COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Date: 2010-09-20
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: consumer protection, explosive, harmonisation of standards, leisure, marketing, product safety, technical standard

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 20.9.2010 
SEC(2010) 1041 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying document to the 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

on the marketing and use of explosives precursors 

COM(2010) 473 
 SEC(2010) 1040 

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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Accompanying document to the 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

on the marketing and use of explosives precursors 

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1. 

BACKGROUND 

In accordance with the EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives, which was 
approved  by  the  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Council  in  April  2008  and  which  called  on  the 
Commission  to  ‘establish  a  Standing  Committee  to  consider  measures  and  prepare 
recommendations concerning the regulation of explosives precursors available on the market 
taking into account their cost-benefit effects’, the Commission intends to adopt measures to 
deal with the marketing and use of explosives precursors in September 2010.  

The overall objective of the measures is to establish a harmonised approach to restricting the 
marketing and use of certain substances that are frequently used for the illicit manufacture of 
explosives, with a view to preventing their diversion and misuse. These measures are intended 
to  constitute  a  tangible  deliverable  under  the  ‘prevent’  strand  of  the  EU  Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy adopted by the JHA Council on 1 December 2005. 

The proposed policy builds on the work and recommendations of the Standing Committee on 
Precursors (SCP), an ad hoc advisory committee composed of experts from the EU Member 
State  authorities  and  representatives  of  the  private  sector,  and  on  a  thorough  assessment 
entitled ‘Preparatory Study to Inform an Impact Assessment of Potential Legislative and Non-
legislative  Restrictions  on  Chemical  Precursors  to  Explosives’,  prepared  by  an  external 
contractor. The reports submitted in the course of the work on the study were also discussed 
regularly in the SCP and in a Commission Interservice Group on explosives issues.  

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

In  recent  years,  the  EU  and  EEA  countries  have  collectively  experienced  a  high  number  of 
terrorist  and  criminal  attacks  using  explosives,  home-made  explosives  (HMEs)  and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as an even higher number of attacks that were 
prevented, or failed1. HMEs are the means most frequently used to carry out attacks.  

2.1. 

Assessment of specific problems 

Wide availability and easy access by the general public to precursors on the market 

At present, a wide variety of precursors are easily available to the general public. The internet 
is an easy channel to buy precursors too. Even greater quantities of precursors can be obtained 
by or through commercial or otherwise legitimate end users. 

High ‘potency’ of precursors 

The concentration levels of precursors in certain products available to the general public and 
to legitimate end users are in many cases sufficient to produce an explosive. 

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As documented in EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports by Europol. 

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No EU level playing field 

While several legislative and non-legislative measures exist at international, EU and national 
level,  these  either  do  not  specifically  focus  on  the  security  risks  associated  with  certain 
chemicals or do not cover the entire EU. This implies that precursors that may be restricted or 
controlled in one country can be easily obtained in another. In addition to the consequences 
for security, such a situation may also give rise to market distortions, preventing a level EU 
playing field in this area. 

The main groups of precursors requiring the most urgent attention are: 

Precursor group 

Chemical 

Main associated use 

Nitrates/ nitrogenous 
fertilisers 

Ammonium nitrate 

Potassium nitrate 

Sodium nitrate 

Calcium nitrate 

Ammonium  nitrate  (mixed  with  a  fuel  e.g. 
diesel  oil  (ANFO)  or  sugar  (ANIS)  is  one  of 
the  most  common  ingredients  in  large-scale 
IEDs  Other  nitrates  can  also  be  used  as 
oxidiser ingredients in IEDs 

Hydrogen  peroxide  and 
acetone 

Hydrogen peroxide 

Used by various terrorist groupings to produce 
Triacetone triperoxide (TATP). 

Acetone (propanone) 

Nitro-methane 
hexamine 

and 

Nitromethane 

Hexamine 
(methenamine) 

Strong acids 

Nitric acid 

Hydrochloric acid 

Sulphuric acid 

Chlorates and perchlorates 

Sodium chlorate 

Sodium perchlorate 

Potassium chlorate 

Potassium perchlorate 

Nitromethane:  used  by  ETA  and  possibly 
other  groupings.  Explosive  in  combination 
with ammonium nitrate or nitric acid. 

Hexamine:  used  to  produce  explosives  in 
combination with hydrogen peroxide. 

Nitric  acid  is  used  in  the  synthesis  of  HMEs 
such as urea nitrate. 

Used  as  oxidisers  /  oxygen  generators  to 
produce HMEs. A mixture of chlorates can be 
an  HME  in  itself  without  the  need  for  a 
detonator  /  booster.  Chlorates  can  also  serve 
as a booster. 

2.2. 

Subsidiarity and proportionality principles 

The EU can only be as secure as its weakest link. Consequently, activities at EU level and a 
coordinated  EU  approach  are  needed,  and  will  benefit  all  relevant  stakeholders.  The 
subsidiarity principle is thus satisfied because the goals to be achieved through measures on 
explosives precursors cannot be achieved by any single EU Member State, and must therefore 
be addressed at EU level.  

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The significant numbers of attacks or attempted attacks, as documented by Europol, underline 
the extent and urgency of the problem. 

Moreover,  EU  regulation  also  has  a  strong  internal  market  rationale,  since  the  current 
situation,  which  imposes  different  regulatory  regimes  on  the  chemical  industry,  distorts  the 
market  and  imposes  additional  costs  of  adjustment  on  the  private  sector.  In  these 
circumstances,  EU  regulation  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives  precursors  is 
proportionate. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES  

As  a  reflection  of  the  problems  identified,  the  policy  objectives  deriving  from  the  problem 
definition are presented in Table 3 below. 

Table 3: General, specific and operational objectives 

General 
objective 

Specific objectives 

Operational objectives 

1.1  To 
precursors by the general public 

restrict  access 

to  certain 

1.1.1  To  reduce  the  availability  of 
certain  precursors  on 
the  EU 
consumer  market 
the  general 
public 

to 

1.1.2  To  reduce  certain  types  of 
supply  channels  /  ways  of  access  to 
precursors 

reduce 

the 
To 
number 
and 
potency  of  terrorist 
and  other  criminal 
incidents  in  the  EU 
explosives, 
using 
by 
deterring 
terrorists  and  other 
from 
criminals 
using  precursors  to 
build 
explosives 
and  inhibiting  their 
to 
access 
precursors. 

1.2 To reduce the reliability and potency 
of home-made explosives or components 
manufactured  for  malicious  or  criminal 
purposes 

1.3  To  enhance 
security  and 
awareness  of  the  entire  supply  chain  of 
precursors 

the 

1.2.1  To  develop  suitable  additives 
and  promote 
these 
additives 
the  use  of 
precursors in explosives 

the  use  of 

to  prevent 

1.2.2  To  reduce  concentrations  of 
certain  precursors  available  to  the 
general public 

1.3.1  To 
increase  control  and 
surveillance  over  transactions  and 
sales of certain precursors 

1.3.2  To 
surveillance 
distribution, import / export, etc. 

increase  control  and 
transport, 

over 

1.3.3  To  raise  awareness  among 
supply  chain  actors  of  the  risks  in 
general and suspicious transactions. 

terrorists  and  other 
1.4  To  prevent 
criminals  from  making  use  of  lower 
control  levels  and  fewer  restrictions  on 
chemicals in some countries 

1.4.1 To establish common measures 
at EU / international level 

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The  policy  objectives  are  fully  in  line  with  the  EU  counter-terrorism  strategy,  with  the  EU 
Action  Plan  on  Enhancing  the  Security  of  Explosives  and  with  the  Stockholm  programme2, 
which  stipulates  that  a  ‘legislative  framework  to  address  the  dangers  associated  with 
precursors should be developed’.  

4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

The  policy  options  considered  are  presented  in  Table  4.  Policy  options  0  –  4  only  concern 
sales to the general public, and will therefore not directly affect any professional use. Those 
who  use  the  identified  precursors  professionally  may  be  indirectly  affected,  because 
sometimes  they  make  use  of  general  retail  channels,  which  under  the  policy  options  may 
become  the  subject  of  certain  restrictions.  Only  policy  option  5  covers  a  wider  spectrum  of 
supply chain stakeholders. 

Table 4: Overview of policy options 

Policy  option  0  — 
Status Quo 

No  action.  This  implies  that  no  changes  are  made  to  the 
current  situation.  The  baseline  is  a  combination  of  existing 
policies,  legislative  acquis,  voluntary  measures  and  other 
relevant activity. 

Policy option 1  

A  total  ban  on  sales  of  the  substances  to  members  of  the 
general public, irrespective of concentration levels. 

Policy option 2 

Policy option 3 

A  ban  on  sales  of  the  substances  in  all  concentrations  and 
quantities over the internet. 

A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above 
a specific concentration level.  

Policy option 4 

Option 3 plus additional measures: 

Policy option 4a 

A ban on sales to minors. 

Policy option 4b 

Sales  of  the  substances  in  higher  concentrations  than  those 
allowed  under  option  3  through  a  trader  or  consumer 
licensing system. 

Policy option 4c 

Introducing a system of reporting suspicious transactions. 

Policy option 4d 

A  scheme  for  labelling  precursors  with  a  code  specifying 
that  the  purchase  may  be  subject  to  registration,  with  a 
system  for  recording  the  identity  of  the  buyer  (including 
internet  sales).  Records  should  be  made  available  to 
competent law enforcement authorities. 

Policy option 5 

Taking  measures  to  enhance  the  surveillance  of  legitimate 

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and professional use, including sub-options such as: 

Promoting Codes of Conduct 

Education and training 

Raising staff awareness 

Addressing medium / small users in particular 

5. 

PREFERRED OPTION 

The preferred policy option can be formulated as follows: 

Setting concentration thresholds for the sale of certain precursors to members of the general 
public,  with  a  system  to  report  suspicious  transactions  for  certain  precursors.  Developing  a 
consumer  licensing  system  to  allow  for  sales  of  higher  concentrations.  Adding  voluntary 
measures  to  support  the  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions  and  the  implementation  of  the 
consumer licensing system, as well as other relevant action to raise awareness in the supply 
chain.  

5.1.  Main impacts of the preferred policy option 

5.1.1.  Financial and economic impacts 

The  value  of  goods  currently  sold  yearly  to  the  general  public  above  the  proposed 
concentration  thresholds  is  estimated  at  about  €
 450-1150  million.  However,  about  half  of 
these  goods  will  still  be  sold  and  bought  through  the  acquisition  of  personal  licences. 
Consumers will also be able to switch to substitute products, which are available. The drop in 
consumer sales is estimated to be at most €

 115-280 million.  

As  a  total  ban  is  not  envisaged,  and  the  overall  non-professional  consumption  of  the 
precursors  concerned  only  amounts  to  about  1-5 %  of  total  EU  consumption  of  these 
chemicals, the impact on the producers of base chemicals will be very limited. 

 100-140  million  per  year  (around  €

In  terms  of  costs  of  compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  preferred  policy  option  by 
businesses and public authorities, the total maximum cost of arrangements needed may add up 
to  about  €
 65  million  of  which  is  to  be  borne  by  public 
 80-126 million one-off cost. Legitimate users will face some 
authorities), plus an additional €
administrative  costs  when  required  to  provide  identification  and  proof  of  legitimate  use: 
licensing,  registration  or  presentation  of  company  documents  may  be  requested.  However, 
consumers will in general be able to access diluted versions or — if these are not a feasible 
option — suitable alternatives (save for a few products such as hexamine fuel tablets), if they 
choose not to ask for a licence.  

All  cost  estimates  have  been  made  assuming  that  the  outcomes  are  at  the  upper  end  of  the 
scale, and could in reality be significantly less.  

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5.1.2. 

Social impacts 

The measures included in the preferred policy option are not expected to have serious social 
effects.  Clearly,  however,  the  overall  positive  social  effect  of  successfully  countering  the 
threat of attacks using home-made explosives is improved security in terms of a reduction in 
casualties and long-term health problems, reduced levels of fear and increased perception of 
safety. 

On the other hand, the restrictions can cause some inconvenience to consumers, who would 
still be able to access precursors in higher concentrations, but will be required to apply for a 
licence.  There  is  also  a  limited  risk  that  sellers  would  too  quickly  consider  a  transaction  as 
suspicious and refuse to sell. However, this could be offset by clear guidance, education and 
training. There is also a risk that competent authorities may decide not to accept licences from 
persons  not  legally  resident  in  the  country  where  they  would  like  to  make  the  purchase,  as 
they  do  not  have  access  to  possibly  relevant  information  on  that  person.  In  addition,  the 
system  of  reporting  suspicious  transactions  should  not  lead  to  ‘overzealous’,  discriminatory 
reactions on the part of businesses, for example based on specific physical features or foreign 
accents. 

5.1.3. 

Impacts on fundamental rights 

The  preferred  policy  option  requires  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  their  further 
disclosure  to  third  parties  (e.g.  law  enforcement  authorities)  in  the  case  of  suspicious 
transactions. This implies potentially serious interference with private life and the right to the 
protection  of  personal  data,  and  thus  requires  compliance  with  international  and  EU  data 
protection law and with national data protection laws implementing EU data protection law.  

Freedom to conduct a business would not be affected as companies will still be able to trade all 
precursors (with some exceptions like producers of hexamine fuel tablets), even though some 
limitations  may  apply  as  they  would  need  to  set  up  a  new  reporting  system  and  carry  out 
additional  checks  of  exemption  permits.  The  right  to  property  would  not  be  affected,  as  in 
principle the handling, sale and possession of precursors would still be possible.  

5.2. 

Benefits of the preferred policy option 

5.2.1.  Restricting access to certain precursors by the general public 

Consumers  would  have  open  access  to  chemical  substances  below  a  certain  concentration 
level. Access to higher concentrations would not be banned, but restricted and controlled.  

5.2.2.  Reducing  the  reliability  and  potency  of  ‘home-made’  explosives  or  components 

manufactured for malicious or criminal purposes 

Setting  concentration  thresholds  would  as  a  minimum  make  it  more  difficult  to  produce 
reliable and potent home-made explosives. The notification of suspicious transactions and a 
licensing  system  will  both  have  a  deterrent  effect  and  improve  the  chances  of  terrorists  and 
other criminals being caught before they can fabricate home-made explosives.  

5.2.3.  Enhancing the security and awareness of the entire supply chain of precursors 

The cumulative effects of the different elements included in the policy option would have a 
strong  positive  impact  on  the  security  and  awareness  of  the  entire  supply  chain  handling 

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precursors.  In  comparison  to  existing  EU  and  national  measures,  more  focus  will  be  on 
security (as opposed to safety). 

5.2.4.  Preventing  terrorists  and  other  criminals  from  making  use  of  lower  control  levels 

and fewer restrictions on chemicals in some countries  

The cumulative effects of lowering concentration levels in open sales channels combined with 
a  system  of  reporting  suspicious  transactions  and  controlled  sales  of  higher  concentration 
levels  will  create  an  EU  level  playing  field,  both  avoiding  internal  market  distortions  and 
preventing  persons  with  malevolent  aims  from  making  use  of  lower  standards  in  other 
Member States. 

5.3. 

The EU added value 

The  purpose  of  the  proposed  measures  is  to  develop  a  holistic  approach  at  EU  level, 
minimising the current differences in national approaches. This will improve the functioning 
of the internal market and will prevent terrorists and other criminals from making use of lower 
standards in certain Member States. In addition, the measures will strengthen the EU focus on 
the  security  of  precursors  (in  contrast  to  solely  safety,  as  has  been  the  case  so  far)  and  will 
help  to  increase  awareness  among  both  supply  chain  actors  and  consumers.  Education  and 
training  will  support  the  implementation  of  the  measures  included  in  the  preferred  policy 
option. Research will help to render precursors less harmful. Last but not least, a common EU 
approach towards the development and implementation of such measures will allow Member 
States to exchange experiences and information. 

5.3.1.  Expected take-up among relevant stakeholders 

Member State experts, even though not expressing any formal political position, were overall 
in  favour  of  the  combination  of  measures  included  in  the  preferred  policy  option.  They 
considered that the policy option was broadly in line with measures that were already in place 
in  several  Member  States,  which  had  proven  to  be  successful  or  were  recently  created  in 
response  to  a  perceived  need  to  increase  the  security  of  precursors.  All  agreed  that  an  EU-
wide approach would favour an EU level playing field. 

Industrial  stakeholders,  while  stressing  an  overall  preference  for  voluntary  measures,  also 
supported the combination of measures included in the policy option.  

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