide whether to implement the ITR. 

Two further options were also analysed: 

Option 1a amounts to Option 1, but uses Option 2’s ‘most sensitive’ rule for mixed fisheries. 

Option 2a amounts to Option 2, but uses the -25 % maximum inter-annual TAC reduction as 
in Option 1. 

5. 

ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS 

The methodology used defined: 

a) measurable targets for the objectives and 

b) a set of impact indicators to capture progress towards the objectives. Additional indicators 
address  governance,  administrative  burden  and  simplification.  The  value  of  indicators  is 

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measured and compared for 2012, 2017 and 2022 (2020 for environmental performance). The 
impact assessment combines quantitative and qualitative analysis. 

5.1. 

Environmental sustainability 

All  reform  options  dramatically  outperform  the  SQ  Option  in  terms  of  environmental 
sustainability. Option 2 appears to perform best both in the short and the long term. However, 
its environmental component is unfeasible, due to the very short time remaining in which to 
develop the necessary scientific advice. Option 1a performs best. Options 1, 2a and 3 result in 
a  very  good  performance,  although  below  that  of  Option  1a,  particularly  by  2020.  The 
maintenance of overcapacity in Option 4 significantly reduces its environmental performance. 

Option  1a  has  the  largest  potential  for  reducing  unwanted  catch  by  combining  the  best 
environmental  performance,  the  ‘most  sensitive’  mixed  fisheries  rule,  ITRs  and  the 
regionalisation  component.  The  ‘most  valuable’  rule  in  Option  1  limits  its  potential  for 
discard reduction. 

The SQ Option and Option 4 result in the largest fleets, short- and long-term. Options 1 and 3 
show the largest reductions in fleets. 

5.2. 

Economic sustainability 

The  SQ  Option  does  not  achieve  economic  sustainability.  Options  1  (and  1a)  perform  best 
both short- and long-term. Option 2 performs somewhat better than Option 2a and 3. Option 4 
performs significantly worse, due to the maintenance of overcapacity. 

The  processing  sector  dependent  on  imported  raw  material  would  be  unaffected.  For 
processing  local  landings,  Options  1  and  1a  give  the  best  short  and  long-term  results.  For 
ancillary  services,  dependent  on  fleet  size,  the  best  performance  would  be  under  the  SQ 
Option, followed by that of Option 4. 

5.3. 

Social sustainability 

All options imply a substantial decline in employment for the catching sector. Given a smaller 
fleet  reduction,  this  decline  under  the  SQ  Option  is  relatively  lowest,  closely  followed  by 
Option 4. However, in term of wages, the performance of the SQ Option is very poor and that 
of  Option  1  (and  1a)  is  very  good.  The  combination  of  employment  and  wages  shows  that 
Options 1 (and 1a) would yield the best performance. 

5.4. 

Simplification and administrative burden 

In terms of simplification, any option will outperform the SQ. The regional approaches under 
options 1 (and 1a), 2 (and 2a) and 4 should also further simplify the CFP.  

In terms of management costs, getting scientific advice and economic data would be a major 
addition. The introduction of ITRs would imply some administrative burden for MS and the 
EU; part of these costs might be passed on to the sector. Finally, the elimination of FPAs or 
the payment of access costs by vessel owners would reduce management costs at EU level. In 
sum, the SQ Option would be the cheapest, followed by Option 4, as there would be no costs 
associated  with  ITRs.  Option  1a  would  be  most  costly,  due  to  the  need  to  obtain  scientific 
advice about the most sensitive stocks. 

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5.5. 

External dimension 

The best performance corresponds to Option 1 (and 1a). 

6. 

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS: THE PREFERRED OPTION(S) 

Figure 1 — Comparison of Options. EU level 2017 

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Status 
Quo
1. Environmental
4. Governance

Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 

2. Economic
5. Other internal

2a
3. Social

Option 
1a

Figure 2 — Comparison of Options. EU level 2022 

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Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 

Status 
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1. Environmental
4. Governance

2. Economic
5. Other internal

Option 
1a

2a
3. Social

Overall Options 1 and 1a offer the best combined results. A study of four regions dependent 
on  fishing  (Brittany,  Galicia,  Sicily  and  Scotland)  confirms  these  results  at  regional  level. 
Option 1 (and 1a) also performs best in terms of the external dimension. 

7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

Yearly  progress  will  be  monitored  on  the  basis  of  scientific  advice,  for  the  Fmsy  objective, 
and of economic/social data received from MS for economic and social sustainability. 

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Regarding evaluation, it will take some time for the reformed CFP to bear fruit, so a mid-term 
review should potentially be carried out for 2017, for which the modelling has been done. The 
review should compare the projected and actual values of the following indicators: 

•  Environmental impacts: stocks at Fmsy, fleet size and progress in ITR 

•  Economic  impacts:  income,  GVA,  revenue/break-even  revenue  and  net  profit 

margin 

•  Social impacts: Employment (FTE) and crew wage per FTE 

Figures for 2017 would be available in 2019. The evaluation should therefore be carried out in 
2019.  

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