International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world : the external dimension of the European Research Area.
Date: 2010-11-15
Institutions: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation
Subjects: EU research policy, international cooperation, research policy, scientific cooperation, scientific research, technology

International Science and Technology
Cooperation in a Globalized World

 
International Science
and Technology
Cooperation in a
Globalized World
The External Dimension of the European
Research Area

Edited by

Heiko Prange-Gstöhl
Directorate-General for Research – International Cooperation,
European Commission, Belgium

IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© European Union 2010

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Contents

List of figures and boxes
List of tables
List of contributors
Preface

1 The European Research Area ‘goes global’: an introduction

Heiko Prange-Gstöhl

PART I GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE EXTERNAL

DIMENSION OF THE ERA

2 European scientific and technical responses to the challenge of 

sustaining global commons
John Vogler

3 Forging European responses to the challenge of climate 

change and energy resource supply
Catherine Mitchell

4 Tackling global public health challenges: how should the 

European Research Area respond?
Ehimario U. Igumbor and David Sanders

5 An ‘outward-looking’ Lisbon Strategy: a solution for challenges 

of the knowledge economy in the EU, China and India
Suma Athreye, Can Huang and Luc Soete

6 Enabling institutional responses to innovation in latecomer

countries
Padmashree Gehl Sampath

7 Global challenges and the external dimension of the ERA: 

a comment
Dinesh Abrol

PART II POLICY COORDINATION IN THE EXTERNAL

DIMENSION OF THE ERA

8 Coordinate to collaborate: the governance challenges for European 

international S&T policy
Jakob Edler

v

vii
viii
ix
xi

1

31

47

65

81

103

123

135

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

9 The added value of international S&T policy coordination

Colin Shaw

10 The organization of policy coordination in multi-level spaces:

implications for EU international S&T policy
Robert Kaiser

11 The coordination of international S&T policies from the

perspective of EU member states
Arie van der Zwan

12 Informal coordination of international S&T policy: the case
of the European Initiative for Agricultural Research for
Development
Jean-Luc Khalfaoui

13 Policy coordination in the external dimension of the ERA:

a comment
Jørgen Mortensen

PART III CONCLUSIONS

14 From the ‘external dimension of the ERA’ to an ‘EU external 

S&T policy’? Conclusions and perspectives
Heiko Prange-Gstöhl

Index

161

174

192

213

220

227

239

Figures and boxes

FIGURES

3.1

S&T priorities of world regions as expressed in national 
foresight exercises

4.1 Relationship between infant mortality rate (IMR) and 

gross domestic product per capita

5.1 China’s R&D expenditure as a percentage of the R&D 

expenditure of the US, EU-25 and Japan, 1991–2003
8.1 The rise of international co-authorship, example of natural 

science

9.1 Variance in research priorities

51

69

86

136
167

BOXES

4.1

Priority topics for health systems research proposed by the World
Health Organization’s task force on health systems research
8.1 The coordination matrix of the Norwegian Research Council
8.2 The international dimension of FP6 ETPs: two examples

76
144
147

vii

Tables

3.1 Energy policy in transition: two discourses
4.1 Life expectancy at birth, infant, maternal and adult mortality

rates for 1990, 2000 and 2007

5.1 Science and technology indicators for Brazil, China, India,

Russia, the EU 27, Japan and the US, 2005

5.2 Working-age population (15–64 years) in 2005 and 2050:

European projections

6.1 Firms’ characteristics in the two sectors
6.2 Firms’ collaboration in the two sectors
6.3 Contribution to new product/process development
8.1 Impact of international collaborations in science, 1991 vs. 2003
8.2 International dimension of ERA-Nets
10.1 Actors, arenas and modes of coordination in international

S&T policy

10.2 Exclusivity and specificity of international S&T agreements
12.1 Selected EIARD contributions, 1995–2008

55

68

83

86
111
113
114
137
143

178
182
217

viii

 
Contributors

Dinesh Abrol is a Scientist in the field of science and technology studies at
the National Institute of Science, Technology and Development Studies, New
Delhi, India.

Suma  Athreye is  a  Researcher  at  UNU-MERIT,  the  Netherlands,  and
currently on leave as a Reader in International Business and Strategy at Brunel
University, United Kingdom.

Jakob Edler is a Professor of Innovation Policy and Strategy and Research
Director  at  the  Manchester  Institute  of  Innovation  Research,  Manchester
Business School, University of Manchester, United Kingdom.

Padmashree  Gehl  Sampath is  a  Research  Fellow  at  UNU-MERIT,  the
Netherlands,  and  Visiting  Research  Fellow  at  the  Open  University,  United
Kingdom.

Can Huang is a Research Fellow at UNU-MERIT and Maastricht University,
the Netherlands.

Ehimario  U.  Igumbor is  a  Senior  Lecturer  at  the  School  of  Public  Health,
University of the Western Cape, South Africa.

Robert  Kaiser is  an  Assistant  Professor  of  Comparative  Politics  at  the
Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Germany.

Jean-Luc Khalfaoui is the Director of European and International Relations
at the Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le
développement  (CIRAD),  Montpellier,  France,  and  former  Executive
Secretary of EIARD/European Commission, Belgium.

Catherine  Mitchell is  a  Professor  of  Energy  Policy  at  the  University  of
Exeter, United Kingdom.

Jørgen Mortensen is an Associate Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for
European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium, and former Senior Economist of

ix

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs.

Heiko Prange-Gstöhl is a Policy Officer for International S&T Cooperation
in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research, Belgium.

David Sanders is a Professor of Public Health at the School of Public Health,
University  of  the  Western  Cape,  South  Africa;  he  was  the  Director  of  the
School of Public Health from 1993 to 2009.

Colin  Shaw is  a  Researcher  at  the  Dublin  European  Institute,  University
College Dublin, Ireland.

Luc  Soete is  the  Director  of  UNU-MERIT and  Professor  of  International
Economic  Relations  (on  leave)  at  the  Faculty  of  Economics  and  Business
Administration, University of Maastricht, the Netherlands.

Arie van der Zwan is a Senior Policy Advisor on International Affairs in the
Directorate-General  for  Enterprise  and  Innovation  of  the  Netherlands’
Ministry of Economic Affairs.

John  Vogler is  Professor  of  International  Relations  at  Keele  University,
United Kingdom.

Preface

The focus of this book, which comprises contributions from both academics
and policymakers, is to deepen the analysis of the external dimension of the
European Research Area (ERA). It is unique in doing so by arguing that in a
globalized  knowledge-economy  the  European  Union  (EU)1 needs  a  new
approach to its international science and technology (S&T) policies by, first,
focusing  on  better  coherence  of  S&T policies  across  the  different  tiers  of
government and, second, by demonstrating leadership in tackling major global
challenges.

The need for an enhanced external dimension of the ERA was recognized
in  the  European  Commission’s  Green  Paper  ‘The  European  Research Area:
New  perspectives’ of  April  2007.  The  Green  Paper  acknowledged  that  the
ERA has to develop deep relations with the outside world as it cannot act as a
‘self-sufficient entity’ for reasons of, inter alia, growing internationalization of
science, research, development and technology, new global S&T players, and
an increased need to tackle global challenges.

The  Green  Paper  addressed  two  key  questions  when  it  comes  to  interna-
tional S&T cooperation: ‘how best to coordinate the international S&T poli-
cies  of  the  Member  States  and  the  Commission’ and  ‘how  best  to  address
global  challenges  through  international  S&T cooperation’.  First  answers  to
both  of  these  questions  were  given  in  the  European  Commission’s
Communication  on  ‘A Strategic  European  Framework  for  International
Science  and  Technology  Cooperation’ in  September  2008  and  in  the
Conclusions  of  the  Competitiveness  Council  of  December  2008  on  a
‘European  Partnership  for  International  Scientific  and  Technological
Cooperation’.

The  chapters  in  this  book  will  provide  theoretical  insights  and  practical
options on how to equip the ERA with policies and instruments to successfully
‘go  global’,  and  on  how  to  implement  policy  measures  for  international
science  and  technology  cooperation  effectively  and  efficiently.  The  authors
base  their  analysis  on  sound  empirics  and  take  particularly  the  multi-level
character of S&T policies in Europe into account.

This project is part of a series of initiatives organized by the International
Cooperation  Directorate  of  the  European  Commission’s  Directorate  General
for  Research  (DG  Research)  to  support  a  more  coherent  international  S&T
cooperation  strategy  at  European  level.  Some  of  the  ideas  presented  in  this

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

book  have  been  debated  and  developed  at  the  workshop  ‘Strengthening  the
coordination of Community and Member States’ policies and programmes for
international S&T cooperation: impediments and opportunities’ organized in
September 2007 by the International Cooperation Directorate of DG Research.
Later on, drafts of most of the chapters were presented and discussed at the
Second Global International Studies Conference ‘What keeps us apart, what
keeps  us  together?  International  order,  justice,  values’ in  Ljubljana  in  July
2008.  Participation  at  this  conference  was  financially  supported  by  DG
Research. I wish to thank in particular Ms Mary Minch and Ms Sigi Gruber of
DG  Research  for  their  continuous  support  in  realizing  this  project  and  the
contributors for their enduring commitment throughout the process of produc-
ing this book. The final responsibility of the content rests of course with the
authors and does not reflect the official position of the European Commission.

Heiko Prange-Gstöhl
Brussels, April 2010

NOTE

1. As the manuscript for the book was finalized before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
some chapters still differentiate between ‘European Community’ and ‘European Union’.

1. The European Research Area ‘goes

global’: an introduction

Heiko Prange-Gstöhl1

This introductory chapter will provide the framework for the two parts of the
book that will deal with ‘global challenges and the external dimension of the
ERA’ and  ‘policy  coordination  in  the  external  dimension  of  the  ERA’.  This
chapter will first give an overview of the different phases of the development
of the European Research Area (ERA) more generally. It will then present the
evolution of the international dimension in the Community’s science and tech-
nology  (S&T)  policies  and  will  explore  the  reasons  why  the  external  ERA
dimension should be fostered. The chapter will conclude with some conceptual
considerations on two of the core pillars of the external dimension of the ERA:
research policy coordination and tackling global challenges effectively. These
two issues are closely interrelated: on the one hand policy coordination has the
potential to  enable actors to address major  problems more  effectively (under
certain circumstances that will be discussed in this book), on the other hand the
ever  more  pressing  need  to  address  global  challenges  more  effectively  (and
efficiently) has the potential to ‘motivate’ actors to closer coordinate their indi-
vidual (that is regional, national, European, international) policies.

THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA: A NASCENT
INTEGRATION CONCEPT

An Emerging European Research Policy

Research policy in Europe is considered as a typical multi-level policy area
(Borrás  2003;  Grande  2000).  Consequently,  different  territorial  levels  own
autonomous  decision-making  capacities  in  research  policies  (Grande  2001).
While  early  attempts  of  European  states  to  cooperate  in  research  policies
started with the EURATOM Treaty of 1957, a true Europeanization of research
policy was realized only with the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987, when
competences  for  a  common  research  policy  were  partly  transferred  to  the
European Community (Lawton 1999; Peterson and Sharp 1998).

1

2

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

A multi-annual Framework Programme (FP), which is so far the main instru-
ment  of  a  common  European  research  policy,  was  implemented  for  the  first
time in 1983 with a budget of 3.75 billion Euro and focusing on eight strategic
technology fields such as information and communication technologies, mate-
rials, energy and environmental technologies. Basically, the first FP only inte-
grated those technology programmes of the Community that already existed at
that  time.  While  the  second  (1987–1991;  5.4  billion  Euro)  and  third
(1990–1994;  6.6  billion  Euro)  FP remained  modest  in  terms  of  budget,  with
FP4 (1994––1998) research expenditures at the European level were doubled
to 12.3 billion Euro. The main driver for this development was the Maastricht
Treaty  which  further  ‘communitarized’ research  policy.  The  Treaty  allowed
pursuing research activities at the EU level that were necessary to achieve other
than research-related goals of the Treaty. The following two FPs saw a further
concentration of major programmes but only a moderate increases of budgets,
with the fifth FP (1998–2002) providing an amount of 13.8 billion Euro and the
sixth FP (2002–2006) of 16.2 billion Euro (both without EURATOM).

Only  the  seventh  FP brought  about  major  changes.  First,  a  significant
budget  increase  was  realized,  providing  an  amount  of  50  billion  Euro  for  a
seven-year period (2007–2013) for research policies, which means an increase
of 40 per cent per year compared to FP6. Second, new instruments with the
aim  to  better  coordinate  research  policies  and  programmes  in  Europe  have
been  introduced.  The  ERA-NETs,  established  under  FP6  to  coordinate
national and regional programmes of member states, were complemented by
so-called ERA-NETs-PLUS which provide Community funds as an incentive
to  build  up  ‘common  pots’ amongst  national  and  regional  programme
managers to finance joint calls for proposals. The final objective is to identify
so-called Article 169 initiatives which integrate national programmes into new
joint  programmes  with  an  additional  financial  contribution  from  the
Community.2 In general, these integrated programmes are large-scale projects
where member states cooperate due to a common interest on the basis of vari-
able geometry.3

A second  instrument  that  is  used  more  frequently  under  FP7  is  the  Joint
Technology Initiatives (JTIs) based on Article 171 of the EC Treaty. In 2008
the  EU  launched  five  JTIs.  JTIs  constitute  public–private  partnerships
between the Community, member states and private actors under Community
Law. Each JTI comprises a large part of research activities in a specific area,
such as innovative medicines, embedded computer systems, aeronautics and
air  transport  and  nanoelectronics.4 Expectations  towards  JTIs  are  high:  the
Commission  and  member  states  expect  the  development  of  closer  links
between public and private research efforts, an improvement of the coordina-
tion of national research programmes as well as an enforcement of Europe’s
industrial technology intensity.

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

3

The Advent of the European Research Area

Research  policy  as  described  above  rather  reflects  an  ‘instrument-driven’ or
‘programme-driven’ approach. This started to change with the advent of the
European  Research Area  in  the  year  2000  when  the  ERA became  the  main
political  concept  of  European  research  policies.  While  the  initial  ideas  of  a
European  research  space  were  already  developed  during  the  1970s  (André
2006), the ERA as a concept gained more political weight and has been further
developed only since former Research Commissioner Busquin pushed it from
the year 2000 onwards (see Edler et al. 2003; European Commission 2000).
The Lisbon European Council followed up on the idea of an ERA and made it
a key component of the Lisbon Strategy.5 Today the ultimate aim of the ERA
is the creation of an ‘internal market for research’ with the free circulation of
researchers, knowledge and technologies.6

Initially, the ERA went well beyond scientific and economic objectives by
additionally focusing on enhanced interaction between science and society as
well as on the establishment of common scientific values. In order to imple-
ment  the  new  concept  the  European  Commission  proposed  different  instru-
ments which were expected to design a common European model for research.
This  model  was  meant  to  correct  the  different  ‘fragmentations’7 of  the
European research landscape (for example national/European, public/private,
universities/enterprises)  while  at  the  same  time  respecting  national  idiosyn-
crasies.

Since the European Commission did not provide a definition of the ERA,
the concept had to be narrowed down through the activities the Commission
proposed in the ERA context. The 2000 Communication entitled ‘Towards a
European Research Area’ brought the following seven fields of action forward
(European Commission 2000):

• A stock of material resources and facilities optimized at the European
level  (including  the  creation  of  ‘virtual  centres  of  excellence’ and  a
‘European approach to research infrastructures’);

• More coherent use of public instruments and resources (including better
coordination of national and European programmes and closer relations
between European research organizations);

• More  dynamic  private  investment  (including  better  use  of  indirect
instruments  such  as  fiscal  measures  and  the  development  of  tools  to
protect intellectual property);

• A common system of scientific and technical reference for policy imple-

mentation;

• More abundant and more mobile human resources (including the intro-

duction of a European dimension into scientific careers);

4

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

• A dynamic European landscape, open and attractive to researchers and
investment (including a reinforced role for regions and making Europe
attractive for researchers around the world);

• An area of shared values.

In  order  to  achieve  these  objectives  the  Communication  suggested  a  set  of
instruments ranging from informative, legally non-binding ones, to financial,
legal and political ones. In fact, the Lisbon European Council supported the
ERA concept as a means of economic reform and encouraged the Commission
to  pursue  the  ERA’s  objectives  strongly.  However,  the  Heads  of  States  and
Governments did not agree to use the entire set of instruments proposed by the
Commission,  but  rather  stressed  that  research  policies  in  Europe  need  to
remain  flexible  and  decentralized.  Generally,  member  states’ governments
accepted the ERA as an integration concept, however not conceived as a trans-
fer of sovereignty based on national interest or functional imperative, but as a
limited coordination venture at the EU level (Banchoff 2003). Consequently,
member states preferred legally non-binding governance instruments, particu-
larly the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), to implement the ERA objec-
tives.

With preferring non-binding governance instruments, one could argue that
member states did not want to go beyond the provisions of the EC Treaty since
the political target of coordinating national and Community research policies
is already codified therein. Article 165 of the Nice Treaty stipulates that ‘the
Community and the member states shall coordinate their research and techno-
logical  development  activities  so  as  to  ensure  that  national  policies  and
Community policy are mutually consistent’. To implement this political target,
in 1965 the member states had already established a committee to recommend
areas of joint action and ways to compare and to coordinate national research
policies. This need for coordination was recalled at the 1972 Summit, followed
by the creation of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Research in 1973
and  the  Committee  on  Science  and  Technical  Research  (CREST)  in  1974.
CREST’s objective was to assist the Commission and the Council in defining
‘objectives  and  ensure  the  development  of  a  common  policy  in  the  field  of
science and technology involving the coordination of national policies and the
joint  implementation  of  projects  of  interest  to  the  Community’.  In  1995
CREST’s tasks were redefined to identify strategic priorities for Community
policy and promote coordination by the Community and the member states of
their research activities.

The Commission’s proposal for the Sixth FP again affirmed the necessity
to apply both the OMC and legislative measures in order to realize the ERA.
National and European policies were meant to complement each other and to
offer the highest degree of coherence. Nevertheless, negotiations on the new

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

5

FP revealed  that  the  member  states  were  not  prepared  to  follow  the
Commission’s  ambitions.  While  Brussels  understood  the  FP as  only  one
instrument amongst others to create the ERA, member states felt no impera-
tive to take measures that go beyond the application of the FP and the OMC
in order to build a coherent ERA (Elera 2006, p. 564). Shortly after adopting
the  Sixth  FP the  Council  once  more  stressed  the  independence  of  national
research policies proposing again the OMC to implement ERA policies while
at the same time rejecting the possible use of legislative measures in European
research policies.8 As a consequence the ERA, in fact, lost political weight.
However,  the  FP offered  certain  instruments  which  helped  to  coordinate
national  and  regional  research  programmes  closer,  such  as  ERA-NETs.
Additionally, the mobility of researchers was simplified and the creation of the
European Research Council (ERC) was seen as a milestone to boost the qual-
ity of European fundamental research.

The  further  development  of  the  ERA since  the  year  2005  was  shaped  by
two major changes in European research and innovation policies: first, through
embedding the ERA into the relaunched Lisbon Strategy, and second through
the Commission trying to re-enforce its role as ‘research policymaker’ rather
than being a sole executer of the Framework Programme. I will explore these
two aspects further in the following sections.

Linking the ERA Better to the Lisbon Strategy

In 2004 the Kok-Report (named after former Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok
who  chaired  a  High-Level  Group  to  review  the  Lisbon  Strategy)  required
urgent action to increase Europe’s attractiveness for researchers and scientists
and  to  make  research  and  development  (R&D)  a  top  priority  (Kok-Report
2004,  p.  6).  Based  on  this  and  other  recommendations  the  Commission
proposed a relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy ‘by way of a European Partnership
for  jobs  and  growth’ (European  Commission  2005a,  p.  14).  EU  Heads  of
States and Governments agreed to this proposal at the 2005 Spring European
Council.9

Since 2005 the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy ‘is based on a close
partnership between the Commission and member states, with a clear division
of  responsibilities  and  a  strong  emphasis  on  maximizing  the  synergies
between  the  Community  and  the  national  levels  and  between  different
economic policy areas’.10 The Commission proposes Integrated Guidelines for
reform which are then approved by the Council and form the basis for member
states’ National  Reform  Programmes.  By  putting  forward  a  Community
Lisbon Programme (CLP) the Commission tries to ensure that policymaking
and  funding  activities  at  the  European  level  best  serve  the  growth  and  jobs
goals. Integrated Guidelines, the CLP and the National Reform Programmes

6

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

are drawn up for a three-year cycle. The Commission monitors the National
Reform Programmes on an annual basis and proposes changes, if necessary.
The relaunched strategy focuses on three main pillars:

•

•

•

‘Making Europe a more attractive place to invest and work’ by extend-
ing  and  deepening  the  Single  Market,  ensuring  open  and  competitive
markets  inside  and  outside  Europe,  improving  European  and  national
regulation, and expanding and improving European infrastructure;
‘Fostering  knowledge  and  innovation  for  growth’ by  increasing  and
improving investment in research and development, facilitating innova-
tion,  the  uptake  of  ICT and  the  sustainable  use  of  resources,  and
contributing to a strong European industrial base;
‘Creating more and better jobs’ by attracting more people into employ-
ment and modernizing social protection systems, increasing the adapt-
ability of workers and enterprises and the flexibility of labour markets,
and investing more in human capital through better education and skills.

This  Communication  was  followed  by  several  initiatives  trying  to  make  the
Lisbon  Project  more  tangible  (see  European  Commission  2005b,  2006a,
2006b). In all these documents the proposals range from improving the legis-
lation and framework conditions to foster new technologies, promoting a free
employment  market  for  researchers,  improving  the  access  to  research  funds
for SMEs and intensifying industry–university links, to proposing a European
patent strategy and linking the European cohesion policy better to research and
innovation.

While the ERA has not been mentioned in the key document relaunching
the  Lisbon  Strategy,  the  Lisbon  Integrated  Guidelines  2005–2008  speak  of
establishing  a  European  Knowledge  Area  (European  Commission  2005d),
however, not addressing the ERA specifically. Only the Integrated Guidelines
for  2008–2010  are  more  precise,  calling  for  ‘more  rapid  progress  towards
establishing the European Research Area, including meeting the collective EU
target  of  raising  research  investment  to  3  per  cent  of  GDP is  needed’
(European Commission 2007b, p. 14).

Additionally, the ERA concept now features prominently in the Community
Lisbon  Programme.  While  the  ERA is  missing  in  the  2005–2008  CLP,  the
2008–2010 CLP devotes a specific objective to the ERA. ‘Objective 6’ states
that  ‘the  Community  will  make  the  “fifth  freedom”,  the  free  movement  of
knowledge, a reality and create a genuine European Research Area’ (European
Commission 2007b, p. 9). For the first time in an official EU document, the
objective also brings forward the need to realize a ‘fifth freedom’, the freedom
of  knowledge,  and  consequently  presents  the  ERA as  a  nascent  integration
concept closely linked to the concept of an ‘Internal Market’.

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

7

Beyond  simply  mentioning  the  ERA,  the  Commission  this  time  also

proposes concrete actions for implementation. These include:

• Pool R&D resources to ensure their more effective use, by agreeing by
end 2008 areas for joint programmes and launching common calls for
projects by end 2010.
Improve  cross-border  mobility  and  career  prospects  of  researchers
based on a European ‘passport’.

•

• Make the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) fully

operational.

• Launch a new generation of world-class research facilities by drawing up
by end 2009 roadmaps for the launch of the commonly agreed projects.
For  those  projects  of  a  global  scale,  launch  a  dialogue  with  interested
international partners during 2008. (European Commission 2007b, p. 10)

Proposing these actions the Commission has acted quite cautiously trying not
to put something forward it cannot deliver in the end. At the time of publish-
ing  the  CLP all  of  these  initiatives  had  already  been  quite  advanced:  a
Communication on joint programming of research and a European initiative
on researchers’ mobility had been on their way, the EIT was about to be estab-
lished and the European Strategy Forum for Research Infrastructures (ESFRI)
had paved the ground for agreeing on common European infrastructures.

To sum up, today the ERA is linked more closely to the Lisbon Strategy
than it was at the beginning of the century. However, this has only happened
recently with the ERA finding its way into the latest CLP and the request to
member states to report progress towards realizing the ERA in their National
Reform Programmes.11 This can be understood as a direct consequence of the
2007 ERA Green Paper.

By  connecting  the  ERA better  to  the  Lisbon  Strategy  it  is  likely  that  the
coherence between research and other policies serving the creation of growth
and  jobs,  notably  innovation,  cohesion,  regional  and  employment  policies,
increases. Linking research policy goals closer to innovation policies has the
advantage  that  coordination,  monitoring  and  evaluation  (of  the  Integrated
Guideline  referring  to  R&D)  fall  under  the  EU  Treaty’s  economic  policy
provisions of Article 121 (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).
This means that ‘harder’ coordination mechanisms apply for research policy
than  originally  foreseen  in  the  Treaty  (that  is,  Article  181  Treaty  on  the
Functioning of the European Union).12

Revamping the ERA: the ERA Green Paper and its Follow-up

Only  when  the  European  Commission  published  its  Green  Paper  ‘The

8

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

European Research Area: New Perspectives’ (European Commission 2007a)
was  the  ERA concept  seriously  revitalized.  It  was  mainly  Science  and
Research  Commissioner  Janez  Potocnik  who  saw  the  necessity  –  after  the
Seventh FP has been successfully launched – to resuscitate the ERA given the
emergence of new global challenges, new global S&T players, and a persis-
tent  performance  gap  between  Europe  and  its  main  competitors  the  United
States  and  Japan.  According  to  the  Green  Paper  the  creation  of  the  ERA
combines  ‘a  European  “internal  market”  for  research,  where  researchers,
technology and knowledge freely circulate; effective European-level coordi-
nation of national and regional research activities, programmes and policies;
and  initiatives  implemented  and  funded  at  European  level’ (European
Commission 2007a, p. 2).

Publishing the ERA Green Paper marked a considerable push for European
research policy activating policymakers at the national and European levels as
well  as  public  and  private  research  institutions  to  work  practically  on  the
creation  of  a  European  Research  Area.  A public  consultation  on  the  ERA
Green Paper mobilized some 800 responses on all of the so-called ‘six axes’
which mainly shall constitute the ERA (European Commission 2008b):

1. Realising a single labour market for researchers;
2. Developing world-class research infrastructures;
3. Strengthening research institutions;
4. Sharing knowledge;
5. Optimizing research programmes and priorities;
6. Opening to the world: international cooperation in S&T.

The Competitiveness Council of November 200713 invited the Commission to
prepare proposals on these topics that were finally adopted by the Commission
during 2008:

• A Recommendation  on  the  management  of  intellectual  property  in
knowledge transfer activities (C 2008 1329) and a Code of Practice for
universities  and  other  public  research  organizations  (PROs)  was
adopted on 10 April 2008.14

• A Communication  on  a  European  Partnership  for  Researchers  was

adopted on 23 May 2008 (COM 2008 317 final).15

• A Communication entitled Towards Joint Programming of Research16

was adopted on 15 July 2008 (COM 2008 468 final).17

• A Proposal for a Council Regulation (based on Article 171 EC Treaty)
on a dedicated Legal Framework for the Construction and Operation of
new Pan-European Infrastructures was adopted on 25 July 2008 (COM
2008 467 final).

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

9

• A Communication on a Strategic European Framework for International
Science  and  Technology  Cooperation  was  adopted  on  24  September
2008 (COM 2008 588 final).18

While these five initiatives are considered to be the core activities fostering the
ERA,  the  Commission  and  member  states  also  agreed  on  several  other
measures to approach the ‘fifth freedom’. In November 2006 the Commission
adopted a modernized Community framework for State aid for research and
innovation as well as guidance for a more effective use of tax incentives for
R&D.19 Moreover, a new General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) was
adopted  in  July  2008.  The  Regulation  authorizes  aid  in  favour  of  SMEs,
research,  innovation,  regional  development,  training,  employment  and  risk
capital.20

Furthermore,  in  November  2007  the  Commission  adopted  the  Strategic
Energy Technology  Plan  (SET-PLAN)  which  aims  at  setting  up  a  dedicated
European policy to accelerate the development and deployment of cost-effec-
tive  low  carbon  technologies  (European  Commission  2007c,  p. 2).21 The
SET-PLAN  should  ensure  that  in  the  future  energy  research  and  innovation
efforts  are  planned  in  alignment  with  EU  energy  policy  goals  (European
Commission  2007c,  p.  14).  To  that  end  a  group  of  high  level  government
representatives from each member state has been set up to steer the process
and to ‘propose options for an optimization of overall energy RDD&D efforts
in  the  European  Research Area  through  joint  programming’.22 As  such  the
SET-PLAN can be seen as a core sectoral component of the ERA.

A major difference between the first ERA Communication in 2000 and the
ERA Green Paper in 2007 was the way in which both the Commission and the
member states engaged in the follow-up of these papers. As explained above,
the 2000 Communication was not taken up with the appropriate commitment
by  member  states  in  favour  of  the  upcoming  discussion  on  the  Sixth
Framework  Programme.  Therefore,  the  time  was  too  short  to  start  serious
discussions in the relevant fora and to implement the ERA through concrete
actions.

The timing of the 2007 ERA Green Paper was different: it was launched
immediately after the start of the Seventh FP which left research policy actors
at  the  national  and  European  levels  sufficient  room  to  devote  more  of  their
capacities  and  time  to  the  ERA itself  instead  of  already  planning  the  next
Framework Programme.

This  engagement  is  mirrored  in  the  launch  of  the  so-called  ‘Ljubljana
Process’. In May 2008, member states agreed that ‘Europe needs to develop a
common  vision  and  effective  governance  of  the  European  Research  Area
(ERA),  in  order  to  improve  the  coherence  and  synergy  among  several  good
initiatives  already  launched  at  national  and  EU  levels,  so  that  a  globally

10

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

competitive, knowledge-based and innovative Europe can be created’.23 This
process  is  based  on  a  long-term  partnership  between  member  states  and  the
Commission,  that  is  that  ‘member  states,  the  countries  associated  to  the
Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development …, and
the Commission … share responsibility for establishing the ERA of the future
with a renewed commitment, with due respect for the roles and prerogatives
of EU institutions and the principle of subsidiarity’.24

The ‘Ljubljana Process’ consists of two parts: a ‘vision’ for the ERA and
‘effective  governance’ of  the  ERA.  Under  the  French  EU  Presidency  in  the
second half of 2008 member states focused on the vision for the ERA. After
consulting  EU  member  states,  countries  associated  to  FP7,  the  Commission
and other stakeholders, the French Presidency managed to come up with a text
of  such  a  vision  which  was  adopted  by  the  Competitiveness  Council  in
December 2008.25

However, the main changes in the context of the ERA concept appear in
terms of governance issues. As a general principle of its future governance the
ERA will be developed in ‘partnership’ between the actors. This means that all
phases of its implementation (from the early phases of planning of initiatives
to their implementation, monitoring and evaluation) are guided at the political
level. A practical result of this principle might be the creation of a yearly ERA
Council which would discuss the ERA dimension of national policies and the
results of the mutual learning exercises. A second governance principle is that
the  ERA shall  build  links  with  other  policies.  In  this  context  the
Competitiveness  Council  of  May  2008  recalled  that  the  ERA is  part  of  the
Lisbon Partnership for Growth and Jobs, and is closely linked to education,
innovation  and  other  relevant  policies.  Enhanced  links  between  Council
formations,  including  through  joint  meetings  and  mutual  information  on
subjects of common interest, could serve this purpose. Finally, consecutive EU
Presidency Trios will in the future work closely with each other (mainly by
drafting  joint  work  plans  and  joint  statements)  and  with  the  Commission  in
order to ensure coherent and sustained progress.26

THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA AND ITS EXTERNAL
DIMENSION

The Development of an International Dimension in European Research
Policies

International S&T cooperation has always been present in the Community’s
research policies since the launch of FP1 in 1983, although, in the beginning
only on an ad-hoc basis.27 These ad-hoc programmes were integrated in the

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

11

form  of  the  INCO  Programme  in  FP4.  Consecutive  FPs  continued  with
specific  programmes  for  international  cooperation  until  FP7,  which  saw  a
decentralization  in  international  cooperation  activities  towards  thematic
programmes (European Commission 2007d).28

Two Commission Communications published in 1990 and 1995 explained
the  rationale  for  international  S&T policies  at  the  beginning  of  the  1990s
(European Commission 1990, 1995):

•

•

•

a  new  international  context  emerged  as  the  Eastern  bloc  disappeared,
the Mediterranean Basin faced several political changes, and the Third
World has been more diversified;
the  conditions  for  research  and  technological  development  have
changed through globalization of the economy and new emerging play-
ers;
new global problems of the 21st century have become apparent.

In  terms  of  international  partners,  S&T cooperation  with  Brazil,  China  and
India  was  already  identified  as  being  of  vital  importance  for  the  European
Union  in  the  mid-1990s  (European  Commission  1996).  Cooperation  with
developing countries has been substantially enforced since the mid-1990s as a
consequence of a demand from the Council and the EU member states to step
up  aid  for  developing  countries  in  research  and  development  (European
Commission 1997a). Under FP5 and FP6 strategic objectives were targeted at
the accession countries, other central and eastern European countries, newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union,29 the Mediterranean countries
and developing countries.

While  the  FP fosters  bottom-up  collaboration  the  Community  has  also
increasingly engaged in bilateral S&T agreements with several third countries.
S&T agreements set a legal basis for reinforcing policy dialogues with indus-
trialized  countries,  emerging  economies  and  European  neighbouring  coun-
tries. Since 1994, agreements have been concluded with Argentina, Australia,
Brazil,  Canada,  China,  Chile,  Egypt,  India,  Korea,  Mexico,  Morocco,  New
Zealand,  Russia,  South  Africa,  Tunisia,  Ukraine  and  the  United  States  of
America. Additionally, several non-EU European countries are associated to
the Seventh Research Framework Programme.30

Despite an increasing engagement of the EU in international S&T cooper-
ation and a growing understanding that ‘in the context of a global economy
and  in  the  light  of  problems  emerging  at  planetary  level,  research  activities
sometimes have to be defined on a broader scale than European’ (European
Commission 2000, p. 22), an approach to develop a real international research
policy  had  not  been  proposed  when  the  Commission  made  its  ideas  for  a
European  Research  Area  public  in  2000.  The  international  dimension  was

12

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

restricted to proposals aiming at enforcing the mobility of researchers, such as
the creation of a system of grants for scientists from third countries and open-
ing of national and European research programmes to researchers from third
countries (European Commission 2000, p. 27).

Only one year later the Commission published a dedicated Communication
on  the  international  dimension  of  the  European  Research  Area  (European
Commission 2001a). This Communication provided a more systematic effort
to  open  the  ERA to  the  world.  It  set  broad  principles  for  international  S&T
cooperation calling for an opening of all national research activities to third
countries,  including  the  industrialized  countries,  integrating  candidate  coun-
tries into the ERA, applying a diversified approach towards different regions,
and  strengthening  coordination  efforts  between  the  member  states  and  the
Community.  In  fact,  the  Commission  enforced  this  last  point  in  the
Communication by recommending setting up a ‘Forum for international scien-
tific and technological relations’ made up of representatives of member states,
international  organizations,  and  the  Community  to  provide  an  appropriate
framework  for  the  strategic  analysis  of  trends  in  science,  technology  and
economics  (European  Commission  2001a,  p.  14).  The  Commission  also
planned to improve the administrative and regulatory conditions for the recep-
tion of non-European researchers within the ERA, to better finance researcher
mobility,  and  to  align  EU  scientific  cooperation  policies  with  EU  foreign
policy and development aid programmes.

However,  the  proposed  measures  were  never  endorsed  by  member  states
and  followed-up  by  concrete  joint  actions  of  the  member  states  and  the
Commission. The consent and support of member states is, however, essential
since most of the necessary measures fall under national competences, such as
labour market law, social security and university policies.

Nevertheless,  on  a  few  of  these  objectives  the  Community  managed  to
make  some  progress.  First,  the  instruments  to  foster  mobility  of  researchers
were  strengthened  with  a  view  to  attract  scientist  to  enter  the  ERA.31 The
Marie  Curie  International  Fellowships  provide  an  opportunity  for  European
researchers  to  gain  international  experience.  The  newly  launched  IRSES
scheme  of  the  FP People  Specific  Programme  allows  the  exchange  of
researchers  for  short  periods  between  member  states’/associated  countries’
organizations and those in 29 third countries covered either by an S&T coop-
eration  agreement  with  the  Community  or  by  the  European  Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP). Additionally, member states have since 2005 implemented the
Scientific Visa Directive which allows issuing a residence permit for scientists
for a period of at least one year.32

Second,  improvements  in  aligning  Community  S&T cooperation  policies
with other external policies and instruments can be noted. Examples are the
research  for  development  initiative  with  African  countries  (European

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

13

Commission  2007e),  the  Stabilization  and  Association  Process  with  the
Western  Balkans  (European  Commission  2008d)  and  the  Action  Plans  for
countries  covered  by  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (European
Commission 2008e). These external EU policies have a major S&T compo-
nent.

In the same way other policy initiatives, particularly in the context of the
Lisbon Strategy, have been rather silent on the external dimension of the EU’s
research  policies.  While  the  Commission’s  Communication  More  Research
and Innovation – Investing for Growth and Employment of 2005, for example,
acknowledged that ‘to achieve sustainable global competitiveness, the EU has
no  choice  but  to  become  a  vibrant  knowledge  economy’,  that  ‘world-wide
competition to attract research and innovation investment is growing’ and that
‘in addition to attractive locations such as the US and Japan, new competitors
have emerged, such as China, India and Brazil’ (European Commission 2005b,
p. 3f) international S&T cooperation was, however, not offered as a strategy to
address these challenges. The same holds for other innovation-related policy
papers such as the Communication Putting Knowledge into Practice: A Broad-
based Innovation Strategy for the EU of 2006 (European Commission 2006a).
Consequently,  the  Community  Lisbon  Programme  2005–2008  also  did  not
have  a  link  to  the  international  dimension  of  European  research  (European
Commission  2005c),  although  the  Integrated  Guidelines  2005–2008  (guide-
line  number  7)  stated  that  ‘the  international  dimension  of  R&D  should  be
strengthened in terms of joint financing, development of a more critical mass
at  the  EU  level  in  critical  areas  requiring  large  funds  and  through  reducing
barriers  to  mobility  of  researchers  and  students’ (European  Commission
2005d, p. 17).33

It is not presumptuous to claim that an international EU research policy or
strategy  hardly  existed.  International  S&T policy,  including  the  bilateral
European Community S&T agreements, was treated as kind of ‘stepmotherly’
and  international  S&T cooperation  was  perceived  as  an  ‘instrument’ of  the
Framework Programmes not as a policy on its own. At the Community level,
this only changed with the ERA Green Paper and major follow-up initiatives
like  the  Commission’s  strategic  European  framework  for  international  S&T
cooperation (European Commission 2008c) and the launch of the next Lisbon
cycle,  which  saw  the  external  ERA dimension  sneaking  into  the  revived
Community Lisbon Programme for 2008–2010.

The  Commission’s  strategic  European  framework  for  international  S&T
cooperation for the first time aims at giving a long-term structure to the EU’s
international S&T policies by setting out several guiding principles for future
international  action,  proposing  an  institutionalized  partnership  between
member states and the Commission, applying differentiated regional priority-
setting,  giving  preference  to  regional  approach  for  S&T agreements,  and

14

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

fostering better framework conditions for international cooperation both at the
national and EU levels.

At the national level for most member states international cooperation in
science and technology has also become a core element of national research
policies.  Countries  like  Denmark,  Finland,  Germany,  Ireland,  the  UK  and
Sweden  have  an  explicit  international  S&T strategy  or  their  activities  are
embedded in a general globalization strategy. In these countries international-
ization is seen as a measure to strengthen excellence and the competitiveness
of  the  national  innovation  system,  to  get  access  to  new  knowledge,  to  gain
access to new markets, talents and human resources, and to cope more effi-
ciently with global challenges.

Unlike  with  past  policy  initiatives  which  tried  to  give  international  S&T
cooperation a strategic touch, member states now seem to be more responsive
to  enforce  the  ERA’s  external  dimension.  Under  the  Open  Method  of
Coordination  member  states  and  associated  countries  set  up  a  CREST
Working Group running in 2007 and 2008 to foster a coordinated S&T policy
approach  towards  third  countries  and  to  identify  areas  and  countries  where
joint  action  could  generate  added-value  for  them  (CREST 2007).34 At  the
highest political level the Competitiveness Council in February 2008 pointed
out that ‘the Commission and member states should further advance coordi-
nated and mutually complementary international S&T cooperation strategies
in order to strengthen Europe’s role as a global key actor in science, research
and technology’.35 The Heads of States and Government recalled this request
at their subsequent Spring meeting36 and finally endorsed the Commission’s
proposals on a strategic European framework for international S&T coopera-
tion at the Competitiveness Council in December 2008.37

Objectives of the External Dimension of the European Research Area

The external dimension of EU internal policies receives ever greater aware-
ness. Unlike in other policy areas, such as the internal market, environment,
justice and home affairs, competition or energy policies, the ‘external dimen-
sion’ in  research  policies  does,  however,  not  imply  a  ‘regulatory  boundary
shifting’ beyond  the  EU’s  own  borders  (for  example  Lavenex  2004).38 As
research policy is not a regulatory policy the EU cannot ‘export’ its rules and
regulations abroad for the purpose of creating a level playing field to maintain
the Union’s competitiveness, to secure its markets or to shape the international
regulatory  framework  for  trade  and  investment  (Woolcock  2007).  Internal
market norms, for example, are promoted by the Commission and the member
states ‘when negotiating international agreements or enlargements, in regula-
tory dialogues with third countries and in the international fora dealing with
internal  market  policies  such  as  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO),  the

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

15

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) or the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision’ (Gstöhl 2007, p. 6).

The ‘external dimension’ or the ‘externalization’ of the ERA has a different
logic.  It  mirrors  the  combined  international  S&T cooperation  efforts  of  the
Community and the member states towards third countries to foster the coop-
eration between stakeholders (individuals and institutions) in- and outside the
Union,  to  pump-up  aid  for  S&T capacity-building  abroad,  and  to  guarantee
access to knowledge, resources and infrastructures worldwide.

This  policy  is  expressed  through  different  arrangements.  First,  the
Community’s  Research  Framework  Programme  offers  several  options  for
third country entities to take part in Europe’s joint research efforts. While the
Framework  Programme  is  generally  open  to  third  country  participation,  it
provides  additional  instruments  that  aim  at  fostering  cooperation  with  third
countries.  Specific  International  Cooperation  Actions  (SICAs)  demand  the
participation of third countries39 in calls for proposals to be eligible for fund-
ing.

Second,  the  Community  has  so  far  signed  more  than  30  bilateral  S&T
agreements,  some  being  agreements  associating  the  partner  country  to  the
Framework Programme. These sectoral agreements confirm a privileged part-
nership  with  the  Community  in  science,  research  and  technology  matters.
Recently the Commission and third countries have started to use these agree-
ments  to  implement  coordinated  calls  for  proposals,  in  which  both  parties
synchronize  their  calls  in  technical  terms  (that  is  through  the  alignment  of
content, resources, timing, evaluation criteria and procedures) while each side
still finances their participants. A coordinated call aims at generating joint or
tightly coordinated projects.

Third,  international  S&T cooperation  is  pursued  in  the  context  of  the
general bilateral or bi-regional agreements the EU has signed with third coun-
tries,  such  as  the  Stabilization  and  Association  Agreements  with  candidate
countries for EU accession, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements,
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with European Neighbourhood
Policy countries and Russia as well as the Economic Partnership Agreements
with ACP countries.

The loosest forms of cooperation, finally, are policy dialogues or other EU
attempts  to  act  as  an  international  S&T promoter  mainly  with  countries  or
regions with which no legal arrangement exists. Policy dialogues are very soft
instruments  to  foster  international  S&T relations  around  the  world,  mainly
with  the  aim  of  identifying  joint  S&T priorities.  The  EU  establishes  policy
dialogues  by  providing  platforms  to  bring  together  policymakers  and  stake-
holders of a given region or group of countries with its EU counterparts.

The rationale to engage in international S&T cooperation is manifold, rang-
ing from securing Europe’s competitiveness to solving global challenges. The

16

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

need  for  an  external  dimension  for  the  ERA can,  first,  be  argued  from  the
viewpoint  of  securing  the  EU’s  economic  competitiveness.  International
competition is intensifying, and Europe faces a twin challenge from Asia and
the US. However, the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, for example, will
create  not  only  a  new  competitor  to  Europe,  but  also  a  vast  and  growing
market. For Europe to take advantage of the opportunities, it needs to have an
appropriate  economic  and  scientific  base,  recognizing  that  over  the  decades
ahead competition is going to be growing.

Nevertheless, and in spite of the rapid rise of emerging economies, research
and patenting in the key technology clusters are still performed dominantly in
the Triad (the US, Japan and the EU). The US has a worldwide lead in health
and information society technologies. Japan specializes in renewable energy
and information technologies. Europe has the most advanced market for envi-
ronmental technologies and holds a strong international position in applying
technologies  for  sustainable  development.  However,
sector-specific 
European-based firms show weaknesses in bio-fuels, fuel cells, a number of
renewable  energy  technologies  and  clean  fossil  energy  technologies.  In  the
field of information technologies, Europe has been catching up in the 1990s,
and European-based firms have a slight lead in telecommunication technolo-
gies. On the other hand, also with regard to health technologies, Europe is a
competitive industry player and European-based firms hold a leading position
in terms of export. It is, however, not as specialized as the US and Japan in
terms  of  science  production  (measured  by  number  and  fields  of  scientific
publications). The EU has in fact neither particular specialization nor under-
specialization in any particular scientific field (European Commission 2007i).
A rapid growth of technology capability in many of the research and tech-
nology  areas  can  be  noted  in  emerging  economies,  especially  in  South  East
Asia. The  current  main  drivers  for  the  industrial  and  commercial  growth  of
China  and  the  ‘Asian Tigers’ are  mature  technologies.  India  and  Russia  are
successfully specialized in software engineering services. India is the single
biggest beneficiary of ‘offshoring’ or ‘outsourcing’ in the service sector with
an  enormous  pool  of  educated,  English-speaking  workers.  India  has  also
started  to  become  a  major  worldwide  player  in  health  technologies,  while
Russia  explores  its  broad  scientific  capacity  for  advanced  materials  and
nanotechnologies.  Brazil  is  specializing  in  information  technologies  and
biotechnologies as well as expanding its offshore software services.

In a global economy, Europe has no option but to improve its knowledge
economy and underlying economic performance. Therefore, Europe’s answer
to  the  changing  global  S&T landscape  consists  of  strengthening  its  interna-
tional S&T position and opening up to the rest of the world in order not to miss
technological opportunities arising outside its borders (European Commission
2007i). ‘International opening can help instigate virtuous circles whereby the

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

17

EU becomes a stronger region in S&T and thereby becomes more attractive
e.g.  for  internationally  mobile  scientists  and  engineers  and  for  international
investments in R&D’ (European Commission 2008b, p. 26).

International  S&T cooperation  can  improve  the  effectiveness  and  effi-
ciency  of  Europe  to  respond  to  global  challenges.  ‘Responding  to  urgent
global  challenges  is  no  longer  a  policy  option  but  a  necessity’,  as  a
Commission Expert Group has recently described the situation. Responding to
global  challenges,  such  as  global  warming,  energy  resource  security,  food
security,  poverty,  desertification  and  global  public  health,  requires  a  more
effective and efficient international S&T policy in Europe. This could include
a concentration of efforts on research and technological areas that respond to
such challenges like health technologies, renewable energy technologies, envi-
ronmental technologies, or information technologies.

Effective responses to global challenges also imply S&T capacity building
in  third  countries  which  would  enable  poorer  regions  to  mobilize  S&T
resources to achieve more growth and prosperity. However, as capacity build-
ing is expensive, horizontal coordination with other EU external policies and
programmes, such as aid and development policies, is required.

Finally, a well-defined international S&T policy will enable the promotion
of political dialogue and trust. As Europe needs to strengthen its role as a reli-
able partner to respond to global problems jointly with its partners around the
world, international collaboration in science and technology can be an impor-
tant means to support also political dialogue and mutual trust building.

If Europe wants to strengthen its role in the world (European Commission
2005e, 2006c, 2007h) mutual trust building is an efficient tool, in particular
if  Europe  has  an  interest  in  spreading  its  values.  The  perception  of  the
European Union as being a ‘soft power’ can be an asset to be ‘heard’ at the
international level. With a ‘strong common voice … Europe can play a more
active  role  in  international  agenda  setting  and  formulation  of  policies  and
strategies  and  be  more  audible  in  international  negotiations’ (European
Commission 2008b, p. 29).

Global Challenges and the External Dimension of the ERA

As argued before, addressing global challenges is a key driver for an enhanced
external  dimension  of  the  ERA. Two  ultimate  aims  of  fostering  an  external
dimension are the reduction of global risks and the boost of prosperity around
the  world.  International  S&T cooperation  also  enables  the  EU  to  meet,  for
example, those international commitments that aim at regulating global chal-
lenges (European Commission 2008i).

Generally,  global  societal  challenges  are  big  challenges.  They  are  often
interrelated (like climate change, security of energy supply and prosperity, for

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

example)  and  need  urgent  treatment. This  is  costly. Therefore,  prioritization
and focusing need to be key principles of international S&T cooperation help-
ing to share the costs of global efforts.40 But how to prioritize and focus? How
to  best  address  global  challenges  through  international  S&T cooperation?
What are the appropriate fora, actor constellations, policies and instruments?
In  reality  there  are  very  different  logics  to  prioritize  and  focus  resources
depending  on  the  angle  from  where  decision-makers  approach  this  task.
Human beings tend to think in terms of their own knowledge and domain of
expertise. With a background as an economist, for example, a decision-maker
would  most  likely  think  that  cost–benefit  analysis  is  an  objective  way  to
decide such an issue. A politician might pay more attention to the questions of
power,  influence  and  governance  that  would  determine  the  outcome  of  any
decision.  Nonetheless,  there  would  probably  be  a  consensus  on  at  least  the
broad priority areas, with the rest of a list more influenced by personal expe-
rience, preferences and prejudices. Healthcare would be near the top of most
lists,  although  within  this  the  main  priority  may  be  HIV/AIDS,  malaria  or
maternal and child health depending on the criteria retained. For the policy-
maker  who  has  to  make  decisions,  the  challenge  is  to  reconcile  budget
constraints,  political  pressures,  public  opinion,  multiple  time  frames,  and  so
on.

According to fora and actor constellations, it is often claimed that multilat-
eral actions are needed to successfully tackle global challenges. The argument
goes that joint multilateral activities are best suited to share costs and to limit
the  free-rider  problem,  where  only  some  countries  pay  to  tackle  a  problem
while  the  majority  enjoys  the  benefits  of  positive  results.  Indeed,  in  recent
years efforts at the G8 level have increased to develop international research
strategies jointly, including the involvement of those countries that are deemed
as major G8 partners for successfully tackling global challenges.41

Others argue that to address global challenges, in particular in the areas of
water  supply,  poverty  reduction  and  food  security,  local  research  capacities
have to be strengthened and research results have to be disseminated to end-
users.  Some  authors  criticized  the  fact  that  most  of  these  programmes  (in
particular in the health sector), while addressing health research of interest to
African  countries,  did  not  have  as  a  primary  goal  to  involve  local  research
communities, in this way preventing the natural sedimentation and develop-
ment  of  local  critical  mass.42 In  fact,  it  seems  to  be  advantageous  to  link
between local, regional, national and global problems and actors to facilitate
mutual learning. Local knowledge could be up-scaled to a regional or national
level. National knowledge could also be disseminated to the regional and local
levels.

In  the  context  of  addressing  global  challenges  the  EU  is  quite  often
confronted with the request to ‘speak with one voice’. It is assumed that acting

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

19

together  in  tackling  global  challenges  increases  the  efficiency  of  actions  as
well  as  their  impact  with  regard  to  problem-solving.  ‘Europe  speaking  with
one voice’ in international negotiations or multilateral fora is therefore seen as
a preferable condition when addressing global challenges. If this is true, what,
however, would be the conditions for the EU (that is its member states and the
Commission) to speak with a ‘single voice’ in different areas of global rele-
vance?  And  what  are  the  mechanisms  that  lead  to  a  coherent  ‘European
voice’?

The EU claims to have been in the lead in the international response to key
issues that cannot be constrained by national boundaries like climate change,
air and water pollution as well as health pandemics, and of having made major
contributions to international negotiations establishing regulatory standards in
these  areas  (European  Commission  2006c).  Built  on  these  experiences  and
competences ‘speaking with one voice’ could be improved by better coordi-
nation in the Council to promote the emergence of consensus on issues of EU
relevance  that  are  subject  to  discussions  in  multilateral  organizations  (for
example the UN), informal bodies (for example the G8) and other global fora
or regional organizations. Practice shows that where the Community is already
a member of UN bodies, multilateral and regional organizations, coordination
in the Council on an EU position between the member states, the Presidency
and  the  Commission  is  already  well  established  (European  Commission
2006c).

Policy Coordination in the External Dimension of the ERA

Policy coordination is a specific mode of governance for daily policymaking
at  the  EU  level.  The  Commission’s  White  Paper  on  Governance  of  2001
proposed policy coordination, in particular the Open Method of Coordination,
as a tool to improve democratic policymaking in Europe and to strengthen the
legitimacy  and  effectiveness  of  the  policy  process  of  EU  institutions
(European Commission 2001b). In contrast to the Community method or regu-
lation,  policy  coordination  relies  on  voluntary  action  and  ‘soft  law’ and  is
based on non-hierarchical instruments and deliberation amongst the actors.43
Non-hierarchical modes of steering can be differentiated between positive and
negative incentives, on the one hand, and non-manipulative negotiation meth-
ods  on  the  other  hand.  Positive  and  negative  incentives,  such  as  side-
payments,  issue-linkages  or  sanctions,  may  change  the  cost–benefit
considerations  of  actors  in  the  desired  behavioural  direction.  Through  non-
manipulative negotiation methods, such as arguing and learning, actors may
be convinced to change their preferences voluntarily (Börzel et al. 2005).

Research  policy  coordination,  and  in  particular  the  coordination  of  inter-
national  research  policies,  is  costly,  time-consuming  and  complex  as  it  has

20

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

both a horizontal (across policies and administrations) and a vertical (across
different  layers  of  government)  coordination  component.  In  a  horizontal
perspective  achieving  a  coherent  policy  requires  ‘organizing  the  production
and  use  of  policy-relevant  knowledge  and  integrating  it  in  decision-making
processes’ (OECD 2005, p. 12). In a vertical perspective it needs to be recog-
nized  that  research  policy  in  Europe  is  a  multi-level  and  multi-actor  policy.
This raises the likelihood of tensions between different levels of government,
for  example  with  regard  to  varying  policy  objectives,  different  aims,  means
and  priorities,  or  because  regions  have  significant  own  competencies  for
research  policy,  thus  implementing  their  own  strategies  and  programmes,
including  in  the  area  of  international  S&T cooperation  (Kaiser  and  Prange
2004; Prange and Kaiser 2005).44

Although  member  states  and  the  Commission  have  repeatedly  acknowl-
edged a shared interest in the closer coordination of their efforts, the coordi-
nation of national and Community research policies has not gone very far, yet.
The reasons for that are manifold ranging from the competitive character of
research and innovation policies to general stagnations of the European inte-
gration process in the mid-1960s (the French policy of the ‘empty chair’) and
mid-1970s (economic recession). Moreover, with the legalization of research
policies in the Single European Act of 1987 (and further institutionalized with
the Maastricht Treaty), the regulative norm of a single European research area
marked  by  coordination  of  national  policies  was  replaced  by  a  distributive
policy, which means by the Framework Programmes.

A new attempt for coordination was started in 1994 when the Commission
put  forward  the  Communication  Research  and  Technological  Development:
Achieving  Coordination  through  Cooperation (European  Commission  1994).
The Commission’s proposals were backed by member states first, but later they
were not pushed as member states remained focused on the distributive mechan-
ics of the Framework Programme. As already explained before, research policy
coordination  was  finally  back  on  the  political  agenda  in  2000  when  the  ERA
became the focus of a research policy at the European level defined in broader
terms  than  the  Framework  Programme.  The  Open  Method  of  Coordination,
Networks of Excellence, ERA-NETs and the more frequent use of Article 169
were expected to spur the coordination of national and Community efforts.

What  are  the  arguments  for  closer  policy  coordination  and  what  is  the
expected  effect?  A general  argument  to  support  policy  coordination  at  the
European level goes that Europe’s international S&T policy is characterized
by  ‘fragmentation’,  which  leads  to  the  potential  for  duplication  and  sub-
critical  levels  of  action.  Fragmentation  is  visible  through  both  EC  research
programmes and individual national programmes often pursuing broadly simi-
lar  goals  and  activities. Therefore,  it  is  assumed  that  in  order  to  exploit  the
potential  of  Europe’s  science  base  and  its  contribution  to  knowledge-based

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

21

policy,  public  policies  need  to  be  coordinated  more  effectively  by  working
more  closely  together.  In  fact,  such  a  statement  must  still  be  regarded  as  a
‘hypothesis’ since so far no empirical evidence has shown that fragmentation
(if it exists at all) is negative per se and that lesser ‘fragmentation’ leads to the
expected positive effects.

Besides this argument policymakers and academics frequently bring forward
several reasons why policy coordination might be beneficial.45 Amongst these
reasons is the possibility of collaborative learning from good practices and, as a
consequence, better coherence and enhanced efficiency of the European S&T
system, the setting up of joint agendas, implementation of joint activities and
also  launching  of  joint  programmes.  Moreover,  coordination  is  deemed  to
reduce costs as the effectiveness of research funding might increase. Through
coordination  policymakers  and  programme  managers  might  develop  common
guidelines and standards, for example for programme development and imple-
mentation, for researcher mobility, or for commonly agreed approaches to intel-
lectual property issues. The result could be a converging understanding on how
to improve the framework conditions for international S&T activities.

In fact, the ability of learning from each other represents a key European
added value of policy coordination, an incentive for working closer together,
and is a necessity to develop coherent and consistent policies and strategies
towards  third  countries.  However,  the  success  factors  for  achieving  mutual
learning  under  conditions  of  complex  horizontal  and  vertical  coordination
needs are still rather unclear. In Europe the diversity of policies and institu-
tions in the area of research constitute demanding conditions for mutual policy
learning (Chalmers and Lodge 2003; Lundvall and Tomlinson 2002; Scharpf
2002). Even if policymakers are willing to learn from each other and consen-
sus has been reached upon a best practice there still exist barriers to implement
a new policy, for example, if the role of a specific national institutional set-up
has been ignored.

Due to this diversity in Europe, the organization (or governance) of inter-
national S&T policy in terms of actor constellations and administrative levels
is conceived as fragmented in Europe. Therefore, this volume will also address
options to better link the different and numerous decentralized activities and
strategies of actors in order to strengthen the governance of international S&T
cooperation and make progress in reducing fragmentation, understood in the
way mentioned above.

NOTES

1. The views expressed in this chapter are purely personal and do not necessarily reflect the

position of the European Commission.

2. Article 169 EC Treaty states: ‘In implementing the multi-annual framework programme the

22

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Community  may  make  provision,  in  agreement  with  the  member  states  concerned,  for
participation  in  research  and  development  programmes  undertaken  by  several  member
states,  including  participation  in  the  structures  created  for  the  execution  of  those
programmes.’

3. The Seventh FP identified four potential initiatives under Article 169 of the EC Treaty: a
joint research programme on ‘Ambient Assisted Living’ (AAL), one in the field of Baltic Sea
research  (BONUS  169),  one  in  the  field  of  Metrology  (EMPR)  and  one  for  research-
performing SMEs (EUROSTARS).

4. See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, doc 11018/08, 21/22 June 2007.
5. See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 23/24 March 2000, Press Release 100/1/00.
Informal  Competitiveness  Council,  Summary  of  the  Presidency,  Würzburg,  26/27  April
6.
2007;  Competitiveness  Council,  Council  Conclusions  on  the  launch  of  the  ‘Ljubljana
Process’ – towards full realisation of ERA, 30 May 2008; European Commission (2007a).
7. An ERA Expert Group set up by the Commission in 2007 to develop and expand rationales
for ERA rightly points out that the term ‘fragmentation’, which is currently the core argu-
ment for developing an ERA, ‘is an inappropriate metaphor’ as the word ‘describes a situa-
tion where something that is whole has been broken or divided into pieces while for Europe
the aim is the reverse’ (European Commission 2008f, p. 13). Moreover, the Expert Group
confirms that the proof of ‘fragmentation’ still needs a proper analysis.

8. Council Conclusions, doc. 5742/03, 26 November 2002.
9. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 22/23 March 2005.
10. See  http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/european-dimension/index_en.htm#e  (accessed  26

August 2008).

11. The 2008 Spring European Council had called on member states ‘to set out in their National
Reform  Programmes  how  progress  towards  national  R&D  investment  targets  will  be
achieved and how their R&D strategies will contribute to the realising and better governance
of the European Research Area’ (European Council, Presidency Conclusions, doc. 7652/08,
13/14 March 2008, p. 5).

12. These include: policy coordination in the Council, that is, at the highest political level; on
the basis of European Council (that is Heads of States and Governments) conclusions the
Council adopts proposals for member states’ economic policies, which raises political pres-
sure on member states; the Council monitors the implementation of these proposals on the
basis of Commission reports; on the basis of Commission recommendations the Council can
propose changes to member states’ economic policies, and the Council Presidency reports
member states’ failures to the European Parliament.

13. Competitiveness Council, Council Conclusions on the Future of Science and Technology in

Europe, 22/23 November 2007.

14. The Competitiveness Council adopted a Resolution in response on 30 May which empha-
sized the need for ‘member states and the Commission to establish, in partnership, light and
effective governance arrangements’.

15. Council  Conclusions  were  adopted  by  the  Competitiveness  Council  on  25–26  September

16.

2008.
Joint programming involves member states on a voluntary basis and on the basis of variable
geometry and is aimed at defining, developing and implementing common strategic research
agendas based on a common vision and addressing major societal challenges.

17. The Competitiveness Council of 2 December 2008 adopted Conclusions on joint program-

ming of research.

18. Council  Conclusions  on  a  European  Partnership  for  International  S&T Cooperation  were

adopted by the Competitiveness Council on 2 December 2008.
IP 06/1598 and IP 06/1600, 22 November 2006.
IP 08/1110, 7 July 2008.

19.
20.
21. The SET-PLAN was a response to the European Council Conclusions adopted on the basis
of the Commission’s Energy Package (that is the Communications: ‘An Energy Policy for
Europe’ COM (2007) 1, ‘Limiting global climate change to 2 degrees Celsius’ COM (2007)
2, and ‘Towards a European Strategic Energy Technology Plan’ COM (2006) 847).

22. Council Conclusions, doc. 6326/1/08, 28 February 2008, p. 4.

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

23

23. Council Conclusions, doc. 10231/08, 3 June 2008, p. 3.
24. Council Conclusions, doc. 10231/08, 3 June 2008, p. 4.
25. Council Conclusions, doc. 16012/08, 2 December 2008.
26. See, for example, Draft 18-month programme of the Council, doc. SN 2782/1/08, 29 May

2008.

27. Due  to  lack  of  space  I  will  not  address  member  states’ international  S&T activities;  for

details see CREST (2007, 2008).

28. Under  its  Cooperation  Specific  Programme  FP7  provides  some  dedicated  instruments  to
promote  international  S&T cooperation  with  third  countries  such  as  Targeted  Opening,
Specific International Cooperation Actions (SICAs), Coordinated Calls and Twinning (for
more  details  see  European  Commission  2008a).  Moreover,  the  Capacities  Specific
Programme  finances  bi-regional  dialogue  platforms  (INCO-NETs)  with  major  regions  to
identify  joint  priorities  and  to  improve  the  participation  of  the  targeted  regions  in  the
Framework Programmes. It also supports bilateral S&T promotion platforms (BILATs) with
countries  that  have  signed  an  S&T agreement  in  order  to  implement  joint  action  plans
defined in the framework of the S&T agreement.

29. Outside the FP the Community and member states established the International Association
for the Promotion of Cooperation with scientists from the New Independent States from the
former Soviet Union (INTAS).

30. These  are  (December  2008): Albania,  Bosnia  &  Herzegovina,  Croatia,  Former  Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Israel
and Switzerland.

31. Nevertheless, one has to admit that both the international mobility of human resources for
S&T towards the EU and the numbers of European researchers emigrating to other parts of
the world is still quite marginal (European Commission 2007f, p. 38).

32. Council  Directive  2005/71/EC  of  12  October  2005  on  a  specific  procedure  for  admitting

third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research.

33. The  same  sentence  has  been  used  in  the  Commission’s  Integrated  Guidelines  2008–2010

(European Commission 2007g, p. 14).
34. See also van der Zwan in this volume.
35. Council Conclusions, doc. 6326/1//08, 28 February 2008, p. 9.
36. See  Brussels  European  Council,  Presidency  Conclusions,  Council  Document  7652/08,  14

March 2008.

37. See Council Conclusions concerning a European partnership for international scientific and
technological cooperation, 2891st Competitiveness Council meeting, Brussels, 2 December
2008.

38. At the political level the only exception where the EU tries to establish common rules in
relation  to  research  and  innovation  are  intellectual  property  rules.  At  the  research
programme and project level the Commission tries to make sure, for example, that its high
evaluation standards are respected when it comes to Coordinated Calls for proposals with
third countries.

39. Eligible third countries are defined in the list of International Cooperation Partner Countries

(ICPC).

40. See also the reports presented at the workshop ‘Research priority setting for international
S&T co-operation’ organized by DG Research of the European Commission in September
2007 (http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/index.cfm?lg=en&pg=wkshp_25-26_09_2007).
41. See,  for  example,  Joint  Statement  by  the  German  G8  Presidency  and  the  Heads  of  State
and/or Government of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa on the occasion of the
G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, 8 June 2007.

42. On the health research issue in Africa see Igumbor and Sanders in this volume.
43. The  pressure  for  member  states  to  comply  with  measures  may  vary  from  policy  area  to
policy  area  depending  on  the  concrete  monitoring  instruments,  the  different  roles  of  EU
institutions, the involvement of stakeholders, and the Treaty base.

44. See also Kaiser in this volume.
45. See CREST (2007) and European Commission (2008h).

24

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

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Impediments  and  Opportunities,  proceedings  of  a  workshop  organised  by  DG
Research on 19/20 September 2007, Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2008i), Responding to Global Challenges: The Role of Europe
and of International Science and Technology Cooperation, proceedings of a work-
shop  organised  by  DG  Research  on  4/5  October  2007,  Brussels:  European
Commission.

Grande,  Edgar  (2000),  ‘Multi-Level  Governance:  Institutionelle  Besonderheiten  und
Funktionsbedingungen  des  europäischen  Mehrebenensystems’,  in  Edgar  Grande
and Markus Jachtenfuchs (eds), Wie problemlösungsfähig ist die EU? Regieren im
europäischen  Mehrebenensystem,  Baden-Baden:  Nomos  Verlagsgesellschaft,  pp.
11–30.

Grande,  Edgar  (2001),  ‘Von  der  Technologie-  zur  Innovationspolitik  –  Europäische
Forschungs-  und  Technologiepolitik  im  Zeitalter  der  Globalisierung’,  in  Georg
Simonis,  Renate  Martinsen  and  Thomas  Saretzki  (eds),  Politik  und  Technik  –
Analysen zum Verhältnis von technologischem, politischem und staatlichem Wandel
am Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 368–87.
Gstöhl,  Sieglinde  (2007),  Political  Dimensions  of  an  Externalization  of  the  EU’s

Internal Market, EU Diplomacy Papers, 3/2007, Bruges: College of Europe.

Kaiser, R. and H. Prange (2004), ‘Managing diversity in a system of multi-level gover-
nance: the open method of coordination in innovation policy’, Journal of European
Public Policy, 11 (2), 249–66.

Kok-Report  (2004),  Facing  the  Challenge  –  The  Lisbon  Strategy  for  Growth  and
Employment, Report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim  Kok, Brussels:
European Communities.

Lavenex, S. (2004), ‘EU external governance in “wider Europe” ’, Journal of European

Public Policy, 11 (4), 680–700.

Lawton, Thomas C. (1999), ‘Fostering Invention and Innovation: Europe’s collabora-
tive R&TD initiatives’, in Thomas C. Lawton (ed.), European Industrial Policy and
Competitiveness:  Concepts  and  Instruments,  Basingstoke:  Macmillan  Press,  pp.
23–48.

Lundvall, Bengt-Åke and Mark Tomlinson (2002), ‘International Benchmarking as a
Policy Learning Tool’, in Maria J. Rodrigues (ed.), The New Knowledge Economy
in  Europe,  Cheltenham,  UK  and  Northampton,  MA,  USA:  Edward  Elgar,  pp.
203–31.

OECD (2005), Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 1: Synthesis Report, Paris:

OECD.

The ERA ‘goes global’: an introduction

27

Peterson, John and Margret Sharp (1998), Technology Policy in the European Union,

Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Prange, H. and R. Kaiser (2005), ‘The open method of coordination in the European
Research Area:  a  new  concept  of  deepening  integration’,  Comparative  European
Politics, 3 (3), 289–306.

Scharpf, F.W. (2002), ‘The European social model: coping with the challenges of diver-

sity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (4), 645–70.

Woolcock, Stephan (2007), European Union Policy towards Free Trade Agreements,
ECIPE  Working  Paper  3,  Brussels:  European  Centre  for  International  Political
Economy.

PART I

Global challenges and the external dimension of
the ERA

2. European scientific and technical
responses to the challenge of
sustaining global commons

John Vogler

INTRODUCTION: THE ‘TRAGEDY’ OF GLOBAL
COMMONS

Global  commons  are  frequently  subject  to  ‘tragedies’ of  misuse  and  pose
particular  problems  for  international  co-operation.  They  comprise  the
resources  of  the  high  seas  and  deep  seabed, Antarctica,  outer  space  and  the
geostationary orbit plus the global atmosphere. One dimension of the manage-
ment regimes for all these commons involves international S&T co-operation,
particularly for monitoring functions, but also to inform the underlying under-
standings  upon  which  the  regimes  are  based.  This  chapter  will  attempt  to
assess the extent to which such activities are carried out on a European rather
than  a  member  state  basis.  For  a  number  of  reasons  direct  European
Community  involvement  is  limited.  However,  there  are  indications  that  its
support  of  international  research  programmes  and  involvement  in  bilateral
capacity building are significant. The chapter concludes with a brief evalua-
tion of arguments for a more coherent and centralized EU approach.

The global commons are areas and resources beyond sovereign jurisdiction.
Although economists sometimes refer to natural commons, they are probably
better regarded as social constructs but ones that are derived from the prevail-
ing state of scientific knowledge and technological capability.1 The first of the
global  commons  and  indeed  the  subject  of  some  of  the  initial  attempts  to
formulate international legal principles were the high seas, beyond a narrow
territorial  sea  of  three  miles. As  it  became  technologically  possible  to  reach
and exploit sea-bed resources the dimensions of the oceans common changed.
National  demands  for  the  right  to  exploit  offshore  oil  and  gas  fields  and  to
monopolize the rich fisheries of the continental shelf led to a re-drawing of the
limits of the high seas by the establishment of 200-mile Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZs) formalized in the Law of the Sea (LoS) Convention, signed in
1982  at  Montego  Bay,  but  only  implemented  in  the  mid  1990s. A principal

31

32

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

cause  of  this  delay  was  the  controversial  resource-sharing  regime  for  the
minerals of the deep sea-bed. During the 1960s scientific and technical devel-
opments  had  enabled  the  exploitation  of  the  deep  seabed  which  thereby
became part of the global ocean common. The novel and controversial element
of  this  move  was  the  proposal  from  Maltese  minister,  Arvid  Pardo,  that  it
should be held and treated as the ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’. As these
events  were  occurring  the  European  Union  was  also  forming.  International
adoption of the 200 nautical mile EEZ had immediate implications in terms of
the setting up of the Common Fisheries Policy which consolidated the EEZs
of member states into one area (no EEZs were set for the Mediterranean Sea).
The  European  Community,  alongside  the  member  states,  because  of  its
maritime competences was a full participant in the LoS Convention and has
negotiated  on  global  fisheries  issues  (notably  on  the  UN  Straddling  Stocks
agreement  of  1995). Arguments  over  the  extent  of  the  ocean  common  have
recently  revived  as  the  impact  of  climate  change  on  the  Arctic  has  finally
turned the North-West passage into a reality and prospects for the exploitation
of the hydrocarbons of the Arctic seabed have led, in 2007, to the assertion of
territorial  claims  by  Russia.  Javier  Solana  has  recently  characterized  this  as
one of the ways in which climate change acts as a ‘threat multiplier’ and other
potential struggles over marine resources and the extension or re-calibration of
EEZs are evident in new British claims in the South Atlantic.

The  second  global  common  to  be  recognized  was  really  a  political
construct. Antarctic exploration in the early twentieth century led to a set of
rival territorial claims to the areas surrounding the South Pole. In retrospect it
was quite remarkable that at the height of the first Cold War in 1959 it proved
possible  to  negotiate  a  special  international  status  for Antarctica  that  placed
the  rival  territorial  claims  in  abeyance  and  allowed  the  creation  and  subse-
quent development of the Antarctic Treaty System which regulates the use of
the continent for scientific research, protects its environment and, through the
defeat  of  proposals  for  an Antarctic  mining  convention  (CRAMRA)  and  its
replacement  by  the  1991  Madrid  Protocol  on  Environmental  Protection,
forbids resource extraction for a period of 50 years. How long these arrange-
ments can actually be upheld must be a source of grave concern as the strug-
gle for diminishing global hydrocarbon and other resources intensifies. They
are particularly important for the international scientific community, given the
importance of the Antarctic wilderness for global change research, critical to
the understanding of the stratospheric ozone problem and through the drilling
of ice cores to the compilation of the earth’s climate record. Scientific research
was  and  continues  to  be  the  driver  of Antarctic  international  cooperation.  It
commenced  with  the  1957  International  Geophysical Year  and  is  expressed
today  in  the  ‘activity  criterion’ which  is  applied  to  states  wishing  to  be
involved  in Antarctic  governance.  The Antarctic  Treaty  regime,  although  it

European S&T responses to sustaining global commons

33

interacts with that of the LoS, has a very different and exclusive basis. That is
to  say  that  only  the  select  original  Antarctic  Treaty  Consultative  Parties
(including a number of EU member states), plus invited newcomers such as
China, participate. Despite objections, lodged at the UN General Assembly, to
this and to the exclusive status of the ATS regime the latter continues to reject
the  status  of  Common  Heritage  for  the  Antarctic  continent.  The  European
Community  (EC)  has  some  limited  involvement  in  the  system  through  its
participation, alongside member states, in the 1980 Convention on Antarctic
Marine Living Resources (CAMLR), this being predicated on the EC’s exclu-
sive competence for fisheries. CAMLR is a ‘mixed agreement’ covering the
rather short Antarctic food chain. The presence of penguins and whales along-
side fish, for which the EC did have competence, meant that such competence
could not be exclusive.

The third of the global commons is constituted by outer space. Outer space
lies beyond sovereign airspace but the exact de-limitation is subject to legal
argument. It roughly approximates to the lowest satellite orbits. While there
may ultimately be questions about whether the moon and other celestial bodies
are subject to the territorial ambitions of earthly states or whether, as in a treaty
of  1979,2 they  form  part  of  the  Common  Heritage  of  Humankind,  the  key
resources  involved  are  the  geostationary  orbit,  GSO,  and  various  low  earth
orbits  used  for  reconnaissance,  navigational  and  communications  purposes.
Alongside a rather underdeveloped legal and military regime for outer space,
the critical arrangements for frequency and orbital assignments in the space
common are made within the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
composed of national telecommunications authorities. Decisions of significant
military, political and commercial importance are arrived at within this highly
technicized  engineering  environment.  The  EU  has  a  space  policy  and  is
increasingly  a  space  user  under  programmes  such  as  Global  Monitoring  for
Environment  and  Security  (GMES)  and  Galileo,  but  the  Community  lacks
status in this area and is forced to rely upon the efforts of its member states.
There is also a problem with representation in UN space policy deliberations
under the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), where
the EC, as with other UN bodies, is limited to the status of observer.

It is only relatively recently that the global atmosphere has been conceptu-
alized as a common. The treatment of atmospheric problems was, during the
1950s  and  1960s,  on  a  local  or  regional  basis  culminating  in  the  1979  UN
Long  Range  Transboundary Air  Pollution  Convention  (LRTAP)  which  was
highly  significant,  not  only  in  its  sophisticated  modelling  approach  to  the
calculation of acceptable loads of sulphur and other chemicals (pioneered and
run by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria) but
also in being the occasion of the first international recognition of the EC as an
entity  distinct  from  the  member  states,  designated  as  a  Regional  Economic

34

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Integration Organization (REIO). This status was to be extended to the inter-
national  deliberations  on  two  global  atmospheric  issues  that  came  to  full
prominence  during  the  1980s.  These  were  stratospheric  ozone  depletion
(Vienna  Convention  1985  and  Montreal  Protocol  1987)  and  of  course  the
emergent problem of the enhanced greenhouse effect and associated climate
change  (United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change  –
UNFCCC,  1992  and  its  Kyoto  Protocol  of  1997).  The  stratospheric  ozone
layer  and  the  atmosphere/climate  system  have  commons-like  characteristics
because it is impossible to conceive of them being brought under sovereign
jurisdiction and because scientific understanding has allowed the recognition
that they are subject to the same dilemmas of sustainability and misuse as the
established global commons.

THE COMMONS PROBLEM AND THE ROLE OF S&T

At  the  heart  of  the  discussion  of  commons  –  indeed  the  whole  point  of
discussing them as a category – is a collective action problem. It received its
most famous twentieth century formulation in Garret Hardin’s (1968) article
on the ‘tragedy of the commons’ but in essence had previously been discussed
by  other  writers  including  the  philosopher  David  Hume.  The  argument  is
simple  and  based  upon  a  probable  misreading  of  the  fate  of  the  English
pastoral commons. When a resource is owned by no one and is open to access
by all, there will be a standing incentive for individual users to maximize their
short-term  use  without  regard  to  the  long-term  unsustainable  consequences.
Pastures  will  be  over-grazed  leading  to  their  collapse,  ecosystems  will  be
destroyed as they are used as a free waste tip without regard to their carrying
capacity, and fish stocks will be wiped out by over-fishing. This is Hardin’s
‘tragedy’ where the pursuit of individual gain leads to the ruin of all. His solu-
tion is the one he claims was implemented in England, the enclosure of the
commons and their transformation into private property or perhaps also their
acquisition by the state which would then allocate user rights and charge rents.
It is easy to find examples of unsustainability and ultimate ecological tragedy
associated with open access commons. One spectacular instance, on a global
scale, is evident in the fate of great whales in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries where unrestrained whaling ‘effort’ on the high seas contributed
to the collapse of both the stocks and the industry.

While  it  is  possible  to  identify  various  global  scale  tragedies  of  the
commons  and  to  analyse  the  problem  of  climate  change  through  Hardin’s
logic, his proposed solutions, even if they are accepted as necessary and much
of the voluminous literature that his work has stimulated denies this (National
Research Council 2002), do not appear applicable at the international level. It

European S&T responses to sustaining global commons

35

is  either  physically  impossible  or  politically  impracticable  to  privatize  the
global commons and it remains a defining characteristic of the international
political system that it is anarchic, lacking the kind of central authority that
could tackle the problem through the allocation of user rights. The alternative
is one which is dismissed by Hardin but advocated by many of his opponents
who have studied the operation of local common property resource regimes
(Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990). They argue that it is possible to devise voluntary
governance  arrangements  between  commons  users  which  can  operate  to
ensure sustainability without recourse to wholesale privatization or the inter-
vention  of  an  external  sovereign  power.  Scaled  up  to  the  regional  or  global
level  this  provides  a  basis  for  arguing  that  global  commons  are  and  can  be
effectively managed through international co-operation. Since the 1970s inter-
national relation scholarship has characterized these arrangements or institu-
tions as regimes. In the standard formulation they comprise sets of principles,
norms, rules and decision-making procedures that serve to govern a particular
issue area (Krasner 1983). The issue areas tend to be politically as much as
scientifically  de-limited  which  often  results  in  a  patchwork  of  international
governance regimes and their concentration on specific aspects of a problem.
For the ocean common which is at least subject to an over-arching legal instru-
ment – the LoS Convention – there are separate regimes for fishing (the vari-
ous  fisheries  commissions),  whaling,  dumping  and  marine  pollution.  Only
Antarctica stands out as possessing a single environmentally oriented manage-
ment regime. For outer space there is a highly developed orbit and spectrum
regime under the ITU, a set of fragmentary understandings on military uses
and an emergent, although uncodified, regime for the growing space environ-
ment problem of orbital debris. The atmospheric regimes cover stratospheric
ozone depletion and climate with a formal connection insofar as CFCs, which
are  very  powerful  greenhouse  gases,  are  controlled  under  the  former.  The
coverage of the UNFCCC is in one sense partial because it concentrates upon
greenhouse  gas  emissions,  sources  and  sinks,  rather  than  taking  the  holistic
approach that might be desirable under ideal circumstances that would encom-
pass  some  of  the  drivers  of  climate  change  in  the  world  trading  and  other
systems.

The  functions  of  S&T for  such  commons  regimes  may  be  analysed  as

follows:

1. The principles of any regime comprise ‘beliefs of fact causation and recti-
tude’ (Krasner 1983). Prevailing understandings in natural science and of
what is technologically possible will have a major role to play in defining
fact and causation. Indeed it is probably correct to assert that most of the
commons  regimes  covered  above  relied  upon  shifts  in  scientific  under-
standing  for  their  very  creation.  The  stratospheric  ozone  and  climate

36

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

regimes are obvious examples, while extensions of technological capabil-
ity  allied  to  natural  science  lie  at  the  heart  of  changes  in  the  oceans
regimes  and  the  development  of  the  international  management  of  outer
space.  It  follows  that  another  function  of  S&T will  be  that  of  problem
definition  and  beyond  that  the  consideration  of  solutions.  A UN
Environment  Programme  (UNEP)-sponsored  study  identified  a  broad
trend involving, ‘a shift in the content of scientific advice from identify-
ing problem areas to suggesting alternative scenarios for effective action’
(Fritz 2000, p. 5).

2. Rule development and the need to adjust to changes in understanding of
the physical environment. This would include the setting of authoritative
scientific standards. At the operational level, the development of scientific
and  other  knowledge  will  be  a  major  determinant  of  the  rules  that  are
made and the possibility of their implementation. The rules for common
fishery resources depend upon ongoing investigations into the nature of
marine  ecosystems  and  population  dynamics.  Despite  the  widespread
adoption of precautionary norms (spearheaded by EU practice), it remains
the case that lack of scientific evidence remains the most popular rationale
for avoiding burdensome regulation to preserve stocks or protect the envi-
ronment (Vogler 2000, p. 38).

3. Monitoring to establish effectiveness and to cope with the free-rider prob-
lem. Free-riding on the provision of a collective good is much discussed
in  the  economics  and  collective-action  literature.  In  common  property
resource (CPR) regimes there is a requirement for constant vigilance to
ensure that participants can be assured that nobody else, in line with ratio-
nal expectations, is taking advantage of collective arrangements. Without
such assurances members will be unwilling to restrain their own behav-
iour.  In  local  commons  regimes  one  can  keep  a  watchful  eye  on  neigh-
bours  and  apply  peer  pressure.  At  the  global  level  there  is  a  need  for
systematic  monitoring  and  transparency  to  deal  with  illegal  unreported
and unregulated fishing, breaches of agreements on emissions, and so on.
Clearly  advances  in  monitoring  and  surveillance  technologies,  often
space-based, have a key role to play here as well as support to NGOs who
are prepared to go into the field to report infractions (see, for example, the
role of Greenpeace in the campaign against whaling and in Antarctica).

4. Capacity  building.  The  resources  available  to  national  participants  in
global  regimes  are  quite  spectacularly  skewed  in  favour  of  developed
countries.  There  is  often  very  little  scientific  and  technical  base  and
extremely  limited  amounts  of  relevant  expertise.  Some  least  developed
countries (LDCs) are only able to send one or two people to highly tech-
nical  meetings  at  which  the  EU  or  US  may  field  scores  of  qualified
specialists. Similarly they may lack the capability to perform the moni-

European S&T responses to sustaining global commons

37

toring functions required when they accede to an international convention
and this is why the UNFCCC and other agreements now include arrange-
ments  for  capacity  building  and  technology  transfer.  This  is  far  more
significant  than  simply  ensuring  the  smooth  functioning  of  a  regime.
Rather, it relates to the underlying political legitimacy of the regime in an
atmosphere of acute North–South distrust. While scholars have concen-
trated  on  the  ‘tragedy  of  the  commons’ they  have  tended  to  neglect  the
accompanying ‘tragedies of dispossession’.

Most  of  the  commons  regimes  under  consideration  have  built  institutional
capacity for the generation and incorporation of scientific and technological
knowledge in relation to these four functions. In fact the entire design of recent
major environmental conventions reflects the requirement to respond to rapid
alterations  in  scientific  knowledge  through  the  framework  convention/
adjustable protocol model. There is often dedicated scientific capacity as in the
Antarctic  scientific  committee  (SCAR)  or  an  institutional  interface  with  the
wider  scientific  community  as  in  the  Subsidiary  Body  for  Scientific  and
Technical Advice (SBSTA) of the Climate Change Convention. The latter was
established by the Conference of the Parties in 1995 to provide it with timely
information and advice on scientific and technological matters relating to the
Convention.  Its  members  are  governmental  scientific  representatives  but  it
also maintains rosters of experts who undertake functions such as the review
of national communications from Parties and the analysis of methodologies.

There are, perhaps, two further comments to be made about the scientific
input to commons regimes. First, in order to provide key guiding principles
and to set agendas it must be authoritative, legitimate and not obviously in the
service of particular interests (sometimes scientific consensus can arise which
fulfils  these  requirements  but  is  subsequently  found  to  be  in  error  as  to  the
physical  environment  that  the  regime  attempts  to  manage).  Second,  except
perhaps in some particular usages of the space and ocean commons, it is very
unlikely that the private sector will have the incentive to generate the neces-
sary basic research. This places the onus on governments both singly and in
co-operation to provide public funds for the necessary work without, gener-
ally, the prospect of evident commercial returns. Climate science, for example,
is not at all equivalent to pharmaceuticals research.

HOW DOES THE EU ENGAGE WITH S&T COOPERATION
IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS REGIMES?

The first and critical question is what is the EU in this context? In the most
expansive  definition  the  EU  is  the  member  states  and  the  European

38

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Community, but there are often contradictions between the two and an impor-
tant absence of status for the Community which can both hinder the represen-
tation  of  the  EU  as  anything  more  than  a  collection  of  states  and  act  as  an
impediment to a unified EU scientific and technical effort.

At one end of the spectrum the EC has no status and relies on member
states which are full participants. This is the case with ITU deliberations on
the  space  common.  ITU  has  191  national  administrations  as  members
including  the  EU  member  states.  It  also  has  ‘sector  members’ including
EUROCONTROL and  EUTELSAT,  but  the  European  Community  as  such
has no status. On the other hand, because of EC fisheries competence only
the  Commission  can  negotiate  in  the  various  fisheries  commissions  or  on
straddling stocks. Despite attempts by the Commission to concert EU action
over whaling the Community is not a member of the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) and it is only member states that participate in its annual
struggles over the preservation of the moratorium on hunting great whales.
Neither is the EC a full member of the International Maritime Organization.3
In  the Antarctic  regime  formal  EC  participation  is  equally  absent,  but  the
situation is very different in the atmospheric regimes where the EC is a full
participant as an REIO in the Conventions and their subsidiary bodies along-
side  the  member  states.  Because  of  shared  competence  for  stratospheric
ozone and climate issues the EU appears less co-ordinated than in fisheries
negotiations and relies upon presidency leadership. Nonetheless, the record
of EU participation in the climate change regime has been impressive over
the years – not least in the way in which the Council of Ministers and the
European  Council  has  taken  scientific  findings  seriously  in  setting  Union
policy.

In the climate regime the key scientific body – providing the authoritative
knowledge  adopted  and  endorsed  by  the  European  Council  –  has  been  the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC was created
by UNEP and World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 to play
the  primary  role  in  providing  and  evaluating  the  scientific  basis  for  the
global  climate  regime  that  was  then  under  construction.  It  represents  an
unprecedented  exercise  in  international  scientific  co-operation  and  brings
together most of the world’s climate research specialists in the production of
its  highly  influential,  indeed  authoritative,  Assessment  Reports.  The
European Community, which is not a full member of either WMO or UNEP,
is  consequently  only  an  observer  at  IPCC,  although  it  has  sponsored  and
supported  its  meetings.  IPCC  reports  do  not  feed  directly  into  the  formal
processes of the international climate regime based on the 1992 UNFCCC
and  its  Kyoto  Protocol.  Instead  IPCC  and  other  scientific  assessments  are
routed through the Convention’s SBSTA. The Community is a full member
of the UNFCCC alongside the member states. The formula used to allow this

European S&T responses to sustaining global commons

39

is that which gives status to REIOs of which the EC is the only extant exam-
ple.  In  October  2009,  the  Community  was  granted  an  ‘enhanced  observer
status’.  This  special  status  gives  Commission  representatives  the  right  to
speak and to introduce proposals like any IPCC member, but not to vote. It
is  worth  recalling  that  the  IPCC’s  title  makes  the  point  that  it  is  an  ‘inter-
governmental panel’. Some of the member states with large national scien-
tific establishments – the UK, Germany and France – have been extensively
involved  in  IPCC  from  the  beginning.  In  the  latest  Fourth  Assessment
Report, Working Group I on climate science involved over 600 contributing
scientists, around 25 per cent of whom were from universities and institutes
located  within  the  European  Union.4 So  one  could  argue  that  the  EU
provides  a  quarter  of  the  international  scientific  effort  that  supports  the
climate regime. It is, however, not organized on a European basis and there
was only one contributor whose designation indicated a Union organization,
that is, the Joint Research Centre (JRC).

SBSTA meetings  review  the  evidence  produced  by  the  IPCC  and  other
sources  and  here  there  is  an  opportunity  for  specialists  employed  by  the
Community’s  JRC  to  make  a  direct  contribution,  alongside  those  of  the
member  states.5 Furthermore,  the  Community  plays  a  central  role  in  the
monitoring  required  by  the  UNFCCC.  This  involves  the  compilation  and
submission of annual monitoring reports which are produced jointly by the
European Environment Agency and the JRC.

Given EC exclusive competence for fisheries one might be led to expect
a  dedicated  and  unified  effort  in  respect  of  the  scientific  research  on  the
oceans and especially the critical issue of fish stocks and sustainable yields.
However, in an arrangement that illustrates the importance of the pre-exist-
ing  architecture  of  international  S&T co-operation,  the  critical  work  is
subcontracted  by  the  Commission  to  the  International  Council  for  the
Exploration of the Sea (ICES). ICES, with its headquarters in Copenhagen,
dates from 1902 and is one of the premier international scientific organiza-
tions. Most of its 20 Council members are also EU member states, but the
EC is only an observer.6 It is ICES that is contracted to provide recurring and
non-recurring  scientific  advice  for  the  conduct  of  the  Common  Fisheries
Policy (and the EU’s future maritime policy) but it is also the case for the
Union’s global fisheries interests:

The advice shall also be given in the context of international agreements and guide-
lines to which the EU or member states have committed notably the UN Straddling
in  Highly  Migratory  Fish  Stocks  Agreement,  the  World  Summit  on  Sustainable
Development  (WSSD)  implementation  plan,  the  FAO  Code  of  Conduct  for
Responsible  Fishing  on  Biological  Diversity.  Whenever  international  agreements
and  guidelines  have  been  translated  into  horizontal  policies  and  adopted  by  the
Commission the advice will relate to them. (EC-ICES 2007, p. 3)

40

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

When fisheries exist in the global ocean common, beyond EEZs, an attempt is
made  to  manage  stocks  through  various  fisheries  organizations  such  as  the
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission. There is  also a marine resources
dimension to The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) and the Convention on the Protection of the
Marine  Environment  of  the  Baltic  (HELCOM)).  Because  of  its  ‘exclusive
competence as regards conservation, management and exploitation of living
marine resources in waters under national jurisdiction in the high seas’ (EC-
ICES 2007, p. 1), the EC is a full member of all of them. Part of the agreement
with  ICES  is  that  when  it  acts  as  advisor  to  them  (it  has  Memoranda  of
Understanding with all of the above) the scientific advice will also be copied
to the Commission (EC-ICES 2007, p. 7).

The foregoing cases illustrate that even in two areas of the global commons
management where the EU otherwise has a formidable political presence and
constitutes a major, if not leading, force in negotiations its scientific input is
mainly  indirect.  As  the  IPCC  example  demonstrates,  scientific  cooperation
within the regime relies heavily upon the member states. This is far from the
end of the story, however, because EU S&T initiatives permeate the commons
regimes in two other significant ways, which will be further explored in the
next sections.

EU-SUPPORTED RESEARCH PROGRAMMES

Although  relatively  limited  in  comparison  to  some  of  the  member  state’s
research activities, Community funding and networking is involved in a range
of important international S&T projects which provide significant background
to discussions on the global commons and, increasingly, monitoring capabil-
ity. We are involved here in what has been described as the ‘alphabet soup’ of
international  scientific  co-operation. The  relevant  thematic  area  of  the  EU’s
Sixth  Framework  Programme,  covering  sustainable  development,  global
change  and  ecosystems  had  a  budget  of  2.12  billion  Euro. This  money  was
spent in part to ‘ensure Europe’s strong and coherent participation in interna-
tional research initiatives, to help resolve global issues such as climate change’
(European Commission 2006a, p. 138). A very wide range of largely, but not
entirely, European-based projects were supported which feed in to established
global  research  organizations  alongside  IPCC,  such  as  the  World  Climate
Research  Programme  (WCRP),  the  International  Geosphere  Biosphere
Programme (IGBP) and the International Human Dimensions Programme on
Global Environmental Change (IHDP) – all of which have a direct relationship
with  the  Climate  Convention’s  SBSTA.7 Additionally,  the  Community  has
supported  the  creation  of  a  Global  Earth  Observation  System  of  Systems

European S&T responses to sustaining global commons

41

(GEOSS) involving 50 nations and 40 international organizations, which aims
to bring together and consolidate all available data on the state of the global
environment.8 The primary EC contribution to this effort will be constituted
by  the  GMES  satellite  system  which  is  a  joint  enterprise  of  the  European
Commission and the European Space Agency.

However,  as  the  Commission  notes:  ‘In  terms  of  direct  participation  in
Global  Climate  Observation  systems,  the  main  responsibility  lies  with  indi-
vidual member states, although sometimes individual stations will be part of
EU  projects’ (European  Commission  2006a,  p.  152).  Elsewhere,  in  the
Antarctic common for example, a similar situation seems to prevail. The EC
has  no  direct  access  to  the  Scientific  Committee  on  Antarctic  Research
(SCAR) that is the official knowledge generation and assessment arm of the
Antarctic Treaty System, but member states, notably the very well established
British Antarctic  Survey,  do.  EC-supported  activities  operate  in  a  somewhat
uncoordinated  manner  alongside  significant  national  research  Antarctic
research efforts. This is not simply a European problem. Across the interna-
tional system there has been a proliferation of agencies and advisory processes
but a failure of co-ordination and standardization, what the UNEP study refers
to as a ‘systematic organization of information gap’ (Fritz 2000, p. 33). In the
Commission’s  2006  Maritime  Green  Paper  the  co-ordination  between
Community-sponsored and other research is highlighted again:

The  contribution  of  FP7  represents  a  fraction  of  public  and  private  spending  on
research in the Community. It is essential that marine-related research in Europe is
considered as a whole and that co-ordination and co-operation in this area is signif-
icantly improved. Work towards co-ordinating national programmes within a truly
pan-European  research  area  has  begun  with  the  ERA net  scheme.  (European
Commission 2006a, p. 14)

At the end of 2008, the Competitiveness Council adopted conclusions on the
European Strategy for Marine and Maritime Research and concurred with the
view that ‘marine and maritime sciences could be better coordinated in order
to  attain  a  critical  mass  and  respond  to  major  challenges’ (Council  of  the
European Union 2008, p. 5). To this end the decision was taken to transform
the  ‘ERA-NET+BONUS  for  the  Baltic  Sea  Science  –  Network  of  Funding
Agencies’ into a joint research programme based on Article 169 of the Treaty
(Council of the European Union 2008, p. 6). It also recognized that European-
level  coordination  ‘should  be  increasingly  organized  and  developed  on  the
basis  of  international  agreement  and  standards’ (Council  of  the  European
Union 2008). In terms of EU support for commons-related science, it is possi-
ble to see the potential here, but not yet to establish its impact upon manage-
ment regimes.

42

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

BILATERAL SUPPORT TO THIRD COUNTRIES

This is as significant, perhaps more significant, than anything else that the EU
accomplishes  in  S&T co-operation  related  to  the  sustenance  of  the  global
commons.  It  is  in  this  area  that  environmental,  development  and  science
policy overlap. While the EU has a deserved reputation for international envi-
ronmental leadership over the last two decades, a large part of the significant
resources for external policy reside within Community aid, development and
fisheries  policies.  It  may  address  a  recurrent  problem  in  global  commons
regimes, that many, indeed most, of the state participants lack the capability to
participate  effectively  and  to  fulfil  their  national  obligations.  The  relevant
technical and scientific capabilities are heavily skewed towards the developed
world  and  there  is  an  urgent  requirement  for  what  is  known  in  the  Climate
Convention as ‘capacity building’.

In general terms, the Seventh Framework Programme is designed to incor-
porate third country partners in thematic research projects and most relevantly
in Specific International Cooperation Actions – ‘a novelty in FP7 and geared
towards the research and development needs of third countries … addressing
the particular needs of developing and emerging economies by means of dedi-
cated cooperative activities’ (European Commission 2007). However, capac-
ity building in third countries under FP7 is marginal; the main funding for such
activity continues to originate from the Community’s development policies.

A more targeted approach is to be found within the external dimension of
the Common Fisheries Policy. Its ‘southern agreements’ have received a very
bad  press  over  the  years  being  quite  accurately  portrayed  as  deals  which
opened up the fisheries of West African and other states to EU trawlers with
scant regard for either the sustainability of stocks or of local coastal commu-
nities. However, the new generation of fisheries agreements go some way to
rectify this state of affairs by earmarking financial assistance to third country
governments.  Some  of  this  assistance  directly  funds  training  and  capacity
building in the surveying of fish stocks and most importantly in fishery protec-
tion activities to combat the kind of ‘free-riding’ evident in illegal unreported
and unregulated fishing. This is activity of the kind which has the potential to
materially contribute to the avoidance of commons ‘tragedies’.

The  Union’s  many  association  and  other  agreements  are  multifaceted  –
usually  with  a  strong  basis  in  trade,  investment  and  market  opening.
Increasingly, there is also a bilateral S&T cooperation element which has rele-
vance to participation in commons regimes. An important example is provided
by recent developments in the EU–China relationship in relation to co-funded
research on climate-related technologies. The aim is by 2020 to demonstrate
advanced  zero-emissions  coal  technology  with  carbon  capture  and  also  to
reduce the cost of key energy technologies and promote their deployment and

European S&T responses to sustaining global commons

43

dissemination.9 There could be few projects of such importance for China’s
willingness to participate in a post 2012 climate regime, which is, of course,
critical to the whole enterprise. As ever, it is also the case that member states
have  developed  their  own  bilateral  S&T climate  projects  with  the  Chinese
although  these  are  sometimes  acknowledged  as  part  of  a  broader  EU  initia-
tive.10

CONCLUSIONS

The EU has long been recognized as a very significant actor in a number of
international  environmental  regimes,  some  of  which  cover  aspects  of  the
global commons and is a powerful player in world fisheries politics.11 If by the
EU we mean the aggregate of the member states’ activities, however uncoor-
dinated,  then  the  same  might  be  said  of  European  S&T inputs  to  the  global
commons  regimes.  The  argument  above  has,  however,  concentrated  on  the
significance  of  the  European  Community.  Here  there  is  a  somewhat  mixed
pattern  where  S&T activities  appear  less  impressive  than  the  political  and
other  functions  fulfilled  by  the  Union  acting  under  either  exclusive
Community competence or, as is usually the case, shared competence. In the,
admittedly few, cases that were surveyed direct inputs from the EU are very
limited. In the critical maritime arena scientific assessment is contracted out to
ICES.  The  current  significance  of  the  Community’s  efforts  in  international
S&T cooperation is, it was argued, observable in two respects. First, through
Community  support  to  what  remain  essentially  national  inputs  to  the  global
commons regimes; second, through capacity building to enhance the partici-
pation of developing state parties to the conventions.

Is there an argument for a unified European approach? The case for it is put

in the Maritime Green Paper:

A vision is urgently needed for marine related research in Europe leading to a strat-
egy that derives even greater benefits from the Framework Programmes and other
sources of funding in Europe, avoids duplication, closes gaps and creates synergies.
The strategy should include mechanisms for optimising coordination, cooperation
and  dialogue  between  the  Commission  and  policymakers,  industry  and  scientific
communities in member states and third countries. (European Commission 2006b,
p. 14)

However, there is the further question as to whether this would amount to a
distinctive EU scientific input to the commons regimes and one which might
provide  direct  support  to  EU  negotiating  positions? As  we  have  seen  there
would be many obstacles in the way of such an effort. The existing architec-
ture  of  international  scientific  co-operation  is  very  well  entrenched  and  the

44

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

status  of  the  Community  is  highly  problematic  in  more  than  one  area.  The
general  approach  of  the  Commission  is  to  push  for  full  recognition  of  the
Community:

The EU is … well placed to support broad consensus building on many important
issues. The gradual build up of the EU makes international agreements and organi-
sations more effective and must be based on solid support from member states. The
EC and its member states are already making important contributions to the imple-
mentation  …  of  measures  agreed  within  the  12  sub  organisations  of  the  UN  and
other international fora dealing with ocean and sea affairs. The status of the EC in
these fora should reflect this role, which at present is not the case … and needs to
be reviewed … taking into account the fact that in several cases the issues under
consideration fall within the exclusive competence of the Community. (European
Commission 2006b, p. 45)

Obtaining recognition has not been easy (see for example the continuing failure
by state parties to agree the Gabarone Amendment to the Convention on Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora which if implemented would
give the Community the membership status that it would normally be afforded
on the basis of its competences for trade and animal welfare) and member states
are bound to jealously protect the national independence of their scientific insti-
tutes  and  budgets  against  what  would  often  be  regarded  as  encroachment  by
Brussels.  The  bureaucratic  politics  of  science  funding  is  always  likely  to  be
present  but  attempts  to  further  centralize  or  coordinate  European  effort  might
well add an additional ‘turf war’ dimension. This is a difficult area because it has
become increasingly recognized that scientific discourse has an inevitably polit-
ical loading, if only in the way in which the scientists and organizations involved
have interests other than the pure pursuit of knowledge.12

It has thus become commonplace to argue that there can be no such thing
as ‘sound science’. While there may be truth in this, there is also substantial
evidence to suggest that that scientific advice will be most likely to be incor-
porated into international environmental regimes if it comes from a demon-
strably  autonomous  and  un-involved  source  (Andresen  et  al.  2000).  This  is
probably  the  most  difficult  and  contested  area  of  the  ‘science–policy’ inter-
face.  Mobilizing  and  co-ordinating  the  enormous  scientific  capabilities  of
Europe under the EU banner would doubtless assist the effectiveness of the
Union in global commons diplomacy. On the other hand it might detract from
the perceived political neutrality of some of the science that the Community
currently supports – but at arms’ length.

NOTES

1. The following general discussion is derived from Vogler (2000).

European S&T responses to sustaining global commons

45

2. The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other celestial Bodies.

It has been signed by few, if any, of the ‘space-faring nations’.

3. The whaling regime and specifically the IWC set up in 1946 has always excluded the EC as
a full member and the Commission only has observer status. Twenty-one member states are
signatories. Given its enlarging maritime remit the Commission has expressed recent inter-
est in whaling issues. The Union has legislated to protect whales in European waters and in
November 2007 voiced public criticism of the Japanese whale hunt and in December issued
a communication designed to encourage the creation of an effective international regulatory
framework which would specifically cover ‘scientific whaling’. Furthermore it called for EU
IWC members to adopt a common position on the matter. Despite Danish objections over
Greenland’s interests in this matter, the Environment Council of 5 June 2008 adopted a deci-
sion establishing a Community position for the IWC meeting in Santiago de Chile (Council
of the European Union, Press Release, 2874th meeting of the Council, Environment, 5 June
2008, 9959/08, p. 15).

4. Some 623 scientists contributed to the WG1 Scientific Assessment of the FAR, 160 of whom

were from universities and institutes within the EU (IPCC Working Group I 2007).

5. At the 2008 Subsidiary Body meetings in Bonn the JRC contributed assessment tools for
modelling  options  for  LULUCF  in  a  future  climate  agreement  (European  Commission
2008).

6. The EC is entitled to be represented in an observer capacity at the annual Statutory Meeting
of  the  Council.  In  addition,  ICES  agrees  to  the  participation  at  meetings  of  the  Council’s
Advisory Group, of a representative of the Commission as an observer of the EC. In that
capacity the EC’s representative will have the right to ask for the floor and participate in
meetings, but will have no voting right nor have freedom to change the meeting’s agendas
(EC-ICES 2007, p. 4).
7. Under Decision 9/CP11.
8. This system was initiated at a summit meeting hosted by the Commission in Brussels on 16

February 2005.

10.

9. China is also ‘second only to Russia in the number of applications submitted so far to the
7th Framework Programme for Research. And one third of such participation is in the area
of energy, environment and climate’ (Potocnik 2008).
In 2006 the UK signed an agreement with China on a UK–China Climate Change Working
Group  for  scientific  collaboration  on  a  range  of  climate  related  issues.  However,  the
UK–China clean coal initiative is portrayed as a ‘key element of the EU–China Partnership’
(DEFRA 2008).

11. For an assessment see Vogler (2005).
12. There  is  a  major  literature  on  this.  See,  for  example,  the  work  of  Boehmer  Christiansen

(1993) or Litfin (1994).

REFERENCES

Andresen, Steinar, Tora Skodvin, Arild Underdal and Jørgen Wettestad (2000), Science
and  Politics  in  International  Environmental  Regimes:  Between  Integrity  and
Involvement, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Berkes,  Fikret  (1989)  (ed.),  Common  Property  Resources:  Ecology  and  Community-

based Sustainable Development, London: Belhaven.

Boehmer  Christiansen,  S.  (1993),  ‘Science  policy,  the  IPCC  and  the  Climate
Convention: The codification of a global research agenda’, Energy & Environment,
4 (10), 362–407.

Council of the European Union (2008), Note from General Secretariat of the Council
to Council, Subject: Commission Communication on European Strategy for Marine
and  Maritime  Research  –  adoption  of  Council  Conclusions, 25  November  2008,
doc. 16019/08, Brussels.

46

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

DEFRA (2008), Climate Change and Energy: Working with Developing Countries –

China, available at http://www.defra.gov.uk.

EC-ICES (2007), Agreement in the Form of a Memorandum of Understanding between
the European Community and the International Council for the Exploration of the
Sea, Copenhagen/Brussels.

European Commission (2006a), Annex to the Fourth National Communication from the
European Community Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,
COM (2006) 40 final, Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2006b), Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union: A
European  Vision  for  the  Oceans  and  Seas, COM  (2006)  275  final,  Brussels:
European Commission.

European Commission (2007), A New Approach to International S&T Cooperation in
the  EU’s  7th  Framework  Programme  (2007–13),  SEC  (2007)  47,  Brussels:
European Commission.

European Commission (2008), JRC Supports Ongoing Climate Change Negotiations
(available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/index.cfm?id=1410&obj_id=5070&dt
_code=NWS&lang= en, last access on 3 March 2009).

Fritz,  Jan-Stefan  (2000),  The  Second  Report  on  International  Scientific  Advisory
Processes on the Environment and Sustainable Development, Nairobi: Division of
Early Warning and Assessment United Nations Environment Programme.

Hardin, G. (1968), ‘The tragedy of the commons’, Science, 162, 1243–8.
IPCC (2008), Draft Report of the Twenty-Eighth Session, Budapest 9–10 April 2008,
IPCC Agenda  for  29th  Session,  Geneva  31 Aug.–4  Sept.  IPCC-XXIX/Doc.2,  19
June 2008.

IPCC  Working  Group  I  (2007)  (eds),  Climate  Change  2007:  The  Physical  Science
Basis,  Contribution  of  Working  Group  I  to  the  Fourth Assessment  Report  of  the
IPCC, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Krasner,  Stephen  D.  (1983)  (ed.),  International  Regimes, Ithaca:  Cornell  University

Press.

Litfin,  Karen  T.  (1994),  Ozone  Discourses:  Science  and  Politics  in  Global

Environmental Cooperation, New York: Columbia University Press.

National Research Council (2002) (ed.), The Drama of the Commons, Washington, DC:

National Academy Press.

Ostrom,  Elenor  (1990),  Governing  the  Commons:  The  Evolution  of  Institutions  for

Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Potocnik,  Janez  (2008),  The  EU  and  China:  A Partnership  for  Sustainable
Development. Forum on Climate Change and Science and Technology Innovation,
Speech by EU Commissioner for Science and Research, Janez Potocnik, 24 April,
Beijing.

Vogler,  John  (2000),  The  Global  Commons:  Environmental  and  Technological

Governance, Chichester: John Wiley.

Vogler,  J.  (2005),  ‘The  European  contribution  to  global  environmental  governance’,

International Affairs, 81 (4), 835–50.

3.  Forging European responses to the
challenge of climate change and
energy resource supply

Catherine Mitchell

INTRODUCTION

The European Union is keen to find its appropriate role in the rapidly chang-
ing world we live in. Recent issues, such as the 2008 oil price hike and food
riots,  combined  with  the  more  traditional  challenges  of  climate  change  and
energy security, have enhanced the need for a flexible, international science
and technology policy for Europe, capable of addressing both short- and long-
term concerns. This chapter focuses on this area, with particular reference to
climate change and energy resource supply.

The 2008 oil price hike (Forbes 2009) highlighted serious political, envi-
ronmental  and  social  issues  concerning  the  dependence  on,  security  to,  and
affordability of, energy around the world; as well as the complex, unintended
consequences of policies. One result of the increasing oil prices was that hith-
erto non-competitive sustainable (for example renewable) and non-sustainable
forms of energy (for example oil sands) became more affordable; another was
that  it led to an  increased use of coal, as its  price  fell below natural gas. In
parallel,  efforts  to  develop  biofuels  to  mitigate  climate  change,  to  reduce
dependence on oil and to improve energy security has been linked to, although
not  proved  to  be  the  cause  of,  an  increase  in  the  price  of  staple  foods.  The
combination of increasing oil and food prices led to serious social unrest in
several parts of the world forcing Europe to examine its appropriate role in this
area. Around  the  same  time,  concerns  related  to  the  Russia–Ukraine  natural
gas  dispute  strengthened  European  desires  for  increased  energy  security
(European Commission 2009a).

All of this highlights the complexity of energy policy. It has always been
the case that Europe understands that there are trade-offs to be made between
policy goals. However, as the importance of climate change becomes clearer;
as the imperative of energy security becomes more powerful; and as the links
between  ‘north’ and  ‘south’ countries  become  closer,  Europe  is  seeking  a
science and technology role which enables these global goals to be met. It is

47

48

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

becoming clear that Europe (and the Globe) is entering a time when certain
trade-offs are no longer acceptable. Europe’s role is increasingly constrained
by outcomes which cannot be compromised: climate change and energy secu-
rity. Moreover, as discussed below, it is also increasingly accepted that global
poverty  reduction  and  sustainable  development  is  a  prerequisite  to  mitigate
climate  change  successfully  (IPCC  2007).  Europe  has  to  hit  these  three
outcomes simultaneously across the board for all its policies, and its science
and technology sits squarely in the middle of these requirements.

THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA – INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The  Commission’s  European  Research Area  (ERA)  Green  Paper  (European
Commission 2007a), its Communication on a Strategic European Framework
for  International  Cooperation  in  Science  and  Technology  (European
Commission  2008c)  as  well  as  the  Report  of  the  independent  ERA Expert
Group (European Commission 2008a) clarify the Community’s position with
respect to recent international science and technology policy and the questions
that Europe will have to face for the future.

The ERA Green Paper called for:

• Better co-ordination of policies and programmes involving neighbour-

ing countries;

• Better co-ordination with developing countries, with a focus on efforts
to strengthen their S&T capacity and support sustainable development;
• Better  co-ordination  with  industrialized  and  emerging  economies  in

•

areas of mutual benefit; and
Joint approaches to global issues and regional needs in specific parts of
the world, preferably via multilateral initiatives and organizations.

The  ERA Expert  Group  Report  (ERA EGR)  justified  greater  international
cooperation with four key elements (European Commission 2008a, p. 11):

• Economic competitiveness;
• Responding to global challenges;
• Meeting  the  demographic  and  educational  challenges  of  human

resources;

• Promoting political cooperation, dialogue and trust.

The ERA EGR sets out its rationales for international cooperation in science
and technology with respect to climate change:

European responses to climate change and energy resource supply

49

•

•

‘responding to urgent global challenges is no longer a policy option but
a  necessity.  In  most  cases,  uncoordinated  national  policies  cannot
provide satisfactory solutions and there is a distinct need for multilateral
collective action’ (p. 26, box);
that  moving  towards  sustainability  is  in  itself  a  rationale  for  interna-
tional  S&T cooperation.  It  states  that  to  ‘slow  down  global  warming;
reduce  energy  consumption  and  other  natural  resources  will  require
manifold innovations and new global innovation networks to be built’
(p. 27).

The report revolves around the fundamental question ‘if the efforts and fruits
of the ERA ventures are shared among 27 member states (and associated coun-
tries), how, when and why should the other countries of the world be included
or  excluded?’ The  thrust  of  the  ERA EGR  is  centred  around  the  view  that
climate change and the move to sustainability provides potential opportunities
for Europe, and that Europe has to do its best to ensure that its knowledge base
has the ability to develop, and retain, a place in those future markets. Given
this, it sets out the difficulties of doing so:

The  experience  from  the  early  collaboration  with  China  highlight  two  important
lessons: the growing demand for new coal fired stations in China will not diffuse
new technology unless it is viewed as cheap and reliable; and to transfer technology
successfully  requires  transferring  the  capabilities  to  replicate  and  manufacture
locally  similar  equipment  and  trained  manufacturers  and  users.  (p.  86,  quoting
OECD 2005)

Moreover, it argues that despite a number of national international initiatives
having been launched to study, develop and promote carbon capture and stor-
age (CCS) ‘we face existing R&D gaps, problems with public awareness and
acceptance, lack of legal and regulatory framework and a lack of long term
policy framework and incentives’ (European Commission 2008a).
Although not baldly stated, this has two important implications:

•

If domestic policies and mechanisms have still not successfully worked,
then  there  will  be  additional  difficulties  of  developing  a  (technology)
transfer mechanism which complements and benefits both parties.
• The  difficulties  of  developing  CCS  reflects  the  view  of  the  transition
literature that to move from one system to another, all system compo-
nents have to be addressed. In this case, if Europe wants to develop CCS
then it will have to address not only the technology but legal and regu-
latory frameworks and so on.

However,  the  Green  Paper  and  the  ERA EGR  are  rather  oblique  about

50

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Europe’s  role  with  poorer  countries.  They  appear  more  comfortable  in  the
European  role  of  international  S&T policy  being  about  markets,  patents,
capacity building and so on. The ERA EGR does mention, rather than stress,
the  urgency  of  climate  change  and  it  does  state  that  technologies  to  reduce
climate change and improve sustainable development ‘are attracting increas-
ing  policy  attention  as  well  as  research  funding’ (European  Commission
2008a, p. 34). It also describes the difficulties faced by low-income countries
(as opposed to BRIC countries –  Brazil, Russia, India and China) which see
the divide between their own S&T capacity and that in the north widen:

•

•
•

‘how to insure that S&T progress is also directed towards solving the
critical  problems  facing  the  south  –  poverty,  food  production,  energy
and  water,  inadequate  communication  and  transportation  systems  and
tropical diseases’;
‘how to build their own research capacity’;
‘how  to  persuade  countries  with  efficient  S&T systems  to  cooperate
with them?’.

As can be seen in Figure 3.1, taken from the EU’s Science, Technology and
Competitiveness Key Figures 2008–2009, Europe’s S&T priorities are pretty
‘balanced’ across the various sectors. What stands out from this figure is that
Africa prioritizes health and the social sciences while the others (that  is, trans-
port,  energy  and  environment)  are  relatively  less  prioritized.  In  effect,  this
absence  provides  an  additional  requirement  for  European  international  S&T
policy. This chapter argues that this is a gap which should be filled, and which
is complementary to wider EU goals.

CURRENT AND FUTURE EU INSTRUMENTS AND
PROGRAMMES

Europe has introduced various instruments for international S&T cooperation:

1.

International dimension of the 7th Research Framework Programme,
• Cooperation  Specific  Programme,  including  Joint  Technology

Initiatives and European Technology Platforms;

• The  Ideas  Specific  Programme  (that  is,  the  European  Research

Council);

• The People Specific Programme (that is, researchers’ mobility);
• The Capacities Specific Programme.

2. Bilateral S&T Agreements with third countries.

European responses to climate change and energy resource supply

51

Transport

Energy

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Environmental
technologies

Social sciences/
Humanities

Health

Manufacturing
technologies

Information and
communication
technology

Africa            Asia            South West Pacific            Europe
South and Central America            North America

Source: European Commission (2009b, p. 150).

Figure 3.1 S&T priorities of world regions as expressed in national foresight

exercises

With respect to the future, the ERA EGR argues that international S&T part-
nerships between countries have to be shaped for mutual benefits – a one-size-
fits-all sort of policy is unhelpful. And with respect to the global challenges
(for  example  climate  change)  and  global  public  goods  arena  (European
Commission 2008a, p. 69) it sets out three properties which international S&T
co-operation should have:

It argues that:

• The global challenges are multi-dimensional and can only be properly
understood  and  analysed  by  multidisciplinary  and  integrated
approaches (that is not just science; political sensitivity must be used;
equity  and  openness  are  required;  local  and  global  challenges  and
solutions must be linked);

• S&T international cooperation needs to address the policy/incentive side
of global issues and so international cooperation is necessary to better
understand  institutional  and  regulatory  characteristics  of  countries  in
order that policies can be more successful in delivering sustainability;

 
52

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

• Gaining a better understanding of the structure and dynamics of global

phenomena is required.

In  conclusion,  the  overall  policy  framing  of  international  S&T within  the
European Commission is sensible and, although the current policy statements
do not include very much about climate change and global trade, what it says
is  reasonable.  Nevertheless,  there  are  serious  complexities  in  transferring
capabilities to industrializing countries (Sauter and Watson 2008) in general,
and with respect to CCS and China in particular (Watson 2009a). This is not
to say that Europe’s international S&T policy should not continue in this direc-
tion, but Europe does have to be realistic about what the type of benefits it will
accrue by doing so.

However, it does not sufficiently discuss the following five areas:

• The  urgency  of  climate  change,  and  what  that  means  for  European

energy policy internally and externally;

• The  consistency,  complementarity  and  tensions  of  European  internal
energy  policy  goals  and  what  that  means  for  its  international  S&T
policy;

• The  link  between  sustainable  development  and  climate  change,  and
therefore  the  importance  of  Europe’s  increased  focus  of  international
S&T policy in the poorer countries;

• The very limited move towards climate change mitigation elsewhere in
the world outside of Europe, and therefore the good global position it
has overall to capture, at least in the short–medium term, opportunities
of climate change;

• While Europe is doing well towards sustainability, it still is not sustain-
able, and therefore its international S&T policy could have the benefit
of complementing its own needs rather more than it currently does.

Because of the limited nature of discussion about these areas, the appropriate
international S&T policy has not been fully explored. The rest of the chapter
concentrates on this issue.

THE EU’S CURRENT GLOBAL POSITION WITH RESPECT
TO CLIMATE CHANGE

The EU is at the forefront of policies and instruments to meet the challenge of
climate  change  (see,  for  example,  Harris  2007).  Other  countries  around  the
world have placed themselves on a sustainable path, but as a block of coun-
tries and as an economic mass, Europe is unsurpassed in its commitment and

European responses to climate change and energy resource supply

53

drive to minimize climate change damage. Of course, the problems faced in
the EU are complex and far from easy, and, in many ways, they are very differ-
ent from many developing countries or other blocks of countries or states (for
example the USA, India or China).

The  EU’s  recent  Climate  Action  Plan  (European  Commission  2008b;
European  Union  2009),  which  has  a  target  of  providing  20  per  cent  of  its
energy from renewable sources by 2020 and of reducing its predicted energy
demand by 20 per cent, is challenging for most member states, although some
have set themselves even higher goals. Even taking account of country differ-
ences, the EU, as a block of countries, is still at the forefront of climate change
commitment. This also means that Europe is in a strong position to capture the
‘benefits and opportunities’ of climate change.

However, in terms of the ‘urgency’ of climate change and the required rate
of reduction in carbon emissions, EU policy is not sustainable. It is therefore
important that Europe’s international S&T policy should be supportive to the
Europe’s  internal  climate  change  policy  and  develop  in  parallel  to  its  own
internal technological needs. This is the first key conclusion of this chapter.

In the same way that the countries in Europe which seem to do better than
others  with  respect  to  sustainability,  such  as  Germany  and  Denmark,  show
particular  attitudes  to  innovation,  so  the  European  Commission  is  going  to
have  to  mirror  those  attitudes  in  its  policies,  and  this  is  further  discussed
below.

THE EU DISCOURSES ON COMPETITION, ENERGY
SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE

The  EU  is  developing  its  international  S&T policy  within  the  broader
European  policy  arena.  This  arena  has  to  fulfil  a  number  of  energy  policy
goals, including ensuring energy (and food) security; reducing climate change
emissions  at  a  rate  sufficient  to  maintain  a  2  degree  Celsius  rise  in  global
temperature;  and  improving  the  social  impacts  of  energy  use  (European
Commission 2006a; European Commission 2007b). This chapter argues that
the EU is hampered in doing this because there are tensions between the inter-
nal discourses with respect to competition and liberalization, energy security
and sustainability. At the moment, these powerful discourses – meaning well-
understood and accepted underlying principles – and their tensions make the
development of a coherent international S&T policy more difficult. The inter-
nal discourses need to be aligned for the good of both internal and external
European policy goals.

The  EU’s  Climate  Action  Plan  of  reducing  energy  demand,  increasing
resource productivity (that is, being more efficient with the energy used) and

54

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

increasing its renewable energy production also improves energy security. The
overall thrust of EU competition and energy policy, however unintentional, is
supporting  the  key  characteristics  of  the  current  energy  system  rather  than
encouraging  innovation  and  change  towards  a  sustainable  energy  system.  It
encourages cheaper energy; larger, transnational energy companies, where the
basis of their culture is to sell units of energy rather than a service; where the
pursuit  of  competition  implies  economies  of  scale,  larger-scale  plants  and
limited  innovation  or  change;  where  networks  are  incentivized  to  transport
energy  as  cheaply  as  possible  rather  than  to  act  as  market  facilitators;  and
where individual households are summed to blocks of customers.

The move to a sustainable energy system has its own powerful discourse.
However, to a large degree it operates separately from the conventional energy
system through various support mechanisms; but where it does overlap, there
is tension with it (Mitchell 2008; Baker et al. 2009). This is because the domi-
nant goal within the competitive discourse is economic efficiency. In this situ-
ation, the newer sustainable technologies and practices are at a disadvantage.
Table 3.1 tries to capture these differences.

A sustainable energy system will be made up of new technologies (to do
with  the  supply  of  energy,  such  as  renewable  energy  technologies,  but  also
new  ‘smart’ technologies  to  do  with  the  operation  and  management  of
networks);  a  drive  towards  greater  energy  efficiency  and  demand  reduction
(again  helped  by  new  management  technologies  of  domestic  products);  and
new relationships and connections between energy and consumers, including
new market opportunities (also fuelled by new information technologies).

These new technologies are generally more expensive than those in place,
or they have to be taken up by the current energy system which has character-
istics which do not value the new technologies abilities. In other words, the
‘old’ system itself, if left to its own devices, has no need of the new technolo-
gies or the required ‘new’ ways of doing things. Research results can show that
the new technologies can reduce energy demand and enable a much more effi-
cient operation and design of the electricity system. However, if the rules and
incentives of the market and network regulation of the energy system do not
explicitly value these new benefits, then there are limited means to enable their
take-up. If the European competition and liberalization discourse is strength-
ening  (or  at  least  not  weakening)  the  ‘old’ system,  then  the  difficulties  of
moving  to  a  sustainable  energy  system  becomes  harder  not  easier  (Mitchell
2008; Baker et al. 2009).

It  does  not  appear  that  the  EU  is  incorporating  insights  from  the  system
transition literature into its fundamental, underlying principles or policies. If it
did so, the tension between the core discourses of EU energy policy would be
recognized  to  be  unhelpful  in  the  move  to  a  secure  and  sustainable  energy
future. The transition literature developed originally from business school case

European responses to climate change and energy resource supply

55

Table 3.1 Energy policy in transition: two discourses

Liberalization and competition

Sustainable energy

Transforming the governance
structure of the energy sector

Main objective is economic
efficiency – cheapest technologies
and practices chosen
Market design principles are to be
technology and fuel blind – meaning
that no particular outcome is
preferentially supported – and market
choices made on price are thought to
be inherently ‘correct’

Focus on individual innovations

Optimizing the current system 

Innovation as optimization

Few links between energy vectors 

Similar technologies and practice
Fewer, larger incumbent companies

National or regional

Transforming the underlying
principles and goals of the energy 
sector
Main objective is sustainability – 
support for low carbon
technologies and practices
Long-term vision of outcome
which requires a co-ordination
with,  and sometimes intervention 
of,  markets to enable
technological portfolio
management and to fulfil social 
and cultural concerns
Focus on linking individual
transformations to sum to system 
transformation
Transforming the current system to
a new one able to meet
environmental imperatives
Evolutionary view of innovation 
and transformation

Links between electricity, heat, gas
and transport; as well as between 
the energy components of energy, 
waste resource and food system in 
order to increase energy efficiency 
of providing energy needs
New technologies and practices
More new entrants of different 
sizes and skills
Local through to global

studies of how to transform firms, but has been expanded to include systems
such  as  the  energy  or  health  systems.  If  all  system  sub-components  are  not
addressed  within  policies  whose  goal  is  to  deliver  a  transformation  of  that
system, then the inertia in (momentum of) the ‘old’ system will continue to
dominate.

 
56

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Because of this the underlying characteristics of the current energy system
can be expected to, fundamentally, continue. The movement towards EU goals
which align with a move to a sustainable future may occur in a limited sense,
but a transformation cannot be expected. The EU’s S&T policy sits squarely
in this unresolved tension. The second key conclusion of this chapter is that
the EU will have to bring these two discourses in alignment if it is to encour-
age innovation and move forward in any meaningful way towards its objec-
tives related to sustainable energy, climate change and energy security, not to
mention S&T policy with the wider world.

ENERGY RESOURCES AND ENERGY SECURITY

Defining what is meant by energy security is complex, since energy is needed
and  used  for  all  aspects  of  life  and  interactions  across  the  globe  (Watson
2009b).  Similarly,  energy  security  policies  are  extremely  varied.  It  includes
the  physical  availability  of  a  resource  –  for  example,  the  ‘securitization’ or
ability to have access to a desired energy resource; it includes the development
of a greater resilience to shocks – for example, the ability to rapidly overcome
breakdowns in networks, shutdowns in power plants and absence of supplies;
it  includes  ensuring  appropriate  market  and  network  rules  and  incentives  to
stimulate  appropriate  investment  in  energy  system  capacity,  including  infra-
structure  and  maintenance  of  it.  Reducing  energy  demand,  whether  through
resource  productivity  (doing/producing  the  same  thing  with  less  energy)  or
absolute demand reduction immediately increases energy security because less
energy is needed overall to be sourced, transported or transformed.

However, most policies include trade-offs. For example, increased genera-
tion  using  domestic  resources  increases  energy  security  because  less  energy
needs  to  be  imported.  Overall,  a  wider  diversity  of  technologies,  dispersed
geographically  and  by  a  range  of  sizes,  improves  energy  security.  From  an
energy system perspective, large plants impose greater risks because if they
were shut down suddenly they would have a greater impact than if they were
smaller. However, many of the technology supply chains may be sourced from
overseas,  and  in  this  way  another  energy  security  concern  related  to  supply
chains is introduced.

Europe’s energy security policy has been twinfold: through its international
relations but also through a Strategic Energy Review (Council of the European
Union  2009;  European  Commission  2008d)  and  its  broader  energy  policy
(Council  of  the  European  Union  2006;  European  Commission  2006b;
European Commission 2007b). There is a very large overlap between the EU’s
energy  security  policy  and  ita  sustainability  policy.  Energy  demand  is  still
rising,  renewable  energy  supplies  only  a  small  proportion  of  EU  energy

European responses to climate change and energy resource supply

57

demand; and the EU is still reliant on imports of oil and gas for much of its
energy. To this extent, the EU still has an insecure energy policy. Nevertheless,
there  is  a  clear  point  of  overlap  between  its  sustainable  energy  policy;  its
energy security policy; its climate change policy; and its policy towards poorer
nations.  This  is  in  relation  to  energy  demand  reduction  and  decentralized,
renewable energy policies, mechanisms and technologies. A third key conclu-
sion is that the EU’s international S&T policy supports its internal needs which
in this case implies a support for decentralization.

DEVELOPING A TWO-WAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE
INTO EUROPEAN EXTERNAL POLICIES

As the Fourth Assessment Report (4AR) of the Inter-Governmental Panel on
Climate  Change  (IPCC  2007)  illuminates,  the  challenges  of  climate  change
differ widely throughout the globe. Much of the developing world has multi-
ple concerns related to sustainable development to deal with, often simultane-
ously with, or before, environmental concerns. The IPCC stresses the two-way
nature  between  climate  change  and  sustainable  development  and  provides
evidence to support the argument that it is easier to achieve a low stabilization
pathway if climate change policies are incorporated into sustainable develop-
ment  policies.  Thus,  this  chapter  argues  that  an  important  strand  of  an  EU
international  S&T policy  to  meet  (or  do  its  bit  towards)  the  urgent,  global
needs of climate change is that related to the economic development needs of
poorer countries, which had limited coverage in the ERA EGR, as discussed
above. This is the fourth key conclusion of this chapter.

A key finding of the Assessment Report was that it was hard to achieve low
stabilization pathways by climate change mitigation policies alone. It empiri-
cally set out the two-way relationship between sustainable development and
climate change. Achieving low stabilization pathways with policies consistent
with  the  principles  of  sustainable  development  –  in  other  words,  policies
which  are  targeted  at  reducing  climate  change  emissions  while  at  the  same
time improving sustainable development – illustrated the significant contribu-
tion  that  sustainable  development  measures  could  make  to  stabilization.
However, in addition to this, there are measures which are aimed at sustain-
able development and poverty reduction which are focused on climate change
reduction – for example, economic development,  clean water and  so on. As
poverty reduces so the possibility of a wide range of other beneficial issues can
be tackled, including climate change mitigation.

Because of this, the fourth IPCC Assessment Report set out greater empha-
sis  on  climate  change  mitigation  being  treated  as  an  integral  element  of

58

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

sustainable  development  policies  (that  is  ‘development  first’;  IPCC  2007,
p.  695). The  impacts  of,  and  links  to,  sustainable  development  were  woven
throughout  the  analysis  of  4AR.  One  of  the  major  findings  of  the  fourth
Assessment Report in terms of sustainable development was that development
choice and paths ‘matter’ (IPCC 2007, p. 700).

Changing development pathways requires working with multiple actors, at
multiple scales (IPCC 2007, p. 708). This is various levels of government as
well as roles for private sector, NGOs and civil society. The IPCC calls incor-
porating climate change goals into sustainable development as ‘mainstream-
ing’.  It  sets  out  a  number  of  policies  and  principles  of  how  to  mainstream
(IPCC 2007, p. 723). The European Union external policies (whether S&T or
not) should also be doing this.

The  IPCC  looked  at  various  development  pathways  and  how  they  effect
sustainable development and in turn climate change: they argued that energy,
transport, agriculture and forestry, macroeconomics and trade were all impor-
tant, and as far as possible should be integrated.

With respect to linking national policies, the IPCC concluded that

single instruments are unlikely to be sufficient for climate change mitigation and it
is  more  likely  that  a  portfolio  of  policies  will  be  required.  Examples  of  areas  of
synergies  include  water  management,  farm  practices,  forestry  management,  and
residential  building  standards.  Instruments  and  policies  that  maximize  potential
synergies  between  climate  change  mitigation  and  sustainable  development  could
become socially and economically efficient and may offer opportunities for coun-
tries to achieve sustainable development targets, even in the face of uncertainties.
This  is  especially  important  given  the  limited  financial  and  human  resources  in
developing countries. (IPCC 2007, p. 765)

Many authors have asserted that a key element of a climate change agreement
will be its ability to the development and transfer of technology (IPCC 2007,
p.  783),  and  this  places  responsibility  squarely  on  EU  international  S&T
policy.

Tirpak and Adams (2008) show that global multilateral and bilateral spend-
ing  related  to  energy  has  fallen  over  the  last  seven  years  and  that  there  is  a
substantial gap between that spending and the predicted required amount of
investment in the energy system. Tirpak and Adams also show that between
1997 and 2005 inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) totalled over 2 tril-
lion US$. Inflows of FDI were three times higher than Overseas Development
Aid (ODA). FDI is cyclical and selective. It flows to countries with relatively
strong  enabling  conditions  for  investment  –  these  include  political  environ-
ments, strong legal systems, macroeconomic stability, available skilled labour
and good institutions. Since many of the poorest countries do not have these
basic governance conditions, ODA remains an important source for technol-
ogy transfer for these countries – or a means to aid sustainable development.

European responses to climate change and energy resource supply

59

Bilateral and multilateral support for energy projects totalled over 64 billion
US$ from 1997 to 2005, with multinational institutions accounting for nearly
70 per cent of support. It has ranged from 6 to 10 per cent of all development
assistance during this period but has declined in real terms over the last seven
years. During this time, funds for the power sector fell, while energy efficiency
doubled on a percentage basis and renewables increased, but less dramatically.
This seems likely to be a recognition that lower greenhouse gas technologies
need to be promoted.

However,  given  the  need  for  a  revolution  to  transform  the  global  energy
system, a much broader and sustained commitment will be needed by donors.
The International Energy Agency has projected a need for 20 trillion US$ (IEA
2008),  most  of  which  will  be  needed  by  developing  countries  to  meet  the
demand  for  energy  by  2030.  There  is  a  considerable  gap  between  current
public funding and projected financing requirements. While much of this will
be filled by private capital, public funding, particularly grants, will be needed
to reduce the risks associated with the introduction of new technologies and to
encourage  developing  countries  to  implement  the  more  environmentally
friendly but more costly options. If developing countries begin to fill this gap
but with lower environmental requirements, then sustainable energy projects
could be undermined.

Tirpak and Adams (2008) argue that ‘Japan and Germany in particular have
a  great  opportunity  to  provide  leadership  by  further  mainstreaming  energy
efficiency  and  renewable  energy  projects  in  their  Development  Assistance
Portfolios, while still supporting the specific needs of developing countries’.
In  other  words, Tirpak  and Adams  are  arguing  that  enlightened  self-interest
can also be in the best interests of both the donor and recipient country. The
inference of this is that the EU’s relationship with the external world should
also parallel its own needs.

This chapter argues, however, that if Europe is serious about its commit-
ment to the reduction of climate change, and if it wants to have the chance of
capturing the global opportunities deriving from climate change (as the ERA
Green  Paper  of  2007  and  the  ERA EGR  of  2008  argue),  then  it  has  limited
choice  other  than  to  increase  the  scale  of  its  international  development  and
S&T programmes.  This  chapter  proposes  that  the  EU  should  bring  those
programmes  closer:  the  technological  needs  of  reducing  poverty  –  usually
small-scale,  decentralized  technologies  –  overlaps  with  the  EU  goals  of
support  for  these  technologies  both  for  climate  change  mitigation,  energy
security and economic development.

The  EU  barely  reaches  into  this  area  because  its  external  S&T policy  is
more to do with the BRIC countries and capturing markets, maintaining capa-
bilities  and  so  on.  However,  as  the  IPCC  makes  clear,  climate  change  is  as
dependent on sustainable development as it is on capping the emissions from

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

the BRIC countries. Therefore, the EU should broaden its international S&T
policy  to  the  poorer  global  countries  and  it  should  view  its  climate  change
policies, international aid and international S&T policies as synonymous for
those countries. Furthermore, in many ways, a broadening of its S&T policies
towards poorer countries enables the EU to better meet its spectrum of goals.

TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability is generally discussed in terms of intergenerational equity and
focuses  on  achieving  appropriate  levels  of  economic  development  while
balancing the resources of life (water, food and agriculture, energy, forestry,
mining  and  so  on)  and  the  bi-products  of  their  use  (waste  resources)  (IPCC
2007, Chapter 12). There are real energy efficiency and sustainability benefits
to be captured by linking the interfaces of these areas, for example, minimiz-
ing energy use through increased public transport; growing and eating more
local food so that energy for transport, packaging and storage is reduced; and
utilizing  waste  resources  for  energy  use  and  so  on.  This  also  increases  the
energy security of a country because of the reduced need for imports, reduced
use of oil for transport, and so forth.

In  Europe,  a  few  countries  have  been  better  at  linking  the  interfaces  of
energy policy and sustainability than others. For example, Austria has long had
biomass  for  domestic  heating;  Denmark  has  an  integrated  heat  and  power
sector;  and  Germany  has  linked  energy  and  waste  resources.  However,  for
much of Europe, sustainable energy means either renewable or nuclear elec-
tricity and demand reduction measures. Linking energy demand and supply;
incorporating ‘smart’ technologies to reduce energy demand; linking renew-
able  heat,  electricity  and  transport  fuels;  linking  the  energy  resources  used
within food, agriculture and waste resource policies, is often poor or non-exis-
tent.  This  is  clearly  an  area  that  international  S&T policy  should  promote
given  that  this  is  also  an  area  that  would  benefit  the  European  climate  and
energy targets.

Global  sustainable  development  is  beginning  to  point  to  very  different
interactions between local and global actors, but it is far from clear how these
interactions will develop, and what their implications for sustainability, will be
(WWF 2009). As has been pointed out, energy use is rising in certain countries
where some, or large percentages, of its manufactured outputs are intended for
other  countries  (Kejun  et  al.  2008).  Nor  is  it  clear  how  global  trade  will
develop.  Increasingly  there  are  those  in  the  rich,  developed  world  who  are
arguing  for  policies  which  promote  prosperity  without  growth  (for  example
Jackson 2009). This argues for greater personal responsibility with respect to
personal  carbon  footprints,  which  implies  reduced  consumption,  more  local

European responses to climate change and energy resource supply

61

food,  more  local  energy  generation  and  reduced  energy.  This  may  lead  to
reduced international trade in some areas.

However, currently Europe is dependent on supply chains from outside of
Europe not just for much of its oil and gas, but also for many technologies or
components which are the basis of a sustainable energy future. The EU’s inter-
national S&T policy will have to be flexible enough to ensure strong supply
chains, in both ways, of these sustainable technologies and to ensure that any
sustainable development concerns over reduced trade to Europe will be mini-
mized. This is the fifth key conclusion of this chapter.

DECENTRALIZATION AND SUPER-GRIDS – ARE THEY
LINKED?

So  far,  this  chapter  has  argued  that  international  S&T policy  for  climate
change and energy resource supply sits squarely in the middle of the EU’s own
internal goals for energy – namely its desire for energy security, its desire to
reduce carbon emissions; and its desire to access opportunities of the transi-
tion to a sustainable future. It has also argued that its internal climate change
policy  should  work  closely  with  its  development  policies,  because  of  the
increasing acceptance that climate change mitigation policies should co-exist
and complement global poverty reduction goals. At the same time, while inter-
national S&T is currently focused on the larger energy-using countries, such
as China, there are concerns that knowledge transfer has a number of barriers
on both sides, as set out in the ERA EGR. And finally, the S&T policy should
preferably be complementary to its internal needs.

This section stresses that the international S&T policy of the EU needs to be
expanded to meet these requirements. It is not that the current EU S&T policy
is ‘wrong’ but rather that it needs to expand and broaden its focus to include the
needs of the globe for meeting its climate change mitigation and poverty reduc-
tion goals. This will mean continuing policies with the fast- growing industri-
alizing countries, such as China and India, which are rapidly increasing their
energy use. But it will also mean re-thinking the EU’s development strategies.
This broadening of international S&T policy fulfils the range of goals the EU
has in relation to climate change and energy resource use.

Maintaining  European  energy  security  and  maximizing  European  and
global  sustainability  implies  developing  new  local  and  global  relationships.
But it also implies a wider benefit of decentralizing the energy system. This is
not arguing that large companies or large energy plants have no place in the
future  of  a  European  sustainable  energy  system.  What  it  is  saying  is  that
decentralizing  technologies  (whether  energy  supply,  energy  demand,  smart
control  and  information)  provide  an  overlap  between  European  internal  and

62

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

external goals and a sound basis for a coherent and relevant international S&T
strategy for climate change and energy resource supply.

For Europe, the decentralizing technologies

improve energy security;

•
• meet increased renewable energy and sustainable energy supply goals;
enable  the  interfaces  between  energy,  waste  and  agriculture  to  be
•
captured;
connect  individuals  to  their  sustainability  footprints,  thereby  possibly
altering their behaviour and improving their energy citizenship; and
• provide a base from which to capture markets and capacity externally,

•

as shown by German policies.

For the EU’s international S&T policy, they

•

•

link  with  sustainable  development  priorities  in  poorer  countries,
because decentralization is seen as more appropriate;
enable international S&T policy to complement Europe’s internal goals.

Given the requirements of global poverty reduction and sustainable develop-
ment, it is hard to visualize how they can be achieved without an increase in
the  uptake  of  decentralized  technologies.  Again,  this  is  not  to  say  that  the
current focus of the EU’s international S&T policy on industrializing countries
is ‘wrong’. Rather, it is arguing that expanding the EU’s policy to focus more
than it has done on the poorer countries and their needs fits well with the EU’s
own internal goals.

In parallel to this, there are increasingly arguments for super-grids. These
can be electricity grids – for example, transporting electricity from vast solar
fields based in the Sahara desert, or grids for heat from the geothermal fields
of  Iceland.  There  are  proponents  for  and  against  this  idea.  Greenpeace,  for
example,  is  in  support  of  them;  the  sustainable  development  community  is
very  wary  of  them;  and  the  energy  security  world  considers  them  an  easy
target.  Nevertheless,  this  is  a  growing  area  which  may  also  help  Europe’s
internal goals. Its international S&T policy needs to keep a very close eye on
this area.

CONCLUSION

Europe’s  international  S&T policy  has  tended  to  see  its  role  as  focusing  on
areas  where  there  is  a  clear  benefit  to  the  member  states.  This  attitude  is
becoming  undermined  in  the  area  of  climate  change  and  energy  resources.

European responses to climate change and energy resource supply

63

This  is  partly  because  of  the  urgency  of  the  situation  but  it  is  also  because,
increasingly,  there  is  a  two-way  movement  in  terms  of  technology  transfer.
Europe has to move a little more to ‘enlightened self-interest’. An expansion
of international S&T policy to decentralized energy technologies and greater
links  with  poorer  countries  may  reap  many  under-recognized  benefits  for
Europe.

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Economic  Regulation  Enables  the  Transition  to  a  Sustainable  Electricity  System,
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Council  of  the  European  Union  (2006),  Paper  from  the  Commission/SG/HR  to  the
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Council of the European Union (2009), Conclusions on the Second Strategic Energy
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European  Commission  (2006a),  Green  Paper  on  a  European  Strategy  for  a
Sustainable,  Competitive  and  Secure  Energy, COM  (2006)  105  final, Brussels:
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European Commission (2006b), External Energy Relations – from Principles to Action,

COM (2006) 590 final, Brussels: European Commission.

European  Commission  (2007a),  Green  Paper  on  the  European  Research  Area:  New

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European Commission (2008a), Opening to the World: International Cooperation in
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European  Commission  (2009a),  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  ‘The  January
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European Commission (2009b), A More Research-intensive and Integrated European
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Council  on  the  Promotion  of  the  Use  of  Energy  from  Renewable  Sources  and
Amending  and  Subsequently  Repealing  Directives  2001/77/EC  and  2003/30/EC,
Official Journal of the European Union, L140, 5 June, pp. 16–62.

Forbes  (2009),  Crude  Oil  Prices  1861–2009,  available  at  http://www.forbes.com/
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August 2009).

Harris,  Paul  G.  (2007),  ‘Sharing  the  burdens  of  global  climate  change:  international
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Economy, London: Sustainable Development Commission.

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Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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WWF (2009), Living Planet Report 2008, Gland: WWF.

4. Tackling global public health

challenges: how should the European
Research Area respond?

Ehimario U. Igumbor and David Sanders

INTRODUCTION

There are few sectors where the European Research Area (ERA) can have a
more  timely  and  relevant  impact  than  in  global  public  health.  This  is  so
because improvement in health and longevity can strengthen economic devel-
opment  and  improve  individual  livelihood  in  human  societies.  The  bi-
directional  relationship  between  health  and  economic  development  is  not
widely appreciated. Health is more commonly understood as ‘a central goal
and an important outcome of economic development’ and is less viewed as an
important  investment  which  then  ‘promotes  economic  development  and
poverty  reduction’ (WHO  2001).  Good  health  is  not  only  influenced  by  but
also itself influences and acts as a means to economic welfare and individual
livelihood in countries the world over.

Perhaps  the  most  substantive  documentation  of  the  evidence  for  the  link
between health and development comes from the World Health Organization’s
Commission  on  Macroeconomics  and  Health  (CMH)  which  reported  that
investing in population health in low and middle income countries (LMICs) is
worthwhile not only as a priority goal in its own right (for its capacity to save
millions  of  lives),  but  also  in  contributing  to  ‘reducing  poverty,  spurring
economic  development  and  therefore,  promoting  global  security’ (WHO
2001).  Three  channels  of  influence  of  ill-health  and  disease  on  economic
development were described by the CMH as including (i) economic losses due
to reduction in healthy life expectancy as a result of early deaths and chronic
disability; (ii) the phenomenon of high fertility to compensate for high death
rates of children and failure to invest in health and education; and (iii) reduc-
tions in returns to business and infrastructure investments (WHO 2001). The
direct manifestations of these processes range from costs of medical treatment
of disease, loss of labour-market income due to disease, loss of future earnings
due to premature death, lack of educational attainment and consequences of

65

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

intergenerational  spill-over  of  disease.  In  fact,  one  empirical  observation  of
LMICs  conservatively  estimated  that  10–15  per  cent  of  Gross  National
Product (GNP) growth since the 1960s may be attributable to health improve-
ments. The economic dividend of improved health status in European coun-
tries is also well-documented (Suhrcke et al. 2005).

In spite of the impressive amount of evidence in support of the link between
health and economic development, policy and programmatic initiatives have
failed  to  convincingly  recognize  that  investing  in  health  is  one  of  a  finite
number of ways to achieve their economic objectives (Suhrcke et al. 2005).
The result is that significant challenges to population health remain palpable
in almost all regions of the world and threaten development and prosperity in
several  countries.  In  almost  all  LMICs,  achieving  the  Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) is undermined by the unremitting burden of ill-
health.

The  Disease  Control  Priorities  project  has  highlighted  that  even  in  coun-
tries with the best health indicators, the pace and unevenness of progress in
improving  health  outcomes  remains  a  challenge  (Lopez  et  al.  2006). At  the
heart of these challenges to global health are rapidly widening health inequal-
ities alongside public health emergencies such as Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) infection, and new (or potential) pandemics exemplified by avian
influenza,  drug  resistant  tuberculosis  and  malaria. These,  coupled  with  high
levels of violence and injuries and an emerging epidemic of non-communica-
ble  diseases,  exert  a  significant  burden  on  countries’ health  and  economic
systems.  In  addition,  South  Asia,  Latin  America  and  sub-Saharan  Africa
continue to grapple with an ‘unfinished’ health burden of severe malnutrition
and infections, including vaccine-preventable diseases. Higher income coun-
tries  specifically  suffer  the  high  impact  of  non-communicable  diseases  and
injuries. This high burden of disease within a context of globalization exerts
considerable  strain  on  health  systems  in  many  countries.  The  result  is  that
health systems are increasingly unable to deliver health services in a rapidly
changing world.

Given  the  policy  initiatives  of  the  ERA which  point  to  establishing  an
‘external dimension’, and within the context of globalization and the resultant
interconnectedness, confronting challenges to public health in regions outside
the European Union (EU) is critical if the ERA is to be ‘open to the world’.
Tackling  public  health  challenges  through  co-operation  in  international
science  and  technology  (S&T)  is  an  urgent  imperative  and  must  be  a  key
component of the agenda of the ERA.

In this chapter we describe the critical global public health challenges with
a deliberate focus on the situation in LMICs and especially Africa. In describ-
ing the global burden of disease and injuries, we present the scale of health
problems and discuss their causal factors. We then suggest ways in which the

Tackling global public health challenges

67

ERA should  respond  to  current  public  health  challenges.  In  this  regard,  we
argue that prioritizing research on the underlying determinants of population
health and promoting health systems research, including research on effective
public  health  initiatives,  should  be  the  focus  of  the  ERA.  These  issues  are
presented  in  four  sections.  In  the  first  section,  the  state  of  global  health  is
described by presenting trends in key health indicators globally and specifi-
cally  the  burden  of  disease  estimates  for  the  EU  and  LMICs.  The  second
section identifies the underlying causes of these global health challenges while
the third section outlines what must then be the ensuing global health research
priorities. A fourth and final section reflects on how the ERA should respond
and promote a research agenda that focuses on critical issues in public health.

THE STATE OF GLOBAL HEALTH

An analysis of the state of population health evidenced by selected health indi-
cators shows that there have been improvements in health globally since 1990
(Table 4.1). Life expectancy at birth (LE), which measures the average number
of years an individual is expected to live as determined by the mortality rate
in  a  specific  geographical  area,  improved  on  average  by  four  years  in  both
males and females between 1990 and 2007 (WHO 2009). Infant mortality rate
(IMR) which is the number of deaths which occur within the first year of life
per 1000 live births in the same year; and adult mortality rates measured as
‘the  probability  of  dying  between  15  and  60  years  per  1000  population’
reduced by 14 infant deaths per 1000 live births and 20 adult deaths per 1000
population respectively between 1990 and 2007 (WHO 2009). Many people
are  therefore  living  longer,  healthier  lives  in  2007  compared  to  1990  (and
indeed  at  any  other  time  in  the  past),  but  these  health  gains  are  not  equally
enjoyed by all.

Global health indicators show significantly different and dissonant patterns
from one region of the world to another as well as between the various socio-
economic groups within regions. In 2007, LE in high income countries was 80
years compared to 57 years in low income countries, portraying a substantial
gap in population health (Table 4.1). In fact, it is estimated that LE is below
40  years  in  nine  African  countries  –  Botswana,  Central  African  Republic,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe
(World Bank 2006) suggesting a deteriorating trend from three decades ago.
This reversal in LE is worst in countries such as Zimbabwe where it was 34
years in 2003, compared with 52 years in 1990 (World Bank 2006).

The IMR in sub-Saharan Africa averaged 101 per 1000 live births in 2005
(higher in some countries), compared to about half this estimate (52 per 1000
live births) worldwide (World Bank 2006). The rate of infant deaths in many

Table 4.1 Life expectancy at birth, infant, maternal and adult mortality rates for 1990, 2000 and 2007

Life expectancy at birth
(years) 

Infant mortality rate
(per 1000 live births) 

Male            Female

Male

Female

Adult mortality rate
(probability of dying
between 15 and 60 years  
per 1000 population)
Female

Male

MMR* 
(per
100 000
births)

1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007      1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007        1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007     2005

Region 

African Region
Region of the Americas
South-East Asia Region
European Region
Eastern Mediterranean Region
Western Pacific Region

6
8

Income group
Low income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
High Income

Global

49
68
58
67
59
68

52
62
64
72
62

49
71
61
68
61
70

53
65
65
75
64

51
73
63
70
63
72

55
67
67
77
65

53
74
58
75
61
71

55
64
72
79
66

52
77
63
76
64
74

56
68
73
81
68

54
78
66
78
66
77

58
70
73
82
70

114 104
24
37
62
82
20
29
74
88
25
32

94
18
50
14
64
17

111
58
40
11
65

85
97
38
47
20
28
7
6
56 48

99
30
79
24
75
40

95
60
33
9
61

90
20
61
16
64
32

83
49
24
6
52

81
15
48
11
56
20

74
39
17
5
45

Note: *MMR = Maternal Mortality Rate.

Source: World Health Organization, World Health Statistics 2009. 

423 454 429 325 376 374
207 180 163 116 100
91
302 283 252 257 219 187
215 229 221
94
270 246 229 217 189 175
85
190 161 147 137 102

98

97

364 365 339 300 302 292
248 226 201 193 159 132
265 284 276 127 136 138
155 129 115
62
247 236 217 175 162 147

67

77

900
99
450
27
420
82

650
180
91
9
400

Tackling global public health challenges

69

1000

100

10

0
0
0
1

r
e
p

s
h
t
a
e
d

t
n
a
f
n
I

1
100 

y = 9722x–0.7037
R2 = 0.6657

1000 

10 000 

100 000

GDP per capita (PPP)

Source: Wikipedia  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Infantdeaths-vs-gdppercapita(ppp).png)
based on data from CIA World Factbook 2007.

Figure 4.1 Relationship  between  infant  mortality  rate  (IMR)  and  gross

domestic product per capita

LMICs was many times more than in countries such as Singapore, Sweden,
Japan,  Hong  Kong  and  Iceland  where  IMR  is  less  than  three  per  1000  live
births. Figure 4.1 shows a very strong inverse correlation between IMR and
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and indicates that countries with a
higher GDP per capita have lower IMR and vice versa.

The maternal mortality ratio (MMR) presents an even bleaker picture being
as high as 900 per 100 000 live births in 2005 for Africa, compared to 27 per
100 000 live births in the European region and a very impressive 9 per 100 000
in  high  income  countries  (WHO  2009).  Interpreted,  these  estimates  indicate
that whereas death due to puerperal (pregnancy-related) causes is increasingly
rare in Europe and high income countries, it is still common in African coun-
tries.

Within  high,  middle  and  low  income  countries,  there  are  also  dramatic
differences in health outcomes amongst the different socio-economic, political
and  cultural  groups.  Generally,  the  higher  individuals  are  in  the  ‘socio-
economic  ladder’,  the  better  their  health  outcomes  and  vice  versa  (CSDH
2007).  For  example,  in  El  Salvador  mothers  with  no  education  have  a  four

 
 
 
 
70

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

times  higher  chance  of  their  babies  dying  compared  to  mothers  who  have
attained  at  least  secondary  level  education.  Similarly,  in  Glasgow,  Scotland,
LE of men in the most affluent part of the city was 82 years compared to 54
years in the most deprived part (ibid.).

In LMICs a few health conditions are responsible for a high proportion of
this mortality burden and, importantly, effective interventions exist to prevent
and  treat  these  conditions  thereby  potentially  averting  several  millions  of
deaths  and  disability  arising  from  them.  Many  LMICs  continue  to  have
‘mortality patterns that reflect high levels of infectious diseases and the risk
of  death  during  pregnancy  and  childbirth’ (WHO  2009).  In  addition  to  this
traditional burden of disease, LMICs are experiencing emerging epidemics of
injuries and chronic diseases, the latter often wrongly assumed to be mainly
confined  to  the  better-off  regions  of  the  world.  This  surge  in  the  disease
burden attributable to chronic diseases is profound. Recent estimates on the
causes of deaths revealed that ‘out of every 10 deaths worldwide, six are due
to  non-communicable  conditions;  three  to  communicable,  reproductive  or
nutritional conditions; and one to injuries’ (ibid.). In South Africa, for exam-
ple, four chronic diseases, namely ischaemic heart disease, stroke, hyperten-
sive disease and diabetes mellitus, accounted for an aggregate 20 per cent of
total  deaths  while  comparative  risk  assessment  of  selected  risk  factors  for
diseases  underscored  the  population-attributable  fraction  of  risk  factors  of
chronic  diseases  such  as  high  blood  pressure,  tobacco  smoking,  unhealthy
diets,  alcohol  abuse  and  physical  inactivity  (Norman  et  al.  2007).
Furthermore,  there  is  growing  empirical  evidence  confirming  that  chronic
disease  is  now  a  problem  for  younger  adults  and  increasingly  affects  them
earlier than it formerly did (Lopez et al. 2006; Igumbor and Buso 2006). This
imposes  a  double  burden  on  weak  and  often  deteriorating  public  health
systems which must provide both health care services that manage infectious
diseases  and  also  health  promotion  strategies  that  address  chronic  diseases
(Sanders et al. 2009).

This state of global health is attributable to rapidly widening inequalities
and unprecedented emergencies such as the pandemic of human immunodefi-
ciency  virus/acquired  immunodeficiency  syndrome  (HIV/AIDS),  tuberculo-
sis,  malaria  and  other  communicable  diseases  and  the  increasing  burden  in
LMICs of non-communicable diseases and injuries. The majority of countries
where LE has decreased have a high prevalence of HIV, affecting in particular
the 15–45 age group (Sanders et al. 2009). At the end of 2006, the number of
HIV-infected  people  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  was  estimated  at  24.7  million,
almost  two-thirds  (63  per  cent)  of  the  total  of  HIV-infected  people  globally
(UNAIDS 2006). Approximately 2.8 million additional people were infected
with HIV in 2006, surpassing the combined number of new infections in all
other regions of the world. There  were 2.1 million deaths in Africa attributed

Tackling global public health challenges

71

to  HIV,  accounting  for  72  per  cent  of  global  AIDS  deaths  (ibid.).  In  the
absence  of  massively  expanded  prevention,  treatment  and  care  efforts,  it  is
expected  that  the  AIDS  death  toll  will  continue  to  rise.  The  social  and
economic  consequences  of  HIV/AIDS  are  already  widely  felt  throughout
Africa, not only in the health sector but also in sectors dependent on human
resources such as education, industry, agriculture, transport, and the economy
in general.

Moreover,  a  number  of  countries  continue  to  be  embroiled  in  conflicts
resulting in complex emergencies affecting livelihoods and further heighten-
ing the demand for health care. At the  same time, health  service delivery is
severely disrupted in such situations. Even in non-emergency situations, fiscal
stringency as a result of debt, macroeconomic reforms and harsh conditional-
ities has led to chronic underfunding of health services (Sanders et al. 2009).
In 2006, expenditure on health accounted for about 8.7 per cent of GDP glob-
ally, with the highest level in the Americas at 12.8 per cent and the lowest in
the South-East Asia Region at 3.4 per cent (WHO 2009). Placed in monetary
terms, ‘this translates to about US$ 716 per capita globally, US$ 31 per capita
in  the  South-East  Asia  Region  and  US$  2636  per  capita  in  the  Americas’
(ibid.). This gross underfunding of health in some regions, together with the
loss  of  health  human  resources  from  HIV/AIDS  and  out-migration,  has
resulted in near collapse of health systems in many LMICs.

The  WHO  (2009)  estimates  that  ‘globally  there  are  13  physicians  per
10 000 population, with large variations between countries and regions’. In the
African Region, there are only two physicians per 10 000 compared with 32
per  10 000  in  the  European  Region  (ibid.).  The  situation  with  nurses  and
midwives is not different – there are 28 nurses and midwives per 10 000 popu-
lation globally, ranging from a low of 11 per 10 000 in the African Region to
a high of 79 per 10 000 in the European Region (ibid.). This dire situation with
respect to human resources severely constrains the response of health systems
to the existing disease burden.

In summary, a number of known and preventable risk factors are associated
with  high  levels  of  mortality  and  morbidity  globally.  These  include  ‘poor
infant feeding practices, low birth weight, being overweight or obese, child-
hood and maternal under-nutrition, unsafe sex, use of tobacco, harmful use of
alcohol, unsafe and inadequate amounts of water and lack of sanitation’ (WHO
2009). When combined, these preventable risks account for ‘over 40 per cent
of the 58 million deaths that occur worldwide annually and one third of global
loss of healthy life years’ (ibid.). However, the primary determinants of indi-
vidual  and  population  health  the  world  over  are  decidedly  macroscopic  in
nature. Poverty, the HIV epidemic, weakened health systems, aggravated by
continued conflict in a number of countries, have all contributed to an unequal
health situation globally which manifests as a crisis in many LMICs.

72

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

GLOBAL HEALTH CHALLENGES

From our discussion so far, it is clear that health in the poorer regions of the
world is disproportionately worse than the global average. We also see a para-
dox  in  global  health,  namely  that  high  income  countries  with  better  health
indicators  show  more  rapid  rates  of  improvement  than  most  LMICs  which
demonstrate a slower pace of improvement, and even sometimes deterioration.
The result is growing global inequities in health outcomes.

But  given  today’s  increasingly  interdependent  and  interconnected  world,
the notion of ‘local health problems’ is quickly becoming obsolete as not even
the poorest of the LMICs exists in isolation. Infectious diseases such as HIV,
SARS and avian influenza (also lately the swine influenza – 2009 HIN1) are
important reminders that ultimately attention to the situation in LMICs should
not be dictated ‘by charity but by self-interest’ (Bloom 2003). Technological
advances in the means of transportation and increasingly globalized economic
activities  mean  that  infectious  diseases  can,  and  do,  now  spread  geographi-
cally  much  faster  than  ever  before.  In  2006  alone,  ‘an  estimated  2.1  billion
airline passengers travelled, implying that a disease outbreak or epidemic in
any one part of the world is only a few hours away from becoming an immi-
nent threat somewhere else’ (WHO 2007).

Beyond the dynamic of disease transmission due to increased interconnect-
edness  as  part  of  globalization,  the  globalization  of  economies  without  ‘re-
distributing,  regulating  and  ensuring  the  rights  of  the  vulnerable  groups’
portend  potential  health  challenges  (McMichael  and  Beaglehole  2000;
Schrecker  et  al.  2008).  Rather  than  leading  to  greater  equality  and  health
benefits  through  economic  growth,  globalization  may  be  resulting  in  ‘four
disequalising dynamics: (i) the global re-organisation of production and emer-
gence  of  a  global  labour  market;  (ii)  the  increasing  importance  of  binding
trade agreements and processes to resolve disputes; (iii) the rapidly increasing
mobility of financial capital, and (iv) the persistence of debt crises in devel-
oping  countries’ (Schrecker  et  al.  2008).  These  dynamics  are  important
contributors to increasing inequities in health.

In addition to globalization, increasing urbanization and the ageing of the
world’s population present new health challenges (WHO 2008). The world’s
population is shifting towards urban areas such that more than 50 per cent (3.3
billion people) of the total population lived in urban areas in 2008 compared
with 38 per cent in 1978 (ibid.). This presents a different type of health chal-
lenge as urban health concerns become increasingly important. Perhaps most
significant is the fact that with urbanization comes increased socio-economic
stratification  which  then  may  translate  into  health  inequities  (ibid.).  It  is,
however,  the  direct  effect  of  lack  of  durable  housing,  sufficient  clean  water
and sanitation, vulnerability to injuries from road traffic accidents, fires, pollu-

Tackling global public health challenges

73

tion,  workplace  hazards,  crime  and  violence  amongst  others,  which  mostly
affect  the  lowest  economic  quintile  of  urban  dwellers  and  result  in  major
disparities in health status. The ageing of the world’s population will manifest
as  an  increase  in  prevalence  of  chronic  conditions  and  multiple  morbidities
demanding a broader approach to the delivery of health services.

Understanding current global health challenges requires a greater focus on
the primary determinants of individual and population health – ‘the causes of
the  causes’ or  ‘social  determinants  of  health’ (Wilkinson  and  Marmot  2003;
CSDH  2008).  Work  by  the  Commission  on  Social  Determinants  of  Health
(CSDH) convincingly demonstrates that universally, ‘health and illness follow
a social gradient (such that) the lower the socioeconomic position, the worse
the  health’ (CSDH  2008). Accordingly,  health  challenges  are  in  effect  also
developmental challenges and arise from economic and social arrangements.
The key global health challenge according to the Commission is to close this
gap in health as both an ethical imperative and a matter of social justice.

It  is,  however,  important  to  emphasize  the  point  that  this  challenge  of
redressing health inequities is ultimately political. Dealing with the problem of
health  inequity  as  an  immediate  priority  of  nation  states  demands  that  the
unfairness  in  resource  allocation  be  addressed.  This  implies  contesting  the
current  economic  order.  The  requirement  is  that  ‘social  policies,  economics
and politics put people at the centre … [such that] the minister of finance may
have  more  influence  over  health  equity  than  the  minister  of  health  and  the
global financial architecture more influence than international assistance for
health care’ (CSDH 2008, p. 35).

The  framework  for  understanding  and  addressing  this  social  injustice  in
health proposed by the CSDH is useful. The call for action of the CSDH is
based on three concrete principles:

1.

Improving the conditions of daily life – the circumstances in which people
are born, grow, live, work and age

2. Tackling  the  inequitable  distribution  of  power,  money  and  resources

including the structural drivers in all spheres; global, national and local

3. Measuring  the  problem,  evaluating  actions,  expanding  the  knowledge
base, developing a trained workforce and raising public awareness of the
social determinants of health. (CSDH 2008, p. 2)

Health  systems  challenges  abound,  fundamentally  as  a  result  of  economic
constraints,  including  the  demands  of  structural  adjustment  programmes  and
ill-considered health sector reforms. These are aggravated by the consequences
of the HIV epidemic and continued conflict in a number of LMICs (Sanders et
al. 2009). Together with the toxic combination of poor health policies and plan-
ning,  under-resourcing  of  public  health  systems,  a  disproportionate  focus  on

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

specialist,  tertiary  care  (hospital-centrism),  fragmentation  as  a  result  of  the
multiplication of programmes and projects, ineffective and inefficient service
delivery and the pervasive commercialization of health care, the capacity of
health systems to provide comprehensive health services to their populations
has been adversely affected (Simms et al. 2001; WHO 2008). Put simply, the
basic tenets and values of primary health care have been abandoned. The chal-
lenge with health systems is therefore how to redirect them towards values of
equity, people-centredness, community-participation and self-determination.

Research can play a critical role in the response to these global health chal-
lenges (Task Force on Health Systems Research 2004). In the next section, we
explore  the  research  approaches  that  must  be  emphasized  given  the  above
challenges and the limited resources available for the conduct of research.

KEY GLOBAL HEALTH RESEARCH IMPERATIVES OF
THE ERA

The global health crisis demands a reappraisal of existing priorities in health
policies and the nature of health research. The research funding gap (dubbed
the ‘10:90 gap’), which is shaped essentially by commercial influences and the
inadequacy of local funds, whereby only 10 per cent of global health research
funds are allocated to the problems that account for 90 per cent of the global
burden of disease, is unacceptable. As the Global Forum for Health Research
notes:  ‘Research  benefiting  the  health  of  poor  populations  remains  severely
underfunded and, therefore, under-researched’.1

One key imperative is to push the global health research agenda towards
equity.  The  European  Research Area  must  collaborate  with  other  important
global partners in identifying the research gaps and working towards closing
this gap. Deliberate and concerted efforts at prioritizing research on the domi-
nant  diseases  in  LMICs  which  have  been  conspicuously  neglected  in  the
global  research  agenda  are  needed. Three  such  diseases  are  Human African
Trypanosomiasis  (HAT),  Visceral  Leishmaniasis  (VL)  and  Chagas  disease.
They  unfortunately  receive  little  or  no  attention  in  global  health  research
despite their high burden in poorer regions of the world. For example, HAT
(also known as sleeping sickness) occurs only in sub-Saharan Africa affecting
50 000–150 000 people per year and threatens 50 million others at risk; VL
affects over 12 million people and puts over 350 million people from 88 coun-
tries  at  risk,  while  Chagas  infects  approximately  8  million  and  puts  100
million at risk in Central and South America.2

Whereas clinical and biological research should not be jettisoned, there is
need for a better balance between the inordinate levels of funding to this type
of research and that to research on the social, economic and political determi-

Tackling global public health challenges

75

nants of ill health. A key research imperative therefore is the investigation of
health  inequities  and  their  determinants  at  local  and  global  levels.  This  is
different  from  investigating  the  determinants  of  average  population  health
which has been the focus of most investigations (CSDH 2008). Thus, health
research needs to focus much more on both the growing divide in health status
between  the  world’s  rich  and  poor.  Multi-  and  interdisciplinary  research  on
social determinants of health needs to be emphasized over a disease-specific
biomedical focus.

Armed  with  knowledge  of  the  determinants  of  health  inequity,  research
should then investigate ways to reduce it. Here, what is needed is ‘research on
what works in what circumstances and how best to implement interventions so
that they contribute to reducing inequities’ (CSDH 2008). A third agenda for
equity  research  would  be  to  ‘investigate  the  development  of  methods  of
measuring and monitoring health inequities and evaluating the impact of inter-
ventions  to  reduce  such  inequities’ (ibid.  p.  196).  The  CSDH  has  recom-
mended  that  ‘research  funding  bodies  create  a  dedicated  budget  for  the
generation and sharing of evidence on social determinants of health and health
equity, including health equity interventions’ (ibid. p. 206).

The unacceptable gap between unprecedented knowledge about diseases and
their control and the implementation of that knowledge (the ‘knowledge-imple-
mentation gap’), especially in LMICs, must be urgently addressed. More empha-
sis  must  be  given  to  the  framing  of  research  questions  that  address  practical
health systems development with a focus on effectiveness. Indeed, many of the
vexing  health  challenges  are  decidedly  macroscopic  in  nature.  It  is  therefore
striking that only cursory attention has been paid to exploring such questions as
‘why some primary health care programmes work and others do not’ or ‘how to
best  organize  public  health  interventions  to  get  maximum  benefits’.  Research
into  ‘effective  mechanisms  for  global  resource  redistribution’;  ‘how  health
equity can be protected from market failures; and the design and financing of
systems including improving access to good quality care’ are needed (McCoy et
al.  2004; Task  Force  on  Health  Systems  Research  2004;  Sanders  et  al.  2005;
Tomlinson et al. 2007). However, it is difficult for public health researchers to
pursue such research given the meagre funding for health systems research that
addresses the ‘how’ questions in health (Chopra and Sanders 2000; Task Force
on Health Systems Research 2004; Sanders and Haines 2006). It has been esti-
mated that only 0.017 per cent of overall health expenditure in low income coun-
tries  is  dedicated  to  health  systems  research  (HSR)  (AHPSR  2004). As  such,
HSR can at best be undertaken at a ‘small scale with consequent limitations’ thus
undermining its potential usefulness in solving health systems challenges (Task
Force on Health Systems Research 2004).

Given existing funding, there is a need to prioritize areas of health systems
research.  The  World  Health  Organization’s  Task  Force  on  Health  Systems

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Research (2004) has outlined four key areas that should receive research prior-
ity,  inter  alia:  ‘financial  and  human  resources;  organisation  and  delivery  of
health  services;  governance,  stewardship  and  knowledge  management,  and
fourthly  global  influences’.  On  these  areas  of  research,  a  list  of  13  priority
research topics were further outlined by the Task Force (Box 4.1).

BOX 4.1 PRIORITY TOPICS FOR HEALTH
SYSTEMS RESEARCH PROPOSED BY THE
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION’S TASK FORCE
ON HEALTH SYSTEMS RESEARCH

Financial and human resources 

1. Community financing and national health insurance. 
2. Human resources for health at the district level and below

(including Community health workers).  

3. Human  resource  requirements  at  higher  management

levels.

Organization and delivery of health services 

4. Community involvement. 
5. Home care.    
6. Equitable,  effective  and  efficient  health  service  delivery
which  meets  the  needs  of  vulnerable  populations  and
addresses major disease priorities.

7. Approaches  to  the  organization  of  health  services  –
autonomy,  decentralization,  public–private  mix,  regula-
tion, vertical/horizontal integration  etc.

8. Drug and diagnostic policies. 

Governance, stewardship and knowledge management 

9. Priority setting and evidence informed policy making.
10. Health information systems.
11. Governance. 
12. Effective  approaches  for  inter-sectoral  engagement  in

health.

Global influences 

13.

Impact of global initiatives and policies (including trade,
donors, international agencies) on health systems.

Source: Task Force on Health Systems Research (2004).

Tackling global public health challenges

77

The above topics are a useful guide to researchers, policymakers and funders.
The  ‘unconscionable  gap’ between  knowledge  and  its  use  is  likely  to  remain
unless  research  and  academic  institutions  actively  promote  ‘implementation
research’ and policymakers insist on robust monitoring and evaluation as a sine
qua non of programme implementation (Sanders and Haines 2006).

There is another dynamic to the low funding for health research in LMICs
– namely, the ‘imbalance in power’ between researchers in LMICs and those
in richer countries (McCoy et al. 2004). As an example of ‘he who pays the
piper  calls  the  tune’,  researchers  in  LMICs  (where  less  than  2  per  cent  of
national  budgets  is  spent  on  research),  have  limited  power  to  significantly
influence  the  research  agenda  in  their  settings  (Global  Forum  for  Health
Research 2004 p. 116; AHPSR 2004). An examination of the distribution of
research funds for health problems between research institutions in rich and
poor  countries  will  highlight  the  disproportionate  benefit  to  researchers  in
richer countries (McCoy et al. 2004). This inequity in research funding will
need  to  be  tackled  if  research  is  to  be  geared  towards  addressing  the  key
research questions relevant to health challenges in LMICs. The best ways of
doing this are not immediately apparent and there is need for research in this
area, including an exploration of funding policies and patterns of donors and
international agencies, together with documenting innovative responses to the
challenges of developing research capacity in LMICs.

Global  health  research  must  be  viewed  within  an  all-inclusive  context
involving  all  stakeholders  including  researchers,  policymakers,  health  care
providers, civil society, patient groups and even the media. This will facilitate
the  seamless  transmission  of  knowledge-to-action. As  Labonte  and  Spiegel
(2003) point out, ‘the setting of health research priorities must be seen not only
in  the  context  of  the  burden  of  disease  but  also  in  terms  of  broader  global
issues pertaining to the environment and the prevailing social, political, and
economic conditions’.

To  this  end,  the  following  important  principles  should  ideally  shape

research priorities:

• Research on inherently global health issues that contribute to the burden

of disease;

• Research that represents concerns or questions defined by LMICs;
• Research  that  increases  equity  in  health  outcomes  both  between  and

within countries;

• Research that solidly engages civil society and communities and as such
builds  scientific  research  capacity  at  community  levels  and  supports
local people to inform decisions which affect their lives;

• Research that increases equity in knowledge capacities between devel-

oped and developing countries; and

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

• Research that is based on sound ethical principles and avoids exploita-

tion of vulnerable populations.

The ERA will need to strengthen cooperation and partnerships with national
health  research  systems  of  countries  which  should  have  research  priority
setting as a function of their activities. The  Council on  Health  Research for
Development (COHRED) has suggested ways of developing this capacity and
has  been  involved  in  collating  evidence  on  best  practices  in  this  regard
(COHRED 2006).

Civil  society  organizations  (CSOs)  and  a  few  research  initiatives  have
begun to promote relevant research directions and can contribute in influenc-
ing, generating and using such research. For example, the Child Health and
Nutrition Research Initiative has developed a simple and systematic method of
discriminating  among  competing  research  options  by  setting  priorities  in
health research which address both diseases and their risk factors (Tomlinson
et al. 2007). Innovative ways of promoting civil society participation and part-
nership in health research are needed that would see CSOs more involved in
‘influencing  commissioning  and  priority  setting,  becoming  involved  in  the
review process, developing enhanced links with academic researchers and in
research production by changing funding rules’ (Sanders et al. 2004).

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, the ERA should focus significant effort on the re-orientation of
global health research to be more responsive to global health needs. The global
health crisis makes it imperative that research should prioritize examining the
reasons  for  the  increasingly  uneven  burden  of  ill-health  both  between  and
within  countries;  assessing  the  impact  of  public  health  interventions;  deter-
mining factors that predict success of interventions under normal conditions;
and analysing political interventions and the types of social mobilization that
would lead to policy change to improve the social determinants of health and
transform weak health systems.

Traditionally  the  EU  has  provided  resources,  including  financial  support,
for  research  and  technical  assistance.  This  needs  to  be  increased  and  more
focused  on  these  highlighted  priorities  and  the  redressing  of  global  health
inequities. A number  of  laudable  initiatives  within  and  outside  the  EU  that
work towards this goal have been highlighted in this chapter. Forging strategic
partnerships to reinforce the agenda of these initiatives will be indispensable
to the success of the ‘external dimension’ of the ERA.

Finally, given rising inequities between and within countries, the increas-
ingly globalized nature of ill-health and its determinants, and the considerable

Tackling global public health challenges

79

impact of population health on economic and social development, it is impor-
tant  that  the  EU  integrates  health  concerns  into  all  of  its  development  and
research activities. For such activities to be of benefit to global public health,
they need to be informed by the material circumstances of both LMICs and
countries  of  the  EU.  Increasing  research  and  development  assistance,
cancelling unfair debt and reforming unjust trade paradigms will obviously be
important parts of the solution.

NOTES

1. See http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Research-issues (accessed 10 August 2009).
2. These figures can be found on the website of the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative at

http://www.dndi.org (accessed on 10 August 2009).

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Commission on the Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) (2008), Closing the Gap in
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Council on Health Research for Development (COHRED) (2006), Priority Setting for
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Global  Forum  for  Health  Research  (2004),  ‘The  10/90  Report  on  Health  Research
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Labonte,  R.  and  J.  Spiegel  (2003),  ‘Setting  global  health  research  priorities’,  British

Medical Journal, 326, 722–3.

Lopez,  A.,  C.  Mathers,  M.  Ezzati,  D.  Jamison  and  J.  Murray  (2006),  ‘Global  and
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McCoy D., D. Sanders, F. Baum, T. Narayan and D. Legge (2004), ‘Pushing the inter-
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McMichael, A.J.  and  R.  Beaglehole  (2000),  ‘The  changing  global  context  of  public

health’, Lancet, 356, 495–9.

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T. Vos, R. Laubscher, N. Nannan, B. Nojilana, D. Pieterse and the SA Comparative
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5. An ‘outward-looking’ Lisbon Strategy:

a solution for challenges of the
knowledge economy in the EU,
China and India1

Suma Athreye, Can Huang and Luc Soete

INTRODUCTION: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND
EMERGENCE OF INDIA AND CHINA IN A GLOBAL
SETTING

Economically, the last 50 years of European integration have brought about an
unparalleled process of economic development, of social transformation and
employment creation. Economic development in Europe has been spurred by
the opening up of national markets and the harmonization, still incomplete in
many sectors, of the European Single Market; by monetary and fiscal conver-
gence with the introduction of the Growth and Stability Pact accompanying
the introduction of the Euro; by regional cohesion policies with the transfer of
substantial amounts of resources between member states towards less favored
regions and countries, and by a series of subsequent enlargements making the
European Union (EU) today the largest trading bloc in the world.

At the same time though, the last 10–15 years have also been characterized
by an unparalleled process of economic growth at the world level, in actual
annual growth terms at a substantially higher percentage than that of the EU,
and accompanied by a dramatic expansion of world trade and worldwide capi-
tal movements. Compared to the enlargement of the EU, the enlargement of
the WTO with some of the large BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) coun-
tries has had by any measure a much greater impact on worldwide growth or,
for that matter, EU growth. As Freeman (2005) put it, the entry of the BRIC
countries in the world trade system has, given the size of their potential labor
force, effectively meant a doubling of the world’s labor force. The impact on
the rest of the world of such a dramatic expansion in opportunities for trading
and specialization is likely to involve a long adjustment period, estimated by
Freeman, of more than 30 years.

81

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

The emergence of India and China is one of the most significant changes in
the  world’s  economic  landscape  in  the  last  three  decades.  The  significance
results from the size of the Indian and Chinese economies, the large population
residing  in  both  countries  and  the  extraordinary  economic  growth  they  have
achieved and maintained in the past decades. Strikingly, the development modes
and engine of the economic growth of the two countries are quite diverse, if not
completely different. China’s economic reform started in the rural area and was
later  expanded  to  the  urban  area  and  industries.  Allowing  private  entry  and
welcoming foreign investment to tap its huge pool of labor force, China success-
fully  established  competitive  manufacturing  industries  and  gradually  trans-
formed its planned economy to a market-oriented economy. India’s success was
largely  boosted  by  domestic  entrepreneurship  and  vibrant  private  capital.  A
service-oriented development strategy gave Indian firms an upper hand in the
global  competition  for  service  outsourcing  business.  Analyses  of  innovation
indicators show that China and India currently lag behind the EU in almost all
indicators  that  measure  the  level  (Table  5.1).  However,  the  two  countries  are
catching up with the EU, and also the US and Japan for that matter in innova-
tion  investment  and  output,  revealed  by  the  indicators  measuring  the  growth
such  as  annual  average  growth  rate  of  gross  expenditure  on  R&D  (GERD),
growth of R&D personnel and growth rate of share in triadic patent families.

It is of course somewhat of a paradox that at the time of the Lisbon Summit
in March 2000, with its strong focus on Europe’s internal competitiveness, so
little  attention  was  paid  to  this  global  transformation  with  the  spreading  of
knowledge  to  new,  emerging  economies  such  as  China  and  India  and  the
implications  this  would  have  for  Europe’s  future  position  in  the  emerging
global  knowledge  economy.  Since  the  Lisbon  Summit,  it  is  probably  fair  to
say that the largest part of worldwide economic growth has been associated
with acceleration in the diffusion of technological change and in worldwide
access to knowledge, as opposed to individual countries’ domestic efforts in
knowledge accumulation as reflected in Table 5.1. Undoubtedly, and as was
actually acknowledged in the Lisbon agenda, the emerging digital technolo-
gies and in particular the easy and cheap access to broadband, the worldwide
spreading of internet and of mobile communication have been instrumental in
bringing about a more rapid and more global diffusion of best practice tech-
nologies, and in particular more capital and organizational embedded forms of
technology transfer such as licenses, foreign direct investment and other forms
of formal and informal knowledge diffusion, no longer limited to the OECD
world but now systematically involving the BRIC countries.

Given these new developments, we argue in this chapter that an ‘outward-
looking’ Lisbon strategy is urgently needed to provide a solution for the chal-
lenges  of  the  knowledge  economy  both  in  the  EU,  as  well  as  in  China  and
India, so that all three can benefit from mutual learning in this regard. In the

An ‘outward-looking’ Lisbon Strategy: EU, China and India

83

Table 5.1 Science and technology indicators for Brazil, China, India,

Russia, the EU 27, Japan and the US, 20051

Gross expenditure on R&D
(GERD) (Billion current 
PPP US dollars)
GERD as a percentage
of GDP
Annual average growth 
rate of GERD (2000–2005)
R&D expenditure by 
business enterprises 
(performing sector) as a
percentage of the 
national total
Total researchers per 
thousand employment
Growth of R&D 
personnel 1995–2005
Share of countries in 
triadic patent families
Annual average growth 
rate of share of countries
in triadic patent families
Scientific articles per 
million population, 2003

Brazil China

India Russia EU 27 Japan

US

14

115

24

17

231

131

324

0.9

1.3

–0.3

18.5

0.7

3.8

1.1

6.5

1.7

3.3

2.6

2.92

2.93

2.94

40.2

68.3

25.3

68

62.5

76.5

70.3

1.0

1.5

0.3

6.8

N.A.

8.25

N.A.

–2.7

5.8

2.3

11

2.46

9.7

0.0

0.1

0.8

0.2

0.1

28.47

28.8

31

14.6

36.7

27.6

–0.4

2.7

4.9

3.1

N.A.

22.6

N.A. 109.1

573.28 470.3

725.6

Notes: 
1. The data are for 2005 or the latest available year.
2. The data are for 1995–2005.
3. The data are for 1996–2005.  
4. The data are for 1998–2004.
5. The data are for 2000–2005.
6. The data are for 1997–2004.
7. The data are for the EU 25.
8. The data are for the EU 15.

Source: OECD (2007).

second section, a brief analytical elaboration is presented on the reasons why
the Lisbon agenda in 2000 did not address many of the emerging globalization
issues.  Viewed  in  retrospect,  Lisbon  appears  primarily  focused  on  the
enhancement of the internal growth dynamics within the EU (Rodrigues 2002;
Courela 2007). We argue in the third section that a new and ‘outward-looking’
Lisbon  strategy  in  Europe  would  have  to  focus  on  three  key  areas:  interna-
tional trade in services, internationalization of research networking, and access
to brains and talent.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

In the fourth section, we draw, albeit very briefly, some of the most strik-
ing similarities and differences between the challenges that the EU, India and
China  are  facing  respectively. We  demonstrate  that  to  sustain  their  develop-
ment,  China  and  India  need  to  promote  a  knowledge  (innovation)-intensive
development  strategy,  overcome  the  obstacles  of  regional  disparities,  and
better strike a balance between market-oriented principal and state interven-
tion in their economies, which are also unavoidable tasks for the sustainable
development of Europe. Finally, we draw some broad conclusions highlight-
ing the scope for comparative studies of the European Union, India and China,
so  as  to  enhance  mutual  learning  from  their  experience  –  even  from  joint
initiatives.

ON THE LONG ROAD TO LISBON

With hindsight, the Lisbon 2000 initiative could be seen as a unique attempt
to deal with what could be considered an institutional weakness in the forma-
tion  of  the  European  Union.  Up  to  Lisbon  there  had  really  been  only  a  few
areas where, in institutional terms, key decisions were made at the EU level,
instead at the level of national Member States: common commercial policy,
competition policy and monetary policy.

Common  commercial  policy  and  competition  policy  were,  and  still  are,
governed, one could argue, by the internal ‘single market’ dynamics leading to
a  continuous  broadening  of  its  influence:  a  systematic  enlargement  of  the
sphere of the working of market forces. One may think of the EU’s ‘services
directive’ with its attempt at further harmonization of regulatory rules regard-
ing the delivery of services within the EU or the European patent proposals.
While  such  broadening  of  the  sphere  of  market  forces  to  new  sectors  has
resulted in bringing about a major general efficiency-enhancing effect across
the EU, it has not contributed in any direct sense to the process of knowledge
accumulation or innovation improvement within the EU. On the contrary, in
areas of research and innovation, competition policy has actually created legal
uncertainty with respect to Member States’ own R&D and innovation support
policies, explaining the Commission’s efforts over the last years to come up
with a new State Aid Action Plan and new rules governing R&D and innova-
tion support policies.

Monetary  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  as  implemented  by  the  European
Central Bank, has put priority on coping with the huge diversity in the EU in
growth  and  inflation  pressures.  In  doing  so,  there  has  again  been  a  sheer
natural broadening of the influence of monetary policy over domestic Member
States’ fiscal policies. The Growth and Stability Pact provides Europe with an
instrument with which it can determine in purely quantitative terms Member

An ‘outward-looking’ Lisbon Strategy: EU, China and India

85

States’ fiscal  policies. The  present  financial  turmoil  puts  strong  pressure  on
redesigning  European  rules  with  respect  to  national  governance  of  financial
institutions, going even beyond the member countries of the Eurozone. Here,
too,  it  can  be  expected  that  European  policies  will  increasingly  take  domi-
nance  over  national  policies.  But  again,  there  is  no  inherent  incentive  to
promote knowledge and innovation as engines of sustainable growth.

Given these institutional biases, it was not really surprising that the Lisbon
agenda of knowledge and innovation capacity building in Europe was by and
large dependent on Member States’ efforts and willingness to give domestic
priority to knowledge accumulation in all its facets, including innovation and
knowledge  diffusion,  education  and  training.  Contrary  to  the  two  areas
described above, this is an area with ultimately little European power over and
above Member States.

All this has to some extent formed the basis of an overemphasis, one might
say  even  a  natural  obsession,  with  internal  knowledge  and  innovation  accu-
mulation in Europe. It has nourished a process of European cocooning in this
area. Thus,  European  and  national  policy  concerns  have  addressed  first  and
foremost the functioning of the European Research Area (ERA), the achieve-
ment  of  the  Barcelona  targets,2 the  comparisons  of  best  practice  innovation
policies amongst Member States or regions, and many other local knowledge
accumulation and diffusion bottlenecks. In the meantime, though, the knowl-
edge  and  innovation  world  outside  of  the  European  borders  has  changed
substantially and is likely to continue to do so in the near future (see Figure
5.1).

In  addition,  analysts  cast  doubts  on  whether  the  EU  can  advance  in  the
science, technology and innovation arena in an isolated way based on the long-
term  demographic  trend  in  Europe  (European  Commission  2008a).
Demographers at the United Nations Population Division project that in the
next  four  decades  the  world  will  be  characterized  by  a  demographic  divide,
whereby  most  of  the  large  decreases  in  working-age  populations  will  be
concentrated in the OECD economies. Table 5.2 summarizes the projection on
the EU. It is estimated that from 2005 to 2050, EU-27 will lose 19 per cent or
64  million  of  its  working-age  population.  Only  four  EU  countries  –
Luxembourg,  Ireland,  the  UK  and  Sweden  –  are  projected  to  see  some
increases in their working-age population.

In  the  medium  and  long  term,  the  demographic  divide  will  also  have
dramatic consequences for human capital-intensive growth strategies such as
those  contained  in  the  Lisbon  agenda.  First,  as  the  European  Commission
(2006, p. 7) notes, ‘the future cohorts of older workers will also benefit from
higher  levels  of  training,  reducing  the  risk  of  a  slower  spread  of  new  tech-
nologies that could be associated with ageing’. This means a larger expendi-
ture  on  training  and  retraining  of  the  workforce  to  keep  pace  with

86

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Notes:
1. All data are calculated by the OECD with purchasing power parities.
2. The data are obtained from the National Science Foundation (2006).

Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators (various years).

Figure 5.1 China’s R&D expenditure as a percentage of the R&D
expenditure of the US, EU-25 and Japan, 1991–2003

Table 5.2 Working-age population (15–64 years) in 2005 and 2050:

European projections

Country/region

2005
(in millions)

2050
(in millions)

Change
(in millions)

Change
(%)

EU-15
EU-27
Germany
France
Italy
UK
USA
Japan

257
330
55.34
39.46
38.35
39.44
199
84.88

218
266
44.66
36.07
26.14
40.56
245
52.33

–38
–64
–10.68
–3.39
–12.21
+1.12
+46
–32.55

–15
–19
–19
–9
–32
+3
+23
–38

Source: UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: the 2004 revision, medium vari-
ant, available at http://www.un.org/esa/population. The 2008 revision of the UN World Population
Prospects confirms the projections.

An ‘outward-looking’ Lisbon Strategy: EU, China and India

87

technological  advance.  Furthermore,  with  a  shrinking  working-age  popula-
tion, a larger proportion would need to pursue science and engineering studies
to generate the same levels of science and engineering graduates (European
Commission 2007, Table 4, p. 18). European countries currently face a voca-
tional  decline  in  science  and  engineering:  in  many  countries  the  number  of
available places is often not matched by applications.

As  a  policy  response  to  the  demographic  trend  in  Europe,  international
scientific cooperation – a phenomenon that has been gathering pace since the
1990s – offers a complementary strategic choice to put the EU S&T agenda
back on track. The logic is that the EU can use international cooperation as a
means by which to target specific S&T nations (on the other side of the demo-
graphic divide) and build up scientific capacity through interaction with scien-
tists  in  these  nations.  We  thus  argue  that,  in  retrospect,  the  Lisbon  strategy
appears  primarily  focused  on  the  internal  growth  dynamics  within  the  EU.
This focus becomes increasingly inconsistent not only with the latest develop-
ment  of  globalization  and  catching-up  of  the  emerging  economies,  but  also
with the intrinsic demographic trend in Europe and its implications to the EU’s
science, technology and innovation policy.

OPENING UP LISBON: TOWARDS AN EXTERNAL
KNOWLEDGE POLICY PERSPECTIVE

In this section, we select a number of areas which appear at first sight most in
need of a further opening up of Lisbon. In our view they are all critical to the
Lisbon knowledge agenda: the information society with its heavy dependence
on  network  service  activities,  research  which  increasingly  has  become  a
borderless activity, and last but not least the international search for brains and
talents.

European Network Services and the Global Level Playing Field

Europe, with its differences in cultures, languages, political and fiscal gover-
nance diversity, historically grown institutions, habits and tastes, has always
been intrinsically at a disadvantage with respect to reaping the scale advan-
tages of the internal market in services and in particular network services. One
may  think  of  finance,  insurance  and  business  services  (including  R&D,
licenses and trademarks), transport, wholesale and retail services, telecommu-
nications, media and advertising services as well as many public services rang-
ing from health to education.

Alongside the European internal discussion about opening up Member States’
national  markets  along  the  lines  of  the  successful  mobile  communications 

88

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

liberalization process, there was also, at the international level, a discussion
within  the  Doha  Round  trade  negotiations  of  the  so-called  Singapore  ‘new
regulatory’ issues: the setting of worldwide standards for public procurement,
of  competition  policy,  investment  policy  and  trade  facilitation.  Those  rules
were  strongly  supported  by  most  European  service  network  firms  as  they
would facilitate the access to emerging markets for those firms in some of the
most rapidly growing high-tech service markets worldwide, such as telecom
services,  but  also  financial  services  and  even  public  utility  services.  Not
surprisingly, the European Commission took a very positive trade liberaliza-
tion  position  in  the  run-up  to  the  Doha  Round  trade  negotiations  on  those
issues whereby, in the typical quid pro quo fashion of trade negotiations, one
was prepared to give in on agriculture tariffs in favor of trade liberalization in
these more dynamic and innovative service sectors (Young 2007).

It is important to realize that this open, positive stand was accompanied by
a new trend for Europe (and also for North America and Japan) of an increas-
ing location of R&D activities in emerging economies such as India and China
due to the larger availability of scientific manpower. Recent studies based on
survey  data  (UNCTAD  2005)  argue  that  much  of  the  internationalization  of
R&D is a corollary of the globalization in world trade and driven by the need
for  product  adaptation  to  the  rapidly  growing  markets  of  India,  China  and
other  emerging  economies.  Other  policy  documents  point  out  that  the  more
important  reasons  for  the  internationalization  of  R&D  are  getting  access  to
research systems and to human resources (OECD 2006). The steadily increas-
ing  stocks  of  patents  from  locations  in  emerging  economies  at  both  the
American  and  the  European  patent  offices  belie  this  story,  and  suggest  that
these  locations  may  in  future  offer  tough  competition  to  EU  locations  that
currently draw in international R&D.

Furthermore, the globalization of firms’ innovation activities was not only
manifest  in  their  overseas  R&D  investment  but  also  in  their  international
collaborations,  technology  trade,  and  access  to  research  systems  and  human
resources. In the aspect of technology trade, the playing field has also become
global. Revealed by the World Bank (2005) and the WTO (2005), the single
countries that make among the largest payments on account of licensing fees
and  royalty  payments  are  China  and  South  Korea  –  these  are  the  largest
markets for such traded technologies.

In short, the underlying motivation for opening up external service trading
relationships  beyond  the  European  internal  single  market  but  directly  at  the
WTO level was illustrative of the underlying scale problem at the European
level in many service network sectors, not just R&D and technology trade. The
characteristic increasing return features associated with the delivery of many,
often  high-tech,  network  services  could  not  always  come  fully  to  fruition
within the context of an EU with 27 Member States, each not only just with

An ‘outward-looking’ Lisbon Strategy: EU, China and India

89

different regulatory regimes governing some of those networks, but also with
different  languages,  different  cultures,  different  tastes  and  habits.  From  this
perspective,  the  slow  progress  on  the  internal  market  front  with  respect  to
services is actually illustrative of the intrinsic difficulties in taking full advan-
tage of scale in many service sectors. By contrast, the international trade nego-
tiations, and in particular the trade liberalization demands with respect to the
‘new regulatory issues’, provided a welcome complement for European firms
to realize those increasing returns advantages at the international rather than
just  at  the  European  level. The  old  language  and  cultural  links,  dating  back
sometimes  to  colonial  times  in  many  individual  EU  Member  States  with
emerging  and  developing  countries,  represented  for  many  of  those  EU
Member  States  a  sheer  natural,  more  straightforward  opportunity  for  the
expansions of such service-based markets in a global direction.

Coming back to the technology component in all this, it will be a crucial
issue for the EU to establish some uniform rules, not only for its own internal
use but also to deal effectively with other regions of the world that may want
to buy technology from or supply technology to the EU. An expansion of tech-
nology  trade  in  Europe  may  actually  have  enormous  benefits  for  the  high-
technology sector. Growth in some of the sectors prominent in licensing activ-
ity (for example, software and biotechnology) has been aided by interesting
cooperative  developments  such  as  the  modularity  of  components  and  open
source and agreements on standards, suggesting such policy coordination can
have enormous benefits for realizing a larger internal market for technology in
Europe.

From the European Research Area to ‘Recherche sans Frontières’

A second area where internal European concerns took over in the aftermath of
Lisbon was of course investment in knowledge (R&D and innovation) accu-
mulation in the EU and its various member states as exemplified by the so-
called Barcelona 3 per cent target endorsed in 2001. The latter target centers
on the strengthening of the geographically determined spillovers of European,
national  and  regional  R&D  and  innovation  efforts  (Muldur  et  al.  2006).
However, precisely because of the much higher risks involved in developing
new products for global markets, firms today will often prefer to license such
technologies  or  alternatively  outsource  locally  but  also  internationally  the
most risky parts to small high-tech companies which operate at arms’ length
but can be taken over, once successful. Not surprisingly, in most EU countries
the large R&D-intensive firms appear today less interested in increasing their
R&D investments in Europe than in merely consolidating them. These firms
try  to  reduce  the  risks  involved  in  carrying  out  R&D  by  collaboration  with
others,  sometimes  through  publicly  sponsored  or  enabled  programs

90

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

(SEMATEC  and  IMEC  in  micro-  and  today  nano-electronics),3 or  even
through so-called open innovation collaboration.

Not  surprisingly,  many  small,  traditionally  high-R&D-intensive  EU
Member States find themselves confronted with stagnating, sometimes even
declining,  privately  funded  R&D  investments  over  the  last  years.  From  this
perspective, the central question appears to be whether the benefits of knowl-
edge investments can be appropriated domestically or will ‘leak away’ glob-
ally. In the catching-up growth literature such as by Fagerberg and Godinho
(2005), it was already emphasized how this phenomenon would be character-
ized by lagging countries benefiting from the import and transfer of technol-
ogy  and  knowledge,  formally  and  particularly  informally.  As  a  logical
extension, in the current global world economy, it seems obvious that increas-
ing R&D investment is unlikely to benefit only the domestic economy. This
holds a fortiori for the small EU Member States, but is increasingly valid for
all EU countries. Thus, as Meister and Verspagen (2004) calculated, achieving
the 3 per cent Barcelona target in the EU by 2010 will ultimately not reduce
the income gap between the EU and the US as the benefits of the increased
R&D efforts will not only accrue to Europe but also to the US and the rest of
the world. In a similar vein, Griffith et al. (2006) illustrated how the US R&D
boom of the 1990s had major benefits for the UK economy and in particular
for the UK firms having shifted their R&D to the US. A UK firm, for exam-
ple, shifting 10 per cent of its UK R&D activity to the US while keeping its
overall  R&D  expenditures  at  the  same  level,  would  witness  an  additional
increase in productivity of about 3 per cent, an effect which appeared to be of
the same order of magnitude ‘as that of a doubling in its R&D stock’ (Griffith
et al. 2006, p. 1868).

The same holds for universities and other public research institutes. Over
ten  years  ago  Soete  (1997)  had  already  pointed  to  the  inherent  knowledge
‘diversion’ implications  of  the  European  research  networking  and  the  likely
impact  this  could  have  on  European  research  ‘cocooning’,  as  pursued,  for
example,  through  the  European  Framework  Programmes.  Georghiou  (2008)
argued  that  the  Framework  Programmes  are  divided  into  large  numbers  of
small  and  loosely  connected  projects  which  are  not  directed  to  real  policy
challenges.  He  recommended  that  the  funding  of  Framework  Programmes
should  be  tied  to  the  large-  and  medium-level  policy  challenges  such  as
climate change, food and energy security, and the funding should be flexible
in responding to the demand and new scientific and technological opportuni-
ties.

Over the years the gradual broadening of research priority areas to include
both local as well as global long-term issues has raised questions increasingly
about the European territorial nature of such EU-sponsored research and has
ultimately  led  to  the  European  Framework  Programmes  becoming  increas-

An ‘outward-looking’ Lisbon Strategy: EU, China and India

91

ingly shared and open in participation and external co-funding to researchers
from non-EU countries. The next step should be a complete opening up. In the
context of demographic trends in the EU and other OECD countries discussed
above, a challenge for international public research policies thus lies in devis-
ing a strategy that will successfully widen the scope of such cooperation activ-
ities and include more non-OECD countries as partners.4

The Global Search for Talent

The third area in need of external action is possibly the most challenging one.
As discussed before, one of the most fundamental differences between the EU
and the US and many emerging economies is the ageing of its highly skilled
workforce.  Europe  could  possibly  learn  in  this  respect  more  from  countries
such as Japan and Russia with similar demographic challenges.

The  international  dimension  of  a  future  European  Lisbon  education  and
employment strategy will have to deal with the growing international compe-
tition for access to brains. Access to brains should be understood here in its
broadest definition: access to talent as an essential ingredient in research, inno-
vation  and  entrepreneurship;  access  to  more  routine  technical  skills  as  one
element in a broader strategy to tackle growing labor shortages in particular
skill  categories;  and  access  to  more  personal  skills  as  Europe’s  population
grows older and the demand for health and care support services will conse-
quently grow dramatically. Access to brains has, of course, been an essential
historical feature of development and knowledge transfer within Europe and
between  Europe  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  Many  European  countries  have
moved from a situation of emigrating countries to immigrating countries, with
Ireland  probably  as  the  most  extraordinary  case.  From  the  point  of  view  of
receiving  countries,  though,  and  the  EU  in  particular,  skilled  migration  is
always important not just for the growth of the economy but also because of
more general benefits like entrepreneurship, the contributions to an increasing
demand for goods and services, attraction of new capital, and so on.

The external appeal for brains and talent should be fully part of the Lisbon
agenda, as should be the challenges it raises in some of the sending countries
because the ‘brain drain’ acts as a double-edged sword on poverty. It increases
further  inequality  at  home  and  slows  down  economic  growth.  On  the  other
hand  there  is  also  a  positive  effect  of  migration  prospects  on  human  capital
formation itself in the sending country. The possibility of emigrating to higher
wage countries may stimulate persons to pursue higher education in the hope
of improving their expected wages abroad. This might cause sending countries
to  benefit  from  skilled  emigration  because  it  induces  the  remaining  native
population to pursue higher education, and might ultimately lead to a process
of ‘brain circulation’, as in the case of Korea in the past and China today.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

For the emigrating countries such as India and China, the key to success in
competing for access to brains would not be restraining the flow of emigration
by imposing tough regulation or even punishment on the brains, which proved
largely futile, if not detrimental, in newly industrialized East Asian countries
such as Korea and also in China. The policymakers should instead focus on
improving  the  domestic  working  environment  and  living  conditions  and
providing better career opportunities to attract returnees. The expertise, expe-
rience and network that these returnees bring back would be a priceless asset
for the development of these emigrating countries.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR MUTUAL
LEARNING: CHINA, INDIA AND THE EU

We argue that in a certain way China and India, the two most populous coun-
tries in the world, resemble the EU in terms of the nature of their innovation
policy challenges. However, as we will discuss below the Chinese and Indian
policy actions to tackle these challenges are not always similar to those imple-
mented in the EU. In this sense the similarities and diversity between China,
India  and  the  EU  in  the  policy  responses  to  the  challenges  of  the  emerging
global knowledge economy provide ample opportunities for mutual learning.
Given  the  limited  space  within  the  framework  of  this  chapter,  we  restrict
ourselves  to  three  particular  major  challenges  directly  related  to  the  knowl-
edge  economy  which  China  and  India  are  currently  facing.  These  are 
knowledge-intensive  growth  strategies,  regional  disparities,  and  the  balance
between the market and the state.

A Knowledge (Innovation)-intensive Growth Strategy

More  by  serendipity,  rather  less  by  design,  India  has  since  the  late  1990s
embarked  upon  a  knowledge-intensive  and  services-based  growth  path  that
bears strong resemblance to the EU’s Lisbon Strategy. Like the growth path
envisaged by the Lisbon Strategy, the growth trajectory of India’s services has
involved the use of knowledge workers, technology-related entrepreneurship
and  a  strong  services  orientation.  The  travails  and  successes  of  this  path  to
growth  in  India  offer  valuable  lessons  about  the  possible  constraints  and
pitfalls that might face growth based on the Lisbon agenda. At the same time
the EU’s successes with the Lisbon Strategy offer lessons for India.

Within India, while there is pride in the achievements of the software sector
there  is  also  a  widespread  perception  that  the  growth  of  this  sector,  which
accounts for just 8 per cent of GDP, will not be enough to lift the economy out
of poverty in any significant measure. Bosworth and Collins (2008), account-

An ‘outward-looking’ Lisbon Strategy: EU, China and India

93

ing for the sources of growth in India and China, also suggest that growth of
the services sector in India cannot add as much to growth as does the growth
of the manufacturing sector. Indeed, the attempt to insist on the possibility of
entrepreneurial,  technology-led  growth  as  the  prescription  for  the  future  of
India  was  a  notable  political  failure.  The  elections  of  2006  ushered  in  a
government  that  focused  more  on  the  needs  of  the  agricultural  sector,  the
removal of inequalities and better governance and infrastructure. Nevertheless
the enabling and constraining factors in India’s software growth are a micro-
cosm of what one may expect from a knowledge-intensive growth strategy and
for this reason are worth examining in some detail.

Inter-sector  and  regional  inequalities  from  the  pursuit  of  a  knowledge-
intensive strategy pose political constraints to the further pursuit of such strat-
egy and destroy the cohesiveness of the growth experience. In addition, a new
kind of constraint is also emerging from within the logic of the strategy itself.
Human capital is after all the critical input into all sorts of outsourced services.
Even though India has an abundant working age population, it lacks the capac-
ity  to  educate  its  entire  people.  Theoretically,  the  demand  for  high  caliber
human  resources  would  be  met  as  private  schools  and  training  institutes
emerged to fulfill the demand for skills at the tertiary level. However, Basant
and Mukhopadhyay (2008) argued that whilst there was a strong private sector
response  to  the  supply  of  education  and  labor  to  the  emerging  technology
sectors, the quality of this new supply was variable. Increasingly, constraints
to expanding the capacity of the higher education sector are also beginning to
bite.  In  turn  this  has  polarized  incomes  between  those  that  can  invest  in
primary and tertiary education and those that cannot.

Different from the Indian experience, the success of the Chinese economic
reforms  came  in  tandem  with  the  emergence  of  competitive  manufacturing
industries. The policy of welcoming foreign direct investment (FDI) acceler-
ated  the  learning  and  assimilation  of  foreign  advanced  technology,  which  is
critical  to  building  up  the  Chinese  national  innovation  capability.  However,
many  critics  pointed  out  that  the  huge  inflow  of  FDI  also  came  at  a  price,
namely  that  China  is  heavily  dependent  on  foreign  technology  and  that  the
rapid expansion of Chinese exports over the last decade is largely based on the
growth of low-wage manufacturing sectors (Gilboy 2004).

Recognizing the urgency of developing indigenous technology and trans-
forming low-wage manufacturing sectors to innovation-based industries, the
Chinese central government took actions in the following policy arenas. First,
the  government  has  more  or  less  continuously  implemented  tax  advantages
and  deduction  policies  targeting  foreign  investors,  but  has  gradually  shifted
the target of preference fiscal policy from low-tech and labor-intensive sectors
to high-tech manufacture and service sectors. Second, the Chinese government
strengthened its support of the innovation activities carried out in enterprises.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

The  863  programme,  as  one  of  the  main  three  S&T funding  programs
supported by the central government, increasingly provided more funding to
the  projects  carried  out  in  the  industry  after  2001.  To  finance  innovation,
China  also  aimed  to  establish  a  viable  financial  system,  and  particularly  a
venture capital system, to support technology-based small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). On 1 March 2006, the Provisional Regulation on Venture
Capital Investment enacted by ten ministries and central government agencies
came  into  effect.  It  was  the  first  Chinese  nation-wide  regulation  on  venture
capital investment and enterprises, with an explicit objective to promote the
development  of  venture  capital  and  SMEs,  particularly  high-tech  SMEs. To
coordinate all of these efforts and set guidelines for the innovation policy in
the next decade, China launched its ‘2006–2020 Chinese National Science and
Technology Development Strategy’ in March 2006 and subsequently enacted
about 50 accompanying policy measures, regulations and guidelines.

In contrast to the soft EU policy tools with respect to the different Member
States such as the Open Method of Coordination and the predominant roles of
the private sector in the development of the Indian service sectors, the volun-
taristic Chinese policy measures in trying to shift its economy in the direction
of more value-added high-tech sectors highlight the frequent and strong inter-
vention  of  the  Chinese  government  into  the  economy,  which  is  rarely  seen
within  either  the  context  of  the  EU  or  that  of  India.  However,  some  of  the
Chinese  policy  measures  with  respect  to  the  nature  of  FDI  or  the  indirect
involvement with the creation of a financial venture system point to the possi-
ble opportunities within the EU in terms of using more effectively the finan-
cial instruments it has at its disposal, such as the European Investment Bank.5
On  the  other  hand,  the  achievement  of  the  Indian  software  sector,  which  is
attributable  to  the  efforts  of  the  private  sector,  indicates  a  choice  for  the
Chinese governments to deregulate the service sectors and pay more attention
to provide public goods and effective coordination to private firms.

Regional Disparity and Regional Policy Experiments

Like  in  the  EU,  with  its  combined  dual  efforts  of  public  knowledge  invest-
ments  at  the  national  level  and  at  the  European  level  through  EU-wide
research, innovation and economic development programs (such as the RTD
Framework  Programmes,  the  Competitiveness  and  Innovation  Programme,
and  the  Structural  Funds),  local  governments  alongside  the  central  govern-
ment do play an important role in the Chinese and Indian innovation systems.
The Chinese fiscal system is a federal tax system: national and local taxes
are collected separately by different tax bureaus and central and local govern-
ments each have their own policies of public support for research, innovation
and  economic  development.  In  an  economically  developed  region  in  China,

An ‘outward-looking’ Lisbon Strategy: EU, China and India

95

local governments will have larger R&D budgets than their counterparts in the
underdeveloped  regions.  Fiscal  federalism  and  autonomy  of  local  govern-
ments in funding innovation activities are likely to bring about a segmentation
of S&T and innovation resources, as is manifested in the differences in avail-
ability of and access to large scientific apparatus, experiment instruments and
databases.  Experiment  instruments  purchased  by  different  institutions  and
organizations in China are typically not used to be shared with others, which
inevitably gives rise to replicate purchasing and a waste of limited funding.

There  was  no  comprehensive  regulation  or  law  overseeing  domestic
venture  capital  investment  in  China  until  2006.  Meanwhile,  a  number  of
legislative  proposals  for  venture  capital  law  were  submitted  to  the  national
legislation  authority,  and  at  the  local  level  the  Shenzhen,  Chongqing  and
Shenyang municipal governments enacted the local regulations to regulate and
promote venture capital development in their administrative purviews.

In India, the constitution gives considerable powers to the states to enact
their own legislation in several areas of economic activity and to spend their
tax revenues. Some scholars (Jenkins 1999; Rudolph and Rudolph 2001; Saez
2002) noted the sharp break that liberalization marked in center–state relations
and the increasing power that some states like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu
and West Bengal gained due to the coalitional politics of the 1990s. Still others
like Sinha (2004) argued that the drop in public investment made the Indian
states  frantic  to  tap  sources  of  private  investment  wherever  they  could  find
them, for example among non-resident Indians, multinational companies and
domestic  firms.  Some  states  also  improved  their  infrastructure  in  order  to
attract  such  investment.  Besley  and  Burgess  (2004)  attributed  differential
manufacturing  performance  across  Indian  states  to  a  combination  of  pro-
employer  policies  and  weak  labor  laws  implemented  after  liberalization  in
some states.

As a result of the federal structure of India, policy experimentation flour-
ishes at the state level. A wide variety of approaches were tried at the regional
level  and  the  successful  policies  diffused  to  other  states  subsequently.  An
important example of state-level policy experimentation was the provision of
technical  education.6 Under  the  Indian  federal  constitution,  education  is
deemed a state subject upon which state governments are free to spend income
and  legislate,  but  the  quality  of  technical  education  is  monitored  and
controlled by a central government institution, the AICTE (All India Council
for Technical  Education).  In  a  unique  study, Arora  and  Bagde  (2006)  noted
that  six  states,  that  is  Andhra  Pradesh,  Karnataka,  Madhya  Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Orissa and Tamil Nadu, were early adopters of privatized tech-
nical  education  policies  and  had  permitted  the  private  sector  to  open  engi-
neering  colleges  by  1986,  whilst  the  other  eight  states  in  India  were  late
adopters  having  opened  such  colleges  only  in  the  1990s.  The  states  which

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

permitted  privatization  earlier  succeeded  in  creating  large  intake  capacities
compared  to  the  states  which  did  not  do  so,  and  thus  became  attractive
locations  for  the  newly  emerging  software  industry,  and  later  the  bio-
pharmaceutical companies.

Another  area  of  regional  policy  experimentation  in  India  has  been  the
approach towards attracting foreign direct investment. While tax breaks and
infrastructure  provision  have  been  standard  tools  in  many  areas,  Andhra
Pradesh first experimented with the strategy of tapping into its diaspora popu-
lation in the US to increase FDI for the region. The advantage of such a policy
was that it sought to bring in FDI that was suitable for the region and exploit
the  role  of  its  diaspora  in  acting  as  ‘reputation  intermediaries’ with  venture
capitalists  and  firms  in  the  US. The  policy  has  since  been  adopted  by  other
states in India such as Karnataka and West Bengal.

Regional development in India as described above with its accompanying
regional policy experimentation reflects the differences in local opportunities
for innovation and knowledge development. It is part of the emergence of a
multitude of regional hotbeds of knowledge accumulation that attract highly
educated  people,  an  Indian  version  of  Richard  Florida’s  ‘creative  class’
concentration.  However,  such  clustering  tendency  occurs  of  course  within  a
very  different  development  environment.  At  some  stage,  questions  about
regional inequality, poverty concentration and mobility pressures will start to
dominate the development debate, as has been the case in China.

Addressing the growing regional disparities seems a common policy concern
for the EU, India and China. The EU is unique in having addressed the enormous
diversity in income and development levels through a system of structural funds
being made available for the least developed regions for infrastructural and intan-
gible investments. It has to do with the availability of its own financial arm, the
European Investment Bank. The gradual enlargement of the EU has undoubtedly
put this system under strain. It has, however, remained a unique policy tool, going
beyond  the  direct  economic  advantages  for  least  favored  regions,  but  also
contributing to the social cohesion of those regions by reducing the emigration
pressures towards richer, more economically successful regions. Through such a
policy the EU was able to maintain some of the regional cultural identities. In
short,  whereas  the  economic  catching  up  of  the  new  Member  States  has  been
spurred by economic integration and the inflow of private foreign direct invest-
ment, European regional policies have helped offset some of the resulting emerg-
ing regional disparities within and between EU Member States.

In summary, as the most well-endowed and well-located regions in China
and India are catching up with world productivity and income levels, never-
theless regional disparities in economic development have emerged in China
and to a lesser extent in India. There is thus scope here for policy learning from
the European experience.

An ‘outward-looking’ Lisbon Strategy: EU, China and India

97

Balance of Market-oriented Principle and State Intervention

An  interesting  and  still  evolving  trend  in  India’s  recent  growth  story  is  a
remarkable dependence on market-mediated solutions. This is, of course, very
different  to  the  previous  history  of  growth  in  the  country  based  on  planned
development and a large role for the government and the public sector. Yet, it
could be argued that disenchantment with public governance has made policy
analysts advocate market-oriented principles in all manner of problems rang-
ing from health, infrastructure, transport and education. This has had good and
bad consequences. On the one hand, such a freeing of market forces has been
the  cause  and  consequence  of  entrepreneurship  in  various  sectors  –  techno-
logical, industrial and social. On the other hand, as Europe knows quite well,
unfettered market forces can seriously undermine social cohesion and be detri-
mental to social welfare in a broader sense.

In India, two major areas where market-oriented solutions have succeeded
in delivering expanded supplies of services have been the provision of tertiary
education and telecommunication services. However, there are areas where the
current  tendency  to  search  for  market-oriented  solutions  may  prove  unwise.
For example, India can learn much from Europe in the provision of universal
health  services.  Public  health  spending  by  the  health  departments  of  federal
and state governments is very low. Overall, in 2004/05 this was about 0.9 per
cent of GDP (federal government 0.29 per cent and state governments 0.61 per
cent) – far lower than that of other countries with similar per capita incomes.
At the same time, the deregulation of the insurance sector allowed a signifi-
cant number of foreign and private firms to enter the industry. It may be a good
time now to review models of health service provision and cooperate with the
EU in order to set higher standards in public health through a combination of
public spending and private insurance.

Similarly, the debate within China over the market-oriented principle and
the role of state-owned enterprises and public sectors has always been drama-
tized over the last three decades. The issue is more complicated in the case of
China  as  the  ruling  Communist  Party  has  been  retaining  control  over  the
strategic sectors in the economy through state-owned enterprises and is reluc-
tant to open up some service sectors for ideological and political reasons. For
example, the reform to build a universal health care system has been discussed
heatedly  for  a  few  years.  However,  the  official  action  plan  has  not  been
announced  publicly  until  very  recently.  One  of  the  central  issues  over  the
debate is whether China will allow private hospitals and insurance companies
to play an important role in the forthcoming universal health care system.

In contrast, a positive example of government intervention in China can be
found within the innovation policy area. An initiative of 2007, led by central
government  agencies  under  the  coordination  of  the  Ministry  of  Science  and

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Technology, established four R&D and innovation consortia in the sectors of
steel,  energy,  agriculture  equipment  and  exploration  of  coal  mines.  The
members of the consortia included 26 large enterprises, whose revenue added
up to more than 900 billion RMB (98 billion Euro, converted by the exchange
rate of 12 January 2009), 18 top universities and nine research institutions. The
government  intended  to  upgrade  industry–academy  cooperation  in  the  four
sectors from the loose and simple form of contracting projects to more sophis-
ticated forms of strategic alliances. The consortia would establish joint R&D
funds and leverage the research centers affiliated to develop critical technolo-
gies addressing the challenges that the sectors were facing.

As Qian (2003) concluded in his study on how reform worked in China in
past  decades,  the  general  principle  of  efficiency-improving  and  interest-
compatible  institutional  change  is  simple,  but  the  specific  form  and  mecha-
nisms of transitional institutions are varied. There is thus an enormous scope
for international collaboration and policy synergies between the EU, India and
China in this regard, since the three present a huge variety of concrete policy
choices. For example, China, India and the EU can work jointly in energy and
transportation  areas,  allowing  for  international  mergers  and  acquisition  as
freeing  market  forces,  as  well  as  setting  joint  environmental  standards  with
respect to public procurement to strengthen inter-governmental coordination.
Since China overly depends on coal as its primary energy source, there is a call
for  China  to  lead  an  international  clean  coal  technology  consortium  (Woo
2007). Here, too, Europe should focus less on preserving internal competitive
markets (enabling intra-European mergers for the sake of guaranteeing domes-
tic  electricity  provision)  than  on  the  global  implementation  of  best  practice
technologies, allowing for easier access to such technologies.

CONCLUSIONS

What  remains  striking  from  a  historical  perspective  is,  as  Nayyar  (2008)  has
pointed out, how the two largest countries in the world, China and India, saw their
share of world population and their share of world GDP fall significantly over the
period 1820–1973. The gap between the Chinese and Indian shares of the world’s
population and their shares of the world’s income was, however, enlarged dramat-
ically in the same period. In 2001, no less than 37.2 per cent of the world popu-
lation resided in China and India, but the two countries only generated 17.7 per
cent of the world’s income. It could be argued that it was this extreme geograph-
ical inequality in world GDP in the 1960s and early 1970s which formed the basis
for the sheer unilateral focus of social scientists and policymakers on strengthen-
ing  domestic  competitiveness  as  the  essential  feature  for  a  country’s  future
economic growth. As Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002, p. xx) commented:

An ‘outward-looking’ Lisbon Strategy: EU, China and India

99

The consequences of [globalization] for society (and sociology) have been spelt out
most clearly in the English-speaking countries, but above all Britain, where it has
been forcefully argued that conventional social and political science remains caught
up in a national-territorial concept of society. Critics of ‘methodological national-
ism’ have  attacked  its  explicit  or  implicit  premise  that  the  national  state  is  the
‘container’ of social processes and that the national framework is still the one best
suited to measure and analyze major social, economic and political changes.

This national–territorial obsession of social scientists was reflected by policy-
makers in both the developed world, such as the EU, and in developing coun-
tries.  However,  the  obsession  with  this  ‘inward-looking’ approach  becomes
increasingly  inconsistent  in  today’s  globalized  world.  In  a  certain  way,  the
time  has  come  for  the  EU  to  reinvent  Lisbon  as  Europe’s  natural  historical
‘gate’ to  the  rest  of  the  world:  the  starting  point  of  an  externally-oriented
Europe as opposed to the Europe of the old internally- oriented Rome Treaty.
Such a reinvention of Lisbon will have to recognize more than ever that the
ground of the debates within Europe about innovation, allocation of resources
to  science  and  technology,  and  knowledge  access  and  diffusion,  is  shifting
because of intensified global competition and cooperation.

The  need  for  a  shift  in  thinking  and  policymaking  towards  the  external
dimensions of Lisbon is essential. The global challenges confronting Europe,
China and India as we have tried to argue here call for shared solutions: shared
solutions  in  the  creation  of  new  knowledge  and  the  diffusion  of  existing
knowledge addressing urgent global problems: climate change and sustainable
development,  infant  mortality,  infectious  diseases,  and  so  on. The  scope  for
mutual learning and joint initiatives from the EU, China and India’s experi-
ence in this regard is substantial. The successes of India’s service-led growth
offer valuable lessons about the possible constraints and pitfalls that might be
associated with the growth based on the Lisbon agenda. The achievement of
the Indian software sector which is attributable to the effort of private sectors
indicates  a  choice  for  the  Chinese  governments  to  deregulate  the  service
sectors  and  to  provide  effective  coordination  to  private  firms.  To  reduce
regional disparity, the EU is unique in having addressed the issue through a
system of structural funds which were allocated to the least developed regions
for  infrastructural  and  intangible  investments,  reducing  the  emigration  pres-
sures  towards  richer,  more  economically  successful  regions.  There  is  thus
room here for the Indian and Chinese policymakers to learn from the European
experience. In terms of striking a balance between market-oriented principle
and state intervention, it may be a good time now for India to review models
of health service provision and cooperate with the EU in order to set higher
standards  in  public  health  through  a  combination  of  public  spending  and
private  insurance.  China,  India  and  the  EU  can  work  jointly  in  energy  and
transportation  areas,  allowing  for  international  mergers  and  acquisition  as

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

freeing  market  forces,  as  well  as  setting  joint  environmental  standards  with
respect to public procurement to strengthen inter-governmental coordination.

NOTES

1. Part of the content of this chapter was published in Soete (2008) and Huang and Soete (2008).
In  the  spring  of  2002,  the  Barcelona  European  Council  set  up  a  target  that  the  EU’s  gross
2.
expenditure on research and development and innovation should be increased to 3 per cent of
the gross domestic product by 2010, with two-thirds of the total volume of new investments
in this area to be financed by the private sector.

3. A look at the world’s nanotechnology publications (indexed by Web of Science) highlights the
increasingly global nature of nanotechnology research (Huang et al. 2008). In 2006 the US
produced 22 per cent of the world’s nanotechnology publications, China and Japan respec-
tively 15 per cent and 9 per cent. By contrast the large European countries such as Germany,
France and the UK accounted for respectively 6 per cent, 5 per cent and 4 per cent. This indi-
cates that nanotechnology R&D in Europe will not advance in an isolated way, but will have
to rely on international cooperation and collaboration.

4. The Seventh Research Framework Programme is completely open to third countries, even in
terms of funding for most third countries. It is true that the participation rate of third coun-
tries in the Framework Programme is still rather low; about 5 per cent in terms of number of
participants.  The  European  Commission  (2008b)  proposed  that  EU  Member  States  should
also gradually open up their national programmes to third countries. This proposal was not
taken up in the Conclusions of the December 2008 Competitiveness Council.

5. An  example  of  the  opportunity  and  concrete  action  is  the  i2i  initiative  of  the  European
Investment Bank. i2i focuses on three objectives: improving access to quality education and
training; supporting excellence in research, development and innovation; promoting the diffu-
sion of information and communications technology (ICT) networks, including audiovisual
activities. The Bank’s overall objective for i2i is to mobilize up to 50 billion Euro over the
current decade. From 2000 to 2006, loans advanced under i2i had reached close to 45 billion
Euro (European Investment Bank 2008).

6. Other areas of policy experimentation at the state level include provision of utility (especially

water and electricity provision), transportation service and IT infrastructures

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Cheltenham,  UK  and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.

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Rudolph, L. and S. Rudolph (2001), ‘Iconisation of Chandrababu: sharing sovereignty
in  India’s  federal  market  economy’,  Economic  and  Political  Weekly,  5  May,
1541–52.

Saez,  Lawrence  (2002),  Federalism  Without  a  Center:  The  Impact  of  Political  and

Economic Reform on India’s Federal System, New-Delhi: Sage Publications.

Sinha, A. (2004), ‘The changing political economy of federalism in India: a historical

institutionalist approach’, India Review, 3 (1), 25–63.

Soete, L. (1997), ‘The impact of globalization on European economic integration’, The

IPTS Report, 15, 21–8.

Soete, Luc (2008), ‘Innovation Policy in a Post-Lisbon Europe: Some Reflections’, in
Claire  Nauwelaers  and  René  Wintjes  (eds),  Innovation  Policy  in  Europe:
Measurement  and  Strategy,  Cheltenham,  UK,  and  Northampton,  MA,  USA:
Edward Elgar, pp. 269–85.

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Internationalization of R&D, Geneva: UNCTAD.

Woo, W. (2007), ‘The challenges of governance structure, trade disputes and natural
environment to China’s growth’, Comparative Economic Studies, 49 (4), 572–602.

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Doha Round’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (4), 789–811.

6. Enabling institutional responses to
innovation in latecomer countries1

Padmashree Gehl Sampath

SYSTEM OF INNOVATION IN LATECOMER CONTEXTS

The systems of innovation framework emerged as a response to conventional
economic analyses of technological change, which underplayed the role of
institutions  as  well  as  the  evolutionary  nature  of  technological  change,
stressing mainly the role of market incentives for the allocation of informa-
tion in society. Critiquing the notions of conventional economics, two funda-
mental  assumptions  form  the  core  of  the  systems  approach.  Firstly,
innovation (as opposed to information or even knowledge) is the result of the
interactions between firms and other organizations within a system, shaped
by  social,  economic,  political  and  historical  dimensions.  The  inclusion  of
contextual, social and historical factors helps to understand innovation (and
its  determinants)  as  it  is  and  as  it  occurs  in  most  contexts:  incremental  in
nature and boosted from within the system. Secondly, institutions are central
to explaining innovative success. Institutions and organizations are routinely
involved  in  the  creation  and  dissemination  of  useful  tacit  and  codified
knowledge that needs to be applied to the production process and in creating
an enabling learning environment.2 An enabling learning environment is one
that  promotes  interactive  learning,  the  process  through  which  the  diverse
actors  in  both  the  public  and  private  domains  of  the  system  communicate
and  collaborate  for  the  creation,  use  and  dissemination  of  new  economic
knowledge (Johnson and Lundvall 2003, p. 159). Within a given system, it
is assumed that the learning capacity and the actions of any set/sets of actors
affect  the  way  other  actors  make  decisions,  and  even  learn  and  perform
(Lundvall  1992). Thus  the  concept  of  learning  is  collective  and  has  social
and  context  specific  connotations  to  it  (McKelvey  1997).  The  absorptive
capacity of firms to translate external knowledge into innovation (Cohen and
Levinthal  1990)  by  creating  products  that  are  new  to  the  local  context  or
products that are more adapted to meet local demand is determined by the
formal  and  informal  institutions  that  permeate  the  processes  of  interactive
learning in the system.

103

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Innovation  systems  in  latecomer  development3 exhibit  certain  common
features albeit to varying extents, depending on the stage of development. The
first of these is the conspicuous absence of a thriving enterprise sector within
which  innovation  could  flourish.  Small  firms  that  employ  indigenous  and
often rudimentary production technologies operate on the fringes of the formal
economy, and have little to do with the multinational enterprises that cater to
most  consumer  demand  in  the  country. A second  feature  is  the  presence  of
weak or ineffective domestic knowledge infrastructure (captured in terms of
researchers per million, secondary and tertiary infrastructure, and other such
established indicators). This often results in the presence of a limited research
community,  operating  usually  in  an  ivory  tower,  and  a  university  system
poorly  connected  to  local  realities,  particularly  to  labour  market  needs  and
opportunities  (Oyeyinka  2006).  Both  universities  and  public  sector  research
institutes  tend  to  operate  with  incoherent  mandates,  insufficient  physical,
human and scientific infrastructure, and competing for limited research funds
and  opportunities,  all  of  which  leads  to  the  commonly  observed  disjuncture
between public sector research and enterprise efforts.

These  organizational  deficits,  however,  accrue  mainly  as  a  result  of  the
institutional  inefficiencies  in  the  innovation  system  at  large,  which  fails  to
promote  socially  beneficial  coordination  patterns  within  the  various  actors.
Innovation  studies  over  the  past  three  decades  have  built  upon  this  to  show
how  institutions  are  contextual  and  path-dependent,  as  a  result  of  which
certain forms of patterns, whether mutually beneficial or non-beneficial, tend
to emerge and thrive in the context of late development.4 Systems of innova-
tion analysis in developing countries not only help to show the importance of
varying  institutional  frameworks  for  innovation,  but  when  conducted  at  a
sectoral level have also been able to show how variegated policy impetus is
critical to cater to the differing characteristics of technology across sectors.

This calls attention to policies and institutions that allow for ‘technological
learning and mastery, across the broad front needed for sustainable economic
development’ (Nelson 2007, p. 5). Several micro-level studies of systems of
innovation  (at  the  national  or  sectoral  levels)  continue  to  contribute  exten-
sively  to  our  understanding  of  what  policy  mixes  have  worked  in  different
contexts,  over  different  periods  of  time.  They  also  show  that  well-intended
policies  do  not  always  work  because  innovation  is  as  much  a  social  and
cultural process as an economic and political one. What is missing, however,
in the context of innovation in late development, is an understanding of when
policies do not work, why they do not and the causes that lead to their failure.
In other words, in the context of late development where innovation fails to
occur as predicted in most cases, the important question needs to be: how and
why does innovation fail to occur in latecomer contexts and what are the insti-
tutional features that promote this trend?5

Enabling institutional responses to innovation in latecomer countries

105

This chapter presents two case studies from Bangladesh, a least developed
country, in order to highlight the factors that underlie knowledge generation,
use and transfer in a late development context, and the role of institutions in
enabling these processes to come to pass. The second section critically analy-
ses  the  state  of  innovation  capacity  in  two  sectors  –  agro-processing  and
ready-made garments (RMGs) – in the country, whereas the third section elab-
orates  upon  the  factors  that  hinder  innovation  in  a  latecomer  context  using
empirical evidence from these two sectors. How this analysis and the empiri-
cal results apply across a wider range of countries at a same/similar level of
development is discussed in the fourth section. The data used in the second
and  third  sections  was  collected  during  a  firm-level  survey  of  innovation
capacity in Bangladesh in 2006–2007. A total of 49 agro-processing firms and
59 ready-made garment firms were surveyed using semi-structured question-
naires and face-to-face interviews that were conducted to capture the nuances
of the innovation environment in the sectors at large.

INNOVATION CAPACITY IN AGRO-PROCESSING AND
THE READY-MADE GARMENTS SECTOR IN
BANGLADESH

Both  the  local  agro-processing  and  the  textiles  sector  have  been  the  focal
points of the economic reform policies over the past two decades in the coun-
try. This emphasis seems to have been justified given the historically impor-
tant role both sectors have played in economic growth and the abundant labour
supply available in the country. The textiles sector in Bangladesh can be traced
back to several hundred years, when it was famous for its unique patterns and
dyes.  Similarly,  as  a  predominantly  agrarian  economy,  production  and
processing  activities  based  on  agriculture  have  always  played  a  major  role.
During  the  colonial  period  (mid-18th  to  mid-20th  centuries)  the  region
produced  and  exported  various  processed  and  semi-processed  agricultural
products like, rice, jute, tea, indigo and sugar, apart from spices.

The Industrial Development Policy of 1999 has been credited with laying
the basis for the growth of the agro-processing and textiles and RMG sectors.
The  policy  targeted  export-oriented  industrialization  by  providing  incentives
and facilities of various kinds to fully ‘export-oriented’ industries. It defines an
export-oriented  industry  as  an  industry  exporting  at  least  80  per  cent  of  its
manufactured goods or contributing at least 80 per cent of its products as an
input to finished exportable products; and similarly, a business entity exporting
at least 80 per cent of services including information technology-related prod-
ucts qualified to be called export-oriented. The policy envisages several facili-
ties  to  fully  export-oriented  industries,  such  as  duty  free  import  of  capital

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

machinery, special facilities and venture capital support to ‘thrust sectors’ (to
be  understood  as  leading  sectors).  This  policy  is  largely  credited  with
Bangladesh’s economic growth, which has been an average of 4.75 per cent
per year throughout the 1990s, owing to the performance of these key sectors.
The textiles sector is often cited as a success case on how appropriate policy
incentives for the processing industry can result in channelling the abundant
labour  force  to  secure  economic  growth.  The  agro-processing  sector  ranks
next only to textiles as the second largest sub-sector within domestic process-
ing both in terms of value of output and employment generation capacity (see
for example Salim and Kalirajan 1999).

Firm-level Innovation Activities in Agro-processing

Bangladesh’s  agro-processing  sector  is  relatively  nascent;  emerging  in  the
latter part of the 1990s. The sector has been growing at an annual rate of 6 per
cent, making a significant contribution of 10 per cent to the country’s GDP.
The sector manufactures a range of products such as pickles, jams and jellies,
spices, tea, rice, Bengali speciality sweets and savouries, nuts, chips, coconut
oil  and  potato  flakes  (BAPA 2007).  The  total  value  of  processed  foods
exported by the country has risen from 1.6 million USD (in 2003–2004) to 5.6
million USD (in 2004–2005) (BAPA 2007).

Although  the  sector  is  gradually  witnessing  the  emergence  of  export-
oriented  modern  agro-processing  in  the  past  few  years,  small-scale,  home-
based  units  have  dominated  the  sector  since  its  inception.  As  of  2001,
approximately 8 per cent of the total production of the domestic agro-process-
ing sector was being carried out in small-scale and home-based units, while 10
per  cent  each  was  contributed  by  urban  industrial  units  and  imported  food
products (Taher 2001). Over the past five years, however, the contribution of
the large-scale industrial units has substantially increased. Their share of the
market has risen from 10 to over 30 per cent of total production, with a number
of major industrial houses and groups of companies expanding into the agro-
processing  business.  The  Bangladesh Agro-Processors’ Association  (BAPA)
estimates that around 50 per cent of total agro-processing is presently being
carried out by small-scale enterprises (BAPA 2007).

In  terms  of  technological  sophistication  of  the  sector,  the  large  firms  are
relatively  well  equipped  in  processing  and  packaging  technologies,  whereas
the  smaller  firms,  especially  household,  small-scale  units,  choose  products
that are not technologically intensive to manufacture (field interviews). Apart
from  frozen  products,  pickles,  spices,  rice,  tea  and  Chanachur  (a  Bengali
savoury) dominated export earnings for 2005–2006 (BAPA 2006). The choice
of these products is dependent on the availability of raw materials and process-
ing equipment as well as round-the-year market demand. Value addition corre-

Enabling institutional responses to innovation in latecomer countries

107

lates  with  the  nature  of  technologies  and  the  scale  of  production  amongst
firms;  the  value  addition  by  home-based  units  is  smaller  when  compared  to
bigger  firms. At  the  same  time,  survey  results  indicate  that  the  larger  firms
display a high degree of unrealized productive capacity in the agro-processing
sector  and  there  is  a  large  potential  to  improve  output  efficiency  without
enhancing inputs in this sector.

The Ready-made Garments Sector

The  RMG  sector,  which  was  the  single  most  important  source  of  foreign
exchange earning in the 1990s, comprises dyeing and printing factories, and
spinning and weaving mills that produce both knitted and woven fabrics. Rural
textiles  (handloom  factories),  which  are  traditionally  focused  on  processing
yarn and produce both clothes and fabrics, also form an essential part of the
sector. This sector has experienced exponential growth over the past few years
in  Bangladesh,  growing  from  1  million  USD  in  1978  to  4.1  billion  USD  in
2002  (UNCTAD  2005,  p.  42).  Much  of  this  growth  is  home-driven,  in  the
sense that most producers are local and the sector has attracted less than 5 per
cent of the total FDI in recent years (ibid.).

Although ready-made garments only contribute to about 5 per cent of the
country’s  GDP,  it  is  the  largest  creator  of  jobs  in  the  country.  RMG  firms
employ 2.2 million people as of 2006, thereby accounting for 40 per cent of
all industrial employment in the country (BGMEA 2007; World Bank 2005).6
The textiles and RMG sector has continued to perform well even after aboli-
tion  of  the  quota-based  trading  system  under  the  Multi-Fibre Agreement  of
1974 that was largely responsible for the rise of the sector initially. There were
around 4200 RMG firms in the country as of 2007, when the empirical survey
was  conducted,  and  trade  in  RMGs  continues  to  be  the  largest  foreign
exchange earner for the country.

The  RMG  sector  in  Bangladesh  exhibits  three  main  characteristics  remi-
niscent of traditional ‘sweatshops’. It comprises a high concentration of low
value-added  products,  demonstrates  a  heavy  dependence  on  imported  inter-
mediate inputs and has a high regional concentration of exports (mainly the
USA and  EU).7 The  main  products  include  garments,  yarn  and  fabrics
produced by modern textile mills, which are also largely export-oriented, and
handloom textiles that cater largely to the needs of the local people. Firms in
Bangladesh  can  range  from  those  which  only  sew  garments  from  imported
woven fabrics/local or imported knitted fabrics, those that use imported woven
fabrics, but produce their own knitted fabrics (and have the capacity for spin-
ning,  dyeing,  weaving  and  knitting)  and  sew  garments,  and  firms  that  knit,
weave and produce garments using imported yarn (see World Bank 2005). The
RMG products include both knit and woven wear but the share of knitwear in

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

the total garment production has been increasing steadily, since the sector has
been  able  to  achieve  backward  integration  in  knitwear  to  its  advantage.
Following  the  abolition  of  MFA in  2005,  the  sector  has  managed  to  create
backward linkages to include textiles production for knitwear and the sector
output has increased because Bangladesh has moved into the lower end of the
global textiles and garments market.

For  a  variety  of  reasons,  Bangladesh  has  been  unable  to  produce  cotton,
making it an importer of woven fabric. Knitwear manufacturing has the advan-
tage that several of the raw materials are synthetic in nature, thus making it
easier for the local firms to manufacture it. According to estimates, around 85
per cent of woven garments rely on imported fabrics, whereas in the case of
knitwear only 25 per cent of the inputs are imported by the knitted garment
manufacturers  (World  Bank  2005).8 Most  of  the  production  for  both  woven
wear and knitwear, is entirely demand-driven and therefore also determined by
buyer specifications (field interviews). In 2006, the sector exported 4544.79
million  USD  worth  of  woven  garments  and  4388.72  million  USD  worth  of
knitted garments (BGMEA 2007).

In terms of technological sophistication, the sector remains largely depen-
dent  on  imported  fabrics,  accessories  and  machinery.  Of  the  60  firms
surveyed, 54.2 per cent of the firms sourced over 50 per cent of their produc-
tion inputs from outside the country (18 per cent of the firms sourced all their
production inputs externally) and 54 per cent of the firms sourced over 80 per
cent of their machinery for production from foreign sources. These numbers
are very high and point towards the major value addition in the sector: domes-
tic labour. The cheap labour force, almost entirely women, is the backbone of
the  RMG  industry  in  Bangladesh  and  its  key  comparative  advantage  over
other RMG-exporting countries in the same league such as Kenya, Cambodia
and Lesotho.

INNOVATION CONSTRAINTS AT THE FIRM LEVEL IN
THE TWO SECTORS

Despite  these  limitations,  both  the  RMG  and  agro-processing  sectors  in
Bangladesh are cases of successful capacity in a latecomer context, albeit in a
limited way, and at the same time help to pinpoint the difficulties of moving
along  the  innovation  trajectories  to  reach  global  frontiers  in  a  latecomer
context. The analysis of collaborative learning for knowledge generation in the
two highly dynamic sectors in Bangladesh suggests that poor flows of knowl-
edge and information and the weaknesses in creating local linkages are in large
part responsible for the weak performance of actors (firms and public sector
organizations  alike)  in  the  innovation  system. The  quality  of  physical  infra-

Enabling institutional responses to innovation in latecomer countries

109

structure,  knowledge  infrastructure  (including  appropriate  human  skills),  in
addition to institutions and incentives for innovation contribute in large part to
observed processes of innovation success. Regardless of whether the initiating
step  is  the  incremental  design  or  laboratory-based  R&D  stage,  the  survey
suggests  that  these  factors  are  critical  determinants  of  competitiveness  and
successful catch-up trajectories.

Physical and Knowledge Infrastructures have a Strong Impact on
Innovation Performance

Bangladesh has very weak physical and knowledge infrastructure captured in
terms of researchers per million inhabitants, research and development (R&D)
expenditure  as  percentage  of  GDP and  foreign  direct  investment  (Gehl
Sampath 2007). The survey confirmed this lack of knowledge infrastructure
further in the form of lacking human skills (as proxied by the share of total
staff  with  PhD,  Masters  and  Bachelors  degrees),  R&D  investments  and
patents/IPRs as firm-level inputs and outputs, as well as innovation and collab-
oration variables.

The agro-processing sector is intricately connected to the local agriculture,
which has been experiencing a declining rate of contribution to GDP from 29
per cent in the early 1990s to about 23 per cent in 2006. The lack of locally
adapted varieties and production technologies, poor post-harvest management
techniques (including handling, grading, packaging and transportation), inad-
equate market access, lack of crop insurance, poor infrastructure and limited
private sector investment all affect the productivity of agro-processing (field
interviews;  World  Bank  2005).  The  Bangladesh  Agricultural  Development
Corporation (BADC) is a semi-government organization that is responsible for
the development of seeds and its distribution to cultivators, but has not been
able  to  perform  its  mandate  effectively  over  the  past  few  years  owing  to
reasons  of  corruption,  managerial  capacity  and  lack  of  skilled  scientists.
Bangladesh also has several other public sector organizations focused on agri-
cultural research, but the present agricultural research and extension system in
Bangladesh is unable to generate, transfer and promote the use of such tech-
nologies to enhance both agricultural productivity and the productivity of the
agro-processing sector (see World Bank 2005 again). Most of the research is
focused on enhancing agricultural productivity for cereal crops, and ensuring
availability of other non-cereal agricultural products that are necessary for a
thriving  agro-processing  sector  assumes  secondary  importance.  Likewise,
issues  of  loss  of  agricultural  produce  due  to  poor  harvest  and  post-harvest
management  techniques  do  not  seem  to  receive  the  attention  they  deserve
(field interviews).

In the RMG sector, all the firms in the survey attributed their inability to

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

compete  efficiently  and  upgrade  to  four  main  factors:  (a)  inability  to  create
backward  linkages  in  woven  fabrics  (the  country  produces  less  than  10  per
cent  of  cotton  that  the  sector  needs);  (b)  delays  in  lead  time  caused  by  raw
material imports (weak physical infrastructure at ports and for transportation)
and use of not-so-modern production technologies especially in weaving and
dyeing; (c) lack of skills creation that is required to branch out into innovative
activities, such as design; (d) lack of interest amongst international buyers to
transfer technology, both tacit (through skills training) and codified (machin-
ery and equipment) (field interviews).

Technological learning and constant upgrading is required if local firms are
to remain competitive even within the low-end global market for textiles and
RMGs. The  level  of  technological  capabilities  in  the  sector  is  very  low  and
skewed. Although most of the technological inputs are sourced from external
sources, their quality is not very high and workers end up spending over four
times the amount of time to accomplish spinning/dyeing and other tasks when
compared to other countries like Sri Lanka. The firms have better technologies
for  spinning  and  weaving  woven  fabrics,  which  is  paradoxical  and  calls  for
improved technologies for knit fabrics, since the sector has achieved backward
linkages  in  knitwear.  Dyeing  is  another  area  where  firms  reported  a  large
wastage, and there is a need for better dyeing expertise and technologies. The
survey data reveals that local firms have a lead time of 90–120 days in deliv-
ering RMG products, which is much more than other countries such as India
(50–70  days)  and  China  (40–60  days)  (Rasiah  2007).  Apart  from  lack  of
appropriate technologies, the survey leads to the conclusion that the lag in lead
times  is  attributable  to  two  other  factors:  poor  transportation  facilities  and
dependence on imported inputs.

Lack  of  technical  education  is  a  major  impediment  to  specialization  and
value addition in the sector. Firms complained of a lack of both managerial
and  technical  expertise.  There  is  a  shortage  of  institutes  to  train  the  skilled
labour  required  for  the  sector.  None  of  the  institutes  in  the  country  has  an
industry-specific skill-based programme, and the few institutes that do exist
operate with antiquated syllabuses dating from colonial times that need urgent
revision.9 In  the  absence  of  professional  training,  on-the-job  training  in  this
sector takes up to four years. Firms, however, do not benefit long enough from
the  workers  they  train  since  workers  are  paid  meagrely,  dismissed  without
notice,  and  not  treated  well  in  the  workplace.  The  main  emphasis  for  most
firms is on securing cheap labour and workers are not in a position to demand
good  and  stable  working  conditions  due  to  very  lax  enforcement  of  labour
laws in the country. Despite being on a par with countries like China in terms
of sector competitiveness, workers are treated much worse than those in other
LDCs with a textiles and RMG sector, like Kenya (UNIDO 2006). There is
also a gender-based dimension that deserves attention here – most of the work-

Enabling institutional responses to innovation in latecomer countries

111

Table 6.1 Firms’ characteristics in the two sectors

Variable

Dependent Variable

Mean

(Std. Dev.)

Mean

(Std. Dev.)

Agro-processing

Textiles

New prod. and/or proc. dev.

0.184

(0.391)

0.119

(0.326)

Independent Variables

Employment in 2005 (FTEs)
Share of staff with PhD
Share of staff with MSc
Share of staff with BSc
R&D expenditures in 2005
R&D personnel in 2005
Training expenditures
Govt. sponsored R&D
programme
Govt. R&D subsidies
Govt. innovation incentives
Scientific/skilled manpower
Local universites for R&D 
collaboration
Local PRI for R&D
collaboration
Intellectual property protection
Quality of local infrastructure
services
Availability of venture capital
Local SMI develop. schemes
Govt.-firm-tech. transf. coord. 
councils
Staff transf. to local firms or
R&D inst. 
Financial constraint

231.571
0.001
0.045
0.092
0.009
0.006
0.022
0.020

0.020
0.612
0.796
0.510

(1145.587)
(0.005)
(0.075)
(0.126)
(0.027)
(0.021)
(0.074)
(0.143)

(0.143)
(0.492)
(0.407)
(0.505)

773.881
0.000
0.042
0.056
0.008
0.003
0.014
0.017

0.017
0.492
0.780
0.492

(1222.574)
(0.000)
(0.139)
(0.134)
(0.013)
(0.009)
(0.015)
(0.130)

(0.130)
(0.504)
(0.418)
(0.504)

0.469

(0.504)

0.441

(0.501)

0.388
0.612

0.347
0.367
0.490

(0.492)
(0.492)

(0.481)
(0.487)
(0.505)

0.254
0.610

0.271
0.254
0.424

(0.439)
(0.492)

(0.448)
(0.439)
(0.498)

0.531

(0.504)

0.373

(0.448)

0.878

(0.331)

0.881

(0.326)

Number of firms

49

59

Source: Field survey by author, 2006–2007.

force in this sector is comprised of women, who are vulnerable to exploitation.
The wages in the garment sector are still higher than other forms of employ-
ment  in  the  informal  sector,  as  a  result  of  which  workers  continue  to  work
despite adverse circumstances (UNIDO 2006).10

Table 6.1 reports descriptive statistics regarding firms’ characteristics in the
two sectors. For instance, 18 per cent of the firms are involved in new product
and/or process development in agro-processing, 12 per cent of the firms are so
in  textiles. The  level  of  human  skills  (education)  as  proxied  by  the  share  in

 
112

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total number of staff with a PhD, MSc and BSc degree shows that the share of
staff with a PhD degree is extremely small (less than 0.5 per cent) in both sectors.
The share of staff with an MSc (Masters) or a BSc (Bachelors) degree is also
rather small (less than 10 per cent) in the agro-processing and the textiles indus-
tries. This is in part due to expenditures on training of personnel, measured as a
percentage of payroll that are relatively low in both sectors. The variables reflect-
ing  scientific  infrastructure  are  R&D,  innovation  and  collaboration  variables.
These  variables  are  presented  in Table  6.1. The  figures  represent  mean  values
calculated  between  an  interval  of  0  and  1,  and  therefore  any  value  below  0.5
represents weak correlation, whereas above 0.5 represents a strong correlation.

Collaboration Between Key Agents in the Domestic Knowledge System
has a Strong Correlation with Innovation Performance

The most acute problems in the sector are mainly attributable to the lack of
inter-linkages  that  promote  learning  through  collaborative  arrangements.  In
agro-processing,  this  relates  to  organizing  reliable  supplies  of  agricultural
produce  and  their  marketing.  Several  missing  linkages  between  production,
processing and marketing of agricultural produce impact upon the production
efficiency on the one hand, and technological upgrading possibilities on the
other. Only the large firms like BRAC, PRAN and Square organize the supply
of agricultural produce through contractual arrangements with growers (field
interviews;  World  Bank  2005).  Most  producers  of  processed  food  are  not
involved in agricultural production, and this emphasizes the need for smooth
channels of collaboration between buyers and sellers of agricultural produce.
Producers, especially small and medium-sized firms, are unable to cope with
fluctuating supplies, which also influence their production decisions. Ensuring
good quality products at stable prices is perhaps the biggest problem for most
agro-processing firms. Firms that are hard pressed to cope with these uncer-
tainties are unable to make production decisions that involve investment into
upgrading technologies. Marketing of agricultural produce is presently domi-
nated by inefficient intermediary structures, and affirmative policy support is
required to eliminate these inefficiencies and enhance collaboration between
buyers and suppliers. Marketing of processed foods, especially in newer and
more technology-intensive products, such as those in the dairy business, also
involve extensive investments into marketing (field interviews). Due to poor
law enforcement of food regulations in the country and problems of corrup-
tion, gaining consumer trust is an uphill task.

Table 6.2  shows the importance of collaborations on new product and/or
process development. The figures presented there represent the mean intensity
of collaboration of the firms in both sectors with various other actors in the
sectoral innovation system. The mean is calculated in an interval between 0

Enabling institutional responses to innovation in latecomer countries

113

Table 6.2 Firms’ collaboration in the two sectors

Variable

Mean

(Std. Dev.)

Mean

(Std. Dev.)

Agro-processing

RMGs

Dependent Variable

New product and/or process
development

0.184

(0.391)

0.119

(0.326)

Independent Variable
Local collaborators
Collaboration with PRIs
Collaboration with industry
associations 
0.082
Collaboration with universities
0.286
Collaboration with private labs 
Collaboration with NGOs
0.143
Collaboration with govt. agencies 0.571

0.796
0.245
0.408

Number of firms

49

Source: Field survey by author, 2006–2007.

(0.407)
(0.434)
(0.497)

(0.277)
(0.456)
(0.354)
(0.500)

0.932
0.203
0.644

0.186
0.186
0.186
0.356

59

(0.254)
(0.406)
(0.483)

(0.393)
(0.393)
(0.393)
(0.483)

and 1 and hence any mean above 0.5 indicates strong collaboration, whereas
below 0.5 indicates weak collaboration. As the table shows, local collabora-
tions  are  strong  in  both  sectors  (higher  in  RMGs  than  in  agro-processing).
However,  the  table  also  shows  that  local  collaborations  are  equally  weak  in
both sectors with universities and public research institutes (PRIs, which are
main suppliers of knowledge infrastructure) as well as private labs and NGOs.
Collaboration  with  industry  associations  (for  lobbying)  and  governmental
agencies (for cash incentives as a reward for innovation performance) are the
only strong forms of collaboration. None of the collaborations contribute in a
significant way to new product/process innovation in both sectors.

Government Policy on Innovation has a Strong Correlation with
Innovation Performance

An  important  result,  which  is  perhaps  well-known  in  innovation  studies  but
was reiterated in the survey, was the critical role of governmental policy on
innovation performance of firms. The survey sought to capture the importance
of  various  factors  on  innovation  decisions  of  firms,  including  direct  govern-
mental  incentives  such  as  tax  subsidies,  sectoral  concessions  for  exports,  and
indirect  incentives  including  provision  of  skilled  manpower  (through  educa-
tional institutions). Table 6.3 contains descriptive statistics on how these vari-
ables impact upon new product/process development at the firm level across the

 
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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Table 6.3 Contribution to new product/process development

Contribution to product
development

Textiles &
RMG

Agro-processing

Government incentives 
Skilled manpower 
Collaboration with universities
Collaboration with PRIs
Intellectual property protection
Good local infrastructure
Venture capital 
Local SMIs
Mobility of staff between public and
private sector
Loom and dye tech. contrib.

Number of firms

2.754
3.100
2.435
2.364
2.000
2.799
2.017
2.029
2.137

2.398

60

2.980
3.540
2.520
2.400
2.280
2.860
2.240
2.200
2.420

–

50

Note: Figures in table represent the mean of rankings between 1 (very weak) to 5 (very
strong).

Source: Field survey by author, 2006–2007.

two sectors. The values once again represent the mean between 1 (very weak)
and  5  (very  strong),  hence  any  rating  above  2.5  indicates  that  the  variable  is
important  for  new  product/process  development  at  the  firm  level.  The  table
shows that skilled manpower and good local infrastructure play a very important
role  for  new  product/process  innovations,  lending  strength  again  to  the  point
made in this section up until now. The main form of direct policy impetus is cash
incentives,  and  it  is  directed  similarly  towards  both  industries.  As  the  table
shows, the contribution of government incentives to new product and/or process
development is rather strong. In other words about 60 per cent and 40 per cent
of the firms in agro-processing and textiles respectively deem the contribution
of government incentives fairly strong, strong or very strong. Some other forms
of incentives such as intellectual property protection do not play an important
role as far as new product or process development is concerned.

What  also  came  through  strongly  in  the  field  survey  is  the  lack  of  other
direct policy support beyond cash incentives. In the agro-processing sector, the
limited policy support impinges upon its capacity to tap into emerging oppor-
tunities  and  adapt  and  thrive  in  a  well-organized  way. Amongst  the  policies
that are in place, the new agricultural policy 1999 has a focus on agro-process-
ing  and  agro-based  industries.  The  policy  projects  the  enhancement  of  the

 
Enabling institutional responses to innovation in latecomer countries

115

annual share of this sector to total GDP earnings in the coming years to 25 per
cent  from  its  estimated  present  rate  of  10  per  cent  per  annum  (Khan  1999).
This was the primary reason for the government to provide cash-based incen-
tives  for  firms  indulging  in  export  of  agro-processing  products  in  the  first
place,  but  other  incentives  that  augment  the  performance  of  the  firms  in  a
systematic  way  are  yet  to  be  put  in  place.  The  Government  of  Bangladesh
offers 20 per cent cash incentives for all agro-products exported using over 70
per cent domestic agricultural raw material. The association of agro-entrepre-
neurs, BAPA, has been accorded the responsibility of certifying entrepreneurs
entitled to receive such benefits from the central bank. The national budgets
for  2006–2007  and  consecutively  for  2007–2008  have  tried  to  enhance  the
financial allocations to support agro-based farms and industries in the country,
through  an  Equity  Development  Fund  to  support  the  sector. Although  these
seem to be positive developments, they may not be entirely relevant to support
the  performance  of  the  sector  in  the  absence  of  sustained  interventions  that
promote collaborations over the next decade.

The  lack  of  an  effective  system  to  ensure  food  quality  also  comes  in  the
way of firms being able to create efficient networks for the distribution of their
products  and  signaling  quality.  The  regulation  of  quality  of  processed  food
falls  under  the  Pure  Food  Ordinance  of  1959.  Section  2  of  the Act  defines
adulterated food products, and also deems the regulation of food products to
be under the local municipality of each city. The municipality has the respon-
sibility under the Act to appoint ‘public analysts’ who are qualified personnel
to inspect and regulate quality of food and also to prohibit the sale or manu-
facture of food that is not of proper standard or quality. Additionally, the Act
has  provisions  against  use  of  false  labels  and  advertisements.  However,  the
Ordinance suffers from poor implementation due to lack of qualified person-
nel  and  funding  available  to  the  city  municipalities.  Implementation  is  also
very selective due to severe corruption amongst municipality officials (field
interviews).  The  Bangladesh  Agro-Processors’ Association  (BAPA)  is  the
main sectoral body overseeing the activities and addressing the problems of
producers and comprises 150 members. All the firms interviewed expressed
the need for improved testing, grading and packaging services, improved tech-
nologies, improved access to information on international markets (field inter-
views), which could be provided through an agency such as the BAPA if its
mandate is expanded and strengthened through policy efforts.

Similarly,  the  RMG  sector  demonstrates  a  lack  of  coherent  policy  vision
that  can  help  firms  to  enhance  their  competitiveness  within  global  value
chains. Survey data reveals that, in addition to a lack of trained technical and
managerial labour, there are no industrial zones, and no common infrastructure
provided by the government to encourage innovation activities that could lead
to  sustained  value  addition.  The  government  had  also  reduced  the  export

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

incentives for the RMG sector to 5 per cent (from a previous 25 per cent) at the
time  of  the  survey  and  enacted  rules  mandating  value  addition  of  exported
goods, which put immense pressure on local firms to compete in the interna-
tional market. This, once again, in the absence of equally forceful enforcement
of labour laws, seems to be adding to the ongoing mistreatment of workers in
the sector.

PROMOTING BANGLADESH’S COMPETITIVENESS:
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

The case of the two dynamic export-oriented sectors in Bangladesh presented
above  shows  how  important  different  physical  and  scientific  infrastructural
components as well as policy inputs are in the process of knowledge genera-
tion, use and transfer in latecomer contexts. It also shows the importance of
social institutions, norms and policy frameworks which condition these inter-
actions.  The  analysis  aims  to  identify  the  principal  forms  of  interaction
between different organizations and firms and evaluates the determinants of
collaboration,  particularly  the  role  of  public  goods  and  policies  and  their
impact on innovative performance.

The survey data shows that those variables providing potential incentives
for new product/process innovations at the firm level, such as IPRs, intensity
of collaboration, areas of government/other institutional support, education of
staff and level of training or financial support, do in fact play no role in the
development of new product/processes in the two sectors concerned, despite
them being the most competitive ones in Bangladesh (Gehl Sampath 2007).
This points to one of the most critical issues confronting the sectors equally:
the  status  of  the  domestic  knowledge  system  and  the  absorptive  capacity  of
firms. The domestic knowledge system in the country is very weak, charac-
terized by weak industrial and scientific infrastructure, poor collaboration and
interlinkages, lack of skills and institutional support for technological upgrad-
ing. Strategic policy support that strengthens the absorptive capacity of firms,
and enables them to move from labour-intensive to knowledge-intensive activ-
ities,  is  urgently  needed  to  remedy  that  constraint  on  enhanced  sectoral
competitiveness.

In the agricultural sector, much more research that meets the needs of the
agro-processing  sector  needs  to  be  conducted.  This  includes  research  on
enhancing variety and ensuring the availability of fruits and vegetables all year
round,  and  livestock  research,  among  others  (field  interviews).  The  New
Agriculture  Extension  Policy  that  focuses  mainly  on  extension  services  for
cereal crops needs to broaden its reach to benefit the agro-processing sector.
Reliable  intermediary  structures  need  to  be  created,  in  order  to  foster  good

Enabling institutional responses to innovation in latecomer countries

117

matches between supply of and demand for food products. Most importantly,
inclusive policy action is called for that also caters to the needs of the major-
ity  of  the  home-based,  small-scale  agro-processing  firms.  Similarly,  low
value-addition capacity in the RMG sector emphasizes the need for policy
support institutions. For both sectors again, the lack of government support
to  subsidize  learning  should  be  addressed  in  the  near  future.  Creation  of
human  resources  at  the  secondary  and  tertiary  levels  should  be  targeted
adequately. Institutional incentives are required to translate individual capa-
bilities  into  organizational  capabilities  so  that  human  resources  that  are
presently available in the three sectors can be harnessed appropriately. The
survey  results  discussed  in  earlier  sections  point  to  an  important  but
neglected reason why inventive efforts tend to get largely buried in the pre-
commercial  phase  in  latecomer  country  contexts:  investing  in  primary
research  without  extension  services  that  allow  for  entrepreneurial  venues,
and  characterized  by  a  lack  of  policy  incentives  for  collaboration  between
different  actors.  Policy  change  could  help  attenuate  this  phenomenon  by
focusing on the following.

1. Strategic policy support is required to focus attention beyond cash incen-
tives, to other extension services in order to steer the local sectors into
more value added activities. In the case of the textiles and RMG sector,
policy support is required to promote complete backward integration in
knitwear and also to enhance designing and creative activities which will
help  the  sector  to  move  gradually  from  a  low-end  labour  intensive
segment,  to  more  niche,  knowledge-intensive  segments  in  the  export
markets. The agro-processing firms require substantial help to cope with
extension  services,  organization  of  reliable  supplies,  product  commer-
cialization  and  sanitary  and  phyto-sanitary  measures  (imposed  by  the
WTO).

2. Policy assistance that seeks to enhance the competitiveness of the sectors

needs to focus on interventions that
a.

Improve  the  bargaining  power  of  women  in  both  the  sectors,  since
women comprise the majority of the workforce in textiles and RMG,
and  also  account  for  the  home-based  informal  sector  production  in
agro-processing;

b. Support the RMG and textiles firms to cope with international restric-
tions  on  exports  that  relate  to  value  addition  and  labour  welfare.
Closer  governmental  cooperation  will  be  key  to  ensuring  that  the
local  firms  survive  the  post-MFA period  to  transition  into  value-
added activities;

c. Help restructure the university education syllabus to incorporate courses
that produce managerial and technical skills required for both sectors;

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

d. Focus  on  improved  basic  infrastructure  provision  that  is  a  major

impediment for both sectors;

e. Focus on reviving the traditional handloom sector, through a focus on

creative designing and upgrade of production facilities.

Secondly, the comparative insights that are thrown up from the two-sector
analysis lend strength to the relevance of different institutional and histori-
cal  factors  for  knowledge  generation.  Although  the  chapter  has  only
presented the case of one country, innovation studies conducted in other late-
comer countries underscore the importance of physical and knowledge infra-
structure,  collaboration  incentives  and  policy  frameworks  on  building  as
well as sustaining innovation capacity (Gehl Sampath and Oyeyinka forth-
coming; Oyeyinka and Gehl Sampath 2009).

FORGING INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO
INNOVATIVE CAPACITY: THE ROLE OF THE EU
AND THE DONOR COMMUNITY

Empirical data and disaggregated sector characteristics as presented in this
chapter create an important basis for thinking about the relevance of institu-
tional incentives that underpin innovative capacity in a latecomer context. A
general tendency while applying lessons from innovation experiences in the
European Union to latecomer countries is to obfuscate the extent of institu-
tional and contextual limitations in these countries. Most results that accrue
from  innovation  studies  in  the  developed  (read  technologically  advanced)
countries  are  not  directly  applicable  to  latecomer  countries  because  of  the
institutional  contexts  in  which  innovation  is  embedded.  What  needs  to  be
kept in mind is that there are no magic bullet policy incentives such as intel-
lectual  property  rights  in  the  case  of  latecomer  countries,  especially  while
speaking of those which are some way off from reaching the economic fron-
tier. This is because these incentives, as we know them, are very well corre-
lated in monolithic ways with the level of development of countries. Instead,
there is a need to address the pre-eminence of learning institutions for creat-
ing  sustained  mid-term  or  long-term  economic  growth  in  a  holistic  way.
These institutions can either be formal or informal (coded in terms of unof-
ficial  attitudes  and  cultural  or  social  practices  of  interaction  and  problem-
solving)  and  pre-existing  cultural  and  social  arrangements  that  shape  the
behaviour of agents in the absence of good formal institutions for exchange.
Efforts  that  seek  to  build  capacity  to  innovate  in  latecomer  countries
should  be  based  on  the  recognition  that  modest  changes  in  institutional

Enabling institutional responses to innovation in latecomer countries

119

arrangements and official attitudes towards the economy can often produce
large  payoffs  (Rodrik  2003,  p.  16).  But  these  changes  are  contextual  and
flow from the specific needs of the knowledge system in consideration. In
the case of Bangladesh, an analysis of the institutional incentives for inno-
vation,  as  conducted  by  this  chapter,  drives  home  two  essential  points.
Firstly,  it  endorses  the  point  on  weak  or  ineffective  domestic  knowledge
systems  in  latecomer  countries,  the  disjuncture  between  public  sector
research  and  commercialization  of  products,  and  stresses  the  relevance  of
concerted policy effort to build science, technology and innovation institu-
tions for economic development. Secondly, and more importantly, it raises a
larger question regarding the institutional framework in Bangladesh, which
can perhaps be extended to other latecomer countries as well. This relates to
the role of market incentives in the two thriving, export-oriented sectors in
the country.

Why are competitive pressures of global exports not fostering these link-
ages locally, despite the obvious gains? Competitive market pressures do not
seem  to  work  in  the  case  of  Bangladesh  due  to  the  institutional  setting,
where  even  well-intended  policy  and  market  incentives  fail  to  enhance
patterns of interaction and learning needed for innovation. For example, all
the professional associations in the two sectors are active mainly in political
lobbying and not for the provision of common industry services, or mid-term
sector strategy creation, as one would normally assume.11 Firms seem to be
more  interested  in  retaining  their  incumbent  advantages  by  lobbying  for
static policies, rather than pushing concertedly for dynamic growth-oriented
models.  Mistrust  and  lack  of  representation  of  consumer  and  labour  force
welfare (in key sectors like pharmaceuticals and textiles and RMG, both of
which  are  supposedly  role  models  for  other  latecomer  countries)  are  key
features of interpersonal interactions and the policy landscape. Most of these
factors  inhibit  even  the  role  of  competitive  market  pressures  in  fostering
welfare-maximizing  collaborations,  and  can  be  summed  up  as  ‘negative’
institutions  (Evans  1995;  North  1990).  The  informal  and  (the  few)  formal
institutions for innovation in the country create ample scope for capture by
a few, to the detriment of the larger population. The survey found numerous
instances  where  firms  work  around  well-intentioned  policies  to  find  infor-
mal mechanisms that help them to retain their profits, to the detriment of the
economy  and  technological  progress  at  large.  This  is  a  key  finding  for
national policy bodies and international agencies trying to build innovation
capacity  in  Bangladesh.  Donor  agencies  and  international  bodies  need  to
focus on how policy-relevant interventions can minimize the inefficiencies
of  the  informal  institutional  structures  that  promote  such  rent-seeking,  to
move towards increased production efficiency and consumer welfare.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

NOTES

2.

1. This chapter is based on a study done by the author for the ALDC division of the UNCTAD
in 2007. The author acknowledges comments by Heiko Prange-Gstöhl and research assis-
tance by Graciela van der Poel.
In the systems approach, the term ‘institutions’ is used in two different senses: technology
policies, patent systems, other standard-setting agencies and also R&D institutes and univer-
sities are called institutions by several scholars (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993), whereas many
others limit its import to sets of common habits, routines, established practices, rules or laws
that regulate the relations and interactions between individuals and groups (Lundvall 1992).
For the latter set of scholars, organizations are understood in the sense of enterprises, R&D
laboratories, and governmental agencies, among others.

3. This chapter understands ‘latecomer development’ to mean development issues raised by those
countries that do not innovate at the global frontier. The term ‘latecomer countries’ refers to
those developing and least developed countries that are not transforming as fast as others that
generally attract attention of innovation scholars such as India, China and South Africa.
4. Many, if  not  all,  empirical  studies  on  national  systems  of  innovation  show  that  failure  is
clearly explained by specialization patterns or institutional deficiencies that have historical
roots (Johnson and Lundvall 2003).

5. A part of why this has not been so keenly explored is perhaps because there are not many
studies of innovation in the very latecomer context, although there have been several in the
context of the late industrializing countries of East Asia and also developing countries of
Latin America, and more recently India and China. Another reason is what Bell (2007) states
as the ‘fuzzy explanations of the role of institutions within the systems of innovation frame-
work’.

6. The  BGMEA is  the  Bangladesh  Garment  Manufacturers  and  Exporters  Association,  a
professional  body  that  seeks  to  establish  a  health  business  environment  for  its  3500
members.

7. Until recently, the sector mainly focused on RMGs due to the market advantages in the USA

and EU under the Multifibre Agreement.

8. The woven fabric is usually imported using back-to-back letter of credit arrangements.
9.

In order to partially fill in the lacuna, the BGMEA has a management centre in Uttara that
offers courses on managerial skills for the textiles and garments sector.

10. According to UNIDO (2006, p. 37), for the poor in Bangladesh the average earnings in alter-
native forms of employment are much less than those of a helper in the first year of employ-
ment in the garment industry.

11. This  finding  is  confirmed  by  another  World  Bank  study  on  the  agro-processing  sector  in

Bangladesh (see World Bank 2007).

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Growth, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Salim,  R.A. and K.P. Kalirajan (1999), ‘Sources of Output Growth in Bangladesh
Food  Processing  Industries:  a  Decomposition  Analysis’,  The  Developing
Economies, 37 (3), 247–69.

Taher,  Misbah  (2001),  Home-based  Workers  and  Women  Food  Processors  in
Bangladesh: a Study on the Effect of Globalisation, Colombo: ITDG-South Asia.
UNCTAD (2005), TNCs and the Removal of Textiles and Clothing Quotas, New York

and Geneva: UNCTAD.
(2006), 

UNIDO 

Industrialization  and  Poverty  Alleviation:  Pro-poor
Industrialization  Strategies  Revisited, Vienna:  UNIDO  Research  Programme,
Combating  Marginalization  and  Poverty  Through  Industrial  Development
(COMPID).

World  Bank  (2005),  End  of  MFA Quotas:  Key  Issues  and  Strategic  Options  for
Bangladesh  Readymade  Garment  Industry, Bangladesh  Development  Series  –
Paper No. 2, Dhaka: The World Bank Office.

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World  Bank  (2007),  Enhancing  Agricultural  Innovation:  How  to  go  Beyond  the
Strengthening  of  Research  Systems,  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  Series,
Washington, DC: The World Bank.

7. Global challenges and the external
dimension of the ERA: a comment

Dinesh Abrol

Previous chapters in Part I of this book addressed two main questions: How
can the EU, that is the Community and its member states, pursue a more effec-
tive and efficient S&T policy targeting global challenges and promoting this
policy more effectively in the international arena? How should the EU invest
in international S&T cooperation, specifically in respect of global issues?

Scholars were expected to reflect particularly on the criteria to be utilized
by the EU to define priority areas and partners and the mechanisms that need
to be reinforced or created to foster international S&T cooperation on global
challenges.  A core  necessity  to  address  global  challenges  via  international
S&T cooperation is the ability for developing countries (DCs) to generate and
to gain knowledge and technology globally and for advanced countries (ACs)
to  spread  that  knowledge  and  technology  globally  through  a  collective
European effort. Scholars were also expected to give their suggestions on the
ideas and mechanisms that would allow Europe to ‘speak in one voice’ and act
together in a coherent way on the identified global challenges.

The chapters in Part I of this book responded to those issues by choosing a
selected  set  of  global  challenges  such  as  climate  change,  global  commons,
global public health and neglected diseases, and pro-poor industrialization and
agricultural development. Responses reflect both the identities that they bear
themselves and the settings in which their suggestions would have to find a
place.  The  contributions  reflect  a  fundamental  divide  in  the  opinion  within
Europe on the selection of policy goals to be pursued at the European level to
develop S&T cooperation with the rest of world with a view to solving global
problems and challenges.

Athreye, Huang and Soete articulate one side of this divide in Chapter 5 of
this volume. It can safely be characterized as a side that favours liberalization,
competition  and  market  forces  dominated  globalization.  They  argue  for
getting the EU and its member states to unhesitatingly work for the emergence
of ‘market friendly’ rules to coordinate their international conduct and promo-
tion of interactions between Europe and the emerging economies. It suggests
that member states select the market forces-led strategy of liberalization and

123

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

competition to undertake the promotion of international trade and investment,
international networking in R&D and development of bilateral S&T relations
with developing countries in energy and transportation for the sustenance of
global commons. It holds the view that the national framework is an outdated
governance  mechanism  for  the  globalized  world  of  today.  The  nation  state
should be keeping itself out of the role of coordination of and intervention in
markets. When addressing the question of achieving a balance between state
intervention and market-oriented governance, the nation state is only asked to
ensure welfare of the citizens at the level of individual consumption for the
realization of social cohesion. It prefers not to hurt the incumbents of the exist-
ing socio-technical regime through state intervention to take care of the global
problems. At the level of theory, policy and practice its recommendations are
hardly  aimed  at  providing  solutions  directly  for  the  achievement  of  sustain-
ability and system transformation.

The argument followed in Chapter 5 demands that the EU and its member
states rally behind an outward-looking Lisbon strategy with a view to encour-
age the growth of international trade in services, internationalization of R&D
activities, and access to the brains and talent of the emerging economies. In
sum, it seems as if in this strategy there is little room for the joint determina-
tion of solutions by the nation states. Choices made by the market forces on
the basis of price signals are seen to be economically efficient for providing
the solutions to global problems. Technologies and practices which the market
forces prefer for the reason of being profitable for them are treated as the sole
economically efficient solutions. The authors argue for choosing to advance
the socio-technical transition by focusing on the diffusion of individual inno-
vations designed in accordance with the principles of market competition. The
chapter suggests that the EU and its member states should follow the principle
of  market  design  of  technology  and  outcomes,  with  the  state  and  society
remaining neutral in respect of determining the S&T cooperation goals to be
forged by Europe with the emerging economies and developing world.

In Chapter 3 Mitchell articulates the view of the other side of this divide.
She states that ‘Europe’s international S&T policy has tended to see its role as
focusing on areas where there is a clear benefit to the member states. This atti-
tude  is  becoming  undermined  in  the  area  of  climate  change  and  energy
resources’.  This  suggests  that  the  EU  policy  thrust  on  liberalization  and
competition  is,  however,  not  sustainable  in  terms  of  the  urgency  of  climate
change  and  the  required  rate  of  reduction  in  carbon  emissions.  The  chapter
argues  that  Europe  is  at  the  moment  hampered  in  dovetailing  international
S&T policy  with  Europe’s  internal  technological  needs  and  climate  change-
related  policy  imperatives  because  there  are  tensions  between  the  internal
discourses with respect to competition and liberalization, energy security and
sustainability. It suggests that the internal discourses need to be aligned for the

Global challenges and the external dimension of the ERA: a comment

125

good  of  both  internal  and  external  European  policy  goals.  Mitchell  is
concerned about the overall thrust of EU and competition policy.

The  chapter  criticizes  the  internal  and  external  policies  of  the  EU  for
supporting  the  key  characteristics  of  the  current  energy  system  rather  than
encouraging innovation and change towards a sustainable energy system. The
European Research Area (ERA) Expert Group Report (EGR) is criticized in
this  view  for  planning  the  S&T cooperation  with  the  third  countries  on  the
basis  that  ‘climate  change  and  the  move  to  sustainability  provides  potential
opportunities  for  Europe,  and  that  Europe  has  to  do  its  best  to  ensure  its
knowledge  base  has  the  ability  to  develop  and  retain  a  place  in  the  future
markets’. It notes that implementation of the low carbon paths in developing
countries  requires  all  the  system  components  to  be  addressed  together.
Furthermore,  Mitchell  recognizes  that  global  poverty  reduction  and  sustain-
able development is a prerequisite to mitigating climate change successfully.
It demands that the EU deals with poverty reduction and sustainable develop-
ment by planning the S&T cooperation in a systemic way. It also recognizes
that the emerging economies of China and India will not be able to diffuse new
technology unless it is accompanied by a transfer of the capabilities to repli-
cate and manufacture locally similar equipment and trained manufacturers and
users.

Contrary to the view of Athreye et al. which seem to have no problem in
encouraging  mega  mergers  of  energy  companies  at  the  international  level,
Mitchell criticizes the EU for encouraging larger transnational energy compa-
nies.  The  chapter  suggests  that  the  dominant  goal  within  the  competitive
discourse is only economic efficiency and places the newer sustainable tech-
nologies and practices at a disadvantage in the new situation. The contribution
suggests that the EU is not incorporating insights from the system transition
its  fundamental,  underlying  principles  or  policies.
literature 
Consequently,  it  notes  that  the  EU’s  S&T policy  sits  squarely  in  this  unre-
solved tension. The EU is required to bring these two discourses into align-
ment if it is to encourage systemic change in the appropriate direction.

into 

Mitchell  notes  that  it  is  easier  to  achieve  a  low  stabilization  pathway  if
climate change policies are incorporated into sustainable development policies
and argues that an important strand of the EU international S&T policy is not
appropriately  emphasizing  the  connection  between  sustainable  development
and  climate  change.  She  points  out  that  development  choice  and  paths  are
going  to  matter  and  requires  that  energy,  transport,  agriculture  and  forestry,
macroeconomics and trade are all important, and as far as possible should be
integrated.  She  recognizes  that  sustainable  development  may  mean  reduced
consumption,  more  local  food,  more  local  energy  generation  and  reduced
energy,  and  all  this  may  lead  to  reduced  international  trade  in  some  areas.
Therefore, Mitchell demands a rethink of development strategies from China

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

and India, which are rapidly increasing their energy use. It is suggested that
the  EU’s  international  S&T policy  can  support  its  internal  needs  and  also
achieve  better  social  impacts  in  the  third  countries  if  it  implies  support  for
decentralization.  To  meet  the  requirements  of  global  poverty  reduction  and
sustainable development the uptake of decentralized smart technologies must
increase.

In fact, I am of the view that the enlightened viewpoint of Mitchell equally
makes  sense  for  the  industrializing  countries  like  China  and  India. There  is
also an urgent need for a rethink of development strategies in these countries
because from the standpoint of economic, environment and social justice their
development  strategies  are  moving  in  a  highly  inappropriate  direction  too.
More than 40 per cent of the world’s populace lives in China and India. Their
development choices and paths matter not only at the global level but also in
terms of the sustainable development of their own economies. Of course, the
poorer countries must be focused on more. It is true that the needs of poorer
countries may fit well with the EU’s own internal goals of sustainable energy
development. But Europe has to move a little more to ‘enlightened self-inter-
est’ because, increasingly, there is a two-way movement in terms of technol-
ogy  transfer.  An  expansion  of  international  S&T policy  to  decentralized
energy  technologies  and  greater  links  with  both  industrializing  and  poorer
countries may reap many under-recognized benefits for Europe.

Further, I would like the policymakers to keep in mind that many important
actors in our own respective countries are still destined to work for a long time
within the national framework. They can perhaps serve the enlightened inter-
est of the populace of Europe and of poorer and industrializing countries even
better  than  the  transnational  companies. The  EU’s  international  S&T policy
must leave sufficient room for the participation of such actors in the determi-
nation  of  policy  goals  for  the  portfolio  to  be  selected  for  international  S&T
cooperation.  Most  of  these  actors  work  at  the  societal/state  level  and  are
accountable  to  the  people  of  their  own  respective  countries. As  knowledge
configurations and design spaces differ from sector to sector, in those sectors
(for example, water management, biodiversity conservation and development,
management  of  renewable  energy  projects,  food  and  agriculture,  health
systems development) where the actors at the societal and state level must act
as nodes for the establishment of network projects, the portfolio of projects to
be selected should be consciously creating a space for their active participa-
tion.  By  encouraging  the  participation  of  these  actors  the  EU  policymakers
would be facilitating the use of decentralized and smart technologies. It will
help the world to undertake the search for ecologically and socially just solu-
tions.  Experimentation  must  be  undertaken  for  these  solutions  jointly  by
Europe and poorer and industrializing countries. Regarding the determination
of policy goals to tackle global challenges such as sustainable development,

Global challenges and the external dimension of the ERA: a comment

127

poverty  reduction,  health  improvement,  energy  security  and  climate  change
the business-as-usual approach is to be shunned, and the EU has the potential
to take such a step due to its post-war experimentation with the development
of – relatively speaking – more inclusive institutions than the rest of the world.
I  am  also  of  the  view  that  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  cannot  be  the
main instrument for the realization of goals of economic, ecological and social
justice.  Neither  poorer  nor  industrializing  countries  are  known  to  have
achieved development on account of the adoption of policies of liberalization,
deregulation of corporates and the withdrawal of the state from the functions
of  generation  of  strategic  knowledge  and  articulation  of  demand  for  invest-
ment in affordable and appropriate products, processes and systems that are
required by the poor in particular.

Let  me  take  the  automobile  and  pharmaceutical  industries  in  India  as  an
example.  These  industries  gained  the  most  in  terms  of  the  development  of
domestic firms. These domestic firms showed better competence and under-
took a lot of creative imitation during the 1980s and 1990s. It was not the route
of liberalization and unfettered competition from foreign firms which permit-
ted these domestic firms to be innovative. Both sectors were beneficiaries of
the  policy  of  selective  protection  that  the  governments  pursued  to  steer  and
nurture them throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. External liberalization was
put on hold till the beginning of twenty-first century. The government insisted
on the phased manufacturing programmes and partnership with Indian firms
while  allowing  technology  imports  and  foreign  direct  investments.  Public
sector firms were used to create the capabilities that have spun off individuals
who have come into the private sector and have benefited industries in terms
of  the  human  resources  needed  for  building  competitiveness  in  both  the
domestic market as well as the export markets.

Experience of FDI-induced business activity tells us that focus in respect of
the generation of human resources for S&T cannot be allowed to shift to meet-
ing the FDI-induced needs of transnational companies and become the model
for  transformation  of  higher  education.  Profit-based  privatization  of  higher
education  is  in  fact  leading  to  the  production  of  a  large  number  of  unem-
ployed. This is the situation in respect of the sectors where there exists a high
demand  for  brains  and  talent  from  the  foreign  and  domestic  firms.  Private
players  are  not  even  looking  into  those  areas  for  which  the  articulation  of
demand for human resources is yet to be organized by the societal/state actors.
FDI-induced  mobility  policies  and  research  networking  are  unlikely  to  add
positively  to  the  EU’s  international  S&T policy  in  respect  of  the  collective
tackling of global challenges.

It must be kept in mind that FDI is flowing into sectors where profitability
is high and less risky for investors. Even the asset-seeking (brains and talent)
FDI from the USA repeatedly uses standard building blocks of knowledge and

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

skills  for  testing  and  clinical  trials  of  products  being  developed  by  trans-
national companies for the global market, leaving hardly any opportunity for
capability-building through FDI. In fact, if one takes into account the magni-
tude  and  direction  of  FDI  projects  attracted  to  India  over  the  period
2003–2009, based on information obtained from the OCO Monitor database,1
we find that Software and Information Technology services accounted for the
highest number of projects, with a total of 981, representing 21 per cent of the
investment projects. The Business Services and Financial Services accounted
for the second and third highest number of projects, respectively a total of 400
and 291 projects, representing 8.5 per cent and 6.2 per cent of the investment
projects. Among the top sectors, the Automotive Components sector recorded
the highest growth at 148 per cent per annum on average.

Second,  during  the  post-liberalization  period  much  of  the  realized  FDI
came through fully-owned subsidiaries (or branch plants) of their parent firms
abroad.  Most  of  them  have  not  issued  Initial  Public  Offerings  (IPOs)  in  the
domestic  bourses,  hence  are  not  listed  companies. About  40  per  cent  of  the
inflow  seems  to  have  been  used  for  acquiring  existing  industrial  assets  and
their managerial control, and there seems to have been a gradual increase in
such  mergers  and  acquisitions  in  the  1990s. Third,  there  is  evidence  that  in
industries in which foreign capital has a substantial share, companies tended
to  be  more  import-dependent  compared  to  domestic  companies.  Fourth,
evidence collated on the aspect of R&D being undertaken by foreign firms for
the benefit of the domestic market is again substantively clear; foreign firms
continue to reveal a lower R&D intensity compared to domestic firms.

Global  challenges  need  locally  targeted  solutions  to  tackle  the  problems
arising  out  of  food  security  and  hunger,  poverty  reduction,  climate  change,
energy security, resurgence of infectious diseases and public health deteriora-
tion. FDI cannot provide the foundation for tackling these challenges. Stronger
intellectual property rights have not stimulated the big business to find solu-
tions for these problems.

As  far  as  the  issue  of  management  of  global  commons  is  concerned,  in
Chapter  2 Vogler  has  been  forthright  in  stating  that  the  member  states  have
been directing the evolution of regimes for global commons and the EU is yet
to  get  its  due  role  in  the  policymaking.  He  recognizes  that  the  problems  of
global commons are going to be aggravated in the future and the EU would
need the aid of sound science to play its due role in the management of global
commons.  Vogler  argues  that  a  shift  away  from  a  common  heritage  to  a
national sovereignty principle, leading to territorial claims of conflicting kinds
failing to take into account the environment side, is not the road ahead that the
world can afford today for a proper management of global commons. Vogler
highlights the role played by actors like Greenpeace and would like the EU to
strengthen  their  participation.  He  suggests  that  scientific  advice  will  most

Global challenges and the external dimension of the ERA: a comment

129

likely  get  incorporated  into  international  environmental  regimes  if  it  comes
from  a  demonstrably  autonomous  and  uninvolved  source. As  it  is  the  most
difficult and contested area of ‘science–policy’ interface, Vogler is clear that
while the EU can enforce the effectiveness of global commons diplomacy, the
Union  should  help  to  provide  public  science  sufficient  autonomy  from  the
interference of the state and business to maintain its credibility.

In Chapter 4 Igumbor and Sanders tackle the failure of public health in the
low and middle income countries (LMIC). They hold the processes of unequal
globalization  of  economies  as  portending  major  health  challenges  for  the
world in general and the LMICs in particular. They point out that in addition
to globalization, increased urbanization has led to increased socio-economic
stratification translating into health inequities. The ageing of the world popu-
lation is shown to be leading to the increased burden of chronic conditions and
multiple morbidities. They call for a broader approach to public health based
on  the  understanding  of  primary  determinants  of  individual  and  population
health. The causes of causes are social determinants of health.

While the authors treat it as a political question, they however confine their
contribution to the role of research and how the international S&T policy of
the  EU  can  make  a  difference  by  changing  the  priorities  of  research  in  the
sphere of public health. They consider that to push the global health research
agenda towards equity the ERA must work towards closing the research gaps
in respect of the dominant diseases of LMICs. They demand a better balance
in favour of undertaking research for the development of methods of measur-
ing  and  monitoring  health  inequities  and  evaluating  the  impact  of  interven-
tions to reduce such inequities. They call for the involvement of researchers,
policymakers, healthcare-providers, civil society, patient groups and even the
media in facilitating the seamless transmission of knowledge-to-action. They
note that civil society organizations (CSOs) and a few research initiatives have
begun  to  promote  relevant  research  directions.  They  argue  that  innovative
ways  of  promoting  civil  society  participation  and  partnerships  in  health
research are needed to change the priorities of research and funding patterns.
They also suggest that the EU should integrate health concerns into all of its
research and development activities.

As Igumbor and Sanders have not addressed the issue of how the problem
of the transformation of state and society is to be tackled at the system level
for health equity in LMICs, it is not clear how the national frameworks would
address improving the status of mandated activities arising out of the accep-
tance of WHO resolutions on public health, innovation and intellectual prop-
erty. Additionally, actions have been prescribed which should immediately be
undertaken within the frameworks of nation states with regard to the tasks of
prioritization and promotion of health research, building of capacity for health
innovation,  transfer  of  technology  (learning  and  absorption  of  knowledge

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

generated somewhere else in the global system), management and application
of  intellectual  property  and  financing  of  health  innovation  and  research.  It
would have to been useful to review this challenge in the context of LMICs.
This  is  necessary  for  the  joint  determination  of  priorities  of  international
research cooperation. If the EU provides the push for research capable of lead-
ing to more equity in health, the pull factor in LMICs should be there to align
and benefit from the knowledge-to-action in a seamless fashion.

In Chapter 6 Gehl Sampath tackles the problem of a failure of a latecomer
country to garner the enabling role of institutions for the benefit of innovation
in  the  case  of  Bangladesh. This  contribution  looks  into  the  sectors  of  agro-
processing  and  ready-made  garments  to  highlight  the  factors  that  underlie
knowledge generation, use and transfer in a late development context, and the
role of institutions in enabling these processes to bear fruit for the benefit of
appropriate and affordable innovations. The contribution suggests that intel-
lectual  property  rights  (IPRs),  intensity  of  collaboration,  areas  of  govern-
ment/other institution support, education and training of staff do not seem to
be playing a role at all in the likelihood of owners being involved in new prod-
uct/process development in these two sectors. She points out that the failure of
enabling institutions is at two levels. First of all, the failure is at the level of
the domestic knowledge system and the absorptive capacity of firms. Second,
the failure is at the level of reliance of the institutions on market incentives that
have not enabled the industry to enhance the patterns of interaction and learn-
ing needed for innovation. Mistrust and the lack of representation of the labour
force are identified as negative institutions which enable a few to capture the
benefits, to the detriment of the economy and technological progress.

I recognize that this is the sole contribution from a latecomer country which
has chosen to focus on the domestic institutions. This contribution takes the
view that as there are no magic bullets available in the form of even policy
incentives, efforts should be targeted to the strengthening of incremental inno-
vation in the institutional arrangements being created for knowledge genera-
tion.  It  recognizes  that  while  the  progress  in  respect  of  improvement  of
production efficiency and consumer welfare can certainly be made through the
intervention of the EU and other relevant donor agencies, for the transforma-
tion of the national system of innovation strategic policy interventions and not
‘cash incentives’ are necessary. It also suggests that the bargaining power of
women would have to be improved, since women comprise the majority of the
workforce in these two sectors. The revival of the traditional handloom sector
would require a focus on creative designing and upgrading of production facil-
ities.

However, a question mark remains concerning the implementation of the
proposed  solutions.  Despite  the  competitive  pressure  that  exist  in  these  two
export-oriented sectors, which are also likely to intensify with the completion

Global challenges and the external dimension of the ERA: a comment

131

of the period of transition prescribed for the country in the post-MFA period,
the firms and professional associations continue to be focused on rent-seeking
activities and are not ready for a focus on innovation. Can we hope that appro-
priate and affordable innovations will be introduced in the absence of appro-
priate social carriers? I think that this is a common problem in many important
sectors for almost all the latecomer countries. And it needs to be addressed by
taking action at the level of the creation of new social carriers of innovative
activities. This  would  demand  from  the  policymakers  the  opening  of  a  new
front in strategic terms because the new social carriers would need support not
only from the state but also from the collectivity of petty producers and work-
ers  who  constitute  the  majority  of  the  labour  force  in  these  countries.  It  is
important that efforts are also made to strengthen all those components of the
national system of innovation that are focused on addressing the question of
pro-poor industrialization and undertaking experiments for the creation of new
development pathways in these countries. The EU’s international S&T policy
should be supportive of all such efforts. It should strengthen the pull factor for
sustainable  development-oriented  efforts  in  an  appropriate  direction  with  a
view to creating a situation of mutual gain for the population of the EU and of
the poorer and industrializing countries.

NOTE

1. See http://www.ocoglobal.com.

PART II

Policy coordination in the external dimension of
the ERA

8. Coordinate to collaborate: the

governance challenges for European
international S&T policy

Jakob Edler

INTRODUCTION: THREE MEGA TRENDS IN
INTERNATIONAL S&T POLICIES

This chapter discusses an increasingly important yet challenging development,
the international coordination of nationally rooted policies or funding schemes
to  support  international  collaboration  in  science  and  technology  (S&T).1 It
conceptualizes ways in which government ministries or agencies can realize
synergies  when  it  comes  to  supporting  the  international  activities  of  their
researchers. Although the principles developed for international coordination
can  be  generalized,  it  is  set  in  the  context  of  the  European  Research  Area
(ERA).  This  is  important  since  European  instruments  have  provided  novel
opportunities  for  coordination,  in  various  forms  and  with  varying  success.
Some  of  those  coordination  activities  have  targeted  or  entailed  international
S&T collaboration by combining two international levels: they have allowed
national ministries and agencies to coordinate with other partners from Europe
(‘international’ from the national perspective), in order to better support inter-
national S&T activities which have often reached beyond Europe’s borders.

The  topicality  of  policy  coordination  for  international  S&T collaboration
becomes  obvious  when  looking  at  three  related,  mutually  reinforcing,  mega
trends.  The  first  mega  trend  is  that  international  collaboration  in  science  and
technology became of increasing importance. All indicators, such as co-publica-
tions, co-inventions and joint research projects, point in the same direction. This
is true not only in absolute terms, but also as regards the relative importance of
international  collaboration  which  has  grown  vs.  single-authored  publications
and national co-authorship (Figure 8.1). This development is strong within the
OECD  world  and  the  emerging  economies,  like  the  BRIC  countries
(Leydersdorff and Wagner 2007; Glänzel 2001). China especially has noted a
dramatic rise in international co-publications, with an increase of more than 100
per cent between the periods 1995–2000 and 2001–2005 (Adams et al. 2007).

135

136

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Thousand articles

Domestic co-authorship

Single-institutional
co-authorship

International co-authorship

Single author

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

Source: OECD STI Scoreboard 2007, based on NISTEP.

Figure 8.1 The rise of international co-authorship, example of natural

science

Interestingly, while the share of international, extra-European collaboration
is  also  rising  (see Table  8.1),  the  collaboration  within  Europe  has  increased
much more than the co-publication with extra-European partners (Mattison et
al. 2008). This, it seems, is an important fact, given the global dispersion of
specialized knowledge production, and it points towards a real need for policy
action  towards  truly  international  policies  and  also  renders  intra-European
coordination of extra-European collaboration the more important.

Not  only  has  the  share  of  international  co-publications  risen,  even  more
importantly the impact of international collaborations – one measure for scien-
tific  excellence  and  relevance  –  seems  to  have  grown  significantly.
Bibliometric data indicates that international activities pay off. The number of
citations a published paper receives can be used to approximate the level of
impact that it has among peers (Glänzel et al. 2006)

The  figures  show  that  international  collaborations  systematically  display
above-average  performances.2 In  addition,  while  for  the  EU15,  the  US  and
Japan  a  slight  decrease  is  observed,  all  other  countries  in  the  table  register
upwards trends.

In  addition  to  the  scientometric  impact,  a  recent  survey  of  scientists  in
Germany found that the vast majority of researchers experience a net utility
gain from their international activities. Internationalization helps German and

The governance challenges for European international S&T policy

137

Table 8.1

Impact of international collaborations in science, 1991 vs. 2003

Evolution of the relative citation rate of internationally co-authored papers of
the Tetrad and four dynamic countries

1991

2003

All papers

International  All papers International

scientific
collaboration

scientific
collaboration

EU15
US
Japan
China
Korea
Chinese Taipei
Brazil
Turkey

1.04
1.07
0.97
0.67
0.72
0.75
0.75
0.62

1.21
1.22
1.19
0.85
0.91
0.89
1.0
0.85

1.04
1.1
0.94
1.02
0.94
0.87
0.86
0.9

1.18
1.21
1.1
1.11
1.1
1.12
1.05
1.17

Source: Glanzel et al. (2006, p. 10).

foreign researchers to make a name for themselves and to step up their perfor-
mance (publications, co-operations). They see a direct link between interna-
tionalization  and  their  own  careers  in  research.  International  activities
accelerate  the  generation  of  knowledge,  avoid  duplicated  work,  increase
competencies  and  increase  researchers’ (measurable)  output  (Edler  et  al.
2008a, b).3

The trend towards international S&T collaboration has been fostered and
accelerated  by  two  major  political  trends  which,  in  fact,  have  positively
changed the landscape for supporting international S&T. One of those trends
is global, the other is Euro-centric, but with potential global consequences.

Thus,  the  second  mega  trend  is  that  political  ambitions  to  support  and
utilize  international  S&T have  deepened  and  broadened.  Fostering  interna-
tional S&T is not exclusively linked to science policy goals any more. It is not
only about improving the conditions for scientists to create knowledge as such,
but about contributing towards solutions for a whole range of global ‘grand’
challenges (Aho et al. 2006). The traditional drivers of effectiveness (comple-
mentary  knowledge)  and  efficiency  (shared  infrastructure)  of  knowledge
production  have  been  complemented  by  attempts  to  integrate  international
collaboration into problem-driven, mission-oriented research (Boekholt et al.
2009).4

The third mega trend constitutes a vast increase and broadening of interna-
tional and transnational policy initiatives and instruments to foster and shape

 
138

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

international  S&T collaboration.  The  policy  and  funding  landscape  –  espe-
cially  in  Europe  –  has  changed  dramatically  within  the  last  decade  and
recently we have witnessed a major shift towards flexible, intertwined instru-
mentation  to  enable  and  support  international  scientific  collaboration.  For
many  decades  there  have  been  Intergovernmental  Research  Organizations
(IGROs) such as EMBL, CERN and so on in areas with common infrastruc-
ture  needs  and  with  costs  that  are  too  high  for  individual  countries.  Within
Europe, the Research Framework Programme (FP) has provided the opportu-
nities  for  small-scale  trans-border  cooperation  in  application-oriented
research. This has been accompanied by smaller and less ambitious network-
ing and partly co-financing activities, such as the basic research scheme COST
(basic  research  networks)  and  the  industry-focused  scheme  EUREKA.  The
ERA dynamics  which  started  in  2000  have  catalyzed  a  move  towards  more
flexible coordination. Firstly, ERA established a new, direct instrument at the
European level (the European Research Council, ERC), supported structural
integration through Networks of Excellence (NoEs), and worked towards joint
large-scale  research  infrastructures  (with  ESFRI).  Secondly,  it  offered  new
possibilities for joined-up actions, namely: ERA-Nets, ERA-Net-Plus and Art.
169  initiatives  for  funding  agencies  and  ministries.  In  addition,  the  policy-
related  discourse  of  industry  has  started  to  Europeanize  (as  signified  by  the
Technology Platform activities at the European level, see below). Companies
have realized that in order to optimize their own internationalization strategies,
coordinated efforts between the large industrial players as well as between the
national governments are needed.

These  initiatives  have  broadened  the  tool  box  for  national  ministries  and
funding  organizations  when  it  comes  to  supporting  S&T collaboration  and
they  have  been  catalytical  for  a  development  towards  flexible  international-
ization policies. Previously, ministries and agencies provided (limited) access
to their programmes (generally without the financial support of foreign actors)
or  encouraged  scientists  to  be  mobile  and  cooperate  internationally  within
their nationally funded projects. Now, ministries – and funding agencies – are
defining explicit internationalization strategies. In a recent country survey by
CREST (CREST Working Group 2007), 10 out of 22 countries reporting on
internationalization  strategies  claimed  to  have  a  comprehensive  strategy  in
place,  three  of  which  being  part  of  a  general  globalization  strategy,  seven
being part of their respective S&T strategies. Apparently, eight countries were
in the process of defining a strategy. However, it also became clear that while
strategic  aspirations  are  high,  the  concrete  finalization  and  implementation
rather  remains  a  promise  than  becoming  a  reality  in  most  of  the  countries
(CREST Working  Group  2007,  pp.  12–14).  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the
drivers for internationalization strategies are very similar across the countries
reviewed, and there appears to be a canon of drivers widely shared within the

The governance challenges for European international S&T policy

139

European  countries  (CREST Working  Group  2007,  II–III).  In  general,  the
most  important  drivers  are:  (1)  strengthening  (domestic)  excellence  through
access to existing excellence and facilities abroad and through attracting talent
into  the  domestic  systems  (inward  mobility);  (2)  preparing  the  ground  for
domestic innovations to be marketed abroad; and (3) contributing to the solu-
tion of global problems.

Consequently,  the  countries  now  have  started  to  look  systematically  for
synergies in achieving their internationalization goals within Europe (CREST
Working Group 2007; Edler et al. 2008b; Boekholt et al. 2009). Those unilat-
eral  initiatives  are  increasingly  linked  to  the  new  forms  of  coordination  as
offered  at  the  European  level.  Thus,  nationally  based  internationalization
strategies  go  hand-in-hand  with  coordinated  activities  to  think  about  joint
action in order to foster international mobility and collaboration.

It is, of course, far from clear where the combination of those three trends
will  lead.  One  can  argue,  however,  that  the  interplay  of  those  mega  trends
marks nothing less than the beginning of a paradigm shift in policies to foster
international S&T collaboration across Europe, with flexible combinations of
joint activities by different countries, represented by ministries and agencies.
Such  variable  coordination  logic  not  only  offers  the  option  of  appropriate
coordination  within  Europe  and  for  European  researchers,  but  also  helps  to
define ways and means to support international, extra-European cooperation
in science and technology more efficiently and effectively.

This opens up a whole range of analytical and conceptual issues, both for
policymakers and analysts alike. The efficiency and effectiveness gains to be
reaped from coordinating national initiatives can only be realized with a very
conscious approach, with a clear understanding of the nature of coordination
and  the  institutional  challenges  associated  with  it.  This  is  what  this  chapter
seeks to support.

The remainder of this chapter starts off with a discussion of a definition of
policy coordination (next section). It then offers some illustrations of interna-
tional  coordination  efforts,  mainly  based  on  ERA-Nets  and  European
Technology Platforms, the latter being a bottom-up, industry-driven coordina-
tion process with accompanying policy coordination. The fourth section then
argues that there are four major conditions that have to be met for successful
international  policy  coordination.  In  principle,  all  of  those  have  to  do  with
coming to grips with the complexity of the issue: awareness of the multitude
of goals in international S&T collaboration from the perspective of those that
shall  be  coordinated,  understanding  of  the  rationales  and  contexts  of  all  the
(institutional)  actors  that  engage  in  coordination,  systematic  understanding
and conscious choice of coordination functions and modes, and finally under-
standing  of  the  domestic  institutional  complexity  (in  itself  a  horizontal  and
vertical coordination challenge) as a prerequisite for successful international

140

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

policy coordination. On this conceptual basis, the chapter ends with a stylized
decision model for developing coordination activities, which should provide a
framework for policymakers to think about design and implementation issues
in a systematic way.

WHAT IS COORDINATION IN S&T POLICY – AND WHAT
IS IT NOT?

The concept of coordination is abundant in political rhetoric, but it is poorly
defined and we hardly have a common understanding of what we mean (for
many see Metcalfe 1994; Peters 1998, 2005).

Even  if  the  general  meaning  is  clear,  co-ordination  is  a  surprisingly  ill-defined
concept with imprecise implications. Despite its importance in practice and the key
role it plays in theories of administration there is no consensus on how it should be
defined and operationalised. (Metcalfe 1994, p. 278)

To define modes of coordination and their best usage, we can start by looking
at  what  it  is  not,  that  is,  we  can  demarcate  the  notion  of  coordination  from
related concepts. First, ‘coordination’ is quite different from ‘collaboration’.
Collaboration, in its most general sense,5 can be defined as ‘to work jointly on
an activity or project’. In terms of S&T the meaning differs for different levels
and  actors.  On  the  level  of  concrete  scientific  and  technological  activities  it
means  that  two  or  more  researchers  work  intentionally6 together  to  achieve
certain  scientific  goals,  to  pool  their  complementary  expertise  or  resources,
thus  enhancing  the  effectiveness  or  efficiency  of  knowledge  production  or
even enabling new knowledge to be produced in the first place. There is no
need to engage in an in-depth discourse on the intensities and intentionality of
working  together  and  forms  of  collaboration  (for  a  thorough  discussion  see
Katz and Martin 1997), but it is important to keep in mind that S&T collabo-
ration means the working together of scientists to produce scientific and tech-
nological knowledge.

On the level of S&T policy the concept of collaboration is more complex.
The major element, again, would be to work together on a concrete, distinct
project on the policy level in order to achieve common goals. This could mani-
fest itself in joint monitoring of international activity, sharing a foreign contact
office and so on or, in fact, joining forces in some additional, new joint activ-
ity. Policy collaboration would not entail any shift of competencies to a new
policy level. Competencies and autonomy would remain within each collabo-
rating policy actor (a ministry or agency).

A shift of competencies or autonomy to a new, common level would indi-
cate ‘integration’ which is again distinct from coordination – even when the

The governance challenges for European international S&T policy

141

boundaries are blurred. Integration describes a process of combining activities
or  structures  so  that  they  then  form  a  ‘new  whole’ (Nedeva  et  al.  2006).  In
institutional  terms  it  means  that  individual  elements  come  into  a  common
participation in a new institution or body. To understand what this might mean
in terms of policy, we can turn to European integration theory (see for exam-
ple Wiener and Dietz 2004), which has taught us that integration is a process
that involves a transfer of competencies and loyalty from one level to the inte-
grated level, with the various parts of the new whole arranged in a common
governance structure. This means delegating authority and assigning the new
integrated structure with its own actor capabilities.

At the level of concrete R&D activities, integration would be the complete
merger of research capacities (for example research institutions merge into a
new virtual or physical institution, or researchers merge their programme lines
altogether). At the level of R&D policies and programmes, integration would
mean  creating  a  new  programme,  together  as  a  group,  and  having  this
programme managed and further developed at the new, integrated level. Art.
169  activities,  should  they  develop  self-standing,  sustainable  structures  and
legally binding rules that are decided upon at the new, integrated level, are one
potential form of integration, where the integrated activity (that is the Art. 169
programme)  and  the  national  activities  (these  are  the  national  programmes)
will co-exist (for a detailed account of one example see Edler et al. 2008a).

Coordination involves elements of both integration and collaboration, but
still is distinct from both concepts. In a very general definition coordination
means to bring different elements (of a complex activity or organization) into
a ‘harmonious’ or efficient relationship.7 This may involve negotiation (with
coordination partners) in order to match or to harmonize. The major charac-
teristic here is that the various elements are still autonomous, they do not strive
to  be  merged  into  one  new  entity,  and  they  still  engage  in  their  individual
activities. It is not so much joint activities that are the key here – this would
be  collaboration  if  focused  on  concrete  activities,  or  integration  if  aimed  at
structural merger of some sort. International S&T policy coordination would
mean to undertake activities in order to adjust and combine individual activi-
ties in a certain area so that they better interact and synergize with activities of
other countries in the same area. However, it might involve or lead to concrete
collaboration (in targeted activities) and it might develop into partial or full
integration (for example of programmes, laboratories, and so on). At the same
time, however, it can remain in a state of mutual information and minor adjust-
ments  in  national  programmes  or  future  design  of  programmes,  or  it  might
simply  mean  mutual  opening  up  of  national  activities  and  the  like.  But  it  is
important  to  make  these  distinctions  as  all  too  often  analysts  and  policy-
makers talk about integration when they mean coordination in a more narrow
sense – and vice versa.

142

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Before  discussing  the  conceptual  challenges  of  international  S&T policy
coordination, the following section provides some recent illustration of vari-
ous coordination modes. They refer mainly to European research policy and
entail industry-driven modes of coordination which, however, receive support
from policymakers and in a way force them into coordination activities as a
consequence of transnational discourse.

SOME ILLUSTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COORDINATION IN THE ERA8

ERA-Nets as a Means to Coordinate International S&T Collaboration

The Sixth Research Framework Programme (FP6) introduced the ERA-Net
instrument. Its aim is to bring together programme owners and managers of
a group of countries that share a common interest in a specific research area
in order to explore possibilities of coordinating their efforts, in some cases
leading  to  jointly  funded  calls  (ERA-Net-Plus). The  instrument  was  origi-
nally not part of the internationalization agenda of FP6. However, a couple
of ERA-Nets developed into instruments to coordinate member state activi-
ties vis-à-vis third countries or regions. In addition, a range of other ERA-
Nets  in  FP6  had  considerable  international  activities.  Some  examples  are
given in Table 8.2.

In a survey of the European Commission conducted in 2006, 20 per cent
of the responding ERA-Net indicated they had at least one international part-
ner and almost 50 per cent of the ERA-Nets would welcome a global dimen-
sion  of  their  network,  especially  if  there  was  a  sound  coordination  across
Europe as a preparatory step (Wittke 2008). The activities of the four ERA-
Nets  mentioned  in  Table  8.2  indicate  that  new  forms  of  joint  action  with
partner regions are being developed (see the example of ‘Co-Reach’ below),
joint action that links to the Framework Programme and is flexible in terms
of participation by clustering member states regionally.

Box  8.1  indicates  the  flexible  forms  of  coordination  used  by  the
Norwegian Research Council (NRC). The NRC employs different kinds of
instruments for different areas, thus, the coordination landscape is tailored to
the needs of the various areas. The NRC has a three-tier arrangement, with
bilateral  activities  to  foster  concrete  and  specific  needs,  regionally  coordi-
nated  approaches  to  take  advantage  of  the  similar  needs  and  networks  of
neighbouring  countries  when  it  comes  to  global  cooperation  partners  and
options, and finally, the NRC engages in multi-country schemes using estab-
lished international frameworks.

Table 8.2 International dimension of ERA-Nets

Name 

Contract Area 

Start date 

End date        Countries Done Launched Planned*

ERA-NET (CA) 

Joint calls/programmes

CO-REACH 
ERA-ARD 

16185 
517837 

36271 
ELUANEST
SEE-ERA-NET 515805

01/05/2005 

Europe and China
Agricultural Research
for Development 
01/04/2005 
Latin American Network  01/07/2006 
01/09/2004 
Southeast Europe

30/04/2010 

9

31/03/2009 
30/06/2010 
31/08/2009 

14
5
14 

–

– 
–
– 

Not yet

Not yet 
Not yet
1 

–

–
–
–

1
4
3

Notes:
* ‘Planned calls’ are calls for which concrete planning has already started. Some ERA-NETs have foreseen further calls at a later stage, in some cases described
in the Description of Work.
Some other ERA-NETs cooperate with third countries without it being their primary focus, for example:
•
• ECORD (deep sea ocean drilling) coordinates the participation of European countries in the International Ocean Drilling Program (IODP), set up by USA

iMERA (metrology) included a number of third countries in a joint call (incl. USA and Japan)

and Japan

• BONUS (Baltic Sea Research) has a Russian partner
• EUROPOLAR (Polar Research) has a Russian partner
• ERA-SAGE (Societal aspect of Genomics) has a Canadian partner
• EraSysBio (Systems biology) has a Russian partner
• EU-SEC is coordinated by UNICRI

Source: Wittke (2008).

144

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

BOX 8.1 THE COORDINATION MATRIX OF THE
NORWEGIAN RESEARCH COUNCIL

CO-Reach – an ERA-Net in FP6 as Means to Coordinate for
International Collaboration

CO-Reach brings together 16 European partners and almost the
same  number  of  Chinese  counterparts  (ministries  and  funding
organizations  and  Academy  of  Science  and  so  on),  with  the
following mission:

This network is intended to create coherence and synergy in Europe’s
S&T relations with China. It will do so by promoting the co-ordination
of  China  related  policies  and  associated  research 
funding
programmes of individual European countries, and integrating these
efforts with those of other multi-lateral European initiatives, including
the programmes and agreements of the European Commission.

The  first  pilot  activities,  two  joint  programmes  in  social  science
and sustainability, have been launched in 2008 and the network
has come to provide a dynamic information system on scientific
and funding activities, a whole range of high level joint events and
a  platform  for  multilateral  and  bilateral  Chinese  schemes
(www.co-reach.org).  The  coordination  gain  is  not  only  through
new  funding  programmes,  but  through  reducing  complexity,
through  pooling  expertise  and  networks  CO-Reach  established
the  ground  for  further  multilateral  and  bilateral  activity.  While
there is still a way to go for a clearer identity of the network, it has
already  changed  the  way  the  science  and  funding  discourse
between Europe and China is led, without distorting the flexibility
of single country approaches or of smaller country groupings to
develop their own strategies. 

The  following  matrix  shows  how  the  Norwegian  Research
Council organizes its strategy towards international collaboration
with China, taking advantage of the coordination instrument CO-
Reach,  but  also  using  bilateral  and  multilateral  coordination
schemes as appropriate for certain issue areas and policy goals
(Kveseth 2008).

The governance challenges for European international S&T policy

145

Theme

Level

Energy,
Environment,
Polar Research

Hydrology,
Water
Management

Economy,
Welfare, Regional
Development

EU FP-7 and
other
International
frameworks

CO-REACH,
OECD-Project,
INNO-Net
and others

CO-REACH,

CO-REACH,
OECD-Project, OECD-Project

INNO-Net
and others

and others

Nordic
framework
and
initiatives

Nordic Centre
Fudan, NORIA-
Net and other
Nordic
Organizations

Nordic Centre Nordic Centre
Fudan, NORIA- Fudan, NORIA-
Net and other Net and other

Nordic

Nordic

Organizations Organizations

Norwegian
MoUs, links,
cooperation

MOST, NSFC,
CAS, other
MoUs, BILAT

MOST, NSFC, MOST, NSFC,
CASS, other
CAS, other
MoUs, BILAT MoUs, BILAT

Coordinating International Collaboration with and for Industry: the
Role of European Technology Platforms

European Technology Platforms (ETPs) offer new options for joint coordi-
nation approaches between the industry and policymakers. ETPs are targeted
at and used by firms, but coordination takes place in a joint approach with
national  policymakers  and  the  European  Commission.  ETPs  support  a
systematic discourse and the development of future strategic research agen-
das  (SRA)  for  certain  technologies  or  sectors.  Between  2002  and  2006  31
ETPs  were  established.  In  FP7  five  ETPs  have  been  transferred  into  Joint
Technology  Initiatives  (JTIs)  that  now  constitute  a  new  forum  for  public–
private partnerships between the Commission, the member states and indus-
try with a view to industry-led coordination of research activities in a certain
technology.  Industry-led  coordination  from  bottom-up  is  accompanied  by
country  mirror  groups  challenging  the  responsible  national  policymakers
that have a strong representation within the ETPs to engage in some sort of
accompanying policy coordination. Some evidence suggests that coordina-
tion  at  European  level  is  a  catalyst  for  domestic  coordination  or  at  least
fosters the discourse between stakeholders.

ETPs have an in-built international dimension. First, many of the leading
companies  are  multinational  firms  active  on  a  global  scale.  Through
bundling  those  companies  together  into  the  ETPs,  the  definition  of  a
European  strategic  research  agenda  has  automatically  been  linked  to  the

146

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

global dynamics. Second, through developing systematic activities to define
future  research  directions  and  technology  options,  ETPs  have  taken  into
account the global developments especially when it comes to the definition
of future potential global lead markets. Third, some of the JTIs (for exam-
ple, Artemis9, ENIAC10) have their roots in EUREKA clusters that had part-
ners from countries outside the EU (see also European Commission 2008, p.
46).

Fourth, ETPs have started to develop international activities and integrate
extra-EU  partners.  The  latest  EU  status  quo  report  on  ETPs  (European
Commission  2007)  obliges  ETPs  to  report  on  their  international  activities.
On this basis, one can get some indication as to the strategic aspiration as for
international collaboration. A systematic scan of those short reports shows
that 21 out of the 31 ETPs have concrete international activities on an oper-
ational  level  or  even  strategic  aspirations.  For  10  ETPs  the  international
activities are either not mentioned at all or only mentioned in a superficial
way, seeing the international dimension in terms of market opportunities to
be secured.

Most of the 21 ETPs that have a more pro-active approach to international
cooperation see themselves as a European focal point and hub for interna-
tional discourse and partnering in the future with strategic ambitions, others
have strategically incorporated international organizations in their member-
ship  in  order  to  link  up  with  and  influence  global  strategies  (and  regula-
tions). Some have already entered a whole range of collaboration projects,
many of which are explicitly linked to international cooperation projects of
FP6. Two examples of strategic approaches for international collaboration in
ETPs are given in Box 8.2.

These activities of ETPs may indicate a tidal change, and their interna-
tional  ambition  will  further  feed  back  to  policymaking.  European  industry
not only develops common foresight and planning activities, but speaks with
one voice (at least in technology-oriented global discourses), has a hub and
focal  point  in  various  key  technologies,  thinks  about  strategic  global  part-
nering  and  links  this  partnering  with  considerations  about  markets  and
competitiveness. This is not free of tensions as some of the less active ETPs
clearly illustrate. However, it helps to improve the role of Europe in indus-
try-driven,  future-oriented  global  discourses,  regulation  and  cooperation.
There  is  of  course  no  automatism  towards  new  joined  strategy  creation
across  Europe,  but  the  opportunity  structure  provided  through  ETPs  may
pave  the  way  for  new  forms  of  international  S&T coordination  involving
private  and  public  stakeholders  alike  and  leading  to  new  forms  of  global
S&T collaboration.

The governance challenges for European international S&T policy

147

BOX 8.2 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF
FP6 ETPS: TWO EXAMPLES 

ARTEMIS – the International Dimension of an ETP in FP6
(prior to its launch into a JTI)

funding  agencies  (for  example, 

The objective of the ARTEMIS international cooperation strategy
is to define ‘modalities’ for interaction between the European R&D
community and the main international players in the area, includ-
ing research institutions, professional organizations (ACM, IEEE),
standardization bodies (for example, OMG, IEEE), large consor-
tia, 
IST,  NSF,  DARPA).
International collaboration covers a potentially wide range of activ-
ities, from the organization of technical meetings, high-level meet-
ings, conferences, schools and joint international projects. These
may have various aims, including education and training, dissem-
ination,  definition  of  standards  and  development  of  joint  R&D
activities. It is clear that International collaboration should fit into a
global win–win strategy, for achieving the participants’ long-range
aims. Dedicated actions are carried out with regard to cooperation
with nanoelectronics platforms in the USA and the Far-East (see,
for example, www.inc-conf.net) ENIAC is actively involved in the
INC conferences, which target international collaboration/cooper-
ation in the fields of nanoelectronics and nanotechnology.

Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Platform – the International
Dimension of an ETP in FP6 

The International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy and the
IEA implementing agreements for hydrogen and fuel cells are the
main fora for research cooperation beyond the EU. The former is
established by ministerial charter signed by 17 members, including
several EU members. It aims to further international co-operation
on  hydrogen  and  fuel  cell  technologies  and  support  activities  of
common interest, such as safety, codes and standards, and analy-
sis in support of policymaking. The work of the HFP platform has
provided  a  European  focus  for  these  international  cooperation
activities and the European partners’ contributions to the definition
of  common  research  priorities  in  the  IPHE  has  drawn  heavily  on
the work of the SRA, Deployment Strategy and the Implementation
Plan. International cooperation is very important in specific areas,
notably where there are challenging technical barriers, or issues of
common interest (for example, sustainability, safety, standards).

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FOUR CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE COORDINATION
OF INTERNATIONAL S&T POLICIES

Against the background of major trends, some basic conceptual understanding
and some recent illustrations of novel forms of international coordination are
in order. The following section conceptualizes international coordination more
in depth and formulates four key challenges for effective and efficient coordi-
nation activity.

Clarity about S&T Collaboration Goals Underlying the Rationales for
Policy Coordination

Any  policy  coordination  within  Europe  aiming  at  cooperating  with  actors
outside Europe needs to start with defining the motivations of both those who
coordinate  and  those  who  are  supported  in  their  collaborations.  The  final
addressees  of  coordination  policies  traditionally  have  been  individual
researchers.  However,  collaboration  is  increasingly  important  for  research
organizations  who  progressively  design  internationalization  strategies  them-
selves. Similarly, the nature and aims of collaboration in S&T change as soon
as companies are involved. Market considerations and economic competition
come  into  play,  and  coordination  of  S&T policies  is  connected  to  trade  and
industrial policies. This is especially true – but not exclusively so – when deal-
ing with emerging economies, as those economies are often new partners with
less  well  institutionalized  governance  structures  and  less  clearly  defined
framework conditions.

One  can  summarize  the  most  important  motivations  for  international
collaboration  of  researchers,  institutes  or  firms  as  follows,  whereby,  if  not
otherwise  indicated,  the  motives  are  relevant  for  firms  and  public  research
alike:11

• Access to complementary and specialized expertise in scientific teams
beyond national borders, or put more broadly, gaining access to trans-
national knowledge networks;

• Access to scientific talent and high-skilled workers;
• Access to, or sharing the cost of, major facilities;
• Access to unique environments (for example geological phenomena) or

populations (for example genetic or disease profiles);

• Achieving critical mass through cost sharing or combination of datasets;
• Collaboration as an element of mobility strategies in science, providing
the basis for the development of scientific capabilities and experience
more  broadly  (in  the  receiving  environment  and  for  the  mobile
researcher herself);

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149

• Additional research markets (contract research organizations, firms as

R&D service providers);

• Preparing the ground for innovative activities and markets abroad, link-
ing to complementary skills and resources (global value chain integra-
tion, firms mainly) or adjusting to local requirements (firms);

• Benefiting from cost advantages elsewhere (firms, mainly standardized
activities  of  R&D,  but  increasingly  also  in  specific  scientific  areas  in
which  low-cost  countries  are  highly  competitive  –  for  example
nanotechnology in China, software development in India and so on);
• Re-transfer of knowledge to be used at the home location, spill-over of

international knowledge into national innovation systems.

Beyond those science-, technology- and market-driven motivations there are
political  and  societal  drivers  who  are  more  and  more  coming  to  the  fore.
International  collaboration  addresses  trans-border  or  global  problems,  and
recent empirical work has shown that those broad motivations are becoming
increasingly important (Boekholt et al. 2009). This, of course, has implications
for the national and international actor arenas, as a whole set of ministries have
started to formulate the need for and goals of international S&T collaboration
(see below).

This richness and breadth of motivations thus leads to complexity when it
comes  to  cost–benefit  calculations  of  governments  for  certain  collaborative
activities.  The  weighing  of  motivations  and  the  context  conditions  against
which  the  internal  coordination  takes  place  varies  considerably.  Countries
differ in the composition of scientific and economic actors and in the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the innovation system. What might seem an obvi-
ous  driving  force  for  one  country  when  it  comes  to  engage  in  coordination
might  be  marginal  for  another.  The  challenges  and  opportunities  of  S&T
collaboration  and  accordingly  the  most  appropriate  mode  of  coordination
normally differ between countries. Often these differences are not fully trans-
parent and actors are not sufficiently aware of them. International policy coor-
dination  in  order  to  follow  those  drivers  of  international  collaboration
activities must start with a clear definition of the objects and motivations for
coordination.  The  recent  survey  by  the  CREST working  group  on
‘Internationalization  of  R&D’ (CREST Working  Group  2007)  has  clearly
shown how different aspirations and modes of internationalization policies of
countries are.

Finally, one aspect most often overlooked when it comes to institutional-
ized coordination is the peculiarity of each issue area – and those peculiarities
have  severe  consequences  for  the  need  for  and  benefit  from  (international)
collaboration. It makes a difference to collaborate internationally in the fields
of chemistry (scientific field), ageing (social issue) or ‘China’ (location). As

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current  work  in  the  EU  network  of  excellence  PRIME12 shows,  different
scientific fields – or search regimes (Bonaccorsi 2008) – have different needs
for international collaboration and hence also different needs for a coordina-
tion of those policies that enable international cooperation. It is evident that
the scientific area and thus the nature of knowledge creation plays a signifi-
cant role, with different scientific fields having different needs to share infra-
structure, pooling data and methodological skills (Adams et al. 2007; Wagner
2006; Kuhlmann et al. 2008; European Commission 2008).13

It becomes even more complex if international collaboration is organized
around certain issues (obesity, ageing, water, and so on), as there are a range
of different scientific disciplines to be coordinated. Those, in turn, may have
developed very different levels of international collaboration already, and very
different agencies with different traditions of international engagement might
be involved. All this has to be taken into account when coordinating the over-
all set of those disciplines. As the PRIME project has shown (Kuhlmann et al.
2008),14 the  scientific  discipline  chemistry  would  not  require  a  thick,  very
broad international collaboration and coordination approach, whereas the fast
growing, dynamic area of catalysis within chemistry has a high need for inter-
national coordination to enable collaboration and even integration.

Clarity about the Objectives of and the Responsibilities for
Coordination

An obvious – but operationally complex – prerequisite for international coor-
dination  is  a  clear  understanding  of  ‘what’ in  fact  is  to  be  coordinated  and
‘who’ is responsible for this object of coordination. First – and as just seen in
the previous section – the institutional actors that engage in international coor-
dination  are  very  heterogeneous.  Coordination  requires  a  thorough  under-
standing  of  the  capabilities,  needs,  framework  conditions,  embedded
rationales and reference frameworks of each of the participants of the coordi-
nation activities. The institutional settings for S&T policies are very different
(along  a  whole  range  of  categories  such  as  ‘agencification’,  mix  of
programmes vs. institutional funding, importance of collaborative approaches
and so on), and thus the requirements for the different modes of coordination.
For example, if coordination is about programmes, one needs to understand
not only the concrete design or the explicit goals of the programmes, but the
underlying rationales and knowledge about who the owners and managers of
the programme are. The governance of the various programmes or initiatives
that should be coordinated and the roles of the various actors within this gover-
nance need to be clarified. The coordination of different traditions and struc-
tures regarding governance modes poses additional challenges for ‘learning’
as the major prerequisite of successful coordination.

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151

Moreover,  the  positioning  of  the  programmes  in  the  institutional  and
systemic contexts ‘at home’ need to be made explicit. This also involves the
relative importance and leverage of the programmes as regards the programme
addressees in the various countries, who not only differ in terms of scientific
and  economic  ambitions,  but  also  in  terms  of  their  need  and  inclination  to
engage in international collaboration. This, of course, leads to very different
cost–benefit considerations for the various national actors who engage in the
policy coordination in the first place.

Understanding the Coordination Challenge within Member States

International S&T policy coordination first of all calls for internal, domestic
coordination. As studies have shown, the need to ‘speak with one voice’ and
to engage in European activities often triggers challenges of domestic coordi-
nation.  National  coordination  and  European/international  coordination  are
interdependent and co-evolutionary, but without a clear dominance of one over
the other. Derlien (1991), Metcalfe (1994) and Peters (1998) have extensively
discussed  the  need  for  internal  coordination  and  the  various  forms  this  can
take in order to arrive at a strategic actor capacity and an internal clarity that
is needed for international policy coordination.

For  international  S&T coordination  this  is  especially  interesting.  The
option to coordinate internationally can open up new ways to coordinate hith-
erto unconnected or uncoordinated national attempts as international coordi-
nation means that those involved have to be transparent and explicit with their
activities  and  goals  and  thus  create  the  momentum  and  pre-conditions  for
internal synergies.

However, given the heterogeneity of actors in national administrations that
deal with R&D funding, there is no single voice when it comes to coordinat-
ing national policies. This often leads to strong groups lobbying for specific
coordination,  instead  of  systematic  strategic  development.  Further,  there  is
very little internal intelligence on internationalization needs across the various
stakeholders  and  fields,  which  again  makes  coordination  of  related  policies
highly problematic. The internal challenges when it comes to defining priori-
ties and ways of action – as a prerequisite for sound coordination with other
countries  –  are  exceptionally  complex  for  international  activities.  This  has
become apparent in a recent exercise for the Irish government,15 in which for
the first time in Ireland systematic attempts have been undertaken to set up a
process across the government to define priorities for international activities.
This also includes the set up of a discursive process in order to obtain more
transparency about ongoing international activities, future aspirations and the
relative  contribution  of  international  activities  to  the  overall  research  goals.
This kind of cross-government coordination mechanisms would in fact be an

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

absolute  necessity  when  it  comes  to  decide  in  which  areas  and  with  which
partners to coordinate international activities.

When looking at the various coordination mechanisms at the EU level, we
find an interesting process of defining strategies in an ex-post manner, which
emerges from a lack of internal coordination. The extensive growth of bottom-
up coordination through ERA-Nets and ETPs has been driven by individual
agencies and departments rather than by an all-government approach within
individual  countries.  Only  after  a  few  years  of  uncontrolled  –  or  un-coordi-
nated – growth of such coordination activities did EU countries start to bring
those coordination activities under some strategic umbrella. The separation of
responsibilities  for  European  and  international  policies  in  many  countries
hinders  coordinating  international  polices  with  European  ones,  or  at  least  it
poses additional challenges of internal coordination within a country.

Definition of Functions and Modes of Coordination

Clearly, in order to best translate coordination and collaboration motives into
concrete  coordination  action,  policymakers  need  to  consider  the  different
modes  of  coordination. To  understand  modes  of  coordination  we  can  turn  to
political science literature, even if political science has focused mainly on intra-
governmental,  inter-departmental  coordination  (Painter  1981;  Peters  2005).
Recently, this has been elaborated for domestic knowledge policies by Braun
(2008a) and applied to country cases by Edler and Kuhlmann (2008), Griessen
and Braun (2008) and Pelkonen et al. (2008). Earlier, Metcalfe (1994) had elab-
orated on coordination for international governance. However, he has done so
in  terms  of  intra-government  coordination  in  order  to  engage  in  EU  policies
rather  than  inter-government  coordination  itself.  Lately,  a  European  expert
group on the Lisbon Strategy (European Commission 2009) has discussed the
various modes and benefits of coordination of S&T policies within Europe –
albeit not especially related to international S&T collaboration.

For coordination within countries, Painter (1981) distinguishes five objec-

tives:

1.
2.
3.

reduction of duplication,
reduction of policy inconsistency (across government),
reduction of bureaucratic and political conflict,

as well as

4.
5.

increase of coherence and priorities, and
design of a comprehensive all-government approach (reduction of policy
fragmentation).

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153

These five objectives may fit the need for cross-government coordination to
enter international coordination. However, it is important to understand they
largely  do  not  apply  for  the  international  (inter-ministerial  or  inter-agency)
coordination itself. There is little need for an ‘all-government approach’ (5),
for  an  increased  coherence  and  priority  ordering  among  different  national
governments (4), and even for a reduction of inconsistencies (2) as the inter-
ests and needs of the governments involved might remain quite diverse and
coordination functions therefore much more limited and multifaceted.

Those  ambitions  would  only  come  in  the  focus  of  coordination  if  it  is
intended  to  lead  into  integration  into  a  new,  coherent  whole.  This,  in  turn,
would only apply if the EU or some sub-group of countries would claim to act
on behalf of all member states or the members of that particular group when it
comes to all aspects of international S&T collaboration. This, however, is far
beyond  the  current  policy  reality.  Even  the  ambitious  Art.  169  initiatives
largely integrate parts of national policy programmes into a new programme,
but they do not create an entire new whole with distinct strategic actor quali-
ties.

Only  within  the  integrated  parts  would  coherence  in  terms  of  goals  and
instruments  be  expected.  Given  the  diverse  interests  and  context  condition
within the EU, it may be even detrimental for the very purpose of the coordi-
nation – as it would force member states into a uniform, single approach when
it comes to international S&T collaboration.

Equally, the third objective, the reduction of conflict between administra-
tions, has an entirely different meaning when it comes to international coordi-
nation of S&T. Conflicts between administrations of different countries when
it comes to international S&T collaboration are rather unlikely. However, if it
occurs it might be an expression of competition for access to resources, talent,
expertise  or  complementary  funds  in  other  countries. This  can  be  overcome
through  strategies  to  create  win–win  situations  when  joining  forces  to  gain
better access and offer better exchange with international partners altogether.
Finally, the first objective, avoiding duplication (for example in setting up
collaboration  structures,  in  performing  research  in  similar  areas  and  so  on)
may  be  a  reasonable  policy  goal  in  international  S&T policy  coordination.
Duplication  may  in  fact  often  increase  variety,  and  is  thus  a  means  for
improved  performance  through  competition  and  an  enhanced  selection
scenario  for  the  best  approaches.  At  least,  duplication  can  offer  alternative
routes to knowledge production with different potential outcomes.

Thus,  to  systematically  reduce  duplication  of  international  collaboration,
efforts may be counterproductive. However, competition of approaches is only
meaningful  if  the  S&T community  can  actually  choose  and  if  the  national
approaches for S&T collaboration are open for participation from other coun-
tries. If they are not, duplication does not mean competition but inefficiency.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

In addition, to reduce duplication certainly is an issue for international policy
coordination when it comes to build up common structures and networks or
even  harmonized  programmes  to  fund  joint  work  in  commonly  agreed
research areas.

In  short,  it  is  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  argument  rather  than  the
coherence argument that is relevant for international S&T policy coordination.
Actors  coordinate  to  achieve  their  own  goals  better  and  more  efficiently.
Currently they do not do it to claim a coherent approach across all EU coun-
tries  (or  a  substantive  sub-set  of  countries)  or  all  scientific  domains.
Coherence would be a goal of policy integration.

A second,  related  issue  is  the  mode  and  thickness  of  coordination.  The
thickness of coordination has been systematized along various scales. While
those scales have been designed for intra-government coordination, they can
help us to understand the nature of inter-organizational coordination in policy-
making and hence also guide the analysis of international policy coordination.
Extending the well established dichotomy of the German political scientist
Fritz Scharpf who distinguishes between positive and negative coordination,
Peters  (2006,  taken  up  also  by  Braun  2008b)  develops  a  five  level  scale  of
coordination. He distinguishes between

1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

no coordination;
negative coordination (mutual information of units who are not indepen-
dent from each other, but no common policy formulation, coordination as
adaptation to minimise costs out of actions of others);
positive coordination (involves pro-active cooperation in order to achieve
certain goals better);
alignment of goals, which means that it is not the process or the instru-
ment that are harmonized, but the aim that is to be achieved. This mode is
most  promising  if  the  systemic  features  of  countries  and  their  specific
contexts are too different for joint action or adaptation of frameworks;
common development of visions, goals and strategies.

The  broader  rationale  for  and  the  thickness  of  coordination  is  often  entirely
unclear, ill-defined or even – more or less – contested. To take but one exam-
ple, a European Expert Group on the Lisbon Strategy has analysed the Open
Method  of  Coordination  (OMC),  which  can  be  defined  as  a  set  of  fora  for
inter-organizational discourse across Europe, whereby various topics around
S&T governance  have  been  discussed  with  different  country  groupings
involved in each of the groups (European Commission 2009). This is impor-
tant in the context of this chapter as the OMC is international (intra-European).
It brings together actors from European countries with a mission to establish
or prepare coordination. To analyse the nature and effects of the coordination,

The governance challenges for European international S&T policy

155

the Expert Group has used the approach of Braun and Peters and concluded
that the trans-border, inter-organizational coordination within the OMC does
not show many signs of real coordination along those scale categories. Most
of  the  international  inter-organizational  coordination  groups  of  the  OMC
focused on learning from each other (undoubtedly one major objective of the
OMC) and only some of the participants in a limited number of those coordi-
nation groups aspired to positive coordination or even alignments of goals and
common visions and strategies. None of the 18 groups of the four cycles of the
OMC  has  reported  positive  coordination  or  even  thicker  forms  of  coordina-
tion. However, it appears that the OMC has, through the intensive learning that
has  taken  place  in  some  of  the  groups,  paved  the  way  for  further  common
activities which become institutionalized – such as the new Strategic Forum
for International S&T Cooperation – and as such might lead to further joint
activities beyond learning.

There has, however, been an interesting diversity of views of OMC partic-
ipants as to what coordination actually is, and a vast majority appears to have
interpreted  mutual  learning  as  the  actual  objective  of  coordination  and  thus
favoured  a  mode  of  knowledge  exchange  and  common  reviews  over  an
approach of defining common ground for strategies. Learning might – as the
expert group has recommended – be designed to speed up the process of adapt-
ing to the shared goals and to check for possibilities for joint action. However,
in itself it is not coordination in one of the four ways described above, not even
negative coordination.

For the ERA-Net examples above, the picture appears to be very different.
Here, it seems there are first signs of positive coordination, as many of those
ERA-Nets strive for synergies in their own national approaches through joint
action. But it also appears that alignment of goals, or even the development of
joint strategic visions and programmes, is still the exception.

CONCLUSIONS – ELEMENTS OF A LOGIC MODEL OF
COORDINATION

Any  policy  coordination  is  complex.  Conceptual  and  empirical  analysis  has
shown that coordination of policy to foster international S&T collaboration is
by and large rather poor, even domestically. This chapter has argued that inter-
national coordination of national policies for international S&T collaboration
meets  an  additional  set  of  challenges  that  need  to  be  tackled  systematically.
The conceptual considerations presented in this chapter can lay the basis for
an  analysis  of  current  coordination  activities.  They  can,  however,  also  be
utilized to design systematic coordination schemes for policies geared towards
international collaboration as they provide the major elements for a strategic

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

approach  for  international  coordination  as  they  would  have  to  be  applied  in
their logical sequence.16

The  starting  point  of  a  strategic  coordination  process  is  the  definition  of
goals for international S&T collaboration and an analysis of the status quo of
this  collaboration. Already  this  definition  of  goals  necessitates  transparency
and coordination domestically in order to understand how different ministries
and  agencies  perceive  opportunities  through  international  collaboration  and
policy coordination. In a second step, the opportunities of international S&T
collaboration have to be explicitly defined, based on the overall national S&T
priorities – across the various ministries involved – and based on the motiva-
tions and aspirations of the S&T community to collaborate. This opportunity
definition  needs  to  take  account  the  heterogeneity  and  specific  needs  of  the
research  fields.  On  that  basis  concrete  potential  target  countries  and  focus
areas for S&T collaboration can be identified. All this definition process may
utilize  broad  strategic  intelligence,  such  as  bibliometric  and  technometric
analyses for the profiling of countries and identification of strongholds. But
most importantly it must involve a strategic discourse among policymakers,
research managers and scientists domestically.

In such an ideal-type process, the international coordination is not at the
beginning, but a consequence of systematic search and definition processes.
Obviously, very often coordination activities develop very differently; they
emerge  from  discussion  fora,  from  initiatives  of  foreign  partners,  out  of
policy  instruments  such  as  ERA-Net  which  start  with  coordination  at  the
European level and only subsequently ask for the linkages to the domestic
context  and  arena.  However,  the  ideal-type  process  stylized  here  serves  to
highlight  the  importance  of  internal,  national  administrative  coordination
and discourse with the scientific community.

Once, ideally, the purpose and targets for international S&T collaboration
are identified, the international coordination arena needs to be understood –
the  activities,  rationales  and  interests  of  other  policy  actors  which  seek  to
support international S&T collaboration in one way or the other and which
have similar policy needs. This involves mapping global policy and funding
activities,  capabilities  and  opportunities,  and  linking  them  with  existing
international  policy  instruments  and  activities  and  involvement  in  interna-
tional  organizations.  A search  and  definition  process  at  the  international
level then would have to define: (1) the concrete purpose of the coordina-
tion,  situated  between  pure  policy  learning  on  the  one  hand  and  efforts  to
integrate programmes (or parts of programmes) on the other hand, as well as
(2) the mode and thickness of the coordination. The target must fit the mode
and the thickness of coordination. The definition must be explicit and formu-
late the added value, the benefits and the pitfalls of coordination – and, most
importantly, be shared by the international partners. Based on the preceding

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157

domestic  discourse,  the  backing  of  key  stakeholders  and  involvement  in
subsequent policy action on the international level is to be ensured.

Once action is agreed and the structures and processes set up, the devel-
opments need to be monitored and the added value of international collabo-
ration  and  the  change  of  opportunities  and  behaviours  of  the  S&T
community  need  to  be  measured.  This  includes  a  constant  assessment  not
only  of  the  benefit  (efficiency,  effectiveness),  but  also  of  the  opportunity
costs, that is, the costs of non-coordination, as well as a clear understanding
of  exit  strategies.  Explicit  cost–benefit  considerations  and  potential  exit
strategies  are  not  hampering  increased  and  improved  coordination.  On  the
contrary, they help to avoid international  coordination  being  regarded as a
good thing per se, which is then easily ill-defined and develops path-depen-
dencies  that  may  lead  to  meaningless  discourse  fora  detached  from  the
national  policy  goals  and  needs  of  the  scientific  community  and  unable  to
adopt  modes  and  targets  of  coordination  to  the  transformation  of  interna-
tional scientific collaborations.

NOTES

1. For  the  sake  of  clarity,  the  discussion  is  limited  to  science  and  technology  and  does  not
include  coordination  of  policies  to  internationalize  innovation  activities,  as  rationales,
addressees, related policy domains (trade, industry policy and so on) and related governance
actors are quite different in innovation from science and technology.

2. Superior  performance  here  implies  impact  in  terms  of  readership.  Whether  this  implies

research of superior quality is a controversial aspect of the academic debate.
3. Similar results are reported from a study on UK researchers (Technopolis 2005).
4. The  intensified  attempts  to  utilize  S&T collaboration  within  domain-based  or  mission-
oriented  policy  areas  globally  appears  obvious,  yet  we  have  little  systematic  knowledge
about  the  ways  in  which  existing  domain-based  organizations  such  as  the  International
Energy Agency actually contribute to the international production, diffusion and utilization
of scientific knowledge and technologies.
I follow the Oxford Dictionary here.
It can be argued, as Subramanyam (1983) has done, that by using concepts of colleagues and
working in successive steps to accumulate complementary knowledge scientists collaborate
all the time, with all they do. However, for the purpose of this chapter I define collaboration
as an intentional activity of distinct actors to work together in order to achieve a certain goal.

5.
6.

7. Again as defined by the Oxford Dictionary.
8. This section builds on Edler et al. (2008a).
9.
10.
11. This list draws on very similar findings from various sources: AD Little (2005), Boekholt et

http://www.artemis.eu.
http://www.eniac.eu.

al. (2009), Leydersdorff and Wagner (2007); Edler (2007), Georghiou (1998).

12. www.prime-noe.org.
13. Although, as Wagner (2006) rightly states, we still do not know enough to link the proper-
ties of a science field to international collaboration patterns, the evidence is not yet consis-
tent and a range of non-area specific variables interfere.

14. See for an illustration www.prime-noe.org/Local/prime/dir/General%20Presentation/News/

Bonn_Case_Chemistry.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2009).

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

15. Conducted  by  a  consortium  of  Manchester  Institute  of  Innovation  Research  and  Matrix,

Dublin/Belfast 2007/2008 on behalf of FORFAS (Edler et al. 2008b).

16. This section is inspired by an internationalization concept developed in Edler et al. (2008b).

It serves as a first illustration of a potential process development.

REFERENCES

AD  Little  (2005),  Internationalisation  of  R&D  in  the  UK  –  A Review  of  Evidence,

Cambridge: AD Little.

Adams,  John,  Karen  Gurney  and  Stuart  Marshall  (2007),  Patterns  of  International
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European Commission (2009), The Open Method of Coordination in Research Policy:
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9. The added value of international S&T

policy coordination1

Colin Shaw

INTRODUCTION

The  European  Union’s  (EU)  aspiration  to  foster  and  promote  international
cooperation and coordination of scientific research is a laudable and, it could
be argued, rather ‘obvious’ goal. The orchestrated pursuit of valuable knowl-
edge is a natural ambition for any political regime; it is a presumed objective
that may, like many lofty aspirations, remain a simple declaration of intent that
does not materialize into concrete action.

The EU’s ‘constitutional treaty’ made early mention of such a goal and ‘big
European  science’ in  the  guise  of  the  production  of  nuclear  energy,  nuclear
physics and, to a lesser extent, aero-space has been a prominent feature of the
wider economic and social integration that characterizes the EU. However, it
cannot be stated confidently that the EU, and the communities that comprise
it, is a genuine ‘community of science’. Broadly speaking, the integration of
the scientific ‘furniture’ that makes up European science (including research
institutions,  funding  organizations  and  scientists  themselves)  has  lagged
behind other areas of integration and the political declarations of successive
Treaties, Commissions and national actors have failed to reorganize national
systems according to a higher European plan.

Addressing,  as  this  volume  does,  the  salience  of,  and  opportunities
presented by, cooperation in research carried out beyond the boundaries of the
EU, it is important to take stock of the experience of internal (intra-EU) coop-
eration and coordination in science. The difficulties such endeavours meet at
a national level are very often mirrored and amplified at the EU level, and the
same may be said of global cooperation. In this chapter, I attempt to draw a
portrait of the practicalities of the European experience, analysing its extent
and  highlighting  the  obstacles  to  cooperation  and  coordination.  How  are
national structures opened up to foreign imperatives? What is gained and what
is lost in the transnationalization of research effort? Which factors enable and
which  factors  mitigate  against  it?  These  are  some  of  the  difficult  questions
facing the architects of international research structures that are raised here.

161

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THE POLICY GAP IN EUROPEAN RESEARCH

In 2002, the European Council meeting in Barcelona entreated Member States
to  fundamentally  change  how,  how  much  and  where  money  is  spent  on
research  and  development  (R&D)  in  the  European  Union.  The  so-called
‘Barcelona objectives’ firstly required a collective effort by member states to
increase total EU spending on R&D to 3 per cent of combined GDP from the
then current 1.9 per cent.2 Secondly, Member States were to coordinate their
national research programmes to create an integrated European Research Area
(ERA) in order to reduce problems of duplication and fragmentation of R&D
effort  across  the  area.  Thirdly,  member  states  were  invited  to  concentrate
efforts  in  specific  and  strategic  areas,  such  as  biotechnology  and  renewable
energy, which were more likely to promote and sustain economic growth. The
timetable for the objectives was identical to that for the Lisbon agenda, that is,
by 2010. Indeed, the Barcelona goals sought to broaden the Lisbon agenda of
creating ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the
world’ to include not only the demand and use of knowledge (through invest-
ment in ICT training, and so on) but also its supply. In this specific area the
EU was seen to lag behind its two most obvious comparators, Japan and the
USA:  not  only  are  investment  levels  in  R&D  still  higher  in  both  countries
(3.36 per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively),3 these resources are deployed via
a  comparatively  well  organized  national  innovation  system  that  comprises
government, industry and university actors. The absence of a European inno-
vation  system  is  ultimately  the  policy  gap  the  ERA seeks  to  fill.  Increased
spending  (the  first  objective)  needs  to  be  deployed  in  a  coordinated  system
(objective two) and concentrate on strategic areas (objective three).

Conditions for International Policy Coordination

Whatever the potential gains from international policy coordination, it remains
an inherently costly business. So although contenders for policy coordination are
numerous,  there  remains  a  near-infinite  amount  of  parallel  or  uncoordinated
national policies that may be candidates for concerted action but remain stolidly
uncoordinated. Whatever the long-term potential benefits, international coordi-
nation  of  policies  is  usually  accompanied  by  short-term  costs.  Coordination
inevitably entails a loss of independence, the risk of policy distortions, and also
the risk of non-cooperative behaviour by partners. The decision to coordinate is
therefore only entered into on the basis of certain conditions being met. Good
contenders for these initial conditions (see Milner 1997) would be:

(a)
Interdependence;
(b) Political support;

The added value of international S&T policy coordination

163

(c) The need to defend policies from domestic pressure;
(d) Structural similarities.

Monetary policy provides the shining example of the EU coordination of poli-
cies across Member States. All four conditions are met: (a) monetary policy
displays high ‘externalities’ or spillover effects on neighbouring countries; (b)
political  backing  was  constitutionalized  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty;  (c)  the
Stability and Growth Pact ‘hardcoded’ budgetary spending, thereby isolating
it from the political cycle; and (d) Eurozone countries had to restructure anom-
alous  or  inconsistent  policies  and  institutions  before  entering  the  pact.
Accompanying  this  project  was  an  extensive  economic  literature  that  dealt
specifically with the costs and benefits of macroeconomic policy coordination.
The  theory  of  the  so-called  ‘optimum  currency  area’ sought  to  define  a
geographical zone in which economic efficiency would be maximized if the
entire region used a single currency (Ghosh and Wolf 1994; Benigno 2001).

Arguments For and Against a Coordinated Research Policy

As regards research policy, the arguments for international policy coordination
are less strong. First, although research is understood to have strong and posi-
tive  externalities  within  countries,  the  effects  of  one  state’s  policies  on  the
economic and scientific performance of its neighbours are largely unknown.
Secondly, there is strong rhetorical support for coordination even if the impact
is not felt in either policy design or budgetary commitments. Thirdly, research
policy  priorities  rarely,  if  ever,  receive  the  degree  of  domestic  scrutiny  that
would  warrant  its  supranationalization.4 And,  finally,  national  research
systems not only exhibit great dissimilarities but, a body of research suggests,
national innovation systems (NIS) are unique constellations of actors, institu-
tions and interests that cannot easily (Maurseth and Verspagen 2002), or even
should not (Grabher 1993), be coordinated.5

Indeed,  the  academic  literature  on  the  coordination  of  research  policy  is
less  well  developed  than  the  equivalent  work  carried  out  in  the  lead-up  to
monetary  union. While  the  objective  of  a  unified  scientific  community  may
seem obvious, vast differences apply of specific scientific areas. For example,
whilst  the  human  and  social  sciences  may  share  methodologies  across
Member States, the object and findings of their studies are in essence local.
Also,  environmental  anthropology  and  ethno-biology  apply  universal  scien-
tific methods to local conditions whose implications are necessarily circum-
scribed  by  that  specific  field  or  application.  Coordination  of  the  natural
sciences  would  seem  less  problematic;  bar  certain  atmospheric  conditions,
‘big’ science could be carried out anywhere.

Existing academic studies in research management have applied mainly to

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

the collaboration of private firms in research programmes. Collaboration is an
extremely weak form of cooperation as cooperative activities cease as soon
as the common project ends. Coordination such as that the EU is proposing is
a far more transformative process, and one that restructures its participants.
The costs and benefits of coordination are therefore greater than piecemeal
collaboration. The dangers of a non-coordinated policy might be summarized
as  including:  duplication  of  research  effort,  fragmentation  of  projects  and
dispersion of resources. On the other hand, the risks of a coordinated regional
policy  could  include  the  creation  of  rigid  institutional  structures  that  can
inhibit  reaction  and  change,  plus  inertia  and  resistance  from  local  actors  to
centralized  plans  can  dissipate  energies  and  waste  resources  (Arndt  and
Sternberg 2000).

DEVELOPMENTS IN GOVERNANCE

As mentioned above, the ambitious Barcelona agenda has not been accompa-
nied by any new legislation. The Commission launched an action plan relying,
for  the  most  part,  on  the  open  method  of  coordination  (OMC),  that  is,  best
practice,  peer  review  and  policy  learning,  to  achieve  these  objectives.  The
OMC  is  a  flexible  instrument  that  comprises  a  set  of  practices  that  affect
change through what can best be called ‘persuasion’, that is, policy goals are
co-opted and then possibly implemented by Member States because it would
be in their best interest to do so, not because the EU has issued a new regula-
tion. This reliance on non-directive or open-ended means to achieve specific
goals is seen as the instrument’s main strength (Radaelli 2003). Compliance is
flexible and tailored to local conditions. Thus, OMC respects the letter and the
spirit  of  the  subsidiarity  principle  in  a  policy  domain  where  Member  States
retain  almost  exclusive  competence.  However,  in  some  instances,  Member
States  simply  trade  statistics  and  the  Commission  produces  league  tables  of
compliant and not-so-compliant states. Not only does this leave existing insti-
tutional structures intact, it provides for no sanctions in the event of inaction
other that the dubious punishment of being ‘shamed’ by the Commission. The
conditions  for  stasis,  argue  OMC  detractors,  are  therefore  satisfied  (Lodge
2007).

Notwithstanding these observations, the Commission had established plat-
forms  for  policy  learning  and  programme  coordination  in  the  guises  of
ERAWATCH  and  ERA-NET.  The  former  project  collates  information  on
Member States’ research systems and produces comparative reports while the
latter funds the coordination of national research programmes with the possi-
ble aim of opening them up.

The added value of international S&T policy coordination

165

ASSESSING THE BARCELONA GOALS: RESULTS SO FAR

Several years into the action plan it is possible to evaluate trends in European
research  policy.  Several  Commission  reports  and  independent  studies  have
already shed some light on the oppositeness and efficiency of the action plan
and its methods.

The ‘3 Per Cent Target’

Of  the  three  Barcelona  goals  (level  of  investment,  coordination  of  research
effort and strategic prioritization) ‘stasis’ would seem to be the general obser-
vation. Taking the 3 per cent target first: since 2002, investment levels, both
government and business-sourced, have remained unchanged. If anything, the
overall trend has been falling since 2002 with the most up-to-date figure for
EU27 spending (2006) standing at 1.85 per cent of GDP (down from 1.9 per
cent in 2002).6

Indeed, if current trends continue, the EU27 will only reach the target in
2040.7 The  reasons  for  this  may  be  that  Member  States  have  ignored  the
Commission’s  pleas  for  increased  spending  and  patterns  of  investment  are
following a ‘business as usual’ approach. It may also be that the magnitude of
the task is beyond the resources deployed to meet the goal. To put matters in
context,  the  shortfall  in  R&D  expenditure  is  equivalent  to  the  total  GDP of
eight of the Union’s poorer members, or 18 million people. The projected 3 per
cent target is itself equal to combined GDP of the 11 poorest members, or a
total of 55 million people.8 It may thus be that the policy goals are in them-
selves  unattainable,  that  is,  Member  States  are  aware  of  the  goals  and  even
support  them,  but  are  unable  or  unwilling  to  institute  the  radical  reforms  to
national spending priorities required to meet them.

A further reason for this ‘non-compliance’ may be that this goal is not only
unfeasible  but  also  undesirable.  Setting  an  eight-year  timetable  means  that
countries  currently  spending  less  that  the  3  per  cent  will  have  to  inject  vast
resources into public and private bodies not prepared for that level of activity.
The  ‘absorption  capacity’ of  states  to  use  resources  effectively  takes  many
years to build up as recent experience with the Cohesion funds have shown.9
An identical phenomenon is highlighted by economists (Narula and Criscuolo
2002)  when  the  return  on  investment  of  R&D  spending  is  calculated.  The
conditions for ‘multiplying one research euro into 4 to 7 euro’ recently cited
by the Commission are restrictive and dependent, at the very least, on a pre-
existing advanced level of technological development.10 Countries with a poor
technological base cannot see such a spectacular return on investment and may
indeed be better off investing in other growth inducing areas such as tourism,
health or primary education.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Opening up National Research Programmes

On the wider issue of institutional change, progress is, quite naturally, more
difficult to evaluate. A recent CREST report has highlighted the many barriers
to  achieving  an  integrated  European  Research  Area  (OPTIMAT and
VDI/VDE-IT 2005). According to the report the most obvious and important
barrier  to  EU  coordination  in  research  is  the  prevalence  of  national  funding
priorities aimed at national capacity-building, that is, national resources being
specifically targeted at, and remaining within, uniquely domestic institutions
(either universities or business). This factor is, arguably, a consequence of the
historical  role  of  science  in  national  industrial  policies.  Although  the  very
notion of a national policy for industry (with its implications of national cham-
pions, state aid and so on) now appears anti-EU, research systems still largely
respond to national priorities and thereby prohibit transnational cooperation.
This may be reflected in the legal constitution of grants that prevent the trans-
fer of funds to non-residents or, more indirectly, the inability or reluctance of
financial administration systems to manage transnational projects.

Another  finding  of  the  report,  which  is  based  on  expert  interviews  and
analysis of ERA Member States’ research policies and programmes,11 is that
the instances of transnational activities are marginal with only 15 per cent of
reported  research  programmes  spending  more  than  5  per  cent  of  total  funds
abroad  and  only  4  per  cent  spending  more  than  25  per  cent  of  total  funds.
Morevoer,  there  is  a  clear  difference  in  practice  between  the  larger  (France,
Germany and the UK) and the smaller economies, with only 3 per cent of the
former’s programmes activity encouraging transnational funding. This figure
rises  to  31  per  cent  for  small  (<100  billion  Euro  GDP)  economies,  which
suggests that larger countries might have the capacity to collaborate but not
always the will, while smaller ones may have the will but not the capacity.

The ERA-NET scheme launched in 2002 was subject to its own review in
2006 (ERA-NET Review 2006). The scheme provides funding for the addi-
tional cost of partner-networking but does not directly fund any ‘science’ per
se. Over 1000 participants from 38 countries were selected from an initial
2000  plus  candidates.  Although  the  review  noted  general  satisfaction  of
participants,  on  the  crucial  question  of  transnational  funding  or  use  of
‘common pots’, that is centralized financial administration, the review found
that ‘the establishment of common pots was rare’ as it was considered a ‘step
too  far’ by  participating  bodies.  It  also  warned  that  the  ‘preponderance  of
ERA-NET projects and the involvement of significant numbers of staff has
only latterly been perceived by some senior policymakers, leading in some
instances  to  criticism  that  there  are  now  too  many  ERA-NETs,  with  little
focus on items of true strategic importance to individual nations’ (ERA-NET
Review  2006,  p.  16).  Collaboration  as  an  end  in  and  for  itself  may  chime

The added value of international S&T policy coordination

167

with  academic  communities;  policymakers  are  more  likely  to  seek  the
‘added-value’ of such activities.

The Trends in Research Strategies

The third aspect of the ERA plan is the thematic balance of national policies.
The  type  of  science  that  is  pursued  by  the  Member  States  ultimately  deter-
mines the conditions for coordination. If each Member State were to concen-
trate  on  an  exclusive  area  of  research,  the  possibilities  for  cooperation  are
consequently  zero.  Naturally,  states  share  an  overlapping  patchwork  of
domains,  the  question  being,  has  there  been  any  noticeable  convergence  in
priorities  over  time?  Figures  on  government  spending  on  socioeconomic
objectives are reported annually and robust data for longer-standing Member
States is presented in Figure 9.1.12

Overall variance in objectives for the period reported (1995–2005) appears
to have fallen and this decline is in a large part due to a convergence in prior-
ities in the amount of spending on defence (which has been reduced from 16
per cent to 13.5 per cent of EU15 research spending) and research financed
from general university funds (which has risen from 30 per cent to 32 per cent
over the same period). This trend suggests the emergence of more favourable
conditions for policy coordination.

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

e
c
n
a
i
r
a
v

f
o

e
d
u
t
i
n
g
a
M

0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

2005

Source: Eurostat.

Figure 9.1 Variance in research priorities

Total variance in difference
in priorities

Research financed from
general university funds
(GUF)

Defence

Industrial production, and
technology

Non-oriented research

Protection and improvement
of human health

Exploration and exploitation
of space

 
 
 
168

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

THE ADDING VALUE TO EU R&D POLICY

An inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the recent developments in EU
R&D policy is that, although the research agenda has gained in profile over
the  past  years,  due  in  part  to  the  OMC  process,  it  carries  the  burden  of  its
initial hubris. The 3  per cent target is a disputed and, I have argued, disputable
goal. Consequently, compliance has been lacklustre and will continue to defy
Commission appeals. The ERA is a more intangible objective and so progress
towards it is harder to find. Evidence from available sources seems to show
that  research  priorities  are  converging  across  Member  States.  This  may
conceivably mean that duplication is on the increase; as states focus in on a
smaller  range  or  research  areas,  the  dangers  of  duplication  inevitably  rise.
Cooperation in research effort is the obvious solution to the problem of dupli-
cation.  This  is  the  ultimate  goal  of  a  fully-fledged  ERA:  an  integrated  area
where funding, findings and people flow across national boundaries.

The EU’s role in policymaking in any policy fields is an ever-contested one.
Indeed the principle of subsidiarity, which supposedly guides the hand of the
EU policymaker, is intended to continually beg the question: is an EU-level
solution the appropriate answer to the problem? As regards EU R&D policy, a
simple  comparison  of  the  legislative  armoury  available  to,  say,  competition
policymakers  would  lead  one  to  the  conclusion  that  Member  States  do  not
possess the will to share competence, that is, have lost individual control of
their research policy. As mentioned above, although the profile of R&D issues
has been raised over the past decade, no appreciable new powers have been
granted to EU institutions. It would seem then that for Member States R&D
policy is better made ‘at home’.

What Can the EU Do?

If the situation in the EU is indeed ‘suboptimal’, that is, that duplication, frag-
mentation and redundancy of research effort are wasting resources, coordina-
tion is one way to optimize the use of resources. This simple diagnostic may
suggest a cure that member states find too painful to administer.

Firstly, the elimination of duplication necessarily means that one or more
of the identical projects or programmes conducted nationally is simply closed,
transferred or modified so that its output feeds into a larger common area of
research.  This  first-best  option  of  structural  reform  would  make  for  some
extremely difficult choices at the national level. Existing institutions, scattered
as they are across political boundaries, would be unlikely to welcome the type
of  radical  restructuring  brought  on  by  a  rationalization  of  the  EU  research
space. It would be a brave national minister of science and technology who
announces that the national institute for ‘X’ is closing and key staff members

The added value of international S&T policy coordination

169

are  being  offered  places  in  the  international  institute  for  ‘X’ based  abroad.
Political  sensitivities  aside,  it  would  require  a  significantly  well-informed
policymaker to decide that a national research effort is sufficiently similar to
that conducted elsewhere and therefore should cease.

A less painful process would conceivably apply to the elimination of frag-
mentation. One major source of involuntary fragmentation is a lack of infor-
mation, that is, many compatible projects are being conducted independently
that would, given the opportunity, work together to greater effect. The prob-
lem  of  multiple  small  laboratories  or  firms  conducting  portions  of  research
projects  that  could,  if  merged,  progress  faster  and  better  together  could  be
mitigated by the type of policy the EU is currently engaged in. The so-called
European Technology  Platforms  (ETPs)  are  precisely  such  an  endeavour.  In
essence,  they  seek  to  disseminate  information  across  traditional  national  or
sectoral barriers and allow for a more strategic and collaborative approach. For
example, the area of biofuels has recently illustrated the problems associated
with non-strategic and isolated technology development; heavy but uncoordi-
nated  investment  in  both  research  and  production  has  been  blamed  for  the
removal  of  agricultural  land  from  food  production  and  the  current  crisis  in
cereal prices globally. The Biofuel ETP provides a cross-country forum for the
development  of  sustainable  biofuels  and  biomass  technologies  that  aims  to
coordinate Member State research.

Another particularly promising initiative is the mapping or data-gathering
activities associated with ETPs: some ETPs act as ‘census offices’ for existing
projects  and  establish  on-line  searchable  databases  of  relevant  projects.  If
widely  adopted,  this  type  of  information-sharing  could  provide  actors  for  a
coherent  and  complete  state-of-the-art  in  a  particular  field  allowing  for  the
identification of similar projects and enabling the famous ‘synergies’ so enthu-
siastically promoted by EU policymakers.

The Need for a ‘Road Map’

Any evaluation of EU R&D policy is dogged by the lack or poor quality of
information on how R&D is conducted across the Member States. This leads
to ill-designed policy goals and vague action plans. The tools proposed by the
Commission for the elimination of duplication and fragmentation need to be
calibrated to the task facing them. This calibration process has not genuinely
begun.  National  research  programmes  are  a  mystery  to  other  member  states
and often only encounter each other at the margin, that is, when they are co-
involved in Commission-funded networks.

One Community-led initiative would be to map R&D activities in the EU
and disseminate information on existing programmes and projects across the
ERA. This could not be achieved by a prospecting of current activities. Such

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

initiatives rely on national surveys collated by individual rapporteurs, thus the
quality of response varies widely across Member States, somewhat undermin-
ing the value of such exercises. Also, the surveys need to be updated regularly
in  order  to  be  of  any  use.  However,  if  Community  legislation  required  all
national research projects fulfilling certain criteria of size or scope to register
in a Community-wide database, a truer picture of the state of play in EU R&D
could finally be established.13 As Member States could not achieve this project
alone, it would clearly constitute an ‘EU added value’.

The  availability  of  such  information  would  strengthen  the  hand  of
programme managers who wish, against the inclination of national adminis-
trations, to pursue transnational initiatives. Coordination is an expensive prac-
tice  whose  costs  are  borne  ‘up-front’ but  whose  benefits,  if  any,  are  reaped
much later, perhaps only after repeated collaborations. EU-funded attempts to
foster  such  collaboration  are  necessarily  piecemeal  and  often  artificial  in
nature meaning that many networks do not outlast the lifetime of the project
funding. The only convincing incentive for international cooperation would be
a clearly identifiable compatibility of purpose and means that would offset the
immediate costs of coordination. Such calculations would initially have to be
based  on  the  type  of  information  currently  unavailable  to  project  leaders:
who’s carrying out relevant research and where?

I have argued that the added value of an EU approach has not been, so far
at  least,  in  providing  compelling  and  coherent  objectives  that  would  unseat
current national practices and foster the creation of a European Research Area.
Strong new legislative instruments are not forthcoming so the EU will have to
remain modest in its ambitions or see them ignored and mocked. One condi-
tion for cooperation and coordination is robust information on the state of play
of research in the Union. I argue that the EU is well placed to establish a map
of projects, perhaps via a Commission regulation, that would provide invalu-
able, even indispensible, information to national decision makers.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The external dimension of the European Research Area does not need to set
such  lofty  goals  as  integration  or  even  coordination  of  research  efforts.
External cooperation need only be, and arguably could only be, organized on
an  ad  hoc basis;  the  EU  will  only  engage  with  external  partners  when  the
economic or scientific rationale is clear and compelling. Any ‘political’ objec-
tives  such  as  creating  a  common  global  scientific  area  comparable  to  the
regional  efforts  of  the  EU  may  be  untenable  and  unrealistic  except  in  the
narrowest of sectional areas. However, a clearer picture of the state of play is
an essential prerequisite for any cooperative endeavour. In this respect, global

The added value of international S&T policy coordination

171

cooperation may present fewer problems than European cooperation; for any
collaboration on a global scale would assuredly be in an area of global concern
but in a specific, well defined area (for example HIV-AIDS or global warm-
ing).  A world  centre  of  excellence  would  automatically  subsume  all  other
regional structures, in fact or in principle, in the way a European centre would
not.

It  may  be  said  that  an  institutional  system  such  as  the  EU’s  (that,  for
instance,  boasts  two  separate  but  identical  parliamentary  seats,  one  in
Brussels,  the  other  in  Strasbourg)  can  teach  the  research  community  little
about reducing fragmentation and duplication. The origin and persistence of
two  parliamentary  buildings  is  both  historical  and  political;  a  compromise
reflecting the deep-seated national preferences that accompany (or beleaguer)
the  process  of  European  integration.  This  real-world  feature  of  European
governance simply illustrates its Janus-faced nature: although the recognition
of common interests can engender common solutions (for example the quest
for  monetary  stability  leads  to  a  European  Central  Bank),  the  system  under
which these solutions are implemented is often based on the principle of ‘juste
retour’, that is, countries expect to take back out about as much as they put in.
This  principle  explains,  for  example,  why  the  location  of  European
Community agencies is established on a ‘me too’ basis, whereby 20 agencies,
many  of  which  have  complementary  objectives,  are  shared  out  between  14
member countries. This custom is a reflection of the diversity and richness of
a  community  of  nation  states;  however  it  is  also  a  parody  of  organizational
practice.  The  plethora  of  the  Community’s  own  agencies  demonstrates  the
ability and will of Member States to work together, but their geographical scat-
tering across the EU also demonstrates their inability to entirely forego nation-
alistic  reflexes.  The  continued  association  of  national  achievement  with  the
location of EU resources within the territory of one’s Member State illustrates
the core challenge faced by the EU in the development of a truly European
coordinated research policy.

NOTES

1. Research  for  this  chapter  was  supported  by  the  FP6  project,  NEWGOV ‘New  Modes  of

Governance’, Project no. CIT1-CT-2004-506392.

2. Of this 3 per cent, two-thirds was to be made up of business-sourced funds.
3. See OECD (2008, pp. 132, 162).
4.

Indeed,  the  opposite  effect  has  been  observed  where  national  preferences  in  matters  of
genetically  modified  organisms  and  stem  cell  research  threatened  to  politicize  EU-level
activities in the area.

5. This last point may seem paradoxical at first. Modern science and the research that produces
it  is  founded  on  a  strict  identity  of  working  practices  across  time  and  place.  There  is  no
‘French’ or  ‘German’ science  beyond  a  mere  association  of  certain  countries  with  certain
fields of scientific endeavour. Good science is more non-national than simply international

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

in  that  it  is  pursued  entirely  independently  of  where  it  is  conducted.  Therefore,  the  very
nature of science would set it apart as an ideal candidate for, as scholars of European inte-
gration  would  term,  ‘supranationalization’,  that  is,  it  is  being  upgraded  from  a  purely
national concern to a commonly shared goal of the member states. The structural identity of
science itself does not mean that it can easily rise above the concerns of everyday national
politics.

6. Source Eurostat, figures for EU25. Figures for EU15 and 27 show similar trends.
7. The Commission estimates the annual average percentage increase in expenditure in R&D
(2001–2005  for  the  EU27)  to  be  1.5  per  cent. As  the  current  level  (2005)  of  expenditure
stands at 1.8 per cent of GDP, it will take another 35 years to reach 3 per cent.

8. Three  per  cent  of  EU27  GDP is  330  052  million  Euro  or  the  combined  GDP of  Malta,
Estonia,  Latvia,  Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Bulgaria,  Slovenia,  Luxembourg,  Slovakia,  Romania
and Hungary. The shortfall of 130 000 million is equal to the first eight of these member
states (source: own calculation based on Eurostat data for 2005).

9. The differing experiences of cohesion countries to usefully invest similar amounts of funds
(for example Greece compared to Ireland) highlighted absorption conditions, that is strong
and concerted public administration.

10. Manuela  Soares,  European  Commission  Director  of  the  Environment  Directorate  at  DG

Research, speech to ‘OCEANS 2007’, Aberdeen, 2007.
127 programmes in the 34 member countries.

11.
12. Eurostat  employs  the  Nomenclature  for  the  Analysis  and  comparison  of  Scientific
programmes and Budgets (NABS) codes and Government budget appropriations or outlays
on  R&D  (GBAORD)  by  13  socio-economic  objectives  (available  at  http://europa.eu./
estatref/info/sdds/en/gba/gba_nabs_classification.pdf).  The  chart  reproduces  normalized
variance for six of the 13 objectives that displayed significant variation (the ‘total variance’
is calculated for all of the 13 priorities). Fourteen member states (EU15 minus Luxembourg)
were  included  in  the  calculations  because  (a)  long  term  data  does  not  exist  for  newer
member  states  and  (b)  there  is,  presumably,  a  lag  effect  to  the  influence  of  EU  research
policy on domestic priorities.

13. Currently, the EU has in place a registration system for ovine and caprine animals across the
27 Member States. Arguably, it knows far more about the whereabouts and number of its
cows and goats than of its research programmes and projects.

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Innovation Linkages? An Empirical Based Answer’, European Planning Studies, 8
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Benigno,  Pierpaolo  (2001),  Optimal  Monetary  Policy  in  a  Currency  Area,  CEPR
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Commission.

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to Finding Optimum Currency Areas, NBER Working Paper No. 4805, Cambridge:
National Bureau of Economic Research.

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255–77.

Lodge,  M.  (2007),  ‘Comparing  Non-Hierarchical  Governance  in  Action:  The  Open
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Maurseth, P.B. and B. Verspagen (2002), ‘Knowledge Spillovers in Europe: A Patent

Citations Analysis’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104 (4), 531–45.

Milner, Helen V. (1997), Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and

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Narula,  Rajneesh  and  Paola  Criscuolo  (2002),  A Novel  Approach  to  National
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Architecture for the European Union?, Report No. 1, Stockholm: SIEPS.

10.  The organization of policy 

coordination in multi-level spaces:
implications for EU international
S&T policy

Robert Kaiser

INTRODUCTION: NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE POLICY
COORDINATION IN MULTI-LEVEL SPACES

In  systems  of  multi-level  governance,  policy  actors  are  likely  to  coordinate
their  activities  within  horizontal  or  vertical  policy  networks1 if  they  are
convinced  that  ‘a  sharing  of  tasks  and  responsibilities’ or  ‘doing  things
together instead of doing them alone’ (Kooiman 1993, p. 1) would be benefi-
cial both for participating actors as well as for public welfare. Policy networks
have  spread  within  the  European  system  of  multi-level  governance  because
policy  coordination  within  networks  seems  to  be  the  most  effective  mecha-
nism for the management of interdependencies if alternative modes of coordi-
nation are either not at hand (for example top-down hierarchical order by the
highest  political  level)  or  if  they  are  considered  to  be  not  appropriate  (for
example competition for the best solution which would produce winners and
losers).

Indeed, network arrangements seem to combine the advantages of compet-
itive and hierarchical coordination without incurring their respective deficits.
Networks offer more flexibility than hierarchies if they are able to produce an
added value or solutions for commonly shared problems, which can be imple-
mented by actors who preserve their autonomy. Therefore, it can be assumed
that  the  most  challenging  aspect  of  the  organization  of  policy  coordination
within  multi-level  policy  networks  is  not  only  the  definition  of  commonly
shared problems or possible added values, but also the determination of the
degree of the actors’ autonomy as well as the identification of the degree of
desirable competition among them.

It is therefore obvious that processes of policy coordination rely on several
prerequisites.  Those  prerequisites  differ  depending  on  the  specific  policy
objectives  that  require  different  degrees  of  coordination.  In  this  respect,

174

The organization of policy coordination in multi-level spaces

175

Painter (1981) and Metcalfe (1994) have defined a number of different objec-
tives that can be achieved through policy coordination. Basically, they intro-
duced  a  differentiation  between  the  following  five  functional  levels:  (1)  the
avoidance or minimization of duplication and overlap which can be reached
primarily  through  the  exchange  of  information;  (2)  the  avoidance  of  policy
inconsistencies which requires not only an exchange of information but also
consultations among actors; (3) the minimization of bureaucratic or political
conflict which implies that actors agree on specific conflict resolution mecha-
nisms; (4) the quest for policy coherence which requires that actors are will-
ing to establish common principles and priorities; and (5) the promotion of a
common policy approach which is based on a unified strategy.

This  list  of  objectives  basically  shows  that  policy  coordination  is  either
necessary  to  avoid  policies  of  interdependent  actors  affecting  each  other
adversely  or  it  is  constitutive  for  the  formulation  and  implementation  of
common agendas. This differentiation therefore reflects an established distinc-
tion between negative and positive coordination. While negative coordination
aims  at  mutual  adjustment  of  autonomous  policies,  positive  coordination  is
much more ambitious as it requires cooperation between actors who strive for
policy coherence (Scharpf 2000). The objective of policy coherence, however,
implies that the different actors largely abstain from defining principles and
priorities  on  their  own  responsibility.  Rather,  if  they  are  able  to  agree  on
common visions and strategies for the future, positive coordination may lead
to a ‘strategic coordination’ of increasingly integrated policies (Braun 2008).
This  chapter  is  interested  in  the  logics  of  policy  coordination  in  vertical
actor  networks.  This  is  not  to  say  that  policy  coordination  in  horizontal
networks is less ambitious. On the contrary, there are a number of empirical
studies that showed that actors at the European level face significant problems
if they aim at developing coherent strategies across established policy domains
(for example Peterson and Sharp 1998). In view of the coordination of inter-
national S&T policies, the engagement of the European Union is a relatively
new phenomenon and it is obviously confronted by the fact the EU Member
States  traditionally  have  been  very  active  in  this  field  while  cooperation
among them has largely taken place within intergovernmental contexts outside
the EU framework.

Against this background I will argue that there are basically two alterna-
tives for the coordination of international S&T policies between the European
Community  and  its  Member  States.  The  first  alternative  would  consist  of  a
strategy of negative coordination that is aimed at minimizing negative spill-
overs between the Member States’ international S&T policies. Such a strategy
could be applied to the whole spectrum of respective national policy initiatives
and  it  would  require  that  the  European  Commission  provides  a  forum  for
information  exchange  among  national  governments  and  research  organiza-

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

tions. The second alternative of a positive or strategic coordination of interna-
tional  S&T policies  would  be  a  promising  endeavour  only  if  it  were  not
targeted at replacing but at complementing national or regional initiatives. It
therefore would have to offer an additional layer of international S&T activi-
ties which leaves it to the Member States (and of course to their subnational
authorities  and  non-profit  S&T organizations)  to  decide  on  the  appropriate
context of their international activities, thus when and why they may choose a
bilateral, a multilateral or a European framework. Consequently, the adequate
level of coherence in international S&T activities would have to be determined
in a bottom-up process as it would have to provide for a high amount of flex-
ibility, which gives different actors different options for coordination. In the
following, this argument will be developed in four steps.

In a first step I will briefly refer to a taxonomy of international S&T coor-
dination and cooperation, which I discussed in more detail in a first contribu-
tion  to  the  ERA Expert  Workshop  on  ‘Strengthening  the  coordination  of
Community  and  Member  States’ policies  and  programmes  for  international
S&T cooperation’ (Kaiser 2008b). This taxonomy differentiates various forms
of  international  S&T cooperation  along  the  type  and  the  number  of  actors.
Thus, it can be shown that there is already an established structure of different
network relations in which a large variety of actors choose different institu-
tional arrangements for different S&T policy goals. In fact, while governments
are only one group of actors that are involved in international S&T coordina-
tion and cooperation mechanisms it is also evident that governments seem to
prefer different institutional contexts dependent on their specific interests and
the level of engagement.

Thus, in my second step I will provide an explanation for the existence of
the many different institutional arrangements in international S&T policies. In
this  section  the  focus  will  be  on  national  governments  and  public  research
organizations which are the actors that are mainly involved not only in bilat-
eral, but also multilateral arrangements for the coordination of S&T measures.
The claim here is that these organizations aim at controlling both the exclu-
sivity of the network actor constellation as well as the degree of specificity of
the common measures. Because of that the different arrangements that will be
identified in the taxonomy (see section 2 of the chapter) can be systematically
differentiated according to their degree of exclusivity and specificity.

This differentiation will be important for the third step of my argumenta-
tion. Here I will argue that the dimensions of exclusivity and specificity both
have an impact on the coordination of international S&T policies within the
European Union. In this respect, it can be assumed that the European level is
mainly for three reasons not likely to establish the adequate framework for the
coordination of transnational S&T collaborations that are characterized by a
high degree of exclusivity and specificity. Those three reasons are the degree

The organization of policy coordination in multi-level spaces

177

of the competition among Member States within the European context (which
refers  to  exclusivity),  the  structural  divergence  of  Member  States’ S&T
systems (which refers to specificity) and the narrow confines for coordination
set by the definition of the added value of European S&T policy. These three
reasons therefore define both the fields of action in which the coordination of
S&T policies between the European Community and its Member States might
be successful as well as those in which this might be not the case.

Against  this  background,  the  fourth  and  final  step  will  summarize  the
consequences that arise for the organization of processes of policy coordina-
tion and policy learning within the EU framework.

A TAXONOMY OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
FOR INTERNATIONAL S&T COORDINATION AND
COOPERATION

Although  there  are  today  a  large  variety  of  actors  who  engage  in  different
arenas for international S&T coordination and cooperation, by far the largest
number of respective efforts to coordinate science and technology across terri-
torial borders has still been taken in bilateral contexts. As Table 10.1 shows,
this holds for all types of actors who play a role in this field.

Bilateral  S&T agreements  or  programmes  do  not  only  exist  between
governments  at  national  or  subnational  levels,  but  also  the  European
Community has concluded about 30 bilateral agreements that either allow for
the  participation  of  third  countries  in  projects  funded  by  the  Framework
Programme  or  institutionalize  a  bilateral  dialogue  about  different  kinds  of
S&T areas.  Within  the  EU  bilateral  agreements  are,  however,  clearly  the
domain  of  the  Member  States.  In  the  year  2000,  the  15  EU  Member  States
were engaged in a total of 993 bilateral agreements of which only 290 were
concluded among themselves (Clark et al. 2001). Even if bilateral agreements
with accession countries that have entered the Union since 2004 are taken into
account,  agreements  with  non-European  countries  still  prevail.  Here  the
largest number of formal arrangements exists with partner countries in Asia as
well as in North and South America. Within the EU, Germany ranks first in the
total  number  of  agreements. The  country  has  concluded,  for  example,  more
than 50 per cent of all bilateral agreements that exist with North America. This
clearly indicates that bilateral agreements of actors within the European Union
are  especially  aimed  at  establishing  relations  with  actors  beyond  the  EU
framework.

There is a notion in the literature that the majority of bilateral intergovern-
mental agreements are ‘ “empty” expressions of diplomatic goodwill’ and that
‘where informal collaborative links are strong and international relations are

Table 10.1 Actors, arenas and modes of coordination in international S&T policy

Type of Actors

Bilateralism

Exclusive Multilateralism

Multilateralism

National and Subnational
Governments 

Foreign policy agreements

International Space Station
(ISS)

Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC)

Intergovernmental
Organizations

EU

Memoranda of understanding

EU-INTAS

International Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor 
(ITER)

Human Frontier Science
Programme Organization 
(HFSPO)

OECD Global Science 
Forum

Intelligent Manufacturing 
System (IMS)

United Nations

1
7
8

Governmental
Agencies 
Ministries

Agreements

Letters of Intent

Thematic programmes

PROs 
National Science Councils

Thematic agreements and
programmes

The Human Genome
Organization (HUGO)

Ocean Drilling Programme
(ODP)

Letters of intent

Memoranda of
understanding

Global Research Alliance
(GRA)

Scientific Committee on
Antarctic Research (SCAR)

Private Non-Profit
Organizations

Thematic programmes

Thematic programmes

The organization of policy coordination in multi-level spaces

179

good, as within the EU, bilateral cooperation agreements are generally unnec-
essary’ (Stein 2004, p. 444). This argument is to a certain extent plausible for
the European context in which the European Research Area (ERA) and a large
number  of  intergovernmental  research  organizations  provide  an  extensive
institutional infrastructure for S&T cooperation. It is, however, less convinc-
ing  in  view  of  S&T policy  coordination  beyond  European  borders.  Rather,
there are at least two reasons why bilateral agreements between nation-states
(or subnational entities) will remain important in the future.

First, they comprehensively structure collaborative efforts between coun-
tries  according  to  their  specific  technological  profiles  and  they  guarantee
access to critical R&D infrastructure that often exist at only one specific place
in the world. Second, the importance of bilateral S&T agreements is also due
to the limits of transnational coordination in multilateral arenas which exist in
two different forms.

The arena of ‘pure’ multilateralism is mainly characterized by the fact that
nation-states generally invest little (financial) resources (as in the cases of the
IPCC  or  HFSPO)  into  such  programmes  while  other  initiatives  are  either
mostly funded by industry (IMS) or solely established by public research orga-
nizations  (ODP,  SCAR).  In  contrast,  nation-states  have  a  much  stronger
involvement in projects agreed upon in the arena of ‘exclusive’ multilateral-
ism. Here exclusivity refers to the participation of a limited number of coun-
tries which either belong to a specific regional context or – as in most cases –
share  the  same  level  of  scientific-technological  development.  The  arena  of
‘exclusive’ multilateralism is typically the context for the transnational coor-
dination  of  so-called  megascience  projects  which  are  limited  simply  by  the
fact that they are cost-intensive, require heavy infrastructures and explore new
fields of basic research or engineering.

Apart  from  that,  public  research  organizations  (PROs)  and  National
Science Councils also play a significant role in both multilateral arenas where
they coordinate specific transnational research projects which receive in some
cases additional funding from national governments. This is an important find-
ing  because  those  actors  commonly  enjoy  a  large  amount  of  autonomy  to
establish  links  to  other  organizations  according  to  their  specific  needs  and
competencies.  Even  if  the  creation  of  those  relations  is  supported  by  public
policies it can be assumed that governmental capabilities to steer those rela-
tions are relatively low while exclusivity is a major impulse for their estab-
lishment.

In sum, these three distinct arenas for S&T policy coordination and coop-
eration already provide an indication for the different logics of negative and
positive  coordination. As  far  as  governments  are  concerned,  bilateral  agree-
ments and memoranda of understanding are used to adjust autonomous poli-
cies in order to enhance the networking capacities of the various organizations

180

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

within their respective research systems. They are thus examples of negative
coordination. Positive coordination takes place especially in the field of exclu-
sive  multilateralism  where  national  governments  agree  on  strategic
programmes  that  often  require  the  investment  of  considerable  financial
resources. This is certainly the case with the ISS and the ITER where partici-
pating countries focus their action on these multilateral programmes. As I will
show in the next section, exclusivity is, however, not the only relevant indica-
tor, because the degree of specificity also plays a role. Moreover, both exclu-
sivity  and  specificity  seem  to  be  the  two  relevant  aspects  that  explain  the
actors’ interests  and  preferences  in  the  coordination  of  international  S&T
policy measures.

EXCLUSIVITY AND SPECIFICITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR S&T COORDINATION AND
COOPERATION

From the perspective of institutionalist theory, there are two different logics
under which political actors weigh the potential gains from coordination and
cooperation (March and Olsen 1998). The  ‘rational’ perspective is based on
the logic of consequentiality that is characterized by an actor who will pursue
his interest by rational calculation and contracts and who is mainly motivated
by incentives and individual advantage. Since the rational actor has to make
his decisions under the conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information
he will seek to specify the aims of coordination as he will also seek to limit the
number of partners to those who are in fact able and willing to contribute to
the  solution  of  a  commonly  shared  problem.  Institutional  arrangements  that
follow the logic of consequentiality will therefore comprise a relatively small
number of actors who have agreed on binding rules for the distribution of costs
and benefits. Those arrangements are close to what Lindberg et al. (1991) have
defined  as  obligational networks  as  a  mode  of  coordination  in  the  world  of
industrial  organization.  Within  obligational  networks  flows  of  resources  are
coordinated among few actors in order to serve individual interests.

Following  their  differentiation  there  is  another  kind  of  network  arrange-
ment, which they characterize as promotional networks. Those networks are
more long-term and stable arrangements aimed at pursuing common interests
by  reducing  excessive  competition  or  facilitating  cooperation  in  a  more
general (or unspecific) sense (Lindberg et al. 1991, pp. 18–26). Actors who are
engaged in those networks are more likely to follow the logic of appropriate-
ness. Here they ‘seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an iden-
tity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices
and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do

The organization of policy coordination in multi-level spaces

181

what  they  see  as  appropriate  for  themselves  in  a  specific  type  of  situation’
(March and Olsen 2004, p. 3). Promotional networks will therefore differ from
obligational ones in terms of a lower level of specificity and/or exclusivity.

This  differentiation  between  the  two  logics  of  coordination  and  the  two
types of networks has a substantial explanatory power for the existence of the
varying types of arrangements for international S&T cooperation. Under the
logic of consequentiality the organizational form of coordination is an impor-
tant  precondition  for  the  achievement  of  common  goals.  Under  the  logic  of
appropriateness,  however,  the  organizational  form  is  at  least  to  some  extent
pre-determined  since  the  various  actors  belong  to  the  same  institutional
context in which coordination and cooperation is a permanent process not only
in the specific field of S&T policies. In more concrete terms, under the logic
of appropriateness at least a number of the EU Member States might agree to
coordinate  some  international  S&T measures  not  primarily  because  of  the
expected  added  value  for  research  and  development,  but  because  of  their
conviction that such a measure would generally support the EU’s position in
international relations.

In principle, S&T policy actors can choose from four institutional alterna-
tives according to their specific goals and preferences. Firstly, if they want to
improve their own competitive position in a field in which they already have
a comparative advantage or which is of strategic importance to them they will
establish  an  arrangement  characterized  both  by  high  exclusivity  and  speci-
ficity. Secondly, if actors want to contribute to scientific progress in a certain
field in which the emergence of new knowledge has no immediate impact on
their competitive position or in which more intense interactions between S&T
organizations is considered beneficial, they will find an arrangement that also
has  a  high  level  of  specificity,  but  a  lower  level  of  exclusivity. Thirdly,  if  a
group of actors has a common understanding about a number of problems that
may have a similar impact on all of them, they will opt for an arrangement of
high exclusivity but low specificity. And fourth and finally, actors will agree
on an arrangement characterized by low exclusivity and low specificity only
if the cooperation itself is seen as advantageous even if there is no clear under-
standing of the potential benefits.

In order to test the plausibility of this differentiation, I will now turn to those
international S&T policy arrangements that were already identified in my taxon-
omy  mentioned  before.  Since  this  taxonomy  took  into  account  the  respective
number of actors it already referred to exclusivity as an important quantitative
indicator. However, in contrast to this earlier classification the indicator of speci-
ficity does not refer to the certain type of actor, but to the degree of specificity
of the different coordination arrangements. In view of the coordination of inter-
national  S&T measures,  exclusivity  can  be  measured  as  high  if  the  network
arrangement is comprised of only those actors who define themselves as crucial

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

contributors for the success of the measure. Membership is thus not predeter-
mined by an organizational structure established under a rationality that has no
immediate relation to the common goal of the respective S&T measure. If, in
contrast, actors who already belong to a specific organizational structure decide
to extent their collaboration to international S&T measures, we would measure
the degree of exclusivity as low. In this respect, the coordination of S&T poli-
cies by G8 Member States, for example, is not a very ‘exclusive’ undertaking
even if the large majority of the countries in the world are excluded from partic-
ipation.  Specificity  can  be  measured  as  high  if  the  subject  of  coordination  is
highly specified in terms of the common goal, the respective contributions of the
participating actors and their obligations and rights in utilizing the results of the
collaboration. Thus, even if a group of countries agree to coordinate their activ-
ities in a specific field, such as climate change, such an arrangement is not neces-
sarily  of  high  specificity  since  we  can  expect  that  the  involved  actors  pursue
various other measures in this field outside that arrangement.

Table 10.2 Exclusivity and specificity of international S&T agreements

Specificity

Exclusivity

High

Low

High

International Space Station

Interministerial Agreement
BMBF-DOE on cooperation
in the area of dense plasma
physics

Bilateral Agreements/MoU between
National Science Councils

Global Research Alliance

MPG/Roche/Novartis Agreement
on the Joint Funding of a
synchrotron beamline

Low

European Molecular Biology
Laboratory

OECD Global Science Forum

G8 Research Dialogue

International Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor

INCO-NETs

Human Frontier Science
Programme

Ocean Drilling Programme

IPCC

COST, EUREKA

Bilateral Science and Technology
Agreements among nation-states

The organization of policy coordination in multi-level spaces

183

This shift in focus is due to a different analytical perspective. Whereas the
taxonomy was able to show the large variety of public actors who are already
engaged in international S&T coordination, the following typology aims at a
systematic differentiation between the different logics and institutional prefer-
ences  of  public  actors.  Based  on  this  typology  we  can  assess  some  of  the
central organizational characteristics of institutional arrangements for interna-
tional S&T coordination and cooperation in terms of the differentiation along
the dimensions of exclusivity and specificity (see also Table 10.2):

1. Arrangements  of  high  exclusivity  and  high  specificity:  Institutional
arrangements such as the International Space Station, but also intermin-
isterial agreements between national governments as well as agreements
concluded by national research organizations (with other public or even
with private actors) are generally treaty-based arrangements that clearly
specify rights and responsibilities of the respective partners. The distrib-
ution of costs and benefits is not determined on the basis of equal shar-
ing  of  burdens  and  gains.  Therefore,  parties  to  those  agreements  can
pursue both individual and collective interests. If nation-states are part-
ners to those agreements, cooperation is normally organized as an inter-
governmental arrangement in which decision-making is largely based on
consensus.  Those  arrangements  thus  clearly  follow  the  logic  of  conse-
quentiality. These agreements are often made in science and technology
fields  in  which  countries  have  specific  economic  or  industrial  policy
interests  or  in  which  public  research  organizations  seek  to  establish
exclusive access to specialized research facilities. In terms of the differ-
ent  kinds  of  coordination,  arrangements  of  high  exclusivity  and  high
specificity are certainly cases of positive coordination.

2. Arrangements of low exclusivity and high specificity: Those arrangements
are the most likely institutional context for international S&T cooperation
that is either aimed at targeting certain common problems or doing highly
specific research in areas in which there is no immediate impact on the
countries’ economic  competitiveness.  Those  arrangements  are  either
concerned with basic research (as in the case of the EMBL) or with rather
long-term  knowledge  production  processes  related  to  important  chal-
lenges of the future (as is in the case of the ITER). In these areas, partners
to the agreements seek to balance their gains and burdens, because they
can expect to profit from the project’s outcome in a similar way. The prin-
cipal characteristic of an equal distribution of burdens does not mean that
individual  countries  would  not  be  able  to  become  more  engaged  than
others. In the case of the EMBL, for example, the three countries which
host  one  of  the  organization’s  laboratories  invest  significantly  more
money  than  those  that  do  not  provide  a  research  infrastructure,  even

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

though  the  respective  financial  share  of  each  country  is  determined  on
the basis of its GDP. In contrast to arrangements of high exclusivity and
high  specificity,  agreements  of  this  second  type  are  also  driven  by  the
logic  of  appropriateness,  because  there  are  expectations  that  countries
having  high  economic  and/or  scientific  capabilities  will  provide  their
support to those arrangements. As such, these arrangements are aimed at
generating a sufficient amount of policy coherence in specific fields and
are thus also examples of positive coordination. They can, however, not
necessarily be characterized as strategic coordination, because they often
integrate  only  a  small  part  of  the  countries’ activities  in  the  respective
S&T area.

3. Arrangements  of  high  exclusivity  and  low  specificity:  These  kinds  of
agreements  mainly  exist  in  form  of  bilateral  arrangements  between
national research organizations while they are relatively rare at the multi-
lateral  level.  They  generally  cover  a  broad  range  of  potential  fields  of
cooperation  in  different  scientific  disciplines.  Exclusivity  thus  refers
either  to  the  bilateral  structure  or  to  the  rather  limited  but  self-defined
multilateral structure of cooperation. Respective agreements normally do
not regulate any distribution of tasks or resources. Accordingly, cooper-
ation is driven both by the logic of appropriateness and by the logic of
consequentiality. Accordingly, those arrangements might allow for nega-
tive and positive coordination.

4. Arrangements of low exclusivity and low specificity: This final category
comprises very different arrangements. Bilateral science and technology
cooperation agreements, for example, are at first sight characterized by
high exclusivity. In countries like Germany, however, most of these bilat-
eral  agreements  with  very  different  countries  provide  for  quite  similar
and  general  frameworks  for  cooperation.  Therefore,  as  a  tool  for  S&T
policy  coordination,  this  kind  of  agreement  has  a  low  degree  of  exclu-
sivity.  In  other  forms  of  agreements  of  low  exclusivity  and  specificity,
such  as  the  European  cooperation  schemes  COST and  EUREKA,
Member States aim at strengthening trans-border R&D collaborations in
a number of technical fields. In these cases, the level of integration and
coherence is still relatively low, because in view of the financial contri-
butions and the governance structures, COST and EUREKA are in fact
forms  of  intergovernmental  multilateralism.  Similar  to  arrangements  in
the third category, cooperation in this final category is much more driven
by  the  logic  of  appropriateness  than  by  the  logic  of  consequentiality.
Given  their  broad  approach  and  the  low  degree  of  specificity,  there  is
hardly any coordination needed  for  the establishment of these arrange-
ments.

The organization of policy coordination in multi-level spaces

185

THE IMPACT OF EXCLUSIVITY AND SPECIFICITY ON
THE COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL S&T
POLICIES AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL

From  what  has  been  said  so  far,  it  can  be  followed  that  the  dimensions  of
exclusivity  and  specificity  largely  explain  why  and  in  what  kind  of  institu-
tional arrangements nation-states and public actors within nation-states coor-
dinate  S&T policies  at  the  international  level.  For  the  reason  of
intra-Community competition among EU Member States and their respective
patterns of technological specialization, a Community dimension in interna-
tional S&T coordination is not evident in areas in which Member States tend
to  choose  arrangements  that  are  characterized  by  high  specificity  and  high
exclusivity. In these cases, Member States are mainly interested in increasing
the absorptive capacity, the attractiveness and competitiveness of their domes-
tic  S&T infrastructure  as  well  as  in  gaining  access  to  foreign  markets.
Admittedly,  processes  of  globalization  and  economic  integration  have
certainly  increased  the  pressure  on  national  S&T policymakers  to  develop
internationalization strategies. Those strategies, however, did react to the pres-
sure of globalization and not primarily to an intensification of coordination of
S&T policies at the European level. They rather led to an increase of national
bilateral efforts, which also became more focussed on a number of strategic
countries and markets (CREST 2008).

From  this  seems  to  follow  that  coordination  of  Community  and  Member
States’ international S&T policies should be most likely in cases characterized
by a relatively low degree of exclusivity and specificity. There is indeed some
empirical evidence which supports this assumption. The INCO-Nets, for exam-
ple, have been valued as successful examples of coordination of international
S&T policies  at  the  European  level  (European  Commission  2008).  Those
arrangements are, in view of the variety of topics concerned, certainly exam-
ples of low specificity. But they are also characterized by a low degree of exclu-
sivity  as  established  inter-regional  fora  on  R&D  policies  that  are  aimed  at
bringing together all countries that belong to the specific regional context. In
the case of the INCO-Nets there is a strong Community dimension since these
instruments are financed by the European Union. A strong EU involvement is,
however,  not  for  granted  in  arrangements  of  low  exclusivity  and  low  speci-
ficity. As the examples of COST and EUREKA show, Member States seem to
have good reasons not to fully integrate these forms of European S&T cooper-
ation into the Community framework. This is mostly due to the fact that both
arrangements allow for a government-controlled bottom-up approach towards
cooperation of highly autonomous actors that delegates mainly national S&T
funds to collaborative actions (Georghiou 2001).

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

This raises the question of whether the differentiation along the dimensions
of exclusivity and specificity provides any insight at all into possible fields of
action  in  which  a  stronger  coordination  between  the  Community  and  its
Member  States  would  be  appropriate.  Indeed,  both  dimensions  are  closely
related to the restrictions for a European approach that derive both from the
principle of subsidiarity as well as from the need to define the European added
value.  Those  restrictions  limit  the  European  engagement  to  actions  which
either establish a critical mass of resources, which strengthen coherence with
other  policy  areas,  which  contribute  to  a  more  integrated  research  area  or
which  increase  the  effectiveness  of  representation  of  the  European  Union
within the international sphere (Kaiser 2006; Kuhlmann 2001).

This means that the definition of a European added value has to be judged
against  two  basic  premises  of  the  ERA (Kaiser  and  Prange  2004). The  first
premise concerns the fact that the generation of a critical mass may come into
conflict with Member States’ ambitions to keep or extend a competitive advan-
tage they have in relation to other Member States. Intra-Community competi-
tion inevitably leads to the result that Member States will delegate resources
into  similar  research  activities.  The  argument  that  R&D  duplication  causes
fragmentation within the ERA is therefore a foreshortened perception, because
the provision of a critical mass is a policy goal also for the Member States’ and
even for regional research policies. Closer coordination within the ERA may
further on come into conflict with the second premise, which is the structural
diversity  and  the  divergence  of  the  technological  capabilities  of  Member
States’ research and innovation systems. Given the fact that in the EU-27 the
degree  of  structural  diversity  and  the  differences  in  R&D  capabilities  have
dramatically increased (European Commission 2006) a short- or medium-term
convergence  in  performance  and  thus  a  need  for  ‘one-size-fits-  all’ policy
strategies  is  an  illusion.  Consequently,  any  definition  of  a  European  added
value in the coordination of international S&T policies has to face the limits
that arise from intra-Community competition and institutional divergence of
national research systems and policies.

Against  this  background  a  solid  definition  of  a  European  added  value
focuses  the  view  firstly  on  multilateral  frameworks  in  which  the  European
Union is already represented or in which a significant number of EU Member
States has a member status. In international institutions, such as the G8 or the
OECD, the coordination of international S&T policies is largely characterized
by  low  degrees  of  exclusivity  and  specificity.  Therefore,  in  principle,  such
frameworks  would  allow  respective  EU  Member  States  to  coordinate  their
related policy initiatives at the European level more strongly. However, this
would  presume  that  Community  mechanisms  for  policy  coordination  would
provide for a structure of variable geometry. As long as such a structure is not
in place the coordination of international S&T policies at the European level

The organization of policy coordination in multi-level spaces

187

is less hampered by the specific character of the arrangement, but more by the
fact  that  EU  Member  States  within  the  G8  or  the  OECD  might  become
confronted with conflicting logics of appropriateness that exist in the different
transnational arenas.

The typically less specific bilateral S&T arrangements of the EU Member
States  open  up  a  second  level  of  coordinated  action  at  the  European  level.
European  framework  agreements  with  other  regional  organizations  or  coun-
tries  (bi-regional  agreements)  are  certainly  of  advantage  especially  for  EU
Member States whose S&T infrastructure is currently in a process of catching-
up. Within this context, the European Union already has concluded a number
of these agreements. This format could nevertheless be extended, especially if
EU bilateral agreements were not considered as alternative, but complemen-
tary  arrangements  to  those  of  the  Member  States  which  –  for  the  reason  of
exclusivity  –  will  not  be  ready  to  abstain  from  their  own  bilateral  arrange-
ments.

A third arena for a coordinated European external S&T policy exists within
the context of large-scale multilateral (mega) science projects, such as ITER.
This  holds  as  long  as  all  member  states  agree  to  pay  a  share  that  largely
follows  the  distributional  mode  of  their  respective  contributions  to  the  EU
budget. In these cases, projects have a relatively high degree of specificity, but
a  significantly  lower  level  of  exclusivity,  thus  the  level  of  intra-Community
competition especially between larger Member States does not impede coor-
dination at the European level.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONSEQUENCES FOR A EUROPEAN
DIMENSION IN INTERNATIONAL S&T POLICY
COORDINATION

The preceding section defined three fields in which the coordination of inter-
national  S&T policies  should  be  a  promising  strategy:  firstly,  a  common
approach towards European initiatives in multilateral fora that would consti-
tute  a  moderate  level  of  positive  coordination  as  this  approach  requires  the
establishment of common principles and priorities; secondly, the Community
engagements  in  bilateral  agreements  with  other  regional  organizations  or
countries for which negative coordination would suffice; and thirdly, engage-
ment  in  multilateral  initiatives  for  the  establishment  of  large-scale  research
infrastructures which would again assume that Member States are willing to
(positively) coordinate their priorities.

What does this mean for the organizational consequences of policy coor-
dination  at  the  European  level?  It  could  be  concluded  that  the  European
Union  currently  fails  to  provide  the  institutional  preconditions  for  strategic

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

coordination  of  the  Member  States’ S&T international  policies. As  long  as
mechanisms  for  a  variable  geometry  are  not  in  place,  processes  of  positive
coordination will be limited to the definition of common priorities and princi-
ples, and thus to the improvement of policy coherence in fields which are not
of the highest strategic importance for the Member States. This limitation is
mostly due to the structural deficits of the current institutional framework of
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).

Since the OMC has been established in the field of research and innovation
policies in 2000, many (official) evaluations of this method have concluded that
it largely failed to achieve the ambitious goals (European Communities 2004)
or that there are at least some major obstacles to coordination (CREST 2008).
This result is hardly surprising as long as the OMC is organized in a way that
widely  ignores  the  multi-level  characteristics  of  the  policy  field  (Kaiser  and
Prange 2005; Kaiser 2008a). One central precondition for the improvement of
policy coordination, therefore, is that actors share a common understanding of
the ‘co-evolution of regional, national, and European policy arenas towards an
integration  in,  more  or  less,  effectively  working  multi-level,  multi-actor
systems’ (Kuhlmann 2001, p. 970). In such an institutional context, policy coor-
dination, horizontally across policy areas and vertically across territorial levels,
is of course essential. It will, however, not be able to produce effective results
as long as it does not find organizational solutions for the management of the
increasing  diversity  both  in  the  horizontal  and  the  vertical  dimensions.  This
means in more concrete terms that processes of coordination and policy learn-
ing will either produce too high transaction costs or decrease the actors’ moti-
vation to coordinate if it does not incorporate the organizational consequences
that  arise  from  the  fact  that  Member  States  pursue  their  divergent  interests
under the logics of consequentiality and appropriateness.

Because of the logic of consequentiality there is no alternative to a struc-
ture  of  variable  geometry  that  allows  for  the  establishment  of  networks  of
‘homogenous’ actors. Obviously, variable geometry produces a certain form of
exclusivity in terms of coping with rather specific territorial, sectoral or func-
tional needs. Variable geometry is, nevertheless, the only plausible approach
to contain the ‘centrifugal factors’ based, inter alia, on competition and struc-
tural diversity between the Member States. Therefore, ‘cooperation and coor-
dination needs to be built on national interests and to prove clear benefits for
all parties involved’ (CREST 2008, p. 16). This means that coordination at the
European level should alleviate individual international policy strategies of the
various actors within the multi-level system instead of considering them as a
fragmentation of the ERA.

With respect to the logic of appropriateness, the effectiveness of coordina-
tion of international S&T policies is dependent on the self-restriction of actors
on  a  limited  number  of  initiatives  that  clearly  have  a  European  dimension.

The organization of policy coordination in multi-level spaces

189

Those  initiatives  will  be  of  supplementary  nature  to  other  related  measures
that are taken by national or regional actors. Those initiatives might be rather
unspecific if they are aimed at improving ties and interactions with the science
systems of third countries. They might also have a higher degree of specificity
if they are targeted at the provision of a common European contribution to the
solution of global challenges.

The differentiation between the two logics also holds for the organization
of  processes  of  policy  learning.  If  policy  learning  is  considered,  on  the  one
hand,  as  a  useful  tool  for  the  correction  of  specific  deficiencies  of  Member
States’ research  and  innovation  systems,  it  is  quite  unlikely  that  appropriate
solutions can be identified amongst a larger number of Member States. Even
if that were to be the case, differences in national institutional and administra-
tive structures would make the implementation of ‘foreign’ best practices diffi-
cult,  if  not  impossible.  On  the  other  hand,  if  coordination  is  aimed  at  the
definition of a specific European contribution to the solution of global chal-
lenges, the divergence of the Member States’ research and innovation systems,
the intra-Community competition and the different technological capabilities
of the Member States certainly play a less important role. This holds because
different  Member  States  can  provide  resources  according  to  their  specific
capabilities while the logic of appropriateness facilitates a fair share of costs
and benefits among Member States.

To sum up, an appropriate organizational solution for the coordination of
international S&T policies at the European level would have to meet two basic
requirements. First, it has to be designed as an additional layer of international
S&T policy that complements, but not does replace, Member States’ activities.
And second, in order to allow for at least a certain level of positive coordina-
tion it certainly has to establish a modus of variable geometry. In this respect,
the  decision  of  the  Competitiveness  Council  in  December  2008  to  mandate
CREST to  establish  a  ‘Strategic  Forum  for  International  S&T Cooperation’
largely conforms to both requirements. This forum will have three main tasks.
It  will  provide  the  institutional  structure  for  the  sharing  and  structuring  of
information  about  international  S&T goals  and  activities  of  the  Member
States, it will pool the relevant knowledge concerning the S&T resources and
capabilities of third countries and it will coordinate, where appropriate, simi-
lar  activities  by  the  Member  States  and  the  Community  by  implementing  a
variable geometry approach.

NOTE

1. Policy  networks  can  be  defined  as  a  set  of  relatively  stable,  non-hierarchical  relationships
among a variety of actors who share common interests and therefore exchange resources in
order to pursue those interests (see Börzel 1997).

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

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11. The coordination of international

S&T policies from the perspective of
EU member states

Arie van der Zwan1

INTRODUCTION

Globalization is an overarching ‘mega-trend’, which will increasingly shape
the  world  during  the  next  decades.  It  will  sustain  world  economic  growth,
raise world living standards, and substantially deepen global interdependence.
At the same time it will generate enormous economic, demographic, environ-
mental,  energetic,  cultural,  security  and  consequently  political  convulsions.
Although the overall benefits are expected to be positive, the net benefits of
globalization will not necessarily be global.

Europe  is  challenged  by  globalization  in  science  and  technology  (S&T),
which remarkably transcends the former focus on the Triad regions (the US,
the  EU  and  Japan).  New  emerging  countries  appear  on  the  international
science  and  technology  scene,  notably  the  BRICS  countries  Brazil,  the
Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa. This causes new opportu-
nities  for  knowledge  and  technology  acceleration  including  the  promise  to
develop and penetrate new markets, but it also increases the competition for
scarce  resources  in  this  field,  for  example  human  capital,  leading  research
infrastructures  and  foreign  direct  investments  in  research  and  development
(R&D). A new division of labour develops at the world scale and also affects
the sphere of science, technology and innovation. The key question is how to
benefit most from this phenomenon and at the same time how to reduce risks
related to the globalization process.

Within the CREST OMC Working Group ‘Internationalisation of R&D’,2 a
group  of  EU  member  states  and  countries  associated  to  the  7th  Research
Framework Programme (FP7) has exchanged experiences in the field of inter-
national  S&T cooperation.  In  particular,  they  have  dealt  with  the  following
issues:

•

collecting  and  presenting  policy  approaches  to  internationalization  of
R&D and innovation;

192

The coordination of international S&T policies

193

•

•

identifying good practice, pending questions and problems related to the
development  and  implementation  of  a  proactive  internationalization
strategy based on national and Community experiences;
analysing the lessons learnt from coordinated multilateral initiatives like
the horizontal ERA-NETs and to develop scenarios for future multilat-
eral approaches based on national and Community instruments;

• developing  recommendations  related  to  the  international  cooperation

concerning both regional, national and community activities.

The  process  was  structured  and  evidence-based  by  empirical  investigations
from  two  questionnaires,  desk  research  of  policy  documents  and  statistics
dealing with the issue of the internationalization of R&D and targeted infor-
mation inputs from the European Commission and external experts. This chap-
ter  is  based  on  the  summary  report  and  reflects  the  main  results,  trends,
conclusions and statements of this work.3

DRIVERS OF THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

In the field of science and technology, globalization enhances a tendency for
higher reliance on external sources, international collaboration and network-
ing.  The  greatest  benefits  will  accrue  to  those  countries  that  can  most  effi-
ciently  access,  adopt  and  exploit  new  technologies  developed  at  whatever
geographical scale, also worldwide. Against this background, internationaliza-
tion in S&T is driven by the aims

•

•

•
•

to  strengthen  research  excellence  and  innovation  performance  by  a
better access to foreign sources of knowledge and by increased global
cooperation  between  research  organizations  and  innovation  networks
including industries to jointly develop and exploit new knowledge and
technologies  based  upon  comparative  factor  advantages  (in  terms  of
knowledge and technologies);
to  increase  the  attractiveness  of  a  specific  country  on  the  worldwide
R&D  market  and  to  successfully  compete  for  R&D  contracts  and
services, to attract more foreign investments in R&D as well as the best
and most creative ‘brains’;
to prepare the domestic ground for successful innovations abroad;
to respond to global problems, international commitments and to foster
the role of the EU as a community of values.

Usually  three  modes  of  internationalization  of  S&T are  distinguished:  first,

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

international R&D cooperation between partners in more than one country to
generate  new  scientific  knowledge  and  technological  know-how,  whereby
each partner retains its own institutional identity and ownership remains unal-
tered (for example the case of European Research Framework Programmes or
bilateral intergovernmental S&T programmes); second, international genera-
tion  of  knowledge  and  innovations  carried  out  by  multinational  enterprises
(MNEs)  which  create  innovations  across  borders  by  building  up  research
networks including the establishment of new R&D units in the host country or
the  acquisition  of  foreign  R&D  units  (that  is  foreign  direct  investment  in
R&D); third, international exploitation of innovative know-how and technolo-
gies  through  means  of  trade,  granting  of  licences  and  patents,  reverse  engi-
neering and so on (see, for example, Archibugi and Michie 1995).

There are, however, problems in interfering against the driving motivations,
like insecure intellectual property regimes (IPR), unbalanced brain circulation
flows,  and  the  relocation  of  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  in  R&D  from
Europe to other regions (notably Asia). Thus, new concepts need to be devel-
oped and tested and further efforts (and funds) invested

•

•

•

•

to upgrade the impact of international S&T collaboration by new strate-
gies;
to facilitate the international mobility of researchers according to indi-
vidual  career  paths  through  the  introduction  of  more  comprehensive
brain-circulation concepts;
to enhance spillovers from FDI in R&D to the relevant research commu-
nities,  irrespective  of  whether  these  FDIs  are  implemented  abroad  by
European  companies  or  domestically  implemented  by  foreign  compa-
nies;
to  provide  better  (regulatory)  conditions  for  national  S&T institutions
and innovative firms to better access foreign knowledge on the one hand
and to exploit domestic knowledge in third countries in a fair manner on
the other hand.

Evidently, to overcome these challenges structural adjustment costs will occur
and  multilevel  dialogues  and  new  governance  modes  will  have  to  be  estab-
lished  which  will  transcend  the  traditional  S&T frame  towards  other  policy
domains  (such  as  economic,  trade  and  labour-market  policy,  development
policy,  environmental  policy  and  education  policy)  as  well  as  towards  non-
political stakeholders (such as autonomous universities, autonomous research
organizations, companies, philanthropic associations, non-governmental orga-
nizations). This calls also for a revisiting of national innovation policy instru-
ments in light of the differing impact that the internationalization of S&T has
on their relative efficiency and efficacy.

The coordination of international S&T policies

195

The  accelerated  internationalization  of  R&D  is  absorbed  differently  by
different  countries,  depending  –  at  least  partly  –  on  each  country’s  current
position relative to the technological frontier on the global R&D map. More
systemic policy answers towards the internationalization of S&T are needed.
A first major challenge exists in investigating how the negative effects of glob-
alization can be addressed without diminishing the benefits of globalization.
In this respect a key question refers to fair global rules (for example relating
to IPRs, technical and social standards, trade and investment) and the sound-
ness  and  compatibility  of  national  policy  responses.  A second  challenge
involves  the  S&T responsibility  towards  global  challenges  and  the  specific
S&T problems of the developing world. As regards the latter, there is a need
for more coordination of policy initiatives between the field of S&T policy and
Official  Development  Assistance  (ODA)  on  one  hand,  and  between  coun-
tries/regions on the other.

POLICY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARDS
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF S&T

The major objectives of developed countries regarding internationalization of
S&T towards third countries can be subsumed in three points:

1. The objective to increase the quality and absorption capacity of domestic
S&T through  international  S&T partnerships  allowing  access  to  foreign
knowledge and S&T resources (this subsumes the explicit aim to support
‘excellence’ but also the less ambitious aim to push forward the interna-
tionalization of domestic R&D and, thus, to raise the quality and absorp-
tion level in general).

2. The objective to gain access to new markets and to increase the own inno-
vation  system’s  competitiveness  (in  this  respect  internationalization  of
S&T is very often perceived as an important complementary approach to
other international economic activities).

3. The readiness to engage in solving global problems which cannot be tack-
led  individually  in  an  efficient  way  by  a  country  alone  (in  this  sense  a
certain commingling with global development goals deriving from devel-
opment cooperation, for example Millennium Development Goals, can be
observed).

It  can  be  summarized  that  all  three  dimensions  have  been  almost  equally
perceived  as  important  objectives  for  the  internationalization  of  S&T with
third  countries. Also  it  turned  out  that  these  objectives  are  not  exclusive  as

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

most countries have mixed objectives for their internationalization policies in
the field of S&T. The highest priority, however, is addressed to the issue of
facilitating access to foreign markets and raising competitiveness.

Alternatively,  the  objectives  can  be  distinguished  by  those  that  focus  on
enhancing  the  national  attractiveness  (‘inward  objectives’)  and  those  which
focus on connecting to research in third countries (‘outward objectives’). The
inward objectives include:

•

•

•
•

the objective to attract expatriate and foreign researchers, recently moti-
vated by a lack of supply of researchers in many advanced countries;
the objective to attract inward FDI in R&D, because international R&D
investments meet often the highest quality standards and can be seen as
accelerators of growth;
the objective to promote and brand national science abroad;
a set of objectives related to ‘clean/prepare the own house’ (for example
in  order  to  offer  ideal  conditions  for  research  cooperation  in  a  broad
range of S&T fields, to continuously develop adequate innovation envi-
ronments, to turn research into new technologies, innovation and entre-
preneurship,  to  enhance  the  knowledge  society  and  to  provide  world
top-level education).

The outward objectives relate to:

•

• higher involvement in international cooperation and the enhancement of
bilateral and multilateral STI relations (including the establishment of
new ones);
connecting  domestic  research(ers)  into  global  STI  activities  (either  in
general, or focused at frontier or strategic research areas or focused at
excellence and greater valorization, partially complementing and under-
pinning trade and investment linkages);
enhancing international mobility of researchers;

•
• opening of the national research programmes to researchers from third

countries.

About  half  of  the  European  countries  who  provided  information  on  the
policy  objectives  towards  internationalization  of  R&D  indicated  that  they
already  have  a  comprehensive  national  strategy  on  internationalization  of
S&T (CREST 2007). Most of the remaining 12 countries stated that they are
in the process of developing one. In addition, many countries envisage new
initiatives, which underpin the dynamic with respect to internationalization
and globalization of S&T. These planned new initiatives encompass a wide
field ranging from far-reaching generic approaches (for example to empha-

The coordination of international S&T policies

197

size  globalization  as  a  horizontal  priority  topic)  to  more  technical,  instru-
mental ones. Frequently, indications on envisaged initiatives derive from the
wish to implement the existing (very often new) international strategies on
S&T and  to  make  them  operational. An  assessment  of  the  results  and  the
impact of the developed strategies is also a future task envisaged by a few
countries.

PRIORITY SETTING IN INTERNATIONAL S&T POLICIES

The CREST OMC Working Group has discussed the issue of priority setting
along two dimensions: first, selecting priority partner countries and, second,
selecting  priority  themes  for  international  S&T cooperation. The  criteria  for
the selection of priority partner countries and respective thematic priorities can
be classified along scientific, political, and economic criteria.

As regards the identification of partner countries, six selection categories

can be distinguished (by rank order):

1.
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

expected scientific benefits including improving quality and excellence;
political reasons including solving societal problems and contributing to
development goals;
gaining access to (new) markets, competition and innovation aspects;
human  factors  (immigration  of  knowledge  workers,  brain  drain,  brain
gain and brain circulation);
promotional activities for the national science system;
geographical, historical, linguistic and cultural ties.

It needs to be underlined that in case of a partnership with third countries,
the common ground is given by mutual interest and a mutual net benefit of
the different countries involved. Here, the criteria mentioned above need to
be  applied  by  both/all  partners  and  the  various  perspectives  need  to  be
considered.  This  basic  principle  is  considered  as  one  of  the  assets  of  any
cooperation.

Regarding  the  scientific  criteria,  member  states  and  associated  countries
mentioned the present and future S&T potential in the partner country includ-
ing the potential for partnerships in high-tech domains, the striving for excel-
lent research on the basis of cooperation with leading R&D centres, benefits
for  joint  participation  in  Framework  Programmes  and  better  access  to  large
international  research  infrastructures.  The  main  political  aspects  relate  to
foreign policies and instruments like bilateral agreements and umbrella agree-
ments  which  can  act  as  ‘opportunities  to  get  windows  opened’,  capacity-
building in less developed countries, sharing responsibility for global issues

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

and  respecting  IPR  and  ethical  rules  as  well  as  cultural  and  historical  ties.
Economic criteria refer to the future growth potential of the partner country,
reflected  through  the  partner  country’s  position  on  the  various  scoreboards
(trend chart, global competitiveness report) as an example of a more evidence-
based approach.

Another selection criterion is the assessment of already existing coopera-
tion relations between research organizations. However, data mining for this
issue becomes increasingly difficult due to the increased autonomy and diver-
sity of the organizations involved. Desirable metrics for evidence-based deci-
sion making are not always available and, moreover, existing metrics do not
necessarily  reflect  the  current  (and  expected  future)  performance  of  certain
countries (such as China or India). Thus, systematic information gathering on
S&T in  third  countries  is  important.  Most  countries  collect  information
systematically  and  use  a  variety  of  tools  for  this  purpose.  The  four  most
frequently mentioned measures are embassies in third countries, regular bilat-
eral  workshops,  national  liaison  offices  in  third  countries  and  systematic
analysis of the participation of domestic research teams with foreign partners
in 
(especially  Framework  Programmes).
Cooperation  in  information  collection  with  other  countries  does  not  happen
frequently. It should be noted that a lot of countries stressed that many forms
of official international S&T cooperation are the result of individual contacts
between  researchers  and  research  organizations,  without  any  government
strategy behind it. In some countries, and only recently, this bottom-up process
has been complemented by more strategic top-down processes.

international  programmes 

Across  Europe,  China  and  the  USA are  most  often  mentioned  as  partner
countries.  Many  European  countries  mentioned  additionally  Japan  and  the
(other) BRICS countries. Historical ties are still important in selecting partner
countries. This preference is in line with existing research that indicates the
importance  of  geographical,  cultural  and  linguistic  proximity  as  important
factors for establishing collaboration. It should, however, not be forgotten that
overall international cooperation is still dominated by the intra-EU collabora-
tion.

The prioritization or top-down selection of scientific topics for R&D coop-
eration with third countries is not expressed very much. Half of the European
countries  do  not  consider  a  thematic  prioritization  as  really  relevant,  which
could be – at least partially – explained by the bottom-up character of some
international  schemes.  Among  the  countries  which  provided  more  specific
answers  in  terms  of  thematic  priorities,  in  some  cases  a  certain  orientation
towards  the  scientific  needs  and  priorities  of  the  partner  countries  could  be
detected. This is especially true as regards developing countries. In general,
the thematic range of scientific cooperation is quite broad and only a few obvi-
ous thematic specializations can be identified.

The coordination of international S&T policies

199

INFLUENTIAL POLICIES AND THE STRATEGY
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Next to S&T policy, other policy areas also influence the internationalization
of R&D. These policies include (by rank  order)  foreign policy, followed  by
economic  and  labour  market  policy,  development  policy  and  –  with  some
distance – environmental policy. In all but a few European countries, the coor-
dination of the development of the national strategy for the internationaliza-
tion of S&T lies within the authority of either the relevant science ministry or
another national S&T body (for example, a council for S&T). S&T interna-
tionalization  strategies  were  or  are  mostly  developed  cross-governmentally,
often  by  inclusion  of  important  stakeholders  with  representative  functions.
Universities and non-university research organizations (or their institutional-
ized representation bodies) were almost always included. Business organiza-
tions were a little less involved. Very high priority levels were attributed to the
inclusion of S&T councils and other advisory bodies as well as research fund-
ing agencies.

The implementation of the S&T internationalization strategies is very often
organized by division of labour across different organizational constituencies:
ministries,  public  agencies,  science  organizations  and  research  councils  (in
rank  order).  Business  organizations  are  usually  not  directly  involved  in  the
implementation of the strategy.

As  regards  the  connection  between  science  and  development  policies  a
clear trend towards more coordination can be detected in some countries, espe-
cially in fields like agriculture, water, energy, biotechnology, climate change
and  health.  However,  the  responsibilities  concerning  development  and
research policies are distributed among various ministries and agencies. There
are  potential  goal  conflicts  in  terms  of  different  geographical  foci,  different
thematic  foci  and  different  approaches.  Some  countries  seems  to  be  quite
advanced in the effort to combine scientific excellence and development goals
while others have only started to look for synergies.

NATIONAL POLICY MEASURES TOWARDS
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION OF S&T
INSTITUTIONS

International  S&T collaboration  of  research  institutions  has  significantly
increased in the last decade. Despite the fact that the majority of internation-
alization activities occur on a bottom-up basis, it is a regular practice of the
member states to support the internationalization of S&T organizations estab-
lished  in  their  respective  countries  with  a  variety  of  policy  measures.  The

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

growing  importance  of  international  cooperation  is  reflected  by  the  high
number of member states which have intensified existing schemes and/or initi-
ated or planned new initiatives, which characterizes a trend to treat the issue
of internationalization of R&D no longer as just a pure ‘add-on’ activity but as
an emerging pillar of S&T policymaking itself.

The  overall  rationale  of  the  existing  policy  support  measures  is  oriented
towards a reduction of transaction costs for the participating (national) institu-
tions,  which  result  from  international  cooperation  and  asymmetric  informa-
tion. Measures in this respect include on the one hand ‘small-scale funding’ to
cover,  for  instance,  travel  costs  within  international  collaborative  R&D
projects, and on the other hand information support services, including legal
and  technical  advice,  research  promotion  activities,  partner  search  support,
and matchmaking to reduce additional information related transaction costs.
Another important approach is the permission for foreign institutions to partic-
ipate in national R&D programmes, usually without funding. A trend towards
more  thematically  focused  initiatives,  mostly  based  upon  national  strengths,
which  are  increasingly  differentiated  by  target  countries,  can  be  observed.
Small  scale  initiatives,  which  by  now  have  usually  centred  on  mobility,  are
increasingly  complemented  by  genuine  research  promotion  activities  to  add
critical  mass  and  momentum  to  the  internationalization  activities  of  R&D
organizations.

NATIONAL POLICY MEASURES TOWARDS THE
INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL
SCIENTISTS

The  stimulation  of  international  inward  and  outward  mobility  of  individual
scientists is one of the classical arenas of international S&T cooperation poli-
cies, not least because mobility measures can also be implemented if available
budgets are constrained. With the increasing acknowledgment of the crucial
role of human resources for successful R&D and innovation, the issue of inter-
national mobility has also received renewed attention from a more exploita-
tion-oriented perspective. The rationale behind this is based on the insight that
knowledge cannot be entirely codified and thus, in principle, accessed every-
where.

Against  this  background,  it  is  not  surprising  that  almost  all  responding
countries have national policy measures in place to enhance the mobility of
researchers through governmental funds. In addition, bottom-up initiatives of
agencies and other stakeholders exist. Most member states target all types of
mobility (brain attraction, brain retention, brain connection and brain circula-
tion)  with  similar  and  usually  high  priority. A focus  on  brain  circulation  is

The coordination of international S&T policies

201

often a top priority in countries with high R&D performance, while attraction
and retention of researchers is more frequently identified in countries with a
less developed R&D system in order to catch-up. In general, however, a need,
especially at the intra-European level, for more comprehensive and balanced
‘brain circulation’ models rather than concentrating only on ‘brain attraction’
can be observed.

From  the  viewpoint  of  policy  measures,  four  types  stand  out  clearly  in

terms of frequency:

the enhancement of individual mobility under S&T agreements;
the provision of incoming fellowships;
the provision of outgoing fellowships;

•
•
•
• measures  aimed  at  raising  the  attraction  of  domestic  universities  and

research institutes.

These  policy  measures  are  complemented  by  other  important  ones,  which
are,  however,  not  so  frequently  in  place,  such  as  the  provision  of  return
programmes or measures to decrease the administrative burden of obtaining
working permits. Many of the new or planned initiatives of member states
focus on mobility measures towards third countries, because intra-European
mobility is to a certain extent perceived as being already covered under FP7.
Joint  European  initiatives,  such  as  the  creation  of  researcher’s  mobility
portals,  the  ERA-MORE  initiative  or  the  implementation  of  the  EU
Scientific Visa Package4 are often mentioned as successful measures in this
respect.

NATIONAL POLICY MEASURES TOWARDS FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN R&D

Research and development has for a long time been one of the least mobile
activities of multinational enterprises (MNE) due to different factors of local
‘stickiness’.  Current  evidence  on  flows  of  R&D  suggests,  however,  that  the
global  R&D  business  environment  has  changed  due  to  intensified  global
competition  and  the  need  to  innovate  more  quickly  at  different  scales  and
scope. At the same time, barriers to the dispersion of R&D have decreased due
to rapid developments in ICT and international regulation progresses. This has
resulted in emerging patterns of globally distributed R&D networks which are
increasingly connected to the concept of ‘open innovation’ (OECD 2008a). At
the same time, there are signs of a declining interest for inward FDI in R&D
in  Europe  (especially  by  US-based  companies)  and  increasing  competition
from emerging economies (especially China).

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

As a result both inward and outward foreign direct investment in R&D is
high on the political agenda of most member states, although the R&D part is
usually included in more general FDI policies. Most of the member states have
recently put in place or revised their policies with the aim of increasing their
own  attractiveness  for  inward  FDI.  The  most  frequently  applied  policy
measures include the promotion of local strengths abroad and active recruit-
ment of foreign companies, cluster policies to attract FDI in R&D, adminis-
trative  support  for  foreign  investors,  the  provision  of  infrastructure,  direct
financial support and fiscal incentives.

Although  only  a  limited  number  of  countries  have  specific  policy  instru-
ments in place to stimulate spillovers from FDI in R&D to the domestic (or
local)  R&D  environments,  there  is  a  rising  awareness  to  innovate  policy
measures in order

•

•

•

to  take  advantage  of  inward  FDI  in  R&D  by  means  of  embedding
(former) high-tech enclaves with little knowledge diffusion in the local
environment and to generate spillovers without hollowing out the local
research base;
to  capture  the  scientific  benefits  of  outward  FDI  in  R&D  (back)  to
domestic R&D environments and;
to  adapt  policy  measures  to  the  rational  of  knowledge  competition
rather than cost competition.

POLICY MEASURES TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL
EXPLOITATION OF KNOWLEDGE

The policy objective as regards the international exploitation of knowledge is
to find a balance between protection and dissemination of knowledge. A large
group of member states have a balanced view on the international exploitation
of research. Some have an open view and an almost equally big number has
no clear opinion (yet) on this matter. No member state has a closed approach.
Among  the  countries  with  a  balanced  view,  regulatory  interventions  in  the
field  of  IPR  protection  and  exploitation  are  usually  made  on  a  case-by-case
basis (for example in certain high-tech domains). Most common, however, is
the  inclusion  of  IPR  regulations  in  S&T and  other  relevant  bilateral  agree-
ments.  Specific  measures  to  promote  protection  of  knowledge  generated  by
domestic universities and research centres are perceived with an increasingly
important priority, but concrete measures are still rare.

A few member states place a special focus on knowledge and technology
(usually under the context of competitiveness and exploitation) within general
programmes  aiming  to  promote  the  internationalization  activities  of  their

The coordination of international S&T policies

203

domestic companies. There are a few cases with respect to developing coun-
tries, where governments of member states encourage also a shared utilization
of new domestic knowledge in and with partners from developing countries.
As regards the enhancement of domestic exploitation of knowledge produced
in  third  countries  only  a  few  member  states  have  policy  measures  in  place,
mostly through means of technology licensing from abroad and international
knowledge and technology scouting activities.

From a policy perspective, the issue of international exploitation of knowl-
edge seems to be in an experimentation stage, confronted with insecurity and
complexity, not least because of the lack of reliable data, the need to cooper-
ate across different policy spheres and the private ownership of many of the
ongoing activities. There is, however, growing awareness that comprehensive
measures  are  needed  to  enhance  the  domestic  exploitation  of  knowledge
produced  in  third  countries  and  the  exploitation  of  domestic  knowledge  on
international markets. Possible ways to go in this direction include a stronger
promotion  of  the  rationale  of  the  model  of  open  innovation  within  funding
programmes to provide more flexibility on how to use the money granted, to
support measures designed to identify and acquire technologies and licences
from abroad and to cooperate in a sustainable way with developing countries
in the field of technology transfer and technology development for the mutual
benefit of both partners involved.

TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION OF S&T POLICIES
TOWARDS THIRD COUNTRIES IN THE EUROPEAN
RESEARCH AREA

Transnational  coordination  of  member  states  towards  third  countries  in  the
field of S&T is already being practiced. Around three-quarters of the member
states who responded to the questionnaire apply mechanisms for transnational
coordination of S&T policies towards third countries. In addition, 60 per cent
perceive a strong or even very strong need for enhanced transnational coordi-
nation.  Two  countries  reported  that  they  do  not  have  any  further  need  for
transnational coordination, one country reported a weak need and an indiffer-
ent  assessment  was  given  by  three  countries.  The  majority  of  respondents,
however, indicated a strong need for coordination. The major objectives for
applying  transnational  coordination  are  to  share  expertise  and  experience  in
order to gain information as well as to learn lessons in view of the challenges
of international S&T cooperation and to undertake joint activities and to share
efforts.

The  latter  objective  is  very  often  pursued  under  European  initiatives.  In
general, transnational coordination is perceived as a means to strengthen and

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

to add critical mass to national efforts, to overcome segmentation of singular
activities, to avoid duplication of efforts and to increase the impact. The poten-
tial  benefit  of  using  already  available  resources  of  other  member  states  and
associated  countries  (for  example  agencies,  strong  research  teams,  specific
equipment) to implement one’s own national ideas or projects, for example in
third countries, has not yet been addressed.

In terms of coordination instruments, Community instruments were high-
lighted  to  be  of  most  importance. Those  instruments  were  partly  introduced
under FP6 (such as ERA-NET) and are presumably even strengthened under
FP7 (Coordination and Support Actions, ERA-NET-PLUS and INCO-NET).
Eighteen  member  states  reported  that  they  participate  in  Community  instru-
ments which support the coordination of EU member states’ activities in the
field  of  international  cooperation  with  third  countries  (ERA-NETs,
Coordination and Support Actions). The second most often used coordination
instrument is the one of sporadic bilateral consultations. Only seven countries
make  use  of  S&T counsellors  to  apply  transnational  coordination  and  only
three cases reported on regular bilateral consultations.

COMMUNITY INSTRUMENTS TO ENHANCE POLICY
COORDINATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL

The Community instruments are in general perceived as the most successful
coordination  instruments,  because  they  stimulate  learning  and  generate
outcome and – from a more practical point of view – because they are tangi-
ble and provide an EU label as well as funding, resources and commitment.
Member  states  emphasized  the  importance  of  ERA-NETs  and  SSA,  but
slightly  more  ERA-NETs.  Values  attributed  to  Coordination  and  Support
Actions include ‘flexibility’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘door-opener for international
contacts and experience’.

However, it should be stated that the majority of FP6 ERA-NET activities
were  not  meant  for  the  development  of  the  international  dimension  of  the
ERA. There are six out of 71 ERA-NETs  with an  explicit focus on interna-
tional cooperation (three regional ERA-NETs and three thematic ERA-NETs).
Joint initiatives in strategic research areas with programme owners in highly
industrialized countries (USA, Japan, Canada) as well as joint initiatives with
candidate and neighbouring countries (for example Mediterranean Area, Black
Sea region) are still missing. There are some coordination instruments under
FP6 and FP7 dealing with mapping and structural S&T issues in and with third
countries which complement the ERA-NET scheme. The knowledge obtained
in these projects has, however, not yet been fully exploited. For this purpose
special new information and dissemination channels should be developed.

The coordination of international S&T policies

205

In  addition  to  the  proven  instruments,  there  is  much  expectation  in  the
member states related to the new INCO-NET instrument allowing a system-
atic bi-regional dialogue with major regions of the world. It is acknowledged
that existing coordination instruments like the Monitoring Committee for S&T
cooperation with the Mediterranean partner countries (MoCo) and the Steering
Platform on Research with the Western Balkan Countries will be strengthened
through  providing  operational  and  knowledge-based  tools.  For  the  other
regions,  such  a  dialogue  structure  can  be  enabled  through  the  INCO-NET
mechanism for the first time.

Finally, there are a number of Community instruments which so far are
not  well  harmonized  with  member  states’ activities,  including  the  S&T
agreements between the EU and selected partner countries, the network of
EU science counsellors in distinguished third countries and the participation
of  the  EU  and  the  member  states  in  international  organizations.  Here,  the
respective  Community  instrument  could  play  a  better  integrative  role  to
provide, at least to some extent, an umbrella for the activities of the member
states.

MEMBER STATES’ STRATEGIES TOWARDS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

From  all  international  organizations  outside  of  the  EU,  the  OECD
(Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development)  was  generally
perceived  as  the  most  important  international  body  influencing  S&T policy
shaping, especially – but not only – from the OECD members among the inter-
viewed  member  states.  UNESCO  (L’Organisation  des  Nations  Unies  pour
l’éducation,  la  science  et  la  culture)  was  mentioned  as  frequently  as  the
OECD, but the priority value assigned to UNESCO was considerably lower
than the one for the OECD. All other international bodies were given lower
rankings  out  of  which  the  FAO  (Food  and Agriculture  Organization  of  the
United  Nations),  IAEA (International Atomic  Energy Agency)  and  UNIDO
(United  Nations  Industrial  Development  Organization)  were  most  often
mentioned. Quite a high priority was assigned to G8/‘Carnegie Group’5 and
WHO (World Health Organization), but just from a handful of member states.
Only  a  few  countries  reported  that  major  changes  in  policy  measures  for  a
proactive participation in international organizations were implemented in the
last  years.  The  emphasis  on  new  measures  seems  to  be  rather  a  result  of  a
general process of allocating higher awareness to the issue of internationaliza-
tion of S&T than to be a singular response to S&T relevant international orga-
nizations.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

LESSONS LEARNT FROM AND BARRIERS TO
COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

In  general,  there  is  a  clear  tendency  by  the  member  states  towards  closer
cooperation on the S&T policy level with third countries, but cooperation and
coordination needs to be built on national interests and to prove clear bene-
fits  for  all  parties  involved.  So  far,  this  process  has  been  driven  by  new
Community instruments. However, there is still much room for improving the
coordination of S&T policies starting with a more extensive and strategic use
of  established  Community  instruments  (which  to  some  extent  still  require
some reshaping to meet the particular needs of international cooperation) and
building on new instruments like, most prominently, the INCO-NET mecha-
nism and possibly the forthcoming joint programming initiative. In addition,
the potential of policy coordination initiated by member states and associated
countries in variable geometries without using Community instruments needs
to  be  explored  building  on  national  interests,  instruments  and  funding.  In
general,  the  analysis  shows  that  the  harmonization  and  consistency  of  the
activities  of  the  member  states  and  the  European  Commission  could  be
further  enhanced  to  implement  a  leading  role  for  Europe  in  the  process  of
globalization and in global problem solving. Here, the interrelationship of the
S&T agreements  of  the  Community  and  the  member  states,  the  interaction
between EU delegations abroad and member states’ embassies and the partic-
ipation in international organizations are three pillars of major importance.

Despite a generally benevolent attitude, barriers to transnational coordina-
tion also exist. There are four dimensions which are most often mentioned in
this respect:

• differences in national legislations and administrative regulations which

•
•

make the implementation of transnational activities more difficult;
lack of coordinating capacities and resources;
lack of awareness of national stakeholders on the importance of a coor-
dinated approach towards third countries;

• other centrifugal factors based on competition between member states or
specific geographical, linguistic and cultural ties which call for unilateral
rather than for coordinated bilateral or multilateral interventions.

Other obstacles include a general but conscious reluctance against any forced
coordination, no clear and measurable outcomes and recognition of benefits
yet (input–output ratio, spill-over effects from international S&T cooperation),
the lack of knowledge on areas of common interest with other member states
and cultural differences.

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207

ENHANCING COORDINATION OF NATIONAL S&T
POLICIES TOWARDS THIRD COUNTRIES

Building  on  the  report  of  the  CREST OMC  Working  Group,  the  following
actions are proposed:

1.

Identifying  the  relevant  targets  for  coordination  activities:  Cooperation
and  coordination  should  build  on  common  interests  and  mutual  benefit
and seems to be possible in areas where a number of member states share
common goals such as: research aiming to solve the particular problems
of developing countries; research aiming to solve the problems of global
impact;  the  transfer  and  promotion  of  European  S&T standards  and
models; joint access to scientific resources in third countries as well as the
development and use of an S&T infrastructure built around the particular
resources  of  third  countries  and  in  spheres  where  civilian  research  is
simply  better  implemented  through  collaborative  research  efforts  than
through national efforts only.

2. Raising awareness on the needs and benefits of coordinated S&T policies
towards  third  countries:  There  are  manifold  addressees  for  awareness-
raising  initiatives  in  this  respect  ranging  from  domestic  S&T policy-
makers to the interested public. It is important to identify and disseminate
good practice, preferably based upon evaluations, via tailor-made instru-
ments.

3. Establish and improve instruments for a better coordination of activities:
There are certain Community instruments already available and accepted
to share and disseminate information, such as the CREST OMC Working
Groups, ERAWATCH and the new INCO-NET platforms. However, there
seems to be room for continuous improvement and the need to discuss the
implementation  of  efficient  management  procedures  and  infrastructures
for joint (programmatic) efforts of member states towards third countries.
Lessons from existing bilateral schemes need to be learned and expanded
towards programmatic multilateral approaches. Here, not only are fund-
ing programmes addressed (for example via ERA-NETs), but also other
essential elements such as joint agenda setting, mobility aspects, intellec-
tual property regulations and good governance in international S&T coop-
eration.
Implement  a  proactive  approach  in  international  S&T initiatives:
Referring to the economic and scientific capacity of the ERA, there is the
potential  to  play  a  strategic  role  in  international  S&T initiatives  imple-
mented,  for  instance,  at  the  OECD  or  UN  level.  Here,  building  on
European  values  and  the  common  objectives  of  its  member  states,  the

4.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

global challenges should be addressed in the first instance, but additional
European S&T agendas might also be covered under the precondition that
the member states share a common interest, which has to be explored and
shaped by preceding strategic consultation processes.

5. Ensure  coherence  towards  developing  countries  and  development  poli-
cies: As regards synergies between S&T policy and development policy
there seems to be more multi-level effort to assure coherence, consistency
and synergy and to avoid duplications. Building S&T capacities in devel-
oping  countries  and  implementing  dedicated  activities  of  ‘research  for
development’ should  play  a  self-evident  and  prominent  role  in  the
member states’ strategies to reach their ODA budget goals. By comple-
menting  and  supporting  member  states’ activities,  the  relevant
Community  instruments,  most  prominently  the  instruments  of  foreign
assistance, also need to be strengthened in this respect.

6. Ensuring harmonized and consistent activities of member states and the
European Commission: One of the present weaknesses of the ERA is its
still  existing  fragmentation  in  many  respects.  To  overcome  this  deficit,
mechanisms  should  be  implemented  to  ensure  synergies  in  the  S&T
agreements  of  the  Community  and  the  member  states,  to  build  a  living
network of EU delegations abroad and member states’ embassies, and to
identify areas of clear benefit from coordination between member states
and the European Commission in international organizations.
7. Establish a sustainable forum on the internationalization of R&D:6

• defining  and  regularly  adapting  specific  common  objectives  of  the
member states and respective priorities for Community action for S&T
cooperation with third countries;

• monitoring the implementation of respective activities of international
cooperation  at  the  Community  level  with  respect  to  consistent  and
coordinated  approaches  of  the  member  states  and  European
Commission measures;

• proposing  actions  to  the  member  states  and  the  European

•

Commission;
exchanging  information  on  strategic  issues  of  S&T cooperation
towards  third  countries  at  member  states’,  associated  countries’ and
Community level.

CONCLUSIONS: RECONCILING COOPERATION AND
COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL S&T POLICIES

From the perspectives of EU member states the coordination of international
S&T policies  bears  some  added  value  under  specific  circumstances  and

The coordination of international S&T policies

209

considering certain prerequisites. A fundamental question, however, remains:
how  to  reconcile  ‘cooperation’ and  ‘competition’ in  the  ERA?  While  there
seems to be a clear tendency of the member states for closer cooperation and
coordination in international S&T policies, both need to be built on national
interests and to prove clear benefits for all parties involved, meaning compe-
tition remains a core factor in science and technology policies.

To address this question it has to be noted, first, that there are significant
differences amongst member states between the types of research, especially
between  schemes  supporting  fundamental  research  and  schemes  supporting
more  applied  forms  of  research,  often  with  commercial  interests.  Regarding
fundamental research a lot of cooperation has been established on a bottom-up
basis without any government intervention at all, while cooperation in the field
of private research, along with cooperation with public research institutions,
has  increased  considerably  during  the  last  decade  as  a  consequence  of  the
upcoming phenomenon of open innovation and cluster policies. The comple-
mentarity between cooperation and competitiveness can be illustrated by the
mission of EUREKA: ‘The objective of EUREKA is to raise, through closer
cooperation among enterprises and research institutes in the field of advanced
technologies, the productivity and competitiveness of Europe’s industries and
national economies on the world market, and hence strengthen the basis for
lasting prosperity and employment’.7

On  the  other  hand  there  are  debates  between  the  need  for  international
cooperation  to  achieve  excellence  versus  the  possible  introduction  of  a
European  quality  label  for  excellent  cluster  organizations  on  a  national  or
European basis. Also according to the recent report on the ‘ERA rationale’ the
core  systemic  feature  of  the  European  research  landscape  is  the  balance
between cooperation and competition (European Commission 2008a, p. 8).

However,  the  balance  between  cooperation  and  competition  might  vary
between  the  various  research  disciplines.  How  can  we  explain  these  differ-
ences? As  was  pointed  out  already  there  is  a  long  tradition  of  international
cooperation in science and research. Most of this has been established on the
basis  of  a  bottom-up  process  without  any  direct  government  intervention.
Often cooperation between individual researchers or research organizations is
the result of individual contacts (CREST 2007). These forms of cooperation
have  been  multiplied  by  the  opportunities  of  information  technology.
Additionally, many Memoranda of Understanding and comparable agreements
have  been  accomplished  in  the  past,  but  most  of  these  were  inspired  by
motives of foreign policies and are often qualified as ‘doors that need to be
opened’.

According to a report by the OECD, policymakers have now recognized the
strategic  benefits  of  international  S&T cooperation  between  companies  and
S&T institutions  and  have  implemented  a  number  of  measures  (OECD

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

2008b). These are inspired by the fact that they should tap into the reservoir of
excellent  knowledge  that  is  available  at  the  global  level  and  access  new
markets and human resources. ‘Connectedness’ is becoming the main driver
for scientific cooperation and many countries are increasing their support for
international cooperation.

An important reason for this development is the evolution in policies from
generic stimulation of international S&T cooperation towards an approach of
international  cooperation  by  means  of  thematic  prioritization  and  differenti-
ated partner approaches. This can be explained by the fact that many countries
focus their S&T policies at national strengths and try to position their indus-
tries in international networks in order to achieve excellence. The report on the
ERA rationale  (European  Commission  2008a)  goes  even  further  and  intro-
duces  the  concept  of  networked  specialization  which  seeks  to  link  research
groups with complementary capabilities.

While the relation between competition and cooperation can vary between
different types of research, one might, however, also ask to what extent coun-
tries should cooperate in the field of science and technology. There are indi-
cations  that  there  is  a  clear  tendency  towards  a  more  strategic  approach  of
individual countries. This can be illustrated by an advice of the Dutch scien-
tific  advisory  council  which  advocates  a  multi-track  approach  for  different
types  of  research  activities  (Advisory  Council  for  Science  &  Technology
Policy 2007). The council makes a distinction between four types of research
which have different consequences concerning the link with national policies
and as a result lead to different policy approaches.

First is curiosity-driven research, which is best organized at an international
level  in  open  competition.  The  European  Research  Council  has  been  estab-
lished as the main EU instrument for this type of research.

Second is research that is important for innovation in companies. This type
of research is often kept close to home and supports national key industries on
the  basis  of  excellence. Although  this  category  was  originally  not  the  most
obvious  category  for  international  cooperation  because  of  competition
between companies, the recent trend of open innovation has led to much more
cooperation. European Technology Platforms and Joint Technology Initiatives
have been important initiatives for this type of research in Europe.

Third  is  research  that  is  important  for  societal  issues  having  a  strong
national  character.  This  type  of  research  is  becoming  more  important  as  it
generally has strong national political support as well as offering good oppor-
tunities for demand-oriented policies and a role for government as a launching
customer.

Fourth is research on issues at the European or global level, such as sustain-
able development, climate change, health, food security, and so on. For this
type of research there is no need to develop national strategies. Coordination

The coordination of international S&T policies

211

at the European level, for example through the concept of joint programming
(European Commission 2008b) or through global level initiatives, for instance
by the OECD, offers many opportunities for improving the quality of research,
creating critical mass and avoiding fragmentation. Governments should guar-
antee optimal framework conditions for these types of research.

These  different  types  of  research  will  definitely  need  to  be  taken  into
account when member states aim at closer coordination of their S&T policies
in the future.

NOTES

1. The  views  expressed  in  this  chapter  are  purely  personal  and  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the

position of the Netherland’s Ministry of Economic Affairs.

2. CREST is  the  advisory  body  for  the  Council  and  the  European  Commission  on  research,
science and technology. CREST supervizes so-called ‘OMC Working Groups’ to implement
the  Open  Method  of  Coordination  (OMC)  in  research.  The  CREST OMC Working  Group
‘Internationalization of R&D’ existed in 2007 and 2008.

3. The  full  report  is  available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/

report_international.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2009).

4. Council  Directive  O.J.  L 289/15  of  3/11/2005  (2005/71/EC),  Recommendation  of  the
European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 (2005/761/EC) O.J. L 289/23
of 3/11/2005.

5. The  ‘Carnegie  Group’ is  an  informal  group  of  G8  Science  Advisors.  For  the  European

6.

Commission the Commissioner for Science and Research is a member of this group.
In  December  2008  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  invited  member  states  and  the
European Commission to establish a Strategic Forum for International S&T Cooperation ‘to
facilitate the further development, implementation and monitoring of the international dimen-
sion of ERA by the sharing of information and consultation between the partners (member
states and the Commission) with a view to identifying common priorities which could lead to
coordinated or joint initiatives, and coordinating activities and positions vis-à-vis third coun-
tries and within international fora’ (Council of the European Union, 16763/08). This Forum
has been working since February 2009.

7. See  Declaration  of  Principles  relating  to  EUREKA (‘Hanover  Declaration’),  adopted  in

Hanover, 6 November 1985.

REFERENCES

Advisory Council for Science & Technology Policy (2007), To Bid and to Bind, That’s
No Question – Internationalisation of R&D as a Policy Challenge, Advisory Report
69, The Hague: Advisory Council for Science & Technology Policy.

Archibugi,  D.  and  J.  Michie  (1995),  ‘The  globalisation  of  technology:  a  new  taxon-

omy’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 19 (1), 121–40.

CREST (2007), Conclusions on ‘Internationalisation of R&D – Facing the Challenge
of Globalisation: Approaches to a Proactive International Policy in S&T’, Report
of the OMC Working Group ‘Policy Approaches Towards S&T Cooperation with
Third Countries’, CREST 1207/07, Brussels: CREST.

European  Commission  (2008a),  Challenging  Europe’s  Research:  Rationales  for  the

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

European  Research  Area, Report  of  the  Expert  Group,  Brussels:  European
Commission.

European  Commission  (2008b),  Towards  Joint  Programming  of  Research,  COM

(2008) 468 final, Brussels: European Commission.

OECD (2008a), Open Innovation in Global Networks, Paris: OECD.
OECD  (2008b),  The  Internationalisation  of  Business  R&D  –  Evidence,  Impacts  and

Implications, Paris: OECD.

12.

Informal coordination of international
S&T policy: the case of the European
Initiative for Agricultural Research
for Development

Jean-Luc Khalfaoui1

INTRODUCTION

The European Initiative for Agricultural Research for Development (EIARD)
is a strong 14-year ‘test case’ of an informal coordination mechanism in inter-
national S&T policy among the European Commission and European states. I
use the term ‘informal’ in contrast to the coordination mechanisms which are
part of the official comitology structure of the European Union (EU) like, for
example,  the  standing  committees  which  are  ‘subunits’ of  the  EU  political
governance system.

After  a  presentation  of  EIARD,  I  will  draw  lessons  on  the  positive  and
negative  drivers  for  such  a  coordination  mechanism  and  conclude  on  their
usefulness for other international research sectors with a view to the construc-
tion of the European Research Area.

BACKGROUND ON THE SCOPE OF AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH FOR DEVELOPMENT

Agricultural research is driven by both ‘scientific motives’ as well as ‘devel-
opment  motives’,  with  an  emphasis  on  the  second  driver  in  the  case  of 
agricultural research for development (ARD).

ARD is multi-dimensional in addressing the agricultural development chal-
lenges of developing countries and emerging economies (DCEE). The agricul-
tural  domain  includes  crop  production  and  animal  husbandry,  agro-forestry,
fisheries and aquaculture, food, agribusiness and related enterprises, as well as
the  sustainable  management  of  the  natural  resources  on  which  farming
depends, the animal and human health-related issues, and the socio-cultural and
bio-diverse landscapes, food systems and ecologies in which it is embedded.

213

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

ARD is closely linked with other research sectors and themes (such as health,
energy and environment), but also to social (for example gender) and institu-
tional (for example capability development) issues. ARD provides technolog-
ical,  economic  and  institutional  knowledge  and  innovations  contributing  to
sustainable  development.  It  encompasses  public  and  private  sector  research,
aiming at producing national and international public goods.

Europe  plays  a  dual  role  in ARD  –  as  an  active  research  and  education
provider for partners of DEEC, and as a major donor to international, conti-
nental,  sub-continental  and  national  ARD  institutions.  Europe  thus  holds  a
special responsibility at the international level regarding ARD.

Europe’s comparative advantage in the ARD area is its ability to couple 150
years of practical experience of ARD with a strong research and training capa-
bility and extensive engagement in rural development cooperation to address
the problems and opportunities facing DCEE in the future.

At a policy level, ARD is a key element of three main EU policies: devel-
opment  cooperation  policy,  neighbourhood  policy,  and  research  policy,  the
first two contributing to the overall EU external policy. By nature, these poli-
cies do not have the same objectives. They can even create conflicting inter-
ests,  which  reinforces  the  necessity  to  develop  an  efficient  ARD  policy
coordination mechanism at European level in order to secure the most appro-
priate balance between them. This role is played by the European Initiative for
Agricultural Research for Development since 1995.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE
FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH FOR DEVELOPMENT

The Origins of the Initiative

The  EIARD  is  a  permanent  informal  policy  coordination  platform  for  the
European  states  and  the  Commission  in  the  area  of  ARD.  In  1995,  the
Commission presented a Working Paper to the European Council proposing a
European initiative on international agricultural research for development, in
order  to  better  coordinate  the  national  and  Community  efforts  in ARD. The
EIARD was launched in Vienna in October 1995 during a high level ministe-
rial  meeting.  In  1997,  a  Communication  of  the  Commission  on  EIARD
(European  Commission  1997)  was  endorsed  by  the  Council  and  European
Parliament. Since then coordination action is legitimized at the EU level, but
also in the international arena where the EIARD helps Europe to ‘speak with
one voice’.

EIARD members are the EU member states plus Norway and Switzerland
as well as the European Commission. National representatives are ARD policy-

Informal coordination of international S&T policy: the case of EIARD

215

makers from Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Aid Cooperation, Ministries of
Research, and Ministries of Agriculture, and their advisers (research agencies
or  universities).  Commission  representatives  come  from  the  various
Directorates-General  supporting  ARD,  that  is,  from  the  Development,
Research and the EuropeAid departments of the Commission.

The main goals of the EIARD are to reduce poverty, to promote economic
growth,  food  security  and  sustainable  management  of  natural  resources  in
DCEEs, to contribute to knowledge generation and to solve global develop-
ment  issues  through  more  effective  European  investments  in  ARD,  and  to
support capacity development in those countries.

Coherent,  aligned  and  relevant  European  initiatives  with  developing  and
emerging  countries  in  agricultural  research  activities  and  capacity  develop-
ment are therefore promoted and implemented by the EIARD in a coordinated
manner  at  the  global,  continental,  sub-continental  and  national  levels  while
giving a stronger voice to developing countries in the European and interna-
tional decision-making processes. It also contributes to providing access for
those countries to European knowledge by opening up the European Research
Area.

EIARD Governance

The set-up decided by the ‘founding fathers’ has had a fundamental implica-
tion on EIARD’s coordination efficiency and limitations. It is therefore impor-
tant to have a description of EIARD’s governance structure.

Each member state is supposed to have a national EIARD network, consist-
ing of ARD policymakers from the relevant ministries and government depart-
ments. In fact, few members have such a network. It is the case, for example,
for  France  which  established  a  ‘Comité  de  la  Recherche  Agronomique
International’ in 1985 with the task of coordinating the policies and activities
of the different ministries and its main research institutions involved in ARD.
Each national EIARD network is coordinated by a National Contact Point.

The  EIARD  is  implemented  by  a  European  Coordination  Group  (ECG)
consisting  of  representatives  of  each  member,  appointed  by  their  respective
governments  or  the  Commission. The  ECG  is  therefore  accountable  to  both
individual  European  governments  (through  their  representatives)  and  to  the
EU  Council  of  Ministers  and  the  European  Parliament,  through  the
Commission.

The ECG elects an EIARD Chair among its national representatives. The
Commission  is  permanent  EIARD  Vice-Chair.  An  EIARD  Executive
Secretary  is  provided  by  one  of  the  member  states,  and  hosted  by  the
Commission’s Directorate-General for Research. The Executive Secretary is
responsible for the day-to-day management of the EIARD.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

A Working  Group  consisting  of  voluntary  EIARD  members  ensures  the
continuing activities of the EIARD, and operates as an ‘Executive Committee’.
It meets about four times a year, and is fully accountable to the ECG. A volun-
tary Working Group member leads one of the four areas of work of the EIARD
strategy to ensure that its outcomes are achieved in line with the EIARD strat-
egy (so-called Strategy Leaders). The Working Group is assisted by ad hoc Task
Forces and Expert Leads who prepare draft reports and positions on specific
issues for endorsement by the Working Group and eventually the ECG.

EIARD Areas of Work

The EIARD strategy comprises four main areas:

1. Effective coordination of European policies related to ARD in the pursuit

of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

2. Effective coordination of European investments in the Consultative Group
on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), a grouping of 15 inter-
national research centres which are major players in ARD. The European
Union  is  the  main  contributor  to  CGIAR,  which  is  the  single-largest
public  goods  investment  in  mobilizing  science  for  the  benefit  of  poor
farming communities worldwide. In the year 2006 the total budget of the
CGIAR  was  495  million  US$  of  which  the  EU  contribution  was  222
million US$.

3. Effective  coordination  of  European  investments  in  strengthening  ARD
organizations  at  the  global,  continental  and  sub-continental  levels,  espe-
cially in Africa.

4. Effective coordination between European investments in ARD and invest-

ments in rural development in the pursuit of the MDGs.

In  these  areas  of  work,  EIARD  tries  to  ensure  that  DCEEs  have  a  stronger
voice  in  the  ARD  arena  and  that  DCEEs  can  build  up  ARD  capacities,  in
particular in terms of institutions, and young and female individuals. During
its 14 years of work the EIARD has already achieved significant outcomes at
the policy, programme and project levels (see Table 12.1).

LESSONS LEARNT FOR EU INTERNATIONAL S&T
POLICY COORDINATION

Positive Elements for Efficient Policy Coordination

Based on the EIARD experience, it is possible to identify four main requirements

Informal coordination of international S&T policy: the case of EIARD

217

Table 12.1

Selected EIARD contributions, 1995–2008

(i) Institutional level 
• Coordinating the largest grouping of donors to the CGIAR (45 per cent of
the CGIAR budget), EIARD has strongly promoted the need for reform of
the CGIAR system, and contributed actively to the reform process through
EIARD position papers and its representation on all key governance bodies
of  the  CGIAR.  In  particular  supporting  focusing  on  structural  and
programmatic alignment in Africa;

• EIARD has strongly supported the Global Forum on Agricultural Research

(GFAR);

• EIARD  has  strongly  supported  the  European  Forum  on  Agricultural

Research for Development (EFARD);

• Coordinating European states’ contributions to the Global Crop Diversity
Trust (GCDT), a 250 million US$ fund to provide long-term sustainable
support for important genetic resources collections;

• Endorsing of the International Centre for development oriented Research

in Agriculture (ICRA) 2004 strategy;

(ii) Policy level
• The    ‘Strategy  for  EIARD  2005–2010’

and  the  current  ‘Strategy  for
EIARD  2009-2013’ which  provide  a  strategy  to  guide  the  ARD  invest-
ments of EIARD members;

• Continuing  to  raise  the  awareness  of  decision  makers  of  the  essential
contributions of ARD to food security and poverty elimination, and main-
taining  the  aggregate  level  of  European  support  for  ARD  more  or  less
constant over the last five years;

• The development and adoption of the EU 2005, 2006 and 2007 develop-

ment policies and strategies on development and Africa;

• The 2008 EC Guidelines on Agricultural Research for Development;
• The 2008 Information Note for EU Delegations on Agricultural Research

for Development;

• Contributing  to  the  successful  re-negotiation  of  the  International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, and the subsequent International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture;

(iii) Programme level
• Developing  the  ‘Consultative  Group  on  International  Agricultural
Research (CGIAR) – Strategy Pointers (2000)’ to guide the EC’s financial
support for the CGIAR;

• Being  instrumental  in  the  design  and  adoption  by  the  CGIAR  of  the

Challenge Programmes, and the African Regional MTPs;

 
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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Table 12.1

continued

• Supporting the design of the international dimension of the EC’s 5th,  6th

and 7th Framework Programmes;

• Under FP6, promoting and facilitating :

(a) ERA-ARD (an ERA-NET on ARD)
(b) A Strategic Alliance between FARA and EFARD (PAEPARD)

• The development and adoption of the Food Security Thematic Programme
(233  million  Euro  for  ARD  for  2007–2010),  which  include  support  to
EIARD in order to increase its coordinating role;

• Supporting  InfoSys+,  an  ARD  information  management  system  for

Europe.

for an effective coordination. First, it requires a good ‘balance’ in the gover-
nance between the Commission and the national members (member states).
In the case of the EIARD, for example, the Chair and Executive Secretary
are provided on a rotation basis by the member states, while the Commission
is permanent Vice-Chair and hosts the Executive Secretary.

Second,  the  coordination  structure  must  demonstrate  a  clear  and  recog-
nized added value. In the case of EIARD, Europe ‘speaking with one voice’
has clearly been able to be a major driver in the reform of the international
agricultural  structures  toward  a  more  efficient  system.  EIARD  offered  a
equitable  consultation  platform  where  the  Commission  and  the  member
states elaborated common positions on the future of the international agri-
cultural structures and became an internationally recognized political vehi-
cle  to  successfully  support  these  positions  in  international  arenas,  as
demonstrated in Table 12.1. Another added value is the exchange of infor-
mation  and  mutual  guidance  which  help  European  decision  makers  to  do
their job better. In the case of EIARD, information on the annual financial
support of the international ARD institutions from the Commission and the
member states is shared through EIARD and helps each member to take its
own decision on the best allocation of its support.

Third,  it  requires  active  support  and  a  fostering  role  of  an  independent
agent.  In  the  case  of  EIARD,  for  example,  the  Commission  hosts  and
actively  supports  the  EIARD  Executive  Secretary  since  its  launching  in
1995.

Fourth and finally, the fact that the EIARD is an informal mechanism, and
not  a  compulsory  one,  brings  a  positive  element  since  it  creates  a  strong
sense of ownership in the Commission and the national representatives.

Informal coordination of international S&T policy: the case of EIARD

219

Main Negative Elements for Efficient Policy Coordination

The  main  limitation  is  by  far  the  lack  of  horizontal  coordination  within  the
member states and the Commission, that is, between ministries and Directorates-
General which have different and even sometimes conflicting policies. ‘Internal
coordination’ is  clearly  a  prerequisite  for  efficient  ‘inter-coordination’.  It  is
therefore  essential  that  each  member  establishes  inter-service  structures  to
address this limitation.

In addition, the fact that EIARD is an informal mechanism also brings two
negative elements. First, there is a tendency toward a ‘dilution’ of the high level
political support in member states and the Commission. It is therefore necessary
to  put  in  place  an  active  reporting  mechanism  toward  the  Council  and  the
European Parliament. Second, the decision-making process is less strong than in
formal coordination mechanisms. It is therefore recommended to link the two
types of coordination mechanisms, with a formal general structure of national
and  Commission  representatives,  on  the  one  hand,  and  informal  coordination
sub-structures with only some of the members for specific topics, on the other
hand. This is the type of governance structure which has been adopted for the
Standing  Committee  on Agricultural  Research  (SCAR)  which  is  coordinating
the European policies related to agricultural research for Europe.

CONCLUSIONS

Coordination  of  international  S&T policies  is  a  key  and  vital  challenge  for
Europe, in particular in a competitive globalized world. In the case of agricul-
tural research for developing and emerging economies, Europe has taken initia-
tives since 1995 to ensure such coordination. Therefore, this policy area is quite
suitable to draw lessons from. I conclude that the positive and negative elements,
as described in this chapter, have a generic value that could be extrapolated and
applied to other international research areas, in particular in areas highly relevant
for developing countries such as health, energy and the environment.

NOTE

1. The  views  expressed  in  this  chapter  are  purely  personal  and  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the

position of the European Commission.

REFERENCE

European Commission (1997), The European Initiative for Agricultural Research for
Development (EIARD), COM (97) 126 final, Brussels: European Commission.

13. Policy coordination in the external
dimension of the ERA: a comment

Jørgen Mortensen

AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY THE TAXONOMY OF THE
‘FIVE Cs’

In order to grasp the nature of governance and as a first step in the discussion
on ‘coordination’ it seems to me necessary to clarify the taxonomy (terminol-
ogy)  of  five  different  concepts  that  are  frequently  used  in  the  governance
debate. I propose to focus on the following ‘five Cs’:

• Coordination;
• Co-operation;
• Collaboration;
• Community instruments (common policies);
• Competition (elimination of barriers and deregulation).

‘Coordination’ is  the  act  of  making  different  actors  work  together  for  a
common  goal.  Conceptually  speaking,  coordination  is  a  top-down  approach
requiring a ‘co-ordinator’ but not a transfer of competences. A typical exam-
ple  of  coordination  is  thus  the  ‘Open  Method  of  Coordination’ now  used
explicitly as a compromise between elementary inter-governmental coopera-
tion and common policies, such as, notably, the Common Agricultural Policy.
The  Open  Method  of  Coordination  was  codified  with  the  Lisbon  European
Council  applying  it  to  policy  sectors  such  as  information  society,  research
policy,  entrepreneurial  policy  and  education  policy  (for  example  European
Commission 2009; Hodson and Maher 2001).

‘Co-operation’ constitutes an approach aimed at getting the components of
a  system  working  together  so  as  to  achieve  common  objectives.  In  other
words, individual components that appear to be ‘selfish’ and independent work
together to create a highly complex, greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts system.
Therefore, co-operation is a horizontal approach.

‘Collaboration’ is  a  recursive  process  where  two  or  more  actors  work
together toward an intersection of common goals – for example, an intellec-

220

Policy coordination in the external dimension of the ERA: a comment

221

tual endeavour that is creative in nature – by sharing knowledge, learning and
building consensus. Collaboration does not require leadership and can some-
times  bring  better  results  through  decentralization  and  egalitarianism.  In
particular, teams that work collaboratively can obtain greater resources, recog-
nition and reward when facing competition for finite resources. Hence, collab-
oration is mainly a bottom-up approach

‘Community instruments’ in general constitute a policy approach using ‘la
méthode communautaire’ including EU funding of policies and projects such
as,  notably,  the  Framework  Programme  for  Research  or  the  Joint  Research
Centre and other EU policies.

‘Competition’, in the present context, must not only be understood as the
application of EU competition policy but more generally as the co-existence
of  different  systems  and  policies  which  are  ‘competing’ to  solve  a  common
policy or social problem. For example, the ‘competition of systems’ has been
proposed  as  a  clear  alternative  to,  for  example,  monetary  integration  or  the
harmonization  of  social  protection  systems  across  Europe.  However,  in  this
sense  of  the  term,  competition  may  not  necessarily  be  compatible  with  the
perceived need to ensure ‘a level playing field’ within the Internal Market.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TARGETS AND
INSTRUMENTS

With reference to this taxonomy, there seems to be a need for a more explicit
identification of targets and instruments in the EU’s approach to S&T policies.
Furthermore,  there  seems  to  be  a  need  for  a  more  transparent  hierarchy  of
targets, that is the differentiation between general and specific targets.
For example the EU has agreed on certain ‘general targets’ such as:

• The  ‘Barcelona  target’:  R&D  investment  in  Europe  shall  equal  3  per
cent of GDP by 2010. In 2005 the EU average was 1.84 per cent of GDP,
with a huge disparity from 0.5 per cent in Bulgaria to 3.86 per cent in
Sweden;

• A single  labour  market  for  researchers  (largely  achieved  in  theory

although not in practice);

• Establishing a European Research Area, involving a ‘single market for
research’ (European  Commission  2007),  which  might  be  a  utopian
project.

In addition to such general targets international or European agreement in the
area  of  R&D  has  been  reached  on  certain  more  ‘specific  targets’ including
plans and budgets for their implementation:

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

International space station;

•
• Common running of meteorological satellites;
• Thermonuclear fusion research (international);
• Research on safety of nuclear power plants.

TARGETS AND INSTRUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL S&T
COOPERATION

In  general,  there  is  a  clear  tendency  among  the  Member  States  for  closer
cooperation  in  S&T policy  towards  third  countries  ensuring  at  the  same
time  that  both  coordination  and  competition  aspects  are  respected  and
compatible  with  national  interests.  Closer  coordination  has  to  prove  clear
benefits  for  all  parties  involved.  The  balance  between  cooperation  and
competition  might  vary  between  various  research  disciplines.1 Within  the
European  Initiative  for  Agricultural  Research  for  Development  (EIARD)
there  has  been  some  success  in  coordinating  the  Consultative  Group  on
International Agricultural  Research  (CGIAR)2 but  a  lack  of  coordination
still  exists  among  the  Member  States.  Furthermore,  Member  States
frequently  aim  at  defending  national  interests  so  there  may  be  a  ‘moral
hazard’ problem to cope with.

In addition, given the heterogeneity of actors in national administrations
that deal with R&D funding, there is no single voice when it comes to coor-
dinating national approaches. This often leads to lobbying for specific coor-
dination actions by strong groups instead of following systematic processes.
Further, there is very little internal intelligence on internationalization needs
across the various stakeholders and fields, which again makes coordination
of related policies highly ambitious.3

Therefore,  according  to  Kaiser,4 coordination  at  the  European  level
should  alleviate  individual  transnational  policy  strategies  of  the  various
actors within the multi-level governance system instead of considering them
as a fragmentation of the European Research Area. Nevertheless, as stressed
by Shaw,5 if the situation in the EU is indeed ‘suboptimal’, that is, that dupli-
cation,  fragmentation  and  redundancy  of  research  effort  are  wasting
resources,  cooperation  is  one  way  to  optimize  the  use  of  resources.  This
diagnostic may, however, suggest a cure that Member States find too painful
to administer.

CONCLUSIONS

The  contributions  on  ‘policy  coordination  in  the  external  dimension  of  the

Policy coordination in the external dimension of the ERA: a comment

223

ERA’ and the supplementary considerations above would seem to point to the
following conclusions:

• Recognize that ‘coordination’ is an instrument not a target in itself;
• Establish a more explicit list of targets and priorities;
• Provide  estimates,  qualitative  and  quantitative,  of  the  value  added  of

coordination;

• Choose  the  right  instrument(s)  (coordination,  cooperation,  collabora-
tion,  Community  instruments  or  competition)  associated  with  each
target;

• Undertake more explicit impact analysis of the potential of actions and

instruments (or combination of instruments).

First of all, it seems to be essential to recognize that before actually jumping
to an ‘instrumentalization’ of ‘coordination’ we need, in each area of S&T, to
start with an identification of the targets to be pursued and the priorities for EU
action  in  this  particular  area.  It  may  then  be  both  useful  and  informative  to
consider the value added for the different actors and stakeholders of the differ-
ent potential paths to follow.

In  addition,  despite  the  large  uncertainties  with  respect  to  the  final
outcomes of any research activity, there seems to be scope for a more regular
and  explicit  recourse  to  impact  assessments.  As  stressed  in  a  recent  CEPS
report (Renda 2006), well-crafted methods of impact assessment can instil a
greater degree of ‘awareness’, transparency, efficiency and accountability in
the policy process. Scholars in many fields of social sciences have discovered
that  regulatory  impact  assessment  and  cost–benefit  analysis  can  provide  the
best contribution to the quality of legislation when those in charge of imple-
menting them are aware of both their potential and their inherent limit. This
explicit  identification  of  the  triangular  relation  of  targets,  instruments  and
impact assessment could, in my view, contribute importantly to the clarifica-
tion of the EU priorities with respect to the internationalization and globaliza-
tion of S&T.

NOTES

1. See Chapters 8 and 11, by Edler and van der Zwan respectively.
2. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research is a grouping of 15 research

centres which are major players in agricultural research for development.

3. See Chapter 8, by Edler.
4. See Chapter 10, by Kaiser.
5. See Chapter 9, by Shaw.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

REFERENCES

European  Commission  (2007),  Green  Paper  on  the  European  Research  Area:  New

Perspectives, COM (2007) 161 final, Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2009), The Open Method of Coordination in Research Policy:
Assessment and Recommendations, Report from the Expert Group for the follow-up
of the research aspects of the revised Lisbon strategy, Brussels.

Hodson, D. and I. Maher (2001), ‘The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance:
The  Case  of  Soft  Economic  Policy  Coordination’,  Journal  of  Common  Market
Studies, 39 (4), 719–46.

Renda, Andrea (2006), Impact Assessment in the EU: The State of the Art and the Art

of the State, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

PART III

Conclusions

14. From the ‘external dimension of the
ERA’ to an ‘EU external S&T
policy’? Conclusions and
perspectives

Heiko Prange-Gstöhl1

INTRODUCTION

This volume aimed at deepening the analysis of the external dimension of the
European  Research Area  (ERA)  by  arguing  that  in  a  globalized  knowledge
economy the European Union (EU) needs a new approach to its international
S&T policies by, first, demonstrating leadership in tackling major global chal-
lenges (as one of the major rationales for developing the international dimen-
sion of the ERA) and, second, by aiming at more coherence of S&T policies
across the different tiers of government – both horizontally and vertically (that
is, the coordination aspect in the external dimension of the ERA to work more
effectively  together).  As  already  argued  in  Chapter  1,  these  two  issues  are
closely interrelated: on the one hand, policy coordination has the potential to
enable actors to address major problems more effectively; on the other hand,
the ever more pressing need to address global challenges more effectively (and
efficiently) is likely to motivate policymakers to closer coordinate their indi-
vidual (national) policies.

Analysing the external dimension of the ERA in the way it has been done
in this volume highlights the interactions between the national, European and
international  policies  and  politics,  including  actors  and  institutions  at  all
levels, thereby helping us to understand what a ‘(common) European policy
for international S&T cooperation’ could look like and under which conditions
such a policy could be possible. Authors in this volume approached this task
by analysing the S&T role of the EU in several areas of global concern, such
as sustaining global commons, climate change and energy resource security,
global public health, innovation, and poverty reduction, as well as by expos-
ing both the pitfalls of policy coordination and its potential to contribute to a
more coherent international S&T policy of the EU.

The  question  what  a  (common)  European  policy  for  international  S&T

227

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

cooperation could look like is by no means only a theoretical one. EU member
states and the European Commission have at various occasions communicated
their wish (and will) to move towards a joint strategy for international S&T
cooperation. In the context of the so-called ‘Ljubljana Process’ member states
and the Commission aim at deepening the ERA further ‘in partnership’.2 This
includes  certainly  the  international  dimension  of  the  ERA.  As  mentioned
earlier  in  this  book,  the  Commission  published  its  opinion  in  the  form  of  a
strategic  framework  for  international  S&T cooperation  in  September  2008,
highlighting  the  need  for  closer  working  between  the  Community  and  its
member  states.  Member  states  reacted  positively  to  this  Communication  in
December 2008, pointing out that swift work towards a common strategy in
international  S&T cooperation  is  urgently  needed.3 As  a  consequence  a
Strategic  Forum  for  International  S&T Cooperation  has  been  established  to
work towards these objectives. Analysis of the volume might help us to think
one step further.

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE EXTERNAL
DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA

Tackling  global  challenges  has  become  one  central  driver  for  strengthening
international  cooperation  in  science  and  technology  (see  CREST 2007).
Policymakers around the world agree that those ‘grand challenges’ cannot be
addressed by one nation alone. By definition those challenges do not stop at
national  borders,  although  they  are  quite  often  of  local  origin  (for  example
pandemics) and need specialized local solutions (for example food security).
Even  more  important,  generally  global  challenges  are  interconnected  with
each  other  (for  example  climate  change–sustainable  development–energy
security–desertification–water  and  food  security–health–armed  conflicts  and
so on). States increasingly try to work together at the global level to jointly
find  solutions  on  how  best  to  address  global  challenges  through  S&T.  The
most  prominent  examples  are  the  G8,  the  UNFCCC  (UN  Framework
Convention on Climate Change) and the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Malaria
and Tuberculosis.4 Most  of  these  global  bodies  or  international  conventions
address  a  specific  societal  challenge.  Other  examples  are  the  International
Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE5), the International Partnership
for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC6) and the International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA7) in the area of energy; the Global Water Partnership
(GWP8)  in  the  area  of  water  management;  the  Carbon  Sequestration
Leadership Forum (CSLF9) in the area of climate change; and the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR10) in the area of agri-
culture, climate change and food.

Conclusions and perspectives

229

However, as interests, ideas and policies differ from country to country, a
common  solution  is  harder  to  reach  the  more  representatives  sit  around  the
table (normally not only state representatives but also representatives of non-
governmental  organizations  and  other  stakeholders  wanting  to  have  a  say).
Therefore, often only solutions of the lowest-common-denominator kind can
be found at the global level. However, even if an agreement has been reached
at  the  international  level,  domestic  implementation  is  not  guaranteed  as
national veto points might stop the transposition of international commitments
into  national  law  (this  is  a  general  challenge  for  global  governance).
Regarding  global  research  initiatives  countries  frequently  hesitate  to  pool
sufficient resources which slip out of their budgetary control.

The EU (Community plus member states) already plays an important role
within international institutions and negotiations (see, for example, European
Commission 2007a; Gstöhl 2009; Jørgensen 2009a, 2009b). In particular, by
‘dealing with climate change, air and water pollution and other trans-national
environment  threats  the  EU  has  made  a  major  contribution  to  international
negotiations establishing regulatory standards in these areas and providing a
model  for  many  countries  and  regions  which  are  grappling  with  the  same
problems’ (European Commission 2006, p. 5).

Having this in mind, contributions in Part I of this book addressed ques-
tions such as: What could the EU’s international S&T contribution be to tackle
global  challenges  more  effectively?  How  should  the  EU  do  that  and  with
which focus (if any)?

Generally, all contributions consider that joint solutions with third countries
addressing the major global challenges are core for international S&T policies.
However,  to  foster  and  guarantee  mutually  beneficiary  cooperation  to  tackle
global challenges technology transfer needs to be secured through the provision
of cheap technologies (in the case of developing countries). Additionally, legal
and regulatory frameworks need to be addressed as well as capacity building in
order to raise third countries’ absorptive capabilities for new technologies.

In Chapter 2, Vogler considers the EU as a leading actor in preserving global
commons  (which  comprise  the  resources  of  the  high  seas  and  deep  seabed,
Antarctica, outer space and the geostationary orbit plus the global atmosphere).
However, he sees a fundamental problem for the EU to use its full potential: the
European Community involvement in international institutions is limited and
membership in international regimes and organizations is like a ‘patchwork’.
Vogler shows that the EU’s support in capacity building is significant and that
integrated policies, such as the new maritime policy as well as energy policy,
are deemed to be necessary to preserve global commons. He claims that mobi-
lizing and coordinating the enormous scientific capabilities of Europe under the
EU  banner  would  doubtless  assist  the  effectiveness  of  the  Union  in  global
commons diplomacy.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Successful  and  effective  international  S&T cooperation  in  the  area  of
climate  change  and  energy  resource  security  would  need  to  link  climate
change policies with sustainable development policies (‘mainstreaming’), for
example  via  sustainable  energy  technologies  (‘maintaining  energy  security
and  maximising  sustainability’)  argues  Mitchell in  Chapter  3.  Hence,  she
considers the decentralization of energy production and distribution through
the promotion of renewable energies (namely wind and solar) as one of the key
solutions  for  the  current  energy  crisis.  Mitchell  points  out  that  if  Europe  is
serious  about  its  commitment  to  the  reduction  of  climate  change,  and  if  it
wants to have the chance of capturing the global opportunities deriving from
climate change, then it has limited choice other than to increase the scale of its
international S&T programmes.

Igumbor  and  Sanders (Chapter  4)  promote  a  significant  re-orientation  in
global health research in order to be more responsive to global health needs in
particular those related to Africa. They clearly recommend that research should
prioritize examining the reasons for the increasingly uneven burden of ill health
both between and within countries, assessing the impact of public health inter-
ventions,  determining  the  factors  that  predict  success  of  interventions  under
normal conditions and analysing the type of social mobilization that would lead
to policy change which would improve the social determinants of health and
transform  weak  health  systems  on  the  continent.  Europe’s  responses  need,
moreover,  to  focus  on  increased  networking  with  developing  countries  and
innovative teaching and research that better addresses policymakers.

In Chapter 5 Athreye et al. stress that there is an urgent need for a new and
‘outward-looking’ European Lisbon Agenda to address the external challenges
with  which  Europe  will  be  confronted  in  the  decades  to  come  (related  in
particular to the rise of emerging economies). They argue that the global chal-
lenges confronting Europe, China and India call for shared solutions: shared
solutions  in  the  creation  of  new  knowledge  and  the  diffusion  of  existing
knowledge addressing the urgent global problems, such as climate change and
sustainable development, infant mortality and infectious diseases. The scope
for mutual learning and joint initiatives from the EU, China and India’s expe-
rience in this regard is substantial.

In her case study on Bangladesh Gehl Sampath (Chapter 6) highlights the
relevance  of  institutional  incentives  that  underpin  innovative  capacity  in  a
latecomer  (that  is,  developing)  context.  She  impressively  reminds  us  that
‘institutions  matter’ in  the  context  of  innovation.  Gehl  Sampath  shows  that
there is a need to address the pre-eminence of learning institutions for creat-
ing sustained mid-term or long-term economic growth: ‘These institutions can
either be formal or informal (coded in terms of unofficial attitudes and cultural
or  social  practices  of  interaction  and  problem-solving)  and  pre-existing
cultural  and  social  arrangements  that  shape  the  behaviour  of  agents  in  the

Conclusions and perspectives

231

absence  of  good  formal  institutions  for  exchange’.  She  recommends  that
‘efforts that seek to build innovation capacity in latecomer countries should be
based on the recognition that modest changes in institutional arrangements and
official attitudes towards the economy can often produce large payoffs’. Firms
in  developing  countries  often  work  around  well-intentioned  policies  to  find
informal mechanisms that help them to retain their profits, which is frequently
to the detriment of the national economy and to technological progress. As this
is  a  key  finding  for  Gehl  Sampath,  donor  agencies  and  international  bodies
should focus on how their interventions can minimize the inefficiencies of the
informal  institutional  structures  that  promote  such  rent-seeking  in  order  to
move towards greater welfare.

POLICY COORDINATION AND THE EXTERNAL
DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA

In the absence of a genuine legal competence for a single European (interna-
tional) S&T policy, the EU (Community plus its member states) has to use the
limited  measures  laid  down  in  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European
Community  (ECT)  to  pursue  a  coherent  research  policy.  One  of  those
measures  is  the  coordination  of  national  and  Community  research  policies
(Art. 165 ECT). Other instruments are the implementation of a multi-annual
research  programme  (that  is,  the  Community  Framework  Programmes; Art.
166), the Community participating in joint programmes of member states (Art.
169) and the setting-up of so-called joint undertakings under Community law
(Art. 171). To improve S&T cooperation with third countries the Community
may  conclude  bilateral  science  and  technology  agreements  (Art.  170).
Although  coordination  of  policies  seems  to  be  the  most  straightforward  of
those  alternatives,  it  has  proven  to  be  complex  and  difficult  to  achieve  the
main target of policy coordination, that is, to pursue a more coherent research
policy  across  Europe  through  policy  learning  (see  Edler,  Shaw  and  van  der
Zwan  in  this  volume).  Nevertheless,  coordination  of  research  policies  is
deemed to be an appropriate means for a more efficient and effective interna-
tional  S&T policy  of  the  European  Union  (see,  for  example,  CREST 2007,
2008;  European  Commission  2007b,  2008a,  2008b).  Coordinating  national
and Community strategies and policies and pooling limited resources is gener-
ally seen by policymakers as the best way to tackle major global challenges,
which  cannot  be  solved  anymore  by  one  nation  alone.11 The  new  Strategic
Forum for International S&T Cooperation set up by the Council as the main
new coordination body in EU international S&T policies still has to prove its
effectiveness in terms of providing a more coherent common European policy
and strategy towards third countries.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

The reality and perception of coordinating (international) science and tech-
nology  policies  has  been  addressed  in  Part  II  of  this  book: What  is  the  real
added  value  of  policy  coordination  at  the  European  level  (mainly  Shaw  in
Chapter 9)? What are the conditions for effective policy coordination (mainly
Kaiser, van der Zwan and Khalfaoui in Chapters 10, 11 and 12)? How can the
EU  make  sure  that  policy  coordination  serves  its  purpose,  that  is,  a  more
coherent policy at the European level (mainly Edler in Chapter 8)?

In the first chapter of Part II Edler conceptualizes ways in which ministries
or agencies can realize synergies when it comes to supporting the international
activities of their researchers. Edler argues that international coordination of
national policies for international S&T collaboration meets an additional set of
challenges that need to be tackled systematically. He claims that the concep-
tual considerations presented in his chapter can be utilized to design system-
atic  coordination  schemes  for  policies  geared  towards  international
collaboration as they provide the major elements for a strategic approach for
international  coordination  as  they  would  have  to  be  applied  in  their  logical
sequence.

In the subsequent Chapter 9 Shaw argues that in order to turn policy coor-
dination  into  a  ‘better’ way  of  EU  policymaking,  that  is  to  achieve  lesser
degrees  of  fragmentation  of  policies  and  programmes,  the  EU  needs  first  a
proper diagnostic of the situation. This would enable the EU to set the right
objectives and to use the most effective instruments. For such a proper diag-
nostic,  that  is,  to  assess  how  great  the  ‘fragmentation’ of  international  S&T
policies really is, the EU needs a suitable mapping of its R&D programmes
since one condition for cooperation and coordination is robust information on
the state of play of research in the EU. Shaw further argues that a structured
exchange of information, in-depth discussions, and increased ‘ownership’ by
stakeholders  are  also  success  factors  for  ‘mutual  learning’ which,  for  Shaw,
represents a key European added value. ‘Mutual learning’ is also a necessity
to develop coherent and consistent policies and strategies towards third coun-
tries.

In Chapter 10 Kaiser studies the likelihood and effectiveness of coordina-
tion at the European and global levels. He argues that the likelihood and effec-
tiveness  of  coordination  depends  on  the  actors’ goals  and  preferences.
Depending on their goals and preferences international S&T policies/arrange-
ments can vary between high and low specificity (in terms of their content),
on the one hand, and between high and low exclusivity (in terms of the actors
involved), on the other hand. As an example Kaiser shows that if actors (for
example, states, enterprises) want to improve their own competitive position
in  a  certain  field  in  which  they  already  have  a  technological  advantage  or
which is of strategic importance to them, they will establish an arrangement
characterized  by  both  high  specificity  and  exclusivity  (for  example,  the

Conclusions and perspectives

233

International Space Station). On the other hand, Kaiser argues, arrangements
of high specificity and low exclusivity are those arrangements that are most
likely  areas  for  international  coordination.  These  arrangements  are  either
targeted to certain common problems or do highly specific research in areas in
which there is no immediate impact on a country’s economic competitiveness
(for  example  EMBL,  ITER).  Finally,  Kaiser  proposes  three  areas  where  the
coordination of EU external S&T policies could be successful: (a) within the
G8/OECD; (b) if bilateral member states’ S&T agreements are turned into EU
Framework Agreements with regional organizations or countries (this would
be of special advantage for member states whose S&T infrastructures are still
catching-up);  (c)  regarding  large-scale  multilateral  (mega-)science  projects
such as ITER.

Van der Zwan, who explains in Chapter 11 the views of member states as
regards policy coordination, recommends that close coordination of national
policies  should  be  sought  in  areas  of  European  or  global  concern,  such  as
sustainable development, climate change, health, and food security. To avoid
duplication, create critical masses and improve the quality of research in these
areas  he  proposes  to  use  the  concept  of  Joint  Programming  of  research
(European Commission 2008c). However, van der Zwan reminds us that while
there seems to be a clear tendency of the member states for a closer coopera-
tion and coordination in international S&T policies, both need to be built on
national interests and to prove clear benefits for all parties involved, meaning
competition  remains  a  core  factor  in  science  and  technology  policies.
Moreover, he stresses that there are significant differences between member
states, in particular in terms of funding schemes. According to van der Zwan
it is crucial to note that many countries focus their S&T policies at national
strengths and try to position their industries in international networks in order
to achieve excellence.

In Chapter 12, Khalfaoui – taking the case of the European Initiative for
Agricultural  Research  for  Development  (EIARD)  –  proposes  a  few
elements  for  effective  international  S&T policy  coordination.  He  argues
that  it,  first,  requires  a  good  ‘balance’ in  the  governance  between  the
Commission  (as  the  independent  agent)  and  the  national  members  (EU
member  states).  Second,  the  coordination  structure  must  demonstrate  a
clear and recognized added value. Khalfaoui points out that in the case of
EIARD,  Europe  ‘speaking  with  one  voice’ has  clearly  been  able  to  be  a
major driver in the reform of international agricultural structures. Third, it
requires  the  active  support  and  a  fostering  role  by  the  independent  agent,
that is, the Commission. Fourth and finally, ‘the fact that the EIARD is an
informal mechanism, and not a compulsory one, brings a positive element
since  it  creates  a  strong  sense  of  ownership  in  the  Commission  and  the
national representatives’.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

CONCLUSIONS

The European Commission in 2006 noted that:

Increasingly  the  EU’s  internal  policies  –  for  example  the  environment,  energy,
competition policy, agriculture and fisheries, transport, the fight against terrorism
and illegal migration, dealing with global pandemics – impact on international rela-
tionships and play a vital part in the EU’s external influence. Conversely, many of
Europe’s  internal  policy  goals  depend  on  the  effective  use  of  external  policies.
(European Commission 2006, p. 2)

Science and technology are not mentioned in that list of internal policies. And
still science and technology cooperation is not really seen as ‘a vital part in the
EU’s external influence’. Only slowly has the conviction in the EU grown that
science and research could be an indispensable part of the EU’s external rela-
tions. Science diplomacy is becoming ever more important, inter alia, due to
the global challenges described here.

Accepting this would mean going a step further – that is, towards an ‘EU
external  S&T policy’ with  the  EU  ‘speaking  with  one  voice’ as  the  core
element.12 However, an ‘EU external S&T policy’ is only achievable through
competence or coordination. As a complete shifting of science and technology
policies  competencies  to  the  EU  level  is  not  foreseen  in  the  Lisbon  Treaty,
coordination would be the only feasible governance mechanism – with all its
complexity and challenges as described in Part II of this volume. While strong
national competences in an issue area (like they will remain in S&T) are likely
to hamper the EU from ‘speaking with one voice’ or developing a joint strat-
egy,  strong  institutionalized  coordination  mechanisms  may  compensate  for
such a drawback (see also Gstöhl 2009).13

In the absence of sole EU (Community) competences in international S&T
policies the development of an ‘EU external S&T policy’ is more likely the
more the coordination process is institutionalized and the more it is themati-
cally narrowed.

First, the strength of the coordination mechanism depends on its degree of
institutionalization. In fact, in the case of European international S&T policies
coordination has been established and institutionalized through the Strategic
Forum  for  International  S&T Cooperation. This  Forum,  composed  of  repre-
sentatives of EU member states and the Commission (countries associated to
the Seventh Research Framework Programme are invited as observers), needs
to  become  the  focal  point  for  continued  consultation  and  information
exchange  as  well  as  a  means  of  aggregating  interests  to  enable  the  EU  to
prepare joint S&T positions and activities towards third countries. To enhance
its  legitimacy  and  institutionalization  frequent  consultation  with  the  formal
Council groups (for example COREPER and the Council Research Working

Conclusions and perspectives

235

Party), the European Parliament and stakeholders would be necessary. Second,
coordination  becomes  less  complex  and  more  effective  if  it  is  thematically
narrowed. Reiter (2005, p. 158) has argued that member states are more reluc-
tant to act together in fora that cover a broad scope and focus (only) on best
practice.  Therefore,  the  Strategic  Forum  is  likely  to  work  more  effectively
towards  an  EU  external  S&T policy  if  it  focuses  its  efforts  on  topics  where
closer cooperation or joint activities across EU member states are more or less
uncontested  and  which  serve  overall  EU  goals  –  that  is,  for  example,  those
global challenges that have been addressed in this volume.

In  sum,  an  EU  external  S&T policy  is  more  likely  to  emerge  if  member
states  and  the  Commission  focus  on  a  limited  number  of  strategic  priorities
where Europe can make the difference. This book might contribute in shaping
such a focus.

NOTES

1. The views expressed in this chapter are purely personal and do not necessarily reflect the

position of the European Commission.

2. See Council Conclusions of 30 May 2008 entitled ‘Ljubljana Process – towards full realisa-

tion of the European Research Area’ (30 May 2008), doc. 10231/08.

3. See Council Conclusions concerning a European partnership for international scientific and
technological cooperation, 2891st Competitiveness Council meeting, Brussels, 2 December
2008.

4. The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Malaria and Tuberculosis, created in 2002 and until 2008
administered by the WHO, is a global public–private partnership dedicated to attracting and
disbursing  additional  resources  to  prevent  and  treat  HIV/AIDS,  tuberculosis  and  malaria.
Since 1 January 2009, the Fund has been an autonomous financing institution. With a perma-
nent staff of about 470 people (based in Geneva) and an approved funding of 15.6 billion
US$ the Fund is the main source for programmes to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.
See http://www.theglobalfund.org.

5. The International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE) was established in 2003 as
an international institution to accelerate the transition to a hydrogen economy. IPHE serves
as  a  mechanism  to  organize  and  implement  effective,  efficient  and  focused  international
research, development, demonstration and commercial utilization activities related to hydro-
gen  and  fuel  cell  technologies. The  formation  of  IPHE  was  facilitated  by  the  US
Department of Energy and the US Department of Transportation in 2003 to foster interna-
tional cooperation on hydrogen and fuel cell R&D, common codes and standards, and infor-
mation sharing on infrastructure development. Members are Australia, Brazil, Canada, the
European Commission, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
New  Zealand,  Norway,  Russia,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States.  See
http://www.iphe.net.

6. On  8  June  2008  at  the  G8  Energy  Ministerial  meeting  in Aomori  the  G8  countries  plus
China,  India,  South  Korea  and  the  European  Community  decided  to  establish  the
International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation. See G8 Declaration available
at  http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/energy/080608ipeec.pdf  (accessed  on  11 August  2009).  The
IPEEC Statute was signed in May 2009 by the G8 countries, Brazil, China, India, Mexico
and the Republic of Korea. The idea of an international initiative on energy efficiency came
originally from the European Commission, and was one of the actions foreseen in the EU
Energy Efficiency Action Plan of October 2006.

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International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

7. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) was officially established in Bonn on
26 January 2009 (the headquarters are in Abu Dhabi/United Arab Emirates). In August 2009
136 states had signed the Statute of the Agency; amongst them 45 African, 36 European, 32
Asian, 14 American and 9 Australia/Oceania states. Acting as the global voice for renewable
energies,  IRENA envisages  providing  practical  advice  and  support  for  both  industrialized
and  developing  countries,  thereby  helping  to  improve  frameworks  and  build  capacity.
Moreover, the Agency intends to facilitate access to all relevant information, including reli-
able data on the potentials for renewable energy, best practices, effective financial mecha-
nisms and state-of-the-art technological expertise. See http://www.irena.org.

8. See http://www.gwpforum.org.
9. The  Carbon  Sequestration  Leadership  Forum,  established  in  2003,  is  a  ministerial-level
international climate change initiative that is focused on the development of improved cost-
effective technologies for the separation and capture of carbon dioxide for its transport and
long-term safe storage. Its secretariat is provided by the US Department of Energy. Members
are  Australia,  Brazil,  Canada,  China,  Colombia,  Denmark,  the  European  Commission,
France,  Germany,  Greece,  India,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Republic  of  Korea,  Mexico,  the
Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Russia,  Saudi  Arabia,  South  Africa,  the  United
Kingdom and the United States. See http://www.cslforum.org.

10. The CGIAR was established in 1971. Its mission is to achieve sustainable food security and
reduce  poverty  in  developing  countries  through  scientific  research  and  research-related
activities  in  the  fields  of  agriculture,  forestry,  fisheries,  policy  and  the  environment.  The
CGIAR partnership includes 25 developing and 22 industrialized countries, 4 private foun-
dations  and  13  regional  and  international  organizations  that  provide  financing,  technical
support  and  strategic  direction.  The  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United
Nations  (FAO),  the  International  Fund  for Agricultural  Development  (IFAD),  the  United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank serve as co-sponsors (for
the complete list of members see http://www.cgiar.org/who/members/index.html). To fulfil
its mission CGIAR supports 15 international centres and collaborates with government and
civil  society  organizations  as  well  as  with  private  businesses  around  the  world.  In  2009,
more than 8000 CGIAR scientists and staff were active in over 100 countries throughout the
world. See http://www.cgiar.org.

11. See Council Conclusions concerning a European partnership for international scientific and
technological cooperation, 2891st Competitiveness Council meeting, Brussels, 2 December
2008.

12. Such an approach would be in line with similar strategies, for example, in the areas of energy
(European Commission 2008d) and maritime policies (European Commission 2009).
13. An  intermediate  governance  mode  could  be  the  so-called  ‘supervised  delegation’ (Pisani-
Ferry 2009). In this model the external representation and negotiation authority is delegated
from  the  national  level  to  an  EU  institution  (that  is,  for  example,  the  Commission).  The
Council (that is, the EU member states) exercises supervision through guidelines and moni-
toring. Therefore, it is a mechanism that does not transfer competences completely to the EU
level but retains a steering role for the member states. This kind of governance is pursued in
the areas of trade in goods and the environment (see Pisani-Ferry 2009, p. 32f).

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237

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Index

absorption capacity 116, 165, 195–6
access to brains/talent 91–2
Action Plans 13
Adams, H. 58, 59
added value 186
EIARD 218
to EU R&D policy 168–70

adult mortality rate 67, 68
Advisory Council for Science and
Technology 210–11

Africa 50, 51, 67, 69, 70–71
ageing population 72–3
agricultural research for development

(ARD) 213–14

EIARD see European Initiative for 

Agricultural Research for 
Development

agriculture 109, 116
agro-processing sector 116–18, 130–31

innovation capacity 105–7
innovation constraints 108–16

AIDS/HIV 70–71
alignment of goals 154–5
All India Council for Technical

Education (AICTE) 95
allocation of user rights 34–5
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) 32–3, 

41

Antarctica 32–3, 35, 41
appropriateness, logic of 180–84, 188–9
ARTEMIS 146, 147
Article 169 initiatives 2, 20, 41, 138,

141, 153
Asian Tigers 16
atmosphere 33–4, 35

stratospheric ozone depletion 34, 35, 

38

see also climate change

Austria 60

innovation constraints 108–16
promoting competitiveness of 116–18
Pure Food Ordinance (1959) 115
Bangladesh Agricultural Development
Corporation (BADC) 109

Bangladesh Agro-Processors’

Association (BAPA) 106, 115

Barcelona targets 85, 162

3 per cent target 89–90, 100, 162, 

165, 168

opening up national research 

programmes 162, 166–7

barriers to cooperation and coordination

206

Basant, R. 93
Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 15

Beck, U. 98–9
Beck-Gernsheim, E. 98–9
bilateral agreements 42–3 

general 15
S&T 11, 15, 42–3, 50, 177–80, 184, 

187, 231

Biofuel ETP 169
bi-regional agreements 15, 187
bi-regional dialogue 205
Bosworth, B. 92–3
bottom-up coordination 152
brain circulation 200–201
brain drain 91
Brazil 11, 16, 81, 83, 192
BRICS countries 192, 198

see also Brazil; China; India; Russia; 

South Africa

Busquin, P. 3

capacity building 17, 166

global commons regimes 36–7, 42
carbon capture and storage (CCS) 49
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum

Bangladesh 105–19, 130–31, 230–31

(CSLF) 228, 236

innovation capacity 105–8

Chagas disease 74

239

240

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

Challenging Europe’s Research:

common visions, goals and strategies

Rationales for the European
Research Area 210

Child Health and Nutrition Research

Initiative 78

China 11, 16, 81–102, 125–6, 192, 198,

230

co-funded research on climate-related

technologies 42–3

emergence in a global setting 81–4
international co-publications 135
National Science and Technology 

Development Strategy 94
opportunities and challenges for 
mutual learning 92–8, 99

chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 35
chronic diseases 70
civil society organizations (CSOs) 78
Climate Action Plan 53, 53–4
climate change 34, 42–3, 47–64, 124–6,

230

EU discourses 53–6
EU’s current global position 52–3
regime 35, 38–9
sustainable development and 57–60, 

154–5, 175

commons, global see global commons
Community instruments 204, 207,

220–21

to enhance policy coordination at 
national level 204–5
Community Lisbon Programme (CLP)

5–7, 13

competition 15–16, 123–4, 220–21, 

222

developed countries’ objectives and 

internationalization of S&T
195–6

EU discourse on 53–6
intra-EU 186
promoting Bangladesh’s 

competitiveness 116–18
reconciling with cooperation 208–11

competition policy 84
Competitiveness Council 8, 14
conflict

complex emergencies and health 71 
political and bureaucratic 152–3, 

175

125–6

consequentiality, logic of 180–84, 

coal 98
Code of Practice 8
coherence, policy 152–4, 175, 208
collaboration 140, 163–4, 220–21

clarity about S&T collaboration goals

148–50

increasing importance of international
S&T collaboration 135–7

policy collaboration 140

Collins, S.M. 92–3
Commission on Macroeconomics and

Health (CMH) 65

188

Consultative Group on International

Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
216, 217, 222, 223, 228, 236
Convention on Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CAMLR) 33
Convention on the Protection of the

Marine Environment of the Baltic
(HELCOM) 40

Convention for the Protection of the

Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic (OSPAR) 40

Commission on Social Determinants of

cooperation 220

Health (CSDH) 73, 75
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) 33

Committee on Science and Technical

Research (CREST) 4, 166, 
189

Working Group on 

‘Internationalisation of R&D’
14, 139, 149, 192–211
common commercial policy 84
Common Fisheries Policy 32, 42

reconciling competition and 208–11

coordination 140–41, 220

policy see policy coordination
Coordination and Support Actions 204
CO-Reach 143, 144–5
COST 138, 182, 184, 185
cost–benefit analysis 149, 157, 223
Council on Health Research for

Development (COHRED) 78

CRAMRA 32
curiosity-driven research 210

Index

241

decentralizing technologies 61–2, 126
demographic divide 85–7
Denmark 60
developing countries 11, 50

capacity building 17, 36–7, 42, 166
institutional responses to innovation 
in latecomer countries 103–22,
130–31, 230–31

LMICs and health 65–80, 129–30

development

agricultural research for 213–14
assistance 58–9
in Europe 81
global economic growth 81
health and 65–6
knowledge-intensive growth strategy 

92–4, 99

pathways 58
sustainable see sustainable 
development

development policy 199
Disease Control Priority project 66
divergence in national research systems

186
Doha Round 88
domestic coordination 151–3, 219
donor community 118–19
duplication 171

eliminating 152–4, 168–9, 175

Equity Development Fund (Bangladesh)

115

ERA-MORE initiative 201
ERA-NET-PLUS 2, 138, 142, 204
ERA-NETs 2, 5, 20, 138, 142–5, 155,

164, 204

Review of the ERA-NET scheme 

166–7

ERAWATCH 164
EURATOM Treaty 1
EUREKA 138, 146, 182, 184, 185, 209
Euro-Mediterranean Association

Agreements 15
European Central Bank 84
European Commission

harmonized activities of member 

states and 208
see also under individual 
publications
European Community (EC) 37–8
European Community Treaty (EC

Treaty) 4, 7, 231

European Coordination Group (ECG)

215

European Expert Group on the Lisbon

Strategy 154–5

European Forum on Agricultural
Research for Development
(EFARD) 217

European Governance – A White Paper

economic criteria for priority setting

19

197–8

Economic Partnership Agreements 15
economic policy 199
education

Bangladesh 110, 111–12
India 93, 95–6
technical 95–6, 110

enabling learning environment 103
energy resource supply 47–64, 124–6,

230

decentralization and super-grids 

61–2

energy resources and energy security 

56–7

EU discourse on energy security 

53–6

enhanced greenhouse effect 34
environmental policy 199
equity 74–8, 129

European Initiative for Agricultural

Research for Development
(EIARD) 213–19, 222, 233

areas of work 216
governance 215–16, 219
lessons for international S&T policy 

coordination 216–19

origins of the initiative 214–15
significant contributions 216, 217–18

European Institute of Innovation and

Technology (EIT) 7

European integration 81, 141
European Investment Bank 94, 96, 100
European Knowledge Area 6
European Molecular Biology Laboratory

(EMBL) 182, 183–4

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

12, 13

European Partnership for Researchers 8

242

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

European Research Area (ERA) 1–27,

48–50, 138, 162, 186

adding value to 168–70
policy gap 162–4

embedding into relaunched Lisbon 

research programmes supported by 

Strategy 5–7

Expert Group Report (ERA EGR) 

48–50, 51–2, 125
external dimension see external 

dimension of the ERA

governance of 10
objectives 3–4
progress in achieving 166–7, 168
vision for 10

‘European Research Area, The: New

40–41

S&T cooperation in the global 
commons regimes 37–40
‘speaking with one voice’ 18–19
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) 31,

32

exclusive multilateralism 178–80
exclusivity 176, 180–87, 232–3

impact on policy coordination at the 
European level 185–7

Perspectives’ (Green Paper) 7–8,
48

expenditure on health 71
expenditure on research 85, 86

European Research Council (ERC) 5,

138, 210

European Single Market 81
European Strategy Forum for Research
Infrastructures (ESFRI) 7

European Strategy for Marine and
Maritime Research 41

European Technology Platforms (ETPs)

145–7, 169, 210
European Union (EU)
agencies 171
Community instruments 204–5, 207, 

Barcelona 3 per cent goal 89–90, 
100, 162, 165, 168
health research 74, 75, 77

exploitation of knowledge 194, 202–3
external dimension of the ERA 10–21,

170–71, 227
development 10–14
global challenges and 17–19, 123–31,

228–31

objectives 14–17
policy coordination in 19–21, 
220–24, 231–3

220–21

external knowledge policy perspective

current and future instruments and 

programmes for international 
S&T cooperation 50–52
current position on climate change 

52–53

discourses on competition, energy 
security and climate change 
53–6

energy security policy 56–7
exclusivity, specificity and policy 
coordination 185–7

external S&T policy 227–8, 

234–5

87–92

Fagerberg, J. 90
fisheries 36, 38, 39–40, 42
Food and Agriculture Organization

(FAO) 205

food quality regulation 115
foreign direct investment (FDI) 58,

127–8, 194
into China 93
India 96, 128
national policy measures towards FDI

in R&D 201–2

fragmentation and duplication in 

institutional system 171
member states see member states of 

foreign policy 199
fragmentation 3, 20–21, 22, 171
overcoming 152–3, 169, 208

the EU

Framework Programmes (FPs) 2, 10–11,

mutual learning between China, India

15, 20, 90–91, 138

and 92–8, 99

organization of policy coordination 

Sixth FP 2, 4–5, 40, 142, 204
Seventh FP 2, 11, 50, 204

185–9
research policy 1–2

France 215
free-rider problem 36

Index

243

Freeman, R. 81

G8  18, 186–7, 205, 228
Gabarone Amendment to the Convention

on Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora 44

Galileo 33
General Block Exemption Regulation

(GBER) 9

general targets 221

see also Barcelona targets; European 

Research Area (ERA)

Georghiou, L. 90
Germany 59, 60
global challenges 1, 17, 51–2, 137, 195,

210–11, 227, 235

Griffith, R. 90
Growth and Stability Pact 81, 84–5, 163

Hardin, G. 34
health 65–80, 129–30, 230

global health challenges 72–4
research imperatives of the ERA

74–8

services in India and China 97
state of global health 67–71
high seas 31–2, 34, 35, 40, 41
HIV/AIDS 70–71
horizontal policy coordination 20, 174,

175, 188

Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT)

(sleeping sickness) 74

and the external dimension of the 

ERA 17–19, 123–31, 228–31

Hume, D. 34
Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Platform (HFP)

see also under individual issues
global commons 31–46, 128–9, 229

bilateral support to third countries 

42–3

EU-supported research programmes 

40–41

regimes 35–40
role of S&T 34–7
‘tragedy’ of 31–4

Global Crop Diversity Trust (GCDT)

217

Global Earth Observation System of
Systems (GEOSS) 40–41
Global Forum on Agricultural Research

217

Global Fund to Fight Aids, Malaria and

Tuberculosis 228, 235

Global Monitoring for Environment and

Security (GMES) 33, 41
Global Water Partnership (GWP) 228
globalization 72, 192
goals see objectives/goals
Godinho, M.M. 90
governance 10

challenges for European international

S&T policy 135–60

developments in 164
EIARD 215–16, 219
of the ERA 10
taxonomy of ‘five Cs’ 220–21
Green Paper on the ERA 7–8, 48
Greenpeace 62

147

impact assessment 223
incentives 114, 115–16, 119
positive and negative 19

INCO Programme 11
INCO-NET 185, 204, 205
inconsistencies, policy 152–3, 175
India 11, 16, 81–102, 125–6, 192, 230
car and pharmaceutical sectors 127
emergence in a global setting 81–4
FDI 96, 128
opportunities for mutual learning 

92–8, 99

inequities, health 72–3, 74–5, 129
infant mortality rate (IMR) 67–9
infectious diseases 70, 72
informal coordination 213–19
informal institutions 119, 231
information sharing 169
infrastructure 109–12, 116
innovation

capacity 105–8
constraints 108–16
infrastructure and innovation 

performance 109–12
institutional responses in latecomer 

countries 103–22, 130–31, 
230–31

policy and innovation performance 

113–16

research that is important for 

innovation in companies 210

244

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

innovation-intensive growth strategy

international organizations 228

92–4, 99

innovation systems 103–5, 163
institutional biases 84–5
institutionalist theory 180
institutions

institutional arrangements for 

international S&T coordination
and cooperation 177–89
exclusivity and specificity 176, 

180–87

impact of exclusivity and 

specificity on coordination 
at the European level 
185–7

organizational consequences of 
policy coordination at the 
European level 187–9

taxonomy 176, 177–80

responses to innovation in latecomer 

countries 103–22, 130–31, 
230–31

instruments 223

and targets in international S&T
cooperation 221–2
Integrated Guidelines 5–6, 13
integration 140–41

ERA as a nascent integration concept 

1–10
European 81, 141

intellectual property rights (IPRs) 202
interdependence 162–3
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC) 38–9, 57–8

Intergovernmental Research

Organizations (IGROs) 138

internal coordination 151–3, 219
internal market for research 3, 8, 14–15
International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) 205

International Geosphere Biosphere
Programme (IGBP) 40

International Council for the Exploration

of the Sea (ICES) 39–40

International Dimension of the European

Research Area, The 12
International Energy Agency (IEA) 59
International Human Dimensions
Programme on Global
Environmental Change (IHDP)
40 

EU member states’ strategies towards

205, 207–8
see also under individual 
organizations

International Partnership for Energy

Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC)
228, 235

International Partnership for the

Hydrogen Economy (IPHE) 147,
228, 235

International Renewable Energy Agency

(IRENA) 228, 236

International Telecommunications Union

(ITU) 33, 35, 38

International Whaling Commission

(IWC) 38, 45

internationalization of S&T 88, 192–8

drivers 193–5
modes of 193–4
policy objectives and strategies of 
developed countries 195–7

priority setting 197–8

internationalization strategies 138–9,

185, 199

investment

in knowledge accumulation 89–91
level and Barcelona target 89–90,

100, 162, 165, 168

Ireland 151
IRSES scheme 12
issue areas, peculiarity of 149–50
issues-based research 210

Japan 16, 59, 83, 86, 162, 192, 198
joint programming 211, 233
Joint Research Centre (JRC) 39
Joint Technology Initiatives (JTIs) 2,

145, 146, 210
‘juste retour’ principle 171

knowledge economy 81–102, 230
knowledge-implementation gap 75–7
knowledge infrastructure 109–12, 116
knowledge-intensive growth strategy

92–4, 99

Kok-Report 5
Korea, South 88, 91, 92
Kyoto Protocol 34

Labonte, R. 77

Index

245

labour market policy 199
latecomer countries 103–22, 130–31,

230–31

see also developing countries
Law of the Sea (LoS) Convention 31,

understanding the coordination 
challenge 151–2
Metcalfe, L. 140, 152, 175
migration 91–2
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

32, 35
learning 189

enabling learning environment 103
mutual learning 21, 92–8, 99, 232

learning institutions 118
Legal Framework for the Construction
and Operation of new Pan-
European Infrastructures 8

liberalization 123–4
discourse 53–6

life expectancy at birth 67, 68
Lindberg, L.N. 180
Lisbon European Council 3, 4
Lisbon Strategy 3, 162

embedding the ERA into the 

relaunched strategy 5–7
focus on internal growth dynamics 

84–7

outward-looking 81–102, 124, 230

Lisbon Summit 82
‘Ljubljana Process’ 9–10, 228
local governments 94–6
local research communities 18
logic model of coordination 155–7
logics of coordination 180–84, 188–9
Long Range Transboundary Air

Pollution Convention (LRTAP) 33
low and middle income countries 65–80,

129–30

see also developing countries

Maastricht Treaty 2, 163
Madrid Protocol on Environmental

Protection 32

mapping of R&D activities 169–70, 232
Marie Curie International Fellowships 12
Maritime Green Paper 41, 43–4
market access 195
market forces-led globalization 123–4
market-oriented solutions 97–8, 99–100
maternal mortality ratio (MMR) 68, 69
megascience projects 178, 187
Meister, C. 90
member states of the EU 

perspectives on policy coordination 

192–212, 233

66, 216

Milner, H.V. 162
mobility of researchers 12, 194

national policy measures towards 

200–201

modes of coordination 152–5, 156
monetary policy 84–5, 163
monitoring 36, 157
Monitoring Committee for S&T
cooperation with the
Mediterranean partner Countries
(MoCo) 205

Montreal Protocol 34
More Research and Innovation –
Investing for Growth and
Employment 13
mortality rates 67–70
motivations for international S&T
collaboration 148–50

Mukhopadhyay, P. 93
Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) 107, 

108

multilateralism 18, 178–80, 184, 186–7
multi-level governance 174–91
mutual learning 21, 232

China, India and the EU 92–8, 99

National Contact Points 215
national innovation systems (NIS)

103–5, 163
national policy 14

enhancing coordination of national 
S&T policies towards third 
countries 207–8

FDI in R&D 201–2
international cooperation of S&T
institutions 199–200

international exploitation of 

knowledge 202–3
mobility of researchers 200–201
National Reform Programmes 5–6, 7
national research programmes, opening

up 162, 166–7

National Science Councils 178
negative incentives 19

246

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

negative policy coordination 154–5,
174–7, 178–80, 184, 187

network services 87–9
networked specialization 210
networking, internationalization of

89–91

networks, policy 174, 180–81, 189
Networks of Excellence (NoEs) 20, 

138

‘new regulatory issues’ 88, 89
new social carriers of innovation

activities 131

Nice Treaty 4
non-binding governance instruments 4,

164

non-hierarchical instruments 19
non-manipulative negotiation methods

19

North-East Atlantic Fisheries
Commission 40

Norwegian Research Council (NRC)

142, 144–5

objectives/goals

ozone, stratospheric 34, 35, 38

Painter, M. 152, 175
Pardo, A. 32
partner countries, selection of 197–8
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements

15
Peters, B.G. 154
physical infrastructure 109–12, 116
policy coherence 152–4, 175, 208
policy collaboration 140
policy coordination 1, 227, 234–5

arguments for and against research 

policy coordination 163–4

barriers to 206
conditions for 148–55, 162–3
defining 140–42
in the external dimension of the ERA
19–21, 220–24, 231–3

five level scale of 154
horizontal 20, 174, 175, 188
modes of 152–5, 156
negative 154–5, 174–7, 178–80, 184, 

187

alignment of goals 154–5
common visions and 154–5, 175
developed countries’ objectives and 

objectives of 150–51, 156, 174–5
positive 154–5, 174–7, 178–80, 

183–4, 187

internationalization of S&T
195–7

stylized decision model 155–7
vertical 20, 174–91

of the ERA 3–4
external dimension of the ERA 14–17
policy coordination 150–51, 156, 

174–5

of S&T collaboration 148–50, 156

obligational networks 180
oceans 31–2, 34, 35, 40, 41
open innovation 201, 203, 210
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 4,

5, 14, 19, 20, 154–5, 164, 188,
220

opportunity costs 157
optimum currency area 163
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) 186–7,
205, 209–10
outer space 33, 35, 40–41
outward-looking Lisbon Strategy
81–102, 124, 230

Overseas Development Aid (ODA)

58–9

policy dialogues 15
policy gap, in European research 162–4
policy learning see learning
policy networks 174, 180–81, 189
political conflict 152–3, 175
political criteria for priority setting

197–8
political dialogue 17
population ageing 72–3
positive incentives 19
positive policy coordination 154–5,

174–7, 178–80, 183–4, 187

Potocnik, J. 8
poverty reduction 57, 62, 125
prioritization 18

health systems research 75–8
in international S&T policies 197–8

problem definition 36
process innovation 112–14
product innovation 112–14
promotional networks 180–81

Index

247

public health see health
Putting Knowledge into Practice: A

Broad-based Innovation Strategy
for the EU 13

Qian, Y. 98

ready-made garments (RMG) sector

116–18, 130–31

innovation capacity 105–6, 107–8
innovation constraints 108–16
regimes for global commons 35–40
regional disparity 94–6, 99
Regional Economic Integration

Organization (REIO) status 33–4,
38–9

regional policy experiments 95–6
regional S&T priorities 50, 51
Reiter, J. 235
research for development initiative 12
research networking, internationalization

of 89–91

research organizations, international

cooperation of 178, 193–4,
199–200

research strategies, trends in 167, 168
Research and Technological

Development: Achieving
Coordination through
Cooperation 20

researchers

mobility of 12, 194, 200–201
net utility gain from international 
collaboration 136–7
responsibilities for policy coordination

150–51

return on investment 165
rules 195

global commons regimes 36

Russia 16, 81, 83, 192

Scharpf, F. 154
Schrecker, T. 72
science and technology (S&T) priorities

of world regions 50, 51

Scientific Committee on Antarctic

Research (SCAR) 37, 41
scientific criteria for priority setting

197–8

Scientific VISA Package 201
seas, high 31–2, 34, 40, 41
services, network 87–9
services directive 84
Singapore ‘new regulatory’ issues 88, 89
Single European Act (SEA) (1987) 1, 20
Soete, L. 90
software sector 92–3
Solana, J. 32
South Africa 70, 192
space, outer 33, 35, 40–41
Specific International Cooperation
Actions (SICAs) 15, 42
specificity 176, 180–87, 232–3

impact on policy coordination at the 
European level 185–7

Spiegel, J. 77
spillovers 194
Stability and Growth Pact 81, 84–5, 163
Stabilization and Association
Agreements 15

Stabilization and Association Process 13
Standing Committee on Agricultural
Research (SCAR) 219

state intervention 97–8, 99–100
state-owned enterprises 97
Steering Platform on Research with the

Western Balkan Countries 205

Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-

PLAN) 9

Strategic European Framework for

International Science and
Technology Cooperation 9, 13–14

Strategic Forum for International

Science and Technology
Cooperation 155, 189, 208, 211,
228, 231, 234–5

strategic international coordination

process 155–7

strategic prioritization 162, 167
strategic research agendas (SRAs) 

145–6

strategic research areas 162, 167
strategies, common 154–5, 175
stratospheric ozone depletion 34, 35, 38
subsidiarity principle 164, 168
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and

Technical Advice (SBSTA) 37,
38, 39, 40

Scientific Visa Directive 12

super-grids 62

248

International science and technology cooperation in a globalized world

supervised delegation model 236
sustainable development

and climate change 57–60, 125–6
energy security policy and 56–7
trade and 60–61

sustainable energy system 54, 55
system transition literature 54–6
systems approach to innovation 103–5,

163

talent, access to 91–2
targets

‘tragedy of the commons’ 34
transnational coordination towards third

countries 203–4

trust building 17

UNESCO 205
UNIDO 205
United Kingdom (UK) 90
United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
34, 35, 228
SBSTA 37, 38, 39

identifying targets for coordination 

United States (US) 16, 83, 86, 90, 162,

207

192, 198

and instruments in international S&T

urbanization 72–3

cooperation 221–2

see also Barcelona targets; European 

Research Area (ERA)
Task Force on Health Systems Research

75–7
taxonomy 

of the ‘five Cs’ 220–21
of international S&T coordination 
and cooperation 176, 177–80

technical education 95–6, 110
technological capabilities 110
technology transfer 58–9
textiles see ready-made garments (RMG)

sector
Tirpak, D. 58, 59
Towards a European Research Area 3–4
Towards Joint Programming of Research

8

trade

network services 87–9
and sustainability 60–61

variable geometry 186, 188, 189
venture capital 94, 95
Verspagen, B. 90
vertical policy coordination 20

organization of policy coordination 

174–91
Vienna Convention (1985) 34
Visceral Leishmaniasis (VL) 74
visions, common 154–5, 175

whales and whaling 34, 38, 45
World Climate Research Programme

(WCRP) 40

World Health Organization (WHO) 65,

75–7, 205

World Intellectual Property Organization

(WIPO) 15

World Trade Organization (WTO) 14, 

81