Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States
Date: 2010-09-29
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Economic and Monetary Union, European accounting system, budget deficit, budget policy, budgetary control, directive (EU), economic convergence, multilateral surveillance, public debt, public finance

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 29.9.2010 
COM(2010) 523 final 

2010/0277 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 

on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

The global economic and financial crisis has exposed and amplified the need for greater co-
ordination  and  enhanced  surveillance  of  economic  policies  in  the  economic  and  monetary 
union  (EMU).  Existing  instruments  and  methods  of  co-ordination  and  surveillance  enabled 
the  EU  to  weather  a  storm  that  no  Member  State  could  have  withstood  on  its  own.  The 
European institutions and Member States reacted quickly and are continuing to work together 
to recover from a crisis that has no precedent in our generation. 

However,  these  recent  experiences  also  revealed  remaining  gaps  and  weaknesses  in  the 
current system of coordination and in the existing surveillance procedures. There is a broad 
agreement  that  the  framework  for  EMU  should  be  urgently  strengthened  in  order  to  anchor 
macroeconomic stability and the sustainability of public finances, which are preconditions for 
durable output and employment growth. 

The  crisis  has  drastically  reversed  the  favourable  economic  and  financial  conditions  that 
prevailed until 2007 and made clear yet again that windfalls accumulated during good times 
had  not  been  sufficiently  used  to  create  room  for  manoeuvre  when  times  turn  bad.  Very 
sizeable consolidation will be necessary in most Member States to bring public debt back onto 
a downward path. This is all the more urgent as European societies and economies are facing 
the effects of ageing populations, which will put further pressure on labour supply and public 
budgets. Reducing debt levels is highly relevant for most countries in view of their negative 
effects on economic incentives and growth through higher taxes and risk premia. 

The key instrument for fiscal policy co-ordination and surveillance is the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), which implements the Treaty provisions on budgetary discipline. Strengthening 
the Pact is important for both increasing the credibility of the agreed co-ordinated fiscal exit 
strategy and avoiding a repetition of past mistakes. The set of proposals now being presented 
aims to strengthen the Pact by: (i) improving its provisions in the light of experience, not least 
of  the  crisis;  (ii)  equipping  it  with  more  effective  enforcement  instruments;  and  (iii) 
complementing it with provisions on national fiscal frameworks. This set of proposals is part 
of a broader reform of economic governance under the umbrella of the Europe 2020 strategy, 
which  includes  proposals  for  addressing  macroeconomic  imbalances  through  stronger 
surveillance,  including  alert  and  sanction  mechanisms.  The  different  strands  of  economic 
policy coordination, including surveillance of structural reforms, are to be integrated in a new 
surveillance cycle, the European Semester, which will bring together existing processes under 
the  SGP  and  the  Broad  Economic  Policy  Guidelines,  including  simultaneous  submission  of 
stability and convergence programmes and national reform programmes. 

2. 

RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH INTERESTED PARTIES  

The  outlines  of  the  present  proposals  were  announced  by  the  Commission  in  two 
communications: Reinforcing economic policy coordination of 12 May 2010 and Enhancing 
economic policy coordination for stability, growth and jobs – Tools for stronger EU economic 
governance of 30 June 2010. In opting for a formal communication, the Commission wished 
to  demonstrate  its  commitment  to  fostering  dialogue  with  Member  States,  the  European 

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Parliament  and  all  stakeholders,  while  at  the  same  time  delivering  concrete  proposals  for 
action. 

In June 2010, the European Council agreed on the urgent need to reinforce the coordination of 
our  economic  policies.  The  agreement  included  first  orientations  as  regards  the  SGP  and 
budgetary surveillance. In particular, the European Council agreed on: (i) strengthening both 
the  preventive  and  corrective  parts  of  the  SGP,  including  with  sanctions  and  taking  due 
account  of  the  particular  situation  of  euro-area  Member  States;  (ii)  giving,  in  budgetary 
surveillance,  a  much  more  prominent  role  to  levels  and  evolutions  of  debt  and  overall 
sustainability; (iii) ensuring that all Member States have national budgetary rules and medium 
term budgetary frameworks in line with the SGP; (iv) ensuring the quality of statistical data. 

The  European  Council  invited  the  Task  Force  on  economic  governance  chaired  by  its 
President and established in March 2010 and the Commission to rapidly develop further and 
make  operational  these  orientations.  A  constructive  relationship  developed  between  the 
Commission and the Task Force. The Commission contributed to the work of the Task Force 
through the Communications referred to above and through ad hoc contributions. 

3. 

LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

The  legal  basis  for  the  SGP  is  laid  down  in  Articles  121  and  126  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union.  The  SGP  consists  of:  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance  and  coordination  of  economic  policies  (referred  to  as  preventive  part);  Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation 
of  the  excessive  deficit  procedure  (referred  to  as  corrective  part);  and  the  Resolution  of  the 
European Council of 17 June 1997 on the Stability and Growth Pact. These Regulations were 
amended  in  2005  by  Regulations  (EC)  No  1055/2005  and  (EC)  No  1056/2005  and 
complemented by the Council Report of 20 March 2005 on ‘Improving the implementation of 
the Stability and Growth Pact’. The present proposals seek further amendments to Regulations 
No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97. Additional enforcement instruments are proposed in a new 
Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  effective  enforcement  of 
budgetary  surveillance  in  the  euro  area,  based  on  Article  136  of  the  Treaty,  in  combination 
with Article 121(6). The requirements for the budgetary frameworks of the Member States are 
the  subject  of  a  new  Council  Directive  based  on  Article  126(14):  the  Directive  aims  in 
particular  to  specify  the  obligations  of  national  authorities  to  comply  with  the  provisions  of 
Article 3 of Protocol No 12 to the Treaties on the excessive deficit procedure. 

The preventive part of the SGP is meant to ensure that Member States follow prudent fiscal 
policies so that there is no need to adopt more stringent forms of coordination to avoid public 
finance  sustainability  being  put  at  risk,  with  potential  negative  consequences  for  EMU  as  a 
whole.  Accordingly,  Member  States  are  required  to  present  stability  and  convergence 
programmes  outlining  their  plans  to  achieve  medium-term  budgetary  objectives  (MTOs), 
which are defined as a percentage of GDP in structural terms (i.e. adjusting for the effect of 
the  cycle  and  excluding  one-off  and  temporary  measures)  and  are  differentiated  across 
countries around a close-to-balance position to reflect the level of public debt and liabilities 
related  to  ageing.  Member  States  not  having  reached  their  MTO  are  expected  to  converge 
towards it at an annual pace of 0.5% of GDP in structural terms. 

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However,  progress  towards  MTOs  has  been  generally  insufficient,  leaving  public  finances 
badly  exposed  to  the  economic  downturn.  Moreover,  the  structural  balance  has  in  practice 
proved  an  insufficient  measure  of  a  country’s  underlying  fiscal  position,  owing  to  the 
difficulty  of  assessing  the  cyclical  position  of  the  economy  in  real  time  and  to  insufficient 
account being taken of revenue windfalls and shortfalls not directly related to the economic 
cycle (in particular housing and financial market developments). As a result, in a number of 
countries,  even  apparently  sound  budgetary  positions  before  the  crisis  masked  a  strong 
reliance  on  windfall  revenues  to  finance  expenditure,  the  reversal  of  which  contributed  to 
soaring budget deficits. 

To  respond  to  these  shortcomings  the  reform  of  the  preventive  part  that  is  being  proposed, 
while  retaining  the  current  MTOs  and  the  0.5%  of  GDP  annual  convergence  requirement, 
makes  them  operational  in  terms  of  a  new  principle  of  prudent  fiscal  policy-making.  This 
principle implies that annual expenditure growth should not exceed – and if the MTO has not 
been  achieved  should  be  clearly  below  –  a  prudent  medium-term  rate  of  growth  of  GDP, 
unless the MTO has been significantly overachieved or the excess of expenditure growth over 
the prudent medium-term rate is matched by discretionary measures on the revenue side. The 
essential aim is to ensure that revenue windfalls are not spent but are instead allocated to debt 
reduction. The new principle will provide the benchmark against which countries’ fiscal plans 
in the stability and convergence programme will be examined. Additionally, failure to respect 
keep to the agreed rate of growth of expenditure, in conjunction with the stipulated revenue 
measures, will make the Member State concerned liable to a warning from the Commission 
and,  if  persistent  and/or  particularly  serious,  a  Council  recommendation  to  take  corrective 
action issued under Article 121 of the Treaty. Such a recommendation, while being issued in 
the  context  of  the  preventive  part,  would  be  backed,  for  the  first  time  and  for  euro-area 
countries only, by an enforcement mechanism under Article 136 of the Treaty, in the form of 
an  interest-bearing  deposit,  amounting  to  0.2%  of  GDP.  A  procedure  of  ‘reverse  voting’ 
mechanism  is  introduced  for  imposing  the  interest-bearing  deposit:  on  the  issue  of  a 
recommendation, the deposit would become due on proposal by the Commission, unless the 
Council  decides  to  the  contrary  by  qualified  majority  within  ten  days.  The  Council  could 
reduce the amount of the deposit only unanimously or based on a Commission proposal and a 
reasoned  request  from  the  Member  State  concerned.  The  deposit  will  be  returned  with  the 
accrued interest once the Council is satisfied that the situation giving rise to it has come to an 
end. 

The  corrective  part  of  the  SGP  is  meant  to  avoid  gross  errors  in  budgetary  policies,  which 
might  put  at  risk  the  sustainability  of  public  finances  and  potentially  endanger  EMU.  This 
translates into the obligation for Member States to avoid excessive government deficits, which 
are defined against a numerical threshold for deficit (3% of GDP) and debt (60% of GDP or 
sufficiently declining toward it). The excessive deficit procedure (EDP) that implements the 
ban  on  excessive  deficits  provides  for  a  sequence  of  steps,  which,  for  euro-area  countries, 
include the eventual imposition of financial sanctions. 

The  EDP  has  been  regularly  applied  in  line  with  the  relevant  provisions,  even  against  the 
background  of  the  exceptional  circumstances  of  the  financial  crisis,  thereby  contributing  to 
anchoring  expectations  of  its  orderly  resolution.  However  a  number  of  shortcomings  have 
emerged.  While  the  deficit  and  the  debt  criterion  are  in  principle  on  an  equal  footing,  and 
persistently  high  levels  of  debt  arguably  represent  a  more  serious  threat  to  public  finance 
sustainability than occasionally high deficits, in practice the ‘3% of GDP’ threshold has been 
the almost exclusive focus of the EDP, with debt playing a marginal role so far. This owes to 
the  less  straightforward  nature  of  the  debt  threshold  compared  to  the  deficit,  including  the 

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ambiguity of the notion of sufficiently diminishing pace of reduction and the greater impact 
on  the  debt  ratio  of  variables  outside  the  control  of  the  government,  notably  inflation.  The 
EDP  is  backed  in  principle  by  a  strong  enforcement  mechanism,  as  financial  sanctions  can, 
and  should  be,  imposed  in  the  event  of  persistent  failure  to  correct  an  excessive  deficit. 
However,  such  sanctions  arguably  come  into  play  too  late  in  the  process  to  represent  an 
effective deterrent against gross fiscal policy errors, not least because the financial situation of 
the  country  concerned  may  have  deteriorated  so  much  as  to  make  the  threat  of  a  fine  less 
credible at the very time when it should become real. Finally, the recent crisis has highlighted 
that if the obligation to correct excessive deficits contributes to anchoring the expectation that 
government solvency will be maintained, the timeline of the correction and the profile of the 
adjustment may have to reflect EMU-wide considerations. 

To respond to these shortcomings the following key proposals for the reform of the corrective 
part are being put forward. 

The  debt  criterion  of  the  EDP  is  to  be  made  operational,  notably  through  the  adoption  of  a 
numerical benchmark  to  gauge  whether the debt ratio is sufficiently diminishing toward the 
60%  of  GDP  threshold.  Specifically,  a  debt-to-GDP  ratio  above  60%  is  to  be  considered 
sufficiently  diminishing  if  its  distance  with  respect  to  the  60%  of  GDP  reference  value  has 
reduced over the  previous three years at  a  rate of the  order  of one-twentieth per year. Non- 
compliance with this numerical benchmark is not, however, necessarily expected to result in 
the country concerned being placed in excessive deficit, as this decision would need to take 
into  account  all  the  factors  that  are  relevant,  in  particular  for  the  assessment  of  debt 
developments,  such  as  whether  very  low  nominal  growth  is  hampering  debt  reduction, 
together with risk factors linked to the debt structure, private sector indebtedness and implicit 
liabilities  related  to  ageing.  In  line  with  the  greater  emphasis  on  debt,  more  consideration 
should be given to relevant factors in the event of non-compliance with the deficit criterion, if 
a country has a debt below the 60% of GDP threshold. 

The more flexible approach put forward with respect to considering the relevant factors in the 
steps  of  determining  the  existence  of  an  excessive  deficit  could  also  benefit  countries 
undertaking  systemic  pension  reforms,  beyond  the  currently  foreseen  five-year  transitory 
period.  The  special  provisions  of  the  SGP  for  systemic  pension  reforms  with  regards  the 
deficit criterion are also extended to the debt criterion; through establishing the same five-year 
transitory period for considering the net costs of such reforms when assessing the compliance 
with  the  debt  criterion.  Finally,  equal  consideration  shall  be  given  to  the  partial  or  total 
reversal of previously implemented systemic pension reforms, during both the launch and the 
abrogation of an EDP. 

Enforcement  is  strengthened  by  introducing  a  new  set  of  financial  sanctions  for  euro-area 
Member  States,  which  would  apply  much  earlier  in  the  process  according  to  a  graduated 
approach.  Specifically,  a  non-interest-bearing  deposit  amounting  to  0.2%  of  GDP  would 
apply upon a decision to place a country in excessive deficit, which would be converted into a 
fine in the event of non-compliance with the initial recommendation to correct the deficit. The 
amount is equal to the fixed component of the sanctions already provided for in the final step 
of  the  EDP.  It  also  bears  a  link  with  the  EU  budget,  which  should  facilitate  the  envisaged 
move to a system of enforcement based on the EU budget as outlined in the above-mentioned 
Commission  Communication  of  30  June  2010.  Further  non-compliance  would  result  in  the 
sanction being stepped up, in line with the already existing provisions in the SGP. To reduce 
discretion in enforcement, the ‘reverse voting’ mechanism is envisaged for imposing the new 
sanctions in connection with the successive steps of the EDP. Specifically, at each step of the 

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EDP,  the  Commission  will  make  a  proposal  for  the  relevant  sanction,  and  this  will  be 
considered  adopted,  unless  the  Council  decides  to  the  contrary  by  qualified  majority  within 
ten  days.  The  size  of  the  non-interest-bearing  deposit  or  the  fine  could  only  be  reduced  or 
cancelled by the Council unanimously or based on a specific proposal from the Commission 
on  grounds  of  exceptional  economic  circumstances  or  following  a  reasoned  request  by  the 
Member State concerned. 

Moreover,  the  criteria  for  assessing  compliance  with  the  recommendations  at  each  step, 
including  the  possibility  of  allowing  an  extension  of  the  deadlines  for  the  correcting  the 
excessive deficit, are clarified by placing explicit emphasis on the fiscal variables that can be 
assumed  to  be  under  the  direct  control  of  the  government,  in  particular  expenditure,  by 
analogy  with  the  approach  proposed  for  the  preventive  part.  Beyond  these  country-specific 
circumstances, the possibility is introduced of extending the deadlines also in the event of a 
general economic crisis. 

Effective enforcement of the EMU budgetary coordination framework cannot be expected to 
derive  only  from  provisions  laid  down  at  EU  level.  The  particular  decentralised  nature  of 
fiscal policy-making in the EU and the general need for national ownership of EU rules make 
it essential that the objectives of the EMU budgetary coordination framework are reflected in 
the  national  budgetary  frameworks.  A  national  budgetary  framework  is  the  set  of  elements 
that form the basis of national fiscal governance, i.e. the country-specific institutional policy 
setting  that  shapes  fiscal  policy-making  at  national  level.  This  includes  public  accounting 
systems,  statistics,  forecasting  practices,  numerical  fiscal  rules,  budgetary  procedures 
governing  all  stages  of  the  budget  process  and  medium  term  budgetary  frameworks  in 
particular, and fiscal relations across government sub-sectors. While Member States’ specific 
needs and preferences must be respected, a number of features stand out as being needed in 
terms  of  ensuring  minimum  quality  and  consistency  with  the  EMU  budgetary  framework. 
These  are  the  subject  of  the  Directive  on  national  budgetary  frameworks  that  is  being 
proposed  to  complement  the  reform  of  the  SGP.  Such  features  firstly  require  that  the  most 
primary elements of national budgetary frameworks, namely accounting and statistical issues 
and  forecasting  practices,  work  in  line  with  minimum  European  standards  to  facilitate 
transparency  and  the  monitoring  of  fiscal  developments.  Domestic  budgetary  frameworks 
need also to adopt a multi-annual fiscal planning perspective so as to ensure the achievement 
of  the  medium-term  objectives  set  at  EU  level.  Additionally,  Member  States  must  have  in 
place  numerical  fiscal  rules  conducive  to  compliance  with  the  deficit  and  debt  thresholds. 
Member  States  must  ensure  that  these  features  apply  to  all  general  government  sub-sectors. 
National authorities must also guarantee the transparency of the budget process by providing 
detailed  information  on  existing  extra-budgetary  funds,  tax  expenditures  and  contingent 
liabilities. 

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2010/0277 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 

on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular  the  third 
subparagraph of Article 126(14) thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, 

Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament1,  

Whereas: 

(1) 

There  is  a  need  to  build  upon  the  experience  gained  during  the  first  decade  of  functioning  of 
economic  and  monetary  union.  Recent  economic  developments  have  posed  new  challenges  to 
the  conduct  of  fiscal  policy  across  the  Union  and  have  in  particular  highlighted  the  need  for 
uniform requirements as regards the rules and procedures forming the budgetary frameworks of 
the Member States. In particular it is necessary to specify what national authorities must do to 
comply with the provisions of the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed 
to the Treaties, and in particular Article 3 thereof.  

(2)  Member  State  governments  and  government  sub-sectors  maintain  public  accounting  systems 
which  include  elements  such  as  bookkeeping,  internal  control,  financial  reporting,  and  audit. 
These should be distinguished from statistical data which relate to the outcomes of government 
finances  based  on  statistical  methodologies,  and  from  forecasts  or  budgeting  actions  which 
relate to future government finances.  

(3) 

(4) 

Complete  and  reliable  public  accounting  practices  for  all  sectors  of  general  government  are  a 
precondition  for  the  production  of  high  quality  statistics  that  are  comparable  across  Member 
States. 

The availability of fiscal data is crucial to the proper functioning of the budgetary surveillance 
framework  of  the  Union.  Regular  availability  of  timely  and  reliable  fiscal  data  is  the  key  to 
proper and well-timed monitoring, which in turn allows prompt action in the event of adverse 
budgetary developments. A crucial element in ensuring the quality of fiscal data is transparency, 
which must entail regular public availability of such data. 

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OJ C , , p. . 

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(5)  With regard to statistics, Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 2009 on European Statistics2 established a legislative framework for the 
production  of  European  statistics  with  a  view  to  the  formulation,  application,  monitoring  and 
assessment  of  the  policies  of  the  Union.  That  Regulation  also  laid  down  the  principles 
governing  the  development,  production  and  dissemination  of  European  statistics:  professional 
independence, 
impartiality,  objectivity,  reliability,  statistical  confidentiality  and  cost-
effectiveness,  giving  precise  definitions  of  each  of  these  principles.  Council  Regulation  (EC) 
No  479/2009  of  25  May  2009  on  the  application  of  the  Protocol  on  the  excessive  deficit 
procedure  annexed  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community3,  as  amended, 
strengthened  the  Commission’s  powers  to  verify  statistical  data  used  for  the  excessive  deficit 
procedure.  

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

The definitions of  'government',  'deficit' and 'investment' are laid down  in  the Protocol on the 
excessive  deficit  procedure  by  reference  to  the  European  System  of  Integrated  Economic 
Accounts  (ESA),  replaced  by  the  European  system  of  national  and  regional  accounts  in  the 
Community (adopted by Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 of 25 June 1996 on the European 
system of national and regional accounts in the Community4 and hereinafter referred to as 'ESA 
95'). 

Biased  and  unrealistic  macroeconomic  and  budgetary  forecasts  may  considerably  hamper  the 
effectiveness  of  fiscal  planning  and  consequently  impair  commitment  to  budgetary  discipline, 
while transparency and validation of forecasting methodologies may significantly increase the 
quality of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for fiscal planning.  

A crucial element in ensuring the use of realistic forecasts for the conduct of budgetary policy is 
transparency,  which  must  entail  public  availability  of  the  methodologies,  assumptions  and 
parameters on which the official macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts are based.  

Alternative  forecast  scenarios  and  corresponding  budgetary  projections  supplementing  the 
central  macroeconomic  scenario  allow  analysis  of  how  fiscal  variables  would  evolve  under 
different economic assumptions and thus greatly reduce the risk of budgetary discipline being 
jeopardised by forecast errors.  

(10)  Commission  forecasts  provide  Member  States  with  a  useful  benchmark  for  their  central 
scenario,  enhancing  the  validity  of  the  forecasts  used  for  budgetary  planning,  although  the 
extent  to  which  Member  States  can  be  expected  to  take  the  Commission  forecasts  into 
consideration will vary according to the timing of forecast preparation and the comparability of 
the forecast methodologies and assumptions.  

(11)  The  quality  of  official  macroeconomic  and  budgetary  forecasts  is  critically  enhanced  by 
auditing  them  at  the  planning  stage.  Thorough  auditing  includes  scrutiny  of  the  economic 

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4 

Regulation  (EC)  No  223/2009  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  March  2009  on  European 
statistics and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities, 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  322/97  on  Community  Statistics,  and  Council  Decision  89/382/EEC,  Euratom 
establishing  a  Committee  on  the  Statistical  Programmes  of  the  European  Communities,  OJ  L  87,  31.03.2009,  p. 
164. 
OJ L 145, 10.6.2009, p. 1.  
OJ L 310, 30.11.1996, p. 1. 

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assumptions,  comparison  with  forecasts  prepared  by  other  institutions,  and  evaluation  of  past 
forecast performance.  

(12)  Considering the documented effectiveness of rules-based budgetary frameworks of the Member 
States in promoting budgetary discipline, strong national fiscal rules that are consistent with the 
budgetary  objectives  at  the  level  of  the  Union  must  be  a  cornerstone  of  the  strengthened 
budgetary  surveillance  framework  of  the  Union.  Strong  fiscal  rules  should  be  equipped  with 
well-specified target definitions together with mechanisms for effective and timely monitoring. 
In  addition,  policy  experience  has  shown  that  for  numerical  rules  to  work  effectively, 
consequences  must  be  attached  to  non-compliance,  where  the  costs  involved  may  be  simply 
reputational.  

(13)  Member States should avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policies and fiscal consolidation efforts should 
be  greater  in  good  times.  Well-specified  numerical  fiscal  rules  are  conducive  to  these 
objectives. 

(14)  National fiscal planning can only be consistent with both the preventive and the corrective parts 
of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  if  it  adopts  a  multi-annual  perspective  and  pursues  the 
achievement  of  the  medium-term  budgetary  objectives  in  particular.  Medium-term  budgetary 
frameworks  are  strictly  instrumental  in  ensuring  that  budgetary  frameworks  of  the  Member 
States are consistent with the legislation of the Union. In the spirit of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and 
the  surveillance  and  coordination  of  economic  policies5  and  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1467/97  of  7  July  1997  on  speeding  up  and  clarifying  the  implementation  of  the  excessive 
deficit procedure6, the preventive and corrective parts of the Stability and Growth Pact should 
not be regarded in isolation. 

(15)  Although approval of annual budget legislation is the key step in the budget process in which 
important  budgetary  decisions  are  adopted  in  the  Member  States,  most  fiscal  measures  have 
budgetary  implications  that  go  well  beyond  the  yearly  budgetary  cycle.  A  single-year 
perspective therefore provides a poor basis for sound budgetary policies. In order to incorporate 
the multi-annual budgetary perspective of the budgetary surveillance framework of the Union, 
planning of annual budget legislation should be based on multiannual fiscal planning stemming 
from the medium-term budgetary framework. 

(16)  Provisions of the budgetary surveillance framework established by the Treaty and in particular 
the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  apply  to  general  government  as  a  whole,  which  comprises  the 
sub-sectors central government, state government, local government, and social security funds, 
as defined in Regulation (EC) No 2223/96.  

(17)  A significant number of Member States have experienced a sizeable fiscal decentralisation with 
the devolution of budgetary powers to sub-national governments. The role of such sub-national 
governments in ensuring that the Stability and Growth Pact is adhered to has thereby increased 
considerably,  and  particular  attention  should  be  paid  to  ensuring  that  all  general  government 
sub-sectors  are  duly  covered  by  the  scope  of  the  obligations  and  procedures  laid  down  in 

5 
6 

OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.  
OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6. 

EN 

9 

   EN 

                                                 
domestic  budgetary  frameworks,  specifically,  but  not  exclusively,  in  such  more  decentralised 
Member States.  

(18)  To  be  effective  in  promoting  budgetary  discipline  and  the  sustainability  of  public  finance, 
budgetary  frameworks  should  comprehensively  cover  public  finances.  For  this  reason, 
operations of extra-budgetary funds and bodies that have an immediate or medium-term impact 
on Member States’ budgetary positions should be given particular consideration. 

(19)  Since  the  objective  of  the  action  to  be  taken,  namely  uniform  compliance  with  budgetary 
discipline as required by the Treaty, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and 
can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance 
with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to achieve that objective,  

HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 

CHAPTER I 
Subject matter and definitions 

Article 1 
Subject matter 

This Directive sets out detailed rules concerning the characteristics of the budgetary frameworks of the 
Member States that are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the excessive deficit procedure. 

Article 2 
Definitions 

For  the  purposes  of  this  Directive  the  definitions  of  'government',  'deficit'  and  'investment'  set  out  in 
Article 2 of Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaties shall apply. 

In addition the following definition shall apply: 

'budgetary  framework'  means  the  set  of  arrangements,  procedures  and  institutions  that  underlie  the 
conduct of budgetary policies of general government, in particular: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

systems of budgetary accounting and statistical reporting; 

rules and procedures governing the preparation of forecasts for budgetary planning; 

numerical fiscal rules, which establish a permanent constraint on the conduct of fiscal policy 
expressed in terms of a summary indicator of budgetary performance, such as the government 
budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major component thereof; 

budgetary  procedures  comprising  procedural  rules  that  regulate  the  budget  process  at  all 
stages;  

EN 

10 

   EN 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

1. 

2. 

1. 

medium-term  budgetary  frameworks  as  a  specific  set  of  national  budgetary  procedures  that 
extend the horizon for fiscal policy making beyond the annual budgetary calendar, including 
the setting of policy priorities and of medium-term budgetary objectives;  

arrangements  for  analysis  to  enhance  the  transparency  of  elements  of  the  budget  process, 
including inter alia the mandate of independent national budget offices or institutions acting in 
the field of budgetary policy;  

mechanisms and rules that regulate fiscal relationships between public authorities across sub-
sectors of general government. 

CHAPTER II 
Accounting and statistics 

Article 3 

As concerns national systems of public accounting, Member States shall have in place public 
accounting  systems  comprehensively  and  consistently  covering  all  sub-sectors  of  general 
government  as  defined  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  2223/96  (ESA  95),  and  containing  the 
information needed to compile ESA 95-based data. Those public accounting systems shall be 
subject to internal control and audit. 

Member  States  shall  ensure  timely  and  regular  public  availability  of  fiscal  data  for  all  sub-
sectors of general government. In particular Member States shall publish  

(a) 

(b) 

cash-based  fiscal  data  at  a  monthly  frequency,  covering  government  with  each  sub-
sector thereof separately identified, before the end of the following month,  

a  detailed  reconciliation  table  showing  the  elements  of  transition  between  cash  based 
and ESA 95-based data. 

CHAPTER III 
Forecasts 

Article 4 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  fiscal  planning  is  based  on  realistic  macroeconomic  and 
budgetary forecasts using the most up-to-date information. Budgetary planning shall be based 
on the most likely macro-fiscal scenario or on a more prudent scenario that highlights in detail 
deviations  from  the  most  likely  macro-fiscal  scenario.  The  macroeconomic  and  budgetary 
forecasts  shall  be  prepared  taking  into  account  the  Commission  forecasts  as  appropriate. 
Differences  between  the  chosen  macro-fiscal  scenario  and  the  Commission  forecast  shall  be 
explained. 

2. 

Macroeconomic  and  budgetary  forecasts  for  fiscal  planning  shall  comprise  alternative 
macroeconomic  scenarios  to  examine  the  path  of  fiscal  variables  under  different  economic 

EN 

11 

   EN 

3. 

4. 

conditions. The range of alternative scenarios used in macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts 
shall be guided by past forecast performance.  

Member  States  shall  make  public  the  official  macroeconomic  and  budgetary  forecasts 
prepared for fiscal planning, including the methodologies, assumptions, and parameters used. 

Member  States  shall  have  the  macroeconomic  and  budgetary  forecasts  for  fiscal  planning 
regularly  audited,  including  ex  post  evaluation.  The  result  of  this  auditing  shall  be  made 
public.  

CHAPTER IV 
Numerical fiscal rules 

Article 5 

Member States shall have in place numerical fiscal rules that effectively promote compliance with their 
respective obligations deriving from the Treaty in the area of budgetary policy. Such rules shall include 
in particular:  

(a) 

(b) 

compliance with the reference values on deficit and debt set in accordance with the Treaty;  

the adoption of a multi-annual fiscal planning horizon, including respect of the medium-term 
budgetary objectives.  

Article 6 

Without  prejudice  to  the  Treaty  provisions  of  the  budgetary  surveillance  framework  of  the  Union, 
numerical fiscal rules shall contain specifications on the following elements:  

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

the target definition and scope of the rules;  

effective and timely monitoring of compliance with the rules, such as by independent national 
budget offices or institutions acting in the field of budgetary policy;  

consequences in the event of non-compliance;  

escape  clauses,  setting  out  a  limited  number  of  specific  circumstances  in  which  temporary 
non-compliance with the rule is permitted.  

The  annual  budget  legislation  of  the  Member  States  shall  reflect  the  constraints  imposed  by  their 
numerical fiscal rules in force. 

Article 7 

EN 

12 

   EN 

CHAPTER V 
Medium-term budgetary frameworks 

Article 8 

1. 

2. 

Member  States  shall establish an effective  medium-term  budgetary  framework  providing  for 
the adoption of a fiscal planning horizon of at least three years to ensure that national fiscal 
planning follows a multiannual fiscal planning perspective. 

Medium-term  budgetary  frameworks  shall  include  procedures  for  establishing  the  following 
items: 

(a) 

comprehensive and transparent multi-annual budgetary objectives in terms of the general 
government deficit, debt, and any other summary fiscal indicator, ensuring that these are 
consistent with any fiscal rules as provided for in Chapter IV in force,  

(b)  detailed projections of each major expenditure and revenue item, by general government 

sub-sector, for the budget year and beyond, based on unchanged policies,  

(c) 

a statement of the government’s medium-term priorities broken down by major revenue 
and  expenditure  item  and  by  general  government  sub-sector,  showing  how  the 
adjustment  towards  the  medium-term  budgetary  objective  is  achieved  compared  to 
projections under unchanged policies.  

3. 

Projections  adopted  within  medium-term  budgetary  frameworks  shall  be  based  on  realistic 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts in accordance with Chapter III.  

Article 9 

Annual  budget  legislation  shall  be  consistent  with  the  provisions  stemming  from  the  medium-term 
budgetary  framework.  Specifically,  revenue  and  expenditure  projections  and  priorities  resulting  from 
the  medium-term  budgetary  framework  as  specified  in  Article  8(2)  shall  constitute  the  basis  for  the 
preparation of the annual budget. Any departure from these provisions shall be duly justified.  

CHAPTER VI 
Transparency of general government finances and 
comprehensive scope of budgetary frameworks 

Article 10  

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  any  measures  taken  to  comply  with  Chapters  II,  III  and  IV  are 
consistent across, and comprehensive in coverage of, all sub-sectors of general government. This shall 
in particular imply consistency of accounting rules and procedures, data publication schedules, and the 
integrity of their underlying data collection and processing systems. 

EN 

13 

   EN 

Article 11 

Member  States  shall  establish  appropriate  mechanisms  of  co-ordination  across  sub-sectors  of  general 
government  to  provide  for  consistent  coverage  of  all  sub-sectors  of  general  government  in  fiscal 
planning  and  in  the  preparation  of  budgetary  forecasts  and  setting  up  multi-annual  planning  as  laid 
down in the multi-annual budgetary framework in particular.  

1. 

2. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

Article 12 

All sub-sectors of general government shall be covered by numerical fiscal rules.  

In order to promote fiscal accountability, the budgetary responsibilities of public authorities in 
different sub-sectors of general government shall be clearly laid down. 

Article 13 

All  the  operations  of  extra-budgetary  funds  and  bodies  shall  be  integrated  into  the  regular 
budgetary  process.  This  shall  comprise  the  inclusion  of  detailed  information  on  these  funds 
and  operations  in  the  standard  budgetary  documentation  disseminated  for  fiscal  planning, 
particularly  for  the  purpose  of  discussion  of  the  medium-term  budgetary  framework  and 
annual budget legislation.  

Member  States  shall  publish  detailed  information  on  the  impact  of  tax  expenditures  on 
revenues.  

For  all  sub-sectors  of  general  government,  Member  States  shall  publish  information  on 
contingent liabilities with potentially large impacts  on public  budgets, including government 
guarantees,  non-performing  loans,  and  liabilities  stemming  from  the  operation  of  public 
corporations, including their extent and likelihood and potential due date of expenditure. 

CHAPTER VII 
Final provisions 

Article 14 

1. 

Member States shall bring into force the provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 
31 December 2013 at the latest. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text 
of those provisions and a correlation table between those provisions and this Directive. 

When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or 
be  accompanied  by  such  a  reference  on  the  occasion  of  their  official  publication.  Member 
States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 

2. 

Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions which 
they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. 

EN 

14 

   EN 

This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official 
Journal of the European Union. 

Article 15 

Article 16 

This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 

Done at , 

For the Council 
The President

EN 

15 

   EN 

 
 
LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT FOR PROPOSALS 

1. 

FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

1.1. 

Title of the proposal/initiative  

Council Directive on requirements for the budgetary frameworks of the Member States 

1.2. 

Policy area(s) concerned in the ABM/ABB structure7  

Economic and Financial Affairs 

1.3. 

Nature of the proposal/initiative  

(cid:133) The proposal/initiative relates to a new action  

(cid:133) The proposal/initiative relates to a new action following a pilot project/preparatory action8  

(cid:56) The proposal/initiative relates to the extension of an existing action  

(cid:133) The proposal/initiative relates to an action redirected towards a new action  

1.4. 

Objectives 

1.4.1.  The Commission's multiannual strategic objective(s) targeted by the proposal/initiative  

To foster EU growth, employment creation and sustainable development 

1.4.2. 

Specific objective(s) and ABM/ABB activity(ies) concerned  

Specific objectives: No.1 and 3. 

- To ensure effective policy co-ordination and overall policy consistency in developing an EU 
response  to  the  economic  crisis,  in  the  context  of  achieving  the  EU  2020  agenda  and 
sustainable development and in order to raise the growth potential of Member States and make 
the EU more competitive; 

-  To  promote  the  pursuit  by  Member  States  of  sound  budgetary  positions  and  of  public 
finances that are sustainable and of high quality in terms of their contribution to growth.  

ABM/ABB activity(ies) concerned 

Economic and Monetary Union 

7 
8 

ABM: Activity-Based Management – ABB: Activity-Based Budgeting. 
As referred to in Article 49(6)(a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation. 

EN 

16 

   EN 

                                                 
1.4.3.  Expected result(s) and impact 

Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted. 

The  Commission's  Communication  COM(2010)367  emphasised  the  need  for  a  well  defined 
EU policy approach in order to (i) revigorate the economic recovery, (ii) put public finances 
back on a sound footing and (iii) actively promote sustainable growth and jobs.  

The  proposed  directive  forms  part  of  the  formal  legislative  proposals  announced  in  the 
abovementioned Communication. It aims at integrating the EU budgetary framework into the 
domestic  fiscal  governance regimes of the Member States such as to foster compliance with 
the Stability and Growth Pact.  

1.4.4. 

Indicators of results and impact  

Specify the indicators for monitoring implementation of the proposal/initiative. 

The achievement of the Commission's general objective of fostering EU growth, employment 
creation and sustainable development is measured through the following impact indicators: 
- the degree to which Member States record budgetary outturns in line with the SGP; 
- potential growth/output.  

1.5. 

Grounds for the proposal/initiative  

1.5.1.  Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term  

The legislative proposal constitutes part of the measures announced by the Commission in its 
Communication (2010)367 of 30 June 2010, which further develops the policy ideas set out in 
the  Commission's  Communication  COM(2010)250  of  12  May  2010  and  builds  on  the 
orientations agreed at the 17 June 2010 European Council. 

1.5.2.  Added value of EU involvement 

The coordination of Member States' economic policies form an integral part of the EU’s remit 
as reflected in Title VIII (on economic and monetary policy) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. 

1.5.3.  Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past 

Past experience suggests that insufficient adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact is among 
others  rooted  in  the  lack  of  ownership  of  the  Pact,  which  is  sought  to  be  remedied  by  the 
legislative proposal.  

1.5.4.  Coherence and possible synergy with other relevant instruments 

The legislative proposal constitutes one of the elements of a comprehensive economic reform 
package presented in Communication (2010)367 of 30 June 2010. 

EN 

17 

   EN 

 
 
1.6. 

Duration and financial impact  

(cid:133) Proposal/initiative of limited duration  

–  (cid:133) Proposal/initiative in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY  

–  (cid:133) Financial impact from YYYY to YYYY  

(cid:56) Proposal/initiative of unlimited duration 

–  Implementation with a start-up period from YYYY to YYYY, 

–  followed by full-scale operation. 

1.7.  Management mode(s) envisaged9  

(cid:56) Centralised direct management by the Commission  

(cid:133) Centralised indirect management with the delegation of implementation tasks to: 

–  (cid:133) executive agencies  

–  (cid:133) bodies set up by the Communities10  

–  (cid:133) national public-sector bodies/bodies with public-service mission  

–  (cid:133) persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions pursuant to Title V of the 
Treaty  on  European  Union  and  identified  in  the  relevant  basic  act  within  the  meaning  of 
Article 49 of the Financial Regulation  

(cid:133) Shared management with the Member States  

(cid:133) Decentralised management with third countries  

(cid:133) Joint management with international organisations (to be specified) 

If more than one management mode is indicated, please provide details in the "Comments" section. 

Comments  

9 

10 

EN 

Details  of  management  modes  and  references  to  the  Financial  Regulation  may  be  found  on  the  BudgWeb  site: 
http://www.cc.cec/budg/man/budgmanag/budgmanag_en.html 
As referred to in Article 185 of the Financial Regulation. 

18 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
2. 

MANAGEMENT MEASURES  

2.1.  Monitoring and reporting rules  

Specify frequency and conditions. 

N/A 

2.2.  Management and control system  

2.2.1.  Risk(s) identified  

N/A 

2.2.2.  Control method(s) envisaged  

N/A 

2.3.  Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities  

Specify existing or envisaged prevention and protection measures. 

N/A 

EN 

19 

   EN 

3. 

ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

3.1. 

Heading(s)  of  the  multiannual  financial  framework  and  expenditure  budget  line(s) 
affected  

The legislative proposal does not require any additional human or financial resources. 

•  Existing expenditure budget lines  

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines. 

Budget line 

Type of  
expenditure

Contribution  

Number  
[Description………………………...……….] 

DA/NDA 
(11) 

from 
EFTA12 
countries 

from 
candidate 
countries13 

from third 
countries 

within the meaning 
of Article 18(1)(aa) 
of the Financial 
Regulation  

[XX.YY.YY.YY] 

DA/DN
A 

YES/N
O 

YES/N
O 

YES/N
O 

YES/NO 

•  New budget lines requested : None 

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines. 

Budget line 

Type of 
expenditure

Contribution  

Number  
[Heading……………………………………..] 

Diff./non-
diff. 

[XX.YY.YY.YY] 

from 
EFTA 
countries 

from 
candidate 
countries 

from third 
countries 

within the meaning 
of Article 18(1)(aa) 
of the Financial 
Regulation  

YES/N
O 

YES/N
O 

YES/N
O 

YES/NO 

Heading of 
multiannual 
financial 
framework 

Heading of 
multiannual 
financial 
framework 

11 
12 
13 

EN 

DA= Differentiated appropriations / DNA= Non-Differentiated Appropriations 
EFTA: European Free Trade Association.  
Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential candidate countries from the Western Balkans. 

20 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3.2. 

Estimated impact on expenditure  

3.2.1. 

Summary of estimated impact on expenditure  

Heading of multiannual financial 
framework:  

Number 

[Heading 
……………...……………………………………………………………….] 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

DG: <…….> 

(cid:121) Operational appropriations  

Number of budget line 

Number of budget line 

Appropriations 
of 
 from the envelop of specific programs15  
Number of budget line 

an 

administrative 

TOTAL appropriations 
for DG <…….> 

Year 
N14 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

… enter as many years as 
necessary to show the duration 
of the impact (see point 1.6) 

TOTAL 

Commitments 

Payments 

Commitments 

Payments 

(1) 

(2) 

(1a) 

(2a) 

nature 

financed 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Commitments 

Payments 

(3) 

=1+1a 
+3 

=2+2a 

+3 

14 
15 

EN 

Year N is the year in which implementation of the proposal/initiative starts. 
Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former "BA" lines), indirect research, direct 
research. 

21 

E

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(cid:121) TOTAL operational appropriations  

Commitments 

Payments 

(cid:121)  TOTAL  appropriations  of  an  administrative  nature 
financed from the envelop of specific programs  

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

TOTAL appropriations  
under HEADING <….> 
of the multiannual financial framework 

Commitments 

=4+ 6 

Payments 

=5+ 6 

If more than one heading is affected by the proposal / initiative: 

(cid:121) TOTAL operational appropriations  

Commitments 

Payments 

(cid:121)  TOTAL  appropriations  of  an  administrative  nature 
financed from the envelop of specific programs  

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

TOTAL appropriations  
under HEADINGS 1 to 4 
of the multiannual financial framework 
(Reference amount) 

Commitments 

=4+ 6 

Payments 

=5+ 6 

EN 

22 

E

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heading of multiannual financial 
framework:  

5 

" Administrative expenditure " 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

… enter as many years as 
necessary to show the duration 
of the impact (see point 1.6)  

TOTAL 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

DG: <…….> 

(cid:121) Human resources  
(cid:121) Other administrative expenditure  

TOTAL DG <…….> 

Appropriations  

TOTAL appropriations 
under HEADING 5 
of the multiannual financial framework  

(Total 
= Total payments) 

commitments 

Year 
N16 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

… enter as many years as 
necessary to show the duration 
of the impact (see point 1.6) 

TOTAL 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

TOTAL appropriations  
under HEADINGS 1 to 5 
of the multiannual financial framework  

Commitments 

Payments 

16 

Year N is the year in which implementation of the proposal/initiative starts. 

EN 

23 

E

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3.2.2.  Estimated impact on operational appropriations  

–  (cid:56) The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations  

–  (cid:133) The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below: 

Indicate 
objectives and 
outputs  

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

… enter as many years as necessary to show 
the duration of the impact (see point 1.6) 

TOTAL 

OUTPUTS 

Commitment appropriations in EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Cost 

r
e
b
m
u
N

s
t
u
p
u
o

f
o

Cost 

r
e
b
m
u
N

s
t
u
p
u
o

f
o

Cost 

r
e
b
m
u
N

s
t
u
p
u
o

f
o

Cost 

r
e
b
m
u
N

s
t
u
p
u
o

f
o

Cost 

r
e
b
m
u
N

s
t
u
p
u
o

f
o

Cost 

r
e
b
m
u
N

s
t
u
p
u
o

f
o

Cost 

Total 
numbe
r of 
ouputs 

Total  
cost 

(cid:216) 

Type 
of 
output
17 

Avera
ge 
cost  
of the 
ouput 

r
e
b
m
u
N

s
t
u
p
u
o

f
o

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 118… 

- Output 

- Output 

- Output 

Sub-total for specific objective N°1 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 2… 

- Output 

Sub-total for specific objective N°2 

TOTAL COST 

17 
18 

EN 

Outputs are products and services to be supplied (e.g.: number of student exchanges financed, number of km of roads built, etc.). 
As described in Section 1.4.2. "Specific objective(s)…" 

24 

E

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3.2.3.  Estimated impact on appropriations of an administrative nature 

3.2.3.1.  Summary  

–  (cid:56) The  proposal/initiative  does  not 

require 

the  use  of  administrative 

appropriations  

–  (cid:133) The  proposal/initiative  requires  the  use  of  administrative  appropriations,  as 

explained below: 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Year 
N 19 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

… enter as many years as necessary 
to show the duration of the impact 
(see point 1.6) 

TOTAL 

HEADING 5 
of the multiannual 
financial framework 

Human resources  

Other administrative 
expenditure  

Subtotal HEADING 5 
of the multiannual 
financial framework  

Outside HEADING 520 
of the multiannual 
financial framework  

Human resources  

Other expenditure  
of an administrative 
nature 

Subtotal  
outside HEADING 5 
of the multiannual 
financial framework  

19 
20 

Year N is the year in which implementation of the proposal/initiative starts. 
Technical  and/or  administrative  assistance  and  expenditure  in  support  of  the  implementation  of  EU 
programmes and/or actions (former "BA" lines), indirect research, direct research. 

EN 

25 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
TOTAL 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3.2.  Estimated requirements of human resources  

–  (cid:56) The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources  

–  (cid:133) The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained below: 

Estimate to be expressed in full amounts (or at most to one decimal place) 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year N+2 

Year N+3 

… enter 
as many 
years as 
necessary 
to show 
the 
duration 
of the 
impact 
(see point 
1.6) 

(cid:121) Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary agents) 

XX 01 01 01 (Headquarters and Commission’s 
Representation Offices) 

XX 01 01 02 (Delegations) 

XX 01 05 01 (Indirect research) 

10 01 05 01 (Direct research) 

(cid:121) External personnel (in Full Time Equivalent unit: FTE)21 

XX 01 02 01 (CA, INT, SNE from the "global 
envelope") 

XX 01 02 02 (CA, INT, JED, LA and SNE in the 
delegations) 

XX 01 04 yy 22 

- at Headquarters23 

- in delegations  

XX 01 05 02 (CA, INT, SNE - Indirect research) 

10 01 05 02 (CA, INT, SNE - Direct research) 

Other budget lines (specify) 

TOTAL 

XX is the policy area or budget title concerned. 

The  human  resources  required  will  be  met  by  staff  from  the  DG  who  are  already  assigned  to 
management of the action and/or have been redeployed within the DG, together if necessary with any 

21 

22 
23 

CA= Contract Agent; INT= agency staff ("Intérimaire"); JED= "Jeune Expert en Délégation" (Young Experts in 
Delegations); LA= Local Agent; SNE= Seconded National Expert;  
Under the ceiling for external personnel from operational appropriations (former "BA" lines). 
Essentially  for  Structural  Funds,  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development  (EAFRD)  and  European 
Fisheries Fund (EFF). 

EN 

27 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
additional allocation which may be granted to the managing DG under the annual allocation procedure 
and in the light of budgetary constraints. 

Description of tasks to be carried out: 

Officials and temporary agents 

External personnel 

3.2.4.  Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework  

–  (cid:56) Proposal/initiative is compatible the current multiannual financial framework. 

–  (cid:133) Proposal/initiative will entail reprogramming of the relevant heading in the multiannual 

financial framework. 

Explain what reprogramming is required, specifying the budget lines concerned and the corresponding amounts. 

–  (cid:133) Proposal/initiative  requires  application  of  the  flexibility  instrument  or  revision  of  the 

multiannual financial framework24. 

Explain what is required, specifying the headings and budget lines concerned and the corresponding amounts. 

3.2.5.  Third-party contributions  

–  X The proposal/initiative does not provide for co-financing by third parties  

–  The proposal/initiative provides for the co-financing estimated below: 

Appropriations in EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

… enter as many years as 
necessary to show the duration 
of the impact (see point 1.6) 

Total 

Specify  the  co-financing 
body  

TOTAL appropriations 
cofinanced  

24 

See points 19 and 24 of the Interinstitutional Agreement. 

EN 

28 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3.3. 

Estimated impact on revenue  

–  (cid:56) Proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue. 

–  (cid:133) Proposal/initiative has the following financial impact: 

– 

– 

(cid:133) 

(cid:133) 

on own resources  

on miscellaneous revenue  

Appropriation
s available for 
the ongoing 
budget 
exercise 

Budget revenue line: 

Article …………. 

EUR million (to 3 decimal places) 

Impact of the proposal/initiative25 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

… insert as many columns as necessary 
in order to reflect the duration of the 
impact (see point 1.6) 

For miscellaneous assigned revenue, specify the budget expenditure line(s) affected. 

Specify the method for calculating the impact on revenue. 

25 

As regards traditional own resources (customs duties, sugar levies), the amounts indicated must be net amounts, i.e. 
gross amounts after deduction of 25% for collection costs. 

EN 

29 

   EN