Proposal for a COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in the People's Republic of China
Date: 2010-09-30
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: China, aluminium, anti-dumping legislation, dumping, import, originating product

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 30.9.2010 
COM(2010) 541 final 

2010/0270 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty 
imposed on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in the People's 
Republic of China 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

•  Grounds for and objectives of the proposal  

This proposal concerns the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 
30  November  2009  on  protection  against  dumped  imports  from  countries  not 
members  of  the  European  Community  ('the  basic  Regulation')  in  the  proceeding 
concerning imports of certain aluminium wheels originating in the People's Republic 
of China. 

•  General context 

This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation 
and is the result of an investigation which was carried out in line with the substantive 
and procedural requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. 

•  Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

Provisional  measures  are  in  force  and  were  imposed  by  Commission  Regulation 
(EU)  No  404/2010  of  10 May  2010  imposing  a  provisional  anti-dumping  duty  on 
imports of certain aluminium wheels originating in the People's Republic of China 

•  Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union 

Not applicable. 

2. 

CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 

•  Consultation of interested parties 

Interested  parties  concerned  by  the  proceeding  have  had  the  possibility  to  defend 
their  interests  during  the  investigation,  in  line  with  the  provisions  of  the  basic 
Regulation. 

•  Collection and use of expertise 

There was no need for external expertise. 

•  Impact assessment 

This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation. 

The basic Regulation does not contain provisions for a general impact assessment but 
contains an exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed. 

3. 

LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

•  Summary of the proposed action 

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On  13  August  2009  the  Commission  initiated  an  anti-dumping  proceeding 
concerning imports of certain aluminium wheels originating in the People's Republic 
of China. 

The  Commission  imposed  provisional  anti-dumping  duties  on  these  imports  by 
Regulation (EU) No 404/2010. 

The attached proposal for a Council Regulation is based on the definitive findings on 
dumping,  injury,  causation  and  Union  interest.  The  provisional  findings  were  in 
general  confirmed,  whereas  some  changes  were  made  to  the  calculation  of  the 
dumping margins and the injury elimination level. 

It is therefore proposed that the Council adopt the attached proposal for a Regulation 
which should be published no later than 11 November 2010. 

•  Legal basis 

Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. 

•  Subsidiarity principle 

The  proposal  falls  under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  European  Union.  The 
subsidiarity principle therefore does not apply. 

•  Proportionality principle 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons: 

The form of action is described in the above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves 
no scope for national decision. 

Indication  of  how  financial  and  administrative  burden  falling  upon  the  Union, 
national governments, regional and local authorities, economic operators and citizens 
is minimized and proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable. 

•  Choice of instruments 

Proposed instruments: regulation. 

Other means would not be adequate for the following reason: 

Other means would not be adequate because the basic Regulation does not provide 
for alternative options. 

4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATION 

The proposal has no implication for the Union budget. 

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2010/0270 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed 
on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in the People's Republic of China 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,  

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community1 ('the basic Regulation') and 
in particular Article 9 and 14(3) thereof, 

Having  regard  to  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  European  Commission  after  having  consulted  the 
Advisory Committee, 

Whereas: 

1. 

(1) 

(2) 

2. 

(3) 

PROVISIONAL MEASURES 

The  Commission,  by  Regulation  (EU)  No  404/20102  ('the  provisional  Regulation')  imposed  a 
provisional  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  certain  aluminium  wheels  originating  in  the 
People's Republic of China ('PRC'). 

The  proceeding  was  initiated  as  a  result  of  a  complaint  lodged  on  30  June  2009  by  the 
Association  of  European  Wheel  Manufacturers  (EUWA)  ('the  complainant')  on  behalf  of 
producers  representing  a  major  proportion,  in  this  case  more  than  50%  of  the  total  Union 
production of certain aluminium wheels. The complaint contained evidence of dumping of the 
said  product  and  of  material  injury  resulting  therefrom,  which  was  considered  sufficient  to 
justify the initiation of a proceeding.  

SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURE 

Subsequent to the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it 
was decided to impose provisional measures ('provisional disclosure'), several interested parties 
made  written  submissions  making  known  their  views  on  the  provisional  findings.  The  parties 
who so requested were granted the opportunity to be heard. 

(4) 

The Commission continued to seek information it deemed necessary for its definitive findings. 

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OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51. 
OJ L 117, 11.5.2010, p. 64. 

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(5) 

(6) 

It  is  recalled  that,  as  set  out  in  recital  18  of  the  provisional  Regulation,  the  investigation  of 
dumping  and  injury  covered  the  period  from  1  July  2008  to  30  June  2009  ('the  investigation 
period'  or  'IP').  The  examination  of  trends  relevant  for  the  assessment  of  injury  covered  the 
period from 1 January 2006 to the end of the IP ('the period considered'). 

All parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was 
intended to recommend the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
aluminium wheels originating in the PRC and the definitive collection of the amounts secured 
by  way  of  the  provisional  duty.  They  were  also  granted  a  period  of  time  within  which  they 
could make representations subsequent to this disclosure. 

(7) 

The oral and written comments submitted by the interested parties were considered and taken 
into account where appropriate. 

2.1. 

Scope of investigation. Inclusion of imports from Turkey 

(8) 

(9) 

One party, representing the interests of exporting producers, claimed that imports of the product 
concerned from Turkey should be included in the scope of the present investigation. 

Concerning  the  non-inclusion  in  the  complaint  of  imports  originating  in  Turkey,  it  should  be 
noted that at initiation stage, there was no sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and causal link 
from this country to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding on such imports.  

(10)  To  the  contrary,  the  complainants  submitted  information  that  imports  from  Turkey  of  the 
product concerned  were  at non-dumped prices (see non-confidential version of  the complaint, 
page 13, point 5, and annex 5.1.a.). 

3. 

PRODUCT CONCERNED AND THE LIKE PRODUCT 

(11)  Following provisional measures some parties reiterated their arguments concerning differences 
between  the  Original  Equipment  Manufacturer  ('OEM')  and  aftermarket  ('AM')  wheels, 
claiming  that  the  two  segments  should  be  treated  as  two  different  products.  Those  parties 
claimed  that  OEM  wheels  should  be  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  present  investigation 
because  the  OEM  and  AM  wheels  are  produced  in  accordance  with  different  production 
processes,  have  different  technical  and  physical  characteristics,  different  channels  of 
distribution and even different uses. 

(12) 

It  is  recalled  that,  as  stated  in  recital  21  of  the  provisional  Regulation,  both  AM  and  OEM 
wheels  can  be  produced  by  means  of  all  production  processes,  in  all  diameters  and  weights, 
with all different types of finishing. OEM and AM wheels share the same physical and technical 
characteristics and are interchangeable.  

(13)  Some parties claimed that the ultimate consumer of OEM and AM wheels is different: for OEM 
it would be the car manufacturer and for AM it would be the car owner. Such an understanding 
is misguided. Although indeed the OEM wheels are sourced by car makers the use of both OEM 
and AM wheels is the same: they are fitted on cars and similar vehicles. Hence they have the 
same ultimate user – the driver. 

(14)  The most common argument put forward was that the requirements for OEM wheels differ from 
those  for  AM  wheels.  According  to  that  argument  measures  should  not  be  imposed  on  OEM 
wheels because they are not interchangeable with AM wheels (they are purchased to meet the 

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needs  of  different  product  markets  and  differ  in  terms  of  design,  quality  requirements, 
investment, production process, prices, and import penetration). 

(15)  Another argument was that OEM wheels are produced according to car makers' specifications 
while  AM  wheels  are  designed  and  manufactured  according  to  specifications  chosen  by  the 
wheel  manufacturer  without  taking  into  account  the  requirements  of  a  specific  car  model. 
Although the AM wheels are not nominally produced according to the specifications provided 
by the car makers, they will be fitted on different car models. In fact, eventually, they will be 
fitted on exactly the same car models for which the OEM wheels had been originally produced. 
The fact that specifications come from different sources cannot be considered as such as a proof 
of differences in physical and technical characteristics. 

(16)  Additional  information  was  received  from  the  Union  producers  and  car  makers.  It  confirmed 
that  the  same  production  processes  (casting,  flow  forming,  rolling,  forging,  2-3  parts  wheels) 
are used for both AM and OEM wheels. They are both produced in all weights and diameters. 
Inserts, the use of certain types of finishing and heat treatment are applicable to OEM and AM 
wheels alike. 

(17)  Some  parties  claimed  that  technical  differences  between  the  OEM  and  AM  wheels  were 
reflected in the fact that OEM wheels use primary aluminium whereas in the production of AM 
wheels aluminium would be often extracted from scrap. The Commission thoroughly analysed 
those comments. Also, additional information was received from car makers and EU producers. 
In  particular  those  EU  producers  which  manufacture  both  OEM  and  AM  wheels  attested  that 
both primary aluminium and – although to a limited extent - aluminium extracted from scrap is 
used  in  the  production  of  both  types  of  wheels.  Additional  information  collected  in  the 
investigation  confirmed  that  the  main  criterion  used  to  distinguish  the  type  and  quality  of 
aluminium used is the percentage of silicium (7% or 11%). Both alloys are used for OEM and 
AM wheels alike. 

(18)  Differences in testing requirements are also not as such conclusive that OEM and AM wheels 
are  two  different  products.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  there  is  no  general  homogeneous  set  of 
requirements  for  aluminium  wheels.  Standards  change  according  to  producer  and  country.  In 
the end it is not possible to establish a coherent dividing line between AM and OEM wheels on 
the basis of standards or requirements. According to the information on file, both OEM and AM 
wheels  are  subject  to  various  tests  (x-ray  tests,  chemical  tests,  leakage  test,  stress  tests,  anti-
corrosion  tests,  wheel  balancing  tests,  impact  tests,  radial  endurance  tests,  bending  tests,  salt 
spray  tests,  CASS-tests  (Copper-Accelerated  Acetic  Salt  Spray  test).  Further,  it  appears  that 
differences  in  testing  as  well  as  differences  in  standards  are  an  indication  of  a  dividing  line 
between  different  Member  States  rather  than  between  OEM  and  AM  wheels  as  two  different 
products. 

(19)  According to the information on file, quality requirements imposed by the car industry lead to a 
highly standardized product which is easily interchangeable between all producers worldwide. 
In  the  AM  segment  quality  requirements  can  also  be  laid  down  by  the  customers  and  those 
wheels also have to meet international and national requirements. Consequently, more stringent 
requirements  or  specifications  may  apply  to  certain  wheels  in  both  segments,  meaning  that 
some AM wheels might comply with more stringent standards than OEM wheels.  

(20)  The  fact  that  AM  wheels  are  customarily  not  installed  on  new  cars  and  that  car  makers  use 
wheels produced by selected manufacturers under their brand name is a sourcing decision which 

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has no bearing on the conclusion on the interchangeability of OEM and AM wheels. Physically 
an AM wheel, i.e. a wheel bearing a brand name of a wheel manufacturer, could be installed on 
a new car. 

(21)  These  conclusions  are  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  car  makers  also  source  and  sell  aftermarket 
wheels. Some of these are sold under the car maker brand name (Original Equipment Supplier, 
OES), some under the brand name of the wheel manufacturer.  

(22)  Many  comments  concerned  the  requirements  imposed  by  car  manufacturers  on  suppliers  of 
wheels  (e.g.  evidence  of  a  fully-functioning  ISO  certified  quality  management  system, 
assessment of quality performance based on experience from previous projects and delivery and 
field quality, product specific and project specific risk assessment). However, aluminium road 
wheels  share  the  same  physical,  technical  and  chemical  characteristics  and  uses  regardless  of 
imposed requirements which are not pertinent to those characteristics. 

(23) 

It should finally also be recalled that many wheel manufacturers produce for both segments and 
OEM  and  AM  wheels  are  produced  on  the  same  production  lines.  Producers  active  in  one 
segment can enter the other segment. 

(24)  Finally, some parties argued that OEM and AM wheels should be considered as two different 

products because they fall under different customs subheadings.  

(25)  The  current  anti-dumping  proceeding  concerns  aluminium  road  wheels  ('ARWs')  currently 
falling within CN codes ex 8708 70 10 and ex 8708 70 50. CN code 8708 70 10 concerns road 
wheels  and  parts  and  accessories  thereof  for  industrial  assembly. This  means  that  the 
application  of  the  lower  duty  rate  foreseen  therein  is  subject  to  the  so-called  end-use  control. 
The  two  CN  codes  are  split  to  indicate  the  difference  in  duty  rate  and  to  allow  for  the 
application of a lower rate for road wheels for industrial assembly. This however does not have 
any impact on the definition of the product concerned. 

(26) 

In reply to parties comments it has to be noted first that the definition of the product concerned 
in an anti-dumping proceeding does not refer to product classifications under different customs 
headings.  Hence,  a  product  concerned  in  an  anti-dumping  proceeding  might  encompass 
different CN codes. In fact such a situation is rather common. 

(27)  Secondly, wheels falling under both CN codes are the same. The only difference is the way they 

are channelled after importation. 

(28)  Thirdly,  it  has  to  be  also  noted  that  the  volumes  of  imports  under  the  CN  code  linked  to 
industrial  assembly  are  less  than  volumes  of  OEM  imports  declared  by  the  co-operating  car 
makers.  This  appears  to  imply  that  OEM  wheels  have  been  customs  cleared  under  both  CN 
codes.  Given  that  it  therefore  seems  that  car  makers  import  under  both  CN  codes,  formal 
differentiation based on end use would be extremely difficult. 

(29)  Consequently, the arguments put forward by interested parties are rejected and the conclusions 
of  the  provisional  Regulation  confirmed.  OEM  and  AM  wheels  are  considered  to  form  one 
single product concerned. 

3.1.  Motorcycle and trailer wheels 

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(30)  The  product  concerned  by  the  present  investigation  are  "aluminium  road  wheels  of  the  motor 
vehicles of CN headings 8701 to 8705, whether or not with their accessories and whether or not 
fitted with tyres, currently falling within CN codes ex 8708 70 10 and ex 8708 70 50 (TARIC 
codes 8708 70 10 10 and 8708 70 50 10)". This definition conforms to the Notice of initiation 
published on 13 August 2009 and to the complaint at the origin of the case. 

(31)  Parties raised questions as to whether the investigation would also cover motorcycle and trailer 
wheels.  The  above  mentioned  definition  implicitly  excludes  aluminium  road  wheels  for 
motorcycles of heading 8711 and for trailers of heading 8716 which are in principle classified 
respectively under headings 8711 and 8716. 

(32)  Regarding trailer wheels, during the investigation, it was argued that, apart from the CN codes 
indicated  in  the  Notice  of  initiation  of  the  proceeding,  another  code  which  covers  inter  alia 
wheels  for  trailers  (CN  code  8716  90  90)  could  be  used  for  imports  into  the  Union  to 
circumvent  measures  on  the  product  concerned  (although  it  appears  that  the  code  is  not 
currently used for that purpose in practice). 

(33) 

It was proposed that the present investigation should also cover aluminium wheels falling under 
CN code 8716 90 90.  

(34)  The Commission services informed all parties concerned by means of a note put in the file open 
for consultation by interested parties advising of the possible inclusion of the other CN code in 
the proceeding.  

(35)  However,  as  stated  above,  aluminium  wheels  which  genuinely  are  intended  for  trailers  and 
therefore are covered by CN code 8716 90 90, were not covered by the Notice of Initiation. It 
can therefore not be excluded that certain operators that produce and or trade in such wheels did 
not  come  forward  in  this  investigation  since  they  expected  that  such  imports  would  not  be 
covered, and thus were not aware of the abovementioned note. Under those circumstances, it is 
not appropriate to include such wheels in the proceeding. On the other hand, since there appears 
to be an especially high risk of circumvention with the use of the aforementioned CN code, it is 
appropriate to introduce a TARIC code with which the development of the level of imports of 
wheels  under  that  code  can  be  precisely  monitored.  On  the  basis  of  Art.  14  (3)  of  the  basic 
Regulation, a provision to this effect is included in the operative part of this Regulation.  

4. 

MARKET ECONOMY TREATMENT (MET), INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT (IT) AND 
ANALOGUE COUNTRY 

4.1.  Market Economy Treatment (MET) 

(36)  All sampled exporting producers contested the provisional findings as set out in recitals (26) to 

(53) of the Provisional Regulation. 

Criterion 1 

(37)  First, it has to be underlined that in the PRC, primary aluminium accounts for more than 50% of 
the  cost  of  production  of  an  aluminium  wheel.  Three  of  the  four  sampled  companies  have 
claimed that the decision to deny MET should be individual and company specific whereas in 
the  present  case  the  Commission,  by  stating  that  there  is  State  interference  in  decisions 
concerning the acquisition of the main raw material (aluminium) as indicated in recitals (30) to 

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(37)  of  the  provisional  Regulation,  has  denied  MET  on  a  general  country-wide  basis.  This 
argument  cannot  be  accepted;  indeed  the  analysis  made  by  the  Commission  has  been  made 
individually  for  each  sampled  producer.  It  is  true  the  Commission  has  reached  the  same 
conclusion for the four of them but this is due to the fact that there is State interference in the 
decision  making  process  of  each  of  them  as  explained  in  Recitals  30  to  37  of  the  provisional 
Regulation. The Commission would have not arrived to the same conclusion for any company 
operating  in  the  PRC  showing  that  it  acquires  the  vast  majority  of  the  aluminium  alloy  it 
consumes  at  London  Metal  Exchange  (LME)  prices  with  the  usual  mechanisms  used  by  any 
company in the sector established in the rest of the world. If this were to be the case, it would 
have been possible for this company to be granted MET even if established in the PRC in case 
of fulfilment of the other Criteria. –  

(38)  Having regard to the above, the conclusions drawn in the said Recitals and in Recital (48) of the 

provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

(39)  Concerning State interference in other business decisions, none of the three groups referred to in 
Recital  (38)  of  the  provisional  Regulation  has  provided  additional  evidence  that  could  allow 
arriving to different conclusions. In particular, it has been argued that that the judgement of the 
General  Court  in  case  Zheijiang  Xinan  v  Council3  provides  that  "the  concept  of  ‘significant 
State  interference’  cannot  be  assimilated  to  just  any  influence  on  the  activities  of  an 
undertaking or to just any involvement in its decision-making process, but must be understood 
as  meaning  action  by  the  State  which  is  such  as  to  render  the  undertaking’s  decisions 
incompatible  with  market  economy  conditions".  Having  regard  to  this  judgement,  exporters 
claim  that  the  European  Institutions  should  apply  it  and  analyze  in  detail  whether  the  actions 
taken  by  the  State  when  running  the  company  are  incompatible  with  market  economy 
conditions.  In  this  respect,  it  has  to  be  pointed  out  that  the  said  judgement  is  presently  under 
appeal.  Therefore,  the  said  judgement  of  the  General  Court  shall  take  effect  only  as  from  the 
date of decision on the appeal. Consequently, the Institutions are in a position to maintain that 
State  interference  found  in  the  present  case  is  sufficient  to  conclude  that  Criterion  1  is  not 
fulfilled.  Having  regard  to  the  above,  the  conclusions  of  Recital  (38)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

Criterion 2 

(40)  None of  the two groups which, according to the conclusions reached at provisional stage, did 
not comply with the requirements of Criterion 2 has contested these provisional conclusions. It 
is therefore confirmed, as indicated in Recitals (39) and (49) of the provisional Regulation that 
two of the sampled groups  do  not have their respective accounts prepared and audited in line 
with International Accounting Standards. 

Criterion 3 

(41) 

It  has  been  claimed  by  Baoding  Lizhong  group  that  Article  2(7)(c)  of  the  basic  Regulation 
explicitly  requires  that  the  distortions  are  caused  by  the  former  non-market  economy  system; 
the group claimed that since it would have allegedly always operated as privately-held group, 
distortions cannot be the result of the "former" non-market economy system as the group never 
operated  as  State-owned  companies.  The  argument  cannot  be  accepted.  As  established  in  the 

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Case T 498/04. Zheijiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group Co. Ltd., paragraph 85. 

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present case, production costs and financial situation of companies can be subject to significant 
distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system regardless if a company 
has operated as a Sate-owned company or not.  

(42) 

In  addition,  Baoding  Lizhong  group,  YHI  Manufacturing  (Shanghai)  Co.  Ltd  and  CITIC 
Dicastal  reiterated  the  arguments  already  put  forward  before  the  adoption  of  the  provisional 
Regulation  and  insisted  on  the  fact  that  the  advantages  enjoyed  by  the  companies  are  not 
significant. However, as explained in recital 50 of the provisional Regulation, the investigation 
revealed that distortions on the financial situation of the groups were significant.  

(43)  Furthermore,  YHI  Manufacturing  (Shanghai)  Co.  Ltd  has  put  forward  that  tax  exemptions 
granted  to  foreign  companies  do  not  represent  a  specific  subsidy  and,  according  to  the  WTO 
case  law  concerning  countervailing  measures  the  burden  of  proof  of  specificity  is  with  the 
investigating authorities4. In its submission, YHI Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. also refers 
to  Article  4(5)  of  the  Anti-Subsidy  basic  Regulation5  which  states  that  "any  determination  of 
specificity (…) shall be clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence". The company 
mentions  as  well  Article  4.2(b)  of  the  Anti-Subsidy  basic  Regulation  (objective  criteria  or 
conditions governing the eligibility of a subsidy implicating the specificity does not exist) and 
Article  10  of  the  Agreement  on  Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures  defining  a 
countervailing duty as "a duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly 
or  indirectly  upon  the  manufacture,  production  or  export  of  a  merchandise).  Finally,  YHI 
Manufacturing  (Shanghai)  Co.  Ltd  suggests  that  "if  the  Commission  Services  want  to  offset 
subsidies provided by the by the Chinese government, the proper process to do so is through an 
anti-subsidy investigation. 

(44)  Concerning  this  interpretation  of  the  anti-dumping  legislation,  it  must  be  said  that  it  is  not 
correct since the criteria of the Anti-Subsidy basic Regulation cannot be applied in the context 
of  a  MET  analysis.  The  basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation  provides  for  the  examination  of 
whether  the  production  costs  and  financial  situation  of  firms  are  not  subject  to  significant 
distortions  carried  over  from  the  former  non-market  economy  system  and,  as  stated  above, 
actions  that  imply  the  involvement  of  the  State  in  shaping  the  business  environment  through 
measures  that  are  typical  of  a  non-market  economy  should  be  considered  as  a  State  influence 
carried over from the former non-market economy system.  

(45)  Having  regard  to  the  above  the  conclusions  of  Recitals  (40)  to  (44)  and  (50)  to  (52)  of  the 

provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

Other considerations 

(46)  Exporters have reiterated their claims addressed in recitals 46-47 of the provisional Regulation 
that  pursuant  to  Article  2(7)(c)  of  the  basic  Regulation  determination  whether  the  producers 
meet the criteria to be granted MET shall be made within three months of the initiation of the 
investigation  whereas,  in  the  present  case,  this  determination  was  made  beyond  this  three 
months  deadline.  To  support  their  argument  exporters  quoted  the  judgement  of  the  General 

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European  Communities-Countervailing  Measures  on  Dynamic  random  Access  memory  Chips  from  Korea, 
WT/DS299/R, Panel Report 17 June 2005, para 7.186. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not 
members of the European Community. OJ L 188, 18.7.2009. 

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Court  in  Case  T-299/056.  In  particular,  exporters  have  put  forward  that,  by  the  time  of  the 
sending  of  the  disclosure  on  MET,  the  Commission  had  received  all  the  answers  to  the  anti-
dumping questionnaires sent to exporters as well as the answers to the questionnaires sent to the 
companies  established  in  the  analogue  country,  therefore,  being  in  possession  of  the  data 
contained  in  the  answers  to  these  questionnaires,  the  Commission  services  had  all  the 
information  necessary  to  calculate  the  dumping  margin  under  the  regular  methodology  and 
under  the  analogue  country  methodology.  The  exporters  arrive  then  to  the  conclusion  that,  as 
such, the Commission was in a position to know what the effect of its MET decision would be 
in terms of the calculation of the dumping margin. Having regard to the above, exporters do not 
exclude that the MET decision was taken on the basis of the effects on dumping.  

(47)  This argument cannot be accepted. First, contrary to what it has been stated, by the time of the 
sending of the disclosure on MET, the Commission did not have all the information necessary 
to  calculate  the  dumping  margin.  Indeed,  in  the  circumstances  of  the  present  case,  the 
information  contained  in  the  answers  to  the  anti-dumping  questionnaires  and  in  the 
questionnaires sent to the companies established in the analogue country was neither complete 
nor  correct  and  therefore  the  Commission  was  not  in  a  position  to  calculate  the  dumping 
margins at that moment. Indeed, verification visits had to be carried out to gather information 
and data which were necessary to make an accurate calculation of the dumping margins. These 
visits  only  started  to  take  place  more  than  two  weeks  after  the  sending  of  the  disclosure  on 
MET. Therefore, in the absence of data obtained during the verification visits, it was materially 
impossible  for  the  Commission  to  make  dumping  calculations  before  the  sending  of  the 
disclosure on MET and take MET decision on the basis of the effects on dumping.  

(48)  Second,  the  exporters  have  not  presented  any  evidence  to  demonstrate  that  the  decision  with 

regard to MET would have been different had it been adopted within the three moths period.  

4.2. 

Conclusion 

(49)  The finding that all companies that had requested MET should be denied MET, as established in 

Recital (53) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. 

4.3. 

Individual treatment (IT) 

(50)  Both sampled groups which were provisionally denied IT due to state interference which was 
found  to  be  such  as  to  permit  circumvention  of  measures  if  individual  exporters  are  given 
different  rates  contested  the  provisional  finding  as  set  out  in  recital  (55)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation. Baoding Lizhong claims that there is no State interference and it also puts forward 
that  from  the  wording  of  Article  9(5)(c)  and  (e)  it  does  not  suffice  that  there  is  some  State 
interference for IT to be refused and that the explicit wording of Article 9(5) allows that there is 
some State interference and still to grant IT provided that there is still sufficient independence 
from the State and that the State interference is not such as to permit circumvention. This would 
only be the case if State officials were holding a majority of key functions and could interfere 
with daily business decisions.  

(51)  The second group claimed that the majority of its shares belongs to private persons and the risk 
of circumvention is non-existing because the group supplies exclusively car makers in the OEM 

6 

Shanghai Excell M&E Enterprise Co. Ltd and Shanghai Adeptech Precision Co. Ltd v Council 

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11 

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market  and  for  each  wheel  model  the  contract  with  a  car-maker  stipulates  specifically  the 
production site which is audited prior to, as well as in the course of the life of the contract.  

(52)  Regarding  the  claims  made  by  Baoding  Lizhong,  the  risk  of  circumvention  has  been  re-
examined. Indeed, the State interference is not such as to permit circumvention. Accordingly, IT 
can be granted to Baoding Lizhong.  

(53)  As  regards  CITIC  Dicastal,  it  is  a  State-owned  company  directly  controlled  by  the  State  (the 
majority  of  its  shares  belong  to  the  State).  The  State  interference  is  such  that  it  permits 
circumvention of measures if it obtains a different rate of duty. In other words, production of 
other State-controlled companies could be re-directed through CITIC Dicastal. Concerning the 
other argument put forward by CITIC Dicastal, the fact that it supplies exclusively car makers 
in  the  OEM  market  does  not  prevent  it  from  supplying  to  other  clients  in  the  future.  It  can 
therefore be concluded that CITIC Dicastal should be denied IT.  

4.4. 

Analogue country 

(54)  A number of interested parties have contested the choice of Turkey as analogue country. Their 
arguments cannot be accepted: first, because comments arrived well beyond the legal deadline 
to submit comments on the choice of the analogue country (the deadline expired on 24 August 
2009) and second, because they cannot be taken into consideration from a substantial point of 
view.  

(55)  The arguments can be summarized as follows:  

1)  One  of  the  co-operating  companies  in  Turkey  (Hayes  Lemmerz)  is  related  to  an  EU 
producer  and  both  co-operating  companies  are  members  of  EUWA  (the  association 
representing  European  producers  which  has  submitted  the  complaint).  This  cannot  be 
accepted. Indeed, the fact that one of the companies in the Analogue country is related to 
an  EU  company  and  that  both  companies  are  members  of  the  same  association  as  the 
complainants  cannot  be  considered  a  relevant  criteria  to  exclude  Turkey  as  analogue 
country  given  that  the  criteria  to  be  taken  into  account  when  analysing  the 
appropriateness of an analogue country have to be based exclusively on facts such as the 
degree  of  competition  in  the  domestic  market  of  the  analogue  country  and  the  non-
existence of significant differences in the production process between producers in the 
analogue country and the Non-Market-Economy exporter.  

2) 

It has also been argued that the production process in China is not comparable to Turkey 
because Chinese companies have access to cheaper raw material. This claim cannot be 
taken into account. On the one hand, access to cheaper aluminium is due to a distortion 
on  prices  caused  by  State  interference.  As  explained  above,  the  PRC  benefits  from  a 
unique world position in terms of access to the cheapest possible prices for raw materials 
and  no  comparable  situation  can  be  found  in  other  countries.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
investigation has shown that the production process is practically identical in China and 
in Turkey.  

3) 

Finally,  it  has  been  claimed  that  there  is  insufficient  competition  at  domestic  level 
because  domestic  production  is  mainly  used  for  exports  and  there  are  entry  barriers  to 
imports from outside the EU. These claims cannot be taken into consideration. Indeed, 
the EU market is much more than six times larger than the Turkish market and there are 

EN 

12 

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no barriers to entry; it is therefore reasonable that Turkey sends to the EU a significant 
part of its production. Moreover, there is sufficient competition in the domestic Turkish 
market  because  there  are  at  least  five  domestic  producers  and  there  are  not  barriers  to 
imports from the EU.  

(56)  Having  regard  to  the  above,  the  provisional  conclusion  that  Turkey  is  an  appropriate  and 
reasonable analogue country, as set out in recital (63) of  the provisional Regulation is hereby 
confirmed. 

4.5. 

DUMPING 

4.5.1.  Calculation 

(57)  Two  exporting  producers  have  contested  the  provisional  findings  as  set  out  in  recitals  (57)  to 
(77) of the provisional Regulation. It has been claimed that, according to Article 2(11) of the 
basic  Anti-dumping  regulation,  dumping  calculations  should  be  based  on  "all  export 
transactions  to  the  Community";  in  other  words,  they  consider  that  100%  of  the  transactions 
should be taken into consideration when calculating dumping margins. It has been also argued 
that the most expensive transactions, in particular for one of the companies investigated, have 
not been taken into account when calculating dumping margins. 

(58) 

In relation to the argument regarding the number of transactions to be taken into account, it has 
to  be  pointed  out  that  Article  2(11)  of  the  basic  Anti-dumping  Regulation  establishes  that 
dumping calculations should be based on "all export transactions to the Community" but they 
should be "Subject to the relevant provisions governing fair comparison". This means that, if it 
is impossible to reach a reasonable matching for 100% of the products, it will not be possible to 
take into account 100% of the export transactions. This is considered reasonable provided the 
calculations  are  based  on  a  sufficiently  large  percentage  of  total  export  transactions.  In  the 
present case, around 85% of the transactions were taken into account.  

(59)  Concerning the claim that the most expensive transactions have not taken into account, a new 
dumping  calculation  has  been  made  in  order  to  take  them  into  consideration.  An  additional 
number  of  product  types  have  been  added  to  the  ones  used  for  the  calculation  made  at 
provisional  level.  This  has  allowed  to  include  in  the  calculations  as  many  transactions  as 
possible,  also  ensuring  that  the  weighted  average  unit  price  of  all  export  transactions  per 
exporting  company  is  as  close  as  possible  to  the  weighted  average  unit  price  of  export 
transactions  (of  this  company)  which  has  been  used  to  calculate  the  dumping  margin.  In  this 
way,  the  value  of  all  export  transactions,  even the  most  expensive  ones,  has  been  considered. 
Normal  values  for  these  additional  product  types  have  been  calculated  following  the 
methodology explained in Recital (70) of the provisional Regulation. With this new calculation 
dumping margins have decreased in particular for YHI.  

(60)  The  methodology  followed  for  the  determination  of  Normal  Value,  Export  Price  and 
Comparison  is  the  same  as  the  one  described  in  Recitals  (64)  to  (75)  of  the  provisional 
Regulation.  The  only  changes  for  the  new  calculations  concern  the  increase  of  the  number  of 
transactions  taken  into  account  and  the  consideration  that  the  average  price  of  the  export 
transactions  used  for  the  calculation  of  dumping  for  any  given  company  should  not  be 
substantially different from the average export price of all transactions of this company.  

EN 

13 

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(61) 

It  has  been  claimed  that  the  analysis  of  the  European  Commission  does  not  take  into 
consideration  the  evolution  of  exchange  rates,  in  particular  the  appreciation  of  the  American 
Dollar  over  the  Euro,  and  of  costs  of  primary  aluminium  and  international  freight.  This 
allegation is not grounded, as the European Commission services, according to their practices, 
have  included  all  types  of  verifiable  costs  in  their  analysis  of  the  market  of  the  product 
concerned during the IP.  

(62)  The  Chinese  producer  YHI  claimed  that  the  computation  of  allowances  in  its  individual 
dumping calculation was inaccurate. The Commission accepted this claim and performed a new 
calculation,  which  gave  a  dumping  margin  result  of  23.81%,  i.e.  2.14%  less  than  what 
previously calculated. 

4.5.2.  Definitive dumping margins 

Company 

Definitive dumping 
margin 

YHI  Manufacturing  (Shanghai)  Co. 
Ltd 

23.81% 

Zhejiang  Wanfeng  Auto  Wheel  Co. 
Ltd 

60.29% 

Baoding Lizhong  

Other co-operating companies 

All other companies 

67.66% 

44.23% 

67.66% 

5. 

INJURY 

(63)  The  Commission  received  comments  on  the  provisional  findings  concerning  injury.  Some  of 
those comments were a repetition of comments already addressed in the provisional Regulation. 

(64)  Arguments already addressed in the provisional Regulation are not repeated in this Regulation.  

5.1. 

Imports from the PRC 

(65)  Parties claimed that the methodology of calculating imports has not been sufficiently explained. 

Those criticisms, however, have not been substantiated.  

(66) 

It  is  recalled  that  at  the  provisional  stage  the  methodology  was  based  on  the  complaint  but 
cross-checked with other sources (data provided by co-operating producers, users, exporters). In 
view  of  parties'  comments  these  data  have  been  analyzed  once  again  and  the  provisional 
conclusions are hereby confirmed.  

(67) 

It  is  recalled  that  three  notes  providing  detailed  information  on  methods  of  calculation  of 
production,  imports  and  sales  were  included  in  the  file  open  for  consultation  by  interested 
parties on the day of publication of provisional Regulation. 

EN 

14 

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(68)  Because the CN codes covered by the present investigation contain also other products than the 
product concerned, most of the comments concerned the methodology used by the Commission 
to exclude product non-concerned from the volumes reported.  

(69)  CN code 8708 70 50 covers aluminium wheels and parts and accessories thereof, of aluminium. 
Corresponding  data  were  extracted  in  tonnes  from  Comext  without  any  further  adjustment  at 
this  stage,  assuming,  as  suggested  in  the  complaint,  that  parts  and  accessories  are  of  minor 
importance. 

(70)  CN code 8708 70 10 covers inter alia aluminium wheels and parts and accessories thereof, of 
aluminium. Here also, corresponding data extracted in tonnes from Comext were duly adjusted 
in accordance with the methodology described in the complaint.  

(71)  Comments  submitted  by  parties  were  in  great  part  critical  of  this  approach  without  however 
suggesting a more suitable or reliable alternative. The criticisms related mainly to the fact that 
parties, unaware of which method the Commission was about to apply could not comment. It is 
recalled that the non-confidential version of the complaint, setting out in a detailed manner the 
exclusion methodology, was available in the non-confidential file as from the initiation of the 
proceeding. The Commission cross checked the data provided in the complaint and could not 
establish anything that would undermine the reasonableness of the method chosen. Further, in 
view of the fact that parties did not propose an alternative method of exclusion, their comments 
were considered as unsubstantiated. 

(72)  A second set of comments related to the method of conversion of volumes initially expressed in 
tonnes  into  units  for  the  two  CN  codes.  Here  again  the  Commission  followed  the  method 
suggested  in  the  complaint  and  subsequently  corroborated  by  the  questionnaire  replies  of 
Chinese exporters. Such methodology suggests that the average weight per unit imported from 
China is around 9 kg per wheel. The unit weight of products imported from other third countries 
has been estimated at around 10 kg per unit in accordance with the complaint but cross checked 
with available information received during the present investigation from different parties. 

(73) 

In their post-provisional submissions parties claimed that 10 instead of 9 kg should be used as 
an average weight as this would be the average weight of imported OEM wheels. As specified 
in the provisional Regulation, the average weight of 9 kg has been based on data provided by 
the sampled exporting producers. Therefore it is concluded that it is the most reasonable method 
of conversion reflecting the average weight of Chinese imports. In any case, conversion based 
on 10 kg for OEM wheels showed that there would be no impact on final conclusions.  

(74)  The conclusions in recitals 86 to 88 in the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

5.1.1.  Volume and prices of imports from the PRC 

(75)  The conclusions drawn from, i.a., Eurostat data reported in recitals 86 and 89 of the provisional 
Regulation have been confirmed by the questionnaire replies of the exporting producers. Given 
that the data emanates from different sources, naturally the trends may differ slightly depending 
on  the  segment  and  company.  In  any  event,  they  confirmed  low  price  levels  which  combined 
with  the  high  undercutting  levels  and  steep  increase  in  volumes  of  imports  from  the  PRC, 
stresses the accuracy of the overall conclusion in this case.  

EN 

15 

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(76)  Data and trends have also been checked for OEM and AM segments considered separately. The 
provisional regulation mistakenly stated in recital 89 that prices for years 2006 to 2008 had to 
be  based  on  Eurostat  because  the  exporters'  questionnaires  did  not  provide  relevant  data.  The 
statement should have related to a split between OEM and AM transactions. The split can only 
be established on the basis of transaction- by-transaction listings provided by exporters. 

(77)  As for AM unit prices data shows a more or less flat levels with a slight increase at the end of 
the period. They ranged from 25 to 34 Euro in 2006, from 24 to 32 Euro in 2007, from 25 to 29 
Euro in 2008 and from 26 to 36 Euro in the IP. For confidentiality reasons those ranges have 
been modified upwards or downwards by 15% at maximum.  

Price range for China AM 
imports (based on sample of 
exporters) 

+/- 15%

+/- 15%

2006 
2007 
2008 
IP 

25
24
25
26

34
32
29
36

(78)  OEM unit prices of imports from the PRC show a decrease of more than 15% over the period 
considered. Further details cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality reasons as explained in the 
section on the calculation of the injury elimination level below. 

(79)  One party claimed that the Chinese import prices increased between 2008 and the IP when most 
of  the  injury  indicators  suffered  from  a  significant  decline.  Indeed  there  has  been  a  nominal 
increase of Chinese import prices (although by only 1.6%).7 It has to be stressed however that 
over the entirety of the period considered they decreased by 8%. 

(80)  Overall,  low  price  levels  have  been  confirmed  for  both  segments,  which  combined  with  high 

undercutting and steep increase of imports from the PRC confirms the conclusions in this case. 

5.2. 

Separate injury analysis for OEM and AM segments 

(81)  One  of  the  main  comments  received  after  the  imposition  of  provisional  measures  was  that  a 
separate  analysis  of  all  injury  indicators  for  OEM  and  AM  segments  should  have  been 
conducted. 

(82)  One  party  referred  in  that  regard  to  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  1888/20068  as  well  as 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  682/20079  concerning  imports  of  sweetcorn  originating  in 
Thailand, claiming that such segment-specific analysis was conducted there. That party further 
claimed  that  by  not  following  the  sweetcorn  case  the  Commission  was  in  breach  of  WTO 
requirements.  

7 

8 
9 

There  was  a  clerical  error  in recital  90  of  the provisional  Regulation which stated  that  the  increase amounted  to 
0.5% (it was 0.5 Euro and 1.6%). 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1888/2006 of 19 December 2006, OJ L 364, 20.12.2006, p. 68. 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  682/2007  of  18  June  2007  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  and  collecting 
definitively  the  provisional  duty  imposed  on  imports  of  certain  prepared  or  preserved  sweetcorn  in  kernels 
originating in Thailand, OJ L 159, 20.6.2007, p. 14. 

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16 

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(83) 

(84) 

In the sweetcorn case a reference was made to the relevant WTO provisions that pursuant to the 
Appellate  Body  "where  investigating  authorities  undertake  an  examination  of  one  part  of  a 
domestic industry, they should, in principle, examine, in like manner, all of the other parts that 
make  up  that  industry,  as  well  as  examine  the  industry  as  a  whole".10  This  case  demonstrates 
clearly  that  the  approach  followed  in  the  present  case  is  in  line  with  the  Institution's  practice 
hitherto  and  compliant  with  the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement.11  Segmental  analysis  is 
possible but it has to be accompanied by an analysis of the whole industry. 

It is recalled that in the current proceeding at the provisional stage the two segments have been 
considered together, however, some indicators have been analysed separately for OEM and AM 
wheels (undercutting, consumption, market shares). In view of comments submitted by parties 
the Commission conducted further analysis and some additional indicators have been analysed 
at the segment level (see below). As shown below, this analysis confirms that the trends for the 
product  concerned  considered  as  a  whole  in  general  correspond  to  those  for  OEM  and  AM 
segments considered separately. 

5.2.1.  Consumption 

(85)  The  table  below  demonstrates  the  development  of  the  Union  consumption  of  aluminium  road 
wheels in the OEM and AM segment, considered separately. More detailed information on split 
between OEM and AM imports has been provided above in the section on imports. Data on the 
split was based on various sources of information provided by co-operating EU producers, users 
and exporting producers in the country concerned. 

Units (in 000) 

2006 

2007 

2008 

IP 

Total 
Consumption 

Union

58 607 

62 442 

58 313 

49 508 

Index 2006 = 100 

100 

107 

99 

84 

Consumption OEM 

43 573 

44 009 

42 076 

34 915 

Index 2006 = 100 

100 

101 

97 

80 

Consumption AM 

15 033 

18 432 

16 237 

14 592 

Index 2006 = 100 

100 

123 

108 

97 

(86)  Total Union consumption decreased by 16% over the period considered from 58.6 million units 
to 49.5 million units. The same trend could be observed in both segments. The consumption of 
OEM  wheels  decreased  by  20%  from  43.5  million  units  to  34.9  million  units,  whereas  the 
consumption of AM wheels decreased by 3% from 15 to 14.5 million units. 

5.2.2. 

Imports from the PRC and market shares for OEM and AM segments 

10 

11 

WT/DS184/AB/R, 23.8.2001, United States – Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from 
Japan. 
Recitals 50-51 of the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1888/2006. 

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17 

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(87)  Many comments referred to the Commission's conclusions with regard to the size of OEM and 
AM segments on the EU aluminium wheel market, in particular to the market share of imports. 
In  particular  parties  argued  that  the  Commission  miscalculated  the  market  share  of  OEM 
imports. Following these comments further investigation was conducted with regard to market 
share of imported OEM and AM wheels. It is recalled that the provisional Regulation specified 
market shares of OEM and AM imports from the PRC. These market shares have been specified 
on the basis of information on file at the provisional stage, based on data provided by the EU 
producers, exporters as well as car makers. On that basis it was established that the market share 
of OEM imports would account for around 3% (conservative calculation) but it could reach up 
to 6%. 

(88) 

(89) 

In  view  of  criticisms  expressed  by  the  interested  parties  all  data  was  re-verified  and  this 
verification confirmed the provisional findings. A detailed explanation of all investigative steps 
and all sources of information used to establish the share of both segments in imports not only 
from the country concerned but also from other third countries has been included in a note to 
the file open for consultation by interested parties. This note demonstrates the variety of sources 
used in order to obtain relevant information. 

In addition, in reply to parties' comments  that  the market  share of  3% was small, it has to be 
stressed that a market share of even 3% cannot be considered small on a price sensitive market 
like  the  one  in  the  case  at  hand.  This  is  particularly  true  in  view  of  the  price  depression 
described  below  in  recital  (116).  Moreover,  there  has  been  also  a  significant  increase  in 
volumes and market share of imports from the PRC.  

Import volumes in 000 units OEM 

2006 

2007 

2008 

IP 

PRC 

Index 2006 = 100 

Market share (%) 

455 

100 

1% 

476 

105 

1% 

508 

112 

1% 

Import volumes in 000 units AM 

2006 

2007 

2008 

1 183 

260 

3% 

IP 

PRC 

Index 2006 = 100 

Market share (%) 

5.3. 

Price undercutting 

3 247 

4 667 

5 301 

4 954 

100 

22% 

144 

25% 

163 

33% 

153 

34% 

(90) 

It is recalled that at the provisional stage undercutting was calculated for the product concerned 
considered as a whole as well as for both segments separately. The split has been based on the 
transaction-by-transaction  listings  provided  by  the  sampled  EU  producers  and  exporters  by 
identifying sales to car manufacturers.  

(91)  The ranges of undercutting disclosed in recitals 95 and 98 of the provisional Regulation were 
recalculated due to most notably changes in the dumping calculations (see above). They were 
also refined with regard to the customs tariff applied. Namely, at the provisional stage a uniform 

EN 

18 

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4.5% customs duty rate was applied. This approach has been followed at the definitive stage in 
the calculation of the general undercutting (for both segments). This was due to the fact that not 
all  of  the  OEM  imports  have  been  declared  under  the  CN  code  linked  with  a  lower  3%  duty 
rate.  

(92)  Some  parties  reiterated  their  comments  that  the  level  of  undercutting  should  be  calculated  by 
reference to the value added component of the price only (excluding aluminium cost). As stated 
in recital 96 of the provisional Regulation using such methodology would indeed increase the 
level of undercutting. Since the level of undercutting established with reference to the full price 
(as percentage) was already substantial this method was not further explored. 

(93)  Undercutting  calculated  for  the  product  concerned  as  a  whole  ranges  from  20%  to  38%. 
Undercutting remains substantial for both segments (between 15% and 29% for OEM and 49% 
and 63% for AM).  

6. 

SITUATION OF THE UNION INDUSTRY 

6.1. 

Definition of the Union industry and macro and micro injury indicators 

(94)  One  party  claimed  that  the  Commission  applied  an  incorrect  definition  of  the  Union  industry 
and  Union  production  and  that  the  injury  assessment  had  to  be  based  on  information  related 
solely  to  the  complainants  and  supporters  of  the  complaint  and  not  on  the  basis  of  the  total 
Union production. 

(95)  The  Union  industry  was  defined  as  provided  for  in  Article  4(1)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  The 
assessment of the situation of the entire Union production complies with the basic Regulation. 
The  argument  that  the  injury  assessment  was  based  on  an  incorrect  definition  of  the  Union 
industry  must  thus  be  rejected.  Consequently,  all  arguments  concerning  the  development  of 
trends  of  injury  indicators  where  data  of  sampled  and  co-operating  producers  was  used  as  a 
basis of analysis had to be rejected. 

(96)  Another more general comment was that non-confidential versions of producers’ questionnaires 
and  mini-questionnaires  were  deficient.  The  Commission  examined  those  comments  in  detail 
and requested improved non-confidential versions, where warranted. Those were included in the 
file open for consultation by interested parties, thereby fully allowing proper defence of rights. 

(97)  Some parties claimed that some EU producers should have been excluded due to the fact that 
they did not provide full information about their activities. The parties further claimed that this 
exclusion would have had an impact on standing. However, these claims are not supported by 
the  facts  since  the  EU  producers  in  question  have  indeed  provided  all  relevant  information. 
Therefore, they have to be rejected.  

(98)  One importer also claimed that it should have been classified as EU producer due to the fact it 
had outsourced the manufacturing process to the country concerned while many other activities 
were  conducted  in  the  EU  (e.g.  design).  This  company  outsourced  the  manufacturing  process 
while  retaining  in  the  Union  some  activities  e.g.  testing  of  wheels.  Given  however,  that 
manufacturing process takes place in the country concerned, this importer cannot be considered 
as EU producer in the anti-dumping proceeding. In the light of the above, this claim had to be 
rejected. 

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(99)  Some  parties  conducted  analysis  of  injury  indicators  on  a  company  basis.  Such  an  approach 

must be rejected as injury analysis is conducted for the EU industry as a whole.  

6.2.  Macro-economic indicators 

6.2.1. 

Sales and market share 

(100)  Subsequent to the publication of the provisional Regulation, parties requested data with a split 
between  OEM  and  AM  segments.  Table  below  demonstrates  the  sales  and  market  share  data 
with a split between OEM and AM segments:  

2006 

2007 

2008 

IP 

Sales  volume  entire  Union  industry 
OEM in 000 units 

36 820 

36 240 

34 932 

28 719 

Index 2006 = 100 

100 

98 

95 

78 

Sales  volume  entire  Union  industry 
AM in 000 units 

8 626 

10 443 

7 962 

7 075 

Index 2006 = 100 

100 

121 

92 

82 

share  OEM 

Market 
producers'  share  of 
consumption) 

(%) 

(EU 
total  OEM

84.5% 

82.3% 

Index 2006 = 100 

100 

97 

Market share AM (%)(EU producers' 
share of total AM consumption) 

57.4% 

56.7% 

Index 2006 = 100 

100 

99 

83% 

98 

49% 

85 

82.3% 

97 

48.5% 

84 

(101)  Different sources of information were used to establish the split, most notably data provided by 
EU producers during the investigation, data from the complaint as well as data collected at pre-
initiation stage. 

(102)  The above table demonstrates a downward trend with regard to sales and market shares for both 

OEM and AM segment. 

6.2.2.  Contractual landscape 

(103)  As specified in recital 112 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission continued to look into 
the tenders awarded during the IP which however would be executed thereafter. Data already on 
file has been supplemented by new information received from the EU wheel manufacturers and 
car makers. This data confirmed the orders of magnitude of purchases and trends with regard to 
market  shares  of  European  and  Chinese  suppliers.  It  is  reinforced  by  arguments  submitted  by 
car  makers  according  to  which  the  share  of  Chinese  imports  increased  because  of  enhanced 
competitiveness and quality and improved capabilities of production processes.  

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6.3.  Micro-economic indicators 

6.3.1.  Cost of production 

(104)  One  party  claimed  that  the  data  on  profitability  reported  in  recital  117  of  the  provisional 
Regulation did not match with those on sales and cost of production in recitals 89 and 122 of 
the  provisional  Regulation.  This  was  due  to  a  clerical  mistake  in  calculating  the  cost  of 
production leading to the use of a wrong set of data. This error has been corrected and the cost 
of production figures are shown in the table below. 

In Euros 

Average  cost  of 
production 
(per 
unit) 

2006 

48.1 

2007 

49.4 

2008 

48.7 

IP 

49.1 

(105)  The correction did not affect the trend established at the provisional stage. The average cost of 

production remained stable over the period considered.  

6.3.2.  Profitability 

(106)  In reply to parties' requests to provide data with a split between OEM and AM, the profitability 
has  been  calculated  separately  for  the  OEM  and  AM  segments.  The  trends  and  orders  of 
magnitude have been confirmed.  

In % 

2006 

2007 

2008 

Profitability total  

Profitability OEM 

Profitability AM 

3.2 

3.1 

5.2 

0.7 

0.4 

5.7 

-1.5 

-1.4 

-3.3 

IP 

-5.4 

-5.7 

-2.4 

(107)  As  demonstrated  in  the  table  above  the  profitability  has  been  affected  in  both  OEM  and  AM 
segments.  It  fell  by  8.8  percentage  points  over  the  period  considered  in  the  OEM  and  by  7.6 
percentage  points  in  the  AM  segment.  Consequently  the  orders  of  magnitude  and  trends  for 
OEM  and  AM  segments  considered  separately  coincide  with  those  for  the  product  concerned 
considered as a whole (a drop by 8.7 percentage points).  

6.3.3.  Return on investment 

(108)  Parties pointed out possible inaccuracies in the calculation of return on investment. The figures 
reported  take  into  consideration  all  items  making  up  the  return  of  investment,  including 
depreciation. The claims have to be thus rejected. 

6.4. 

Conclusion on injury 

(109)  The  conclusions  on  injury  as  set  out  in  recitals  80  –  123  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are 
hereby  confirmed.  The  Union  industry  suffered  material  injury,  which  was  reflected  most 
notably  in  decreasing  profitability.  Some  injury  indicators  have  been  analysed  separately  for 

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OEM  and  AM  segments.  The  trends  and  orders  of  magnitude  of  developments  of  these 
indicators correspond to those established for the whole product concerned. 

7. 

CAUSATION 

7.1. 

Impact of the imports from the PRC 

(110)  Some parties claimed that the decline in Union industry's production and sales was a result of 
decreasing consumption (which allegedly also triggered decrease in capacity). The provisional 
Regulation indeed did not contest that the consumption on the Union market has been shrinking. 
Although it is possible that factors other than dumped imports from the PRC (economic crisis 
and imports from Turkey) might have contributed to the injury suffered by the EU industry, the 
impact of those other factors is not such as to break the causal link as stated in recitals 136 – 
152  of  the  provisional  Regulation.  In  any  case,  as  outlined  in  recitals  126  et  seq  of  the 
provisional  Regulation  there  is  an  evident  link  between  the  significant  increase  in  Chinese 
import volumes at low prices and the injury observed with the Union industry. Furthermore, as 
outlined  in  recital  103  of  the  provisional  Regulation  and  contrary  to  parties'  claims  capacity 
remained  stable  over  the  period  considered  (most  notably  between  2006  and  2008,  with  a 
decrease of 4% between 2008 and the IP).  

(111)  Some parties referred to statements published by Union producers on their Internet sites and to 
the  fact  that  dumped  imports  from  the  PRC  were  not  mentioned  among  causes  of  injury. 
Irrespective of any public statements by the Union producers (which in any case do not exclude 
Chinese imports as possible cause of injury) the data on file demonstrates clearly that there is a 
causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from the 
PRC. 

(112)  Some  parties  claimed  that  the  loss  in  profitability  was  due  to  the  decreasing  production 
volumes. Hence, producers were unable to amortize their fixed costs over the smaller number of 
wheels produced. However, the drop in production was due to loss in market share which was 
due to import penetration by Chinese imports. 

(113)  Some  parties  claimed  that  the  imports  from  the  PRC  could  not  have  been  the  cause  of  injury 
suffered  by  the  Union  industry  because  year  2007  saw  a  drop  in  profitability  despite  stable 
prices and sales. It is recalled that between 2006 and 2007 there has been an increase in market 
share of imports from the PRC and a 40% increase in terms of volumes. On those grounds the 
claim had to be rejected.  

(114)  The  conclusions  set  out  in  recitals  126  –  130  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are  hereby 

confirmed. 

7.2. 

Effects of other factors 

7.2.1. 

Segmental split  

(115)  Parties reiterated their claims that the injury to the Union industry which channels most of its 
sales to the OEM segment could not have been caused by Chinese imports which concentrate 
predominantly  on  the  AM  segment  and  have  limited  OEM  presence.  It  is  recalled  that  these 
comments have been addressed in the provisional Regulation in recitals 131 – 135. 

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(116)  After  imposition  of  the  provisional  measures  some  parties  referred  to  recital  133  of  the 
provisional  Regulation  which  stated  that  "there  are  indications  that  car  makers  use  Chinese 
prices to force down the EU industry prices." Those parties claimed that the Institutions cannot 
base their findings on indications but on positive evidence only. Parties further pointed out that 
no  information  on  the  file  open  for  consultation  by  interested  parties  was  made  available  in 
order to evidence such claims. 

(117)  The high commercial sensitivity of this type of information has to be underlined at the outset. 
On  top  of  the  information  at  Commission's  disposal,  further  information  was  provided  by  the 
parties. This additional information confirmed conclusions based on evidence at Commission's 
disposal  at  the  provisional  stage  showing  a  pattern  of  clear  downward  price  pressure.  The 
Commission  has  further  build  up  the  file  with  regard  to  price  pressure  aspect.  A  detailed 
submission  has  been  provided  by  the  Union  producers.  It  provided  the  Commission  with  a 
further insight into the details of the bidding process and confirmed the conclusions with regard 
to  the  downward  price  pressure  and  the  use  of  Chinese  offers  as  benchmark  to  exercise  such 
pressure. Indeed in some cases the target price set out by the car makers (which constitutes the 
starting point of negotiations) was already set below the Union producers’ costs and was thus 
unsustainable  from  the  outset.  In  some  cases  even  offers  below  that  level  have  been 
unsuccessful.  

(118)  According  to  the  information  at  the  Commission's  disposal  some  car  makers  just  indicate  to 
their  bidders  that  they  should  lower  prices  in  line  with  Chinese  offers;  some  other  are  using 
quotes from companies which were not participating in the tenders; some others finally do not 
even  restrict  their  tenders  and  anybody  can  bid  (even  those  that  would  never  meet  the 
requirements). 

(119)  Car manufacturers claimed that the price is not a determining factor in their sourcing decisions. 
Indeed  the  information  on  file  demonstrates  that  there  can  be  other  considerations,  however 
price plays a predominant role. 

(120)  The  conclusions  set  out  in  recitals  131  –  135  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are  hereby 

confirmed.  

7.2.2. 

Impact of imports from Turkey 

(121)  Parties claimed that the Commission underestimated the impact of Turkish imports as a cause of 
injury  suffered  by  the  Union  industry.  It  is  recalled  that  the  provisional Regulation  in  recitals 
136 – 137 recognized that the lower prices of Turkish imports might have had some negative 
impact on the situation of the Union industry but not such as to break, on its own, the causal 
link between dumped imports from the PRC and the injury suffered by the Union industry. 

(122)  The  impact  of  imports  from  Turkey  has  also  been  considered  per  segment.  It  has  been 
established  that  ¾  of  the  Turkish  imports  were  OEM.  It  was  confirmed  that  the  trends  and 
orders of magnitude established for OEM and AM segments considered together corresponded 
to  those  for  both  segments  considered  separately.  According  to  the  information  on  file 
(provided  by  different  co-operating  parties)  the  AM  prices  of  Turkish  imports  decreased  over 
the period considered. As for prices of Turkish OEM imports those remained relatively stable.  

(123)  Parties pointed out that prices of imports from Turkey decreased significantly between 2008 and 
the IP. However, as noted in recital 137 of the provisional Regulation the price differential has 

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been  still  considerably  lower  that  that  between  Chinese  import  prices  and  the  EU  producers' 
prices. 

(124)  In view of comments of one party that Turkey should have been included in the complaint (see 
recitals (9) et seq above), it has to be noted that the non-inclusion of Turkey does not break the 
causal link between the Chinese exports of the product concerned and the injury suffered by the 
Union industry.  

(125)  On these grounds therefore, claims put forward by the parties have to be rejected. In the light of 
the  foregoing  and  in  absence  of  any  other  comments  recitals  136  –  137  of  the  provisional 
Regulation are herby confirmed. 

7.2.3. 

Impact of imports from other countries 

(126)  Some parties claimed that the market share of imports from third countries other than the PRC 
increased  between  2006  and  2008.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  the  share  of  imports  from  third 
countries remained stable with small variations in the range of 1%. Therefore, this claim had to 
be rejected. 

(127)  Some countries mentioned imports from South Africa as contributing to the injury suffered by 
the  Union  industry  because  of  their  volume  and/or  prices.  As  outlined  in  recital  99  of  the 
provisional Regulation the market share of the South African imports, even if they increased in 
terms  of  volumes,  has  been  stable  since  2007  (at  the  level  of  1.4%  with  an  increase  of  0,6% 
between  2006  and  2007).  The  Commission  received  information  that  the  majority  of  those 
imports were intended for the OEM market. As far as the prices of South African OEM imports 
are concerned the Commission received contradictory information. On the basis of Eurostat data 
it can be concluded that they increased from 43 to 51 Euros. These data would be also in line 
with information provided by one EU producer. Therefore, the claim with regard to impact of 
South African imports has to be rejected. 

(128)  The  conclusions  of  provisional  Regulation  in  recitals  136  –  138  with  regard  to  imports  from 

third countries taken together or in isolation are therefore confirmed.  

7.2.4. 

Impact of economic crisis 

(129)  Parties  reiterated  their  arguments  on  the  impact  of  financial  crisis.  Those  comments,  most 
notably the drop in car production, have been addressed in the provisional Regulation.  

(130)  As stated in recital 142 of the provisional Regulation the downward trend started well before the 
economic crisis and coincided in time with the market penetration by the imports from the PRC.  

(131)  The  conclusions  set  out  in  recitals  139  –  144  of  the  provisional  Regulation  are  hereby 

confirmed.  

7.2.5.  Competition between Union producers and concentration on the EU market 

(132)  Parties claimed that the structure of the Union industry contributed to the injury suffered by the 
Union  industry.  However,  as  specified  in  recitals  146  and  147  of  the  provisional  Regulation 
data  collected  during  the  investigation  demonstrates  that  larger  and  smaller  companies  have 
been similarly affected. 

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7.2.6.  Management decisions by Union producers 

(133)  Some  parties  claimed  that  the  causes  of  injury  lied  in  wrong  management  decisions  by  the 
Union  producers.  Those  comments  referred  to  the  producers  mentioned  in  recital  124  of  the 
provisional  Regulation  which  have  either  closed  or  gone  under  insolvency  proceedings.  It  is 
recalled  that  the  provisional  Regulation  mentioned  30  companies  whereas  the  comments  of 
parties refer to only 4. In general those comments have not been substantiated. In any case the 
data on file demonstrates clearly the causal link between injury suffered by the Union industry 
and  imports  from  the  PRC.  This  conclusion  is  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  despite  closures  the 
market share of remaining companies did not go up.  

7.2.7. 

Imports from third countries by the EU industry 

(134)  Some parties claimed that one EU producer offered cheaper wheels from third countries thereby 
contributing to the injury suffered by the EU industry. These allegations however have not been 
confirmed  by  evidence.  Above  all  it  was  not  clear  whether  such  imports  would  have  affected 
any significant quantities. Therefore the claim had to be rejected. 

7.2.8.  Aluminium prices and supply contracts of the Union industry 

(135)  It  was  claimed  that  the  average  cost  of  production  remained  stable  despite  the  changes  in  the 
aluminium prices. Parties claimed that the losses suffered by the Union producers were due to 
the fact that they entered into long-term contracts for supply of aluminium which did not allow 
for price adjustment in line with the decreasing LME prices. The information on file submitted 
by co-operating Union producers contradicted such claims. They had to be therefore rejected. 

7.2.9.  Exchange rate fluctuations 

(136)  It has also been argued that the injury to the Union producers is likely to decrease as a result of 
the appreciation of the RMB to the EURO. The fluctuation in currency would push up the prices 
of the dumped imports that are traded in Euro so as to close the price gap between the dumped 
imports and Union producer prices. 

(137)  In  this  context  it  should  be  noted  that  the  investigation  has  to  establish  whether  the  dumped 
imports (in terms of prices and volume) have caused (or are likely to cause) material injury to 
the  Union  industry  or  whether  such  material  injury  was  due  to  other  factors.  In  this  respect, 
Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation states that it is necessary to show that the price level of the 
dumped imports cause injury. It therefore merely refers to a difference between price levels, and 
there is thus no requirement to analyse the factors affecting the level of those prices.  

(138)  The likely effect of the dumped imports on the Union industry's prices is essentially examined 
by establishing price undercutting, price depression and price suppression. For this purpose, the 
dumped  export  prices  and  the  Union  industry's  sales  prices  are  compared,  and  export  prices 
used for the injury calculations may sometimes need to be converted into another currency in 
order to have a comparable basis. Consequently, the use of exchange rates in this context only 
ensures  that  the  price  difference  is  established  on  a  comparable  basis.  From  this,  it  becomes 
obvious that the exchange rate can in principle not be another factor of the injury.  

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(139)  The  above  is  also  confirmed  by  the  wording  of  Article  3(7)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  which 
refers to known factors other than dumped imports. The list of the other known factors in this 
Article does not make reference to any factor affecting the price level of the dumped imports. 

(140)  However, even in the event that this factor was taken into account, given the likely pressure on 
consumer prices in a context of a market downturn, it is unlikely that importers buying from the 
country concerned would be able to increase prices to retail as a result of the appreciation of the 
RMB. Furthermore, exchange rates as such are very difficult to predict. Finally, an appreciation 
of the RMB against the Euro has been seen post IP. All these elements make it impossible to 
conclude that the currency fluctuations will have an upward effect on prices of dumped imports 
from the country concerned.  

(141)  In view of the foregoing it cannot be concluded that the development of exchange rate could be 

another factor causing injury. 

7.2.10.  Increasing demand for steel wheels 

(142)  Some parties claimed that the injury suffered by the Union industry was due to the fact that in 
times  of  economic  crisis  consumers  turned  to  less  expensive  steel  wheels,  or  to  smaller  cars 
which  would  allegedly  more  frequently  be  equipped  with  steel  wheels.  This  argument  was 
alleged to be reinforced by the fact that aid schemes introduced by different European countries 
incentivised  sales  of  smaller  cars.  On  the  other  hand,  other  parties  claimed  that  although  aid 
schemes  indeed  might  have incentivised sales of smaller cars those cars  were better equipped 
and fitted with aluminium wheels. 

(143)  Additional analysis has been conducted on the basis of data available, since there are no general 
statistics  concerning  steel  wheels.  Data  on  the  level  of  consumption  of  steel  wheels  could  be 
retrieved  by  comparing  data  on  car  production  in  the  EU  (recital  141  of  the  provisional 
Regulation) and consumption of OEM wheels (see recital (85) above).  

Production  of  cars  in 
the EU (in 000 units) 

Amount  of  wheels 
used in car production 
(production*4.5 
wheel) 

of 
Consumption 
OEM 
aluminium 
wheels  in  the  EU  (in 
000 units) 

Consumption  of  steel 
wheels  in  the  EU  (in 
000 units) 

2006 

2007 

2008 

IP 

16 198 

17 103 

15 947 

13 443 

72 891 

76 963 

71 761 

60 493 

43 573 

44 009 

42 076 

34 915 

29 318 

32 954 

29 685 

25 578 

Share 

of  OEM  59% 

57% 

58% 

57% 

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aluminium wheels 

Share of steel wheels 

40% 

42% 

41% 

42% 

(144)  The table demonstrates that the consumption of steel wheels decreased by 12% between 2008 
and the IP. The share of aluminium wheels in production of new cars decreased by 1 percentage 
points  between  2008  and  the  IP  (period  affected  by  the  economic  crisis).  The  share  of  steel 
wheels in the production of new cars in the EU increased by 1 percentage points over the same 
period.  

(145)  It can be concluded that the share of aluminium and steel wheels in the production of new cars 
remained stable. Besides, trends of consumption and production of aluminium wheels also do 
not support the above argument. Therefore, it had to be rejected.  

7.3. 

Conclusion on causation 

(146)  None  of  the  arguments  submitted  by  the  interested  parties  demonstrates  that  the  impact  of 
factors other than dumped imports from the PRC is such as to break the causal link between the 
dumped  imports  and  the  injury  found.  The  conclusions  on  causation  in  the  provisional 
Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

8. 

UNION INTEREST 

(147)  In  view  of  parties'  comments  the  Commission  conducted  further  analysis  of  all  arguments 
pertaining  to  the  Union  interest.  All  issues  have  been  examined  and  the  conclusions  of  the 
provisional Regulation confirmed. 

8.1. 

Interest of importers 

(148)  As announced in recital 160 of the provisional Regulation the Commission further investigated 
the  impact  of  duties  on  companies  that  import  and  resell  their  own  branded  ARWs,  the 
production of which they have outsourced to the PRC. It has been established that although the 
impact of duties on such a company would most probably be more than impact on other types of 
importers  as  defined  in  recitals  159-160  of  the  provisional  Regulation,  it  would  still  not  be 
disproportionate in view of global effects on the whole Union industry.  

(149)  Based  on  price  data  provided  for  the  IP  by  one  co-operating  importer  (outsourcer)  it  was 
established that the profit margins achieved by such company would be sufficient to shoulder 
the effects of the duties. The margins achieved by that company were higher than the proposed 
duties.  

8.2. 

Interest of users 

(150)  After  imposition  of  provisional  measures  parties  reiterated  general  comments  on  high  cost 
impact of measures without providing evidence substantiating such claims. It is recalled that the 
cost impact analysis was based on data provided by the co-operating  car manufacturers. Only 
three  companies  provided  such  data  before  imposition  of  provisional  measures  and  only  this 
data could form the basis of the Commission's conclusions. 

(151)  As  stated  in  recital  165  of  the  provisional  Regulation  the  cost  impact  of  measures  is  limited 
(with  a  maximum  cost  impact  of  0.223%  (if  accepting  that  all  price  levels  would  go  up  by 

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22,3%).  However  even  this  maximum  cost  impact  appears  limited  in  view  of  the  turnover 
achieved by car makers. 

(152)  Some  parties  claimed  that  the  cost  increase  due  to  measures  would  force  them  to  delocalize 
their  production.  However,  in  view  of  the  limited  cost  impact  a  decision  to  delocalize  car 
production  mentioned  by  some  car  makers  would  seem  disproportionate  to  the  cost  impact 
established. The claims had to be therefore rejected. 

(153)  It has to be also noted that the arguments on high cost impact contradict with comments of some 

car manufacturers that they rely on Chinese supplies to a very limited extent. 

(154)  The  conclusions  on  cost  impact  of  measures  in  the  provisional  Regulation  are  hereby 

confirmed.  

8.3. 

Variety of sources of supply 

(155)  The complainant submitted that imposition of measures would be in the interest of car industry. 
By  ensuring  that  the  Union  industry  would  remain  operational  it  would  ensure  a  variety  of 
sources of supply. 

(156)  Other parties, most notably users, reiterated their arguments with regard to the competition on 
the  EU  market.  They  also  claimed  that  imports  from  the  PRC  were  essential  to  cover  the 
demand  on  the  EU  market  with  EU  producers  being  unable  to  provide  sufficient  capacities. 
Whereas the capacity utilisation rate remained at the level of 92% in the years 2006 and 2007, 
there  has  been  a  dramatic  drop  to  84%  in  2008  and  73%  in  the  IP.  These  data  clearly 
demonstrates that there are, especially currently, sufficient free capacities which could be used 
for  increased  production.  Further,  the  argument  of  insufficient  capacities  on  the  part  of  the 
Union industry contradicts with other claims by the car industry namely those of substantially 
reduced demand for OEM wheels. The claims therefore had to be rejected. 

(157)  One party also claimed that the Chinese producers were not producing the same product types 
as the European ARW manufacturers. These claims had to be rejected in view of the level of 
PCN  matching  found  in  this  case  (depending  on  the  calculation  performed,  as  explained  in 
recital (93), the matching ratio would be 92% for the undercutting calculation for the product 
concerned considered as a whole and 77% for OEM and AM segments considered separately ). 

(158)  The conclusions in recital 166 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

8.4. 

South Korea 

(159)  Parties reiterated their comments with regard to the negative impact of the duties in the present 
case when combined with other factors, like the competitive advantage given to South Korean 
car  manufacturers  on  the  basis  of  the  Free  Trade  Agreement.  These  comments  have  not  been 
substantiated by any new evidence. It should be noted that there is no evidence that FTA would 
result  in  injury  to  the  car  industry  and  that  in  any  event  a  safeguard  instruments  is  available 
under  the  FTA  in  question  as  a  remedy.  The  conclusions  in  recitals  167  and  168  of  the 
provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.  

8.5. 

Conclusion on Union interest 

(160)  The conclusions in recitals 153 - 171 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. 

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9. 

PROVISIONAL MEASURES 

9.1. 

Injury elimination level 

(161)  Most of the comments received concerned the calculation of the injury elimination level. Parties 
questioned  the  methodology  of  this  calculation  as  such  and  complained  about  insufficient 
disclosure. 

9.1.1.  Disclosure 

(162)  It  is  recalled  that  the  methodology  for  calculation  of  the  injury  elimination  level  has  been 
explained in detail in the note included in the file open for consultation by interested parties on 
the  date  of  publication  of  provisional  measures.  All  interested  parties  also  received  this  note 
together with the disclosure letter sent on the same day.  

(163)  A second note has been included in the file open for consultation by interested parties in reply 

to comments submitted after the imposition of provisional measures. 

(164)  It  is  recalled  that  PCNs  used  for  the  calculation  per  car  maker  were  clearly  identified  in  the 
above mentioned note. However, precise data on price and volume items could not be disclosed 
due to confidentiality reasons.  

(165)  As  regards  imports  from  China,  data  on  quantities  exported,  on  CIF  Union  border  value  and 
weighted  average  unit  sales  prices  could  not  be  disclosed  as  they  were  based  on  transactions 
made by two exporters. The disclosure hence would breach the confidentiality requirements as 
contained in the basic Regulation.  

(166)  As  regards  transactions  made  by  the  Union  producers  on  the  EU  market,  providing  more 
detailed information would only be meaningful if given individually for each of the producers. 
This is however not possible since it would be in breach of the abovementioned confidentiality 
requirements.  

(167)  On these grounds, it  is  therefore considered that  the  detailed  information  on  the  methodology 
applied in calculating the duty (including among others the PCNs used and split by car maker) 
has provided the parties with sufficient information to allow them to fully exercise their rights 
of  defence,  while  respecting  the  confidentiality  requirements  provided  for  in  the  basic 
Regulation. 

9.1.2.  Methodology 

(168)  It  is  recalled  that  underselling  was  computed  on  the  basis  of  data  relating  to  ARW  purchases 
made by car makers. For the reasons set out in particular in recitals 174-177 of the provisional 
Regulation, this approach encompasses only ARWs destined for the OEM segment. Car makers 
which co-operate with the investigation confirmed that they purchase ARWs pursuant to tender 
proceedings. Given the nature of tender proceedings, models that are "dual-sourced" have to be 
the  same  in  all  respects,  whether  purchased  from  the  PRC  or  the  EU.  In  order  to  ensure  the 
highest possible level of comparison between imported Chinese and EU products, comparison 
has been made PCN per PCN separately for each large car maker identified in the data supplied 
by both EU sampled producers and cooperating Chinese exporters. Contrary to claims by some 
parties this level of duties is not an outcome of any kind of adjustment but it recognizes that the 
duty has to be set at a level appropriate to remedy the injury suffered by the Union industry. 

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9.1.2.1.  Information used as the basis for the calculation 

(169)  Parties  claimed  that  the  injury  elimination  level  calculation  was  conducted  on  the  basis  of 
tenders  although  information  on  tenders  was  neither  requested  in  the  investigation  nor  made 
available in the file open for consultation by interested parties.  

(170)  Although tenders were mentioned in the description of the methodology applied to calculate the 
duty level, this reference was only a reference to the type of sourcing procedure applied by car 
makers which guaranteed that dual-sourced wheels would be the same and that a higher level of 
comparability  could  be  achieved.  It  was  not  a  reference  to  documentation  or  sources  of 
information on the basis of which calculations were conducted.  

(171)  To the contrary, the calculations were conducted in accordance with the usual practice on the 
basis of the transaction-by-transaction listings provided by the sampled exporting producers and 
EU  manufacturers.  The  PCN  matching  was  conducted  at  the  level  of  car  maker,  i.e.  within  a 
group of transactions identified as exporters' and EU producers' sales to this specific car maker. 
These data were fully verified. 

9.1.2.2.  Adjustments 

(172)  Parties'  comments  further  related  to  adjustments  made  in  the  calculation.  The  Commission 

accepted some of those comments. 

(173)  It is recalled that the CIF prices of Chinese exporters were adjusted upwards by adding 7.6%: 
4.5% customs duty plus 3.1% other importation cost. In order to construct a target price on the 
basis of the actual EU manufacturers' sales price, two additions had to be made: 

add 5.4% on a turnover basis to reach the level of cost of production (note that this is 

1. 
weighted average loss for EU wheel producers found for the IP), 

the 

2. 

add  3.2%  on  a  turnover  basis  to  cost  of  production  (computed  under  (1))  to  cater  for  a
reasonable  profit  and  to  arrive  at  a  target  price.  The  3.2%  correspond  to  the  profit
achieved by the Union industry in 2006, the first year of the period considered, when 

the 

financial results of Union producers were not yet affected by injurious dumping. 

(174)  As regards customs duties, at the provisional stage import prices have been adjusted upwards by 
4.5 %. This duty corresponds to the customs duty applied to CN code 8708 70 50. However, it 
is  CN  code  8708  70  10  which  in  principle  concerns aluminium road wheels for the industrial 
assembly (i.e., OEM), and not CN code 8708 7050. A duty of 3% is applicable to imports under 
this code. Given the methodology used to determine the injury elimination level, which is based 
on the OEM segment, and in view of comments by parties after the imposition of provisional 
measures, it is appropriate, in order to ensure consistency in the approach, to use a duty rate of 
3%.  

(175)  With regard to target profit parties claimed that this profit margin has been calculated for both 
OEM  and  AM  producers  and  might  thus  inflate  the  calculation  based  on  OEM  transactions 
only.  In  view  of  parties'  comments,  the  Commission  adjusted  these  calculations  by  applying 
rates  of  loss  and  profit  calculated  for  OEM  wheels  only  (-5.7%  and  3.1%  respectively,  see 
recital (106) et seq above). 

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(176)  On the other hand parties argued that the level of profit should be adjusted downwards in order 
to reflect the impact of the crisis. However, it is a consistent practice to apply the profit margin 
which the industry would have achieved in the absence of dumping practices. Other causes of 
injury, even if contributing, are not singled out in the calculation of target profit. 

(177)  Certain parties claimed that the methodology used to calculate the injury elimination level was 
in  breach  of  the  methodology  prescribed  by  the  basic  Regulation.  However,  the  basic 
Regulation  does  not  prescribe  any  particular  method  to  establish  the  injury  elimination  level. 
The method to establish such a level must be examined in terms of the specific facts of the case. 
As  explained  in  the  provisional  Regulation  and  elsewhere  in  this  Regulation,  the  facts  of  the 
case support the use of the methodology applied by the Institutions. Further, it has to be noted 
that the undercutting levels disclosed in the provisional Regulation and above in recital (93) are 
an indication that the underselling levels using the approach suggested by certain parties would 
be much higher. 

(178)  Taking into account these changes the duty rate amounts to 22.3%. 

9.1.2.3.  Applicability of "OEM duty" to AM sales 

(179)  One party claimed that it was inappropriate that the calculation of the injury elimination level 
was based only on OEM sales while the duty was also applicable to AM wheels. However, as 
explained  above  (and  also  in  point  174-177  of  the  provisional  Regulation),  this  approach  is 
appropriate  in  this  case,  in  particular  since  85%  of  Union  producers'  sales  relate  to  the  OEM 
segment. 

(180)  The  approach  applied  by  the  Commission  whereby  the  calculation  of  the  injury  elimination 
element has been limited only to the OEM was the most appropriate. A different approach did 
not seem appropriate because it would lead to a situation where a set of export data geared more 
to  AM  would  be  compared  to  that  of  the  EU  industry  selling  predominantly  to  the  OEM 
segment. 

(181)  The  approach  applied  is  justified  and  reasonable  given  that  the  aim  of  the  measure  is  to 
eliminate injury of the EU industry. It ensures that the duty was not set at a level higher than 
what is necessary to eliminate injury.  

9.1.2.4.  Impracticability and the obligation to establish an individual duty for those operators having 

been granted IT  

(182)  One  party  claimed  that  unlike  the  first  paragraph  of  Article  9(5)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  the 
second  paragraph  does  not  provide  for  the  possibility  not  to  specify  the  individual  duty. 
Consequently, it argued that the exception linked to impracticability could not be applied in the 
present  case  and  that  the  obligation  to  establish  an  individual  duty  rate  for  those  exporters 
having been granted IT remains. 

(183)  Certain parties further claimed that impracticability was only due to the methodology applied; 
hence it was "self-induced" by the Commission. The parties alleged that the Commission had at 
its disposal all data submitted by the AM exporting producers enabling it to include AM sales in 
the calculation of the injury elimination level. 

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(184)  Finally,  certain  parties  claimed  that  since  the  Commission  was  able  to  calculate  undercutting 
separately for OEM and AM segments it must have been able to calculate underselling. A final 
argument was that AM prices could be compared with OEM prices since the PCN construction 
did not make any distinction between the two segments.  

(185)  Regarding the first argument, it is true that Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation is based on the 
presumption that if an operator is granted IT, it will be possible to specify an individual duty for 
it. However, in this particular case, doing so would be impracticable and/or inappropriate. That 
is  because,  as  explained  above,  for  determining  the  injury  elimination  level  it  is  necessary  to 
focus  on  OEM  sales.  Moreover,  regarding  all  producers  having  been  granted  IT,  a  duty  also 
based  on  their  AM-sales  would  be  inappropriately  high,  i.e.  in  excess  of  what  would  be 
warranted  in  the  circumstances  of  this  particular  case  in  order  to  eliminate  injury.  That  is 
because, as explained above, an injury elimination level of 22,3% is sufficient to protect Union 
producers  on  their  primary  market  (OEM).  A  duty  which  would  also  be  based  on  those 
producers'  AM-sales  –  which,  in  all  three  cases  of  producers  granted  IT,  would  be  higher  - 
would therefore be unduly high. 

(186)  It  also  has  to  be  mentioned  that  the  reference to  lack  of  reliable  data  in  paragraph  182  of  the 
provisional Regulation did not relate to the quality of data provided but to the type of data used 
for the calculation (PCN matching per car maker, i.e. comparing the models sourced from the 
PRC and EU by a specific car maker. The type of procedure used to source wheels on the OEM 
segment gave the opportunity to achieve a greater level of comparability. The same type of data, 
due to the fact that different procedures are used, could not be provided for the AM sales.  

(187)  The exercise of establishing injury on the basis of Article 3 of the basic Regulation is legally 
separate from setting the level of the duty. The latter exercise is conducted once injury has been 
established with a view to setting a level of duty which would be sufficient to remedy injury. 
Consequently,  the  Commission  conducted  this  calculation  in  accordance  with  the  chosen 
methodology. Also the fact that the PCN structure did not include the criterion of sales channels 
is not linked to the methodology applied when establishing the injury elimination level.  

(188)  Parties'  arguments  related  to  the  application  of  impracticability  exception  as  well  as  to  the 
unconditional character of the obligation to establish an individual duty rate have to be rejected. 

9.1.2.5.  Representativity of transactions used 

(189)  Parties'  criticisms  related  also  to  the  fact  that  the  injury  elimination  level  calculation  was 

arbitrary because it selected only few unrepresentative transactions. 

(190)  First  and  foremost,  parties  claimed  that  the  calculation  was  based  on  an  unrepresentative 
volume of import transactions from the PRC. Such an approach allegedly contradicts the WTO 
Anti-Dumping  Agreement12  as  it  cannot  be  considered  as  based  on  positive  evidence. 
Complainant  argued  that  the  fact  that  most  of  the  EU  industry  sales  were  OEM  was  of  no 
importance since the purpose of the underselling calculation is to determine the average amount 
by  which  the  price  of  dumped  imports  should  be  raised  in  order  not  to  cause  injury.  The 
underselling calculation must be representative for the dumped imports and not for the sales of 
EU  industry.  Another  party  claimed  that  such  an  approach  contradicted  Institutions'  own 

12 

Agreement on Implementation of Article IV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 

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practice as normally the individual undercutting and underselling is weighted per PCN on the 
basis of share of undercutting and underselling quantities of exports rather than quantities sold 
by EU industry. 

(191)  It is recalled that the injury elimination margin reflects (based on the sample) the situation of 
around 85% of the EU industry sales, which are directed to the OEM segment. It was the choice 
of  methodology,  and  not  the  technicalities  of  the  calculation  as  such,  that  was  driven  by  the 
specific  situation  on  the  EU  market  where  the  majority  of  sales  are  directed  to  the  OEM 
segment. This choice led the Commission to compare prices at the level of car maker, achieving 
a greater level of comparability and at the same time ensuring that the injury elimination level is 
not overstated.  

(192)  It is further recalled with regard to representativity that the matching ratio of export transactions 
used in proportion with all exports by sampled Chinese exporters into the OEM segment was 
found to be more than 55%. Such a ratio was considered representative given the methodology 
used in calculating the injury elimination level. 

9.1.2.6.  Duty based on undercutting 

(193)  One party claimed that the injury margin should have been based on undercutting pursuant to 
the practice established in the Council Regulation (EC) No 1531/200213 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in the People's Republic 
of China, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Indeed in this case the duty was based 
on  price  undercutting  taking  account  of  the  fact  that  factors  other  than  the  dumped  imports 
appeared to have contributed to the injury to the Union industry and secondly that on a world-
wide basis this industry had for a number of years realised no or extremely low profits.14  

(194)  It should be noted that the factors that led to the decision to set the level of duties at the level of 
price undercutting are not applicable to the present case. Unlike in colour television receivers 
case15 the product concerned is not characterised by low levels of profitability. The profitability 
decreased substantially as a result of low priced imports from the country concerned. Also the 
imports from other third countries remained stable over the period considered.  

9.2. 

Conclusion on injury elimination level 

(195)  The  approach  in  the  provisional  Regulation  with  regard  to  the  methodology  used  is  hereby 
confirmed. Taking into account parties' comments on adjustments the re-calculated level of the 
duty amounts to 22.3%. 

10. 

ALLEGATION OF CIRCUMVENTION 

(196)  Parties alleged that measures can possibly be circumvented, pointing to notably recent increase 
of  imports  of  ARWs  from  countries  without  known  local  production.  Competent  authorities 

13 

14 
15 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1531/2002  of  14  August  2002  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of 
colour television receivers originating in the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand 
and  terminating  the  proceeding  regarding  imports  of  colour  television  receivers  originating  in  Singapore,  OJ  L  231, 
29.8.2002, p. 1. 
Ibid, para 229. 
Ibid, para 231. 

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have  been  alerted  about  those  developments  and  possibilities  and  the  issue  will  be  closely 
monitored. 

11. 

UNDERTAKING 

(197)  One unrelated importer expressed an interest to offer a price undertaking. Although no formal 
price  undertaking  was  offered,  it  is  noted  that  Article  8  of  the  basic  Regulation  limits  the 
possibility to offer price undertakings exclusively to exporters. The Commission's practice not 
to  accept  undertaking  offers  from  importers  was  also  accepted  by  the  European  Court  of 
Justice,16 arguing, inter alia, that the acceptance of an undertaking offered by an importer would 
have the effect of encouraging him to continue to obtain supplies at dumped prices.  

(198)  Two co-operating Chinese exporting producers offered a price undertaking in accordance with 
Article  8(1)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  However, the  product  concerned  exists  in  a  multitude  of 
product  types,  for  which  prices  vary  significantly  (for  one  company  even  up  to  300%),  thus 
posing  a  very  high  risk  of  cross-compensation.  In  addition,  the  product  types  will  evolve  in 
design  and  finishing.  It  was  therefore  considered  that  the  product  is  not  suitable  for  a  price 
undertaking. In addition, one of the companies did receive neither Market Economy Status nor 
Individual  Treatment,  whereas  for  the  other  company,  major  accounting  problems  were 
identified  and  its  structure  and  product  range  (production  of  OEM/AM)  was  considered  too 
complex. The undertaking offers therefore were rejected. 

12. 

CUSTOMS DECLARATION 

(199)  Statistics of aluminium wheels are frequently expressed in number of pieces. However, there is 
no such supplementary unit for aluminium wheels specified in the Combined Nomenclature laid 
down  in  Annex  I  to  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2658/87  of  23  July  1987  on  the  tariff  and 
statistical  nomenclature  and  on  the  Common  Customs  Tariff.17  It  is  therefore  necessary  to 
provide that not only the weight in kg or tonnes but also the number of pieces of the product 
concerned  and  of  certain  products  of  CN  code  ex  8716  90  90  for  imports  is  entered  in  the 
declaration for release for free circulation. 

13. 

DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF PROVISIONAL DUTY 

(200)  In  view  of  the  magnitude  of  the  dumping  margins  found  and  in  the  light  of  the  level  of  the 
injury caused to the Union industry, it is considered necessary that the amounts secured by way 
of  the  provisional  anti-dumping  duty,  imposed  by  the  provisional  Regulation  be  definitively 
collected.  

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of aluminium road wheels of the 
motor  vehicles  of  CN  headings  8701  to  8705,  whether  or  not  with  their  accessories  and 

Nashua Corporation and others vs Commission and Council, joined cases C-133/87 and C-150/87, ECR 1990 page 
I-719 and Gestetner Holdings plc vs Council and Commission, C-156/87, ECR 1990 p. I-781. 
OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1. 

1. 

16 

17 

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whether or not fitted with tyres, currently falling within CN codes ex 8708 70 10 and ex 8708 
70  50  (TARIC  codes  8708  70  10  10  and  8708  70  50  10)  and  originating  in  the  People's 
Republic of China. 

The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price 
before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 shall be 22.3%. 

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. 

2. 

3. 

Article 2 

Amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties pursuant to Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 404/2010 on imports of certain aluminium road wheels, currently falling within CN codes ex 8708 
70  10  and  ex  8708  70  50  (TARIC  codes  8708  70  10  10  and  8708  70  50  10),  and  originating  in  the 
People’s Republic of China, shall be definitively collected. 

Article 3 

Where a declaration for release for free circulation is presented in respect of imports of aluminium road 
wheels of vehicles of CN heading 8716, whether or not with their accessories and whether or not fitted 
with tyres, and currently falling within CN code ex 8716 90 90, TARIC code 8716 90 90 10 shall be 
entered in the relevant field of that declaration. 

Member  States  shall,  on  a  monthly  basis,  inform  the  Commission  of  the  number  of  pieces  imported 
under this code, and of their origin. 

Article 4 

Where  a declaration for  release for free  circulation is presented in respect of the products mentioned 
under Articles 1 and 3, the number of pieces of the products imported shall be entered in the relevant 
field of that declaration. 

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal 
of the European Union. 

Article 5 

This  Regulation  shall  be  binding  in  its  entirety  and  directly  applicable  in  all  Member  States. 

Done at Brussels, 

For the Council 

Member of the Commission 

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