Transforming the Quartet principles : Hamas and the peace process.
Date: 2010-11-16
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: Israel, Palestine question, diplomatic relations, political violence, recognition of a state, settlement of disputes

SEPTEMBER   2010    85

Transforming the Quartet principles: 
Hamas and the Peace Process 

Carolin Goerzig

ISBN 978-92-9198-169-4
ISSN 1608-5000
QN-AB-10-085-EN-C
doi:10.2815/19294

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OccasiOnal PaPer

September  2010 85

transforming the Quartet 
principles: Hamas and  
the peace process

Carolin Goerzig

the author

Carolin Goerzig is currently a post-doctoral fellow at the EUISS with-
in the framework of the Transatlantic Fellowship for International 
Relations and Security (TAPIR) programme. She holds a doctorate 
from the University of Munich and a Masters degree from the Uni-
versity of Kent. Her doctoral research on the topic ‘Negotiating with 
Terrorists’ has led her to complete field research in Colombia, Egypt, 
Syria and Turkey. She has been a visiting researcher at the London 
School of Economics, a participant in the Young Scientists Summer 
Programme of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analy-
sis in Austria and a Marie Curie Fellow at the Department for Peace 
and Conflict Research at Uppsala University.

All views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the EUISS.

Acknowledgements 

Researching the Middle East conflict has itself been like venturing into a ter-
ritory without clear borders. The author is grateful to have had the unique 
opportunity to undertake research on this topic at the EUISS – an experi-
ence which has taught her about territory, engagement, principles and may-
be most importantly the value of distinguishing between conflict resolution 
and conflict avoidance. Various colleagues at the EUISS have contributed to 
make this a highly stimulating and interesting research experience. In par-
ticular, the author gratefully acknowledges the support of Mr. Álvaro de Vas-
concelos who encouraged her to undertake this research. 
The paper draws on material from interviews with European decision-makers 
conducted in Brussels in spring 2010. Various quotes from these interviews are 
used in this paper while preserving the anonymity of the interviewees. The au-
thor would like to acknowledge the input of the interviewees in Brussels whose 
insights made a valuable contribution to this paper.

 
Contents

Summary	

Introduction	

1.				The	inflexibility	of	the	three	Quartet	principles	

Renunciation	of	violence	versus	recognition	of	Israel	
Recognition	of	Israel	versus	adherence	to	previous	diplomatic	agreements	
Adherence	to	previous	diplomatic	agreements	versus	renunciation	of	violence	

2.				Why	the	EU	cannot	abandon	the	principles	
Renunciation	of	violence:	credibility	
Recognition	of	Israel:	responsibility	
Adherence	to	previous	diplomatic	agreements:	consensus	

3.				A	possible	way	out	

Renunciation	of	violence:	credibility	through	consistency		
Recognition	of	Israel:	responsibility	through	reciprocity	
Adherence	to	previous	diplomatic	agreements:	consensus	through	flexibility	

4.				Relaxing	the	Quartet	principles	

Renunciation	of	violence	and	recognition	of	Israel	
Recognition	and	adherence	to	agreements	
Adherence	to	agreements	and	renunciation	of	violence	

Conclusion	

5

7

13
13
14
15

17
17
18
18

19
19
21
23

25
25
26
26

29

 Summary

Despite the clear necessity of an inclusive approach that involves all rele-
vant actors, the Middle East Quartet (comprising the United Nations, the 
United States, the European Union and Russia) has made political and fi-
nancial cooperation with the Palestinian Authority dependent on the rec-
ognition of the three Quartet principles – the recognition of Israel, the re-
nunciation of violence and adherence to previous diplomatic agreements 
– in exchange for the recognition of a Palestinian government. But instead 
of compelling Hamas to consider compliance, the Quartet principles have 
in  fact  led  the  group  to  become  more  entrenched  in  its  defiant  stance. 
There is a fundamental problem with the three Quartet conditions. While 
decision-makers proclaim that the three principles come as a package and 
are  inseparable,  it  is  precisely  the  fact  that  they  are  so  interlocked  and 
that Hamas is required to comply with them simultaneously that makes 
compliance problematic. This is the case because the three principles are 
mutually constraining to such an extent that complying with one princi-
ple effectively prevents Hamas from complying with another. Originally, 
the three Quartet principles were intended as a basis or a framework for a 
potential peace process. They define the conditions a negotiating partner 
has to  fulfil in order to take part in Middle East peace talks. In reality, 
however,  they  have  acted  as  an  impediment.  This  paper  seeks  to  find  a 
way of overcoming the constraints that the EU has imposed upon itself 
by insisting on simultaneous adherence to the three Quartet principles. 
It looks at what room for manoeuvre there remains for the EU within the 
framework of the Quartet conditions and at how they can be modified in 
such a way that they facilitate rather than obstruct compliance.

5

Introduction				

Introduction

The EU’s relationship with the US concerning the Middle East Peace Proc-
ess is conditioned by their joint membership of the Quartet. How precisely 
the roles of the different Quartet stakeholders are distributed is not easily 
to discern, however. While ‘in theory the four partners (the US, Russia, the 
UN and the EU) are equal within the group, each playing a complemen-
tary role … it is not possible to determine exactly the weight of any partner 
relative to the others.’1 Yet, in his end of mission report issued in 2007, 
Álvaro de Soto, the outgoing UN Special Coordinator of the Middle East 
Peace Process, described the functioning of the Quartet in the following 
terms: ‘the Quartet is pretty much a group of friends of the US – and the 
US doesn’t feel the need to consult closely with the Quartet except when 
it suits it.’2 This was of course before the election of President Obama in 
2008 and the subsequent change in the American administration, follow-
ing  which  consultation  among  the  Quartet  did  improve.  However,    the 
nature  of  the  constraints  that  the  Quartet  places  on  EU  policy  did  not 
change as pointed out in the recent EUISS Report A strategy for EU foreign 
policy: ‘Efforts to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict have become constrained 
by the EU’s own difficulties in forging a meaningful consensus and, in the 
last years, by its participation in the Quartet which became a “gilded cage” 
for the EU and undermined its singularity.’3

The  apparently  US-dominated  Middle  East  Quartet  has  posed  three 
conditions that have to be fulfilled by Palestinian parties to the conflict 
before a Palestinian government will be recognised by the international 
community:  the  recognition  of  Israel,  the  renunciation  of  violence  and 
adherence to previous diplomatic agreements. However, instead of luring 
Hamas into compliance, the three Quartet principles have served to ex-
clude Hamas from a potential peace process. In dealing with Hamas, the 
American strategy is characterised by a cautious, incremental approach. 
The US seeks to support Salam Fayyad in order to empower him so that 
the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank – once it is strong 
enough – will be able to deal with Hamas.

1.  House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union,  26th report of session 2006-7,  ‘The EU and the 
Middle East Peace Process’, July 2007.
2.  Álvaro de Soto, End of Mission Report to the UN Secretary General, May 2007.
3.  See Alvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.) et al, A strategy for EU foreign policy, EUISS Report no. 7, Paris, June 2010.

7

Transforming	the	Quartet	principles:	Hamas	and		the	Peace	Process				
Transforming	the	Quartet	principles:	Hamas	and		the	Peace	Process				

The  exclusion  of  Hamas  has  backfired,  however.  Divide-and-rule  policies 
seldom bear fruit and rarely contribute to conflict resolution. It could be 
argued that there are numerous options, such as talks between Israel and the 
Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank – an option much easier to 
digest than the engagement of Hamas. Unfortunately, however, the spoiler 
problem remains, making the question of the inclusion of Hamas crucial. It 
could be cynically argued that people have become accustomed to the status 
quo: ‘better the devil you know than the devil you don’t know’. Like the in-
ability to quit a bad habit, accepting change can be a challenge. The inability 
to drive change in a constructive manner, however, may lead to the under-
mining of a status quo that is much more fragile than commonly assumed. 

Small wars, not big wars, it has been argued, lead to the destruction of 
the international system. Where state actors engage in dirty warfare when 
confronting non-state actors, they lose legitimacy and undermine inter-
national humanitarian law.4 Thus, one Hamas member explains why the 
West is losing legitimacy among the Arab people: 

During the era when the Arab world was being liberated from the Ro-
man occupation or during the time when the principles of Islam were 
being spread to non-Arab parts of the world non-militants were pro-
tected by Muslims themselves. On the other hand, during the Western 
conquest of the Arab world, and recently in occupying Iraq, for exam-
ple, thousands of civilians were massacred and slaughtered.5

That the loss of legitimacy leaves states with a high price to pay is increas-
ingly obvious. The US, for example, cannot tolerate the loss of American 
lives  in  Afghanistan  much  longer.  The  unpopularity  of  these  kinds  of 
military interventions and the fact that its soldiers are targeted by insur-
gent groups is closely connected to the Middle East conflict fiasco. The 
Petraeus briefing of January 2010 is telling in this regard. When a team 
dispatched by General David Petraeus briefed the Pentagon on the Israeli-
Palestinian  conflict,  they  emphasised  that  ‘Israeli  intransigence  on  the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was jeopardising US standing in the region.’6 

4.  See Christopher C. Daase, Kleine Kriege - Große Wirkung. Wie unkonventionelle Kriegführung die internationale Politik 
verändert (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), p. 223.
5.   Author’s interview with a Hamas member, Damascus, August 2008. 
6.   Mark  Perry,    ‘The  Petraeus  Briefing:  Biden’s  report  is  not  the  whole  story’,  Foreign  Policy,  13  March  2010. 
Available  online  at:  http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/14/the_petraeus_briefing_biden_s_em-
barrassment_is_not_the_whole_story.

8

Introduction				

Many agree that it is essential for the US to use its leverage. The EU might 
have more leverage than it is aware of, but it has yet to find the right way to 
use its leverage. If this is really a now-or-never moment – especially in view 
of the ongoing peace talks under the aegis of Hillary Clinton – and con-
crete progress in terms of achieving peace has to be made within the next 
four to five years,7 it is an opportune time for the EU to act. In fact, some 
(indirect) contacts between European stakeholders and Hamas members 
could help to show a way forward. Indeed, maybe the EU can help the US 
out of its predicament by taking over the job of engaging Hamas.

It is clear that Palestinians and Israelis alike can no longer afford to ignore 
certain realities. The Palestinians realise that time is running out, and this 
obliges them to negotiate. Israel, in turn, remains sensitive about increas-
ingly critical attitudes in the US. Therefore, things do not necessarily look 
totally bleak at the moment. Just as the Northern Ireland conflict was ul-
timately settled by negotiations, so in Afghanistan the allies’ new strategy 
of seeking to reach some form of accommodation with the Taliban may 
serve as an inspiration for rethinking how to deal with Hamas.  

The Northern Ireland example is a good case in point, as it demonstrates 
that investing in trust and goodwill can yield dividends. The experience of 
the peace process in Northern Ireland, as shown in the EUISS 2007 Wash-
ington  Forum Seminar  Report,  teaches  us  that overloading  the  process 
with preconditions can only be counterproductive – a lesson that should 
be heeded when dealing with Hamas.8 

The  example  of  proposed  engagement  with  the  Taliban  constitutes  an 
even stronger argument in favour of realistically considering engagement 
with Hamas. Some argue that since the Taliban is not a single unified or-
ganisation, separating the moderates from the radicals is easier to achieve 
than in the case of Hamas, which is substantially more homogenous. Yet, 
divide-and-rule  policies  are  seldom  successful.  A  coherent  movement  is 
much more  likely to have control over its followers and actually imple-

7.   While some Europeans talk about a four or five year timescale, the Americans say that progress has to come 
within the next two years. This difference may be attributable to diverging domestic and international interests 
and the two actors’ differing sense of the urgency of the situation.
8.  Since the IRA did not agree to decommission its arms as a precondition for peace talks, progress was achieved 
when the process moved along two tracks: political negotiations on the one side and the decommissioning of 
weapons on the other. See EUISS 2007 Washington Forum Conference Report, available online at: http://www.
iss.europa.eu/fileadmin/fichiers/pdf/seminars/2007/rep07-11.pdf.

9

Transforming	the	Quartet	principles:	Hamas	and		the	Peace	Process				

ment  agreements.  The  fact  that  Hamas  is  being  challenged  by  internal 
dissent and even more radical formations makes the matter increasingly 
urgent. Furthermore, it is apparent that making overtures to the Taliban 
is a measure of last resort, a reaction born out of desperation. When all 
other  strategies  have  failed,  engagement  becomes  an  inevitable  option. 
Being forced to adopt a strategy of engagement in this manner, however, 
would leave the EU in a much weaker negotiating position. From a strate-
gic point of view also, it is clear that negotiations should not be the option 
of last resort.

Is Israel ready to compromise? Clearly, a lot depends on to what extent 
the prevailing mindset among Israel’s decision-makers can be changed – 
either by external pressure or by internal developments within Israel. An 
internal process of change might be triggered by the awareness that cur-
rent Israeli policies are in fact not working in Israel’s favour, at least not 
in the long term. However, internal developments cannot be easily influ-
enced from outside. 

How can pressure be exerted on Israel so that it can be persuaded to give 
a  clear  signal  that  it  is  ready  to  make  a  real  effort  towards  peace?  The 
minimal pressure that has been exerted so far has proven fruitless. That is 
not to say that there needs to be a dramatic increase in pressure, a move 
that  would  inevitably  prove  counter-productive  as  Israel  would  almost 
certainly react negatively. What could induce a positive reaction from Is-
rael  however  would  be  a  more  moderate,  ‘well-behaved’  Hamas:  such  a 
transformation  might  lead  Israel  to  reconsider  its  isolationist  policies.9 
If Hamas were to evolve towards a more moderate position this would, 
moreover, strengthen the voices within the EU that favour engagement. 
But Hamas’ evolution towards such a moderate stance is not incumbent 
upon Hamas exclusively: the EU also has an important role to play. So far, 
however, it has done little in this respect. 

Despite the necessity of an inclusive approach, the Middle East Quartet 
has made political and financial cooperation with the Palestinian Author-
ity  dependent  on  the  recognition  of  the  three  Quartet  principles  –  the 

9.  However, where two sides claim the moral high ground, they often fail to grasp that it is this very ‘competition’ 
that obstructs any moral progress. Declaring one’s pacifism often serves propaganda purposes and can indeed 
be a weapon in disguise. Therefore ultimately one side or the other will have to swallow their pride and take the 
first step towards peaceful engagement.

10

Introduction				

recognition of Israel, the renunciation of violence and abiding by previous 
diplomatic  agreements  in  exchange  for  the  recognition  of  a  Palestinian 
government. But instead of compelling Hamas to consider compliance, 
the  inflexibility  of  the  Quartet  principles  has  led  the  group  to  become 
more entrenched in its defiant stance. There is a fundamental problem 
with  the  three  Quartet  conditions.  While  many  decision-makers  pro-
claim that the three principles come as a package and are inseparable, it 
is precisely the fact that they are so rigidly interlocked and that Hamas 
is required to comply with them simultaneously that makes compliance 
problematic.  This  is  the  case  because  the  three  principles  are  mutually 
constraining in such a way that complying with one principle precludes 
Hamas from complying with the next one. In order to find a solution and 
overcome the constraints that the EU has imposed upon itself in its insist-
ence on Hamas’s simultaneous adherence to the Quartet’s conditions, it 
is necessary to examine how the Quartet conditions could be modified so 
that they facilitate rather than obstruct compliance.

11

1.				The	inflexibility	of	the	three	Quartet	principles				

1.    the inflexibility of the three Quartet 

principles

Emphasising  that  the  three  Quartet  principles  must  be  complied  with 
simultaneously  reduces  the  likelihood  of  Hamas  adhering  to  them.  It 
seems that the group is capitalising on the growing awareness that only 
by bringing in all political players, including those currently perceived as 
peace spoilers, can a solution be reached. The financial and political isola-
tion of Hamas, as well as the fact that Fatah’s security forces are bolstered 
and assisted by international donors, directly contribute to Hamas’ refus-
al to accept the Quartet principles. As the Quartet’s insistence that they 
be  complied  with  simultaneously  paradoxically  prevents  Hamas  from 
complying with them, the three conditions turn into an end per se. Simul-
taneous compliance with even just two of the three principles is basically 
impossible for Hamas.

renunciation of violence versus recognition of Israel
The EU demands that Hamas renounces violence and simultaneously rec-
ognises Israel. Whereas cases like Northern Ireland show that insisting on 
the renunciation of violence as a precondition for engagement in negotia-
tions  is  not  necessarily  conducive  to  a  militant  group  adopting  a  more 
moderate posture, the Quartet principles allow for no room to reflect on 
how  Hamas  might  realistically  embark  on  the  path  of  moderation  and 
rejection of violence, and thus propagate a vicious circle. Hamas’ agreeing 
to adopt a more moderate posture becomes a necessary precondition to 
engaging the group in peace talks, which are themselves aimed at its mod-
eration.  Seen  from  this  perspective,  the  inflexible  and  self-constraining 
nature of the Quartet principles becomes apparent.

Hamas  has  taken  some  steps  towards  moderation.  It  cannot,  however, 
couple  this  simultaneously  with  the  renunciation  of  violence.  Realising 
that defiance will not get the movement anywhere in the long run, Ha-
mas is making some concessions. Thus, with several truce offers Hamas 
has implicitly recognised Israel’s right to exist and it has also displayed 
willingness  to  compromise  with  Fatah.  Furthermore,  Hamas  senior  of-
ficials  have  signalled  willingness  to  move  towards  moderation  during 
13

Transforming	the	Quartet	principles:	Hamas	and		the	Peace	Process				

interviews.10 Claims like ‘our message to the world and to the Jews them-
selves is: we are brothers;’ or ‘the more we confront them, the more human 
they look to us,’ reveal that engaging Hamas need not mean appeasing 
a movement that has no capacity for moderation. Simultaneously, how-
ever, Hamas openly admits that moderation and concessions are part of 
a strategic calculus, such as buying time to re-organise. That the group is 
quite blunt about this tells us something about its intentions. Apparently, 
Hamas is seeking to strike a balance between improving conditions in the 
Gaza Strip without coming off as the loser. When members of the move-
ment state that ‘our issue with Jews is one of existence, and not borders,’ it 
becomes clear that, for Hamas, its survival as a political force is at stake.11 
At the same time, however, Hamas is equally becoming a prisoner of its 
own rhetoric – risking a loss of credibility if it moves any further along the 
road to moderation. As the group has always emphasised its non-recogni-
tion of Israel as a central tenet, it limits its own room for manoeuvre. As 
a consequence, Hamas cannot recognise Israel and renounce violence at 
the same time.

recognition of Israel versus adherence to previous 
diplomatic agreements
The EU demands that Hamas both recognises Israel and abides by previous 
diplomatic  agreements.  However,  playing  the  Israeli-Palestinian  and  the 
intra-Palestinian conflict against each other will only contribute to the per-
petuation of a vicious circle. Clearly, the global repercussions of the Mid-
dle Eastern impasse cannot be neglected. The Middle East has furnished 
various actors with an alibi to pursue their own agendas of violence.12 The 
complexity of the Middle East conflict is such that it can easily be instru-
mentalised and exploited by regional players. Palestinians are more divided 
than ever. By connecting intra-Palestinian reconciliation to the peace proc-
ess, Palestinians as well as Israelis would be forced to overcome their ani-

10.    The author conducted interviews with five senior members of Hamas in Syria in the summer of 2008, quotes 
from which are used throughout this paper. 
11.   See also Carolin Goerzig, ‘Mediating Identity Conflicts: Potential and Challenges of Engaging with Hamas’, 
Berghof Occasional Paper, no. 30, February 2010.
12.  Now as in the past, the Middle Eastern impasse has global repercussions. Without doubt, the Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict is one of the most acute international relations crises in the world and at the same time the most 
complicated conflict of our era. A number of terrorist attacks by various actors throughout the world in the last 
five decades have had a direct or indirect connection with the Palestinian problem. The global predicament to 
which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has brought us is all too obvious. Over the years the Middle East has pro-
vided various actors with a pretext to pursue their own agendas of violence.

14

1.				The	inflexibility	of	the	three	Quartet	principles				

mosities. However, by excluding one of the parties to the conflict, the EU is 
feeding the vicious circle of intra-Palestinian and Israeli-Palestinian strife. 
Both  risk  being  played  out  against  each  other.  Thus,  Israel  argues  that 
there is no point in negotiations as long as Palestinians remain divided. 
Yet Palestinians are divided because of diverging views about what form an 
agreement with Israel should take. If Hamas abides by previous diplomatic 
agreements and simultaneously recognises Israel, it might resolve this pre-
dicament, but at the price of forfeiting its own existence as a movement. 
Insisting that Hamas comply simultaneously with the two principles will 
only serve to demonstrate that they are mutually exclusive.

Adherence to previous diplomatic agreements versus 
renunciation of violence
Finally, the EU demands that Hamas abides by previous diplomatic agree-
ments and simultaneously renounces violence. For Hamas, however, this 
would basically mean that it would cease to exist as an independent move-
ment. In the way in which it pressurises the movement, the EU fails to take 
account of the dynamics of radicalisation within the Palestinian commu-
nity.  Many  Palestinians  perceive  Fatah  –  which  represents  those  endors-
ing recognition of Israel – as corrupt and co-responsible with Israel for the 
hardship and deprivations to which many of the Palestinian population 
are subject. As the price Fatah has paid in popularity terms is too high for 
Hamas, Hamas’s leaders cannot easily abide by previous diplomatic agree-
ments: this would be tantamount to political suicide. Precisely because the 
ambition of Hamas is to avoid the same fate as Fatah, any move towards 
moderation on Hamas’s part can only result from concessions and not be 
their  precondition.  Clearly,  if  the  group  compromises  without  receiving 
anything in return, it must fear the loss of its support base to more radi-
cal groups such as the Islamic Jihad.13 When Hamas members caution that 
‘if we give up on our homeland, then our children and the generations to 
come will not forgive us,’14 it becomes apparent that in the current circum-
stances the group feels that it has no option but to continue in its resist-
ance role. 

13.   The  Islamic  Jihad  movement  in  Palestine  is  a  militant  Palestinian  organisation  listed  as  a  terrorist  group, 
among others, by the EU and the US. It aims at replacing the Israeli state with a Palestinian Islamic state.
14.  Author’s interview with a Hamas member, Damascus, August 2008. 

15

2.				Why	the	EU	cannot	abandon	the	principles				

2.    Why the eU cannot abandon the 

principles

Just as it is debatable whether Hamas poses a major challenge at the mo-
ment, it is also debatable whether it should be up to the EU to tackle what 
has become a central issue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After all, it 
can be argued, why should Europe continue to invest time and effort in 
trying to find a solution to the conflict if the conflict parties themselves 
remain reluctant to compromise: or, as one interviewee put it, why should 
Europe indulge the ‘consumer behaviour’ of the protagonists?15 If Fatah 
and  Hamas  are  not  serious  about  intra-Palestinian  reconciliation  and  
Israel is not serious about peace, it is not clear what can be done from the 
outside. And why should Europe take the first step? In fact, the EU can-
not – for several reasons.

renunciation of violence: credibility
Firstly, the EU needs to maintain credibility. Of course, it can be – and of-
ten is – argued that the EU prioritised proscription rather than democracy 
promotion when it opted not to recognise Hamas after its election victory 
in 2006. Perhaps with some justification, a Hamas member complains ac-
cordingly: ‘An election pushed by the USA, Europe, Russia … but the result 
did not suit the interests of the occupation and Western views, so they re-
jected it, imposed a siege and stopped even humanitarian support. Where 
is the democracy in that?’16 It is, however, equally true that democracy is 
also about certain values. From this angle it can be argued that the EU 
should not have monitored elections involving the participation of Ha-
mas in the first place. Things being as they are now, it remains clear that 
all parties have to assume certain responsibilities in order to be engaged 
in the peace process. This reasoning does not have a purely declaratory 
dimension nor is it merely related to the EU’s credibility stakes. It is also 
about the very purpose of peace negotiations. There has to be some sort 

15.  In the course of a background interview for this paper, the expression ‘consumer behaviour’ was used in this 
context by an EU official, who remarked that the conflict protagonists seem to have high expectations towards 
the international community while remaining rather passive regarding peace efforts. In contrast, several analysts 
claim that the flotilla raid incident of 31 May 2010 is evidence of a failure of the international community to face 
up to its responsibility in the Middle East by dealing decisively with the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
16.  Author’s interview with a Hamas member, Damascus, August 2008.

17

Transforming	the	Quartet	principles:	Hamas	and		the	Peace	Process				

of common basis, otherwise the parties are too far apart. Another failed 
negotiation attempt would only serve to confirm the pessimism of those 
who are sceptical about the possibility of resolving the conflict through 
peaceful means. The EU has clearly signalled that the renunciation of vio-
lence has to be the basis of any talks. The EU upholds the position that if 
the international community fails to ensure that Hamas decommissions 
its weapons, then the start of negotiations may coincide with more sui-
cide missions and rocket attacks. 

recognition of Israel: responsibility
Secondly, the EU needs to be clear about its position vis-à-vis the recogni-
tion of Israel. This position is crucial in relation to the Europe’s histori-
cal responsibility, its relations with Israel and the US as well as its stance 
towards Mahmoud Abbas. Even if Hamas chose to enter into talks with 
Israel, this would not necessarily imply that the group already recognis-
es Israel. It is likely that Hamas would negotiate with Israel as an armed 
party  and  not  as  a  state.  The  key  question  is  who  the  respective  actors 
identify as their negotiating partners, which again is closely related to the 
necessity  of  a  common  starting  point  for  negotiations.  Furthermore,  it 
is hardly encouraging if Hamas seeks to exploit truce offers in order to 
re-organise and re-arm. Statements of the movement’s members such as 
‘we cannot liberate Palestine completely all at once’ or ‘our long-term goal 
is the return of all Palestinians to where they belong’ only confirms the 
widespread view that the group has to be decisively weakened in order for 
it to realise the benefits of peace.

Adherence to previous diplomatic agreements: 
consensus
Finally, the third principle stipulating that Hamas has to abide by previ-
ous diplomatic agreements is equally related to the necessity of a common 
agreed  basis  for  negotiations.  If  engaging  Hamas  implies  undermining 
the Palestinian Authority, no gain for the peace process is to be expected. 
Not only is there a need for a common starting point between Israel and 
Hamas, but also between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. 

18

3.				A	possible	way	out				
3.				A	possible	way	out				

3.    A possible way out

The  EU  now  finds  itself  in  a  precarious  ‘lose-lose’  situation,  whereby  
either adhering to or disowning the Quartet conditions will be problem-
atic. Clearly, there are good reasons for respecting the three Quartet con-
ditions – the recognition of Israel, the renunciation of violence and abid-
ing by previous diplomatic agreements in exchange for the recognition of 
a Palestinian government. But there are equally good reasons not to. The 
pros and cons of the three Quartet principles reveal a certain paradoxical 
quality in current EU policies.17 Whether the three principles are respected 
or not, neither scenario is likely to advance the Middle East peace process; 
and the EU will continue to be in a precarious situation. This, however, 
will only be the case if the EU remains a prisoner of its own rhetoric: that 
is, if the three principles become immutable, non-debatable and no flex-
ibility is allowed for in terms of their consequences. Without having to 
take the first step and feed the ‘consumer behaviour’ of those unwilling 
to assume any responsibility, the EU nevertheless has a role. It can exploit 
the potential of the three principles to become a real framework. Rather 
than being trapped in a black and white situation where it acts either in 
favour of or against one of the parties to the polarised conflict, the EU can 
start to move in a more subtle ‘grey zone’ whereby it applies the princi-
ples in a qualified manner, i.e. emphasising the principles while bearing in 
mind their original intended purpose. Although this might sound tricky, 
introducing  some  flexibility  into  the  principles  can  resolve  a  seemingly 
irresolvable contradiction. 

renunciation of violence: credibility through 
consistency 
The EU seeks credibility by making it clear that Hamas has to renounce  
violence. This quest for credibility is, however, tarnished by the widespread 
perception that the EU is actually employing double standards when it 
comes to its attitude to violence committed by Palestinians and Israelis. 
If it is the case that a conflict party has to be pressured into peace, then 
surely  this  holds  true  for  all  conflict  parties.  The  tendency  to  pressure 

17.  As well as a certain paradoxical quality in US policies or in the strategy of the Middle East Quartet in gen-
eral.

19

Transforming	the	Quartet	principles:	Hamas	and		the	Peace	Process				

one side only serves to increase asymmetries which block progress on the 
path towards peace. When a Hamas member asserts ‘just because some-
body  is stronger does  not mean that we will stop fighting,’ it becomes 
apparent that one-sided pressure targeting Hamas alone is fruitless. Of 
course,  it  can  be  argued  that  it  is  through  engagement  that  pressure 
comes about. Accordingly, Emanuele Ottolenghie argues that upgrading 
relations with Israel would mean that the EU would have more influence 
over it.18 Many, however, will wonder why the same approach is not ap-
plied to Hamas. By debating how to use its leverage equitably over Pales-
tinians and Israelis alike, the EU will not risk its credibility. The fear of 
losing its role in the Middle East by upsetting Israel, which might chose 
to exclude the EU from future peace equations, is not justified when the 
EU  sends  a  clear  signal  of  consistency.  On  the  contrary,  taking  a  clear 
position on the necessity of all sides to renounce violence will enhance 
its credibility.

The difficulty of exerting  pressure on Israel might pose an impediment to 
engaging with Hamas. If Hamas moderates its posture, and Israel refuses 
to show recognition, Hamas will risk losing even more of its shaky support. 
New  challengers  will  capitalise  on  Hamas’s  ‘sell-out’  and  repeat  the  radi-
calisation dynamics that were set in motion when the Oslo Accords failed 
to strike a chord with the Palestinian population. The way that events un-
folded in the early 1990s reveals that frustrated peace attempts can be the 
cause rather than just the effect of radical groups. Initially, the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Hamas fought the same enemy – Israel 
– with equal vigour. Things changed with the Oslo Accords in 1993. Where-
as initial concessions to the Palestinians led Hamas to de-radicalise and to 
declare a ceasefire – thereby implicitly recognising Israel – concessions that 
increasingly focused on PLO members alone led an alienated Hamas to re-
sort to suicide bombings in order to derail the peace process. 

If, however, Israel and Hamas could indeed be persuaded to adopt less un-
compromising stances and to ‘behave’, the EU would be provided with a 
second chance to adopt an inclusive approach. But such a scenario could 
be threatened by even more radical challengers such as Islamic Jihad, who 
could take over Hamas’s current role of peace spoiler. If Israel and Europe 

18.  See Emanuele Ottolenghi, ‘Squaring the Circle: EU-Israel Relations and the Peace Process in the Middle East’, 
Paper published as part of the debate series of the Centre for European Studies, Brussels, 2010, p. 34.

20

3.				A	possible	way	out				

fail  to  win  over  the  Palestinian  population  for  peace  negotiations,  new 
challenger groups could easily recruit from the ranks of the disillusioned 
and  angered.  This  would  certainly  be  the  case  if  long-promised  conces-
sions are deferred once more. The scenario of a repeated peace spoiler situ-
ation does not allow for much hope. The current constellation seems too 
complicated to allow for an easy exit. Including some actors but exclud-
ing others only adds to the conflict’s intricacy. Through an inclusive ap-
proach – also aimed at future potential spoilers – and by exerting pressure 
on all conflict protagonists alike, the EU can contribute to a disentangle-
ment of the complexities which endanger a potential peace process.

recognition of Israel: responsibility through 
reciprocity
The EU wishes to be clear in its recognition of Israel and it demands rec-
ognition of Israel by Hamas. The EU’s position would be even clearer if 
it was plain what would follow from such recognition. Hamas, just like 
Israel,  is  looking  for  acknowledgement,  which  is  no  easy  task  consider-
ing that both sides are fighting for the same territory. Tellingly, a Hamas 
member  warns:  ‘when  I  negotiate  with  the  occupying  authorities,  I  im-
plicitly give them a legal right to stay in my country. This is dangerous.’19 
With a ‘reciprocal’ approach20 the three Quartet principles could be used 
to encourage negotiations instead of constraining them. Thus, for the EU, 
moving in the ‘grey zone’ of recognition could be a very useful way of test-
ing the waters without making a commitment to one side or another. The 
EU can send a clear signal that it will encourage the recognition of Israel 
by Hamas while offering to recognise Hamas in turn as an elected entity 
representing a segment of the Palestinian population.21 It might be help-
ful to attempt to see things from Hamas’s point of view and contemplate 
what conditions Hamas would pose for the EU. Of course, it must not be 
the EU which has to make the first overtures. But, as it turns out, Hamas 

19.  Author’s interview with a Hamas member, Damascus, August 2008.
20.  A reciprocal approach would make it clear what would be the tangible benefits of complying with the three 
Quartet principles.
21.  In his Cairo speech, Barack Obama emphasised the need for a Palestinian state: ‘On the other hand, it is 
also undeniable that the Palestinian people – Muslims and Christians – have suffered in pursuit of a homeland. 
For more than 60 years they have endured the pain of dislocation. Many wait in refugee camps in the West Bank, 
Gaza, and neighbouring lands for a life of peace and security that they have never been able to lead. They endure 
the daily humiliations – large and small – that come with occupation. So let there be no doubt: the situation for 
the Palestinian people is intolerable. America will not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for 
dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own.’

21

Transforming	the	Quartet	principles:	Hamas	and		the	Peace	Process				

has already done so. Arguably therefore, it is time to show some sort of 
recognition  of  this  initiative.  A  reciprocal  ‘tit-for-tat’  approach  is  more 
promising than a continuation of the status quo masquerading as peace. 
Here again, such clarity would reinforce the credibility of the EU by sig-
nalling consistency and commitment to mutual recognition.

It may be doubtful that Hamas is truly willing to become more moderate. 
Although the group has sent out some clear signals, these do not neces-
sarily go beyond mere strategic calculations. In fact, as has already been 
pointed out, the group itself stresses that truce offers are only contempo-
rary manoeuvres intended to buy time for re-organisation. What if Hamas 
stands  to  gain  by  abusing  potential  European  goodwill  to  promote  its 
own  agenda,  either  to  buy  time  for  the  acquisition  of  armaments  or  to 
capitalise  on  the  opportunity  to  spread  propaganda?  This  doubt  is  not 
groundless  considering  the  comment  by  one  Hamas  member  that  Ha-
mas ‘makes peace with Israel to show the world that Israel does not want 
peace.’22  The  history  of  the  Middle  Eastern  conflict  is  testament  to  the 
fact that ‘peace’ can easily turn into a weapon of war. How often is the 
other side’s first step sold as surrender and a sign of weakness, thereby 
reconfirming  one’s  own  use  of  force?  The  underlying  logic  contains  an 
assumption that if the other side is weakened, then this is the perfect mo-
ment to strike and be done with it. Hamas is no exception. It undermined 
the  Oslo  talks  and  capitalised  on  Fatah’s  subsequent  loss  of  legitimacy 
among the population.

It  is  commonly  assumed  that  a  further  weakening  of  Hamas  will  force 
the movement to adopt a more moderate stance. Once the group is weak 
enough to realise the costs of war, so the argument goes, the time will be 
ripe to consider peace. However this assumption is erroneous. Just as it is 
certain that too much strength can prevent a movement from consider-
ing negotiations, it is also certain that nobody wants to negotiate from a 
position of weakness. Both – weakness and strength – can thereby become 
the Achilles heel of attempts to broker peace.23 

However, ‘testing the waters’ through a ‘tit-for-tat’ approach would yield 
dividends for the EU. The benefits of a cautious tit-for-tat-approach lie 

22.  Author’s interview with a Hamas member, Damascus, August 2008.
23.  See Daniel Lieberfeld, ‘Conflict “Ripeness” Revisited: The South African and Israeli/Palestinian Cases’, Nego-
tiation Journal, vol.15, no.1, 1999, pp. 63-82.

22

3.				A	possible	way	out				

precisely in its vagueness. Without having to commit, the EU could gain 
important  insights  into  when  the  right  time  for  resolution  has  arrived. 
Without  any  engagement  at  all,  this  opportunity  is  forfeited.  Further-
more, the benefits of engaging must outweigh the costs of non-engage-
ment. The rational calculation of costs and benefits is closely related to 
expectations. If there are no gains to be expected from showing goodwill, 
moderation will not be a rational option: without any carrots, sticks will 
be  ineffective.  Terrorist  proscription,  for  example,  could  be  employed 
much more strategically if a group like Hamas would stand to lose some-
thing from being banned. But since the group has never been recognised, 
proscription makes no difference. If the EU made a step towards Hamas 
via a reciprocal tit-for-tat approach, it could use its toolbox of sticks and 
carrots far more effectively.24 

Adherence to previous diplomatic agreements: 
consensus through flexibility
Finally,  the  EU  insists  that  Hamas  abide  by  previous  diplomatic  agree-
ments without prescribing in detail how intra-Palestinian reconciliation 
would evolve. After all, previous agreements were never concluded. This 
is the point about which the EU can indeed show flexibility. Admittedly, 
engaging Hamas – even indirectly – could create the danger of undermin-
ing Abbas and accentuating his powerlessness. Who can guarantee that 
making overtures to Hamas will not be exploited by the movement as a 
propaganda tool, either to depict Israel as the villain or to emphasise Fa-
tah’s lack of clout? How can potential peace brokers be sure that Hamas 
will behave as a responsible actor? However, if it remains unclear what the 
starting point of negotiations is, thus leaving the substance of potential 
negotiations open to interpretation, the EU requires something very dif-
ficult – if not impossible – from Hamas: to abide by agreements that have 
never materialised.

24.  Low-key policies such as development aid could be crucial in this context.

23

4.				Relaxing	the	Quartet	principles				

4.    relaxing the Quartet principles

The three Quartet principles are intended as a basis or framework for a 
potential peace process. They define the conditions a negotiating partner 
has to fulfil in order to take part in Middle East peace talks. However they 
lack specifics and are not precisely detailed, which means it is left up to 
the parties ‘to fill in the gaps’. This, after all, seems the point of negotia-
tions. Thus, the principle of the recognition of Israel is not explicit with 
regard to borders. Similarly, the principle that Hamas has to abide by pre-
vious diplomatic agreements does not clearly reflect the fact that the ma-
jority of previous agreements were never actually concluded. Ideally, the 
three principles should be quite flexible and should act as a constructive 
framework for peace efforts.25

In reality, however, they have acted as a constraint. As there are no clari-
fications on the European side as to how their mutually exclusive nature 
might be overcome, the actual purpose of the principles – the provision of 
a solid framework for peace initiatives – is lost. Instead of continuing in a 
situation where the EU applies insurmountable constraints, the following 
three suggestions would help to mutually reinforce the chances of Hamas 
complying with the three Quartet principles.

renunciation of violence and recognition of Israel
In the absence of a debate among European decision-makers about the 
Quartet principles, it remains unclear what would follow from Hamas’s 
compliance with them. Sceptics might argue that there is no point in hav-
ing a debate and that the principles should be taken at face value. How-
ever, this misses a crucial point: without a debate the Quartet principles 
actually mean nothing. Without clarifications, the principles can be inter-
preted very differently by different actors. This poses a double problem: 
both Hamas and the EU can interpret the principles as they wish. If the 
way the principles are interpreted and therefore how the EU will react if 
Hamas actually complies with them remains vague and unclear, Hamas 
will understand that there is no point in complying with these principles 
in the first place.

25.  This could also help to clarify the role of the Quartet today. 

25

Transforming	the	Quartet	principles:	Hamas	and		the	Peace	Process				

In fact, a ‘tit-for-tat’ approach would be much more credible than a lack 
of clarity on what follows from adhering to the principles. Manoeuvring 
in the – clearly challenging – grey area of step-by-step recognition should 
not  damage  the  EU’s  credibility  but  could  signal  a  consistent  give-and-
take approach instead.

recognition and adherence to agreements
Demonstrating flexibility regarding adherence to previous agreements 
and exercising a tit-for-tat approach regarding recognition can go hand-
in-hand. It is crucial to understand that progress in terms of peace and 
mutual  Israeli-Palestinian  recognition  cannot  be  detached  from  intra-
Palestinian agreement. Both issues are closely interrelated and must be 
used  to  mutually  complement  each  other.  Otherwise  they  risk  being 
played out against each other. Peace negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians  will  help  to  bring  about  intra-Palestinian  reconciliation, 
because the PA and Hamas will be forced to come to some sort of under-
standing as to who represents and speaks for them and as to what they 
actually want. Dialogue between the two Palestinian actors, in turn, will 
–  as  is  widely  recognised  –  increase  the  chances  of  a  more  sustainable 
peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in the long term. In 
order to enhance this mutual reinforcement of the two interrelated mat-
ters, the flexibility of the principle of adherence to previous diplomatic 
agreements and the tit-for-tat approach in terms of mutual recognition 
could be emphasised by the EU instead of excluding one of the parties 
to the conflict – a strategy which only feeds the vicious circle of intra-
Palestinian and Israeli-Palestinian strife.

Adherence to agreements and renunciation of violence
Reconciling  consistency  and  flexibility  does  appear  challenging  indeed. 
Arguably, the EU has to act consistently and cannot just change its strat-
egy overnight. It can certainly be argued that the EU acted inconsistently 
when not recognising Hamas once it was democratically elected or when 
it  did  not  take  a  clear  position  on  intra-Palestinian  reconciliation  after 
the Mecca agreement. Yet, changing the Quartet principles at this stage 

26

4.				Relaxing	the	Quartet	principles				

would constitute the same mistake, only coming from a different direc-
tion. It would be just another dent in the credibility of the EU. Clearly, the 
danger of a directionless policy is apparent. Yet, if a rather bleak picture of 
the future is being drawn here, it could also be true that postponing early 
minor concessions will force us to make major concessions later on.

If the EU shows consistency regarding the renunciation of violence and 
flexibility regarding the issue of adherence to previous agreements, it could 
interlink both and thereby contribute to intra-Palestinian reconciliation. 
The EU could emphasise that violence is not accepted by either Palestin-
ian conflict protagonist. Emphasis on supporting Fatah alone may have 
indirectly contributed to the inability of Hamas to renounce violence. In 
order to support the Palestinian civil police with training as well as equip-
ment, the EU established the European Police Mission for the Palestin-
ian Territories (EUPOL COPPS). As the EU refuses to work with Hamas, 
EUPOL COPPS only took effect in the West Bank. This has augmented 
Palestinian  suspicions  that  the  mission  was  biased  and  pro-Fatah.  The 
politicisation of the security forces26 and the EU’s backing of Fatah have 
pushed Hamas even further into a corner. Unfortunately, by focusing on 
training the civil police in the West Bank only, the EU is unwittingly re-
linquishing control over Hamas’ forces. Introducing some flexibility into 
its hitherto one-sided approach towards the two main Palestinian sides, 
in turn, could in fact help to increase the consistency and hence the cred-
ibility of the EU. In fact, the EU would have everything to gain by training 
Hamas police forces. Clearly, we cannot be sure that Hamas would accept 
such an offer, but at least the onus would then be on Hamas.

26.  See Esra Bulut, ‘EUPOL COPPS’, in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, Daniel Keohane (eds.), European Security 
and Defence Policy: the first 10 years (Paris: EUISS, 2009), pp. 287-98.

27

Conclusion				

Conclusion

Hamas has implicitly recognised Israel by accepting Egyptian mediation 
offers  and  has  made  repeated  offers  of  truce  to  Israel.  It  also  displayed 
willingness to compromise with Fatah as evidenced by the Mecca agree-
ment. However, the EU has not sent out any positive signals in response. 
Clearly, in judging Hamas, the EU emphasises the proscribed group’s in-
cendiary rhetoric over its actual deeds (in terms of the steps it has taken 
towards moderation). Unfortunately, by doing so, the EU is becoming a 
prisoner of its own rhetoric. Of course, judging by deeds alone is impos-
sible as rhetoric cannot be ignored, especially at the political level. Ironi-
cally,  however,  rhetoric  can  prevent  communication  and  debate.  By  un-
waveringly adhering to the three Quartet principles, the EU is limiting its 
own  scope  to  take  action.  Conducting  a  dialogue  with  Hamas  through 
the  Egyptians  or  through  the  media  is  thereby  not  only  constrained  by 
the communication deficit that such indirectness entails, but also by the 
lack of communication within the EU itself. Making dialogue with Ha-
mas taboo automatically hinders the ability of EU officials to reflect upon 
EU policy vis-à-vis Hamas and the concomitant implications for the Mid-
dle Eastern impasse. According to Alexander George, an efficient way to 
depict ‘truth’ and prevent it from being challenged is to ‘shift the frame-
work of debate in such a way that any conclusion reached within it is in 
accord with one’s own views.’27 The proscription of terrorist organisations 
is a case in point. Treating dialogue with violent movements as taboo pre-
vents mutual understanding and progress. Ignoring ‘terrorists’ does not 
provide any insight into what would have occurred if the engagement op-
tion had been pursued. 

In the absence of any debate about their interpretation, the three Quartet 
principles become self-defeating, amounting to no more than an empty 
mantra. But why is there no such debate about the utility and scope of the 
three  Quartet  principles?  A  closer  look  into  European  decision-making 
mechanisms is revealing. While some argue that it is very clear that ‘we 
have our official stance’ and that there is no problem of incoherence, oth-
ers take the opposite view and consider that the lack of coherence in the 

27.  Alexander L. George, ‘The Discipline of Terrorology’, in Alexander L. George (ed.), Western State Terrorism, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 76.

29

Transforming	the	Quartet	principles:	Hamas	and		the	Peace	Process				

EU’s position thwarts progress in the Middle East. After all, ‘we are only as 
strong as the weakest link, if one Member State says no, it’s no.’28 It is pos-
sible to regard coherence as the result of consensus based on the lowest 
common  denominator,  especially  when  considering  compromise  as  the 
essence of such coherence. It becomes more problematic when coherence 
becomes so dominant as to prevent the questioning of compromise based 
on the lowest common denominator considered as being ‘as strong as the 
weakest link’.

The struggle within the EU to agree – even though it only leads to a con-
sensus based on the lowest common denominator in the end – is related 
to the lack of debate. Reaching an agreement among 27 different Mem-
ber States can be quite difficult and often there are tricky internal discus-
sions. Thus, when the EU reaches a conclusion, it usually appears quite 
firm. It would be unfortunate, however, if in cases where the conclusion 
subsequently reveals itself to be unsatisfactory, the EU feels unable to ad-
dress this issue and initiate a new debate on the matter. The sensitivity of 
the topic of the Quartet principles only adds to the obstacles to an open 
debate on the matter. At the same time, however, it is precisely through 
an open discussion that the EU could become more than the sum of its 
parts  and  move  beyond  Member  State  politics.  Furthermore,  the  entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty has raised hopes and expectations in this 
regard. 

But how would such a debate come about and from where would the im-
petus be generated? Usually, a group of Member States can drive such a 
debate or a policy discussion is spurred by an external event, such as the 
Gaza war. Current events seem to be propitious for inciting fresh think-
ing on what is to be done or how exactly the Quartet principles should 
be  implemented  in  order  to  bear  fruit.  The  entry  into  force  of  the  Lis-
bon Treaty and the expectations that it has raised with regard to the EU’s 
enhanced capabilities as a foreign policy actor mean that the moment is 
ripe for a re-consideration of its policies. Engaging in a debate does not 
thereby have to simply mean simply ‘being seen in the room.’29 In fact, the 
attitude that sometimes prevails among the EU of ‘being there, but not 
upsetting anyone’ has to make way for creative thinking about how to use 

28.  Author’s interview with a European decision-maker, Brussels, spring 2010.
29.  Ibid.

30

Conclusion				

political leverage over Israel and the Palestinians. Persuading Hamas to 
tread the path of moderation would signal a clear turning point and lead 
to progress on how to deal not only with the proscribed group, but also 
with the current deadlock. 

In a way, this momentum could be seen as a test for the EU to demon-
strate its ability to assert itself in world politics. Clearly, Europeans do not 
want  to  anger  the  US  and  would  not  simply  recognise  Hamas  unilater-
ally: ‘we would just not do that to the US.’30 At the same time, some fear 
that the momentum will be lost if nothing happens now, as soon Iran will 
dominate the agenda and the US will be preoccupied with domestic issues 
such as mid-term elections. Therefore, many have looked to the idea of 
proxy talks with a sense of hope as well as with a certain sense of caution 
so as not to jeopardise the chance for indirect talks between the two pro-
tagonists. However, perhaps both the EU and the US stand to gain from a 
more assertive Europe. The EU carries credibility with Israel and the Pal-
estinians alike. Initiating a discussion among European decision-makers 
must not imply abandoning the Quartet principles, thereby angering the 
US and, in the words of one EU official, ‘upsetting everyone’.31 

The question remains whether Hamas is equally ready to play its part. It 
is  useful  to  attempt  to  gauge  how  Hamas  sees  things  from  its  perspec-
tive. What would Hamas expect, what conditions would the group impose 
upon the EU, for example? Possible solutions could be financial support 
for the reconstruction of Gaza as well as the recognition of Hamas as a 
full, independent Palestinian movement. Whether the EU would be ready 
to do that depends upon Hamas’s acceptance of the Quartet principles. 
Here again, we are left wondering who makes the first move. Many would 
surely agree that such a first move has to take the form of a joint effort 
between Israelis and Palestinians. What role is then left for the EU? What 
can it offer? Hypothetically, the EU could give guarantees of its support 
to all sides. Of course, this is not formally the case now. The benefits of 
such an approach are equally unclear. However, instead of compromising 
its principles and allies by committing to engaging all sides no matter at 
what  cost,  the  EU  can  approach  the  problem  from  a  different,  perhaps 
more helpful, angle by making it clear that it does not support violence 

30.  Author’s interview with a European decision-maker, Brussels, spring 2010.
31.  Ibid.

31

Transforming	the	Quartet	principles:	Hamas	and		the	Peace	Process				

and the current policies pursued by either side. At the same time, the EU 
can complement this stick with a carrot for those parties that comply with 
its requirements.  The aforementioned tit-for-tat approach could signal 
such a carrot-and-stick policy: if you comply with certain principles, we 
will reciprocate by showing recognition. This could be coupled with ef-
forts to foster both intra-Palestinian and Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation 
by  signalling  that  Hamas  could  become  part  of  the  talks  if  it  agrees  to 
become  more  moderate.  In  sum,  consistency,  reciprocity  and  flexibility 
might indicate a way out of the EU’s current predicament. 

If Hamas were to move towards a more moderate position this would cer-
tainly have a positive impact on the current deadlock. In order to achieve 
this, the EU can play a role, arguably one more significant than the role 
played by the US at this stage. As this paper has demonstrated, this role 
must not compromise the EU’s principles and relationships with its al-
lies. On the contrary, by actually opening a discussion on how to use the 
hitherto constraining matrix of the Quartet principles as a framework en-
couraging the engagement of all parties, the EU can only stand to gain 
and make a positive contribution on all fronts. 

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