Proposal for a DIRECTIVE …/…/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [recast]
Date: 2010-07-12
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: bank deposit, banking, credit guarantee, credit institution, financial institution, management audit

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 12.7.2010 
COM(2010)368 final 

2010/0207 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

DIRECTIVE …/…/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL  

on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [recast] 

COM(2010)369 
SEC(2010)835 
 SEC(2010)834 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

No  bank,  whether  sound  or  ailing,  holds  enough  liquid  funds  to  redeem  all  or  a  significant 
share of its deposits on the spot. This is why banks are susceptible to the risk of bank runs if 
depositors  believe  that  their  deposits  are  not  safe  and  try  to  withdraw  them  all  at  the  same 
time.  This  can  seriously  affect  the  whole  economy.  If,  despite  the  high  level  of  prudential 
supervision,  a  bank  has  to  be  closed,  the  relevant  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme  (DGS) 
reimburses  depositors  up  to  a  certain  ceiling  (the  ‘coverage  level’),  thereby  meeting 
depositors’ needs. DGSs also save depositors from having to participate in lengthy insolvency 
proceedings, which usually lead to insolvency dividends that represent only a fraction of the 
original claim. 

Following  the  Commission  communication  in  2006  concerning  the  review  of  Directive 
94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes1, events in 2007 and 2008 showed that the existing, 
fragmented  DGS  system  has  not  delivered  on  the  objectives  set  by  Directive  94/19/EC  on 
Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes,  in  terms  of  maintaining  depositors’  confidence  and  financial 
stability  in  times  of  economic  stress.  The  current  about  40  DGS  in  the  EU  which  cover 
different  groups  of  depositors  and  deposits  up  to  different  coverage  levels,  impose  different 
financial obligations on banks and therefore limit the benefits of the internal market for banks 
and  depositors.  Moreover,  schemes  have  proved  to  be  underfinanced  in  times  of  financial 
stress. 

On  7  October  2008,  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  agreed  confidence  in  the  financial 
sector  had  to  be  restored  and  encouraged  the  Commission  to  bring  forward  an  appropriate 
proposal to promote convergence of DGSs. This led to the adoption of Directive 2009/14/EC2. 
However, given that the need for swift negotiations precluded tackling all the open issues, this 
Directive was only an emergency measure to maintain depositors’ confidence, in particular by 
increasing  the  coverage  level  from  € 20 000  to  € 100 000  by  the  end  of  2010.  Directive 
2009/14/EC therefore contained a clause providing for a broad review of all aspects of DGSs. 
The need to reinforce DGSs by presenting appropriate legislative proposals was reiterated in 
the Commission communication of 4 March 2009 Driving European recovery3.  

The main elements of this proposal are: 

•  Simplification  and  harmonisation,  in  particular  as  to  the  scope  of  coverage  and  the 

arrangements for payout; 

•  Further reduction of the time limit for paying out depositors and better access for DGS to 

information about their members (i.e. banks); 

•  Sound and credible DGSs that are sufficiently financed; 

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3 

COM(2006) 729. 
Directive  2009/14/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  March  2009  amending 
Directive 94/19/EC on DGS as regards the coverage level and the payout delay (OJ L 68, 13.3.2009, 
p. 3). 
COM(2009) 114, p. 4. 

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•  Mutual borrowing between DGSs, i.e. a borrowing facility in certain circumstances. 

The  elements  of  the  review  which,  in  the  Commission’s  view,  should  not  (or  not  yet)  be 
subject to legislation are set out in the report accompanying this proposal. The report and the 
proposal  are  part  of  a  package  on  guarantee  schemes  in  the  financial  sector,  which  also 
comprises a review of investor compensation schemes (Directive 97/9/EC) and a white paper 
on insurance guarantee schemes. 

2. 

CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND EXTERNAL EXPERTISE 

A  public  consultation  was  held  from  29  May  to  27  July  2009.  All  104  contributions  and  a 
summary  report  were  published  in  August  20094  and  stakeholders’  views  were  in  general 
taken  into  account.  Four  issues  were  raised  by  many  respondents  (mainly  banks  and  their 
associations, consumers and their associations, Member States and DGSs) and therefore merit 
particular attention: 

•  Nearly  all  respondents  were  in  favour  of  simplification  and  harmonisation  of  eligibility 

criteria for depositors. This has been taken into account. 

•  A clear majority of respondents was against further reducing the deadline for payout; many 
argued that experience with the new deadline of 4-6 weeks set out in Directive 2009/14/EC 
should first be assessed before a further reduction is envisaged. The Commission maintains 
that the current deadline is too long to prevent bank runs and to meet depositors’ financial 
needs. A clear majority of respondents supported involving DGSs at an early stage when it 
becomes  likely  that  the  DGS  is  triggered.  This  was  considered  essential  for  a  shorter 
payout deadline and is reflected in the proposal. 

•  A large majority of respondents was in favour of ex-ante funding of schemes, and of risk-

based contributions to DGSs. This has been taken into account. 

•  Opinions were divided on whether or not mutual guarantee schemes should be covered by 
the  Directive.  These  are  schemes  which  protect  the  credit  institution  itself  and,  in 
particular, ensure its liquidity and solvency. Such systems guarantee a different protection 
for depositors in comparison to the protection provided by a Deposit Guarantee Scheme. If, 
due to the support of a mutual scheme, a bank does not fail and its services are provided 
continuously,  it  is  not  necessary  to  reimburse  depositors.  In  contrast  to  this,  a  Deposit 
Guarantee  Scheme  is  only  triggered  when  a  bank  fails.  However,  the  current  proposal 
leaves  the  stabilising  function  of  mutual  schemes  intact,  but  improves  the  position  of 
depositors, who will now have a claim against them if they cannot prevent the failure of a 
member. 

External expertise was used to prepare this proposal. In March 2009, an informal roundtable 
with experts was held5. Member States’ expertise was provided at the three meetings of the 
Working Group on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSWG), in June and November 2009 and 
in February 2010. The Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC)  submitted reports on the 
coverage level (2005), possible harmonisation  of  funding  mechanisms  (2006  and  2007),  the 
efficiency  of  deposit  guarantee  schemes  (2008)  and  possible  models  for  introducing  risk-

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See: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2009/deposit_guarantee_schemes_en.htm. 
See: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm#roundtable. 

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based contributions in the EU (2008 and 2009)6. This work was supported by the European 
Forum  of  Deposit  Insurers  (EFDI),  which  in  2008  also  finalised  several  reports  on  specific 
issues7. This work has been taken into account in drafting the current proposal. The ECB was 
also closely involved in the preparation of this proposal. 

3. 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

A  directive  amending  the  current  directive  is  the  most  appropriate  instrument.  The 
Commission  is  aware  of  the  cumulative  effects  of  current  and  future  legislative  measures 
concerning the banking sector. 

3.1. 

Preferred options 

Altogether,  over  70  different  policy  options  were  assessed.  The  main  options  identified  as 
preferable are: 

•  Simplifying and harmonising the scope of coverage; 

•  Reducing the payout deadline to seven days; 

•  Ending the practice of setting off depositors’ liabilities against their claims; 

•  Introducing an information template to be countersigned by a depositor and a mandatory 

reference to DGSs in account statements and advertisements; 

•  Harmonising the approach to the funding of DGSs; 

•  Setting a target level for DGS funds; 

•  Fixing the proportions of ex-ante and ex-post bank contributions to DGS; 

•  Introducing risk-based elements for bank contributions to DGS; 

•  Restricting  the  use  of  DGS  funds  for  broader  bank  resolution  purposes  benefiting  of  all 

creditors of a bank; 

•  Having the host country DGS act as a single point of contact for depositors at branches in 

another Member State. 

3.2. 

Social impact 

The proposal will ensure that, in the event of a bank failure, depositors are reimbursed up to 
€ 100 000  by  a  DGS  within  seven  calendar  days.  This  will  make  the  intervention  of  social 
welfare  systems  almost  unnecessary.  The  impact  assessment  report  is  available  at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm.  A  summary  is  attached  to 
this proposal. 

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All reports can be downloaded from http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm. 
The relevant reports issued by the EFDI in May 2008 are available at www.efdi.eu. 

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3.3. 

Administrative burden 

The proposal will not entail any significant administrative burden and simplifies the eligibility 
criteria for depositors. The impact assessment report contains additional information. 

4. 

MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

Since  bank  failures  are  unpredictable  and  are  avoided  if  possible,  the  functioning  of  DGSs 
cannot be regularly monitored on the basis of how real bank failures are handled. However, 
there should be regular stress tests of DGSs to show whether they are capable of meeting the 
legal  requirements,  at  least  in  an  exercise  scenario.  This  should  be  part  of  a  peer  review 
conducted  by  the  European  Forum  of  Deposit  Insurers  (EFDI)8  and  the  future  European 
Banking Authority (EBA). 

5. 

LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

A directive amending the current directive is the most appropriate instrument. Since Directive 
2009/14/EC  amending  Directive  94/19/EC  has  not  been  completely  implemented,  both 
Directives should be consolidated and amended by means of a recast. 

Directive  94/19/EC  constitutes  an  essential  instrument  for  the  achievement  of  the  Internal 
Market  from  the  point  of  view  of  both  the  freedom  of  establishment  and  the  freedom  to 
provide  financial  services,  in  the  field  of  credit  institutions.  Consequently,  its  legal  basis  is 
Article 57(2) of the Treaty establishing a European Community, which preceded Article 53(1) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). In conjunction with Article 54(1), Article 
53 TFEU provides for issuing Directives concerning the taking-up and pursuit of companies 
such  as  credit  institutions.  Therefore,  this  proposal  is  based  on  Article  53(1)  TFEU.  All 
elements of this proposal serve this objective and are ancillary to it. 

In  accordance  with  the  principles  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  set  out  in  Article  5 
TFEU, the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore be better achieved by the EU. Its provisions do not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives pursued. Only EU action can ensure that credit institutions 
operating in more than one Member State are subject to similar requirements for DGSs, and 
thereby  ensure  a  level  playing  field,  avoid  unwarranted  compliance  costs  for  cross-border 
activities  and  promote  further  integration  in  the  EU  market.  EU  action  also  ensures  a  high 
level  of  financial  stability  in  the  EU.  Harmonising  coverage  and  payout  deadlines,  in 
particular, cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States because it means bringing into 
line a multitude of different rules under the legal systems of various Member States, and can 
therefore  be  better  achieved  at  EU  level.  This  has  been  acknowledged  in  the  existing 
Directives on DGSs9. 

6. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS 

The proposal has no implications for the EU budget. 

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See www.efdi.eu. 
Recital 17 of Directive 2009/14/EC and (unnumbered) recitals of Directive 94/19/EC. 

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7. 

DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE PROPOSAL 

The  recast  gave  the  Directive  a  better  and  more  comprehensive  structure.  Many  outdated 
references were amended. Article headings make it easier to read. Articles on the scope of the 
Directive  and  a  number  of  new  definitions  make  it  easier  to  understand.  The  Directive 
describes  the  features  of  DGSs,  before  laying  down  coverage  levels.  Articles  dealing  with 
payout are followed by rules on financing and on the information to be given to depositors. 

7.1. 

Scope, definitions and supervision (Articles 1-3) 

The  Directive  now  encompasses  all  credit  institutions  and  all  schemes,  without  distinction. 
All  banks  must  join  a  DGS;  they  cannot  be  exempted.  This  ensures  that  depositors  always 
have a claim against a scheme and that all schemes must be soundly financed.  

Mutual  guarantee  schemes  protect  depositors  by  protecting  the  credit  institution  itself  (see 
chapter  2).  Since  all  banks  must  now  join  a  DGS,  mutual  guarantee  schemes  can  either  be 
recognised  as  DGSs  and  in  this  case  must  meet  the  requirements  set  out  in  Directive 
2006/48/EC  in  order  to  ensure  consistency  in  EU  law.  Alternatively,  mutual  schemes  and 
DGS  could  be  set  up  separately.  In  the  latter  case,  a  dual  membership  of  a  bank  in  both 
schemes and the additional safeguard role of mutual schemes can be taken into account when 
the contributions to the DGS are set. 

Deposits  are  now  defined  more  clearly.  Only  entirely  repayable  instruments  can  be  deemed 
deposits,  not  structured  products,  certificates  or  bonds.  This  prevents  DGSs  from  taking 
unpredictable risks with investment products. 

All DGSs must now be supervised on an ongoing basis and they must perform regular stress 
tests of their systems. DGSs now have the right to obtain information from banks at an early 
stage in order to enable fast payout. Member States are now explicitly allowed to merge their 
DGSs. Credit  institutions  now  have to be given one month’s notice, not 12 months’, before 
they can be excluded from a DGS. 

7.2. 

Eligibility criteria and determination of the repayable amount (Articles 4-6) 

Depositors’  eligibility  has  been  simplified  and  harmonised.  Most  discretionary  exclusions 
have become mandatory, in particular the exclusion of authorities and financial institutions of 
any kind. On the other hand, deposits in non-EU currencies are covered under the law and so 
are the deposits of all non-financial companies. 

The  coverage  level  of  EUR  100  000  (to  be  implemented  by  end  of  2010  under  Directive 
2009/14/EC) has not been amended. However, Member States may decide to cover deposits 
arising  from  real  estate  transactions  and  deposits  relating  to  particular  life  events  above  the 
limit of EUR 100 000 , provided that the coverage is limited to 12 months. 

It  is  now  stipulated  that  interest  due  but  not  credited  at  the  time  of  failure  must  be  repaid, 
provided  that  the  coverage  level  is  not  exceeded.  Depositors  must  now  be  paid  out  in  the 
currency  in  which  the  account  was  managed.  Setting  off  claims  against  the  depositor’s 
liabilities is no longer permitted after an institution fails. 

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7.3. 

Payout (Articles 7 and 8) 

The  DGS  must  now  act  to  repay  depositors  within  one  week.  Depositors  do  not  need  to 
submit an application. Any information they are given must be in the official language(s) of 
the Member State where the deposit is located. The Directive now stipulates that depositors’ 
unacknowledged or unpaid claims against DGS can only be time-barred to the extent that the 
DGS’s claims in the liquidation or reorganisation proceedings are time-barred. 

In order to meet such a short payout deadline, the competent authorities are obliged to inform 
DGSs by default if a bank failure becomes likely. Moreover, DGSs and banks must exchange 
information  on  depositors,  domestically  and  across  borders,  unfettered  by  confidentiality 
requirements. Credit institutions must also be in a position to provide the aggregated deposits 
of a depositor (‘single customer view’) at any time. 

7.4. 

DGS financing and borrowing between DGS (Articles 9 and 10) 

The  Directive  now  ensures  that  DGSs’  available  financial  means  are  proportionate  to  their 
potential  liabilities.  These  financial  means  are  safeguarded  against  potential  losses  by 
restrictions on investment similar to those for electronic money institutions under Article 7 of 
Directive 2009/110/EC10 and UCITS under Article 52 of Directive 2009/64/EC11, taking into 
account the need for lower risk and higher liquidity. The financing of DGS will be based on 
the following subsequent steps: 

First, in order to ensure sufficient funding, DGSs must have 1.5 % of eligible deposits on hand 
after a transition period of 10 years (this is referred to as the ‘target level’). If these financial 
means  turn  out  to  be  insufficient  in  the  event  of  a  bank  failure,  the  second  and  third  steps 
below must be taken. 

Second,  banks  must  pay  extraordinary  (‘ex-post’)  contributions  of  up  to  0.5 %  of  eligible 
deposits if necessary. (If making this payment jeopardises a bank, it may be exempted by the 
competent  authorities  on  an  individual  basis.)  Consequently,  ex-ante  funds  will  account  for 
75 % of DGSs’ financing and ex-post contributions 25 %. 

Third, a mutual borrowing facility allows a DGS in need to borrow from all other DGSs in the 
EU, which, altogether, must, if needed, lend to the DGS a maximum of 0.5 % of its eligible 
deposits  in  need  on  short  notice,  proportionate  to  the  amount  of  eligible  deposits  in  each 
country. The loan must be repaid within five years and new contributions to the DGS must be 
raised  to  reimburse  the  loan.  To  secure  repayment,  the  lending  DGSs  have  the  right  to 
subrogate  into  the  claims  of  depositors  against  the  failed  credit  institution  and  these  claims 
will rank first in the liquidation procedure of the credit institution whose failure depleted the 
borrowing DGS. 

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Directive  2009/110/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  September  2009  on  the 
taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending 
Directives  2005/60/EC  and  2006/48/EC  and  repealing  Directive  2000/46/EC  (OJ  L  267,  10.10.2009, 
p. 7). 
Directive  2009/65/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  July  2009  on  the 
coordination  of  laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions  relating  to  undertakings  for  collective 
investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 32). 

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As a fourth and last line of defence against taxpayers’ involvement, DGSs must have in place 
alternative  funding  arrangements,  recalling  that  those  arrangements  must  comply  with  the 
monetary financing prohibition laid down in Article 123 TFEU. 

Only after 10 years, this four-step mechanism will become operational. In order to adapt the 
target  level  to  schemes’  potential  liabilities,  it  will  be  recalibrated  on  the  basis  of  covered 
deposits  (i.e.  taking  into  account  the  coverage  level),  but  without  diminishing  the  level  of 
protection. 

DGS  funds  should  principally  be  used  for  paying  out  depositors.  This,  however,  does  not 
prevent their use for bank resolution purposes in accordance with state aid rules. However, to 
avoid the depletion of funds for the benefit of a bank’s uninsured creditors, such use must be 
limited to the amount that would have been necessary to pay out covered deposits. Given that 
bank resolution and payout have different purposes, DGS funds should be ring-fenced already 
when  the  target  level  is  build  up,  ensuring  that  the  primary  function  of  DGSs,  i.e.  deposit 
payout, is not impeded. This is without prejudice to the future Commission policy concerning 
bank resolution funds. 

7.5. 

Risk-based contributions to DGSs (Article 11 and Annex I and II) 

Contributions  from  credit  institutions  to  DGSs  must  be  calculated  according  to  their  risk 
profiles  in  a  harmonised  way.  In  principle,  contributions  consist  of  both  non-risk  and  risk-
based elements. The latter will be calculated on the basis of several indicators reflecting the 
risk  profiles  of  each  credit  institution.  The  proposed  indicators  cover  the  key  risk  classes 
commonly  used  to  evaluate  the  financial  soundness  of  credit  institutions:  capital  adequacy, 
asset  quality,  profitability  and  liquidity.  The  data  necessary  to  compute  those  indicators  are 
available under existing reporting obligations. 

Taking  into  account  differences  between  banking  sectors  in  Member  States,  the  Directive 
ensures  some  flexibility  by  developing  a  set  of  core  indicators  (mandatory  for  all  Member 
States)  and  another  set  of  supplementary  indicators  (optional  for  Member  States).  The  core 
indicators  consist  of  commonly  used  criteria  such  as  capital  adequacy,  asset  quality, 
profitability and liquidity. Core indicators weigh 75 % and supplementary indicators 25 %.  

This  approach  to  calculating  risk-based  contributions  relies  on  the  Commission  (Joint 
Research  Centre)  reports  of  2008  and  2009,  and  also  reflects  current  approaches  in  some 
Member States12. In general, the Directive requires that the total amount of contributions to be 
collected by DGS should first be determined in line with the target level for DGS funds; then 
the amount should be apportioned among DGS member banks according to their risk profiles. 
Consequently, the Directive provides incentives for sound risk management and discourages 
risky behaviour by clearly differentiating between the levels of contribution paid by the least 
and most risky banks (from 75 % to 200 % of the standard amount, respectively). 

As  to  the  non-risk  element,  the  contribution  base  is  the  amount  of  eligible  deposits,  as  is 
currently the case in most Member States. However, over time, covered deposits (i.e. eligible 
deposits not exceeding the coverage level) will become the contribution base in all Member 
States as they better reflect the risk to which DGSs are exposed. 

12 

See  JRC  reports  at  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/risk-based-report_en.pdf 
and http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/2009_06_risk-based-report_en.pdf. 

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A  full  harmonisation  of  the  calculation  of  risk-based  contributions  should  be  achieved  at  a 
later stage. 

7.6. 

Cross-border cooperation (Article 12) 

In order to facilitate the payout process in cross-border situations, the host country DGS acts 
as a single point of contact for depositors at branches in another Member State. This includes 
not  only  communication  with  depositors  in  that  country  (acting  as  a  ‘post  box’)  but  also 
paying  out  on  behalf  of  the  home  country  DGS  (acting  as  a  ‘paying  agent’).  Agreements 
between DGSs will facilitate this function. 

Schemes  have  to  exchange  relevant  information  with  each  other.  Mutual  agreements  will 
facilitate this. 

Banks reorganising themselves in a way that causes their membership of one DGS to cease 
and entails membership in another DGS will be reimbursed their last contribution so that they 
can use these funds to pay the first contribution to the new DGS. 

7.7. 

Depositor information (Article 14 and Annex III) 

Depositors are now better informed about whether their deposits are covered and about how a 
DGS  functions.  To  this  end,  before  making  a  deposit,  depositors  must  now  countersign  an 
information  sheet  based  on  the  template  set  out  in  Annex  III,  which  contains  all  relevant 
information  about  the  coverage  of  the  deposit  by  the  responsible  DGS.  Existing  depositors 
must be informed accordingly on the statements of account. Advertising on deposit products 
must  be  limited  to  a  factual  reference  to  coverage  by  the  DGS,  in  order  to  avoid  using  the 
DGS as a marketing argument. 

The  regular  disclosure  of  specific  information  by  DGSs  (ex-ante  funds,  ex-post  capacity, 
results  of  regular  stress  testing)  ensures  transparency  and  credibility,  leading  to  enhanced 
financial stability with insignificant costs (see impact assessment report for more details).. 

7.8. 

New supervisory architecture 

On 23 September  2009,  the Commission adopted proposals for Regulations establishing the 
European  System  of  Financial  Supervisors,  including  the  creation  of  the  three  European 
supervisory authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board. The new European Banking 
Authority should, within the powers conferred to it by the Regulation, collect information on 
the  amount  of  deposits,  conduct  peer  review  analyses,  confirm  whether  a  DGS  can  borrow 
from other DGSs, and settle disagreements between DGSs. 

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2010/0207 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

DIRECTIVE …/…/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL  

of […] 

on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [recast] 

(Text with EEA relevance) 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC (adapted) 

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the 
first and third sentences of Article ⌦ 53(1) ⌫ 57 (2) thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission13, 

Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank,14 

Having regard to the opinion of the ⌦ European Data Protection Supervisor15 ⌫ Economic 
and Social Committee16, 

⌦ After transmission of the proposal to the national Parliaments, ⌫ 

Acting  in  accordance  with  the  ⌦ ordinary  legislative ⌫  procedure  referred  to  in  Article 
189b of the Treaty17, 

Whereas: 

13 
14 
15 
16 
17 

OJ No C 163, 30.6.1992, p. 6 and OJ No C 178, 30.6.1993, p. 14. 
OJ C […] 
OJ C […] 
OJ C […] , p.[…], OJ No C 332, 16.12.1992, p. 13. 
OJ No C 115, 26.4.1993, p. 96 and Decision of the European Parliament of 9 March 1994 (OJ No C 91, 
28.3.1994). 

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   EN 

 
 
                                                 
(1) 

A number of substantial changes are to be made to European Parliament and Council 
Directive 94/19/EC of 30 May 1994*. In the interests of clarity, that Directive should 
be recast. 

(cid:216) new 

_____________________ 
* 

OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5.  

(2) 

(3) 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 1 (new) 

In order to make it easier to take up and pursue the business of credit institutions, it is 
necessary  to  eliminate  the  differences  between  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  as 
regards  the  rules  on  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  to  which  these  institutions  are 
subject.  Whereas,  in  accordance  with  the  objectives  of  the  Treaty,  the  harmonious 
development of the activities of credit institutions throughout the Community should 
be  promoted  through  the  elimination  of  all  restrictions  on  the  right  of  establishment 
and  the  freedom  to  provide  services,  while  increasing  the  stability  of  the  banking 
system and protection for savers; 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 2 (new) 

This Directive constitutes an essential instrument for the achievement of the Internal 
Market from the point of view of both the freedom of establishment and the freedom 
to  provide  financial  services,  in  the  field  of  credit  institutions,  while  increasing  the 
stability  of  the  banking  system  and  protection  for  depositors.  Whereas,  when 
restrictions on the activities of credit institutions are eliminated, consideration should 
be  given  to  the  situation  which  might  arise  if  deposits  in  a  credit institution  that  has 
branches  in  other  Member  States  become  unavailable;  whereas  it  is  indispensable  to 
ensure  a  harmonized  minimum  level  of  deposit  protection  wherever  deposits  are 
located  in  the  Community;  whereas  such  deposit  protection  is  as  essential  as  the 
prudential rules for the completion of the single banking market; 

(cid:216) new 

(4) 

Directive  2009/14/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  March 
2009  amending  Directive  94/19/EC  on  deposit-guarantee  schemes  as  regards  the 
coverage level and the payout delay18 required the Commission, if appropriate, to put 
forward proposals to amend Directive 94/19/EC. This encompasses the harmonisation 
of  the  funding  mechanisms  of  deposit-guarantee  schemes,  possible  models  for 
introducing risk-based contributions, the benefits and costs of a possible introduction 
of  a  Union-wide  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme,  the  impact  of  diverging  legislations  as 

18 

OJ L 68, 13.3.2009, p. 3. 

EN 

11 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
regards set-off and counterclaims, on the efficiency of the system, the harmonisation 
of the scope of products and depositors covered. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 8 (new) 

(5) 

Directive  94/19/EC  was  based  on  the  principle  of  minimum  harmonisation. 
Consequently,  a  variety  of  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  with  very  distinct  features 
were  established  in  the  Union.  This  caused  market  distortions  for  credit  institutions 
and limited the benefits of the Internal Market for depositors. Whereas harmonization 
must  be  confined  to  the  main  elements  of  deposit-guarantee  schemes  and,  within  a 
very  short  period,  ensure  payments  under  a  guarantee  calculated  on  the  basis  of  a 
harmonized minimum level; 

(cid:216) new 

(6) 

The  Directive  should  enable  a  level  playing  field  between  credit  institutions,  allow 
depositors  to  easily  understand  the  features  of  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  and 
facilitate  a  quick  repayment  to  depositors  by  sound  and  credible  Deposit  Guarantee 
Schemes in the interest of financial stability. Therefore, deposit protection should be 
harmonised and simplified to the largest extent possible. 

(7) 

IWhereas in the event of the closure of an insolvent credit institution the depositors at 
any branches situated in a Member State other than that in which the credit institution 
has its head office must be protected by the same guarantee scheme as the institution's 
other depositors.; 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 3 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 15 (adapted) 

(8) 

IWhereas in principle this Directive requires every credit institution to join a deposit-
guarantee  scheme;  whereas  the  Directives  governing  the  admission  of  any  credit 
institution  which  has  its  head  office  in  a  non-member  country,  and  in  particular  the 
First Council Directive (77/780/EEC) of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of 
the  business  of  credit  institutions  (1)  allow  Member  States  to  decide  whether  and 
subject to what conditions to permit the branches of such credit institutions to operate 
within their territories; whereas such branches will not enjoy the freedom to provide 
services  under  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  59  of  the  Treaty,  nor  the  right  of 
establishment  in  Member  States  other  than  those  in  which  they  are  established; 
whereas,  accordingly,  a  Member  State  admitting  such  branches  ⌦ of  a  credit 
institution having its head office in a third country ⌫ should decide how to apply the 
principles of this Directive to such branches ⌦ and take account of ⌫ in accordance 
with Article 9 (1) of Directive 77/780/EEC and with the need to protect depositors and 

EN 

12 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
maintain the integrity of the financial system. I; whereas it is essential that depositors 
at  such  branches  should  be  fully  aware  of  the  guarantee  arrangements  which  affect 
them.; 

(cid:216) new 

(9) 

(10) 

(11) 

Although,  in  principle,  all  credit  institutions  should  be  members  of  a  Deposit 
Guarantee  Scheme,  it  should  be  recognised  that  there  are  systems  which  protect  the 
credit institution itself (Institutional Protection Schemes) and, in particular, ensure its 
liquidity and solvency. Such schemes guarantee protection for depositors beyond that 
provided by a Deposit Guarantee Scheme. If such schemes are separate from Deposit 
Guarantee  Schemes,  their  additional  safeguard  role  of  systems  should  be  taken  into 
account  when  the  contributions  of  its  members  to  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  are 
determined.  The  harmonised  level  of  coverage  should  not  affect  schemes  protecting 
the  credit  institution  itself  unless  they  repay  depositors.  Depositors  should  have  a 
claim  against  all  schemes,  in  particular  if  protection  by  a  Mutual  Guarantee  Scheme 
cannot be ensured. No scheme or system should thus be excluded from this Directive. 

Institutional protection schemes are defined in Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking 
up  and  pursuit  of  business  of  credit  institutions  (recast)19 and  may  be  recognized  as 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes by the competent authorities if they fulfil all criteria laid 
down in that Article and in this Directive. 

In the recent financial crisis, uncoordinated increases in the coverage levels across the 
EU  led  to  depositors  shifting  money  to  banks  in  countries  where  deposit  guarantees 
were higher. This drained liquidity from banks in times of stress. In times of stability, 
different  coverage  levels  may  lead  to  depositors  choosing  the  highest  deposit 
protection rather than the most suitable deposit product. This may result in competitive 
distortions in the Internal Market. It is therefore indispensable to ensure a harmonised 
level  of  deposit  protection  wherever  deposits  are  located  in  the  Union.  However, 
certain  deposits  relating  to  the  personal  situation  of  depositors  may  be  covered  at  a 
higher level but for a limited time. 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC, Recital 4 
(cid:214) new 

(12)  The  same  coverage  level  should  apply  to  all  depositors  regardless  of  whether  a 
Member State’s currency is the Eeuro or not (cid:214) and regardless of whether a bank is a 
member  of  a  system  which  protects  the  credit  institution  itself . Member  States 
outside the Eeuro area should have the possibility to round off the amounts resulting 
from the conversion without compromising the equivalent protection of depositors. 

19 

OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1. 

EN 

13 

   EN 

 
 
 
                                                 
(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 16 (adapted) 

(13)  OWhereas, on the one hand, the minimum guarantee level prescribed in this Directive 
should  not  leave  too  great  a  proportion  of  deposits  without  protection  in  the  interest 
both  of  consumer  protection  and  of  the  stability  of  the  financial  system;  whereas,on 
the  other  hand,  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  impose  throughout  the  Community  a 
level  of  protection  which  might  in  certain  cases  have  the  effect  of  encouraging  the 
unsound  management  of  credit  institutions;  whereas  the  cost  of  funding  schemes 
should be taken into account. It; whereas it would therefore appear reasonable to set 
the  harmonized  minimum guarantee  level  at  ⌦ EUR  100  000. ⌫  ECU  20  000; 
whereas  limited  transitional  arrangements  might  be  necessary  to  enable  schemes  to 
comply with that figure; 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 20 (adapted) 

(14)  TWhereas the principle of a harmonized minimum limit per depositor rather than per 
deposit  has  been  retained.  It;  whereas  it  is  therefore  appropriate  to  take  into 
consideration the deposits made by depositors who either are not mentioned as holders 
of an account or are not the sole holders; whereas the limit must therefore be applied 
to  each  identifiable  depositor.  T;  whereas  that  should  not  apply  to  collective 
investment undertakings subject to special protection rules which do not apply to the 
aforementioned deposits.; 

(cid:216) new 

(15)  Member States should not be prevented from establishing systems protecting pensions 
in  general,  which  should  operate  separately  from  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes. 
Member  States  should  not  be  prevented  from  protecting  certain  deposits  for  social 
reasons or in relation to real estate transactions for private residential purposes. In all 
cases, state aid rules should be complied with.  

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 23 (new) 
(cid:214) new 

(16) 

IWhereas  it  is  not  indispensable,  in  this  Directive,  to  harmonize  the  methods  of 
financing  schemes  guaranteeing  deposits  or  credit  institutions  themselves.  On,  given 
on  the  one  hand,  that  the  cost  of  financing  such  schemes  should  be  borne 
(cid:214) principally  in principle by credit institutions themselves;, and on the other hand, 
that the financing capacity of such schemes must be proportionatein proportion to their 
liabilities. (cid:214) In order to ensure that Depositors in all Member States enjoy a similarly 
high level of protection and that Deposit Guarantee Schemes lend money to each other 
only if substantial financing efforts have been made by the Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
concerned,  the  financing  of  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  should  be  harmonised  at  a 
high level.  This, however, should; whereas this must not jeopardize the stability of 
the banking system of the Member State concerned.; 

EN 

14 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
(cid:216) new 

(17) 

In order to limit deposit protection to the extent necessary to ensure legal clarity and 
transparency  for  depositors  and  to  avoid  transferring  investment  risks  to  Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes, certain financial products with an investment character should be 
excluded from the scope of coverage, in particular those that are not repayable in par 
and those whose existence can only be proven by a certificate. 

(18)  Certain  depositors  should  not  be  eligible  for  deposit  protection,  in  particular  public 
authorities or other financial institutions. Their limited number compared to all other 
depositors  minimises  the  impact  on  financial  stability  in  case  of  a  bank  failure. 
Authorities  also  have  much  easier  access  to  credit  than  citizens.  Non-financial 
businesses should in principle be covered, regardless of their size. 

(19)  Article 1 of Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use 
of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering20 provides a definition for 
money laundering. On the basis of this definition, depositors should be excluded from 
payments by Deposit Guarantee Schemes. 

(20)  TWhereas the cost to credit institutions of participating in a guarantee scheme bears no 
relation to the cost that would result from a massive withdrawal of bank deposits not 
only from a credit institution in difficulties but also from healthy institutions following 
a loss of depositor confidence in the soundness of the banking system.; 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 4 

(cid:216) new 

(21) 

It  is  indispensable  that  the  available  financial  means  of  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes 
amount to a certain target level and that extraordinary contributions may be collected. 
Where  necessary,  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  should  have  adequate  alternative 
funding  arrangements  in  place  to  enable  them  to  obtain  short  term  funding  to  meet 
claims made against them. 

(22)  The financial means of Deposit Guarantee Schemes should principally be used for the 
repayment  of  depositors.  They  could,  however,  also  be  used  in  order  to  finance  the 
transfer of deposits to another credit institution, provided that the costs borne by the 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme do not exceed the amount of covered deposits at the credit 
institution  concerned.  They  could  also  to  a  certain  extent,  as  circumscribed  in  the 
Directive,  be  used  to  finance  the  prevention  of  bank  failures.  Such  measures  should 
comply with state aid rules. This is without prejudice to the future Commission policy 
concerning the establishment of national bank resolution funds. 

20 

OJ L 166, 28.6.1991, p. 77. 

EN 

15 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
(23)  Table 1 of point 14 of Annex I to Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and 
credit institutions (recast)21 assigns risks to certain asset items. This annex should be 
taken into account in order to ensure that Deposit Guarantee Schemes only invest in 
low-risk assets.  

(24)  Contributions to Deposit Guarantee Schemes should take account of the degree of risk 
incurred by their members. This would allow to reflect the risk profiles of individual 
banks  and  lead  to  a  fair  calculation  of  contributions  and  to  provide  incentives  to 
operate  under  a  less  risky  business  model.  Developing  a  set  of  core  indicators 
mandatory for all Member States and another set of optional supplementary indicators 
would introduce such harmonisation gradually. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 25 (new) 
(cid:214) new 

(25)  DWhereas deposit protection is an essential element in the completion of the internal 
market  and  an  indispensable  supplement  to  the  system  of  supervision  of  credit 
institutions on account of the solidarity it creates amongst all the institutions in a given 
financial  market  in  the  event  of  the  failure  of  any  of  them.;  (cid:214) Therefore,  Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes should be able to lend money to each other in case of need.  

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC, 
(adapted) 
(cid:214) new 

Recital 

10 

(26)  The  payout  delay  of  three  months  currently  provided  for,  which  can  be  extended  to 
nine months ⌦ at maximum six weeks from 31 December 2010 ⌫ , runs counter to 
the need to maintain depositor confidence and does not meet their needs. The payout 
delay  should  therefore  be  reduced  to  a  period  of  (cid:214) one  week.   20  working  days. 
That  period  should  be  extended  only  under  exceptional  circumstances  and  after 
approval  by  the  competent  authorities.  Two  years  after  the  entry  into  force  of  this 
Directive  the  Commission  should  submit  to  the  European  Parliament  and  to  the 
Council  a  report  on  the  effectiveness  and  delays  of  the  payout  procedures  assessing 
whether a further reduction of the delay to 10 working days would be appropriate. 

(cid:216) new 

(27)  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  in  Member  States  where  a  credit  institution  has 
established  branches  or  where  it  directly  provides  services,  should  inform  and  repay 
depositors  on  behalf  of  the  Scheme  in  the  Member  State  where  the  credit  institution 
has  been  authorised.  The  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  that  may  be  concerned  should 
enter into agreements in advance in order to facilitate these tasks. 

21 

OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 201. 

EN 

16 

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(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 21 
(cid:214) new 

(28) 

IWhereas  information  is  an  essential  element  in  depositor  protection  and  must 
therefore  also  be  the  subject  of  a  minimum  number  of  binding  provisions;  (cid:214) . 
Therefore,  actual  depositors  should  be  informed  about  their  coverage  and  the 
responsible  scheme  on  their  statements  of  account  and  intending  depositors  by 
countersigning  a  standardised  information  sheet. The  content  of  such  information 
should  be  identical  for  all  depositors.   Twhereas,  however,  the  unregulated  use  in 
advertising of references to the amount and scope of a deposit-guarantee scheme could 
affect  the  stability  of  the  banking  system  or  depositor  confidence;  whereas  Member 
States  should  therefore  lay  down  rules  to  limit  such  references;  (cid:214) .  Therefore,  a 
reference to Deposit Guarantee Schemes in advertisements should be limited to a short 
factual  reference. Systems  which  protect  the  credit  institution  itself  should  clearly 
their  function  without  promising  unlimited  deposit 
inform  depositors  about 
protection.  

(29)  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data22 applies to the processing of personal data carried out 
pursuant to this Directive. 

(cid:216) new 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Recital 24 

(30)  TWhereas  this  Directive  may  not  result  in  the  Member  States'  or  their  competent 
authorities' being made liable in respect of depositors if they have ensured that one or 
more schemes guaranteeing deposits or credit institutions themselves and ensuring the 
compensation  or  protection  of  depositors  under  the  conditions  prescribed  in  this 
Directive have been introduced and officially recognized.; 

(cid:216) new 

(31)  The Commission in its Proposal  for  a Regulation of  the  European Parliament and of 
the  Council  establishing  a  European  Banking  Authority  of  23  September  200923 
brought forward draft legislation creating a European System of Financial Supervisors 
and  provided  details  about  the  architecture  of  such  a  new  supervisory  framework 
including the creation of a European Banking Authority. 

22 
23 

OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31. 
Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishing  a  European 
Banking Authority - COM(2009) 501. 

EN 

17 

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(32)  While respecting the supervision of deposit guarantee schemes by Member States, the 
European Banking Authority should contribute to the achievement of the objective of 
making it easier for credit institutions to take up and pursue their activities while at the 
same  time  ensuring  effective  protection  for  depositors.  To  that  end,  the  Authority 
should confirm that the conditions of borrowing between Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
laid  down  in  this  Directive  are  fulfilled  and  state,  within  the  strict  limits  set  by  this 
Directive, the amounts to be lent by each scheme, the initial interest rate as well as the 
duration  of  the  loan.  In  this  respect,  the  European  Banking  Authority  should  also 
collect  information  on  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes,  in  particular  on  the  amount  of 
deposits  covered  by  them,  confirmed  by  competent  authorities.  It  should  inform  the 
other Deposit Guarantee Schemes about their obligation to lend. 

(33)  There is a need to introduce an effective instrument to establish harmonised technical 
standards  in  financial  services  to  ensure  a  level  playing  field  and  an  adequate 
protection of depositors across Europe. Such standards should be developed in order to 
standardize the calculation of risk-based contributions. 

(34) 

In  order  to  ensure  efficient  and  effective  functioning  of  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes 
and  a  balanced  consideration  of  their  positions  in  different  Member  States,  the 
Authority should be able to settle disagreements between them with binding effect. 

(35)  The  Commission  should  be  empowered  to  adopt  delegated  acts  in  accordance  with 
Article  290  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  in  respect  of 
Article 5(5). 

(36) 

In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on 
European Union, the objectives of the action to be taken, namely the harmonisation of 
rules concerning the functioning of Deposit Guarantee Schemes, can be only achieved 
at  Union  level.  In  accordance with  the  principle  of  proportionality,  as  set  out  in  that 
Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those 
objectives. 

(37)  The obligation to transpose this Directive into national law should be confined to those 
provisions  which  represent  a  substantive  change  as  compared  with  the  earlier 
Directives.  The  obligation  to  transpose  the  provisions  which  are  unchanged  arises 
under the earlier Directives. 

(38)  This  Directive  should  be  without  prejudice  to  the  obligations  of  the  Member  States 
relating to the time-limits for transposition into national law of the Directives set out in 
Annex IV, 

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC 

EN 

18 

   EN 

 
 
(cid:216) new 

Article 1 

Subject matter and scope 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

This  Directive  lays  down  rules  concerning  the  functioning  of  Deposit  Guarantee 
Schemes. 

This  Directive  shall  apply  to  all  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  on  a  statutory  or 
contractual  basis  and  to  institutional  protection  schemes  recognized  as  Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes. 

Institutional  protection  schemes  defined  in  Article  80(8)  of  Directive  2006/48/EC 
may  be  recognized  as  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  by  the  competent  authorities  if 
they fulfil all criteria laid down in that Article and in this Directive. 

Institutional  protection  schemes  not  recognized  under  paragraph  3  and  not 
guaranteeing  deposits  shall  not  be  subject  to  this  Directive,  except  to  the  second 
subparagraph of Article 14(5) and the last subparagraph of Annex III. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 1.1 (new) 

Article 2 

Definitions 

1. 

For the purposes of this Directive: 

(a)1. 

'deposit' shall means any credit balance which results from funds left in an account or 
from  temporary  situations  deriving  from  normal  banking  transactions  and  which  a 
credit  institution  must  repay  under  the  legal  and  contractual  conditions  applicable, 
and any debt evidenced by a certificate issued by a credit institution. 

Shares in United Kingdom and Irish building societies apart from those of a capital 
nature covered in Article 2 shall be treated as deposits. 

Bonds which satisfy the conditions prescribed in Article 22 (4) of Council Directive 
85/611/EEC  of  20  December  1985  on  the  coordination  of  laws,  regulations  and 
administrative  provisions  relating  to  undertakings  for  collective  investment  in 
transferable securities (Ucits)24 shall not be considered deposits. 

24 

OJ No C 163, 30. 6. 1992, p. 6 and OJ No C 178, 30. 6. 1993, p. 14. 

EN 

19 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
For the purpose of calculating a credit balance, Member States shall apply the rules 
and  regulations  relating  to  set-off  and  counterclaims  according  to  the  legal  and 
contractual conditions applicable to a deposit; 

An instrument shall not be a deposit in any of the following circumstances:  

its  existence  can  only  be  proven  by  a  certificate  other  than  a  statement  of 

(cid:216) new 

account; 

its principal is not repayable at par;  

its principal is only repayable at par under a particular guarantee or agreement 

provided by the credit institution or a third party;  

(b) 

(c) 

'eligible  deposits'  are  deposits  that  are  not  excluded  from  protection  according  to 
Article 4; 

'covered  deposits'  are  eligible  deposits  that  do  not  exceed  the  level  of  coverage 
referred to in Article 5; 

(d)2. 

'joint account' shall means an account opened in the names of two or more persons or 
over which two or more persons have rights that may operate against the signature of 
one or more of those persons; 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 1.2 

(e)3. 

'unavailable deposit' shall means a deposit that is due and payable but has not been 
paid  by  a  credit  institution  under  the  legal  and  contractual  conditions  applicable 
thereto, where either: 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 1.3 

(i) 

the relevant competent authorities have determined that in their view the credit 
institution concerned appears to be unable for the time being, for reasons which 
are  directly  related  to  its  financial  circumstances,  to  repay  the  deposit  and  to 
have no current prospect of being able to do so. 

The competent authorities shall make that determination as soon as possible and in 
any event no later than five working days after first becoming satisfied that a credit 
institution has failed to repay deposits which are due and payable; or 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC Art. 1.1 

EN 

20 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 1.1 (new) 

(ii) 

a judicial authority has made a ruling for reasons which are directly related to 
the  credit  institution's  financial  circumstances  which  has  the  effect  of 
suspending  depositors'  ability  to  make  claims  against  it,  should  that  occur 
before the aforementioned determination has been made; 

'credit  institution'  shall  means  an  undertaking  the  business  of  which  is  to  receive 
deposits  or  other  repayable  funds  from  the  public  and  to  grant  credits  for  its  own 
account (cid:214) defined under Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC  ; 

'branch'  shall  means  a  place  of  business  which  forms  a  legally  dependent  part  of  a 
credit institution and which conducts directly all or some of the operations inherent 
in the business of credit institutions; 

(cid:216) new 

'target  level'  means  1.5%  of  eligible  deposits  for  the  coverage  of  which  a  Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme is responsible; 

'available  financial  means'  means  cash,  deposits  and  low-risk  assets  with  a  residual 
term  to  final  maturity  of  24  months  or  less,  which  can  be  liquidated  within  a  time 
limit not exceeding the limit set by Article 7(1); 

'low-risk assets' are asset items falling into one of the categories set out in the first 
and second category of Table 1 of point 14 of Annex I to Directive 2006/49/EC but 
excluding other qualifying items as defined in point 15 of that Annex; 

'home  Member  State'  means  the  Member  State  in  which  a  credit  institution  has  its 
head office; 

'host  Member  State'  means  the  Member  State  in  which  a  credit  institution  has  a 
branch or in which it provides services; 

'competent  authorities'  means  competent  authorities  defined  under  Article  4(4)  of 
Directive 2006/48/EC; 

Where this Directive refers to the [EBA regulation], bodies which administer Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes shall, for the purpose of this regulation, be considered competent 
authorities under Article 2(2) of the [EBA regulation]. 

(f)4. 

(g)5. 

(h) 

(i) 

(j) 

(k) 

(l) 

(m) 

2. 

EN 

21 

   EN 

 
 
 
(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 3 
(cid:206)1 2005/1/EC, Article 2 
(cid:214) new 

Article 3 

Membership and supervision 

1. 

Each  Member  State  shall  ensure  that  within  its  territory  one  or  more  Ddeposit-
Gguarantee Sschemes are introduced and officially recognized. 

(cid:214) This shall not preclude the merger of schemes of different Member States.   

Except in the circumstances envisaged in the second subparagraph and in paragraph 
4,  nNo  credit  institution  authorized  in  that  Member  State  pursuant  to  Article  3  of 
Directive 77/780/EEC may take deposits unless it is a member of such a scheme. 

A  Member  State  may,  however,  exempt  a  credit  institution  from  the  obligation  to 
belong  to  a  deposit-guarantee  scheme  where  that  credit  institution  belongs  to  a 
system  which  protects  the  credit  institution  itself  and  in  particular  ensures  its 
liquidity and solvency, thus guaranteeing protection for depositors at least equivalent 
to  that  provided  by  a  deposit-guarantee  scheme,  and  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
competent authorities, fulfils the following conditions: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

the system must be in existence and have been officially recognized when this 
Directive is adopted, 

the  system  must  be  designed  to  prevent  deposits  with  credit  institutions 
belonging  to  the  system  from  becoming  unavailable  and  have  the  resources 
necessary for that purpose at its disposal, 

the system must not consist of a guarantee granted to a credit institution by a 
Member State itself or by any of its local or regional authorities, 

the  system  must  ensure  that  depositors  are  informed  in  accordance  with  the 
terms and conditions laid down in Article 9. 

Those  Member  States  which  make  use  of  this  option  shall  inform  the  Commission 
accordingly; in particular, they shall notify the Commission of the characteristics of 
any such protective  systems  and  the  credit  institutions  covered  by  them  and  of  any 
subsequent  changes  in  the  information  supplied.  The  Commission  shall  inform  the 
(cid:206)1 European Banking Committee  thereof. 

2. 

If  a  credit  institution  does  not  comply  with  the  obligations  incumbent  on  it  as  a 
member of a Ddeposit G-guarantee Sscheme, the competent authorities which issued 
its  authorization  shall  be  notified  and,  in  collaboration  with  the  guarantee  scheme, 
shall  take  all  appropriate  measures  including  the  imposition  of  sanctions  to  ensure 
that the credit institution complies with its obligations. 

EN 

22 

   EN 

 
 
3. 

4. 

5. 

4. 

If those measures fail to secure compliance on the part of the credit institution, the 
scheme may, where national law permits the exclusion of a member, with the express 
consent of the competent authorities, give not less than (cid:214) 1  12 month's notice of 
its  intention  of  excluding  the  credit  institution  from  membership  of  the  scheme. 
Deposits  made  before  the  expiry  of  the  notice  period  shall  continue  to  be  fully 
covered  by  the  scheme.  If,  on  the  expiry  of  the  notice  period,  the  credit  institution 
has  not  complied  with  its  obligations,  the  guarantee  scheme  (cid:214) shall   may,  again 
having  obtained  the  express  consent  of  the  competent  authorities,  proceed  to 
exclusion. 

Where  national  law  permits,  and  with  the  express  consent  of  the  competent 
authorities  which  issued  its  authorization,  a  credit  institution  excluded  from  a 
deposit-guarantee  scheme  may  continue  to  take  deposits  if,  before  its  exclusion,  it 
has made alternative guarantee arrangements which ensure that depositors will enjoy 
a  level  and  scope  of  protection  at  least  equivalent  to  that  offered  by  the  officially 
recognized scheme. 

If a credit institution the exclusion of which is proposed under paragraph 3 is unable 
to  make  alternative  arrangements  which  comply  with  the  conditions  prescribed  in 
paragraph  4,  then  the  competent  authorities  which  issued  its  authorization  shall 
revoke it forthwith. 

Deposits  held  when  the  authorization  of  a  credit  institution  authorized  pursuant  to 
Article ⌦ 6  of  Directive  2006/48/EC ⌫  3  of  Directive  77/780/EEC  is  withdrawn 
shall continue to be covered by the guarantee scheme. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 5 (adapted) 

5. 

All  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  referred  to  in  Article  1  shall  be  supervised  by  the 
competent authorities on an ongoing basis as to their compliance with this Directive. 

(cid:216) new 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC  Article 
(new) 

1.6(a) 

6. 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  Ddeposit  G-guarantee  Sschemes  perform  tests  of 
their  systems  and  that,  if  appropriate,  they  are  informed  in  the  event  that  the 
competent authorities detect problems in a credit institution that are likely to give rise 
to the intervention of Ddeposit G-guarantee Sschemes. 

EN 

23 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
(cid:216) new 

Such  tests  shall  take  place  at  least  every  three  years  or  when  the  circumstances 
require it. The first test shall take place by 31 December 2013.  

The European Banking Authority shall periodically conduct peer reviews pursuant to 
Article 15 of the [EBA regulation] in this regard. Deposit Guarantee Schemes shall 
be  bound  to  professional  secrecy  referred  to  in  Article  56  of  that  Regulation  when 
exchanging information with the European Banking Authority. 

7. 

Member States shall ensure that Deposit Guarantee Schemes, at any time and at their 
request,  receive  from  their  members  all  information  necessary  to  prepare  a 
repayment  of  depositors,  including  markings  under  Article  4(2).  Information 
necessary to perform stress tests shall be submitted to Deposit Guarantee Schemes on 
an  ongoing  basis.  Such  information  shall  be  rendered  anonymous.  The  information 
obtained may only be used for the performance of stress tests or the preparation of 
repayments and shall be kept no longer than is necessary for those purposes. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 2 (adapted) 

Article 4 

Eligibility of deposits 

1. 

The  following  shall  be  excluded  from  any  repayment  by  Deposit-Gguarantee 
Sschemes: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

subject to Article 68(3), deposits made by other credit institutions on their own 
behalf and for their own account, 

all instruments which would fall within the definition of 'own funds' in Article 
⌦ 57 of Directive  2006/48/EC ⌫ 2 of Council Directive 89/299/EEC of 17 
April 1989 on the own funds of credit institutions25 , 

deposits arising out of transactions in connection with which there has been a 
criminal conviction for money laundering as defined in Article 1 ⌦ (C) ⌫ of 
Council Directive 91/308/EEC 

(d)  deposits  by  financial  institutions  as  defined  in  Article 4(5)  of  Directive 

2006/48/EC; 

(cid:216) new 

25 

OJ L 124, 5.5.1989, p. 16 

EN 

24 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(e) 

(f) 

deposits  by  investment  firms  as  defined  in  Article  4(1)(1)  of  Directive 
2004/39/EC; 

deposits the holder of which has never been identified pursuant to Article 3(1) 
of Directive 91/308/EEC, when they have become unavailable, 

(g)  deposits by insurance undertakings, 

(h)  deposits by collective investment undertakings, 

(i) 

deposits by pension and retirement funds, 

(j) 

deposits by authorities, 

(k)  debt  securities  issued  by  a  credit  institution  and  liabilities  arising  out  of  own 

acceptances and promissory notes. 

2. 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  credit  institutions  mark  deposits  referred  to  in 
paragraph 1 in a way that allows an immediate identification of such deposits. 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC  Article 
(adapted) 

1.3(a) 

Article 5 

Coverage level 

1. 

1a. 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  coverage  for  the  aggregate  deposits  of  each 
depositor shall be at least EUR ⌦ 100 000 ⌫ 50 000 in the event of deposits being 
unavailable. 

By  31  December  2010,  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  coverage  for  the 
aggregate  deposits  of  each  depositor  shall  be  set  at  EUR 100000  in  the  event  of 
deposits being unavailable. 

If,  in  its  report  referred  to  in  Article  12,  the  Commission  concludes  that  such  an 
increase and such harmonisation are inappropriate and not financially viable for all 
Member States in order to ensure consumer protection and financial stability in the 
Community  and  avoid  cross-border  distortions  between  Member  States,  it  shall 
present  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  a  proposal  to  amend  the  first 
subparagraph. 

2. 

Member States shall ensure that Deposit Guarantee Schemes do not deviate from the 
coverage level laid down in paragraph 1. However, Member States may decide that 
the  following  deposits  are  covered  provided  that  the  costs  for  such  repayments  are 
not subject to Article 9, 10 and 11: 

(cid:216) new 

EN 

25 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
(a) 

deposits resulting from real estate transactions for private residential purposes 
for up to 12 months after the amount has been credited; 

(b)  deposits that fulfil social considerations defined in national law and are linked 
to  particular  life  events  such  as  marriage,  divorce,  invalidity  or  decease  of  a 
depositor. The coverage shall not exceed a time period of 12 months after such 
event. 

3. 

Paragraph  2  shall  not  prevent  Member  States  from  maintaining  or  introducing 
schemes  protecting  old-age  provision  products  and  pensions,  provided  that  such 
schemes  do  not  only  cover  deposits  but  offer  comprehensive  coverage  for  all 
products and situations relevant in this regard.  

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC  Article 
(new) 

1.3(a) 

41b.  (cid:214) Deposits shall be paid out in the currency in which the account was maintained. 
If Member States outside the euro area that convert the amounts expressed in euro 
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 1a (cid:214) are converted  into (cid:214) other  their national 
currencies,  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  amounts  of  national  currencies 
effectively  paid  to  depositors  are  (cid:214) shall  be   equivalent  to  those  set  out  in  this 
Directive. 

5. 

Member  States  who  convert  the  amounts  expressed  in  euro  into  their  national 
currency shall initially use in the conversion the exchange rate prevailing on the date 
of entry into force of this Directive. 

(cid:216) new 

Member States may round off the amounts resulting from the conversion, provided 
that such rounding off does not exceed EUR 2 500. 

Without  prejudice  to  the  preceding  subparagraph,  Member  States  shall  adjust  the 
coverage  levels  converted  into  another  currency  to  the  amount  referred  to  in 
paragraph  1  every  five  years.  Member  States  may  make  an  earlier  adjustment  of 
coverage levels, after having consulted the Commission, following the occurrence of 
unforeseen events such as currency fluctuations . 

2. 

Member  States  may  provide  that  certain  depositors  or  deposits  shall  be  excluded 
from guarantee or shall be granted a lower level of guarantee. Those exclusions are 
listed in Annex I. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 7.2 (new) 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
3. 

--- 

6. 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC  Article 
(new) 

1.3(b) 

Paragraph  1a  shall  not  preclude  the  retention  of  provisions  which  offered  before  1 
January  2008,  notably  for  social  considerations,  full  coverage  for  certain  kinds  of 
deposits. 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC Art. 1.3(c) 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 7.5 (adapted) 
(cid:214) new 

The  amount  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  shall  be  reviewed  periodically  by  the 
Commission  at  least  once  every  five  years.  If  appropriate,  the  Commission  shall 
submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a proposal for a Directive to 
adjust  the  amount  referred  to  in  paragraph  1,  taking  account  in  particular  of 
developments in the banking sector and the economic and monetary situation in the 
⌦ Union ⌫  Community.  The  first  review  shall  not  take  place  before  ⌦ 31 
December 2015 ⌫ until five years after the end of the period referred to in Article 7 
(1),  second  subparagraph  (cid:214) unless  unforeseen  events  necessitate  an  earlier 
review.  . 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC  Article 
(new) 

1.3(d) 

7. 

The  Commission  may  adjust  the  amounts  referred  to  in  paragraphs  1  and  1a  in 
accordance  with  inflation  in  the  European  Union  on  the  basis  of  changes  in  the 
harmonised index of consumer prices published by the Commission. 

That  measure,  designed  to  amend  non-essential  elements  of  this  Directive,  shall  be 
adopted in accordance with ⌦ Article 16 ⌫ the regulatory procedure with scrutiny 
referred to in Article 7a(2). 

EN 

27 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 8 (adapted) 

Article 6 

Determination of the repayable amount 

The  limits  referred  to  in  Article  57  (1),  (3)  and  (4)  shall  apply  to  the  aggregate 
deposits  placed  with  the  same  credit  institution  irrespective  of  the  number  of 
deposits, the currency and the location within the ⌦ Union ⌫ Community. 

The  share  of  each  depositor  in  a  joint  account  shall  be  taken  into  account  in 
calculating the limits provided for in Article 57 (1), (3) and (4). 

In  the  absence  of  special  provisions,  such  an  account  shall  be  divided  equally 
amongst the depositors. 

Member  States  may  provide  that  deposits  in  an  account  to  which  two  or  more 
persons are entitled as members of a business partnership, association or grouping of 
a similar nature, without legal personality, may be aggregated and treated as if made 
by a single depositor for the purpose of calculating the limits provided for in Article 
57 (1), (3) and (4). 

Where  the  depositor  is  not  absolutely  entitled  to  the  sums  held  in  an  account,  the 
person  who  is  absolutely  entitled  shall  be  covered  by  the  guarantee,  provided  that 
that  person  has  been  identified  or  is  identifiable  before  the  date  on  which  the 
competent authorities make the determination described in Article 2 (1) (e)1 (3) (i) or 
the judicial authority makes the ruling described in Article 2 (1) (e)1 (3) (ii). If there 
are  several  persons  who  are  absolutely  entitled,  the  share  of  each  under  the 
arrangements  subject  to  which  the  sums  are  managed  shall  be  taken  into  account 
when the limits provided for in Article 57 (1), (3) and (4) are calculated. 

(cid:216) new 

The reference date for the calculation  of  the repayable amount shall be the date on 
which  the  competent  authorities  make  the  determination  referred  to  in  Article 
2(1)(e)(i)  or  when  the  judicial  authority  makes  the  ruling  referred  to  in  Article 
2(1)(e)(ii). Liabilities of the depositor against the credit institution shall not be taken 
into account when calculating the repayable amount. 

Member States shall ensure that Deposit-Guarantee Schemes may at any time request 
credit institutions to inform them about the aggregated amount of deposits of every 
depositor. 

Interest on deposits which has accrued until but has not been credited at the date on 
which  the  competent  authorities  make  the  determination  referred  to  in  Article 
2(1)(e)(i) or  the  judicial  authority makes the ruling referred to in Article 2(1)(e)(ii) 
shall  be  reimbursed  by  the  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme.  The  limit  referred  to  in 
Article 5(1) shall not be exceeded. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

EN 

28 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
If interest depends on the value of another financial instrument and can therefore not 
be determined without jeopardising payout within the deadline referred to in Article 
7(1),  the  reimbursement  of  such  interest  shall  be  limited  to  the  default  interest  rate 
under national law. 

7. 

Member  States  may  decide  that  certain  categories  of  deposits  fulfilling  a  social 
purpose defined by national law, for which a third party has given a guarantee that 
complies  with  state  aid  rules,  are  not  taken  into  account  when  aggregating  the 
deposits held by the same depositor with the same credit institution as referred to in 
paragraph 1. In such cases the third party guarantee shall be limited to the coverage 
established by Article 5 (1). 

4. 

This provision shall not apply to collective investment undertakings. 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC  Article 
(new) 

1.6(a) 

Article 7 

Repayment 

1. 

Deposit G-guarantee Sschemes shall be in a position to repay duly verified claims by 
depositors  in  respect  of  unavailable  deposits  within  (cid:214) 7   20  working  days  of  the 
date  on  which  the  competent  authorities  make  a  determination  as  referred  to  in 
Article  2(1)(e)(i)  or  a  judicial  authority  makes  a  ruling  as  referred  to  in  Article 
2(1)(e)(ii). 

That  time  limit  includes  the  collection  and  transmission  of  the  accurate  data  on 
depositors and deposits, which are necessary for the verification of claims. 

In  wholly  exceptional  circumstances,  a  deposit-guarantee  scheme  may  apply  to  the 
competent  authorities  for  an  extension  of  the  time  limit.  Such  extension  shall  not 
exceed 10 working days. 

By 16 March 2011, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to 
the  Council  a  report  on  the  effectiveness  and  delays  of  the  payout  procedures 
assessing whether reduction to 10 working days of the delay referred to in the first 
subparagraph could be implemented. 

2. 

— 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC Article 1.6(b) 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
(cid:216) new 

Member  States  may  decide  that  deposits  referred  to  in  Article  6(3)  are  subject  to  a 
longer repayment period. However, that period shall not exceed 3 months from the 
date  on  which  the  competent  authorities  make  a  determination  as  referred  to  in 
Article  2(1)(e)(i)  or  a  judicial  authority  makes  a  ruling  as  referred  to  in  Article 
2(1)(e)(ii). 

A depositor who is not absolutely entitled to the sums held in those accounts referred 
to  in  Article  6(3)  shall  be  repaid  within  the  time  limit  referred  to  in  the  first 
subparagraph. That payment shall be taken into account when the persons absolutely 
entitled are repaid. 

2. 

Depositors  shall  be  repaid  without  a  request  to  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  being 
necessary.  For  this  purpose,  the  credit  institution  shall  transmit  the  necessary 
information on deposits and depositors as soon as requested by the Scheme. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 10 (new) 

3. 

34. 

45. 

The time limit laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2 may not be invoked by a guarantee 
scheme  in  order  to  deny  the  benefit  of  guarantee  to  any  depositor  who  has  been 
unable to assert his claim to payment under a guarantee in time. 

(cid:214) Any correspondence between the Deposit Guarantee Scheme and the depositor  
The  documents  relating  to  the  conditions  to  be  fulfilled  and  the  formalities  to  be 
completed to be eligible for a payment under the guarantee referred to in paragraph 
1shall be drawn up in detail in the manner prescribed by national lawin the official 
language  or  languages  of  the  Member  State  in  which  the  guaranteed  deposit  is 
located.  (cid:214) If  a  bank  operates  directly  in  another  Member  State  without  having 
established  branches,  the  information  shall  be  provided  in  the  language  that  was 
chosen by the depositor when the account was opened.  

Notwithstanding the time limit laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2, where a depositor or 
any person entitled to or interested in sums held in an account has been charged with 
an offence arising out of or in relation to money laundering as defined in Article 1 of 
Directive  91/308/EEC,  the  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme  may  suspend  any  payment 
pending the judgment of the court. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 7.6 

Article 8 

Claims against Deposit Guarantee Schemes 

1. 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  depositor's  rights  to  compensation  may  be  the 
subject of an action by the depositor against the Ddeposit G-guarantee Sscheme. 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
2. 

3. 

4. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 11 
(cid:214) new 

Without prejudice to any other rights which they may have under national law (cid:214) and 
subject to paragraph 3 , schemes which make payments under guarantee shall have 
the right of subrogation to the rights of depositors in liquidation proceedings for an 
amount equal to their payments. 

(cid:216) new 

Where  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  lend  to  another  scheme  under  the  procedure 
referred to in Article 10, the lending Deposit Guarantee Schemes shall in proportion 
to  the  amount  lent  have  the  right  of  subrogation  to  the  rights  of  depositors  in 
liquidation proceedings for an amount equal to their payments. 

The right of subrogation shall not be exercised before the loan is due under Article 
10(2)(b). If the liquidation procedure ends before that date, the right of subrogation 
shall extend to the liquidation proceeds paid to the borrowing scheme. 

Rights subject to the right of subrogation referred to in this paragraph shall have the 
first rank after the right of depositors referred to in paragraph 1 and before all other 
rights against the liquidator. 

Member  States  may  limit  the  time  in  which  depositors  whose  deposits  were  not 
repaid or acknowledged by the scheme within the deadline set out in Article 7(1) can 
claim the repayment of their deposits. Such time limit shall be determined by the date 
at which the rights to which the Deposit Guarantee Scheme has subrogated pursuant 
to paragraph 2 are due to be registered in a winding up procedure under national law. 

When  determining  the  time  limit,  Member  States  shall  take  into  account  the  time 
needed  by  the  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme  to  collect  such  claims  before  such 
registration. 

(cid:216) new 

Article 9 

Financing of Deposit Guarantee Schemes 

1. 

Member States shall ensure that Deposit Guarantee Schemes have in place adequate 
systems  to  determine  their  potential  liabilities.  The  available  financial  means  of 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes shall be proportionate to these liabilities.  

Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  shall  raise  the  available  financial  means  by  regular 
contributions  from  their  members  on  30  June  and  30  December  of  each  year.  This 

EN 

31 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
shall not prevent additional financing from other sources. One-off entry fees may not 
be requested.  

The  available  financial  means  shall  at  least  reach  the  target  level.  Where  the 
financing  capacity  falls  short  of  the  target  level,  the  payment  of  contributions  shall 
resume at least until the target level is reached again. Where the available financial 
means amount to less than two thirds of the target level, the regular contribution shall 
not be less than 0.25% of eligible deposits. 

The  cumulated  amount  of  deposits  and  investments  of  a  scheme  related  to  a  single 
body  shall  not  exceed  5%  of  its  available  financial  means.  Companies  which  are 
included in the same group for the purposes of consolidated accounts, as defined in 
Directive  83/349/EEC  or  in  accordance  with  recognised  international  accounting 
rules, shall be regarded as a single body for the purpose of calculating this limit.  

If  the  available  financial  means  of  a  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme  are  insufficient  to 
repay  depositors  when  deposits  become  unavailable,  its  members  shall  pay 
extraordinary contributions not exceeding 0.5% of their eligible deposits per calendar 
year.  That  payment  shall  be  executed  one  day  before  the  time  limit  referred  to  in 
Article 7(1). 

The  cumulated  amount  of  contributions  referred  to  paragraphs  1  and  2  may  not 
exceed 1% of eligible deposits per calendar year.  

The competent authorities may entirely or partially exempt a credit institution from 
the  obligation  referred  to  in  paragraph  2  if  the  sum  of  payments  referred  to  in 
paragraphs  1  and  2  would  jeopardize  the  settlement  of  claims  of  other  creditors 
against it. Such exemption shall not be granted for a longer period than 6 months but 
may be renewed on request of the credit institution. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

The  financial  means  referred  to  in  paragraphs  1,  2  and  3  of  this  Article  shall 
principally be used in order to repay depositors pursuant to this Directive.  

They may however also be used in order to finance the transfer of deposits to another 
credit institution, provided that the costs borne by the Deposit Guarantee Scheme do 
not exceed the amount of covered deposits at the credit institution concerned. In this 
case,  the  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme  shall,  within  one  month  from  the  transfer  of 
deposits,  submit  a  report  to  the  European  Banking  Authority  proving  that  the  limit 
referred to above was not exceeded. 

Member States may allow Deposit Guarantee Schemes to use their financial means 
in order to avoid a bank failure without being restricted to financing the transfer of 
deposits to another credit institution, provided that the following conditions are met: 

(a) 

a scheme's financial means exceed 1% of eligible deposits after such measure; 

(b) 

the  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme,  within  one  month  from  its  decision  to  take 
such measure, submits a report to the European Banking Authority proving that 
the limit referred to above was not exceeded. 

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
6. 

7. 

On  a  case  by  case  basis  and  subject  to  authorisation  by  the  competent  authorities 
following  a  reasoned  request  by  the  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme  concerned,  the 
percentage referred to in (a) may be set between 0,75 and 1 %. 

Member States shall ensure that Deposit Guarantee Schemes have in place adequate 
alternative funding arrangements to enable them to obtain short-term funding where 
necessary to meet claims against those Deposit Guarantee Schemes. 

Member States shall monthly inform the European Banking Authority of the amount 
of eligible deposits and covered deposits in their Member State and of the amount of 
the available financial means of their Deposit Guarantee Schemes. This information 
shall  be  confirmed  by  the  competent  authorities  and  shall,  accompanied  by  this 
confirmation, transmitted within 10 days from the end of each month to the European 
Banking Authority. 

Member States shall ensure that the information referred to in the first subparagraph 
is published on the web-site of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes at least on an annual 
basis. 

(cid:216) new 

Article 10 

Borrowing between Deposit Guarantee Schemes 

1. 

A scheme shall have the right to borrow from all other Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
referred  to  in  Article  1(2)  within  the  Union  provided  that  all  of  the  following 
conditions are met: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

the  borrowing  scheme  is  not  able  to  fulfil  its  obligations  under  Article  8(1) 
because  of  previous  payments  within  the  scope  of  the  first  and  second 
subparagraph of Article 9(5). 

the  situation  referred  to  in  point  (a)  of  this  subparagraph  is  due  to  a  lack  of 
available financial means referred to in Article 9. 

the  borrowing  scheme  has  made  recourse  to  extraordinary  contributions 
referred in Article 9(3) 

the  borrowing  scheme  undertakes  the  legal  commitment  that  the  borrowed 
funds will be used in order to pay claims under Article 8(1). 

the borrowing scheme is not currently subject to an obligation to repay a loan 
to other Deposit Guarantee Schemes under this Article. 

(f) 

the borrowing scheme shall state the amount of money requested. 

(g) 

the  total  amount  lent  may  not  exceed  0.5%  of  eligible  deposits  of  the 
borrowing scheme. 

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
 
 
(h) 

the borrowing scheme informs without delay the European Banking Authority 
and states the reasons why the above conditions are fulfilled and the amount of 
money requested. 

The amount referred to in point (f) of the first subparagraph shall be determined as 
follows:  

[amount  of  covered  deposits  to  be  repaid  under  Article  8(1)]  –  [available  financial  means 
 + maximum amount of extraordinary contributions referred to in Article 9(3)] 

The other Deposit Guarantee Schemes shall act as lending schemes. For this purpose, 
Member  States  in  which  more  than  one  scheme  is  established  shall  designate  one 
scheme acting as the lending scheme of this Member State and inform the European 
Banking  Authority  thereof.  Member  States  may  decide  if  and  how  the  lending 
scheme is reimbursed by other Deposit Guarantee Schemes established in the same 
Member State. 

Deposit Guarantee Schemes being obliged to repay a loan to other Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes under this Article shall not lend to other Deposit Guarantee Schemes. 

2. 

The loan shall be subject to the following conditions: 

(a) 

each  scheme  shall  lend  the  amount  proportionate  to  the  amount  of  eligible 
deposits at each scheme without taking account of the borrowing scheme and 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes referred to under point (a). The amounts shall be 
calculated pursuant to the latest confirmed monthly information referred to in 
Article 9(7). 

(b) 

the  borrowing  scheme  shall  repay  the  loan  at  the  latest  after  5  years.  It  may 
repay the loan in annual instalments. Interest shall be due  only  at the time of 
repayment. 

(c) 

the interest rate shall be equivalent to the marginal lending facility rate of the 
European Central Bank during the credit period. 

3. 

The  European  Banking  Authority  shall  confirm  that  the  requirements  referred  to  in 
paragraph 1 have been met, state the amounts to be lent by each scheme as calculated 
pursuant to paragraph 2(a) and the initial interest rate pursuant to paragraph 2(c) as 
well as the duration of the loan. 

The  European  Banking  Authority  shall  transmit  its  confirmation  together  with  the 
information referred to in paragraph 1(h) to the lending Deposit Guarantee Schemes. 
They  shall  receive  this  confirmation  and  information  within  2  working  days.  The 
lending  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  shall,  without  delay  but  at  the  latest  within 
further  2  working  days  after  reception  effect  payment  of  the  loan  to  the  borrowing 
scheme. 

5. 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  contributions  levied  by  the  borrowing  scheme 
are sufficient to reimburse the amount borrowed and to re-establish the target level as 
soon as possible. 

EN 

34 

   EN 

 
(cid:216) new 

Article 11 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

Calculation of contributions to Deposit Guarantee Schemes 

The  contributions  to  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  referred  to  in  Article  9  shall  be 
determined for each member on the basis of the degree of risk incurred by it. Credit 
institutions shall not pay less than 75% or more than 200% of the amount that a bank 
with  an  average  risk  would  have  to  contribute.  Member  States  may  decide  that 
members  of  Schemes  referred  to  in  Article  1(3)  and  (4)  pay  lower  contributions  to 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes but not less than 37.5% of the amount that a bank with 
an average risk would have to contribute. 

The determination of the degree of risk incurred and the calculation of contributions 
shall be based on the elements referred to in Annex I and II. 

Paragraph 2 shall not apply to Deposit Guarantee Schemes referred to in Article 1(2). 

In  order  to  ensure  specify  the  elements  of  definitions  and  methods  under  Annex  II 
Part  A,  powers  are  delegated  to  the  Commission.  These  draft  regulatory  standards 
shall  be  adopted  in  accordance  with  Articles  7  to  7d  of  [EBA  Regulation].  The 
European Banking Authority may develop draft regulatory standards for submission 
to the Commission. 

By 31 December 2012, the European Banking Authority shall issue guidelines on the 
application of Annex II Part B pursuant to [Article 8 of the EBA Regulation]. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 4 (new) 

Article 12 

Cooperation within the Union 

1. 

Deposit-g  Guarantee  Sschemes  introduced  and  officially  recognized  in  a  Member 
State in accordance with Article 3 (1) shall cover the depositors at branches set up by 
credit institutions in other Member States. 

Until 31 December 1999 neither the level nor the scope, including the percentage, of 
cover  provided  shall  exceed  the  maximum  level  or  scope  of  cover  offered  by  the 
corresponding guarantee scheme within the territory of the host Member State. 

Before  that  date,  the  Commission  shall  draw  up  a  report  on  the  basis  of  the 
experience acquired in applying the second subparagraph and shall consider the need 
to  continue  those  arrangements.  If  appropriate,  the  Commission  shall  submit  a 
proposal for a Directive to the European Parliament and the Council, with a view to 
the extension of their validity. 

EN 

35 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
2. 

3. 

4. 

Where the level and/or scope, including the percentage, of cover offered by the host 
Member State guarantee scheme exceeds the level and/or scope of cover provided in 
the Member State in which a credit institution is authorized, the host Member State 
shall ensure that there is an officially recognized deposit-guarantee scheme within its 
territory  which  a  branch  may  join  voluntarily  in  order  to  supplement  the  guarantee 
which its depositors already enjoy by virtue of its membership of its home Member 
State scheme. 

The  scheme  to  be  joined  by  the  branch  shall  cover  the  category  of  institution  to 
which it belongs or most closely corresponds in the host Member State. 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  objective  and  generally  applied  conditions  are 
established for branches' membership of a host Member State's scheme in accordance 
with  paragraph  2.  Admission  shall  be  conditional  on  fulfilment  of  the  relevant 
obligations of membership, including in particular payment of any contributions and 
other charges. Member States shall follow the guiding principles set out in Annex II 
in implementing this paragraph. 

If a branch granted voluntary membership under paragraph 2 does not comply with 
the  obligations  incumbent  on  it  as  a  member  of  a  deposit-guarantee  scheme,  the 
competent  authorities  which  issued  the  authorization  shall  be  notified  and,  in 
collaboration  with  the  guarantee  scheme,  shall  take  all  appropriate  measures  to 
ensure that the aforementioned obligations are complied with. 

If  those  measures  fail  to  secure  the  branch's  compliance  with  the  aforementioned 
obligations,  after  an  appropriate  period  of  notice  of  not  less  than  12  months  the 
guarantee  scheme  may,  with  the  consent  of  the  competent  authorities  which  issued 
the  authorization,  exclude  the  branch.  Deposits  made  before  the  date  of  exclusion 
shall continue to be covered by the voluntary scheme until the dates on which they 
fall due. Depositors shall be informed of the withdrawal of the supplementary cover. 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC Art. 1.7 (adapted) 

Article 12 

1.  The  Commission  shall  submit  to  the  European  Parliament  and  to  the  Council  by  31 
December 2009 a report on: 

(a)  the  harmonisation  of  the  funding  mechanisms  of  deposit-guarantee  schemes 
addressing, in particular, the effects of an absence of harmonisation in the event of a 
cross-border  crisis,  in  regard  to  the  availability  of  the  compensation  payouts  of  the 
deposit  and  in  regard  to  fair  competition,  and  the  benefits  and  costs  of  such 
harmonisation; 

(b)  the  appropriateness  and  modalities  of  providing  for  full  coverage  for  certain 
temporarily increased account balances; 

(c) possible models for introducing risk-based contributions; 

EN 

36 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
(d)  the  benefits  and  costs  of  a  possible  introduction  of  a  Community  deposit-
guarantee scheme; 

(e) the impact of diverging legislations as regards set-off, where a depositor’s credit 
is  balanced  against  its  debts,  on  the  efficiency  of  the  system  and  on  possible 
distortions, taking into account cross-border winding-up; 

(f) the harmonisation of the scope of products and depositors covered, including the 
specific needs of small and medium enterprises and local authorities; 

(g)  the  link  between  deposit-guarantee  schemes  and  alternative  means  for 
reimbursing depositors, such as emergency payout mechanisms. 

If necessary, the Commission shall put forward appropriate proposals to amend this Directive. 

2. Member States shall inform the Commission and the European Banking Committee if they 
intend to change the scope or level of coverage for deposits and on any difficulty encountered 
when cooperating with other Member States. 

5. 

In the cases referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4, Member States shall ensure that deposit-
guarantee schemes shall cooperate with each other. 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC  Article 
(new) 

1.2(a) 

6. 

2. 

The Commission shall review the functioning of this Article at least every two years 
and, if appropriate, propose amendments thereto. 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC  Article 
(new) 

1.2(b) 

(cid:216) new 

Depositors  at  branches  set  up  by  credit  institutions  in  other  Member  States  or  in 
Member  States  where  a  credit  institution  authorised  in  another  Member  State 
operates  shall  be  repaid  by  the  scheme  of  the  host  Member  State  on  behalf  of  the 
scheme  in  the  home  Member  State.  The  home  scheme  shall  reimburse  the  host 
scheme. 

The scheme of the host Member State shall also inform the depositors concerned on 
behalf  of  the  scheme  of  the  home  Member  State  and  shall  be  entitled  to  receive 
correspondence from those depositors on behalf of the scheme of the home Member 
State. 

3. 

If a credit institution ceases to be member of a scheme and joins another scheme, the 
contributions  paid  during  the  6  months  preceding  the  withdrawal  of  membership 

EN 

37 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
shall be reimbursed or transferred to the other scheme. This shall not apply if a credit 
institution has been excluded from a scheme pursuant to Article 3(3). 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  of  the  home  Member 
State exchange information referred to under Article 3(7) with those in host Member 
States. The restrictions set out in that Article shall apply. 

In  order  to  facilitate  an  effective  cooperation  between  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes, 
with particular regard to this Article and Article 10, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes, 
or,  where  appropriate,  the  competent  authorities,  shall  have  written  cooperation 
agreements  in  place.  Such  agreements  shall  take  into  account  the  requirements  set 
out in Directive 95/46/EC. 

The European Banking Authority shall be notified of the existence and the content of 
such  agreements.  It  may  issue  opinions  on  such  agreements  under  Articles  6(2)(f) 
and  19  of  the  [EBA  regulation].  If  competent  authorities  or  Deposit  Guarantee 
Schemes cannot reach an agreement or if there is a dispute about the interpretation of 
such agreement, the European Banking Authority shall settle disagreements pursuant 
to [Article 11 of the EBA regulation]. 

The  absence  of  such  agreements  shall  not  affect  the  claims  of  depositors  under 
Article 8(2) or of credit institutions under paragraph 3 of this Article. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 6 (adapted) 
(cid:214) new 

Article 13 

Branches of credit institutions established in third countries 

Member States shall check that branches established by a credit institution which has 
its  head  office  outsideoutwith  the  ⌦ Union ⌫  Community  have  (cid:214) protection  
cover equivalent to that prescribed in this Directive. 

Failing  that,  Member  States  may,  subject  to  Article  ⌦ 38(1)  of  Directive 
2006/48/EC ⌫ 9 (1) of Directive 77/780/EEC, stipulate that branches established by 
a  credit  institution  which  has  its  head  office  outsideoutwith  the  ⌦ Union ⌫ 
Community  must  join  Ddeposit  G-guarantee  Sschemes  in  operation  within  their 
territories. 

Actual and intending depositors at branches established by a credit institution which 
has  its  head  office  outsideoutwith  the  ⌦ Union ⌫  Community  (cid:214) and  is  not 
member of a scheme operating in a Member State  shall be provided by the credit 
institution  with  all  relevant  information  concerning  the  guarantee  arrangements 
which cover their deposits. 

The  information  referred  to  in  paragraph  2  shall  be  made  available  in  the  official 
language or languages of the Member State in which a branch is established in the 

4. 

5. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

EN 

38 

   EN 

 
 
 
manner prescribed by national law and shall be drafted in a clear and comprehensible 
form. 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC Article 1.5 (new) 

Article 14 

Depositor information 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  credit  institutions  make  available  to  actual  and 
intending depositors the information necessary for the identification of the Ddeposit 
G-guarantee  Sscheme of which the institution and its branches are members within 
the  ⌦ Union ⌫  Community  or  any  alternative  arrangement  provided  for  in  the 
second  subparagraph  of  Article  3(1)  or  in  Article  3(4).  The  depositors  shall  be 
informed  of  the  provisions  of  the  deposit-guarantee  scheme  or  any  alternative 
arrangement applicable, including the amount and scope of the coverage offered by 
the  deposit-guarantee  scheme.  When  a  deposit  is  not  guaranteed  by  a  Ddeposit  G-
guarantee  Sscheme  in  accordance  with  Article  ⌦ 4 ⌫  7(2),  the  credit  institution 
shall inform the depositor accordingly.  

IAll  information  (cid:214) to  intending  depositors   shall  be  made  available  in  a  readily 
comprehensible  manner. (cid:214) before  entering  into  a  contract  on  deposit-taking  and 
shall  be  countersigned  by  intending  depositors.  The  template  in  Annex  III  shall  be 
used.  

Information  to  actual  depositors  shall  be  provided  on  their  statements  of  account. 
This  information  shall  consist  of  a  confirmation  that  the  deposits  are  eligible 
pursuant  to  Article  2(1)  and  Article  4.  Moreover,  reference  shall  be  made  to  the 
information  sheet  in  Annex  III  and  where  it  can  be  obtained.  The  web  site  of  the 
responsible Deposit Guarantee Scheme may also be indicated. 

Information about the conditions for compensation and the formalities which must be 
completed to obtain compensation shall be given on request. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 9 
(cid:214) new 

The information provided for in paragraph 1 shall be made available in the manner 
prescribed by national law in the official language or languages of the Member State 
in which the branch is established. 

Member States shall establish rules limiting the use in advertising of the information 
referred to in paragraph 1 in order to prevent such use from affecting the stability of 
the  banking  system  or  depositor  confidence.  In  particular,  Member  States  may 
restrict  such  advertising  to  a  factual  reference  to  the  scheme  to  which  a  credit 
institution belongs. (cid:214) guaranteeing the product to which the advertisement refers.  

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

EN 

39 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
(cid:216) new 

Credit institutions that are member of a scheme referred to in Article 1(3) and 1(4) 
shall  inform  depositors  adequately  on  the  functioning  of  the  scheme.  Such 
information may not contain a reference to unlimited coverage of deposits. 

6. 

7. 

If credit institutions merge, their depositors shall be informed of the merger at least 
one  month  before  it  takes  legal  effect.  Depositors  shall  be  informed  that  when  the 
merger  becomes  effective,  all  their  deposits  held  with  each  of  the  merging  banks 
would after the merger be aggregated in order to determine their coverage under the 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme. 

If a depositor uses internet banking, the information required to be disclosed by this 
Directive shall be communicated by electronic means in a way that brings it to the 
attention of the depositor. 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC 
(adapted) 

Article 

1.7 

Article 12 

1. 

The Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council by 31 
December 2009 a report on: 

(a) 

the  harmonisation  of  the  funding  mechanisms  of  deposit-guarantee  schemes 
addressing,  in  particular,  the  effects  of  an  absence  of  harmonisation  in  the 
event of a cross-border crisis, in regard to the availability of the compensation 
payouts  of  the  deposit  and  in  regard  to  fair  competition,  and  the  benefits  and 
costs of such harmonisation; 

(b) 

the  appropriateness  and  modalities  of  providing  for  full  coverage  for  certain 
temporarily increased account balances; 

(c) 

possible models for introducing risk-based contributions; 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

the  benefits  and  costs  of  a  possible  introduction  of  a  Community  deposit-
guarantee scheme; 

the  impact  of  diverging  legislations  as  regards  set-off,  where  a  depositor’s 
credit  is  balanced  against  its  debts,  on  the  efficiency  of  the  system  and  on 
possible distortions, taking into account cross-border winding-up; 

the  harmonisation  of  the  scope  of  products  and  depositors  covered,  including 
the specific needs of small and medium enterprises and local authorities; 

the  link  between  deposit-guarantee  schemes  and  alternative  means  for 
reimbursing depositors, such as emergency payout mechanisms. 

EN 

40 

   EN 

 
 
 
If necessary, the Commission shall put forward appropriate proposals to amend this 
Directive. 

2. 

Member States shall inform the Commission and the European Banking Committee 
if  they  intend  to  change  the  scope  or  level  of  coverage  for  deposits  and  on  any 
difficulty encountered when cooperating with other Member States. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 13 (adapted) 

Article 15 

List of authorized credit institutions 

In the list of authorized credit institutions which it is required to draw up pursuant to Article 3 
(7)  of  Directive  77/780/EEC  ⌦ 14  of  Directive  2006/48/EC ⌫  the  Commission  shall 
indicate the status of each credit institution with regard to this Directive. 

(cid:216) new 

Article 16 

Exercise of the delegation 

1. 

2. 

3. 

1. 

2. 

The powers to adopt the delegated acts referred to in Article 5(7) shall be conferred 
on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time.  

As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to 
the European Parliament and to the Council. 

The powers to adopt delegated acts are conferred on the Commission subject to the 
conditions laid down in Articles 17 and 18. 

Article 17 

Revocation of the delegation 

The delegation of power referred to in Article 16 may be revoked at any time by the 
European Parliament or by the Council. 

The institution which has commenced an internal procedure for deciding whether to 
revoke the delegation of power shall endeavour to inform the other institution and the 
Commission  within  a  reasonable  time  before  the  final  decision  is  taken,  indicating 
the delegated powers which could be subject to revocation and possible reasons for a 
revocation. 

EN 

41 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
3. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

The decision of revocation shall put an end to the delegation of the powers specified 
in that decision. It shall take effect immediately or at a later date specified therein. It 
shall  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  delegated  acts  already  in  force.  It  shall  be 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union. 

Article 18 

Objections to delegated acts 

The European Parliament and the Council may object to the delegated act within a 
period of two months from the date of notification. At the initiative of the European 
Parliament or the Council this period shall be extended by one month. 

If,  on  expiry  of  that  period,  neither  the  European  Parliament  nor  the  Council  has 
objected  to  the  delegated  act  it  shall  be  published  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the 
European Union and shall enter into force at the date stated therein. 

The delegated act may be published in the Official Journal of the. European Union 
and enter into force before the expiry of that period if the European Parliament and 
the  Council  have  both  informed  the  Commission  of  their  intention  not  to  raise 
objections. 

If the European Parliament or the Council objects to a delegated act, it shall not enter 
into  force.  The  institution  which  objects  shall  state  the  reasons  for  objecting  to  the 
delegated act.  

Article 19 

Transitional provisions 

Contributions  to  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  referred  to  in  Article  9  shall  be 
distributed  as  evenly  as  possible  until  the  target  level  referred  to  in  the  third 
subparagraph of Article 9(1) is reached. 

Depositors holding debt securities issued by the same credit institution and liabilities 
arising  out  of  own  acceptances  or  promissory  notes,  deposits  whose  existence  can 
only  be  proven  by  a  certificate  other  than  a  statement  of  account,  deposits  whose 
principal is not repayable at par; or whose principal is only repayable at par under a 
particular guarantee or agreement provided by the credit institution or a third party 
shall be informed that their deposits would not be covered anymore under a Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme. 

Where certain deposits cease to be covered wholly or partially by Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes  after  the  transposition  of  this  Directive  or  Directive  2009/14/EC  into 
national  law,  Member  States  may  allow  such  deposits  to  be  covered  until  31 
December  2014  if  those  deposits  were  paid  in  before  30  June  2010.  After  31 
December  2014,  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  no  scheme grants  higher  or  more 
comprehensive guarantees than those provided for in this Directive, regardless when 
the deposits were paid in. 

EN 

42 

   EN 

 
 
4. 

5. 

1. 

By 31 December 2015 the Commission shall submit a report, and, if appropriate, a 
legislative  proposal  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  with  the  aim  to 
determine  whether  existing  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes  should  be  replaced  by  a 
single scheme for the whole Union. 

The  Commission,  supported  by  the  [European  Banking  Authority],  shall  submit  to 
the  European  Parliament  and  to  the  Council  by  31  December  2015  a  report  on  the 
progress  towards  the  implementation  of  this  Directive.  This  report  should  cover 
notably the possibility to determine the target level on the basis of covered deposits, 
without diminishing the protection of depositors. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 14 
(cid:214) new 

Article 20 

Transposition 

Member  States  shall  bring  into  force  the  laws,  regulations  and  administrative 
provisions  necessary  for  them  to  comply  with  this  Directive  (cid:214) Articles  1,  2(1)(a), 
(c), (d), (f), (h)-(m), 2(2), 3(1), 3(3), 3(5)-3(7), 4(1)(d)-(k), 5(2)-5(5), 6(4)-6(7), 7(1)-
(3),  8(2)-(4),  9-11,  12,  13(1)-(2),  14(1)-(3),  14(5)-(7),  19  and  Annex  I-III  by  31 
December 2012 at the latest.  They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
(cid:214) communicate  to  the  Commission  the  text  of  those  provisions  and  a  correlation 
table between those provisions and this Directive.  

By  way  of  derogation  from  the  first  subparagraph,  Member  States  shall  bring  into 
force  the  laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions  necessary  for  them  to 
comply with the third subparagraph of Article 9(1), Article 9(3) and Article 10 by 31 
December 2020. 

By  way  of  derogation  from  the  first  subparagraph,  Member  States  shall  bring  into 
force  the  laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions  necessary  for  them  to 
comply with Article 7(1) and 9(5) by 31 December 2013. However, the percentage of 
eligible deposits referred to in Article 9(5)(a) shall not apply before 1 Januar 2014. 
Until 31 December 2017, a percentage of 0.5% shall apply. After that date and until 
31 December 2020, a percentage of 0.75% shall apply. 

When  Member  States  adopt  those  provisions,  they  shall  contain  a  reference  to  this 
Directive  or  shall  be  accompanied  by  such  a  reference  on  the  occasion  of  their 
official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by the 
Member  States.  (cid:214) They  shall  also  include  a  statement  that  references  in  existing 
laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions  to  the  directives  repealed  by  this 
Directive  shall  be  construed  as  references  to  this  Directive.  Member  States  shall 
determine  how  such  reference  is  to  be  made  and  how  that  statement  is  to  be 
formulated.  

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2. 

The  Member  States  shall  communicate  to  the  Commission  the  texts  of  the  main 
provisions  of  national  law  which  they  adopt  in  the  field  governed  covered  by  this 
Directive.  

(cid:216) new 

Article 21 

Repeal 

Directives 94/19/EC together with its successive amendments, are repealed with effect from 
31 December 2012, without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States relating to the 
time-limits  for  transposition  into  national  law  and  application  of  the  Directives  set  out  in 
Annex IV.  

References  to  the  repealed  Directives  shall  be  construed  as  references  to  this  Directive  and 
shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex V. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 15 (adapted) 
(cid:214) new 

Article 22 

Entry into force 

This  Directive  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  (cid:214) twentieth   day  (cid:214) following  that   of  its 
publication in the Official Journal of the European ⌦ Union ⌫ Communities. 

(cid:214) Articles 2(1)(b), (e), (g), 4(1)(a)-(c), 5(1), 6(1)-6(3), 7(4), 8(1), 12(1), 13(3), 14(4), 15-18 
shall apply from 1 January 2013.  

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Article 16 

Article 23 

This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 

Done at Brussels, […] 

For the European Parliament 
The President 
[…] 

For the Council 
The President 
[…] 

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(cid:216) new 

ANNEX I 

Determination of risk-based contributions to Deposit Guarantee Schemes 

1. 

The following formulas shall be used:  

(a) 

the amount of risk-based contributions of a member  

Ci = TC * RSi 

(b) 

the risk share of a member  

RS

i

RA

i

RA

k

= n
∑

1k
=

(c) 

the risk-weighted amount of contribution of a member  

RAi = CB * iβ  

where:  

Ci 

the amount of contribution of the i-th DGS member  

TC 

the total amount of contributions to be collected by the scheme 

RSi 

the risk share for the i-th member 

RAi  the risk-weighted amount of contribution of the i-th member  

RAk  the risk-weighted amounts of contributions of each of the n members 

CB 

the contribution base (i.e. the eligible deposits)  

βi 

the  risk  coefficient  assigned  to  the  i-th  member  in  accordance  with 
Annex II.  

2. 

The following formulas shall be used:  

(a) 

the total composite score of a member  

iρ = ¾ COR

iρ + ¼ SUP
iρ  

(b) 

the composite sub-score of a member as regards core indicators  

COR

iρ = ¼ [

CA1

iρ + AQ1

iρ + P1

iρ + L1

iρ ] 

(c) 

the composite sub-score of a member as regards supplementary indicators  

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SUP

iρ =

[

1

n

where: 

x1

iρ + x2

iρ + … + xn

iρ ] 

iρ  

the total composite score of the i-th member 

COR

iρ   the  total  composite  sub-score  of  the  i-th  member  as  regards  core 

indicators 

SUP

iρ   the 

total  composite  sub-score  of 

the 

i-th  member  as  regards 

supplementary indicators 

x

iρ  

a  variable  assessing  the  risk  of  the  i-th  member  with  regard  to  an 
individual core or supplementary indicator presented in Annex II 

x 

the symbol of a given core or supplementary indicator. 

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(cid:216) new 

ANNEX II 

Indicators, scores and weights for calculating risk-based contributions 

PART A 

Core indicators 

1. 

The following core indicators shall be used for calculating risk-based contributions: 

Risk class 

Indicator 

Ratio 

Capital 
adequacy 

Own funds items referred to in Article 57 
(a) to (ca) of Directive 2006/48/EC and 
risk-weighted assets referred to under 
Article 76 of Directive 2006/48/EC 

Asset quality  Non-performing loans 

Profitability 

Return on assets 

Own funds
Risk weighted asssets 

Non performing loans
Gross loans 

Net income
Average total assets

Liquidity 

To be determined by Member States subject to Article 11(4) 

2. 

The following scores shall be used in order to reflect risk profiles with regard to core 
indicators: 

Risk level 

Very low risk 

Low risk 

Medium risk 

High risk 

Very high risk 

Capital adequacy 

Asset quality 

Profitability 

Liquidity 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

3. 

The  following  scores  shall  be  assigned  to  a  member  based  on  actual  values  of  the 
indicators in a given risk class: 

Element 

Symbol 
(x) 

xρ = 1 

xρ = 2 

xρ = 3 

xρ = 4 

xρ = 5 

Capital adequacy 

CA 

x > 12.3% 

12.3% ≥ x > 9.6% 

9.6% ≥ x > 8.2% 

8.2% ≥ x > 7% 

x ≤ 7% 

Asset quality 

AQ 

x ≤ 1% 

1% < x ≤ 2.1% 

2.1% < x ≤ 3.7% 

3.7% < x ≤ 6% 

x > 6% 

Profitability 

Liquidity 

P 

L 

x > 1.2% 

1.2% ≥ x > 0.9% 

0.9% ≥ x > 0.7% 

0.7% ≥ x > 0.5% 

x ≤ 0.5% 

Member States may determine the thresholds for each 

xρ

subject to Article 11(4) 

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4. 

The  following  risk  weights  (coefficients) shall  be  assigned  to  a  member  depending 
on its composite score:  

Composite score (ρ) 

1 < ρ ≤ 1.5 

1.5 < ρ ≤ 2.5 

2.5 < ρ ≤ 3.5 

3.5 < ρ ≤ 4.5 

4.5 < ρ ≤ 5 

Risk coefficient (β) 

75% 

100% 

125% 

150% 

200% 

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PART B 

Supplementary indicators 

1. 

Member  States  shall  determine  supplementary  indicators  for  calculating  risk-based 
contributions. Some or all of the following indicators may be used for this purpose:  

Risk class 

Indicator / ratio 

Definition 

Capital adequacy 

Asset quality 

Profitability 

Total capital 

Excess capital * 

Loan loss provision 

Risk weighted assets 

Costs to income 

Net margin 

Total capital 
Risk weighted assets 

Excess capital 
Total assets 

Excess capital 

or  Risk weighted assets 

Loan loss provision 

Loan loss provision 

Net interest revenue 

or 

Operating income 

Risk weighted assets 

Total assets 

Operating expenses 

Operating income 

Net margin 

Total capital 

Liquidity 

To be determined by Member States subject to Article 11(5) 

* Excess capital = Capital – own funds referred to in Article 57 (a) to (h) of Directive 2006/48/EC. 

2. 

The  following  scores  shall  be  used  in  order  to  reflect  risk  profiles  with  regard  to 
supplementary indicators. 

Risk level 

Very low risk 

Low risk 

Medium risk 

High risk 

Very high risk 

Capital adequacy 

Asset quality 

Profitability 

Liquidity 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

3. 

The  following  risk  weights  (coefficients) shall  be  assigned  to  a  member  depending 
on its composite score:  

Composite score (ρ) 

1 < ρ ≤ 1.5 

1.5 < ρ ≤ 2.5 

2.5 < ρ ≤ 3.5 

3.5 < ρ ≤ 4.5 

4.5 < ρ ≤ 5 

Risk coefficient (β) 

75% 

100% 

125% 

150% 

200% 

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(cid:216) new 

ANNEX III 

Depositor information template 

If  a  deposit  which  is  due  and  payable  has  not  been  paid  by  a  credit  institution  for  reasons 
which  are  directly  related  to  its  financial  circumstances,  depositors  are  repaid  by  a  Deposit 
Guarantee  Scheme.  The  [insert  product]  of  the  [insert  name  of  the  account-holding  credit 
institution] is in general covered by the responsible Deposit Guarantee Scheme. 

This repayment covers at maximum EUR 100 000 per bank. This means that all deposits at 
the  same  bank  are  aggregated  in  order  to  determine  the  coverage  level.  If,  for  instance  a 
depositor holds a savings account with EUR 90 000 and a current account with EUR 20 000, 
he or she will only be repaid EUR 100 000. 

[Only where applicable]: This method will also be applied if a bank operates under different 
trading  names.  The  [insert  name  of  the  account-holding  credit  institution]  also  trades  under 
[insert all other brands of the same credit institution]. This means that all deposits with one or 
more of these brand names are in total covered up to EUR 100 000. 

In case of joint accounts, the limit of EUR 100 000 applies to each depositor. 

[Only where applicable:] However, deposits in an account to which two or more persons are 
entitled  as  members  of  a  business  partnership,  association  or  grouping  of  a  similar  nature, 
without legal personality, are aggregated and treated as if made by a single depositor for the 
purpose of calculating the limit of EUR 100 000.] 

In  general,  all  retail  depositors  and  businesses  are  covered  by  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes. 
Exceptions for certain deposits are stated on the web site of the responsible Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme. Your bank will also inform you on request whether certain products are covered or 
not. If deposits are covered, the bank shall also confirm this on the statement of account. 

The  responsible  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme  is  [insert  name  and  address,  telephone,  e-mail 
and web site]. It will repay your deposits (up to EUR 100 000) within six weeks at the latest, 
from 31 December 2013 within one week. 

If you have not been repaid within these deadlines, you should take contact with the Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme since the time to claim reimbursement may be barred after a certain time 
limit. Further information can be obtained under [insert web site of the responsible DGS]. 

[Only  where  applicable:]  Your  deposit  is  guaranteed  by  an  Institutional  Guarantee  Scheme 
[recognized/not  recognized]  as  a  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme.  This  means  that  all  banks  that 
are  members  of  this  scheme  mutually  support  each  other  in  order  to  avoid  a  bank  failure. 
However, if a bank failure would nevertheless occur, your deposits will be repaid up to EUR 
100 000. 

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(cid:216) new 

ANNEX IV 

PART A 

Repealed Directives together with their successive amendments (referred to in Article 
21) 

Directive  94/19/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  30  May  1994  on 
deposit-guarantee schemes 

Directive  2009/14/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  March  2009 
amending Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and 
the payout delay 

PART B 

Deadlines for transposition (referred to in Article 21) 

Directive 

Deadline for transposition 

94/19/EEC 

2009/14/EC 

2009/14/EC  (second  paragraph  of  point  3(i) 
of Article 1, Article 7(1a) and (3) and Article 
10(1)  of  Directive  94/19/EC  as  amended  by 
Directive 2009/14/EC)  

1.7.1995 

30.6.2009 

31.12.2010 

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(cid:216) new 

ANNEX V 

Correlation Table 

This Directive 

Directive 2009/14/EC 

Directive 94/19/EEC 

Article 1 

- 

Article 2(1)(a) 

Article 2(1)(d) 

Article 2(1)(e) 

Article 1(1) 

- 

Article 1(1) 

Article 1(2) 

Article 1(3) 

Article 1(4) 

Article 1(5) 

Article 3(1) 

Article 3(2) 

Article 3(3) 

Article 5 

Article 2 

Article 7(2), Annex I (1) 

Article 7(2), Annex I (10) 

Article 7(2), Annex I (2) 

Article 7(2), Annex I (5) 

Article 7(2), Annex I (6) 

Article 7(2), Annex I (3), (4) 

Article 7(2), Annex I (12) 

Article 1(6)(a) 

Article 2(1)(f) 

Article 2(1)(g) 

Article 3(1) 

Article 3(2) 

Article 3(3) 

Article 3(4) 

Article 3(6) 

Article 4(1)(a)-(c) 

Article 4(1)(d) 

Article 4(1)(f) 

Article 4(1)(g) 

Article 4(1)(h) 

Article 4(1)(i) 

Article 4(1)(j) 

Article 4(10)(k) 

Article 5(1) 

Article 5(4) 

Article 1(3)(a) 

Article 7(1) 

Article 1(3)(a) 

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This Directive 

Directive 2009/14/EC 

Directive 94/19/EEC 

Article 1(3)(d) 

Article 1(6)(a) 

Article 5(6) 

Article 5(7) 

Article 6(1)-(3) 

Article 7(1) 

Article 7(3) 

Article 7(4) 

Article 8(1) 

Article 8(2) 

Article 12(1) 

Article 13 

Article 14(1)-(3) 

Article 1(5) 

Article 14(4) 

Article 14(5) 

Article 15 

Article 16-18 

Article 1(4) 

Article 7(4), 7(5) 

Article 8 

Article 10(1) 

Article 10(4) 

Article 10(5) 

Article 7(6) 

Article 11 

Article 4(1) 

Article 6 

Article 9(1) 

Article 9(2) 

Article 9(3) 

Article 13 

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(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Annex I (new) 

ANNEX I 

List of exclusions referred to in Article 7 (2)  

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

Deposits by financial institutions as defined in Article 1 (6) of Directive 89/646/EEC. 

Deposits by insurance undertakings. 

Deposits by government and central administrative authorities. 

Deposits by provincial, regional, local and municipal authorities. 

Deposits by collective investment undertakings. 

Deposits by pension and retirement funds. 

Deposits by a credit institution's own directors, managers, members personally liable, 
holders  of  at  least  5  %  of  the  credit  institution's  capital,  persons  responsible  for 
carrying out the statutory audits of the credit institution's accounting documents and 
depositors of similar status in other companies in the same group. 

Deposits  by  close  relatives  and  third  parties  acting  on  behalf  of  the  depositors 
referred to in 7. 

Deposits by other companies in the same group. 

Non-nominative deposits. 

Deposits for which the depositor has, on an individual basis, obtained from the same 
credit institution rates and financial concessions which have helped to aggravate its 
financial situation. 

Debt  securities  issued  by  the  same  institution  and  liabilities  arising  out  of  own 
acceptances and promissory notes. 

13. 

Deposits in currencies other than: 

– 

– 

those of the Member States, 

ecus. 

14. 

Deposits by companies which are of such a size that they are not permitted to draw 
up  abridged  balance  sheets  pursuant  to  Article  11  of  the  Fourth  Council  Directive 

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(78/660/EEC) of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the annual 
accounts of certain types of companies26. 

(cid:208) 94/19/EC, Annex II (new) 

ANNEX II  

Guiding principles  

Where a branch applies to join a host Member State scheme for supplementary cover, the host 
Member  State  scheme  will  bilaterally  establish  with  the  home  Member  State  scheme 
appropriate  rules  and  procedures  for  paying  compensation  to  depositors  at  that  branch.  The 
following principles shall apply both to the drawing up of those procedures and in the framing 
of the membership conditions applicable to such a branch (as referred to in Article 4 (2)): 

(a) the host Member State scheme will retain full rights to impose its objective and generally 
applied  rules  on  participating  credit  institutions;  it  will  be  able  to  require  the  provision  of 
relevant  information  and  have  the  right  to  verify  such  information  with  the  home  Member 
State's competent authorities; 

(b) the host Member State scheme will meet claims for supplementary compensation upon a 
declaration from the home Member State's competent authorities that deposits are unavailable. 
The  host  Member  State  scheme  will  retain  full  rights  to  verify  a  depositor's  entitlement 
according to its own standards and procedures before paying supplementary compensation; 

(c) home Member State and host Member State schemes will cooperate fully with each other 
to  ensure  that  depositors  receive  compensation  promptly  and  in  the  correct  amounts.  In 
particular, they will agree on how the existence of a counterclaim which may give rise to set-
off under either scheme will affect the compensation paid to the depositor by each scheme; 

(d) host Member State schemes will be entitled to charge branches for supplementary cover 
on an appropriate basis which takes into account the guarantee funded by the home Member 
State scheme. To facilitate charging, the host Member State scheme will be entitled to assume 
that  its  liability  will  in  all  circumstances  be  limited  to  the  excess  of  the  guarantee  it  has 
offered over the guarantee offered by the home Member State regardless of whether the home 
Member  State  actually  pays  any  compensation  in  respect  of  deposits  held  within  the  host 
Member State's territory. 

(cid:208) 2009/14/EC Art. 1.8 

--- 

26 

OJ No L 222, 14. 8. 1978, p. 11. Directive as last amended by Directive 90/605/EEC (OJ No L 317, 16. 
11. 1990, p. 60). 

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