Comparison of risk analysis methods and development of a template for risk characterisation.
Date: 2010-11-24
Institutions: Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen, Joint Research Centre
Subjects: accident prevention, comparative analysis, environmental risk prevention, evaluation method, industrial hazard, land transport, oil pipeline, transport of dangerous goods

COMPARISON OF RISK ANALYSIS 
METHODS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A 
TEMPLATE FOR RISK CHARACTERISATION 

J.M. Ham, M. Struckl, A.-M. Heikkilä, E. Krausmann,  
C. Di Mauro, M. Christou, J.-P. Nordvik 

Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 

2006 

EUR 22247  EN    

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 
Directorate-General Joint Research Centre 
Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 

Contact information 
European Commission – DG Joint Research Centre, Institute for the Protection and Security of 
The Citizen, Traceability and Vulnerability Unit 
TP 361, Via Fermi 1 
21020 Ispra(VA), ITALY 

E-mail: jean-pierre.nordvik@jrc.it 
Tel.: +39 0332 78 5021 
Fax: +39 0332 78 5145 

http://www.jrc.cec.eu.int 

Legal Notice 
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is  
responsible for the use which might be made of this publication. 

EUR 22247 EN 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 

© European Communities, 2006 

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged 

Printed in Italy 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PREFACE

3

Managing  risk  associated with  technological  systems has always  been a  demanding task.  Today this
task  is  becoming  even more  challenging  for  politicians  and  risk-decision  makers.  Different  factors
contribute  to  this  situation  such as  an always  increasing  complexity  of  technological  systems, the
increased expectations of the European citizen  for a knowledge-based society and transparent decision-
making processes, and the emergence of  new threats like  sabotage and terrorism.  In  fact,  when man-
made  and  environmental  risk-related  issues are  concerned,  it  appears that  a  lack  of  balance  exists
between citizen's  expectations and decision-maker's behaviour. This  discrepancy can be traced back to
the variety and complexity  of the risk  assessment approaches in use today as well  as to the uncertainties
that affect the results of these studies.

Decision makers are confronted  with  a large variety of approaches to assess and manage a specific risk;
a  fact  that makes the  comparison of  risk  studies performed  by  different  analysts or  for  differ j nt  end-

a 

users 
and, 
assessment for certain decision-making purposes. 

consequently, 

difficult 

task 

has 

significantly 

hampered 

the 

widespread 

use 

risk

of 
,

I

Currently,  the  existing  risk  assessment approaches  differ 
their  underlying
assumptions, the way they are applied in practice, and the [mal  format  of their results. In  1999, the JRC
launched a number of activities  to  better understand the  structural characteristics of the results  of  such
studies -the  so-called  risk  figures  -and  to  investigate  how  the  quality  of  these risk  figures I can be
evaluated. 

in  their  terminology, 

i

These activities  resulted in the following  two events: (a) a JRC International  Workshop  on Promotion of
Technical  Harmonization  on Risk-based Decision  Making,  held  at Stresa &  Ispra,  Italy,  22-25  May
2000 and (b) a meeting in July 2001  with  other Directorates-General of the European Commiss~on and
representatives from  standardization organizations. 

I

As  a  follow-up  of  these events, an Institutional  Activity  called  COMPASS  (Risk  Comparability  and
Integrated  Risk  Assessment) was  started in  2003  under the  6th Research Framework  Program  of  the
European Commission.  During  the period  2003-2004,  a  main  study of  the COMPASS  Activity  was
the  development of a common format,  also called template, to  characterize a risk  figure  as wen  as the
overall  process that lead to this  risk figure.  The template was intended to comprise the presentation of
the results and of the structure of a specific  risk-analysis  process, therefore  facilitating  the  verification
of the completeness and adequacy of the process. It should be noted that the  development of a generic

technical  standard on  how  to perform  a  risk  assessment was no  objective  of  the  project.  Thi! report

presents the final  results of that study.

Although  the template is intended to  cover as many risk-related  activities  as possible, the current study
focuses only  on the comparison of risk  assessment in chemical industrial  facilities  and transportation of
dangerous  goods.  This  way,  it  benefited  from  the  experience  with  risk  assessment in  Seveso
installations  and the  work  that is  being  carried  out  in  the JRC,  and it  received  significant  input  from
other  Seve so-related activities,  such as the  European Working  Group  on  Land-use  Plannin~  in  the
Context of Article  12 of Directive  96/82/EC (Seveso II Directive). 

I

The  study was funded  entirely  by JRC and was carried  out by TNO  Environment,  Energy and Process
Innovation  (TNO-MEP)a  under  Service  Contract  No.  21503-1003-12,  and  JRC  staff  from  the
COMPASS  team and from the Major  Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB).

/

/J. 

/~) 
l.t.~:fL~~i~:~~~~
M.  Christou
MAHB  NEDIES  Action  Leader,  JRC/IPSC

r 

~

I.-P. Nordvik
COMPASS Action Leader, JRCRPSC
I

a Since 1 st January 2005  known as: TNO  Built  Environment  and Geosciences, Team Industrial  and External  Safety.

CONTRIBUTORS 

J.M. Ham, 
TNO Built Environment and Geosciences, Team Industrial and External Safety 

M. Struckl,  
MAHB, JRC-IPSC 

A.-M. Heikkilä,  
COMPASS, JRC-IPSC 

E. Krausmann  
MAHB, JRC-IPSC 

C. Di Mauro 
COMPASS, JRC-IPSC 

M. Christou 
MAHB, JRC-IPSC 

J.-P. Nordvik 
COMPASS, JRC-IPSC 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 

In the context of the Institutional Activity COMPASS “Risk Comparability and Integrated Risk Assessment” 
of  the  Joint Research  Centre  of  the  European  Commission,  a  specific  study  entitled:  “Comparison  of  Risk 
Analysis Methods and Development of a Template for Risk Characterisation” was conducted. 

The objective of this study was twofold: 

1. 

to  carry  out  a  comparative  analysis  of  existing  risk  analysis  approaches,  for  estimating  the 
technological accidental risks related with the process industry and the transportation of dangerous 
goods by road, rail and pipelines, over member States (MS), Candidate Countries (CC) and other 
relevant countries; and 

2. 

to develop a template for the characterisation of the outcome of risk analysis and of the risk analysis 
process itself. 

Objective 1: 

Comparison of risk analysis practices 

The  first  objective  was  realised  by  collection  of  risk  analysis  requirements  and  practices  in  twelve 
countries,  mainly  in  the  EC.  The  formal  requirements  of  risk  analysis  mainly  refer  to  the  regulatory 
obligations following from the (implementation of) the Seveso-II Directive. 

National requirements in the various EC Member States show considerable differences in the way risk 
analysis  is  implemented,  both  in  formal  regulations  and  in  risk  acceptance  criteria  as  well  as  in  the 
standardisation of practices and availability of tools and guidance for the subject.  

The  most  prominent  difference  is  a  deterministic  approach  versus  a  probabilistic  approach  in  risk 
analysis  and  risk  evaluation.  The  choice  of  either  of  the  two  approaches  –  whether  determined  by 
technological, or by political and historical reasons – appears to be not only a strict country preferred 
issue. The objective of conducting a risk analysis in a specific situation and the purpose of application 
of the results, are criteria to give preference to one approach rather than the other. The required nature 
of a risk analysis depends on the field of decision making for which the results of such an analysis are 
needed. In this study, at least four objective areas have been distinguished: 

•  Application of environmental permit and licence to operate (LIC) 

•  Demonstrating the technological safety (state-of-the-art) of an installation and its operation, and 

defining measures for risk reduction (RRM) 

•  Land-use planning (LUP) 

•  Preparation for Emergency response (ERP) 

In Safety Reports, mandatory as per Seveso-II, all these four issues have to be addressed. Differences, 
however, exist between countries of the role and priority of risk analysis therein. The conclusions of the 
actual  comparisons  are  given  in  this  report  and  in  an  extensive  appendix  with  the  results  of  data 
collection  through  questionnaires.  As  an  additional  result,  a  spreadsheet  table  has  been  developed  for 
item-wise comparison of the different risk analysis practices. 

Objective 2: 

Development of template(s) for risk characterisation 

A set of pilot templates has been developed that decision makers can apply to verify the completeness 
and  the  quality  of  a  given  risk  analysis.  A  set  of  four  different  templates  is  proposed  based  on  the 
mentioned differences in approach in risk analysis studies, in the area of application of their results and 
in the interest of the different decision makers. The templates are presented for the purpose of: 

•  LIC & RRM, with a deterministic approach; 

•  LIC & RRM, with a probabilistic approach; 

•  LUP & ERP, with a deterministic approach; 

•  LUP & ERP, with a probabilistic approach. 

3 

 
 
 
 
Each template comprises a comparison table with: 

•  The  five  elements  of  the  risk  analysis  process,  chosen  for  these  templates:  (i)  hazard 
identification,  (ii)  frequency  assessment,  (iii)  consequence  assessment,  (iv)  risk  figure 
determination, and (v) decision making. 

•  For each element: (i) the method(s) applied; (ii) the tool(s) and model(s) available or used; and 

(iii) the result obtained in the respective phase. 

The templates can be used as a tick-table and may be completed with specific data drawn from the risk 
analysis report. 

Recommendations for introduction of the templates 

The  templates  were  developed  in  a  desk  exercise.  The  objectives  and  the  envisaged  end-users 
(stakeholders) were determined in communication with the JRC. 

It is advised to test and validate these templates on practical use among (categories of) stakeholders, by 
e.g. translating past risk-analysis studies into the format of the templates. This test and validation should 
reveal: 

•  Whether the format of the template is ‘workable’; 

•  Whether its contents are complete, in phases and items; 

•  Whether it provides the information the decision maker needs; 

•  Whether  a  system  of  ‘scoring’  of  the  quality  of  a  risk  analysis  shall/can  be  developed,  and 

which weighting factors shall then be applied; 

•  Whether  written  guidance  and  instruction  in  the  application  would  be  sufficient,  or  practical 

training will be required; 

•  How the template(s) can be made to ‘living’ documents, to satisfy the application on the longer 

term in the dynamic discipline of risk analysis. 

4 

 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 

1 

2 

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 7 

Issues of the study ...................................................................................................................................... 7 

2.1  Background to this study..................................................................................................................... 7 

2.2  Objectives of risk analysis .................................................................................................................. 8 

2.3  Different appreciations of risk analysis............................................................................................... 8 

3  General procedure for risk analysis............................................................................................................ 9 

3.1  Main phases ........................................................................................................................................ 9 

3.2 

Steps of the risk analysis procedure .................................................................................................... 9 

3.3  Example: Risk analysis for land-use planning .................................................................................. 10 

3.3.1 

3.3.2 

The “consequence-based” Methods........................................................................................... 10 

The “risk-based” Methods ......................................................................................................... 10 

3.3.3  Hybrid Methods ......................................................................................................................... 10 

3.3.4 

“State-of-the-Art” – Approach................................................................................................... 11 

3.4  Other objectives of risk analysis and their approaches ..................................................................... 11 

4 

Inventory of data from various countries: methods and results ............................................................... 12 

4.1 

Inventory sources and methods......................................................................................................... 12 

4.1.1  Questionnaire............................................................................................................................. 12 

4.1.2 

Selection of countries ................................................................................................................ 12 

4.2 

Inventory results................................................................................................................................ 13 

4.2.1 

4.2.2 

The Netherlands......................................................................................................................... 13 

Belgium / Flanders..................................................................................................................... 13 

4.2.3  Germany .................................................................................................................................... 13 

4.2.4 

France ........................................................................................................................................ 14 

4.2.5  United Kingdom ........................................................................................................................ 14 

4.2.6 

4.2.7 

4.2.8 

Spain .......................................................................................................................................... 15 

Finland ....................................................................................................................................... 15 

Switzerland ................................................................................................................................ 15 

4.2.9  Greece ........................................................................................................................................ 16 

4.2.10  Sweden....................................................................................................................................... 17 

4.2.11  United States of America........................................................................................................... 17 

4.2.12 

Israel .......................................................................................................................................... 17 

4.3  Observations and conclusions from comparison over seven countries............................................. 17 

4.3.1  General observations ................................................................................................................. 17 

4.3.2 

Conclusions on comparability ................................................................................................... 18 

5  Risk analysis practices for transport of dangerous materials ................................................................... 21 

5.1  General.............................................................................................................................................. 21 

5.2 

Pipelines transport............................................................................................................................. 21 

5 

 
 
 
 
5.3  Road and rail transport...................................................................................................................... 22 

5.4  Acceptance criteria............................................................................................................................ 23 

5.5  Developments and current studies .................................................................................................... 23 

6  Template Development: Risk analysis Comparison scheme.................................................................... 24 

6.1  Objectives of the template................................................................................................................. 24 

6.2  Considerations on structure and contents of the template................................................................. 24 

6.3  Template’s instruction for use........................................................................................................... 26 

6.4  The templates .................................................................................................................................... 26 

6.5  Recommendations for introduction of the templates ........................................................................ 37 

7  References ................................................................................................................................................ 37 

Appendices 

Annex 1  Risk Analysis Comparison Scheme: Fixed installations 

Annex 2  Results of Comparison, Item-Wise 

Annex 3  Explanation of Terminology 

Annex 4  Detailed description of risk analysis process in seven EU countries 

Annex 5  Risk analysis methods and practices in seven EU countries, spreadsheet for comparison 

6 

 
 
 
 
1 

Introduction 

Under  the  6th  Framework  Program  of  the  European  Commission  (EC),  DG  Joint  Research  Centre  is 
carrying  out  an  Institutional  Activity  called  COMPASS  “Risk  Comparability  and  Integrated  Risk 
Assessment”. In this context, DG JRC conducted, in close cooperation with TNO Environment, Energy 
and Process Innovation (TNO-MEP)b, The Netherlands, a study entitled “Comparison of Risk Analysis 
Methods and Development of a Template for Risk Characterisation”.  

The objectives of this study were: 

(i)  To  carry  out  a  comparative  analysis  of  existing  risk  analysis  approaches,  for  estimating  the 
technological  accidental  risks  related  with  the  process  industry  and  the  transportation  of 
dangerous  goods  by  road,  rail  and  pipelines,  over  member  States  (MS),  Candidate  Countries 
(CC) and other relevant counties; and 

(ii)  To  develop  a  template  for  the  characterisation  of  the  outcome  of  risk  analysis  and  of  the  risk 

analysis process itself. 

The results of the study are presented in this report. 

2 

Issues of the study 

2.1  Background to this study 

In  all  decision  making  processes  where  risks  to  the  public,  to  employees,  to  the  environment  or  to 
property are involved, some kind of risk analysis is required.  

This  particularly  holds  for  the  so  called  ‘higher  tier’  Seveso-II  enterprises,  where  the  operator  has  to 
demonstrate  that  he  has  identified  the  risks  of  the  hazardous  installation(s)  and  that  these  risks  are 
controlled,  managed  and  prepared  for.  But  also  for  ‘lower  tier’  companies  and  for  transport  of 
dangerous goods, the potential risks to the surrounding areas are often considered for decision making 
on the prime objectives: environmental permits, land-use planning or emergency response planning. 

Technological  risks  are  dealt  with  differently  in  different  applications  (industries)  and  in  different 
circumstances  (regulatory  regimes)2,3,4,5,6.  Decision-makers  are  therefore  confronted  with  a  variety  of 
approaches,  methodologies  and  forms  to  evaluate  and  present  a  specific  risk,  a  fact  that  makes  the 
comparison  of  risk  studies  performed  by  different  analysts  or  for  different  end-users  a  difficult  task. 
Non-uniformity in methods, data and applications has significantly hampered the widespread use of risk 
assessment for decision-making purposes. 

In the EU Member States, considerably big differences exist in both the extent of prescribed procedures 
for, and the type of result of risk analysis, as well as in the use of (quantified) risk criteria for decision-
making in the various purposes listed in section 2.2. These differences in approaches and results may 
pose  a  problem  to  decision  makers  in  interpretation  of  results  of  different  risk  studies.  Another 
complicating  consequence  arises  for  (management  of)  multi-national  companies,  who  are  confronted 
with differing requirements between the different EU Countries even if production process & control as 
well as the safety management systems are similar for the entire company, regardless in which country 
a particular process unit is located. 

This study distinguished the following issues of risk analysis approaches and practices in Europe: 

•  Various objectives of risk analysis: why is it done, what are the results used for and what kind 

of decisions are based on it? 

•  Various countries: what is the risk analysis approach, how is the RA-process carried out and 
what is the nature of results? Which steps in the process can be distinguished? Which input is 
used and what are the uncertainties in this process? 

•  Various  approaches  and  risk  results,  and  the  strictness  of  regulations  and  directives  in  this 

b Since 1st January 2005 known as: TNO Built Environment and Geosciences, Team Industrial and External Safety. 

7 

 
 
 
                                                      
field (or the freedom of application of preferred methods and models). 

2.2  Objectives of risk analysis 

Risk  analysis  for  technological  hazards  can  have  different  objectives,  either  in  isolation  or  in 
combination. The most important stakeholders and their objectives are: 

•  Competent authorities, for the purpose of environmental permission; 

•  Competent  authorities,  for  the  purpose  of  fulfilling  safety  report  obligations,  e.g.  as  per 

SEVESO-2 requirements; 

•  Emergency Response organisations, for the purpose of response preparation; 

•  Regional planning authorities, for the purpose of decision  making on land-use planning in an 

area with major hazard industries or dangerous goods transport; 

• 

Installation owners, for the purpose of identifying priorities in risk reduction or for cost–benefit 
analysis of different risk reduction options. 

The objectives (or purposes) of a risk analysis may thus cover the following: 

•  Licence application (LIC) 

•  Determination and evaluation of risk reducing measures (RRM) 

•  Land-use planning (LUP) 

•  Emergency response preparation (ERP), 

or  combinations  of  two  or  more  of  these.  The  various  objectives  logically  lead  to  differences  in  the 
nature and the extent of risk studies. 

2.3  Different appreciations of risk analysis 

As described in the IEC/ISO Guide 737 on risk management, it is fundamental to distinguish the risk 
assessment and the decision-making steps. The guide explains that risk assessment is a part of the risk 
management process, ended up with the decision. Risk assessment is a tool used to estimate the risk, 
characterised by the likelihood and severity of specific events. A risk based decision-making process is 
naturally based on risk assessment criteria, but must also integrate other criteria that can be economical, 
cultural, ethical, etcetera. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  different  stakeholders  and  the  differing  objectives  will  lead  to  a  variety  of 
definitions and appreciations of risk. Though there is a common opinion about the definition of risk: 

Risk = the Probability of an Undesired Outcome, 

As the definitions of a “deterministic” and “probabilistic” approach in risk analysis are often disputed, 
the key characteristics with respect to this document are the following: the traditional deterministic risk 
assessment  approach  is  based  on  conservatively  defined  values  for  design  or  structural  reliability  in 
conjunction with a safety factor based on judgment, evidence of satisfactory performance or calibration 
exercise;  in  simple  words,  safety  is  expressed  with  0  (=  insufficient  safety)  or  1  (=sufficient 
safety).”Deterministic  quantities”  can  be  interpreted  as  random  variables  with  deviations  tending  to 
zero.  The  probabilistic  assessment  may  be  seen  as  an  extension  of  the  deterministic  approach,  taking 
into account the variety of physical behaviour, poor information or human error, thus aiming at a more 
realistic modelling of a structural behaviour. 

This quantification –or even the necessity to quantify- of risk is an issue of a long lasting debate. As far 
as the risks of hazardous substances are concerned, this debate has as yet not resulted in uniformity in 
definitions  of  neither  the  probability,  nor  the  nature  or  extent  of  the  outcome.  Consequently,  the 
dimension  of  the  ‘risk  figure’  differs  in  the  various  applications,  and  so  does  the  presentation  of  this 
figure. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
In this report, the “Outcome” is mostly expressed in the consequences for humans of exposure to (the 
effects of) a release of hazardous material. These consequences may vary from experience of nuisance 
to  serious  injures  or  even  death.  Alternatively,  and  depending  on  the  surroundings  potentially  to  be 
affected or on the objectives of the stakeholder, the outcome may also be damage to the environment, 
e.g. area of polluted soil, number of killed sea species, etc. 

The  differences  in  the  risk  figures  applied  in  various  countries  are  partly  due  to  historical  or  cultural 
background. In some cases, a quantified risk value as a basis for decision making is explicitly excluded. 
This then results in a fully deterministic approach with qualitative outcomes and decision making, like 
in Germany. In other countries, like UK and The Netherlands, a risk based approach has been adopted. 

3  General procedure for risk analysis 
3.1  Main phases 

In general, the process of the risk analysis methodology comprises the following phases: 

•  Hazard  identification:  to  find  the  parts  of  the  installation,  which  are  of  importance  with 
respect  to  safety  including  mapping  of  the  origin  and  causes  of  possible  accidents  and  the 
quantities  and  properties  of  chemicals  used.  The  HAZID  phase  may  result  either  in  direct 
measures  to  reduce  the  risks  (fully  deterministic)  or  in  (a  list  of)  scenarios  that  are  to  be 
considered quantitatively in consequences and/or frequencies. 

•  Analysis of accident scenarios: to describe the possible modes how an accident can develop, 
e.g.: a  malfunction in a valve triggers  other failure modes and gives a release of a dangerous 
compound to the environment threatening humans.  

•  Analysis  of  frequencies  and  consequences:  the  accident  scenarios  are  analysed  more 
thoroughly.  The  frequency  of  a  scenario  occurring  and  the  consequences  resulting  from  the 
scenario are assessed. The consequences are often measured as the impact on human health or 
even as mortality. Also, the environmental impacts might be used as a measure.  

•  Evaluation of the total risk: the final evaluation of the risk includes a ranking of the scenarios 
found  and  might  be  expressed  as  a  sum  of  the  risk  of  all  the  scenarios.  The  probabilistic 
approach  will  define  the  risk  as  the  product  of  the  frequencies  and  the  consequences.  The 
quantified deterministic approach is based on the possible consequences. 

3.2  Steps of the risk analysis procedure  

A stepwise procedure of a risk analysis could be listed out as follows e.g.8: 

•  Gathering  of  all  relevant  information  regarding  the  hazardous  activity  (e.g.  chemical  plant)  to  be 

analysed and its environment (plant documentation). 

•  Listing  of  the  plant  sections  containing  special  hazardous  substances  and  having  special  safety 

systems (hazard-preventing and consequence-limiting technical and organisational systems). 

•  Analysis  (e.g.  by  HAZOP,  FMEA,  etc.)  of  the  plant’s  danger  potential  with  consideration  of  the 

effectiveness of existing safety systems. 

•  Evaluation of the results of the hazard analysis as to completeness and accuracy of triggering events 

and possible hazard/incident scenarios. 

•  Definition  of  the  hazard/incident  scenarios  to  be  investigated  resulting  in  event  sequences; 
quantitative statement of the frequency of occurrence of triggering events; definition and analysis of 
triggering events in the same manner. 

•  Determination of the effects of individual hazard/incident scenarios (e.g. spread of toxic substances, 
pressure  shock  waves,  thermal  radiation).  The  calculated  effects  of  the  different  hazard/incident 
scenarios are evaluated on the basis of evaluation criteria (e.g. IDLH values or Probit functions for 
substances that are toxic when inhaled, or limit values for pressure shock wave strength and thermal 
radiation intensity). 

•  Combination of the quantitatively determined and evaluated effects and the determined/calculated 

9 

 
 
 
frequencies of occurrence of individual hazard/incident scenarios for the purpose of risk estimation. 

•  Summation of all individual scenarios resulting in the chemical plant’s total risk; evaluation of the 

total risk. 

Most of the steps are common for both qualitative and quantitative risk analysis. Particularly the first 
four steps are fully applicable to both the probabilistic as well as the deterministic studies. Differences 
exist in the extent of quantification in steps 5 and 6. Especially the frequency statement (step 5) in the 
deterministic approach will be qualitative in nature, and be expressed in terms of ‘quite likely’ or ‘this 
has never happened in a similar process’. Evidence is given through casuistry of accidents in the past 
(databases)  or  through  engineering  judgements.  The  consequence  assessment  however  is  usually 
quantified,  even  in  the  deterministic  approach,  especially  for  scenarios  with  the  potential  of  affecting 
people or the environment offsite.  

In  all  cases,  the  eventual  conclusions  are  derived  by  combination  of  the  two  steps  5  and  6.  This 
combination results in an expression of risk (qualitative or semi-quantitative or fully quantitative). This 
‘risk  figure’  forms  the  basis  for  decision  making  about  acceptability  of  the  level  of  risk,  necessity  of 
risk reduction, required accident preparedness, etc. 

In the following sections 3.3 and 3.4, the different approaches of risk analysis used for the purpose of 
land-use planning are described. The purpose of these sections is mainly illustrative. 

3.3  Example: Risk analysis for land-use planning 

Currently  the  following  methods  in  use  for  risk  assessment  in  Land  Use  Planning  may  be 
distinguished9. 

3.3.1  The “consequence-based” Methods 

The “consequence based” approach follows the assessment of consequences of pre-selected credible (or 
conceivable) accidents, without quantifying the likelihood of these accidents.  

The  pre-selected  “reference  scenarios”  can  be  chosen  in  various  ways,  either  by  a  numerical  or  non-
numerical  consideration  of  the  likelihood  of  occurrence  or  by  simple  expert  judgement.  The 
consequences of the accidents mostly are taken into consideration by calculating the distance in which 
the physical and/or human health - relevant magnitude describing the effects (e.g. toxic concentration) 
reaches, for a given exposure period, a threshold value corresponding to the beginning of the undesired 
effect (e.g. irreversible health effect/harm or fatality).  

3.3.2  The “risk-based” Methods  

The “risk-based” approach presents the risk usually in the form of a numerical value for the likelihood 
of a certain undesired effect. The related methods have an underlying calculation of the consequences 
stemming from selected accidents. The consequence calculation may be identical like the  one carried 
out  in  the  consequence-based  methods;  also  the  scenario  selection  may  be  the  same.  The  main 
difference lies in the additional use of the numerical value of the occurrence likelihood of the scenario 
which finally defines the likelihood of the calculated undesired effect (with supplementary factors, e.g. 
the likelihood of weather conditions). 

3.3.3  Hybrid Methods 

•  Semi-Quantitative Methods: 

The semi-quantitative methods are a specific subcategory of the risk-based methods. Here explicitly 
a  quantitative  element  (e.g.  likelihood  analysis)  is  accompanied  by  a  qualitative  one  (e.g.  the 
consequence assessment). 

•  Tables of fixed distances: 

Tables of fixed distances may be considered as a simplified form of the consequence-based method, 
most common as a rough consequence estimate based on selected scenarios, or in their most simple 
form they may have been derived from expert judgment, including consideration of historical data 
or the experience from operating similar plants and are developed on a rather conservative basis 

10 

 
 
 
Tables  of  appropriate  distances  are  often  used  because  of  the  limited  relevance  of  the  case.  The 
distance extent depends mainly on the type of industrial activity or on the quantity and type of the 
hazardous substances present; design characteristics, safety measures and particular features of the 
establishment under question are not explicitly taken into account. 

3.3.4  “State-of-the-Art” – Approach 

The  State-of-the-Art  –  Approach  is  not  a  RA  method  for  LUP  in  the  strict  sense.  The  underlying 
philosophy  is  based  on  the  idea  that  if  measures  exist  sufficient  to  protect  the  population  from  an 
accident considered to be the “worst conceivable”,  sufficient protection will also be available for any 
less serious incident. It is assumed that the consideration of the consequences of the worst conceivable 
accident  (including  a  “precautionary  element”)  has  been  carried  out  during  the  identification  of  a 
specific State-of-the-Art. As the deterministic foundations of the underlying assumptions are mostly not 
retraceable it is necessary to have an add-on consequence-based method. 

As a synthesis of the summary above, the following most important common best practice elements of 
risk assessment in LUP may be listed: 

•  Scenarios: they are used either directly in different numbers, pre-selected (“reference”) or implicitly 

e.g. for generic distance tables ► scenario selection 

•  Event  Frequencies:  the  event  frequency  is  either  a  factor  directly  necessary  for  the  assessment 
method or it appears implicitly in other form, e.g. as limiting condition for the scenario definition 
► determination models & frequency data. 

•  Endpoint Values: they are applied either for individual consequence calculations or are considered 

implicitly in a generic form ► underlying basics for risk/consequence evaluation. 

•  Technical Measures: they influence the event frequency consideration (the acknowledged level of 
confidence  may  vary)  or  are  proposed  as  “additional  measures”  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  an 
undesired  event  or  limit  the  consequences  (with  different  ways  to  impose  them)  ►  feasibility  of 
technical measures vs. incompatibility of situations. 

3.4  Other objectives of risk analysis and their approaches 

The example in section 3.3 was worked out for various options of risk analysis for land-use planning. It 
is  obvious  that  this  application  requires  some  kind  of  measuring,  either  of  risk  (probabilistic)  or  of 
consequences (deterministic). Setting safety zones or defining exclusion zones requires to some extent 
the use of modelling and computation.  

Also  for  off-site  emergency  response  planning  (ERP)  and  the  definition  of  resource  requirements, 
estimation of potential consequence areas and/or numbers of potential victims of a calamity requires an 
approach  that  indicates  clearly  the  zones  of  concern.  Response  organisations  often  define  a  few 
reference incidents (scenarios) for training and preparedness. Risk analysis for licence application (LIC) 
or for identification of risk reducing measures (RRM) is often qualitative or semi-quantitative in nature. 
Structured techniques and lessons learned are applied to determine the required level of safety, judged 
against qualitative principles like ‘State-of-the-Art’, ‘As Low As Reasonable Achievable (ALARA), or 
Practicable  (ALARP)’,  ‘Best  Available  Technique  (BAT)’,  ‘Best  Practice’,  etc.  At  the  other  hand,  in 
some applications a fully quantified probabilistic approach is followed, for instance in power generation 
and in nuclear reactors. A last possible objective of risk analysis mentioned here, is occupational safety: 
the  risk  that  workers  are  exposed  to  during  their  job.  Both  deterministic  methodologies  as  well  as 
probabilistic  quantification  are  applied.  Moreover,  human  reliability  assessment  and  ergonomics  are 
disciplines  that  are  exploited  in  occupational  risk  analysis.  Statistical  evaluation  of  accident  histories 
forms  an  important  element  of  focussing  on  particular  risky  jobs.  The  issue  of  ‘internal  risks’  is 
excluded from the scope of this study.e.g. 10  

11 

 
 
 
 
4 
4.1 

Inventory of data from various countries: methods and results 

Inventory sources and methods 

The comparison of risk analysis methods applied in various countries and by various organisations was 
aimed  at  describing  the  actual  situation:  which  are  the  current  practices  and  what  is  the  nature  of 
results?  In  principle,  the  inventory  should  focus  on  information  available  in  open  bibliography  in 
sources like periodicals, conference proceedings and the internet. 

These open sources however appeared not sufficiently detailed or accessible for a full comparison of all 
issues of relevance. Therefore a direct collection of data from a representative sample of countries was 
considered necessary to provide the issues that are relevant for the comparison of risk analysis practices 
and for the development of a comparison template. 

4.1.1  Questionnaire 

During  the  study,  it  appeared  that  a  thorough  inventory  of  practices  and  methodologies  would  not be 
feasible without enquiries of persons and organisations directly involved in decision-making about risk 
analysis or in doing such studies. A format of an elementary questionnaire was developed and sent out 
to representatives in a limited number of countries. The questionnaire comprised the inventory of the 
following main issues: 

1)  Definition of risk, or risk characterisation 

2)  Methodology of risk analysis 

•  Overall structure and phasing 

•  Methods of hazard identification 

•  Frequency assessment 

•  Consequence assessment 

•  Risk calculation and presentation 

3)  Risk mapping and decision making 

The  questionnaire  (Annex  1),  called  ‘Comparison  Scheme’,  together  with  a  ‘Clarification  document’ 
were  filled  in  for  the  situation  in  The  Netherlands,  serving  as  a  format  to  other  countries  to  ensure 
uniformity in the collection of data. 

4.1.2  Selection of countries 

It appeared that in many countries, especially in the newly accessed EU Member States, a clear policy 
on implementation of Seveso-II was not yet in place. It was therefore decided that the detailed inventory 
could best be carried out for a limited number of ‘key countries’, based on intensity of industrialisation 
and on regions where the policy development and the ‘time of learning experience’ would be more or 
less in a stage of maturity. 

The following regions and countries were selected: 

•  Western Europe: The Netherlands (NL), Belgium (BE), United Kingdom (UK), Germany (DE); 

•  Southern Europe & Mediterranean: France (FR), Spain (ES), Greece (GR); 

•  Northern Europe / Scandinavia: Finland (FI). 

The questionnaire was sent to one representative per a  country. From  countries that were  approached 
with the full questionnaire, information was received from FR, DE, ES and FI. For BE and UK, part of 
the information was gathered from various internet sites and in the scope of the project SHAPE-RISK11.  

Additional  information  from  other  countries  that  was  collected  during  literature  searches  and/or  from 
hands-on experience within TNO is also included in the inventory. Such information is reported here as 
well,  but  in  a  less  structured  format  than  for  the  above  named  countries.  This  also  includes  a  few 
countries outside Europe: USA and Israel. 

12 

 
 
 
The findings of the various countries / practices are summarised in section 4.2 and in Annex 2. Section 
4.3 summarises the key findings of the comparison, similarities and differences. 

4.2 

Inventory results 

In this section, the results of the inventories in various countries are given.  

4.2.1  The Netherlands 

In  The  Netherlands,  a  fully  quantified  probabilistic  risk  assessment  (QRA)  is  required  in  the  safety 
report for each of the top tier Seveso-II sites. Moreover, competent authorities may require a QRA to be 
carried out as part of a permit procedure for new installations or for urban developments, also for non-
Seveso installations. The scenarios for the QRA have been prefixed by the national Committee for the 
Prevention of Disasters (CPR). 

Acceptance  criteria  are  in  place  both  for  location  specific  risk  (individual  risk)  and  for  societal  risk, 
outside  the  plant’s  boundaries.  Additionally,  for  specific  types  of  enterprises  fixed  safety  zoning 
distances between the installation and the populated surroundings are applied. These zoning distances 
are also risk based; they reflect the (average) distance for location specific risk LR = 10-6/year. 
The so called national Committee for the Prevention of Disasters (CPR)12 has issued several guidelines 
on  modelling  and  quantifying  the  risks  and  the  consequences  of  dealing  with  dangerous  materials. 
These  ‘coloured  books’  form  the  standard  for  QRAs  in  the  Netherlands  and  are  increasingly  used  in 
countries abroad as well.  
The  Purple  Book  (CPR-18E)12  gives  the  standardised  procedures  for  a  QRA  in  the  Netherlands, 
including reference scenarios for equipment on industrial sites and for transport of dangerous goods by 
road and rail and over inland waterways, and their frequency of occurrence. 
The Yellow Book (CPR-14E)12 presents recommended  models for physical effect calculations for the 
release,  evaporation  and  dispersion  of  hazardous  materials  and  for  assessing  thermal  radiation  due  to 
fire, overpressures due to explosion and exposure to toxic dose. 
In the Green Book (CPR-16E)12 one finds models for assessing the potential damage due to exposure to 
the mentioned effects.  

In  practice,  over  90%  of  the  QRAs  follow  the  mentioned  CPR  guidelines.  Substitution  of  the 
recommended  methods,  models  and  figures  by  alternative  solutions  would  only  be  accepted  if  the 
alternatives  are  demonstrated  to  be  more  appropriate  to  the  subject  of  study.  This  then  requires  the 
consent of the competent authority. 

4.2.2  Belgium / Flanders 

Belgium is a federal state where regulations and their implementation are different for the two regions 
Flanders and Walloon. The Flemish approach is strongly related to the Dutch one (probabilistic). The 
Dutch  CPR  guidelines  are  also  recommended  as  standard  in  Flanders.  For  probability  and  frequency 
assessment, the Flemish authorities13 have developed their own set of figures. 

For the acceptance criteria for location specific risk three types of surroundings are distinguished: the 
boundary  of  the  establishment,  the  boundary  of  the  industrial  area  and  the  location  of  vulnerable 
objects. Moreover, distinction is made in the tolerance limits between existing situations and new ones. 

4.2.3  Germany 

The German approach14 is a fully deterministic one. This follows from a constitutional requirement that, 
in principle, activities that can lead to accidents with life- or health threatening effects shall never be 
tolerated. This principle was further acknowledged in procedures around the Kalkar debate in the late 
1970s. Whatever measures can be taken to reduce the possibility of occurrence of such accidents shall 
be applied. The risk analysis thus forms the basis for evaluating whether state-of-the-art technologies 
are applied. Application of this is in principle a strict condition for LIC procedures. Basis is a hazard 
identification  process  using  structured  techniques  like  HAZOP,  FMEA  and  Checklists,  as  well  as 
accident history and expert opinions. 

13 

 
 
 
Germany  applies  generic  safety  distances  between  potentially  hazardous  installations  and  vulnerable 
(populated)  areas.  The  values  of  the  safety  distances  have  mostly  been  derived  through  expert 
judgement and based on historical data and experience with similar installations / situations. Eventually, 
for the remaining hazards the possible consequence areas are assessed. The outcome of the consequence 
assessment  is  a  consequence  distance  for  (a  limited  number  of)  foreseeable  accident  scenarios. 
Quantification of damage areas is practically limited to the purpose of LUP. 

Recently,  a  discussion  has  started  to  explore  the  possibilities  of  introducing  the  probabilistic  risk 
approach  in  Germany  as  well.  The  Störfall  Kommission15,16  has  issued  a  discussion  document    for 
exploring  the  feasibility  of  implementing  the  risk  approach  in  Germany.  This  is  partly  driven  by 
developments like the definition of the “Eurocodes”c which are of semi-probabilistic nature, partly by 
the  multinational  character  of  companies;  nevertheless  the  future  implication  cannot  be  foreseen 
currently. 

4.2.4  France 

Till recently, the French regulations followed the deterministic approach. The requirements comprised 
the  presentation  of  consequence  distances  for  a  number  of  scenarios  that  are  to  be  determined  by  the 
plant owner. Some guidelines on modelling were available, but no strict requirements were set. 

This has changed after the Toulouse tragedy in 2001 where a series of explosions of ammonium nitrate 
caused about twenty fatalities, multiple number of injures and extensive property damage. Since then, 
the  French  government  has  issued  several  new  and  stricter  regulations,  especially  for  land-use 
planning17,18,19,20.  Several  guidelines  are  now  available  giving  the  types  of  loss  of  containment, 
analytical  equations  for  assessing  consequence  distances  for  typical  events,  and  prescription  of  the 
presentation of the results. End points of calculations are clearly set, e.g. levels of heat radiation or toxic 
exposure.  Also  the  procedures  followed  to  select  scenarios  to  be  included  in  the  safety  report,  have 
recently been set more clear and uniform. This includes mandatory consultation of accident databases, 
structured identification methods (e.g. HAZOP) and selection of relevant scenarios with the help of a 
risk matrix. A quantified frequency assessment is (will be) required to give evidence that the likelihood 
of  certain  scenarios  is  sufficiently  low  (e.g.  <  10-6/year)  in  order  to  rule  them  out  from  the  external 
effects calculations. A (revised) set of requirements is expected to be issued in 2005. 

The  French  government  has  assigned  a  limited  number  of  independent  experts  (‘Tiers  Experts’)  that 
will  assist  in  the  evaluation  of  safety  reports  submitted  by  the  plant  owners.  These  experts  regularly 
meet  to  exchange  views  and  experiences,  which  results  in  more  uniformity  and  increasing 
understanding  about  the  issues  of  risk  analysis.  Their  conclusions  will  probably  be  reflected  in  the 
future guidelines. It appears obvious that the current practice in France is a very dynamic one, in which 
the probabilistic phenomena will receive an increasing interest.21,22

4.2.5  United Kingdom 

In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  risk  analysis  approach  is  primarily  a  probabilistic  one.  In  safety  reports 
according to Seveso-II (COMAH), a quantified risk assessment is required. The procedures for a QRA 
are  not  very  strictly  prescribed,  though  the  competent  authority,  the  UK-HSE,  has  developed  several 
guidance documents23,24,25 for assisting the risk analysts.  

The QRA procedure and phasing is one according to ‘proportionality’, which means that the extent of 
detail of a QRA shall be proportional to the risk generated and/or to the complexity of the process or 
installation  in  question.  In  practice,  this  means  that  for  relatively  simple  situations  a  deterministic  or 
even  qualitative  approach  is  followed.  If  then  no  (external)  hazard  is  expected,  the  procedure  of  risk 
analysis is satisfied. However, in cases where off-site hazard may occur or high societal concerns exist, 
a  more  in  depth  analysis  of  scenarios,  their  causes  and  mitigating  measures  is  required.  Quantified 
probabilistic  assessment  of  these  issues  is  then  required.  In  decision-making,  ALARP26,27  motivation 
plays a crucial role. 

Acceptability  criteria  are  set  for  both  individual  risk  and  societal  risk.  The  HSE  will  provide 
recommendations with regard to a planned (urban or industrial) development: ‘advise against’ or ‘don’t 

c Eurocode: Harmonized European set of structural design codes for building and civil engineering works 

14 

 
 
 
                                                     
 
advise against’. 

4.2.6  Spain  

In  Spain,  the  formal  national  requirements  with  regard  to  Seveso-II  are  described  in  the  ‘Directriz 
Basica’28. The approach with regard to risk analysis is basically a deterministic one. For a number of 
accident  scenarios,  the  consequence  areas  (distances)  have  to  be  assessed  and  mapped  for  a  set  of 
prescribed effect values like heat radiation and explosion overpressure29. Not only areas for fatalities are 
required,  but  also  areas  with  potential  injures.  The  values  are  directly  related  to  emergency  response 
levels.  Except  for  Catalonia,  policy  for  using  risk  analysis  for  LIC  or  LUP  appears  hardly to  exist  in 
Spain. 

Regional  differences  are  observed  in  Spain.  In  the  province  Catalonia  for  instance,  the  regional 
authorities  often  require  a  probabilistic  assessment  to  be  provided  in  addition  to  the  national 
requirements. Use of the Dutch tools and CPR-models is encouraged. 

4.2.7  Finland 

In Finland30, the deterministic risk assessment approach is applied in the industry related to dangerous 
chemicals. Finnish chemicals legislation doesn't specify the methods that should be used in identifying 
hazards or evaluating risks. The competent authority (TUKES) requires a description and the control of 
possible hazards at the plant, as well as measures for protection and intervention in the limiting of the 
consequences  of  accidents.  At  the  higher  tier  plants  the  use  of  systematic  methods  is  required  by  the 
competent  authority.  Consequences  of  major  accidents  are  usually  evaluated  by  using  the  models  of 
accidental releases. The results of risk analysis can also be used for emergency response planning, by 
the local rescue services. 

Risks  are  often  evaluated  by  using  a  semi  quantitative  assessment,  e.g.  a  risk  matrix,  in  which  an 
evaluation is based on simple numerical values. In this method evaluated consequences are multiplied 
by  an  evaluated  likelihood  of  an  incidence.  The  result  describes  a  severity  of  a  risk.  This  type  of 
assessment is a prevailing practice in the higher tier plants, but not a mandatory one for submission in a 
safety report. 

For the revising and evaluation of the Safety Reports, TUKES uses a "workbook" in which the method 
is based on the EFQM model, on quality management. The workbook contains information on required 
criteria. The book is not available to industries and consultants. 

4.2.8  Switzerland 

Although Switzerland is not an EU Member State, the Swiss Agency for the Environment, Forest and 
Landscape  (SAEFL,  BUWAL)  has  reflected  the  Seveso  II  Directive  in  most  of  the  regulations  with 
regard to major hazard industries: the Ordinance on Protection against Major Accidents (OMA)31. This 
Ordinance  reflects  well-established  procedures  in  risk  control,  in  particular  those  used  in  The 
Netherlands in the context of the environment control policy, e.g. the quantitative risk approach. At the 
same time, the OMA requires implementation of the state-of-the-art technology in agreement with the 
German practice. 

The following definitions for ‘hazard potential’ and ‘risk’ are given in OMA: 

• 

• 

‘Hazard  potential’  means  the  sum  of  all  the  consequences  which  substances,  products,  special 
wastes, micro-organisms or dangerous goods could have as a result of their quantity and properties. 

‘Risk’  shall  be  determined  by  the  extent  of  the  possible  damage  to  the  population  or  the 
environment, caused by major accidents and by the probability of the latter occurring. 

Assessment of hazard potential and risks is done in a two steps procedure: (1) submission of a Summary 
Report by the facility owner, and (2) submission of a quantitative risk assessment (QRA), in case the 
Summary  Report  shows  that  major  accidents  and  serious  damage  must  be  expected.  Fault/Event-tree 
assessment is an essential element in QRAs in Switzerland. In addition to this top-down approach, also 
a bottom-up approach of causes is encouraged, for instance through HAZOP, FMEA and similar. The 
need for consistency in the application of the OMA and in the conduct of QRAs was recognised in an 
early  stage.  Therefore,  the  SAEFL  published  a  series  of  guidance  documents  for  risk  analysts  and 

15 

 
 
 
reviewers. 

The objective of risk assessment is twofold: (i) to control the risk level of the major hazard facilities, 
and  (ii)  to  inform  the  public.  Considerable  effort  has  been  put  into  making  the  hazard  and  risk 
assessment simple and accessible to the facility owners. Still, it is expected that both risk analysts and 
reviewers be knowledgeable in the principles of QRA. The consequence models are supported by LoC 
events  defined  in  the  Manuals.  Typically,  in  Switzerland  the  (presentation  of)  risk  assessment  covers 
more  than  only  danger  to  life  among  the  public.  Damage  indicators  (‘Disaster  Values’)  have  been 
defined in the OMA, covering damage to man, natural resources, and property. 

For  each  ‘hazard  recipient’  the  Disaster  Values  are  expressed  on  a  uniform  scale  of  three  categories: 
“Accident”, “Major Accident” and “Catastrophe”. In the societal risk curve, these Disaster Values are 
presented against the expected frequency of occurrence. The acceptability matrix of the curve presents 
four domains, namely: 

•  No serious damage, i.e. no group risk: < 10 fatalities, or < 100 injures; 

•  Acceptable: 10 fatalities at f < 10-7/year, with N2 rule for risk aversion;  

•  Unacceptable: 10 fatalities at f > 10-5/year, with N2 rule for risk aversion; 

•  Transition, the area between “Acceptable” and “Unacceptable”. 

4.2.9  Greece 

In Greece, the requirements for the safety report are limited to common interpretations of the Seveso II 
text, and thus neither quantitative risk analysis nor environmental risk studies are required.  

As far as safety report supporting instruments are concerned, Greek practice is poor in instruments and 
guidance32.  The  single  exception  is  a  zoning  system  with  certain  consequence  criteria  that  have  been 
widely  accepted  since  they  have  been  proposed  by  the  Ministry  of  Environment  for  the  external 
emergency plan of industrial areas. The zoning system comprises three levels of consequences that are 
based  on  damage  criteria  such  as  TLVs  for  toxic  substances  and  certain  thermal  doses  and 
overpressures.  This  system  is  widely  accepted  but  not  formally  adopted.  Safety  reports  have  been 
developed  using  these  criteria  to  identify  the  extent  of  possible  damage  in  the  surroundings  of  the 
establishments.  

In Greece, formal risk criteria are neither used, nor have they been proposed by any of the cooperating 
authorities.  Some  safety  reports  were  developed  with  the  support  of  certain  risk  criteria  used  in 
industrial  practices  of  other  EU  member  states.  The  Greek  authorities  have  planned  a  programme  to 
develop national guidance documents and to provide training to authority employees, in order to create 
more uniformity and consensus in risk analysis practices. 

From an investigation (questionnaire) taken from a few ‘Seveso higher tier’ companies in the scope of 
SHAPE-RISK, the following information on used methods was collected: 

•  For hazard identification and/or LoC definition: International databases of failure records, Reports 
from  equipment  reviews,  Checklists,  Literature  and  international  guidelines,  Reports  on  ‘lessons 
learnt’ and on ‘near miss analysis’, LNG Standards from NFPA and EN. 

•  For  identification  of  failure  causes:  HAZOP,  Accident  analysis, What-If,  Fault-tree  &  Event-tree, 

International guidelines. 

•  For  consequence  assessment:  Gas/toxic  cloud  dispersion  model  in  PHAST-Pro  (refineries), 

Scenarios for release and ignition of LNG: dispersion with DEGADIS. 

•  For QRA: QRA is not required 

Although QRA is not required nor guidance on quantitative data is given, the following information and 
data sources are mentioned for risk assessment: 

•  Seveso I: individual risk and societal risk; Seveso-II: Dose zones 

•  Dose zones defined by the Ministry of Environment 

•  Meteorological data 

16 

 
 
 
•  Substance characteristics 

•  Quantification of external effects based on distances of toxicity and radiation levels. 

4.2.10  Sweden 

From Sweden, the information is based on documentation from the Rescue Service Agency33. Decision 
support  is  based  on  a  risk  matrix  approach,  in  which  semi-quantitative  classification  of  consequence 
severity  and  incident  likelihood  are  presented.  Consequences  are  expressed  in  human  life,  damage  to 
the environment and financial loss of property. The results are used to prioritise risks in municipalities, 
to evaluate possibilities for accident prevention and to plan for emergencies. 

4.2.11  United States of America 

In  the  USA,  the  responsibility  of  risk  assessment  requirements  lays  with  the  US-EPA.  They  have 
developed  the  policy  of  Risk  Management  Plan  (RMP)34  which  requires  major  hazard  industries  to 
submit an RMP document. This document shall provide information primarily required for emergency 
response planning. Basically, the approach is a deterministic one.  

At least two scenarios have to be evaluated and to be quantified in terms of consequence distances for 
each relevant installation:  

•  The first one is a major or catastrophic incident, usually defined as the loss of containment of an 

installation within 10 minutes, at constant rate;  

•  The second one is a scenario that is considered to be a ‘more likely serious incident’, to be defined 

by the operator.  

For both, the consequences have to be assessed and mapped. The results are communicated to the local 
authorities and the public, and form the basis for the civil protection agencies and public forums.  

US-EPA  provides  guidance  documents  and  consequence  assessment  software  to  support  a  consistent 
and uniform application of the matter. No evidence has been found that risk analysis results are used for 
environmental permit procedures. The results do play a role in land-use planning, though no formal risk 
based acceptance criteria are used. 

4.2.12  Israel  

Although a full QRA is not yet mandatory in Israel, the national Ministry of Environment has adopted 
the  approach  of  the  Dutch  Purple  Book  (CPR-18)12  and  requires  evaluating  LoC  events  as  defined 
therein. Scenarios that have the potential of life threatening exposure to the public shall be mitigated to 
a likelihood of occurrence of less than 10-6 per year. The base frequency is taken from the Purple Book, 
and the effects of mitigating measures must be demonstrated for reduction of the likelihood of exposure 
to below the set limits. 

In  the  Haifa  Town  area,  generally  the  QRA  approach  is  followed,  identical  to  the  Dutch  approach. 
Results are used for permit purposes and for land use decisions. 

4.3  Observations and conclusions from comparison over seven countries 

The investigation in this report covers the risk analysis approach and practices of twelve countries. For 
seven  of  them,  an  extensive  investigation  has  been  carried  out.  The  most  obvious  or  remarkable 
conclusions  of  this  inventory  are  discussed  in  this  chapter  and  are  summarised  in  Table  4.1.  An 
extensive overview of practices is given in Annex 4. 

4.3.1  General observations 

The investigation revealed that different situations exist with regard to homogeneous application of risk 
analysis methodologies: 

i)  situations where the practices of risk analysis are strictly prescribed by the government or 

competent authority (e.g. the CPR ‘coloured books’12 in The Netherlands); 

ii)  situations where a generally accepted practice is followed without being precisely prescribed; and  

17 

 
 
 
iii)  situations where the initiative to choose and apply the preferred methodologies is left to the 

operator, for instance because these belong to a company’s strategy. 

For situations (ii) and (iii) the country’s approaches cannot be exactly defined. The approach in Finland 
for  instance  appears  to  be  category  (iii),  while  in  Germany  both  (ii)  and  (iii)  seem  to  exist.  The 
distinction in the mentioned situations is the most obvious in the phase of hazard identification. 

Another obvious difference in practices applied (or required), even within a specific country, originates 
from  the  objective  of  a  particular  risk  analysis.  One  may  distinguish  in  the  following  areas  of 
application: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 

permit / license application (LIC); 
evaluating need and means of risk reduction / demonstration of ALARA (RRM); 
land-use planning (LUP); 
emergency response planning (ERP); 
occupational safety (OCS). 

And  finally  there  is  a  category  of  purely  administrative  reasons:  ‘to  fulfil  the  Seveso  requirements, 
because the Directive requires us so!’ 

The  principle  of  evaluation  whether  a  certain  situation  is  “ALARA”  (or  ALARP:  As  Low  As 
Reasonably  Practicable;  or  State-of-the-Art)  is  followed  in  several  countries,  but  with  different 
background.  This  can  be  explained  e.g.  for  the  situations  in  Germany  and  in  United  Kingdom.  The 
fundamental  difference  can  be  understood  as  follows:  In  Germany  risk  reduction  measures  are 
investigated  as  an  integral  part  of  the  risk  analysis,  and  are  evaluated  and  considered  till  the  level  of 
‘justifiable risk’ is achieved as defined by the “State-of-the-Art”. Consequence assessment is done in a 
last  stage,  when  all  reasonable  options  of  minimising  the  risks  have  been  implemented,  and  only  for 
specific purposes as LUP zoning or emergency response. Contrary, in United Kingdom the evaluation 
starts with the quantification of consequence and likelihood, and additional risk reduction is proposed if 
certain acceptance criteria are exceeded. 

4.3.2  Conclusions on comparability 

From the summary in the previous section and Annex 2, it is concluded that there is a big variation in 
the risk analysis practices in the investigated countries. Comparison of the end results of a risk analysis, 
the so called ‘risk figure’, will therefore be difficult if not impossible for most of the decision makers 
and stakeholders defined for this investigation. 

The  differences  are  not  only  caused  by  the  adopted  approach  (deterministic  versus  probabilistic),  but 
also by a number of other factors like: 

•  The procedures of selecting scenarios relevant for the risk analysis, and for discarding others. Some 
situations  allow  discarding  scenarios  because  of  their  limited  consequences  (e.g.  no  harm  outside 
the  fence),  while  others  allow  neglecting  the  worst  case  scenarios  which  are  considered  too 
incredible  (very  low  frequency),  or  they  are  entirely  used  only  for  emergency  response.  In  other 
words: in one case the selection (and negation) of safety-relevant installations and scenarios is done 
on the basis of consequence, while in other situations this is done on the basis of likelihood.  

•  The purpose of the risk analysis is another cause of differences in the analysis results. For example, 
it  is  obvious  that  differences  occur  in  the  levels  of  calculated  consequences  that  will  be  used  for 
emergency response planning and those used for land-use planning. These differences are reflected, 
among others, in the values of the end-point of calculation. These appear to vary by a factor of 3 to 
6 for thermal radiation and overpressure, and even more for toxic materials. 

•  There appears to be a significant difference in the definition of e.g. individual risk between the two 
probabilistic approaches of United Kingdom and The Netherlands. The main difference lies in the 
definition of the respective consequences:  

- 

In the Dutch definition, the reference consequence is (the likelihood of) fatality. For instance: if 
at  a  certain  location  an  effect  occurs  that  would  lead  to  50%  fatality,  according  to  a  probit 
function, then the individual risk is 0.5 times the frequency that the effect occurs. Likewise the 
effect resulting in 1% fatality leads to an individual risk equal to 0.01 times the frequency of the 
effect. 

18 

 
 
 
- 

In  the  English  definition,  the  figure  of  individual  risk  is  not  corrected  for  this  consequence 
factor.  The  IR  is  expressed  as  the  frequency  that  a  person  receives  a  harm  (=  exposure  to  an 
effect) that would result in 50% or 1% fatality. 

Eventually,  the  risk  figures  may  differ  by  a  factor  of  100  in  the  area  away  from  the  scene  of  the 
accident, only due to this difference in definitions. 

•  Regarding tools and methods, the following is observed: 

- 

In  most  of  the  countries,  casuistry  of  past  accident  is  used  as  one  of  the  means  of  hazard 
identification.  Accident  databases  are  used  for  that.  It  appears  that  the  various  countries  use 
only  their  ‘own’  database,  while  sharing  experience  between  data  sources  would  probably 
reveal additional relevant scenarios which are now easily overlooked. The following databases 
have been mentioned in this study: FACTS (NL), MHIDAS (UK), ZEMA (DE), ARIA (FR), 
VARO (FI) and MARS (EU). 

-  Harmonisation in consequence modelling would probably also limit the variation in results, like 

in the Netherlands.  

19 

 
 
 
 
Country 

Approach 

Objectives 

Risk 

HAZID 

Frequency 

Consequences 

End-point 

Risk figure 

Tools 

Criteria 

Netherlands 

P-QRA 

LUP-LIC-RM-ER 

IR, SR 
(cumul) 

Generic 
LoCs, CPR-
18 

CPR-18 

CPR-14/16 

Belgium / 
Flanders 

P-QRA 

LIC-LUP-ER 

IR, SR 
(cumul) 

Generic LoCs 

Aminal 

CPR-14/16 

1% fatality: heat radiation 9.8 
kW/m^2, overpressure 100 mbar, 
toxic 1% lethality according to probit 
function 

IR: contours  
10-4 – 10-8

SR: fN curve 

CPR-14/16/18; 
several software 
accepted. 

IR strict: < 10-6

GR advised: 10 fat 
< 10-5, fN2

AGW, VRW 

1% fatality: heat radiation 9.8 
kW/m^2, overpressure 40 mbar, 
toxic 1% lethality according to probit 
function 

IR: contours  
10-4 – 10-8

SR: fN curve 

Aminal + CPR-
14/16/18; several 
software 
accepted. 

IR three levels, and 
separate for 
existing and new. 

AGW, VRW 

GR advised: 10 fat 
< 10-5, fN1; N<1000 

Germany 

D-QL 

LIC-RM-LUP-ER 

N.A. 

HAZOP + 
Experts 

N.A. 

VDI + 
international 
models 

Toxic:  ERPG-2  and  ERPG-3;  Heat 
radiation 1.6 kW/m^2;  explosion  0.1 
bar 

N.A. 

No fixed models; 
VDI models 
preferred. 

N.A. 

France 

D-QL/QN 

LIC-RM-LUP-ER 

N.A. 

Casuistry + 
HAZOP + 
generic LoCs 

N.A. 

Distances SEL 
& SEI 

Risk matrix 
for selection 
of LoCs 

Thermal radiation: SEL = 5 kW/m2 , 
SEI = 3 kW/m^2. Overpressure: SEL 
= 140 mbar, SEI = 50 mbar. Toxics: 
SEL (1% and 5%) and SEI; IDLH. 

SEL & SEI 

UIC, UFIP, CPR-
14 

United 
Kingdom 

D-QL→P-QRA 

LIC-RM-LUP 

IR, SR 

Generic LoCs  Generic 

(proportionality) 

figures and 
CPR-18 

Company 
models; HSE 
guidance; CPR-
14 

Probit-based values for hypothetical 
person: 1%, 10% and 50% fatality. 
Thermal radiation 500 
(kW/m^2)^4/3,s; overpressure 70 
mbar 

IR: contours 

GR: for indiv. 
LoCs 

HSE guidance 
documents; no 
preferred 
software. 

SEL  and  SEI  for 
two  categories  of 
urban 
development: 
housing  and  public 
buildings. 

IR: 10-6; public 10-4.  

Spain 

D-QN 

ER 

N.A., 
except for 
Catalonia 

No fixed 
method 

N.A., except 
for Catalonia 
with CPR-18 

Effects not fixed. 
Damage criteria 
in DB. 

Probit-based for thermal radiation 
and toxics. Thermal: ZI = 250 TDU, 
ZA = 115 TDU, ZD = 8 kW/m^2. 
Overpressure: ZI = 125 mbar, ZA = 
50 mbar, ZD = 160 mbar. Toxics ZI = 
ERPG-2, ZA = ERPG-1. 

N.A., except for 
Catalonia 

Nothing fixed 

N.A.; criteria 
drafted for 
Catalonia. 

Finland 

D-QL/QN 

LIC 

N.A. 

No fixed 
method 

N.A. 

No fixed models 

Not specified. Safety / separation 
distances are specified for avoiding 
domino effects. 

N.A. 

N.A. 

Consequence 
models + 
Workbook for the 
evaluation of 
safety reports  

20 

 
 
 
5  Risk analysis practices for transport of dangerous materials 

5.1  General 

The  main  scope  of  this  investigation  is  primarily  focussed  on  installations  falling  under  SEVESO-II 
Directive. In practice, local decision makers also have to deal with the risks of transport of dangerous 
goods.  Massive  amounts  of  chemicals  like  chlorine,  ammonia,  LPG  and  gasoline  are  transported 
between industrial sites and harbour terminals, often crossing country boundaries. Transportation routes 
(road, rail, pipeline and sometimes also water) often cross densely populated areas and cities for which 
urban development and emergency preparedness are a matter of great concern to the public and to the 
local  authorities.  Especially  around  railway  stations,  which  are  usually  located  in  city  centres,  the 
presence  of  many  people  is  a  common  issue  (train  passengers,  other  public  transport,  offices  and 
houses)  together  with  passing  transports  of  dangerous  chemicals.  An  accident  may  result  in  many 
casualties.  Another  issue  of  concern  are  road-  and  rail  tunnels  where  high  capital  loss  and  societal 
disruption may occur in case of an accident with flammable materials transport. 

Essentially, there are three different situations (objectives) for which a risk assessment for transport can 
be made: 

A.  Risk  inventory  for  environmental  or  land-use  planning:  e.g.  risk  maps,  of  transport  routes  and 

emergency planning. 

B.  Risk comparison of different transport options, such as planning of transport streams and transport 

routes: e.g. evaluation of different options for transport modes and/or transport routes. 

C.  Risk  assessment  for  a  specific  location:  e.g.  check  on  risk  criteria  and  the  effect  of  specific 

measures. 

From a global inventory of practices and experiences of application of risk analysis in various countries 
it  can  be  concluded  that  several  transport  risk  studies  have  been  conducted  in  the  past,  but  that 
harmonisation of approaches and criteria still hardly exist.  

An in-depth evaluation of practices across Europe appeared not feasible within the scope of this study. 
Insufficient data has been collected to develop a specific template for the comparison of risk analysis 
approaches and results between the various countries. 

Therefore,  this  chapter  gives  a  non-limitative  overview  of  observations  of  experiences  and 
developments in this field. 

5.2  Pipelines transport 

The  major  application  of  pipeline  transport  in  Europe  is  for  distribution  of  natural  gas.  Millions  of 
kilometres of NG pipelines cross the states and the continent. Other applications of pipeline transport 
comprise  oil  products  (crude  oil,  gasoline,  diesel  oil,  kerosene,  LPG)  and  general  purpose  chemicals 
like  ammonia,  ethylene,  propylene,  etc.  Moreover,  between  industrial  sites  and  (harbour)  terminals 
several chemicals are transferred by pipelines, including acrylonitril, benzene, LPG products, chlorine, 
etc. 

In most countries, there exists a policy of reducing risks around natural gas pipelines by application of 
safety  zones.  Within  such  zones,  several  activities  will  not  be  allowed;  e.g.  no  houses  or  other 
vulnerable  objects  shall  be  built,  no  ground  works  or  no  vegetation  shall  be  applied.  Basically,  there 
exist two approaches or philosophies in setting the zoning requirements.  

The first one aims at protecting the pipeline from being damaged by activities within its direct vicinity. 
Such activities include construction of buildings, ground digging, excavation, etc., but also (interference 
with) other infrastructural objects like crossing roads, electrical power cables, etc. Guidelines and codes 
of practice are in force for the construction and operation of such pipelines and for the design of their 
surroundings.  This  includes  both  safety  distances  and  depth  of  burial,  as  well  as  extra  mechanical 
protection  of  the  pipes.  Traditionally,  most  of  these  practices  have  been  developed  by  the  pipeline 
operators who also assume the responsibility of the enforcement of the requirements. 

21 

 
 
The second approach aims at protecting the surroundings from potential hazards caused by the pipeline 
and its contents. The objective of this approach is to create sufficient distance between the pipeline and 
vulnerable areas and the public, so as not to cause an unacceptable risk of exposure to the consequences 
of a release from the pipeline. In countries where this philosophy is followed, mostly the society and the 
government have initiated the regulations. 

From  risk  analysis  point  of  view  the  two  approaches  seem  to  differ  fundamentally.  The  first  one 
primarily aims at avoiding loss of containment from a pipeline, while the second one intends to reduce 
the (risk of) consequences. In fact, the first approach can be classified as qualitative and deterministic, 
while  the  second  one  is  quantified  and  even  probabilistic  in  some  cases.  In  the  Netherlands,  for 
instance, the zoning distances are derived from a QRA determining the 10-6 individual risk contour. 

In  most cases the required safety distances are  a function of pipeline properties like internal pressure 
and pipeline diameter. In a risk based approach, also other protective parameters are taken into account, 
like:  depth  of  burial,  presence  of  physical  protection,  presence  of  isolation  stations,  leak  detection, 
periodical monitoring of the pipeline track, external interference prevention, public information centre, 
etc.35

For pipelines other than those for transport of natural gas, specific risk analysis studies are sometimes 
required within the scope of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The approaches often follow 
the national policy on risk assessment and acceptance criteria as applicable for industrial installations. It 
appears  that  the  development  of  dedicated  methodologies,  modelling  and  failure  data  sets  is  still 
continuing, mostly at national scale. The problem with existing pipelines often is that the exact routes 
of a pipeline networks are not properly documented in authority’s archives. 

5.3  Road and rail transport 

The transport of hazardous goods across Europe by road and by rail involves a wide range of chemicals. 
Harmonisation of regulations exists mainly on the technical and mechanical provisions on the transport 
vehicles  (truck  or  rail  wagon)  in  RID-  and  ADR-rules.  Most  of  these  requirements  are  based  on 
qualitative and deterministic approaches, often initiated by lessons from past accidents. Despite these 
international  rules,  differences  still  appear  to  exist  in  specific  national  requirements  like  safety 
provisions on the vehicle and traffic rules. Particularly for road transport, the management of risks to 
the  public  living  or  working  close  to  transport  routes  often  appears  to  be  a  decentralised  concern:  a 
concern of local and regional authorities.  

Potential high risk situations, where transport routes run close to (or even cross) populated areas, are 
often solved by assigning dedicated routes for dangerous transport. There are restriction areas for such 
transports. In most cases, the assignment of routes is done on qualitative sound arguments or because 
accident statistics show that a certain route poses higher than average risks of traffic accidents. Also the 
vulnerable surroundings of a certain road may play a role: e.g. avoid dangerous goods transport through 
a city centre or passing by a school or hospital. 

A structured and detailed risk analysis is performed only by exception. In practice, a quantitative risk 
analysis for the purpose of land-use planning or identifying alternative means of transport is only done 
for large scale transports, e.g. on highways. 

The option of assigning alternative routes hardly or not exists for rail transport. Public concerns about 
rail transport through, or marshalling yards located inside densely populated areas have, in some cases, 
initiated  national  risk  studies  for  the  comparison  of  alternatives  for  the  mode  of  transport.  In  these 
cases, the preferred approach of risk analysis is mostly the quantitative probabilistic one. 
In the Purple Book (CPR-18)12, a full section is dedicated to quantitative risk assessment for (road and 
rail) transport in The Netherlands. The guidelines rely on a limited number of reference scenarios, like 
catastrophic failure of a tank truck or rail wagon (e.g. BLEVE) or a leak resulting in pool formation of 
predefined  surface  area.  Also,  the  relevant  substances  are  categorised,  like  flammable  liquids, 
flammable  gases,  very  toxic  gases,  etc.  Often,  standard  consequence  distances  are  applied.  Accident 
frequencies are usually expressed in [LoCs /km.year] or [LoCs / vehicle.km.year]. Increased frequency 
figures may be assigned to joints, shunts, crosses-over, etc. 
The  quantitative  approach  is  applied  in  only  few  countries;  it  is  known  for  Switzerland36,37,  United 
Kingdom40 and The Netherlands. 

22 

 
5.4  Acceptance criteria 

Quantitative  risk  acceptance  criteria  for  transport  risks  have  been  introduced  in  the  Netherlands.  The 
location specific risk criterion along transport routes is enforced in a way similar to that of stationary 
sites: no vulnerable objects shall be allowed within the 10-6 contour. Societal risk is calculated for each 
kilometre  of  route  length;  the  indicative  acceptance  level  is  a  factor  of  10  higher  than  the  one  for 
stationary installations: 10-4/year for 10 fatalities. 

5.5  Developments and current studies 

Within  the  scope  of  implementation  of  Chapter  1.9  of  RID/ADR,  an  RID  experts  working  group  on 
‘Standardised  Risk  Analysis’  was  formed  by  the  Intergovernmental  Organisation  for  International 
Carriage  by  Rail  (OTIF).  The  first  meeting  of  this  experts  group  was  held  in  April  2004,  with 
participation of representatives from 13 European countries, the EC, chemical industry and 4 transport 
unions. 

From the exchange of practices in the various countries, it appears that still big differences exist in the 
approach of risk analysis and even in recognising the RA-tool as feasible for this purpose. The follow-
up of the activities and developments from this working group is considered very relevant for the future 
risk analysis policy in the EU and abroad. The reports and contributions of the group and its members 
may be followed via the internet: 
 http://www.otif.org/html/e/rid_CExp_RID_gt_analyse_risque_doc_inf2004.php. 
Other  recent  developments  are  on  tunnel  safety  and  risk39.  During  the  past  few  years,  the  need  for 
harmonisation of road tunnel regulations was recognised. Several contact networking is currently taken 
up and R&D activities for developing risk analysis methodologies for road and rail tunnels are carried 
out. Risk assessment for tunnels often requires specific  models on effects and consequences that free 
field flat terrain models cannot cope with. Moreover, evacuation modelling gets much attention. 

In The Netherlands, a study has been carried out on the external risks involved in the entire chain of 
production,  handling  and  transport  of  three  basis  chemicals:  chlorine,  ammonia  and  LPG40.  When 
compared  to  the  risk  acceptance  criteria  in  the  country,  most  risk  constraint  were  identified  in  the 
transport  activities  of  these  substances.  Quantitative  risk  analysis  on  a  wider  scale  was  applied  to 
evaluate possible risk reducing measures and alternative means or routes for transport. This evaluation 
included cost – benefit analysis. 
In Italy, the risks of hazardous materials transport by rail between industrial sites have been studied.41

23 

 
6  Template Development: Risk analysis Comparison scheme 
6.1  Objectives of the template 

The  scope  of  this  study  is  the  development  of  a  template  for  the  characterisation  of  the  risk  analysis 
procedure: a tool that will aid the decision/policy maker in verifying the completeness and the quality 
of  a  given  risk  analysis  (process).  The  template  should  therefore  list  out  the  minimum  required 
information that is necessary to establish: 

•  whether a risk analysis contains all necessary steps (completeness); 

•  how these steps have been implemented; and 

•  whether these steps have been implemented and documented properly so that the risk figure can be 

used with confidence. 

The collection of information on policy and practices in a large number of countries, described in the 
previous sections, provided the data that needs to be included in the template. 

6.2  Considerations on structure and contents of the template 

The  inventory  of  practices  in  several  EU  Member  States  and  other  countries,  together  with  intensive 
brainstorming about the envisaged comparison tool, has made a number of things clear: 

•  The process of a risk analysis, and hence the required outcome, differs to a large extent, depending 

on the purpose for which it is carried out. The following objectives have been recognised: 

-  Demonstrating that a technological process can be operated at an acceptable level of safety, and 
that state-of-the-art technology is applied. This is often required for the purpose of obtaining an 
environmental permit or licence to operate (LIC), for insurance premiums (INS) or for setting 
acceptance criteria for occupational safety (OCC). 

-  Evaluating priority areas and measures of risk reduction in a given process or its design (RRM). 

-  Prioritising  hazards  and  risks  for  which  emergency  preparedness  (on-site  and/or  off-site)  is 

required, and determination of the required resources (ERP). 

-  Determination of required safety zones around hazardous activities and of land-use planning / 

development (LUP). 

-  Administrative  reasons,  for  instance  because  the  risk  assessment  is  required  according  to 
governing  regulations  like  the  Seveso-II  Directive  or  Environmental  Impact  Assessment 
(ADM). 

•  The  respective  different  objectives  relate  to  as  many  different  stakeholders  and  decision  makers, 
like:  environmental  authorities;  land-use  planners  and  developers;  emergency  services;  local, 
regional,  national  and  even  supra-national  authorities;  industrial  operators;  workers  unions;  etc. 
More explicitly, the following users can be considered: 

-  A competent authority that wants to evaluate a given R.A. and to base decisions of LIC, LUP or 

ERP upon it. 

-  Authorities that want to review their risk policy and reflect their own policy to the one of other 

countries or regions. 

-  Countries  and  authorities  that  still  need  to  develop  a  risk  policy,  or  to  choose  a  particular 

approach from those available; this may hold for the newly accessed Member States. 

-  The European Commission that wants to compare safety studies across countries. 

-  A  multi-national  company  that  receives  and  evaluates  safety  reports  of  separate  plants  in 

different EU countries. 

•  Different philosophies and practices in the risk analysis processes have been developed in the past, 
and  are  applicable  nowadays.  The  need  for  these  different  approaches  is  not  only  related  to  the 
mentioned  different  objectives  (LIC,  RRM,  ERP,  LUP,  etc.),  but  also  to  historical  and  cultural 

24 

 
background of countries and the nature of industrial activities. The most pronounced difference is 
the distinction between the probabilistic risk approach versus the deterministic approach. A further 
distinction  lays  in  the  extent  of  quantitative  measuring  of  the  risks,  varying  from  a  purely 
deterministic  approach  (demonstrating  state-of-the-art,  like  applied  in  Germany),  via  semi-
quantitative likelihood estimation and quantification of potential consequences (preferred approach 
in France), to a fully quantified probabilistic approach (as followed in The Netherlands).  

•  Differences are also found in the definitions of the dimension of the risk figures as well as in the 
application  of  risk  acceptance  criteria  and  their  regulatory  status.  A  large  number  of  methods, 
guidelines and tools have been developed, by (multi-national) industries, by research organisations 
and  by  national  governments.  National  approaches  vary  from  presenting  suggestions  of 
methodologies that may be applied, to prescriptive manuals of accident scenarios to be considered 
and  models  and  figures  to  be  used  in  the  risk  analysis  process.  The  latter  is  particularly  found  in 
cases where the quantified approach is followed.  

It  is  obvious  that  the  number  of  options  and  parameters  that  determine  the  eventual  result  of  a  risk 
analysis  (the  ‘risk  figure’)  is  too  diverse  to  claim  the  development  of  an  all-inclusive  comparison 
template. A limited number of comparison schemes have been developed in which the following prime 
entries are distinguished: 

•  Objective/purpose, for the following two clusters: 

-  Licence application and risk reducing measures (LIC & RRM); these objectives mainly focus 
on  the  safety  of  process  related  aspects,  like  the  technological  details  of  the  installation,  the 
operation, the safety management system, etc.; 

-  Land-use  planning  and  Emergency  response  planning  (LUP  & ERP);  these  objectives  mainly 

focus on the potential external effects and the management of the external consequences. 

•  Basic approaches, for the following two clusters:  

- 

- 

deterministic, possibly with calculation of consequences; 

probabilistic, possibly partly with semi-quantitative indications. 

A strict distinction in these approaches cannot be made in all cases. Particularly in application for LUP 
and ERP, a fully deterministic approach appears not functional. Estimation and calculation of the extent 
of off-site consequences will always be required. This has resulted in four sets of templates, namely: 

•  LIC & RRM, deterministic 

•  LIC & RRM, probabilistic 

•  LUP & ERP, deterministic 

•  LUP & ERP, probabilistic 

The  developed  template  is  a  two-dimensional  table  that  can  be  used  as  a  tick-list  for  evaluating  the 
completeness of a given risk analysis. Each template will have a structure comprising:  

• 

the elements related to a risk analysis, i.e.: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

hazard identification 

frequency assessment 

consequence assessment 

risk figure 

decision making 

•  overview of characteristics (elements) in each phase, distinguished in: 

-  methods that are available or applicable for this stage 

- 

- 

tools and models that can be used or consulted for employing these methods 

results from the respective phase 

25 

 
- 

space for comments and clarification.  

In practice, the table can be used in hard-copy format or as a digital fill-in table, for instance in MS-
WORD.  The  latter  provides  some  space  for  modifications  and  inclusion  of  methods,  tools,  etc.  that 
were not included in the non-exhaustive templates presented in this study. 

6.3  Template’s instruction for use 

The main objective of the template is the use as a tool to verify the completeness and the quality of a 
given risk analysis report.  

Assuming that a competent authority or a decision maker(s) is the assessor body entrusted with the task 
to evaluate and verify a risk analysis, he/she will use the template basically as a checklist for ticking the 
completeness of all relevant elements. The quality shall be verified by checking the references of tools 
and models against the ones listed in the template. In Annex 3, an explanatory list of terms used in the 
templates is given. 

The following procedure shall be followed, having at hand the risk analysis study: 

1.  Selection of the appropriate template, from the four ones attached. It will not be possible in all cases 
to clearly determine the purpose (LIC&RRM versus LUP&ERP) of the risk analysis. Particularly if 
the risk analysis has been done as mandatory for Seveso-II requirements and is included in a Safety 
Report, the distinction in these two objectives is often not present. In such cases, one shall select the 
template most relevant to the objective of the assessor or decision maker. 

2.  Verification of addressing all relevant elements. Each of the stages shall be addressed in the process 
of a risk analysis. Reference to methodologies, guidelines and used tools (e.g. software programmes) 
shall  be  available.  Elaboration  of  the  last  phase,  the  ‘Decision  Making’,  may  be  less  extensive  in 
case  of  a  risk  analysis  included  in  a  safety  report.  In  such  cases,  the  risk  evaluation  and  decision 
making is done after completion of the R.A. and is (partly) the responsibility of the decision maker 
who  assesses  the  risk  analysis  results.  These  results  shall  then  be  fit  and  sufficiently  complete  to 
arrive at a sound decision. 

3.  For detailed scrutiny of the completeness, correctness and quality of each of the phases, each cell in 
the  template  (method,  tool/model  and  result)  comprises  a  number  of  options  through  which 
compliance can be identified. In a risk analysis process, at least one element of each cell should be 
addressed. In several cases, some space is allowed in the table cells for noting detailed information. 
For example: the number of the used CPR-guideline or the company internal procedure can be noted 
for further reference, and a software package or database can be indicated. In many cases, more than 
one element will apply in a specific risk analysis. All addressed elements shall be ticked. Annex 3 
gives an extensive list of explanatory definitions of each of these elements. 

4.  In  cases  where  the  application  of  certain  methods  and  guidelines  is  mandatory,  as  per  authority’s 
regulation, the particular elements shall appear in the risk analysis and shall be ticked in the table. 
Alternatively, the analysis shall clearly motivate whether a different approach has been followed, as 
well as why, where, when and how. 

5.  The entire process of the risk analysis shall be logical. This means that the methods followed and the 

results obtained in one stage, are logically found back in the sequential phase(s).  

6.  The  eventual  result  (the  risk  figure)  shall  obviously  be  informative  to  the  decision  maker  as  to 
formulate  further  requirements  like  modifications  in  the  analysis,  measures  or  goal-setting  of  risk 
reduction  or  setting  safety  zones  between  hazardous  or  major  hazard  sites  and  vulnerable 
destinations outside the fence lines. 

6.4  The templates 

The developed templates are presented in the Tables 6.1 to 6.4, for the four combinations of purpose: 
LIC&RRM versus LUP&ERP, and deterministic versus probabilistic. 

26 

 
Table 6.1: 

Template Risk Analysis:  

Approach: 

DETERMINISTIC 

Purpose: 

LICENCE APPLICATION and/or RISK REDUCTION 

Installation / activity: 

Location: 

Type of hazard: 

Assessor (name & date): 

Method 

Tool / model 

Result 

Comment / clarification 

Hazard identification 

o  HAZOP, guide-word approach 
o  What-If 
o  FMECA 
o  Checklist 
o  Fault tree 
o  DOW F&E Index 
o  Risk matrix, not-quantified 
o  Accident database 
o  Other: ………….. 

o None 
o Qualitative 
o Qualitative, based on LoCs 
o Semi-quantitative 
o Other: …. 

o  Measures, hardware: ……… 
o  Measures, software: …… 
o  Measures, SSM: ………. 
o  Process / plant modification 
o  Denial of process or permit 

o  CCPS guideline 
o  EPSC guideline 
o  CPR guideline: ……. 
o  Expert opinion: ….. 
o  Company internal procedure: …….. 
o  Public domain: ..…… 
o  F&EI guideline, version …. 
o  Accident database: …… 
o  Software: ………. 
o  Other: ……… 

Frequency assessment 

o  None 
o  Semi-quantitative figure 

o  CPR guidelines: …. 
o  HSE guidelines: … 
o  Fault tree 
o  Expert opinions 
o  Identification of measures 
o  Physical barriers 
o  Area classification 

o  Other: …. 

27 

 
 
 
 
Qualitative: ….. 

o None 
o Risk matrix 
o Consequence distance 

Consequence assessment 

o  CPR guideline: …. 
o  HSE guideline: …. 
o  Company internal procedure: …. 
o  Software commercial: ….. 
o  Software public domain: …. 
o  Software other: …. 
Environment and surroundings 

o  Description of surroundings 
o  Identification of vulnerable 

environment 

o  Authority approved format: 
consequence distance  

o  Software: …. 
o  Other: …. 

o  None 
o  Consequence criteria 
o  Environmental criteria 

o  Qualitative: …. 
o  Semi-quantitative 
o  Distance of end-point 

Risk figure 

o  Mapped area(s) at risk 
o  Tabular area(s) at risk 
o  Risk matrix 
o  Other: ….. 

Decision 

o  Approval of licence to operate 
o  Denial of licence to operate 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2: 

Template Risk Analysis:  

Approach: 

PROBABILISTIC 

Purpose: 

LICENCE APPLICATION and/or RISK REDUCTION 

Installation / activity: 

Location: 

Type of hazard: 

Assessor (name & date): 

Method 

Tool / model 

Result 

Comment / clarification 

Hazard identification 

o  HAZOP, guide-word approach 
o  What-If 
o  FMECA 
o  Checklist 
o  Fault tree 
o  Event tree 
o  Reference LoCs 
o  DOW F&E Index 
o  Risk matrix, quantified 
o  Proportionality 
o  Accident database 
o  Other: ………….. 

o  CCPS guideline 
o  EPSC guideline 
o  CPR guideline: ……. 
o  Expert opinion: ….. 
o  Company internal procedure: …….. 
o  Public domain: …… 
o  F&EI guideline, version …. 
o  Risk matrix criteria: ……. 
o  Accident database: …… 
o  Software: ………. 
o  Other: ……… 
o   

o  Scenarios: .. Nos. 
o  Measures, hardware: ……… 
o  Measures, software: …… 
o  Measures, SSM: ………. 
o  Discarded scenarios: .. Nos 
o  Process / plant modification 
o  Denial of process or permit 

Frequency assessment 

o Semi-quantitative 
o Semi-quantitative, based on LoDs 
o Quantitative, for single LoCs 
o Quantitative, for single LoCs, and 

based on LoDs 

o Other: …. 
o  

o  CPR guidelines: …. 
o  HSE guidelines: … 
o  Database failure frequencies: …. 
o  Database ignition sources: …. 
o  Fault tree 
o  Company internal figures 
o  Expert opinions 

o  Semi-quantitative figure 
o  Quantitative, generic 
o  Quantitative, detailed specific 
o   

29 

 
 
 
 
 
Quantitative, Effects: 

o Release 
o Gas 
o Vapour 
o Liquid 
o Evaporation 
o From land 
o From water 
o Aerosol 
o Dispersion 
o Exposure 
o Thermal 
o Overpressure 
o Toxic dose 

Quantitative, Damage: 

o Fatalities 
o Injuries 
o Property 
o Environment 

o Risk matrix 
o Frequency assessment 

o  Identification of measures 
o  Physical barriers 
o  Area classification 

o  Other: …. 

Consequence assessment 

o  Qualitative: …. 
o  Semi-quantitative, in risk matrix 

o Casualties 
o Property loss 
o Environmental damage 

o  Distance of end-point 

o  CPR guideline: …. 
o  HSE guideline: …. 
o  Company internal procedure: …. 
o  Handbook approach 
o  Software commercial: ….. 
o  Software public domain: …. 
o  Software other: …. 

End-point values 

o  Exposure dose 
o  Exposure intensity 
o  Emergency response levels: ….. 
o  Domino levels 

Environment and surroundings 

o  Description of surroundings 
o  Inventory of population 
o  Weather distribution 
o   

o  Approved format of frequency 

o  Numerical value of failure 

presentation 

frequency  

Risk figure 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
o Consequence distance 

o  Company specific format: …. 
o  Software: …. 
o  Other: …. 

o  Risk matrix 
o  Other: ….. 

Decision 

o  None 
o  Risk criteria 

o  Approval of licence 
o  Denial of licence 
o  Modification of process safety 

31 

 
 
 
Table 6.3: 

Template Risk Analysis:  

Approach: 

DETERMINISTIC 

Purpose: 

LAND-USE  PLANNING  and/or  OFF-SITE  EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE 

Installation / activity: 

Location: 

Type of hazard: 

Assessor (name & date): 

Method 

Tool / model 

Result 

Comment / clarification 

Hazard identification 

o  HAZOP, guide-word approach 
o  What-If 
o  FMECA 
o  Checklist 
o  Fault tree 
o  Reference LoCs 
o  DOW F&E Index 
o  Maximum Credible Accident 
o  Risk matrix, not-quantified 
o  Risk matrix, quantified 
o  Proportionality 
o  Accident database 
o  Other: ………….. 

o  CCPS guideline 
o  EPSC guideline 
o  CPR guideline: ……. 
o  Expert opinion: ….. 
o  Company internal procedure: …….. 
o  Public domain: ..…… 
o  F&EI guideline, version …. 
o  Risk matrix criteria: ……. 
o  Accident database: …… 
o  Software: ………. 
o  Other: ……… 

o  Scenarios: .. Nos. 
o  Measures, hardware: ……… 
o  Measures, software: …… 
o  Measures, SSM: ………. 
o  Discarded scenarios: .. Nos 
o  Process / plant modification 
o  Denial of process or permit 

o None 
o Qualitative 
o Semi-quantitative 
o Semi-quantitative, based on LoDs 
o Quantitative, for single LoCs 
o Quantitative, for single LoCs, and 

o  CPR guidelines: …. 
o  HSE guidelines: … 
o  Database failure frequencies: …. 
o  Database ignition sources: …. 
o  Fault tree 
o  F&EI credits 

Frequency assessment 

o  None 
o  Semi-quantitative figure 
o  Quantitative, generic 
o  Quantitative, detailed specific 

32 

 
 
 
 
based on LoDs 

o Other: …. 

Qualitative: ….. 

Quantitative, Effects: 

o Release 
o Gas 
o Vapour 
o Liquid 
o Evaporation 
o From land 
o From water 
o Aerosol 
o Dispersion 
o Exposure 
o Thermal 
o Overpressure 
o Toxic dose 

Quantitative, Damage: 

o Fatalities 
o Injuries 
o Property 
o Environment 

o None 
o Risk matrix 

o  Company internal figures 
o  Expert opinions 
o  Other: …. 

o  CPR guideline: …. 
o  HSE guideline: …. 
o  Company internal procedure: …. 
o  Handbook approach 
o  Software commercial: ….. 
o  Software public domain: …. 
o  Software other: …. 

End-point values 

o  Exposure dose 
o  Exposure intensity 
o  Emergency response levels: ….. 
o  Domino levels 

Consequence assessment 

o  Qualitative: …. 
o  Semi-quantitative, in risk matrix 

o Off-site casualties 
o Property loss 
o Environmental damage 

o  Distance of end-point 
o  Distance of dose 
o  Estimate of casualties 
o  Estimate of financial loss 

Environment and surroundings 

o  Description of surroundings 
o  Identification of vulnerable environment 
o  Inventory of population 
o  Inventory of special destinations 
o  Weather distribution 

o  Authority approved format: consequence 

distance for single LoCs 

o  Mapped area(s) at risk 
o  Tabular area(s) at risk 

Risk figure 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
o Consequence distance 
o Consequence envelop 
o Protection zone 
o Exclusion zone 

o  Authority approved format: consequence 

envelop for all LoCs 

o  Risk matrix 
o  Other: ….. 

o  Company specific format: …. 
o  Software: …. 
o  Other: …. 

o  None 
o  Risk criteria 
o  Consequence criteria 
o  Environmental criteria 

Decision 

o  Approval of land-use 

development 

o  Denial of land-use development 
o  Required organisation of ERP 
o  Required resources of ERP 
o  Information for public 

communication 

34 

 
 
 
Table 6.4: 

Template Risk Analysis:  

Approach: 

PROBABILISTIC 

Purpose: 

LAND-USE  PLANNING  and/or  OFF-SITE  EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE 

Installation / activity: 

Location: 

Type of hazard: 

Assessor (name & date): 

Method 

Tool / model 

Result 

Comment / clarification 

Hazard identification 

o  Checklist 
o  Fault tree 
o  Reference LoCs 
o  DOW F&E Index 
o  Maximum Credible Accident 
o  Risk matrix, quantified 
o  Proportionality 
o  Accident database 
o  Other: ………….. 

o  CCPS guideline 
o  CPR guideline: ……. 
o  Expert opinion: ….. 
o  Company internal procedure: …….. 
o  Public domain: ..…… 
o  F&EI guideline, version …. 
o  Risk matrix criteria: ……. 
o  Accident database: …… 
o  Software: ………. 
o  Other: ……… 

o  Scenarios: .. Nos. 
o  Discarded scenarios: .. Nos 
o  Measures, hardware: ……… 

o None 
o Semi-quantitative 
o Semi-quantitative, based on 

LoDs 

o Quantitative, for single LoCs 
o Quantitative, for single LoCs, 

and based on LoDs 

o Other: …. 

o  CPR guidelines: …. 
o  HSE guidelines: … 
o  Database failure frequencies: …. 
o  Database ignition sources: …. 
o  Fault tree 
o  Event tree 
o  F&EI credits 
o  Company internal figures 
o  Expert opinions 
o  Other: …. 

Frequency assessment 
o  None 
o  Semi-quantitative figure 
o  Quantitative figure, generic 
o  Quantitative figure, detailed 

specific 

Quantitative, Effects: 
o Release 
o Gas 

Consequence assessment 

o  CPR guideline: …. 
o  HSE guideline: …. 
o  Company internal procedure: …. 
o  Handbook approach 

o  Semi-quantitative, in risk matrix 

o Off-site casualties 
o Property loss 
o Environmental damage 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
o Vapour 
o Liquid 
o Evaporation 
o From land 
o From water 
o Aerosol 
o Dispersion 

o Neutral gas 
o Dense gas 

o Exposure 
o Thermal 
o Overpressure 
o Toxic dose 

Quantitative, Damage: 
o Fatalities 
o Injuries 
o Property 
o Environment 

o Risk matrix 
o Individual risk calculation 
o Societal risk calculation 
o Protection zone determination 
o Exclusion zone determination 

o  Software commercial: ….. 
o  Software public domain: …. 
o  Software other: …. 

End-point values 
o  Exposure dose 
o  Exposure intensity 
o  Emergency response levels: ….. 
o  Domino levels 

Environment and surroundings 
o  Description of surroundings 
o  Identification of vulnerable environment 
o  Inventory of population 
o  Inventory of special destinations 
o  Weather distribution 

o  Risk matrix criteria 
o  Risk assessment methodology, CPR-18:  
o  Risk assessment methodology, HSE: …  
o  Format for risk contours 
o  Format for fN-curves 
o  Company specific format: …. 
o  Software: …. 
o  Other: …. 

o  None 
o  Risk criteria 
o  Consequence criteria 
o  Environmental criteria 

o  Distance of end-point 
o  Distance of dose 
o  Estimate of casualties 
o  Estimate of financial loss 
o  Consequence envelop 

Risk figure 

o  Mapped area(s) at risk 
o  Tabular area(s) at risk 
o  Risk matrix 
o  Other: ….. 

Decision 
o  Approval of land-use 

development 

o  Denial of land-use development 
o  Required organisation of ERP 
o  Required resources of ERP 
o  Information for public 

communication 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5  Recommendations for introduction of the templates 

The  templates  were  developed  in  a  desk  exercise.  The  objectives  and  the  envisaged  end-users 
(stakeholders)  were  determined  in  communication  with  the  JRC.  A  full  test  and  validation  should  be 
done before the method is introduced and distributed for implementation externally. This should ideally 
be  carried  out  in  collaboration  with  the  end-users.  The  test  and  validation  of  the  templates  should 
reveal: 

•  Whether the format of the template is ‘workable’; 

•  Whether its contents is complete, in phases and items; 

•  Whether it provides the information the decision maker needs; 

•  Whether  a 

system  of 

‘scoring’  of 

the  quality  of  a 

risk  analysis 

shall/can  be  

developed, and which weighting factors shall then be applied; 

•  Whether  written  guidance  and  instruction  in  the  application  would  be  sufficient,  or  practical 

training will be required; 

•  How  the  template(s)  can  be  made  to  ‘living’  documents,  to  satisfy  the  application  on  the  longer 

term in the dynamic discipline of risk analysis. 

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Product Chains in the Netherlands. Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries, 
Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium, Praha, Czech Republic, 31 May - 3 June, 2004. 

41.  Antonio,  G.,  Spadoni,  G.,  Milazzo,  M.,  Maschio,  G.  (2004):  Major  Accident  Risks  of  HazMat 
Transport  by  Rail  between  Industrial  Sites;  A  Case  Study  in  Sicily.  Loss  Prevention  and  Safety 
Promotion in the Process Industries, Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium, Praha, Czech 
Republic, 31 May - 3 June, 2004. 

39 

 
European Commission 

EUR 22247 EN– DG Joint Research Centre, Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
2006 – 39 pp  21 x 27.9 cm 
Scientific and Technical Research series 

Abstract 

In the context of the Institutional Activity COMPASS "Risk Comparability and Integrated Risk Assessment" 
of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, a specific study entitled "Comparison of Risk 
Analysis Methods and Development of a Template for Risk Characterisation" was conducted. 

The objective of this study was twofold: 

1. 

to  carry  out  a  comparative  analysis  of  existing  risk  analysis  approaches,  for  estimating  the 
technological  accidental  risks  related  with  the  process  industry  and  the  transportation  of  dangerous 
goods  by  road,  rail  and  pipelines,  over  member  States  (MS),  Candidate  Countries  (CC)  and  other 
relevant countries; and 

2. 

to develop a template for the characterisation of the outcome of risk analysis and of the risk analysis 
process itself. 

 
 
 
 
 
The  mission  of  the  Joint  Research  Centre  is  to  provide  customer-driven  scientific  and  technical  support  for  the 
conception,  development,  implementation  and  monitoring  of  European  Union  policies.  As  a  service  of  the 
European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of science and technology for the Union. Close to 
the  policy-making  process,  it  serves  the  common  interest  of  the  Member  States,  while  being  independent  of 
special interests, whether private or national.