COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT   IMPACT ASSESSMENT   accompanying the Proposal for a  DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL  on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of seasonal employment
Date: 2010-07-13
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU migration policy, admission of aliens, foreign national, impact study, labour law, migrant worker, residence permit, rights of aliens, seasonal employment, work permit

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 13.07.2010 
SEC(2010) 887 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

 IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

accompanying the 

Proposal for a 

DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
seasonal employment 

{COM(2010) 379 final} 
{SEC(2010) 888} 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties .............................................. 4 

1.1. 

Background .................................................................................................................. 4 

1.1.1.  Legal and policy context .............................................................................................. 4 

1.1.2.  Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 5 

1.1.3.  Consultation and expertise ........................................................................................... 5 

1.1.4.  The Opinions of the Impact Assessment Board........................................................... 6 

1.2. 

State of play: existing legal instruments ...................................................................... 7 

2. 

Problem definition........................................................................................................ 8 

2.1. 

Scope of the problem: Non-EU seasonal work in Member States............................... 8 

2.1.1.  Size and sectors of seasonal work................................................................................ 9 

2.1.2.  Legislation in Member States..................................................................................... 10 

2.2.  What are the problems that may require action?........................................................ 11 

2.2.1.  Shortages in Member States for seasonal labour ....................................................... 11 

2.2.2.  Exploitative working conditions ................................................................................ 12 

2.2.3. 

Illegal immigration and illegal work.......................................................................... 13 

2.2.4.  Limited contribution of EU legal migration policies to the development of third 

countries ..................................................................................................................... 14 

2.3. 

2.4. 

Possible evolution of the problem all things being equal (baseline scenario) ........... 14 

Does the EU have the right to act?............................................................................. 15 

2.4.1.  EU right to act ............................................................................................................ 15 

2.4.2.  Principles of subsidiarity and proportionality ............................................................ 16 

2.4.3.  EU added value .......................................................................................................... 17 

3. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

Objectives................................................................................................................... 17 

Global objectives........................................................................................................ 17 

Specific and operational objectives............................................................................ 18 

Developing policy options ......................................................................................... 18 

Option 1: Status Quo.................................................................................................. 18 

Option 2: Legal instrument on entry and residence conditions of seasonal workers. 19 

Option 3: Directive laying down common admission procedures ............................. 20 

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4.4. 

4.5. 

5. 

Option 4: Directive on measures to ensure effective return....................................... 20 

Option 5: Communication, coordination and cooperation among Member States.... 21 

Assessment of policy options..................................................................................... 21 

5.1. 

Implementation costs of the policy options ............................................................... 33 

6. 

6.1. 

6.2. 

Identification andassessment of the preferred policy option...................................... 34 

Comparison of policy options .................................................................................... 34 

Identification of the preferred policy option .............................................................. 36 

6.2.1.  Main benefits and effects ........................................................................................... 38 

6.2.2.  Proportionality and EU added value .......................................................................... 39 

6.2.3.  Assessment of costs ................................................................................................... 40 

7. 

Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 43 

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Lead DG: 

Home Affairs 

Other  involved  services:  Secretariat  General,  Legal  Service,  and  Directorates-General  for 
Employment,  Social  Affairs  and  Equal  Opportunities,  for  Agriculture  and  for  External 
Relations. 

Work  programme  reference:  Agenda  Planning  or  Work  Programme  Reference: 
Commission Work Programme 2010 (31.3.2010 COM(2010) 135 final 

1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

1.1. 

Background 

1.1.1.  Legal and policy context  

Since the Tampere European Council of 1999 the EU has sought to develop, on the basis of 
the new powers conferred to it by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Title IV EC), a comprehensive 
immigration policy that would address the phenomenon in all its main dimensions, i.e. legal 
and  illegal  immigration,  integration  and  cooperation  with  the  countries  of  origin  of 
immigrants. As concerns legal immigration, and in particular economic immigration, Article 
79(2)(a) and (b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union explicitly empowers 
the  European  Union  to  adopt  measures  laying  down  conditions  of  entry  and  residence  of 
third-country nationals and the standards of issue by Member States of residence permits, as 
well as to define rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State.  

In 2001, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Directive dealing with ‘the conditions of 
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-
employed  economic  activities’1.  Whilst  the  other  European  Institutions  gave  positive 
opinions2, discussion in Council was limited to a first reading of the text and the proposal was 
officially withdrawn in 2006. It has to be recalled in this context that legal immigration was 
subject  to  unanimity  in  the  Council  and  consultation  of  the  European  Parliament.  The  2004 
Hague  Programme  recognised  the  important  role  legal  migration  will  play  in  advancing 
economic development in the EU and asked the Commission to present a policy plan on legal 
migration,  ‘including  admission  procedures,  capable  of  responding  promptly  to  fluctuating 
demands  for  migrant  labour  in  the  labour  market’.  The  Policy  Plan  on  Legal  Migration 
(COM(2005)  669)  defines  a  roadmap  and  a  set  of  actions  and  legislative  initiatives  for  the 
coherent  development  of  EU  legal  migration  policy3.  It  suggests  establishing  EU  rules  on 
specific channels of legal migration (highly skilled migrants, seasonal workers, remunerated 
trainees,  intra-corporate  transferees)  and  a  general  directive  on  the  rights  of  third  country 
workers on the other. The proposals regarding highly qualified workers (‘EU Blue Card’) and 
for a general framework Directive were presented in October 20074. The Council adopted the 
first proposal on 25 May 2009; the second one is currently under negotiation in the European 
Parliament  and  the  Council.  Both  texts  exclude  seasonal  workers  from  their  scope  of 
application. 

1 
2 

3 
4 

COM(2001) 386. 
Opinions of the: European Parliament of 12.2.2003 (A5-0010/2003); Economic and Social Committee 
of 16.1.2002 (SOC/084, CES 28/2002); Committee of the Regions of 13.3.2002 (CdR 386/2001). 
Adopted by the Commission on 21.12.2005 - COM(2005) 669. 
COM(2007) 637 and 638, 23.10.2007. 

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Under  the  European  Pact  on  Immigration  and  Asylum,  endorsed  by  the  October  2008 
European  Council,  one  of  the  five  basic  commitments  is  ‘to  organise  legal  immigration  to 
take  account  of  the  priorities,  needs  and  reception  capacities  determined  by  each  Member 
State,  and  to  encourage  integration’.  This  proposal,  together  with  the  proposals  on  intra-
corporate  transferees,  presented  in  parallel,  contributes  to  the  completion  of  the  legislative 
elements of the 2005 Policy Plan on Legal Migration and transposes the commitment made in 
the 2008 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum into concrete measures. 

The Stockholm Programme, adopted by the European Council of 10 and 11 December 2010, 
recognises that labour immigration can contribute to increased competitiveness and economic 
vitality and that, in the context of the important demographic challenges the Union will face 
and  the  increased  demand  for  labour,  flexible  immigration  policies  will  make  an  important 
contribution to the Union's economic development and performance in the longer term. It thus 
invites the Commission and Council to continue to implement the 2005 Policy Plan on Legal 
Migration. 

1.1.2.  Organisation and timing 

The chronology of this impact assessment was as follows: 

–  December  2007  –  July  2008:  data  gathering  and  discussion  with  Member  States  in  the 
context of the Commission's Committee on Immigration and Asylum (hereinafter “CIA”); 

–  Throughout  2008:  consultation  and  exchange  of  views  with  relevant  stakeholders 

(including NGOs, social partners) in a number of meetings and conferences; 

–  December 2007 – October 2008: external study (hereinafter “the external study”) ordered 

by the Commission in December 2007;  

–  29  April  and  16  September  2008:  Meetings  of  the  Inter-service  Steering  Group 
accompanying  the  Impact  Assessment,  at  which  participated  representatives  of  the 
Commission's  Secretariat  General  and  Directorates-General  for  Employment,  Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities, for Agriculture and for External Relations. 

1.1.3.  Consultation and expertise 

This  report  is  based  on  consultations  with  Member  States  and  other  stakeholders.  The  data 
was collected from these consultations as well as from case studies and literature reviews. The 
data-gathering and large parts of the consultations were undertaken through an external study 
ordered  by  the  Commission  in  December  2007.  That  study  constitutes  the  main  support  for 
this report. The problem, objectives and policy options assessed were based on the final report 
from  the  contractor  and  on  basis  of  a  desk  analysis  of  appropriate  analytical  methods  and 
applicable legal documents. 

A public consultation was carried out with the Green Paper on an EU approach to managing 
economic  migration.  The  Commission  received  more  than  130  contributions  from  Member 
States, other EU institutions, social partners, NGOs, third countries, academia, etc.5. A public 

5 

See 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/economic_migration/news_contributions_eco
nomic_migration_en.htm. 

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hearing was held on 14 June 2005. Member  States  were consulted  within the framework of 
the Commission's Committee on Immigration and Asylum. A majority was supportive of such 
an initiative and underlined the need for common flexible rules and a secure legal status for 
seasonal workers. Issues raised concern the question of subsidiarity, the type of permit to be 
issued  (visa  or  residence  permit),  as  well  as  the  range  of  rights  to  be  granted  for  such 
temporary workers. 

Through the external study, further consultations of the main stakeholders (including Caritas 
Europe,  the  International  Organisation  for  Migration,  BUSINESSEUROPE,  and  also  an 
organisation  representing  small  and  meeting  enterprises  (UEAPME))  were  undertaken  by 
means of questionnaires and interviews. The results of such consultations are reflected in this 
report where relevant, and in addition a summary is presented in Annex 5.  

A  specific  consultation  of  the  social  partners  was  undertaken,  namely  ETUC  and  EFFAT 
(European Federation of Trade Unions in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism sectors) as well 
as  COPA-COGECA  (European  Farmers  –  European  agri-cooperatives);  the  employers' 
organisation from the sector by far most concerned with seasonal work. ETUC advocated in 
favour  of  common  rules,  in  order  to  reduce  unfair  competition  based  on  the  exploitation  of 
weak  and  under-protected  seasonal  workers.  EFFAT  specifically  pointed  to  the  need  for  a 
very precise definition of seasonal work in order to avoid regular, full-time jobs being filled 
by  third-country  national  seasonal  workers.  Another  concern  relates  to  the  fact  that  third 
country  national  seasonal  workers  may  have  contributed  over  years  to  the  pension  system 
without  being  eligible  to  receive  any  pension,  either  because  of  long  waiting  periods  or 
absence  of  portability  to  home  countries.  Agricultural  employers  raised  issues  such  as  the 
need for simplification of procedures and the concern that return after the end of the season 
should  be  effectively  ensured;  that  the  authorisation  for  stay  should  allow  workers  to  move 
freely within the EU (currently problems with the homeward journey in case of D-visas) and 
the question of whether intra-EU mobility should be granted to seasonal workers in order to 
take up subsequent jobs in different Member States. 

1.1.4.  The Opinions of the Impact Assessment Board 

On 3 February 2009 and 12 May 2009 the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) of the European 
Commission delivered its opinions regarding preliminary versions of this Impact Assessment 
report. In these opinions, the Board requested:  

to  put  less  emphasis  on  the  functioning  of  the  labour  market,  given  the  rather  low 

(1) 
numbers of third-country workers involved; 

to  put  more  emphasis  on  the  problem  of  exploitation  of  seasonal  workers  and  to 

(2) 
demonstrate that regulation would be a proportionate response and meet the subsidiarity test; 

to justify why Article 63 of the Treaty was chosen as legal basis (and not Article 137 

(3) 
on "working conditions for third-country nationals) ; 

to  clarify  the  key  aspects  of  the  proposed  approach,  including  whether  EU  national 

(4) 
migrants could be treated less favourably than third-country national migrants; 

to analyse the impact on the number of migrants and improve the analysis of impacts 

(5) 
on enterprises and public finances. 

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The present version of the Impact Assessment report has been redrafted, with a view to taking 
these recommendations into account. Namely, 

(1) 
the numbers of TCN seasonal workers were rechecked and revised; an explanation on 
why  it  was  necessary  to  include  numbers  of  illegally  staying/non-registered  was  added  (see 
2.1.1); information on certain regions of the EU that are in particular need of TCN seasonal 
workers was added (see 2.2.1); 

a  further  update  on  statistical  data  on  seasonal  workers  has  been  made  taking  into 
(2) 
consideration the query on Seasonal Workers launched through European Migration Network 
in March 20106; 

the proposal has been re-focused: a stronger case is made about the need to regulate 

(3) 
migration to avoid exploitation of the third-country seasonal workers; 

(4) 
given  the  still  relatively  low  numbers  and  thus  the  limited  impact  on  EU  wide 
competition, the second general objective to protect labour force and enterprises from unfair 
competition was deleted, as well as the reference to the functioning of the EU labour market 
in the first general objective; 

the  exploitation  aspect  was  strengthened  in  particular  in  section  2.2.2  (examples  of 

(5) 
exploitative working and living conditions in certain regions and sectors added); 

the references to a level playing field and distortions of the migratory flows have been 

(6) 
removed; 

(7) 

proportionality of the proposed instrument has been explained; : 

(8) 

a description of the linkages with the existing legislation has been added;  

(9) 
the legal base point was clarified – the IAB delivered its opinion at a time when the 
Treaty establishing the European Community applied, under which Article 63(3) was the legal 
basis for measures on immigration policy; 

the issue of the possible better treatment of third-country national seasonal workers as 

(10) 
compared to EU posted workers has been addressed.  

1.2. 

State of play: existing legal instruments 

The  2001  proposal  on  economic  migration  referred  to  above  under  1.1.1  contained  some 
specific rules on admission of seasonal workers, including a definition and rules on the length 
of the residence permit. In the absence of support for that proposal, the only existing EU level 
instrument  that  also  addresses  conditions  for  the  admission  of  seasonal  workers  is  a  1994 
Council resolution ‘on limitations on admission of third-country nationals on the territory of 
the Member States for employment’7, adopted under Article K.1 of the Treaty. That resolution 
includes elements for a definition of seasonal workers (workers who undertake well-defined 
jobs,  normally  fulfilling  a  traditional  need  in  a  Member  State).  It  also  sets  the  maximum 

6 

7 

Ad-Hoc  Query  on  Seasonal  Workers  and  Intra-Corporate  Transferees  Requested  by  Commission  to 
EMN NCP on 17 March 2010. 
OJ No C 274, p. 3-6. 

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duration of stay at six months in any 12 month period and excludes extensions of the stay for 
a different type of employment. 

The EU law concerning the posting of workers in the context of the provision of services do 
not apply. In particular, there is no risk of better treatment of third-country seasonal workers 
as compared to EU posted workers in the framework of a provision of services because these 
two categories of workers are not in the same position. Namely: 

–  posted workers remain linked to the labour market on their country of recruitment, whereas 
seasonal  workers,  although  they  are  temporary  workers,  they  form  a  part  of  the  national 
labour market where they work;  

–  third-country seasonal workers have a work contract with an employer established in that 
Member State and therefore they are subject to general labour law that does not distinguish 
on  the  basis  of  nationality.  In  other  words,  unlike  posted  workers  they  do  not  provide 
services on the basis of a contract concluded abroad;  

–  posting  of  workers  takes  place  in  the  context  of  a  provision  of  services  and,  pursuant  to 

Directive 96/71/EC general law does not apply to a provision of service.  

–  Nevertheless, to avoid any misunderstanding third-country nationals who are carrying out 
activities on behalf of undertakings established in a Member State in the framework of a 
provision  of  services  covered  by  Article  56  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European Union, including those posted by undertakings established in a Member State in 
the framework of a provision of service in accordance with Directive 96/71/EC should be 
clearly  excluded  from  the  scope  of  any  legislative  proposal  on  third-country  seasonal 
workers.  

–  At the same time, considering the vulnerability of this particular group of workers and the 
temporary  nature  of  their  task,  there  is  a  need  to  define  clearly  legal  rules  applicable  to 
their  working  conditions.  Such  a  definition  will  not  only  ensure  legal  certainty  and 
guarantee  a  level  playing  field  with  other  categories  of  workers,  but  it  will  also  provide 
effective protection of the rights of third-country seasonal workers.  

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION  

2.1. 

Scope of the problem: Non-EU seasonal work in Member States 

Seasonal  workers  can  be  defined  as  third-country  national  workers  who  migrate  on  a 
temporary  basis  to  work  in  a  sector  of  activity  dependent  on  the  passing  of  the  seasons,  in 
other  words,  the  activity  is  tied  to  a  certain  time  of  the  year  by  an  event  or  pattern  during 
which  required  labour  levels  are  far  above  those  necessary  for  normal  ongoing  operations 
Seasonal  workers  are  generally  engaged  in  non-  or  low-skilled  sectors  of  the  receiving 
country’s economy such as in agriculture or tourism. 

EU economies face a structural need for seasonal work for which labour from within the EU 
is expected to become less and less available. It is expected to be increasingly difficult to fill 
these gaps with EU national workers, primarily owing to the fact that these workers consider 
seasonal work unattractive, in addition to demographic changes the European Union will have 
to face in the coming years.  

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Further,  there  is  significant  evidence  that  certain  third-country  seasonal  workers  face 
exploitation and sub-standard working conditions which may threaten their health and safety.  

Lastly, sectors of the economy that are characterised by a strong presence of seasonal workers 
– most notably agriculture, horticulture and tourism – are repeatedly identified as the sectors 
most prone to work undertaken by third-country nationals who are staying illegally. 

2.1.1. 

Size and sectors of seasonal work 

Some  Member  States  admitted  a  considerable  number  of  non-EU  seasonal  workers.  For 
example,  in  2008  alone  Spain  admitted  24  838  non-EU  seasonal  workers8.  For  the  2008 
calendar year, already by 7 February 2008, Italy received 11 273 applications9 (for 2008, 2009 
and  2010,  the  quota  set  by  the  Italian  Ministry  of  Interior  for  seasonal  work  by  non-EU 
nationals was 80 000)10. In 2009, Germany admitted 4 248 non-EU seasonal workers, France 
2 215, whereas Sweden 7 25211. 

Non-EU seasonal workers have been also working in the new Member States. For example, 
Hungary  admitted  919  and  892  third-country  nationals  in  2008  and  2009  respectively.  The 
data available for Poland concerns temporary work undertaken by third-country nationals and, 
as a result, the numbers are considerably higher, namely, 181 030 for 2009. In Slovenia over 
10 000 non-EU nationals were admitted as seasonal/temporary workers in 2008 and 2009. 

Although  trends  are  short  and  not  comparable  given  the  gaps  in  data,  general  increases  of 
foreign seasonal labour have been registered in recent years in Member States such as France, 
United Kingdom and Slovenia.  

The  scarcity  of  recent  data  does  not  allow  a  proper  assessment  of  the  impact  of  the  current 
economic crisis on the demand for non-EU seasonal workers. Nonetheless, the comparison of 
the data for 2008 and 2009 does not show any falling off in respect of the demand. Whereas 
there are Member States where the numbers of the admitted third-country nationals admitted 
for 2009 are lower (Austria, Slovenia, Hungary) or even considerably lower in 2009 (France), 
there  are  also  Member  States  in  which  an  increase  has  been  observed  (Germany  and 
Sweden)12.  

In  this  perspective,  the  percentage  of  third  country  seasonal  workers  as  compared  to  all 
foreign seasonal workers remains above 50% in most of the Member States for which data is 
available. In particular, Portugal and Slovenia receive nearly all their foreign seasonal labour 
from  non-EU  countries,  followed  by  Sweden  and  United  Kingdom.  Other  Member  States, 
such as Germany, traditionally recruit their non-national seasonal labour from EU-10 Member 
States so that the share of third-country seasonal workers is relatively low.  

Further, it should be emphasised that seasonal work sectors are very prone to work undertaken 
by  illegally  staying  workers  or  otherwise  unregistered  workers.  Accordingly,  the  total 

8 

9 

10 
11 
12 

Ad-Hoc  Query  on  Seasonal  Workers  and  Intra-Corporate  Transferees  Requested  by  Commission's 
EMN NCP on 17 March 2010. 
See 
<http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/084
8_APP_domande_pervenute_STAGIONALI.html>. 
Above, at 2.  
Ibid. 
Above, at 2.  

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numbers  of  seasonal  workers  can  be  assumed  to  be  much  higher  (well  above  100 000  per 
year). 

The main regions of origin of third-country seasonal workers are neighbouring regions such 
as  the  Balkans  and  Eastern  Europe,  followed  by  Central  Asia,  North  Africa  and  Latin 
America. 

For certain regions in certain Member States seasonal labour recruited from third countries is 
crucial.  Thus,  regarding  agriculture  in  Andalusia,  in  particular  in  the  province  of  Huelva, 
35 000  third-country  nationals  were  recruited  from  non-EU  countries  in  2008.  An  estimated 
12 000  agricultural  seasonal  workers  from  third  countries  were  employed  in  southern  Italy, 
especially  in  Apulia,  and  an  estimated  5 000  Moroccan  seasonal  workers  in  the  French 
department  of  Bouches-du-Rhône.  In  those  regions  third-country  workers  are  thought  to 
represent about 80-90 % of total seasonal workers. In tourism, certain regions of Austria, most 
notably Tyrol and Salzburg, strongly rely on seasonal workers from third countries to cover 
seasonal peaks: the quota was set at 8 000 for the 2008/09 winter season. 

In many Member States seasonal workers from third countries take up jobs in specific sectors 
such as agriculture (e.g. 60 % of total seasonal labour force in Italy, 20 % of total labour force 
in agriculture in Greece) and tourism (e.g. in Spain work permits for work in the hotels and 
catering  sector  reached  13 %  of  the  total  work  permits  issued  in  2003),  which  generally 
require  non-  or  low-skilled  or  manual  workers  and  where  there  are  significant  shortages  of 
manpower. More detailed information on size and sectors of seasonal work is given in Annex 
1, p 3-6. 

2.1.2.  Legislation in Member States 

At  least  20  Member  States  have  specific,  though  rather  divergent,  admission  schemes  for 
seasonal workers from third countries, while six Member States do not have separate systems 
in place because of the current lack of need for seasonal labour from third countries. There are 
divergences in the definitions of seasonal work, criteria for and duration and contents of the 
work permit, as well as rights granted to seasonal workers. These differences seem to result 
from  divergent  basic  assumptions  on  the  role  of  third-country  seasonal  workers;  some 
Member  States  appear  to  focus  mostly  on  filling  labour  market  gaps,  while  others  also 
emphasise measures to ensure return and thus to avoid overstaying13. Several Member States 
have bilateral agreements with specific third countries on admission of seasonal workers that 
typically fill annual quotas. Such agreements exist, for example, between Greece and Albania 
on seasonal employment of labour force (1997); France and Morocco (Convention on Manual 
Labour,  1963);  the  Slovak  Republic  and  Russia  (Agreement  on  individual  seasonal 
employment of citizens, 1995); Spain and Ecuador/Colombia (Agreement on migratory flows, 
2001) and Germany and Croatia (1998). 

The  main  divergences  in  Member  States'  legislation  relate  to  the  definition  (from  defining 
seasonal work as temporary work to stricter definitions such as seasonal work being linked to 
specific  sectors  of  the  economy  in  a  fixed  period  of  the  calendar  year);  the  duration  of  the 
permit (from a maximum of 4 months per calendar year to a maximum of 12 months in a 14-
months period; some Member States also foresee a possibility for renewal of the permit); the 

13 

A detailed description can be found in Annex 1.2.2. 

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procedure  (from  one-stop  shop  procedures  to  separate  procedures  for  work  permit  and 
authorisation to stay) and the level of rights granted (a set of rights and/or equal treatment in 
the full range of socio-economic rights including unemployment benefits). Specifically, only a 
few  Member  States  grant  a  right  to  free  accommodation,  or  explicitly  foresee  that  the 
accommodation has to respect certain standards. 

2.2.  What are the problems that may require action?  

2.2.1. 

Shortages in Member States for seasonal labour 

EU economies already face a structural need for seasonal workers for which labour force from 
within the EU is expected to be less and less available. Seasonal work implies by definition 
temporary  work  that  is  limited  to  a  number  of  months  per  year,  as  activities  depend  on  the 
passing  of  the  seasons.  Thus,  there  is  a  permanent  need  in  the  EU  for  such  temporary, 
seasonal  work,  but  no  need  for  permanent  labour  in  the  temporary  (seasonal)  sector  of  the 
economy. 

It  should  also  be  noted  that  regional  differences  exist  within  the  EU.  For  some  regions 
seasonal  labour  recruited  from  third  countries  is  crucial14.  There  are  also  significant 
differences between EU Member States in terms of entry and temporary residence conditions 
of  seasonal  workers  and  several  Member  States  do  not  have  any  specific  rules  for  this 
category.  In  some  Member  States,  rules  are  very  tight  and  few  channels  for  re-entry  are 
provided. Also, there is anecdotal evidence of competition among Member States for the most 
attractive  conditions  in  terms  of  salary,  travel  arrangements,  accommodation  or  working 
conditions. Such wide differences may hinder an efficient allocation of seasonal workers, as 
these may prefer to go where they are easily admitted or are more likely to remain both in a 
legal (by renewing their permit) or illegal (due to overstaying) situation, instead of where their 
work is most needed.  

It has to be also added that the decision to migrate does not exclusively depend on the legal 
framework  in  place  in  a  given  destination  country  but  is  influenced  by  a  variety  of  factors 
such  as  geographical  vicinity,  tradition,  language  preference,  cultural  ties  etc.  The  relative 
importance of these latter factors are however difficult to measure, and they outside the remit 
and impact of EU legislation. 

A future needs scenario… 

As  regards  future  skills  shortages  in  the  EU,  a  medium-term  forecast15  found  that  despite  a 
shift towards services and knowledge-intensive jobs, traditional sectors will continue to play 
an important role in the EU economy and the structural need for low skilled and low qualified 
workforce will continue to expand.  

In particular, employment in hotels and catering will experience a sustained growth (+1.7% 
per  annum).  Agriculture  will  experience  high  job  losses  (-2.5%);  however,  it  will  still 
represent 3.5% of total employment.  

Regarding  prospects  by  occupations,  despite  a  growing  demand  for  highly  skilled  workers, 
there will also be significant increases in job numbers for low skilled workers (+0.6%) as well 

14 
15 

See section 2.1.1 on page 7. 
CEDEFOP: Future skill needs in Europe – Medium-term forecast, Synthesis report, 2008. 

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as in elementary occupations (+1.6%), and especially for sales services (+2%). Moreover, in 
2015  non-  or  low-skilled  occupations  will  represent  the  most  important  occupational  group 
(that is 11.8% of total employment)16.  

…that is unlikely to be matched by EU labour force 

It is expected to be increasingly difficult to fill these gaps with EU national workers, mostly 
owing  to  the  unattractiveness  of  seasonal  work  for  EU  national  workers,  along  with  the 
mismatching  between  EU  nationals’  qualifications  and  the  demand  for  low-skilled  labour. 
The impact of the global economic crisis remains difficult to predict. However, according to 
the  International  Organization  for  Migration  (IOM),  it  is  expected  that  ‘(i)n  certain  labour 
market  sectors  in  destination  countries,  there  is  likely  to  be  a  continued  stable  need  for 
migrant  workers,  particularly  in  healthcare,  household/domestic  employment  and  care  work 
(as  well  as  in  agriculture  in  some  countries)  where  the  demand  for  such  workers  is 
structural’17.  

Another advantage generally attached to temporary and seasonal migration is improved labour 
market flexibility. Indeed, admission of foreign workers on a temporary basis is attractive for 
enhancing  the  flexibility,  availability  and  willingness  of  sufficient  numbers  of  workers  to 
work at prevailing wages of the labour market without involving permanent settlement by the 
workers. Such flexibility is of importance in sectors where the demand for labour is inherently 
seasonal,  especially  agriculture  and  tourism.  Labour  market  gaps  are  currently  often  filled 
with seasonal workers from EU-12 MS. However, this may not be sustainable because of the 
changing  economic  and  social  conditions  in  these  Member  States.  For  example,  the  net 
income of Polish workers 1999-2006 increased by more than 50 %. In addition, workers from 
new  Member  States  may  decide  to  stay  and  work  in  other  Member  States  on  a  permanent 
basis  and  seek  better  opportunities  and  more  stable  jobs  rather  than  seasonal  employment. 
Lastly, as EU-12 Member States are expected to follow similar development patterns as the 
EU-15, the extent of push and pull factors for economic migration from these Member States 
will be reduced, and shortages similar to those already experienced in the EU-15 are expected 
in the next years18.  

2.2.2.  Exploitative working conditions 

There  is  significant  evidence  to  suggest  that  certain  third-country  seasonal  workers  face 
exploitation  and  sub-standard  working  conditions.  Examples  frequently  quoted  include  the 
absence of a work contract and thus no form of legal protection, bad working conditions with 
low  salaries,  limited  social  protection  particularly  for  sickness  at  work  and  invalidity,  sub-
standard accommodation, and social segregation. This is reported in particular for agriculture 
with its often remote locations and demanding, sometimes dangerous work (such as through 
heavy use of pesticides).  

Certain evidence exists about the situation in Spain, Italy and France. For instance, as regards 
living conditions, in interviews with some 600 seasonal workers from North and sub-Saharan 
Africa in Southern Italy, 90 % of the respondents said that they did not have work contract, 65 
% lived in shacks, 62 % had no access to basic sanitary services, and 71 % did not have the 

16 
17 

18 

More details are given in box 2.2. of Annex 1. 
IOM Policy brief: ‘The impact of the global economic crisis on migrants and migration’, March 2009, 
p. 5-6. 
See above for the statistical data for Poland, section 2.1.1, page 7. 

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necessary card to access healthcare19. Regarding working conditions there are problems with 
issues  such  as  salary  levels  which  are  often  below  the  legal  minimum,  extremely  long 
working  hours,  very  little  protection,  occupational  diseases,  and  absence  of  social  security 
coverage20. 

Another  phenomenon  is  that  regular,  year-round  occupations  are  filled  with  third-country 
seasonal workers under the often precarious conditions described above. This situation is the 
consequence of either  a  gap  in the  rights that third-country seasonal workers enjoy in some 
Member  States  compared  to  EU  national  seasonal  workers,  or  lax  national  legislation  that 
does not precisely define seasonal work and thus allows filling posts for permanent, ongoing 
operations  with  seasonal  workers.  Finally,  insufficient  enforcement  of  the  existing  rights 
plays its role21.  

In respect of social alienation of third-country seasonal workers, it has to be noted that some 
degree of social alienation may be inherent in the very nature of the temporary stay combined 
with  the  workload,  which  leaves  few  opportunities  to  acquire  basic  knowledge  of  the 
language and day-to-day organisation of life in the host country. This situation is obviously 
exacerbated for third-country nationals who are illegally working as seasonal workers. 

2.2.3. 

Illegal immigration and illegal work 

Two  aspects  are  of  relevance.  First,  there  is  the  risk  that  in  the  absence  of  meaningful 
opportunities in the EU for legal migration in the non- and low-skilled sector pressure from 
illegal  immigration  will  remain  high.  Second,  the  fact  that  sectors  of  the  economy  that  are 
characterised  by  a  strong  presence  of  seasonal  workers  such  as  agriculture,  horticulture,  or 
tourism  are  repeatedly  identified  as  the  sectors  most  prone  to  work  undertaken  by  illegally 
staying third-country nationals22.  

These are made up of both illegal entries and overstayers, that is, persons who entered the EU 
legally  but  stayed  beyond  the  expiry  of  their  authorisation  to  do  so.  In  a  Schengen  area 
without internal borders, illegally staying persons could subsequently move to other Member 
State and work there illegally. 

Illegal  entry,  overstaying  and  illegal  employment  of  third-country  nationals  have  adverse 
consequences  for  the  EU  such  us  discrimination  and  exploitation  of  migrant  workers  and 
threats to social and economic cohesion in the EU; reduced tax revenues for Member States 
and additional costs for identifying, apprehending and returning illegal migrants.  

Due  to  the  very  nature  of  the  phenomenon  of  illegal  immigration,  it  is  impossible  to  give 
precise  figures.  However,  various  data  collections  exist  at  EU  level  on  aliens  refused  at  the 
borders, illegally staying persons apprehended within the EU and removed aliens. These can 
serve as indicators for the extent of the phenomenon. Thus, 915 860 and 803 069 aliens were 
refused  at  the  borders  of  the  today's  EU-27  in  2006  and  2007  respectively.  There  were  516 
000 apprehended persons in the EU-27 in 2006 and 467 501 in 2007. 201 870 and 174 265 

19 
20 

21 
22 

Report by Doctors Without Borders ‘Una Stagione all`inferno’, 2007.  
Report  by  GISTI  ‘Saisonniers  en  servage’,  2008.  Report  by  CODETRAS  ‘Les  omis.  Livre  noir  de 
l´exploitation des travailleurs etrangers dans l´agriculture des Bouches-du-Rhone’, 2005. 
For details see box 2.6 on page 16 of the Annex. 
See  section  2.3  of  the  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  Proposal  for  a  Directive  providing  for 
sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals (see SEC(2007) 603.  

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persons were returned to a third country in 2006 and 207 respectively. Although, there is no 
specific  data  on  illegally  staying  seasonal  workers,  it  might  be  assumed  that  many  of  the 
illegally  staying  third-country  nationals  worked  as  seasonal  workers  as  this  type  of  work  is 
particularly prone to illegal work. 

Such illegal immigration and illegal employment in seasonal work sectors may be facilitated 
by  the  diverging  rules  on  entry  and  temporary  residence  of  seasonal  workers.  Illegal 
immigration and illegal work can be also caused by lax enforcement of the existing rules, but 
in most of the cases it is induced by lax rules (such as vague definitions of seasonal work or 
the possibility to change the status for seasonal workers). It follows that lax rules may act as 
pull-factors for illegal immigration. 

2.2.4.  Limited  contribution  of  EU  legal  migration  policies  to  the  development  of  third 

countries 

The Global Approach to migration illustrates the ambition of the European Union to establish 
an inter-sectoral framework to manage migration in a coherent way through political dialogue 
and  practical  cooperation  with  third  countries.  It  is  based  on  genuine  partnership  with  third 
countries and addresses all migration issues, covering legal migration and mobility, irregular 
immigration, and migration and development. 

Sending  countries  are  typically  developing  countries  with  high  rates  of  unemployment  and 
surpluses  in  labour  supplies,  which  temporary  migration  towards  the  EU  could  somewhat 
relieve. From the perspective of certain third countries, there is however a lack of transparent 
and efficient rules for legal migration into the EU. Instead, potential migrants are faced with a 
range  of  very  diverse  rules  set  by  EU  Member  States,  on  which  information  is  not  always 
readily available. This is particularly relevant for the seasonal work sector, as facilities in that 
area  could  be  of  particular  interest  to  countries  with  high  unemployment  rates  and  strong 
migration pressure, most notably the countries of Northern and sub-Saharan Africa and, to a 
lesser extent, Eastern Europe. 

Also, the implementation of the Global approach was somewhat affected by the difficulty at 
EU level of commitments on labour migration for low- and non-skilled migrants. Progress in 
this  area  would  thus  allow  for  a  stronger  commitment  in  countries  of  origin  and  transit, 
including cooperation to fight illegal immigration. 

2.3. 

Possible evolution of the problem all things being equal (baseline scenario) 

Decisions  to  migrate  are  based  on  push  factors  (unemployment  or  lack  of  productive 
employment  along  with  permanently  low  wage  levels,  including  lack  of  enforcement  of 
internationally  recognised  labour  and  social  standards;  natural  disasters  or  ecological 
devastation) and on pull factors (informal employment; political stability and maintenance of 
the  rule  of  law;  the  structural  need  for  low-skilled  workers  in  the  EU).  These  factors  are 
expected  to  remain  relatively  stable,  and  so  will  be  the  migration  pressure  on  the  EU, 
especially  from  North  and  Sub  Saharan  Africa,  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  in  the 
low- and non-skilled sector of the labour market. 

As  described  above,  labour  market  needs  in  the  low-  and  non-skilled  sectors  that  typically 
employ seasonal workers are expected to increase. Member States could partly fill these needs 
through  additional  bilateral  agreements  with  specific  third  countries,  which  would  have 
different entry and residence conditions for seasonal workers, as is the case today. Yet, such 
divergences  could  continue  to  prompt  seasonal  workers  to  enter  illegally  or  to  overstay 

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illegally,  in  particular  in  those  Member  States  that  have  less  defined  regimes  on  seasonal 
workers.  The  sending  countries  of  third-country  workers  continue  to  benefit  less  from  the 
outward migration of their workers than they could given limited possibilities for transfer of 
savings.  Cooperation  between  the  EU  and  countries  of  origin  could  not  fully  exploit  its 
potentials  in  the  absence  of  common  EU  rules,  that  is,  a  stronger  cooperation-oriented 
message  in  an  area  of  non-  and  low-skilled  migration.  Illegal  stay  and  work  of  seasonal 
workers are likely to be somewhat reduced with more effective employer sanctions, including 
inspections  provides  for  in  the  Directive  on  sanctions  against  employers  of  illegally  staying 
third-country nationals23. Control of illegal employment will be based on risk assessment of 
sectors  where  such  employment  is  concentrated.  As  noted  above,  seasonal  work  sectors  are 
prone to such illegal employment so that there will be positive spill-over effects. 

2.4. 

Does the EU have the right to act? 

2.4.1.  EU right to act 

The legal basis for Community action in the area is Article 79(2)(a) and (b) of the Treaty on 
the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (hereinafter  TFEU)  which  states  that  the  European 
Parliament and the Council shall adopt measures on ‘conditions of entry and residence, and 
standards on the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits…’, as well 
as ‘the definition of rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State…’. 

The main purpose of Union action is to design an admission instrument for seasonal workers, 
thus, to define conditions of entry in the sense of Article 79(2) of the Treaty. Necessary and 
ancillary  provisions  regarding  the  status  of  seasonal  workers,  once  admitted,  would  be 
regulated  as  ‘conditions  of  residence’  in  the  sense  of  Article  79.  The  same  approach  was 
already  adopted  for  existing  migration  acquis  and  proposals,  such  as  Directives  2003/109 
(long-term residents), 2005/71 (researchers), and 2009/50 (EU Blue Card).  

Article 79(2)(b) TFEU is a legal basis clearly allowing the EU to regulate the rights of third 
country  nationals  in  order  to  ensure  an  efficient  management  of  migration  flows  and  fair 
treatment of third-country nationals24. On the basis of ex. Art 63 TEU, the same approach was 
already  adopted  for  existing  migration  acquis  such  as  Directives  2003/109  (long-term 
residents), 2005/71 (researchers) and 2009/50 (Blue Card).  

In accordance with the objective stated in the Stockholm Programme adopted by the European 
Council  in  December  2009,  the  Commission  intends  to  table  the  proposal  ensuring  fair 
treatment  to  third-country  nationals  and  protecting  them  with  rights  comparable  to  those  of 
EU  citizens.  The  objective  of  the  proposal  is  to  give  the  seasonal  workers,  who  are  a 
particularly vulnerable group of migrants, a secure legal status in order to prevent exploitation 
and protect their safety and health. Provisions are therefore proposed to give seasonal workers 
a  significant  core  of  rights  in  a  number  of  socio-economic  fields,  including  working 

23 

24 

Directive  2009/52/EC  on  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  18  June  2009  providing 
minimum  standards  on  sanctions  and  measures  against  employers  of  illegally  staying  third-country 
nationals should. The deadline for transposition by Member States is 20 July 2011. 
The legal basis for immigration is contained in Article 79§1 and article 79§2 (ex Article 63, points 3 
and  4,  TEC)  which  states  that:  ‘The  Union  shall  develop  a  common  immigration  policy  aimed  at 
ensuring, at all stages, … fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, .. ’ 
and the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State, including 
the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States. 

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conditions, as well as health and safety requirements at the workplace. Also a procedure on 
accommodation standards and facilitation of complaints in case of abuse have been foreseen. 

2.4.2.  Principles of subsidiarity and proportionality  

The principle of subsidiarity applies since this is an area of shared competence. The principle 
requires  that  the  Union  does  not  take  action  in  areas  of  shared  competence  unless  ‘the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either 
at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of 
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’25.  

The reasons for a common EU intervention are the following: 

–  The need for third country seasonal workers is a common phenomenon in the majority of 

Member States.  

–  Although third-country workers enter  a  specific  Member  State within  the EU,  a Member 
State's decision on the rights of third country nationals could affect other Member States 
with  possible  impact  on  migratory  flows26.  The  difference  in  treatment  granted  to  third 
country  nationals  in  the  different  Member  States  -  as  perceived  by  potential  migrants  - 
consequently  has  a  supranational  dimension  that  lies  outside  the  scope  of  national 
legislation. 

–  The  Schengen  area  without  internal  borders  requires  a  common  discipline  (common 
minimum rules) to reduce the risk of overstaying and illegal entries that may be caused by 
lax  and  diverse  rules  on  admission  of  seasonal  workers.  Shortcomings  in  one  Member 
State  can  have  adverse  implications  for  other  Member  States  as  well  as  the  European 
Union and, accordingly, it is in the interest of all Member States to effectively manage this 
segment of labour migration. Indeed, as explained above sectors of the economy that are 
currently characterised by a strong presence of seasonal workers – agriculture, horticulture, 
and  tourism  –  are  repeatedly  identified  as  the  sectors  most  prone  to  work  undertaken  by 
illegally staying third-country nationals. 

–  Exploitation  and  sub-standard  working  conditions  of  third-country  national  seasonal 
workers needs to be overcome, by granting certain socio-economic rights in a binding, and 
thus enforceable, EU level instrument, in line with the call of the 1999 Tampere Council to 
grant third-country nationals fair treatment and a secure legal status. 

–  With  respect  to  the  external  aspects  of  migration  policy,  an  EU  instrument  on  seasonal 
workers is important for effective cooperation with third countries and further deepening of 
the  Global  Approach,  in  giving  the  EU  the  possibility  to  facilitate  low-  and  non-skilled 
legal migration by creating credible legal migration channels and in strengthening third the 
commitment of third countries to fight against illegal immigration. 

The  principle  of  proportionality  also  applies.  That  principle  stipulates  that  ‘the  content  and 
form  of  Union  action  shall  not  exceed  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  the 
Treaties’ (Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union). Accordingly: 

25 
26 

Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union. 
See sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3. 

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–  The instrument chosen should give Member States a high degree of flexibility in terms of 
implementation. The form of action should not exceed what is necessary to achieve the aim 
to  regulate  seasonal  migration  flows  effectively.  Non-binding  measures  would  have  too 
limited  an  effect  as  potential  third-country  seasonal  workers  and  their  prospective 
employers  would  continue  to  face  an  array  of  different  rules  for  entry  and  residence  and 
different levels of rights would be granted during the residence. 

–  The content of the action should be limited to what is necessary to achieve the above aim. 
The proposed rules should concern admission conditions, procedure and permit, as well as 
rights  of  seasonal  workers,  that  is,  the  areas  that  constitute  elements  of  a  common 
immigration  policy  under  Article  79  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European 
Union.  

Finally,  any  measure  proposed  should  respect  the  competence  of  the  Member  States  to 
determine the numbers of economic migrants seeking access to the EU, including by means of 
national quotas. Thus, it remains up to the respective Member State to assess whether it has an 
economic need for the admission of third-country seasonal workers. 

2.4.3.  EU added value 

The EU added value lies in the following aspects: 

–  Member States and employers of seasonal workers would benefit from a flexible admission 

system to fill seasonal labour shortages. 

–  Third  country  national  seasonal  workers  and  their  employers  would  benefit  from  a 
common, transparent and accessible European framework, allowing them to move legally 
to  Member  States  in  need  of  work  and  to  work  under  a  secure  legal  status.  Such  legal 
migration opportunities may also diminish illegal immigration and illegal employment. 

–  Additional  added  value  lies  in  the  external  dimension.  An  EU  intervention  would  send  a 
cooperation-oriented  message  to  third  countries  concerning  the  management  of  labour 
migration.  A  commitment  on  behalf  of  the  EU  as  a  whole  in  the  field  of  economic 
migration  in  the  non-  and  low-skilled  sector  has  the  potential  of  facilitating  cooperation 
with  third  countries  including  in  fighting  illegal  migration  and  fostering  mutually 
beneficial circular migration. 

3. 

OBJECTIVES 

3.1. 

Global objectives 

The global objectives, that is, the overall goals expressed in terms of its ultimate impact of an 
EU intervention, are the following:  

To respond to seasonal fluctuations in the economy and offset labour shortages faced 

1. 
in specific industries/economic sectors and regions; 

To  contribute  to  prevent  exploitation  and  poor  working  conditions  for  third-country 

2. 
seasonal workers and illegal immigration; 

3. 

To contribute to the development of third countries. 

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3.2. 

Specific and operational objectives 

The  specific  objectives,  that  is,  the  immediate  objectives  expressed  in  terms  of  direct  and 
short-term effects or outcomes, are the following:  

To  provide  for  flexible  rules  to  facilitate  the  temporary  legal  migration  of  seasonal 

1. 
workers and to promote their circular migration;  

To  provide  for  equal  conditions  for  employers  of  third-country  seasonal  workers 

2. 
legally entering the EU labour market; 

To  ensure  a  secure  legal  status  and  protection  against  exploitation  of  third-country 

3. 
seasonal workers; 

4. 

To enhance cooperation with third countries in the management of seasonal migration. 

At this stage, only a set of basic operational objectives are identified, that is, those objectives 
that should be considered valid irrespective of the policy option actually adopted. 

To  limit  the  extent  of  labour  shortages  in  the  EU  for  seasonal  work  by  reducing  the 

1. 
average processing time for applications for third-country seasonal workers; 

To  limit  the  number  of  overstaying  and  illegally  working  third-country  seasonal 

2. 
workers; 

To  approximate  the  average  salary  level  of  third-country  seasonal  workers  to  that  of 

3. 
EU national seasonal workers.  

The objectives above are consistent with horizontal EU strategies, in particular, with the EU 
2020  Strategy.  In  the  Integrated  Guidelines  for  growth  and  jobs  (2008-2010),  guideline  20 
calls  to  ‘Improve  matching  of  labour  market  needs’  through  the  modernisation  and 
institutions,  notably  employment  services;  greater 
strengthening  of 
transparency  of  employment  and  training  opportunities;  better  anticipation  of  skill  needs, 
labour market shortages and bottlenecks and appropriate management of economic migration. 

labour  market 

4. 

DEVELOPING POLICY OPTIONS 

This  section  addresses  policy  options  the  impacts  of  which  will  be  further  analysed. 
Information on discarded options is given in Annex 3.8. These policy options are not mutually 
exclusive, but complementary, in particular as regards options 2 to 4. 

4.1. 

Option 1: Status Quo 

No changes are made to the current situation, that is, current developments in Member States 
and  at  EU  level  would  continue  within  the  existing  legal  framework,  accordingly,  current 
divergences  would  continue  to  exist.  Employers,  including  those  employing  third-country 
seasonal workers, will be under certain obligations under the Directive on employer sanctions, 
namely as concerns notifications to authorities and penalties in case of illegal employment. 

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4.2. 

Option  2:  Legal  instrument  on  entry  and  residence  conditions  of  seasonal 
workers 

A  basic  level  of  harmonisation  would  be  reached  by  establishing  some  common  rules,  in 
particular:  

–  Definition  of  seasonal  workers:  the  definition  would  comprise  various  elements.  These 
elements  would  be  the  obligation  to  retain  a  legal  domicile  in  a  third  country;  the 
employment  in  the  territory  of  a  Member  State  in  a  sector  of  activity  dependent  on  the 
passing  of  the  seasons  and  one  or  more  fixed-term  contracts  for  a  specific  job.  An 
alternative choice, that is one single element for a definition only – ‘temporary stay’ – was 
discarded  for  the  reason  that  only  a  strict  definition  as  described  above  will  ensure  that 
third-country  seasonal  workers  are  used  for  peak  times  only  and  thus  for  genuinely 
seasonal  occupations  rather  than  on  a  regular  basis  and  for  permanent  jobs.  In  addition, 
laxer definitions and admission rules are more likely to encourage illegal immigration and 
overstaying. 

–  Admission  criteria  include  the  need  for  a  work  contract  or  a  binding  job  offer  and  the 
possibility  for  Member  States  to  perform  a  labour  market  test  as  well  as  to  ensure 
preference for Union workers. In addition, the requirement of a salary equal to or above a 
minimum level of one granted to national seasonal workers in the respective Member State 
and  sufficient  resources  to  maintain  him/herself  was  considered.  The  alternative  choice, 
namely only relying on a work contract or a job offer, was discarded since it would create 
the risk of social dumping and recourse to Member States' social assistance systems and it 
could also deprive Member States of the means to exercise effective control before entry of 
a seasonal worker.  

–  Maximum  duration  of  the  work/residence  permit  for  seasonal  employment:  a  strict  time 
limitation  is  required  in  order  to  ensure  that  seasonal  workers  stay  on  a  temporary  basis 
only and are indeed used for seasonal occupations only, rather than for regular jobs.  

As regards the residence conditions during the temporary stay, two sub-options are identified. 

–  Sub-option  A:  clear  determination  of  working  conditions  (for  example,  treatment  in 
payment/wages, right to health and safety protection) of seasonal workers by providing a 
reference to a set of legal instruments applicable in the Member State (for example laws, 
regulations  or  administrative  provisions,  and/or  universally  applicable  collective 
agreements). 

–  Sub-option  B:  clear  determination  of  working  conditions  (for  example,  treatment  in 
payment/wages, right to health and safety protection) of seasonal workers by a reference to 
a set of legal instruments applicable in that Member State (for example, laws, regulations 
or  administrative  provisions,  and/or  universally  applicable  collective  agreements)  and 
equal  treatment  with  EU  nationals  in  respect  to  certain  rights  pertaining  to  working 
conditions (such as right to association and affiliation of workers organisations) and social 
security  rights,  such  as  occupational  diseases,  accidents  at  work,  sickness  benefits, 
invalidity  benefits,  family  benefits,  death  grants,  as  well  as  the  right  to  change  employer 
(under certain circumstances and conditions). It should be noted that third-country national 
seasonal  workers  would  not  be  treated  in  a  more  preferential  way  compared  to  EU 
nationals to whom transition periods for free movement of workers apply. In particular, a 
set of rights and/or equal treatment in certain socio-economic areas would only be granted 

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once  the  third-country  national  seasonal  worker  has  been  admitted  to  a  Member  State  to 
work.  There  is  no  right  to  admission  since  it  is  up  to  Member  States  to  determine  the 
numbers  of  third-country  nationals  admitted  to  their  territory  for  employment.  Member 
States are also free to apply a labour market test.  

4.3. 

Option 3: Directive laying down common admission procedures 

In  addition  to  the  elements  considered  under  Option  2  the  following  rules  would  be  laid 
down: 

–  Introduction of a single permit for work and residence: a single document allowing third-
country seasonal workers to work and reside in the territory of the Member State would be 
issued.  All  these  single  permits  are  technically  identical  as  they  are  based  on  Regulation 
1030/2002 and include specific security features. What differs obviously is the remark put 
in the permit that specifies the type of employment authorised, such as ‘seasonal work’ in 
this case. For short periods of stay (not exceeding 90 days), admission could take place on 
the basis of a visa.  

–  Deadlines  for  processing  applications  for  the  single  permit  to  grant  applicants  and 

employers with a quick and facilitated procedure. 

–  This  option  would  focus  on  the  introduction  of  a  single  permit.  At  the  same  time,  the 
ability  for  both  employers  to  meet  their  needs  for  seasonal  labour  and  third-country 
nationals to have a work perspective in the EU in upcoming seasons could be facilitated. 
Two sub-options were identified: 

–  Sub-option  A:  single  permit,  including  re-entry  in  subsequent  years:  This  sub-option 
considers the introduction of a multi-seasonal permit, that is, a single work and residence 
permit allowing a third-country seasonal worker to re-entry in the same Member State for 
successive seasons, with a maximum duration defined (for example, up to three years). The 
previous  compliance  of  the  third-country  seasonal  workers  with  all  rules  would  be  also 
considered as a condition for re-entry.  

–  Sub-option  B:  single  permit,  including  a  facilitated  procedure  for  subsequent  entries. 
Seasonal  workers  who  in  the  past  complied  with  the  permit  conditions  including  return 
after the end of the duration of the permit would have access to a facilitated procedure to 
re-enter  that  Member  State  as  a  seasonal  worker  (as  a  minimum:  preference  over  first 
applicants). 

4.4. 

Option 4: Directive on measures to ensure effective return  

This  option  would  establish  a  common  definition  of  seasonal  workers  among  EU  Member 
States (see Option 2) as a first condition for establishing a minimum level playing field across 
the European Union.  

To ensure the temporary nature of  the stay, a maximum duration of stay per year would be 
introduced, as well as the explicit obligation to return after that period, that is, there would be 
no possibility for changes in status. In addition, obligations on third-country seasonal workers 
could be introduced to ensure effective return after the expiry of the authorisation to stay such 
as  reporting  to  the  consulate  of  the  Member  State  of  employment  in  the  country  of  origin. 
Last,  both  non-compliant  employers  and  seasonal  workers  could  be  excluded  from  multi-
seasonal permits and/or access to the facilitated procedure considered under sub-options 3A 

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20 

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and 3B. Third-country seasonal workers would have the right to challenge decisions rejecting 
an application for admission. 

4.5. 

Option 5: Communication, coordination and cooperation among Member States 

No  new  legislation  is  introduced  so  that  the  non-binding  1994  Council  Resolution  would 
remain  the  yardstick.  The  focus  would  be  on  complementary  and  supporting  activities.  The 
aim  would  be  to  achieve  an  approximation  of  the  legislative  practices  of  Member  States, 
through  the  gathering  and  exchange  of  knowledge  and  information  including  best  practices, 
performing  comparative  analyses,  giving  advice,  evaluating  experiences,  promoting 
innovative  approaches  and  organising  information  campaigns.  The  activities  would  be 
particularly focused on disseminating information on EU legislative framework, exchanging 
information  and  best  practices  on  measures  against  illegal  immigration  and  illegal 
movements, and measures ensuring return and avoiding exploitation of third-country seasonal 
workers. Social partners and other relevant actors could be involved in the elaboration of the 
content of such activities. 

5. 

ASSESSMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS 

A multi-criteria analysis was used to assess and compare impacts. The assessment criteria are 
aggregated  with  respect  to  their  relevance,  feasibility  and  expected  impacts.  In  view  of  the 
limits of the data available and of the fact that Member States will retain competence for the 
numbers  of  third-country  seasonal  workers  admitted  to  their  territory,  no  attempt  has  been 
made to quantify the impact of each option.  

For  each  policy  option,  the  anticipated  impact  has  been  assessed  on  an  ‘intuitive’  scale  of 
positive impact from one to four. Negative impact is highlighted by -√ and positive impact by 
√,  whilst  0  means  that  there  would  be  no  effect.  A  brief  explanation  of  rating  and  various 
aspects  of  the  policy  options  necessary  to  achieve  the  desired  impacts  are  provided  in  the 
grids.  

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21 

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Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 

Policy Option 1: Status quo 

Relevance 

in 

and 

To  respond  to  seasonal 
the 
fluctuations 
economy 
offset 
labour  shortages  faced 
specific 
in 
industries/economic 
sectors and regions 

To 
to 
contribute 
preventing  exploitation 
poor  working 
and 
third-
conditions 
seasonal 
country 
workers 
illegal 
immigration,  

and 

for 

To  contribute  to  the 
development  of 
third 
countries  

Feasibility 

Difficulty/risks 
transposition, 
proportionality 

for 
incl. 

Simplification/ 
administrative burden 

Financial impacts 

Expected Impacts 

Economic  Impacts  at 
EU level  

0 

Labour  shortages  in  low  skill  sectors  will  persist  and  increase  in  the  future,  in 
parallel with a growing difficulty for EU employers to rely on EU national workforces 
only. 

0 

MS could take unilateral measures to allow further entries of third-country Seasonal 
Workers (TCN SW) to address labour shortages. 

Wide  differentiations  of  MS  legislation  concerning  seasonal  migration  may  cause 
distortions in the inflow and allocation of TCN SW.  

Illegal immigration and overstaying of TCN SW remain important problems for the 
EU. The possible setting up of an entry/exit system at the external borders of the EU 
would  contribute  to  identifying  overstayers,  including  TCN  SW.  It  is  however 
currently  not  foreseen  to  use  such  a  system  for  the  management  of  legal  migration, 
including seasonal work. 

The  Directive  on  sanctions  for  EU  employers  of  illegally  staying  third-country 
nationals,  once  agreed  and  applied,  will  have  a  positive  impact  on  reducing  illegal 
immigration,  as  it  should  reduce  one  of  the  pull-factors  (the  possibility  of  finding 
employment without legal status). There could be a certain spill-over effect from that 
Directive  also  as  regards  detecting  the  most  serious  forms  of  exploitative  working 
conditions. 

Numerous  cooperation  and  development  programmes  between  EU  and  third 
countries  are  supported  in  a  range  of  sectors,  including  migration  and  development, 
the prevention of illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. However, these 
programmes  do  not  have  a  specific  focus  on  seasonal  migration  and,  more 
generally,  EU  action  in  this  field  remains  quite  fragmented.  The  “Thematic 
Programme” enhances a horizontal approach and could contribute to the development 
of  EU  external  migration  policy.  However,  projects  only  have  a  limited  size. 
Moreover, this Programme is not specifically addressed at seasonal migration. 

0 

0 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

The  current  and  expected  labour  shortages  in  low  skill  sectors  in  numerous  MS, 
along with the development patterns followed by the EU-12, will lead to difficulties 
in  relying  on  national  labour  forces  and  on  the  current  bilateral  seasonal  worker 
schemes which still do not tap seasonal labour shortages. 

Illegal migration and overstaying of TCN SW would persist, with implied risks of 
illegal employment and exploitation.  

The  policies  on  seasonal  migration  at  MS  level  could  improve  the  current 
macroeconomic  framework,  by  contributing  to  offset  labour  shortages  (the  focus  of 

national legislations in MS of Group B

) . 

27

However, without a common instrument, the ability of EU MS to provide for an even 
allocation of seasonal workers is limited. 

SMEs  in  sectors  such  as  agriculture,  tourism  and  construction  will  continue  to 
suffer from labour shortages. 

Labour and skill shortages inlow skill sectors are currently faced in many EU MS, 
especially in tourism, construction and agriculture. These shortages are expected to 

Impacts on SMEs 

Social  Impacts  at  EU 
level 

0 

0 

27 

See Annex (Survey of MS legislations) for an explanation of MS groups mentioned in the assessments. 

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Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 

Policy Option 1: Status quo 

Impacts 
countries 

on 

third 

on 

Impacts 
country 
workers 
impacts 
inclusion 
fundamental rights) 

third-
seasonal 
(including 
social 
and 

on 

Impacts on EU national 
seasonal workers 

0 

0 

0 

Stakeholders and experts’ view 

increase in the future. 

At  the  same  time,  TCN  SW  (illegally  entering  or  overstayers)  are  one  of  the  main 
pools of illegal employment in several EU MS. As mentioned, the application of the 
Directive on sanctions for EU employers could contribute to tackling these issues. 

The positive impacts of migration on the countries of origin (in terms of remittance 
inflows,  circular  migration,  reduced  brain  drain)  will  continue  to  depend  on 
various factors, such as protection from exploitation and the illegal employment of 
seasonal workers (which could reduce the size of remittances), their overstaying in 
the EU (thus excluding circular migration), the over-qualification of these workers 
(risk of brain drain). 

Cooperation and development programmes with third countries can help address 
these  issues;  however  EU  action  remains  fragmented  and  does  not  specifically 
focus on seasonal migration.  

The  position  and  socio-economic  integration  of  TCN  SW  would  depend  on  how  far 
national rules grant rights and benefits to TCN SW. 

However, the exposure to risks of exploitation of TCN linked to situations of illegal 
migration,  overstaying  and  related  risks  of  illegal  employment,  will  continue  to 
impact  on  TCN  SW.  Without  a  secure  legal  status  and  future  employment 
perspectives, TCN SW would continue to face social exclusion.. 

EU labour forces (EU national and non-EU national workers) would continue to be 
affected by third-country seasonal workers employed at lower wage levels and in poor 
working conditions. 

Stakeholders support an EU intervention to address aspects such as coherence of EU 
immigration policy, efficiency of the EU economy, illegal/irregular migration and fair 
treatment  of  TCN  SW.  However,  also  positive  aspects  of  the  status  quo  are 
highlighted,  such as:  labour  market  policies could  be best  adapted  to  national  labour 
market  needs  if  no  action  at  the  EU  level  is  taken  (Caritas  Europa)  some  national 
systems are considered well established (i.e. UEAPME on the AT system).  

In status quo admission procedures would continue to be rigid and slow for employers, 
would not diminish the level of illegal immigration, would harm the overall efficiency 
of the EU labour market and would continue to have negative impacts on TCN SW so 
that  countries  of  origin  could  not  benefit  from  additional  remittances  (Business 
Europe).  Moreover,  this  option  is  not  considered  desirable  since  it  maintains  unfair 
competition based on the exploitation of weak and under-protected SW (ETUC). 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 

Policy Option 2 –Entry conditions and rights 

Relevance 

in 

to  seasonal 
To  respond 
the 
fluctuations 
economy and offset labour 
shortages  faced  in  specific 
industries/economic 
sectors and regions 

/√ 
(2A)/ 
√√ 
(2B) 

Common EU conditions of entry and temporary residence of TCN SW would ensure that 
needs for third-country seasonal workers could be satisfied more easily, and harmonized 
entry  conditions  could  offset  an  uneven  distribution  of  TCN  SW  among  MS. 
However,  compared  to  the  status  quo  (most  MS  already  have  rules  for  TCN  SW),  this 
option  does  not  greatly  improve  the  ability  of  the  EU  employers  to  fill  labour  market 
gaps.  

Granting a set of rights in the field of working conditions (2A) would generate a  more 
level playing field across the EU, leading to a better allocation of TCN SW.  

This effect would be further strengthened under 2B, as a consequence of a higher level of 
harmonization. Moreover, the right to change employer would improve the availability 
of seasonal workforces, the ability of EU employers in matching labour shortages and the 
flexibility of EU labour market. 

EN 

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Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 

Policy Option 2 –Entry conditions and rights 

contribute 

to 
To 
exploitation 
preventing 
working 
and 
conditions 
third-
country  seasonal  workers; 
and illegal immigration. 

poor 

for 

Granting  a  set  or  rights  (2A,  and  even  stronger  2B)  would  enhance  the  level  of 
protection  for  TCN  SW  and  would  reduce  the  risks  that  this  category  of  workers 
usually  face  in  terms  of  poor  working  conditions  and  exploitation.  Moreover,  the 
provision  of  a  secure  legal  status  for  TCN  SW  entering  the  EU  labour  markets  could 
further  encourage  seasonal  workers  to  legally  enter  and  stay  in  the  EU.  On  the  other 
hand, increased rights could  mean additional costs for employers which  could resort to 
illegal channels. However, as the scope of rights granted is limited, such negative effects 
are negligible. 

This  option  would  have  only  an  indirect  and  marginal  effect  on  illegal  migration,  by 
offering specific and common rules at EU level for TCN SW wishing to legally enter 
the labour market of one of the MS.  

√√ 
(2A)/ 
√√ 
(2B) 

contribute 

To 
development  of 
countries  

to 

the 
third 

√ (2A)/ 
√√ 
(2B) 

Possibilities for temporary migration could relieve surpluses of labour supply in sending 
countries. Granting a set of rights in respect of working conditions (2A and B), especially 
in  terms  of  wages  granted,  could  allow  third  country  seasonal  workers  to  save  enough 
earnings  to  send/take  back  remittances  to  their  countries  of  origin.  Further,  EU 
commitment  as  evidenced  by  2B  would  strengthen  the  credibility  of  the  external 
migration policy as a whole 

Feasibility 

Difficulty/risks 
transposition, 
proportionality 

for 
incl. 

-√ 
(2A)/ 

-√√ 
(2B) 

The  establishment  of  common  rules  would  entail  legal  adjustments  at  MS  level. 
However, this option would not seem to present major transposition difficulties.  

Specifically, many of the rights in the area of working conditions are already granted in 
EU MS (2A). Some more adjustments would be needed in order for MS to comply with 
provisions  on  social  security  (2B).  Issues  could  arise  in  (non)  compliance  with  new 
provisions. 

Binding  regulation  of  these  areas  appears  proportionate,  as  it  would  entail  a  change  in 
only some Member States  , and would have the benefits of ensuring fairer competition 
and higher protection both for non-EU and EU workers. 

Simplification/ 
administrative burden 

The degree of simplification would not be considerable. The imposition of a common 
definition  would,  on  the  contrary,  add  administrative  burden  to  those  MS  which 
currently do not have such a definition and would have to admit TCN SW according to 
this  definition.  This  burden  would  however  be  minimal.  The  rights  of  sub-option  2A 
appear to be generally respected throughout the EU; rights under 2B would partly and for 
some MS have to be included in national legislations and respect ensured.  

-√ 
(2A)/ -
√√ 
(2B) 

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Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 

Policy Option 2 –Entry conditions and rights 

Financial impact 

- √√ 
(2A)/ 

- √√√ 
(2B) 

Expected Impacts 

Economic Impacts at EU 
level  

 √√ 
(2A)/ 
√√√ 
(2B) 

Financial  costs  would  arise  for  employers  due  to  additional  costs  to  provide  a  set  of 
rights  to  TCN  SW  relating  to  wages  and  possible  investments  in  improved  working 
conditions (2A), and additional costs for employers' contributions to social security, such 
as  sickness  and  health  care,  disability  and  old-age  pensions  in  those  MS  that  do  not 
currently grant full equal treatment in that area (2B) (see below under 6.2.3. for a more 
detailed  assessment  of  these  costs).  As  a  result  of  increased  costs  for  employers  under 
option  2A  and  even  more  2B,  it  is  not  expected  that  the  demand  for  third-country 
seasonal  workers  could  significantly  fall  (given  that,  for  example  for  agricultural 
employers it will not be an option to simply let the products be unpicked and rotten), but 
rather that prices would somewhat increase to reflect the actual costs. Given reinforced 
future inspections under the employer sanctions Directive especially in risk sectors such 
as the seasonal work sector, it is also not expected that employers would more often turn 
to illegal employment.  

Positive  impacts  on  public  finance  as  a  consequence  of  increased  wages  paid  to  TCN 
SW,  thus  increased  revenues  from  the  payment  of  taxes.  Additional  costs  for  public 
finance owing to granting a set of rights in areas and in MS where these rights are not 
already  granted  (disability  (MT,LU,IT),  old  age  pensions  (IT,LU,MT),  sickness 
insurance  (BG);  see  in  more  detail  below  p.  37  for  an  analysis  of  net  implementation 
costs).  Given  that  TCN  SW  and  their  employers  pay  contributions  to  security  schemes 
and that only a minority of seasonal workers will meet the eligibility criteria especially 
for  drawing  an  old-age  pension,  it  is  assumed  that  these  costs  are  outweighed  by  the 
increased revenues from taxes and social insurance. 

Limited costs due to: One-off financial/implementation costs on MS in order to adapt 
their  legislation,  and  recurring  costs  for  verification  procedures  (e.g.  verification  that 
admission criteria are met, labour market test if assigned to MS authorities). In addition, 
costs  would  arise  for  possible  monitoring  in  order  to  verify  the  respect  of  proposed 
provisions in terms of granting a set of rights and equal treatment (2 A and B). 

Positive  impacts  in  terms  of:  offsetting  the  possible  distortions  in  the  allocation  of 
TCN  SW,  owing  to  the  differences  between  MS  in  terms  of  admission  and  residence 
conditions; fostering legal inflows of TCN SW, facilitated by specific and common rules 
across the EU, and consequently reducing illegal immigration and overstay as an effect 
of transparent channels for entry. 

Employers,  especially  SMEs,  would  benefit  from  better  allocation  of  TCN  SW  but 
could incur additional costs (e.g. if required to do a labour market test). The impact on 
legal  flows,  illegal  migration  and  overstay  of  could  be  only  indirect.  Also,  most  MS 
already  have  specific  rules  on  TCN  SW.  Thus,  the  overall  economic  impacts  appear 
limited. 

Under  2A,  additional  positive  impacts  on  the  competition  in  the  internal  and  EU 
labour  market,  due  to  reduced  risks  of  exploitation  of  TCN  SW  and  related  unfair 
competition  between  EU  employers  (Similar  impact  as  results  from  the  Directive 
96/71/EC on the posting of workers that lays down terms and conditions of employment 
for posted workers, thus for temporary employment, often in sectors subject to seasonal 
work). Negative impacts may arise as a consequence of possible increases in the labour 
costs for EU employers (due to higher wages) and the related prices of goods. This risk 
could worsen  the  competitive  positioning  of  EU  firms  (especially  SMEs)  especially 
for  agricultural  goods,  which  are  more  exposed  to  a  high  international  competition. 
SMEs could turn to illegal employment to reduce costs.  

Under  2B,  positive  impacts  on  EU  employers  could  be  stronger:  wider  availability  of 
legal  labour  forces  (stronger  incentives  for  TCN  SW  to  legally  enter  the  EU  and  the 
possibility to change employer); right to change employer strengthens the protection of 
TCN SW against exploitation. Higher risks for increased prices that could fall back on 
consumers, thus risks of a negative impact on EU competitiveness 

By including a reference to the passing of seasons and to fixed term contracts in the 
common  definition,  the  main  option  should  ensure  TCN  SW  are  not  used  to  cover 
year-round  positions,  which  could  entail  unfair  competition  for  EU  and  non-EU 
permanent  labour  force  as  well  as  for  law-abiding  enterprises/employers.  The 
requirement  of  a  salary  level  that  is  equivalent  to  the  one  of  an  EU  national  SW  as  an 
entry condition contributes to avoiding social dumping. 

EN 

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Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 

Policy Option 2 –Entry conditions and rights 

Impacts on SMEs 

Social  Impacts  at  EU 
level 

- √√ 
(2A)/- 
√√√ 
(2B) 

 √√ 
(2A)/ 
√√√ 
(2B) 

Especially SMEs in the agricultural sector could be affected by increased labour costs. 
SMEs  could  turn  to  illegal  employment  in  order  to  reduce  their  prices  and  maintain 
competitiveness.  This  is  particularly  true  for  the  group  of  southern  EU  Member  States 
with a relatively high share of seasonal agricultural work. 

. 

Better  allocation  of  TCN  SW  between  MS  could  offset  possible  distortions  and 
shortages  at  regional  level.  Possible  increased  inflows  of  TCN  SW  could  help  to  fill 
current  labour  shortages.  However,  as  previously  pointed  out,  impacts  on  inflows  of 
TCN SW are not likely to be significant.  

Under  2A,  the  ability  of  EU  employers  in  filling  seasonal  labour  shortages  would  be 
improved  by  facilitated  legal  inflows  of  TCN  SW  and  better  allocation  of  seasonal 
workers.  The  legal  status  of  TCN  SW  would  be  secure  with  positive  impacts  on  their 
social inclusion. However, employers may turn to illegal employment. In this case, the 
proper  functioning  of  the  EU  labour  market  would  be  negatively  affected.  The 
functioning of the EU labour market could be still improved under 2B through a right to 
change  employer.  Limiting  the  possibility  for  mobility  only  to  specific  circumstances 
would  reduce  the  risks  related  to  difficulties  of  temporary  migration  control,  illegality 
and overstay.  

Impacts 
countries 

on 

third 

 √ 
(2A)/ 
√√ 
(2B) 

Positive  impacts  in  terms  of  remittances’  size  (higher  still  under  sub  option  2B),  as 
granting  a  set  of  right  to  TCN  SW  could  grant  better  working  conditions  and 
payments/wages.  Given  that  SW  usually  implies  low/non-skilled  work,  but  seasonal 
workers  from  TC  are  not  necessarily  low/  non-skilled  (more  often,  the  younger,  more 
educated persons tend to migrate), risk of (temporary) brain drain.  

Impacts on third-country 
workers 
seasonal 
impacts  on 
(including 
social 
and 
fundamental rights) 

inclusion 

 √√ 
(2A)/ 
√√√ 
(2B) 

Impacts  on  EU  national 
seasonal workers  

 √ 
(2A)/ 
√√ 
(2B) 

More  secure  legal  status  for  TCN  SW  under  the  main  option.  This  would  have  limited 
positive impacts on social inclusion of TCN SW.  

Under  2A,  benefits  on  fundamental  rights  of  TCN  SW,  especially  non  discrimination 
(art. 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Charter), and right to fair and 
just  working  conditions  (art  31  Charter).  Indeed,  working  conditions  would  be 
explicitly  protected  by  the  clear  determination  of  the  applicable  law.  The  possibility  to 
have access to other benefits (such as social security, health care, etc) would be left to the 
decision  of  single  MS.  However,  the  improved  working  conditions  and  possible 
additional  benefits  would  foster  the  social  inclusion  of  TCN  SW.  As  compared  to  2A, 
under  2B,  positive  impacts  in  terms  of  protection  from  exploitation  and  benefits 
granted would be reinforced.  

The risks of job displacement of EU national workers would be reduced by admission 
criteria providing for a labour market test and the existence of a concrete job offer/ 
work  contract.  Moreover,  a  specific  definition  would  ensure  that  third  country 
seasonal workers are not employed to cover year-round positions, avoiding risks of 
unfair competition.  

Providing a set of rights in the field of working conditions, 2A, (with particular reference 
to  treatment  in  payment/wages)  reduces  risks  of  unfair  competition  between  EU 
national  seasonal  workers  and  TCN  SW.  The  risks  of  job  displacement  of  EU 
national workers would be notably reduced, and even further under 2B. 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
 
 
Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 

Policy Option 2 –Entry conditions and rights 

Stakeholders’ view 

Most  stakeholders  agree  with  the  various  aspects  included  in  the  definition,  affirming 
that  common  definition  and  criteria  would  increase  the  transparency  of  the  EU  legal 
framework (Business Europe). TCN SW would be more attracted to the EU, alleviating 
labour  shortages,  and  would  avoid  discrimination  between  EU  citizens  and  TCN 
(ETUC). Some state that the definition must be very strict so that SW may be used only 
when  strictly  justified,  for  a  limited  period  of  time  and  in  specific  sectors  (ETUC). 
Caritas  Europa  suggests  denying  admission  for  overqualified  TCN  for  seasonal 
employment to avoid brain drain. ETUC states that political consensus could be built on 
protection  of  SW  and  the  effectiveness  of  the  internal  market  through  more  fair 
competition. 

All stakeholders support the provision of the rights under option 2A. Some stakeholders 
(ETUC) do not consider the level of rights granted by this option as sufficient to protect 
SW  and  would  include  other  rights  (i.e.  occupational  diseases,  accidents  at  work, 
sickness  benefits,  etc.),  as  in  2B.  One  stakeholder  (Business  Europe)  underlines  that 
equal treatment is already a reality in the large majority of MS and that extra costs could 
arise for employers for investing in working conditions in the other MS. 

A  general  consensus  exists  on  granting  the  possibility  to  change  job/employer  (2B), 
except  one  stakeholder  (Business  Europe)  that  considers  that  the  permit  for  seasonal 
work  is  limited  to  a  specific  enterprise’s  needs  and  that  employers  who  first  hired  SW 
should be protected against sudden loss in manpower. Another stakeholder (UEAPME) 
stresses the need to have a strict control over the circumstances for change of employer: 
if too easy, such might contribute to the informal economy. 

6. 

Policy Option 3: Single permit and facilitations for re-entry 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 

Relevance 

in 

and 

To  respond  to  seasonal 
the 
fluctuations 
economy 
offset 
labour  shortages  faced 
in 
specific 
industries/economic 
sectors and regions 

To 
to 
contribute 
preventing  exploitation 
poor  working 
and 
third-
conditions 
seasonal 
country 
workers 
illegal 
immigration. 

and 

for 

 More  efficient  recruitment  procedure  for  EU  employers.  Common  definition  and 
admission criteria would allow a more even allocation of TCN SW between EU MS.  

√√√ 
(3A)/√√ 
(3B) 

Multi-seasonal  permits  (3A)  would  ensure  a  steady  and  fairly  predictable 
availability of seasonal workforces to EU employers/enterprises; labour shortages 
would  be  efficiently  addressed.  Delays  for  recruiting  third  country  seasonal  workers 
would  be  reduced.  A  facilitated  procedure  for  re-entry  (3B)  would  foster  a  more 
continuous  supply  of  legal  channels  to  TCN  SW  which  would  provide  a  slightly 
more certain and available labour force to labour shortages, albeit less predictable as 
3A. 

√√√ (3A)/ 
√√(√) (3B 

Simplified admission procedure and fewer obstacles for legal immigration of TCN 
SW, in turn possible reduction in illegal immigration and illegal work. 

A  multi-seasonal  permit  (3A)  would  offer,  under  certain  conditions,  concrete 
perspectives  of  re-entry.  Requiring  the  previous  compliance  with  all  rules  as  a 
condition  for  re-entry  would  create  an  additional  incentive  for  return  in  the  home 
country  at  the  end  of  the  term.  Thus,  positive  impacts  in  terms  of  reduced  illegal 
immigration  and  overstay.  Phenomena  of  exploitation,  sub-standard  working 
conditions linked to situation of illegal migration and illegal stay would be reduced.  

3B would foster the legal inflows of TCN SW through simplified procedures for re-
entry in subsequent years. As access to facilitate procedure only for those TCN SW 
complaint with all rules during previous stays, incentives for return as perspective for 
re-entry.  Thus  reduction  of  overstay.  As  working  legally,  TCN  SW  would  be  more 
protected against exploitation and poor working conditions. Incentives appear weaker 
as  in  3  B,  which  give  a  more  concrete  perspective  for  re-entry  through  a  multi-
seasonal permit 

EN 

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Policy Option 3: Single permit and facilitations for re-entry 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 

To  contribute  to  the 
development  of 
third 
countries  

 √√√√ 
(3A)/ √√√ 
(3B) 

Feasibility 

Difficulty/risks 
transposition, 
proportionality 

for 
incl. 

-√√√√ 
(3A)/ 

-√√√(3B) 

Simplification/administ
rative burden 

-√(3A)/ 0 
(3B) 

Financial impact 

 -√ (3A)/ 

- √ (3B) 

Expected Impacts 

Economic  Impacts  at 
EU level  

√√√√ 
(3A)/ √√√ 
(3B) 

Providing  TCN  SW  with  channels  for  admission  could  foster  legal  inflows  of  TCN 
SW,  thereby  relieving  certain  labour  supply  surpluses  in  sending  countries,  and 
reduce recourse to illegal routes.  

3A fosters circular migration, as it encourages TCN SW to return at the end of each 
season, benefiting from eventual skills and knowledge acquired in the EU. Households 
of seasonal workers would benefit from a steady income. 

Mechanism would foster cooperation of third countries in coordinating migration 
policies to combat illegal immigration and other migration related issues. 

To a lesser extent as 3A, 3B could enhance circular migration by encouraging TCN 
SW  to  return  to  their  countries  of  origin.  Moreover,  would  provide  a  more  stable 
seasonal  income  for  households  in  the  countries  of  origin  though  remittances.  May 
foster cooperation with the EU migration policy in terms of migration-related issues 

Regarding  3A,  all  MS  (except  IT  and  FR)  would  have  to  introduce  multi-seasonal 
permits,  including  procedures  to  ensure  the  correct  functioning  of  the  multi-
seasonal  work/residence  permit  (i.e.  verifying  the  previous  compliance  with  all 
rules, etc.). All MS (except for FR and IT which have comparable procedures to the 
one  proposed)  would  have  to  adapt  their  procedures  to  the  facilitated  re-entry 
procedure. This would require verification of compliance with rules in the previous 
year  and  a  simplification  of  the  procedure  the  year  after  (most  likely  including  a 
database).  

Such  adaptation  appears  proportionate,  given  the  expected  gains  both  in  terms  of 
labour  supply  and  likelihood  of  return  after  the  season  that  such  facilitated  re-entry 
possibilities will allow. 

Streamlining of procedures: National authorities as main beneficiaries, followed by 
third country seasonal workers. 

A  multi-seasonal  permit  (3A)  would  simplify  and  lighten  the  administrative 
burden,  however  at  the  same  time  require  the  set  up  of  mechanisms  to  have  an 
overview  of  multi-seasonal  permit  holders.  A  facilitated  re-entry  procedure  (3B) 
would  require  additional  checks  upon  application  in  the  second  year  of  whether  the 
TCNSW  has  complied  with  all  conditions  in  a  previous  year  as  well  as  require 
mechanism  to  have  an  overview  of  seasonal  workers  in  a  previous  year,  which 
however is useful to have for migration management. 

For  MS,  financial  costs  in  the  short  term  would  occur  as  a  consequence  of  the 
introduction  of  a  single  permit.  However,  given  that  under  the  future  framework 
Directive,  MS  would  introduce  that  permit  anyway  for  other  categories  of  workers, 
additional adaptation costs are not expected to be high Financial costs: multi-seasonal 
permit (3A) would entail costs for adapting procedures at MS level, as well as getting 
acquainted with new legislation. However, considerable savings for MS would be 
achieved  in  the  medium  term  as  a  consequence  of  reduced  admission  procedures. 
Under 3B,, financial costs on MS for introducing the new procedure would be more 
limited. Savings for MS would occur but to a more limited extent 

Additional administrative costs for  EU employers and TCN  SW to familiarise with 
the  multi-seasonal  permit,  but  once  the  system  is  set  up  and  running,  costs  could  be 
reduced for the recruitment of TCN SW.  

Positive economic impact (faster and simplified procedures increase availability of 
legal  seasonal  labour).  Multi-seasonal  permit  (3A)  would  have  strong  positive 
impacts  on  legal  inflows  of  TCN  SW  and  reducing  illegal  immigration  and 
overstay.  Steady  and  predictable  availability  of  legal  seasonal workforces  would 
allow  a  quick  response  to  labour  market  needs.  Enhanced  fair  competition 
between employers through incentives for legal employment.  

Several economic benefits: higher availability of legal seasonal labour forces, which 
would  strengthen  the  position  of  EU  firms  reduction  of  distortions  due  to  illegal 
migration, overstay. 

This is valid also for 3B, however, to a lesser extent, as less concrete and predictable 
perspectives for re-entry would exist. 

EN 

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Policy Option 3: Single permit and facilitations for re-entry 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 

Impact on SMEs 

√√√√ 
(3A)/ √√√ 
(3B) 

Given that labour demands could be more easily and quickly satisfied, the competitive 
position  of  SMEs,  which  represent  more  than  35%  of  the  total  EU  firms  in  the 
relevant sectors for seasonal employment, would be strengthened.  

Social  Impacts  at  EU 
level 

 √√√√ 
(3A)/ √√√ 
(3B) 

Impacts 
countries 

on 

third 

 √√√√ 
(3A)/ √√ 
(3B) 

on 

Impacts 
country 
workers 
impacts 
inclusion 
fundamental rights) 

third-
seasonal 
(including 
social 
and 

on 

√√ (3A)/ 
√√ (3B) 

Impacts on EU national 
seasonal workers  

√ (3A)/ √ 
(3B) 

Better ability of EU employers to match labour shortages. Both EU employers and 
TCN  SW  would  have  more  incentives  (as  reduced  costs,  simpler  and  faster 
procedures) for opting for legal migration and employment channels. Positive impact 
on illegal migration and the related risks of employment.  

Under 3B, strong positive impacts, as enterprises could rely on a pool of legal seasonal 
workers,  with  agriculture  and  tourism  being  particularly  positively  affected. 
Incentives  for  legal  migration,  against  illegal  entry  and  overstay  in  the  EU  labour 
market, could further reduce the size and likelihood of illegal employment linked to 
illegal inflows and overstay of TCN SW. 

The  same  is  valid  to  some  extent  for  3B,  however,  the  availability  of  seasonal 
workforces  could  be  less  predictable  for  employers  and  the  ability  to  fill  the  gaps 
and  improve  the  flexibility  of  the  EU  labour  market  would  be  more  limited.  Illegal 
inflows would probably persist with consequences, inter alia, on the social inclusion 
of TCN SW. 

Positive  impact  on  remittances  to  third  countries,  as  legal  employment  of  SW  is 
favoured. However, the impact is indirect and quite limited. 

3A would contribute to effectively enforce the temporary nature of seasonal migration 
and could imply notable benefits for countries of origin, including to reduce the risk of 
(permanent)  brain  drain.  In  particular,  circular  migration  between  EU  and  home 
countries would be fostered, including transfer of skills and support to investments. 
Stable and predictable sources of income within the duration of the multi-seasonal 
permit-stability and continuity of inflows of remittances in countries of origin. 

3B  would  encourage  the  return  in  the  countries  of  origin  after  the  period  of 
employment  which  reduces  the  risk  of  (permanent)brain  drain.  Nevertheless,  the 
impacts  in  terms  of  circular  migration,  skill  transfer  and  investments  would  be 
indirect and lower as in 3A, due to the less concrete perspective for re-entry offered to 
TCN  SW.  The  same  is  true  for  the  impacts  on  remittances.  Indeed,  the  continuity 
and predictability of these inflows would be reduced compared to 3 B. 

Possible  reductions  of  illegal  immigration  and  overstay  could  prevent  situations  of 
illegal  employment  and  of  social  exclusion; more  secure  legal  status  for  TCN  SW. 
Exploitative and sub-standard working conditions (art. 31 of the Charter) linked to 
illegality  could  be  reduced.  Effects  on  protection  against  exploitation  of  third-
country seasonal workers could be lower under 3B, as more limited effectiveness of 
this sub-option with respect to illegal  migration and overstay. As a consequence, the 
expected level of social inclusion and the granting of fair and just working conditions 
(art. 31 of the Charter) are likely to be lower. 

The provision for labour market test and the job offer/work contract would reduce 
risks of job displacement of EU seasonal workers. The possible reduction of illegal 
migration would limit risks of unfair competition for EU national SW.  

The  positive  impact  in  terms  of  protection  of  TCN  SW  from  exploitation  linked  to 
illegal  migration  and  overstay  would  be  stronger,  with  related  positive  effects  on 
risks  of  unfair  competition  for  EU  national  workers.  Such  effects  are  expected  to  be 
slightly lower under 3B. 

EN 

29 

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Policy Option 3: Single permit and facilitations for re-entry 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 

Stakeholders’ view 

Stakeholders  support  a  single  permit  to  avoid  lengthy  and  complex  procedures 
(Business Europe, Coordeurop, IOM, UEAPME), reducing costs (IOM), improve the 
labour  market  functioning  (IOM,  UEAPME)  and  ensure  better  management  of 
seasonal migration (Caritas Europa, IOM, Social Platform-Youth Forum). 

Stakeholders support multi-seasonal permits. IOM highlights however that if there are 
no  sufficient  or  suitable  seasonal  jobs  available,  irregular  migration  could  be 
prompted.  Caritas  Europa  and  ETUC  suggest  a  temporary  multi-seasonal  permit  of 
max. 5 years. In addition, ETUC suggests to allow re-entry in different seasons of the 
same year and to use this option for the first MS of entry while using sub-option 3B 
(i.e.  facilitated  re-entry  procedure)  to  improve  geographical  mobility  (guaranteeing 
continuous  and  sufficient  income  for  SW).  IOM  underlines  that  a  multi-seasonal 
permit could be issued and managed with the involvement of EU MS consular services 
in countries of origin. 

Regarding 3B, limits and negative impacts are highlighted. In particular, IOM points 
out  that  if  there  are  no  longer  sufficient/  suitable  seasonal  jobs  available,  irregular 
migration could be prompted. Further difficulties are identified in the potential lack of 
political consensus due to the larger impact on national legislations (ETUC). 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve 
the impact 

Policy Option 4 : Measures ensuring return 

Relevance 

in 

and 

To  respond  to  seasonal 
fluctuations 
the 
economy 
offset 
labour  shortages  faced  in 
specific 
industries/economic 
sectors and regions 

contribute 

to 
To 
exploitation 
preventing 
working 
and 
conditions 
third-
country  seasonal  workers 
and illegal immigration. 

poor 

for 

0√ 

Marginal  impacts  only,  as  no  enhancement  of  legal  inflows  of  TCN  SW  to  fill 
labour market gaps and no improved allocation within the EU. 

In  case  of  reporting  obligations  on  TCN  SW,  reduced  risks  for  overstaying  and 
illegal employment, thus fairer competition. 

An explicit obligation to return could contribute to reducing overstaying, as no false 
expectations on TCN SW side are created. 

√√ 

Reporting  obligations  on  TCN  SW  would  reduce  risks  for  overstaying  and  illegal 
employment and exploitative working conditions. . 

contribute 

To 
development 
countries,  

of 

to 

the 
third 

√ 

Reporting  obligations  on  TCN  SW  should  foster  return  which  is  potentially 
beneficial to third countries (circular  migration) for skills enhancement/ to avoid 
brain drain. 

Feasibility 

Difficulty/risks 
transposition, 
proportionality 

for 
incl. 

- √√√ 

Limits in  feasibility, acceptability and proportionality for reporting obligation on 
TCN SW, as there is no obligation to return to the country of origin, difficulties in 
practical application. 

Simplification/administra
tive burden 

- √√√ 

No reduction of administrative burden, but additional one for MS who do not have a 
definition currently. Marginal costs for MS to introduce definition of TCN SW.  

Reporting  obligations  on  TCN  SW  would  create  additional  burden  for  already 
overburdened consular posts (need to register return, check against database etc) 

Financial impact 

- √√√√ 

Reporting obligations on TCN SW would add costs for TCN SW and consulates, as 
need to check files and report in case of non-return.  

Expected Impacts 

Economic  Impacts  at  EU 
level 

Impact on SMEs 

√ 

√ 

Marginal  impacts  on  EU  competitiveness  mainly  due  to  fewer  distortions  in  the 
allocation of seasonal workers between EU MS.  

A  common  definition  and  maximum  stay  duration  would  help  avoiding  the  use  of 
TCN SW for all year-round jobs, thereby posing unfair competition to EU labour or 
permanent non-EU labour. 

Especially SMEs would benefit from a slightly more efficient allocation of seasonal 
workers to where the strongest economic need is.  

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve 
the impact 

Policy Option 4 : Measures ensuring return 

Social Impacts at EU level 

√√ 

Impacts 
countries 

on 

third 

√√ 

Impacts  on  third-country 
workers 
seasonal 
impacts  on 
(including 
social 
and 
fundamental rights) 

inclusion 

-√√√ 

The establishment of a common definition across EU could be a first condition for 
achieving  a  more  efficient  allocation  of  seasonal  workers  and  contributing  to 
offset labour shortages at the regional level.  

Sucha  specific  definition  for  seasonal  workers  could  contribute  to  better  and 
specifically  address  seasonal  needs  in  the  EU  labour  markets,  helping  MS  filling 
job  vacancies  in  sectors  characterised  by  cyclical  labour  needs  (agriculture  and 
tourism in particular).  

Reporting obligation on TCN SW may enhance return and thus (through compliance 
with  that  obligation)  open  ways  for  entry  as  seasonal  worker  in  a  following  year, 
thus foster circular migration with the benefits that brings to TC.  

The  establishment  of  a  common  system  at  EU  level  (i.e.  a  common  definition, 
common  admission  criteria)  would  grant  a  somewhat  more  secure  legal  status  for 
TCN SW with (limited) positive repercussions in terms of social inclusion.  

Reporting  obligations  on  TCN  SW  are  likely  to  have  negative  effects,  as  may  be 
difficult in practice (logistical problems such as remote locations) and the travel to 
the  consulate  costly  for  the  TCN  SW,  so  some  of  the  development  effect  would 
likely be lost. This would raise concerns about proportionality, as TCN SW will not 
necessarily  have  to  return  to  their  country  of  origin,  plus  consular  offices  may  be 
difficult to reach in particular in big countries. 

Impacts  on  EU  national 
seasonal workers 

√ 

Reduced overstaying and better protection against exploitation and poor working 
conditions for TCN SW would also protect EU and non-EU labour forces from 
unfair competition. 

Stakeholders’ view 

Overstaying  reduced  through  a  common  definition  since  temporary  nature  of 
seasonal  migration  reinforced  and  SW  would  invest  upon  return  through  financial 
means and experience acquired in the EU (Business Europe).  

This  option  could  be  “too  attractive  for  MS,  given  the  current  political  climate 
toward migrant workers” (Caritas Europa). In addition, costs would rise not so much 
for EU public authorities but for employers (Business Europe). 

“Ensuring  return”  per  se  is  not  generally  considered  a  valid  option,  whereas 
supporting  the  mobility  between  EU  MS  and  third-countries  is  considered  as  a 
useful means for reducing illegal migration and ensuring the functioning of the EU 
labour market and promoting the development of countries of origin.  

TCN  SW  would  be  faced  with  limited  administrative  costs  that  could  be 
compensated by prospect of future work in the EU (Business Europe). 

However, there would be difficulties for TCN SW to report in the consular office of 
the  MS  of  employment  abroad  (UEAPME)  and  experience  shows  how 
consular/diplomatic offices abroad are not effective in monitoring and recording re-
entry with the risk of bureaucratic bottlenecks if competent authorities in the hosting 
countries are not involved (ETUC). 

Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to 
achieve the impact 

Option 5 

Relevance 

to 

To  respond 
seasonal 
fluctuations  in  the  economy 
and  offset  labour  shortages 
faced 
specific 
in 
industries/economic  sectors 
and regions 

and 
conditions 

To contribute to  preventing 
poor 
exploitation 
for 
working 
seasonal 
third-country 
workers 
illegal 
immigration. 

and 

The  option  would  aim  at  approximation  of  legislative  practices  on  TCN  SW 
throughout the EU. This could reduce the differentiation between MS (in terms 
of  definitions,  admission  criteria,  temporary  residence  and  work  permits)  and 
favour a better allocation of TCN SW within the EU. Moreover, by spreading 
knowledge  and  information  (especially  best  practices),  MS  legislations  may  be 
improved and adapted in order to better respond to fluctuations in some economic 
sectors  and  specifically  offset  labour  and skills  shortages.  However,  impacts  are 
likely to be very limited, as such measures would not be mandatory for MS. 

Exchanging  information  on  the  consequences  of  illegal  migration  and  best 
practices  on  measures  against  illegal  immigration,  illegal  employment  and 
exploitation  of  TCN  SW  could  help  preventing  these  phenomena  in  the  EU.. 
However,  impacts  are  likely  to  be  very  limited,  as  such  measures  would  not be 
mandatory for MS. 

0/√ 

0/√ 

EN 

31 

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Assessment Criteria  

Rating 

Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to 
achieve the impact 

Option 5 

contribute 

To 
development 
countries 

of 

to 

the 
third 

0/ √ 

The  diffusion  of  knowledge  and  best  practices  within  the  EU  on  seasonal 
migration could include some relevant issues in this field: measures ensuring the 
return of TCN SW to their countries of origin where they could contribute to the 
development  of  their  local  economies  through  the  acquired  skills;  the  protection 
of TCN SW from exploitation and poor working conditions, which could increase 
the size of remittances. At the same time, MS could be encouraged (e.g. through 
advising  and  information  campaigns)  to  promote  cooperation  with  third 
countries in the area of seasonal migration. 

Feasibility 

Difficulty/risks 
transposition, 
proportionality 

for 
incl. 

0 

No difficulties or risks of transposition would be envisaged by this policy option 
since it would not impose any additional legislative interventions and MS would 
have complete discretion in whether to adapt to the content of the information and 
best practices delivered through this policy option. 

Simplification/administrativ
e burden 

-√√√ 

Financial impact 

-√√√ 

Expected Impacts 

Economic  Impacts  at  EU 
level 

Impact on SMEs 

0 

0 

Social Impacts at EU level 

0 /√ 

Impacts on third countries 

0/√ 

Impacts  on  third-country 
seasonal workers (including 
impacts  on  social  inclusion 
and fundamental rights) 

0/ √ 

Impacts  on  EU  national 
seasonal workers 

0/ √ 

Stakeholders’ view 

No  simplification  or  reduction  of  the  administrative  burden  would  be  attained 
through this policy option. Possible additional administrative burdens (compared 
to status quo) could occur to carry out OMC activities (e.g. sharing best practices) 
to  collect  and  share  information.  Only  if  MS  were  to  spread  the  use  of  certain 
practices  (i.e.  single  work/residence  permit,  facilitated  re-entry  procedure,  etc.) 
would there be a certain degree of simplification within those MS that adopt such 
legislative provisions. 

At EU and MS level, fair additional recurrent financial costs for organizing OMC 
activities  such  as  creating  networks  of  expertise,  data  collection  and 
dissemination. Administrative costs for OMC activities such as drafting national 
action plans, sharing good and best practices and setting up awareness campaigns 

Performing analysis, exchanging information and best practices could improve the 
ability  of  MS  to  provide  better  and  faster  responses  to  the  needs  for  seasonal 
labour through the recruitment of TCN SW. Nevertheless, these impacts appear 
be very limited.  

The competitiveness of SMEs could be -marginally- improved. 

Positive  impacts  on  functioning  of  EU  labour  market  could  arise  from:  the 
possible harmonization among MS and the resulting effect on allocation of TCN 
SW  across  EU;  the  offsetting  of  illegal  immigration  of  TCN  SW.  Nevertheless, 
these impacts are expected to be very limited and not significant.  

Improving the measures ensuring the return of TCN SW and the protection from 
exploitation  and  poor  working  conditions  could  benefit 
third  countries. 
Nevertheless, these impacts are expected to be very limited. 

Protection  against  exploitation  could  be  strengthened  by  the  exchange  of 
information  and  best  practices  between  MS  on  measures  and  approaches  in 
force in single MS. However, the effective impact on working conditions of TCN 
SW  (art.  31  of  the  Charter)  as  well  as  on  non-discrimination  (art.  21  of  the 
Charter) will continue to depend on the national policies. Moreover, situation 
of  illegal  migration,  if  not  in  parallel  and  properly  addressed,  will  continue  to 
pose serious risks of exploitation of third country seasonal workers and jeopardize 
the social inclusion of these migrants. Nevertheless, these impacts are expected 
to be very limited. 

The possible strengthening of protection of TCN SW from exploitation and sub-
standard  working  conditions  would  contribute  to  protect  EU  national  seasonal 
workers  from  risks  of  job  displacement.s.  Nevertheless;  these  impacts  are 
expected to be very limited. 

This  option  would  help  to  spread  best  practices  (business-friendly)  and  would 
have a positive impact in terms of managing SW migration policies and attracting 
limited  additional  SW,  with  limited  extra  costs  and  no  problems  in  terms  of 
political  acceptability  (Business  Europe).  Moreover,  it  would  anticipate  labour 
demand  and  allow  a  more  effective  planning  of  migration  flows  (ETUC). 
Coordination  and  cooperation  would  be  “necessary,  but  insufficient”  to  ensure 
granting a set of rights to TCN SW and an efficient functioning of the EU labour 
market (Caritas Europa). 

EN 

32 

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6.1. 

Implementation costs of the policy options  

A  qualitative  assessment  of  costs  of  the  policy  options  is  given.  Policy  option  1  would  not 
require additional resources. 

Option 2 brings about additional costs for the five Member States (EE, IE, LV, LT, MT. DK 
is not calculated given its opt-out) which currently do not have specific legislation on seasonal 
workers and would be required to introduce such and monitor its application. A 2 months full 
time equivalent per Member State is calculated for transposing legislation, and a 4 months per 
2 years for monitoring. EU staff resources (3 months full time equivalent) would be required 
to prepare and channel that legislation. 

Option  2B  entails  limited  additional  costs  for  Member  States  and  employers  for  equal 
treatment in social security, including enforcement, where the proposed range of rights is not 
currently granted. EU staff resources would be required to prepare and channel that legislation 
(see in more detail below under 6.2.3). 

For option 3, additional cost regarding the introduction of a single permit for Member States 
that currently do not  have  such  a  system are not expected to be very  high; under  the  future 
framework Directive28. EU staff resources (3 months full time equivalent) would be required 
to prepare and channel that legislation. 

Under  options  3A/B  some  additional  costs  for  the  introduction  of  multi-seasonal  permits/a 
facilitated  procedure  are  foreseen  for  Member  States´  authorities,  most  notably  costs 
associated with keeping an overview-database of multi-seasonal permit holders and seasonal 
workers in view of their re-entry, and with operating a system to apply preferential re-entry). 
At the same time, cost savings can be expected for Member States' authorities (in particular 
fewer working hours for processing applications- document checks- of third-country seasonal 
workers already admitted previously) and employers (re-activation of an application made in 
a previous year instead of need for new application)29. 

One element of option 4 – reporting at consular offices – would entail considerable costs for 
consular  offices  (following  the  reporting  procedure,  issuing  the  receipt  to  third-country 
seasonal  workers  and  submitting  reports  to  immigration  authorities:  an  estimated  cost  of  € 
22.8  million),  immigration  authorities  (establishing  a  reporting  form  and  procedure; 
examining,  processing  and  filing  the  reports:  an  estimate  cost  of  €  19  million)  and  third-
country  seasonal  workers  (costs  of  time  and  money  to  reach,  report  and  return  from  the 
consular office: an estimate cost of € 1.5 million). These costs are estimated at a total of more 
than € 43 million (see annex 4.1 for an EU cost model). 

Option 5 would require EU staff resources (1 month full time equivalent annually) for support 
activities, and Member State government resources in terms of cost of time of participants in 
these activities (0.5 months full time equivalent per Member State), as well as costs to convey 
information on their respective legislative framework and admission conditions. This option 
would not imply additional costs for employers and third countries. 

28 
29 

See point 6.2.3. 
See point 6.2.3. 

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
                                                 
7. 

IDENTIFICATION ANDASSESSMENT OF THE PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

7.1. 

Comparison of policy options 

Table 6.1 compares the "ratings" of the five policy options set out in section 5. 

Assessment 
criteria 

PO 1: Status 
Quo 

PO 2 

PO 3 

PO 2A 

PO 2B 

PO 3A 

PO 3B 

PO 4 

PO 5 

Relevance 

•  Global 

Objective 
1: 
To  respond  to 
seasonal 
fluctuations  in 
economy 
the 
offset 
and 
labour 
shortages 
faced 
specific 
industries/eco
nomic  sectors 
and regions 

in 

•  Global 

2 
Objective 
prevention  of 
exploitation 
and 
immigration. 

illegal 

•  Global 

Objective 
3: 
To  contribute 
to 
the 
development 
of 
countries 

third 

0 

0 

0 

√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

√√ 

0√ 

0/√ 

√√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

√√(√) 

√√ 

0/√ 

√ 

√√ 

√√√√ 

√√√ 

√ 

0 

EN 

34 

EN 

 
  
 
Assessment 
criteria 

PO 1: Status 
Quo 

PO 2 

PO 3 

PO 2A 

PO 2B 

PO 3A 

PO 3B 

PO 4 

PO 5 

Feasibility 

Difficulty/risks  for 
transposition 

Simplification 
administrative 
burden 

of 

and 

Financial 
administrative 
costs 

Expected impacts 

Economic  impacts 
at EU level 

Impacts on SMEs 

Social  impacts  at 
EU level 

Impacts  on 
countries 

third 

Impacts  on 
country 
workers 

third 
seasonal 

Impacts  on  EU 
national 
seasonal 
workers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

-√ 

-√ 

-√√ 

√√ 

-√√ 

√√ 

√ 

√√ 

√ 

-√√ 

-√√ 

-√√√ 

√√√ 

-√√√ 

√√√ 

√√ 

√√√ 

√√ 

EN 

-√√√√ 

-√√√ 

0 

-√ 

√√√ 

√√√ 

√√√ 

√√ 

√√ 

√ 

-√ 

-√ 

√√√√ 

√√√√ 

√√√√ 

√√√√ 

√√ 

√ 

35 

-√√√ 

-√√√ 

-√√√√ 

√ 

√ 

√√ 

√√ 

-√√√ 

√ 

0 

-√√√ 

-√√√ 

0 

0 

0/√ 

0/√ 

0/√ 

0 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
7.2. 

Identification of the preferred policy option 

On the basis of comparison of the options and their impacts on reaching the policy objectives, 
the preferred option set out below is a combination of different aspects of policy options 2B, 
3A, 3B and 4. 

Main fields of 
the EU 
intervention 

Admission 
conditions 

Provisions of the preferred Policy options 

Policy Options and sub-options 
considered 

•  Common definition of seasonal workers; 

Policy Option 2B 

•  Common  admission  criteria,  such  as  the  need  to  perform  a  labour  market 

test; the need for a work contract/job offer; 

•  Definition of the maximum duration of the permit; 

•  Single permit for work and residence on the territory of the MS; 

•  Admission  allowed  on  the  basis  of  a  visa  bearing  the  mention  “seasonal 

workers” for short periods of stay (up to 3 months); 

• 

. 

Re-entry 
subsequent 
years 

in 

•  Multi-seasonal  permit,  with  a  defined  maximum  duration  (e.g.  up  to  three 

Sub-option 3 A/B 

years); or facilitated procedure for re-entry (optional for MS) 

•  Previous compliance of the third-country seasonal workers with all rules as a 

condition for re-entry; 

and 
Rights 
benefits  granted 
to TCN SW 

Provisions 
ensuring  return 
of TCN SW  

• 

•  A set of defined rights in the field of working conditions ; 

Sub-option 2 B 

•  Equal treatment with EU nationals with respect to: 

•  Social  security  rights,  as  defined  in  Council  Regulation  1408/71,  such  as 
occupational diseases, accidents at work, sickness benefits, invalidity benefits, 
family benefits, death grants.  

•  Right to change employer under specific circumstances (e.g. in the event of 
situation  of  exploitation/poor  working  conditions,  in  the  case  of  consecutive 
short harvests) and within the duration of authorized stay.  

•  Explicit obligation to return after the end of each season 

Option 4, 3 A/B 

•  Maximum duration of the authorisation to stay per season 

•  Possibilities  for  facilitated  re-entry  in  subsequent  years  that  are  accessible 
only  to  TCN  SW  who  have  complied  with  all  conditions  during  their 
previous stay as seasonal worker 

EN 

36 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Given  that  the  preferred  option  is  a  combination  of  various  options,  this  table  re-
assesses the preferred option against the policy objectives. 

•  Assessment criteria 

•  Relevance 

Rating 

Provisions contributing to the rating 

To  respond  to  seasonal  fluctuations 
in  the  economy  and  offset  labour 
specific 
shortages 
faced 
industries/economic 
and 
regions 

in 
sectors 

√√√√√ 

A  high  impact  in  this  field  could  be  achieved  due  to  the  streamlining  of  entry 
conditions and the establishment of specific provisions for re-entry: 

- single permit for work and residence ( visa in exceptional cases); 

- definition of a maximum time for processing applications; 

- multi-seasonal permit or facilitated re-entry 

Moreover,  a  common  definition  and  admission  criteria  would  grant  a  more 
efficient allocation of TCN SW across EU MS. Regarding the number of TCN SW, 
the instrument would not have an immediate effect, as it falls upon MS to determine 
the  volumes  of  admission  to  their  territories.  However,  a  more  attractive  scheme 
coupled  with  increased  labour  market  needs  is  likely  to  lead  to  higher  numbers  of 
TCN SW being admitted to the EU. 

Given that, for competence reasons, it will remain for MS to determine the volumes 
of TCN SW admitted, the impact on the numbers of TCN SW coming to the EU is 
impossible  to  estimate.  However,  it  is  assumed  that  a  flexible  system  that  includes 
guarantees  for  return  after  each  season,  combined  with  labour  market  needs  in  that 
sector, will lead to a rise in numbers. 

to 

contribute 

To 
preventing 
exploitation  and  poor  working 
third-country 
conditions 
illegal 
and 
seasonal  workers 
immigration. 

for 

-  single  permit  for  work  and  residence  and  one-stop  shop  procedure  for  obtaining 
the permit and multi-seasonal permit, as a means for granting TCN SW with better 
channels for entry and re-entry; 

√√√√ 

-  right  to  change  employer  under  specific  circumstances  (i.e.  in  the  event  of 
exploitation); 

- equal treatment with respect to working conditions and social security.  

To contribute to the development of 
third countries 

√√√ 

Feasibility 

The positive impact would be due to: 

-  multi-seasonal  permit  or  facilitated  re-entry  in  subsequent  years,  as  specific 
means to foster circular migration; 

-  a  set  of  rights  in  respect  of  working  conditions  and  equal  treatment  with  EU 
nationals in the field social security , which would positively affect remittances’ size.  

- Possible considerable transposition difficulties related to multi-seasonal permit 
(especially  for  MS  particularly  concerned  with  a  strict  control  over  seasonal 
migration from third countries, i.e. MS of Group A); 

Difficulty/risks for transposition 

-√√√ 

-  more  limited  difficulties  with  respect  to  single  permit,  collective  applications, 
the rights granted in respect of working conditions, equal treatment. 

-  risks  of  compliance  of  EU  employers  with  the  obligation  foreseen  in  terms  of 
equal treatment; 

Simplification 
burden 

of 

administrative 

√√√√ 

High  simplification  of  administrative  burdens  and  establishment  of  more  efficient 
admission and recruitment procedures, through the introduction of the single permit, 
the multi-seasonal permit/facilitated re-entry.  

Financial and administrative costs 

- √√√ 

- Financial costs for MS Authorities, EU employers and TCN SW for familiarising 
with  the  new  procedures  (single  permit;  multi  –seasonal  permit,  facilitated  re-
entry).  However,  given  that  under  the  future  framework  Directive,  MS  would 
introduce a single permit anyway for other categories of workers, additional costs are 
not expected to be high. 

Moreover, positive impacts on public finance as a consequence of increased wages 
paid  to  TCN  SW  and  higher  numbers  of  seasonal  workers  legally  employed,  thus 
increased  revenues  from  the  payment  of  taxes.  Certain  increase  in  employment 
costs  linked  to  the  provisions  granting  a  set  or  rights  in  respect  of  working 
conditions,  in  particular  for  employers  who  currently  pay  salaries  below  such 
threshold (in contradiction to the respective national legislation). 

EN 

37 

   EN 

 
 
 
•  Assessment criteria 

•  Relevance 

Expected impacts 

Rating 

Provisions contributing to the rating 

Particularly high positive impacts would be achieved through the establishment of a 
simpler and more efficient admission procedure:  

Single permit for work and residence; 
definition of a maximum time for processing applications; ; 
multi-seasonal permit/facilitated re-entry.  
Further positive effects on the proper functioning of the internal market and the EU 
labour  market would be achieved through the establishment of common definition 
and common admission criteria across the EU; 

the provision granting a set of rights relating to working conditions and equal 
treatment in respect of other socio-economical rights, which would support the 
fair competition between EU employers and between EU national and TCN SW.  
Very  positive  impacts  especially  for  SME  through  simpler  and  more  flexible 
admission  procedures  including  possibility  to  rely  on  a  more  stable  and  trained 
workforce as a result of provisions for facilitated re-entry. 

Support  to  fair  competition  in  the  internal  market,  including  vis-à-vis  bigger 
enterprises. 

Some negative impact as a result of granting a set of rights with to salary and equal 
treatment with respect to certain social security rights, as costs are partly to be borne 
by employers, with SME being particularly affected. However, such additional costs 
would be  mostly  borne by employers who even currently do not abide by the rules 
set in national legislation in respect of issues such as wage level and social (security) 
rights. 

The impacts on third countries would be mainly related to the provisions supporting 
circular  migration,  granting  a  secure  legal  status,  ensuring  return  of  TCN  SW,  i.e. 
respectively:  

Multi-seasonal permit/facilitated re-entry; 
A set of rights in the field of working conditions (in particular with respect of 
wages) and equal treatment with EU nationals in the field of social security, which 
could positively affect remittances’ inflows (in terms of increased size and possibility 
for TCN SW to send them); 
A set of rights relating to working conditions and related field and right to change 
employer under specific circumstances (i.e. in the event of exploitation); 
Common definition and admission criteria across the EU, single permit and 
multi-seasonal permit, as provisions granting more efficient and more transparent 
opportunity for admission.  
Admission criteria including labour market test; 
Re-entry subject to the existence of a work contract/job offer; 
A set of rights relating to working conditions and equal treatment with respect to 
social security 
. 

Economic  and  social  impacts  at  EU 
level  

√√√√ 

Impacts on SMEs 

√√√ 

Impacts on third countries  

√√ 

Impacts  on  third  country  seasonal 
workers (including impacts on social 
inclusion and fundamental rights) 

√√√√ 

Impacts  on  EU  national  seasonal 
workers 

√√√ 

7.2.1.  Main benefits and effects 

The preferred option would achieve better results than any of the policy options alone, or any 
other combination of options. Common admission standards with simplified entry procedures 
would have positive impacts by providing Member States with the required seasonal labour 
force from third countries through a flexible admission system. With respect to facilitated re-
entry in subsequent years and in view of expected transposition difficulties in Member States 
in particular in respect of the multi-seasonal permit, the preferred option is to require Member 
States  either  to  introduce  multi-seasonal  permits  or  to  set  up  a  facilitated  procedure.  This 
would  have  positive  impacts  on  the  ability  to  meet  labour  market  needs  as  a  seasonal 
workforce  would  be  more  easily  available.  Additionally,  this  system  would  offer  to  third-
country seasonal workers the prospect of return to the Member State, in other words, it would 

EN 

38 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
support  circular  migration  and  by  offering  the  possibility  to  return,  it  would  dissuade  third-
country  seasonal  workers  from  overstaying  and  working  illegally.  This  aspect  could  be 
reinforced  through  an  obligation  of  third-country  seasonal  workers  to  register  at  a  Member 
State  consulate  after  their  return.  However,  in  view  of  the  negative  financial  impacts  and 
doubts about feasibility of such solution, this element was discarded. Third-country seasonal 
workers  who  enjoy  a  secure  legal  status  would  be  better  protected  from  exploitation  and 
dangerous work. Further, countries of origin could benefit from increased remittances.  

The decision on the numbers of admitted third-country nationals remains the competence of 
Member  States  so  that  the  impact  of  the  instrument  on  numbers  of  admitted  third-country 
seasonal  workers  is  difficult  to  measure.  However,  looking  at  economic  needs  forecasts  for 
the mid-term, combined with the introduction of a more flexible admission procedure, a rise 
in numbers of seasonal workers can be expected. This is so even in the context of the current 
economic crisis30. On the other hand, increased levels of protection granted to third-country 
seasonal workers could lead to a certain decrease in demand by employers. An increase in the 
number  of  illegally  staying  seasonal  workers  is  not  expected,  given  the  future  labour 
inspections in certain designated risk sectors under the employer sanctions Directive. 

Some impact of the preferred option on  the  current problem of lax enforcement is expected 
due to the fact that a number of safeguards are foreseen, in particular, the authorities will have 
to undertake controls before the arrival of a third-country seasonal worker (such as existence 
of  a  work  contract  or  a  binding  job  offer  that  stipulates  a  salary).  This  should  contribute  to 
ensuring higher standards from the outset. In addition, under the employer sanctions Directive 
labour inspections in certain risk sectors for illegal employment shall be undertaken that are 
expected to have positive spill-over effects on sectors of seasonal work. 

7.2.2.  Proportionality and EU added value 

Proposing binding rules on the admission and residence  conditions of  third-country  seasonal 
workers is in accordance with the principle of proportionality since the content of the action is 
limited  to  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the  above  aim.  The  proposed  option  consists  of 
admission conditions, procedure and permit, as well as rights of seasonal workers, that is, the 
areas that constitute elements of a common immigration policy under Article 79 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union.  

Further, the proposed option constitutes a relatively small change from the status quo in terms 
of both the legislative action required and the burden on prospective employers. Whereas some 
Member States may have increased burdens resulting from the need to set up (more) specific 
rules, these are considered to be justified in view of the objectives of the present proposal and 
the  structural  demand  for  this  category  of  third-country  workers.  Further,  as  stated  above,  it 
will  remain  for  Member  States  to  determine  the  volumes  of  third-country  seasonal  workers 
admitted. 

–  The  instrument  chosen  is  a  Directive,  which  gives  Member  States  a  high  degree  of 
flexibility  in  terms  of  implementation.  The  form  of  action  does  not  exceed  what  is 
necessary  to  achieve  the  aim  to  regulate  seasonal  migration  flows  effectively  as  non-
binding  measures  would  have  too  limited  an  effect;  potential  third-country  seasonal 

30 

See section 2.1.1. 

EN 

39 

   EN 

 
                                                 
workers and their prospective employers would continue to face an array of different rules 
for entry and residence and different levels of rights would be granted during the residence. 

This  combination  of  policy  options  has  the  potential  to  generate  the  following  EU  added 
value: 

–  Thanks to simplified admission procedures and residence conditions, seasonal workers will 

be available more quickly, when EU economies need them; 

–  Rules governing  working  conditions  will help prevent exploitation and protect the health 

and safety of non-EU seasonal workers;  

–  Clear, simpler admission rules should result in fewer people working illegally in seasonal 

jobs and/or staying on longer than they are entitled to; 

–  Impetus to the further development of third countries and of the external aspects of the EU 

migration policy. 

7.2.3.  Assessment of costs 

•  Administrative costs 

•  The following assumptions and estimates were made: 

–  The  number  of  third-country  seasonal  workers  to  be  admitted  to  the  EU  is  estimated  at 
roughly 230 000 per year, thus on average 9000 per Member State (based on available data 
for 10 Member States, and projected onto EU-26). At least half of these, thus 115 000, are 
estimated to be eligible for a multi-seasonal permit or facilitated re-entry because they are 
expected  to  be  interested  in  regular  employment  opportunities  in  the  EU  and  they 
previously complied with all obligations, including return. 

–  The  hourly  tariffs  of  Member  States'  personnel  are  estimated  to  be  €23,  based  on  EU 
average hourly labour costs in public administration  (NACE L), extracted from Eurostat. 
The examination of an application is calculated to require six hours; information on multi-
seasonal permits half an hour and annual reporting at 10 hours. 

The preferred option would generate the following additional administrative costs for Member 
States authorities:  

–  Information  by  regional/local  foreigners'  offices  to  the  Member  State  authority  handling 

the database of multi-seasonal permits and facilitated re-entry procedures. 

–  Obligation  to  submit  annual  statistics  to  the  Commission  and  other  Member  States  on 

numbers of residence permits or visa issued to third-country seasonal workers.  

Costs for Member States' authorities for the examination of the submitted applications are not 
added  here,  given  that  these  costs  already  occur  at  present,  where  such  applications  are 
checked either as part of specific legislation on admission of seasonal workers, or as part of 
the  general  immigration  laws.  Accordingly,  the  preferred  option  does  not  create  additional 
costs for employers and seasonal workers. 

EN 

40 

   EN 

 
Proposal  on  conditions  of  entry  and  residence  of  third-
country seasonal workers 

Tariff 
(€ per hour) 

Time  
(hour) 

Price 
(per 
action 
or 
equip) 

Freq  
(per 
year) 

Nbr  
of  
entitie
s 

Total 
of  
actions 

nbr

Total  
cost 

Regulatory 
origin 
(%) 

No
. 

Type of obligation 

Description  of  required 
action(s) 

Target group i 

e 

I 

e 

Int  EU  Nat  Reg 

Application for individual 
or 
authorisation 
exemption 

Producing new data 

–

MS 
Immigration 
Services 
at 
regional/local 
level 
(information 
on 
seasonal 
permits) 

multi-

23 

Application for individual 
authorisation 
or 
exemption 

Retrieving 
relevant 
information  from  existing 
data 

MS – (Annual 
reporting 
to 
COM 
and 
other MS) 

23 

2 

3 

0.5 

11.5 

1 

26 

115.000 

57.500 

10 

230 

1 

26 

26 

5980 

Total administrative costs (€)  63.480 

100
% 

100
% 

EN 

41 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Net implementation costs 

The below quantitative conclusions should be used with extreme caution, given the absence of 
reliable data and numbers, as well as the various underlying assumptions.  

Introduction of a single permit 

Net  implementation  costs  for  the  introduction  of  a  single  permit  are  not  expected  to  be 
considerable, given that:  

–  Under the framework Directive (currently under negotiation in Council and Parliament) the 
12 Member States that currently do not have a single permit system would be required to 
introduce  such.  Given  certain  specificities  that  a  seasonal  workers  regime  requires, 
seasonal workers have been excluded from the scope of that proposal for a Directive.  

–  Under the preferred option, a single permit would have to be issued only for stays of more 
than  3  months,  as  shorter  stays  are  covered  by  the  Schengen  visa  regime.  There  are  no 
specific  data  on  the  average  length  of  stay  of  seasonal  workers.  From  indicative  data  in 
Member States, it appears however that approximately a third of seasonal workers stay for 
a period shorter than 3 months.  

Costs savings could occur in the 12 MS (BE, BG, CZ, ES, IE, HU, LV, MT, PL, PT, RO, SL) 
that  currently  do  not  have  a  single  permit,  notably  with  respect  to  assumptions  of  reduced 
labour  input  (up  to  one  working  day  less)  in  a  single  application  procedure  that  leads  to  a 
single permit. Assuming an average of 9000 seasonal workers per MS, half of which would 
be issued with a single permit, this would entail savings of up to € 8.64 Euro. 

Multi-seasonal permit/facilitated procedure 

This kind of permit/procedure would require Member States to run tools (most likely in the 
form of databases) to have an overview of seasonal workers who are beneficiaries of a multi-
seasonal  permit  or  the  facilitated  procedure.  It  is  estimated  that  at  least  half  of  the  Member 
States already have tools that could be used for this new obligation. 

Costs for the set up and operation of such a database are estimated at between 10 000 and 20 
000  Euro  for  the  other  13  Member  States,  thus  at  a  range  of  between  130.000  and  260.000 
together.  At  the  same  time,  in  subsequent  years,  savings  up  to  1.85  million  Euros  can  be 
expected due to reduced labour input (up to one working day less) for the evaluation of the 
renewed  applications,  as  less  checking  of,  for  example,  documentary  evidence  will  be 
required.  

A  set  of  defined  rights  and/or  equal  treatment  in  a  range  of  areas:  impact  on  public 
finances 

Member  States  already  grant  seasonal  workers  equal  treatment  in  working  conditions.  With 
respect  to  social  security  rights,  the  majority  of  Member  States  also  grant  the  full  range  of 
rights to seasonal workers. Gaps in rights that the proposal would close are relevant in four 
Member States that appear to have either waiting periods of between one and 10 years before 
access is granted to rights, or not to grant certain rights to third-country nationals. These are 
sickness and health care (BG), disability (MT, LU, IT), and old age pensions (IT, LU, MT). 
Seasonal workers would thus be excluded from access, unless a specific regime covered them. 

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In recent years, Malta has not admitted third-country seasonal workers and is not expected to 
do so in the near future, so no additional costs are expected. There are no data on numbers of 
seasonal workers admitted to LU. Thus, additional costs are calculated for IT and BG only, on 
basis of Eurostat data on per capita expenditure on social security benefits. For IT, these are € 
215.8 million for old age pensions (providing that the quota of 80.000 third-country seasonal 
workers will be filled, it is assumed that roughly 10 % will have worked over several decades 
and are therefore, in the long run, eligible for such pensions; the per capita expenditure in IT 
amounts  to  €  3.084.  It  should  be  noted  however  that  this  calculation  does  not  include 
contributions and tax paid by third-country seasonal workers and their employers.) and € 25.8 
million for disability benefits (the expenditure being € 369 per capita.). For BG, the numbers 
of third-country seasonal workers admitted are ‘negligible’ (statement of Ministry in reply to 
COM questionnaire), thus assumed at 100 persons/year. There are no data on expenditure for 
sickness insurance in BG so that the PL expenditure of € 204 is used as a proxy. That way, 
additional costs of € 20 400 are expected. 

Costs for employers 

Additional costs for employers arise as a consequence of higher wages to be paid. Given that 
all  Member  States  already  now  grant  equal  treatment  in  working  conditions,  including 
salaries, these additional costs would be borne by employers who currently do not abide by 
the respective national legislation. Data or estimates for such payment of sub-standard salaries 
for either legally or illegally staying seasonal workers are not available so that an estimate of 
these  additional  costs  is  impossible  to  make.  As  indicated  above,  the  employers  sanctions 
Directive  is  expected  to  have  certain  spill-over  effects  in  terms  of  enforcement  of  rights  of 
third-country  seasonal  workers.  In  addition,  binding  EU  rules  would  allow  controlling  the 
application of these rules in the Member States. 

8. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The  table  below  includes  suggestions  for  indicators  that  could  be  developed  to  assess  the 
progress and effectiveness of the preferred option in achieving the main policy objectives. 

Main Objectives 

 Indicators 

Sources of Information 

I)  To  respond  to  seasonal 
fluctuations in the economy 
and  offset  labour  shortages 
faced 
specific 
in 
industries/economic sectors 
and regions 

-  Estimated  extent  of  the  labour  shortage  (job 
vacancies  rate  in  seasonal  occupations  according  to 
employers’ requests); 

- EUROSTAT; 

- Average time taken to process an application; 

-  Number  of 
permit/facilitated procedure;  

requests 

for  a  multi-seasonal 

-  Number  of  TCN  SW  admitted  through  a  multi-
seasonal permit on total number of TCN SW admitted 
in the EU. 

-  Member  States  authorities  involved 
in  the  administration  of  the  migration 
policy at national level; 

- Labour force Survey (LFS); 

- Surveys at EU and national level.  

contribute 

to 
II)  To 
illegal 
preventing 
exploitation 
immigration, 
and 
working 
poor 
conditions for third-country 
seasonal workers 

-  Number  of  alerts  on  TCN  SW  overstayers  on  total 
number of alerts on overstayers; 

- Estimated number of TCN SW without the right to 
work  employed  on  total  number  of  TCN  illegally 
employed in the EU territory; 

-  Conditions  of  work  of  legally-employed  TCN  SW 
(such as average salary level of TCN SW; compared 

-  Data  collected  through  the  future 
entry/exit system; 

-  MS 
employers inspections; 

authorities 

involved 

in 

- MS Monitoring reports; 

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Main Objectives 

 Indicators 

Sources of Information 

to average salary level of EU national SW). 

- Surveys at MS level. 

III)  To  contribute  to  the 
third 
development 
countries 

of 

 -Number  of  agreements  signed  with  TCN  SW 
concerning seasonal migration; 

- Estimated size of remittances sent by TCN SW. 

- EUROSTAT 

-  Member  States  authorities  involved 
in  the  administration  of  cooperation 
programmes at national level; 

- Surveys at EU and national level. 

In  accordance  with  the  Commission  Communication  ‘A  Europe  of  results  –  Applying 
Community law’31, the Commission suggests setting up an expert group of representatives of 
the  Member  States  and  the  Commission  (the  ‘Contact  Committee’),  which  would  meet  to 
discuss  issues  concerning  the  transposition  of  the  proposed  directive,  along  the  lines  of  the 
Contact  Committees  that  meet  regularly  to  consider  the  implementation  of  for  example 
Directives 2009/50/EC and 2009/52/EC. The proposed expert group would ensure improved 
information  flow  between  EU  and  national  authorities  on  how  the  directive  is  implemented 
and would help to anticipate and resolve problems more effectively.  

Member States would be required to communicate to the Commission and the other Member 
States  statistics  on  the  volumes  of  third-country  national  seasonal  workers  who  have  been 
granted,  renewed  or  withdrawn  a  seasonal  work  permit  during  the  previous  calendar  year, 
indicating their nationality, age and sex, length of validity of the permit and economic sector.  

Lastly,  monitoring  and  evaluation  arrangements  will  be  also  carried  out  in  the  form  of  a 
Commission evaluation report three years after the transposition deadline of the Directive, on 
the  basis  of  Member  States  reporting.  Following  this  report,  the  Commission  will  decide 
whether a proposal for amendment of the Directive should be put forward. 

31 

COM(2007) 502. 

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