Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of coated fine paper originating in the People’s Republic of China
Date: 2011-04-12
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: China, anti-dumping duty, anti-dumping legislation, import, originating product, pulp and paper industry

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 12.4.2011 
COM(2011) 198 final 

2011/0082 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty 
imposed on imports of coated fine paper originating in the People’s Republic of China 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

Grounds for and objectives of the proposal 

This  proposal  concerns  the  application  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1225/2009  of  30 
November  2009  on  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the 
European Community (‘the basic Regulation’) in the proceeding concerning imports of coated 
fine paper originating in the People’s Republic of China. 

General context 

This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation and is the 
result  of  an  investigation  which  was  carried  out  in  line  with  the  substantive  and  procedural 
requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. 

Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

By  Regulation  (EU)  No  1042/2010  the  Commission  imposed  provisional  anti-dumping 
measures on imports of coated fine paper originating in the People’s Republic of China. 

Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union 

Not applicable. 

2.  RESULTS  OF  CONSULTATIONS  WITH  THE  INTERESTED  PARTIES  AND 

IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 

Consultation of interested parties 

Interested parties concerned by the proceeding have had the possibility to defend their 
interests during the investigation, in line with the provisions of the basic Regulation. 

Collection and use of expertise 

There was no need for external expertise. 

Impact assessment 

This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation. 

The  basic  Regulation  does  not  foresee  a  general  impact  assessment  but  contains  an 
exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed. 

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3. LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

Summary of the proposed action 

On  18  February  2010,  the  Commission  initiated  an  anti-dumping  proceeding  concerning 
imports of coated fine paper originating in the People's Republic of China. 

The investigation found dumping of the product concerned, which caused injury to the Union 
industry. The investigation also found that it was not against the Union interest to impose anti-
dumping measures. On this basis, provisional measures were imposed.  

The continuation of the investigation has confirmed the essential provisional findings. 

Therefore,  it  is  proposed  that  the  Council  adopts  the  attached  proposal  for  a  Regulation  in 
order to impose definitive measures on imports of coated fine paper originating in the People's 
Republic  of  China.  The  Regulation  should  be  published  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the 
European Union no later than 17th May 2011. 

Legal basis 

Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Community (‘the basic Regulation’)  

Subsidiarity principle 

The  proposal  falls  under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Union.  The  subsidiarity  principle 
therefore does not apply. 

Proportionality principle 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons: 

The form of action is described in the above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves no scope 
for national decision. 

Indication  of  how  financial  and  administrative  burden  falling  upon  the  Union,  national 
governments, regional and local authorities, economic operators and citizens is minimized and 
proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable. 

Choice of instruments 

Proposed instrument: Council Regulation. 

Other  means  would  not  be  adequate  because  the  basic  Regulation  does  not  provide  for 
alternative options. 

4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATION  

The proposal has no implication for the Union budget. 

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2011/0082 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty 
imposed on imports of coated fine paper originating in the People’s Republic of China 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,  

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community1 ('the basic 
Regulation'), and in particular Article 9 and 14(1) thereof, 

Having  regard  to  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  European  Commission  ('the  Commission') 
after consulting the Advisory Committee, 

Whereas: 

1. 

(1) 

(2) 

2. 

(3) 

PROVISIONAL MEASURES 

The  Commission,  by  Regulation  (EU)  No  1042/20102  (‘the  provisional  Regulation’) 
imposed  a  provisional  anti-dumping  duty  ('the  provisional  measures')  on  imports  of 
coated fine paper ('CFP') originating in the People's Republic of China ('PRC'). 

The  proceeding  was  initiated  following  a  complaint  lodged  on  4  January  2010  by 
CEPIFINE,  the  European  association  of  fine  paper  manufacturers  ('the  complainant') 
on behalf of producers representing a major proportion, in this case more than 25% of 
the total Union production of coated fine paper. The complaint contained prima facie 
evidence  of  dumping  of  the  said  product  and  of  material  injury  resulting  therefrom, 
which was considered sufficient to justify the initiation of a proceeding.  

SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURE 

Subsequent to the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on  the basis of 
which  it  was  decided  to  impose  provisional  anti-dumping  measures  ('the  provisional 
disclosure'),  several  interested  parties  made  written  submissions  making  known  their 
views  on  the  provisional  findings.  The  parties  who  so  requested  were  granted  the 
opportunity to be heard.  

(4) 

The Commission continued to seek and verify all information it deemed necessary for 
its definitive findings.  

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OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51. 

OJ L 299, 17.11.2010, p. 7. 

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(5) 

One  group  of  cooperating  Chinese  exporting  producers  ('the  exporting  producer') 
claimed that it should have been heard prior to the imposition of provisional measures 
given that, according to that group, a provisional Regulation is an individual measure 
in  the  sense  of  Article  41  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European 
Union3 (‘the Charter’).  

(6)  With respect to the above stated claim, the following points should be highlighted. The 
basic  Regulation  delineates  the  rights  of  parties  in  the  framework  of  anti-dumping 
proceedings  and  in  this  particular  matter  Article  7  sets  out  the  procedural  steps  for 
imposition of provisional measures. Article 7 of the basic Regulation states, inter alia, 
that provisional measures, if any, can be imposed within 9 months from the initiation 
of a case. In the present proceeding the Commission conducted its investigation in line 
with  the  provisions  of  Article  6  of  the  basic  Regulation  and  imposed  provisional 
measures  in  line  with  the  provisions  of  Article  7  of  the  basic  Regulation  while  all 
interested parties that had requested so were heard and had the adequate opportunities 
to submit information and make comments. The Court of Justice has consistently held 
that " even if… the principle of the right to a hearing requires exporters to be informed 
of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it is intended to impose 
provisional  duties,  a  failure  to  respect  that  right  cannot  in  itself  have  the  effect  of 
vitiating  the  regulation  imposing  definitive  duties  where,  in  the  course  of  the 
procedure  for  the  adoption  of  the  latter  regulation,  the  defect  vitiating  the  procedure 
for  the  adoption  of  the  corresponding  regulation  imposing  provisional  duties  was 
remedied4.  In  the  present  case,  the  Commission  fulfilled  its  obligations  to  disclosure 
under the basic Regulation and the right to a fair hearing of the exporting producer was 
respected during the procedure leading to the adoption of the present Regulation.  

(7) 

(8) 

The  provisional  nature  of  measures  adopted  pursuant  to  Article  7  of  the  basic 
Regulation is inter alia reflected in the maximum period of six months for which they 
can be imposed only as well as the fact that any provisional duty is only secured by 
guarantee.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  never  prevented  any  party  from  coming 
forward with requests to hold more hearings prior to the 9 month deadline stipulated 
by  law  for  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures  should  they  have  considered  that 
there is a need to be heard further at that stage.  

One group of cooperating Chinese exporting producers requested access to data used 
from  the  sole  company  in  the  USA  that  provided  information  in  line  with  the 
provisions of Article 2(7)(a) for the establishment of normal value. It was claimed that 
otherwise the party was prevented from having access to the evidence on the basis of 
which provisional measures were imposed and that this both violated the party's rights 
of defence and was contrary to the principle of good administration. The same party 
claimed  that  disclosure  of  confidential  data  pertaining  to  specific  parties  could  be 
made  available  to  the  legal  representatives  of  the  group  of  co-operating  Chinese 
exporting  producers.  The  legal  representatives  would  undertake  the  obligation  to 
guarantee the confidentiality of companies' business secrets. The claim was backed by 
reference  to  the  USA  and  the  Canadian  systems  and  to  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European  Union  in  G.J.  Dokter  and  Others  v  Minister  van  Landbouw,  Natuur  en 
Voedselkwaliteit. 

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OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, p.1. 
Judgment  of  3  May  2001,  joined  cases  C-76/98  P  and  C-77/98  P,  Ajinomoto  ,  ECR  2001  p.  3233, 
paragraph 67 

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(9) 

These requests had to be rejected. The party's request referred to access of confidential 
data  on  prices  provided  by  the  aforesaid  US  company.  The  Commission  could  not 
grant  the  access  to  such  detailed  business  confidential  information.  Giving  access  to 
such  data  would  have  been  against  Union  law,  notably  Article  19  of  the  Basic 
Regulation  since  it  would  have  led  to  an  unauthorised  disclosure  of  limited  and 
sensitive  business  data  of  the  US  company.  As  to  the  proposed  methodology  on 
disclosing  company's  business  secrets  to  legal  representatives  of  other  interested 
parties, unlike in the USA and Canadian systems, no such process is provided for by 
the basic Regulation. It is thus clearly outside the established EU legal framework for 
anti-dumping proceedings. In any event, the Court case cited above does not support 
any  claim  of  access  to  confidential  information.  The  judgment  also  refers  to  some 
inherent limits of the principle of the right of defence. 

(10)  One  group  of  cooperating  Chinese  exporting  producers  also  requested  access  to 
evidence concerning: rolls used in web-fed printing produced by the Union producers, 
detailed  information  about  one  representative  Union  producer's  legal  status,  the 
activities  and  financial  data  of  selected  mills,  detailed  data  related  to  the  Union 
industry's  cost  of  production  and  product  control  numbers  of  the  products  of 
representative  Union  producers.  Some  of  the  requested  information  was  outside  the 
scope of the investigation as it related to products not covered by the investigation or 
the  activity  of  Union  producers  that  does  not  involve  the  production  of  CFP. 
Concerning  other  information  requested,  the  Commission  was  not  in  a  position  to 
grant access to it, since pursuant to Article 19 of the basic Regulation this would have 
constituted an unauthorised disclosure of confidential business secrets.  

(11)  The  same  exporting  producers  also  requested  the  disclosure  of  the  names  of  the 
companies which opposed the investigation and did not request confidential treatment. 
Such  a  disclosure  would  have  revealed  the  identity  and  position  of  producers  that 
requested confidentiality; therefore it was not possible to reveal this information.  

(12)  The provisional disclosure was as detailed as possible without disclosing confidential 
information and was thus not in breach of the exporting producer's fundamental rights, 
its rights of defence or of the principle of good administration.  

(13)  The  injury  analyses  performed  in  the  present  anti-dumping  and  the  parallel  anti-
subsidy  investigation  are  identical,  since  the  definition  of  the  Union  industry,  the 
representative  Union  producers  and  the  investigation  period  are  the  same  in  both 
investigations. For this reason, comments on injury aspects put forward in any of these 
proceedings were taken into account in both proceedings. 

2.1. 

Investigation period 

(14) 

It  is  recalled  that,  as  set  out  in  recital  (13)  of  the  provisional  Regulation,  the 
investigation  of  dumping  and  injury  covered  the  period  from  1  January  2009  to  31 
December 2009 (the ‘investigation period’ or ‘IP’). The examination of trends relevant 
for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2006 to the end of the 
IP (‘the period considered’). 

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3. 

PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 

3.1. 

Product concerned 

(15)  Following  provisional  measures,  the  exporting  producer  and  the  complainant 
submitted  further  comments  concerning  the  product  definition.  Some  of  these 
comments  were  a  repetition  of  comments  already  addressed  in  the  provisional 
Regulation.  

(16)  The  exporting  producer  reiterated  that  there  is  no  substantial  difference  concerning 
basic  characteristics  between  CFP  in  sheets  and  rolls  suitable  for  use  in  sheet-fed 
printing machines (the product concerned) and rolls suitable for use in web-fed presses 
and that therefore CFP for web-fed printing should not have been excluded from the 
product scope. The party also argued that the Commission's finding that these products 
are not interchangeable was not supported.  

(17) 

It  is  recalled  that  the  investigation  found  that  CFP  used  in  web-fed  and  sheet-fed 
printing processes are distinct product groups and are not interchangeable as described 
in  recitals  (18)  and  (20)  of  the  provisional  Regulation.  The  exporting  producer  itself 
also acknowledged that these products are not fully interchangeable. 

(18)  To note as well is that no rolls for use in web-fed presses were imported from the PRC 
during  the  period  considered.  It  may  also  be  considered  unlikely  that  these  products 
would  be  imported  in  the  future  as  sourcing  these  products  from  long  distance  is 
economically  not  viable  for  the  reasons  mentioned  in  recital  20  of  the  provisional 
Regulation. 

(19) 

It  was  further  claimed  by  the  same  party  that  the  criteria  defined  in  the  provisional 
Regulation in recital (16), namely the technical characteristic of resistance to picking 
was not appropriate to distinguish between CFP suitable for use in web-fed printing on 
the one hand and CFP used in sheet-fed printing on the other hand. It further claimed 
that the exclusion of web rolls was made on an arbitrary basis  alleging that web-fed 
rolls  produced  by  Union  producers  do  not  meet  the  criteria  set  in  recital  16  of  the 
provisional Regulation as regards the characteristics of resistance to picking.  

(20)  The exporting producer also argued that the Commission fell short of its obligation to 
examine  objectively  the  evidence  presented  by  that  exporting  producer  to  the 
Commission's  services  before  the  provisional  Regulation,  namely  the  results  of  the 
testing  conducted  in  its  own  laboratory  measuring  the  resistance  to  picking  of  web 
rolls produced by the Union producers. 

(21)  The test results presented by the exporting producer consisted of a summary of the test 
results performed in its own laboratory. Crucially, the results were not made available 
for  inspection  and  comments  by  other  interested  parties,  in  particular,  the  Union 
industry,  nor  did  the  exporting  producer  submit  a  meaningful  non-confidential 
summary thereof despite repeated reminders. 

(22) 

It is reminded that at provisional stage the Commission concluded that the objectivity 
and  reliability  of  the  test  was  insufficient  to  base  conclusions  thereon.  No  further 
detailed information was provided by the exporting producer which could help further 
assess  the  reliability  of  the  test.  Since  no  non-confidential  version  of  this  test  was 
provided, the companies whose web rolls were allegedly tested could not respond to 

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the conclusions of the test. The Commission thus could not objectively check whether 
the  submitted  test  results  were  reliable  and  correct  and  could  be  relied  upon  for  the 
purposes  of  the  investigation.  On  the  basis  of  the  facts  available  to  the  Commission 
conclusions reached at provisional stage about the objectivity and reliability of the test 
could not be reconsidered since the information submitted under confidentiality could 
not be counterchecked by any reliable sources. 

(23)  After the imposition of the provisional measures, the exporting producer presented the 
results  of  a  further  test  conducted  on  its  behalf  by  an  external  test  laboratory  and 
reiterated  that  CFP  used  in  web-fed  printing  has  been  arbitrarily  excluded  from  the 
scope  of  the  investigation.  The  test  reports  stated  that  the  resistance  to  picking  has 
been  measured  on  25  samples  of  web-fed  rolls  provided  and  identified  by  the 
exporting producer to the laboratory as paper samples produced by Union producers. 
According  to  this  report,  none  of  the  paper  met  both  criteria  set  in  recital  16  of  the 
provisional Regulation. 

(24)  The assessment of the test report brought to light that, first of all, the test report by the 
external laboratory related mostly to products for which these results were irrelevant 
as  most  of  the  samples  tested  were  not  in  fact  web  rolls;  secondly,  the  test  report 
related to products which were not sufficiently identified as it could not be ascertained 
from  the  test  report  whether  the  paper  tested  was  for  sheet-fed  printing  or  web-fed 
printing  as  the  paper  brand  described  in  the  report  existed  in  both  formats. 
Furthermore  the  test  report  provided  no  assurance  that  the  sampled  rolls  indicated 
were indeed the ones that were tested.  

(25) 

In response to the external laboratory's test report, the complainant provided the results 
of the testing performed by one of the Union producers on the same samples of web 
rolls that were allegedly tested by the external laboratory. This test showed different 
results. The complainant attributed the differences to possibly different test conditions 
and  thus  a  potential  non-compliance  with  the  ISO  3783:2006  standard,  i.e.  the 
standard according to which resistance to picking set in recital (16) of the provisional 
Regulation should be measured. 

(26)  After  disclosing  the  definitive  findings,  the  exporting  producer  questioned  the 
Commission's  objectivity  in  rejecting  the  test  result  of  the  external  laboratory.  It 
claimed  that  the  testing  was  carried  out  blindly  by  the  independent  expert  and  in 
accordance  with  the  relevant  ISO  standard.  It  provided  an  affidavit  of  its  manager 
explaining the sourcing process of the samples used in the testing in order to prove the 
independence, correctness and representativeness of the testing.  

(27)  Firstly, the objectivity of the external laboratory test report was never questioned  by 
the  Commission  and  in  this  regard  it  is  irrelevant  that  the  testing  was  carried  out 
blindly.  On  the  other  hand,  doubts  were  raised  as  to  the  assurances  on  the  selection 
and  origin  of  the  samples  tested  and  not  on  the  test  itself.  The  arguments  of  the 
exporting producer did not remove these doubts as these were not comprehensive and 
were unclear in several aspects, for example the inclusion of products other than web 
rolls  were  claimed  to  have  been  caused  by  administrative  errors  or  were  blamed  on 
mistakes by the suppliers in providing possibly wrong samples. 

(28)  Since both the source as well as the samples of the allegedly tested products were not 
clear  and  the  results  of  the  testing  by  the  different  parties  were  contradictory,  it  was 

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considered that the submitted test report of the external laboratory acting on behalf of 
the Chinese exporting producer did not conclusively demonstrate that the resistance to 
picking test was not appropriate to distinguish between CFP suitable for use in web-
fed  printing  on  the  one  hand  and  CFP  used  in  sheet-fed  printing  on  the  other  hand. 
Consequently,  the  test  report  did  not  demonstrate  that  CFP  used  in  web-fed  printing 
had been arbitrarily excluded from the scope of the investigation. 

(29)  As regards the relevance of the resistance to picking as a distinguishing criterion for 
rolls suitable for web-fed printing, it is recalled that in the product definition the two 
product  groups  are  distinguished  from  each  other  based  on,  among  other  things,  the 
use of the products, i.e. whether the product is suitable for use in web-fed or sheet-fed 
printing  as  determined  by  the  requirements  of  the  presses  on  which  they  are  used 
which is reflected in, inter alia, the characteristic of resistance to picking. Furthermore 
it is noted that resistance to picking is only one of the characteristics that distinguish 
CFP suitable for use in web-fed printing from CFP used in sheet fed printing; Recitals 
(16) and (18) of the provisional Regulation set out additional criteria which have not 
been contested by the exporting producer concerned. One party claimed that humidity 
as  defined  in  recital  (18)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  was  not  a  distinct  basic 
characteristic  to  distinguish  products.  During  the  investigation  however  differing 
claims  in  this  regard  were  made  by  other  parties.  In  any  event,  it  was  found  that 
stiffness and resistance to picking are the most relevant factors.  

(30) 

(31) 

In its responding submission the complainant acknowledged that there might be rolls 
that  do  not  fully  meet  all  the  criteria  for  resistance  to  picking  set  in  the  provisional 
Regulation  which  could  still  be  used  in  web-fed  printing.  However,  it  sustained  its 
view that pick resistance is the only test that is able to identify with certainty that a roll 
is indeed suitable for web-fed printing, i.e. if a roll meets the picking resistance criteria 
in recital 16 of the provisional Regulation, it is certainly a web roll. 

In support of the above claims concerning resistance to picking the exporting producer 
referred to arguments put forward by one of the complainant Union producers in anti-
dumping  and  anti-subsidy  investigations  in  the  USA  in  which  the  Union  producer 
allegedly  acknowledged  that  web  rolls  cannot  be  differentiated  based  on  pick 
resistance test or by any other measurement. 

(32)  The complainant contested these statements of the exporting producer and claimed that 
contrary  to  what  has  been  claimed,  it  follows  from  the  proceedings  in  the  USA  that 
there is a clear dividing line distinguishing web rolls from CFP.  

(33)  Firstly,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  statements  referred  to  by  the  exporting  producer 
were presented in investigations under other jurisdictions and by different parties than 
the  ones  in  the  current  proceeding  and  thus  are  not  relevant.  Secondly,  the  US 
authorities in the mentioned investigations concluded that there was a clear distinction 
between  on  one  hand  CFP  used  in  sheet-fed  printing  and  on  the  other  hand  rolls 
suitable  for  use  in  web-fed  printing.  Cutter  rolls  were  regarded  as  semi-finished 
products  while  rolls  suitable  for  web  fed  printing  were  not  considered  as  product 
concerned. The US authorities did not explicitly define web rolls in their definition of 
the  product  scope.  For  this  reason,  the  criterion  of  resistance  to  picking  was  not 
relevant in the definition of the product scope in the mentioned investigations. 

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(34)  Based on the above comments, the technical characteristic "resistance to picking" was 
confirmed as being a reliable characteristic to describe CFP suitable for use in web-fed 
printing  

(35)  The comments put forward have however also revealed that there exist web rolls that 
can  be  used  in  web-fed  printing  even  if  they  do  not  fully  meet  all  the  criteria  of 
resistance to picking. For this reason it was considered necessary to further refine the 
definition of rolls suitable for web-fed printing.  

(36) 

In order to provide a further criterion to distinguish web rolls which do not fully meet 
all  the  criteria  for  resistance  to  picking,  the  complainant  suggested  that  a  roll  which 
does not fully meet the picking resistance test but has an internal core size of less than 
80mm, should be considered as a web roll.  

(37)  The GOC and the exporting producer claimed that the addition of core size as a new 
element into the product definition constituted a revision of the definition of web rolls 
and  thus  the  product  concerned.  It  also  claimed  that  the  internal  core  size  is  not  a 
suitable  criteria  as  there  exist  web  rolls  with  higher  than  80mm  core  size  and  cutter 
rolls with lower than 80mm core size.  

(38)  The Commission endeavoured to further refine the definition of rolls suitable for use 
in web-fed printing and to give further clarification in order to distinguish even more 
clearly  between  the  product  concerned  and  other  products,  also  with  a  view  to 
minimize the possibility of circumvention of the measures. The evidence submitted on 
the  suitability  of  the  core  size  as  an  alternative  criterion  in  the  definition  however 
proved that this criterion would lead to the possible exclusion of product concerned, 
i.e. cutter rolls with a core size of less than 80mm from the measures. Therefore this 
criterion to define rolls suitable for use in web-fed printing was abandoned. 

(39)  The above is without prejudice to the reliability of the method according to which rolls 
suitable  for  use  in  web-fed  printing  have  been  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the 
investigation as it was claimed by the Chinese group of exporting producers. 

(40)  No further comments were received concerning the exclusion of multi-ply paper from 

the product scope of the investigation. 

(41)  Based  on  the  above,  recitals  (14)  to  (26)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are  hereby 

confirmed. 

3.2. 

Like product 

(42)  Since no comments were received with regard to the conclusions outlined in recital 27 
of the provisional Regulation, the provisional findings with regard to the like product 
are herewith confirmed. 

4. 

SAMPLING 

(43) 

In the absence of any comments on sampling, recitals (28) to (30) of the provisional 
Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

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(44)  The four producers referred to in recital (29) of the provisional Regulation that were 
considered to be representative of the Union industry as defined in recital (77) of the 
provisional Regulation are further referred to as "representative Union producers".  

5. 

DUMPING 

(45)  Only one Chinese cooperating group (i.e. APP) submitted comments on dumping as a 

follow-up to the imposition of provisional measures. 

5.1.  Market economy treatment (MET) 

(46)  With respect to criterion 1, APP alleged that the Commission's arguments relied solely 
on  the  alleged  impossibility  to  verify  payment.  It  was  consequently  argued  that  the 
methods used by the party are in line with International Accounting Standards (‘IAS’).  

(47)  This had to be rejected. In this respect it is noted that the investigation revealed that it 
was  not  possible  to  establish  the  existence  of  payments  with  respect  to  transfer  of 
companies' shares and cost of major raw material inputs. As to the accounting methods 
used  it  is  noted  that  the  methods  followed  were  not  in  line  with  IAS  (offsetting  and 
related party disclosures).  

(48)  With respect to criteria 1 and 2, APP submitted that the Commission had dismissed the 
opinion  of  a  well-known  firm  of  accountancy  advisors  in  a  summary  fashion  on  the 
grounds  that  it  was  irrelevant.  Such  dismissal  would  amount  to  an  inadmissible 
rejection of an independent witness statement, thereby violating APP's right to a fair 
process. APP argued that its accounting advisors found the Commission's analysis on 
accounting  procedures  and  principles  flawed  while  some  of  the  points  that  the 
Commission identified were, according to those advisors, not material.  

(49)  APP  allegations  were  not  backed  by  any  evidence  and  had  to  be  rejected.  In  this 
respect it is noted that the accountancy advisors referred to in the recital above do not 
appear to dispute the actual facts established in this investigation but rather attempted 
to present an analysis of some of the basic accounting principles, notably the prudence 
principle,  the  accrual  principle,  the  principle  of  faithful  representation  and  the 
materiality  principle.  It  should  be  noted  that  those  accountancy  advisors  were  not 
present during the on-spot  verification  carried out by the Commission in the PRC in 
the  course  of  which  the  Commission  got  first-hand  knowledge  about  APP's  actual 
practices relevant for the MET assessment. The Commission has explained in detail in 
writing  to  the  party  the  deficiencies  spotted  and  their  links  with  the  IAS  accounting 
principles. The interpretation of these principles given by the accounting firm was not 
sufficiently  substantiated  or  supported  by  evidence  and  could  also  not  be  reconciled 
with  the  actual  facts  established.  Indeed,  the  evidence  on  file  confirmed  that  the 
aforesaid accounting principles were not respected.  

(50)  APP  submitted  that  its  fundamental  rights  were  breached.  It  was  argued  that  the 
Commission  imposed  an  excessive  burden  of  proof  on  the  party  when  investigating 
MET.  

(51)  This had to be rejected. In this respect it is noted that the Commission has informed 
APP fully on the type of information requested with respect to MET and endeavoured 
to verify at every stage of the proceeding any information provided by the party. The 
fact that the information provided by the party does not confirm the compliance with 

EN 

11 

   EN 

IAS of its accounting methods does not imply the existence of an excessive burden of 
proof. MET is an exception to the normal regime for companies located in non-market 
economy  countries  and  parties  in  such  cases  are  simply  requested  to  show  that  they 
complied with the rules set out in Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation, failure to one 
criterion  being  enough  to  justify  the  refusal  for  granting  MET.  In  this  particular 
proceeding  the  investigation  established  that  APP  was  not  able  to  show  that  it 
complied with the requirements of Criterion 2.  

(52)  APP  also  argued  that  there  was  a  lack  of  objectivity  in  the  MET  assessment.  It 
submitted  that  the  MET  decision  was  possibly  influenced  by  the  Commission's 
knowledge about the impact of the MET rejection on the group's dumping margin.  

(53)  Moreover,  these  claims  are  unsubstantiated  and  thus  had  to  be  rejected.  There  is  no 
indication  that  the  MET  decision  was  influenced  by  the  Commission's  knowledge 
about  the  impact  of  the  MET  rejection  on  the  group's  dumping  margin.  The  MET 
analysis is a technical analysis of the fulfilment of the five clear criteria set out under 
Article  2(7)(c)  of  the  basic  Regulation  and  the  MET  analysis  presented  by  the 
Commission was carried out on the basis of the MET criteria and without considering 
the impact of the outcome of that analysis to the party's potential dumping margin. In 
this  respect  it  is  recalled  that  the  scheduling  of  the  various  segments  of  the  on-spot 
verifications  and  the  difference  in  the  calendars  followed  (MET  claim  forms,  anti-
dumping questionnaires, analogue country data, export sales via related Union parties) 
together  with  the  periods  within  which  parties  filed  replies  and  subsequent 
amendments  to  their  submissions  demonstrates  that  the  Commission  was  not  able  to 
establish any effect of a MET decision on the party's potential dumping at the time of 
MET disclosure. Finally, APP kept up to a late stage submitting new information and 
replacing  information  already  on  file  thus  it  cannot  be  upheld  that  the  Commission 
could  be  able  to  compute  dumping  margins  on  the  basis  of  information  that  did  not 
have. 

(54)  APP also argued that the Commission did not need to verify in full the party's replies 
in order to have a detailed picture of the data included in the party's reply to the anti-
dumping  questionnaire  and  that  suspicions  exists  that  the  Commission  had  all  the 
necessary data in order to calculate a dumping margin.  

(55)  This claim had to be rejected. In this respect it is noted that in line with the provisions 
of  Article  16  of  the  basic  Regulation,  the  Commission  verified  all  the  information 
submitted  by  interested  parties  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  representative  finding.  The 
findings of the investigation were based on verified facts during a period of time that 
spread  across  four  months  and  not  on  mere  suspicions  or  any  type  of  unverified 
statements or allegations.  

(56)  APP  submitted  that  the  MET  criteria  should  be  read  in  light  of  their  objective  to 
ensure that prices are the result of normal market forces. In this respect it is noted that 
the  purpose  of  the  MET  criteria  is  clearly  set  out  under  Article  2(7)  of  the  basic 
Regulation and the Commission applied with respect to APP these clearly set out rules 
when analyzing its MET claim.  

(57)  APP  also  claimed  that  the  MET  assessment  had  shortcomings,  given  that  the 
verification of the reply to the anti-dumping questionnaire had established a "reliable" 

EN 

12 

   EN 

cost of production, while the MET assessment points to a lack of ability to establish 
payments for inputs. 

(58)  This interpretation of the findings has to be rejected as erroneous. It is recalled that the 
basic Regulation explicitly conditions the granting of MET and thus the reliability and 
use of an exporting producer's own price and cost data for the purpose of establishing 
normal value on the company successfully showing that it meets the requirements set 
out  in  Article  2(7)(c).  If  the  aforementioned  claim  by  APP  were  to  be  accepted  it 
would  simply  "by-pass"  the  findings  of  the  MET  assessment  and  the  provisions  of 
Article 2(7)(c) by using other type of information collected for other purposes. This is 
not in conformity with the provisions of the basic Regulation. 

(59) 

It is recalled that for APP two out of the four related exporting producers were found 
to  produce  only  the  multi-ply  paperboard.  Account  taken  of  the  fact  that  multi-ply 
paper board is excluded from the product scope as confirmed in recitals (40) and (41) 
above, it is concluded that the MET findings with respect to the two related exporting 
producers  that  produce  only  multi-ply  paperboard  within  the  APP  group  are  not 
relevant for this proceeding.  

(60) 

In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments  concerning  MET,  recitals  (31)  to  (51)  of  the 
provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

5.2. 

Individual treatment (IT) 

(61) 

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  on  IT,  recitals  (52)  to  (55)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

5.3. 

Normal value 

5.3.1.  Analogue country 

(62)  No party disputed the selection of the United States of America (USA) as an analogue 

country for the definitive determination. 

(63) 

In  the  absence  of  any  comments  concerning  the  selection  of  the  analogue  country, 
recitals (56) to (63) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

5.3.2.  Determination of normal value 

(64) 

It is recalled that the normal value was calculated on the basis of the data provided by 
the sole cooperating producer in the analogue country (i.e. United States of America). 
Thus, normal value was established on the basis of prices of domestic sales of one US 
producer  of  the  like  product  produced  in  the  USA.  During  the  IP  this  producer 
produced and sold in the US market the great majority of the types of the like product.  

(65)  APP submitted that the Commission did not provide necessary information in relation 
to  the  normal  value  in  the  analogue  country,  such  as  comparability  of  the  products, 
representativeness, cost structure, fair comparison mechanics and adjustments.  

(66)  These  claims  had  to  be  rejected.  In  this  respect  it  is  noted  that,  as  explained  under 
recital  (9)  above,  the  Commission  provided  to  the  party  all  relevant  information 
concerning  to  data  used  in  order  to  calculate  normal  value  that  could  be  released 

EN 

13 

   EN 

without infringing the provisions of Article 19 of the basic Regulation, i.e. assuring at 
the same time that any confidential data provided by the sole US producer is treated as 
such  and  is  not  disclosed  to  other  parties.  The  information  provided  to  the  Chinese 
party  was  meaningful  and  offered  to  the  party  the  possibility  to  understand  the 
methodology used in line with the provisions of Article 2 of the basic Regulation.  

(67) 

In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments,  recitals  (64)  to  (67)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

5.4. 

Export price 

(68)  APP  argued  that  the  export  sales  of  one  of  its  companies  cooperating  with  the 
investigation should not have been disregarded from the dumping margin calculation 
even if there are no matching products. It was also argued that the export quantities of 
this company were not small but substantial.  

(69)  With  respect  to  these  claims  it  is  noted  that  the  sales  values  of  the  transactions  in 
question  were  considered  for  the  establishment  of  the  export  prices  but  no  normal 
value  for  these  transactions  could  be  established  since  there  were  no  comparable 
product  types  in  the  analogue  country  and  thus  no  comparison  could  be  made.  With 
respect  to  the  export  quantities  of  this  particular  company  it  is  noted  that  they 
represented  only  a  minor  part  of  the  total  APP  export  sales  and  their  price  levels 
appeared to be in line with the overall APP export sales price levels. Finally, it should 
be pointed out that the great majority of export transactions were used for the purposes 
of determining whether or not the exports were dumped, i.e. those offering an absolute 
match  to  normal  value  established  in  the  analogue  country.  Thus,  APP  claims  with 
respect to export price had to be rejected as they cannot put into question the finding 
of injurious dumping given that the basis for the calculation is clearly representative. 
The  fact,  that  a  matching  normal  value  in  the  analogue  country  does  not  necessarily 
exist for each and every export transaction is inherent to such a finding. 

(70)  APP  also  submitted  that  the  aforesaid  export  sales  should  have  been  used  in  the 
dumping  margin  calculations  since  the  investigating  authority  has  the  possibility  to 
identify similar product types used for the normal value calculation, adjust the export 
price  to  the  normal  value  or  construct  a  normal  value  to  compare  with  the  aforesaid 
export sales.  

(71)  These claims had to be rejected as there were no product types in the analogue country 
that had been close enough to those exported to cover the differences by an adjustment 
for  differences  in  physical  characteristics.  Equally,  it  was  not  possible  to  construct 
normal  value  for  such  product  types.  Neither  similar  product  types  in  other  normal 
value transactions were identifiable, nor any basis was available to make adjustments 
or otherwise construct normal value using selling, general administrative expenses and 
profit assumptions.  

(72)  APP  requested  clarifications  with  respect  to  the  reasonable  profit  margin  used  for 
constructing export price in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. 

(73) 

In  this  respect  it  is  noted  that  the  Commission  revisited  this  point  following  new 
developments.  It  is  recalled  that  as  explained  in  recital  (71)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation  a  reasonable  profit  rate,  much  lower  than  the  target  profit  for  the  Union 
industry  was  used.  The  Commission  reviewed  the  available  data  and  decreased  the 

EN 

14 

   EN 

profit  margin  rate  used  for  constructing  export  price  to  a  rate  equal  to  the  weighted 
average  rate  reported  by  a  series  of  unrelated  Union  importers  of  the  product 
concerned, i.e. 4.5%. 

(74) 

In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments,  recitals  (68)  to  (71)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation, as modified above, are hereby confirmed. 

5.5. 

Comparison 

(75)  APP claimed to be unable to understand the basis of calculations of certain allowances 
with respect to normal value (namely the type of adjustments and their impact on the 
normal value) and export price (namely the methodology used and calculations made 
in order to arrive at several ratios).  

(76)  With  respect  to  normal  value  adjustments,  as  explained  under  recitals  (9)  and  (66) 
above,  the  Commission  provided  to  the  party  all  the  relevant  data  that  could  be 
provided,  account  taken  of  the  provisions  on  confidentiality  in  the  basic  Regulation. 
Furthermore,  the  Commission  checked  with  the  cooperating  party  in  the  analogue 
country  whether  further  information  relating  to  adjustments  could  be  disclosed  in 
order  to  improve  transparency.  Having  obtained  the  analogue  country  producer's 
agreement,  more  detailed  information  was  indeed  provided  to  the  party  following 
provisional disclosure, further elaborating on the normal value adjustments.  

(77)  With respect to export price adjustments it is noted that APP received full disclosure. 
Then,  following  APP's  request,  clarifications  were  provided  to  the  party  following 
provisional disclosure further elaborating on the export price adjustments.  

(78) 

In  the  absence  of  any  other  comments,  recitals  (72)  and  (73)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

5.6. 

Dumping margin 

(79)  No  pertinent  comments  with  respect  to  the  dumping  margin  were  submitted.  In  the 
absence  of  any  other  comments,  recital  (74)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  is  hereby 
confirmed. 

(80)  Taking into account the revised profit margin rate used for constructing export price 
for  APP  and  on  the  basis  of  the  methodology  set  out  in  recitals  (31)  to  (73)  of  the 
provisional Regulation, the definitive dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of 
the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows: 

Exporting producer 

Dumping margin 

Gold  East  Paper  (Jiangsu)  Co.,  Ltd, 
Zhenjiang City, Jiangsu Province, PRC  

Gold  Huasheng  Paper  (Suzhou  Industrial 
Park)  Co.,  Ltd,  Suzhou  City,  Jiangsu 
Province, PRC 

43,5% 

43,5% 

Shangdong  Chenming  Paper  Holdings 
Limited,  Shouguang  City,  Shandong 

63% 

EN 

15 

   EN 

Province, PRC 

Shouguang Chenming Art Paper Co., Ltd, 
Shouguang  City,  Shandong  Province, 
PRC 

63% 

(81)  On  the  basis  of  the  facts  stated  in  recital  (76)  of  the  provisional  Regulation,  the 
country-wide  definitive  dumping  margin  for  the  PRC  was  established  using  the 
definitive dumping margin established for the cooperating companies with the highest 
individual duty rate, i.e. 63%. In the absence of any other comments, recital (76) of the 
provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. 

6. 

UNION PRODUCERS 

(82)  The  government  of  China  commented  that  one  of  the  representative  producers  was 
allegedly  related  to  a  Chinese  company  and  thus  should  be  excluded  from  the 
definition of the Union industry. The investigation however revealed that the products 
produced by the Chinese company referred to are not product concerned. Therefore the 
relationship  does  not  have  any  impact  on  the  injury  analysis  nor  on  the  inclusion  of 
this Union producer in the definition of Union industry. 

(83) 

In the absence of further comments on Union production, recitals (77) to (79) of the 
provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

7. 

INJURY 

7.1. 

Union consumption 

(84) 

In  the  absence  of  comments  on  Union  consumption,  recitals  (80)  to  (82)  of  the 
provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

7.2. 

Imports into the Union from the PRC 

(85) 

In  the  absence  of  comments  on  the  level  of  imports  into  the  Union  from  the  PRC, 
recitals (83) to (84) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

7.2.1.  Price undercutting 

(86)  To  ensure  that  the  dumping  and  undercutting  and  underselling  calculations  follow  a 
coherent approach and for the reasons set out in recitals (68) to (71), the undercutting 
calculation has been revised to exclude the export sales of a company within the group 
of one cooperating exporting producer. 

(87)  Based  on  the  modified  dataset  used  for  the  calculation,  and  also  due  to  a  minor 
calculation  correction,  the  rate  of  price  undercutting  in  recital  (87)  was  slightly 
revised. The dumped imports undercut the Union producers' sales prices on average by 
7.6% in the IP.  

7.3. 

Economic  situation  of  the  Union  industry  and  the  representative  Union 
producers 

7.3.1.  Preliminary remarks 

EN 

16 

   EN 

(88)  One exporting producer claimed that the injury analysis should be done at the level of 
a  properly  defined  Union  industry  that  should  be  limited  to  Union  producers  that 
support  the  complaint  and  cooperate  with  the  investigation.  The  exporting  producer 
suggests  that  the  conclusions  concerning  material  injury  would  be  different,  were 
some  indicators  such  as  market  share  established  at  the  level  of  such  "properly 
defined"  Union  industry.  The  Government  of  China  commented  that  the  injury 
analysis failed to analyze all injury indicators for the complainants and for the Union 
industry as a whole in a coherent and comprehensive fashion. 

(89)  Firstly it is noted that the statements of these parties seem to have been drawn on the 
basis  of  indicators  calculated  from  different  datasets  and  information  than  those 
established  during  the  investigation  and  presented  below  and  in  the  provisional 
Regulation.  Consequently,  these  conclusions  are  factually  wrong  and  are  thus 
irrelevant. 

(90)  Secondly,  it  is  the  Commission's  practice  to  evaluate  macroeconomic  factors  for  the 
indication of the injury suffered at the level of the Union industry as a whole, as it was 
explained in recital (89) of the provisional Regulation. In the present investigation, the 
Union  industry  was  defined  at  the  level  of  Union  producers  accounting  for  the  total 
Union  production  (recital  77  of  the  provisional  Regulation),  regardless  of  whether 
producers  supported  the  complaint  or  have  been  cooperating  in  the  investigation. 
Given this broad definition, the exporting producers claim that Union industry has not 
been defined "properly" is rejected.  

(91)  Microeconomic factors are analyzed at the level of the representative Union producers, 
regardless of whether these support the complaint or not. The representative producers 
covered  58%  of  the  Union  production.  None  of  the  other  Union  producers  came 
forward claiming that the Commission's conclusions on microeconomic factors would 
be unreliable or not substantiated. Therefore there are no reasons to put into question 
the findings established based on the information provided by the representative Union 
producers only.  

(92)  Further  comments  on  the  level  of  cooperation  by  one  of  the  representative  Union 

producers were received.  

(93) 

It  was  claimed  that  one  of  the  representative  Union  producers  cooperated  only 
partially as it was allegedly related to another producer that did not cooperate in the 
investigation.  The  companies  were  alleged  to  be  related  as  a  consequence  of 
transitional  agreements  concluded  at  the  time  of  the  acquisition  by  the  cooperating 
Union producer of the CFP business segment of the other producer It was alleged that 
through  these  transitional  agreements  the  cooperating  Union  producer  controls  some 
of  the  mills  which  remained  in  the  ownership  of  the  partially  acquired  producer.  To 
support its claim the exporting producer made reference to the Commission Decision5 
examining at the time of the acquisition whether the transaction should be considered 
as an acquisition within the meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings. 

5 

Commission  Decision  of  31/10/2008  declaring  a  concentration  to  be  compatible  with  the  common 
market  (Case  No  COMP/M.5283  -  SAPPI  /  M-REAL)  according  to  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
139/2004, OJ C 324, 19.12.2008, p. 8 

EN 

17 

   EN 

                                                 
(94)  This  claim  was  already  addressed  in  recital  (91)  of  the  provisional  Regulation.  It  is 
recalled  that  the  transitional  agreements  referred  to  did  not  show  any  relationship 
between the companies that would be extending beyond a normal business relationship 
between a buyer and a seller. In particular, the terms of the transitional agreements aim 
to  administer  the  coated  paper  sales  for  a  transitional  period  and  according  to  these 
terms  the  Union  producer  only  has  functions  comparable  to  a  sales  agent  during  the 
transitional period. Furthermore, in its consolidated audited accounts and in its reply to 
the questionnaire it reported commission income while acting as an agent for the mills 
concerned; no ownership and therefore no costs were recognized for these mills by the 
Union producer. 

(95)  According to the Commission Decision referred to above, the transaction between the 
companies was considered as an acquisition by the Union producer of part of the other 
companies' business, not the take-over of the company as such. The Decision does not 
suggest that the companies should be considered as one entity after the acquisition; in 
particular,  there  is  no  joint  venture  between  the  companies.  It  is  also  noted  that  the 
geographical scope examined in the above decision is EEA – wide and not EU wide. 
To note is also that in the Decision the Commission did not analyze the relationship 
between the companies in question within the meaning of Article 143 of the IPCCC 6. 

(96) 

In  this  regard,  there  are  consequently  no  grounds  to  re-consider  the  provisional 
conclusions, i.e. that the two companies are not related in the sense of Article 143 of 
the  IPCCC  and  that  the  Union  producer  in  question  cooperated  fully  with  the 
investigation. 

(97)  The  exporting  producer  also  claimed  that  each  affiliated  company  of  the  Union 
producers  should  have  filled  in  a  separate  questionnaire  reply  as  they  were  separate 
legal entities. The Chinese group of exporting producers claimed discrimination as it 
was requested to provide a separate MET claim for each entity within the group.  

(98) 

It is noted that in case of MET claims, a group of companies has the burden of proof 
of  showing  that  all  companies  in  the  group  fulfill  the  MET-criteria  as  the 
determination of whether or not MET should be granted is specific to the group. In the 
case  of  the  questionnaires  for  Union  producers,  the  purpose  is  to  determine  whether 
material injury to the Union industry (as a whole) exists during the IP. The claim of 
discrimination  disregards  the  clear  difference  between  the  objectives  of  an  injury 
investigation and a MET determination.  

(99) 

In any event, in the case of the Union producer in question it was considered that one 
questionnaire  reply  would  be  sufficient  for  a  meaningful  reply  and  analysis  of  the 
injury aspects. In particular, the reply provided a detailed breakdown of information at 
individual  paper  mill  level  and  all  the  necessary  data  relating  to  all  of  the  related 
producers/sellers of the like product could be verified during the verification visits.  

(100)  In  a  subsequent  submission  the  exporting  producer  also  claimed  that  the  same 
company failed to fully cooperate as it filed its questionnaire reply on behalf of a non-
existing  entity  and  that  the  audited  accounts  of  the  company  do  not  reflect  the  data 

6 

Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  2454/93  of  2  July  1993  laying  down  provisions  for  the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EC) no 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, OJ 
L 253, 11.10.1993, p. 1. 

EN 

18 

   EN 

                                                 
provided  in  its  questionnaire  reply.  The  conclusions  in  the  preceding  recital  are 
relevant also in this regard. 

(101)  Therefore the conclusions in recital (88) to (91) remain unaffected. 

7.3.2.  Data relating to the Union industry (macroeconomic indicators) 

(102)  The GOC argued that the macro-economic data used for the analysis is incomplete and 

inaccurate thus cannot be used as a positive evidence of material injury.  

(103)  The on spot verification at the complainant association confirmed that the data used to 
establish  macroeconomic  indicators  are  directly  collected  from  Union  producers 
covering  around  98%  of  the  total  Union  production  and  are  sufficiently  detailed  to 
identify  information  about  the  product  concerned.  Assumption  and  /  or  estimations 
used were made on a reasonable and justifiable basis, e.g. cutter rolls were not taken 
into  account  because  of  their  clearly  insignificant  volumes  as  witnessed  in  their 
proportion  in  the  total  sales  volume  of  the  representative  Union  producers.Therefore 
this claim had to be rejected. 

(104)  One group of Chinese exporting producers claimed that the market share of the Union 
producers  should  also  include  imports  from  Switzerland  as  these  come  from  a  mill 
owned by one of the representative Union producer. 

(105)  The  geographical  scope  of  anti-dumping  investigations  is  the  European  Union. 

Therefore this claim had to be rejected. 

(106)  It was also claimed that the complainants' market share increased remarkably  during 

the period considered. 

(107)  Market  share  is  a  macro  indicator  analyzed  at  the  level  of  the  whole  Union  industry 
and  not  at  the  level  of  the  complainants.  Secondly,  the  statement  concerning  the 
complainant's market share is factually erroneous.  

(108)  In the absence of any further comments in this regard, the provisional findings set out 

in recitals (92) to (98) of the provisional Regulation are herewith confirmed.  

7.3.3.  Data relating to the representative Union producers (microeconomic indicators) 

(109)  One party commented that the injury analysis is flawed due to the fact that information 
about the paper mills that were acquired by the Union producer referred to in recital 
(93)  was  not  included  in  the  analysis  of  the  microeconomic  indicators  for  the  years 
2006-2008. 

(110)  Following  the  arguments  presented  by  the  party  the  microeconomic  indicators  were 
adjusted to present a fully comparable trend over the years by excluding information 
about the acquired mills for all years under examination. 

(111)  Following  the  modified  scope  of  the  data  used  for  the  analysis  of  the  economic 
situation  of  the  representative  Union  producers,  as  explained  in  the  previous  recital, 
the microeconomic indicators are definitively established as follows: 

7.3.3.1.  Average unit prices of the representative Union producers 

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(112)  Despite the slightly modified figures, the basic trends and the findings in recital (99) in 
the provisional Regulation concluding that prices of coated fine paper remained stable 
over the years are confirmed.  

Table 5: Prices of the Union producers 

Prices of the Union producers 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009/IP 

Average price (EUR/tonne) 
Index 

692 
100 

717 
104 

691 
100 

699 
101 

Source: Verified questionnaire replies. 

7.3.3.2.  Stocks 

(113)  Stocks represented around 10 % of the production volume in the IP. The representative 
Union  producers  increased  its  stock  levels  by  10  %  during  the  period  considered,  in 
particular  between  2006  and  2007  and  later  between  2008  and  the  IP.  Notably,  this 
coincided with the surge in the low-priced dumped imports from the PRC.  

Table 6: Stocks 

Stocks 
Stocks (tonnes) 
Index 

2006 
278.265 
100 

2007 
298.547 
107 

2008 
296.387 
107 

2009/IP 
306.588 
110 

Source: Verified questionnaire replies. 

7.3.3.3.  Employment, wages and productivity 

Table 7: Employment 

Employment 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009/IP 

Employment — full-
time equivalent (FTE) 
Index 
Labour cost (EUR/FTE) 
Index 
Productivity (unit/FTE) 
Index 

7.756 
100 
54.053 
100 
453 
100 

7.487 
97 
54.948 
102 
478 
106 

7.207 
93 
57.026 
105 
486 
107 

6.197 
80 
58.485 
108 
484 
107 

Source: Verified questionnaire replies. 

(114)  Due  to  the  paper  mill  closures  and  consolidation  of  the  representative  Union 
producers, the number of employees was reduced substantially by 20 % (almost 1600 
jobs) during the period considered. Efficiency gains have been achieved by raising and 
maintaining a high output per employee even at a time of significant layoffs. Labour 
costs increased steadily, totalling an 8 % increase over the period considered.  

(115)  The  conclusions  presented  in  recital  (102)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are  thus 

further supported by the slightly modified figures.  

7.3.3.4.  Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investment 

Table 8: Profitability 

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Profitability 
Change (100=2006) 

Cash flow (EUR thousand) 
Index 
Investments (EUR 
thousand) 
Index 
Return on investments 
Change (100=2006) 

2006 
-1,08% 

260.047 
100 

151.900 
100 
-0,73% 

2007 
-0,20% 
+0,88% 

211.036 
81 

151.027 
99 
-0,54% 
+0,19% 

2008 
-2,49% 
-1,41% 

172.570 
66 

127.845 
84 
-2,73% 
-2,00% 

2009/IP 
2,88% 
+3,95% 

336.753 
129 

87.875 
58 
0,39% 
+1,12% 

Source: Verified questionnaire replies. 

(116)  The profitability rate throughout the period considered was corrected to reflect more 
accurately  the  profitability  level.  However,  the  basic  trend  concerning  profitability 
remains unaffected by the change. The representative Union producers incurred losses 
in the years 2006 to 2008 and the financial situation only turned positive in 2009 when 
the world price of pulp, the main raw material exceptionally decreased significantly as 
a  result  of  the  economic  downturn.  The  drop  in  the  price  of  pulp  (-19%)  was 
considered an abnormally large drop that directly contributed to the improved financial 
situation in the IP. It is to be noted that since the IP, pulp prices have returned to their 
pre-IP levels. 

(117)  Subject  to  the  slight  modification  of  the  figures,  the  findings  concerning  cash  flow, 
investment  and  return  on  investment  presented  in  recital  (104)  and  (105)  of  the 
provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

(118)  One party claimed that the improvement of profitability should not be considered as a 
limited  instance  based  on  an  exceptional  drop  of  raw  material  costs  as  explained  in 
recital (107) of the provisional Regulation. The drop in costs benefited both: all local 
as well as Chinese producers, not only the complainants, therefore the breakthrough in 
profitability was not exclusively based on the drop in costs but was rather the result of 
a change in the pricing behaviour of the complainants.  

(119)  Furthermore  the  exporting  producer  claimed  that  the  profitability  is  driven  by  CFP 
prices,  rather  than  the  price  of  pulp.  It  was  found,  however,  that  when  pulp  prices 
sharply  fell  in  2009,  CFP  prices  remained  stable  and  profits  rose  as  a  consequence. 
Therefore  given  that  prices  remained  stable,  no  correlation  can  be  made  between 
prices and profitability in this specific time period. 

(120)  The profitability rate is an indicator that is analysed at the level of the representative 
Union producers and not at the level of complainants as suggested by the party. The 
analysis of information gathered showed a direct link between the exceptional fall in 
pulp  prices,  the  main  raw  material  and  the  increased  profitability;  whereby  stable 
prices  of  the  finished  products  indeed  played  a  role  in  the  improvement  of 
profitability.  While  this  was  probably  the  case  for  other  producers  on  the  market  as 
well,  this  does  not  affect  the  conclusion  that  this  temporary  improvement  of 
profitability is due to the exceptional drop in raw material prices in the IP. 

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7.3.3.5.  Ability to raise capital 

(121)  The findings concerning the representative producers' ability to raise capital presented 

in recital (106) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed. 

7.4. 

Conclusion on injury 

(122)  One  exporting  producer  and  the  government  of  China  claimed  that  there  was  no 
positive  evidence  that  the  complaining  Union  producers  suffered  material  injury. 
Contrarily,  complainants  presented  overall  stable  economic  results  and  increased 
profitability in the IP.  

(123)  First of all, the state of the Union industry is analysed at the level of the representative 
Union producers and not at the level of complainants as suggested by the parties.  

(124)  Secondly, as already pointed out in recitals (89) and (107) above, the conclusions of 
these  parties  seem  to  have  been  drawn  from  indicators  calculated  on  the  basis  of 
different datasets and information than what was established during the investigation 
and  presented  above  and  in  the  provisional  Regulation.  Consequently,  these 
conclusions are factually wrong. Furthermore, the parties' analysis was not consistent 
in the use of two different datasets for macro and micro indicators. 

(125)  It was further claimed that the improvement of profitability should be regarded also as 
a  consequence  of  the  restructuring  efforts  of  the  industry  including  reduction  of 
production,  employment  and  increased  productivity.  In  this  case,  the  latter  factors 
cannot be deemed to be the sole indicators of injury, but all injury indicators should be 
looked at together.  

(126)  Article  3(5)  of  the  basic  Regulation  lists  the  economic  factors  and  indices  to  be 
evaluated  in  the  examination  of  the  impact  of  the  dumped  imports  on  the  Union 
industry. Article 3(5) explicitly states that the list of factors is not exhaustive, nor can 
any  one  or  more  of  these  factors  necessarily  give  decisive  guidance.  Thus,  while 
indicators have to be assessed individually, conclusions should be reached through the 
analysis of all factors. 

(127)  Overall,  the  claims  of  the  parties  as  presented  above  do  not  affect  the  conclusion 
reached at  provisional stage which is  therefore hereby confirmed, i.e. that the Union 
industry  suffered  material  injury  within  the  meaning  of  Article  3(5)  of  the  basic 
Regulation. 

(128)  Parties also commented repeatedly on the possible threat of further material injury in 
view of the huge capacity build-up by Chinese producers supported by State policies 
and subsidies. The scope of the investigation was the existence of material injury and 
not the threat of further material injury. Therefore these comments could not affect the 
findings and had to be disregarded. 

(129)  Based  on  the  above,  the  provisional  findings  set  out  in  recitals  (107)  to  (111)  of  the 

provisional Regulation are herewith confirmed.  

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8. 

CAUSALITY 

(130)  The  Commission  received  several  comments  on  the  provisional  findings  concerning 

the causal link between dumping and injury.  

8.1. 

Effect of the dumped imports 

(131)  Provisional  findings  concerning  the  effect  of  dumped  imports  were  contested  by 
several parties. The main argument brought forward was that Chinese imports did not 
have significant impact in terms of volume and prices. It was argued that there was no 
surge of Chinese imports but rather these grew gradually over the years and therefore 
their impact was quite limited which should not be exaggerated for the purpose of the 
injury  determination.  It  was  further  argued  that  Chinese  prices,  even  if  they  were 
below  Union  prices,  did  not  have  any  impact  on  the  relatively  stable  prices  of  the 
Union  industry.  One  exporting  producer  questioned  the  Commission's  finding  that 
there would be price suppression caused by Chinese prices. It pointed out that in 2009 
when  the  Chinese  prices  declined  further,  the  Union  industry's  prices  not  only 
recorded an increase but in fact allowed the Union industry to make profits. 

(132)  The evolution of Chinese imports was analyzed in detail in recitals (84) and (114) of 
the  provisional  Regulation.  It  was  established  that  imports  almost  tripled  over  the 
period considered, especially in the years from 2006 to 2007 (+118%) and from 2008 
to  the  IP  (+81%).  The  increase  in  the  volume  therefore  cannot  be  regarded  as 
insignificant. 

(133)  In  terms  of  prices  Chinese  imports  undercut  the  prices  of  the  representative  Union 
producers  by  7.6%  which  is  considered  significant  in  a  market  where  price 
transparency  is  high.  As  depicted  in  recital  (112)  above,  indeed  prices  of  the 
representative  Union  producers  were  stable  over  the  period  considered,  with  an 
exceptional  increase  in  2007,  the  year  where  Chinese  exports  did  not  grow.  In  2009 
the  Union  producers  could  keep  their  prices  stable  at  the  expense  of  losing  further 
market share and their profitability derived from the combination of these stable prices 
and the decreased cost of raw material.  

(134)  The Chinese exporting producer claimed that CFP imports from China do not have an 
impact  on  the  prices  of  the  Union  industry  as  these  are  not  comparable  to  the  CFP 
manufactured and sold by the representative Union producers as only 10% of the sales 
of  the  representative  Union  producers  were  compared  in  the  determination  of  the 
undercutting  and  non-injurious  price  level.  It  is  noted  that  these  determinations  are 
made  on  the  basis  of  fully  comparable  products  that  are  directly  matching  in  all 
characteristics  so  as  to  ensure  a  fair  comparison.  However,  CFP  produced  by  the 
Chinese  and  Union  producers  in  general  are  comparable  products  as  concluded  in 
recital (42) and thus are competing with each other directly on the Union market.  

(135)  It was furthermore alleged that the finding that the CFP market is a commodity-market 
characterized by a high degree of transparency is incorrect as the Union producers sell 
around  half  of  their  products  directly  to  end  users.  In  contrast  to  this  claim  the 
representative Union producers sold the majority of their products through merchants 
either directly or indirectly (so called indent sales when products are directly shipped 
to  the  customer  but  ordering  and  invoicing  process  goes  through  merchants).  Indeed 

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merchants  play  a  crucial  role  in  both  stocking  products  and  providing  price 
transparency to the market. 

(136)  Based  on  the  above,  the  provisional  findings  set  out  in  recitals  (113)  to  (117)  of  the 

provisional Regulation are herewith confirmed.  

8.2. 

Effect of other factors 

8.2.1.  Development of the consumption on the Union market and the economic crisis 

(137)  One  exporting  producer  and  the  government  of  China  claimed  that  the  decrease  in 
Union  production  was  the  consequence  of  the  global  financial  crisis  and  the  sharp 
decline  in  consumption  on  the  Union  market,  as  witnessed  by  the  negative  trends 
shown  by the  Union producers'  domestic  sales, capacity  utilization, employment and 
stock level, and should not be attributed to Chinese imports.  

(138)  To support its claim, the government of China quoted a Manifesto for Competitiveness 
and Employment launched by the paper and pulp industry in June 2009 ('Manifesto'). 
This document covers the whole paper and pulp industries sectors and serves a general 
policy purpose. On the basis of the information included in this document, no separate 
conclusions could be drawn for the production and sales of the product concerned. It is 
therefore not possible to conclude whether the statements or findings of the Manifesto 
in fact apply one-to-one to the product concerned. Since, in addition, the investigation 
did not bring to light a strong link between the financial crisis and the material injury 
suffered by the Union industry, this argument had to be rejected.  

8.2.2.  Prices of raw materials 

(139)  No  new  arguments  were  brought  forward  to  reconsider  the  conclusions  reached  in 
recital  (120)  to  (122)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  and  in  recital  (118)  of  this 
Regulation. 

8.2.3.  Export performance of the representative Union producers 

(140)  The revision of the microeconomic indicator as explained in recital (110) impacted the 
analysis of export performance of the representative Union producers to the extent that 
the  decrease  of  their  export  sales  in  the  period  considered  was  16%.  Export  sales  to 
unrelated parties made by these companies represented 26% of their total sales. 

(141)  Contrary to the claim of one exporting producer, the evolution of export of the product 
concerned  by  the  representative  Union  producers  was  addressed  in  the  provisional 
Regulation  in  recitals  (123)  to  (124).  The  above  revision  does  not  affect  these 
conclusions reached at provisional stage. 

(142)  The  arguments  and  evidence  brought  forward  concerning  the  effect  of  export 
performance  of  the  Union  industry  thus  did  not  give  cause  to  a  change  in  the 
conclusions reached at provisional stage. 

8.2.4. 

Imports from other third countries 

(143)  Arguments brought forward about the effect of imports from other third countries were 

already addressed in recitals (125) to (127) of the provisional Regulation. 

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8.2.5. 

Structural overcapacity 

(144)  It  was  claimed  that  injury  suffered  by  the  Union  producers  is  caused  by  structural 
overcapacity.  This  factor  was  already  analysed  in  recital  (128)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation.  

(145)  The main argument brought forward in this respect is that restructuring efforts of the 
Union  industry  were  completed  in  2009  by  the  consolidation  of  two  large  producers 
that resulted in the immediate improvement of the situation of the Union industry. As 
described in recital (93) of the provisional Regulation, restructuring efforts took place 
since 2000 up until the IP. The positive effect of the mentioned consolidation should 
have  been  reflected  in  the  improvement  of  capacity  utilisation  and  at  least  in  stable 
sales volume but both these indicators deteriorated in the IP. On the other hand, it had 
been  established  that  the  improved  profitability  of  the  Union  industry  in  the  IP  was 
caused primarily and directly by the exceptional one-off drop in pulp prices. Therefore 
the  conclusions  reached  in  recital  (128)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  that  the 
restructuring  efforts  of  the  industry  were  undermined  by  the  dumped  imports  are 
maintained. 

8.3. 

Conclusion on causation 

(146)  Based on the above, the provisional findings as set out in recitals (129) to (132) of the 
provisional Regulation that the dumped imports from the PRC caused material injury 
to the Union industry within the meaning of Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation are 
maintained. The provisional findings about the effect of the other known factors which 
could have caused injury to the Union industry were also confirmed: these factors are 
not such as to break the causal link established between the dumped imports from the 
PRC and the injury suffered by the Union industry. 

9. 

UNION INTEREST 

9.1. 

Union industry 

(147)  No further comments or information was received regarding the interest of the Union 
producers  and  importers  and  traders.  Therefore  the  provisional  findings  in  recitals 
(134)  to  (138)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  on  the  interest  of  these  groups  are 
confirmed.  

9.2. 

Importers and traders 

(148)  No further comments or information was received regarding the interest of importers 
and  traders.  Therefore  the  provisional  findings  in  recitals  (139)  to  (143)  of  the 
provisional Regulation on the interest of these groups are confirmed.  

9.3. 

Users 

(149)  Three additional printers and an association of European printers and publishers came 
forward after the publication of provisional measures. They claimed that the measures 
would have negative effects on the downstream industries as price increases could lead 
to the relocation of the printing industry leading to increased imports of downstream 
printed  matter.  The  claim  was  supported  by  the  fact  that  imports  of  printed  matter 

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from  China  increased  rapidly  in  recent  years  and  apparently  took  a  considerable 
market share within European consumption for all printed matter.  

(150)  It was also claimed that measures would cause a shortage of supply on the market and 

longer delivery times for users. 

(151)  Most of these claims were not company specific and similar to claims already made at 
provisional stage of the investigation and addressed in recitals (146) and (150) of the 
provisional Regulation. It is recalled that the cooperation of printers was limited and 
on  the  basis  of  the  limited  quantitative  information  received  it  was  concluded  that 
because  of  their  profitability  level  and  the  share  of  CFP  in  their  costs,  printers  are 
indeed  sensitive  to  price  increases.  However,  most  printers  had  no  or  very  limited 
direct purchases of Chinese paper in the IP and the amount of Chinese paper used by 
printers is in general low therefore the direct impact of the duty would be negligible. 
Most printers also stated that because of their need for short delivery times, the share 
of supplies directly from third countries would remain limited.  

(152)  As regards the claims concerning downstream printed matter from China it should be 
noted  that  the  import  statistics  of  printed matter  cover  a  wide  range  of  products  that 
include  final  printed  matter  that  is  not  printed  on  coated  fine  paper.  Based  on  the 
information available it could not be assessed what part of the products imported from 
China is printed on the product concerned and what is printed on other types of paper. 
However,  from  information  submitted  it  is  known  that  printed  matter  originating  is 
China  is  mostly  comprised  of  some  specific  categories  of  books,  children  books, 
calendars, packaging and greeting cards. Products that are more "time sensitive" such 
as weekly/monthly magazines and other newsprint are less susceptible to be imported 
from China because of the time needed for transportation. While the printing of some 
printed products may be more susceptible to relocation, on the other hand there exist 
product types for which proximity and service are crucial and therefore would not be 
affected by foreign competition. Furthermore, even though paper is an important cost 
element for the printing industry, it is also a labour-intensive industry and thus labour 
costs may be a more significant driver in relocation trends. In summary, it cannot be 
excluded that imports of printed products that are printed on CFP will increase but it is 
not  possible  to  estimate  with  any  accuracy  what  the  level  of  increase  might  be  and 
how  far  this  would  play  a  role  in  the  competitiveness  of  printing  producers  and 
therefore  what  direct  impact  price  increases  might  have  on  the  downstream  Union 
printing industry.  

(153)  From  information  submitted,  it  is  also  known  that  the  printing  industry  suffers  from 
structural overcapacity that leads to the continuing restructuring of the sector. One of 
the  driving  forces  towards  the  restructuring  was  also  the  consolidation  of  the  paper 
manufacturers  within  the  value  chain.  Any  difficulty  of  the  printing  industry  to 
increase  prices  is  considered  to  be  rather  largely  due  to  this  structural  overcapacity 
within the printing industry itself.  

(154)  The interested parties claiming possible shortages of supply did not quantify or give an 
estimate of the possible shortages. The claims in any case do not seem to be supported 
by  the  capacity  utilization  rate  of  the  Union  producers  that  was  at  83%  in  the  IP 
leaving  around  one  million  tonnes  of  free  capacity.  On  this  basis,  it  is  unlikely  that 
shortages would occur.  

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9.4. 

Conclusion on Union interest 

(155)  In  view  of  the  above,  the  provisional  findings  concerning  Union  interest  are 
confirmed,  i.e.  there  are  no  compelling  reasons  against  the  imposition  of  definitive 
measures on imports of CFP originating in the PRC. 

10. 

DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 

10.1. 

Injury elimination level 

(156)  One  group  of  Chinese  exporting  producers  requested  further  details  for  the  method 
used to calculate the target profit of 8 % used for the calculation of the non-injurious 
price. It referred to the complaint in which the target profit suggested was lower.  

(157)  The  complainant  on  the  other  hand  requested  that  the  target  profit  should  be  set  at 
minimum  10%,  basing  its  arguments  on  the  expected  profit  margin  used  by 
independent  rating  agencies  in  their  classification  methodology  and  the  profitability 
achieved by a producer active in another paper production segment that is not affected 
by Chinese imports. 

(158)  It should be clarified that the target profit as suggested in the complaint was examined 
based  on  the  questionnaire  replies  and  verification  visits  to  the  representative  Union 
producers.  More  specifically,  the  cost  of  investment  into  machinery  was  considered. 
The  target  profit  set  on  this  latter  basis  was  found  to  reflect  the  high  up-front 
investment needs and risk involved in this capital-intensive industry in the absence of 
dumped and/or subsidised imports. Therefore a target profit of 8% is considered as the 
level  that  the  industry  could  obtain  at  the  absence  of  dumped  imports.As  stated  in 
recital  (86)  above,  to  ensure  that  the  dumping  and  undercutting  and  underselling 
calculations follow a coherent approach and for the reasons set out in recitals (68) to 
(71),  the  calculation  of  the  injury  elimination  level  has  been  revised  to  exclude  the 
export sales of a company within the group of one cooperating exporting producer. 

(159)  In  all  other  aspects  recitals  (153)  to  (161)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are  hereby 

confirmed. 

10.2.  Definitive measures 

(160)  In  view  of  the  conclusions  reached  with  regard  to  dumping,  injury,  causation  and 
Union  interest,  and  in  accordance  with  Article  9(4)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  a 
definitive  anti-dumping  duty  should  be  imposed  on  imports  of  coated  fine  paper 
originating  in  the  PRC  at  the  level  of  the  lower  of  the  dumping  and  injury  margins 
found,  in  accordance  with  the  lesser  duty  rule.  In  this  case,  the  duty  rate  should 
accordingly be set at the level of the injury found.  

(161)  It is noted that an anti-subsidy investigation was carried out in parallel with the anti-
dumping investigation concerning imports of coated fine paper originating in the PRC. 
Since,  pursuant  to  Article  14(1)  of  the  basic  Regulation  and  Article  24(1),  second 
subparagraph of Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection 
against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community7 

7 

OJ L 188, 18.7.2009, p. 93. 

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('the basic anti-subsidy Regulation'), no product shall be subject to both anti-dumping 
and countervailing  duties for the purpose  of dealing with one and the same situation 
arising  from  dumping  or  from  export  subsidisation,  it  was  considered  necessary  to 
determine whether, and to what extent, the subsidy amounts and the dumping margins 
arise from the same situation.  

(162)  As concerns the subsidy schemes that constituted export subsidies within the meaning 
of Article 4(4)(a) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation, the definitive dumping margin 
established  for  two  Chinese  exporting  producers  are  partly  due  (i.e.  0,05%)  to  the 
existence of countervailable export subsidies. With respect to other subsidy schemes, 
in view of the use of the lesser duty rule in this case and the amount of subsidisation 
found  in  the  anti-subsidy  investigation  carried  out  in  parallel,  it  was  not  considered 
necessary to further examine whether and to what degree the same subsidies are being 
offset twice when anti-dumping and countervailing duties are simultaneously imposed 
on the same imported product.  

(163)  As concerns the country-wide definitive dumping and subsidy levels it is recalled that 
they were established using the definitive dumping margin and the definitive subsidy 
margin  established  for  the  cooperating  companies  with  the  highest  individual  duty 
rates  i.e.  63%  for  the  definitive  dumping  margin  and  16%  for  the  definitive  subsidy 
margin.  

(164)  It is recalled that the same injury elimination level applies for both the anti- dumping 
and the anti-subsidy investigations. In this respect it is noted that the injury elimination 
level  is  lower  than  the  definitive  dumping  margins  but  higher  than  the  definitive 
subsidy margins. It is thus considered appropriate to impose a definitive countervailing 
duty  at  the  level  of  the  established  definitive  subsidy  margins  and  then  impose  a 
definitive anti-dumping duty up to the relevant injury elimination level.  

(165)  On  the  basis  of  the  above,  and  taking  into  account  the  findings  set  out  in  the 
Regulation imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of coated fine paper 
originating in the People’s Republic of China (Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 
No  ***/2011)8  and  in  light  of  Article  14  paragraph  1  last  sentence  of  the  basic 
Regulation that duty will not be imposed to the extent necessary to comply with the 
rule laid down in that sentence the rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty for the PRC 
and the rate at which such duties will be imposed are set as follows:  

Company 

Total 
subsidy 
margin 

Out  of 
which 
export 
subsidy 

Dumping 
margin 

Injury 
margin

Definitive 
CVD 
duty rate 

Definitive 
AD  duty 
rate 

Definitive 
AD  duty 
rate to be  

imposed 

12% 

0,05% 

43,5% 

20% 

12% 

20% 

8% 

Gold East Paper 
(Jiangsu)  Co., 
Ltd,  Zhenjiang 
City, 
Jiangsu 
Province,  PRC; 
Gold  Huasheng 

8 

OJ L ***, ***, p. ***.  

EN 

28 

   EN 

                                                 
Paper 
(Suzhou 
Industrial  Park) 
Ltd, 
Co., 
Suzhou 
City, 
Jiangsu 
Province, PRC 

Shangdong 
Chenming 
Paper  Holdings 
Limited, 
Shouguang 
City,  Shandong 
Province,  PRC; 
Shouguang 
Chenming  Art 
Paper  Co.,  Ltd, 
Shouguang 
City,  Shandong 
Province, PRC 

All 
companies 

other 

4,3% 

0% 

63% 

39,1%  4,3% 

39,1% 

35,1% 

12% 

0,05% 

63% 

39,1%  11,9% 

39,1% 

27,1% 

11. 

DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF THE PROVISIONAL DUTY 

(166)  In view of the magnitude of the dumping margin found and in the light of the level of 
the  injury  caused  to  the  Union  industry,  and  taking  into  account  that  no  provisional 
measures  were  imposed  in  the  parallel  anti-subsidy  investigation,  it  is  considered 
necessary that the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duty imposed 
by  the  provisional  Regulation  should  be  definitively  collected  to  the  extent  of  the 
amount of the provisional duty imposed 

(167)  One exporting producer claimed that the definitive collection of the provisional duty at 
the rates set out in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1042/2010would be contrary to 
Article 10 paragraph 3 second sentence of the basic Regulation. However, as clarified 
in  this  Regulation,  and  in  particular  in  Article  1  paragraph  2  thereof,  the  definitive 
duty imposed by this Regulation is actually higher than the provisional duty which has 
been  imposed.  In  these  circumstances  the  provisional  duty  at  the  rates  set  out  in 
Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1042/2010 should be definitively collected,  

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on coated fine paper, which is paper or 
paperboard coated on one or both sides (excluding kraft paper or kraft paperboard), in either 
sheets  or  rolls,  and  with  a  weight  of  70  g/m2  or  more  but  not  exceeding  400  g/m2  and 
brightness of more than 84 (measured according to ISO 2470-1), currently falling within CN 
codes ex 4810 13 20, ex 4810 13 80, ex 4810 14 20, ex 4810 14 80, ex 4810 19 10, ex 4810 
19 90, ex 4810 22 10, ex 4810 22 90, ex 4810 29 30, ex 4810 29 80, ex 4810 99 10, ex 4810 

EN 

29 

   EN 

99 30 and ex 4810 99 90 (TARIC codes 4810 13 20 20, 4810 13 80 20, 4810 14 20 20, 4810 
14 80 20, 4810 19 10 20, 4810 19 90 20, 4810 22 10 20, 4810 22 90 20, 4810 29 30 20, 4810 
29 80 20, 4810 99 10 20, 4810 99 30 20 and 4810 99 90 20) and originating in the People's 
Republic of China.  

The definitive anti-dumping duty does not concern rolls suitable for use in web-fed presses. 
Rolls suitable for use in web-fed presses are defined as those rolls which, if tested according 
to the ISO test standard ISO 3783:2006 concerning the determination of resistance to picking 
– accelerated speed method using the IGT tester (electric model), give a result of less than 30 
N/m when measuring in the cross-direction of the paper (CD) and a result of less than 50 N/m 
when measuring in the machine direction (MD). The definitive anti-dumping duty does also 
not concern multi-ply paper and multi-ply paperboard. 

2. The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty shall be as follows:  

AD duty rate 

20% 

39,1% 

Company 

Gold  East  Paper  (Jiangsu)  Co., 
Ltd,  Zhenjiang  City,  Jiangsu 
Province,  PRC;  Gold  Huasheng 
Paper  (Suzhou  Industrial  Park) 
Co.,  Ltd,  Suzhou  City,  Jiangsu 
Province, PRC 

 Shangdong  Chenming  Paper 
Holdings  Limited,  Shouguang 
City,  Shandong  Province,  PRC; 
Shouguang Chenming Art Paper 
Co.,  Ltd,  Shouguang  City, 
Shandong Province, PRC 

All other companies 

39,1% 

3. In regard to the anti-dumping duty foreseen in Article 1(2), 12% will not be collected for 
Gold East Paper (Jiangsu) Co. and Gold Huasheng Paper (Suzhou Industrial Park) Co., 4% for 
Shangdong Chenming Paper Holdings Limited and Shouguang Chenming Art Paper Co., Ltd 
and  12%  for  all  other  companies  in so  far  as  the corresponding  amount  is  collected  in 
accordance with Regulation XXX/2011 imposing definitive countervailing duties. 

4.  In  light  of  Article  1(2)  and  1(3)  above,  the  rate  of  the  definitive  anti-dumping  duty 
applicable  to  the  net,  free-at-Union-frontier  price,  before  duty,  of  the  products  described  in 
paragraph 1 and manufactured by the companies listed below shall be as follows:  

Company 

AD duty rate 

TARIC additional 
code 

8% 

B001 

Gold 
Paper 
East 
(Jiangsu)  Co.,  Ltd, 
City, 
Zhenjiang 
Jiangsu 
Province, 
PRC;  Gold  Huasheng 

EN 

30 

   EN 

35,1% 

B013 

Paper 
(Suzhou 
Industrial  Park)  Co., 
Ltd, 
Suzhou  City, 
Jiangsu Province, PRC 

 Shangdong  Chenming 
Paper 
Holdings 
Shouguang 
Limited, 
Shandong 
City, 
Province, 
PRC; 
Shouguang  Chenming 
Art  Paper  Co.,  Ltd, 
City, 
Shouguang 
Shandong 
Province, 
PRC 

All other companies 

27,1% 

B999 

5. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. 

Article 2 

Amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty pursuant to Regulation (EU) 
No 1042/2010 a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of coated fine paper originating in 
the  People's  Republic  of  China  shall  be  definitively  collected  at  the  rate  of  the  provisional 
duty imposed pursuant to Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1042/2010.  

This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day  following  that  of  its  publication  in  the 
Official Journal of the European Union. 

Article 3 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels, 

For the Council 
The President 

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