Eastern borders risk analysis network : annual overview 2011.
Date: 2011-03-05
Institutions: Frontex
Subjects: European security, Frontex, border control, external border of the EU, frontier migration, illegal migration

Eastern Borders  
Risk Analysis Network 
Annual Overview 2011 

European  Agency for the  Management  of  Operational  Cooperation  at the External  Borders  of  the Member 
States of the European Union 

Warsaw, October 2011 

Risk Analysis Unit 

For Public Release 

Frontex reference number: 14695 

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation  

at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
(FRONTEX) 
Rondo 1 

00-124 Warsaw 

Poland 

2 

 
Table of contents 

Executive summary 

1. Background and methodology 

1.1 Data collection and additional information 

1.2 Quality of the available data 

2. Overview of the main threats affecting 
common border security 

5 

7 

7 

8 

9 

2.1 Cross-border crime at the common borders 

10 

2.2 Flow of irregular migrants through common  
green borders 

2.3 Flow of would-be migrants through BCPs 

3. Factors impacting regional migratory 
movements 

3.1 Economic factors 

3.2 Legal factors 

3.3 Mass sports events 

4. Conclusions 

5. Statistical annex 

15 

16 

20 

20 

23 

26 

27 

30 

3 

 
 
This page left intentionally blank for double-sided printing 

4 

Executive summary 

When compared to 2009, the overall situation at the common borders between the 

Eastern  Borders  Risk  Analysis  Network  (EB-RAN)  members  (Belarus,  Moldova, 

Ukraine, the Russian Federation) and neighbouring Frontex Risk Analysis Network 

(FRAN)  members  (Poland,  Slovakia,  Finland,  Norway,  Lithuania,  Romania,  Latvia, 

Hungary and Estonia) did not change significantly. 

Analysis of the available statistical data, additional information provided by the EB-

RAN  countries  and  relevant  Frontex-coordinated  Joint  Operations  (JOs)  clearly 

indicate  that  the  single  largest  threat  to  border  security  at  the  common  borders 

between EU  Member States and EB-RAN countries (henceforth referred to simply 

as “the common borders”) remains smuggling of excise goods, especially cigarettes 

and  fuel,  followed  by  stolen  vehicles  on  exit  from  the  EU  and  the  localised 

smuggling of household goods ranging from groceries to electronics. This is mostly 

due  to  significant  price  differences  between  EU  Member  States  and  Eastern 

European Countries. 

Frontex-coordinated  JO  Focal  Points  data  indicate  that  the  suppliers  of  cigarettes 

smuggled through the common borders are, in order of quantity smuggled, Ukraine, 

the Russian Federation, Belarus and Moldova. The workload of border guards does 

not vary considerably, however, as a meaningful number of cigarettes is smuggled 

by the green border and through rivers and the price gap is very similar along the 

entirety of the common borders. 

Data  collected  by  Frontex  indicates  that  the  Russian  Federation,  Belarus  and 

Ukraine  remain  markets  with  a  significant  purchasing  power  and  high  demand  for 

second-hand and (to a lesser extent) new vehicles such as motorbikes, cars, heavy 

machines (agricultural and construction machines) and lorries. Due to market needs 

the modi operandi of smugglers of vehicles are varied and rapidly changing. 

Despite the small amount of seizures, there are indications of drug trafficking routes 

from Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan or Uzbekistan) to the Russian Federation 

for the domestic market as well as to be further smuggled to the EU. The Odessa 

seaport  appears  as  a  point  of  entry  for  cocaine  smuggled  from  South  America, 

whereas  Russian  ports  such  as  Saint  Petersburg  and  Murmansk  are  used  as 

entrance points for synthetic drugs from EU countries.  

In  2010  two  routes  of  trafficking  in  human  beings  (THB)  which  affect  both  EU 

Member  States and/or  EB-RAN  countries  were  particularly  visible.  The  first  was  a 

trafficking  route  between  Moldova  and  Romania  used  for  trafficking  Moldovans 

(including minors) to Romania and other EU Member States. A second THB route 

takes  Moldovans  and  Belarusians  from  their  respective  countries  to  Turkey  or 

through Turkey to Arab countries such as Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. 

5 

The  risk  of  irregular  migration  is  considered  somewhat  smaller  in  its  magnitude 

when  compared  to  the  cross-border  crime  phenomenon.  Frontex  analysis  clearly 

points  to  the  existence  of  two  migratory  systems affecting both  EB-RAN  countries 

and neighbouring FRAN members. The first one links CIS* migrants to the Russian 

Federation  as  their  main  destination  country  while  the  other  brings  both  CIS  and 

non-CIS  migrants  into  the  EU.  Relative  differences  in  earning  potential  between 

source  (mainly  in  south  Caucasus,  Central  Asia  and  Africa)  and  destination 

countries  (the  EU  and  the  Russian  Federation)  are  the  key  motivators  for  both 

movements.  

*  The  Commonwealth 
of  Independent  States 
regional 
(CIS) 
is  a 
organisation 
estab-
lished  in  1991  whose 
participating  countries 
are 
former  Soviet 
Republics. 

During 2010 the Slovakia-Ukraine border remained the most affected section of the 

common  borders  in  terms  of  irregular  migration  (more  than  40%  of  the  total 

detections of illegal border-crossings at the common borders took place there). As 

was  the  case  in 2009,  detections  there still  point  to  two  distinct flows  of  migration 

composed  of  CIS  and  non-CIS  nationals.  The  two  flows  differ  in  terms  of 

composition,  modus  operandi  and  need  for  facilitation  (or  lack  thereof).  CIS 

nationals  (mainly  from  Moldova  and  Georgia)  represented  the  largest  share  of 

irregular migrants detected (more than 50%).  

Migration of non-CIS nationals to the EU consists mainly of Afghans, Somalis and 

Palestinians. Detection figures from Ukraine suggest three main ways CIS migrants 

use  to  arrive  to  Ukraine:  (a)  direct  arrival  using  legal  travel  channels  (business, 

student or tourism visa), (b) indirect arrival, transiting the Russian Federation, and 

(c) via Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.  

Ukraine  remains  the  main  transit  country  for  both  CIS  and  non-CIS  irregular 

migrants aiming at reaching the EU through its eastern borders. In addition, Ukraine 

is  also  the  major  route  for  migrants  from  the  Caucasus  region  and  Central  Asian 

countries travelling towards (or from) the Russian Federation. It remains difficult to 

ascertain to what extent the two flows are linked. 

In  terms  of  yearly  trends  (which  can  only  be  ascertained  for  FRAN  members,  as 

there  is  no  previous  data  from  EB-RAN  countries),  the  overall  number  of  refusals 

issued by FRAN members alone decreased marginally from around 36 200 in 2009 

to around 34 000 in 2010. The decrease was largely due to a 15% drop in Polish 

refusals  and  occurred  despite  a  33%  increase  in  Hungary’s  refusals.  Both 

developments are an indication of changes in the composition of regular passenger 

flows (less Georgians attempting to enter Poland) and possible changes in border 

checks procedures (Hungary). 

Poland  and  Ukraine  will  host  the  Euro  Cup  from  June  to  July  2012.  Networks 

organising  irregular  migration  as  well  as  smuggling  activities  may  try  to  take 

advantage  of  the  simplified  border-crossing  rules  that  will  apply  during  the 

competition. 

6 

1. Background and methodology 

The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 

Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) created in August of 

2008 a concept of Eastern Borders Conference (EBC). The EBC was designed as a 

regular  activity/forum  where  specific  challenges  related  to  irregular  migration  at  the 

eastern  borders  of  the  EU  could  be  addressed  by  FRAN  (Frontex  Risk  Analysis 

Network) representatives and the relevant neighbouring third countries. 

By  2009  Frontex  signed  Working  Arrangements  (WA)  with  Ukraine,  the  Russian 

Federation,  Moldova  and  Belarus.  Subsequently,  Frontex  proposed  to  set  up  a 

permanent Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN), to be comprised of the 

competent Border Control Authorities from the mentioned four countries and the Risk 

Analysis Unit of Frontex. 

Additional  agreements  were  later  signed  allowing  for  the  establishment  of  regular 

information  exchange  and  joint  analytical  activities:  with  Moldova  in  March  2009 

(Cooperation  Plan),  with  Ukraine  in  November  2010  (Mechanism  on  information 

exchange  for  risk  analysis  cooperation)  and  with  Belarus  in  November  2010 

(Memorandum on regular exchange of information and joint analytical activities). 

When proposing to set up EB-RAN, Frontex also proposed to draft a joint risk analysis 

each  year,  based  in  part  on  monthly  statistical  information  exchange.  However,  the 

monthly statistical data exchange between Frontex and the EB-RAN countries had not 

yet  been  fully  established  at  the  time.  This  in  turn  made  drafting  of  a  joint  annual 

analysis impossible. Nevertheless, an Annual Overview covering 2009 was delivered 

by Frontex in November 2010. 

By  4  June  2011,  Moldova,  Belarus  and  Ukraine  provided  monthly statistical  data for 

2010.  As  this  data  still  have  not  provided  enough  information  for  a  joint  annual 

analysis, the following document is to be considered as the second EB-RAN Annual 

Overview.  

1.1 Data collection and additional information  

This document utilises the relevant Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) data from 

the  common  borders  between  EU  Member  States  and  the  EB-RAN  countries 

(hereafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  common  borders’)  in  2009  and 2010  and  the available 

monthly  statistical  data  from  Ukraine,  Belarus  and  Moldova  (2010  only,  no  trend 

analysis yet possible). In addition, it draws on information from other Frontex reports 

such  as  the  Annual  Risk  Analysis  2011,  FRAN  bi-monthly  analytical  reports  and 

relevant Frontex Tailored Risk Analyses. Information collected during different Frontex 

coordinated  Joint  Operations  (JOs)  and  reports  issued  by  specialised  agencies  or 

international actors (e.g. INCB, EUBAM) also played an important part in this analysis. 

Finally,  EB-RAN  and  FRAN  members  were  able  to  provide  additional  information 

during the last EB-RAN expert meeting, which took place in Warsaw in June 2011. 

7 

The monthly statistics provided by the EU Member States along the eastern border 

within  the  framework  of  FRAN  and  monthly  statistics  from  Ukraine,  Belarus  and 

Moldova  focus  on  six  key  indicators  of  irregular  migration:  (1)  detections  of  illegal 

border-crossing,  (2)  refusals  of  entry,  (3)  detections  of  illegal  stay,  (4)  asylum 

applications,  (5)  detections  of  facilitators  and  (6)  detections  of  forged  documents. 

Summary tables for statistical data are attached at the end of the document. 

1.2 Quality of the available data 

The quality of statistical data on irregular migration depends on several factors. The 

number of detections of illegal border-crossings, for example, is not only a function 

of  the  number  of  persons  attempting  to  cross  the  border  illegally,  but  also  of  the 

effort  of  border  control  authorities  to  detect  them.  Increasing  detections  might  be 

due  to  a  rise  in  persons  attempting  illegal  crossings  or  be  a  result  of  enhanced 

resources to detect such crossings.  

Similar issues should be taken into account regarding the number of detections of 

cross-border  crimes  at  the  borders.  Higher  numbers  of  detections  at  a  particular 

Border Crossing Point (BCP) might indicate a surge of criminality, but may also be 

the result of more efficient border control and/or the presence of specialists whose 

expertise  in  a  certain  area  (the  identification  of  stolen  vehicles,  for  instance)  may 

lead to a high number of detections. 

The  statistical  data  used  for  this  analysis  should  not  be  considered  as  official 

statistics  but  as  management  of  information  to  support  the  planning  of  joint 

operational  activities.  The  data  might  therefore  occasionally  vary  from  data 

published officially by national authorities.  

8 

 
2. Overview of the main threats affecting 

common border security 

Data  collected  within  EB-RAN,  as  well  as  obtained  from  Frontex-coordinated  JOs 

and various open sources clearly indicate that one of the largest threats to border 

security at the eastern borders of the EU remain cross-border smuggling of excise 

goods  and  stolen  vehicles  exiting  the  EU.  In  terms  of  its  negative  human  impact, 

trafficking in human beings (THB) is still a sizeable problem.  

Price differences between the two sides of the common borders are the main driver 

of the demand for cheaper goods which in turn fuels smuggling activities across the 

eastern border of the EU. The smuggling of goods also occurs due to specific legal 

limitations  in  the  number  of  items  a  person  is  allowed  to  carry  across  the  border. 

The types of items that are smuggled depend on the direction of travel. On exit from 

the  eastern  EU  countries  smuggled  goods  range  from  groceries  (such  as  meat, 

vegetables  and  fruits),  clothes  and  shoes  to  cars,  agriculture  machines  (including 

spare parts for cars) and electronic goods such as mobile phones. On entry to the 

EU smuggled goods consist mainly of excise goods such as cigarettes, petroleum 

products  and,  in  smaller  amounts,  drugs,  alcohol  and  small  arms  (including 

ammunition).  

The  risk  of  irregular  migration  is  considered  somewhat  smaller  in  its  magnitude 

when compared to the above mentioned cross-border smuggling and can largely be 

divided in three parts: (a) illegal flow through green borders (common between EB-

RAN  countries);  (b)  flow  of  would-be  migrants  through  BCPs  and;  (c)  flow  by  air 

from the EB-RAN countries’ main airports. The three flows are quite distinct, both in 

terms of size and composition. 

Statistical  indication  of  the  size  of  the  problem  is  best  represented  through  an 

analysis  of  several  FRAN  and  EB-RAN  indicators  (see  Table  1).  When  2010 

detections at the common borders are compared to those made at external borders 

elsewhere, it becomes clear that refusals of entry are by far most significant at the 

eastern borders. This is indicative of specific border control challenges in terms of 

effective  management  of  bona  fide  regular  passenger  flows  and  the  reduction  of 

overstaying and/or illegal work at the same time. 

Table 1: SUMMARY OF FRAN, EB-RAN* AND EB NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES** INDICATORS FOR 2010 

Illegal entries between BCPs

Clandestine entries at BCPs

Facilitators

Illegal stay

Refusals of entry

False travel-document users

FRAN

EB-RAN 

104 049

242

8 629

348 666

108 500

9 439

4 796

2 167

115

28 953

37 524

455

EB neighbouring  
countries

Share of EB 
neighbouring 
countries in FRAN

1 043

123

149

3 306

34 039

1 083

1.0%

51%

1.7%

0.9%

31%

11%

* 2010 data from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine

** Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania

Source FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 17 June 2011

9 

2.1 Cross-border crime at the common borders 

Cigarette smuggling 

Significant  price  differences  between  EU  Member  States  and  Eastern  European 

Countries  (see  Fig.  1)  create  a  large  incentive  for  cigarette  smuggling.  This  is 

increasingly  perceived  by  organised  crime  groups  (OCGs)  as  a  ‘low  risk  –  high 

profit’  enterprise,  especially  if  compared  with  drug  trafficking,  which  is  also  highly 

lucrative  but  carries  with  it  hefty  penalties.  Information  from  EB-RAN  countries 

suggests  that  cigarettes  smuggled  through  the  eastern  borders  are  mostly  ‘cheap 

whites’* rather than counterfeit cigarettes.  

Figure 1: Comparison of cigarettes prices in EU and neighbouring countries, December 2010 

*  ‘Cheap  whites’  is  a 
designation for low cost 
brands  not  legally  sold 
in the EU. 

Data collected during Frontex-coordinated JOs in 2010 indicate that the suppliers of 

cigarettes  smuggled  through  the  common  borders  are,  in  order  of  quantity 

smuggled,  Ukraine,  the  Russian  Federation,  Belarus  and  Moldova.  Data  collected 

during JO Focal Points show that the scale of the phenomenon could be growing in 

comparison with 2009.  

10 

In terms of cigarette smuggling activities, the most heavily affected BCPs involved 

in Frontex-coordinated JO Focal Points were Dorohusk, located at the land border 

between  Ukraine  and  Poland,  Terespol,  found  at  the  Poland-Belarus  border, 

Zahony, located between Hungary and Ukraine and Galati and Sculeni, both found 

along the Romania-Moldova border (Fig. 2). 

Figure 2: Seizures of cigarettes at the eastern borders of the EU during JO 
Focal  Points  2010  indicate  that  the  Poland-Ukraine  border  is  the  most 
affected 

FIN-RUS,Vaalima 1%

ROU-MDA,Sculeni 
2%

ROU-MDA,Galati 3%

POL-UKR,Korczowa 
3%

HUN-
UKR,Zahony 6%

LTU-RUS,Kybartai 
2%

POL-
BLR,Terespol 
14%

POL-UKR,Dorohusk 
69%

b o r d e r 
*  
L o c a l  
agreements 
in 
are 
force  between  Ukraine 
and  Poland,  Slovakia, 
Romania and Hungary.  

Source: JO Focal Points 2010 

The substantial number of seizures of cigarettes in Poland, Hungary and Romania 

are most likely the result of changes in customs regulations in 2009 that limited the 

amounts  of  cigarettes  and  alcohol  allowed  into  the  EU.  The  introduction  of  local 

border traffic agreements allowing residents of borderland regions to enjoy visa-free 

travelling  may  be  an  additional  incentive  for  small-scale  cigarette  smugglers  to 

cross the EU borders with Ukraine even more frequently.*  

The  modi  operandi  of  cigarette  smugglers  continue  to  be  extremely  diverse  and 

dynamic. They range from ‘ant’ smuggling operations carried by isolated individuals 

to 

large-scale  enterprises.  The  natural  conditions  of 

the  border  and 

the 

infrastructure of BCPs affect specific strategies applied by cigarette smugglers.  

At BCPs cigarettes enter the EU concealed in cars and lorries, as well as in public 

transportation vehicles such as buses and trains. They are hidden in floors, walls or 

seats of the vehicle in question, as well as in its wheels or petrol tank. Professional 

smugglers frequently use specially prepared vehicles with concealed compartments 

for  smuggled  cigarettes.  At  green  (or  river)  borders  the  modi  operandi  are 

significantly influenced by the season of the year.  

11 

In terms of the size of each shipment, at the Belarus-Lithuania, Moldova-Romania 

and  Ukraine-Romania  borders  cigarettes  are  smuggled  in  large  quantities  mainly 

through  BCPs.  The  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  borders  with  Poland,  on  the  other 

hand, are mainly affected by small scale, fragmented smuggling operations where 

cigarettes are transported through checkpoints by petty traders. 

It is important to note that some smugglers are becoming a physical security threat, 

a  fact  that  has  been  confirmed  by  several  security  incidents  in  2010.  Poland 

reported a case in which two smugglers (Polish and Lithuanian) were using private 

cars  to  break  through  a  patrol  outpost  to  avoid  being  stopped.  Of  even  greater 

concern  is  the  fact  that  a  Lithuanian  patrol  controlling  the  green  border  with 

Kaliningrad  Oblast  was  attacked  by  a  smuggler  who  opened  fire  at  the  officers, 

resulting in injuries to the border guards and the smuggler’s death. 

Stolen vehicles (on exit) 

Data  collected  by  Frontex  suggest  that  the  Russian  Federation,  Belarus  and 

Ukraine  remain  markets  with  a  significant  purchasing  power  and  high  demand  for 

second-hand and (in a lesser extent) new vehicles such as motorbikes, cars, heavy 

machines (agricultural and construction machines) and lorries.  

JOs coordinated by Frontex in 2010 point to an increase in the detections of stolen 

vehicles at the external land borders of the EU compared to 2009. The trend is most 

likely  an  indication  of  strengthened  border  checks  and  better  equipment  used  to 

detect stolen vehicles. 

In  2010  the  highest  number  of  detections  were  reported  at  the  Belarusian  border 

with  Poland  (Terespol)  and  at  the  Ukrainian  borders  with  Hungary,  Slovakia  and 

Poland (Zahony, Vysne Nemecke and Dorohusk BCPs, respectively) (Fig. 3).  

Figure 3: Detections of stolen vehicles during JO Focal Points 2010 

ROU-MDA,Galati
1%

POL-
UKR,Korczowa
5%

SVK-
UKR,Vysne 
Nemecke
15%

HUN-
ROU,Nagylak
18%

POL-
UKR,Dorohusk
15%

HUN-
UKR,Zahony
19%

POL-
BLR,Terespol
27%

Source: JO Focal Points 2010 

12 

Detected vehicles were mainly stolen in Belgium, Germany, France and Italy. The 

modi operandi of criminal groups trafficking vehicles across the external borders of 

the  EU  evolve  quickly  in  response  to  the  legal  and  economic  situation  of  the 

affected  regions  and  to  the  degree  of  expertise  of  border  guards  and  customs 

officers in identifying stolen vehicles.  

Petroleum products 

Trafficking  of  petroleum  products  is  mainly  reported  at  the  eastern  European 

borders with the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine. Smuggling is motivated 

by  the  price  difference  between  EU  Member  States  and  their  immediate  third-

country neighbours (see Fig. 4). Queues created by fuel smugglers with extended 

fuel  tanks  impact  the  border  control  of  BCPs  by  increasing  waiting  time,  while 

vehicles modified  for  fuel smuggling  raise  the  security  risk at  the  borders,  as  they 

may catch fire or even explode. 

Figure 4: Average prices of 95-octane petrol in selected Member States and third countries 
differ extensively (December 2010) 

13 

Trafficking in human beings (THB) 

In  2010,  two  routes  of  THB  which  affect  both  EU  Member  States  and/or  EB-RAN 

countries  were  particularly  visible.  The  first  and  most  immediately  relevant  is  the 

trafficking route that exists between Moldova and Romania, which includes not only 

the  movement  of  trafficked  Moldovans  (including  minors)  but  also  of  documents 

which are used in the trafficking process. Romania is both a final destination for THB 

victims  and  a  transit  country  through  which  victims  pass  on  the  way  to  other  EU 

Member States. 

A  second  THB  route  takes  Moldovans  and  Belarusians  from  their  respective 

countries  to  Turkey,  which  will  either  be  their  final  destination  or  the  transit  point 

towards Arab countries such as Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. This use of 

Turkey  as  a  transit  country  in  the  THB  process  is  particularly  relevant  given  that 

Turkey is still the main transit country for irregular migration towards the EU.  

Other criminal activities affecting the security of the common borders 

Smuggling  of  alcoholic  beverages  has  become  a  less  profitable  activity  for 

traffickers due to stricter EU regulations and a lower price disparity across borders 

(with  the  exception  of  the  Scandinavian  Member  States).  Nevertheless,  some 

seizures of alcohol were reported during Frontex-coordinated JOs, especially luxury 

brands.  The  biggest  seizures  of  alcohol  at  the  external  borders  of  the  EU  were 

reported at the Ukrainian border with Hungary (Zahony BCP), the Romania-Moldova 

border (Galati BCP) and the Poland-Belarus border (Terespol BCP). 

Routes  of  drug  trafficking  vary  depending  on  the  kind  of  drug,  its  origin  and  the 

specific  criminal  organisation  involved.  Statistical  data  collected  during  Frontex-

coordinated JOs in 2010 indicate that only small amounts of drugs were detected at 

the  eastern  borders,  the  majority  of  them  at  the  Hungary-Romania*  (Nagyak)  and 

Romania-Moldova (Galati) border. This may indicate that Romania is being used by 

drug traffickers as a transit route to Western European countries. 

Data  obtained  from  EB-RAN,  JOs  and open sources  indicate  two  main  patterns  of 

drug  trafficking  in  the  eastern  part  of  Europe.  Heroin  and  opium  are  smuggled  via 

Central  Asia  (through  Kazakhstan,  Kirgizstan  or  Uzbekistan)  to  the  Russian 

Federation  mainly  for  the  domestic  market.  It  is  reported,  however,  that  a  part  of 

these drugs is further transported to the EU, moving through Belarus and Ukraine to 

Poland  from  where  they  are  distributed  further.  A  particular  route  has  drugs  being 

transported  to  Lithuania,  from  where  they  are  distributed  to  the  Scandinavian 

countries.** 

Cocaine  from  South  America  is  being  smuggled  through  the  Odessa  seaport 

(Ukraine). This has been confirmed by three major seizures which took place within 

a few days in June–July 2010 and resulted in a total seizure of about two tonnes of 

cocaine.***  Synthetic  drugs  and  drug  precursors  are  usually  being  smuggled  from 

the EU to large Russian ports such as Saint Petersburg and Murmansk. 

14 

*  Although  Hungary 
and  Romania  are  both 
EU Member States, the 
H u n g a r y - R o m a n i a 
border  is  considered  to 
be  an  external  border 
of 
the  EU  because 
Romania is not yet part 
of the Schengen area. 

**  INCB  annual  report 
2010 

***  EUBAM,  Common 
Border  Security  As-
sessment Report Over-
view  Of  The  Moldova-
Ukraine  State  Border 
2010 

Box 1: Cross border crime at Ukraine-Moldova border 

“In comparison with 2009, detected smuggling [in 2010] on the border increased by 

13%  in  terms  of  number  of  cases,  and  by  31%  in  terms  of  value.  The  pattern  in 

smuggling  remained  opportunistic,  with  smaller  amounts  of  high  excise  goods 

(cigarettes,  alcohol)  and  other  consumer  goods  being  moved  more  frequently 

across  the  [Moldova-Ukraine]  border.  Nevertheless  cigarette  and  ethanol  smug-

gling  had  become  more  organised  by  the  end  of  2010,  with  larger  consignments 

being  moved  by  vehicles  and  by  boats  in  the  border  area  or  over  the  green/blue 

border”. 

Source:  EUBAM,  Common  Border  Security  Assessment  Report  Overview  of  the 

Moldova-Ukraine State Border 2010 

2.2 Flow of irregular migrants through common green borders 

In  2010  the  Slovakia-Ukraine  border  remained  the  most  affected  section  of  the 

eastern  borders,  accounting  for  40%  of  the  total  detections  of  irregular migrants  at 

the  common  borders.  In  line  with  the  general  decreasing  trend  at  the  eastern 

borders  in  2010,  Slovakia  detected  12%  less  irregular  migrants  when compared  to 

2009.  Given  the  climatic  and  geographical  features  of  this  section  of  the  common 

borders,  detections  on  both  sides  of  the  border  (54%  Slovakia,  46%  Ukraine) 

followed a clear seasonal pattern with winter lows and summer highs.  

By and large, there continue to exist two distinct flows of irregular migrants: one of 

CIS and one of non-CIS nationals. The two flows differ in terms of composition, modi 

operandi  and  need  for  facilitation  (or  lack  thereof).  CIS  nationals  (mainly  from 

Moldova  and  Georgia*)  represent  the  largest  share  (more  than  70%).  They  are 

usually  well  prepared  for  illegal  border-crossings  (food,  clothes)  and  are  able  to 

enter  Ukraine  legally  (visa-free).  Their  transit  towards  the  border  with  Slovakia  is 

usually  not  facilitated,  given  the  knowledge  of  the  local  language  and  the  fact  that 

they  often  travel  with  detailed  maps.  When  detected,  migrants  are  often  in 

possession of their national travel documents (hidden in clothes or luggage). 

*  For  the  purpose  of 
this  document,  Geor-
are 
gian 
nationals 
considered 
as  CIS 
nationals  regardless  of 
the  fact  that  Georgia 
formally 
its 
membership  in  CIS  on 
18 August 2009.  

ended 

Migration  of  non-CIS  nationals  (consisting  mainly  of  Afghans,  Somalis  and 

Palestinians)  appears  to  be  different.  Almost  all  above  mentioned  nationals  are 

detected during late night hours in small groups of two to five members. The groups 

consist  of  nationals  from  the  same  country;  however  mixed  groups  were  also 

reported  during  2010.  When  detected,  migrants  very  often  do  not  have  any 

documents, which in turn complicates identification and return procedures.  

Detection figures from Ukraine suggest three main ways CIS migrants use to reach 

Ukraine: (a) direct arrival, using legal travel channels (business, student or tourism 

visa),  (b)  indirect  arrival,  transiting  the  Russian  Federation,  and  (c)  via  Ukraine’s 

Black Sea ports.  

15 

Ukrainian  detections  of  illegal  border-crossings  at  its  border  with  the  Russian 

Federation confirm the existence of a constant flow of migrants declaring themselves 

as  Afghans  and  Somalis,  albeit  one  low  in  numbers.  A  preliminary  analysis  of 

detection  data  from  Belarus  indicates  that  Afghans,  detected  only  on  exit  towards 

Lithuania, were in fact all coming from the Russian Federation. 

Detections of Afghans and Somalis at Ukraine’s border with Slovakia were more than 

double  the  figure  detected  at  the  border  with  Russia,  which  allows  for  multiple 

explanations. This is either an indication that: 

(1)  The  majority  of  non-CIS  migrants  prefer  to  enter  Ukraine  directly  by  air,  a 

hypothesis corroborated in part by refusal figures at Ukrainian air borders; or  

(2)  Detections  at  different  border  sections  of  Ukraine  reflect  possible  variable 

amounts  of  surveillance  efforts,  making  thus  detection  figures  less  indicative  of  the 

size of respective flows.  

In  conclusion,  Ukraine  (and  to  a  much  lesser  extent  Belarus)  is  the  main  transit 

country  for  both  non-CIS  and  CIS  irregular  migrants  aiming  at  reaching  the  EU 

through its eastern borders. In addition, Ukraine is also on route for migrants from the 

Caucasus region and Central Asian countries travelling towards (or from) the Russian 

Federation. It remains difficult to ascertain to what extent the two flows are linked. 

When compared to other migration  routes towards  the  EU,  the flow  routing through 

Ukraine  should  be  considered  as  modest.  For  example,  overall  detections  at  the 

common borders in 2010 roughly amounted  to  detections made  in  one  week  at the 

Greece-Turkey  border  during  the  peak  period  in  October  and  November  2010. 

However, a worrying trend emerged in 2010 when Slovak authorities reported that of 

all  detected  migrants,  between  20%  and  30%  were  unaccompanied  minors  who 

crossed the green border illegally between Ukraine and Slovakia. 

2.3 Flow of would-be migrants through BCPs 

The flow of would-be migrants thought BCPs is best represented through refusals of 

entry figures. Jointly, EB-RAN (Moldova and Ukraine) and EU neighbouring countries 

refused entry to almost 64 000 persons in 2010. Most travellers were refused entry in 

the third quarter of 2010, in line with seasonal travel patterns. 

In terms of yearly trends (which can only be ascertained for FRAN members, as there 

is no previous data from EB-RAN countries), the overall number of refusals issued by 

FRAN members alone decreased marginally from around 36 200 in 2009 to around 

34 000 in 2010. The decrease was largely due to a 15% drop in Polish refusals and 

occurred  despite  a  33%  increase  in  Hungary’s  refusals.  Both  developments  are  an 

indication of changes in the composition of regular passenger flows (less Georgians 

attempting  to  enter  Poland)  and  possible  changes  in  border  checks  procedures 

(Hungary).  Authorities  there  have  been  improving  their  capacity  to  detect  persons 

staying in the territory of the EU for more that 90 days in any given six months period, 

resulting in increasing numbers of refusals for this reason (reason F of the Schengen 

Border Code –  Regulation EC  No  562/2006 of  the  European  Parliament and  of the 

Council of 15 March 2006, OJ L 105/1 – Annex V, Part B). 

16 

Box 2: Improved IT system in Hungary and increases in refusals  

In September 2007 a new IT system was introduced in Hungary that allowed bor-

der authorities to automatically calculate the total period of stay for each traveller. 

The  system  saw  additional  improvements  with  inclusion  of  the  local  border  traffic 

data, extending thus its use also to local border traffic permits. The newest version 

of the supporting IT system was introduced at the Hungary-Ukraine border section 

in January 2010, which resulted in an abrupt increase in the number of refusals of 

Ukrainian nationals in possession of Local Border Traffic Permits who have already 

stayed in Hungary more than three months during a six months period. 

Polish authorities still issued most of the refusals at the common borders, largely at 

the  border  with  Ukraine  and Belarus.  Importantly,  more  than  50%  of all  refusals  at 

the  common  borders  were  issued  to  Ukrainian  nationals,  followed  by  nationals  of 

other neighbouring countries (the Russian Federation and Belarus) (see Fig. 5). 

Figure  5:  FRAN  indicator  4  –  refusals  of  entry  in  2010  in  FRAN  and  neighbouring  EB-RAN 
countries.  The  thickness  of  the  border  line  (green)  represents  the  number  of  refusals  of 
entry;  the  pink  background  colour  shows  the  main  affected  countries  in  the  region.  
Pie-charts  show  the  share  (%)  of  the  top  nationality  refused  at  the  main  affected  border 
sectors 

Source: FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 17 June 2011 

17 

Refusal  data  from  Moldova  and  Ukraine  suggest  a  different  profile  of  refused 

persons.  In  Moldova,  most  refusals  were  issued  to  nationals  of  the  Russian 

Federation. 

Ukraine refused entry to more than 28 000 persons, most of them at its border with 

the Russian Federation, followed closely by the border with Moldova. Overall, at the 

Ukrainian  border  Moldovans  were  the  most  refused  nationality,  with  refusals 

predominantly  issued  at  their  national  border  (90%  of  refused  Moldovans). 

Moldovans  were  also  refused  at  the  borders  with  the  Russian  Federation  and 

Belarus, although at these two borders sectors the main refused nationalities consist 

of nationals from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. 

Nationals from CIS countries were refused by Ukraine mostly for reasons linked to 

means  of  subsistence  or  purpose  of  their  travel.  According  to  the  Ukrainian 

authorities  some  were  in  search  of  temporary  employment  in  the  agricultural  and 

construction  industry  in  Ukraine,  while  a  portion  of  the  would-be-migrants  from 

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were most likely trying to legalise their stay 

in  the  Russian  Federation.  These  migrants  need  proof  that  they  left  the  Russian 

Federation  (passport  stamps)  if  they  want  to  renew  their  Russian  migration  cards, 

allowing  them  to  temporarily  stay  in  the  country.  In  the  majority  of  cases  their 

intention is not to stay in Ukraine or move towards the EU, but merely to extend their 

stay in the Russian Federation.  

Interestingly,  during  the  third  quarter  of  2010,  the  numbers  of  refusals  for  the 

mentioned  three  Central  Asian  nationalities  almost  doubled  when  compared  to  the 

previous  quarter.  This  development  was  most  likely  linked  to  increased  efforts  of 

Russian  authorities  to  reduce  the  illegal  stay  and  illegal  work  problems,  prompting 

many migrants to try to legalise their stay in the Russian Federation.  

In  contrast  to  refusals  at  the  land  borders  of  Ukraine,  sea  borders  refusals  were 

issued  mainly  to  non-CIS  nationals.  Ukraine  issued  more  than  3  200  refusals  in 

2010 at  its sea borders, mainly  to  nationals  of  Myanmar,  Syria,  Turkey,  Sri  Lanka, 

India,  Georgia  and  Bangladesh  (75%  share  of  the  total).  More  that  two  thirds  of 

refusals were issued to crew members due to invalid or forged documents.  

The  number of  refused  persons at  the  Ukrainian sea  borders  is  relatively  high  and 

reflects intense commercial links between seaports in the Odessa region and other 

Black Sea ports, including those in Turkey. According to Ukrainian authorities there 

were almost 723 000 passengers crossing Ukraine’s sea borders in 2010 (359 000 

on entry and 364 000 on exit). Refusals at the Ukrainian sea borders are most likely 

not indicative of a possible new Black Sea transit route for irregular migration to the 

EU. So far there is little or no overlap between the nationalities of detected non-CIS 

irregular  migrants  at  the  Slovakia-Ukraine  border  and  those  refused  at  Ukrainian 

Black Sea borders.  

18 

Flow by air from EB-RAN countries’ main airports 

Frontex-coordinated  JO  Hubble  2010,  which  was  implemented  at  the  main  EU 

airports, was focused on flights coming from the major African airports. Despite the 

focus of the operation, Moscow’s Sheremeteyevo airport was identified as the most 

used  hub  by  irregular  migrants  entering  the  EU  after  Istanbul.  Russian  nationals 

flying from Moscow airports constituted 44% of the share of detections. Their flight 

destinations  were  the  main  European  cities  (Amsterdam,  Stockholm,  Athens, 

Brussels, Prague, Warsaw, and Paris).  

In  2011  an  increasing  number  of  Afghans  were  reported  after  their  arrival  from 

Moscow claiming asylum in different European airports. 

African migration from Estonia 

Estonian  authorities  have started  to  detect  an  emerging  trend  of  irregular  migrants 

coming  from  Africa  (mostly  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo or  Cameroon). With 

previous legal residence in the Russian Federation, they try to enter Estonia, Finland 

or Latvia using false documents. 

Estonian authorities believe that the migrants’ travel from the Russian Federation to 

the  EU  is  facilitated  by  the  African  community  network  in  the  Russian  Federation 

which  supplies  forged  travel  documents,  gives  advice  about  routes  and  is  also 

purchasing train tickets or flights to reach the destination Member States. 

19 

3. Factors impacting regional migratory 

movements 

The preceding overview of available statistical data clearly points to the existence of 

two  migratory  systems,  affecting  both  EB-RAN  countries  and  neighbouring  FRAN 

members. The first one links CIS migrants to the Russian Federation as their main 

destination  country  while  the  other  brings  both  CIS  and  non-CIS  migrants  into  the 

EU. The state of the economy in general and relative differences in earning potential 

in particular are the driving force behind both movements.  

3.1 Economic factors 

Destination: the Russian Federation  

In  the  case  of  the  Russian  Federation,  statistical  data  published  by  its  Federal 

Migration  Service  (FMS)  suggest  that  the  number  of  illegal  stayers  present  on 

Russian  territory  in  December  2010  was  3.5  million  (down  from  an  estimated  10 

million in 2001). Illegal stayers are counted on the basis of Migration Cards given on 

entry and taken back on exit from the Russian Federation. The number is calculated 

as the difference between the two.  

In  addition,  FMS  also  estimates  that  at  the  end  of  2010  around  10%  of  the  whole 

working  pool  in  the  Russian  Federation  (about  9  million  people)  were  nationals  of 

other  CIS  countries.  Migrants  staying  legally  on  the  Russian  territory  are  mainly 

living  in  Moscow,  Saint  Petersburg  and  selected  regions  (Kaliningrad,  Briansk, 

Belgorod and Rostov Oblasts).  

As  Figure  6  opposite  clearly  shows,  the  Russian  Federation,  with  its  average 

salaries of more than EUR 500 (in big cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg), is 

an  attractive  place  for  non-qualified  workers  from  CIS  countries.  Moreover,  non-

qualified  workers  from  CIS  countries  can  enter  the  Russian  Federation  legally  and 

can immediately adapt to living in the country given their knowledge of the language 

and the existence of large diasporas there.  

To reduce the number of illegal stayers and illegal workers, the Russian Federation 

introduced  new  legislation  prohibiting  foreigners  from  working  in  retail  trade  and 

open  markets.  The  decision  was  considered  by  the  Ukrainian  media  as  targeting 

particularly  non-qualified  legal  and  illegal  workers  from  Ukraine,  Tajikistan,  and 

Kirghizstan. The impact of the new legislation is yet to be observed.  

20 

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21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3: Azerbaijan as a destination? 

Starting from 2011 Azerbaijan’s appeal for workers from the neighbouring countries 

has  increased  as  the  Government  has  decided  to  liberalise  its  labour  legislation 

due in part to labour shortages. However, only 10 000 labour vacancies were pub-

lished for foreigners in 2011. 

Destination: the European Union 

This  migratory  system  is  driven  by  economic  realities  and  seasonal  demand  for 

labour. The destination countries in the EU can be divided into those in immediate 

proximity  (Poland,  the  Czech Republic,  Slovakia,  Hungary, Romania)  and  those 

hosting  significant  diasporas  from  Ukraine  and  Moldova  (Italy,  Spain,  the  UK, 

Germany). This distinction is important in terms of intended duration of migration, 

with  those  preferring  neighbouring  EU  countries  clearly  engaged  in  a  more 

circular migratory pattern.  

Italy, Spain, the UK, Germany and France are the traditional destination countries 

for  non-qualified  workers  from  Ukraine  and  Moldova  (construction  and  domestic 

services).  

The  Czech  Republic  has  become  an  attractive  country  for  Ukrainians  and 

Moldovans working in different industries and the construction sector. The Czech 

Ministry  of  Labour  and  Social  Affairs  (MPSV)  reported  that  by  the  end  of  2009 

there were around 75 000 Ukrainians legally present in the country. Open source 

data  suggest  that  the  number  of  Ukrainians  residing  and  working  (legally  and 

illegally) in the Czech Republic is much higher.  

Poland introduced  a  liberalisation  in its  labour market  for  nationals  from  several 

CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Russian Federation) in 2008. In 

that year approximately 156 000 CIS nationals were working seasonally in Poland 

under this new regulation, a number which increased to 190 000 legal workers in 

the  following  year.  According  to  the  Polish  Ministry  of  Labour  90%  of  these 

workers  were  Ukrainians.  During  the  first  six  months  of  2010  entrepreneurs 

registered  120  000  CIS  workers,  which  could  indicate  an  increased  demand  for 

both legal and illegal work in Poland (particularly in the construction industry). 

When  compared  to  2009,  there  were  more  than  twice  the  number  of  Ukrainian 

nationals  trying  to  enter  Poland  with  fraudulent  travel  documents  in  2010. 

Ukrainian  nationals  used  mainly  Polish  fraudulent  documents  (51%  of  the  total) 

followed  by  Ukrainian  (24%)  and  Slovakian  (3%)  ones.  Poland  also  reported 

cases of passports with stamps that were added or altered by Ukrainian nationals 

in order to validate travel history.  

22 

 
3.2 Legal factors 

Visa liberalisation process 

The  EU  is  currently  engaged  in  visa  dialogues  with  the  Russian  Federation, 

Ukraine,  and  the  Republic  of  Moldova.  The  European  Commission  will  draft  an 

impact assessment of the possible migratory and security impacts of future visa 

liberalisations in the framework of these dialogues.  

Georgia  recently  signed  a  visa  facilitation  agreement  with  the  EU,  which  will 

substantially  simplify  the  visa  application  procedure  for  certain  categories  of 

persons and make the whole process cheaper and quicker. It entered into force 

on 1 March 2011 together with the EU-Georgia readmission agreement. 

Visa issuing trends for nationals of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova and 

Belarus  remain  relatively  stable.  They  usually  apply  for  visas  in  EU  countries 

where their communities are well-established and where they have opportunity to 

work  (mainly  the  closest  neighbouring  countries).  In  2009  the  average  visa 

refusals  rates  for  nationals  of  Belarus,  the  Russian  Federation,  Moldova  and 

Ukraine was below the EU-wide average refusal rate of 7% (see Fig. 7 overleaf).  

Local border traffic agreements (LBTA) 

A  series  of  LBTAs  between  Ukraine  and  most  of  its  EU  neighbours  (Poland, 

Hungary  and  Slovakia)  came  into  force  in  2009.  In  2010  a  LBTA  was 

implemented  between  Romania  and  Moldova  in  March,  while  another  was 

implemented between Lithuania and Belarus in October. 

In  addition,  the  Polish-Belarusian  and  Norwegian-Russian  agreements  were 

signed in 2010 and are expected to enter into force during 2011. The LBTAs will 

allow  certain  groups  of  border-area  residents  to  cross  the  border  without  visas, 

using special local border traffic permits instead. Holders of such permits will be 

entitled to stay on the territory of the other country (in the border zone of 50 km) 

for up to 90 days per half-year. 

23 

 
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Hungary  has  reported  that  in  2010  there  were  more  than  1.5  million  of  border 

crossings (entry-exit) by persons with local border traffic permits (see Fig. 8). This in 

turn  represented  a  50%  increase  in 

comparison to 2009.  

In 

the  case  of  Poland-Ukraine, 

roughly  6%  of  the  total  number  of 

passenger  crossing  the  border  are 

doing  so  under  the  LBT  agreement 

rules.  The  evidence  so  far  does  not 

point to abuse of the LBTA for illegal 

migration purposes.  

In  terms  of  potential  impact  of  local 

border  traffic  agreements  for  border 

control, available reports suggest that 

local  smugglers  use 

local  border 

Figure  8:  A  specimen  of  local  border  traffic  permit 
issued  by  Hungarian  consular  authorities  to  Ukrainian 
nationals  

traffic agreements (LBTA) to daily smuggle cigarettes from EB-RAN countries to the 

neighbouring  EU  Member  States.  Such  activities  were  reported  particularly  in 

Romania and Ukraine. The potential impact of LBTAs on the situation at the borders 

needs to be further developed in future reports.  

Schengen enlargement 

During the 24 February 2011 JHA Council meeting, Member States failed to agree on 

a  compromise  as  to  the  way  to  proceed,  both  in  terms  of  enlarging  the  Schengen 

area and introducing amendments to the Schengen evaluation mechanism (Scheval). 

The earliest possible date for Romania and Bulgaria to join the Schengen area has 

therefore been pushed beyond 2012.  

25 

 
Box 5: Belarusian plans to introduce visa regime for Georgians 

Apart from repercussions due to a possible Schengen enlargement, Georgian migratory 

patterns could also change due to Belarusian plans to introduce a visa regime for Geor-

gians. This would make Belarus less attractive as a transit country for Georgians travel-
ling to the EU. 

Tbilisi has very good air connections to Odessa and Kiev provided by Ukrainian air car-

rier Aerosvit, with ticket prices which are comparable to the prices for the Tbilisi-Minsk 

route (TBS-ODS – EUR 250, TBS-MSQ – EUR 250). A possible new migration route 

could then lead from Odessa via the Moldovan Transnistria region and from there to-
wards the Moldova-Romania border. 

3.3 Mass sports events 

The  sports  event  that  will  have  the  most  significant  impact  on  border  security  at  the 

common borders between the  EU and  EB-RAN countries is the Euro  Cup 2012. Other 

events, like the Euro Basket 2011 or the London 2012 Olympics will probably have a less 

pronounced and more indirect impact.  

Euro Cup 2012 Poland-Ukraine 

Poland and Ukraine will host the Euro Cup from June to July 2012. Networks organising 

illegal  migration  as  well  as  smuggling  activities  may  try  to  use  this  event.  The  entry  to 

Poland  by  claiming  to  be  a  sports  fan  and  further  migration  to  other  EU  countries  with 

original or counterfeit Ukrainian travel documents could become a new modus operandi 

used by Ukrainians and nationals of other countries during Euro-2012. Another credible 

risk is overstaying after entering Poland with a fast-track visa.  

At  the  beginning  of  June  2011  Poland  and  Ukraine’s  UEFA  branches  announced  that 

41%  of  the  total  tickets  had  been  sold  (580  000  out  of  1.4  million)  and  that  from  this 

number  80%  had  been  purchased  by  Poles  and  Ukrainians.  According  to  Markian 

Lubkivsky, the Tournament Director for Ukraine, Poles are buying tickets for matches in 

Lviv, while Russians are buying tickets for matches to be held in Kharkov. This suggests 

that for would-be-spectators the distance is the most important factor when applying for 

the tickets. 

26 

4. Conclusions 

Cross-border crime 

Cross-border crime is a phenomenon significantly burdening border guards at the 

eastern  borders  of  EU.  It  mostly  consists  of  small  to  large-scale  smuggling 

activities, mainly of cigarettes, petrol and stolen vehicles and in a lesser extent of 

drugs, alcohol and small weapons. 

Although  some  countries  are  introducing  higher  excise  tariffs  for  cigarettes  and 

alcohol (Moldova, Ukraine)* the difference in prices should remain large enough 

to attract smugglers. In the case of crisis-ridden Belarus, the number of cases of 

cigarette smuggling dropped significantly in the last months because of the lack of 

money to buy goods for smuggling.** However, smuggling activities may return to 

their  previous  level  in  the  short-term  as  the  current  price  difference  makes 

cigarette smuggling a lucrative business. 

In  terms  of  its  negative  impact,  smuggling  of  excise  goods  is  linked  with 

significant  revenue  losses  for  Member  States  where  the  goods  are  sold  and 

distortions  of  market  conditions  at  the  borderland.  It  feeds  the  existing  grey  and 

black  economy  in  those  regions  and  maintains  structural  unemployment  as  it 

proves  to  be  more  lucrative  than  legitimate  work  (e.g.  Poland).  Smuggling  of 

cigarettes  also  undermines  public  health  policy  objectives  in  respective  Member 

States,  as  high  tobacco  prices  are  designed  in  part  to  reduce  cigarette 

consumption  and  associated  health  problems.  On  the  other  hand,  it  brings 

revenue  to  economically  underdeveloped  regions,  the  greatest  part  of  which  is 
injected into the legitimate economy.  

The  Libyan  conflict,  a  significant  price  gap  between  eastern  border  countries, 

shortages  of  fuel  reserves  in  the  Russian  Federation  and  limitations  in  the 

quantity of fuel sold to citizens in Belarus are reasons which create incentives for 

fuel  smuggling  through  the  common  borders  and  among  eastern  border 

countries.  

Eastern neighbouring countries remain markets with significant purchasing power 

and  a  high  demand  for  stolen  vehicles  from  Western  Europe  (luxury  cars, 

motorbikes,  cars,  heavy  machinery  and  lorries).  The  fact  that  currently  the 

number of stolen vehicles identified is not very high at some BCPs does not mean 

that  vehicle  trafficking  did  not  occur.***  New  trends  are  emerging,  such  as  the 

smuggling of vehicles from Lithuania to Moldova and to Central Asia.  

*  An  increase  in  excise 
duty  rates  for  tobacco 
and  alcohol  started  to 
take place in Ukraine in 
January  2011  and  was 
followed  by  increasing 
prices  for  these  prod-
ucts 
in 
April. 

in  Moldova 

**  Citizens  do  not  have 
foreign  currency  and 
are  not  able  to  pay  for 
goods. 

***  The  small  number 
of  detections  might  be 
linked  to  many  factors 
such  as  shortage  of 
equipment,  staff  which 
are insufficiently trained 
or  prepared  to  identify 
theft, 
cases  of  car 
re-
human 
limited 
sources 
border-
at 
crossing points, as  well 
as cases of corruption. 

27 

Drug 

trafficking  routes 

from  Central  Asia  (via  Kazakhstan,  Kirgizstan  or 

Uzbekistan) to the Russian Federation and then on to EU markets are still in use, 

as are routes which smuggle synthetic drugs out of the EU through large seaports 

in the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odessa has been used 

as a transit point for cocaine smuggled from South America, indicating a possible 

shift in the cocaine trade away from the Iberian Peninsula towards the Black Sea 

region. 

In  regards  to  THB,  one  cannot  exclude  the  possibility  that  the  Eastern  Europe-

Turkey-Arab  countries  THB  route  may  morph  into  an  Eastern  Europe-Turkey-EU 

countries  route  at  some  point  in  the  future.  This  topic  requires  more  thorough 

analysis and additional data collection. 

Clearly,  there  is  a  need  to  target  cross-border  crime  increasingly  as  a  part  of 

Frontex-coordinated JOs at the eastern borders of the EU. This activity should also 

include a systematic and more detailed data collection that would result in a better 

understanding of this phenomenon. 

Irregular migration 

Although irregular migration is not as significant in terms of numbers at the eastern 

borders  as  it  is  in  other  EU  border  sections  such  as  the  Mediterranean  and  the 

Greece-Turkey border, it is still an issue that needs to be closely monitored.  

The  majority  of  illegal  detections  at  the  common  borders  occur  between  BCPs. 

This  means  that  the  joint  surveillance  activities  at  the  green  and  river  borders 

should  be  a  priority  for  EU  Member  States  and  their  eastern  neighbours.  The 

majority of irregular migrants detected at the common borders are national from EB

-RAN  countries,  followed  by  nationals  of  other  CIS  countries.  Outside  BCPs,  the 

number of Afghans and Somalis detected is also quite significant. From late 2010 

onwards a significant rise in the number of irregular migrants from Africa identified 

at BCPs has been detected. 

Migrants are making use of the current political situation to facilitate their entry into 

the  EU.  Not  only  have  a  relatively  meaningful  number  of  Afghan  and  Somali 

migrants  been  detected  (especially  at  the  Ukrainian  borders),  but  nationals  from 

the Caucasus region have been claiming Afghan nationality at the borders to try to 

obtain  refugee  status.  Particular  attention  needs  to  be  paid  to  this  and  similar 

“nationality  swapping”  modi  operandi  as  they  might  result  in  fraudulent  asylum 

applications. 

Refusals  at  the  Ukrainian sea  borders  are most  likely  not  indicative  of a  possible 

new Black Sea transit route for irregular migration to the EU. So far there is little or 

no  overlap  between  nationalities  of  detected  non-CIS  irregular  migrants  at  the 

Slovakia-Ukraine  border  and  those  refused  at  the  Ukrainian  Black  Sea  borders, 

which  is  mostly  related  to  the  refusal  of  entry  to  undocumented  ship  crew 

members. 

28 

The establishment of a visa regime between Belarus and Georgia might impact the 

migration flows from the latter country. The Georgia-Belarus-Poland/Lithuania route 

for irregular migration will most likely be supplanted by a Georgia-Ukraine-Romania 

route. 

A possible Schengen enlargement will likely have an impact on the migration routes 

in  the  region.  The  route  between  Moldova  and  Romania  will  gain  in  importance 

facilitated by the fact that Moldova has good air and train connections to all parts of 

Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Georgia.  

Past  experiences  (Euro  Cup  2008,  Ice  Hockey  Championships  2011)  show  that 

sport  events have a  very  limited  impact  on  the  risk  of  irregular migration.  Still,  the 

Euro Cup 2012 is likely to produce new challenges for border control authorities of 

Poland and Ukraine in terms of facilitating the increased flow of bona fide travellers 

and  fans  while  minimising  the  risk  of  abuse  by  identifying  those  that  will  use  the 

Euro Cup to enter Poland and subsequently overstay.  

29 

5. Statistical annex 

Legend: 

Symbols and abbreviations  n.a.   not applicable 

: 

data not available 

Source:  

FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 2 June 2011 

Note: 

 For  all  indicators,  excluding  Asylum  and  Facilitators, 
detections  reported  for  EU  countries  are  detections 
on  entry  at  the  land  borders  with  EB  countries.  For 
Asylum, all applications (land, sea, air and inland) are 
included.  Facilitators  also  include  detections  on  exit 
at the land borders with EB countries. 

For EB countries, all indicators – save for Refusals of 
entry  –  include  detections  (applications)  on  exit  and 
entry at the land, sea and air borders. 

The  group  of  ‘Non-EU  Countries’  in  the  tables  only 
includes data for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. 

Table A1:  ILLEGAL BORDER-CROSSING BETWEEN BCPs

Detections by top ten nationalities

2009

2010

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2009

2010

% change on
year ago

per cent of 
total

Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries

Moldova
Georgia
Afghanistan
Ukraine
Russia
Somalia
Viet Nam
Armenia
Belarus
Pakistan
Other

Total
% in total EU LAND

% in total EU 

43
36
44
17
29
27
0
10
4
42
54

306

3.1%

1.3%

141
52
53
31
29
3
0
14
7
16
31

377

150
51
28
31
38
19
4
10
11
7
27

376

2.2%

1.3%

2.2%

1.3%

62
34
38
24
25
15
27
1
6
8
34

39
8
11
26
26
0
2
6
0
2
4

274

2.2%

1.2%

124

1.1%

0.8%

Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries

Ukraine
Moldova
Russia
Georgia
Belarus
Afghanistan
Somalia
Armenia
Pakistan
Romania
Other

Total

30 

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

415
251
143
30
48
38
9
5
4
0
65

132
55
39
42
20
15
4
17
8
5
12

349

134
50
48
27
15
26
33
4
9
2
7

355

1.5%

1.3%

1.2%

1.0%

561
433
177
59
69
42
17
23
4
3
78

468
386
161
120
46
15
28
10
3
5
96

88
31
34
12
22
7
0
1
7
1
12

396
173
163
103
121
64
31
35
28
73
146

215

0.9%

0.8%

1 333

2.3%

1.3%

413
221
111
78
50
32
25
11
5
7
31

984

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

393
144
132
107
83
48
39
28
24
10
35

1 043

1.2%

1.0%

1 857
1 291
592
287
213
127
79
49
16
15
270

4 796

-0.8
-17
-19
3.9
-31
-25
26
-20
-14
-86
-76

-22

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.

38
14
13
10
8.0
4.6
3.7
2.7
2.3
1.0
3.4

100

39
27
12
6.0
4.4
2.6
1.6
1.0
0.3
0.3
5.6

100

1 008

1 466

1 338

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2:  ILLEGAL BORDER-CROSSING AT BCPs

Detections by top ten nationalities

2009

2010

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2009

2010

% change on
year ago

per cent of 
total

Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries

Ukraine
Belarus
Georgia
Moldova
Russia
China
Armenia
Iran
Not specified
Turkey
Other

Total
% in total EU LAND

% in total EU 

27
0
0
22
3
0
0
0
0
11
0

63

28
1
3
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

37

36
1
0
12
2
0
0
0
0
0
0

51

37
2
0
8
2
0
0
0
1
0
0

50

21
3
3
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

30

23
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

25

21
4
2
5
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

33

27
2
3
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
0

35

128
4
3
47
7
0
0
0
1
11
0

201

45%

30%

47%

28%

32%

24%

44%

22%

29%

23%

32%

20%

15%

14%

39%

28%

41%

26%

Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries

Ukraine
Moldova
Russia
Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan
Belarus
Not specified
Kazakhstan
Turkey
Poland
Other

Total

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

221
78
36
26
8
7
4
2
3
4
34

423

289
95
37
18
23
14
11
3
1
2
39

532

368
87
81
42
33
20
20
2
2
2
34

691

274
78
31
32
35
18
13
5
5
3
27

521

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

92
10
8
6
4
1
1
1
0
0
0

123

25%

20%

1 152
338
185
118
99
59
48
12
11
11
134

2 167

-28
150
167
-87
-43
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

-39

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.

75
8.1
6.5
4.9
3.3
0.8
0.8
0.8
0
0
0

100

53
16
8.5
5.4
4.6
2.7
2.2
0.6
0.5
0.5
6.2

100

Table A3:  FACILITATORS

Detections by top ten nationalities

2009

2010

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2009

2010

% change on
year ago

per cent of 
total

Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries

Romania
Ukraine
Moldova
Poland
Russia
Lithuania
Belarus
Armenia
Afghanistan
Congo (DR)
Other

Total
% in total EU LAND

% in total EU 

8
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
9

20

9.3%

0.9%

5
1
0
14
4
0
1
1
0
0
4

30

1
5
0
5
0
4
0
0
0
1
17

33

2
9
1
7
2
9
0
2
0
0
13

45

11%

1.3%

8.0%

1.4%

17%

2.1%

0
8
3
3
0
1
1
3
0
0
1

2
5
2
0
2
3
0
0
0
0
0

3
8
1
9
3
0
2
0
3
0
3

20

7.6%

0.8%

14

5.1%

0.6%

32

9.2%

1.5%

Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries

Ukraine
Russia
Moldova
Afghanistan
Lithuania
Georgia
Armenia
Netherlands
Poland
Not specified
Other

Total

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

13
4
3
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
6

29

27
7
4
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1

40

16
1
4
3
0
1
2
0
0
1
1

29

49
5
11
3
4
4
1
0
0
1
5

83

29%

4.8%

10
3
1
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0

17

16
16
2
27
6
13
1
3
0
1
43

54
26
17
15
9
8
4
3
3
1
9

128

11%

1.4%

149

13%

1.7%

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

66
15
12
4
2
2
2
2
1
1
8

115

238
63
750
-44
50
-38
300
0
n.a.
0
-79

16

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.

36
17
11
10
6.0
5.4
2.7
2.0
2.0
0.7
6.0

100

57
13
10
3.5
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
0.9
0.9
7.0

100

31 

Table A4:  ILLEGAL STAY

Detections by top ten nationalities

2009

2010

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2009

2010

% change on
year ago

per cent of 
total

Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries

Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Armenia
Israel
Other

Total
% in total EU LAND

% in total EU 

185
384
78
97
21
8
3
3
0
2
9

790

145
173
53
54
18
13
1
1
2
1
15

476

399
229
123
72
21
9
3
2
6
1
12

877

205
159
138
21
27
12
4
4
1
1
2

574

284
117
105
48
6
9
2
1
1
7
3

583

55%

0.7%

39%

0.4%

39%

0.8%

40%

0.6%

46%

0.7%

364
127
131
49
13
8
7
2
3
0
5

576
193
267
54
27
8
1
2
2
0
6

709

1 136

47%

0.8%

50%

1.3%

Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries

Georgia
Russia
Ukraine
Moldova
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Uzbekistan
Lithuania
China
Turkey
Other

Total

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

Table A5:  REFUSALS OF ENTRY

Detections by top ten nationalities

892
735
363
743
268
238
232
156
143
188
1 209

1 432
761
970
762
319
228
197
191
161
151
1 279

1 305
1 407
1 144
942
381
361
393
249
124
179
1 990

5 167

6 451

8 475

8 860

299
298
137
57
34
27
5
7
6
2
6

878

45%

1.0%

2 480
892
1 018
901
399
473
442
218
295
190
1 552

934
945
392
244
87
42
11
10
9
5
38

2 717

43%

0.7%

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

1 523
735
640
208
80
52
15
12
12
9
20

3 306

47%

0.9%

6 109
3 795
3 495
3 348
1 367
1 300
1 264
814
723
708
6 030

28 953

63
-22
63
-15
-8.0
24
36
20
33
80
-47

22

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.

46
22
19
6.3
2.4
1.6
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.6

100

21
13
12
12
4.7
4.5
4.4
2.8
2.5
2.4
21

100

2009

2010

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2009

2010

% change on
year ago

per cent of 
total

Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries

Ukraine
Russia
Belarus
Georgia
Moldova
Kazakhstan
Armenia
Kyrgyzstan
Uzbekistan
Not specified
Other

Total
% in total EU LAND

% in total EU 

4 427
1 181
1 403
10
492
20
14
6
4
7
91

3 728
1 074
1 090
466
334
27
16
10
3
10
91

5 026
1 699
1 066
4 435
376
30
126
16
22
23
99

4 404
1 708
1 263
852
358
15
88
21
9
13
116

4 805
1 144
1 164
595
378
21
11
12
4
13
73

4 321
1 291
1 401
622
333
30
23
32
13
5
75

4 587
1 827
1 409
663
368
24
19
16
12
7
101

3 623
1 708
1 566
1 151
326
48
68
36
20
20
74

17 585
5 662
4 822
5 763
1 560
92
244
53
38
53
397

17 336
5 970
5 540
3 031
1 405
123
121
96
49
45
323

7 655

6 849

12 918

8 847

8 220

8 146

9 033

8 640

36 269

34 039

68%

29%

64%

26%

70%

38%

72%

34%

64%

31%

64%

32%

61%

32%

64%

31%

69%

32%

63%

31%

Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries

Moldova
Uzbekistan
Lithuania
Tajikistan
Russia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Armenia
Ukraine
Kyrgyzstan
Other

Total

32 

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

1 731
1 946
456
675
287
487
389
446
206
195
1 786

2 301
1 462
722
370
319
416
492
393
439
228
2 422

2 093
1 735
649
594
716
386
326
386
448
488
3 052

1 672
1 080
645
448
360
354
430
321
394
535
2 244

8 604

9 564

10 873

8 483

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

7 797
6 223
2 472
2 087
1 682
1 643
1 637
1 546
1 487
1 446
9 504

37 524

-1.4
5.4
15
-47
-9.9
34
-50
81
29
-15
-19

-6.1

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.

51
18
16
8.9
4.1
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.9

100

21
17
6.6
5.6
4.5
4.4
4.4
4.1
4.0
3.9
25

100

Table A6:  PERSONS USING FALSE DOCUMENTS

Detections by top ten nationalities

2009

2010

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2009

2010

% change on
year ago

per cent of 
total

Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries

Ukraine
Russia
Moldova
Belarus
Georgia
Turkey
Armenia
China
Congo
Egypt
Other

Total
% in total EU LAND

% in total EU 

155
10
15
3
0
4
1
0
4
0
16

208

74%

10%

59
12
23
2
2
2
0
4
1
1
19

125

51%

6.5%

118
12
23
1
4
4
1
6
0
0
12

181

107
11
16
4
0
0
0
5
1
0
19

163

198
13
25
4
6
4
2
4
0
0
8

264

216
15
7
11
4
0
5
4
2
1
11

276

258
20
5
7
1
5
1
0
1
1
16

315

162
14
12
25
1
2
1
0
1
2
8

228

439
45
77
10
6
10
2
15
6
1
66

677

53%

9.2%

54%

8.6%

60%

12%

57%

12%

66%

13%

69%

8.6%

58%

8.6%

Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries

Ukraine
Moldova
Syria
Georgia
Russia
Turkey
Azerbaijan
Uzbekistan
Iraq
Iran
Other

Total

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

50
30
0
7
5
5
2
3
5
1
6

71
15
0
4
2
1
1
1
0
1
10

73
23
1
5
6
1
3
0
0
1
9

64
13
19
2
2
3
2
1
0
1
6

114

106

122

113

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

:

834
62
49
47
12
11
9
8
4
4
43

1 083

62%

11%

258
81
20
18
15
10
8
5
5
4
31

455

90
38
-36
370
100
10
350
-47
-33
300
-35

60

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.

77
5.7
4.5
4.3
1.1
1.0
0.8
0.7
0.4
0.4
4.0

100

57
18
4.4
4.0
3.3
2.2
1.8
1.1
1.1
0.9
6.8

100

33 

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 

Frontex    
Frontex
Frontex
Frontex

Rondo ONZ 1 

00-124 Warsaw

Poland

ISBN 978-92-9471-016-1     doi:10.2819/090070 

TT0117948ENN