REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL on the modalities of European Union participation in the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)
Date: 2011-06-06
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, United States, corruption, political cooperation

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 6.6.2011 
COM(2011) 307 final 

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 

on the modalities of European Union participation in the Council of Europe Group of 
States against Corruption (GRECO) 

 
 
 
 
  
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 

on the modalities of European Union participation in the Council of Europe Group of States 
against Corruption (GRECO) 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

As called for by the Stockholm Programme1, the Commission submits to the Council this Report on the 
modalities  for  the  European  Union  to  accede  to  the  Council  of  Europe  Group  of  States  against 
Corruption (GRECO). 

GRECO is the most inclusive existing anti-corruption monitoring mechanism at European level, with 
participation of all EU Member States. GRECO has had an important role in setting certain minimum 
European standards for a legal and institutional framework to combat corruption.  Yet corruption still 
poses  serious  problems  in  some  Member  States  and  effective  results  are  not  achieved  consistently 
across  the  EU.  This  reinforces  the  Commission's  belief  that  political  engagement  to  fight  corruption 
remains uneven across the EU. 

The  Communication  on  an  EU  policy  against  corruption2  recommends  EU  participation  in  GRECO, 
together with the establishment of an EU anti-corruption reporting mechanism. This should provide the 
potential to stimulate political will among Member States and render the existing legal and institutional 
framework more effective. 

This  Report  defines  the  main  objectives  of  reinforced  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  GRECO  and 
analyses possible ways and benefits for EU's participating in the work of GRECO. 

2. 

ROLE AND FUNCTIONING OF GRECO 

GRECO was set up in 1999 by the Council of Europe, to 'improve the capacity of its members to fight 
corruption  by  following  up,  through  a  dynamic  process  of  mutual  evaluation  and  peer  pressure, 
compliance with their undertakings in this field'3. GRECO now has 49 members (48 European states 
and the United States of America). 

The work of GRECO is governed by its Statute4 and Rules of Procedure5. Each member appoints up to 
two representatives in plenary meetings with the right to vote. Members also provide GRECO with a 
list of experts available to carry out evaluations. 

1 
2 
3 

4 

5 

OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p. 1. 
COM(2011) 308. 
Resolution  (99)  5  of  Council  of  Europe's  Committee  of  Ministers  on  establishing  the  'Group  of  States  against 
Corruption – GRECO'. 
Appendix to Resolution (99) 5 of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on establishing the 'Group of 
States against Corruption – GRECO'. 
Rules of Procedure adopted by GRECO on 4-6 October 1999. 

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Evaluations of GRECO members are divided into rounds and are carried out against the standards set 
out in the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption6, the Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption7 and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption8 with its Additional Protocol9. GRECO’s 
first evaluation round took place in 2000-2002 and covered the independence, specialisation and means 
of national bodies engaged in preventing and fighting corruption, as well as the immunities of public 
officials.  The  second  evaluation  round,  conducted  in  2003-2006,  focused  on  the  seizure  and 
confiscation  of  corruption  proceeds, 
in  public 
administration, and the prevention and fighting of corruption in the private sector. The third evaluation 
round, started in January 2007, is still ongoing. It covers the criminalisation of offences in accordance 
with the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and political party financing. 

the  prevention  and  detection  of  corruption 

Evaluation reports are issued after discussion with the state evaluated and then debated and endorsed 
by the plenary. They are as a rule confidential, but may be published with the consent of the evaluated 
state.  Each  report  comprises  recommendations  the  country  is  requested  to  comply  with  in  a  certain 
period  of  time  (e.g.  18  months).  A  compliance  procedure  is  conducted  to  check  the  follow-up  of  the 
recommendations and ends with the issuing of compliance reports, possibly with addenda. 

3. 

ADDED VALUE OF EU PARTICIPATION IN THE WORK OF GRECO 

The  2007  Memorandum  of  Understanding  between  the  Council  of  Europe  and  the  European  Union 
stipulates that legal cooperation covering the rule of law (including fight against corruption) between 
the  two  parties  should  be  further  developed  to  ensure  coherence  between  EU  law  and  Council  of 
Europe conventions, although this does not prevent the EU from adopting more far-reaching rules. 

EU participation in GRECO was already outlined as a key element of EU anti-corruption policy in the 
Communication10  of  28  May  2003.  Following  the  adoption  of  the  2003  Communication,  different 
possibilities for participation were explored against the legal competences of the EU under the Treaty 
on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. Given the then limited 
Community competence with regard to the Council of Europe's Civil and Criminal Law Conventions 
on Corruption, a decision had to be postponed until the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides a more streamlined EU competence on anti-
corruption and paves the way for a reinforced EU anti-corruption policy, including participation in the 
work  of  GRECO.  Moreover,  the  path  opened  by  EU  accession  to  the  UN  Convention  against 
Corruption (UNCAC)11 would be strengthened by a decision to join the European regional monitoring 
mechanism.  

The  main  deficiency  of  anti-corruption  policies  in  the  EU-27  is  the  effective  implementation  of  the 
existing  framework.  GRECO  has  prompted  some  action  in  the  EU  Member  States  through  its 
monitoring  process,  notably  in  areas  less  regulated  at  international  level  (e.g.  financing  of  political 

6 
7 
8 
9 

10 
11 

Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers' Resolution (97) 24 . 
The Civil Law Convention on corruption adopted on 4 November 1999, entered into force on 1 November 2002. 
The Criminal Law Convention on corruption adopted on 27 January 1999, entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
The  Additional  Protocol  to  the  Criminal  Law  Convention  on  Corruption  adopted  on  15  May  2003,  entered  into 
force on 1 February 2005. 
COM(2003) 317. 
Council Decision 2008/801/EC (OJ L 287, 29.10.2008). 

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parties12). However, GRECO's capacity to generate the necessary political will to adopt and maintain 
robust  anti-corruption  measures  has  certain  limitations.  Also,  GRECO's  capacity  to  signal  systemic 
problems  generated  by  corruption  has  on  some  occasions  proven  rather  weak13.  The  EU's  active 
participation  in  GRECO's  work  may  thus  bring  benefits  to  both  organisations,  combining  GRECO 
expertise  in  monitoring  anti-corruption  efforts  and  the  political  role  of  EU  institutions  towards  an 
effective enforcement of anti-corruption policies in the EU-27.  

To  this  end,  the  Commission  will  set  up  an  EU  anti-corruption  reporting  mechanism.  The  EU's 
participation  in  GRECO  will  dovetail  the  new  EU  mechanism.  Moreover,  the  EU's  participation  in 
preparing GRECO evaluations may also contribute to improve the methodology and outcome of these 
evaluations.  Within  the  EU  anti-corruption  reporting  mechanism  the  Commission  will  draw  on  input 
from GRECO and other relevant sources including information obtained within the framework of the 
OECD's Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions 
(Anti-Bribery Convention) and the UN Convention against Corruption. 

In the light of the above, the following specific objectives would be most relevant for EU participation 
in GRECO: 

•  Involvement  in  the  country  visits  leading  to  evaluations  of  EU  Member  States  and/or  candidate 

countries and potential candidates, should the latter agree; 

•  Making suggestions on draft evaluation reports and participation in GRECO plenary debates on the 
evaluation/compliance  reports  for  EU  Member  States  and/or  the  candidate  countries  and  potential 
candidates, should the latter agree; 

•  Association  with  the  work  of  GRECO's  Bureau14,  which  has  an  important  role  in  preparing 

evaluations and drafting the reports; 

•  Contribution to GRECO's budget; 

•  Comparative  analysis15  to  be  carried  out  by  GRECO  on  the  basis  of  the  existing  evaluation  and 
compliance reports on the EU Member States as input for the future EU Anti-Corruption Report; 

•  Identifying outstanding GRECO recommendations of relevance for the EU, for which the future EU 

reporting mechanism may provide additional impetus for adequate follow-up. 

12 

13 

14 

15 

GRECO  evaluations  have  led  to  important  changes  in  the  legal  and  institutional  setting  for  the  financing  of 
political parties in some EU Member States (Slovenia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia). 
For  example,  the  2005  GRECO  evaluation  report  did  not  alert  to  the  seriousness  of  the  systemic  problems  that 
generated a chain of corruption scandals linked with the financial crisis that emerged soon afterwards. 
The Bureau is composed of GRECO's President and Vice-President, and five other representatives of the GRECO 
members  entitled  to  vote.  The  Bureau  prepares  the  draft  annual  programme  of  activities  and  the  draft  annual 
activity  report,  makes  proposals  on  the  draft  budget,  organises  country  visits,  proposes  the  composition  of 
evaluation  teams,  prepares  the  agenda  for  the  GRECO  plenary,  and  proposes  the  provisions  to  be  selected  for 
evaluation. 
The comparative analysis would assume additional work for the GRECO Secretariat. However, it will be based on 
the existing evaluation/compliance reports. It will not bring an additional evaluation step. It will only assess what 
has been already produced by GRECO. 

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These  specific  objectives  start  from  the  need  to  avoid  any  additional  burden  on  the  Member  State 
administrations and duplication of efforts with work already covered by GRECO. 

With  a  view  to  ensuring  reciprocity,  the  Commission  may  consider  modalities  of  participation  of  a 
GRECO  representative  in  the  expert  group  that  will  be  set  up  to  support  the  work  on  the  EU  Anti-
Corruption Report. 

4. 

MODALITIES OF EU PARTICIPATION IN THE WORK OF GRECO 

The  legal  framework  governing  GRECO's  functioning  provides  for  two  forms  of  association  with 
GRECO's work: observer status and participation, each analysed below.  

As  regards  participation,  two  alternatives  are  considered:  full  membership  and  membership  with 
limited voting rights. In addition, the alternative of a joint programme is analysed. 

The first assessment below is based on the Commission's analysis of the legal and practical aspects of 
potential reinforced cooperation with GRECO. As a next step, the Commission will request from the 
Council the authorisation to open negotiations for EU participation in GRECO. 

4.1. 

Status of observer 

Statutory Resolution (93) 28 of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on partial and enlarged 
agreements provides for the possibility of certain activities to be carried out by the states parties jointly 
with  one  or  more  non-member  states,  through  enlarged  or  enlarged  partial  agreements.  GRECO  was 
created by means of an enlarged partial agreement. Any non-member of the Council of Europe and any 
international organisation may be invited by the Committee of Ministers to take part as an observer in 
the  activities  of  an  enlarged  partial  agreement.  The  Resolution  does  not  define  the  specifics  of  the 
rights  and  obligations  of  observers  in  partial  and  enlarged  agreements.  Therefore,  the  general 
provisions  of  Statutory  Resolution  (93)  26  of  the  Council  of  Europe's  Committee  of  Ministers  on 
observer  status  apply.  According  to  these,  observer  status  gives  no  right  to  be  represented  in  the 
Committee of Ministers or the Parliamentary Assembly, unless a specific decision was taken by one of 
these organs. 

GRECO has granted observer status to the OECD and the UN, represented by the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC). This practice has also been followed in other partial agreements of the Council 
of Europe16. No budgetary contribution is required from the observer. 

While the invitation of the EU to GRECO as an observer can follow observership of other international 
organisations and has no budgetary implications, the limited scope of such an arrangement and its low 
added value discourage this option.  

Observer status can ensure only limited participation in the evaluation of Member States. It would not 
allow for EU involvement in the overall preparation of evaluations and hence not facilitate focusing on 
matters relevant for the EU. Consequently, it cannot guarantee the needed input for the future EU Anti-
Corruption Report. Also, it would not fully comply with the Stockholm Programme, which calls for the 
development of a comprehensive anti-corruption policy in close cooperation with GRECO.  

16 

The World Health Organisation is for example an observer in European Pharmacopoeia.  

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4.2. 

Participation 

Statutory Resolution (93) 28 of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers has a broad provision 
for  the  (former)  European  Community's  participation  in  partial  and  enlarged  agreements,  stipulating 
that  the  modalities  of  participation  are  to  be  determined  in  the  invitation  to  participate.  GRECO's 
Statute17  reiterates  this,  mentioning  that  the  modalities  of  the  (former)  Community's  participation  in 
GRECO are to be determined in the resolution inviting it to participate. 

GRECO's Rules of Procedure18 provide in Rule 2 that the (former) European Community may become 
a 'member' of GRECO through the following means: 

•  Upon invitation of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers to participate in GRECO. To this 
end, a proposal should be made by GRECO and endorsed by its Statutory Committee. The formal 
invitation  takes  the  form  of  a  Resolution  adopted  by  the  Committee  of  Ministers,  followed  by  an 
agreement with the EU, via an exchange of letters; 

•  Accession  to  the  Criminal  Law  Convention  on  Corruption,  upon  invitation  by  the  Committee  of 

Ministers; 

•  Accession to the Civil Law Convention on Corruption. 

To  date,  the  EU  participates  in  partial  agreements  such  as  the  Venice  Commission19  and  the 
Cooperation Group for the prevention of, protection against and organisation of relief in major natural 
and technological disasters20. The EU is also member of the European Pharmacopoeia Convention and 
of  the  European  Audiovisual  Observatory,  as  well  as  participant  to  a  large  number  of  Council  of 
Europe partial agreements. 

Given  that  the  GRECO  Statute  refers  to  EU  participation  in  GRECO  and  that  the  GRECO  rules  of 
procedure refer to 'membership', participation therefore assumes a form of membership the details of 
which  are  established  in  a  specific  agreement.  Consequently,  this  Report  analyses  two  modalities  of 
participation: full membership (i.e. full voting rights) and membership with limited voting rights. 

Full membership  

Full-fledged membership would give the EU voting rights in the GRECO plenary on all matters under 
GRECO  competence  (e.g.  evaluation/compliance  reports,  procedural  matters,  financial/budgetary 
issues). As the EU will not act on behalf of the Member States in the GRECO plenary, it would have 
one vote, as all other members.  

According  to  Article  8(6)  of  the  GRECO  Statute,  'members  of  GRECO  participating  in  the  mutual 
evaluation  shall  have  the  right  to  vote'21.  Although  the  EU  is  not  party  to  the  Council  of  Europe's 
Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption, according to the GRECO regulatory framework, it 

17 
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19 

20 

21 

EN 

GRECO's Statute, Article 5. 
GRECO's Rules of Procedure, Rule 2: "Participation of the European Community". 
Resolution(2002)3 
adopted 
(http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/Statute_E.asp). 
Established 
(http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/PartialAgr/Html/Europa8702.htm). 
i.e. full membership would assume evaluation of the EU by GRECO. 

by  Resolution 

of  Ministers 

the  Council 

Committee 

(87)2/1987 

the 

by 

of 

of  Europe  Committee 

on 

21 

February 

2002 

of  Ministers 

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may still be evaluated. The evaluation of the EU institutions would concern mainly the Twenty Guiding 
Principles for the Fight against Corruption22 and would assume a form of prior endorsement (possibly a 
unilateral statement) of these principles. Through accession to UNCAC, a precedent has been created 
for full-fledged membership of the EU in an organisation that also carries out reviews of its members. 
However, in the case of UNCAC, the EU is not currently participating in the mutual review process. 

Under this option, the EU would participate fully in the evaluation procedure of Member States, as well 
as candidate countries, potential candidates, and other third countries. Consequently, the EU would be 
able  to  have  a  representative  nominated  in  GRECO's  Bureau  according  to  the  applicable  rules  (i.e. 
rotating  basis).  The  EU  would  be  member  of  GRECO's  Statutory  Committee,  which  has  decision-
making  powers  on  budgetary  matters.  All  other  rights  and  obligations  under  GRECO's  Statute  and 
Rules of Procedure would apply to the EU. 

The EU would become a contributor to the GRECO budget. The impact assessment accompanying the 
Commission  Decision  on  the  setting  up  of  an  EU  reporting  mechanism  for  periodical  evaluation23 
estimated the potential financial costs of EU participation in GRECO at about 450,000 Euros per year. 
This  would  cover  the  contribution  to  the  GRECO  budget  (i.e.  around  300,000  euros  for  a  major 
contributor) and the cost of activities not currently carried out by GRECO that would mainly benefit 
the  EU  (e.g.  comparative  reports  and  identification  of  outstanding  recommendations  for  the  EU-27). 
Such activities may be financed, for example, via service contracts or action grants. 

This option has a high potential to meet all the specific objectives mentioned in section 3. It would also 
ensure:  high  visibility  of  the  EU-GRECO  cooperation;  complementarity  between  GRECO  and  the 
future  EU  reporting  mechanism;  potential  to  ensure  further  improvements  in  the  GRECO  evaluation 
system; greater focus on EU policy areas.  

However, evaluation of EU institutions by GRECO is an endeavour that needs to be assessed in more 
depth  in  terms  of  requisites,  feasibility  and  potential  impact,  the  GRECO  evaluation  system  being 
geared  to  countries  rather  than  organisations.  While  some  of  the  Twenty  Guiding  Principles  may  be 
applied to organisations as well (e.g. integrity in public administration), an evaluation under the current 
GRECO procedures would not be comprehensive and its added value rather unclear for both GRECO 
and  the  Union.  Without  the  evaluation  of  EU  institutions  by  GRECO,  the  EU  would  not  have  full 
voting rights in the GRECO plenary24.  

Membership with limited voting rights 

GRECO  Statute  stipulates  that  the  modalities  of  the  EU's  participation  will  be  determined  in  the 
resolution inviting it to participate, without any specific indication as to the type of participation. Thus, 
EU participation may also take the form of membership with limited voted rights. 

Such an alternative may not require evaluation of the EU by GRECO, but would imply the creation of a 
framework  for  a  further  joint  assessment  by  the  two  organisations  of  the  requisites,  feasibility  and 
potential  impact  of  the  evaluation  of  EU  institutions,  taking  account  of  the  specificities  and 
competences  of  the  EU.  However,  in  its  50th  meeting,  the  GRECO  plenary  stressed  that,  while 
acknowledging that special arrangements might be necessary to accommodate to the particularities of 

22 
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24 

See footnote 5. 
C(2011) 3673. 
Article 8(6) of the GRECO Statute. 

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the EU, the evaluation of EU institutions by GRECO must be more than just a remote possibility (i.e. 
the assessment would need to progressively lead to EU's evaluation).  

Under  this  option,  the  EU  becomes  a  contributor  to  the  GRECO  budget,  with  a  slightly  reduced 
contribution25 than in the case of full membership. The EU would have the right to vote on procedural, 
financial and budgetary issues26. It would have no right to vote in the GRECO plenary on the adoption 
of  evaluation  and  compliance  reports,  no  representative  in  the  GRECO's  Bureau  and  would  not 
participate in the elections for president and vice-president. The EU would appoint representatives to 
the  GRECO  plenary,  participate  in  its  debates,  make  recommendations  on  evaluation/compliance 
reports,  and  possibly  have  a  representative  participating  as  an  observer  in  the  country  visits  in  the 
Member  States27,  candidate  countries,  potential  candidates,  and  other  states  accepting  such 
participation. The EU would be able to formulate suggestions as to the organisation of evaluations and 
their follow-up. 

The  practical  arrangements  for  EU  participation  in  GRECO  would  be  reviewed  by  the  Commission 
jointly  with  GRECO  on  a  periodical  basis  (e.g.  every  5  years),  and  potential  amendments  may  be 
adopted by mutual agreement between GRECO and the EU. 

This  option  would  ensure  input  to  the  future  EU  Anti-Corruption  Report:  i.e.  a  comparative  analysis 
carried out by GRECO based on the existing evaluation and compliance reports on Member States and 
flagging  of  the  most  relevant  outstanding  recommendations.  It  would  largely  meet  the  specific 
objectives  mentioned  in  section  3,  allowing  EU  participation  in  the  evaluation  of  Member  States. 
Although  it  would  not  have  any  decision-making  power  in  the  evaluation  process,  the  EU  may  be 
actively involved in implementation and prompt actions which may ensure additional focus on policy 
areas more relevant for the EU. Cooperation between GRECO and the EU would gain political weight, 
and  duplication  would  be  avoided.  The  issue  of  the  evaluation  of  EU  institutions  by  GRECO  would 
need  to  be  clarified  as  a  matter  of  priority  in  negotiations.  The  advantages  of  a  simplified  form  of 
participation are however clearer where the EU would not be required to commit to the evaluation of its 
institutions. 

4.3. 

Joint programme 

This  would  assume  EU  financial  assistance  to  GRECO  in  the  form  of  a  grant  for  the  delivery  of 
specific  predefined  results  and  may  span  a  set  period  of  time  (2-3  years),  with  the  possibility  of 
periodical renewal. Such a solution for targeted cooperation between the EU and GRECO has already 
been  implemented.  For  example,  the  Council  of  Europe  participates  in  the  Eastern  Partnership  as  a 
privileged partner, supporting with its expertise the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries. 

To  give  some  political  weight  to  the  partnership,  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  or  an  agreement 
may be concluded with GRECO, as in the case of the agreement between the Council of Europe and 
the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 

25 

26 
27 

Since  membership with  limited voting rights  assumes  a  more  limited  participation  in  the  evaluation process,  the 
costs  entailed  by  these  activities  will  be  deducted  from  the  EU  contribution  to  the  GRECO  budget  (i.e.  the 
contribution would be lower than 300,000 Euros per year). 
In these matters, the EU would have one vote. 
GRECO plenary pointed out that consent of the Member States would be needed.  

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As to objectives, a joint programme may ensure input from GRECO to the future EU Anti-Corruption 
Report,  notably  through  comparative  analysis  of  existing  GRECO  evaluation/compliance  reports  on 
Member States and flagging of outstanding recommendations. This would also avoid duplication. The 
budget  involved  would  be  lower  than  that  needed  for  membership  with  limited  voting  rights  (i.e. 
roughly  around  200-250,000  Euros  per  year,  covering  the  drafting  of  comparative  reports,  logistical 
costs, workshops, etc.).  

However, a joint programme, while meeting some of the specific objectives, would not meet the overall 
objective  of  creating  synergies  between  GRECO  expertise  and  EU  political  leverage.  Partnership 
between  the  two  organisations  would  be  less  visible  and  EU  involvement  in  GRECO's  evaluations 
would be less active. This option might be perceived as a purely technical solution, with the EU acting 
more  as  a  contractor  rather  than  a  partner.  It  would  thus  have  less  added  value  than  participation  in 
GRECO.  

5. 

CONCLUSION 

The Council is invited to consider the options identified in this Report.  

Taking into account the increased competences of the EU and the need for a comprehensive EU policy 
against  corruption,  participation  in  GRECO  (i.e.  membership)  is,  in  Commission's  view,  the 
appropriate way forward to meet the objectives set by the Stockholm Programme. As the future 
EU  reporting  mechanism  aims  to  measure  anti-corruption  efforts  in  Member  States,  with  a  view  to 
identifying  EU  trends  and  proposing  policy  and  legal  action  at  EU  level,  participation  in  GRECO 
would  facilitate  the  monitoring  task.  Cooperation  would  be  more  visible  and  the  risk  of  overlapping 
avoided.  

In addition, participation as a full-fledged member or a member with limited voting rights would ensure 
good  use  of  the  mutual  benefits  of  GRECO's  expertise  in  monitoring  anti-corruption  efforts  and  the 
EU's political leverage over the Member States. It is thus likely to contribute, jointly with the future EU 
reporting  mechanism,  to  creating  a  momentum  for  more  effective  enforcement  of  anti-corruption 
policies in the EU-27. 

The Commission has held some preliminary discussions with the GRECO Secretariat, with a view to 
identifying  the  main  matters  of  interest  and  potential  alternatives  in  terms  of  the  legal  and  practical 
feasibility  of  EU  participation  in  GRECO.  In  terms  of  practical  feasibility,  membership  with  limited 
voting rights would seem a possible and suitable option to be considered in negotiations. However, a 
key issue to be addressed under this option is the evaluation of EU institutions by GRECO, whereby 
evaluation of EU institutions would commend full membership.  

The  actual  modalities  of  EU  participation  in  GRECO  (e.g.  form  of  participation,  participation  in  the 
Council of Europe bodies, practical arrangements, budgetary contribution) would have to be carefully 
negotiated  with  GRECO.  To  this  end,  the  Commission  will  request  the  Council  to  authorise  the 
opening of negotiations for the EU's participation in GRECO. Negotiations would be conducted in 
the light of the general principles of cooperation between the EU and the Council of Europe, namely: 

–  specificity and limits of the EU's competence. It should however allow the EU to establish higher 

standards within its borders; 

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–  privileged  working  relationship  to  ensure  a  coordinated  approach  at  European  level  towards 
corruption. For the EU, access to the early stages of evaluation rounds and the drafting of country 
reports,  as  well  as  the  comparative  analysis  of  Member  States'  evaluations  and  the  flagging  of 
outstanding  recommendations,  would  be  essential.  In  turn,  EU  membership  would  enhance  the 
visibility of GRECO and provide an opportunity for GRECO recommendations to be considered and 
where relevant followed up within the EU anti-corruption reporting mechanism..  

Finally,  apart  from  the  agreement  with  the  GRECO  plenary,  the  potential  participation  of  the  EU  in 
GRECO  requires  endorsement  by  the  Council  of  Europe's  Committee  of  Ministers,  which  is  the 
initiator  of  the  formal  participation  procedure.  Accordingly,  the  Communication  on  EU  policy 
against  corruption  calls  upon  Member  States  to  fully  support,  within  the  Council  of  Europe's 
Committee of Ministers, the EU's application for participation in GRECO. 

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LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT FOR PROPOSALS 

1. 

FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

1.1.  Title of the proposal/initiative  

1.2.  Policy area(s) concerned in the ABM/ABB structure 

1.3.  Nature of the proposal/initiative  

1.4.  Objective(s)  

1.5.  Grounds for the proposal/initiative  

1.6.  Duration and financial impact  

1.7.  Management method(s) envisaged  

2. 

MANAGEMENT MEASURES  

2.1.  Monitoring and reporting rules  

2.2.  Management and control system  

2.3.  Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities  

3. 

ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

3.1.  Heading(s)  of  the  multiannual  financial  framework  and  expenditure  budget  line(s) 
affected  

3.2.  Estimated impact on expenditure  

3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on expenditure  

3.2.2. Estimated impact on operational appropriations  

3.2.3. Estimated impact on appropriations of an administrative nature 

3.2.4. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework 

3.2.5. Third-party participation in financing  

3.3.  Estimated impact on revenue

EN 

11 

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LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT FOR PROPOSALS 

6. 

FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

6.1. 

Title of the proposal/initiative  

Commission  Decision  establishing  an  EU  anti-corruption  reporting  mechanism  for  periodic 
assessment  ('EU  Anti-Corruption  Report')  and  Report  on  modalities  of  EU  participation  in 
Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) 

6.2. 

Policy area(s) concerned in the ABM/ABB structure28  

Home Affairs 

Security and Safeguarding Liberties 

6.3. 

Nature of the proposal/initiative  

⌧ The proposal/initiative relates to a new action  

(cid:133) The proposal/initiative relates to a new action following a pilot project/preparatory action29  

(cid:133) The proposal/initiative relates to the extension of an existing action  

(cid:133) The proposal/initiative relates to an action redirected towards a new action  

6.4. 

Objectives 

6.4.1.  The Commission's multiannual strategic objective(s) targeted by the proposal/initiative  

Stockholm Action Plan – Protection against Serious and Organized Crime  

6.4.2. 

Specific objective(s) and ABM/ABB activity(ies) concerned  

Specific objective No 2 

Enhancing the EU's capacity to prevent, fight and limit the consequences of criminal acts 

Specific sub-objectives30: 

EU Anti-Corruption Report 

1. drafting, publication and dissemination of the Report. 

28 
29 
30 

ABM: Activity-Based Management – ABB: Activity-Based Budgeting. 
As referred to in Article 49(6)(a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation. 
The additional division in sub-objectives is done to facilitate the calculation of the breakdown of estimated impact 
on expenditure in section 3.2.  

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12 

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2. consultation with experts (i.e. setting up of an expert group). 

3. civil society input. 

4. setting up and functioning of national research correspondents network. 

5. experience-sharing programme 

EU participation in GRECO 

6.  comparative  analysis  and  flagging  of  outstanding  recommendations  for  the  EU  Member 
States based on information available with the GRECO Secretariat. 

7. EU membership of GRECO. 

ABM/ABB activity(ies) concerned 

1805 Security and Safeguarding Liberties 

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6.4.3.  Expected result(s) and impact 

Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted. 

The  EU  Anti-Corruption  Report  will  assess  periodically  the  anti-corruption  efforts  in  the 
EU27. It will provide a clear picture of the state of play in the Union, and identify weak spots 
and  EU  trends,  with  the  view  to  prompt  additional  political  will  of  the  Member  States  to 
adress corruption and to prepare future EU policy actions.  

EU  participation  in  GRECO  would  ensure  that  synergies  are  created  between  the  two 
mechanisms.  

6.4.4. 

Indicators of results and impact  

Specify the indicators for monitoring implementation of the proposal/initiative. 

The EU Anti-Corruption Report will be managed by the Commission and published every two 
years.  The  Commission  will  be  assisted  by  an  expert  group,  a  network  of  local  research 
correspondents  and  civil  society  assessments.  The  Commission  will  constantly  supervise  the 
activity of the experts and the input of the research correspondents and civil society. At each 
assessment  round  the  follow-up  of  the  recommendations  of  previous  reports  will  be 
scrutinised.  

Following  the  adoption  of  the  Report  on  modalities  of  EU  participation  in  GRECO,  the 
Commission will ask the Council to authorize the opening of negotiations with the Council of 
Europe.  In  case  of  EU  participation  in  GRECO,  the  Commission  intends  to  review  the 
practical  arrangements  for  participation  on  a  regular  basis  (e.g.  every  5  years),  based  on  the 
results of the reinforced cooperation. 

6.5. 

Grounds for the proposal/initiative  

6.5.1.  Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term  

The  Commission  will  select  at  each  assessment  round  a  number  of  cross-cutting  elements 
relevant  at  EU  level  at  a  given  moment,  as  well  as  aspects  specific  to  each  Member  State. 
These will be assessed against certain indicators, some selected in line with already existing 
standards, and some newly developed.  

The Commission will be assisted by:  

- an expert group set up by a separate Commission Decision (to be adopted soon after the anti-
corruption  package)  advising  on:  indicators,  assessment  of  Member  States'  performance, 
identifying best practices and EU trends, recommendations, and potential EU proposals.  

- a network of local research correspondents, set up by the Commission through procurement 
procedures and formed of civil society and academia, that will collect relevant information in 
each Member State.  

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14 

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-civil  society  assessments  (to  be  contracted  through  targeted  calls  for  proposals).  The  civil 
society organisations will be encouraged to apply for subject specific assessments of Member 
States' anti-corruption efforts.  

The  development  of  an  experience  sharing  programme  may  be  considered  to  help  Member 
States,  local  NGOs  or  other  stakeholders  to  identify  best  practices  and  shortcomings,  raise 
awareness  or  provide  training.  The  decision  to  set  up  such  programme  and  the  details  of  its 
functioning  may  only  be  taken/clarified  at  a  later  stage,  once  the  preparations  for  the  first 
Report are more advanced. 

6.5.2.  Added value of EU involvement 

The Stockholm Programme recognises corruption as a trans-national threat that challenges EU 
internal  security.  There  is  a  need  for  action  at  EU  level,  since  the  problems  associated  with 
corruption cannot be adequately solved by Member States alone.  

Enhancing fight against corruption is also relevant for policy areas where large amounts of EU 
resources  are  involved.  The  EU  has  the  required  political  leverage  and  is  therefore  better 
placed  to  act  as  a  catalyst  for  boosting  the  anti-corruption  policy  of  the  EU  and  Member 
States.  

6.5.3.  Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past 

To  date  there  is  no  mechanism  in  place  at  EU  level  to  measure  in  a  coherent  manner  the 
enforcement  of  anti-corruption  policies.  The  only  EU  monitoring  tool  that  also  covers  anti-
corruption  issues  is  the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism  for  Romania  and  Bulgaria 
which has managed over time to maintain or revive a certain momentum for reforms. 

Based  on  annual  assessments,  indices  and  qualitative  judgments,  the  work  of  civil  society 
organisations,  like  Transparency  International,  placed  corruption  squarely  on  the  political 
agenda in many countries worldwide and generated political pressure for reforms.  

At  international  level,  the  main  existing  evaluation  mechanisms  (e.g.  GRECO,  the  OECD 
Working  Group  on  Bribery  and  the  UN  Convention  against  Corruption),  in  spite  of  obvious 
benefits, have also proven their limitations, notably as regards prompting additional political 
will at national level. The EU has a unique leverage to generate this political will. The new EU 
Anti-Corruption Report will strive to be fact-oriented, focused, outspoken, and flexible.  

6.5.4.  Coherence and possible synergy with other relevant instruments 

The EU anti-corruption package is part of the wider Commission's strategic initiative on the 
protection  of  licit  economy  which  also  comprises  the  new  Commission  Anti-Fraud  Strategy 
and the asset recovery legislative initiative. The current proposal is fine-tuned with both. 

EN 

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6.6. 

Duration and financial impact  

(cid:133) Proposal/initiative of limited duration  

–  (cid:133)  Proposal/initiative in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY  

–  (cid:133)  Financial impact from YYYY to YYYY  

⌧ Proposal/initiative of unlimited duration 

–  Implementation  with  a  start-up  period  from  the  date  of  the  adoption  of  Commission 
Decision in the case of the EU Anti-Corruption Report and from the date of EU accession 
act  in  case  of  EU  participation  in  GRECO.  This  Legislative  Financial  Framework  covers 
the first five years of implementation. 

–  followed by full-scale operation. 

6.7.  Management mode(s) envisaged31  

⌧ Centralised direct management by the Commission  

(cid:133) Centralised indirect management with the delegation of implementation tasks to: 

–  (cid:133)  executive agencies  

–  (cid:133)  bodies set up by the Communities32  

–  (cid:133)  national public-sector bodies/bodies with public-service mission  

–  (cid:133)  persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions pursuant to Title V of the 
Treaty  on  European  Union  and  identified  in  the  relevant  basic  act  within  the  meaning  of 
Article 49 of the Financial Regulation  

(cid:133) Shared management with the Member States  

(cid:133) Decentralised management with third countries  

(cid:133) Joint management with international organisations (to be specified) 

If more than one management mode is indicated, please provide details in the "Comments" section. 

Comments  

31 

32 

Details  of  management  modes  and  references  to  the  Financial  Regulation  may  be  found  on  the  BudgWeb  site: 
http://www.cc.cec/budg/man/budgmanag/budgmanag_en.html 
As referred to in Article 185 of the Financial Regulation. 

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16 

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7. 

MANAGEMENT MEASURES  

7.1.  Monitoring and reporting rules  

Specify frequency and conditions. 

The  EU  Anti-Corruption  Report  will  be  published  every  two  years,  starting  in  2013.  The 
implementation is subject to future monitoring and evaluation.  Potential indicators are: EU's 
CPI  ranking,  national  anti-corruption  strategies,  reported  experiences  with  corruption, 
instances  of  new  anti-corruption  policies/practices,  number  of  peer  learning  activities 
sponsored  by  the  Commission,  levels  of  awareness,  time  taken  to  transpose  and  implement 
legislation,  perceptions  of  transparency.  GRECO's  outstanding  recommendations  on  the 
Member States will be picked up by the EU reporting mechanism. 

7.2.  Management and control system  

7.2.1.  Risk(s) identified  

-  negative  reception  by  the  Member  States,  fear  of  overlapping  with  other  existing 
mechanisms and of additional burden on the national administrations. 

-  difficulties  in  gathering  information  and/or  lack  of  active  involvement  of  the  experts, 
researchers and civil society organisations. 

7.2.2.  Control method(s) envisaged  

Regular evaluations of the effectiveness of the new reporting mehanism are considered, with 
the first evaluation after the publication of two EU Anti-corruption Reports. The Commission 
may then issue evaluation reports every 5 years and based on the findings it may consider any 
further amendment to or other possible developments of the mechanism. 

7.3.  Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities  

Specify existing or envisaged prevention and protection measures. 

The  preparatory  activities  with  financial  implications  (i.e.  expert  group,  network  of  research 
correspondents, supporting actions for the drafting of the Report, civil society input, potential 
experience  sharing  programme,  participation  in  GRECO)  shall  be  subject  to  the  financial 
control of the Commission and to the audits of the Court of Auditors. 

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17 

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8. 

8.1. 

Heading of 
multiannual 
financial 
framework 

ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

Heading(s)  of  the  multiannual  financial  framework  and  expenditure  budget  line(s) 
affected  

•  Existing expenditure budget lines  

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines. 

Budget line 

Type of  
expenditure

Contribution  

Number  
[Description………………………...……….] 

DA/NDA 
(33) 

from 
EFTA34 
countries 

from 
candidate 
countries35 

from third 
countries 

within the meaning 
of Article 18(1)(aa) 
of the Financial 
Regulation  

3A 

18.05.09  –  Prevention  and  Fight 
against Crime 

DA 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

•  New budget lines requested  

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines. 

Heading of 
multiannual 
financial 
framework 

Budget line 

Type of 
expenditure

Contribution  

Number  
[Heading……………………………………..] 

Diff./non-
diff. 

[XX.YY.YY.YY] 

from 
EFTA 
countries 

from 
candidate 
countries 

from third 
countries 

within the meaning 
of Article 18(1)(aa) 
of the Financial 
Regulation  

YES/N
O 

YES/N
O 

YES/N
O 

YES/NO 

33 
34 
35 

DA= Differentiated appropriations / DNA= Non-Differentiated Appropriations 
EFTA: European Free Trade Association.  
Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential candidate countries from the Western Balkans. 

EN 

18 

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8.2. 

Estimated impact on expenditure  

8.2.1. 

Summary of estimated impact on expenditure  

Heading of multiannual financial 
framework:  

Number 

3A 

Freedom, security and justice 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

DG: Home Affairs 

(cid:121) Operational appropriations  

Number of budget line 3A 

Number of budget line 

Appropriations 
of 
 from the envelop of specific programs36  
Number of budget line 

an 

administrative 

TOTAL appropriations 
for DG Home Affairs 

(cid:121) TOTAL operational appropriations  

Year 
2011 

Year 
2012 

Year 
2013 

Year 
2014 

Year 
2015 

TOTAL 

2.180 
1.180 

3.442 
2.442 

4.583 
3.583 

4.233 
3.233 

4.583 
3.583 

19.021 
14.021 

2.180 

3.442 

4.583 

4.233 

4.583 

19.021 

1.180 

2.442 

3.583 

3.233 

3.583 

2.180 

3.442 

4.583 

4.233 

4.583 

1.180 

2.442 

3.583 

3.233 

3.583 

14.021 

19.021 

14.021 

Commitments 

Payments 

Commitments 

Payments 

(1) 

(2) 

(1a) 

(2a) 

nature 

financed 

(3) 

=1+1a 
+3 

=2+2a 

+3 

(4) 

(5) 

Commitments 

Payments 

Commitments 

Payments 

36 

EN 

Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former "BA" lines), indirect 
research, direct research. 

19 

E

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(cid:121)  TOTAL  appropriations  of  an  administrative  nature 
financed from the envelop of specific programs  

(6) 

TOTAL appropriations  
under HEADING 3A 
of the multiannual financial framework 

Commitments 

=4+ 6 

2.180 

3.442 

4.583 

4.233 

4.583 

Payments 

=5+ 6 

1.180 

2.442 

3.583 

3.233 

3.583 

19.021 

14.021 

EN 

20 

E

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If more than one heading is affected by the proposal / initiative: 

(cid:121) TOTAL operational appropriations  

Commitments 

Payments 

(cid:121)  TOTAL  appropriations  of  an  administrative  nature 
financed from the envelop of specific programs  

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

TOTAL appropriations  
under HEADINGS 1 to 4 
of the multiannual financial framework 
(Reference amount) 

Commitments 

=4+ 6 

Payments 

=5+ 6 

Heading of multiannual financial 
framework:  

5 

" Administrative expenditure " 

Year 
2011 

Year 
2012 

Year 
2013 

Year 
2014 

Year 
2015 

TOTAL 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

DG: Home Affairs 

(cid:121) Human resources  
(cid:121) Other administrative expenditure  

0.165 

0.292 

0.292 

0.292 

0.292 

0.009 

0.047 

0.047 

0.047 

0.047 

TOTAL DG Home Affairs 

Appropriations  

0.174 

0.339 

0.339 

0.339 

0.339 

1.333 

0.197 

1.530 

TOTAL appropriations 
under HEADING 5 
of the multiannual financial framework  

(Total 
= Total payments) 

commitments 

0.174 

0.339 

0.339 

0.339 

0.339 

1.530 

Year 

Year 

Year 

Year 

Year 

TOTAL 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

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21 

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TOTAL appropriations  
under HEADINGS 1 to 5 
of the multiannual financial framework  

Commitments 

2.354 

3.781 

4.922 

4.572 

4.922 

Payments 

1.354 

2.781 

3.922 

3.572 

3.922 

20.551 

15.551 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

EN 

22 

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8.2.2.  Estimated impact on operational appropriations  

–  (cid:133)  The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations  

–  ⌧ The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below: 

Commitment appropriations in EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Indicate 
objectiv
es and 
outputs  

Type of 
output37 

Avera
ge 
cost  
of the 
ouput 

(cid:216) 

Year 
2011 

Year 
2012 

Year 
2013 

Cost 

r
e
b
m
u
N

f

Cost 

r
e
b
m
u
N

s
t
u
p
u
o

f
o

  Cost 

s
t
u
p
u
o

f
o

r
e
b
m
u
N

r
e
b
m
u
N

s
t
u
p
u
o

f
o

Cost 

r
e
b
m
u
N

s
t
u
p
u
o

f
o

Year 
2014 

Cost 

Year 
2015 

TOTAL 

Total 
numbe
r of 
ouputs 

Total  
cost 
(estimate
s for 5 
years) 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No. 2 

Sub-objective 1: drafting, 
publication, dissemination, 
communication of the EU Anti-
Corruption Report38… 

- Output 

Conference – 
every year, 
starting 2012 

1 

0.040 

1 

0.040 

1 

0.040 

1 

0.040 

4 

0.16 

37 
38 

Outputs are products and services to be supplied (e.g.: number of student exchanges financed, number of km of roads built, etc.). 
As described in Section 1.4.2. "Specific objective(s)…" 

EN 

23 

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- Output  Eurobarometer 

1 

0.180 

1 

0.180 

1 

0.180 

3 

0.540 

- Output 

– every two 
years, starting 
2011 

publication, 
dissemination, 
communication 
(every two 
years, starting 
2013) 

1 

0.170 

1 

0.170 

2 

0.340 

Sub-total for sub-objective 1 

1 

0.180 

1 

0.040 

3 

0.390 

1 

0.040 

3 

0.390 

9 

1.040 

Sub-objective 3: civil society input 
for the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report39 

- Output 

Grants to 
civil society 
organisatio
ns40  

1 

2 

1 

2 

1 

2 

1 

2 

1 

2 

5 

10 

Sub-total for sub-objective 3 

1 

2 

1 

2 

1 

2 

1 

2 

1 

2 

5 

10 

Sub-objective 4: setting up and 
functioning of a network of research 
correspondents for the EU Anti-
Corruption Report41 

- Output 

Input from 
the 
correspond
ents for the 

1 

0.810 

1 

0.810 

1 

0.810 

1 

0810 

4 

3.24 

39 
40 

41 

EN 

See specific sub-objective no. 2 (expert group) under section 3.2.3 (costs of administrative nature). 
Through  targeted  calls  for  proposals  within  the  EU  programme  for  prevention  and  fight  against  crime  (call  targeting  financial  and  economic  crime),  civil  society  organisations  will  be 
encouraged to apply for subject specific assessments of Member States' anti-corruption efforts. The exact number and specific target of each contract cannot be predicted at this point. 
Public procurement procedures. The contractor will be tasked to set up the network of 27 local research correspondents and cover the coordination/logistic aspects. 

24 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
EU Anti-
Corruption 
Report42 

2 
meetings/ye
ar 

-Output 

-Output  Manageme
nt of the 
network 

1 

0.016 

2 

0.32 

2 

0.032 

2 

0.032 

7 

0.112 

1 

0.126 

1 

0.126 

1 

0.126 

1 

0.126 

4 

0.504 

Sub-total for sub-objective 4 

3 

0.952 

4 

0.968 

4 

0.968 

4 

0.968 

15 

3.856 

Sub-objective 5: experience-
sharing-programme linked with the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report43… 

- Output 

Setting up 
of an 
experience-
sharing 
programme 
(5 such 
exchange 
workshops/
year) 

5 

0.775 

5 

0.775 

5 

0.775 

15 

2.325 

Sub-total for sub-objective 5 

5 

0.775 

5 

0.775 

5 

0.775 

15 

2.325 

Sub-objective 6 (comparative 
analysis and flagging of outstanding 
recommendations for the EU 

42 

43 

EN 

An  average  cost  of  30,000  Euros  per  correspond  was  considered,  calculated  for  an  annual  input  of  approximately  50  working  days  (for  monthly  updates,  2-3  more 
comprehensive analysis/studies on specific topics, and gathering of relevant information) 
The decision to set up such programme and the details of its functioning may only be taken/clarified at a later stage, once the preparations for the first Report are more 
advanced.  One  possibility  for  its  setting  up  would  be  via  procurement  procedures  (i.e.  a  contractor  tasked  to  organise  a  number  of  roughly  5  experience-sharing 
workshops/events per year). The costs were estimated for approximately 50 participants + 5 speakers, with 1,000 Euros cost/person and an overall 100,000 Euros for 
organisation/logistics/dissemination/communication for each event. 

25 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Member States by the GRECO 
Secretariat) 

- Output  Comparativ
e analysis 
and 
flagging of 
outstanding 
recommend
ations44 

1 

0.150 

1 

0.150 

1 

0.150 

1 

0.150 

4 

0.6 

Sub-total for sub- objective 6 

1 

0.150 

1 

0.150 

1 

0.150 

1 

0.150 

4 

0.6 

Sub-objective 7 (EU membership of 
GRECO) 

- Output 

Participatio
n in 
GRECO's 
work 

1 

0.3 

1 

0.3 

1 

0.3 

1 

0.3 

4 

1.2 

Sub-total for sub-objective 7 

Sub-total for specific objective No 2 

TOTAL COST  

1 

7 

7 

0.3 

3.442 

3.442 

1 

15 

15 

0.3 

4.583 

4.583 

1 

13 

13 

2 

2 

2.180 

2.180 

0.3 

1 

0.3 

4 

1.2 

4.233 

15 

4.583 

52 

19.021 

4.233 

15 

4.583 

52 

19.021 

44 

EN 

Possibly to be contracted through negotiated procedure, as it regards compiling of information available only with GRECO and it requires their unique expertise in the 
evaluation of Member States. 

26 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8.2.3.  Estimated impact on appropriations of an administrative nature 

8.2.3.1.  Summary  

–  (cid:133)  The  proposal/initiative  does  not 

require 

the  use  of  administrative 

appropriations  

–  ⌧ The  proposal/initiative  requires  the  use  of  administrative  appropriations,  as 

explained below: 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Year 
2011 45 

Year 
2012 

Year 
2013 

Year 
2014 

Year 
2015 

TOTAL 

HEADING 5 
of the multiannual 
financial framework 

Human resources  

0.165 

0.292 

0.292 

0.292 

0.292 

1.333 

0.009 

0.047 

0.047 

0.047 

0.047 

0.197 

0.174 

0.339 

0.339 

0.339 

0.339 

1.530 

Other administrative 
expenditure (specific 
sub-objective 2 – 
expert group)46 

Subtotal HEADING 5 
of the multiannual 
financial framework  

Outside HEADING 547 
of the multiannual 
financial framework  

Human resources  

Other expenditure  
of an administrative 
nature 

Subtotal  
outside HEADING 5 
of the multiannual 
financial framework  

TOTAL 

45 
46 

47 

Year N is the year in which implementation of the proposal/initiative starts. 
9,000 and 47,000 respectively. Assuming 17 experts will be part of the group and that 5 meetings will 
take place every year, starting 2012 and possibly one meeting will take place in 2011. Average cost per 
expert – 550Eur).  
Technical  and/or  administrative  assistance  and  expenditure  in  support  of  the  implementation  of  EU 
programmes and/or actions (former "BA" lines), indirect research, direct research. 

EN 

27 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8.2.3.2.   Estimated requirements of human resources  

–  (cid:133)  The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources  

–  ⌧ The  proposal/initiative  requires  the  use  of  human  resources,  as  explained 

below: 

Estimate to be expressed in full amounts (or at most to one decimal place) 

(cid:121) Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary agents) 

18 01 01 01 (Headquarters and Commission’s 
Representation Offices) 

1.348 

2.3 

2.3 

2.3 

2.3 

Year 
2011 

Year 
2012 

Year 
2013 

Year 
2014 

Year 
2015 

XX 01 01 02 (Delegations) 

XX 01 05 01 (Indirect research) 

10 01 05 01 (Direct research) 

(cid:121) External personnel (in Full Time Equivalent unit: FTE)49 

XX 01 02 01 (CA, INT, SNE from the "global 
envelope") 

XX 01 02 02 (CA, INT, JED, LA and SNE in 
the delegations) 

XX 01 04 yy 50 

- at Headquarters51 

- in delegations  

XX 01 05 02 (CA, INT, SNE - Indirect 
research) 

10 01 05 02 (CA, INT, SNE - Direct research) 

Other budget lines (specify) 

TOTAL 

18 is the policy area or budget title concerned. 

The human resources required will be met by staff from the DG who are already assigned to 
management of the action and/or have been redeployed within the DG, together if necessary 
with any additional allocation which may be granted to the managing DG under the annual 
allocation procedure and in the light of budgetary constraints. 

Description of tasks to be carried out: 

Officials and temporary agents 

Coordination and organisation of meetings/conferences, processing and assessment of 
information,  secretarial  tasks  for  the  expert  group  and  network  of  research 
correspondents,  drafting  of  the  EU  Anti-Corruption  Reports,  cooperation  with 
GRECO, etc. 

48 
49 

50 
51 

Number of persons. 
CA= Contract Agent; INT= agency staff ("Intérimaire"); JED= "Jeune Expert en Délégation" (Young 
Experts in Delegations); LA= Local Agent; SNE= Seconded National Expert;  
Under the ceiling for external personnel from operational appropriations (former "BA" lines). 
Essentially  for  Structural  Funds,  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development  (EAFRD)  and 
European Fisheries Fund (EFF). 

EN 

28 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
External personnel 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
 
8.2.4.  Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework  

–  ⌧ Proposal/initiative is compatible the current multiannual financial framework. 

–  (cid:133)  Proposal/initiative will entail reprogramming of the relevant heading in the multiannual 

financial framework. 

Explain what reprogramming is required, specifying the budget lines concerned and the corresponding amounts. 

–  (cid:133)  Proposal/initiative  requires  application  of  the  flexibility  instrument  or  revision  of  the 

multiannual financial framework52. 

Explain what is required, specifying the headings and budget lines concerned and the corresponding amounts. 

8.2.5.  Third-party contributions  

–  ⌧ The proposal/initiative does not provide for co-financing by third parties  

–  The proposal/initiative provides for the co-financing estimated below: 

Appropriations in EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

… enter as many years as 
necessary to show the duration 
of the impact (see point 1.6) 

Total 

Specify  the  co-financing 
body  

TOTAL appropriations 
cofinanced  

52 

See points 19 and 24 of the Interinstitutional Agreement. 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8.3. 

Estimated impact on revenue  

–  ⌧ Proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue. 

–  (cid:133)  Proposal/initiative has the following financial impact: 

– 

– 

(cid:133) 

(cid:133) 

on own resources  

on miscellaneous revenue  

Appropriation
s available for 
the ongoing 
budget 
exercise 

Budget revenue line: 

Article …………. 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Impact of the proposal/initiative53 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

… insert as many columns as necessary 
in order to reflect the duration of the 
impact (see point 1.6) 

For miscellaneous assigned revenue, specify the budget expenditure line(s) affected. 

Specify the method for calculating the impact on revenue. 

53 

As regards traditional own resources (customs duties, sugar levies), the amounts indicated must be net amounts, i.e. 
gross amounts after deduction of 25% for collection costs. 

EN 

31 

   EN