COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENTAccompanying document to theREGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCILon the marketing and use of explosives precursors
Date: 2010-09-20
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: consumer protection, explosive, harmonisation of standards, leisure, marketing, product safety, technical standard

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 20.9.2010 
SEC(2010) 1040 final  

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying document to the 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL  

on the marketing and use of explosives precursors  

COM(2010) 473 
 SEC(2010) 1041 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

Introduction ______________________________________________________________4 

2.  Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties ___________________________4 

2.1.  Organisation and timing _____________________________________________________ 4 

2.2. 

Consultation process ________________________________________________________ 5 
2.2.1.  Standing Committee on Precursors ____________________________________________________ 5 
2.2.2.  Consultation with other stakeholders __________________________________________________ 6 

3.  Problem definition _________________________________________________________6 

3.1. 

Context: home made explosives as the preferred means for perpetrating attacks ______ 6 

3.2. 

The problem _______________________________________________________________ 7 
3.2.1.  Chemical precursors to explosives of highest concern _____________________________________ 8 
3.2.2. 
Insufficient security and awareness of the supply chain ____________________________________ 9 
3.2.3.  No EU level playing field __________________________________________________________ 10 

3.3. 

The baseline scenario _______________________________________________________ 13 

3.4.  Why the EU is better placed to take action: subsidiarity and proportionality principles 14 

4.  Policy Objectives__________________________________________________________15 

5.  Policy options and their Assessment __________________________________________16 

5.1. 

Definitions used ___________________________________________________________ 17 

5.2. 

Assessment of the policy options______________________________________________ 17 
5.2.1.  Assessment of policy option 0: Status Quo_____________________________________________ 18 
5.2.2.  Assessment of policy option 1: A total ban on sales of the substances to members of the general 
public, irrespective of concentration levels ____________________________________________________ 18 
5.2.3.  Assessment of policy option 2: A ban on sales of the substances in all concentrations and quantities 
over the internet_________________________________________________________________________ 19 
5.2.4.  Assessment of policy option 3: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a specific 
concentration limit_______________________________________________________________________ 19 
5.2.5.  Assessment of policy option 4a: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a 
specific concentration limit with a ban on sales to minors ________________________________________ 20 
5.2.6.  Assessment of policy option 4b: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a 
specific concentration limit with sales of higher concentrations through a system of licensing either the retail 
distribution or the use of the precursors ______________________________________________________ 20 
5.2.7.  Assessment of policy option 4c: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a 
specific concentration limit with introducing a system of reporting suspicious transactions ______________ 21 
5.2.8.  Assessment of policy option 4d: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a 
specific concentration limit with a scheme for labelling precursors with a code specifying that the purchase 
may be subject to registration and developing a system for recording the identity of the buyer (including 
internet sales), with records to be made available to competent law enforcement authorities _____________ 22 
5.2.9.  Assessment of policy option 5: Taking measures to enhance the surveillance of professional use, 
including sub-options such as promoting codes of conduct, education and training, raising staff awareness or 
addressing in particular medium / small users__________________________________________________ 23 

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6.  The preferred policy option _________________________________________________24 

6.1. 

The reasons for the regulatory response proposed _______________________________ 25 

6.2.  Main advantages of the preferred policy option _________________________________ 26 

6.3. 

Detailed assessment of the preferred policy option_______________________________ 27 
6.3.1.  Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives _____________________________________ 27 
6.3.2.  Assessment of economic impacts ____________________________________________________ 28 
6.3.3.  Assessment of fundamental rights impacts _____________________________________________ 32 
Article 8 Protection of personal data _______________________________________________________ 32 
Article 16: Freedom to conduct a business __________________________________________________ 32 
6.3.4.  Assessment of social impacts _______________________________________________________ 33 
6.3.5.  Assessment of environmental impacts: 0 ______________________________________________ 33 
6.3.6.  Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity___________________________________________ 34 

6.4. 

Assessment and consideration of proportionality ________________________________ 38 

7.  Monitoring and evaluation _________________________________________________39 

Annex 1: recommendations of the standing committee on precursors in its annual report for 
2008________________________________________________________________________40 

Annex 2: NOTE FROM THE LAST MEETING OF THE INTERSERVICE GROUP ON 
EXPLOSIVES ISSUES ________________________________________________________42 

Annex 3: List of private sector stakeholders in the standing committee on precursors ______43 

Annex 4: overview of recent terrorist attack and intended attacks with explosives in europe _45 

Annex 5: overview of the main household and other downstream use of precursors________51 

Annex 6: Overview of the main findings of the "mystery shopping" exercise conducted in the 
course of the preparatory study informing the impact assessment (per precursor) _________53 

Annex 7: Calculation of the loss to consumers, businesses and of the administrative costs  - 
methodology _________________________________________________________________54 

ANNEX 8: ESTIMATES AND BACKGROUND CALCULATIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC 
ASSESSMENT _______________________________________________________________65 

ANNEX 9: DETAILED ASSESSMENT TABLES FOR EACH POLICY OPTION: GENERAL 
ASSESSMENT _______________________________________________________________84 

ANNEX 10: GLOSSARY ______________________________________________________113 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives, approved by the Council on 
18 April 20081, called on the Commission to:  

"establish  a  Standing  Committee 
to  consider  measures  and  prepare 
recommendations concerning the regulation of explosives precursors available 
on the market taking into account their cost-benefit effects."  

Based  on  the  recommendations  of  the  Standing  Committee  (listed  in  Annex  1)  and  an 
extensive  impact  assessment  study,  the  Commission  intends  to  adopt  measures  to  deal 
with the marketing and use of explosives precursors in the 3rd quarter of 2010. 

The  overall  objectives  of  the  measures  are  to  establish  harmonised  measures  for 
restricting the marketing and use of certain substances, which are frequently used for the 
illicit manufacture of explosives, with a view to preventing their diversion and misuse.   

These  measures  are  intended  to  constitute  a  tangible  deliverable  within  the  "prevent" 
strand of the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy adopted by the JHA Council on 1 December 
2005.2 

2. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

2.1. 

Organisation and timing 

This impact assessment is based on an extensive "Preparatory Study to Inform an Impact 
Assessment  of  Potential  Legislative  and  Non-legislative  Restrictions  on  Chemical 
Precursors to Explosives" (Preparatory study), prepared by an external contractor, GHK. 
The  study  assessed  the  impacts  of  the  recommendations  made  by  the  Standing 
Committee on Precursors in its Annual Report 2008, as well as a number of other policy 
options.  The  work  on  the  study  lasted  for  9  months,  and  included  an  extensive 
consultation  with  the  Standing  Committee  on  Precursors.  The  reports  submitted  in  the 
course of the work on the study were also discussed regularly in the Interservice Group 
on explosives issues. The group's last meeting was 20 January (note at Annex 2).  The IA 
Board  scrutinised  the  IA  on  28  April  2010.  In  line  with  the  Board's  comments,  the 
following changes have been made to this IA: 

-  strengthening  the  explanation  of  how  the  preferred  policy  option  would  make  a 
contribution to the prevention of terrorist attacks; 

-  strengthening  of  methodological  explanations  (in  the  main  body  of  the  Impact 
Assessment as well as in the relevant annexes), including the explanation of why the EU 
Standard Cost model could not be used; 

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8109/09, ENFOPOL 69 
15708/03. 

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-  enhanced  explanation  of  the  expected  costs  to  public  authorities  and  businesses  and 
linking  these  to  the  relevant  annexes,  which  provide  background  statistical  data  and 
methodology;  

- enhanced justification of EU action;  

- strengthened justification for the selection of the preferred policy option;  

-  provision  of  more  information  about  stakeholder  views,  including  an  overview  of 
private sector stakeholders consulted;  

-  adding  a  table  of  contents,  glossary,  and  annexes  on  the  recommendations  of  the 
Standing Committee on Precursors.  

Adoption of the legislative instrument by the European Commission, most likely in the 
form of a Regulation on the basis of Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, is scheduled for the 3rd quarter of 2010.    

2.2. 

Consultation process 

2.2.1. 

Standing Committee on Precursors  

The  proposed  policy  builds  on  the  work  and  the  recommendations  of  the  Standing 
Committee  on  Precursors  (SCP).  This  Committee  is  an  ad  hoc  advisory  Committee 
composed  of  experts  from  the  EU  Member  State  authorities  and  representatives  of  the 
private  sector  (major  EU  level  chemical  and  fertiliser  producers  and  distributors 
associations, listed in Annex 3), and is chaired by the Commission. The objective of the 
Standing  Committee  is  to  make  recommendations  to  the  European  Commission  with 
regard to possible measures to enhance the security of precursors to explosives with the 
aim  of  preventing  the  fabrication  of  Improvised  Explosive  Devices  (IEDs)  serving 
criminal or terrorist purposes. The Committee started its work in January 2008.  

the 

recommendations  on  enhancing 

On  13  February  2009,  the  SCP  adopted  its  annual  report  for  2008  which  contained 
concrete 
security  of  precursors.  These 
recommendations served as a basis for the impact assessment study performed by GHK. 
The SCP was closely involved in the development of this study – its members (both from 
the public and the private sector) were consulted on a regular basis. Three SCP meetings 
were  devoted  to  discussing  the  outputs  in  the  course  of  the  work  on  the  study  –  on  8 
September 2009, 11 January 2010 and 10 March 2010.  
In  addition  to  this,  the  contractor  organised  a  business  survey3  and  two  stakeholder 
workshops on 3 and 4 December 2009 (with representatives of Member State authorities 
and with the private sector, respectively) to validate the assessment of the policy options 
proposed in the draft study.  

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The  businesses  for  the  survey  were  identified  through  European  and  national  industrial 
representative  bodies,  through  a  "mystery  shopping"  exercise  and  through  an  internet  search 
aimed at identifying businesses in the chemical sector in each Member State, for each precursor 
addressed  by  the  study.  The  responses  received  covered  various  supply  chain  stakeholders, 
ranging from producers and manufacturers to distributors and wholesalers of chemical substances 
and products. In addition to this, several specialist end sellers and retailers also responded. 

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The consultations in the course of the development of the Preparatory study also included 
consultation  of  some  SMEs,  which  would  be  most  affected  by  possible  measures  on 
precursors, in particular on hexamine.  

This broad consultation process, together with the results of the impact assessment study, 
form the basis for  this Impact  Assessment.  This consultation process resulted in a high 
level of consensus on the preferred policy option.  

2.2.2.  Consultation with other stakeholders  

Work on the issue of security of explosives has been developed by Directorate General 
for  Justice,  Freedom  and  Security  since  2006.  Over  that  period,  internal  consultations 
with  other  Commission  Services  have  focussed  on  those  directorates,  which  are  most 
directly  involved  with  this  issue  –  Directorate  General  for  Enterprise  and  Industry, 
because  of  its  responsibility  for  regulating  chemicals,  including  commercial  explosives 
and  pyrotechnics,  and  Directorate  General  for  Transport  and  Energy    (now  Directorate 
General  for  Mobility  and  Transport)  for  issues  related  to  transport  of  dangerous  goods. 
The  Secretariat  General  had  been  involved  in  the  interservice  meetings  as  well.  Other 
services  have  been  consulted  through  the  normal  interservice  procedures  (including 
Directorate General for Health and Consumers and Directorate General for Agriculture), 
and have not raised issue with this in the past.  

3. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

3.1. 

Context:  home  made  explosives  as  the  preferred  means  for  perpetrating 
attacks  

The  direct  and  indirect  social  and  economic  costs  of  a  terrorist  attack  are  tremendous, 
especially  when  such  attack  takes  place  in  a  major  centre  of  economic  activity  (e.g. 
financial  and  commercial  centres)  or  when  major  transport  nodes  (public  transport 
networks, airports, seaports, etc) are targeted. Incidents always involve substantial direct 
costs  to  handle  the  crisis,  including  first  responders,  specialists  to  manage  the  crisis, 
emergency medical care, forensic investigations, etc. However, the main costs associated 
with major incidents are usually: 

• 

the value of loss of life and temporary or persistent health conditions leading to lower 
employability and a lower quality of life; 

•  effects of the disruption of economic activities and destruction of infrastructure; 

•  social  disruption  and  an  overall  public  perception  of  being  unsafe,  that  also  has  an 

effect on overall public health and wellbeing. 

The  arbitrary  and  apparently  irrational  nature  of  terrorism  means  that  its  threat  and 
consequences are difficult to predict.  

In recent years, the EU and EEA countries have collectively experienced a high number 
of  terrorist  and  criminal  attacks  using  explosives,  homemade  explosives  (HMEs)  and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as an even higher number of attacks which 

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were prevented or attempts, which failed. The 2009 TE-SAT report4 prepared by Europol 
states that in 2008, a total of 515 failed, foiled or successfully perpetrated terrorist attacks 
were reported by just seven Member States. The report confirms that HMEs, fabricated 
from  chemical  precursors,  are  the  means  most  frequently  used  to  carry  out  attacks.  To 
illustrate  this  point  further,  Annex  4  provides  a  more  detailed  overview  of  some  of  the 
terrorist attacks and intended attacks in Europe since 2004. The table documents that this 
phenomenon is far from extinct, and affects a variety of Member States, not just a few. 
Although  frequently  detailed  indication  of  the  explosive  involved  is  not  provided  for 
reasons  of  confidentiality  or  unavailability,  it  is  clear  that  the  means  which  are  readily 
available, i.e. also home made explosives produced from chemical precursors, are most 
popular.  

The threats stemming from the misuse of the precursor chemicals used to produce these 
HMEs were also documented at the meetings of the SCP. Worldwide, the growing threat 
from  fundamentalist  terrorism,  focusing  on  causing  mass  casualties,  contributes  to  the 
increased  lethality  of  terrorist  incidents.  The  popularity  of  home  made  explosives  for 
carrying  out  terrorist  attacks  is,  besides  the  availability  of  chemical  precursors,  also 
underpinned by the wide availability of information on how to fabricate HMEs and IEDs 
on the internet.  

Whilst  several  legislative  and  non-legislative  measures  exist  at  international,  EU  and 
national  level,  these  are  either  not  specifically  focused  on  the  security  risks  associated 
with certain chemicals or do not cover the entire EU. This implies that precursors which 
may  be  restricted  or  controlled  in  one  country  can  be  easily  obtained  in  another.  In 
addition to the consequences for security, it means that there are market distortions which 
prevent a level EU playing field in this area. 

There  have  been  indications  that  terrorist  groups  take  the  different  approaches  in 
different  Member  States  into  consideration.  The  clearest  cases  have  related  to  ETA, 
which  has  hidden  large  quantities  of  precursors  to  explosives  outside  of  Spain,  in 
particular in France and Portugal. At the same time, there is no clear evidence to date that 
terrorists  have  changed  their  purchasing  behaviour  on  the  basis  of  differences  in 
regulation in the different Member States. The lack of such indications may also relate to 
the  fact  that  currently  these  chemicals  are  still  easily  available  across  most  of  the 
Member States. 

3.2. 

The problem   

Table 1 provides an overview of the main problems, the key issues and the drivers of the 
problem identified.  

Table 1: Synthesis of the main problems, key issues and drivers 

Main problems 
The  costs  to  society,  in  terms  of 
lives,  social  unrest  and 
human 
by 
material 

damages, 

caused 

Key issues and drivers of the problem 
Wide  availability  and  easy  access  by  the  general  public  to 
precursors on the market 
At present, a wide variety of precursors is easily available to the 

4  

EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, Europol, 2009.  

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attacks 

explosive 

terrorists  using  explosives  are 
substantial. 
Terrorists  and  other  criminals  have 
often  made  use  of  chemicals  to 
produce  homemade  explosives  and 
devices. 
improvised 
and  prevented 
Earlier 
attacks  show  that  so  far,  access  to 
such  precursors  has  been  relatively 
easy. 
The  chemical  market  in  the  EU  is 
large  and  diversified,  with  multiple 
end-users. Additionally some of the 
precursors have substantial markets 
in  their  own  right  (e.g.  Nitrate 
fertilizers and acids) 

general public. The internet is an easy channel to buy precursors 
too. 
Even  greater  quantities  of  precursors  can  be  obtained  by  or 
through commercial or otherwise legitimate end users 
High ‘potency’ of precursors 
The  concentration  levels  of  precursors  in  certain  products, 
available to the general public and to legitimate end users, are in 
many cases sufficient to produce an explosive. 
Insufficient security and awareness of the supply chain 
The supply chain for precursors, and in particular the last segment 
(e.g.  end  users),  is  overall  insufficiently  aware  of  the  risks  of 
terrorists and criminals attempting to obtain precursors. They are 
also insufficiently aware of their own vulnerabilities. 
Some  supply  chain  actors,  in  particular  at  the  end  of  the  chain, 
have  sold precursors  to  terrorists  or other  criminals  in  quantities 
which should have raised suspicion. 
In  some  cases,  this  is  due  to  insufficient  awareness  of  which 
transactions  in  precursors  are  suspicious  and  should  require 
increased  attention,  or  to  the  lack  of  a  ‘consequence’  or 
‘repercussion’,  when  selling  precursors  to  possibly  dubious 
parties without checking. 
No EU level playing field 
While  several  legislative  and  non-legislative  measures  exist  at 
international,  EU  and  national  level,  these  are  either  not 
specifically  focused  on  the  security  risks  associated  with  certain 
chemicals  or  do  not  cover  the  entire  EU.  This  means  that 
precursors  which  may  be  restricted  or  controlled  in  one  country 
can be easily obtained in another. 

3.2.1.  Chemical precursors to explosives of highest concern  

The Standing Committee on Precursors (SCP) discussed and confirmed the five priority 
groups of precursors shown in Table 2 as those requiring the most urgent attention.  

Table 2: SCP identified precursor groups 

Precursor group 

Nitrates 
fertilizers 

/  Nitrogenous 

Hydrogen  peroxide  and 
acetone 

Nitro-methane 
hexamine 

and 

Chemical 
Ammonium nitrate 
Potassium nitrate 
Sodium nitrate 
Calcium nitrate 

Hydrogen peroxide 
Acetone (propanone) 
Nitromethane 
Hexamine 
(methenamine) 

Strong acids 

Nitric acid 

Main associated use 

Ammonium  nitrate  (mixed  with  a  fuel  e.g. 
diesel  oil  (ANFO)  or  sugar  (ANIS)  is  one  of 
the  most  common  ingredients  in  large  scale 
IEDs.  Other  nitrates  can  also  be  used  as 
oxidiser ingredients in IEDs. 
Used by various terrorist groupings to produce 
Triacetone triperoxide (TATP). 

Nitromethane: Used by ETA and possibly 
other groupings. Explosive in combination 
with ammonium nitrate or nitric acid. 
Hexamine:  Used  to  produce  explosives  in 
combination with hydrogen peroxide. 
Nitric  acid  is  used  in  the  synthesis  of  HME 

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Precursor group 

Chemical 

Main associated use 

Chlorates and perchlorates 

Hydrochloric acid 
Sulphuric acid 
Sodium chlorate 
Sodium perchlorate 
Potassium chlorate 
Potassium perchlorate 

such as urea nitrate. 

Used  as  oxidisers  /  oxygen  generators  to 
produce HMEs. A mixture of chlorates can be 
an HME in itself without need for a detonator 
/  booster.  Chlorates  can  also  serve  as  a 
booster. 

In many investigated cases, terrorists obtained these chemicals legally or at least without 
having to resort to any form of physical theft (some form of identity theft or the use of a 
fake identity may have occurred). The chemical market in the EU is large and diversified, 
with multiple end-users using the precursors concerned. While they are mostly consumed 
by  industry,  household  use  of  the  chemicals  is,  in  most  cases,  also  wide  and  varied. 
Annex 5 provides an overview of the main household and other downstream use of the 
precursors discussed in this Impact Assessment.  

The  concentration  levels  of  precursors  in  certain  products  currently  available  to  the 
general  public  and  to  legitimate  end  users  are  in  many  cases  sufficient  to  produce  an 
explosive.  There  is  an  overall  concern  that the  concentration  levels  of  many  precursors 
available  to  the  general  public  for  household  use  are  high,  even  when  a  lower 
concentration level might be adequate for the same purposes. This applies in particular to 
hydrogen  peroxide,  liquid  nitromethane,  and  most  strong  acids.  Research  undertaken 
(including "mystery shopping" conducted in eight EU Member States5) confirms that it is 
relatively easy to purchase the chemicals themselves or mixtures containing them in high 
concentration levels. These levels are in many cases sufficient to produce an HME with a 
relatively low quantity of the chemical. 

The "mystery shopping" exercise also demonstrated that in some Member States, it was 
possible  to  buy  potent  chemicals  in  a  quantity  which  is  sufficient  to  build  an  HME 
without  any  questions  asked,  while  in  other  Member  States,  such  products  are  not 
available to the general public. It is important to take into account that persons intending 
to  produce  an  HME  can  easily  cross  the  border  when  they  encounter  difficulties  in 
obtaining certain chemicals  in  one  country. Annex  6  provides  an  overview  of  the  main 
findings of the "mystery shopping" exercise per precursor. 

3.2.2. 

Insufficient security and awareness of the supply chain  

The  supply  chain  for  precursors,  and  in  particular  its  last  segment  (i.e.  downstream 
stakeholders such as retailers and end users), is overall insufficiently aware of the risks of 
terrorists  and  criminals  attempting  to  obtain  precursors.  In  some  cases,  this  is  due  to 
insufficient  awareness  of  which  transactions  in  precursors  are  suspicious  and  should 
require increased attention. In other cases, the reasons relate to opportunistic sales or to a 
lack of a consequence or repercussion when selling precursors to possibly dubious parties 
without checking.  

Especially  at  the  end  of  the  supply  chain,  retailers  and  other  businesses  have  sold 

5  

Denmark, Belgium, France, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Romania and the UK. 

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precursors  to  terrorists  or  other  criminals  in  quantities  which  should  have  raised 
suspicion.  Examples  include  the  21/7  (failed)  London  bombings,  with  400  litres  of 
peroxide purchased from 3-4 retailers, and the discovery of 600 kg of ammonium nitrate 
fertiliser  in  a  public  self-storage  facility,  purchased  by  an  individual  from  a  single 
agricultural  supplier.  Another  case  worth  mentioning  is  the  Sauerland  group,  which 
bought  huge  quantities  of  hydrogen  peroxide  of  35%  (more  than  750  litres  were 
discovered)  after  they  realised  that  higher  concentrations  could  only  be  ordered  with  a 
specific  permit.  The  results  from  the  "mystery  shopping"  confirmed  relatively  low 
awareness  levels  of  some  of  the  retailers  and  other  downstream  sellers  that  were 
approached.  At  least  two  businesses  actually  suggested  an  "alternative"  when  the 
potential buyer turned out not to belong to a registered company (e.g. by suggesting  to 
purchase the products through a third, professional party). Others actively encouraged the 
purchases of very high quantities by offering discounts. 

Only a few countries have recording and reporting mechanisms in place for identifying 
and notifying suspicious transactions of precursors and in most cases, these notification 
mechanisms  are  part  of  voluntary  agreements  and  initiatives  set  up  by  industry  bodies. 
This  means  that  there  are  no  consequences  for  non-compliance.  Another  limitation  of 
many  existing  notification/reporting  mechanisms  is  that  public  authorities  often  fail  to 
provide  adequate  feedback  to  those  businesses  who  notified  them.  Finally,  where 
legislation or voluntary measures are in place, particularly retailers and other downstream 
supply chain stakeholders are often not aware of such restrictions, or at least not aware of 
their  "raison  d’être",  considering  them  just  another  administrative  burden.  Smaller 
businesses often do not have sufficient means to fully comply with voluntary measures, 
as these require some investment (e.g. nominating a security officer, attending training, 
etc). High competition in a period of tremendous financial uncertainty may also lead to 
some  smaller  players  lowering  their  security  standards  in  order  to  keep  up  their  sales 
figures. 

3.2.3.  No EU level playing field  

While  some  legislative  and  non-legislative  (voluntary)  measures  on  explosives  and 
chemicals  exist  at  international,  EU  and  national  level,  these  are  either  not  specifically 
focused on reducing the danger of misuse of these chemicals for the production of home 
made explosives, do not cover the most high risk chemicals comprehensively or do not 
cover the entire EU. This implies that precursors which may be restricted or controlled in 
one country can be easily obtained in another. 

Measures adopted at the international level mainly focus on the security of explosives or 
chemicals  used  for  weapons  or  drugs.  Examples  include  the  Convention  on  the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction’ and The United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs’. 
Voluntary  programmes  set  up  at  international  level  and  dealing  with  the  issue  of 
chemicals include the Responsible Care® programme. 

At EU level, legislative and non-legislative measures primarily focus on chemical safety, 
explosives  for  civilian  use,  pyrotechnics,  fertilisers  and  drug  precursors.  Examples 

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include REACH6, the fertiliser regulations7, explosives and pyrotechnics directives8 and 
the drug precursors regulations9. EU non-legislative measures include the ‘Guidance for 
safe and secure storage of fertilisers on farms’ of the European Fertiliser Manufacturers 
Association (EFMA).   

At  national  level,  a  detailed  assessment  of  existing  measures  in  the  impact  assessment 
study10 has shown that Member States have various approaches to the issue of precursors 
and  their  security.  While  some  Member  States  have  encouraged  the  development  of 
various legislative and/or voluntary measures (e.g. Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
the UK, Spain), other Member States have set up very few or no measures to deal with 
the security of precursors (e.g. Slovenia, Austria, the Czech Republic). There is hence a 
real risk that terrorists and criminals may seek to obtain access to precursors in countries 
which have relatively lower security standards.  

This is a consideration based on logical reasoning and on instances of seizures of bomb-
making materials in hide-outs, for example in Spain, Portugal and France. However, in 
the  current  system,  it  is  practically  impossible  to  credibly  trace  the  origin  of  these 
materials.  Where  such  information  does  exist,  as  a  result  of  criminal  investigations,  it 
was  not  available  for  reasons  of  confidentiality.  What  the  seizures  and  the  terrorist 
incidents  listed  in  Annex  4  have  shown,  though,  is  that  it  is  possible  to  obtain  these 
materials, likely at a number of sellers, without raising suspicion or leaving records of the 
transaction.    

The measures set up by Member States to address the security of precursors to explosives 
vary in nature, coverage and purpose. The main differences are: 

•  Nature or type of instruments: while some countries mainly rely on "soft" measures 
such as voluntary agreements, industry-backed guidelines and codes of conduct (e.g. 
the Netherlands, the UK), other Member States (e.g. Germany Denmark, Ireland) have 
taken  a  more  regulatory  approach.  Nevertheless,  even  in  Member  States  with  a 
regulatory  framework,  existing  legislative  measures  are  often  backed  up  and 
complemented by voluntary measures; 

•  Coverage  of  measures:  while  some  countries  have  adopted  far-reaching  measures 
covering  a  wide  array  of  precursors  of  interest,  other  Member  States  have  instead 
developed measures focusing on a specific group of chemical substances;  

•  Purpose  of  measures:  the  purpose  of  existing  measures  varies  significantly.  While 
existing measures in some Member States specifically aim at restricting or controlling 
access  of  the  general  public  to  the  precursors  of  interest,  other  Member  States  have 

6  
7  

8  
9  
10  

Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006. 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 552/2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, Regulation 
(EC) No 2003/2003 and Decision 1348/2008/EC, amending Council Directive 76/769/EEC 
Directive 93/15/EEC, Directive 2008/43/EC and Directive 2007/23/EC. 
Regulation (EC) 273/2004, Regulation (EC) 111/2005 and Regulation (EC) 1277/2005. 
A detailed overview of these  is provided in Annex 5 and 6 to the Preparatory Study to Inform an 
Impact  Assessment  of  Potential  Legislative  and  Non-legislative  Restrictions  on  Chemical 
Precursors  to  Explosives.  Given  their  size,  it  was  not  possible  to  include  them  into  this  Impact 
Assessment, which only contains the main conclusions from these Annexes.  

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focused  on  increasing  the  security  of  precursors  within  the  wider  supply  chain  (e.g. 
secure handling, storage, transport). 

Several types of non-legislative measures have been identified, including: 

•  Training  measures  for  staff,  law  enforcement  personnel  and  first  responders.  These 
include the UK ‘Know your chemical’ booklet, a similar booklet launched in 2008 in 
Sweden and a training programme targeting police officers in Germany; 

•  Awareness  raising  campaigns  targeting  supply  chain  actors  and  notably  retailers, 
including the UK’s Self-storage initiative and the UK Code of Conduct on Chemical 
Trade Controls; 

•  Notification  of  suspicious  transactions  mechanisms  for  supply  chain  operators, 

notably retailers. These include the UK "Know your customer" campaign; 

•  National plans, strategies and other measures to map precursors of interest, including 
the Danish Anti-Terrorism Action Plan adopted in 2005 and the Dutch "Handbook on 
Precursors for Home-made Explosives"; 

•  Research  into  precursors  carried  out  by  Member  States  (e.g.  Denmark,  France  and 

Sweden); 

•  Safety measures also used with a security purpose: as confirmed by several Member 
States,  existing  safety  legislation  and  voluntary initiatives, while targeting the safety 
of consumers and supply chain operators, also take into account security concerns. In 
the  German  law  on  dangerous  explosive  substances  for  example,  safety  aspects  are 
closely linked to security considerations. 

Existing national measures covering specific precursors have been identified and mapped 
for  a  certain  number  of  Member  States:  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  the 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  

Overall, precursor-specific measures cover: 

•  Measures  to  restrict  access  by  the  general  public  (e.g.  bans  or  concentration  levels): 
five Member States (e.g. Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland) have 
adopted legislation or voluntary agreements to implement this type of measures; 

•  Notification of suspicious transactions: in several Member States, voluntary measures 
require the notification of suspicious activities/customers to relevant authorities (e.g. 
the Netherlands, the UK);  

•  Measures  aiming  at  enhancing  the  security  within  supply  chain  operators:  the 
measures  adopted  by  some  Member  States  (e.g.  Denmark,  Spain,  the  UK)  are  both 
legislative and voluntary. They focus for example on storage, handling and transport 
security;  

•  Awareness campaigns: voluntary measures have been developed by several countries 

(e.g. Denmark, the UK). Some have a clear focus on end-user professionals; 

•  Training programmes for police officers in Germany (planned – see generic measures 

above);  

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•  Security related research: specific research into groups of precursors has been carried 

out by France, Denmark, Sweden and the UK.  

The experience of these Member States with these measures, which are to a large extent, 
also the measures proposed in the preferred policy options, has been positive according 
to  the  research  and  interviews  conducted  for  the  Preparatory  study  and  presentations 
made in the Standing Committee on Precursors.  

Third countries such as the US and Canada have also developed measures dealing with 
the  security  of  chemicals.  These  measures  range  from  policy  and  legislative  measures, 
including  strategies,  priority  lists  and  specific  security  programmes,  to  "soft"  measures 
such as awareness programmes and trainings. 

3.3. 

The baseline scenario    

Under  the  status  quo,  there  would  continue  to  be  no  coherent  EU  approach  towards 
preventing  the  misuse  of  chemical  precursors  to  fabricate  home  made  explosives  for 
terrorist purposes.  

It  is  likely  that  terrorist  attacks  would  continue,  possibly  also  targeting  Member  States 
that so far have little experience with such incidents. Terrorists will continue to make use 
of  chemicals  to  produce  home  made  explosives  and  improvised  explosive  devices.  The 
use  of  chemicals  to  produce  such  devices  may  further  increase,  especially  when 
considering that legal or illicit access to civil explosives is likely to become even further 
restricted and controlled.  

In as far as one can speak of a trend, it is likely that the use of chemicals to produce such 
devices  may  further  increase,  especially  when  considering  that  legal  or  illicit  access  to 
civil explosives is likely to become even further restricted and controlled. As mentioned 
earlier,  in  the  past  few  years  a  number  of  attacks  were  carried  out,  failed  or  were 
prevented from happening.  

In  the  current  scenario,  the  general  public  will  continue  to  have  access  to  precursors, 
even  in  high  concentrations.  On  the  other  hand,  several  Member  States  have  indicated 
their intentions to put measures in place to (further) restrict or control access to chemicals 
which can be used to fabricate HMEs. In a number of countries access will therefore be 
reduced.  New  measures  are  likely  to  specifically  target  products  containing  high 
concentrations  of  the  substances.  The  new  measures  may  thus  to  some  extent  have  a 
deterrent  effect,  by  making  it  more  difficult  to  purchase  certain  chemicals.  In  addition, 
further  voluntary  action  by  industry,  both  at  national  and  international  level,  may  also 
contribute to reducing the risk of misuse of the chemicals of concern. 

Similarly,  in  the  current  scenario,  the  lack  of  awareness  and  insufficient  security  in 
particular at the level of the downstream supply chain will continue to exist. Retailers and 
other supply chain actors, such as wholesalers, specialist end user sellers, etc., may still 
sell  to  persons  purchasing  with  malicious  intent.  Again,  the  fact  that  several  Member 
States  (e.g.  Spain,  Poland)  are  intending  to  develop  new  legislative  or  non-legislative 
measures  will  contribute  to  improved  awareness  and  better  security  standards  in  a 
number of countries. Voluntary industrial action will also have some positive effect. 

It is equally important to take into account that further developments in EU policy,  for 
example as part of the Action Plan on the Security of Explosives and the recently adopted 

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EU Action Plan to strengthen Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in 
the  European  Union  -  both  part  of  the  wider  EU  strategy  to  combat  terrorism  -  will 
certainly have an impact on preventing, detecting and responding to terrorist activity. 

However,  without  creating  an  EU  level  playing  field  in  terms  of  specific  measures  to 
control and restrict access to precursors, there is a great risk that terrorists and criminals 
will simply seek to obtain precursors maliciously in those countries in which the security 
standards are lower. In addition, the current situation and the continuation of the current 
trends  may  have  adverse  effects  on  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  Internal  Market  as  a 
result of the different national measures.  

3.4.  Why the EU is better placed to take action: subsidiarity and proportionality 

principles 

The current differences among the regimes applied to chemical precursors to explosives 
not only have a negative effect on security but also distort the functioning of the Internal 
Market.  They  negatively  affect  the  cross-border  trade  and  other  economic  activities  of 
producers and other supply chain stakeholders active in more than one country. Action at 
EU  level  would  help  eliminate  these  negative  effects.  The  Member  States  are 
increasingly  accepting  the  need  for  EU  action  to  support  their  efforts  in  combating 
terrorism,  as  especially  in  an  area  without  borders  this  has  become  a  problem  which 
requires  EU-wide  action.  With  regard  to  the  security  of  explosives  and  explosive 
substances in particular, with the approval of the Action Plan on Enhancing the Security 
of Explosives by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in April 2008, the Member States 
have formally signed up to the implementation of a package of actions. These include as 
a  priority  the  establishment  of  the  SCP  to  identify  "the  risks  associated  with  various 
precursors  and  recommending  appropriate  actions  to  the  Commission".  Recent  attacks 
and failed or prevented attacks have shown that terrorism is going beyond affecting the 
Member  States  which  have  traditionally  suffered  from  terrorist  attacks  (e.g.,  Spain,  the 
UK,  France)  and  is  spreading  to  other  EU  countries.  The  nature  of  these  incidents  or 
prevented incidents also shows that terrorists may prepare in one country for an attack in 
another.  

The EU can only be as secure as its weakest link. In this sense, activities at EU level and 
an EU co-ordinated approach are needed and beneficial to all relevant stakeholders. The 
subsidiarity  principle  is  thus  satisfied  as  the  goals  to  be  achieved  through  measures  on 
explosives  precursors  cannot  be  achieved  by  any  single  EU  Member  State,  and  must 
therefore be addressed at EU level.  

The  Member  States,  by  way  of  their  representatives  in  the  Standing  Committee  on 
Precursors, have indicated that they prefer an EU approach to this issue in order to create 
a  level  playing  field.  This  approach  is  also  supported  by  the  EU  associations  of  the 
chemical industry, which have been extensively consulted in the context of the SCP work 
and the work on the Impact Assessment. Some Member States indicated that they have 
not yet taken action because they are waiting for the EU initiative. 
The  Stockholm  Programme,  adopted  by  the  European  Council  in  December  200911, 

11 The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens, 17024/09.   

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indicates that a legislative framework to address the dangers associated with precursors 
should be developed. 

Moreover,  EU  regulation  also  has  an  Internal  Market  rationale,  whereby  the  current 
situation, which imposes different regulatory regimes on chemical industry,  distorts the 
market  and  imposes  additional  costs  of  adjustment  on  the  private  sector.  The  chemical 
industry and retail support the level-playing field argument. For the chemical industry, a 
divergence of applicable measures would mean that they would have to produce different 
concentration levels of the different substances for different parts of the EU market. For 
traders,  different  security  measures  and  standards  also  pose  certain  barriers.  It  can  be 
assumed that without an EU approach, the divergence among the Member States in the 
regulation of this area would grow, and these detrimental effects on the Internal Market 
would be growing too.  

In these circumstances EU regulation on the marketing and use of explosives precursors 
is  proportionate.  The  EU  right  to  act  in  this  area  is  stipulated  by  the  Treaty  of  the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union  which  in  Article  4,  paragraph  2  states  that  shared 
competence  between  the  Union  and  the  Member  States  applies  with  regard  to  "(b) 
internal  market"  and  "(j)  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice".  The  legal  basis  for 
regulating the marketing and use of explosives precursors is likely to be found mainly in 
the Internal Market article (Article 114 TFEU). 

4. 

POLICY OBJECTIVES 

As  a  reflection  of  the  problems  identified,  the  policy  objectives  deriving  from  the 
problem definition are presented in Table 3 below. 

Table 3: General, specific and operational objectives 

General 
objectives 

To reduce the 
number and 
potency of terrorist 
and other criminal 
incidents in the EU 
using explosives, 
by deterring 
terrorists and other 
criminals from 
using precursors to 
building explosives 
and inhibiting their 
access to 
precursors. 

Specific objectives 

Operational objectives 

1.1 To restrict access to certain 
precursors by the general public 

1.2 To reduce the reliability and potency 
of ‘home made’ explosives or 
components manufactured for malicious 
or criminal purposes 

1.3 To enhance the security and 
awareness of the entire supply chain of 
precursors 

1.1.1 To reduce the availability of 
certain precursors on the EU 
consumer market to the general 
public 
1.1.2 To reduce certain types of 
supply channels / ways of access to 
precursors 
1.2.1 To develop suitable additives 
and promote the use of these 
additives to prevent their use in 
explosives 
1.2.2 To reduce concentrations of 
certain precursors available to the 
general public 
1.3.1 To increase control and 
surveillance over transactions and 
sales of certain precursors 
1.3.2 To increase control and 
surveillance over transport, 
distribution, import / export, etc 

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1.3.3 To raise the awareness of 
supply chain actors on the risks in 
general and on suspicious 
transactions. 

1.4.1 To establish common measures 
at EU / international level 

1.4 To prevent terrorists and other 
criminals from making use of lower 
control levels and fewer restrictions on 
chemicals in some countries. 

The  policy  objectives  are  fully  in  line  with  the  EU  counter-terrorism  strategy,  with  the 
EU  Action  Plan  on  Enhancing  the  Security  of  Explosives  and  with  the  Stockholm 
programme12,  which  stipulates  that  a  "legislative  framework  to  address  the  dangers 
associated with precursors should be developed".  

5. 

POLICY OPTIONS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT 

The policy options considered are presented in Table 4. Policy options 0 – 4 only concern 
sales  to  the  general  public  (definitions  used  are  explained  in  section  5.1),  and  will 
therefore not directly affect any professional use. Those who use the identified precursors 
professionally may be  indirectly  affected, because sometimes they make  use of general 
retail  channels,  which  under  the  policy  options  may  become  the  subject  of  certain 
restrictions. Only policy option 5 covers a wider spectrum of supply chain stakeholders. 

Table 4: Overview of policy options 

Policy  option  0 
Status Quo 

- 

Policy option 1  

Policy option 2 

Policy option 3 

Policy option 4 
      Policy option 4a 
      Policy option 4b 

      Policy option 4c 
      Policy option 4d 

No  action.  This  implies  that  no  changes  are  made  to  the 
current situation. All actions included are already underway 
or  are  planned  to  happen  in  the  absence  of  the  Policy 
options.  The  baseline  is  a  combination  of  existing  policies, 
legislative  acquis,  voluntary  measures  and  other  relevant 
activity. 
A  total  ban  on  sales  of  the  substances  to  members  of  the 
general public, irrespective of concentration levels. 
A  ban  on  sales  of  the  substances  in  all  concentrations  and 
quantities over the internet. 
A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above 
a specific concentration level.  
Option 3 plus additional measures: 
A ban on sales to minors. 
Sales  of  the  substances  in  higher  concentrations  than  those 
allowed under option 3 to the general public through a trader 
or consumer licensing system. 
Introducing a system of reporting suspicious transactions. 
A  scheme  for  labelling  precursors  with  a  code  specifying 

12  

17024/09 

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Policy option 5 

that the purchase may be subject to registration, developing 
a  system  for  recording  the  identity  of  the  buyer  (including 
internet  sales).  Records  should  be  made  available  to 
competent law enforcement authorities. 
Taking  measures  to  enhance  the  surveillance  of  legitimate 
and professional use, including sub-options such as: 
-  Promoting Codes of conduct 
-  Education and training 
-  Raising staff awareness 
-  Addressing in particular medium / small users 

5.1. 

Definitions used  

The following definitions apply to the policy options under assessment.  

•  For  the  choice  of  chemicals  and  chemical  products  to  be  covered  by  the  policy 
options,  it  is  emphasised  that  these  only  include  substances  and  mixtures  of  the 
chemicals and not articles as defined in the REACH regulation ((EC) No 1907/2006): 

"Article:  means  an  object  which  during  production  is  given  a  special  shape, 
surface or design which determines its function to a greater degree than does its 
chemical composition." 

The  above  also  implies  that  pyrotechnic  articles  under  the  scope  of  Directive 
2007/23/EC on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles and SOLAS (Safety 
Of Life At Sea) articles covered by Directive 96/98/EC on marine equipment are not 
included in the policy options. 

•  General  public:  Households/consumers  who  buy  chemicals  for  household  purposes 
(e.g. cleaning, gardening,  beauty care) or hobby activities. In  line with  the proposed 
Consumer  Rights  Directive13,  the  definition  of  consumer  could  be  used:  any  natural 
person who, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession. 

5.2. 

Assessment of the policy options 

The assessment of the impacts of policy options was performed in two steps. They were 
assessed in general terms against the following criteria:  

•  The  effects  of  the  policy  option  on  the  achievement  of  the  specific  policy 

objectives;  

•  The  economic,  social  and  environmental  impacts  of  the  policy  option,  including 
potential  effects  on  fundamental  rights.  Full  details  on  sources,  estimates  and 
calculations made are included in Annex 4; 

•  Aspects  of  feasibility  and  subsidiarity,  including  the  EU  added  value  and 

rationale;  

13 

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/Directive_final_EN.pdf 

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•  Key 

risks,  uncertainties,  political  and 

technical 

feasibility  and  necessary 

preconditions;  

•  The need for changes in Community legislation and; 

• 

Issues raised by stakeholders. 

Detailed  assessment  tables  for  each  policy  option  are  presented  in  Annex  9.  The 
Preparatory  study  also  contains  detailed  assessment  tables  for  each  option  and  each 
precursor,  which  have  not  been  presented  in  this  Impact  Assessment  but  which  are 
available.   

An  assessment  against  the  set  of  criteria  was  performed  for  each  individual  precursor 
group. This was considered necessary given the different nature, use and market structure 
of the individual chemical substances to be covered by the policy options. The specific 
character of the chemicals of concern in the remaining relevant policy options is taken on 
board in the general assessment tables.14  

For  the  purpose  of  clarity  and  focus,  the  following  subsections  will  only  include  the 
main  conclusions  of  the  assessment  of  all  policy  options,  including  the  options, 
which were discarded at an early stage. The assessment of the preferred policy option, 
composed  of  some  of  these  individual  options,  is  presented  separately  and  in  full  in 
section 6.2. The associated costs and the calculation of economic impacts can be found in 
Annex  7  for  the  methodology  of  the  calculation  of  costs  to  consumers,  businesses  and 
administrations,  and  Annex  8,  containing  the  background  statistical  data  for  the 
assessment of these costs. 

5.2.1.  Assessment of policy option 0: Status Quo  

The policy option implies no changes to the current situation. Under the Status Quo, the 
risk  of  terrorist  attacks  using  IEDs/HMEs  will  continue  to  exist,  with  the  likelihood  of 
such  incidents  increasing  in  frequency  and/or  lethality.  The  level  of  awareness  and 
security  of  the  chemical  supply  chain  may  slightly  increase  as  a  result  of  current  and 
upcoming international, EU and national measures, but terrorists would continue to make 
use  of  lower  restrictions  and  control  standards  in  other  countries.  The  Status  Quo  will 
have  no  economic  effects  other  than  those  already  occurring.  Social  effects  could  be 
negative,  as  a  result  of  casualties  caused  by  terrorist  incidents  and  an  increased 
perception  of  insecurity.  The  Status  Quo  was  not  supported  by  the  stakeholders 
consulted as part of the study. In fact, most considered that there was a strong rationale 
for action at EU level and agreed on the need to control and restrict access to precursors. 

5.2.2.  Assessment of policy option 1: A total ban on sales of the substances to members 

of the general public, irrespective of concentration levels 

This policy option would imply that all selected precursors, either in their pure form or in 
a mixture, would no longer be available to the general public (i.e. consumers, household 
users) and  their possession would also  be forbidden.  Manufacturing of certain  products 

14  

A  more  detailed  assessment  of  the  different  options  for  each  of  the  separate  precursors  can  be 
found in the Preparatory study. 

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for  the  consumer  market  and  sales  of  the  substances  to  the  general  public  would  no 
longer  be  allowed.  The  policy  option  has  the  highest  rating  on  achieving  the  policy 
objectives,  but  its  feasibility  and  acceptability  are  among  the  lowest  levels,  also 
because  of  its  disproportionate  negative  effects  on  consumers  and  businesses.  In 
addition, some negative social effects and potential tension with fundamental rights have 
been identified; it is questionable, in particular, whether a total ban on sales to members 
of 
the  principle  of 
proportionality.  

the  general  public  could  be  considered  compatible  with 

5.2.3.  Assessment  of  policy  option  2:  A  ban  on  sales  of  the  substances  in  all 

concentrations and quantities over the internet 

The  policy  option  would  ban  all  sales  to  the  general  public  made  over  the  internet. 
Internet  sales  are  relatively  common  for  some  chemical  products  (e.g.  fertilisers, 
hydrogen  peroxide,  acetone,  hexamine  fuel  tablets,  etc).  Overall  e-commerce  statistics 
show  that  it  is  a  sales  channel  which  is  increasing  in  volume  every  year.  However, 
regarding the chemicals concerned, only about 0.5% of the goods in question is sold to 
the general public online. This share would be banned under this policy option.  

The assessment  has shown  that  banning the sales of the  precursor groups via one  sales 
channel only does not strongly contribute to the achievement of the policy objectives, as 
the products would still be available through other sales channels and from third country 
internet sellers. The implementation of this policy option may face difficulties in terms of 
feasibility  for  the  wide  range  of  products  (given  it  applies  to  all  concentrations).  This 
option, in its own right, was discarded.  

5.2.4.  Assessment  of  policy  option  3:  A  ban  on  sales  to  the  general  public  if  the 

substance is above a specific concentration limit  

Under this policy option the general public would no longer have access to the selected 
precursors  (or  mixtures  containing  these  precursors)  above  a  pre-defined  concentration 
level  (including  sales  via  the  internet).  For  the  purpose  of  this  impact  assessment,  the 
following concentration levels were used as a starting point:  ammonium nitrate: 16% N 
(mass);  alkali  nitrates:  8%N  (mass);  hydrogen  peroxide:  12%  (volume);  acetone:  no 
threshold;  nitromethane:  30%  (volume);  hexamine:  no  threshold;  nitric  acid:  30% 
(volume); sulphuric acid: 50% (volume); hydrochloric acid: 20% (volume); chlorates and 
perchlorates: 40% (mass)15.  

The  technical  and  political  feasibility  of  this  policy  option  is  overall  high,  while  it 
achieves a fairly good rating with regard to the achievement of the policy objectives. It 
may  be  less  feasible  for  some  selected  precursors,  which  are  only  effective  in  high 
concentrations (e.g. hexamine) or which are widely used in high concentrations in some 
popular  products  (e.g.  hydrogen  peroxide  in  hair-dyeing  products).  Their  ban  would 
possibly cause a high level of inconvenience among the public.   

15  

X% by mass refers to the relation of the weight of the precursor substances to the other substances 
in the mixture (at least on the earth's surface). X% by volume is easier to measure when mixing 
liquid.  

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In terms of economic impacts, the ban would result in small overall drop in the market of 
chemicals as non-professional use only accounts for about 1-5% of total EU consumption 
for the chemicals concerned. The value of chemicals sold to the general public above the 
thresholds (for all precursors assessed) is estimated at about €450-1,150 million. The loss 
of profit overall from this policy option is estimated to be €130-330 million per annum 
for the whole of the chemical sector within the EU.  

More  significant  consequences  might  be  experienced  by  manufacturers  of  consumer 
products  and  SMEs.  A  very  small  number  of  producers  for  whose  products  reduced 
concentration  levels  are  not  a  feasible  option  might  leave  the  market  or  would  have  to 
diversify.  Indirectly,  certain  manufactured  products  which  use  the  restricted  products 
(e.g.  model  steam  engines  using  hexamine  fuel  tablets)  will  be  rendered  useless. 
However,  the  overall  retail  sales  of  products  to  general  public  will  not  change 
considerably for most consumer products, as either alternatives will replace the restricted 
products,  or  more  of  diluted  chemicals  will  be  bought  to  compensate  for  lower 
concentration levels.  

This option would impose additional administrative costs for business (estimated in the 
order of €6-16 million euro per annum, and a one-off cost of €40-63 million), and for the 
national authorities.  

5.2.5.  Assessment  of  policy  option  4a:  A  ban  on  sales  to  the  general  public  if  the 

substance is above a specific concentration limit with a ban on sales to minors 

Policy option 4a includes the measures proposed in Policy option 3 (i.e. the introduction 
of threshold concentration levels) and proposes a ban on sales to minors. The results of 
the  assessment  of  this  option  indicated  negligible  added-value  in  achieving  the  policy 
objectives and the fight against terrorism. Its main benefit is increased safety for minors 
(and possibly other individuals). This is why the option was discarded.  

5.2.6.  Assessment  of  policy  option  4b:  A  ban  on  sales  to  the  general  public  if  the 
substance  is  above  a  specific  concentration  limit  with  sales  of  higher 
concentrations through a system of licensing either the retail distribution or the 
use of the precursors 

Policy  option  4b  includes  the  measures  proposed  as  part  of  policy  option  3  (i.e.  the 
introduction  of  threshold  concentration  levels  for  sales  to  the  general  public)  and 
proposes that sales of higher concentrations are either made through i) a licensing system 
of retailers or ii)  licensing consumers for legitimate use.  

i) With a licensing system for retailers, retailers would need to apply for a license, which 
would involve the checking of their ‘reliability’ and an obligation to record all sales of 
higher concentrations. A similar system is currently in place in Germany as a part of the 
Chemical Ordinance for nine chemical substances.  

ii)  With  a  licensing  system  for  consumers,  all  retailers  could  still  sell  higher 
concentrations,  but  consumers  would  need  to  apply  for  a  license  with  the  competent 
authorities (the police or local authorities) to purchase these products. A similar system is 
in  place  in  Denmark  and  Ireland.  The  license  provided  could  state  the  use  and  the 
quantity  required,  and  could  have  a  limited  duration.  Any  possession  of  the  respective 

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chemical  substance  or  a  mixture  exceeding  the  stated  concentration  without  a  license 
would be illegal. 

The policy option overall received higher scores than policy option 3, given that it still 
provides  access  to  the  entire  spectrum  of  chemical  substances  and  products,  however, 
these sales (above the concentration thresholds) would occur in a controlled environment.  
The  loss  of  profit  for  businesses  will  be  lower  than  under  policy  option  3,  and  is 
estimated at €65-155 million per annum. This op tion would in particular be effective in 
meeting  the  policy  objectives  for  those  chemical  substances  and  products  which  would 
become harmless in a concentration below the set threshold (i.e some hydrogen peroxide 
and  acid  applications,  nitromethane,  hexamine  and  chlorates  and  perchlorates).  It  also 
received high stakeholders support. 

The  development  of  a  system  of  licensed  consumers  seems  to  be  less  costly  than  the 
licensing  system  for  retailers  and  also  the  most  effective  in  preventing  terrorists  from 
accessing higher concentrated chemicals.  

It is estimated that public authorities maintaining the scheme for licensed consumers will 
incur an additional cost of only about €1.8 million per annum. The scheme for licensed 
consumers would strictly limit the sales of higher concentrated chemicals to a marginal 
number  of  consumers,  who  genuinely  need  those  chemicals.  It  is  expected  that  the 
monitoring of these consumers by competent authorities would also be easier, given their 
limited  number.  Any  licensing  scheme  developed  at  EU  level  would  need  to  ensure  a 
harmonised implementation across the EU – although the details of the licensing scheme 
should  be  left  to  the  Member  States.  The  requirements  for  businesses  under  option  4bi 
(retailers  licence)  and  the  criteria  for  granting  licenses  under  scenario  4bii  (consumers 
licence) would need to be clearly defined as part of implementation by Member States. 
One of the caveats is that the licensed consumer system may pose an issue with internet 
and distance sellers who would need to ensure a proper processing and checking of the 
licenses displayed by consumers. 

As part of the implementation, Member States would be required to pay special attention 
to ensuring compliance with national and EU data protection law, given that a licensing 
scheme would require the processing of personal data of the licensees.   

The  political  feasibility  of  this  policy  option  is  high,  as  several  Member  States  have 
similar provisions in place. Moreover, this policy option seems desirable and politically 
acceptable,  as  an  overwhelming  majority  of  Member  States  experts  and  industry 
representatives have expressed their support for such measures.  

5.2.7.  Assessment  of  policy  option  4c:  A  ban  on  sales  to  the  general  public  if  the 
substance  is  above  a  specific  concentration  limit  with  introducing  a  system  of 
reporting suspicious transactions  

Policy  option  4c  includes  the  measures  proposed  as  part  of  policy  option  3  (i.e.  the 
introduction of threshold concentration levels) and proposes the introduction of a system 
of  reporting  suspicious  transactions.  The  policy  option  will  require  sellers  to  assess 
whether  a  certain  order  or  transaction  is  suspicious  and  to  take  responsibility  for 
notifying  the  competent  authorities  (e.g.  their  respective  retail/sector  association  or  law 
enforcement  agencies).  At  least  4  Member  States  have  already  introduced  systems  for 

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reporting  suspicious  transactions.  At  EU  level,  the  drug  precursor  regulation16  has 
introduced  a  requirement  to  report  suspicious  transactions,  which  also  covers  the 
explosive  precursor  substances  acetone,  sulphuric  acid  and  hydrochloric  acid  (but  this 
would relate only to larger quantities traded business-to-business). 

Estimated total costs to businesses of this option represent an additional €16 million per 
year. Public authorities will have to maintain a central hotline or decentralised contacts, 
as well as organise training, awareness raising campaigns, etc. National authorities may 
incur  an  additional  cost  of  about  €0.34  m illion  per  year.  Companies  selling  over  the 
Internet  would  also  need  to  develop  new  procedures  and  possibly  buy  new  software 
detecting  suspicious  transactions.  As  part  of  implementation,  Member  States  will  be 
required to pay due regard to compliance with the protection of personal data and non-
discrimination provisions.  

This policy option would be especially useful with respect to precursors that keep their 
dangerous  characteristics  even  at  lower  concentrations  or  could  be  re-concentrated 
(notably  hydrogen  peroxide)  or  for  those  precursors  where  limiting  the  concentration 
level is not an option (e.g. acetone, hexamine in fuel tablets).  

The policy option received higher scores than policy option 3, given that it adds a higher 
level of security to the sales of chemical substances and products. The feasibility of the 
policy option is high as already several Member States have similar measures in place. 
Stakeholders consulted were overall in favour of this policy option. 

5.2.8.  Assessment  of  policy  option  4d:  A  ban  on  sales  to  the  general  public  if  the 
substance  is  above  a  specific  concentration  limit  with  a  scheme  for  labelling 
precursors  with  a  code  specifying  that  the  purchase  may  be  subject  to 
registration  and  developing  a  system  for  recording  the  identity  of  the  buyer 
(including  internet  sales),  with  records to be made available to competent law 
enforcement authorities  

Policy  option  4d  includes  the  measures  proposed  as  part  of  Policy  option  3  (i.e.  the 
introduction  of  threshold  concentration  levels  for  sales  to  the  general  public)  and 
proposes  the  introduction  of  a  labelling  scheme  and  a  registration  system  for  recording 
the identity of the buyer. The labelling scheme would focus on warning household users 
that  the  purchase  may  be  subject  to  registration.  The  records  of  the  registration  system 
would need to be made available to competent law enforcement authorities. 

While this option received high scores on achieving the policy objectives, its evaluation 
was  rather  negative  from  the  perspective  of  economic  impacts  and  feasibility.  The 
majority  of  Member  States  and  other  stakeholders  did  not  consider  Policy  option  4d  a 
feasible  option  for  such  a  wide  range  of  precursors,  covering  a  multitude  of  different 
products sold by a variety of retailers and other downstream sellers. For some products, 
given their very small size, labelling will be difficult and the warning may go unnoticed 
when the indications are too small. Instead of labelling, the barcode on products could be 
adapted to alert sellers to the need to register. This is also very expensive. 

16  

Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 
on drug precursors.  

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The amounts of data that would need to be entered in the registration system at national 
level  would  be  enormous  with  a  risk  of  crashes  and  losses  of  information.  Such  a 
registration  system,  to  be  effective,  would  need  to  be  deemed  acceptable  by  the  wider 
public in terms of proportionality. The registration system would also require a specific 
mechanism  to  review  whether  a  product  should  be  subject  to  labelling  and  registration 
requirements or not. 

In addition to this, there is a risk that the labelling of products, especially when hinting at 
the  fact  that  they  may  pose  a  security  risk,  would  attract  the  wrong  kind  of  attention. 
Finally,  using  a  registration  system  for  preventive  purposes  will  be  close  to  impossible 
given the amounts of records that will be created every day. Only a highly sophisticated 
online database may allow for direct identification of transactions which are suspicious 
of for cross-references (e.g. many small purchases made by the same purpose in different 
locations).  The  registration  scheme  would  therefore  only  be  useful  for  investigative 
purposes after a terrorist event. 

5.2.9.  Assessment of policy option 5: Taking measures to enhance the surveillance of 
professional  use,  including  sub-options  such  as  promoting  codes  of  conduct, 
education  and  training,  raising  staff  awareness  or  addressing  in  particular 
medium / small users  

This  policy  option  would  entail  the  introduction  non-legislative  measures  aiming  at 
enhancing the control of the precursors market among all supply chain actors. Examples 
of  means  to  this  end  include  the  adoption  of  Codes  of  Conduct,  education  and  training 
measures  and  campaigns  to  increase  awareness  among  supply  chain  operators.  Several 
Member  States  (e.g.  Germany,  Denmark,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden  and  the  UK)  have 
developed similar measures with various purposes.  

This policy option has a positive contribution to the achievement of the policy objectives 
and does not cause excessive compliance costs. However, one of the key risks associated 
with this policy option is the voluntary nature of the measures, meaning that businesses 
may choose not to comply with the requirements. It can take up to several years before a 
voluntary  measure  has  a  wide  coverage  and  100%  market  coverage  often  remains 
difficult to achieve.  

Overall,  there  seems  to  be  a  clear  support  for  developing  some,  if  not  all  measures 
proposed  under  this  policy  option.  There  was  a  consensus  among  Member  States  and 
industry  stakeholders  that  the  proposed  measures  could  be  highly  beneficial  and 
achievable at relatively low costs. It is expected that all major players (members of the 
relevant trade associations of producers, chemical distributors, the retail sector) who will 
voluntarily comply with the relevant codes of conduct, will train their staff accordingly, 
and will employ other necessary tools and methods to raise awareness amongst staff (and 
business partners). This will incur a yearly cost of around €64 million. The costs incurred 
to  public  authorities  (e.g.  to  offer  training  and  guidance,  conduct  awareness  raising 
campaigns  etc.)  are  also  estimated  at  around  €64  million  per  year  (f or  all  EU  Member 
States in aggregate and for all precursors).  

This policy option can help achieve a greater level of awareness and control within the 
supply  chain  while  its  economic  costs  and  impacts  are  limited.  Nonetheless,  the 
effectiveness  of  this  policy  option  across  all  EU  Member  States  depends  on  active 

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cooperation  and  commitment  of  stakeholders  in  all  EU  Member  States,  which  is  very 
difficult to achieve in the case of solely voluntary measures.  

For  companies  marketing  hexamine  fuel  tablets  a  ban  on  sales  to  the  general  public 
above  a  certain  concentration  limit  would  effectively  be  a  total  ban,  because  a 
concentration  limit  is  not  technically  feasible.  This  could  be  alleviated  by  way  of  the 
licensing  scheme  (policy  option  4b),  although  a  licensing  scheme  for  products  such  as 
fuel tablets for camping or other recreational purposes would be difficult to implement. 
Therefore,  in  this  case,  option  5  linked  to  a  mandatory  reporting  of  suspicious 
transactions could be a more proportionate measure. 

6. 

THE PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

Based  on  the  general  as  well  as  precursor-specific  assessment  of  the  individual  policy 
options, the preferred policy option is a combination of policy option 4b (general ban 
on  sales  of  precursors  to  the  general  public  if  the  substance  is  above  a  specific 
concentration level with the possibility of sales of higher concentrations through a 
licensing  system),  4c  (reporting  on  suspicious  transactions)  and  5  (different 
voluntary measures).   

The preferred policy option can be formulated as follows: 

Setting  concentration  thresholds  for  the  sales  of  precursors  to  the  general  public, 
with  a  system  to  report  on  suspicious  transactions  for  certain  precursors. 
Developing a licensed consumer system to allow for sales of higher concentrations. 
Adding voluntary measures to support the reporting of suspicious transactions and 
the implementation of the licensed consumer system, as well as other relevant action 
to raise awareness in the supply chain.  

The  policy  option  consists  of  four  different  elements.  First,  it  sets  concentration 
thresholds on precursors that can be sold freely to the general public. However, through a 
system  of  reporting  on  suspicious  transactions  it  still  requires  sellers  to  monitor  and 
notify purchases, which, because of for example the quantity bought, the combination of 
precursors bought or the frequency of the purchases by the same buyer, are suspicious. 
Reporting  suspicious  transactions  is  essential  also  for  those  precursors  for  which  no 
concentration  limit  could  be  set.  In  addition,  purchase  of  higher  concentrations  of 
precursors  will  only  be  allowed  through  a  licensed  consumer  system  managed  by  the 
competent  authorities,  which  could,  for  example,  be  the  police,  specific  departments  in 
local authorities or other agencies. The license will only be provided for legitimate use, 
possibly  including  the  quantity  that  can  be  purchased  and  the  period  during  which  the 
purchase  can  be  made.  Possession  of  the  chemical  substances  without  such  a  license 
would  be  illegal.  Finally,  a  series  of  voluntary  measures  will  be  aimed  at  further 
supporting  the  development  and  implementation  of  the  policy  option,  using  specific 
education,  training,  awareness  raising  and  support  to  medium  and  small  supply  chain 
stakeholders.  The  preferred  policy  option  would  include  elements  of  measures  put  in 
place in Denmark, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 

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6.1. 

The reasons for the regulatory response proposed 

The regulatory measures proposed in the preferred policy option fulfil the need to find a 
realistic balance - for each precursor - between the need to reduce the risk of misuse of 
the chemical substance, and the effort to minimise the actual impacts on the consumers 
and  businesses  of  these  measures.  This  logic  drove  the  proposal  of  the  concentration 
threshold levels. For those precursors where setting a concentration threshold is relevant, 
the concentration thresholds proposed are based on consultations with the authorities of 
the Member States, as well as in depth consideration of these precursors by the Standing 
Committee on Precursors during 2008. This was done on the basis of data related to the 
substance  used  in  terrorist  attacks,  recipes  for  IEDs  available  over  the  internet,  and 
(mostly classified) research undertaken by the intelligence services of the Member States.  

At  the  same  time,  it  is  acknowledged  that  no  concentration  level  will  ever  provide  a 
complete certainty that publicly available chemicals can no longer be used for producing 
home  made  explosives  or  that  the  control  system  cannot  be  circumvented.  What  the 
proposed measures aim to achieve is that it will become much more difficult to produce 
home  made  explosives,  extending  the  timeframe  needed  to  prepare  the  improvised 
explosive devices, and thus making detection and intervention by public authorities more 
likely.  

This is also why the practicality and ensuring the least negative effect on consumers and 
businesses possible was strongly taken into consideration. For all these chemicals, factors 
relating to their usage, the size of the market and the associated compliance costs have 
been  presented  in  the  Preparatory  study.  The  concentration  thresholds  are  set  at  such 
levels  to  ensure  that  there  is  a  very  limited  use  of  these  substances  or  mixtures  by  the 
general public. Moreover, the wide use or the nature of some precursors excluded setting 
a concentration limit at all, for example for hexamine fuel tablets17 or for acetone (which 
further demonstrates the individual approach taken to the assessment of each precursor). 
The  proposed  measures  in  such  case  foresee  a  solution  in  the  form  of  a  regime  of 
reporting suspicious transactions.  

In  order  to  further  reduce  any  possible  inconvenience  to  consumers  from  the  general 
public who have a legitimate use for the given chemical above the stated concentration 
threshold, and where no other alternative can be used, the preferred option also includes a 
consumer  licensing  system.  This  is  also  an  effective  system  from  the  perspective  of 
security since it allows a personal appreciation of the security risks involved. A consumer 
licensing system limits the administrative costs on businesses as opposed to a licensing 
system for retail, as the assessment showed. The experience of the Member States, where 
this system is already in place shows that there are only very few consumers who really 
need to purchase such products. Therefore, the amount of consumers requesting a license 
was very low.  

17  

A general restriction of the sale of hexamine fuel tablets to the general public with a license for 
legitimate use would result in a situation where owners of model steam engines or persons owning 
a  hexamine  fuel  tablet  powered  camping  stove  would  have  to  obtain  a  license.  This  would  be 
difficult to implement. It is also technically not possible to set a useful concentration limit for the 
substance, as hexamine fuel tablets contain more than 90% pure hexamine. 

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6.2.  Main advantages of the preferred policy option  

Before listing the individual advantages, it needs to be stressed that assessing the security 
benefits of any preventive measure, particularly when combating terrorism is concerned, 
is very difficult. The approach chosen in this Impact Assessment aims to ensure that all 
relevant elements that could have an impact on security in the EU are considered, also in 
relation to their economic impact. However, no hard data can be collected which would 
demonstrate  that  any  particular  measure  would  have  prevented  (a  certain  number  of) 
terrorist attacks. The aim is adopt the measures, of which one can reasonably expect that 
they  will  make  it  much  more  difficult  for  terrorists  to  produce  home  made  explosives, 
giving  national  authorities  a  better  chance  of preventing  terrorist  attacks.  The  preferred 
policy  option  proposed  those  measures  –  based  on  a  long  and  wide  discussion  with 
relevant  stakeholders  –  which  are  believed  to  offer  the  best  result  set  against  the 
associated costs. 

More  specifically,  the  preferred  policy  option  presents  some  important  advantages  and 
benefits:   

•  Restricting  and  controlling,  but  not  prohibiting  access  to  precursors  by  the  general 
public.  The  preferred  policy  option  reduces  general  access  to  highly  concentrated 
precursors by the general public by setting concentration thresholds for sales through 
open  channels  while  introducing  a  licensing  system  for  consumers  for  legitimate, 
justified  use.  This  will  ensure  that  such  chemical  substances  and  products  are  not 
excluded from the market, even though their trade may be reduced; 

•  Reducing  the  reliability  and  ‘potency’  of  homemade  explosives.  Precursors  in  lower 
concentrations  make  it  more  difficult  to  produce  reliable  and  potent  homemade 
explosives.  In  most  cases,  this  would  require  substantial  additional  processes  to 
increase  their  purity  or  concentration  level.  High  concentrations  would  only  be 
available in a controlled environment, with a deterrent effect on buyers with potential 
criminal intentions. The system of reporting on suspicious transactions will ensure that 
even "dubious" purchases of lower concentrations can be identified and notified;  

•  Enhancing security, awareness and capacity. The package of measures included in the 
preferred  policy  option  will  improve  overall  awareness  levels  throughout  the  supply 
chain. The voluntary action will help to  properly  implement and ‘operationalise’ the 
measures, providing guidance, education, training and awareness-raising; 

•  Creating an EU level playing field. The preferred policy option envisages a common 
EU  approach,  which  will  help  to  both  avoid  distortion  of  the  Internal  Market  and 
prevent  terrorists  and  other  criminals  from  making  use  of  lower  standards  in  other 
Member States. 

•  Maintaining  proportionality  By  introducing  specific  measures  for  ensuring  the 
reporting  of  suspicious  transactions  for  substances  for  which  no  technically  useful 
concentration  level  can  be  set,  the  preferred  policy  option  ensures  that  the  negative 
consequences  of  a  mandatory  substance  restriction  for  the  companies  concerned  can 
be avoided while it creates a higher level of security at the same time. 

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6.3. 

Detailed assessment of the preferred policy option18  

In  this  section,  where  appropriate  a  rating  is  given  which  represents  the  detailed 
assessment of the anticipated impacts – the scoring is from -3 (very negative) to +3 (very 
positive). It is stressed that these ratings compare the policy options between each other 
and against the Status Quo and are primarily used to quickly reflect the full assessment 
and to facilitate comparisons. 

6.3.1.  Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 

Objective 1.1. - To restrict access to certain precursors by the general public: +2 

Positive  impact.  Consumers  would  have  open  access  to  chemical  substances  below  a 
certain  concentration  level.  Access  to  higher  concentrations  would  not  be  banned,  but 
restricted  and  controlled.  This  would  be  particularly  important  to  ensure  access  to 
chemical  substances  which  in  lower  concentration  levels  would  be  ineffective,  such  as 
hydrogen  peroxide  and  acids,  as  well  as  nitromethane.  In  most  cases,  however,  it  is 
anticipated that consumers would use products with lower concentrations, as they may be 
discouraged from applying for a license. While the chances of "opportunistic sales" are 
reduced  to  a  minimum,  it  may  still  be  possible  to  obtain  the  chemical  substances  from 
third  countries,  or  in  EU  countries  under  false  pretences  or  through  other  illegal 
approaches such as theft. However, possession of high concentrations would be illegal. 

Objective  1.2  To  reduce  the  reliability  and  potency  of  ‘home  made’  explosives  or 
components manufactured for malicious or criminal purposes: +1.5 

Positive  impact.  Setting  concentration  thresholds  would  as  a  minimum  make  it  more 
difficult  to  produce  reliable  and  potent  homemade  explosives.  The  notification  of 
suspicious  transactions  and  licensing  system  will  both  have  a  deterrent  effect  and 
improve the chances terrorists and other criminals being caught before they can fabricate 
homemade explosives. There is a potential displacement effect towards chemicals which 
would not be covered by the policy option but still represent a security risk. These would 
remain openly available. 

Objective  1.3.  To  enhance  the  security  and  awareness  of  the  entire  supply  chain  of 
precursors: +3 

Very  positive  impact.  The  cumulative  effects  of  the  different  elements  included  in  the 
policy option would have a strong positive impact on the security and awareness of the 
entire supply chain handling the precursors. Unlike existing EU and national measures, 
the  preferred  option  emphasises  the  connection  between  control  of  precursors  and  the 
security of the EU. 

Objective  1.4  To  prevent  terrorists  and  other  criminals  from  making  use  of  lower 
control levels and fewer restrictions on chemicals in some countries: +2 

18  

An assessment of the main advantages and disadvantages of the preferred policy option for each 
precursors is included in the  for each precursor, as included in the Preparatory Study to Inform an 
Impact  Assessment  of  Potential  Legislative  and  Non-legislative  Restrictions  on  Chemical 
Precursors to Explosives. The Impact Assessment presents the main conclusions.  

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Positive  impact.  The  cumulative  effects  of  lowering  concentration  levels  in  open  sales 
channels,  combined  with  a  system  of  reporting  suspicious  transactions  and  controlled 
sales of higher concentration levels will create an EU level playing field, both preventing 
internal market distortions and preventing persons with malevolent purposes from taking 
advantage of lower standards in other Member States. There may still be a displacement 
effect  of  such  persons  attempting  to  make  purchases  of  the  precursors  in  higher 
concentrations  in  third  countries,  although  possession  within  the  EU  would  be  illegal 
under the preferred option. 

6.3.2.  Assessment of economic impacts 

Impacts on administrative costs for business: -219 

The preferred policy option involves a wide range of administrative costs to businesses. 
Traders  are  likely  –  depending  on  national  implementation  –  to  be  obliged  to  provide 
information  for  their  prospective  buyers  on  the  restrictions  concerning  concentration 
levels  in  their  standard  terms  and  in  additional  information  material.  They  might  also 
have  to  submit  reports  to  public  authorities  on  how  they  are  complying  with  the  legal 
requirements. Producers, importers and wholesalers will probably have to monitor their 
distributors/retail  partners'  compliance  with  the  new  rules.  All  businesses  will  need  to 
allow public inspection. In aggregate, the administrative costs imposed upon businesses 
are likely to be around €20-54 million per a nnum, and a one-off cost of €40-63 million.  

The  calculation  of  these  costs  as  well  as  the  compliance  costs  in  the  section  below  is 
based on a simplified estimation model, and therefore not on the Standard Cost Model – 
the method chosen was one relating to the turnover to businesses from the turnover of the 
products concerned. The reason for not using the Standard Cost Model is that the number 
of  traders  who  will  sell  substances  that  can  be  subject  to  the  new  legislation  is  very 
difficult  to  estimate.  No  useful  data  was  available  or  found  during  the  work  on  the 
Preparatory  study.  This  made  the  completion  of  a  Standard  Cost  model  close  to 
impossible.  

The methodology for the calculation and the background statistical data are presented in 
Annexes 7 and 8. The estimates are actually rather on the high end of the scale, and could 
in reality be significantly less than the estimated amount. The total estimated costs also 
have to be divided over the 27 Member States, and thus over all companies in Europe – 
the actual impact on the businesses concerned will therefore be marginal. 

Compliance costs for business and authorities: -2.5  

Generally,  no  compliance  cost  will  incur  to  producers  of  the  base  chemicals  and 
importers  (who  are  not  selling  to  the  general  public)  under  the  preferred  policy  option. 
Producers of products sold to the general public in places and ways where a verification 
of  licenses  is  not  viable  will  have  to  reduce  the  concentration  level.  Otherwise,  if 

19  

Please note that the scores related to the economic impact are based on a comparison between the 
different  policy  options,  and  are  therefore  not  calibrated  to  be  compared  within  the  preferred 
policy option on the basis of the actual monetary value of the impact. 

EN 

28 

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complying with the requirements of the licensing scheme, they will be able to continue 
selling  higher  concentrations.  Retail  traders  will  have  to  verify  that  products  above  the 
thresholds  are  bought  for  professional  consumption  only  (checking  e.g.  company 
documents, registration number) or for a legitimate purpose by the general public, which 
may be proven by a license issued by a public authority. They will need to verify which 
products are concerned. The cost estimate is €9-24 million per year. An additional one-
off  cost  of  €80-126  million  is  also  exp ected.  The  methodology  and  the  background 
statistical data are presented in Annexes 7 and 8.  

Public authorities will also incur certain implementation costs, including initial guidance 
and training, as well as inspections. Also, they will have to issue personal licenses. This 
will involve  costs of verification.  Some additional compliance costs in connection with 
developing  and  adopting  procedures  and  rules  with  dealing  with  exemptions  of  an 
estimated  €10-30  million  in  total  is  also  expected.  Furthermore,  public  authorities 
maintaining the licensing scheme will incur an additional cost of about €1.8 million/year. 

Reporting  suspicious  transactions  will  impose  an  additional  compliance  cost  for  the 
private  sector  of  about  €16  million  per  ye ar,  and  public  authorities  will  incur  an 
additional  cost  of  about  €0.34  million  per  year.  Those  Member  States  (e.g.  United 
Kingdom,  the  Netherlands),  which  have  such  measures  in  place  on  a  voluntary  basis, 
reported that these measures did not represent any significant costs to them.  

The  voluntary  measures  included  in  the  preferred  policy  option  will  be  associated  with 
cost  to  businesses  of  around  €64  million  per  year,  bearing  in  mind  that  actions 
disproportionately  increasing  the  cost  of  sale  are  unlikely  to  be  taken  by  business.  An 
additional annual €64 million is calculate d as costs to public authorities.  

The  total  costs  of  the  preferred  policy  option  thus  may  add  up  to  about  €100  –  140 
million per year, out of which about €65 million  is to be borne by public authorities, and 
an additional €80 – 126 million one-off cost.  

Economic  impacts  on  producers,  merchants  (importers,  wholesalers  and  retailers), 
professional  users  (agriculture  and  industry),  consumers  from  the  general  public, 
SMEs, and on export and import, and intra-Community transport/commerce: -1.5 

The  value  of  goods  currently  sold  yearly  to  the  general  public  above  the  concentration 
thresholds set is estimated at about €450-1.150  million. However, about half of these will 
still be sold and bought through the acquisition of personal licences. As a total ban is not 
envisaged,  and  the  overall  non-professional  consumption  of  the  precursors  only 
accounts  to  about  1.5%  of  total  EU  consumption  for  the  chemicals  concerned,  the 
impact on the producers of base chemicals will be very limited. Consequences on sales 
volumes might be experienced by manufacturers of consumer products: 

•  Ammonium nitrate and alkali nitrates: commercial fertilisers, food preservatives; 

•  Hydrogen  peroxide  and  acetone:  hair,  tooth  and  textile  bleaches,  detergents, 
disinfectants (incl. pool cleaners), thinners and solvents (incl. nail polish removers; 

•  Nitromethane and hexamine: fuel for racing cars, boats and amateur rockets, solid fuel 

tablets (and indirectly: equipment based on this); 

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29 

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•  Strong acids: solvents, detergents, pH adjuster; 

•  Chlorates and perchlorates: amateur rocket propellants. 

A number of companies producing consumer products (mixtures, solutions etc.) over the 
concentration  threshold  levels  may  feel  inclined  to  lower  the  concentration  level  they 
offer to the general public, fearing a loss of revenues as a result of the fact that a part of 
the consumers buying their products may consider it too burdensome to request a license. 
Producers  of  retail  fertilisers  and  household  solvents  may  be  especially  affected. 
Consequently,  they  will  need  to  adjust  the  production  processes  and  packaging  of 
products intended for non-professional use.  

Some traders may consider that selling the products containing a substance or its mixture 
above the respective concentration threshold is too burdensome too, as it requires them to 
ask for and verify licenses. It is estimated that this will affect about  half  of the  current 
sales volume above thresholds. This may represent a loss of about €65-155 million per 
year for all companies EU-wide. This is, however, very likely an overestimation, because 
the  calculation  included  also  substances  for  which  no  concentration  threshold  can  be 
applied  and  the  sales  of  which  will  not  be  subject  to  these  effects.  Products  for  which 
reduced  concentration  levels  are  not  a  feasible  option  (e.g.  food  preservatives  or 
hexamine  fuel  tablets,  will  have  to  comply  with  the  requirement  to  report  suspicious 
transactions  (see  compliance  costs).  However,  sales  to  the  general  public  will  not  be 
limited. In addition to that, the assessment of the financial impacts on business did not 
take  into  account  that  consumers  will  still  need  to  buy  alternative  products  to  the  ones 
which  might  no  longer  be  available  (or  only  available  with  a  license).  This  further 
increases  the  likelihood  that  the  numerical  estimates  are  at  the  maximum  limit  of 
potential negative economic impacts for businesses.  

Overall,  the  detrimental  effects  will  be  relatively  small  for  business;  but  they  may  be, 
proportionally,  somewhat  higher  for  SMEs,  given  their  smaller  sales  volumes  and 
relative concentration in retail. The administrative and compliance costs relative to their 
turnover will be higher and SMEs will be more likely to be affected by loss of business. 
Yet even taking this consideration into account, the administrative burden for SMEs will 
be  relatively  light  –  limited  only  to  reporting  suspicious  transactions  and  verifying  that 
purchases of higher concentration levels are by professional or licensed users only. These 
have been estimated to be 16 million euro a year for all businesses across the entire EU 
(see  in  the  section  above).  In  practice  this  means  that  the  costs  will  be  negligible  for 
SMEs. 

Given  the  scope  of  the  measures  proposed  there  are  only  very  limited  options  for 
providing flexibility to SMEs in the implementation of the proposal. There should be no 
diversity  in  the  concentration  limits,  nor  in  the  requirements  to  report  suspicious 
transactions just for SMEs – this would create loopholes. 

Any effect on exports is likely to be negligible.  

As regards the effect on consumers, they will incur a certain amount of consumer surplus 
loss  as  certain  products  might  no  longer  be  (easily)  accessible  to  them.  The  amount  of 
this  loss  was  calculated  for  the  scenario  that  all  substances  of  concern  in  this  context 

EN 

30 

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would not be accessible at all to the general public above certain concentration thresholds 
or in any concentration (where setting such threshold is not possible, e.g. for acetone or 
hexamine). The substitution effect (availability of alternative products) was incorporated, 
albeit relatively roughly, into the calculations by way of the price elasticity assumptions. 
As a result, an estimate of a maximum potential loss to consumers amounts to €115-280 
million/year. The methodology for the calculation of consumer surplus loss is explained 
in Annex 7. 

However, this effect will be mitigated by  

a)  the  diversification  of  the  regimes  for  the  precursors  of  concern.  Several  chemicals 
(e.g., notably, the widely used acetone) are not intended to be subject to any sales bans at 
all  (but will be subject to tighter control by means of reporting suspicious transactions).  

b) substances (or mixtures thereof), the sales of which would be generally banned above 
a  certain  concentration  threshold,  would  still  be  accessible  to  the  general  public  if  the 
consumer obtains a license from the respective national authority, and presents it to the 
seller.  The  consumer  might  incur  some  administrative  costs  (fees  for  obtaining  the 
license) in this situation but will be able to continue purchasing the desired products.  

Consumers  will  in  general  be  able  to  access  diluted  versions  or  –  if  these  are  not  a 
feasible  option  –  suitable  alternatives.  The  data  and  background  calculations  available, 
however, do not enable to specify convincingly and specifically how far this substitution 
is possible for each product (the usage of which is mostly already relatively minor).      

Overall,  the  monetised  loss  is  estimated  to  be  around  €180-435  million  for  businesses 
and consumers per year (sums are aggregated for the whole EU). It has to be added that 
the calculations were made on rather higher-cost assumptions, and so the figures may be 
biased  upwards  (overestimate  the  costs).  The  ranges  for  some  of  the  costs  reflect  the 
difficulty  to  estimate  them  and  the  variety  of  factors,  which  cannot  be  assumed  at  the 
moment  (for  example  the  establishment  of  the  licensing  schemes),  which  will  be  laid 
down by the Member States individually. The figure indicated for the ongoing costs for 
public authorities for reporting suspicious transactions (reacting to calls from sellers) and 
voluntary measures represents an upper limit of the costs and are likely to be lower.  

Table 5: Summary of estimated costs of the preferred option for businesses 

Administrative  Compliance 

Reporting 
suspicious 
transactions 

Voluntary 
measures 

of 

Total 

Loss 
sales 
revenue 

Set up 

40-63m 

80-126m 

Ongoing 
(p.a.) 

20-54m 

35-75m 

16m 

64m 

65-155m 

120m-
189m 

200-
364m 

Table 6: Summary of estimated costs of the preferred option for public authorities 

Compliance 

including 

Reporting 
transactions 

suspicious 

Voluntary 
measures 

Total 

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licensing system 

Set up 

10-30m 

Ongoing 
(p.a.) 

1.8m 

0.34m 

64m 

10-30m 

66.12m 

6.3.3.  Assessment of fundamental rights impacts 

Article 8 Protection of personal data 

The  preferred  policy  option  requires  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  their  further 
disclosure  to  third  parties  (association  or  law  enforcement  authorities)  in  case  of 
suspicious  transactions.  This  implies  a  potentially  serious  interference  with  private  life 
and the right to the protection of personal data. For this interference to be lawful it must 
comply with the conditions required by the ECHR case law and Article 8 of the European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights,  be  "in  accordance  with  the  law"  and  "necessary  in  a 
democratic  society  to  protect  a  legitimate  public  interest  and  the  law  is  formulated  with 
sufficient precision and is proportionate". The processing of personal data must always be 
carried  out  in  accordance  with  national  data  protection  laws  implementing  EU  data 
protection  law,  particularly  Directive  95/46/EC. The  processing  of  data  is  also  subject  to 
the requirements set out in the Directive including a clear and strict purpose limitation and 
security of transmissions, the conditions for the transmission by sellers to law enforcement 
authorities and precise obligations of controllers with regard to their processing activities, 
the  personal  data  that  law  enforcement  authorities  may  retain  from  reported  suspected 
transactions,  clear  retention  periods  for  personal  data  stored,  based  on  necessity  to 
achieve  the  purpose,  and  the  rights  granted  to  data  subjects  for  the  protection  of  their 
personal data, including access and rectification rights. The processing of personal data 
in  the  EU  will  always  be  subject  to  supervision  by  public  independent  data  protection 
authorities.  Normally  all  these  safeguards  are  provided  under  national  data  protection 
legislation.  Under  these  conditions,  the  processing  of  data  for  the  purposes  of  the 
preferred policy option would be both legitimate and proportionate. 

 Article 16: Freedom to conduct a business 

Businesses would still be able to trade all precursors, even though some limitations may 
apply  as  they  would  need  to  set  up  a  new  reporting  system  and  carry  out  additional 
checks  of  exemption  permits.  It  must  be  ensured  that  the  additional  requirements  are 
designed in a way that will allow all businesses, independent of their size, to implement 
and apply them. 

Article 17 Right to property 

The  right  to  property  would  not  be  affected,  as  businesses  and  members  of  the  general 
public would continue to be able to use their lawfully acquired possessions.  

Article 21 Non-discrimination  

Since parts of the  preferred  policy option  are  built on a risk assessment  of transactions 
performed  by  sellers,  the  proposal  will  establish  guidelines  relating  to  the  criteria  and 
elements  that  sellers  should  follow  in  order  to  assess  the  suspicious  nature  of  a 

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32 

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transaction.  The  system  of  reporting  suspicious  transactions  should  not  lead  to 
overzealous  discriminatory  reactions  from  businesses,  for  example  based  on  physical 
features  or  foreign  accents.  This  would  be  necessary  to  avoid  a  broad  interpretation  of 
this concept which would result in a general reporting of transactions and transmissions 
of  personal  data  to  law  enforcement  authorities  and  discriminatory  practices,  which 
would  imply  a  breach  of  necessity  and  proportionality  principles.  Accompanying 
measures, including the voluntary actions included in the preferred policy option, could 
help to avoid such practices through education, training and awareness-raising. 

6.3.4.  Assessment of social impacts 

Impacts on labour market: 0  

In  principle,  businesses  will  still  be  allowed  to  trade  the  chemicals  in  all  concentration 
levels  and  producers  and  other  supply  chain  stakeholders  can  also  continue  their 
activities. It is however anticipated that the sales of higher concentrations will be reduced 
overall and that the set up and implementation of the reporting and licensing systems will 
require investments from both businesses and public authorities. No significant impacts 
on the labour market are expected. 

Impacts on public health: +1 

Some  positive  effect.  While  higher  concentrations  would  still  be  available,  albeit  in  a 
controlled environment in the EU, and these may still represent a risk of being misused 
for  making  homemade  explosives,  the  possibilities  of  detection  and  prevention  would 
greatly  improve  as  result  of  the  package  of  measures  included  in  the  preferred  policy 
option. In addition, as a result of the measures, it is also likely that the general public’s 
perception of security will increase. 

Other impacts (e.g. inconvenience, discrimination): -1 

Minor  negative  impact.  In  relation  to  inconvenience,  consumers  would  still  be  able  to 
access precursors in higher concentrations, but the requirement to apply for a license will 
cause some level of inconvenience. As mentioned earlier, there is also a limited risk that 
sellers  would  too  quickly  consider  a  transaction  as  suspicious  and  refuse  the  purchase. 
The latter could be offset by clear guidance, education and training. 

In  relation  to  the  internal  market  and  the  free  movement  of  goods,  there  is  a  risk  that 
competent authorities may decide not to accept licenses from persons who are not legally 
residing  in  the  country  in  which  they  would  like  to  make  the  purchase,  as  they  do  not 
have  access  to  possibly  relevant  information  on  the  person.  In  order  not  to  restrict  the 
free movement of goods and services and people, Member States should consider, as part 
of  implementation,  a  harmonised  approach  to  granting  licenses  and  ensuring  that  any 
license issued in any Member State would be valid for purchases in any other Member 
State.  

6.3.5.  Assessment of environmental impacts: 0 

Neutral,  with  a  minor  risk  of  consumers  opting  for  the  use  of  products  with  lower 
concentration  levels  (which  require  higher  quantities  to  be  as  effective  as  the  higher 

EN 

33 

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concentrations) and possible increased use of paper / transport, etc to develop and deliver 
education and training, awareness raising campaigns, etc. 

6.3.6.  Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 

Key risks, uncertainties, political and technical feasibility and necessary preconditions 
to achieve impact 

There  are  several  preconditions  which  need  to  be  met  to  ensure  the  feasibility  of  the 
policy  option  and  to  mitigate  some  of  the  potential  negative  effects  that  have  been 
identified: 

•  With  regard  to  the  licensing  system,  it  will  be  essential  to  clearly  define  "legitimate 
use",  e.g.  by  providing  criteria  or  guidance  on  when  to  grant  a  license  and  when  to 
reject a request by a consumer. This could be done both at national and at EU level. In 
addition,  Member  States  will  have  to  appoint  competent  authorities  to  manage  the 
licensing  system,  ensuring  that  these  have  the  appropriate  expertise  and  human 
resources to deal with consumer requests. In order to help sellers in recognising when 
a chemical substance requires a license, support measures such as a specific indication 
in the barcode could be considered, even though this may be costly. The policy option 
should  also  allow  distance  sellers  (i.e.  those  who  will  not  "physically"  receive  the 
license  or  certificate)  to  still  process  the  licenses  and  sell  higher  concentrations  of 
precursors.  The  receipt  of  licenses  by  fax  or  in  a  scanned  version  will  however 
heighten the risk of falsification. Finally, options for ensuring a harmonised licensing 
system across the EU should be carefully studied in order to avoid any distortion of 
the  internal  market  and  discrimination  of  consumers  wishing  to  purchase  chemical 
products in countries other than their own. 

•  In  general,  the  preferred  policy  option  takes  existing  national  and  EU  approaches, 
which are similar in nature and scope, into consideration. The policy option also needs 
to  be  accompanied  by  measures  supporting  education,  training,  awareness  raising, 
operational implementation and enforcement. Research also needs to be continued to 
find ways of making the precursors less potent and effective for malevolent use. 

There  are  some  additional  important  issues  which  will  require  careful  consideration 
during implementation: 

•  The policy option will be applied to a relatively high number of chemical substances 
and their mixtures and to a large number of different products. None of the Member 
State  measures  have  a  similar  coverage.  Its  implementation  is  therefore  expected  to 
require  investments  in  terms  of  financial  and  human  resources,  especially  in  the 
starting  phase,  and  can  meet  some  resistance  from  authorities  and  business 
representations. 

•  In addition, some precursors, such as hexamine, remain highly reactive even in small 

doses. They therefore represent a relatively higher risk.  

Ultimately, there are some concerns: 

•  The policy option could have a displacement effect towards other chemical substances 
which would still be freely available but which equally present a security risk. It will 

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34 

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therefore be important to ensure a regular review of the policy option, e.g. through a 
Comitology procedure, to assess whether any precursors need to be added or dropped 
from the current list. 

EU added value and rationale 

The EU added value and rationale for introducing concentration threshold and requiring 
systems for reporting of suspicious transactions and for granting exemptions for access to 
higher concentrations of chemical substances and products are high. Firstly, the current 
differences in national approaches may affect the functioning of the internal market and 
may lead to terrorists and other criminals making use of lower standards in other Member 
States. 

Secondly, the system of reporting suspicious transactions strengthens the EU focus on the 
security  of  precursors,  as  past  terrorist  attacks  and  attempts  to  gain  access  to  chemical 
substances  and  products  could  have  been  prevented  if  the  seller  had  realised  that  the 
transaction  was  dubious.  In  addition,  several  Member  States  already  have  notification 
systems  in  place  which  the  policy  option  should  take  into  account.  At  EU  level, 
important lessons can be learned from for example notification requirements included in 
the drug precursors legislation. 

Thirdly,  there  is  clear  added  value  in  applying  higher  control  levels  on  highly 
concentrated  chemical  substances  and  products,  as  historically  terrorists  and  other 
criminals  have  most  often  sought  to  gain  access  to  the  purest  forms  possible.  Three 
Member States have similar approaches in place. 

Fourthly,  the  voluntary  measures,  to  be  developed  where  possible  EU  wide,  or  in  a 
harmonised manner, will help to increase awareness among both supply chain actors and 
consumers. Education and training will support the implementation and operations of the 
two  systems.  Research  will  help  to  render  precursors  less  harmful.  A  common  EU 
approach  towards  the  development  and  implementation  of  such  measures  will  allow 
Member States to exchange experiences and information. 

Stakeholder views 

Member  State  experts,  even  though  not  expressing  any  formal  political  position,  were 
overall in favour of the combination of measures included in the preferred policy option. 
They  considered  that  the  policy  option  broadly  followed  measures  that  were  already  in 
place  in  several  Member  States,  which  had  proven  to  be  successful  or  were  recently 
created in response to a perceived need to increase the security of precursors. All agreed 
that an EU wide approach would favour an EU level playing field. 

Some expressed their concerns (reflected above) as to the consumer licensing system and 
the  possible  effects  on  cross-border  shopping.  Most  emphasised  the  need  for  clear 
guidance,  education,  training  and  awareness-raising  to  support  the  development  and 
implementation of the policy option in all its aspects. Some countries indicated that they 
would  have  preferred  voluntary  measures  only,  but  agreed  that  ensuring  their  EU 
coverage  and  full  participation  of  all  relevant  supply  chain  stakeholders  would  be  very 
difficult. 

Industrial stakeholders, while stressing an overall preference for voluntary measures, also 
supported  the  combination  of  measures  included  in  the  policy  option.  Their  concerns 

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35 

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mainly related to the possible burden which would be placed on businesses to implement 
the various systems and the need to vary carefully consider the concentration thresholds. 
With  regard  to  the  consumer  licensing  system,  they  drew  attention  to  the  possible 
disadvantaged position of distance sellers. A list of industrial stakeholders, participating 
on the Standing Committee on Precursors, is presented in Annex 3.  

The overall the effects of the policy under this point was estimated at: +1,5 

Table 7 presents an overview of the scores of the options included in the preferred policy 
option. The scores rank from -3 (very negative impact) to +3 (very positive impact). The 
ratings in the table compare the policy options between each other and against the Status 
Quo.  The  column  in  grey  represents  an  aggregate  assessment  of  the  respective  policy 
option,  while  the  five  columns  that  follow  it  (e.g.  PO4B  1,  PO4B  2  etc.)  represent  the 
assessment of the effects of the policy option on the individual groups of precursors.20  

The  scores  related  to  the  economic  impact  are  based  on  a  comparison  between  all  the 
different  policy  options,  and  are  therefore  not  calibrated  to  be  compared  within  the 
preferred policy option on the basis of the actual monetary value of the impact. The total 
scores show that for some precursor groups, certain measures within the preferred policy 
option  may  be  slightly  more  appropriate  and  for  other  slightly  less.  The  latter  does  not 
mean,  however,  that  this  option  should  be  disregarded  but  rather  that  some 
accompanying measures may need to be put in place to ensure success.  

20  

1: Nitrate-based fertilisers and nitrates; 2: Hydrogen peroxide and acetone; 3: Nitromethane and 
hexamine; 4: Strong acids; 5: Chlorates and perchlorates.  

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Table 7: Scoring of the policy options included in the preferred policy option 

PO4B PO4B.
1
6.5

6.5

PO4
B.2
6.5

PO4
B.3
6.5

PO4
B.4
6.5

PO4
B.5
6.5

PO4
C
7.5

PO4C
.1
7.5

PO4
C.2
7

PO4
C.3
7

PO4
C.4
7

PO4
C.5
7

4.5

PO5 PO5.1 PO5.

PO5.3 PO5.

Assessm ent criteria

Assessment of achievement of the policy 
objectives
1.1 To restrict access to certain precursors by 
the general public
1.2 To reduce the reliability and potency of ‘home 
made’ explosives or components manufactured 
for malicious or criminal purposes
1.3 To enhance the security and aw areness of 
the entire supply chain of precursors
1.4 To prevent terrorists and other criminals from 
making use of low er control levels and few er 
restrictions on chemicals in some countries

Assessment of economic impacts

Impacts on administrative costs for business and 
authorities
Compliance costs for business and authorities

Economic impacts

Assessment of social impacts

Impacts on labour market 

Impacts on public health

Other impacts

Assessment of environmental impacts

Considerations on feasibility and 
subsidiarity
Key risks, uncertainties, political and technical 
feasibility and necessary preconditions to achieve 
impacts.
Total scores

Explanatory notes  

2

1

2

2

1

2

2

1

2

2

1

2

2

1

2

2

1

2

2

3

2

3

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1

1

2

3

1

1

1.5

3

1.5

1

2

3

1

1

1.5

1.5

3

1.5

1

0

2

1

-5

-1.5

-2

-1.5

1

1

-2

-1

1

1

-0.5

-0.5

0

2.5

0

2.5

-4.5

-1.5

-6

-2

-5.5 -6

-2.5 -6

-6

-6.5 -6

-6.5 -2.5 0

-1.5 -2

-1

-1.5 -2

-2

-1.5 -2

-1

-2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -1

-2.5 -2.5

-2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -1

-1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -0.5 -2

-1.5

-2

-0.5 0

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.5

-1

0

-0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -1

0

0

0

0

0.5

0.5

1

-1

0

0.5

0.5

1

-1

0

-2

0.5

0.5

1

-1

0

-2

0.5

0.5

1

-1

0

0.5

0.5

1

-1

0

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

0

0

1

1

1

-1

-1

-1

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

1

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

-1

2
4

1

0

2

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

-1

-1

-2

-2

5

2

0

2

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

-1

-1

-1

-1

4
4

1

0

2

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

-1

-1

-1

-1

4

1

0

2

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

-1

-1

0

0

PO5.
5
5

2

0

2

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

-1

-1

0

0

5

5

5.5

3.5

4.5

4

7.5

3.5

3.5

2.5

3

2.5

6.5

3.5

4

2

4

3

PO4B:  A  ban on  sales  to  the  general  public  if  the  substance  is  above  a  specific  concentration  limit  with 
sales of higher concentrations through a system of licensing either the retail distribution or the use of the 
precursors 

PO4B 1: Nitrate-based fertilisers and nitrates  
PO4B 2: Hydrogen peroxide and acetone 
PO4B 3: Nitromethane and hexamine 
PO4B 4: Strong acids 
PO4B 5: Chlorates and perchlorates 

PO4 C: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a specific concentration limit with 
introducing a system of reporting suspicious transactions 

PO4C 1: Nitrate-based fertilisers and nitrates  
PO4 C 2: Hydrogen peroxide and acetone 
PO4 C 3: Nitromethane and hexamine 
PO4 C 4: Strong acids 
PO4 C 5: Chlorates and perchlorates 

PO5:  Taking  measures  to  enhance  the  surveillance  of  professional  use,  including  sub-options  such  as 
promoting  codes  of  conduct,  education  and  training,  raising  staff  awareness  or  addressing  in  particular 
medium / small users   

PO5 1: Nitrate-based fertilisers and nitrates 
PO5  2: Hydrogen peroxide and acetone 
PO5  3: Nitromethane and hexamine 
PO5  4: Strong acids 
PO5  5: Chlorates and perchlorates  

EN 

37 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4. 

Assessment and consideration of proportionality  

The preferred policy option consists of a package of measures which will pose, especially 
during the set-up phase, a relatively high burden on both the supply chain - in particular 
downstream supply chain sellers but also on some upstream stakeholders - and on public 
authorities. Most costs incurred will be administrative in nature or relate to the need to 
comply  with  the  new  requirements,  e.g.  making  a  clear  distinction  between  chemical 
substances  and  products  with  low  and  high  concentrations,  reporting  of  suspicious 
transactions,  providing  exemptions,  etc.  There  is  a  likelihood  of  some  longer-term 
negative effects. 

In order to mitigate some of these negative effects, the introduction of the regulation will 
foresee  a  transitional  phase  for  implementation.  This  is  necessary  in  order  to  allow 
businesses and consumers to still use their old supplies of the targeted chemicals in order 
to minimise their economic loss, but also to allow national authorities to put in place the 
licensing scheme which forms part of the preferred policy option. The actual time limit is 
likely to be in the region of 2 years. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  expected  benefits  that  can  be  accrued  by  the  preferred  policy 
option  are  strong,  as  it  would  effectively  reduce  illegitimate  access  to  precursors  and 
place their sales in a controlled environment. This will have a strong deterrent effect on 
persons  with  malevolent  intentions,  but  will  not  fully  remove  the  risks  associated  with 
the  precursors.  Nor  will  the  preferred  option  reduce  the  risk  of  displacement  effects 
towards other chemical substances or towards illegal access/purchases in third countries. 
Such  displacement  effects  could  be  countered  through  creating  a  flexible  system  to 
extend the scope of the measure to other precursors. 

As identified in the assessment of the preferred policy option, there are some important 
conditions to be met and some important issues to be considered before its development 
and implementation, in order to ensure the full proportionality of the policy package. In 
particular,  the  preferred  option  raises  some  concerns  with  regard  to  the  respect  of  the 
fundamental rights to private life and the protection of personal data. It will be necessary 
to ensure that such interference is "in accordance with the law" and demonstrates that it is 
"necessary in a democratic society and proportionate". This means that the processing of 
personal data must be always carried out in accordance with national data protection laws 
implementing EU data protection law.  

In  conclusion,  the  potential  negative  effects  of  terrorist  attacks  using  (homemade) 
explosives  can  be  enormous,  in  terms  of  direct  financial  losses,  longer-term  economic 
consequences  and  social  disruption.  In  addition,  fear  induced  by  terrorism  can  result 
indirectly  in  damage  to  wellbeing  beyond  the  direct  costs  of  loss  of  life,  injury  or 
property.  It is therefore important to at least make a first step towards the development 
of a policy which addresses those precursors which have proven to represent the highest 
security risk, leaving the possibility (and the flexibility) for this policy to be adapted and 
expanded in the future.  

EN 

38 

   EN 

 
7. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

It is foreseen that the effects of the proposal will be evaluated within three years after the 
end of the implementation period. Core indicators for possible monitoring and evaluation 
include: 

Impacts: 

-  Reduced  number  of  terrorist  and  other  criminal  incidents  using  explosives 
(distinguishing attacks with ‘conventional’ explosives from those with HMEs and 
IEDs) and related casualties 
Increased EU harmonisation and cooperation between Member States 

- 

Outcomes: 

- 
- 

- 
- 

Increased number of suspicious transactions identified 
Increased  number  of  incidents  detected  and  prevented  (distinguishing  potential 
attacks with ‘conventional’ explosives from those with HMEs and IEDs) 
Increased number of terrorists and other criminals apprehended 
Increased number of ‘failed’ attacks (due to reduced potency and reliability) 

Outputs: 

- 

- 

-  Reduction of household consumption of precursors in high concentrations (above 
the threshold), in volume, value and as a percentage of total consumption (below 
and above threshold). 
Increased  household  consumption  of  alternative  chemicals  (not  presenting  a 
security risk or presenting a reduced security risk) 
Increased availability of phlegmatised precursors or precursors with additives for 
household consumption 
Increased  number  of  retailers  and  other  supply  chain  stakeholders  reached 
through awareness-raising campaigns, education and training, etc. 
Increased number of Codes of Conduct developed at EU and national levels (and 
increased numbers of businesses signing up to these Codes of Conduct) 

- 

- 

Monitoring and evaluation could make use of: 

-  National statistics on chemical production 
-  Reporting  by  business  associations  on  household  consumption  of  chemical 

substances, voluntary measures implemented, etc. 

-  Eurobarometers (scoping perception of security) 
-  EU and Member State reporting on criminal investigations, prosecution, terrorist 

incidents (e.g. TE-SAT reports) etc. 

-  EU and Member State reporting on implementation of the legislative instrument 
-  Research and studies (e.g. on phlegmatisation). 

EN 

39 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 1:  RECOMMENDATIONS  OF  THE  STANDING  COMMITTEE  ON  PRECURSORS  IN  ITS  ANNUAL 

REPORT FOR 2008  

1. The SCP recommends elaboration of a voluntary agreement with private-sector partners at 
the European level with a view to increasing the security of the supply chain. This agreement 
would: 

• 

increase awareness and training among the members of the supply-chain for security 
concerns; 

•  envisage joint vulnerability assessments within the supply chain and devise measures 

• 

to address these vulnerabilities; 
increase  information-exchange  and  cooperation  of  retailers  and  law-enforcement 
authorities on suspicious transactions. 

2.  The  SCP  recommends  that  the  following  EU-wide  (regulatory)  measures  should  be 
considered without delay: 

Extend the control of nitrogenous fertilisers to alkali nitrate based fertilisers for sales 
to the general public by imposing the obligation:  

• 

• 

on the buyer to identify himself and demonstrate a legitimate use (i.e. farming or 
gardening.) 
on the seller: 

to place internet sales under better control; 

o  not to sell to unidentified buyers;  
o 
o  not to sell to minors; 
o 

to  keep  records  of  customers  to  whom  the  substance  has  been  sold  for 
traceability purposes; 
to report suspicious transactions to law enforcement authorities. 

o 

3. The SCP recommends: 

•  holding a meeting of the stakeholders of the supply chain of fertilisers; 
•  examining  the  possibility  to  establish  an  EU-wide  security  and  registration 

system for the above-mentioned nitrogenous fertilisers; 

•  conducting  campaigns  on  raising  end-users’  awareness  about  the  security 
implications  of  transport  and  storage  of  the  above-mentioned  nitrogenous 
fertilisers by extending on-going efforts by EFMA. 

4.  The  SCP  recommends  the  adoption  of  the  following  (regulatory)  EU-wide  measures  as 
soon as possible: 

(cid:206) prohibit the sale of highly concentrated hydrogen-peroxide (>12 %) to the general 
public,  providing  for  exemptions  in  case  of  proof  of  legitimate  use.  In  the  case  of 
exemptions, the following control measures should be examined:   

•  on  the  buyer  to  identify  himself  and  demonstrate  a  legitimate  use  (e.g.  pool-

cleaning etc.); 
•  on the seller: 
o 
o 
o  not to sell to minors, 

 not to sell to unidentified buyers,  
to place internet sales under better control,   

EN 

40 

   EN 

o 

o 

to keep records about customers to whom the substance has been sold  
for traceability purposes, 
to report suspicious transactions to law-enforcement authorities. 

(cid:206)  put  professional  use  under  closer    surveillance  (with  a  view  of  enhancing  the 

security of the supply chain).   

The  SCP  also  recommends  further  research  into  additives  that  may  inhibit  the  re-
concentration and/or use in synthesis of  primary explosives of hydrogen  peroxide solutions. 
Research should also be conducted on ways to prevent the misuse of acetone.  

5.  The  SCP  recommends  adopting  the  following  (regulatory)  EU-wide  measures  as  soon  as 
possible: 

(cid:206) prohibit the sale of highly concentrated nitromethane to the general public  

(cid:206)  improve  control  of  sales  of  diluted  nitro-methane  (<  30  %)    by  imposing  the 
obligation  

•  on  the  buyer  to  identify  himself  and  demonstrate  a  legitimate  use  (e.g. 

membership in an aeroplane modelling club etc.); 

•  on the seller: 
o 
o 
o  not to sell to minors, 
o 

 not to sell to unidentified buyers,  
to place internet sales under better control,   

to keep records about customers to whom the substance has been sold  
for traceability purposes, 
to report suspicious transactions to law-enforcement authorities. 

o 

(cid:206)  put  professional  use  under  closer    surveillance  (with  a  view  of  enhancing  the 

security of the supply chain). 

6.  After  consultation  with  the  affected  downstream  user  industries,  the  SCP  will  consider  
proposing the following short-term (regulatory) measures: 

(cid:206) prohibit the sale of highly concentrated hexamine to the general public and place 
professional use under closer surveillance. 

7. The SCP recommends that the Commission considers to propose:  

•  prohibiting  the  sale  of  nitric  acid  to  the  general  public  and  placing  professional  use 

• 

under closer surveillance; 
further  examining  the  role  of  other  strong  acids  in  producing  IEDs  as  well  as  the 
distribution channels of strong acids to the general public; and 

•  determining concentration limits which can help to make misuse more difficult. 

8. The SCP recommends adopting the following short-term measures as soon as possible: 

(cid:206) restrict the sale of chlorates and perchlorates as substances or preparations to the 
general public and place professional use under closer surveillance; 

(cid:206) examine the role of pyrotechnics in producing IEDs. 

EN 

41 

   EN 

ANNEX  2:  NOTE  FROM  THE  LAST  MEETING  OF  THE  INTERSERVICE  GROUP  ON 

EXPLOSIVES ISSUES  

The meeting took place on 20 January 2010 with the presence of representatives of DG JLS, 
DG ENTR and the contractor, GHK. DG AGRI, SG and the Legal Service were absent on the 
ground  that  they  did  not  have  any  comments  to  make.  The  purpose  of  the  meeting  was  to 
discuss  the  draft  final  report  of  the  "Preparatory  Study  to  Inform  an  Impact  Assessment  of 
Potential Legislative and Non-legislative Restrictions on Chemical Precursors to Explosives", 
and  comments  submitted  on  the  draft  report  from  the  Member  State  and  private  sector 
stakeholders.  

The participants at the meeting raised the following points:  

 - Methodology and reliability of the numerical estimates in the draft report. This was taken 
on board by the consultant who provided a more detailed explanation of the methodology and 
inputs  into  their  calculations  in  an  annex  to  the  report.  It  was  also  agreed  that  intervals  are 
used for the costs, rather then one number as an estimate.  

-  Scoring  of  individual  options  against  especially  qualitative  criteria  (fundamental  rights, 
subsidiarity  and  proportionality).  It  was  agreed  that  a  qualitative  assessment  instead  of 
numerical  scoring  for  these  categories  will  be  provided.  Also,  consistency  of  scoring  was 
addressed.  

- Regulation of hexamine fuel tablets: DG ENTR underlined that setting concentration limit 
on hexamine fuel tablets would have considerable negative effects on the SME producing it, 
as well as on other SMEs producing model steam engines and toys  using these tablets as a 
fuel. It was agreed that a proportional solution needs to be found.  

- Issues related to impacts on fundamental rights, esp. considerations and assessments of right 
to property, correct representation of terrorist attacks, and considerations related to licensing 
schemes.  These  comments  were  taken  on  board  by  the  contractor  for  the  finalisation  of  the 
report.  

After the meeting, comments were also received from the Data protection unit of DG JLS and 
were also incorporated into the final version of the impact assessment report.  

Next steps:  

- submission of final report by the contractor on 22 February 2010 

- preparation of the impact assessment by 25 March 2010  

- submission of the impact assessment on 28 March 2010 

- IAB 28 April 2010  

-  Meeting  of  the  Stranding  Committee  on  Precursors  on  10  March  2010  (to  share  research 
results and discuss concentration limits)  

EN 

42 

   EN 

ANNEX  3:  LIST  OF  PRIVATE  SECTOR  STAKEHOLDERS  IN  THE  STANDING  COMMITTEE  ON 

PRECURSORS  

Agricultural Industries Confederation (AIC) 

ARKEMA 

Carrefour 

Chemical Business Association 

Downstream Users of Chemicals Co-ordination Group (DUCC) 

ESBIT Compagnie GmbH 

EuroCommerce 

Euromines 

European Aerosol Federation (FEA) 

European Association of Chemical Distributors (FECC) 

European Association of Mining Industries (Euromines) 

European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) 

European DIY-Retail Association (EDRA) 

European Fertilizer Blenders Association (EFBA) 

European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association (EFMA) 

Federation of European Explosives Manufacturers (FEEM) 

Haifa Chemicals 

EN 

43 

   EN 

 
Verband der Chemischen Industrie (VCI) 

Wilhelm Schroeder GmbH + Co. KG 

WilmerHale 

Yara International 

EN 

44 

   EN 

 
ANNEX  4:  OVERVIEW  OF  RECENT  TERRORIST  ATTACK  AND  INTENDED  ATTACKS  WITH 

EXPLOSIVES IN EUROPE  

Date/ Year  Organisation/ 
Perpetrators 

Country/ 
Location 

Target 

Explosives/  Precursors 
Utilised  

Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  

2004 
Onwards 

Revolutionary 
Struggle-
Extreme Left 

Not public 

Various, 
Greece: 
predominantly  banks, 
police 
stations  and 
Government buildings 

January 
2004 

AQ-‘Chechen’ 
Network  based 
around 
Benchallali 
Family 

France: 
Embassy Paris  

Russian 

Not public 

February 
2004 

AQ Network 

Italy:  Milan  Subway 
& Church in Cremona 

Not public 

February- 
March 2004 

Network 

AQ 
(Operation 
Crevice) 

United 
Kingdom: 
Ministry  of  Sound 
London 
nightclub, 
and 
Bluewater 
Shopping  Complex, 
Kent 

ANFO: 
ammonium 
nitrate  and  Fuel  Oil 
to 
(ANFO)  combined 
create 
powerful 
a 
‘shifting’ explosive. 

11  March 
2004 

GICM  –  AQ 
Network  

Spain:  Rail 
around 
Station, Madrid 

trains 
Atocha 

Echo 
2 
Goma 
commercial  quarrying 
explosive  

the  years  Revolutionary 
Achieved:  Over 
Struggle, or Epanastatikos Agonas, has launched 
various  attacks  with  IEDs  against  banks,  police 
stations  and  Government  buildings.  These 
extreme  left  elements  are  believed  to  have 
emerged  from  remnants  of  the  N  17  terrorist 
organisation. 

Planned:  Arrest  of  Islamist  extremists  linked  to 
Benchallali Family, who were planning to utilise 
IED’s  and  non-conventional  weapons  to  attack 
the Russian Embassy in Paris.  

Planned:  Arrest  of  Islamist  extremists  planning 
bomb  attacks  against  the  Milan  Subway  and  a 
historic church in Cremona. 

Planned:  A  cell  of  extremists  with  contacts  to 
the  LeT,  were  arrested  in  possession  of  half  a 
ton  of  ammonium  nitrate  fertiliser,  which  they 
had purchased from an agricultural supplier, and 
kept  in  a  storage  unit  in  West  London.  The 
group  were  also  in  possession  of  aluminium 
powder  to  help  facilitate  an  effective  explosive, 
and some had received training in Malakand on 
the Pakistani-Afghan border.   

Achieved:  A  group  of  extremists  exploded  ten 
bombs,  comprising  Goma  2  Echo  commercial 
quarrying  explosive  initiated  by  mobile  phones, 
on  commuter 
into  Madrid’s 
trains  coming 
Atocha  station  during  the  morning  rush  hour. 
This  killed  191  people  and  wounding  around 
1,841,  but  it  is  believed  the  plan  was  for  the 
bombs  to  explode  simultaneously  inside  the 
Station itself, which would have led to far higher 
losses.  The  attack  was  timed  days  before  the 
the 
Spanish  election,  and  contributed 
withdrawal  of  Spanish 
Iraq, 
following the election of the Socialist Party. 

forces 

from 

to 

April 2004 

ETA-  Basque 
Nationalist 

Spain: 
Campo de Naciones  

Madrid, 

Not public 

Attempted: A lorry bomb was stopped travelling 
into  Madrid,  and  its  drivers  arrested.  It  was 
believed  it  was  planned  by  ETA  to  target  the 
Campo  de  Naciones  to  disrupt  Spain’s  2012 
Olympics bid.    

July 

June/ 
2004  

Hofstad  Group- 
AQ Network 

Netherlands:  Schipol 
Airport,  AIVD  HQ, 
The Hague, 

Not public 

to 

linked 

Planned:  The  arrest  of  a  group  of  Islamist 
extremists, 
the  Hofstad  Group, 
uncovered  a  conspiracy  to  target  venues  in  the 
Netherlands.  One  of  the  group’s  members, 
later  killed  Dutch 
Mohammed  Bouyeri, 
filmmaker  Theo  van  Gogh.  Though 
later 
released due to lack of evidence, a number were 

EN 

45 

   EN 

 
Date/ Year  Organisation/ 
Perpetrators 

Country/ 
Location 

Target 

Explosives/  Precursors 
Utilised  

Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  

August 
2004 

  Network 

AQ 
(Operation 
Rhyme) 

United  Kingdom  and 
United States 

Not public 

September 
2004  

AQ Network 

Spain:  Barcelona,  the 
Mapfre  Tower  and 
nearby Hotel Arts  

Not public 

November 
2004 

Hofstad  Group- 
AQ Network 

Netherlands 

Not public 

July 2005 

Hofstad  Group- 
AQ Network 

Netherlands 

Not public 

7 July 2005  AQ 

Network 

(Operation 
Theseus) 

United 
Kingdom: 
Three  Underground 
Carriages  at  Aldgate, 
and 
Kings  Cross, 
Edgeware Road, and a 
bus 
in  Tavistock 
Square 

Triacetone 
TATP: 
triperoxide 
created 
from  crystals  collected 
the 
following 
evaporation 
of 
concentrated 
hydrogen 
peroxide, 
acetone  and  sulphuric 
acid 

July 

21 
2005 

Network 

AQ 
(Operation 
Vivace)  

United 
Kingdom: 
London Tube and Bus 
transport networks 

Suspected 
TATP: 
Triacetone triperoxide 

26 
September 
2005 

GIA-GSPC-AQ 
Network 

France:  DST  HQ, 
Orly  Airport,  Paris 
Metro 

Not public 

October 
2005 

AQ –‘Bosnian’ 

Denmark: 
‘Western’ Targets. 

Various 

Not public 

Network 

November 
2005 

GSPC-AQ 
Network 

Italy & Abroad 

Not public 

April 2006 

AQ Network 

Italy:  Milan  Subway 
& Church in Bologna 

Not public 

re-arrested 
conspiracy to bomb targets in Holland. 

in  October  2005  for  a  further 

Planned: Following the arrest of an AQ member 
in Pakistan, information was obtained regarding 
a  conspiracy  in  the  UK  to  construct  and  use 
IEDs  and  non-conventional  attacks.  A  series  of 
arrests followed in London, Luton and the North 
of England. 

Planned:  Ten  extremists  from  Barcelona  were 
found to be in possession of false papers, drugs, 
and what appeared to be a reconnaissance video 
of their potential target. 

to 

Planned:  The  arrest  of  members  of  the  group 
the  murder  of  Theo  van  Gogh 
linked 
for  multiple  bomb 
uncovered  preparations 
attacks and assassinations across Holland. 

Planned:  A  young  Anglo-Dutch  national  linked 
to the Hofstad Group was arrested in possession 
of home-made explosives.   

Achieved: A cell of three extremists and another 
extremist  with  links  to  Kashmiri  separatist 
groups, exploded four TATP bombs contained in 
their rucksacks, three aboard tube trains and the 
fourth  on  a  bus.  The  attacks  were  timed  to 
coincide  with 
the  morning  rush  hour  and 
consequently,  52  people  were  killed  and 
hundreds injured.  

Attempted:  A  group  of  extremists  attempted  to 
launch  a  copycat  of  the  7/7  attacks,  but  while 
their  detonators  worked,  they  failed  to  initiate 
the  main  charges,  injuring  only  themselves.  All 
four  were  convicted  and  given 
lengthy 
sentences.  

Planned:  Arrest  of  nine  Islamist  extremists 
linked  to  the  GSPC,  who  were  preparing  to 
attacks  on  the  DST  headquarters,  Orly  Airport 
and the Paris Metro.  

Planned:  Arrest  of  multi-national  group  of 
extremists, with links to Bosnia. At Bosnian end, 
arrests  recovered  explosives,  a  suicide  vest  and 
weaponry.  Group  known  to  have  links  with 
other extremists in Denmark and Bosnia. 

Planned:  Arrest  of  extremists  believed  to  have 
been  planning  attacks  in  Italy  and  abroad, 
possibly against a Synagogue in Oslo, Norway.  

Planned: 
Islamist  extremists  were  arrested 
and/or  deported  as  they  were  believed  to  be 
planning  attacks  near 
the 
the 
forthcoming Italian elections.  

time  of 

EN 

46 

   EN 

Date/ Year  Organisation/ 
Perpetrators 

Country/ 
Location 

Target 

Explosives/  Precursors 
Utilised  

Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  

July 2006 

Fatah al Islam 

Germany:  Dortmund 
& Koblenz Trains 

21

:  Use 

Propane
of 
Propane  Gas  canister 
with 
Primary 
fragmentation/ Lethality 
enhanced 
nails-
shrapnel. 

by 

Attempted:  Two  students  associated  with  Fatah 
al  Islam,  an  affiliate  group  of  AQ  attempted  to 
detonate  bombs  on  passenger  trains  between 
Dortmund and Koblenz, which failed to detonate 
due to poor construction.  

August 
2006 

Network 

AQ 
(Operation 
Overt)  

United 
Multiple 
Atlantic aircraft 

Kingdom: 
trans-

based 
Peroxide 
explosive  in  liquid-gel 
format, which was to be 
smuggled  on  board  the 
targeted 
aircraft 
jet 
disguised  as  bottles  of 
soft drink. 

Planned:  Arrests  of  a  number  of  Islamist 
extremists  for  involvement  in  a  conspiracy  to 
bring  down  ten  trans-Atlantic  airliners  with 
homemade  IEDs.  These  were  to  be  constructed 
with explosive gel/ liquid explosives, which they 
intended to smuggle aboard. Associated searches 
led  to  the  recovery  of  bomb  making  chemicals 
and martyrdom videos.  

September 
2006 

AQ Network 

Denmark 

1.  ANFO:  ammonium 
nitrate  and  Fuel  Oil 
(ANFO). 

Planned:  Subsequent  searches  following  arrests 
of  the  cell  recovered  Home  Made  Explosive 
(HME) with both ANFO and TATP. 

2.  TATP:  Triacetone 
triperoxide. 

September 
2006 

AQ Network 

Not public 

Norway: 
Oslo 
Synagogue  and  US 
and  Israeli  Embassies 
(Not a Member State) 

30 
December 
2006 

ETA-  Basque 
Nationalist  

Spain: 
Airport, Madrid 

Barajas 

Not public 

2007 

PCC  –  Extreme 
Left 

Italy  

Not public 

5  March 
2007  

Revolutionary 
Front 
Communism- 
Extreme Left  

for 

Italy:  Milan  Police 
station 

Not public 

29  -30  June 
2007 

Network 

AQ 
(Operation 
Segram) 

Kingdom: 
United 
London  nightclubs  & 
Glasgow Airport 

22

:  Use 

Propane
of 
Propane  Gas  canister 
with 
Primary 
fragmentation/ Lethality 
enhanced 
nails-
shrapnel.  These  were  to 
be  triggered  by  mobile 
phone/detonators. 

by 

Planned:  Four  extremists  were  arrested  while 
conspiring  to  launch  IED  attacks  against  a 
synagogue and embassies in Oslo. 

Achieved:  Although  formally  under  a  ceasefire, 
ETA placed a large car bomb in a car park at the 
airport,  killing  two  Ecuadorian  workers  and 
causing significant damage.  

Achieved:  Two  attacks  were  completed  due  to 
Italy’s  ‘imperialism  and  contribution  to  the 
NATO strategy’.  

Attempted:  An  IED  discovered  outside  a  Milan 
police station, was claimed by the Revolutionary 
Front due to arrests of fellow activists.  

Attempted:  Seven  Islamists  arrested,  with  a 
further  linked  arrest  in  Australia.    A  group  of 
predominantly Iraqi medically trained extremists 
(seven  doctors  and  a  medical 
technician), 
attempted to car bomb  ‘Tiger-Tiger’ nightclub, 
Haymarket    in  Central  London  on  29th  June, 
with  another 
  VBIED  in  Cockspur  Street. 
However, these failed to explode. The following 
day, as police investigated the attacks and began 
closing  in  on  the  cell,  they  launched  a  vehicle 
borne  suicide  attack  of  Glasgow  airport,  again 
using propane gas canisters and nails. Although 

21  

22  

Whilst this does not fall within the scope of precursors, it illustrates the use of ‘household’ substances 
for terrorist attacks. 
Ibidem. 

EN 

47 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
Date/ Year  Organisation/ 
Perpetrators 

Country/ 
Location 

Target 

Explosives/  Precursors 
Utilised  

Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  

July 2007 

GICM-AQ 
Network 

Italy: 
Fiumicino 
Airport,  Rome  and 
targets in Milan 

TATP: 
triperoxide 

Triacetone 

4 September 
2007 

Network 

AQ 
(Glasvej Case)  

Denmark 

TATP: 
triperoxide 

Triacetone 

4 September 
2007 

Uzbeck IJU 

Germany:  Frankfurt 
Ramstein  
Airport, 
Airbase, 
and  US 
military venues  

TATP: 
triperoxide 

Triacetone 

the vehicle caught fire, fatally burning one of the 
attackers,  and  causing  minor  injuries  to  airport 
and fire staff, these devices failed to explode. 

Planned: Three Islamist extremists were arrested 
in  Perugia,  involved  in  a  ‘training  school’ 
leading  to  the  recovery  of  precursors  and 
equipment  associated  with  the  construction  of 
suggested 
IEDs.  Reconnaissance  material 
possible  targets  included  Rome  airport  and 
locations in Milan. 

Planned:  Following  the  arrest  of  a  cell  of  eight 
Islamist  extremists,  a  quantity  of  precursors 
suitable  for  the  fabrication  of  TATP  were 
recovered (hydrogen peroxide & Acetone). One 
of 
those  arrested  had  previously  received 
training on the Pakistan-Afghan border.  

three 

extremists 

Planned:  Arrest  of 
in 
Oberschledorn,  linked  to  the  IJU  an  affiliate 
group  of  AQ.  Found  in  possession  of  around 
750kg of hydrogen peroxide, a key precursor for 
TATP construction. 

October 
2007 

Extreme  Right 
Wing 

United 
Local Mosques. 

Kingdom: 

Planned:  Following  the  arrest  and  search  of  the 
home address of a known right wing extremist, a 
recovered. 
quantity  of  nail  bombs  were 
Paperwork  at  the  location  indicated  that  he 
intended to attack local mosques with these  

Homemade  nail  bombs, 
believed  black  powder: 
In  many  such  extreme 
the 
cases, 
right 
individual 
acting 
is 
alone,  or  as  part  of  a 
small 
conspiracy 
without  a  coordinated 
organisation, 
nevertheless 
is 
increasing  concern  at 
the  number  or  extreme 
right  activists  involved 
in 
of 
construction 
home-made  explosives/ 
IEDs. 

there 

November 
2007 

Animal  Rights 
Extremist 
– 
Single Issue 

United 
Oxford University 

Kingdom: 

Incendiary 
Designed 
fiercely 
explode.  

bombs: 
burn 
than 

to 
rather 

December 
2007 

AQ Network 

Belgium 

Not public 

2007-8 

FLNC-Corsican 
Nationalist 

Not public 

Corsica, 

France: 
predominantly 
targeted  at  buildings 
and property 

Achieved: incendiary devices destroyed the cars 
of two Oxford University Professors, involved in 
research  using  animals,  while  a  third  device 
failed to ignite. 

Planned:  A  group  of  fourteen  Islamists  were 
arrested planning to launch a prison jailbreak for 
Nizar Trabelsi, an AQ member imprisoned for a 
conspiracy  to  launch  a  VBIED  attack  on  the 
NATO airbase at Kleine Brogel. 

Achieved: During the course of the year, around 
123  IED  explosions  occurred  on  the  Island  of 
Corsica, a decrease from the previous year. Most 
of  these  consist  of  small  devices  aimed  at 
causing damage to buildings symbolic of French 
authority,  such  as  Gendarmerie  bases,  town 
halls,  post  offices  etc.  Many  are  timed  to 
explode  in  the middle  of  the  night,  to  minimise 
the risk of casualties.  

EN 

48 

   EN 

Date/ Year  Organisation/ 
Perpetrators 

Country/ 
Location 

Target 

Explosives/  Precursors 
Utilised  

Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  

2008 

Revolutionary 
Struggle- 
Extreme Left 

Greece: Various  

Not public 

January 
2008 

AQ Network 

Spain:  Barcelona  & 
International 

Not public 

Achieved:  Throughout  the  course  of  the  year, 
Revolutionary Struggle committed three terrorist 
attacks  against  a  police  station  an  international 
oil company building and a police bus.   

Planned:  The  Spanish  authorities  arrested 
fourteen  Islamist  extremists  in  Barcelona,  who 
were  believed  to  be  planning  suicide  bomb 
attacks in both their own city and other cities in 
Europe.  

May 2008 

ETA-Basque 
Nationalist 

Spain:  Guardia  Civil 
Barracks,  Legutiano, 
Alava Province 

Not public 

Achieved: ETA activists used a VBIED to attack 
a  barracks,  killing  one  officer  and  causing 
serious damage. 

May 2008 

AQ 
Radicalised 
Individual 
Convert  

/ 

United 
Restaurant 
shopping 
Exeter. 

Kingdom: 
in 
centre, 

IED: 
Homemade 
Caustic 
drain 
soda, 
cleaner  and  kerosene, 
with  nails  added 
to 
enhance  fragmentation/ 
lethality 

Attempted:  While  preparing  the  devices,  the 
individual,  a  mentally  vulnerable  convert  to 
Islam,  detonated  one  of  his  own  devices. 
Consequently  only  succeeding 
injuring 
himself before being arrested.  

in 

2008-9 

Criminals/ 
Dissident 
Republicans 

Ireland:  Various  cross 
border incidents  (e.g. 
certain  urban  drug 
related 
crime 
incidents) 

gangs 

Criminal 
use 
improvised  pipe  bombs 
both  directly  and  as 
UVIEDs.  These  bombs 
black 
use 
mainly 
powder  from  fireworks 
and/or 
shotgun 
propellant as filling, and 
firework 
for 
initiators. 

fuses 

Attempted  /  achieved:  Following  the  PIRA 
ceasefire of 1997 and "Good Friday" agreement 
of  1998,  some  Dissident  Republicans  in  CIRA, 
RIRA  and  INLA  may  have  been  involved  in 
selling  technical  bomb  making  expertise  to 
increasingly violent city based drug gangs. 

A  small  number  of  Dissident  Republican  large 
scale  IED  attacks  have  been  attempted  in 
Northern Ireland since the ceasefire. 

Dissident  Republicans 
still  have  the  capability 
to  manufacture 
large 
scale  IEDS  such  as  car 
culvert 
and 
bombs 
mines 
PIRA 
using 
methods  and  precursors 
on 
based 
nitrate 
ammonium 
fertilisers and sugar 

mainly 

31 
2009 

July 

ETA-Basque 
Nationalist  

Spain: 
Palma, 
Mallorca  –  Guardia 
Civil Officers 

Not public 

Achieved:  A  UVIED  placed  under  their  vehicle 
killed  two  Guardia  Civil  officers  in  the  tourist 
area of Palma, Mallorca. 

August  

9 
2009  

ETA-  Basque 
Nationalist  

Spain: 
Palma, 
Mallorca  –  Tourist 
Bars 

Not public 

2 September 
2009 

Revolutionary 
Struggle- 
Extreme Left 

Not public 

Greece:  Athens  Stock 
Exchange  &  Ministry 
for  Macedonia  & 
Thrace 

Achieved:  Three  small  bombs  exploded  in 
tourist café /Bars in Palma, Mallorca, following 
telephone  warnings  from  ETA.  These  appear 
part  of 
the  organisation’s  annual  summer 
campaign to disrupt the Spanish tourist industry. 

Achieved:  Two  bombs  exploded  on  the  same 
day, both preceded by warning phone calls. The 
first outside the Athens’ Stock Exchange injured 
a  woman  and  caused  serious  damage,  while  the 
second  was  placed  in  a  telephone  kiosk  outside 
the  Ministry  for  Macedonia  and  Thrace  in 
Thessaloniki, again causing extensive damage. 

EN 

49 

   EN 

Date/ Year  Organisation/ 
Perpetrators 

Country/ 
Location 

Target 

Explosives/  Precursors 
Utilised  

Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  

10 
September 
2009 

Experimental 
behaviour  by  an 
individual, 
target unknown 

Poland:  a  small  town 
called Zbaszynek 

Triacetone 
triperoxide, 
Hexamethylenetriperoxi
dediamine and others 

Achieved:  explosion 
in  garden  allotments, 
causing  the  death  of  a  50  year  old  man  who 
produced  and  tested  several  explosives  in  his 
garden. Forensics discovered about 2 kg HMTD 
and approximately 5 kg TATP as well as 10 kg 
of a mixture of TNT, RDX and hexolite. 

Abbreviations used: 

AQ: al-Qaeda terrorist network. 

1. 
2.  CIRA: Continuation Irish Republican Army = Dissident Irish Republican terrorist group which emerged following the 

2nd PIRA ceasefire of 1997 and the 1998 ‘Good Friday’ agreement. 

3.  DST: Direction du Surveillance du Territoire = French Domestic Intelligence agency, now part of DCRI.  
4. 
5. 

ETA: Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna. Basque Fatherland and Freedom = Basque separatist terrorist organisation. 
FLNC:  Frontu  di  Liberazione  Naziunalista  Corsu.  National  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  Corsica  =  Original  Corsican 
Nationalist separatist terrorist group, from which numerous splinter groups have emerged. 
6.  GIA: Groupe Islamique Arme. Islamic Army Group = Algerian Islamist terrorist organisation. 
7.  GICM:  Groupe  Islamique  Combattant  Marocain.  Moroccan  Islamic  Combat  Group=  Moroccan  and  North  African 

Islamist terrorist organisation with links to the AQ network.  

8.  GSPC:  Groupe  Salafiste  pour  la  Predication  et  le  Combat.  Salafist  Group  for  Prayer  &  Combat,  now  Al-Qaida  au 
Maghreb  Islamique  (AQMI)  =  Algerian  &  North  African  Islamist  terrorist  organisation  which  emerged  from  the  GIA 
and is part of the AQ network. 
IED: Improvised Explosive Device. 
INLA: Irish National Liberation Army = Irish Republican terrorist organisation which emerged from extreme elements 
within the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA). 
IJU: Islamic Jihad Union. Uzbek splinter group from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), believed an affiliate to 
the al-Qaeda terrorist network.  

9. 
10. 

11. 

12.  LeT: Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. Army of the Righteous = Kashmiri Islamist terrorist group linked to the AQ network. 
13.  NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
14.  PIRA: Provisional Republican Army = Mainstream Irish Republican terrorist organisation. 
15.  PCC: Partito Comunista Combatente (PCC). Communist Combatant Party = Extreme Left Italian organisation. 
16.  RIRA: Real Irish Republican Army = Dissident Irish Republican terrorist group which emerged following the 2nd PIRA 

ceasefire of 1997 and the 1998 ‘Good Friday’ agreement. 

17.  UVIED: Under-Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device. 
18.  VBIED: Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device. 

EN 

50 

   EN 

 
ANNEX  5:  OVERVIEW  OF  THE  MAIN  HOUSEHOLD  AND  OTHER  DOWNSTREAM  USE  OF 

PRECURSORS 

Precursor 
group 

Chemical 

Main household use low 
concentrations 

Main household use high 
concentrations 

Ammonium 
nitrate 

Fertiliser mixtures 
Biological testing kits 
Printing ink cartridges 

Fertiliser mixtures 

Nitrates / 
Nitrogenous 
fertilizers 

Potassium nitrate 

Fertiliser mixtures 
Toothpastes 
Herbicides 
Disinfectants 
Corrosion inhibitors 

Sodium nitrate 

Fertiliser mixtures 

Calcium nitrate 

Fertiliser mixtures 

Hydrogen 
peroxide and 
acetone 

Hydrogen 
peroxide 

Acetone 
(propanone) 

Nitro-methane 
and hexamine 

Nitromethane 

Hexamine 
(methenamine) 

Strong acids 

Nitric acid 

Hair bleaching, dying or fixing of 
hair perm 
Tooth bleaching 
Cleaning (toilet cleaners and 
dishwashing detergents) 
Textile bleaching (an additive for 
washing) 
Disinfection of wounds, mouth 
and eye contact lenses 
Dermatological treatments 
Hydroponics gardening 
Domestic solvent (superglue 
remover, nail polish remover, 
household cleaner) 
Thinning fibreglass resins, 
epoxies, polyester resins, vinyl & 
adhesives 
Degreaser 
Surface aging product 

Building and construction 
products 
Carpet cleaner 

Fungicides 
Turbidity standard 
Shampoo / hair product 
Hobby metalworking 
Nitrating agent for home 
pyrotechnics, cleaning, etc.  

Fertiliser mixtures 
Food preservation 
Tree stump remover, component 
of rodenticides 
Gun powder 
Fireworks 
Signal flares 
Photographic printing 
Fertiliser mixtures 
Food preservation 
Tree stump remover, component 
of rodenticides 
Signal flares 
Fertiliser mixtures 
Food preservation 
Tree stump remover, component 
of rodenticides 
Hair  bleaching,  dying  or  fixing 
of hair perm 
Disinfection  of  wounds,  mouth 
and eye contact lenses 
Propellant for amateur rockets 

Domestic 
(superglue 
solvent 
remover,  nail  polish  remover, 
household cleaner) 

Fuel and fuel additive for racing 
cars,  boats,  amateur  rockets  and 
models 
Superglue remover 
Special solvent 
Solid  fuel  tablets  for  camping 
stoves, toys and models 

Tin stripper 
Disinfectant 
Pool cleaning 
Specialist cleaning 

EN 

51 

   EN 

 
 
 
Precursor 
group 

Chemical 

Main household use low 
concentrations 

Main household use high 
concentrations 

Hydrochloric acid 

Brick, drain & toilet cleaners 
Building and construction 
products 

Sulphuric acid 

Cleaner for drains, toilets, bricks 
& metals 

Sodium chlorate 

Bleacher 
Cleaning products 

Chlorates and 
perchlorates 

Sodium 
perchlorate 

Potassium 
chlorate 
Potassium 
perchlorate 

Bleacher 

Insecticide smoke  

Brick, drain & toilet cleaners 
Specialist cleaning 
Swimming pool and fish tank pH 
adjuster 
Cleaning products / descalants 
Cleaner for drains, toilets, bricks 
& metals 
Battery acid 
Car and other lead acid batteries 
Rust remover 
Swimming pool and fish tank pH 
adjuster 
Pesticide / herbicide 
Metal treatment 
Fireworks 
Signal flares 
Smoke flares 
Gun powder 

Bird chaser 

EN 

52 

   EN 

 
 
 
ANNEX 6: OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE "MYSTERY SHOPPING" EXERCISE 
CONDUCTED  IN  THE  COURSE  OF  THE  PREPARATORY  STUDY  INFORMING  THE 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PER PRECURSOR)  

Precursor group 

Chemical 

Nitrates 
Nitrogenous 
fertilizers 

/ 

Ammonium nitrate 

Potassium nitrate 

Sodium nitrate 

Calcium nitrate 
Urea 

Hydrogen  peroxide 
and acetone 

Hydrogen peroxide 

Acetone 
(propanone) 

Nitro-methane  and 
hexamine 

Nitromethane 

Hexamine 
(methenamine) 

Strong acids 

Nitric acid 

Hydrochloric acid 

Sulphuric acid 

Chlorates 
perchlorates 

and 

Sodium chlorate 

Sodium perchlorate 

Potassium chlorate 

Potassium 
perchlorate 

In nearly all Member States, purchases of high concentration levels 
can only be made by a non-household or professional user. Only in 
Romania,  Poland  and  Belgium  it  was  possible  to  purchase  nitrates 
with  a  high  concentration  level  as  a  household  user.  In  one 
additional  case  it  was  possible  to  purchase  as  a  consumer  by 
providing  the  details  of  a  third  party’s  company  (this  was  openly 
mentioned and accepted). 
When  placing  the  order,  it  was  in  all  cases  compulsory  to  provide 
details of the company / individual purchasing the product. The level 
of  detail  to  be  provided  however  varied,  from  the  requirement  to 
formally  prove  the  company’s  registration  with  a  professional 
business  registrar  to  simply  providing  the  company’s  tax  (VAT) 
code. 
In most Member States, hydrogen peroxide can be purchased in an 
unlimited  quantity  up  to  a  concentration  level  of  35%  through  retail 
channels.  In  a  number  of  cases,  it  was  sold  in  units  containing  a 
high quantity, i.e. from 1 to 5 litres. Other downstream sellers often 
required  some  form  of  identification,  even  though  this  could  be 
circumvented. 
Acetone  is  also  widely  available  from  retail  channels  in  nearly  all 
countries.  The  average  unit  quantity  available  varies  but  seems  to 
go up to 1 litre. In some Member States, some proof of identification 
is  required  for  purchasing  high  quantities,  While  in  at  least  two 
others  it  was  possible  to  order  up  to  100%  concentration  level  in 
unlimited quantities. 
High  concentration  levels  of  nitromethane  were  not  easy  to  find  on 
retail.  In  one  Member  State  it  was  possible  to  order  an  unlimited 
quantity of superglue breaker and in another country it was possible 
to obtain an unlimited quantity of model engine fuel. 
Hexamine  fuel  tablets  could  be  ordered  in  a  practically  unlimited 
quantity, upon provision of contact details. Pure hexamine was only 
sold upon provision of company details / tax code. 
Access to high concentration levels of strong acids was possible in 
all  countries  from  retailers,  as  well  as  from  wholesalers  and 
specialist end user sellers. Strong acids with high concentrations are 
openly  on  sale  in  garden  centres  and  hardware  /  DIY  shops,  as 
drain  cleaner,  metal  treatment  product,  etc  While  in  some  Member 
States, non-retail sellers  asked for contact details  and tax  codes, it 
was relatively  easy to circumvent these or  negotiate the use of the 
details of a third professional party.  
Chlorates  and  perchlorates  are  far  less  available  to  the  general 
public  in  retail.  Wholesalers,  distributors  and  specialist  end  user 
sellers in the countries addressed only sold to registered companies 
and not to individuals. In one country, it was possible to purchase an 
unlimited  quantity  of  weed  killer  in  one  garden  centre  with  60% 
sodium chlorate, While several other shops had indicated that such 
product  was  banned.  In  another  Member  State  it  was  possible  to 
order an unlimited quantity of pure potassium perchlorate, upon the 
provision of contact details. 

EN 

53 

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ANNEX  7:  CALCULATION  OF  THE  LOSS  TO  CONSUMERS,  BUSINESSES  AND  OF  THE 

ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS  - METHODOLOGY  

Introductory comment on the assumptions underlying the cost estimates  

The assumptions for the theoretical model to calculate the loss to consumers are based on 
standard  economic  theory.  In  order  to  be  able  to  dimension  the  problem,  certain 
simplifications  were  necessary,  notably  an  assumption  of  a  linear  demand  curve.  The 
baseline data concerning the quantity bought assumed that the price elasticity was related 
to that specific quantity and assumed a linear demand curve. 

The  estimation  models  for  the  calculation  of  the  loss  to  consumers,  businesses  and 
administrative costs had to take into account that the data needed for the calculation in an 
ideal case (e.g. reliable, up-to-date and comprehensive on the number of traders selling 
the substances of concern in the respective concentrations, or data on the basis of which 
administrative costs would be more precisely specified), are not available or even do not 
exist. Notwithstanding this fact, the estimations followed existing approaches taken from 
comparable  assessments  (e.g.  in  the  case  of  the  estimate  of  administrative  costs)  and 
worked  with  the  best  available  data,  collected  from  respected  databases  (notably 
Prodcom) or obtained directly from relevant private sector stakeholders and associations. 
The empirical assumptions and calculations were available for review and discussions to 
the public authority- as well as private sector stakeholders (as explained in the main body 
of  the  impact  assessment),  and  corrections  suggested  by  these  were  incorporated.  No 
objections or critique were raised to the final version of the calculations.   

Annex 7 explains the steps undertaken to estimate the respective costs.  

Annex  8  provides  yet  more  details  on  the  numerical  assumptions  and  inputs  into  the 
estimation models.   

Calculation of the loss to consumers (consumer surplus) 

To monetise the costs to consumers from the general public from not being able to buy 
anymore the products they preferred, we first need to outline the total ’consumer surplus’ 
associated  with  the  products  in  question.  Total  consumer  surplus  is  the  aggregate  of 
individual  consumer  surpluses,  i.e.  the  difference  between  the  maximum  price  a 
consumer  who  has  bought  a  specific  product  would  have  been  willing  to  pay  for  the 
given quantity and the actual price he had to pay. If this difference were small, the loss to 
the consumer in case the product were not available anymore – being  about indifferent 
whether to spend the given amount on money on the product in question or on others – 
would be similarly small. If the difference were big, a huge consumer surplus would be 
lost in case of a full or partial ban. 

EN 

54 

   EN 

the  area  of 
between 

graphical 
In 
representation, 
total 
the 
consumer  surplus  equals 
the area below the demand 
curve  between  zero  and 
actual  consumption  (Q0) 
the 
minus 
rectangle 
the 
origin  and  the  intersection 
of actual consumption  and 
(Q0,  P0),  which 
price 
equals 
total 
the 
consumption  expenditure 
spent  on  the  product  (see 
Error!  Reference  source 
not found.). 

Figure 4.1 The demand curve and consumer surplus 

Price

Pmax

P0

D emand curve 3 
(Kimball’s)

Consumer 
surplus

Total  expenditure
(total sales)

Demand curve 2 
(constant price 
elasticity)

Demand 
curve (linear)

Q0

Qmax

Quantity 
bought/sold

However, market data only provides historic consumer expenditure, and not the shape of 
the  demand  function.  By  the  purchasing  decision  they  have  taken  consumers  were 
’revealing’ their preference for a given quantity of the product at the given price, but not 
what they would have been willing to pay otherwise. 

Therefore, we have constructed simple linear demand curves for the product categories in 
question for certain groups of consumer products. Our choice of a linear demand curve is 
arbitrary.  Error!  Reference  source  not  found.  also  depicts  two  alternative  demand 
curves.  The  first  is  a  constant  price  elasticity  demand  curve  (ε  =  const.).  The  second, 
proposed  by  Kimball  (1995)  is  one  with  a  price  elasticity  which  is  a  function  of  the 
relative price level itself. The ratio of current and baseline actual demand is expressed in 
the two models as follows: 

;   Constant elasticity model: 

.   Kimball: 

(1) 

These  demand  curves  are  often  used  and  analysed  in  economic  literature,  but  they  – 
rather counter-intuitively – do not intersect with the Y-axis, i.e. demand will not sink to 
zero at any given price. Because of this, and for reasons of simplicity, we opted for the 
use of a linear demand curve. 

The  estimations  of  the  demand  curve  are  based  on  a  typical  price  elasticity  ranges, 
obtained from economic studies, taking into  account  the ease  of  substituting  them  with 
alternatives (e.g. strong acids as household detergents can be relatively easily replaced) 
and their eventual ’complementary product’ nature (e.g. relatively cheap hexamine solid 
fuel  tablets  complement  more  valuable  model  steam  engines  or  tracking  kits,  the  price 
sensitivity  of  consumers  is  assumed  therefore  to  be  relatively  low).  For  a  practical 
example, when the price elasticity is assumed to be 2, this means in simple terms that a 
1% increase in price would yield a 2% decrease in sales. Correspondingly,  for a 100% 
decrease of sales (the intersection point with the Y-axis), a 50% price increase would be 
necessary.  The  total  consumer  surplus  (the  area  of  the  triangle)  would  in  this  case  be 

EN 

55 

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simply calculated by multiplying the total sales volume of the chemical (in the baseline 
period) by 50%, and dividing this result by two. 

Typical  price  elasticity  ranges  for  consumer  products  vary  widely  between  products, 
depending  on  the  nature  of  the  product.  Generally,  products  which  do  not  have 
satisfactory  alternatives  concerning  the  specific  use  they  are  bought  for,  and  they  are 
relatively important for the consumer, tend to have a low price elasticity. Such products – 
for example – may be subject to habitual consumption with high brand loyalty (specialty 
food),  have  an  addictive  character  (cigarettes),  may  be  complementary  products  of 
something  more  valuable  (fuel,  batteries),  or  be  otherwise  high-involvement  products 
(healthcare, personal care products).  

Tellis  (1988),  analysing  market  studies  on  220  different  branded  consumer  products, 
found a typical range of about 1 to 3, with slight variations across product categories.23 In 
Dossche et al (2006) macroeconomic study estimates ranging from 3 to 20 are collected. 
For cigarettes, an addictive and habitual product, the World Bank in its meta-analysis has 
reported  price  elasticities  of  between  0.4  and  1.24  For  gasoline,  a  fully  complementary 
product (of motor vehicles, that is) with barely any good alternative, the average estimate 
for long-run price elasticity is 0.64, as assessed by Goodwin et al (2004). 

Our assumptions for the price elasticity ranges concerning the most frequent uses of the 
precursors by the general public are summarised in the following table. 

Table 7.1 Price elasticity assumptions (most significant product categories) 

Product category 

Assumed  price 
elasticity 

Comments 

Nitrate-based retail fertilisers and other consumer products 

Ammonium 
fertilisers 

nitrate 

based 

2 – 4 

Alternatives  generally  exist 
straight-nitrogen fertilisers). 

(e.g.  urea,  other 

Alkali nitrate fertilisers 

Alkali nitrate food preservatives 

Hydrogen peroxide products 

2 – 4 

1 – 2 

Widely available alternatives. 

Alternatives are available. 

Hair and tooth bleaching products 

0.5 – 1.5 

Some  alternatives  exist  to  hydrogen  peroxide  but 
are not yet widely used. Personal care products are 
normally high-involvement goods. 

Household 
(drain 
detergents) 

cleaning  products 
dishwashing 

cleaner, 

2 – 4 

Widely available alternatives. 

Textile bleaching products 

2 – 4 

Widely available alternatives. 

Pool and fish tank disinfectants 

0.5 – 1.5 

Alternatives  (chlorine-based  products)  exist  but  are 
not traditionally used in certain countries (France). 

23  

24  

The  main  product  categories  and  their  typical  price  elasticity  were:  pharmaceuticals  (1.12), 
toiletries (1.38), food (1.65), durable goods (2.03), detergents (2.77). 
http://www1.worldbank.org/tobacco/book/html/chapter4.htm 

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56 

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Product category 

Assumed  price 
elasticity 

Comments 

Pharmaceutical products, creams 
and antiseptic solutions 

Acetone products 

0.5 – 1.5 

Suitable alternatives are less available. 

Nail  polish  removers,  cosmetic 
solvents 

0.5 – 1.5 

Limited  number  of  alternatives.  Personal  care 
products are normally high-involvement goods. 

Household  cleaning  products, 
superglue remover 

Nitromethane 

1 – 2 

Alternatives are available (e.g. ethyl acetate). 

Fuel  and  fuel  additive  for  racing 
cars,  boats,  amateur  rockets  and 
models 

0.3 – 0.7 

Complementary product (‘top fuel’ for nitro-engines). 
No  alternatives  can  produce  similar  combustion 
characteristics.  Any  alternative  need 
to  be  a 
nitrogen-based fuel of an explosive nature. 

Hexamine 

Hexamine fuel tablets 

0.3 – 0.7 

Complementary 
imperfect 
alternatives  exists  for  use  in  camping  gear  but  not 
for use in toy models. 

product. 

Some 

Strong acids 

Domestic  solvents,  household 
in  drain 
(included 
detergents 
cleaners etc.) 

1 – 2  

Available  alternatives,  even  though  some  of  these 
could be less effective. 

Battery acid (sulphuric acid) 

N/A 

Price elasticity is virtually infinite as it is an essential 
component 
in  car  and  other  motor  vehicles 
batteries. 

Chlorates and perchlorates 

Specialty products 

N/A 

Only a very limited market exists for the products in 
question. 

Table 7.2 Estimated loss to consumers (consumer surplus lost) if products were not 
available any more (by thresholds) 

The  baseline  data,  i.e.  concerning  the  quantity  bought,  assume  that  the  price  elasticity 
was related to that specific quantity and assumed a linear demand curve. On that basis the 
consumer surplus was calculated. It is potentially contestable, as it is perhaps simplistic, 
but  it  was  the  only  way  to  dimension  this  problem.  The  particular  approach  taken  is 
based on standard macro-economic theory. 

Precursor 
%) 

(threshold 

Estimated value of consumer 
products (€ million) 

Estimated consumer surplus (lost) 
(€ million) 

Most 
significant 
consumer products 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

Ammonium 
nitrate 
(fertiliser)  (16%  N  from 
AN) 

380-530 

26-59 

350-480 

63-89 

4-10 

58-80 

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Precursor 
%) 

(threshold 

Estimated value of consumer 
products (€ million) 

Estimated consumer surplus (lost) 
(€ million) 

significant 
Most 
consumer products 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

High-concentration  AN-
fertilisers 

13-26 

13-26 

- 

2-4 

Component in mixtures 

52-160 

10-33 

38-132 

9-27 

310-350 

- 

310-350 

52-58 

2-4 

2-6 

- 

- 

6-22 

52-58 

Component 
fertilisers: 
similar 

in 
tablets 

retail 
or 

Sodium  nitrate  (8%  N 
from nitrate) 

6-18 

2-5.5 

4-12 

1-4 

0.5-1.5 

1-2 

Component in mixtures 

5-14 

Food 
(100%) 

preservative 

1-3.5 

0.9-2 

1-3.5 

4-12 

0.8-2.3 

0.2-0.3 

0.7-2 

- 

0.3-1.2 

0.3-1.2 

- 

Potassium  nitrate  (8% 
N from nitrate) 

30-83 

6-15 

23-70 

5-14 

1-3 

4-12 

Component in mixtures 

29-79 

Food 
(100%) 

preservative 

1-3.5 

5-11 

1-3.5 

23-70 

5-13 

0.8-1.8 

4-12 

- 

0.3-1.2 

0.3-1.2 

- 

31-85 

5-12 

25-75 

5-14 

1-2 

4-13 

31-85 

5-12 

25-75 

5-14 

0.8-2 

4.2-12.5 

Hair  and  tooth  bleaching 
products 

1,085-
1,720 

13-53 

1,750-
2,900 

130-250 

1,650-
2,700 

1,070-
1,680 

710-1,170 

29-70 

680-1,100 

543-860 

7-27 

535-840 

Calcium  nitrate  (8%  N 
from nitrate) 

Component  in  mixtures 
and CN AN double salt 

Hydrogen peroxide  

(12% H2O2) 

Household 
bleaching products 

textile 

Household 
cleaning 
products  (drain  cleaner, 
dishwashing  detergents 
etc.) 

86-114 

86-114 

- 

14-19 

14-19 

- 

442-743 

17-58 

400-720 

74-124 

3-10 

67-120 

Pool  and 
disinfectants 

fish 

tank 

10-30 

10-30 

- 

5-15 

5-15 

- 

Pharmaceutical 
products,  creams  and 
antiseptic solutions 

Acetone 

removers, 
Nail  polish 
solvents, 
cosmetic 
cleaning 
household 
products, 
solvents 
(superglue  remover)  and 
other consumer products 

150-300 

- 

150-300 

75-150 

- 

75-150 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Nitromethane (30%) 

 55-110 

33-88 

22-55 

55-110 

33-88 

22-55 

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Precursor 
%) 

(threshold 

Estimated value of consumer 
products (€ million) 

Estimated consumer surplus (lost) 
(€ million) 

significant 
Most 
consumer products 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

Racing car fuel (‘top fuel’ 
for nitro-engines) 

 55-110 

33-88 

22-55 

55-110 

33-88 

22-55 

Hexamine 

3-9 

3-9 

(110-220) 

(110-220) 

3-9 

3-9 

- 

- 

3-9 

3-9 

(110-220) 

(110-220) 

3-9 

3-9 

- 

- 

(110-220) 

(110-220) 

(110-220) 

(110-220) 

Nitric acid (30%) 

550-800 

38-130 

500-730 

183-267 

550-800 

38-130 

500-730 

183-267 

13-43 

13-43 

167-243 

167-243 

1,680-
2,570 

1,650-
2,500 

90-330 

90-330 

1,580-
2,320 

1,550-
2,250 

550-833 

30-110 

517-750 

550-833 

30-110 

517-750 

Solid 
tablets 
fuel 
(consumer  market),  with 
linked products 

Domestic 
household 
(included 
cleaners 
adjusters for fish tanks 

solvents, 
detergents 
drain 
in 
pH 
etc.), 

Sulphuric acid (50%) 

Domestic 
household 
(included 
cleaners 
adjusters for fish tanks 

solvents, 
detergents 
drain 
in 
pH 
etc.), 

Lead-acid batteries 

35-70 

- 

35-70 

- 

- 

- 

Hydrochloric 
(20%) 

acid 

350-520 

16-37 

330-500 

117-173 

5-12 

110-167 

350-520 

16-37 

330-500 

117-173 

5-12 

110-167 

Domestic 
household 
(included 
cleaners 
adjusters for fish tanks 

solvents, 
detergents 
drain 
in 
pH 
etc.), 

Chlorates 
perchlorates (40%) 

and 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Specialty products 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

TOTAL 

5,000-
7,800  

450-1,150 

4,500-
7,000 

1,800-
2,900 

230-560 

1,600-
2,400 

*  A  minor  overlap  is  possible  between  different  precursors  (fertilisers,  household  cleaning  products,  personal  care 
products etc.) 

Calculation of the loss to businesses (profit foregone) 

Looking at ‘producer surplus’ to establish what the potential loss for businesses would be 
in  case  of  a  restriction  of  the  products  in  question  would  not  fully  grasp  the  aggregate 
losses accruing to a multi-tiered system of suppliers along the value chain. Rather, one 
should best estimate the aggregate profit on the product accruing to EU businesses in the 
entire supply chain. 

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Eurostat  in  its  Structural  Business  Statistics  section  provides  EU-wide  data  on  average 
profit  margins.  The  ‘gross  operating  surplus  /  turnover’  indicator  is  12.9%  for 
manufacturers  of  chemicals  and  chemical  products  (DG24),  5.2%  for  wholesale  (G51) 
and 7.0% for retail trade (G52). The products generally sold to the general public usually 
have a value  chain comprising  of more than more than one producer (producer  of base 
chemical,  producer  of  formulated  product  or  mixture),  and  eventually  more 
wholesalers/repackagers or distributors. 

For the sake of simplicity, we assume that on average, the extra-EU import share for the 
end-user  products  (i.e.  not  the  base  chemicals)  vary  between  10  and  90%.  We  also 
assume  that  European  business  combined  loses  profits  corresponding  to  33%  of  the 
consumer price for products fully manufactured in the EU (wholesale 5.2%, retail 6.6%, 
producers  21.2%  in  total)  and  wholesalers25  and  retailers  lose  profit  corresponding  to 
11.8% of the consumer price for the imported share (wholesale 5.2%, retail 6.6%). 

Table 7.3 Estimated loss to businesses if products were not available any more (by 
thresholds) 

Precursor (threshold %) 

Most 
cons. products 

significant 

Estimated volume of 
consumer products (€ 
million) 

Total 

Above 
thresh. 

Below 
thresh. 

Ammonium 
(fertiliser) (16% N) 

nitrate 

380-
530 

26-59 

350-
480 

Assumed 
import 
share (end-
user 
products) 

Estimated volume of losses 
to business (profit foregone) 
(€ million) 

Total 

Above 
thresh. 

Below 
thresh. 

116-166 

7-18 

107-149 

High-concentration 
fertilisers 

AN-

13-26 

13-26 

- 

10% 

4-8 

4-8 

- 

Component in mixtures 

52-160 

10-33 

38-132 

Component 
retail 
fertilisers: tablets or similar 

in 

Sodium nitrate (5% N) 

Component in mixtures 

310-
350 

6-18 

5-14 

Food preservative (100%) 

1-3.5 

Potassium nitrate (5% N) 

30-83 

Component in mixtures 

29-79 

- 

2-5.5 

0.9-2 

1-3.5 

6-15 

5-11 

310-
350 

4-12 

4-12 

- 

23-70 

23-70 

Food preservative (100%) 

1-3.5 

1-3.5 

- 

Calcium nitrate (5% N) 

Component 
and CN AN double salt 

in  mixtures 

31-85 

31-85 

5-12 

5-12 

25-75 

25-75 

Hydrogen peroxide  

(12% H2O2) 

1,750-
2,900 

130-
250 

Hair  and  tooth  bleaching 
products 

1,085-
1,720 

13-53 

1,650-
2,700 

1,070-
1,680 

10% 

10% 

60% 

60% 

90% 

90% 

60% 

16-49 

3-10 

12-41 

96-108 

- 

96-108 

1.2-4 

0.4-1.1 

0.8-2.4 

1-3 

0.2-0.4 

0.8-2.4 

0.2-0.7 

0.2-0.7 

- 

4-11 

4-11 

1-2 

0.7-1.5 

3-10 

3-10 

0.1-0.5 

0.1-0.5 

- 

6-17 

6-17 

1-2.4 

1-2.4 

5-15 

5-15 

550-900 

39-79 

500-834 

10% 

335-531 

4-16 

330-519 

25  

These might be producers.  

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Precursor (threshold %) 

Most 
cons. products 

significant 

Estimated volume of 
consumer products (€ 
million) 

Total 

Above 
thresh. 

Below 
thresh. 

Assumed 
import 
share (end-
user 
products) 

Estimated volume of losses 
to business (profit foregone) 
(€ million) 

Total 

Above 
thresh. 

Below 
thresh. 

Household 
bleaching products 

textile 

86-114 

86-114 

- 

10% 

27-35 

27-35 

- 

Household 
products 
dishwashing 
etc.) 

cleaning 
(drain  cleaner, 
detergents 

442-
743 

17-58 

400-
720 

10% 

136-229 

5-18 

124-222 

Pool 
and 
disinfectants 

fish 

tank 

10-30 

10-30 

- 

3-10 

3-10 

- 

Pharmaceutical  products, 
antiseptic 
and 
creams 
solutions 

Acetone 

polish 

removers, 
Nail 
solvents, 
cosmetic 
cleaning 
household 
products, 
solvents 
(superglue  remover)  and 
other consumer products 

150-
300 

- 

150-
300 

10% 

46-93 

- 

46-93 

Multipl
e 
billion 
euros 

Multipl
e 
billion 
euros 

Multipl
e 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

10% 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Nitromethane (30%) 

 55-110 

33-88 

22-55 

 55-110 

33-88 

22-55 

60% 

11-22 

11-22 

7-18 

7-18 

4-11 

4-11 

Racing  car  fuel  (‘top  fuel’ 
for nitro-engines) 

Hexamine 

Solid fuel tablets  

(consumer market) 

Nitric acid (30%) 

solvents, 
Domestic 
household 
detergents 
(included  in  drain  cleaners 
etc.),  pH  adjusters  for  fish 
tanks 

Sulphuric acid (50%) 

solvents, 
Domestic 
household 
detergents 
(included  in  drain  cleaners 
etc.),  pH  adjusters  for  fish 
tanks 

3-9 

(110-
220) 

3-9 

(110-
220) 

550-
800 

550-
800 

3-9 

(110-
220) 

3-9 

(110-
220) 

38-130 

38-130 

- 

- 

500-
730 

500-
730 

0.8-2.4 

0.8-2.4 

(4-12) 

(4-12 
per 
annum) 

30% 

0.8-2.4 

0.8-2.4 

(4-12) 

(4-12) 

- 

- 

170-247 

12-40 

154-225 

10% 

170-247 

12-40 

154-225 

1,680-
2,570 

1,650-
2,500 

90-330 

90-330 

1,580-
2,320 

1,550-
2,250 

521-795 

28-102 

490-718 

10% 

510-772 

28-102 

479-695 

Lead-acid batteries 

35-70 

- 

35-70 

30% 

12-23 

- 

12-23 

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Precursor (threshold %) 

Most 
cons. products 

significant 

Estimated volume of 
consumer products (€ 
million) 

Total 

Above 
thresh. 

Below 
thresh. 

350-
520 

350-
520 

16-37 

16-37 

330-
500 

330-
500 

Hydrochloric acid (20%) 

solvents, 
Domestic 
household 
detergents 
(included  in  drain  cleaners 
etc.),  pH  adjusters  for  fish 
tanks 

Assumed 
import 
share (end-
user 
products) 

Estimated volume of losses 
to business (profit foregone) 
(€ million) 

Total 

Above 
thresh. 

Below 
thresh. 

108-161 

5-11 

102-154 

10% 

108-161 

5-11 

102-154 

Chlorates 
perchlorates (40%) 

and 

Minima
l 

Minima
l 

Minima
l 

Minimal  Minimal  Minimal 

Specialty products 

Minimal  Minimal  Minimal 

90% 

Minimal  Minimal  Minimal 

Grand total* 

5,000-
7,800  

450-
1,150 

4,500-
7,000 

1,500-
2,400 

130-330 

1,400-
2,100 

*  A  minor  overlap  is  possible  between  different  precursors  (fertilisers,  household  cleaning  products,  personal  care 
products etc.) 

Administrative and substantive compliance costs 

Cost to businesses 

Given  the  complexity  of  the  topic,  the  variety  of  products,  sales  channels  and  traders 
covered  (as  well  as  unavailability  of  data),  calculations  were  based  on  a  simplified 
estimation  model.  This  simple  method  of  approximating  the  administrative  and 
substantive  compliance  costs  occurring  to  businesses  relates  it  to the  turnover  from  the 
products  concerned  (i.e.  not  following  the  Standard  Cost  Model  for  assessing 
administrative costs). 

As it is mostly retail that is directly concerned by the preferred policy option, we focus 
on the costs of retail businesses. Eurostat reports a cost share for the retail sector for 2006 
of about 26% relative to its turnover. The profit margin was 6.6%. The share of personnel 
cost  (which  is  normally  affected  by  any  administrative  task)  was  32%  of  the  total 
production value of the sector (this roughly equates to the cost of sales figure above). 

We estimate that the additional administrative cost to businesses will range between 5-
20% percentage of the personnel cost of the totality of traders who sell the products in 
question, depending on the policy option (i.e. 0.42-1.67% of the total sales volume of the 
products).  This  is  to  be  understood  as  an  ongoing  cost,  although  a  one-off  cost  in 
connection  with  studying  legislation,  preparing  for  implementation  and  informing 
customers and business partners will also be involved (assumed to equal to about 10% of 
the relevant labour cost value). 

We  also  assume  that  annual  compliance  costs  (checking  inventories  etc.)  will  be 
proportionate to the turnover of traders. These will for most policy options also include a 

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significance  one-off  part  and  could  be  in  the  range  of  10-30%  of  the  sales-related 
personnel cost (i.e. 0.84-2.5% of the total sales volume of the products) for the traders of 
the product categories concerned (note that most obligations – maintaining control over 
inventories, checks of customers etc. – will need to be done for most of the options). A 
one-off  cost  of  ca.  20%  of  the  related  staff  cost  will  additionally  occur:  this  involves 
initial checking of inventories, clients and procedures. 

Cost to public authorities 

As for the upkeep (compliance) costs of licensing and registration schemes incurred by 
public authorities, the figures are based on the estimates provided in the “Ad Hoc Study 
to be used in the Evaluation of the Community Legislation on Drug Precursors” prepared 
by RPA for the Commission in February 2009. The key cost element in this regard was 
staffing cost. Data has been obtained from five Member States.  

Table 7.4 Staffing costs of the national Competent Authority associated with 
licensing and registration (annually, in euro) 

Belgium 

Ireland 

Hungary 

Slovakia 

Sweden 

Average 

130,810 

28,852 

54,518 

38,315 

80,360 

66,571 

Source: RPA Ad Hoc Study 

It  is  assumed  for  the  purpose  of  this  draft  estimate  that  the  remuneration  of  the  public 
administration  staff  and  the  overall  staffing  costs  in  the  public  administrations  (as  the 
implementation  of  the  measures  will  be  by  existing  staff  within  existing  national 
structures)is  independent  from  the  size  of  the  national  market.  It  may  be  also  largely 
independent  from  the  exact  number  of  substances  to  steward  (the  drug  precursors 
legislation  covers  23  "scheduled"  substances  and  a  further  17  "non-scheduled"  ones). 
Consequently, the total cost to EU national authorities are approximated as 27 times the 
average value of the five national estimates above, i.e. about €1.80 million annually. 

The  same  report  provides  some  estimates  for  the  cost  incurring  to  public  authorities 
processing  notifications  of  suspicious  transactions.  The  number  of  notifications  in  the 
case  of  drug  precursors  was  relatively  low,  about  300  annually,  Total  costs  (staff  and 
non-staff  included)  to  national  Competent  Authorities  was  estimated  to  be  around 
€340,000 only. 

References 

Dossche, M.; Heylen, F.; Van den Poel, D (2006), The Kinked Demand Curve and Price 
Rigidity: Evidence from Scanner Data, National Bank of Belgium and SHERPPA, Ghent 
University. Available at: 

http://www.feb.ugent.be/soceco/sherppa/members/maarten/documents/paper3.pdf 

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Goodwin  P.,  Dargay  J.,  Hanly  M.  (2004),  Elasticities  of  Road  Traffic  and  Fuel 
Consumption with Respect to Price and Income: A Review. Transport Reviews, Vol. 24, 
No. 3, 275–292, May 2004. Available at: 

http://www2.cege.ucl.ac.uk/cts/tsu/papers/transprev243.pdf  

Tellis,  G.  (1988),  "The  Price  Elasticity  of  Selective  Demand:  A  Meta-Analysis  of 
Econometric  Models  of  Sales",  XXV  Journ.  Marketing  Research  331  at  337.  Available 
at: http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~tellis/pricesensitivity.pdf

EN 

64 

   EN 

ANNEX 8: ESTIMATES AND BACKGROUND CALCULATIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT  

Table 8.1: Estimated EU market size of the chemical precursors (base chemicals)  

The table was prepared by the company GHK, contractor of the preparatory study for the impact assessment.  

Precursor 

PRODCOM 
code 

PRODCOM data (2008) 

Other sources, comments 

Production 
volume 

Sold volume  Value 

of 
sold volume 

Unit price 

Ammonium nitrate 

20153300 

4,253 kt N 

2,496 kt N 

(excluding in tablets or similar 
forms  or  in  packages  of  a 
weight of <= 10 kg) 

€1,629 
million 

653 €/t N 

Around  2,000-2,200  kt  N  of  ammonium  nitrate  is 
sold  (more  is  produced  for  own  consumption)  and 
used annually in European agriculture as a straight 
nitrogen fertiliser, according to EFMA estimates. In 
2006,  this  corresponded  to  about  19%  of  the  total 
estimated  consumption  of  10,636  kt  N  of 
nitrogenous  fertilisers.  A  small  fraction  of  sales  of 
AN  goes  to  the  mining  and  construction  industries 
to be used as an explosive. 

Fertiliser  mixtures  including 
ammonium nitrate 

20153400 

1,753 kt N 

1,652 kt N 

20153930 

20153960 

€ 1,169 
million 

708 €/t N 

AN is also often a component in fertiliser mixtures; 

overall,  about  50-60%  of  the  N  content  in  these 
categories  is  estimated  be  come  from  ammonium 
nitrate. (CAN has been excluded from the analysis 
due 
the  desensitising  effect  of  calcium 
carbonate. 

to 

Total  annual  estimated  consumption  of  AN  as 
straight  nitrogen  fertiliser  is  2,020  kt  N  (€1,320 
million), and an additional 1,000-1,200 kt N (€2,310 
million)  is  estimated  to  be  used  in  commercial 
fertiliser  mixtures,  including  an  estimated  10% 
(around 20 kt; 6.7 kt N; €16  million) of the category 
‘Fertilizers in tablets or similar forms or in packages 
of  a  gross  weight  of  <=  10  kg)’  (20157930),  most 
easily  available  to  the  general  public.  In  total, 
annual consumption of AN as fertiliser is estimated 
at 3,020-3,220 kt N (€1,970-2,100 million).  

Sodium nitrate 

20156000 

12 kt N 

38.6 kt N 

€ 23 million 

601 €/t 

Based  on  ComExt  export  and  import  data,  net 

EN 

65 

EN

 
  
 
Precursor 

PRODCOM 
code 

PRODCOM data (2008) 

Other sources, comments 

Production 
volume 

Sold volume  Value 

of 
sold volume 

Unit price 

Potassium nitrate 

20157600 

1.4 kt N 

1.8 kt N* 

€ 6 million* 

3,399 €/t N*

import amounted to about 21.86 kt N in 2008, in a 
value of about €8.5 million euro.  

EFMA, in its submission to the SCP estimates the 
annual  consumption  of  sodium  nitrate  as  solid 
product (not only as fertiliser) in the EU at 30 kt N, 
PNA  at  94  kt  N  (the  average  of  estimates  is  62  kt 
N, corresponding to ca. 37 million euro). 

†  Net import (ComExt) is about 345 kt N in a value of 
231.9  million  euro.  EFMA  estimates  consumption 
at  355  kt  N,  PNA  at  346  kt  N  (average:  350  kt  N; 
245 million euro). 

Calcium nitrate 

20153400 

44 kt N 

39.9 kt N 

€ 32 million 

802 

€/t N 

This  PRODCOM  code  also  includes  the  physical 

Hydrogen peroxide 

20136300 

1,185 kt H2O2  1,182 kt H2O2 

€490 million 

blend  of  calcium  nitrate  and  ammonium  nitrate, 
which  is  not  known  to  be  used  as  solid  fertiliser. 
The  net  import  in  this  product  category  was  about 
115.28 kt N in a value of 24.0 million euro. 

The  double  salt  of  calcium  nitrate  and  ammonium 
nitrate  usually  contains  about  90%  calcium  nitrate 
and  10%  ammonium  nitrate.  EFMA  estimates  the 
annual  use  of  calcium  nitrate  at  290  kt  N,  PNA  at 
min. 274 kt N (average: 282 kt N, 226 million euro). 

414 €/t H 2O2  ComExt reports a net export of about 110 kt H2O2 
(27.1  million  euro).  The  H2O2  sector  group  of 
CEFIC counts with about 1,000 kt H2O2. The SCP 
annual report  sets the market volume in the EU27 
at  930  kt  H2O2  (JRC  estimates  based  on  CEFIC 
figures set the consumption level at 670 kt for 1995 
for  the  EU15).  The  unit  price  in  2009  varies 
between  510-980  €/t  H 2O2,  according  to  Harriman 
Chemconsult. 

We use the sector group’s volume estimate and an 
average  price  of  700  €/t  H 2O2,  which  corresponds 
to a value of about 700 million euro.  

EN 

66 

EN

 
  
 
Precursor 

PRODCOM 
code 

PRODCOM data (2008) 

Other sources, comments 

Production 
volume 

Sold volume  Value 

of 
sold volume 

Unit price 

Acetone 

20146211 

1,581 kt 

1,529 kt 

€1,093 
million 

715 €/t 

Europe  was  a  net  exporter  of  acetone  in  2008,  in 

Nitromethane 

Hexamine 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

the  magnitude  of  cca.  186  kt,  in  a  value  of  111.8 
million  euro.  We  estimate  on  the  basis  of  these 
data  that  the  annual  consumption  is  around  1,350 
kt, in a value of 965 million euro. 

In 
the  US,  production  of  nitromethane  was 
estimated  to  be  around  7.3  kt  in  2001,  which  was 
supplemented  by strong imports.26 We assume an 
annual EU consumption in the magnitude of 100 kt. 

racing 

for  bulk 

The  price 
currently  moves  around  3-4,000  €/t  (can  go  up  to 
10,000 €/t for retail products). Correspondingly, the 
total  market  size  is  estimated  to  be  at  around  350 
million euro. 

fuel  nitromethane 

A JRC report estimated EU production for 2005 to 
be  around  30  kt.27  The  Scientific  Committee  on 
Health and Environmental Risks of DG SANCO set 
production  at  about  39  kt.’28  The  net  import  of 
hexamine  is  estimated  on  the  basis  of  ComExt 
data  at  about  3-4  kt.  We  estimate 
total 
consumption  in  Europe  to  be  around  40  kt  per 
annum.  Chinese  suppliers  offer  hexamine  (FOB 
China)  over  the  Internet  for  1,000-1,500  USD  per 
ton  (ca.  700-1,100  €/t on),  While  the  ComExt 
database signal unit prices of €835 and €1,038 per 
ton  for  2008.  Based  on  the  above,  we  set  the 
market size at 36 million euro.  

26  

27  
28  

EN 

Report on Carcinogens, Eleventh Edition, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, National Toxicology Program January 
31, 2005. Available at: http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/eleventh/profiles/s123zntm.pdf  
http://ecb.jrc.it/classlab/1705a3_D_methenamine_RAR.doc 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/04_scher/docs/scher_o_054.pdf 

67 

EN

 
  
 
                                                 
Precursor 

PRODCOM 
code 

PRODCOM data (2008) 

Other sources, comments 

Production 
volume 

Sold volume  Value 

of 
sold volume 

Unit price 

Nitric acid 

20151050 

6,074 kt N 

917 kt N 

€330 million 

360 €/t N 

Sulphuric acid 

28070010 

17,818 kt SO2 

9,580 kt SO2 

€687 million 

72 €/t SO 2 

PRODCOM  data  includes  sulphonitric  acids.  Net 
export  of  nitric  acid  amounted  to  109  kt  N  (5.9  m 
euro)  in  2008.  Total  consumption,  excluding  own 
consumption, is estimated at 800 kt N in a value of 
288 million euro. 

According  to  ComExt,  the  European  net  export  of 
sulphuric  acid 
in  2008  was  2,416  kt  SO2, 
corresponding to 106.3 million euro. The European 
market  size 
is 
assumed to amount to ca. 7,150 kt SO2, in a value 
of 515 million euro. 

(excluding  own  consumption) 

Hydrochloric acid 

20132413 

6,014 kt HCl 

3,051 kt HCl 

€253 million 

83 €/t HCl 

Net  export  of  hydrochloric  acid  was  about  301  kt 

HCl  in  2008,  in  a  value  of  12.9  million  euro.  EU 
consumption (excl. own consumption) is estimated 
at 2,750 kt HCl (228 million euro). 

Chlorates and perchlorates 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

and 

iodates 

The broader category ‘Chlorates and perchlorates; 
bromates 
and 
perbromates; 
periodates’  (PRODCOM  code:  20133250),  also 
from  sodium  and  potassium 
including  apart 
chlorates  and  perchlorates  e.g.  ammonium  and 
barium  perchlorate  (these  are  also  produced  in 
significant amounts), added up to a quantity 555 kt 
in  2008.  The  total  value  of  production  was  266.7 
million euro. 

* Data for 2007. † Unreliable estimate; ComExt data suggests a unit price of about 700 €/t N 

Total use of potassium chlorate and perchlorate is 
estimated in total at 30 kt per annum, consumption 
of  sodium  chlorate  at  100  kt  and  of  sodium 
perchlorate  at  5  kt.  The  combined  value  of  these 
four  precursors  may  amount  to  about  65  million 
euro (at a unit price of ca. 480 €/t). 

EN 

68 

EN

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.2: Assumptions to calculate the volume and value of products sold to the general public 

Precursor 

Most 
consumer products 

significant 

Volume 

Estimated  market  size  of 
base chemical 

Ammonium 
(fertiliser), excl. CAN 

nitrate 

3,030-
3,230 kt N 

High-concentration 
fertilisers 
nitrates, 
regulation) 

see 

(>=16%  N 

AN-
from 
REACH 

2,020 kt N 

Estimated 
proportion 
sold 
general 
public 

to 

Estimated 
volume 
consumer 
products 

of 

Estimated 
value 
consumer 
products29 

of 

Comments 

44-100 kt N 

€380-530 
million 

1-2% 

20-40 kt N 

€13-26 
million 

Estimated  market  size  of  base  chemical  based  on 
EFMA data. 

Value 
(producer 
price) 

€1,970-
2,100 
million 

€1,320 
million 

Component  in  mixtures  (e.g. 
UAN) 

1,000-
1,200 kt N 

€650-780 
million 

19-54 kt N 

Fertiliser blends >=16% N 
(from AN) 

500-840 kt 
N 

€325-546 
million 

1-2% 

5-17 kt N 

€52-160 
million 

€10-33 
million 

Fertiliser blends <16% N 

300-600 kt 

€195-390 

4-7% 

12-42 kt N 

€38-132 

The general public includes small subsistence and 
second-incom  farmers  and  garden  owners  (used 
e.g.  to  fertilise  lawns).  The  concentration  levels 
they  access  are  all  above  16%  but  below  or  at 
around  28% 
(higher  concentrations  are  not 
available to non-professional users).  

EFMA  has  confirmed  the  estimate  given  in  the 
SCP  annual  report.  The  proportion  is  higher  in 
some Member States and almost zero in others. 

The  overall  estimate  is  based  on  Prodcom  and 
EFMA  data  (on  mixtures  containing  AN).  The 
mixtures may contain 50% and up to 80% AN. 

We  assume  products  above  the  16%  threshold 
account  for  50-70%  of  the  total  market  of  AN  in 
fertiliser mixtures (in N-equivalent weight). 

29  

EN 

Average wholesale and retail margins are both assumed to be in the 30-40% range, so the retail   price will be 2-2.8x the producer price. 

69 

EN

 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Precursor 

Most 
consumer products 

significant 

Estimated  market  size  of 
base chemical 

Volume 

N 

Value 
(producer 
price) 

million 

Estimated 
proportion 
sold 
general 
public 

to 

Estimated 
volume 
consumer 
products 

of 

Estimated 
value 
consumer 
products29 

of 

Comments 

Component 
retail 
fertilisers:  tablets  or  similar 
(<16% N) 

in 

6.7 kt N 

€16 million 

80% 

164-185 kt 

(5.4-6 kt N 
from AN) 

million 

€310-350 
million 

Total  volume  of  various  commercial  fertilisers 
containing AN sold  was 205 kt in 2008, in a value 
of  161  million  euro,  according  to  the  Prodcom 
database.  It  is  assumed  that  ca.  80-90%  of  this  is 
purchased by the general public. 

Sodium nitrate 

62 kt N 

€37.3 
million 

1.5-4 kt N 

€6-18 million 

Component in mixtures 

53 kt N 

€31 million 

1.5-4 kt N 

€5-14 million 

Fertiliser blends >=8% N 

37-42 kt N 

€22-25 
million 

1-2% 

0.4-0.8 kt N 

€0.9-2 million 

Fertiliser blends <8% N 

11-16 kt N 

€6-9 million 

10-20% 

1-3 kt N 

€4-12 million 

About  85%  of  the  alkali  nitrates  are  used  as 
fertilisers,  according  to  PNA.  Ceramic,  metal  and 
photovoltaic  industries  together  account  for  cca. 
10% of total consumption. 

the 

We  assume  that  about  70-80%  of  SN  fertiliser 
blends  sold  are  above 
threshold.  The 
remaining  ingredients  in  the  mix  are  assumed  to 
have the same unit value by weight. Blends above 
the  threshold  are  assumed  to  have  an  average 
concentration  level  of  10%  N  (about  61%  SN), 
blends below the threshold 6% N (about 36% SN).  

Food preservative (100%) 

0.5 kt N 

€0.3 million 

3-5% 

0.015-0.025 

€1-3.5 million  Maximum  1  kt  N  of  SN  and  PN  combined  is  used 

kt N 

as food preservative (PNA data). It is assumed that 
SN  counts  for  half  of  it  and  that  3%  or  maximum 
5% is sold to the general public. 

Retail  prices  may  vary  from  €10  to  25  per  kg  of 
100% SN (0.165 kg N). 

Potassium nitrate 

350 kt N 

€245 
million 

8-22 kt N 

€30-83 
million 

Net import (ComExt) is about 345 kt N in a value of 
231.9  million  euro.  EFMA  estimates  consumption 
at 355 kt N, PNA at 346 kt N. 

Component in mixtures 

298 kt N 

€208 million 

8-22 kt N 

€29-79 
million 

About  85%  of  the  PN  is  used  as  fertiliser  (PNA 
estimate).  Ceramic,  metal  and  photovoltaic 

EN 

70 

EN

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Precursor 

Most 
consumer products 

significant 

Estimated  market  size  of 
base chemical 

Volume 

Value 
(producer 
price) 

Estimated 
proportion 
sold 
general 
public 

to 

Estimated 
volume 
consumer 
products 

of 

Estimated 
value 
consumer 
products29 

of 

Comments 

Fertiliser blends >=8% N 

238 kt N 

€166 million 

1-2% 

2-5 kt N 

€5-11 million 

Fertiliser blends <8% N 

60 kt N 

€42 million 

10-20% 

6-18 kt N 

€23-70 
million 

industries  together  account  for  cca.  10%  of  total 
consumption. 

We assume that ca. 70-80% of PN fertiliser blends 
sold  are  above  the  threshold.  The  remaining 
ingredients  in  the  mix  are  assumed  to  have  the 
same  unit  value  by  weight.  Blends  above  the 
threshold  are  assumed 
to  have  an  average 
concentration  level  of  10%  N  (about  72%  PN), 
blends below the threshold 6% N (about 43% PN). 

Food preservative (100%) 

0.5 kt N 

€0.4 million 

3-5% 

0.015-0.025 

€1-3.5 million  Maximum  1  kt  N  of  SN  and  PN  combined  is  used 

kt N 

as food preservative (PNA data). It is assumed that 
PN  counts  for  half  of  it  and  that  3%  or  maximum 
5% is sold to the general public. 

Retail  prices  may  vary  from  €10  to  25  per  kg  of 
100% PN (0.139 kg N). 

Calcium nitrate 

282 kt N 

€ 226 
million 

Component in mixtures 

225 kt N 

€181 million 

6-17 kt N 

6-17 kt N 

€31-85 
million 

€31-85 
million 

Fertiliser blends >=8% N 

158-180 kt 
N 

€127-145 
million 

1-2% 

2-4 kt N 

€5-12 million 

Fertiliser blends <8% N 

45-68 kt N 

€36-54 
million 

10-20% 

4-14 kt N 

€25-75 
million 

Based  on  Prodcom  data.  We  assume  that  80%  of 
calcium  nitrate  is  used  as  fertiliser.  This  does  not 
contain  the  double  salt  of  calcium  nitrate  and 
ammonium nitrate. 

the 

We  assume  that  about  70-80%  of  CN  fertiliser 
threshold.  The 
blends  sold  are  above 
remaining  ingredients  in  the  mix  are  assumed  to 
have the same unit value by weight. Blends above 
the  threshold  are  assumed  to  have  an  average 
concentration  level  of  10%  N  (about  59%  CN), 
blends below the threshold 6% N (about 35% CN). 

Hydrogen peroxide 

1,000 kt 

€70 0 

11-18 kt 

€1,750-2,900 

Volume  based  on  SCP  report  estimate  and 

EN 

71 

EN

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Precursor 

Most 
consumer products 

significant 

Estimated  market  size  of 
base chemical 

Volume 

Value 
(producer 
price) 

Estimated 
proportion 
sold 
general 
public 

to 

Estimated 
volume 
consumer 
products 

of 

Estimated 
value 
consumer 
products29 

of 

Comments 

H2O2 

million 

H2O2 

million 

Hair  and 
products 

tooth  bleaching 

10 kt H2O2 

€7 million 

55-85  kt 

(4-7 kt H2O2) 

€1,085-1,720 
million 

>=12% H2O2 

1-2 kt H2O2 

<12% H2O2 

8-9 kt H2O2 

€0.7-1.4 
million 

€5.6-6.3 
million 

10-20% 

0.7-2.7 kt 

(0.1-0.4 kt 
H2O2) 

€13-53 
million 

50-70% 

53-84 kt 

(4-6 kt H2O2) 

€1,070-1,680 
million 

from 

PRODCOM  unit  value  data.  This  figure  includes 
about  30%  captive  use  (i.e.  own  consumption  in 
industry).  The  H2O2  sector  group 
chemical 
remaining  70%  of 
the 
that 
estimates 
consumption,  50%  go  to  pulp  bleaching,  10%  to 
manufacturing  of  chemical  products.  2.5%  is  used 
in  professional  textile  bleaching,  2.5%  in  waste 
water treatment and similar, and 5% miscellaneous 
industry,  manufacture  of 
(bleaching 
pharmaceuticals, 
household 
personal 
disinfectants,  cleaning  and  bleaching  products, 
drain  and  greenhouse  pipe  cleaners,  aseptic 
packaging). 

food 

and 

in 

According  to  information  from  the  sector  group, 
hair  bleaching  product  constitute  a  significant  part 
of the miscellaneous category. We estimate it to be 
around 1% of total use. 

Hair dying consumer products are normally sold in 
concentrations of 5-10% but there are some which 
are above this threshold. We estimate 80-90% are 
below  threshold,  with  average  concentration  level 
of  7.5%  and  10-20%  above  with  average 
concentration level of 15%.  

We  assume  the  majority  (80-90%)  of  the  higher 
concentration  products  are  bought  by  professional 
hairdressers 
lower 
concentration  products.  The  "mystery  shopping" 
exercise  identified  unit  prices  of  €10-40/kg  (not 
conditional  to  concentration  level).  We  calculate 
with an average of €20/kg. 

30-50% 

and 

the 

of 

EN 

72 

EN

comparison, 

code 
For 
20421700, sales from domestic production of ‘Hair 

under  PRODCOM 

 
  
 
Precursor 

Most 
consumer products 

significant 

Estimated  market  size  of 
base chemical 

Volume 

Value 
(producer 
price) 

Estimated 
proportion 
sold 
general 
public 

to 

Estimated 
volume 
consumer 
products 

of 

Estimated 
value 
consumer 
products29 

of 

Comments 

Household  textile  bleaching 
products (>=12% H2O2) 

5 kt H2O2 

€3.5 million 

60-80% 

9-11 kt 

(3-4 kt H2O2) 

44-74 kt 

(3-4 kt H2O2) 

2-6 kt 

(0.5-2 kt 
H2O2) 

40-72 kt 

(2-4 kt H2O2) 

Household  cleaning  products 
(drain  cleaner,  dishwashing 
detergents etc.) 

>=12% H2O2 

5 kt H2O2 

€3.5 million 

1-2.5 kt 
H2O2 

€0.7-1.8 
million 

50-70% 

<12% H2O2 

2.5-4 kt 
H2O2 

€1.8-2.8 
million 

80-90% 

Pool 
disinfectants (>=12% H2O2) 

and 

fish 

tank 

5 kt H2O2 

€3.5 million 

10-30% 

1.5-4 kt 

(0.5-1.5 kt 
H2O2) 

Pharmaceutical 
and 
creams 
solutions (<12% H2O2) 

products, 
antiseptic 

10 kt H2O2 

€7 million 

5-10% 

10-20 kt 

(0.5-1 kt 
H2O2) 

€150-300 
million 

€86-114 
million 

preparations 
(excluding  shampoos,  permanent 
waving  and  hair  straightening  preparations, 
lacquers)'  sum  up  to  €2,385  million  (wider  group 
and at producer price). 

These concern products intended for household (or 
small-scale  professional)  use  and  are  normally 
strong, up to 35% concentration level. Estimated at 
0.5%  of  total  H2O2  consumption.  We  assume 
households consume 60-80% of it. The unit price is 
estimated at €10/kg. 

€442-743 
million 

We  estimate  use  to  be  around  0.5%  of  total  H2O2 
consumption. 

€17-58 
million 

€400-720 
million 

€10-30 
million 

Many of these strong detergents (ca. 20-50%) are 
above  the  12%  threshold.  Average  concentration 
level  is  estimated  to  be  ca.  30%  above  and  5% 
below  threshold.  We  assume  50-70%  of  above- 
and  80-90%  of  the  below-threshold  products  is 
bought  by  households  (the  rest  by  caterers  etc.). 
We  assume  an  average  product  price  of  €10/kg, 
based on "mystery shopping". 

Estimated  at  0.5%  of  total  H2O2  consumption. 
These products are normally sold in concentrations 
of  35%  (but  can  be  more).  It is  not  widely  used  in 
the EU by households (but popular e.g. in France). 
We estimate use by general public at 10-30% and 
unit price (based on "mystery shopping" results) at 
7 €/kg. 

Antiseptic solutions include mouth, wound, contact 
lens  disinfectants.  Estimated  at  1%  of  total  H2O2 
consumption.  Concentrations  are 
low,  usually 
(assumed  average  5%).  Most 
around  3-7% 

EN 

73 

EN

 
  
 
Precursor 

Most 
consumer products 

significant 

Estimated  market  size  of 
base chemical 

Volume 

Value 
(producer 
price) 

Estimated 
proportion 
sold 
general 
public 

to 

Estimated 
volume 
consumer 
products 

of 

Estimated 
value 
consumer 
products29 

of 

Comments 

Acetone 

1,350 kt 

€965 
million 

Multiple 
billion euros 

polish 

Nail 
removers, 
cosmetic solvents, household 
cleaning  products,  solvents 
(superglue 
and 
other consumer products 

remover) 

101 kt 

€72 million 

Nitromethane 

100 kt 

€350 
million 

Racing  car  fuel  (‘top  fuel’  for 
nitro-engines) 

5-10 kt 

5-10 kt 

€ 55-110 
million 

€ 55-110 
million 

pharma  products  are  formulated  but  the  general 
public  can  have  access  to  diluted  HP  as  wound, 
mouth  or  contact  lens  disinfectant.  This  may 
account to one tenth of use in this category. Based 
on our price review the estimated average price is 
set at €15/kg. 

A notable proportion (5-10%) of acetone consumed 
in the EU is available to household users through a 
low 
wide  variety  of  products  (although  only 
concentrations  in  some).  Most  significant  of  these 
are  probably  nail  polish  removers  and  other 
cosmetic  solvents,  as  well  as  household  cleaning 
products and solvents. 

It  is  not  possible  to  dimension  the  volume  and 
value  of  consumer  products  that  contain  acetone. 
The  products  in  question  have  huge,  multi-billion 
markets  and  the  concentration  level  of  acetone 
contained  in  them  strongly  varies.  We  assume  5-
10%  of  all  acetone  in  the  EU  is  sold  to  general 
households  directly  or  used  to  produce  consumer 
products. 

It is estimated that only about 5-10 kt nitromethane 
is  consumed  by  the  general  public,  predominantly 
as  racing  fuel  (another,  more  restricted  use  is  as 
amateur rocket propellant).  

Some of the fuel is sold as additive (e.g. to add to 
methanol), some already in a ready-to-use mixture. 
Internet  search  pointed  to  price  ranges  for  retail 
nitromethane 
fuel  between  7-12 
"mystery  shopping"  exercise,  we 

identified  a 

€/kg  (in 

the 

EN 

74 

EN

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Precursor 

Most 
consumer products 

significant 

Estimated  market  size  of 
base chemical 

Volume 

Value 
(producer 
price) 

Estimated 
proportion 
sold 
general 
public 

to 

Estimated 
volume 
consumer 
products 

of 

Estimated 
value 
consumer 
products29 

of 

Comments 

product for 11 €/kg – taken as an average price).  

>=30% 

<30% 

3-8 kt 

1.5-5 kt 

€33-88 
million 

€22-55 
million 

Hexamine 

40 kt 

€36 million 

0.1-0.3 kt 

€3-9 million 

Solid fuel tablets 

0.4-0.8 kt 

€0.36-0.72 
million 

25-40% 

0.1-0.3 kt 

€3-9 million 

(€110-220 
mn) 

(with linked 
products: 

€110-220 
mn) 

level.  We 

No  information  is  available  on  the  breakdown  by 
concentration 
50-80% 
nitromethane  is  sold  above  the  proposed  30/40% 
threshold  (we  have  found  products  in  50-70% 
concentration,  and  often  the  pure  form  as  an 
additive). 

assume 

Around  1-2%  of  hexamine  is  sold  as  solid  fuel 
tablets (measured in volume), the majority of which 
is sold to military and international organisations as 
field ration. Less than 1% of hexamine is available 
to the general public, nearly exclusively in the form 
of  solid  fuel  tablets  (Esbit  is  thte  market  leader  in 
Europe  with  an  estimated  sales  of  0.03-0.04  kt  to 
the  general  public).  The  overall  volume  was 
estimated at 0.1-0.3 kt. 

Our  "mystery  shopping"  exercise  has  identified 
cheaper  products  for  about  €10/kg  and  more 
expensive  ones  for  €30-50/kg.  We  calculate  with 
an average retail price of €30/kg. 

A 
range  of  consumer  products  depend  on 
hexamine  fuel  tablets  which  can  not  or  not  easily 
substituted  with  other  fuels  (e.g.  paraffin).  Annual 
sales  of  stoves,  coffe-makers  and  other  outdoor 
equipment  may  account  for  an  additional  €3-9 
million. The value of model engines at households 
and  schools  rendered  useless  may  reach  the 
range of ca. €100-200 mn. 

EN 

75 

EN

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Precursor 

Most 
consumer products 

significant 

Volume 

Estimated  market  size  of 
base chemical 

Estimated 
proportion 
sold 
general 
public 

to 

Estimated 
volume 
consumer 
products 

of 

Estimated 
value 
consumer 
products29 

of 

Comments 

Value 
(producer 
price) 

€288 
million 

4 kt N 

€1.4 million 

Nitric acid 

800 kt N 

solvents, 
Domestic 
household 
detergents 
(included  in  drain  cleaners 
etc.),  pH  adjusters  for  fish 
tanks 

>=30% 

<30% 

110-150 kt 

(3.5-3.7 kt N) 

110-150 kt 

(3.5-3.7 kt N) 

€550-800 
million 

€550-800 
million 

0.4-1.2 kt 
N 

€0.1-0.4 
million 

2.8-3.6 kt 
N 

€1-1.3 
million 

70-80% 

2.5-9 kt 

(0.3-1 kt N) 

80-90% 

100-146 kt 

(2-3 kt N) 

€38-130 
million 

€500-730 
million 

industry, 
is  very  widely  used 
Nitric  acid 
household  use  in  comparison  is  very  low,  below 
1%. We assume a share of 0.5%. 

in 

In  the  "mystery  shopping"  exercise  we  found  that 
household  cleaning  products  above  the  proposed 
30%  concentration  threshold  –  some  in  near  pure 
form – are widely available (average concentration 
level:  50%).  We  assume  they  account  for  ca.  10-
30%  of  all  household  sale  of  nitric  acid.  In  the 
majority of consumer and hobby goods NA is only 
a  less  significant  component  and  has  an  average 
concentration of about 10%. The conversion factor 
between kt and kt N is 0.2233. 

We  assume  that  70-80-90%  of  these  products  is 
bought by the general public. 

We  identified  a  price  range  of  about  6-22  €/kg 
(average:  15  €/kg)  for  the  concentrated  products. 
General domestic cleaning products may cost less, 
about €5/kg. 

Sulphuric acid 

solvents, 
Domestic 
household 
detergents 
(included  in  drain  cleaners 
etc.),  pH  adjusters  for  fish 
tanks 

7,150 kt 
SO2 

€ 515 
million 

36 kt N 

€2.63 million 

EN 

30 kt SO2 

€1,680-2,570 
million 

We  estimate  that  about  0.5%  of  sulphuric  acid  is 
used in households as strong solvents/detergents. 

€1,650-2,500 
million 

Household use of SA is estimated to be below 1%. 
We assume a share of 0.5%. 

330-460 kt 

(28-32 kt 
SO2) 

76 

EN

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Precursor 

Most 
consumer products 

significant 

>=50% 

<50% 

Estimated  market  size  of 
base chemical 

Volume 

4-11 kt N 

25-32 kt N 

Value 
(producer 
price) 

€0.3-0.8 
million 

€1.8-2.4 
million 

Estimated 
proportion 
sold 
general 
public 

to 

Estimated 
volume 
consumer 
products 

of 

Estimated 
value 
consumer 
products29 

of 

Comments 

70-80% 

6-22 kt 

(2.5-9 kt SO2) 

80-90% 

310-450 kt 

(20-29 kt 
SO2) 

€90-330 
million 

€1,550-2,250 
million 

Lead-acid batteries 

- 

- 

- 

5-10 kt 

(1.2-2.4 kt 
SO2) 

€35-70 
million 

The mystery shoppers found many products above 
the  proposed  50%  concentration 
threshold 
(average  concentration  level  set  at  60%).  These 
are estimated to account to ca. 10-30% of sales to 
the  general  public.  SA  below 
threshold 
(cleaning  products)  has  an  average  concentration 
level of ca. 10%. The conversion factor between kt 
and kt N is 0.6532. 

the 

We  assume  that  70-80-90%  of  these  products  is 
bought by the general public. 

We  identified  a  price  range  of  about  5-25  €/kg 
(average:  15  €/kg)  for  the  concentrated  products. 
General domestic cleaning products may cost less, 
about €5/kg. 

Lead-acid batteries are widely used in vehicles and 
industrial  facilities.  The  general  public  uses  them 
mostly  in  private  cars  and  other  motor  vehicles 
(there  are  other  rare  household  applications  as 
well). These batteries normally contain somewhere 
around  2  to  4  litres  (average:  3)  of  electrolyte 
solution  (often  a  mix  of  33.5%  sulphuric  acid  and 
distilled water, about 4 kg). 

Eurostat  reports  that  the  number  of  cars  in  the 
EU27  was  466  per  1,000  in  2006  (about  233 
million in total). If all of these cars were private and 
all had SA-containing batteries, this would effect an 
existing  stock  of  about  930  kt  electrolyte,  and  325 
kt SA (corresponding to ca. 231 kt SO2 (conversion 
factor 0.6532).  

However,  this  has  to  be  rarely  replaced  and  if  so, 
then in a car mechanic workshop by professionals. 

EN 

77 

EN

 
  
Precursor 

Most 
consumer products 

significant 

Estimated  market  size  of 
base chemical 

Volume 

Value 
(producer 
price) 

Estimated 
proportion 
sold 
general 
public 

to 

Estimated 
volume 
consumer 
products 

of 

Estimated 
value 
consumer 
products29 

of 

Comments 

Hydrochloric acid 

2,750 kt 
HCl 

€ 228 
million 

solvents, 
Domestic 
household 
detergents 
(included  in  drain  cleaners 
etc.),  pH  adjusters  for  fish 
tanks 

13.8 kt HCl 

€ 1.14 
million 

79-107 kt 

(10-12 kt 
HCl) 

79-107 kt 

(10-12 kt 
HCl) 

>=20% 

<20% 

2.8-5.5 kt 
HCl 

8-11 kt HCl 

€0.2-0.5 
million 

€0.7-0.9 
million 

70-80% 

6-15 kt 

(2-4 kt HCl) 

80-90% 

66-99 kt 

(7-10 kt HCl) 

€350-520 
million 

€350-520 
million 

€16-37 
million 

€330-500 
million 

We  calculate  with  an  annual  general  public 
consumption  of  5-10  kt  of  electrolyte.  Prices  for 
refill battery acid are in the magnitude of 5-10 €/kg 
(assumption: 7 €/kg). 

The  use  of  hydrochloric  acid  in  households  has 
been  estimated  to  be  around  0.5%  of  total  EU 
consumption. 

for 

A wide range of products above the proposed 20% 
concentration  threshold  –  or  in  pure  form  –  are 
available 
(average 
concentration  level:  30%).  They  may  account  for 
ca.  20-40%  of  all  household  sale  of  HCl  acid. 
Below  the  threshold,  the  average  concentration  is 
set at 10%. 

the  general  public 

Chlorates and perchlorates 

PC+PPC 
30 kt 

SC 100 kt 

SPC 5 kt 

€65 million 

Minimal 

Minimal 

We  assume  that  70-80-90%  of  these  products  is 
bought by the general public. 

The normal price range for HCl acid is between 1-4 
€/kg (average: 2.5 €/kg) for concentrated products. 
General  domestic  cleaning  products  may  cost  on 
average about €5/kg. 

Pyrotechnics  have  been  identified  as  the  only 
significant  household  use 
for  chlorates  and 
perchlorates (sodium chlorate is now banned as a 
pesticide).  This  product  group  has  however  been 
omitted from the scope of the measures envisaged 

EN 

78 

EN

 
  
 
 
 
 
Precursor 

Most 
consumer products 

significant 

Estimated  market  size  of 
base chemical 

Volume 

Value 
(producer 
price) 

Estimated 
proportion 
sold 
general 
public 

to 

Estimated 
volume 
consumer 
products 

of 

Estimated 
value 
consumer 
products29 

of 

Comments 

Specialty products 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

as  access  by 
regulated. 

the  general  public 

is  already 

Only  a  very  little  market  seems  to  exist  for 
specialty  products,  such  as  home-made  model 
rocket propellants. 

EN 

79 

EN

 
  
 
 
Table 8.3 Estimated volume and value of products sold to the general public (by 
thresholds) 

Precursor 
(threshold %) 

Estimated volume of consumer 
products 

Estimated value of consumer products 

Most 
significant 
consumer 
products 

Ammonium 
nitrate  (fertiliser) 
(16% N from AN) 

High-
concentration  AN-
fertilisers 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

44-100 kt 
N 

25-57 kt N 

17-48 kt N 

€380-530 
million 

€26-59 
million 

€350-480 
million 

20-40 kt N 

20-40 kt N 

- 

Component 
mixtures 

in 

19-54 kt N 

5-17 kt N 

12-42 kt N 

Component 
retail 
tablets or similar 

in 
fertilisers: 

Sodium 
(8% 
nitrate) 

N 

nitrate 
from 

164-185 kt 

- 

164-185 kt 

(5.4-6 kt N 
from AN) 

(5.4-6 kt N 
from AN) 

1.5-4 kt N 

0.4-0.8 kt N 

1-3 kt N 

Component 
mixtures 

in 

1.5-4 kt N 

0.4-0.8 kt N 

1-3 kt N 

Food  preservative 
(100%) 

0.015-
0.025 kt N 

0.015-0.025 
kt N 

Potassium 
nitrate 
from nitrate) 

(8%  N 

8-22 kt N 

2-5 kt N 

6-18 kt N 

Component 
mixtures 

in 

8-22 kt N 

2-5 kt N 

6-18 kt N 

Food  preservative 
(100%) 

0.015-
0.025 kt N 

0.015-0.025 
kt N 

Calcium  nitrate 
(8% 
from 
N 
nitrate) 

Component 
in 
mixtures  and  CN 
AN double salt 

6-17 kt N 

2-4 kt N 

4-14 kt N 

6-17 kt N 

2-4 kt N 

4-14 kt N 

Hydrogen 
peroxide  

(12% H2O2) 

Hair  and 
bleaching 
products 

Household 
bleaching 
products 

EN 

11-18 kt 
H2O2 

4-8 kt H2O2 

6-11 kt 
H2O2 

tooth 

55-85  kt 

0.7-2.7 kt 

53-84 kt 

(4-7 kt 
H2O2) 

(0.1-0.4 kt 
H2O2) 

textile 

9-11 kt 

(3-4 kt 

9-11 kt 

(3-4 kt 

(4-6 kt 
H2O2) 

- 

80 

€13-26 
million 

€52-160 
million 

€310-350 
million 

€13-26 
million 

€10-33 
million 

- 

- 

€38-132 
million 

€310-350 
million 

€6-18 
million 

€2-5.5 
million 

€4-12 
million 

€5-14 
million 

€1-3.5 
million 

€30-83 
million 

€29-79 
million 

€1-3.5 
million 

€31-85 
million 

€31-85 
million 

€1,750-
2,900 
million 

€1,085-
1,720 
million 

€86-114 
million 

€0.9-2 
million 

€1-3.5 
million 

€6-15 
million 

€5-11 
million 

€1-3.5 
million 

€5-12 
million 

€4-12 
million 

€23-70 
million 

€23-70 
million 

€25-75 
million 

€5-12 
million 

€25-75 
million 

€130-250 
million 

€13-53 
million 

€86-114 
million 

€1,650-
2,700 
million 

€1,070-
1,680 
million 

- 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Precursor 
(threshold %) 

Estimated volume of consumer 
products 

Estimated value of consumer products 

Most 
significant 
consumer 
products 

Household 
cleaning  products 
(drain 
cleaner, 
dishwashing 
detergents etc.) 

Pool  and  fish  tank 
disinfectants 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

H2O2) 

44-74 kt 

(3-4 kt 
H2O2) 

H2O2) 

2-6 kt 

(0.5-2 kt 
H2O2) 

40-72 kt 

(2-4 kt 
H2O2) 

€442-743 
million 

€17-58 
million 

€400-720 
million 

1.5-4 kt 

1.5-4 kt 

- 

(0.5-1.5 kt 
H2O2) 

(0.5-1.5 kt 
H2O2) 

€10-30 
million 

€10-30 
million 

- 

Pharmaceutical 
products,  creams 
and 
antiseptic 
solutions 

10-20 kt 

(0.5-1 kt 
H2O2) 

- 

10-20 kt 

(0.5-1 kt 
H2O2) 

Acetone 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

polish 

Nail 
removers, 
cosmetic  solvents, 
household 
cleaning  products, 
solvents 
(superglue 
remover) 
other 
products 

and 
consumer 

€150-300 
million 

- 

€150-300 
million 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion 
euros 

Multiple 
billion euros 

Multiple 
billion euros 

Multiple 
billion euros 

Nitromethane 
(30%) 

Racing  car 
fuel 
(‘top fuel’ for nitro-
engines) 

5-10 kt 

3-8 kt 

1.5-5 kt 

5-10 kt 

3-8 kt 

1.5-5 kt 

€ 55-110 
million 

€ 55-110 
million 

Hexamine 

0.1-0.3 kt 

0.1-0.3 kt 

- 

€3-9 million 

(with linked 
products: 
€110-220 
mn) 

€33-88 
million 

€33-88 
million 

€3-9 
million 

(€110-220 
mn) 

Solid fuel tablets  

0.1-0.3 kt 

0.1-0.3 kt 

- 

€3-9 million 

€3-9 million 

€22-55 
million 

€22-55 
million 

- 

- 

(consumer 
market) 

Nitric acid (30%) 

110-150 
kt 

(3.5-3.7 kt 
N) 

(with linked 
products: 
€110-220 
mn) 

(€110-220 
mn) 

2.5-9 kt 

100-146 kt 

(0.3-1 kt N) 

(2-3 kt N) 

€550-800 
million 

€38-130 
million 

€500-730 
million 

Domestic 
solvents, 

EN 

110-150 kt 

2.5-9 kt 

100-146 kt 

€550-800 

€38-130 

€500-730 

81 

   EN 

 
Precursor 
(threshold %) 

Estimated volume of consumer 
products 

Estimated value of consumer products 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

Total 

Above 
threshold 

Below 
threshold 

(3.5-3.7 kt 
N) 

(0.3-1 kt N) 

(2-3 kt N) 

million 

million 

million 

Most 
significant 
consumer 
products 

household 
detergents 
(included  in  drain 
cleaners  etc.),  pH 
adjusters  for  fish 
tanks 

Sulphuric 
(50%) 

acid 

30 kt SO2 

6-22 kt 

315-460 kt 

(2.5-9 kt 
SO2) 

(21-31 kt 
SO2) 

330-460 kt 

6-22 kt 

310-450 kt 

(28-32 kt 
SO2) 

(2.5-9 kt 
SO2) 

(20-29 kt 
SO2) 

€1,680-
2,570 
million 

€1,650-
2,500 
million 

€90-330 
million 

€90-330 
million 

€1,580-
2,320 
million 

€1,550-
2,250 
million 

5-10 kt 

- 

5-10 kt 

(1.2-2.4 kt 
SO2) 

(1.2-2.4 kt 
SO2) 

79-107 kt 

6-15 kt 

66-99 kt 

(10-12 kt 
HCl) 

(2-4 kt HCl) 

(7-10 kt 
HCl) 

79-107 kt 

6-15 kt 

66-99 kt 

(10-12 kt 
HCl) 

(2-4 kt HCl) 

(7-10 kt 
HCl) 

€35-70 
million 

- 

€35-70 
million 

€350-520 
million 

€16-37 
million 

€330-500 
million 

€350-520 
million 

€16-37 
million 

€330-500 
million 

Domestic 
solvents, 
household 
detergents 
(included  in  drain 
cleaners  etc.),  pH 
adjusters  for  fish 
tanks 

Lead-acid 
batteries 

Hydrochloric 
acid (20%) 

Domestic 
solvents, 
household 
detergents 
(included  in  drain 
cleaners  etc.),  pH 
adjusters  for  fish 
tanks 

and 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Chlorates 
perchlorates 
(40%) 

Specialty products 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

Minimal 

TOTAL 

- 

- 

- 

€5,000-
7,800 
million 

€450-1,150 
million 

€4,500-
7,000 
million 

EN 

82 

   EN 

 
 
EN 

83 

   EN 

 
ANNEX  9:  DETAILED  ASSESSMENT  TABLES  FOR  EACH  POLICY  OPTION: 
GENERAL ASSESSMENT  

In the  tables  below, several  of  the assessment criteria are accompanied by  a ‘rating’,  which 
‘scores’ the policy options from -3 (very negative impact) to +3 (very positive impact). The 
explanations  for  the  ratings  are  elaborated  in  the  respective  assessment  of  each  criterion. 
These ratings compare the policy options with the status quo option.   

of 

General assessment 

POLICY OPTION 0 – 
STATUS QUO 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectivenes
s  
Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
No changes to the current situation will be made. All effects have been rated as ‘0’. The problems that have 
been  identified  in  section  2 will  continue  to  exist.  Given  that  the  effects  identified  are  highly  similar  for  all 
precursor groups, no precursor-specific assessments have been provided. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
0 
1.1 To restrict access to 
certain  precursors  by 
the general public 

The general public will continue to have access to precursors. In at 
least  five  Member  States  such  access  is  either  restricted  or 
controlled  through  legislative  measures  (DK,  DE,  IE,  NL,  UK). 
Voluntary industrial action will also continue 
The  general  public  will  continue  to  have  access  to  high 
concentrations of precursors. Terrorists will continue to make use 
of  chemicals  to  produce  homemade  explosives  and  improvised 
explosive  devices.  In  the  past  few  years  nearly  50  attacks  were 
carried out, failed or were prevented from happening. 

0 

0 

‘home 

reduce 

1.2  To 
the 
reliability  and  potency 
made’ 
of 
or 
explosives 
components 
manufactured 
for 
malicious  or  criminal 
purposes 
1.3  To  enhance 
the 
security  and  awareness 
of 
the  entire  supply 
chain of precursors 
prevent 
1.4 
To 
terrorists 
and  other 
criminals  from  making 
use  of  lower  control 
fewer 
levels 
and 
on 
restrictions 
chemicals 
some 
countries 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts 
on 
administrative costs for 
business and authorities 
Compliance  costs  for 
business and authorities 

in 

0 

0 

0 

Economic impacts 

0 

Little changes will occur. Existing EU and national measures will 
make  a  further  contribution  to  awareness  and  security  levels. 
However, such measures will by no means cover all precursors or 
all industrial stakeholders. 
Under the Status Quo, all current differences in the restriction and 
control  levels  in  the  EU  will  continue  to  exist.  This  means  that 
terrorists, to obtain higher quantities or higher concentrations of a 
certain  precursors,  can  ‘select’  the  countries  in  which  such 
purchases are least likely to raise any suspicions. 

No impacts on administrative costs for businesses and authorities 
other than those already occurring. 

No  compliance  costs  for  businesses  and  authorities  other  than 
those  in  Member  State  which  already  have,  in  particular 
legislative, measures in place. 
No  additional  economic  impacts.  The  current  economic  crisis  is 
likely to negative affect the entire chemical supply chain. 

Article  16  Freedom  to  No change to the existing situation. 

EN 

84 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
No change to the existing situation. 

to 

conduct a business 
Article  17  Right 
property 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts 
market 

labour 

on 

0 

Impacts 
health 

on 

public 

0 

Other impacts 
Article  8  Protection  of 
personal data 
21 
Article 
discrimination 
Assessment of environmental impacts 

Non-

0 
No change to the existing situation. 

No change to the existing situation. 

No  effects,  other  than  those  already  occurring  as  a  result  of 
relevant  measures  in  place  in  some  Member  States  and  those 
generated by the economic crisis overall. 
Terrorist attacks will contribute to casualties and to the perception 
of  insecurity  by  the  general  public.  Other  EU  developments  may 
help to prevent, detect and respond to terrorist attacks. 
No change to the existing situation. 

0 

No change to the existing situation. 

No change to the existing situation. 

0 

Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key 
risks, 
uncertainties,  political 
and technical feasibility 
necessary 
and 
preconditions 
to 
achieve impacts. 
EU added value  

Further developments in EU policy, for example as part of the Action Plan on the 
Security of Explosives, both part of the wider EU strategy to combat terrorism will 
be taken forward. 
No need for changes to Community legislation. 

Stakeholder  consultation  has  shown  that  there  is  overall  consensus  on  the  need  to 
restrict and control access to precursors. Most were hence not in favour of the Status 
Quo. 

Need  for  changes  in 
Community legislation 
by 
raised 
Issues 
Member  States 
and 
stakeholders  
Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
Under the Status Quo, the risk of terrorist attacks using IEDs / HMEs will continue to exist, with the likelihood 
of such incidents increasing in frequency and / or lethality. The level of awareness and security of the chemical 
supply  chain  may  slightly  increase  as  a  result  of  current  and  upcoming  international,  EU  and  national 
measures,  but  terrorists  would  continue  to  make  use  of  lower  restrictions  and  control  standards  in  other 
countries.  The  Status  Quo  will  have  no  economic  effects  other  than  those  already  occurring.  Social  effects 
could  be  negative,  as  a  result  of  casualties  caused  by  terrorist  incidents  and  an  increased  perception  of 
insecurity. The Status Quo was not supported by the stakeholders consulted as part of the study. In fact, most 
considered that there was a strong rationale for action at EU level and agreed on the need to control and restrict 
access to precursors. 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

POLICY OPTION 1 
–  A  total  ban  on 
the 
sales 
of 
substances 
to 
the 
members  of 
public, 
general 
irrespective 
of 
concentration 
levels. 

Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
The policy option would imply that all selected precursors, either in their pure form or in any products, would 

EN 

85 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

POLICY OPTION 1 
–  A  total  ban  on 
the 
sales 
of 
substances 
to 
the 
members  of 
public, 
general 
irrespective 
of 
concentration 
levels. 

no  longer  be  available  to  the  general  public  (i.e.  consumers,  household  users).  Manufacturing  of  certain 
products for the consumer market and sales of the substances to the general public will no longer be allowed. 
Possibly  the  possession  of  the  substances  by  the  general  public  could  also  be  forbidden.  It  would  require  a 
judgement as to when a product should be banned. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
+3 
1.1  To  restrict  access 
to  certain  precursors 
by the general public 

of 

+1 

+2 

1.2  To  reduce 
the 
reliability 
and 
‘home 
potency  of 
made’  explosives  or 
components 
manufactured 
for 
malicious  or  criminal 
purposes 
1.3  To  enhance  the 
and 
security 
the 
awareness 
entire supply chain of 
precursors 
1.4 
prevent 
To 
terrorists  and  other 
from 
criminals 
making  use  of  lower 
control 
levels  and 
fewer  restrictions  on 
in  some 
chemicals 
countries 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts 
on 
administrative  costs 
for 
and 
business 
authorities 

+2 

-3 

Compliance  costs  for 
business 
and 
authorities 

-3 

Economic impacts 

-3 

It  will  be  impossible  for  the  general  public  to  purchase  certain 
precursors  through  retail  (and  other  downstream)  channels  in  the 
EU.  It  may  still  be  possible  to  obtain  the  chemical  substances 
through downstream seller channels (e.g. under false pretences as 
a company or “opportunistic” sales by the latter) or through other 
illegal approaches (e.g. theft). 
The  policy  option  would  make  it  very  difficult  for  persons  to 
access the precursors most often used for making HMEs or IEDs. 
There  is  a  potential  displacement  effect  (e.g.  greater  attention  to 
other  chemicals  that  can  also  serve  to  produce  improvised 
explosive  devices  and  which  are  still  available  on  the  consumer 
market). 

The  ban,  which  will  raise  a  high  level  of  attention,  is  likely  to 
make  other  supply  chain  stakeholders  also  aware  of  the potential 
risks when trading such chemicals between professional users. 

The  ban  would  be  EU  wide,  meaning  that  terrorist  and  other 
criminals  would  no  longer  be  able  to  purchase  the  chemical 
substances  through  retail  and  other  downstream  channels  in  the 
EU.  If  possession  of  the  substance  is  not  rendered  illegal,  then 
precursors could also be purchased from sellers in third countries 
(also through the internet). 

Given  the  importance  of  compliance,  implementation  of  the 
restrictions will involve administrative costs to businesses. These 
are  estimated  to  range  from  €8 0-126  million  per  annum;  and  a 
one-off cost of €40-63. They cover providing information for their 
prospective buyers, providing proof of legitimate professional use, 
registry keeping, collecting and checking reports. 
Compliance costs to business are estimated to be between 120-189 
million euro per annum, and a one-off cost of 80-126 million euro. 
A  ban  would  involve  a  sophisticated  mechanism  identifying  the 
products to be restricted, exemptions, the circle of economic actors 
affected,  control  of  imports  and  related  market  surveillance 
activities etc. 
Overall, consumer products with an estimated total value ranging 
from  5,000  to  7,800  million  euros  (not  counting  acetone-
containing  products,  themselves  worth  an  additional  several 
billion euros) will be banned from the market. Businesses selling 
to the general public will have to withdraw products intended for 

EN 

86 

   EN 

 
 
of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

POLICY OPTION 1 
–  A  total  ban  on 
the 
sales 
of 
substances 
to 
the 
members  of 
public, 
general 
irrespective 
of 
concentration 
levels. 

non-professional  consumers  from  the  market  (restricting  their 
business), replacing the precursors with alternatives It is estimated 
that the consumer surplus lost will amount to some €1,800-2,900 
million  per  year  and  businesses  will  lose  profit  of  about  €1,500-
2,400 million per year. 

Article  16  Freedom 
to conduct a business 

Article  17  Right  to 
property 

Businesses which highly depend on the production and sale of the precursors to the 
general  public  will  suffer  and  may  need  to  cease  activities  or  downscale.  The  ban 
therefore could therefore, to some extent, restrict the freedom to conduct a business. 
In order to alleviate these effects, a ‘phasing out’ period could be established. 
As highlighted above, the policy option would leave companies with a large stock of 
produced goods which would need to be destroyed, dependant on possible transitional 
measures. 

Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts  on 
market 

labour 

-1 

Impacts  on  public 
health 
Other impacts 

+1 

-2 

No effect 

Article  8  Protection 
of personal data 
Article 
discrimination 
Assessment of environmental impacts 

21  Non-

No effect 

The ban would effectively remove a myriad of products from the 
consumer market. This may lead to some businesses, e.g. retailers 
having to cease their activities and the related loss of jobs. Some 
(mainly  short-term)  new  employment  opportunities  within  pubic 
authorities, control and enforcement agencies, etc. 
Some  increased  perception  of  safety  and  possibly  a  reduction  in 
loss of lives. 
A  high  level  of  inconvenience  and  some  social  unrest,  as 
consumers would no longer have access to a range of products. 

Neutral effect. 

-2 

risks, 

0 
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key 
uncertainties, 
political and technical 
feasibility 
and 
necessary 
preconditions 
achieve impacts. 
EU  added  value  and 
rationale 

to 

While  a  ban  on  the  precursors  is  technically  feasible  for  all 
chemicals,  for  most  of  them  such  measure  would  have  serious 
negative  consequences,  both  in  terms  of  economic  and  social 
effects,  as  most  chemicals  are  widely  used  and  many  cannot  be 
fully replaced. 

The introduction of a ban in one or more Member States would only lead to distortion 
of  the  internal  market  and  persons  still  purchasing  the  chemicals  in  other  countries. 
The political feasibility of this Policy option is very low. None of the Member States 
have similar measures in place at present and most were strongly against any kind of 
ban. 
A ban would require a legislative instrument, as well as a mechanism or and process, 
similar  to  what  already  happens  in  the  health  and  environmental  safety  areas  (for 
example,  the  authorisation  system  part  of  REACH  and  its  annexes),  to  select  those 
products  that  should  be  banned  and  those  which  should  be  exempted  from  such 
restrictions. 
None of the Member States and industrial stakeholders consulted as part of the study 
considered  this  an  acceptable  Policy  option.  The  businesses  which  took  part  in  the 
survey considered policy option 1 the most ‘negative’ measure. 

Need  for  changes  in 
Community 
legislation 

raised 

Issues 
by 
Member  States  and 
stakeholders  

EN 

87 

   EN 

 
 
 
of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

POLICY OPTION 1 
–  A  total  ban  on 
the 
sales 
of 
substances 
to 
the 
members  of 
public, 
general 
irrespective 
of 
concentration 
levels. 

Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
The Policy option has the highest score on achieving the policy objectives, but its feasibility and acceptability 
are among the lowest levels. In addition, some negative social effects and potential tension with fundamental 
rights  have  been  identified;  it  is  questionable,  in  particular,  whether  a  total  ban  on  sales  to  members  of  the 
general public could be considered compatible with the principle of proportionality 

POLICY OPTION 2 
–  A  ban  on  sales 
of  the  substances 
in 
all 
concentrations 
and 
over the internet 

quantities 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
The Policy option would ban all sales to the general public made over the internet. The share of internet sales 
(against sales on business premises, i.e. physical shops) of the precursor groups is relatively common for some 
chemical products (e.g. fertilisers, hydrogen peroxide, acetone, hexamine fuel tablets, etc); While internet sales 
of others are less frequent (e.g. chlorates and perchlorates). Overall e-commerce statistics show that it is a sales 
channel  which  is  increasing  in  volume  every  year.  From  2006  to  2008, the  share  of  all  EU  consumers  who 
have  bought  at  least  one  item  over  the  internet  has  increased  significantly  (from  27%  to  33%)  While  cross 
border e-commerce is stable (6% to 7%)30. The share of internet sales in the retail sector varies greatly by type 
of  seller.  DYI  shops,  for  example,  who  sell  large  shares  of  the  precursor  groups  addressed  by  the  Policy 
option, are still behind other types of sellers when it comes to offering products online (even though this sales 
channel is on the rise). Overall, It is assumed that on average, only about 0.5% of the goods in question is sold 
online when sales to the general public is concerned. This share would be banned under this policy option. As 
for Policy option 1 which proposes a ban on all sales, Policy option 2 also entails a judgement as to when a 
product should be banned from internet sales. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1  To  restrict  access 
+1 
to  certain  precursors 
by the general public 

One sales channel would be restricted to the general public, but all 
other  sales  channels  would  still  be  open.  For  some  chemical 
substances,  the  ban  on  internet  sales  would  hamper  access  more 
(e.g.  beauty  products  including  hydrogen  peroxide  or  acetone) 
than for others. 
While  the  ban  on  internet  sales  may  have  a  slightly  deterrent 
effect, terrorists and other criminals determined to by the chemical 
substances will simply turn to other sales channels. 

the 
1.2  To  reduce 
and 
reliability 
potency  of 
‘home 
made’  explosives  or 
components 
manufactured 
for 
malicious  or  criminal 
purposes 
1.3  To  enhance  the 
and 
security 
the 
awareness 

of 

0 

+1 

A  total  ban  of  internet  sales  would  at  least  raise  awareness  of 
online retailers and other downstream sellers on security issues in 
relation to the products they trade in.  

30  

Special Eurobarometer 298, October 2008 

EN 

88 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

POLICY OPTION 2 
–  A  ban  on  sales 
of  the  substances 
in 
all 
concentrations 
and 
over the internet 

quantities 

0 to +1 

entire supply chain of 
precursors 
prevent 
To 
1.4 
terrorists  and  other 
criminals 
from 
making  use  of  lower 
levels  and 
control 
fewer  restrictions  on 
chemicals 
in  some 
countries 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts 
on 
administrative  costs 
for 
and 
business 
authorities 

-1 

Compliance  costs  for 
business 
and 
authorities 

-1 

Economic impacts 

-1 

Article  16  Freedom 
to conduct a business 

Article  17  Right  to 
property 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts  on 
market 

labour 

-1 

Impacts  on  public 
health 
Other impacts 

0 

-1 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

An  EU  level  playing  field  would  be  created  for  internet  sales  of 
the  precursor  groups,  while  leaving  business  premise  and  other 
distance  sales  unaffected.  This  means  that  terrorists  and  other 
criminals  can  still  benefit  from  lower  control  levels  and  fewer 
restrictions in some countries. 

Internet  retailers  will  face  a  range  of  administrative  costs. 
Depending  on  national  implementation,  they  will  be  most 
probably  obliged  to  provide  information  for  visitors/prospective 
buyers on the restrictions in their standard terms and elsewhere on 
the website. Estimated cost to business: €20-32 million per annum 
and an additional €40-63 million one-off cost. 
Public  authorities  might  have  to  keep  a  register  of  specialised 
Internet sellers and collect and compile reports from vendors. 
Businesses  with  Internet  retail  activities  (including  producers, 
general  and  specialist  retailers)  will  have  to  cease  selling  all 
restricted  products  B2C.  This  might  affect  a  huge  range  of 
products.  Estimated  cost  to  business:  €40-63  million  per  annum, 
and an additional €40-63 million one-off cost. 
It is estimated that about 24-38 million euro million euro worth of 
consumer  products  currently  sold  online  will  be  affected. 
Merchants (and eventually producers) engaged in Internet sales to 
the  general  public  will  lose  part  of  their  revenues.  Businesses 
might  expect  a  loss  of  profit  of  only  about  €12-38  million 
altogether. Consumer surplus of about €8-13 million. 

Those who  exclusively  sell  online  or  those  who depend to  a high  extent  on  internet 
sales  are  significantly  affected.  Their  specific  freedom  to  conduct  that  type  of 
business  /  to  use  that  type  of  sales  channel  would  be  affected.  This  effect  could  be 
partly remediated by a ‘phasing out’ period. 
The  policy  option  would  close  one  sales  channel.  Companies  depending  on  this 
channel will have to deal with their stock. 

The ban would effectively remove a myriad of products from the 
online  consumer  market.  This  may  lead  to  some  online  retailers 
having to cease their activities and the related loss of jobs. Public 
authorities  may  need,  initially,  need  more  human  resources  to 
prepare for the internet ban, but this would be a short-term effect. 
No effect. 

to 

Some negative impact as for a range of products, consumers will 
to  business  premises.  This  causes  high 
have 
inconvenience  for  less  mobile  consumers  and  those  living  in 
remote areas. 

travel 

Article  8  Protection 
of personal data 

Enforcement  agencies  will  need  to  control  transactions  (as  well  as  the  details  of 
buyers and sellers) in order to enforce the internet ban. This would necessarily imply 
the  collection  and  processing  of  personal  data.  To  be  lawful,  this  processing  shall 
comply with national data protection laws implementing EU data protection law. (e.g. 

EN 

89 

   EN 

 
 
POLICY OPTION 2 
–  A  ban  on  sales 
of  the  substances 
in 
all 
concentrations 
and 
over the internet 

quantities 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

21  Non-

Article 
discrimination 
Assessment of environmental impacts 

Directive 95/46/EC). 
Less  mobile  consumers  and  those  living  in  remote  locations  would  suffer  higher 
levels of inconvenience. 

The  implementation  of  a  ban  on  internet  sales  would  be 
technically  unfeasible,  especially  because  the  products  could  still 
be purchased through other sales channels or in third countries. 

Neutral effect. 

-3 

risks, 

0 
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key 
uncertainties, 
political and technical 
feasibility 
and 
necessary 
preconditions 
achieve impacts. 
EU  added  value  and 
rationale 

to 

Need  for  changes  in 
Community 
legislation 

raised 

Issues 
by 
Member  States  and 
stakeholders  

The Policy option only bans a very specific sales channel, leaving it up to the Member 
States to regulate all other sales channels in line with existing EU legislation and their 
own  priorities.  This  could  still  lead  to  internal  market  issues.  Measures  restricting 
internet transactions are impossible to implement without continuous monitoring and 
control.  There  is  also  a  potential  grey  zone  as  to  what  constitutes  an  internet  sales 
transaction. 
A ban would require a legislative decision, for example in the form of a regulation or 
directive.  More  importantly,  a  ban  will  require  the  creation  of  a  mechanism  and 
(continuous)  process  to  select  those  products  which  would  need  to  be  banned  and 
those which should be exempted from such restrictions. In addition, the ban on online 
sales would also require changes to existing EU legislation. 
While the majority of Member States considered a ban on internet sales desirable or at 
least  potentially  useful  and  effective,  all  countries  consulted  agreed  that  such  a  ban 
was  technically  unfeasible, would  entail  very  high  costs and would potentially  have 
negative  social  consequences.  Stakeholders  during  the  workshop  considered  that  if 
such a ban was applied, it would need to cover all forms of distance selling (e.g. mail 
orders)  and  not  just  the  internet.  Several  mentioned  that  the  internet  was  the  only 
channel  with  a  minimum  form  of  control  and  hence  far  less  likely  to  be  used  by 
terrorists  to  purchase  precursors.  Nearly  a  quarter  (24%)  of  the  respondents  to  the 
business survey considered that the policy option would lead to a reduction of sales. 

Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
Banning  the  sales  of  the  precursor  groups  via  one  sales  channel  only  does  not  strongly  contribute  to  the 
achievement of the policy objectives, as the products would still be available through other sales channels and 
from third country internet sellers. The ban on internet sales would overall have negative economic and social 
effects.  The  EU  rationale  for  this  type  of  measure  is  not  very  high.  The  Policy  option  is  also  deemed 
technically unfeasible, with many preconditions. 

POLICY OPTION 3 
–  A  ban  on  sales 
the  general 
to 
the 
if 
public 
substance 
is 
above  a  specific 
concentration 
level. 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 

EN 

90 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY OPTION 3 
–  A  ban  on  sales 
the  general 
to 
the 
public 
if 
substance 
is 
above  a  specific 
concentration 
level. 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

This  Policy  option  would  imply  that  the  general  public  would  not  have  access  any  longer  to  the  selected 
precursors  (or  mixtures  containing  these  precursors)  above  a  pre-defined  concentration  level.  ammonium 
nitrate:  16%  N;  alkali  nitrates:  8%N;  hydrogen  peroxide:  12%;  acetone:  no  threshold;  nitromethane:  30%; 
hexamine:  no  threshold;  nitric  acid:  30%;  sulphuric  acid:  50%;  hydrochloric  acid:  20%;  chlorates  and 
perchlorates: 40%.31  
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1  To  restrict  access 
+2 
to  certain  precursors 
by the general public 

The Policy option entail that the general public would still be able 
to  buy  the  selected  precursors  (or  products)  with  a  lower 
concentration  or  at  very  similar  but  slightly  lower  concentration. 
However, an important number of products which are widely used 
and popular among consumers will no longer be accessible. While 
several  of  them  can  be  replaced  by  alternatives,  others  require  a 
high concentration of the selected precursors in order to keep their 
essential properties. 
The  risk  of  terrorists  accessing  the  selected  precursors  in  high 
concentrations  would  be  reduced,  thus  lowering  the  potency  and 
reliability of HMEs and IEDs. it It would not make it impossible, 
as  some  lower  concentrated  precursors  (e.g.  ammonium  nitrate) 
can still be used for bomb-making. 

The policy option could increase the awareness and control level 
among  supply  chain  actors.  While  some  of  the  precursors  are 
covered  by  the  EU  drug-precursor  legislation,  others  are  covered 
by health and safety legislation and/or other national measures set 
up  at  Member  State  level.  It  may  cause  some  cause  confusion 
among    some  supply  chain  actors  (e.g.  retailers)  which  sell  a 
variety of chemical products simultaneously. 
As the ban above certain thresholds would be EU-wide, terrorists 

+1.5 

+1 

the 
1.2  To  reduce 
and 
reliability 
potency  of 
‘home 
made’  explosives  or 
components 
manufactured 
for 
malicious  or  criminal 
purposes 
1.3  To  enhance  the 
and 
security 
awareness 
the 
entire supply chain of 
precursors 

of 

1.4 

To 

prevent  +1.5 

31  

ammonium nitrate: 16% N from ammonium nitrate  (the sale to the general public is already 

hydrogen peroxide: 12% (recommended by the SCP in its 2008 Annual Report, examples for 

alkali nitrates: 8% N from nitrate (this is the concentration level more or less corresponding to 

The thresholds selected for the individual precursors were the following: 
- 
banned by Commission Regulation 552/2009, effective from 27 June 2010) 
- 
the 16% N threshold for ammonium nitrate) 
- 
national restrictions: DK, DE) 
- 
acetone: no threshold 
- 
nitromethane: 30% (recommended by SCP in its 2008 Annual Report, existing threshold in the 
Netherlands) 
- 
- 
existing threshold in Denmark) 
- 
existing threshold in Denmark) 
- 
hydrochloric acid: 20% (recommendation emerged from meetings with SCP members in 2009) 
-        chlorates  and perchlorates:  40% (recommendation  emerged from  meetings  with SCP  members  in 
2009, existing threshold in Denmark). 

hexamine: no threshold 
nitric  acid:  30%  (recommendation  emerged  from  meetings  with  SCP  members  in  2009, 

sulphuric  acid:  50%  (recommendation  emerged  from  meetings  with  SCP  members  in  2009, 

EN 

91 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

POLICY OPTION 3 
–  A  ban  on  sales 
the  general 
to 
the 
public 
if 
substance 
is 
above  a  specific 
concentration 
level. 

terrorists  and  other 
from 
criminals 
making  use  of  lower 
control 
levels  and 
fewer  restrictions  on 
in  some 
chemicals 
countries 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts 
on 
administrative  costs 
for 
and 
business 
authorities 

-1 

Compliance  costs  for 
business 
and 
authorities 

-2 

Economic impacts 

-2 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

would  no  longer  be  able  to  purchase  highly  concentrated 
precursors in the EU. 

Traders will be likely – depending on national implementation – to 
be  obliged  to  provide  information  to  their  prospective  buyers  on 
the  restrictions  concerning  concentration  levels  in  their  standard 
terms  and  in  additional  information  material.  They  might  also 
have  to  submit  reports  to  public  authorities  on  how  they  are 
complying with the legal requirements.  
It is estimated that the administrative burden would be in the order 
of  €6-16  million  euro  per  annum,  and  a  one-off  cost  of  €40-63 
million.  Administrative  costs  will  be  imposed  also  on  public 
authorities. 
Producers  of  products  sold  to  the  general  public  will  have  to 
reduce  the  concentration  level.  This  may  not  be  viable  in  certain 
cases (e.g. hexamine fuel tablets, car battery acid) and alternatives 
will  have  to  be  used.  Retail  traders  will  have  to  verify  that 
products above threshold are bought for professional consumption 
only.  Public  authorities  will  also  incur  certain  implementation 
costs. 
The cost estimate is 9-24 million euro. An additional one-off cost 
of €80-126 million is also expected. 
The value of goods sold to the general public above the thresholds 
is estimated at about €450-1,150 million. The overall consumption 
of  the  precursors  may  not  change  dramatically;  non-professional 
use only accounts to about 1-5% of total EU consumption for the 
chemicals  concerned.  More  significant  consequences  might  be 
experienced by manufacturers of consumer products, as they will 
need to adjust the production processes and packaging of products 
intended for non-professional use. Some producers where reduced 
concentration  levels  are  not  a  feasible  option  might  leave  the 
market  or  have  to  diversify.  Indirectly,  certain  manufactured 
products  which  use  the  restricted  products  (e.g.  model  steam 
engines using Hexamine fuel tablets) will be rendered useless. The 
overall  retail  sales  of  products  to  general  public  will  not  change 
considerably  for  most  consumer  products,  as  either  alternatives 
will  replace  the  restricted  products,  or  more  of  diluted  chemicals 
will be bought to compensate for lower concentration levels. The 
detrimental effects will be relatively higher for SMEs. 
The loss of profit overall is estimated to be €130-330 million per 
year. 
Consumers will in general be able to access diluted versions or – if 
these  are  not  a  feasible  option  –  suitable  alternatives  (save  for  a 
few products such as Hexamine fuel tablets), however, these might 
be less effective or more expensive. 

EN 

92 

   EN 

 
 
POLICY OPTION 3 
–  A  ban  on  sales 
the  general 
to 
the 
public 
if 
substance 
is 
above  a  specific 
concentration 
level. 

Article  16  Freedom 
to conduct a business 

Article  17  Right  to 
property 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

Overall,  the  consumer  surplus  lost  will  amount  to  an  estimated 
€230-560 million per year. 

While some businesses could still trade in products with lower concentrations, other 
businesses  would  not  be  able  to  produce  or  trade  in  alternative  lower  concentrated 
products with the same desired qualities. In order to alleviate these effects, a ‘phasing 
out’ period could be established. 
The policy option would leave companies with a stock of produced goods with high 
concentration levels which would need to be destroyed or sold to professional users. 
Certain  production  processes  would  have  to  be  stopped  –  this  would  render  certain 
machinery and related infrastructure useless. Setting concentration levels would also 
mean that certain products would no longer be available on the market, which would 
make  it  difficult  for  the  general  public  to  access  certain  consumer  goods  and  thus 
properly use their possessions. Measures to mitigate these negative effects should be 
considered, such as a ‘phasing out’ period. 

Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts  on 
market 

labour 

-0.5 

Impacts  on  public 
health 

+1 

Other impacts 

-1 

No effect.  

Article  8  Protection 
of personal data 
Article 
discrimination 
Assessment of environmental impacts 

21  Non-

No effect.  

The ban on precursors above pre-defined thresholds would remove 
a  certain  number  of  widely  used  products  from  the  consumer 
market.  Some  manufacturers  producing  for  the  general  public  as 
well as distributors and retailers may have to reduce their activity 
and downsize their staff. The preparation of the ban would require 
public authorities to allocate additional staff, however this would 
be only in the short-term. 
A  ban  according  to  pre-defined  thresholds  would  reduce  the 
potency of HMEs and IEDs, as the latter would be less powerful 
or  become  much  more difficult  to  make.  Consumer  safety  would 
also be improved. 
A ban above certain thresholds would lead to some inconvenience 
for consumers.  

0 

In some cases, consumers would have to use greater quantities of 
the  same  product  in  lower  concentration  in  order  to  obtain  the 
desired  effect.  However,  this  would  be  mitigated  by  decreased 
consumption (and pollution) of highly concentrated precursors. 

+2 

risks, 

Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key 
uncertainties, 
political and technical 
feasibility 
and 
necessary 
preconditions 
achieve impacts. 

to 

The proposed ban is technically feasible for an important number 
of precursors. It may be less feasible for some selected precursors, 
which are only effective in high concentrations (e.g. hexamine) or 
which  are  widely  used  in  high  concentrations  in  some  popular 
products  (e.g.  hydrogen  peroxide  in  hair-dyeing  products).  Their 
ban would possibly cause a high level of inconvenience among the 
public. This policy option achieves a fair score with regard to its 
political  feasibility  of,  as  several  Member  States  have  similar 
provisions  in  place  or  have  expressed  their  interest  in  such 
measures.  However  none  of  the  Member  States  consulted  have 
measures covering all the selected precursors 
The  rationale  for  applying  a  ban  above  certain  thresholds  is  strong.  Indeed,  the 
effectiveness  of  the  ban  (i.e.  preventing  terrorists  from  taking  advantage  of  lower 

EU  added  value  and 
rationale 

EN 

93 

   EN 

 
 
 
POLICY OPTION 3 
–  A  ban  on  sales 
the  general 
to 
the 
public 
if 
substance 
is 
above  a  specific 
concentration 
level. 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

raised 

Need  for  changes  in 
Community 
legislation 
by 
Issues 
Member  States  and 
stakeholders  

control levels) can only be achieved if the latter is applied across all Member States 
and in a uniform fashion (i.e. same thresholds). 
The  ban  above  certain  thresholds  would  require  a  legislative  initiative  (e.g. 
Regulation,  Directive).  This  would  also  require  a  mechanism  for  selecting  the 
products that should be banned and those that can be marketed for consumers. 
This  policy  option  was  deemed  overall  acceptable  by  most  Member  States  and 
stakeholders.  Although  its  deterrent  effect  was  acknowledged,  some  Member  States 
(notably  with  an  important  history  of  terrorist  attacks)  noted  that  concentration 
thresholds would only raise the bar for terrorists but would not prevent the making of 
HMEs  and  IEDs.  Some  niche  industries/businesses  would  be  severely  impacted 
though, as some products cannot offer the same properties and effectiveness based on 
lower concentrations. 
Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
The technical and political feasibility of this policy option is overall high, while it achieves a fairly good rating 
with regard to the achievement of the policy objectives. It should be noted that this policy option only lowers 
the risk of terrorists accessing highly concentrated precursors and devising HMEs and IEDs, however it does 
not  address  the  issue  of  HMEs  and  IEDs  made  with  low-concentrated  precursors  (or  precursors  which  have 
been re-concentrated). 

POLICY  OPTION 
4a – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

A  ban  on  sales  to 
minors 

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
Policy  option  4a  includes  the  measures  proposed  in  Policy  option  3  (i.e.  the  introduction  of  threshold 
concentration levels) and proposes a ban on sales to minors. More specifically, the SCP has recommended that 
nitrates/nitrogenous  fertilisers  and  nitromethane  should  not  be  sold  to  minors.    Several  Member  States  have 
adopted measures banning the sales of certain precursors to minors (e.g. DE).  
Policy  option  4a  makes  sense  in  a  safety  rather  than  a  security  perspective.  It  should  be  noted  that  all 
assessments  start  with  the  rating  and  assessment  of  Policy  option  3  as  a  minimum  and  assess  whether  the 
cumulative  effect  of  Policy  option  4a  further  improves  or  deteriorates  the  situation.  Policy  options  4a  -  d 
should therefore be read in conjunction with Policy option 3. 
Given that the effects of Policy option 4a are identical for all precursor groups, only the general assessment 
sheet has been completed for this Policy option. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
+2 
1.1  To  restrict  access 
to  certain  precursors 
by the general public 

The  policy  option  would  completely  ban  access  to  the  selected 
precursors by minors. Existing legislation in some Member States 
already  bans  the  sale  of  some  precursors  (e.g.  chlorates  and 
perchlorates)  to  minors  from  a  safety  perspective.  Adults  (who 
account for a larger share of the EU population) would still be able 
to access the precursors below the defined threshold.  
As minors would not be able to access these precursors, unless via 
illicit  means,  there  is  a  reduced  risk  of  minors  making  highly 
potent  and  reliable  IEDs.  However,  this  policy  option  does  not 
adequately address the issue of “terrorist” purpose.  

+1.5 

1.2  To  reduce 
the 
reliability 
and 
‘home 
potency  of 
made’  explosives  or 

EN 

94 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
POLICY  OPTION 
4a – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

A  ban  on  sales  to 
minors 

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

of 

+1 

+1.5 

components 
manufactured 
for 
malicious  or  criminal 
purposes 
1.3  To  enhance  the 
and 
security 
the 
awareness 
entire supply chain of 
precursors 
1.4 
prevent 
To 
terrorists  and  other 
criminals 
from 
making  use  of  lower 
control 
levels  and 
fewer  restrictions  on 
in  some 
chemicals 
countries 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts 
on 
administrative  costs 
for 
and 
business 
authorities 
Compliance  costs  for 
and 
business 
authorities 

-2 

-2 

Economic impacts 

-2 

This  policy  option  would  increase  the  level  of  awareness  among 
supply  chain  actors  and  notably  retailers  with  regard  to  minors 
using precursors with a criminal purpose.  

The  policy  option  would  potentially  prevent  minors  having 
criminal  intentions  from  smuggling  the  selected  precursors  from 
other  Member  States  were  restrictions  may  be  laxer.  However, 
minors with criminal or ‘experimental’ intentions often operate in 
the domestic market. 

Slightly  higher  administrative  costs  than  under  Policy  option  3. 
Young buyers will have to provide identification of their age. 

Retailers will have to ask for identification of young buyers of the 
products  of  question  (irrespective  of  concentration  level).  This 
may  be  very  onerous  in  most  retail  outlets  and  not  feasible  for 
certain  product  categories  (e.g.  cosmetics  containing  acetone  or 
HP). Shops might de-list most of the products concerned to avoid 
compliance requirements. Internet retailers also need to verify the 
buyers’ age, which will be a complex process. 
Producers and retailers of certain products that are often bought by 
minors (e.g. cosmetics containing acetone or HP) may lose a share 
of  their  business.  Minors  as  consumers  will  not  have  access  to 
products such as cosmetics. 

Little effect, as the share of sales to minors is estimated to be small, thus not affecting 
businesses in their activities. 
No effect. 

Article  16  Freedom 
to conduct a business 
Article  17  Right  to 
property 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts  on 
market 

labour 

-0.5 

Impacts  on  public 
health 

+1 

Other impacts 

-1 

Public  authorities  carry  out  information  campaigns  and  other 
information  activities  vis-à-vis  retailers  and  sellers  and  would 
need  to  categorise  those  products  which  should  be  banned  for 
minors. This could potentially require some additional resources. 
Positive effect. Each year, Member States record cases of minors 
attempting  to  make  IEDs  and  other  pyrotechnics,  which  often 
result in serious injuries or even life losses. By banning access to 
the  selected  precursors,  this  policy  option  would  increase  the 
safety of minors (and possibly other individuals). Nonetheless, this 
policy  option  will  not  decrease  the  potency  and  reliability  of 
HMEs and IEDs made by terrorists with the intention to carry out 
deadly attacks. 
The negative impact under this policy option would mainly relate 
to  the  fact  that  minors  would  no  longer  access  the  selected 

EN 

95 

   EN 

 
 
POLICY  OPTION 
4a – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

A  ban  on  sales  to 
minors 

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

precursors.  The  inconvenience  could  be  somehow  important 
among  farmers’  families,  where  the  division  of  labour  assigns 
young  people  with  the  task  of  picking  up  fertilisers  on  their 
parents’ behalf.  
However,  in  many  Member  States,  the  sale  of  some  of  the 
precursors  is  already  banned  for  minors  (e.g.  strong  acids  are 
considered  as  poisonous  substances  under  the  health  and  safety 
legislation), therefore the impact will remain limited.  

Article  8  Protection 
of personal data 
Article 
discrimination 

21  Non-

No effect. 

This policy ban would de facto provide for a difference of treatment between adults 
and minors. However, many legislative measures often make such a distinction based 
on  valid  grounds  (e.g.  safety  perspective  for  individuals  who  are  not  yet  fully 
responsible). 

Assessment of environmental impacts 

No effect. 

+2 

risks, 

0 
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key 
uncertainties, 
political and technical 
feasibility 
and 
necessary 
preconditions 
achieve impacts. 
EU added value 

to 

Member  States  such  as  the  Netherlands  and  France  have 
highlighted  that  accidents  involving  minors  using  precursors  to 
make  IEDs  and  other  pyrotechnics  are  an  important  safety  issue. 
However, this problem does not seem to bear a link with terrorism 
as such..  

Need  for  changes  in 
Community 
legislation 
Issues 
by 
Member  States  and 
stakeholders  

raised 

There  is  a  rationale  for  introducing  an  EU-wide  ban  as  some  countries  have 
introduced bans on selected precursors 
New Community legislation would need to include a special provision related to the 
sale to minors. 

There is a consensus among Member States and industry stakeholders that this policy 
option  is  out  of  the  scope  of  this  impact  assessment.  Member  States  have  already 
implemented  various  awareness  campaigns  to  prevent  the  sale  to  minors,  and  this 
policy option addresses safety concerns but not security concerns.   
Moreover, Member States have varying definitions and age limits for defining minors, 
and this policy option may prove impossible to implement.    

Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
This  policy  option  does  not  provide  any  added-value  to  the  achievement  of  the  policy  objectives.  Its  main 
benefit  is  increased  safety  for  minors  (and  possibly  other  individuals),  but  it  has  no  impact  on  the  policy 
objectives and the issue of terrorism. 

EN 

96 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
POLICY  OPTION 
4b – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

higher 
of 
Sales 
concentrations  than 
those allowed under 
through 
option  3, 
either 
system 
a 
licences 
which 
retailers,  or  through 
a 
system  which 
licences 
consumers. 

Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
Policy option 4b includes the measures proposed as part of Policy option 3 (i.e. the introduction of threshold 
concentration levels) and proposes that sales of higher concentrations are either made through a system which 
either licenses retailers, or through a system which licenses consumers for ‘justified’ use.  

Under  scenario  1,  i.e.  the  licensing  system  for  retailers,  retailers  would  need  to  apply  for  a  license,  which 
would involve the checking of their ‘reliability’ and an obligation to record all sales of higher concentrations. 
The general public needs therefore would not need to register and the seller should ascertain that there appear 
to be no grounds for suspecting unauthorised use or resale. A similar system is currently in place in DE as part 
of the Chemical Ordinance for nine chemical substances.  

Under scenario 2, all retailers could still sell higher concentrations, but consumers would need to apply for an 
license with the competent authorities (the police or local authorities), similar to what is in place in DK and IE. 
The license provided states the use, the quantity required and has a limited duration. Any possession without a 
license would be illegal. 

It  is  noted  that  all  assessments  start  with  the  rating  and  assessment  of  Policy  option  3  as  a  minimum  and 
subsequently determine whether the cumulative effect of Policy option 4b further improves or deteriorates the 
situation. It is therefore important that Policy options 4a-d are read in conjunction with Policy option 3. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1  To  restrict  access 
to  certain  precursors 
by the general public 

+1.5 / +2 

Under this policy option, consumers would not be deprived from 
obtaining chemicals in higher concentrations for legitimate use. As 
a  result,  there  is  a  higher  probability  that  consumers  will  access 
these  precursors,  notably  those  in  higher  concentrations.  The 
Policy  option  would  therefore  be  particularly  relevant  for  the 
precursor  groups  containing  chemical  substances  which,  in  low 
concentration  levels,  would  be  ineffective  in  products,  such  as 
some  hydrogen  peroxide  and  acid  applications,  nitromethane, 
hexamine and chlorates and perchlorates, 
Restrictions under scenario 1 would still provide easier access than 
under  scenario  2.  Under  scenario  1,  retailers  selling 
the 
concentrations would be better monitored but it would be up to the 
seller to determine whether a buyer has legitimate reasons. Under 
scenario  2,  the  legitimacy  of  access  for  each  single  consumer 
would  be  checked  by  competent  authorities.  This  may  have  a 
deterrent and thus more restrictive effect. 
The  impacts  are  the  same  as  described  under  Policy  option  3. 
However,  as  higher  concentrations  would  still  be  available,  there 
is  a  slightly  higher  chance  that  terrorists  and other  criminals  will 
access  these.  The  licensing  system  for  retailers  under  scenario  1 
will  act  as  a  deterrent,  but  it  will  not  be  fully  fraud-proof.  The 
licensing  system  for  consumers  under  scenario  2  will  exercise  a 
higher level of control and may be more difficult to circumvent. 

Under both scenarios, the level of awareness and security among 

+0.5 / +1 

the 
1.2  To  reduce 
and 
reliability 
‘home 
potency  of 
made’  explosives  or 
components 
manufactured 
for 
malicious  or  criminal 
purposes 
1.3  To  enhance  the  +2 / +2 

EN 

97 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
POLICY  OPTION 
4b – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

higher 
of 
Sales 
concentrations  than 
those allowed under 
through 
option  3, 
either 
system 
a 
licences 
which 
retailers,  or  through 
a 
system  which 
licences 
consumers. 

+1.5 / +1.5 

of 

and 
security 
awareness 
the 
entire supply chain of 
precursors 
1.4 
prevent 
To 
terrorists  and  other 
criminals 
from 
making  use  of  lower 
levels  and 
control 
fewer  restrictions  on 
chemicals 
in  some 
countries 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts 
on 
administrative  costs 
for 
and 
business 
authorities 
Compliance  costs  for 
business 
and 
authorities 

-1.5 

-2 

Economic impacts 

-1.5 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

all supply chain operators will be increased. Sellers and their staff 
would pay increased attention to their customers, and could even 
‘voluntary’ notify the police in case of suspicious transactions, as 
they would be more informed of the potential risks. 
The  lowering  of  concentration  levels  in  open  sales  channels  and 
controlled  sales  of  higher  concentration  levels  will  create  an  EU 
level playing field, both preventing internal market distortion and 
avoiding that persons can make use of lower standards in other EU 
Member  States.  A  necessary  pre-condition  for  ensuring  a  level 
playing  field  within  the  EU  is  that  the  licensing  system 
implemented  in  the  EU  for  higher  concentrations  be  harmonised 
across all EU Member States. 

Additional  administrative  cost  for  businesses  and  government 
authorities  (applying  for  permits  and  keeping  registers  under 
scenario  1  or  verifying  consumer  licences  under  scenario  2)  of 
about €10-30 million above Policy option 3. 
Additional  compliance  costs  in  connection  with  developing  and 
adopting  procedures  and  rules  with  dealing  with  licences    of  an 
estimated €10-30 million in total. 

Public authorities maintaining the licensing and reporting scheme 
will incur an additional cost of about €1.80 million per year. 
Loss of profit for businesses – on the assumption that half of the 
goods previously sold above threshold will continue to be sold to 
registered/legitimate  buyers  from  the  general  public  -  will  be 
lower than under option 3, estimated to be at €65-155 million per 
year.  Consumer  surplus  lost  will  amount  to  only  an  estimated 
€115-280  million  annually.  Scenario  2  requires  a  common  EU-
wide  scheme,  setting  down  common  requirements  for  obtaining 
such licenses and ensuring that any license issued in any Member 
State would be valid for purchases in any other Member State. 

Article  16  Freedom 
to conduct a business 

The  requirements  linked  to  the  licensing  system  might  possibly  restrict  the 
possibilities to conduct a business, as they may exclude those with insufficient means 
to  run  a  similar  system.  The  requirements would  therefore  need  to  be designed  in  a 
way to allow that any business, independent of its size, to be able to obtain a public 
license. Under scenario 2, the freedom to conduct a business will not be affected. 
No effect. 

Article  17  Right  to 
property 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts  on 
market 

labour 

+0.5 / +1 

The potential negative effects described as part of Policy option 3 
would be in part offset by allowing businesses to still trade higher 
concentrated  chemical  substances.  Producers  and  other  supply 
chain  stakeholders  manufacturing  highly  concentrated  products 
(and  related  items)  can  continue  their  activities,  albeit  to  a  lesser 

EN 

98 

   EN 

 
 
 
POLICY  OPTION 
4b – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

higher 
of 
Sales 
concentrations  than 
those allowed under 
through 
option  3, 
either 
system 
a 
licences 
which 
retailers,  or  through 
a 
system  which 
licences 
consumers. 

Impacts  on  public 
health 

+0.5 / +0.5 

Other impacts 

0 / -0.5 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

extent. Scenario 1 could potentially have a more negative effect on 
the labour market, as the burden related to obtaining a license and 
recording sales may be considered too high (e.g. staff training, IT 
resources for recording sales, processing costs).  

Under  scenario  2,  no  significant  impact  on  the  labour  market  is 
expected. Under both scenarios, competent authorities would need 
more  human  resources  for  setting  up,  running  and  enforcing  the 
licensing system. 
While  the  Policy  option  would  reduce  the  possibility  of  terrorist 
attacks  involving  HMEs  and  IEDs  based  on  the  precursors,  the 
fact  that  higher  concentrations  would  still  be  available  in  a 
controlled  environment  could  somewhat  increase  the  chances  of 
them being used.  
Neutral to minor negative impact.  
The  inconvenience  experienced  by  some  consumers  due  to  the 
unavailability  of  chemical  products  with  higher  concentrations 
would  to  a  large  extent  be  addressed  by  making  these  available 
through the licensing system. This would be particularly useful for 
products which would be ineffective in lower concentrations.  
Under both scenario 1 and 2, the licensing system would need to 
ensure  the  proper  protection  of  personal  data,  thus  avoiding  the 
mishandling  by  sellers  (e.g.  sale  to  third  parties,  loss  of  data)  or 
public authorities (e.g. use of personal data for other purposes).  
Under  scenario  2,  consumers  would  face  a  certain  level  of 
inconvenience,  as  they  would  have  to  apply  and  obtain  a  license 
from the competent authorities. It is particularly important that the 
criteria  for  granting  licenses  be  explicit  and  non-discriminatory 
(e.g.  not  based  on  ethnicity  or  other  similar  considerations).  In 
addition, scenario 2 requires a common EU-wide scheme. 

Article  8  Protection 
of personal data 

This  licensing  systems  imply  processing  of  personal  data  and  have  to  comply  with 
national DP law implementing EU DP law. Any instrument proposing either two of 
these systems should therefore provide with specific rules setting out the specific and 
explicit  purpose  for  the  processing,  the  retention  periods  or  the  personal  data  to  be 
processed  so  as  to  comply  with  the  necessity  and  proportionality,  and  other  data 
protection principles. 
Both systems considered could potentially give rise to discriminatory practices, when 
determining whether a consumer should be allowed to make a purchase. 

21  Non-

Article 
discrimination 
Assessment of environmental impacts 

0 

The potential negative consequences outlined under Policy option 
3  would  in  part  be  reduced  by  the  availability  of  higher 
concentrations  of  the  chemical  products.  However,  it  is  still 
expected  that  consumers  would,  for  the  sake  of  simplicity,  make 
more  use  of  products  with  lower  concentrations  (as  they  are 
available through all sales channels). 

EN 

99 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
POLICY  OPTION 
4b – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

higher 
of 
Sales 
concentrations  than 
those allowed under 
through 
option  3, 
either 
system 
a 
licences 
which 
retailers,  or  through 
a 
system  which 
licences 
consumers. 

+3 

risks, 

Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key 
uncertainties, 
political and technical 
feasibility 
and 
necessary 
preconditions 
achieve impacts. 

to 

The  political  feasibility  of  this  policy  option  is  high,  as  several 
Member  States  have  similar  provisions  in  place.  Moreover,  this 
policy  option  seems  desirable  and  politically  acceptable,  as  an 
overwhelming  majority  of  Member  States  and 
industry 
representatives have expressed their interest in such measures.  
Any licensing scheme developed at EU level would need to ensure 
even  implementation  across  the  EU.  The  requirements  for 
businesses under scenario 1 and the criteria for granting licenses to 
consumers under scenario 2 would need to be clearly defined. One 
of the caveats is that the licensing system for consumers may pose 
an  issue  with  internet  and  distance  sellers,  which  would  need  to 
ensure a proper processing and checking of the licenses displayed 
by consumers. 

EU added value  

Need  for  changes  in 
Community 
legislation 

raised 

Issues 
by 
Member  States  and 
stakeholders  

The EU rationale for introducing thresholds on concentration levels for open sales and 
restricting  and  controlling  sales  on  higher  concentrations  is  high,  as  differences  in 
national  approaches  would  lead  to  market  distortion  and  displacement  effects. 
Scenario  2  may  be  problematic  with  regard  to  cross-border  sales,  unless  Member 
States authorities issue EU-wide recognised licenses. 
The policy option would require a legislative decision (a directive or regulation) and a 
mechanism  for  selecting  the  products  that  can  be  openly  sold  and  those  subject  to 
restrictions.  The  policy  option  would  also  require  the  creation  of  an  EU-wide 
licensing system. 
The  overwhelming  majority  of  Member  States  as  well  as  a  substantial  share  of 
industry representatives expressed their support for this policy option.  
Industry representatives emphasised that scenario 1 (i.e. licensing system for retailers) 
may  be  more  cumbersome  for  businesses  than  a  system  which  licenses  consumers. 
Under  scenario  2,  Member  States  raised  the  question  of  background  checks  for 
consumers applying for a license. 

Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
The Policy option overall receives higher scores than Policy option 3, given that it still provides access to the 
entire spectrum of chemical substances and products by proposing a controlled environment for the sales of 
those with high concentration levels. For some precursor groups, the Policy option is certainly more attractive 
than  for  others.  It  would  in  particular  be  effective  for  those  chemical  substances  and  products  which  would 
become ineffective as a result of the thresholds on concentration levels set as part of Policy option 3. It also 
received high stakeholders support. 
Ultimately, the development of an licensing system for consumers seems to be less costly than the licensing 
system  for  retailers,  and  also  the  most  effective  in  preventing  terrorists  from  accessing  higher  concentrated 
chemicals. The licensing system for consumers would strictly limit the sales of higher concentrated chemicals 
to a marginal number of consumers, who genuinely need those chemicals. It is expected that the monitoring of 
these consumers by competent authorities would also be easier, given their limited number. 

EN 

100 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
POLICY  OPTION 
4c – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

a 
of 

Introducing 
system 
reporting 
suspicious 
transactions 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
Policy option 4C includes the measures proposed as part of Policy option 3 (i.e. the introduction of threshold 
concentration  levels)  and  proposes  the  introduction  of  a  system  of  reporting  transactions.  The  Policy  option 
will require sellers to assess whether a certain order or transaction is suspicious and to take responsibility for 
notifying  the  competent  authorities  (e.g.  their  respective  retail  /  sector  association  or  law  enforcement 
agencies).  At  least  4  Member  States  have  introduced  systems  for  reporting  suspicious  transactions.  At  EU 
level, the drug precursor regulation has introduced a requirement to report suspicious transactions in acetone, 
sulphuric and hydrochloric acid (but the parameters are different). 
It  is  noted  that  all  assessments  start  with  the  rating  and  assessment  of  Policy  option  3  as  a  minimum  and 
subsequently determine whether the cumulative effect of Policy option 4c further improves or deteriorates the 
situation. It is therefore important that Policy options 4a-d are read in conjunction with Policy option 3. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1  To  restrict  access 
+2 
to  certain  precursors 
by the general public 

There is a chance that sellers of chemical substances and products 
may  refuse  orders  /  transactions  which  they  consider  suspicious, 
for ‘fear’ of possible repercussions, but this is not within the scope 
of the Policy option 
Very  positive  impact.  In  addition  to  placing  thresholds  on 
concentration levels, this Policy option would in addition request 
sellers  to  notify  suspicious  transactions.  This  will  have  both  a 
deterrent  effect  and  improve  the  chances  that  terrorists  and  other 
criminals are caught before they can fabricate HMEs and IEDs. 

of 

+3 

+1.5 

the 
1.2  To  reduce 
and 
reliability 
potency  of 
‘home 
made’  explosives  or 
components 
manufactured 
for 
malicious  or  criminal 
purposes 
1.3  To  enhance  the 
and 
security 
awareness 
the 
entire supply chain of 
precursors 
prevent 
To 
1.4 
terrorists  and  other 
criminals 
from 
making  use  of  lower 
levels  and 
control 
fewer  restrictions  on 
chemicals 
in  some 
countries 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts 
on 
administrative  costs 
for 
and 
business 
authorities 

-1.5 

+1 

Compliance  costs  for 
business 
and 
authorities 

-2.5 

The positive impact already accrued as part of Policy option 3 will 
be  further  strengthened,  as  a  result  of  the  notification  system. 
Retailers  and  other  downstream  sellers  will  be  informed  of  the 
need  to  report  on  suspicious  transactions  and  hence  their 
awareness levels and security will improve. 
The  lowering  of  concentration  levels  in  open  sales  channels  in 
combination  with  a  system  of  reporting  suspicious  transactions 
will  create  an  EU  level  playing  field,  both  preventing  internal 
market distortion and avoiding that persons can make use of lower 
standards in other EU Member States. 

In  addition  to  policy  option  3,  businesses  will  also  have  provide 
information on the new legal provisions to the general public (see 
“non  labelling  information  for  third  parties”.  The  number  of 
expected notifications is however likely to be low. The magnitude 
of costs is estimated to amount to about an additional 4-8 million 
euro for businesses. 
Especially larger retailers and producers also selling to consumers 
will  need  to  adopt  new  policies  and  tools  to  identify  suspicious 
transactions  (including  automated  Internet  sales),  train  their  staff 
and survey correct implementation. It will need considerable effort 
in  both  time  and  money  to  achieve  a  level  of  satisfactory 

EN 

101 

   EN 

 
 
POLICY  OPTION 
4c – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

a 
of 

Introducing 
system 
reporting 
suspicious 
transactions 

Economic impacts 

-2 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

compliance. Small shops will probably not invest in training, and 
they  normally  don’t  have  codified  business  practices  which  they 
needed to amend. 
Companies  selling  over  the  Internet  also  need  to  develop  new 
procedures and possibly buying new software detecting suspicious 
transactions. 
Estimated  total  costs  to  businesses  represent  an  additional  €16 
million per year . 
Public  authorities  will  have  to  maintain  a  central  hotline  or 
decentralised  contacts,  as  well  as  organise  training,  awareness 
raising  campaigns,  etc.  National  authorities  may 
incur  an 
additional cost of about €0.34 million per year. 
Wider  economic  impacts  (additional  to  policy  option  3)  on  retail 
traders  are  likely  to  remain  very  low:  some  retailers,  especially 
those  from  whom  the  products  in  question  only  represent  a 
negligible  share  of  sales,  might  opt  for  de-listing  the  products  in 
question rather than complying with the burdensome provisions. 

Article  16  Freedom 
to conduct a business 

Some minor additional limitations may apply as businesses would have to implement 
the system, which may pose a burden on their capacity. It must, therefore, be ensured 
that the system is designed in order to allow all businesses, independent of their size, 
to implement and apply it. 
No additional effects other those identified under policy option 3. 

Article  17  Right  to 
property 
Assessment of social impacts 
+0.5 
Impacts  on 
market 

labour 

Impacts  on  public 
health 

+1 

Other impacts 

0 

The potential negative effects on the labour market as described as 
part  of  Policy  option  3  may  be  in  part  offset  by  employment 
created  as  a  result  of  the  requirement  to  report  on  suspicious 
transactions and the need for national authorities to prepare for the 
new measure. 
In addition to the positive effects identified under Policy option 3, 
the  system  for  reporting  suspicious  transactions  would  further 
increase  the  possibility  of  detecting  and  preventing  terrorist 
attacks involving HMEs and IEDs. 
Some  inconvenience  given  that  some  products  will  no  longer  be 
available  on  the  EU  market  (as  they  will  be  ineffective  with  low 
concentration levels). 

Article  8  Protection 
of personal data 

Article 
discrimination 

21  Non-

Setting  up  a  system  of  reporting  suspicious  transactions  requires  the  processing  of 
personal data by sellers and to carry on an assessment of customers for the disclosure 
of  data  to  third  parties  who  will  also  process.  The  assessment  carried  out  by  sellers 
risks to be inappropriate if customers personal data will be disclosed to third parties, 
e.g. associations or law enforcement authorities (risk of blacklisting). This may imply 
a  serious  interference  with  private  life.  If  this  option  is  to  be  followed  it  will  be 
necessary  to  demonstrate  the  necessity  and  proportionality  of  this  processing  and 
provide particular rules relating to the specific and explicit purpose of the processing. 
The  system  of  reporting  suspicious  transactions  should  not  lead  to  overzealous, 
discriminatory reactions from businesses when identifying persons who in their view 
have  the  ‘physiognomy’  of  a  terrorist,  rather  than  identifying  persons  buying 
extraordinary quantities or showing clearly suspicious behaviour. 

Assessment of environmental impacts 

EN 

102 

   EN 

 
 
POLICY  OPTION 
4c – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

a 
of 

Introducing 
system 
reporting 
suspicious 
transactions 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

0 

The  impacts  on  the  environment  would  be  the  same  as  under 
policy option 3. 

+1.5 

risks, 

Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key 
uncertainties, 
political and technical 
feasibility 
and 
necessary 
preconditions 
achieve impacts. 
EU  added  value  and 
rationale 

to 

Important feasibility issues to be addressed relate to the potential 
overload of the system due to very high numbers of notifications 
and the operational setup. In order to ensure that the system would 
not affect privacy or trigger discrimination, it should be important 
for  it  to  be  ‘passive’,  hence  not  requiring  any  level  of 
investigation, surveillance or monitoring of customers. 

The EU rationale for introducing thresholds on concentration levels and a system for 
reporting suspicious transactions is high. The addition of the system strengthens the 
EU focus on security, as in some cases terrorist attacks or attempts to gain access to 
chemical substances and products could have been prevented if the seller had realised 
that  the  transaction  was  suspicious.  As  at  least  four  Member  States  have  similar 
measures  in  place.  The  policy  option  may  be  more  difficult  for  those  products  for 
which only relatively small quantities are needed to build an HME or IED. 
The Policy option would require a legislative decision, for example in the form of a 
regulation or directive, which would as a minimum set out the minimum operational 
requirements  and  suggestions  for  criteria  to  determine  whether  a  transaction  is 
suspicious. 
The  majority  of  Member  States  and  other  stakeholders  consulted  were  in  favour  of 
this  Policy  option.  Many  however  were  perhaps  more  in  favour  of  a  non-legislative 
measure, for example a programme either led by the State or based on self-regulation 
by industry, but were also willing to consider a legislative instrument. 

Need  for  changes  in 
Community 
legislation 

raised 

Issues 
by 
Member  States  and 
stakeholders  

Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
The  Policy  option  overall  receives  higher  scores  than  Policy  option  3,  given  that  it  adds  a  higher  level  of 
security to the sales of chemical substances and products. The feasibility of the Policy option is high as already 
several Member States have similar measures in place. Stakeholders consulted were indeed overall in favour of 
the Policy option. 
For some precursor groups, the Policy option is more useful than for others. With the reduced concentration 
levels, some chemical substances, such as strong acids, will have become less ‘reliable’ for making HMEs and 
IEDs. For these, establishing a system of reporting suspicious transactions may not be necessary. Others keep 
their dangerous characteristics or could be re-concentrated. For these, the proposed system is useful. 

EN 

103 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

POLICY  OPTION 
4d – A scheme for 
labelling 
precursors  with  a 
code 
specifying 
that  the  purchase 
may  be  subject  to 
registration, 
developing 
a 
system 
for 
recording 
the 
identity  of 
the 
buyer 
(including 
internet 
sales). 
should 
Records 
be  made  available 
to  competent  law 
enforcement 
authorities 

Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
Policy option 4d includes the measures proposed as part of Policy option 3 (i.e. the introduction of threshold 
concentration  levels)  and  proposes  the  introduction  of  a  labelling  scheme  and  a  registration  system  for 
recording  the  identity  of  the  buyer.  The  labelling  scheme  would  focus  on  warning  household  users  that  the 
purchase  may  be  subject  to  registration.  The  records  of  the  registration  system  would  need  to  be  made 
available to competent law enforcement authorities. 
A labelling scheme is passive. It should not draw attention to the reasons why registration may occur, in order 
to  avoid  ‘experimenting’  by  for  example  young  curious  people.  A  registration  system  for  low  chemical 
substances and products with low concentrations does not seem to be fully justified. It may make more sense 
to  register  sales  of  high  concentrations  (as  already  happens  in  Member  States  such  as  Germany).  This 
assessment  however  focuses  on  registering  low  concentrations,  as  Policy  option  4d  is  an  ‘add-on’  to  Policy 
option  3.  Finally,  using  a  registration  system  for  preventive  purposes  will  be  close  to  impossible  given  the 
amounts of records that will be created every day. Only a highly sophisticated online database may allow for 
direct  identification  of  transactions  which  are  suspicious  of  for  cross-references  (e.g.  many  small  purchases 
made by the same purpose in different locations). The registration scheme will therefore be mainly useful for 
investigative purposes after a terrorist event. 
It  is  noted  that  all  assessments  start  with  the  rating  and  assessment  of  Policy  option  3  as  a  minimum  and 
subsequently determine whether the cumulative effect of Policy option 4d further improves or deteriorates the 
situation. It is therefore important that Policy options 4a-d are read in conjunction with Policy option 3. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
+3 
1.1  To  restrict  access 
to  certain  precursors 
by the general public 

+3 

+2 

the 
1.2  To  reduce 
and 
reliability 
potency  of 
‘home 
made’  explosives  or 
components 
manufactured 
for 
malicious  or  criminal 
purposes 
1.3  To  enhance  the 
and 
security 
awareness 
the 
entire supply chain of 
precursors 

of 

1.4 

To 

prevent  +1 

The  policy  option would put in  place  accompanying  measures  to 
control access. There is a chance that, for chemical substances and 
products for which good alternatives are available, consumers will 
not want to register, as they consider it too much effort, but rather 
purchase the alternative. 
In  addition  to  placing  thresholds  on  concentration  levels,  this 
Policy option would in addition label the chemical substances and 
products  and  request  sellers  to  record  all  sales.  The  registration 
system will have a strong deterrent effect and improve the chances 
that  terrorists  and  other  criminals  are  caught  when  having 
undertaken  an  attack  with  HMEs  and  IEDs.  The  benefits  of  the 
labelling scheme are less evident. 

is 

likely 

to  become  aware,  as 
The  entire  supply  chain 
manufacturers will need to place the labels and retailer and other 
downstream  sellers  will  need  to  record  their  sales.  Hence 
awareness  levels  and  security  will  improve.  Awareness  levels  of 
other supply chain stakeholders are already reasonable as a result 
of other EU legislation. 
The  lowering  of  concentration  levels  in  open  sales  channels  in 

EN 

104 

   EN 

 
 
of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

POLICY  OPTION 
4d – A scheme for 
labelling 
precursors  with  a 
code 
specifying 
that  the  purchase 
may  be  subject  to 
registration, 
developing 
a 
system 
for 
recording 
the 
identity  of 
the 
buyer 
(including 
internet 
sales). 
should 
Records 
be  made  available 
to  competent  law 
enforcement 
authorities 

terrorists  and  other 
criminals 
from 
making  use  of  lower 
levels  and 
control 
fewer  restrictions  on 
chemicals 
in  some 
countries 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts 
on 
administrative  costs 
for 
and 
business 
authorities 

-3 

Compliance  costs  for 
and 
business 
authorities 

- 3 

Economic impacts 

-3 

combination with a labelling scheme and registration system will 
create  a  strong  EU  level  playing  field  both  preventing  market 
distortion  and  avoiding  that  persons  can  make  use  of  lower 
standards in other EU Member States. 

Significant  administrative  costs.  Retail  will  have  to  keep  records 
of the identity of all clients of the products in question and submit 
them on request to public administration. Recording the identity of 
clients  may  qualify  as  normal  business  practice  in  chemical 
wholesale/specialised distribution, but not in retail.  
The  public  labelling  provisions  will  need  to  be  monitored  by 
public authorities at a relatively large cost. 
Producers  /  packagers  of  consumer  products  will  need  to  change 
the  labels.  Retailers  will  need  to  amend  their  procedures 
accordingly to accommodate the labelling and registry scheme for 
both  online  and  business  premises  transactions.  They  also  will 
have  to  procure  appropriate  IT  tools  (covering  their  automated 
Internet sales as well) and train their staff. 
Integrating  a  procedure  of  checking  buyers’  identity  and  the 
validity  of  their  registration  will  require  considerable  time  and 
financial investment. A large proportion of retailers might find the 
registry  system  too  onerous  and  will  not  sell  the  relevant 
substances to the general public. 

Consumers  might  be  able 
to  access  certain  high-
concentration chemicals after registration. Also, the time and 
effort  needed  to  join  the  registration  scheme  will  be 
substantial  and  could  discourage  them  from  buying  the 
preferred chemicals. 

Article  16  Freedom 
to conduct a business 

For some businesses, the implementation and management of the registration system 
would  pose  an  additional  burden  which  may  make  it  difficult  for  them  to  conduct 
their  business.  It  must,  therefore,  be  ensured  that  the  system  is  designed  in  order  to 
allow all businesses, independent of their size, to implement and apply. 
No additional effects. 

Article  17  Right  to 
property 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts  on 

labour 

-1 

Policy  option  4d  would  worsen  the  negative  effects  of  policy 

EN 

105 

   EN 

 
 
POLICY  OPTION 
4d – A scheme for 
labelling 
precursors  with  a 
code 
specifying 
that  the  purchase 
may  be  subject  to 
registration, 
developing 
a 
system 
for 
recording 
the 
identity  of 
the 
buyer 
(including 
internet 
sales). 
should 
Records 
be  made  available 
to  competent  law 
enforcement 
authorities 

market 

Impacts  on  public 
health 

Other impacts 

Article  8  Protection 
of personal data 

Article 
discrimination 

21  Non-

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

+1 

option3, as some retailers and other downstream sellers would not 
be able to afford running the registration system. If their business 
highly depended on the sales of the precursors, they would suffer 
economic  losses  and  possibly  redundancies  as  a  result.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  development  of  a  labelling  scheme  may  create 
some  new  employment  at  the  level  of  producers.  Some  retailers 
and downstream sellers could hire new staff to manage the system. 
Public authorities may need, initially, need more human resources 
to prepare for the new measure. Control and enforcement agencies 
will also require additional human resources to check and follow 
up entries in the registration system. 
The  labelling  scheme  and  registration  system  would  have  a 
deterrent  effect,  thus  reducing  the  possibility  of  detecting  and 
preventing  terrorist  attacks  involving  HMEs  and  IEDs  based  on 
the precursors. 
Consumers  may  experience  higher  inconvenience  levels  when 
having  to  register  for  every  (small)  purchase  of  chemical 
substances or products. They may consider this very burdensome, 
especially as the system would apply to low concentration levels.  
This  option  will  imply  a  processing  of  personal  data  for  the  further  transmission  to 
law enforcement authorities. This processing shall be in compliance with national DP 
laws implementing EU DP law. This requires clear rules relating to the conditions for 
law  enforcement  authorities  to  access  personal  data,  strict  requirements  on  the 
specific  and  explicit  purpose  for  the  processing  by  buyers  and  law  enforcement 
authorities, retention periods and other safeguards.. 
The  registration  system  should  only  serve  to  record  personal  details,  without  any 
assessment  or  investigative  action  from  the  side  of  the  seller  as  to  whether  the 
transaction is valid or justified. 

-2 

Assessment of environmental impacts 

0 

Neutral  impact.  The  impacts  on  the  environment  would  be  the 
same as under Policy 3.  

-1 

risks, 

Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key 
uncertainties, 
political and technical 
feasibility 
and 
necessary 
preconditions 
achieve impacts. 

to 

There  is  a  risk  that  the  labelling  of  products  especially  when 
hinting at the fact that they may pose a security risk, would attract 
the wrong attention from young ‘experimenters’, for example. For 
some  products,  given  their  very  small  size,  labelling  will  be 
difficult  and  the  warning  may  go  unnoticed  when  the  indications 
are too small. The true effectiveness of adding a notice or warning 
that the purchase of the product could be subject to registration is 
somewhat  questionable.  Instead  of  labelling,  the  barcode  on 

EN 

106 

   EN 

 
 
 
of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

POLICY  OPTION 
4d – A scheme for 
labelling 
precursors  with  a 
code 
specifying 
that  the  purchase 
may  be  subject  to 
registration, 
developing 
a 
system 
for 
recording 
the 
identity  of 
the 
buyer 
(including 
internet 
sales). 
should 
Records 
be  made  available 
to  competent  law 
enforcement 
authorities 

products could be adapt to alert sellers to the need to register. This 
is also very expensive. 
with  regard  to  the  registration  system,  there  are  several  risks, 
uncertainties  and  preconditions.  Firstly,  the  usefulness  of  a 
registration  system  for  chemical  substances  and  products  in  low 
concentrations  may  pose  a  too  heavy  burden  on  both  businesses 
and household users. The amounts of data that will be entered in 
the  system  at  national  level  will  be  enormous  with  a  risk  of 
crashes and losses of information. It will be important to consider 
whether  the  registration  system  would  be  deemed  acceptable  by 
the  wider  public,  and  whether  it  is  proportional.  The  registration 
system would also require a specific mechanism to review whether 
a  product  should  be  subject 
labelling  and  registration 
requirements or not. 

to 

EU  added  value  and 
rationale 

Need  for  changes  in 
Community 
legislation 

raised 

Issues 
by 
Member  States  and 
stakeholders  

Differences in national approaches would lead to market distortion and displacement 
effects.  In  addition,  the  registration  system  strengthens  the  EU  focus  on  security, 
increasing the chances to identify and catch terrorists and other criminals. With regard 
to proportionality, the EU rationale is considered to be low. 
The Policy option would require a legislative decision, for example in the form of a 
regulation  or  directive.  This  would  also  need  to  cover  the  labelling.  A  more 
operational  framework  or  guidance  would  need  to  be  developed  on  the  minimum 
requirements of the registration system, what should be recorded, how this should be 
controlled, etc. 
The majority of Member States and other stakeholders did not consider Policy option 
4d  a  feasible  option  for  such  a  wide  range  of  precursors,  covering  a  multitude  of 
different  products  sold  by  a  variety  of  retailers  and  other  downstream  sellers. 
Labelling could attract the wrong attention. A barcode was considered possibly more 
appropriate.  Most  were  concerned  that  it  would  be  very  expensive  to  apply  to  all 
products  available  on  the  market.  Possibly  it  should  only  apply  to  products  with 
concentration  levels  above  the  thresholds  set.  Business  stakeholders  considered  that 
the option would add a significant burden. 

Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
The policy option would help in achieving the policy objectives, but is scores low in terms of feasibility and 
stakeholder support. The main weaknesses relate to its costs, the burden posed on businesses and consumers 
and its effectiveness. Such a ‘heavy’ system would not be justified, especially in the eyes of the general public, 
if its main purpose was limited to facilitating investigations only once an attack has taken place. It is therefore 
questionable whether the policy option is proportional. 
For  some  precursor  groups,  the  Policy  option  is  potentially  more  useful  than  for  others.  With  the  reduced 
concentration levels, some chemical substances, such as strong acids, will have become much less ‘reliable’ 
for making HMEs and IEDs. For these, establishing a labelling scheme and registration system would not be 

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of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

POLICY  OPTION 
4d – A scheme for 
labelling 
precursors  with  a 
code 
specifying 
that  the  purchase 
may  be  subject  to 
registration, 
developing 
a 
system 
for 
recording 
the 
identity  of 
the 
buyer 
(including 
internet 
sales). 
should 
Records 
be  made  available 
to  competent  law 
enforcement 
authorities 

necessary.  Others,  such  as  nitromethane  and,  depending  on  its  concentration  level,  hydrogen  peroxide,  keep 
their dangerous characteristics or could be re-concentrated. For these, the proposed system may be useful. 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

POLICY  OPTION 
5–  Policy  option  5: 
Taking  measure  to 
the 
enhance 
surveillance 
of 
use, 
professional 
including 
sub-
options such as: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

5.a  Promoting 
Codes 
of 
conduct 

5.b  Education 
and training 

5.c 
Raising 
staff awareness 

5.d  Addressing 
in 
particular 
medium / small 
users 

Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
This  policy  option  would  entail  the  introduction  of  one  or  several  non-legislative  measures  aiming  at 
enhancing the control and surveillance of the precursors market among all supply chain actors. To this end, the 
SCP  has  recommended  the  possible  adoption  of  Codes  of  Conduct,  education  and  training  measures  and 
campaigns  to  increase  awareness  among  supply  chain  operators.  The  proposed  measures  would  need  to 
address the specific concern of small and medium end-users. Several Member States (e.g. Germany, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Sweden and UK) have developed similar measures with various purposes. It should be noted that 
the majority of voluntary measures adopted by Member States generally cover several groups of precursors, 
with only a few specifically dedicated to specific precursors. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
+1.5 
1.1  To  restrict  access 
to  certain  precursors 
by the general public 

Positive  effect.  As  a  result  of  enhanced  awareness  among supply 
chain  operators  and  notably  retailers  and  end-user  sellers, 
businesses  may  be  encouraged  not  to  sell  the  selected  precursors 
to members of the public.  

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of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

POLICY  OPTION 
5–  Policy  option  5: 
Taking  measure  to 
the 
enhance 
surveillance 
of 
use, 
professional 
including 
sub-
options such as: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

5.a  Promoting 
of 
Codes 
conduct 

5.b  Education 
and training 

5.c 
Raising 
staff awareness 

5.d  Addressing 
particular 
in 
medium / small 
users 

0 

+2 

the 
1.2  To  reduce 
and 
reliability 
‘home 
potency  of 
made’  explosives  or 
components 
manufactured 
for 
malicious  or  criminal 
purposes 
1.3  To  enhance  the 
and 
security 
awareness 
the 
entire supply chain of 
precursors 

of 

+1 

To 

1.4 
prevent 
terrorists  and  other 
from 
criminals 
making  use  of  lower 
control 
levels  and 
fewer  restrictions  on 
in  some 
chemicals 
countries 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts 
on 
administrative  costs 
for 
and 
business 
authorities 
Compliance  costs  for 
and 
business 
authorities 

-0.5 

0 

In addition, as the proposed measures are voluntary, businesses are 
free  not  to  comply  with  the  requirements,  as  there  is  no  “hard” 
sanction for non-compliance.  
This policy option would not reduce the potency and reliability of 
HMEs or IEDs, as it would still be possible to access the selected 
terrorists, 
in  high  concentrations  by  determined 
precursors 
especially at the retail level.  

The proposed measures are the most likely to effectively increase 
the  level  of  awareness  among  supply  chain  actors.  Awareness 
campaigns  similar  to  the  UK  “Know  your  customer”  have 
significantly  enhanced  the  awareness  among  businesses  on  the 
possible  criminal/terrorist  use  of  certain  precursors.  Moreover, 
existing  awareness  campaigns  are  often  accompanied  by 
notification/reporting  mechanisms  in  case  of  thefts,  losses  or 
suspicious  transactions.  Codes  of  Conduct  and  related  guidelines 
have  also  proved  effective  in  raising  security  at  all  stages  of  the 
supply chain, notably during storage and transport.   
This  policy  option  will  not  completely  prevent  terrorists  from 
taking advantage of lower control levels, as the proposed measures 
are  in  essence  voluntary  and  their  effectiveness  depends  on 
businesses’ willingness to comply with them. While businesses in 
some  Member  States  may  have  strong  incentives  to  comply  with 
the  requirements  (i.e.  as  there  is  already  a  strong  culture  and 
consensus around this type of measures), this may not be the case 
in other Member States. 

This option does not impose administrative costs upon businesses 
as it does not involve legal obligations. 

This option does not impose compliance costs upon businesses: no 
requirements  to  comply  with  certain  legislation,  However,  it  is 
expected  that  all  major  players  (members  of  the  relevant  trade 
associations  of  producers,  chemical  distributors,  the  retail  sector) 

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POLICY  OPTION 
5–  Policy  option  5: 
Taking  measure  to 
the 
enhance 
surveillance 
of 
use, 
professional 
including 
sub-
options such as: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

5.a  Promoting 
of 
Codes 
conduct 

5.b  Education 
and training 

5.c 
Raising 
staff awareness 

5.d  Addressing 
particular 
in 
medium / small 
users 

Economic impacts 

No effect 

No effect 

Article  16  Freedom 
to conduct a business 
Article  17  Right  to 
property 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts  on 
market 

labour 

+1 

Impacts  on  public 
health 

+1 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

who  will  voluntarily  comply  with  the  relevant  codes  of  conduct, 
will train their staff accordingly, and will employ other necessary 
tools  and  methods  to  raise  awareness  among  staff  (and  business 
partners). These costs are estimated to be around €64 million per 
year, bearing in mind that actions disproportionately increasing the 
cost of sale are unlikely to be taken by businesses. 
Also,  various  public  authorities  will  have  to  incur  costs,  to  offer 
training  and  guidance.  It  is  estimated  that  costs  will  about  match 
the  expenditure  incurring  to  business,  i.e.  €64  million  per  year 
(this  includes  awareness  raising  campaigns  at  an  average  cost  of 
€1-2  million  per  Member  State,  some  form  of  training  given  to 
thousands of retailers). 
These costs are an aggregate and not specific to certain precursors 
(except some differences in the retail target group). 
Lacking legal restrictions, the precursors and products based upon 
them will be still eligible for sale to the general public (at least this 
will not impose additional restrictions, if understood as an add-on 
Policy option). 

Sales to the general public would still continue, provided that there 
are  no  grounds  for  suspicion.  Businesses  may  refuse  a  few 
transactions, but this is not expected to lead to a significant loss in 
activity or job losses.  
Considering  that  a  multitude  of  initiatives  and  measures  would 
need to be developed by businesses, trade associations and public 
authorities, this policy option may lead to job creation.  
Although  members  of  the  general  public  could  feel  safer  as  a 
consequence  of  retailers  and  other  supply  chain  actors  enforcing 
stricter controls, this policy options would not completely prevent 
terrorists  from  accessing  the  selected  precursors  (e.g.  using  fake 
ID),  and  hence  the  potency  and  reliability  of  HMEs  and  IEDs 
would remain high.  
Voluntary  measures  supporting  research,  testing  and  detection 

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of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

POLICY  OPTION 
5–  Policy  option  5: 
Taking  measure  to 
the 
enhance 
surveillance 
of 
use, 
professional 
including 
sub-
options such as: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

5.a  Promoting 
of 
Codes 
conduct 

5.b  Education 
and training 

5.c 
Raising 
staff awareness 

5.d  Addressing 
particular 
in 
medium / small 
users 

Other impacts 

0 

lead  to  increased  use  of  additives,  phlegmatisation,  substitutes, 
taggants  and  effective  detection  techniques.  This  may  ultimately 
decrease the potency and reliability of HMEs and IEDs, and hence 
reduce the number of casualties/life losses. 
Very  little  inconvenience  to  consumers,  possibly  some  increased 
concerns if the voluntary measures are to ‘evident’ (e.g. warnings, 
posters, notices, etc).  

Article  8  Protection 
of personal data 

Article 
discrimination 

21  Non-

If  the  proposed  awareness  measures  also  encourage  businesses  to  check  the 
credentials  of  their  customers  in  order  to  identify  suspicious  transactions,  clear 
guidelines related to the obligation to comply with national DP law implementing EU 
DP law will need to be set out, to avoid a lack of protection of personal data.  
The  proposed  measure  should  explicitly  define  objective  and  non-discriminatory 
criteria  for 
to  avoid  potential. 
discriminatory behaviour.  

identifying  suspicious  customers/transactions, 

Assessment of environmental impacts 

0 

Possibly some increased use of paper (and other hardcopy support 
requiring the use of chemicals) for awareness initiatives, guidance 
material, training material (e.g. leaflets, posters, booklets), etc. 

-1 

risks, 

Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key 
uncertainties, 
political and technical 
and 
feasibility 
necessary 
preconditions 
achieve impacts. 

to 

to  comply  with 

One  of  the  key  risks  associated  with  this  policy  option  is  the 
voluntary  nature  of  the  measures,  meaning  that  businesses  may 
choose  not 
the  requirements.  Awareness 
campaigns  need  to  reach  a  significant  share  of  the  retail  market 
and of professional end-users, requiring a tremendous effort from 
public  authorities  and  trade  associations.  Such  campaigns  also 
require frequent “updates” and follow-ups.  
The degree of professional organisation within the EU precursors 
market  (i.e.  to  what  extent  the  market  is  organised  and  well-
represented by trade bodies), greatly varies among Member States, 
which  is  not  equally  developed  among  the  Member  States.  The 
existence  of  a  good  working  relationship  between  industry  and 
government  is  also  essential.  There  may  be  some  ‘cultural’ 
difficulties in some countries. 
It  can  take  up  to  several  years  before  a  voluntary  measure  has  a 
wide coverage and 100% market coverage often remains difficult 
to achieve.  
With  regard  to  the  notification  of  suspicious  transactions,  the 
simpler and more transparent the mechanism (i.e. do stakeholders 

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POLICY  OPTION 
5–  Policy  option  5: 
Taking  measure  to 
the 
enhance 
surveillance 
of 
use, 
professional 
including 
sub-
options such as: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

5.a  Promoting 
of 
Codes 
conduct 

5.b  Education 
and training 

5.c 
Raising 
staff awareness 

5.d  Addressing 
particular 
in 
medium / small 
users 

EU  added  value  and 
rationale 

Need  for  changes  in 
Community 
legislation 
Issues 
by 
Member  States  and 
stakeholders  

raised 

of 

Rating 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness  

General assessment 

Explanation  of  rating  and  aspects  of  the  policy  option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 

need  to  call  one  single  national  hotline  or  several  authorities  at 
different levels and has this been clearly explained to them?), the 
more efficient and effective such mechanisms are.. 

Overall, there would be a rationale in developing the proposed measures on an EU-
wide  scale,  as  this  would  ensure  an  equal  level  of  awareness  among  supply  chain 
actors,  and  notably  retailers.  EU-wide  actions  have  already  been  developed  at  EU-
level  by  EFMA  (i.e. guidance  for  the  secure  and  safe  storage of  fertilisers on farms 
premises)  or  are  under  way  (i.e.  European  Code  supported  by  the  Commission  and 
targeting the entire supply chain). 
No changes required. 

This policy option enjoys a very strong support among Member States and industry 
stakeholders, as the proposed measures are deemed highly desirable. In the Member 
States where such measures have been implemented, it has been noted that the level 
of  awareness  among  the  supply  chain  has  increased.  Industry  stakeholders  pointed 
that it remains difficult to ensure that the proposed measures will be evenly applied 
across all Member States. With regard to research, several Member States agreed that 
increased  research  is  needed  into  phlegmatisation,  which  could  ultimately  facilitate 
any (future) restrictions on the sale of precursors above certain concentration levels 

Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
Overall, there seems to be a clear support for developing some, if not, all measures proposed under this policy 
option.  There  was  a  consensus  among  Member  States  and  industry  stakeholders  that  the  proposed  measures 
could be highly beneficial. This policy option can help indeed achieve a greater level of awareness and control 
within  the  supply  chain,  while  its  economic  costs  and  impacts  are  close  to  neutral.  The  fact  that  several 
Member States have developed similar  measures in place, seems  to suggest that this type of measures work 
and  are  overall  effective.  Nonetheless,  the  effectiveness  of  this  policy  option  across  all  EU  Member  States 
depends on a certain number of pre-requisites. 

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ANNEX 10: GLOSSARY  

ADR 

International  Carriage  of  Dangerous  Goods  by  Road 
Regulations (Accord européen relatif au transport international 
des marchandises dangereuses par route) 

CBRN 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

CEFIC 

European Chemical Industry Council 

DG ENTR 

Directorate-General  for  Enterprise  and  Industry  of 
European Commission 

the 

DG JLS 

Directorate-General  for  Justice,  Freedom  and  Security  of  the 
European Commission 

DG MOVE 

Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 

DG SANCO  Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs 

HME 

HP  

IED  

REACH 

Home Made Explosive  

Hydrogen Peroxide  

Improvised Explosive Device 

European  Union  Regulation  on  Registration,  Evaluation, 
Authorisation and restriction of Chemicals 

SCP  

Standing Committee on Precursors  

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