Commission staff working document - Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on market reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework (3rd Report) - Further Steps towards the consolidation of the internal market for electronic communications {COM(2010) 271 final}
Date: 2010-06-01
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: electronic mail, information society, regulation of telecommunications, report, single market, transmission network

EN 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 1.06.2010 
SEC(2010) 659 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
Accompanying document to the  
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 

 on market reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework (3rd report) 

Further Steps towards the consolidation of the internal market for electronic 
communications 

{COM(2010) 271 final} 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
  
 
 
ANNEX I:  THE ARTICLE 7 PROCEDURE 

Under the procedures set out pursuant to Article 7 of the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC), 
national  regulatory  authorities  (NRAs)  must  define  the  boundaries  of  relevant  markets  in 
accordance  with  competition  law  principles,  taking  utmost  account  of  the  SMP  Guidelines1 
and  the  Recommendation  of  relevant  markets2.  If  they  find  that  relevant  markets  are  not 
effectively  competitive,  NRAs  are  obliged  to  propose  appropriate  regulatory  measures  to 
address market failures. A market is not effectively competitive if one or more players have 
significant  market  power  (SMP)  in  this  market.  Where  operators  are  found  to  have  SMP, 
NRAs  are  required  to  propose  appropriate  regulatory  remedies  to  ensure  effective 
competition. In the event of effective competition on the market, existing regulation has to be 
lifted. The market analysis has to be carried out in cooperation with the national competition 
authorities. 

Before  adopting  final  measures  on  market  definition,  market  analysis  and  the  imposition  of 
remedies NRAs must not only carry out a national consultation, but are also required to notify 
their draft measures to the Commission, either by means of standard notification procedure or, 
in  certain  cases3,  by  means  of  a  short  notification  form  which,  in  principle,  will  not  trigger 
comments  from  the  Commission.  Once  an  NRA  notifies  the  Commission  of  its  proposed 
measure for a particular market, the case is registered, and an ad hoc case team comprising 
officials  of  the  services  of  both  the  Information  Society  and  Media  and  Competition 
Directorates  General  is  appointed.  The  case  team  analyses  the  notification  and  may  ask  the 
NRA  concerned  to  provide  some  further  information  or  clarification  for  the  purpose  of 
conducting  the  assessment.  The  team  must  carry  out  its  assessment  and  comply  with  the 
necessary internal checks and balances, within the legally binding deadline of one month. At 
the end of this period and provided that the notified measure does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with EU law, the Commission may decide to make comments. NRAs are 
to  take  utmost  account  of  comments  issued  by  the  Commission  before  adopting  the  draft 
measure in question. 

In the event the Commission expresses serious doubts, the investigation period is extended by 
a  further  two  months  (phase  two  investigation)  during  which  the  NRA  may  not  adopt  its 
proposed measure. During these two months, the case team resumes an in-depth examination 
of the case and the Commission invites third parties to make known their views. What follows 
thereafter is an intense exchange of information between all interested parties (including the 
NRAs  and  industry  players)  and  all  data  provided  and  views  expressed  are  carefully 
considered by the Commission. At the end of the investigation period, the Commission may 
withdraw  its  serious  doubts  (in  which  case  the  NRA  may  adopt  the  draft  measure),  make 
comments  (of  which  the  NRA  must  take  utmost  account  when  implementing  the  draft 
measure)  or  require  the  NRA  to  withdraw  its  proposed  measure.  In  such  an  event,  the 

1  Commission  guidelines  on  market  analysis  and  the  assessment  of  significant  market  power  under  the  EU 
regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications  networks  and  services  (SMP  Guidelines),  OJ  C  165, 
11.7.2002, p. 6. 

2  Commission  Recommendation  2007/879/EC  of  17  December  2007  on  relevant  product  and  service  markets 
within  the  electronic  communications  sector  susceptible  to  ex  ante  regulation  in  accordance  with  the 
Framework Directive, OJ L 344, 28.12.2007, p.65. 

3  See footnote 15 chapter 3.3.1 of the present Communication. 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Commission submits its draft decision to the Communications Committee for an opinion. In 
both phases the NRA may withdraw its draft measure. 

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
Overview phase 1 investigation 

Receipt of notification and
ac knowledgement  of  rec eipt

T ranslation of documents required

(cid:159) Day 0

Notificati on  COMPLETE

Case reg istration and
relevant  parties inf ormed

AN ALYS IS
of notification

FINAL  draft proposed Decision

Scenar io  1

Scenar io  2

Scenar io  3

“No comment”

“Comments - without serious doubts

“Serious doubts”

Assess ment  of  compl eteness

Deci sion on  complet eness

T rans lation of documents required

Reques t for a meeting

Information required from  NRA

Information supplied wi thout request

NRA wi thdrawal of notification

Notificati on  INCOMPLETE

COMMUNICATION
to relevant NR A

AN ALYS IS
suspend ed

COMMUNICATION
to relevant NR A

CLOSING
PHASE  1

(cid:159) + 1 month

Overview phase 2 investigation 

Start of Phase 2

(cid:159) + 1 month

Analysis of
Notification

Translation of documents required

Request for a meeting

Information required from NRA

Information supplied without requirement

NRA withdrawal of notification

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Withdrawal of initial objections 

Draft decision to require the NRA
to withdraw the notification

Communication to COCOM

Advisory procedure before COCOM

Commission’s written procedure

Communication to relevant NRA

Closing of Phase 2 

(cid:159)

+ 3 months

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX II:   TABLE CONCERNING COMPETITION/REGULATION IN THE EU (31/12/2009) 

Effective competition -no ex ante regulation 
No effective competition - ex ante regulation 
Partial competition - partial ex ante regulation
Withdrawal (totally or partially) not yet-renotified
Veto

W
V

1
2
3

1st round-competition/regulation
2nd round-competition/regulation
3rd round-competition/regulation

NEW RECOMMENDATION

OLD RECOMMENDATION

Access to 
PSTN for res 
& non-res.

Call orig. on 
fixed network

Call term. on 
fixed network

Unbund. 
access

Broadb. 
access

Term. 
segments LL

Voice call 
term. on 
mobile 
networks

Local/nat. 
call for res.

Internat. call 
for res.

Local/nat. 
call for non-
res.

Internat. call 
for non-res.

Retail LL

Transit on 
fixed network

Trunk 
segments LL

Access & call 
orig. on 
mobile 
network

Broadcast 
Transmis.

Market 1

Market 2

Market 3

Market 4

Market 5

Market 6

Market 7

ex-Mkt 3

ex-Mkt 4

ex-Mkt 5

ex-Mkt 6

ex-Mkt 7

ex-Mkt 10

ex-Mkt 14

ex-Mkt 15

ex-Mkt 18

Austria

Belgium

Bulgaria

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Ireland

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxemburg

Malta

Netherlands

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

UK

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

3

1

1

1

2

1

1

2

2

2

1

2

2

1

2

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

3

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

2

1

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

3

2

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

3

1

2

1/w

2

2

3

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

1/w

3

2

1

1

2

1

2

2

2

2

3

2

1

2

2

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

1

3

2

1

2

2

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

2

1

2

3

1

1

2

2

1

2

1

2

2

2

3

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

1

1

2

3

2

1

2

3

2

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

EN 

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

2

2

2

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

1

1

2

1

1

1

V

W

1

1

2

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

w

1

2

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

3

2

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

5 

EN 

 
  
ANNEX III:  DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE OF PLAY PER MARKET4 

1. 

RETAIL ACCESS TO THE PUBLIC TELEPHONE NETWORK AT A FIXED LOCATION FOR 
RESIDENTIAL AND NON-RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS (MARKET 1)  

In  almost  all  Member  States,  NRAs  found  the  access  markets  to  be  non-competitive  and 
imposed  regulatory  obligations  on  the  incumbent  operators,  owing  still  very  high  market 
shares (around 90%). However, as a result of effective wholesale regulation in place, NRAs in 
the Netherlands5 and the UK6 proposed the withdrawal of retail fixed access remedies. 

1.1. 

Issues related to the market definition 

As  defined  in  the  Recommendation,  the  retail  access  market  includes  the  provision  of  a 
connection or access (at a fixed location or address) to the public telephone network for the 
purpose of making and/or receiving telephone calls and related services (such as fax).  

The  revised  Recommendation  no  longer  distinguishes  between  residential  and  non-
residential  customers  in  the  retail  fixed  access  markets  since  in  most  Member  States 
contractual terms do not differ significantly between the two types of access. In line with this 
new approach most NRAs have, after the end of 2007, defined one single narrowband access 
market  for  residential  and  non-residential  customers.  However,  based  on  national  market 
circumstances,  such  as  differences  in  demand  of  services,  price  structures  and  marketing 
approaches towards the two customer groups, the Commission has accepted to maintain such 
distinction in some countries7. 

As regards the product market definition, the Cypriot, Greek and Irish NRAs differentiated 
between  lower  and  higher  level  narrowband  access  markets,  whereas  the  British  NRA 
distinguished  between  analogue  and  ISDN  fixed  access  markets8.    Some  NRAs  included 
alternative  means  of  access  in  the  market  definition,  such  as  cable9  and  optical  fibre10 
networks  or  wireless  local  loop11.  Home-zone  access  services12  provided  over  mobile 
networks belong to the relevant market in Spain, Romania and Bulgaria. The Hungarian NRA 
concluded that within the timeframe of the review home-zone products will not form part of 
the  relevant  market.  Nevertheless,  the  Commission  invited  the  NRA  to  examine  in  its  final 

4   Overview  of  notifications  assessed  between  October  2005  and  December  2009.  Details  concerning 
notifications prior to this date can be found in the "Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European  Parliament,  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  Regions  on 
Market  Reviews  under  the  EU  Regulatory  Framework  -  Consolidating  the  internal  market  for  electronic 
communications", (COM(2006) 28 final) of 6.2.2006. 

5   Case NL/2008/0821explain market is effectively competitive. 
6   Case UK/2009/0899.explain market is partially competitive. 
7   Austria, Bulgaria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Latvia and the UK. 
8   Cases CY/2006/0485-486, EL/2006/0500-501, IE/2007/0632 and UK/2009/0899 respectively. 
9   E.g.  cases  ES/2008/0815,  HU/2007/0662-663,  PL/2007/0593,  PL/2007/0647,  EE/2007/0637-638, 

BG/2009/0911and LV/2009/0994. 

10   E.g. cases AT/2008/0832 and IT/2009/0890. 
11   E.g. cases HU/2007/0662-663, EE/2007/0637-638, IT/2009/0890 and BG/2009/0911. 
12   Services which do not allow for mobility and that have been assigned fixed geographical numbering.  

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
                                                 
measure the substitutability in terms of functionality and prices in this respect. In most cases, 
the broader market definition did not affect the finding of SMP or the scope of regulation.  

The Commission has pursued a consequent line regarding the inclusion of broadband access 
services in the relevant market. In particular, the Commission has pointed out that to underpin 
increased substitutability between broadband access and narrowband access products, NRAs 
must  demonstrate  that  as  a  result  of  a  small  but  significant  non-transitory  price  increase 
(SSNIP) customers  would  switch from a narrowband connection to a broadband connection 
only. It requested the Polish NRA to withdraw its measures13 concerning retail access markets 
because it had not provided sufficient data to support the inclusion of xDSL access services. 
The NRA in its re-notified draft measure14 excludes any form of broadband access from the 
relevant  market.  In  Austria15,  Bulgaria16  and  Italy17  different  broadband  access  products  are 
included in the relevant  market  and  NRAs have not always provided  exhaustive  analysis of 
substitutability,  particularly  as  to  pricing  structure.  Whilst  in  its  comments  letters  the 
Commission  has  expressed  its  concerns,  the  question  of  the  market  definition  could  be  left 
open as the inclusion of these services would not affect the SMP assessment and none of the 
NRAs would impose regulatory obligations concerning these services. On the other hand, the 
Commission did not contest the German NRA's conclusion to include complete connections18 
in  the  retail  access  market  definition,  based  on  the  evidence  provided  on  the  increased 
substitutability  between  traditional  narrowband  connections  and  complete  connections, 
especially as regards their functionality19 and pricing structure. Furthermore, the Commission 
did not challenge the inclusion of managed VoIP connections in the relevant access market in 
Romania  and  of  IP-based  telephony  access  with  numbers  in  Sweden20  on  the  basis  of  the 
substitutability of these access products with traditional narrowband connections (particularly 
in  terms  of  function,  price,  and  intended  use).  However,  the  Commission  called  upon  these 
NRAs  to  closely  monitor  market  developments  and  adapt  their  market  definition  and 
regulatory  intervention  accordingly,  should  the  market  structure  change  with  regard  to  the 
increased substitutability of different access products.  

Referring  to  national  circumstances21,  the  Dutch  NRA  defined  the  relevant  market  as 
including  both  fixed  telephony  access  and  voice  calls  services.  While  the  Commission  was 

13   Cases PL/2006/0518, PL/2006/0524. 
14  Cases PL/2007/0593, PL/2007/0647. 
15   Voice over Broadband (VoB) services (cases AT/2007/0579-580 and AT/2008/0832). 
16   Services  offered  via  Wireless  Broadband  Access 

technologies 

like  CDMA  and  WiMax  (case 

BG/2009/0911). 

17   Broadband access services enabling VoIP services (case IT/2009/0890). 
18  

i.e. DSL or broadband cable connections that are bundled with telephone service and are not simultaneously 
coupled with a narrowband connection (Case DE/2009/0897). 

19  

i.e.  complete  connections  should  offer  the  functionalities  which  the  end  user  of  traditional  connections  is 
used to, for example both types of connections are offered with local exchange telephone numbers. 

20    Cases RO/2009/1001 and SE/2009/0965 respectively. 
21   In  the  Netherlands  end-users  would  opt  increasingly,  and  more  often  than  in  the  rest  of  Europe,  for 
purchasing  so-called  bundles  of  fixed  telephony  access  and  voice  calls.  Nevertheless,  around  a  third  of 
Dutch  customers  still  choose  unbundled  services  (i.e.  access  and  calls  provided  separately).  (Case 
NL/2008/0821) 

EN 

7 

   EN 

 
                                                 
not convinced that the arguments and evidence put forward demonstrated this conclusively, it 
concluded that the exact scope of the market definition did not affect the regulatory outcome. 

The  geographical  market  is  mainly  national  in  scope  except  for  Finland,  Hungary  and  the 
UK where it corresponds to the networks of multiple incumbent operators22. 

1.2. 

Issues related to remedies 

In  the  fixed  access  markets  the  selection  of  remedies  supporting  the  access  obligation 
(transparency,  non-discrimination,  price  control  and  accounting  separation)  shows  a  great 
diversity. 

Looking  at  the  individual  remedies  imposed,  carrier  selection/carrier  pre-selection 
(CS/CPS)  and  wholesale  line  rental  (WLR)  are  imposed  in  most  Member  States  either  in 
the  access  market  or  in  the  call  origination  market.  WLR  is  vital  to  encourage  alternative 
operators  to  climb  the  ladder  of  investment  towards  full  unbundling  and  it  also  allows  the 
incumbent’s competitors to bundle their products and services in the retail markets as WLR is 
deemed  most  efficient,  complementing  CS/CPS.  However,  in  quite  a  few  Member  States, 
WLR is not imposed or not well implemented23. To this end the Commission invited NRAs to 
consider imposing this obligation.24 

Price  control  and  price/cost  calculation  methodologies  play  a  key  role  in  regulating 
telecommunication  markets.  Inappropriate  prices  (e.g.  those  discouraging  operators  from 
investments  or  becoming  efficient  over  time)  can  lead  to  significant  distortions.  Therefore, 
remedies  related  comments  of  the  Commission  address  in  most  cases  the  proposed  price 
control  and  the  cost  accounting  obligation25,  where  a  great  variety  of  methodologies  are 
notified under the Article 7 consultation procedure. The Commission has stressed on various 
occasions that WLR conditions should be designed in a way to avoid margin squeeze, while 
not  discouraging  investments  in  LLU  in  geographic  areas  where  such  investment  would  be 
economically  feasible26.  The  Commission  has  invited  NRAs  to  impose  or  maintain  ex  ante 
price  control  obligations  where  wholesale  regulation  has  not  yet  proved  sufficient  to  ensure 
competition at retail level27 or there was a risk of excessive pricing by the SMP operator28. In 
several cases, comments concern the lack of details of the price control obligation provided in 

22   Cases FI/2003/0020-21, HU/2007/0662-663 and UK/2009/0899 respectively. 
23   E.g.:  Denmark,  Estonia,  Germany,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Slovakia,  Romania  as  well  as  Austria  and  the  Czech 

Republic. 

24   E.g. cases EE/2007/0637-638, HU/2007/0662-663, LV/2009/0994, RO/2009/1001 and DE/2009/1006. 

In  Germany  the  NRA  did  not  impose  WLR,  instead,  it  took  note  of  the  voluntary  commitment  of  the 
incumbent  to  offer  access  lines  to  wholesale  customers  under  retail  conditions  (i.e.  as  offered  by  the 
incumbent  to  end  users).  The  NRA  in  its  regulatory  measure  only  reserved  the  right  to  impose  a  WLR 
remedy  at  a  later  stage  should  the  voluntary  commitment  fail  to  fulfil  its  regulatory  function.  The 
Commission stressed that the incumbent's voluntary commitment can under no circumstances be used as a 
reason  not  to  adopt  a  regulatory  measure  necessary  to  redress  the  competition  problem  identified  in  the 
relevant market. 

25   Cases ES/2008/0815, LU/2006/0526-527, BE/2007/0640, IE/2007/0632. 
26     Cases PL/2006/0380, LV/2009/0994, RO/2009/1001 and DE/2009/1006.  
27   Cases EE/2007/0637-638 and SK/2007/0696. 
28   Cases ES/2008/0815 and CZ/2008/0755. 

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
                                                 
 
the notifications29, which failed to ensure adequate transparency and legal certainty for market 
players. 

The Commission made fewer comments with regard to non-discrimination, transparency and 
accounting  separation  obligations.  In  one  case,  the  Commission  reminded  the  NRA30  that 
voluntary  undertakings  of  the  incumbent,  providing  additional  guarantees  of  non-
discrimination and transparency, must be notified under the EU consultation procedure. 

Finally,  the  Commission  also  commented  on  the  differentiation  of  the  transparency 
obligation31 as regards categories of access products belonging to the same relevant market in 
Spain (i.e. between standardized and customized offers32); as well as on the non-imposition of 
accounting separation in Latvia and Slovakia33. 

2. 

WHOLESALE FIXED CALL ORIGINATION (MARKET 2)  

Call origination markets are characterized by the lack of effective competition in all Member 
States;  NRAs  designated  incumbent  operators,  having  still  very  high  market  shares,  as 
operators with significant market power. 

2.1. 

Issues related to the market definition 

Call origination is one of the key wholesale inputs required to provide retail fixed telephone 
services, including voice calls and dial-up Internet services. Call origination may also include 
switching and/or call conveyance services.  

Most NRAs have defined the relevant market in line with the Recommendation on relevant 
markets. However, the Danish and the Dutch34 NRAs have proposed a market delineation that 
includes  both  wholesale  access  and  call  origination  services.  The  Commission  expressed 
doubts  over  the  inclusion  of  wholesale  access  services  in  the  wholesale  call  origination 
market,  as  access  services  are  complements  to  rather  than  substitutes  for  call  origination 
services. Furthermore the Commission was also not convinced of the Dutch NRA's proposal 
to  subdivide  the  relevant  market  into  two  distinct  markets  for  residential  and  business 
customers35  since  call  origination  services  are  in  the  two  market  segments  functionally 
identical; an operator providing these services to residential customers could easily switch to 
provide the same services to business customers and vice versa. Nevertheless, in both cases 
the  question  of  the  market  delineation  could  be  left  open  since  it  had  no  impact  on  the 
assessment of SMP or on the proposed remedies.  

29   CasesGI/2007/0710-711, EE/2007/0637-638, IE/2007/0632 and LV/2009/0994. 
30   Case IT/2009/0890. 
31   Case ES/2008/0815. 
32    Customized offers are defined as offers to customers whose billing exceeds 12.000 euros per year and that 

comprise not only access but also other electronic communications services. 

33   Cases LV/2009/0994 and SK/2007/0696. 
34   Cases DK/2005/0141 and NL/2008/0822.  
35   The NRA stated that residential and business products are not substitutable on the demand and also not on 
the  supply  side  because  of  the  different  type  of  lines  used  and  the  different  price  features.  (Case 
NL/2008/0822). 

EN 

9 

   EN 

 
                                                 
As  the  above  market  definitions  deviate  from  those  identified  in  the  Recommendation  on 
relevant markets the Danish and Dutch NRAs carried out the three criteria test to justify ex 
ante  regulation  of  the  defined  broader  markets  in  accordance  with  Article  15(3)  of  the 
Framework Directive and the Recommendation. As regards the Netherlands, the Commission 
explicitly invited the NRA to present its assessment on the three criteria test also in its final 
measure. 

NRAs have predominantly defined the geographic scope of the relevant markets as national 
with  the  exception  of  Finland,  Hungary  and  the  UK  where  it  corresponds  to  the  operating 
areas of the incumbents' local networks36. 

2.2. 

Issues related to remedies 

As  regards  remedies,  most  NRAs  imposed  the  full  set  of  obligations  available  under  the 
Access  Directive.  The  Commission  was  concerned  with  the  effectiveness  of  wholesale 
regulation applied in Latvia and in Malta37. 

Some  NRAs38  imposed  carrier  selection/carrier  pre-selection  (CS/CPS)  and  wholesale 
line rental (WLR) not in the retail fixed access markets but in the call origination market. In 
this  context  the  Commission  called  upon  the  Slovak  NRA39  to  ensure  the  effective 
implementation of CS/CPS services and to consider imposing a WLR remedy which should 
also render the CS/CPS services more effective. 

Similarly  to  other  markets,  the  Commission  commented  on  several  occasions40  on  price 
control and price/cost calculating methodologies in the wholesale call origination market; it 
requested  for  instance  the  Slovak  NRA  to  enforce  the  implementation  of  the  price  control 
obligation without delay. Furthermore, the Commission expressed concerns over the lack of 
details  of  the  price  control/cost  accounting  obligations  notified,  which  fails  to  provide 
adequate transparency and legal certainty for market players41. Finally, it stressed the need to 
notify cost oriented price caps, glide-paths or interconnection rates under the EU consultation 
procedure in order to ensure transparency and coherence of the applied remedies42. 

From  the  procedural  point  of  view,  the  Commission  pointed  out,  that  it  considers  the 
German approach to separately notify the proposed remedies by a subsequent notification as 
an ineffective approach to address swiftly the competition problems identified43. Moreover, it 
reminded the Irish NRA that under the Regulatory Framework notified draft measures should 
be adopted within a reasonable timeframe44. 

36   Cases FI/2007/0703, HU/2007/0726 and UK/2009/0898 respectively. 
37    Cases LV/2009/0960 and MT/2009/0979. 
38   CS/CPS is imposed in market 2 in Greece, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands and the UK. WLR is imposed in 

market 2 in Poland, Spain, Malta, the Netherlands and the UK. 

39   Case SK/2007/0740. 
40   Cases AT/2006/0543, CZ/2006/0351and SK/2007/0740. 
41   Cases PL/2006/0380 and GI/2007/0716. 
42   Case DE/2009/0887 and SE/2009/1016. 
43   Case DE/2008/0843. 
44    Case IE/2007/0672. 

EN 

10 

   EN 

 
                                                 
3. 

CALL TERMINATION ON INDIVIDUAL PUBLIC TELEPHONE NETWORKS PROVIDED AT 
A FIXED LOCATION (MARKET 3)  

Wholesale  call  termination  is  the  service  which  operators  provide  to  each  other  to  connect 
incoming  calls  to  subscribers  located  on  their  networks.  In  the  EU,  the  calling  party  pays 
entirely for the call45, and the wholesale termination rate paid by  the  originating  operator is 
normally passed to its end customer. As the called party is not billed for incoming calls, it is 
generally indifferent to the termination charge set by its network provider and has little or no 
incentive to change network in the event that those charges are raised46. Consequently, in the 
absence  of  other  factors  potentially  limiting  market  power  such  as  countervailing  buyer 
power, the criteria to merit ex ante regulation are normally met, and the terminating operator 
is designated as having SMP. 

Since  the  previous  Communication,  all  NRAs  have  notified  their  relevant  markets  for  fixed 
call termination. The market was found to be non-competitive and is consequently regulated 
in all Member States47. 

3.1. 

Issues related to market definition  

As noted in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation on relevant markets, call 
termination is the least replicable element in the series of inputs required to provide retail call 
services.  

Call  termination  can  only  be  supplied  by  the  network  provider  to  which  the  called  party  is 
connected. There are currently no demand- or supply-side substitutes for call termination on 
an individual network. Therefore, in line with the Recommendation on relevant markets, all 
NRAs have defined each individual fixed network operator as constituting a distinct relevant 
network market for call termination.  

The  market  has  frequently  been  defined  independently  of  the  underlying  technology.  For 
example, termination of calls at fixed locations using managed Voice over Internet Protocol 

45   Calling Party Pays (CPP) principle. 

46   A  different  rationale  applies  to  numbers  used  by  service  providers.  A  called  service  provider  is  generally 
sensitive  to  the  level  of  termination  charges  —  which  directly  affect  its  revenues  —  and  may  therefore 
switch between providers of termination services. 

47   In  its  first  round  review  of  the  fixed  termination  markets  (case  DE/2005/0144)  the  German  regulator 
considered that 53 alternative network operators did not have SMP for call termination on their respective 
networks, despite their 100% market share. In RegTP’s view, the fixed incumbent Deutsche Telekom AG 
had countervailing buyer power which did not allow the alternative operators to behave independently to an 
appreciable  extent.  The  Commission  concluded,  however,  that  the  evidence  provided  by  the  German 
regulator did not support its finding of an absence of SMP for each ANO and therefore required RegTP to 
withdraw the notified draft measures to the extent that they related to the 53 alternative network operators. 
In a subsequent notification (case DE/2005/0239) the German regulator BNetzA designated all alternative 
network  operators  with  SMP  on  the  market  for  call  termination  on  their  individual  networks.  This  SMP 
finding has been confirmed again in a recent notification (case DE/2008/0843). 

EN 

11 

   EN 

 
                                                 
(VoIP)/Voice  over  Broadband  (VoB)  technology  which  provides  a  high  level  of  quality 
management has been included in the relevant market by a number of Member States48. 

The market has also been generally defined independently of the origin of the call (i.e. fixed 
or mobile, national or international)49. 

In view of the different substitution possibilities50 calls to service providers are also generally 
excluded  from  the  relevant  market51.  Call  termination  to  certain  non-geographic  numbers 
(frequently  for  emergency  or  public  interest  services)  have  however  been  included  in  the 
relevant market definition where they are subject to the same supply and demand conditions 
as call termination to standard geographic numbers52. 

Voice call termination services to integrated fixed/mobile offers were increasingly identified 
as part of the relevant market for call termination on geographic numbers at fixed locations in 
view of their more limited mobility and similar pricing to fixed calls53, although in Germany 
they fell to be considered as part of the mobile call termination markets54. 

3.2. 

Issues related to remedies 

In  view  of  the  potential  for  excessive  pricing,  the  Commission  has  consistently  called  on 
regulators to ensure an effective implementation of the cost orientation obligation55 and to 
apply effective price regulation also in the case of alternative network operators which have 

48   See,  for  example,  cases  DE/2008/0843,  RO/2008/0774,  FR/2005/0228,  AT/2008/0834  (TKK  proposed  to 
include VoB but not VoIP), IT/2008/0777, LV/2009/0889, MT/2006/0388, SI/2007/0690 (APEK excluded 
calls  that  are  terminated  at  customers  of  unmanaged  VoIP  services  from  the  market  definition),  and 
ES/2008/0818. 

49  See, for example, case RO/2008/0774. 
50   See footnote 46 above. 
51   UKE's  first-round  review  registered under  case  number  PL/2006/0381 was  concluded  by  the  Commission 
withdrawing its serious doubts after UKE withdrew from the scope of the market definition call termination 
to numbers of information  networks  (NDSI),  non-geographic numbers  and  numbers for  special  subscriber 
services (AUS).  UKE  indicates  that  the  relevant product market  does  not  include  call  termination  to  such 
numbers, apart from termination of calls to emergency numbers (99X, 98X and 112 - allocated to services 
officially required to provide assistance). 

52   For  example,  TKK  (case  AT/2009/0909)  includes  calls  to  certain  non-geographic  numbers  in  Austria 
provided they are converted into geographic numbers before termination and terminated in the same way as 
a standard geographic number. The operators terminating this specific type of call are not aware that their 
subscriber, to which the call is addressed, is a service provider and charge the same rates as for termination 
to  standard  geographic  numbers.  ANRCTI  noted  further  (case  RO/2008/0774)  that  in  the  case  of  calls  to 
public interest services in Romania, the service providers in question behave like end-users and do not have 
an incentive to switch supplier in case of a 5-10% increase in termination rates. Other examples may also be 
found in cases FR/2008/0784, NL/2008/0830, DE/2008/0843, CZ/2007/0660-0661, DK/2009/0984. 

53   Cases IT/2008/0777 (in this case this Commission commented on the fact that although AGCOM included 
voice call termination services to integrated fixed/mobile offers in the fixed call termination, it proposed to 
defer  the  definition  of  obligations  for  these  services  until  its  assessment  of  the  market  for  voice  call 
termination on individual mobile networks), PL/2008/0762 and RO/2008/0774. 

54    Case DE/2008/0813. 
55   Cases MT/2006/0388, FI/2007/0704, BG/2009/0865. 

EN 

12 

   EN 

 
                                                 
been designated with SMP56.  In the absence of a fully functioning cost orientation obligation, 
the Commission has recognised benchmarking as a temporary measure57.  

The Commission has continuously reiterated the importance of bringing termination rates to 
the  level  of  the  cost  of  an  efficient  operator  as  soon  as  possible  and  has  further  invited 
NRAs to apply a forward-looking LRIC model for setting termination rates58.  

In terms of costs included in the relevant cost model, the Commission has underlined that as 
wholesale call termination services are traffic-related services, relevant costs considered for 
wholesale call termination charging purposes are typically those costs which vary in response 
to increased levels of wholesale call termination traffic and which reflect the additional costs 
directly involved in providing the service in question59.  In response to one notification, the 
Commission also noted that a hybrid cost model implemented by way of a simple averaging 
of the results of the top-down and the bottom-up LRAIC models does not seem to be the most 
appropriate  means  of  reconciliation  nor  consistent  with  the  principle  of  forward-looking 
economic efficiency60. 

The  Commission  has  also  on  numerous  occasions  stated  that  termination  rates  should 
normally be symmetric and that asymmetry should be adequately justified by objective cost 
differences  and  limited  to  a  transitory  period  taking  into  account  the  need  for  alternative 
operators  to  become  efficient  over  time61.  The  Commission  has  also  encouraged  NRAs  to 
impose  effective  access  obligations  on  all  SMP  operators62.  The  Commission  has  further 
called for regulators to ensure a symmetric wholesale rate is applied by terminating operators 
irrespective of the origin of the call, i.e. fixed-to-fixed and mobile-to-fixed calls63. 

In  recent  cases,  the  Commission  has  underlined  the  importance  of  NRAs  notifying  their 
actually  proposed  glide  paths  as  part  of  the  consultation  procedure  under  Article  7(3),  as 
price levels, amendments to cost methodologies,  as well as the determination of glide-paths 
are considered to have a material impact on the relevant markets64. 

Furthermore,  the  Commission  has  consistently  called  upon  the  national  regulators  to  work 
together towards a coherent European approach to cost accounting and has adopted, in May 
2009,  a  Recommendation  which  sets  out  a  coherent  costing  approach  for  the  regulatory 

56   Cases  AT/2006/0544,  DE/2009/0948,  IE/2007/0701,  PL/2006/0502,  PL/2007/0633,  PL/2007/0641, 
PL/2007/0685,  PL/2008/0760-0762,  PL/2008/-0776,  PL/2008/0814,  LV/2009/0889,  EE/2007/0598, 
HU/2007/0727, LT/2009/0983, GI/2009/0976. 

57   Case MT/2006/0388. 
58   Cases NL/2008/0830, LV/2009/0889, PL/2009/0903. 
59   Cases AT/2009/0909, IT/2008/0753. 
60   Case AT/2009/0909. 
61   Cases DK/2005/0207, AT/2006/0504, IT/2008/0753, ES/2008/0818. 
62   Case  DE/2009/0948, 

IE/2007/0701,  EE/2007/0598,  GI/2009/0976,  CZ/2009/0964, 

IE/2009/0917. 
Furthermore,  the  Commission  has  underlined  in  case  LT/2009/0983  that  an  access  obligation  is  unilateral 
and unconditional in its nature, and should in principle not be made subject to conditions offered on markets 
other than the relevant market, i.e. another termination market. 

63   Case BG/2009/0865. 
64   Cases DE/2009/0948, PL/2009/0903. 

EN 

13 

   EN 

 
                                                 
treatment of fixed and mobile termination rates in the EU.65 Over the next regulatory period, 
we  can  expect  NRAs 
the 
Recommendation66  which  holds  that  all  Member  States  should  set  their  termination  rates 
according to the cost of an efficient operator by 31 December 2012.67  

regulatory  practice  with 

increasingly  align 

their 

to 

4. 

WHOLESALE (PHYSICAL) NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE ACCESS (MARKET 4) 

The  2003  Recommendation  on  relevant  markets  identified  the  market  for  wholesale 
unbundled access (including shared access) to metallic loops and sub-loops as one of the two 
wholesale markets linked to the broadband retail market. As set out in the Explanatory note to 
the 2007 Recommendation,68 technological change implied that, contrary to a strict limitation 
to  the  metallic  loop  or  sub-loops,  all  relevant  physical  infrastructure  necessary  to  reach  the 
end  consumer  would  be  included  in  the  relevant  market.  Accordingly,  the  relevant  market 
identified  as  being  susceptible  to  ex  ante  regulation  is  the  wholesale  (physical)  network 
infrastructure  access  (including  shared  or  fully  unbundled  access)  at  a  fixed  location  (LLU 
market). 

This market was found to be non-competitive and is regulated in all Member States that have 
notified it to the Commission.69 

4.1. 

Issues related to the market definition 

In  the  period  under  review,  the  upgrading  of  copper  access  networks  to  next  generation 
access  (NGA)  networks  and  the  (potential)  rollout  of  new  fibre  networks  have  had  the 
greatest  impact  on  regulatory  measures.  The  deployment  of  NGA  networks  brought  along 
new issues related to market definition and to the imposition of remedies.  

The  impact  was  especially  pronounced  in  terms  of  market  definition,  since  NRAs  had  to 
decide on the exclusion or inclusion of certain technologies and/or infrastructure in the market 
definition. In even more concrete terms, the inclusion of access products based on FttN/FttC70 
(or VDSL) and FttH71 has been an issue dealt with by NRAs. 

65   Commission  Recommendation  2009/396/EC  of  7  May  2009  on  the  Regulatory  Treatment  of  Fixed  and 

Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, OJ L 124, 20.5.2009, p. 67. 

66  The  Commission  has  emphasized  the  need  for  a  coherent  European  approach  in  a  number  of  cases: 
FI/2007/0704, SI/2007/0690, GI/2007/0717, HU/2007/0727, RO/2008/0774, UK/2009/0898, ES/2008/0818, 
IT/2008/0753, IT/2008/0777, NL/2008/0830, NL/2009/0978, PL/2008/0903, PL/2008/0760, PL/2008/0762, 
PL/2008/0776, PL/2008/0814, BG/2009/0865, FR/2008/0784, IE/2009/0917, EL/2008/0751, EL/2008/0754. 
67   In exceptional circumstances set out in section 12 of the Termination Rates Recommendation the NRA may 

delay its implementation until 1 July 2014. 

68   Commission  Staff  Working  Document,  Explanatory  Note  accompanying  document  to  the  Commission 
Recommendation  on  Relevant  Product  and  Service  Markets  within  the  electronic  communications  sector 
susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and 
of  the  Council  on  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications  networks  and  services 
(Second edition), SEC (2007) 1483 final.  

69   Bulgaria and Romania have not yet notified this market. 
70   Fibre to the Node or Fibre to the Cabinet.  
71   Fibre to the Home. 

EN 

14 

   EN 

 
                                                 
While several NRAs decided to include fibre based access products in their definitions of the 
LLU  market72,  some  defined  the  relevant  market  excluding  FttH  and/or  fibre  access 
products73.  The  Commission  generally  invited  NRAs  to  analyse  the  substitutability  between 
copper  and  fibre  based  access  products  in  both  the  LLU  and  WBA  markets  in  a  forward 
looking,  technologically  neutral  manner  and,  in  the  presence  of  continued  lack  of  effective 
competition,  to  impose  remedies  on  fibre  as  appropriate  in  the  following  market  reviews.74 
Where  NRAs  excluded  fibre  access  products  from  the  market  because  operators  only 
limitedly  had  started  deploying  their  fibre  access  networks,  the  Commission  called  on  the 
NRAs to monitor market developments in order to take account of prospective roll-out plans 
of operators and to reassess their market analyses when appropriate.75 

The  French  NRA  included  civil  works  infrastructure  (ducts)  in  the  product  market 
definition  and  the  Estonian  NRA  included  access  support  services  (including  co-location, 
duct  access  and  shared  use  of  buildings).76  While  acknowledging  that  access  to  such 
supporting infrastructure was an appropriate remedy for the market at stake, the Commission 
also  recalled  that  such  access  obligation  could  be  imposed  without  the  supporting 
infrastructure being included in the relevant market.77 

4.2. 

Issues related to remedies 

The most important development with regard to remedies is also linked to the deployment of 
NGAs. New regulatory remedies were specifically devised by NRAs in order to address the 
increasing deployment of fibre based products. 

Most NRAs mandated access to SMP operators' civil work infrastructures (ducts) and/or dark 
fibre  in  order  to  foster  the  rollout  of  alternative  fibre  networks.78  In  the  Spanish  case,  the 
Commission  welcomed  the  imposition  of  the  obligation  of  access  to  the  physical  network 
infrastructure, yet requested the NRA to develop a reference offer and the corresponding price 
control obligations, as these obligations were key to ensure effective access to such bottleneck 
input.  The  Spanish  NRA  proceeded  accordingly.79  In  terms  of  price  regulation  of  access  to 

72   E.g. cases EE/2009/0942, ES/2008/0804 (FTTH point to multipoint technology is excluded), FI/2008/0839, 

FR/2008/0780, IE/2009/0875, NL/2008/827 and PT/20080850. 

73   E.g. cases CY/2009/0869 and CZ/2009/0933 (withdrawn by the NRA), DK/2008/0860, EL/2009/0934, and 

SK/2009/0929 (withdrawn by the NRA).  

74   E.g. cases CY/2009/0869, DK/2008/0860 and ES/2008/0804. 
75   E.g. cases CY/2009/0869, DK/2008/0860 and EL/2009/0934. 
76   Case EE/2009/0942. 

77   Case  FR/2008/0780.  The  Commission  pointed  out  that  access  to  civil  works  infrastructure  is  indeed 
considered as an appropriate remedy in relation to this market, which can be imposed without the inclusion 
of  civil  works  infrastructure  in  the  relevant  market.  The  Commission  invited  ARCEP  to  provide  further 
justification in its final decision as to the inclusion of civil works infrastructure in the relevant market.  
78   E.g.  cases  BE/2008/0801,  CY/2009/0869,  DK/2008/0860,  EE/2009/0942,  EL/2009/0934,  ES/2008/0804 

FR/2008/0780, IT/2009/0891 and PT/2008/0850.  

79   Case ES/2009/0961. 

EN 

15 

   EN 

 
                                                 
passive  infrastructures,  most  NRAs  adopted  cost-orientation.    The  Commission  insisted  in 
several cases on the adequacy of such -tariff regulation.80 

In  an  FttN/FttC  (VDSL)  scenario,  some  NRAs  imposed  obligations  to  ensure  unbundled 
access at the street cabinet level (also referred to as sub-loop unbundling), ancillary services 
(co-location)  and  appropriate  backhaul  (duct,  unlit/dark  fibre,  Ethernet).81  As  regards  FttH-
based access, the Dutch, the Finish and the Slovenian NRAs put in place measures mandating 
unbundled access to fibre loops, although they implemented different price regulation.82  The 
Dutch NRA, OPTA, imposed cost-oriented prices for unbundled access to the fibre access and 
proposed a cost model including a form of risk premium.83 Because the proposed investment 
risks' parameters (internal rate of return and payback period) could lead to an over-estimation 
of the investment risk, the Commission  invited the Dutch NRA to review the parameters in 
case  competitive  conditions  changed.  OPTA  proposed  to  differentiate  between  FttH  and 
FttO84 ODF-access prices, considering that the level of investment required for FttH is higher 
than  for  FttO  and  aligning  the  costing  methodology  for  the  latter  with  the  one  used  for  the 
tariff  regulation  of  copper.85  The  Finnish  NRA  instead  did  not  intend  to  impose  a  cost-
orientation  obligation  on  the  prices  for  unbundled  access  to  the  fibre  loop  since  fibre 
deployment was only in its early stage in Finland. The Commission urged FICORA to ensure 
that the access measures were supplemented by appropriate costing remedies and to consider 
imposing on fibre loops similar remedies as proposed for copper loops.86 The Slovenian NRA 
proposed  to  implement  cost-oriented  access  based  on  a  LRIC+  methodology.  The 
Commission invited APEK to reassess the parameters of the proposed cost model87.  

The issue of transparency88 and migration from copper to fibre networks89 were explicitly 
addressed  by  some  Member  States  in  their  measures.  As  for  the  migration  process,  the 
Commission  pointed  out  that  migration  from  copper  to  fibre  loops  and  the  dismantling  of 
exchanges substantially affects the business case for alternative operators. In the cases where 
NRAs did not develop remedies specifying in detail the migration process (e.g. information to 
be  provided  by  SMP  operators  concerning  their  network  rollout  plans,  the  conditions  for 

80   E.g. IT/2009/0987 and ES 2008/0805.  
81   E.g. SI/2009/0957, DE/2007/0646, BE/2008/0801. 
82   Cases FI/2008/0839, NL/2008/0826 and SI/2009/0981.  
83   OPTA implemented a multi-annual price cap based on a discounted cash flow model. It applied an Internal 
Rate  of  Return  (IRR)  methodology  to  set  the  price  cap  instead  of  the  Embedded  Direct  Costs  (EDC) 
methodology  it  uses  to  regulate  the  pricing  of  access  to  copper  unbundling  since  it  considers  that  FTTH 
represents a completely new investment undertaken by a company, Reggefibre Group, structurally separated 
from the SMP operator, which provides copper unbundling.  

84   Fibre to the Office. 
85   Case  NL/2009/0868  (price  control  obligation  for  FttH  unbundled  ODF-access)  and  case  NL/2009/0906 

(price control obligation for FttO unbundled ODF-access).   

86   Case FI/2008/0839. 
87   SI/2009/0981.  
88   In particular with  regard  to  access  to physical  network  infrastructure,,  to  the  migration process and to  the 
the  new  generation  access  network.  E.g.  cases  BE/2008/0801,  EE/2009/0942, 

development  of 
EL/2009/0934, ES/2008/0804, FR/2008/0780 and PT/2008/0850.  

89   E.g. cases BE/2008/0801, DK/2008/0860, NL/2008/0826 and ES/2008/0804.  

EN 

16 

   EN 

 
                                                 
closing down exchanges and the methods of collocation at the newly-built access points for 
LLU  operators,  and/or  the  provision  of  appropriate  backhaul  facilities),  the  Commission 
invited them to do so.90  

On  the  basis  of  the  early  stage  of  development  of  fibre  networks,  some  Member  States 
proposed  to  apply  lighter  regulation  on  fibre-based  access  products,  exempting  such 
networks from specific obligations.91 In such cases the Commission inter alia pointed to the 
increasing  roll-out  of/investment  in  fibre  access  networks  and  the  need  to  monitor  market 
developments. The  Commission also invited NRAs to consider the application of additional 
remedies on fibre products.  

Although  strictly  speaking  not  part  of  a  review  of  the  LLU  market,  complementary 
symmetric  measures  pertaining  to  in-building  wiring92  –  based  on  national  laws  or  on 
Article 12 of the Framework Directive93 - were also developed in some countries to tackle the 
remaining physical bottlenecks associated with FttH deployment.94 In Spain, CMT imposed a 
symmetric  obligation  requiring  the  first  operator  having  deployed  a  fibre  access  solution  in 
the  building  to  meet  reasonable  requests  for  access  and  use  of  its  equipments  within  the 
building.  The  Commission,  whilst  acknowledging  the  importance  of  in-building  cabling, 
requested  the  NRA  to  provide  specific  justification  supporting  the  use  of  Article  12  of  the 
Framework Directive and asked CMT to consider imposing additional obligations. In France, 
as a complement to the obligation of access to France Telecom's civil works infrastructures, 
ARCEP  mandated  (i)  the  sharing  of  in-house  wiring  of  any  operator  deploying  a  fibre 
network  inside  a  building  and,  (ii)  in  very  dense  areas,  where  it  is  economically  most 
profitable  for  operators  to  roll-out  their  own  fibre  networks  into  the  homes,  required  all  in-
building  operators  to  roll-out  multiple  fibre  lines  (i.e.  additional  dedicated  fibre  lines)  on 
condition that the requesting operators are willing to co-invest.95 The Commission invited the 
French  NRA  inter  alia  to  carefully  monitor  the  development  of  fibre  network  roll-out  in 
France and to verify whether the proposed symmetrical regulation, coupled with the remedies 
imposed in the broadband markets (access to civil works infrastructure), would be sufficient 
to ensure effective competition within the foreseeable timeframe. Should this not be the case, 
ARCEP should consider imposing on the SMP operator other remedies, e.g. unbundled access 
to the fibre loops.  

90   E.g. cases FI/2008/0839 and IT/2009/0988. 
91   E.g. cases EE/2009/0942 (absence of non-discrimination and cost orientation obligations on fibre products), 
FI/2008/0839 (absence of a cost-orientation obligation on fibre products), FR/2008/0780 (regulation of fibre 
products  limited  to  access  to  civil  infrastructure  and  in-house  wiring)  and  IT/2009/0890  (lack  of  a  fibre 
unbundling access obligation).  

92   Imposed on all operators, irrespective of whether these have SMP in the relevant market. 
93   Directive  2002/21/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  7  March  2002  on  a  common 
regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications  networks  and  services  (Framework  Directive),  OJ  L 
108, 24.4.2002, p. 33. 

94  FR/2008/0780,  FR/2009/0993,  ES/2008/0804.  Portugal  adopted  as  well  on  May  2009  a  Decree-Law 

containing specific provisions related to the sharing of in-house wiring.  

95   FR/2009/0993. A regulatory decision and a recommendation are implementing the provisions regarding in-
house wiring  regulation under  the Law  on  the  Modernisation  of  the  Economy.  In-building operators must 
meet reasonable requests for access to their passive lines at a local connection point (at reasonable and non-
discriminatory conditions) and give access to a dedicated fibre line or to a shared fibre line to the requesting 
operators. 

EN 

17 

   EN 

 
                                                 
In  parallel,  the  Commission  also  had  the  opportunity  to  comment  on  the  modification  of 
price control remedies related to the LLU market, more specifically on the increase of the 
LLU  prices.  In  this  regard,  two  cases  are  worth  mentioning.  In  the  Italian  case,  AGCOM 
notified to the Commission the modification of the prices of the local loop unbundling (LLU) 
services. In line with Telecom Italia's proposal, AGCOM proposed to allow increases in the 
LLU prices charged by Telecom Italia in 2009. In the UK case, Ofcom proposed to amend the 
price control remedies related to LLU services and to the wholesale line rental ("WLR"), by 
increasing  the  price  for  fully  unbundled  loops,  shared  lines  and  residential  WLR  and  by 
lowering  the  price  for  business  WLR.  In  both  cases,  noting  in  particular  that  at  EU  level 
regulators adopted different costing methodologies to calculate LLU prices, the Commission 
invited the Italian and British regulators to discuss with other NRAs and with the Commission 
on how to achieve more consistency in the costing methodologies used for calculating LLU 
prices. 

5. 

WHOLESALE BROADBAND ACCESS (MARKET 5) 

This market was found to be non-competitive and is regulated in all Member States with the 
exception of Malta, where the market was found to be competitive.96  

In the UK and in Portugal, the market was geographically segmented and parts of the national 
territory  were  found  to  be  effectively  competitive.97  Geographical  segmentation  of  the 
wholesale broadband access market was a genuinely novel issue which was examined by the 
Commission in several cases during the period under review.98  

5.1. 

Issues related to the market definition  

As  in  the  LLU  market,  the  upgrading  of  copper  access  networks  to  NGA  networks  and  the 
(potential)  roll-out  of  new  fibre  networks  had  a  great  impact  in  the  definitions  of  the  WBA 
market.99  The NRAs dealt with the inclusion of access products based on FttN/C (VDSL) 
and  FttH/B.    Some  NRAs  excluded  VDSL  and/or  other  fibre-based  access  products  from 
their  market  definitions  on  the  basis  of  a  lack  of  (extensive)  deployment  of  fibre  access 
networks  during  the  on-going  market  review  period.100  The  Commission  generally  urged 
NRAs to properly assess the substitutability of fibre-based products with copper in a forward 
looking technologically neutral manner and to monitor market developments. 

In  two  specific  cases,  the  exclusion  of  specific  access  products  from  the  relevant  market 
gave  rise  to  serious  doubts  from  the  Commission.  In  its  first  notification  of  the  WBA,  the 
German  regulator  (BNetzA)  excluded  the  new  FTTN/VDSL  infrastructure  of  Deutsche 
Telekom from the relevant market. The Commission launched a Phase II investigation on the 
grounds that there was no evidence of a lack of substitution between VDSL and other DSL 

96   Case MT/2008/2003.  
97   Cases UK/2007/0733 and PT/2008/0851.  
98   See 5.1 infra. 
99   See 4.1 supra. 
100   E.g.  cases  AT/2009/0970  (FTTH  excluded),  CY/2009/0870,  CZ/2008/0797  and  EL/2009/0935.  In  case 
SI/2009/0957, the Slovenian NRA excluded from the relevant market the fibre optic infrastructure owned by 
the alternative operator T-2. 

EN 

18 

   EN 

 
                                                 
products.101  Following  the  Commission's  serious  doubts  letter,  BNetzA  finally  included 
VDSL infrastructure in the WBA market to the extent that such infrastructure is substitutable 
with  other  bitstream  access  products  in  this  market.  Similarly,  the  Commission  expressed 
serious  doubts  on  the  proposal  of  the  Spanish  regulator,  CMT,  to  exclude  wholesale 
broadband access at speeds above 30 Mbps from the relevant product market.102 While CMT 
considered that, due to uncertainties surrounding the substitutability pattern at both the retail 
and  wholesale  level,  speeds  above  30  Mbps  should  be  excluded  from  the  market,  the 
Commission  stressed  that,  in  the  absence  of  detailed  factual  information  and  of  a  sound 
substitutability  analysis,  it  was  not  possible  to  draw  such  a  conclusion.  Rather,  the 
Commission  noted  that  there  seemed  to  be  a  general  trend  towards  higher  speeds  in  Spain, 
and  that  it  was  artificial  to  limit  the  relevant  market  to  speeds  below  30  Mbps.  CMT 
eventually withdrew the speed limit from its market definition. 

Another  relevant  issue  concerned  the  definition  of  geographically  segmented  markets. 
While in the first round of market analyses all NRAs defined national markets, the second 
round  revealed  that  previously  imposed  regulation  of  relevant  wholesale  inputs  (LLU  and 
bitstream)  lead  to  certain  developments.  Particularly  in  certain  regions,  mostly  densely 
populated areas, competitors were able to build their own networks and to connect them to the 
incumbent's  local  loop.  This  has  lead  NRAs  to  address  the  question  whether  to  regionally 
segment markets or to reduce or completely remove regulation in some areas.  

The  first  regulator  to  notify  such  segmentation  was  Ofcom.103  In  its  comments  letter,  the 
Commission set the criteria and type of evidence required for geographic segmentation of 
the wholesale broadband access market. The Commission stated, inter alia, that the definition 
of  geographic  sub-markets  had  to  be  based  on  a  thorough  analysis  of  structural  and 
behavioural factors. This should include not only structural indicators, such as the number 
of  competitors  present  in  a  given  exchange  area,  but  also  other  potentially  relevant  factors, 
such  as  the  size/density  of  the  areas  in  question,  in  order  to  establish  that  the  presence  of 
alternative operators is sustainable. The distribution of market shares and their development 
over time within individual exchange areas should also be looked into. Relevant behavioural 
indicators  would  include  a  preliminary  analysis  of  pricing,  price  trends  and  price 
differentiation at retail and wholesale level, as well as any differences in supply and demand 
characteristics,  such  as  the  commercial  strategies  and  product/service  offerings  observed  in 
the different areas. The definition of geographic sub-markets would also entail the assessment 
of whether any proposed market boundaries would be sufficiently stable over time. 

Subsequently, in February 2008, the Austrian regulator (TKK)104 decided to define a national 
market  but  to  geographically  differentiate  the  remedies  imposed  on  the  SMP  operator  on 
the  basis  of  the  competition  faced  by  this  operator  in  the  different  areas.  The  Commission 
accepted  this  approach,  yet  in  its  comments  letter  set  out  the  criteria  under  which  such 
differentiation  of  remedies  would  be  justified.  The  Commission  stated,  inter  alia,  that  the 
abovementioned  differentiation  could  be  appropriate  in  those  situations  where,  for  example, 
the  boundary  between  areas  where  there  is  different  competitive  pressure  is  variable  and 

101   Case DE/2005/0262. 
102  Case ES/2008/0805. 
103   Case UK/2007/0733. 
104   Case AT/2008/0757. 

EN 

19 

   EN 

 
                                                 
likely  to  change  over  time,  or  where  significant  differences  in  competitive  conditions  are 
observed but the evidence may not be such as to justify the definition of sub-national markets. 
In  addition,  differentiation  of  remedies  may  be  appropriate  where  premature  removal  of  ex 
ante  regulation  could  have  significant  detrimental  consequences  for  consumers  and  the 
competitive process.105 

The  Portuguese  NRA  has  also  proposed  to  geographically  segment  the  market.106  The 
Commission  found  that  the  geographical  segmentation  was  substantiated  to  the  required 
degree, yet pointed out that the NRA should carefully monitor the market in the context of the 
NGA rollout, as the deployment of new infrastructure could well reverse the development of 
competition  in  the  referred  market.  Other  NRAs,  such  as  CMT107  (Spanish  regulator)  and 
Ficora108  (Finish  regulator),  were  also  contemplating  a  geographical  differentiation  of  the 
market. In these cases, however, the Commission considered that further justification would 
be necessary to remove regulation.  

The Commission has also systematically elaborated on the appropriateness of the inclusion of 
cable  in  the  relevant  market.  When  assessing  NRAs'  notifications,  the  Commission  has 
reiterated the need for a thorough assessment of the direct competitive constraints exerted by 
cable  operators  on  traditional  broadband  access  products  for  the  purposes  of  properly 
delineating  the  relevant  wholesale  broadband  access  market.109  Where  cable  could  not  be 
included in the product market definition on this basis, the Commission indicated that, even in 
the absence of a relevant wholesale access offer, competition at the retail level from vertically 
integrated  undertakings  may  be  such  as  to  exert  an  indirect  constraint  on  the  market  for 
wholesale  access  services.  Such  indirect  pricing  constraints  should  be  taken  into  account  in 
the context of the SMP assessment.110 

105   On  17  December  2008  the  Austrian  Administrative  Court  (Verwaltungsgerichtshof)  annulled  the  NRA's 
decision. A new notification was submitted to the Commission in September 2009 (Case AT/2009/0970). 

106   Case PT/2008/0851. 
107   Case ES/2008/0805. CMT defined a national market but proposed differentiating remedies according to the 
intensity of retail competition in the different parts of the country. The Commission had serious doubts as to 
whether the development of the Spanish broadband markets would or would not justify the application of 
geographically  differentiated  regulatory  obligations.  The  Spanish  regulator  has  in  Phase  II  changed  its 
conclusions and has inter alia abandoned its intent to apply geographically differentiated remedies.  

108   See  Cases  FI/2008/0848  and  FI/2009/0900.  Ficora  notified  its  analysis  of  the  WBA  market  under  case 
FI/2008/0848.  Therein,  Ficora  defined  31  regionally  different  geographic  markets,  corresponding  to  the 
operating  areas  of  31  fixed  telecoms  network  companies.  The  Finish  NRA  proposed  to  distinguish 
geographic  sub-markets  within  5  of  these  operating  areas,  where  it  identified  25  municipalities  (typically 
urban  centres)  which  exhibited  differing  competitive  characteristics  in  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  local 
operating  area.  Ficora  proposed  to  partially  deregulate  inter  alia  the  referred  5  operating  areas.  The 
Commission raised serious doubts as to the proposed de-regulation due to the lack of sufficient evidence to 
substantiate  the  geographic market  definition/partial  de-regulation. Following  the  serious  doubts raised by 
the  Commission  and  the  opening  of  phase  II,  Ficora  withdrew  the  referred  notification  and  re-notified  its 
analysis under Case FI/2009/0900. No geographic sub-markets were then defined.  

109   E.g. cases AT/2008/0757, EE/2009/0943, FI/2009/0900, FR/2008/0781, NL/2009/0827, PT/2008/0851 and 

UK/2007/0733. 

110   Explanatory Note to the Commission Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets within the 
electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC 
of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic 
communications networks and services (C(2007) 5406), pp. 34-35. See also, inter alia, Case UK/2007/0733. 

EN 

20 

   EN 

 
                                                 
The Commission underlined that if weak constraints are automatically taken into account at 
the market definition stage there is also a risk of understating the real extent of market power 
at  the  wholesale  level  by  including  self-supplied  market  shares  for  all  vertically  integrated 
competitors irrespective of whether the latter are actually constraining the market behaviour 
of the incumbent. It is therefore essential that the degree or strength of the constraint posed is 
correctly  estimated  in  the  assessment.  When  assessing  the  effect  of  indirect  substitution 
through  a  SSNIP  (small  but  significant  non-transitory  increase  in  prices)  test,  NRAs  are 
required to demonstrated that:111 

(i) 

based on the wholesale/retail price ratio, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) would not be 
able  to  absorb  and  would  therefore  be  forced  to  pass  a  hypothetical  wholesale  price 
increase on to their consumers at the retail level; 

(ii) 

there would be sufficient demand substitution, at the retail level, to retail services based 
on indirect constraints such as to render the wholesale price increase unprofitable; and 

(iii)  the customers of the ISPs would not switch to a significant extent to the retail arm of the 
integrated hypothetical monopolist, in particular if the latter does not raise its own retail 
prices. 

Two  cases  have  shown  specificities  which  are  worth  mentioning.  In  the  Maltese  case    the 
NRA included the provision of wholesale products over cable networks in the relevant market 
on  the  basis  of  direct  constraints,  which  resulted  from  the  particular  characteristics  of  the 
Maltese  market.  The  Maltese  NRA  sustained  that:  (i)  although  cable  modem  and  DSL 
technologies  differed,  the  services  presented  similar  network  architectures,  similar  possible 
points  of  interconnection  and  similar  cost  structures,  which  rendered  them  equivalent 
wholesale products; (ii) on the demand side, both platforms provided equivalent products, had 
ubiquitous coverage of the national territory and the interconnection for ISPs and wholesale 
providers  was  simple  and  cost-effective;  and  (iii)  on  the  supply  side,  despite  high  entry 
barriers  to  the  roll-out  of  a  new  fixed  network,  DSL  and  cable  modem  wholesale  providers 
could  counteract  any  price  increase  by  their  competitor  by  providing  a  similar  product 
through  their  own  access  network.  The  Commission  invited  the  NRA  to  monitor  market 
developments. 112  

In the Danish case, the main justification put forward by the regulator to include cable in the 
relevant market was the fact that in Denmark the largest cable TV network was controlled by 
the  incumbent  operator  (TDC),  which  owned  the  copper  network.  The  Danish  NRA 
considered  that  this  fact  could  in  itself  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  supply  of  broadband 
connections based on copper networks113. Although the Commission was not convinced that 
sufficient evidence on the direct constraints between copper and cable had been provided to 
justify the inclusion of cable in the relevant market, it acknowledged, however, that the joint 
control  over  both  parallel  networks  and  the  absence  of  appropriate  obligations  imposed  on 
cable  could  lead  TDC  to  circumvent  existing  regulation  limited  to  traditional  copper-based 

111  E.g. cases FI/2009/0900, NL/2008/0827 and UK/2007/0733.  
112  Case MT/2008/0803. 
113   The joint control of the copper and cable networks would create disincentives for TDC to invest in copper 
network expansion (VDSL2 network) in those areas where TDC would be able to provide higher bandwidth 
connections to end-users based on its cable TV network. 

EN 

21 

   EN 

 
                                                 
wholesale  broadband  access  products,  thereby  distorting  competition  by  depriving  its 
wholesale  customers  reliant  on  TDC´s  DSL  bitstream  access  products  from  the  ability  to 
match the high bandwidth retail offers provided via the incumbent's cable network. Therefore, 
on  the  basis  of  Article  8(2)  of  the  Framework  Directive  and  of  Article  8(4)  of  the  Access 
Directive, the Commission considered that it was justified to extend the remedies applicable 
to the copper-based network to TDC's cable network.114  

In  several  other  cases  analysed  by  the  Commission,  the  exclusion  of  cable-based  wholesale 
broadband  access  services  from  the  relevant  market  would  have  neither  changed  the  SMP 
finding nor led to a different regulatory outcome.115 Consequently the issue of the inclusion of 
cable-based wholesale broadband access services in the relevant market has been left open. 

Finally, in one of the cases notified, the Commission addressed the issue of substitutability, 
at retail level (residential market), between mobile and fixed broadband. In this regard, in 
its third round review of the WBA market, the Austrian NRA identified two separate markets 
for broadband access at the retail level, for residential and business customers respectively.116 
Whereas  the  business  market  included  only  DSL  based  connections,  the  residential  market 
comprised DSL as well as cable TV and mobile broadband connections.  On the basis of the 
situation at the retail level, RTR concluded that only the wholesale broadband access market 
based on bitstream connections for the subsequent use of business customers would warrant 
ex  ante  regulation. The  Commission  had  serious  doubts  as  to  the  inclusion  of  mobile 
broadband in the retail broadband market for residential customers and as to the treatment of 
external  and  internal  supply  of  bitstream  connections,  for  the  subsequent  use  by  residential 
customers,  in  the  definition  of  the  wholesale  market.  The  Commission  eventually  accepted 
RTR's conclusion that, on the basis of the market situation, mobile broadband connections for 
fixed broadband connections for residential users could be substitutes. The Austrian NRA was 
however  invited  to  closely  monitor  market  developments,  in  particular  the  constraints  of 
further mobile take-up in comparison with the evolution of fixed broadband networks and the 
impact of NGA deployment.  

5.2. 

Issues related to remedies 

The  transition  to  NGA  has  brought  along  new  issues  related  to  the  imposition  of  remedies. 
Some  NRAs  have  refrained  from  regulating  or  have  proposed  lighter  regulation  on  certain 
networks or functionalities. In this regard, some NRAs have included fibre based products in 
their market definitions but have proposed not to impose remedies or to limit such imposition 
in respect of fibre-based products.117  

In Denmark,118 the regulator proposed not to impose any obligations on fibre, stating that in 
case the incumbent started to deploy fibre in the local loop in order to provide high bandwidth 

114   Case DK/2008/0862. 
115  Cases AT/2008/0757, EE/2009/0943, FI/2009/0900, NL/2008/0826 and UK/2007/0733. 
116   Case AT/2009/0970 (only the market definition was notified). 
117   E.g. cases DK/2008/0862, FR/2008/0781, DE/2005/0262, DE/2006/0457 and DE/2007/0576, PT/2008/0850 
(no WBA regulation imposed); EE/2009/0943, ES/2008/0805, NL/2008/0827 (lighter regulation imposed/no 
regulation of specific offers). 

118   Case DK/2008/0862. 

EN 

22 

   EN 

 
                                                 
broadband services to end-users, such remedies could be imposed by means of an additional 
decision. The Commission invited the Danish regulator to closely monitor the overall level of 
retail competition and the development of fibre access networks in Denmark and to perform a 
new market analysis in the event the incumbent launched fibre based retail product offerings 
on  a  larger  scale.  Furthermore,  in  case  of  continued  lack  of  effective  competition,  the 
Commission invited the Danish NRA to impose remedies on fibre access products. 

In  the  Netherlands,119  whilst  including  fibre  in  both  the  low  and  high  wholesale  broadband 
access  markets,  the  regulator  proposed  not  to  impose  regulatory  obligations  on  bitstream 
access via  fibre networks  in the  low quality market. The Dutch NRA considered that WBA 
access over fibre was in casu unnecessary due to the fact that unbundled fibre ODF access in 
the LLU market would already allow for market players to gradually build up a geographical 
coverage  based  on  unbundled  fibre  access.  It  considered,  moreover,  that  mandating  WBA 
over  copper  was  sufficient  to  remedy  competition  problems  in  the  WBA  market  and  in  the 
underlying retail markets. The Commission, while considering the exclusion of fibre from the 
WBA  market  as  potentially  justifiable,  pointed  to  the  uncertainties  regarding  the  successful 
implementation  of  ODF  unbundled  access  and  invited  the  Dutch  NRA  to  closely  monitor  
market developments and to extend the proposed remedies to fibre networks if the obligations 
imposed proved insufficient to ensure competition.  

In  Germany,120  following  the  Commission's  serious  doubts  on  to  the  exclusion  of  VDSL 
infrastructure from the WBA market,121 the NRA included such infrastructure in the market 
but considered that substitutability could not yet be assessed given the marginal demand for 
retail products based on VDSL. Therefore it did not mandate VDSL bitstream.   

In  Estonia,  the  regulator  imposed  on  the  SMP  operator  fibre  bitstream  at  national  and  local 
level, but specified that the obligation to provide bitstream at DSLAM level and the related 
price  control  obligation  would  not  apply  to  the  SMP  operator's  fibre  infrastructure  since, 
otherwise, there would a duplication of the access remedies applied in the LLU market.  

The absence of regulation of specific offers was also an issue dealt with by the Commission 
in the Spanish case.122 As previously mentioned, following the serious doubts put forward by 
the  Commission  on  the  exclusion  of  wholesale  broadband  access  at  speeds  above  30  Mbps 
from the relevant product market, the Spanish NRA eventually withdrew the speed limit from 
its market definition123 but maintained the distinction in terms of the access remedy applied. 
In this regard, the Spanish regulator proposed to regulate only bitstream offers up to 30 Mb/s, 
considering  that  such  an  approach  would  contribute  to  fostering  infrastructure  competition 
and that the imposition of access to passive infrastructure in the LLU market would already 
allow entrants to roll out their own fibre. The Commission pointed out that since the prospects 
for enhanced infrastructure-based competition did not appear to be particularly strong, there 
was  a  risk  that,  with  a  fibre-based  wholesale  broadband  access  product  limited  in  speed, 
Telefónica could pre-empt the market for retail broadband services during the period in which 

119   Case NL/2008/0827. 
120   Cases DE/2005/0262, DE/2006/0457 and DE/2007/0576. 
121   See 5.1 supra. 
122  Case ES/2008/0805. 
123   See 5.1 supra. 

EN 

23 

   EN 

 
                                                 
the deployment of fibre was taking up in Spain. The Commission therefore urged the Spanish 
regulator to reconsider imposing remedies for wholesale access products also in excess of 30 
Mb/s. 

The non imposition of specific remedies was also criticised by the Commission e.g. in the 
Finnish case,124 where the regulator proposed not to impose any price obligation in the WBA 
market. The Commission invited the regulator to reconsider imposing such obligation in order 
to avoid competition problems, given that the absence of such a remedy could create a risk of 
access regulation being de facto annihilated by supra competitive prices. 

6. 

TERMINATING SEGMENTS OF LEASED LINES (MARKET 6)  

A leased line is a dedicated permanent communication link between two locations and is used 
for providing telephone, data or internet services. At wholesale level, leased lines are rented 
from  and  by  telecoms  operators  either  to  complete  their  own  infrastructure  or  to  provide 
leased  line  services  at  retail  level.  At  retail  level,  leased  lines  are  typically  rented  by  large 
businesses  to  connect  branch  offices  since  these  lines  guarantee  bandwidth  for  network 
traffic.  The  "terminating  segment"  of  leased  lines  (as  opposed  to  the  "trunk  segment"125) 
refers to the segment of a leased line which ends at the site of a final user. Twenty-five NRAs 
have  notified  the  market  for  terminating  segments  for  leased  lines126.  All  notifying  NRAs 
found  that  the  fixed  incumbent  operator(s)  had  SMP  on  this  market,  although  the  British 
NRA  found  that  there  was  no  SMP  on  the  more  narrowly  defined  market  for  very  high 
capacity terminating segments of leased lines, the Austrian regulator assessed the wholesale 
market  for  terminating  segments  of  leased  lines  for  very  high  bandwidths  and  found  the 
wholesale market for leased lines with high bandwidths in Area 1127 as not susceptible to ex 
ante  regulation,  whereas  the  Lithuanian  NRA  designated  the  incumbent  operator  as  having 
SMP only on the market for low capacity leased lines.  

6.1. 

Issues related to the market definition 

The precise delineation between trunk and terminating segments of leased lines is highly 
dependent  on  the  national  network  topologies128.  Some  NRAs  segmented  wholesale 
terminating  segments  of  leased  lines  according  to  bandwidth129.  Other  NRAs  instead 
identified significant geographic variations in competitive conditions and proposed to define 
separate geographic markets accordingly. The British130 and the Austrian131 NRAs identified 

124   Case FI/2009/0900. 
125   A market for long distance dedicated capacity between two fixed points (see below). 
126   The Romanian and Bulgarian regulators have not notified their draft measures related to that market. 
127   See  case  AT/2008/0836.  Area  1  covers  the  following  12 towns:  Vienna,  Linz, Graz,  Salzburg,  Innsbruck, 

Wels, Feldkirch, Steyr, Klagenfurt, Dornbirn, Bregenz and Hallein. The rest of Austria is Area 2. 

128   E.g.  as  a  result  of  the  Commission's  comment  regarding  the  lack  of  a  clear  definition  of  the  boundary 
between the two wholesale leased lines markets (PL/2006/0516), UKE defined the terminating segments as 
leased lines between the terminal equipment and the closest, from the terminal equipment, network node of 
the operator providing the service to which an alternative operator purchasing the service is connected. 

129   Cases LT/2006/0430, EL/2006/0422, UK/2008/0747, UK/2008/0787 and NL/2008/0823. 
130   UK/2008/0747, UK/2008/0787. 
131   AT/2008/0836, AT/2009/0932. 

EN 

24 

   EN 

 
                                                 
different  competitive  conditions  with  regard  to  the  areas132  where  business  customers  are 
located and alternative operators are rolling out high bandwidth networks. The Finish133 NRA 
proposed the regional definition of the geographic market, which follows the borders of the 
traditional  operating  areas134  of  telecommunications  operators  that  provide  fixed  local 
telephone services. One NRA135 segmented terminating segments of leased lines according to 
intended use and proposed to deregulate leased lines connecting with base stations of mobile 
network  operators.  As  to  the  geographical  differentiation  of  the  market  for  terminating 
segments of leased lines, the Commission in its comment letters provided guidelines for the 
regulatory  authorities.  In  particular  the  Commission  underlined  that  in  order  to  determine 
whether the market is characterised by different competitive conditions NRAs have to analyse 
also  other  structural  and  behavioural  factors  than  the  number  of  operators  capable  of 
providing services in a given area. The Commission also made it clear that the notified market 
definition should reflect the actual market reality. 

Some NRAs136 included alternative interfaces in the wholesale leased lines markets because 
they  are  functionally  equivalent  to  wholesale  leased  lines  with  traditional  interfaces.  In  that 
respect the Commission considered the inclusion of wholesale leased lines with functionally 
equivalent  alternative  interfaces  (in  particular  Ethernet)  in  the  market  definition  as  being 
technologically  neutral.  The  British  NRA  defined  however  separate  markets  for  traditional 
and alternative interfaces137. 

With  regard  to  NRAs  that  notify  their  market  definitions  (including  the  three  criteria  test) 
separately from their SMP assessment and regulatory remedies, the Commission has reserved 
its right to re-assess the market definition in the context of all elements of the draft regulatory 
decision138,  stressing  that  such  an  approach  harbours  a  high  potential  risk  that  the  SMP 
analysis is based on a market, which is either wrongly delineated or no longer susceptible to 
ex ante regulation. 

6.2. 

Issues related to remedies 

As  to  the  remedies  in  the  market  for  wholesale  terminating  segments  of  leased  lines,  in  the 
context  of  the  Dutch  notification139  where  the  proposed  access  obligation  was  supposed  to 
cover part of the market for trunk segments of leased lines, the Commission stressed that the 
scope of the proposed obligations should be limited to remedying the lack of competition in 
the market at hand only.  

132   In the UK Ofcom identified different competitive conditions in the Central and East London Area whereas 
RTR  defined  the  so  called  "Area  1"  covering  12  towns:  Vienna,  Linz,  Graz,  Salzburg,  Innsbruck,  Wels, 
Feldkirch, Steyr, Klagenfurt, Dornbirn, Bregenz and Hallein. 

133   FI/2009/0986 
134   The  traditional  operating  areas  are  those  where  the  relevant  operators  had,  until  31  December  1993, 

unrestricted rights to operate local telecommunications. 

135   IT/2009/1000. 
136   e.g. cases EE/2007/0643 and DE/2007/0677. 
137   Ofcom  defined  the  so  called  traditional  interface  symmetric  broadband  origination  ("TISBO")  and 
alternative interface symmetric broadband origination ("AISBO"), including LLU backhaul services within 
the latter. 

138   Case AT/2008/0836. 
139   Case NL/2008/0823. 

EN 

25 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Commenting  upon  the  British  notification140,  the  Commission  expressed  its  view  that 
timeframes for regulatory obligations should not be fixed for a too long period if competitive 
conditions are likely to improve in the short or mid term. In such a case NRAs should be in a 
position  to  conduct  market  analysis  at  any  moment  and  remove  unnecessary  obligations  if 
proportionate and justified.  

With  regard  to  price  control  obligations,  the  Commission  has  in  its  comment  letter 
concerning  the  Estonian  notification141  recommended  direct  regulatory  intervention  by 
imposing concrete prices to be applied rather than self regulation by the incumbent operator, 
who could itself determine cost oriented prices. 

In the context of the Italian notification in which AGCOM proposed to lift the regulation for 
leased  lines  leading  to  mobile  operators'  base  stations  ,  the  Commission  stressed  that 
regulatory  obligations  should  be  withdrawn  only  after  a  transition  period  long  enough  to 
enable alternative operators to eliminate remaining bottlenecks in their networks.142 

7. 

VOICE CALL TERMINATION ON INDIVIDUAL MOBILE NETWORKS (MARKET 7)  

7.1. 

Issues related to market definition 

As for fixed telephony, the absence of effective substitution possibilities and the presence of 
the  CPP  principle  in  the  EU  have  led  NRAs  to  consistently  find  each  individual  mobile 
network operator as constituting a distinct relevant network market for terminating calls on 
their own networks. 

A  number  of  NRAs  have  also  identified  relevant  termination  markets  for  mobile  virtual 
network  operators  (MVNOs)  to  the  extent  that  such  MVNOs  can  determine  their 
commercial  terms  and  conditions  for  call  termination  independently  of  their  host  network 
operators143. 

The  market  definition  generally  includes  all  calls  terminated  on  the  mobile  network, 
irrespective of the technology used (i.e. 2G or 3G) and regardless of the origin of the call144. 

Two  NRAs  also  identified  separate  relevant  markets  for  wholesale  SMS  termination  on 
individual  mobile  networks  (not  listed  in  the  Recommendation  on  relevant  markets)  as 
susceptible to ex-ante regulation145. 

140   Case UK/2008/0859. 
141 Case EE/2007/0643. 
142   IT/2009/0999-1000. 
143  Cases  ES/2007/0706,  NL/2007/0634,  DE/2008/0813,  DK/2008/0785,  FI/2008/0778,  PL/2008/0855, 
EE/2009/0883  (three  other  MVNOs  were  however  not  included  by  the  Estonian  regulator  in  the  relevant 
product markets as they are either service providers/resellers or do not have full control over the data of their 
subscribers' SIM-cards). 

144   E.g.  cases  EL/2008/0786,  EE/2009/0883,  FI/2008/0778,  DE/2009/0947,  PL/2009/0904,  ES/2008/0819, 

RO/2009/0878. 

145   Cases FR/2006/0413, GI/2007/0724. 

EN 

26 

   EN 

 
                                                 
7.2. 

Issues related to remedies 

As  in  case  of  fixed  call  termination,  the  Commission  has  also  underlined  the  importance  of 
effective  cost  orientation146  and  continuously  reiterated  the  importance  of  bringing  mobile 
termination rates down to the level which reflects the cost of an efficient operator as soon as 
possible147.  While  the  Regulatory  Framework  does  not  exclude  a  price  control  mechanism 
based  on  comparison  with  other  countries,  the  Commission  has  noted  that  any  such 
benchmarking  should  serve  to  promote  efficiency  and  sustainable  competition  and 
maximise  consumer  benefits.  Furthermore,  the  prices  can  be  considered  as  appropriate  to 
serve  as  a  basis  for  comparison  only  if  they  have  been  set  based  on  an  appropriate  cost 
accounting model and relevant cost accounting data to reflect cost orientation148. 

In  urging  NRAs  to  specify  their  cost-orientation  obligation  as  soon  as  possible,  the 
Commission has frequently invited them to apply a forward-looking LRIC model149 and has 
also noted that a glide path towards an efficient  rate should be established without delay as 
any  grace  period  could  remove  the  incentive  to  become  cost-effective  as  quickly  as 
possible150.  In  terms  of  costs  included  in  the  relevant  cost  model,  the  Commission  has 
continued to highlight the importance of LRIC models using the current costs of an efficient 
operator  employing  efficient  technology  and  not  historical  costs,  which  risk  overestimating 
the  appropriate  costs  considerably151.  Where,  for  example,  spectrum  is  included  in  the  cost 
model, the Commission has noted that the value of spectrum licences should be calculated at 
current  value  on  a  forward-looking  basis  and  not  on  the  basis  of  values  which  approximate 
past levels152.  

Furthermore,  the  Commission  has underlined that as wholesale call termination services are 
traffic-related  services,  relevant  costs  considered  for  wholesale  call  termination  charging 
purposes are typically those costs which vary in response to increased levels of wholesale call 
termination traffic, i.e. the additional costs involved in providing the service in question153. 
For  example,  there  are  costs  of  spectrum  usage,  which  are  not  traffic-related  and,  as  such, 
should not be calculated as part of the wholesale call termination service154.  

The Commission has also on numerous occasions stated that mobile termination rates should 
normally be symmetric and that asymmetry should be adequately justified by objective cost 
differences  and  limited  to  a  transitory  period155.  The  Commission  has  further  encouraged 

146   Cases FI/2006/0403, FI/2008/0778, DE/2009/0947, SK/2009/0902, PL/2008/0794, PL/2008/0855. 
147  Cases  LU/2005/0321,  FR/2007/0669,  IT/2008/0802,  BG/2009/0866,  CZ/2008/0841,  SI/2009/0946, 

ES/2008/0819, CZ/2009/0959, GI/2009/0977. 

 Cases EL/2008/0786, IT/2008/0802, CZ/2008/0841, SK/2009/0902, ES/2008/0819, PL/20096/0991. 

148   Cases LU/2005/0321, EE/2009/0883, MT/2009/0926, PL/2009/0904, IE/2008/0746.  
149   Cases LV/2006/0464, BG/2009/0866. 
150  Case IE/2008/0746. 
151 
152   Case UK/2006/0498, HU/2008/0829. 
153   Case EL/2008/0786, HU/2008/0829, AT/2009/0910, SE/2009/0941. 
154   Case IT/2008/0802. 
155   Cases  DK/2008/0765,  DK/2008/0785,  FR/2009/0927,  IT/2008/0802,  LV/2007/0574,  PL/2008/0794, 
PL/2008/0855,  ES/2009/0937,  PT/2007/0707,  RO/2009/0878,  DK/2009/1013-1014,  SK/2009/0902.  With 

EN 

27 

   EN 

 
                                                 
NRAs  to  impose  effective  access  obligations  on  all  SMP  operators156.  In  addition,  the 
Commission  has  called  for  regulators  to  ensure  a  symmetric  wholesale  rate  is  applied 
irrespective of the origin of the call, i.e. fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile calls157.  

As for fixed termination, the Commission has consistently called on the national regulators to 
work together towards a coherent cost accounting method for estimating mobile termination 
rates.  Moreover,  the  Commission  has  in  recent  cases  underlined  the  importance  of  NRAs 
notifying  their  actually  proposed  glide  paths  as  part  of  the  consultation  procedure  under 
Article 7(3), as price levels, amendments to methodologies used to calculate costs or prices, 
as  well  as  the  determination  of  glide  paths  are  considered  to  have  a  material  impact  on  the 
relevant markets158.  

Finally, in recent notifications a number of regulators have already signalled their intention to 
implement  the  costing  approach  set  out  in  the  Recommendation  on  the  Regulatory 
Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in their next market reviews159. In its 
notification,  the  French  regulator,  ARCEP,  considered  that  cost  orientation  towards  LRIC, 
where the relevant increment is defined as the wholesale call termination service provided to 
third parties, provides the efficient signal for operators in the long term and has identified the 
target  efficient  cost-based  mobile  termination  rate  to  be  eventually  reached  by  all  mobile 
operators at between 1 and 2 €cent/min 160.  

8. 

OTHER MARKETS (OUTSIDE THE RECOMMENDATION ON RELEVANT MARKETS)  

In  its  Recommendation  2007  on  relevant  markets  the  Commission  removed  a  series  of 
markets listed  in the Recommendation on relevant markets 2003. One set of those removed 
markets  covers  certain  retail  markets,  in  particular  the  markets  for  calls  from  fixed  location 
and the retail market for the minimum set of leased lines. Those markets have been removed 
from the Recommendation on relevant markets based on the expected erosion of market entry 
barriers due to efficient wholesale regulation.  

A  further  set  of  markets  removed  from  the  Recommendation  covers  certain  wholesale 
markets,  in  particular  the  transit  interconnection  market,  the  trunk  leased  lines  market,  the 
market for access and call origination on mobile networks and the broadcasting transmission 
market.    Regarding  those  markets  it  is  duplication  of  the  network  and/or  the  dynamics  of 
competition  shown  within  the  notification  procedure  have  led  to  the  conclusion  that  at 
European level, those markets do not fulfill anymore the three criteria test. 

respect to asymmetry allowed for MNVOs, the Commission highlighted (in case DK/2010/1013-1014) that 
NRAs  should  identify  any  objective  cost  differences  that  would  justify  such  asymmetry  or  ensure  the 
phasing out of asymmetries in MVNOs' termination rates as soon as possible. 

156   Case DE/2009/0947. 
157   Case BG/2009/0966. 
158   Cases DE/2008/0813, DE/2009/0947, PL/2009/0904, EE/2009/0883. 
159   Cases BG/2009/0866, RO/2009/0878, AT/2009/0910. Following its notification of case IT/2008/0802, the 
Italian  regulator,  AGCOM,  also  committed  to  develop  and  adopt  by  2010  a  cost  model  in  line  with  the 
Commission's recommended approach to termination rates. 

160 

 Case FR/2008/0812. 

EN 

28 

   EN 

 
                                                                                                                                                         
Where NRAs nevertheless propose to regulate one  of  those  markets  no  longer  considered a 
priori  suscepble  to  ex  ante  regulation,  there  are  recommended  to  justify  maintenance  of 
regulation based on the evidence that given the specificities of their national market the three 
criteria test161 is still fulfilled and SMP is found.162  

8.1.  Issues related to the retail call markets (former markets 3-6)  

These markets comprise all outgoing telephone calls from a fixed location. They have been 
removed  from  the  Recommendation  on  relevant  markets  based  on  the  expected  erosion  of 
market entry barriers due to efficient wholesale regulation.  

The  majority  of  NRAs163  which  have  more  recently  analyzed  the  three  criteria  test  in  those 
markets  also  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  markets  were  not  any  longer  susceptible  to  ex 
ante regulation. For instance, the first criterion (high and non transitory market entry barriers) 
was assessed on the basis of the efficiency of wholesale regulation in place, in particular CPS 
and CS and WLR, which have substantially reduced market entry barriers. Furthermore, the 
progression of new technologies (e.g. VoIP) has been at the basis of findings of competition 
dynamics  (the  second  criterion  of  the  3-criteria  test).  Accordingly,  since  2007,  in  those 
countries  regulation  of  the  retail  calls  markets  has  been  withdrawn.  However,  in  some 
Member States regulation was maintained based on a recent finding of the fulfillment of the 
three  criteria  test  and  finding  of  SMP164.  In  all  cases  where  an  NRA  concluded  on  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  regulation  the  Commission  stressed  the  need  to  strengthen  the 
efficiency  of  wholesale  regulation,  to  monitor  market  developments  and  assess  whether 
wholesale remedies alone will be sufficient to achieve the objectives of the framework.  

Overall, experience with market reviews carried out by the NRAs during the reporting period 
largely confirm the Commission's assessment that at EU level this market no longer warrants 
ex ante regulation. Also, the conclusions and recommendations made by the Commission in 
its  2nd  report  on  the  need  to  strengthen  the  efficiency  of  wholesale  regulation  enabling  the 
removal of regulation at retail level remain fully valid165.  

161   1)  there  are  high  and  non-transitory  barriers  to  market  entry,  which  may  be  of  a  structural,  legal  or 
regulatory  nature;  2)  the  market  structure  does  not  tend  towards  effective  competition  within  the  relevant 
time  horizon;  and  3)  competition  law  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  adequately  address  the  identified  market 
failure(s). 

162   Article 15(3) of the Framework Directive.  
163   Cases  CZ/2008/0796,  CZ/2008/0840  and  CZ/2008/0857;  DE/2007/0628,    DE/2007/0709,  DE/2008/0846, 
DE/2007/0847  and  DE/2009/0895;  IE/2007/0697-0700;  ES/2008/0817;  MT/2009/0884;  NL/2008/0821; 
AT/2009/0881  regarding  the  residential  calls  markets  only;    SI/2009/0893;  UK/2009/0899  with  the 
exception of the Hull area; RO/2009/1004. 

164   Cases BE/2008/0798 and 0799 – market shares in the national residential calls market have been declining 
but still stay above 65%; for national business calls they have been increasing to above 75%; BG/2009/0912 
 market shares stayed above 78% for the international calls market for non-residential customers and above 
95% for the other calls markets; LT/2008/0763 and 0764  market shares in the national calls markets have 
been increasing to above 99% for business and above 93% for the residential calls market; AT/2009/0880  
for the business national and international calls markets TKK considered the three criteria test to be fulfilled 
and the SMP analysis will be carried out subsequently. 

165  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on market reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework – 
Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications, COM (2007) 401 final of 11.7.2007. 

EN 

29 

   EN 

 
                                                 
8.2.  Issues related to the market for the minimum set of leased lines (former market 7)  

The  market  for  the  retail  minimum  set  of  leased  lines  has  been  removed  from  the 
Recommendation on relevant markets based on the expected removal of market entry barriers 
due to the efficiency of wholesale regulation. The three criteria test carried out by the NRAs 
during the reporting period largely confirmed this assessment.  

Article 18 of the Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC166 provides for the minimum set of 
leased lines to be offered in accordance with Annex VII of this Directive. The minimum set of 
leased  lines  was  defined  in  the  Commission  Decision  2003/548/EC167,  while  Decision 
2008/60/EC168 has set a null-set, i.e. NRAs are no longer under an obligation to ensure that a 
defined set of leased lines is provided at retail level. While previously the retail leased lines 
market was regulated in all Member States, the majority  of telecom regulators having more 
recently  analyzed  this  market  confirmed  that  the  market  was  not  susceptible  to  ex  ante 
regulation169.    Those  conclusions  were  based  on  the  technical  evolution  towards  higher 
bandwidth, together with the efficiency of wholesale regulation for the competitiveness retail 
level,  thus  largely  confirming  the  conclusions  made  by  the  Commission  in  its  2007 
Communication on market reviews. However,  two  NRAs170 concluded on the fulfillment of 
the three criteria test. The Commission questioned this finding stressing the need to carry out 
a  prospective  market  analysis  and  to  rely  on  wholesale  regulation.  While  accepting  the 
conclusions of the British NRA based on the evidence of national specific circumstances, the 
Commission  recalled  that  NRAs  should  append  detailed  reasoning  to  their  (new)  analysis 
outlining why, in the particular circumstances, the three criteria are satisfied. 

8.3.  Issues related to the market for fixed transit services (former market 10)  

The market for transit services refers to the conveyance of calls at a higher network level and 
may be defined as pure transit between nodes (unbundled transit) or as being  complemented 
by  the  call  origination  and  call  termination  services  (bundled  transit).  The  market  has  been 
removed  from  the  Recommendation  on  relevant  market  based  on  the  observation  of 
replication  of  networks  at  a  higher  network  level  which  indicates  that  market  entry  barriers 
cannot be regarded any longer as high and non transitory.  

While  a  substantial  number  of  NRAs171  had  already  concluded  on  the  competitiveness 
(absence  of  SMP)  of  the  transit  market  at  a  time  when  this  market  was  still  listed  in  the 

166  Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service 
and users's rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 108, 24,2,2002, p. 51. 
167   Commission Decision of 24 July 2003 on the minimum set of leased lines with harmonised characteristics 
and associated standards referred to in Article 18 of the Universal Service Directive, OJ L 186, 25.7.2003, 
p.43. 

168  Commission  Decision  of  21  December  2007  amending  Decision  2003/548/EC  as  regards  the  deletion  of 

specific types of leased line from the Minimum Set of Leased Lines, OJ, L 15, 18.1.2008, p. 32. 

169  Cases  CZ/2009/0872,;  DE/2009/1009 

(removal  of 

remedies  not  yet  notified);  EE/2007/0642, 

EL/2008/0751,IT/2009/0998 NL/2009/0824 SI/208/0768 and SK/2009/1008. 

170  Cases AT/2008/0836, UK/2008/0749 and UK/2009/0938 proposing partial withdrawal of regulation.  
171  In  addition  to  the  8  NRAs  referred  to  in  the  last  report  see  cases  DK/2007/0693,  EE/2007/0670, 
AT/2007/0590; one NRA (Luxembourg ILR) concluded already during the last period of reporting that the 
three criteria test was not fulfilled, see case LU/2006/0542 . 

EN 

30 

   EN 

 
                                                 
Recommendation  on  relevant  markets,  the  majority  of  NRAs  having  analyzed  this  market 
under  the  new  Recommendation  withdrew  regulation  based  on  a  finding  of  absence  of  the 
fulfillment  of  the  three  criteria  test172  supported  by  the  commercial  availability  of  transit 
services  and  decreasing  market  shares,  together  with  self-supply  and  the  replication  of  the 
network at transit level, while one NRA173 based the withdrawal of regulation on the absence 
of SMP. In one case the Commission opposed the three criteria test, together with the SMP-
finding, of an NRA174. The Commission in particular stressed that the scale of market entry 
and  the  roll  out  of  parallel  infrastructures  indicated  the  absence  of  high  and  non-transitory 
market entry barriers and thus the absence of the fulfilment of the first criterion of the three 
criteria test. In addition, on the basis of decreasing market shares below 40% and no further 
evidence  the  conclusion  that  the  second  criterion  is  met  would  not  be  justifiable. 
Subsequently, the NRA withdrew regulation.  

Thus, the experience over the reporting period with the analysis of the three criteria test at the 
national level largely confirms the Commission's statement made in its 2007 Communication 
on market reviews. Indeed, duplication of the backbone infrastructure in the transit segment 
has continued and the developments have shown that this market does not anymore warrant ex 
ante regulation.   

8.4.  Issues related to the trunk leased lines market (former market 14) 

The  market  for  the  provision  of  wholesale  trunk  leased  lines  has  been  removed  from  the 
Recommendation on relevant markets based on the observed and expected replication of the 
network. However, given that – depending also on the network level at which NRA delineate 
the  trunk  part  from  the  terminating  segment  –  not  all  trunk  routes  may  be  duplicated,  the 
fulfillment of the three criteria test may also be subject to the fact whether the replication of 
the network is expected to occur to a sufficient extent to allow operators to compete on the 
relevant market.  

Since  the  last  report  two  NRAs  concluded  on  the  absence  of  the  fulfillment  of  the  three 
criteria  test  and  two  further  NRAs  withdrew  regulation  based  on  a  finding  of  absence  of 
SMP175.  Among  those  NRAs  which  have  regarded  the  three  criteria  test  to  be  fulfilled,  one 
NRA176  concluded  on  SMP  still  under  the  former  Recommendation  while  two  NRAs 
concluded  on  SMP  in  parts  of  the  market  under  the  new  Recommendation177.  The 
Commission  commented  on  the  need  to  carry  out  the  three  criteria  test,  to  monitor  market 
dynamics and to provide more evidence for market definition and for concluding on the need 

172  See  cases  DE/2009/0887-888;  EE/2009/0962  SE/2009/0968  and  UK/2009/0898;  see  however  cases 

IE/2009/0921 and RO/2009/1005. 

173  See Case NL/2008/0800. 
174  See case PL/2008/0766, PL/2008/0788 (absence of SMP without withdrawal of regulation); PL/2008/0831 

(proposal to withdraw regulation). 

175   See cases IE/2008/0791 and IT/2009/999 (absence of three criteria test); regarding the findings of absence 
of SMP see DE/2007/0678 and DK/2007/0725 (subsequent to a withdrawal containing an SMP finding in 
case DK/2007/586). 

176   EE/2007/0644. 
177  UK/2009/0901.  PL/2008/0882  (second  phase),  PL/2008/0856  (splitting  the  trunk  market  into  routes,  the 
draft measures related to the SMP finding regarding competitive routes was withdrawn); and PL/2009/971. 

EN 

31 

   EN 

 
                                                 
of  ex  ante  regulation.  The  Commission  in  particular  stressed  that  (1)  in  the  absence  of  a 
detailed  analysis  as  to  what  extent  the  areas  with  duplication/multiplication  of  the  trunk 
infrastructure and those which are only connected to the incumbent's network can be regarded 
to  form  a  substantial  part  of  the  relevant  market,  it  is  not  possible  to  assess  the  degree  to 
which the market is constrained with high market entry barriers; and (2) in the absence of an 
analysis  of  price  trends  and  pricing  behaviour  of  different  operators,  which  give  valuable 
information on whether the market tends towards effective competition, it is not possible to 
conclude that the second criterion is met. 

Thus, the analysis of the three criteria test at national level largely confirms the Commission's 
statement  made  in  its  2007  Communication  on  market  reviews.  Indeed,  duplication  of  the 
backbone  infrastructure  at  trunk  level  progressed  and  allowed  a  series  of  further  NRAs  to 
withdraw  regulation.  The  developments  have  shown  that  this  market  does  not  anymore 
warrant ex ante regulation.  Furthermore, it should be noted that the assessment as to whether 
the replication of the network is expected to occur to a sufficient extent to allow operators to 
compete on the relevant market in particular requires NRAs to analyse the impact of a partial 
duplication of the network on the whole trunk market – which may also include also the non-
duplicated  trunk  lines.  A  more  in  depth  analysis  of  this  impact  may  have  led  to  further 
withdrawals of regulation than registered over the reporting period.  

8.5.  Issues  related  to  the  market  for  access  and  call  origination  on  public  mobile 
telephone networks (former market 15)  

The  market  for  access  and  call  origination  on  public  mobile  telephone  networks  has  been 
deleted  from  the  Recommendation  on  relevant  markets  based  on  an  observed  finding  of 
absence  of  SMP  in  the  large  majority  of  Member  States,  the  emergence  of  a  competitive 
wholesale market in a substantial number of countries and the status of retail competition.  

The  large  majority  of  NRAs  which  had  already  found  the  market  for  access  and  call 
origination  to  be  competitive  has  not  undertaken  a  new  market  analysis,  in  line  with  the 
withdrawal  of  this  market  from  the  Recommendation178.  One  NRA  proposed  in  its  draft 
measures  regulation  based  on  a  deviation  from  the  Recommendation  by  defining  separate 
markets for the access and the calls markets, this latter including calls to reach value added 
services  by  dialing  premium  rate  numbers,  however,  the  notification  was  withdrawn  and 
subsequently the NRA adjusted its market definition and concluded on the absence of SMP179. 
The two NRAs having concluded previously on single dominance re-confirmed their findings 
in  a  second  round  notification  and  imposed  a  set  of  remedies  including  access  and  price 
control180. With regard to the proposed measures by the Slovenian NRA181 the Commission 
stressed  the  need  to  provide  evidence  regarding  the  fulfillment  of  the  three  criteria  test,  in 
addition to and separately from the evidence provided as part of the SMP analysis, and also 
called  on  the  Slovenian  NRA  to  monitor  market  developments  with  a  view  to  promote 

178  With the exception of the Danish NRA, NITA, which previously had concluded on absence of SMP but did 
not withdraw remedies, and subsequently again concluded on absence of SMP, see case DK/2008/0863. 

179  See cases IT/2007/0575, IT/2008/0861. 
180  See  cases  CY/2009/0877  and  SI/2009/0913  (after  a  proposal  of  joint  dominance  by  the  Slovenian  NRA, 

APEK, in case SI/2008/0806 which was however withdrawn).  

181  See case SI/2009/0913. 

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
                                                 
effective infrastructure competition and investment, especially when imposing price control, 
and on the requirement to notify decisions on access prices. 

On the background that the large majority of NRAs did not identify a need to carry out a new 
market analysis following withdrawal of remedies and given that keeping regulation in place 
in  two  countries  could  be  regarded  as  justified  only  on  the  basis  of  very  specific  national 
circumstances,  the  developments  over  the  reporting  period  support  the  Commission's 
conclusions in its 2007 Recommendation on relevant markets to  withdraw  this market from 
the list of markets susceptible to ex ante regulation.  

While  in  its  previous  communication  on  market  reviews  the  Commission  focused  on  the 
emergence, the potential and the existence of MVNO agreements as an important parameter 
to  assess  the  development  of  competition182,  over  the  current  reporting  period  the 
Commission also stressed the relevance of (indirect) pricing constraints at the wholesale level 
resulting from the competition at retail level in order to assess the second criterion of the three 
criteria test, i.e. the dynamics of competition.    

8.6.  Broadcasting  transmission  services  for  the  provision  of  content  to  end  users 
(former market 18) 

The market for broadcasting transmission services was withdrawn from the Recommendation 
on  relevant  markets  on  the  basis  of,  inter  alia,  the  emergence  of  new  digital  transmission 
technologies  reducing  capacity  constraints  and  the  emergence  of  new  transmission  platform 
creating dynamics of competition which would erode the fulfillment of the second criterion of 
the  three  criteria  test.  Also,  the  last  report  on  Article  7  pointed  to  increased  platform 
competition  due  to  the  emergence  of  further  distribution  platforms,  in  particular  terrestrial 
digital television and internet television.  

A number of  NRAs183 concluded  on  the absence  of  the fulfillment  of  the  3  criteria  test  and 
withdrew regulation. However, the previous approach of the NRA which could predominantly 
be observed and which was based on a splitting of the market according to different platforms 
and  the  finding  of  SMP  in  one  of  the  markets  identified,  i.e.  the  terrestrial  transmission 
market184,  could  also  be  observed  during  the  present  reporting  period,  while  some  NRAs 
extended regulation also to digital terrestrial transmission services185 and/or proposed also in 
the second round notification to regulate the cable access market.186 In its comments letters, 
the Commission reiterated the need to monitor the competitiveness of the market in order to 
assess  whether  broadcasting  transmission  services  provided  over  different  platforms  are 
developing  to  the  extent  that  they  become  viable  substitutes,  so  that  the  terrestrial  platform 
would  not  constitute  a  market  on  its  own,  and  therefore  enable  competitive  pressure  on  the 

182   I.e., the decisive parameters of the assessment of the status of competition are based on incentives to grant 

MVNO network access, such as excess network capacity. 

183   See  cases  DK/2007/0618,  EL/2007/0684,  LV/2007/0694,  MT/2008/0810  (following  withdrawal  in  case 
MT/200/0564)  NL/2008/0849,  2009/0873,  NL/2009/1007,  NL/2009/105  and  SE/2009/0975  (in  this  case, 
however, for free to air digital TV the three criteria was still found to be met.  

184   See  cases  CZ/2009/0907,  EE/2007/0666,  LT/2009/1022  (excluding  digital  terrestrial  transmission) 

ES/2009/0905, HU/2007/0734, AT/2009/0896, RO/2009/0876. 
185   See cases FI/2009/0789, FR/2009/0914, SI/2007/0730, PT/2007/0655. 
186   See case NL/2008/0873. 

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
                                                 
retail market absent regulation so that the first and/or second criteria of the three criteria test 
are no longer met.  

On the background that a number of NRAs concluded on the absence of the fulfillment of the 
three criteria test it may be concluded that the Commission's prognosis as to the development 
of competition dynamics as a result of the emergence of new platforms has been confirmed. 
Accordingly, the experience with the measures notified further support that the withdrawal of 
the market from the list of markets susceptible to ex ante regulation is still justified.   

However, due to a large number of diverging technical, economic and regulatory obstacles to 
the  development  of  direct  competition  between the  different  transmission  platforms,  both  at 
retail and wholesale level, competition in the market for broadcasting transmission services, 
to deliver content to end-users has not yet developed to its full potential and therefore, NRAs 
may  still  conclude  on  the  fulfillment  of  the  three  criteria  test  in  certain  parts  of  the  market. 
Where  NRAs  intend  to  continue  to  regulate  certain  parts  of  the  broadcasting  transmission 
services,  it  is  recommended  that  in  particular  the  assessment  of  the  second  criterion  of  the 
three  criteria  test  should  include  an  analysis  of  the  status  of  competition  on  the  entire 
broadcasting  transmission  market  at  retail  level,  together  with  the  interrelationship  of  the 
markets,  where  applicable,  and  also  provide  evidence  on  the  absence  of  relevant  indirect 
pricing  constraints  at  wholesale  level  –  taking  into  account  of  all  those  constraints  derived 
from any of the transmission platforms - as one of the preconditions to demonstrate the three 
criteria test is fulfilled. 

EN 

34 

   EN 

 
ANNEX 4: TABLE OVERVIEW PER MARKET

187 

Market 1: Retail access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for residential and non-residential customers 

Member 
State 

Related cases

AT188 

BE 

AT/2004/0109 
AT/2004/0110 
AT/2007/0579 
AT/2007/0580 
AT/2008/0832

BE/2006/0400 
BE/2006/0401 
BE/2007/0640 

BE/2007/0657

BE/2008/0750

Market 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation 

Number of 
SMP 

operators  Carrier 
(Pre-) 
selec-
tion 

NO** 

VoB is incl. 

1 

YES 

+WLR 

Remedies imposed 

Non-
discrimination 

Trans-
parency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Accounting 
separation 

Comments / no comment 

YES 

NO 

Cost-orientation and ex ante 
tariff authorisation 

YES 

Inclusion in the access markets of 
broadband access lines over which VoB 
services are provided; Efficiency of 
wholesale regulation 

NO** 

1 

YES 

+WLR 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation for CS/CPS 
(top-down model) + approval of 
tariffs submitted by the 
incumbent and  

YES 

Application of the margin squeeze test to 
markets non-regulated at the retail level; 
Application of a Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) methodology 

retail minus for WLR 

(BE/2007/0640) 

187   Overview of notifications assessed between October 2005 and December 2009. Details concerning notifications prior to this date can be found in the "Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on Market Reviews under 
the  EU  Regulatory  Framework  -  Consolidating  the  internal  market  for  electronic  communications",  (COM(2006)  28  final  of  6.2.2006  and  COM(2007)401  final  of 
11.7.2007. 

188   In  case  AT/2008/0832  the  Austrian  NRA  notified  already  the  market  definition  for  its  third  round  market  review.  The  Commission  reminded  the  NRA  that  any 

notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon the effective delineation of the relevant market concerned at the time of that notification. 

EN 

35 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
BG 

BG/2009/0911

CY 

CY/2006/0485 
CY/2006/0486

CZ 

CZ/2006/0356 
CZ/2006/0357 
CZ/2008/0755

NO 

Homezone 
and wireless 
broadband 
incl.; Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers 

NO** 
Submarkets 
for 
lower/higher 
level 

1 

1 

YES 

+WLR 

YES 

+WLR 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation for CS/CPS 
and retail minus for WLR 

YES 

(wholesale level)

(wholesale 
level) 

(wholesale level) 

(imposed at 
M2 & M3) 

YES 

(retail level) 

YES 

(retail 
level) 

Cost-orientation; price cap; 
and requirement to provide 
information on price changes 
of the access price one month 
in advance 

NO 

(retail level) 

Cost-orientation 

Inclusion of wireless broadband access 
services in the market for retail access;  
Retail remedies versus wholesale remedies

YES 

YES 

 (FDC costing methodology) 

YES 

No comments 

and retail minus for WLR 

YES 

1 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

YES 

Efficiency of the proposed remedies in 
resolving identified market failures 

(CZ/2006/0356) 

Insufficient justification for withdrawal of 
the price regulation. 

(CZ/2008/0755) 

DK 

DK/2005/0183 
DK/2005/0184

YES 

EE 

EE/2007/0637 
EE/2007/0638

YES 

1 

1 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

YES 

NO 

NO 

Cost orientation for CS/CPS 

NO 

Effectiveness of the proposed remedies in 
resolving the identified market failure in 
the fixed access market;  

EN 

36 

EN 

 
  
 
YES 

Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network 

NO 

Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers 

NO** 

Complete 
connections 
(~naked DSL) 
incl. 

FI 

FI/2003/0020 
FI/2003/0021 

FR 

FR/2005/0221 
FR/2005/0222 
FR/2007/0648 
FR/2008/0782

DE 

DE/2005/0306

DE/2005/0307

DE/2006/0402 
DE/2009/0897

DE/2009/1006

Details of cost-orientation of CS/CPS 

43 

YES 

NO 

YES 

NO 

NO 

Remedies at retail level 

1 

YES 

+WLR 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

1 

YES 

NO 

NO 

Ex-post price control 

NO 

Notification of remedies at a later stage 

Inclusion of complete connections in the 
market for retail access; 

 (DE/2009/0897) 

Need to impose an appropriate price 

EN 

37 

EN 

 
  
EL 

EL/2006/0500 
EL/2006/0501 
EL/2006/0555 
EL/2008/0751

NO** 

Submarkets 
for 
lower/higher 
level 

HU 

HU/2005/0130 
HU/2005/0131 
HU/2007/0662 
HU/2007/0663

YES  

Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network 

IE/2005/0158 
IE/2005/0159 

NO** 

IE 

IE/2007/0632 
IE/2008/0852 

IE/2009/0928 

Submarkets 
for 
lower/higher 
level 

1 

5 

1 

YES 

YES 

Retail minus for WLR 

(wholesale 
level) 

(wholesale 
level) 

(FDC /CCA) 

(wholesale level) 

YES 

(wholesale 
level) 

NO 

But WLR

YES 

(retail level 

for low and high
capacity lines)

YES 

(retail level 
diff. for low 
and high 
capacity 
lines) 

Price cap and a sub-cap 

for new connections 
(Consumer Price Index) 

 (retail level) 

YES 

(retail level for 
low capacity 
lines) 

No comments 

YES 

YES 

NO 

Prohibition of unjustifiably high 
fees by imposing an annual 
ceiling of price increase 
equivalent to the consumer 
price index 

NO 

Product market definition (exclusion of 
home-zone products); 

Imposition of wholesale line rental remedy

YES 

+WLR 

YES 

YES 

Retail minus for Single Billing-
WLR 

YES 

(wholesale 
level) 

(wholesale 
level) 

(wholesale level) 

(wholesale 
level) 

Further consultation planned by ComReg 

(IE/2007/0632) 

EN 

38 

EN 

 
  
 
 
IT/2005/0260 
IT/2005/0261 
IT/2007/0611 

IT/2007/0612 

IT 

IT/2008/0842 
IT/2009/0890 

IT/2009/0987 

NO* 

Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers; 

VoIP 
connections 
incl.  

YES 

YES 

(wholesale 
level) 

(wholesale 
level) 

Cost accounting 

(wholesale level) 

YES 

(wholesale 
level) 

Inclusion of broadband access enabling 
VoIP services in the market for retail 
access; 

1 

NO 

But 
WLR189

NO 

(retail level) 

YES 

(retail 
level) 

Lack of notification of the remedies 
(IT/2009/0890) 

Modification of the undertakings; 

Cost accounting 

NO 

Implementation and monitoring of the 
undertakings of Telecom Italia; 

 (retail level) 

(retail level)

LV 

LT 

LV/2007/0565 
LV/2007/0566

LV/2009/0994

NO 

Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers 

1 

YES 

NO 

NO 

Cost-orientation and cost 
accounting 

NO 

LT/2006/0411 
LT/2006/0412 
LT/2006/0512 
LT/2006/0513

YES 

1 

YES 

+WLR 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

(FDC methodology based on 
historical cost accounting) 

The inclusion of wireless radio, optic cable
and local area networks in the same 
market as fixed residential analogue and 
cable access lines 

YES 

(LT/2006/0411 and LT/2006/0412) 

The Supervisory Board and OTA Italia; 

Notification requirements as to the price 
control obligation(IT/2009/0987) 

Implementation of existing remedies and 
non-imposition of a wholesale line rental 
remedy; 

Lack of details concerning price control 
obligation and non-imposition of 
accounting separation 

189   The NRA imposed on the SMP operator also the obligation not to unreasonably bundle retail offers and WLR. 

EN 

39 

EN 

 
  
 
 
                                                 
LU 

LU/2006/0526 
LU/2006/0527

NO** 

1 

YES 

+WLR 

MT190 

MT/2006/0394 
MT/2006/0395

NO** 

1 

YES 
+WLR 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation for CS/CPS 
and retail minus for WLR 

YES 

(wholesale 
level) 

(wholesale 
level) 

(wholesale level) 

(wholesale 
level) 

YES 

(retail level) 

YES 

(retail 
level) 

To charge reasonable prices 

(retail level) 

NO 

YES 

YES 

(wholesale 
level) 

(wholesale 
level) 

Cost-orientation for CS/CPS 
and specified price control for 
WLR to be defined at a later 
stage 

(wholesale level) 

YES 

(wholesale 
level) 

YES 

(retail level) 

YES 

(retail 
level) 

YES 

YES 

(retail level) 

(retail level)

NL 

NL/2005/0287 
NL/2005/0288 
NL/2008/0821

NO** 

voice calls 
services are 
incl.; 

Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers 

1 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Price control obligation 

The inclusion of BWA in the same market 
as fixed residential analogue and 

cable access lines 

Product market definition – inclusion of 
access and calls in the same market; 

Phasing out retail regulation of business 
market 

190   Notification MT/2009/0980 has been withdrawn by the authority. 

EN 

40 

EN 

 
  
 
                                                 
PL 

PL/2006/0518 
PL/2006/0524 
PL/2007/0593 
PL/2007/0647

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Prohibition of excessive pricing;

Obligation to refrain from 
limiting competition by fixing 
prices below the costs of their 
provision; 

Cost orientation and cost 
accounting obligation on the 
basis of FL – FDC 
methodology;  

Obligation to submit for 
approval prices of service 
provision 

Regulatory obligations to be limited to 
correspond to the scope of market 
definition  

NO 

(PL/2007/0593) 

PT 

PT/2004/0053 
PT/2004/0054 
PT/2004/0091

YES 

1 

YES 

+WLR 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation  

YES 

Wholesale line rental 

(PT/2004/0091) 

NO** 

RO  RO/2009/1001191

Home zone 
products and 
managed VoIP
connections 
incl. 

1 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Inclusion of managed VoIP products in the 
access market definition; 

Non-imposition of a wholesale line rental 
remedy 

SK 

SK/2005/0172 
SK/2005/0173 
SK/2007/0676 
SK/2007/0696

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

NO 

NO (non-residential market) 

Market definition; 

YES (residential market) 
prohibition of charging 
excessive prices 

NO  

Effectiveness of the proposed remedies 

(SK/2007/0676 and SK/2007/0696) 

191   The NRA also imposed on the SMP operator the prohibition of unreasonably bundling access with other services. 

EN 

41 

EN 

 
  
 
                                                 
SI 

SI/2005/0231 
SI/2005/0232 

SI/2007/0600 
SI/2007/0601 

YES 

1 

YES 

+WLR 

YES 

YES 

Retail minus 10% for WLR 

(wholesale 
level) 

(wholesale 
level) 

(wholesale level) 

YES 

(wholesale 
level) 

Prohibition to charge excessive 
prices  (price cap for 
subscription fees);   

No comments 

YES 

(retail level) 

NO 

(retail 
level) 

Cost-orientation (for other end-
user prices (FAC - CCA); 

NO 

(retail level)

 Prohibition to set predatory 
pricing 

(retail level) 

ES/2005/0336

ES 

ES/2006/0337 
ES/2007/0620

NO** 
Homezone 
incl. 

ES/2007/0621 
ES/2008/0815

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Price cap related to (recurrent) 
subscription fees on the basis 
of an RPI-X factor 

YES 

Standardized and customized offers; 

Withdrawal of price regulation 

SE 

SE/2004/0112 
SE/2004/0113

NO** 

SE/2009/0965

IP-based 
telephony incl.

1 

YES 

+WLR 

YES 

YES 

Retail minus for WLR and cost 
accounting (LRIC) 

YES 

Inclusion of IP-based telephony with 
numbers in the market for retail access 

EN 

42 

EN 

 
  
 
UK 

UK/2003/0009 
UK/2003/0010 
UK/2004/0045 
UK/2007/0649 
UK/2008/0854

UK/2009/0899

NO** 

Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network; 
Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers; 

Submarkets 
for analogue 
and ISDN 

2  

(in ISDN 
markets) 

YES 

YES 

NO 

(In the Hull 
area) 

(In the Hull
area) 

NO 

NO 

NO - in the UK excluding the Hull area 

With regard to ISDN 2 and ISDN 30 markets: sole reliance on wholesale remedies

No comments 

GI 

GI/2007/0710   
GI/2007/0711 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Price cap - to be specified at the
later stage 

(most likely RPI-x) 

YES 

Lack  of  details  concerning  price  control 
obligations.  

*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 

** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets or geographic differentiation 

EN 

43 

EN 

 
  
 
Market 2: Wholesale call origination on the public telephone network at a fixed location 

Member 
State 

Related cases

Market 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation 

Number of 
SMP 
operators 

Access 

Non-
discrimination 

Trans-
parency 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Remedies imposed 

Comments / no comment 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Cost-orientation 

 (LRAIC-model) 

Accounting 
separation 

YES 

Implementation of the proposed cost-
orientation obligation; Reduction of 
minimum interconnection loads 

AT192 

BE 

AT/2004/0105 
AT/2006/0543 

AT/2008/0833

BE/2006/0439 
BE/2007/0657

BE/2008/0750

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Not specified 

YES 

No comments 

BG 

BG/2009/0864

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation (Fully Allocated
Costing methodology)  

The future accounting 
methodology will be LRIC 
bottom up. 

YES 

No comments 

CY 

CY/2006/0473

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation (LRIC-model)

YES 

No comments 

192   In  case  AT/2008/0833  the  Austrian  NRA  notified  already  the  market  definition  for  its  third  round  market  review.  The  Commission  reminded  the  NRA  that  any 

notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon the effective delineation of the relevant market concerned at the time of that notification. 

EN 

44 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
CZ 

CZ/2006/0351 
CZ/2009/0808

CZ/2009/0963

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

No comments 

Price cap 

(LRIC model) 

Cost-orientation 

 (LRAIC model); 

DK 

DK/2005/0141 
DK/2006/0536

NO** 

Wholesale 
access incl. 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Minor services may be priced 
according to modified historic 
cost 

Market for wholesale access connections 

(DK/2005/0141) 

EE 

EE/2007/0597

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Fully distributed costs based on 
historical costs (HC FDC) 

NO 

No comments 

YES 

Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding 
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network 

FI 

FI/2003/0028 

FI/2007/0703 

FR/2005/0227

34 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

FR 

FR/2007/0650

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

YES 

No comments 

FR/2008/0783

EN 

45 

EN 

 
  
 
DE 

DE/2005/0143 
DE/2005/0254 
DE/2008/0843 
DE/2008/0887

YES 

2 product 
submarkets  

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Not specified price control 

(ex ante tariff authorization 
procedure) 

NO 

Notification of remedies at a later stage 
(DE/2008/0843) 

Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of remedies under the EU 
consultation procedure (DE/2009/0887) 

EL 

EL/2006/0493

EL/2008/0751

YES 

1 

YES 

+C(P)S

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

(LRAIC/CC) 

YES 

No comments 

YES 

Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding 
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network 

HU 

HU/2005/0151

HU/2007/0726

IE/2005/0190 

4 

YES 

NO 

YES 

Cost-orientation  

(LRIC model) 

YES 

No comments 

IE 

IE/2007/0672 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

 (LRIC model) 

YES 

Failure to adopt previously notified 
measures 

IE/2009/0916 

IT 

IT/2006/0383 

YES 

1 

YES 

+C(P)S

YES 

YES 

Network cap mechanism 

YES 

No comments 

EN 

46 

EN 

 
  
 
 
LV193 

LV/2006/0365

LV/2009/0960

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

LT 

LT/2006/0364

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Implementation of existing remedies and 
non-imposition of a wholesale line rental 
remedy 

YES 

No comments 

Cost-orientation and cost 
accounting 

(Activity based allocation of 
current costs, FDC) 

Cost-orientation 

(During a transitional period: 

 top-down fully distributed costs 
(FDC); 

as of 2007: FL-LRAIC model) 

Cost-orientation 

LU 

LU/2006/0541

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

No comments 

MT 

MT/2006/0387

MT/2009/0979

YES 

YES 

1 

+C(P)S

YES 

YES 

 (fully allocated historic costs) 

Cost orientation for call 
origination and C(P)S, 

Retail minus for WLR  

YES 

Need to monitor the effectiveness of the 
wholesale inputs 

+ WLR 

YES 

NL 

NL/2005/0286

NL/2006/0511

NL/2008/0770

NL/2008/0793

NL/2008/0822

NL/2009/0992

NO 

wholesale 
access incl.; 
Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers 

1 

+C(P)S

YES 

YES 

+ WLR 

Cost-orientation for call 
origination and CS/CPS and 
retail minus for WLR 

NO 

Inclusion of wholesale access services in 
the market for call origination; Subdivision 
of the wholesale market for fixed 
telephony into residential and business; 
The three criteria test 

(NL/2008/0822) 

193  Notification LV/2009/0925 was withdrawn by the authority. 

EN 

47 

EN 

 
  
                                                 
PL 

PL/2006/0380

YES 

1 

YES 

+ WLR 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation (LRIC)  

after the calculations have been 
approved by an independent 
auditor; 

 Until then: to set appropriate 
charges based on costs 
incurred, which may be verified 
by the NRA using 
benchmarking or other methods

YES 

Price control before approval of LRIC cost 
calculation; Wholesale Line Rental 

PT 

PT/2004/0060 
PT/2004/0092

YES 

RO 

RO/2009/1002

YES 

1 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

YES 

No comments 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation  

(hybrid (TD-BU) LRIC) 

YES 

Inclusion of conveyance services in the 
definition of the call origination network 
segment 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation on the basis of 
a FL-LRAIC bottom up model 

YES 

Lack of effective implementation of 
CS/CPS services; 

Non-imposition of wholesale line rental 
(WLR) remedy; 

Timely enforcement of price control 
obligation 

(SK/2007/0740) 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

 (LRIC methodology) 

YES 

No comments 

SK 

SK/2004/0103 
SK/2007/0740

SK/2008/0792

SI 

SI/2005/0257 

SI/2007/0689 

ES/2006/0355

ES 

ES/2007/0589

YES 

1 

ES/2008/0816

YES 

+WLR 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

YES 

No comments 

EN 

48 

EN 

 
  
SE/2004/0049

SE 

SE/2009/0966

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

(hybrid (TD-BU) LRIC in 
general, HC FDC for network 
capacity pricing) 

YES 

Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of remedies under the EU 
consultation procedure 

(SE/2009/1016) 

YES 

2 

+WLR 

YES 

YES 

+C(P)S

Charges of BT and KCOM must 
be set on the basis of LRIC plus 
an appropriate mark-up for 
costs which are common across 
products, and for recovery the 
cost of capital; charge control 
based on the RPI-/+X method 

YES 

Appropriateness of the proposed costing 
methodology and need for a coherent 
European approach 

SE/2009/1016

UK/2003/0011 
UK/2003/0012

UK/2004/0045

UK/2004/0064 
UK/2004/0071 
UK/2004/0088 
UK/2004/0089 
UK/2004/0122 
UK/2005/0165 
UK/2005/0166 
UK/2005/0170 
UK/2005/0180 
UK/2005/0300 
UK/2007/0585 
UK/2007/0649 
UK/2008/0769 
UK/2008/0775

UK/2008/0854

UK/2009/0898

UK/2009/0972

UK 

NO** 

Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding 
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network 

GI 

GI/2007/0716 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

YES 

Lack of details concerning price control and 
cost accounting obligations 

*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 

** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets or geographic differentiation 

EN 

49 

EN 

 
  
Market 3: Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location 

Member 
State 

Related cases

Market 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation 

Number of 
SMP 
operators

Remedies imposed 

Comments / no comment 

Access 

Non-
discrimi
nation 

Trans-
parency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Accounting 
separation 

AT 

AT/2004/0106

AT/2004/0432 
AT/2006/0544 
AT/2008/0834
194 
AT/2009/0909

YES 

12 

for

YES 
Telekom 
Austria (TA) 

YES for TA

for

YES 
TA 

YES for TA 

Cost-orientation for Telekom 
Austria (TA) based on hybrid 
model, averaging of TD and 
BU LRAIC models. 

Benchmarking for ANOs to 
TA’s regional termination fees.

Implementation of proposed cost-
orientation obligation should be specified 
and take into account need for ANOs to 
become efficient over time. 

TKK invited to address issue of minimum 
interconnection loads. 

(AT/2006/0544) 

Calculation of the rates on the basis of a 
"hybrid" LRAIC model. Commission's 
recommended approach. 

(AT/2009/0909) 

194   In  case  AT/2008/0834  the  Austrian  NRA  notified  already  the  market  definition  for  its  third  round  market  review.  The  Commission  reminded  the  NRA  that  any 

notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon the effective delineation of the relevant market concerned at the time of that notification. 

EN 

50 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
YES 

20 

YES 

YES 

YES 

No comments 

Cost orientation for Belgacom 
based on TD approach 
possibly reconciled with BU 
approach. 

YES for 
Belgacom 

BE 

BE/2006/0440 
BE/2007/0588 
BE/2008/0750

BG 

BG/2009/0865

YES 

16 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Prohibition of excessive pricing 
for ANOs and benchmarking 
against incumbent (max. mark-
up of 15%). 

Cost-orientation for BTC 
based on benchmarking 
referring to 7 EU Member 
States that apply TD LRIC 
accounting systems. 
Methodology eventually in 
line with Recommendation. 

Further consultations planned by CRC. 

YES for BTC

Need to set termination rates at cost of an 
efficient operator and need for a coherent 
European approach.  

ANOs prices shall not 
exceed those of BTC. 

Implementation of symmetry for fixed-to-
fixed and mobile-to-fixed calls  

EN 

51 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CY 

CY/2006/0474

YES 

3195 

YES for ATHK

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation for ATHK 

(LRIC-model) 

Fair and reasonable prices for 
ANOs equal to the 
corresponding cost-oriented 
double transit  rate of ATHK 

increased by 10% and a 3-year 
time delay. 

Maximum prices based on 
BU-LRIC model 

(NGN to be taken into 
account in the following 
round) 

YES (subject 
to a 

Remedies imposed on D.Y. Worldnet, 
Callsat and Telepassport  

€50 million 
turnover 
threshold) 

(only notify when they enter the market 
and not to adopt the proposed measures 
at this stage). 

YES for TO2

Need to impose the access and cost-
orientation obligations also on ANOs 

CZ/2006/0358 
CZ/2007/0660 
CZ/2009/0809

CZ/2009/0964 

YES 

24 

YES for TO2 

YES 

YES 

CZ 

DK 

DK/2005/0207 
DK/2005/0314 
DK/2006/0523 
DK/2007/0683

DK/2009/0984

NO 

(includes dial-
up internet 
access) 

6 

YES 

YES for 
TDC 

YES for TDC

 (LRAIC model) 

YES for TDC

Cost-orientation for TDC 

Asymmetric application of remedies.  

(DK/2005/0207) 

Need to review the market; 

Inclusion of calls to service-providers in the 
fixed call termination market 

(DK/2009/0984) 

195 

At the time of notification, OCECPR expected that three other operators, D.Y. Worldwide, Callsat and Telepassport, which did not have direct connections to end-users 
at the time, would start providing wholesale call termination during the timeframe of its review and would de facto have SMP on their individual network markets.  

EN 

52 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
EE 

EE/2007/0598

YES 

12 

YES for Elion

YES 

YES 

FI 

FI/2003/0029 
FI/2007/0704 

YES 

35 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation  

(FDC based on HCA) 

Non-imposition of an access obligation on 
the market for call termination on ANOs' 
networks 

NO 

Asymmetry of termination rates 

Cost orientation. 

According to the Finnish 
Communications Market Act it 
is up to each operator to select 
their cost-accounting model 
and to submit a description of 
the procedures to FICORA 
showing main cost categories 
and cost allocation rules. 

Cost-orientation for France 
Telecom (FT) based on LRAIC

YES (subject 
to a net sales 
threshold of 
€20 million).

Cost-orientation and cost accounting 
obligations in the fixed termination 
markets. 

Need for a coherent European approach  

Need for a coherent European approach 

FR 

FR/2005/0228 
FR/2008/0784

YES 

21 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES for FT 

(differentiated glide-paths for France 
Telecom and ANOs) 

Prohibition of excessive pricing 
for ANOs 

EN 

53 

EN 

 
  
 
 
YES 

57 (2 
merged 
since 
original 
notification 
of 58 
operators)

YES for 
Deutsche 
Telekom 

NO for 56 
ANOs 

DE/2005/0144

DE/2005/0234

DE/2005/0239

DE 

DE/2006/0343

DE/2007/0671

DE/2007/0679

DE/2008/0844

DE/2009/0888 
DE2009/0948

EL 

EL/2006/0494 
EL/2008/0751 
EL/2008/0754

Not a specified price control. 
Ex-ante tariff authorization 
procedure. In the 
authorisation procedure 
BNetzA ensures that prices 
do not exceed the cost of 
efficient service provisioning. 

Notification of remedies at a later stage 
(ineffective approach) 

(DE/2008/0844)  

Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of remedies under the EU 
consultation procedure  

YES 

YES 

NO 

(DE/2009/0888 and DE/2009/0948) 

Ex-post price control. 

ANOs' termination rates 
should not exceed cost level 
of an efficient operator. 

Cost-orientation 

Delayed reciprocity for ANOs 
with OTE’s LRAIC-CCA fee. 

Price control and cost 
accounting for the incumbents

(to continue with FL-LRIC 
model pending outcome of 
consultation on wholesale 
price cap) 

Need to impose a cost orientation 
obligation on the market for call termination
on ANOs' networks; 

Non-imposition of access obligation on 
ANOs. 

(DE/2009/0948) 

Need for a coherent European approach 

(EL/2008/0751 and EL/2008/0754) 

YES for 
incumbents 

Remedy of non-discrimination 

Asymmetric remedies imposed on local 
incumbents and alternative operators 

Need for a coherent European approach. 

HU 

HU/2005/0152 
HU/2007/0727

YES 

15 

YES for 
incumbents 

YES 

YES 

YES 

15 

YES 

YES 

YES 

(LRAIC-CCA for OTE). 

YES for OTE

EN 

54 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IE 

IE/2005/0191 
IE/2007/0701 
IE/2009/0917

YES 

7 

YES for Eircom YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation for Eircom 

 (LRIC model) 

Price  control  obligation  on 
ANOs  linked  to  market  share 
threshold  of  5%  or  5  years 
from  date  of  final  decision, 
whichever is soonest. 

IT 

IT/2006/0384 
IT/2008/0753 
IT/2008/0777 

YES 

41 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO for 23
ANOs 

NO for 23 
ANOs with 
low level of 
infrastructure

Price control through a network 
cap (CPI-X%) mechanism for 
Telecom Italia (TI). 

For 17 ANOs, starting value of 
glide paths determined in 
derogation proceedings. BU-
LRAIC model used to calculate 
remaining values. 

NO for 23 ANOs 

YES for TI 

Non-imposition of access obligation on the 
market for call termination on ANOs' 
networks. 

Price control obligation to be imposed on 
ANOs (does not address competition 
problem identified). 

YES for 
Eircom 

Further consultations on wholesale price 
cap and glide path to be imposed on 
Eircom and ANOs 

Need for a coherent European approach. 

High starting points of ANOs' glide paths 
and asymmetry between ANOs. 

Inclusion of mark-up in ANO cost model 
for "competition costs". 

Inclusion of costs in ANO cost model 
related to customer premises equipment. 
(IT/2008/0753) 

Definition of obligations for call 
termination to geographic numbers at 
fixed locations for integrated fixed/mobile 
offers.  

Differentiation of remedies according to 
type of access employed. 

Need for a coherent European approach. 
(IT/2008/0753 and IT/2008/0777) 

EN 

55 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
LV 

LV/2006/0366 
LV/2009/0889

YES 

18 

YES for 
Lattelecom 

YES for 
Lattelecom

YES 

YES for 
Lattelecom

Further consultation planned by SPRK 
on price control and cost accounting 
obligation.  

Asymmetric remedies proposed for 
alternative operators. (SPRK invited to 
ensure that ANOs' termination rates are 
set at an efficient level). 

Need for a coherent European approach. 

Cost-orientation for 
Lattelecom. Subject to 
outcome of consultation and 
Commission Recommendation 
foresees glide path based on 
existing FDC-CCA model. 

Obligation on ANOs to publish 
price lists. 

Cost-orientation for TEO 

(HY-LRAIC) 

LT 

LT/2005/0263 
LT/2007/0607 
LT/2007/0681

LT/2009/0983

YES 

10 

YES 

for

YES 
TEO 

YES for TEO

For ANOs: apply prices not 
higher than TEO's (when 
implementing the price control 
obligation) 

YES for TEO

Need for an appropriate price control 
obligation 

Access obligations proposed for TEO 
and alternative operators (need to 
reconsider their scope and wording)  

LU 

LU/2006/0560

YES 

9 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation for EPT 

 (FDC) 

Obligation on ANOs to charge 
reasonable prices. Max mark-
up of 20% on EPT's rates and 
subject to ILR's approval. 

YES for EPT

No comments 

EN 

56 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MT 

MT/2006/0388

YES 

2 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NL 

PL 

NL/2005/0284 
NL/2007/0742 
NL/2007/0743 
NL/2008/0793 
NL/2008/0830

NL/2009/0978

PL/2006/0381 
PL/2006/0502

PL/2007/0633 
PL/2007/0641 
PL/2007/0685 
PL/2008/0760  
PL/2008/0761 
PL/2008/0762

PL/2008/0776 
PL/2008/0814 
PL/2009/0903

YES 

33 

YES 

NO 

YES 

YES 

Approx. 40

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation for Maltacom

(FAC-HCA; considering a 
move to CCA) 

Melita's termination rates are 
pegged to Maltacom's as a 
maximum.  

Price control based on 
symmetric price caps for all 
operators from 1 January 
2009. 3-year wholesale price 
caps which take KPN's 
prices into account based on 
TD-EDC. 

Price control only for 
Telekomunikacja Polska (TP) 
based on costs incurred, which 
may be verified by the NRA 
using benchmarking or other 
methods (e.g. Including price 
cap, retail minus, cost 
orientation/cost accounting) 

NO for ANOs 

YES for 
Maltacom 

Level of termination charges – 
implementation of cost orientation. (Invites 
MCA to accelerate tariff reduction. 
Suggests benchmarking as temporary 
measure). 

Need for a coherent EU approach - the 
proposed cost calculation methodology 

NO 

(NL/2008/0830, NL/2009/0978) 

Non-imposition of price control on ANOs  

(PL/2006/0502, PL/2007/0633, 
PL/2007/0641, PL/2007/0685, 
PL/2008/0760-0762, PL/2008/0776, 
PL/2008/0814) 

Need for a coherent European approach 

YES only for 
TP 

(PL/2008/0760-0762, PL/2008/0776, 
PL/2008/0814) 

Asymmetry of fixed termination rates 
(PL/2008/0814) 

Proposed price control and cost 
accounting obligation (for TP) and need 
for a coherent European approach for 
regulating wholesale fixed termination 
rates. (PL/2009/0903) 

EN 

57 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of remedies under the 
EU consultation procedure. 
(PL/2009/0903) 

Asymmetrical application of remedies; 
(assess whether assumptions on ‘fair and 
reasonable prices’ will remain relevant 
over market review). 

(PT/2004/0092) 

Inclusion  of  conveyance  services 
in
definition  of  the  call  termination  network
segment 

PT 

PT/2004/0061 
PT/2004/0092

YES 

8 

YES 

Cost-orientation for PT 

YES for 
Portugal 
Telecom 
(PT) 

YES for PT

Obligation for fair and 
reasonable prices for ANOs. 
Max difference of 20% to PT’s 
rates. 

YES for PT 

RO 

RO/2007/0653 
RO/2008/0774

RO/2009/1003

YES 

(includes calls 
to public 
interest 
services) 

38 

YES 

YES 

YES 

SK 

SK/2004/0102 
SK/2005/0187

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation for 
Romtelecom based on LRIC 

Delayed reciprocity for ANOs 

Cost-orientation  

(conciliation between the TD-
LRIC of the incumbent and 
BU-FL-LRAIC model 
developed by the regulator) 

YES for 
Romtelecom

Need for a coherent European approach 
(RO/2008/0774)  

Scope and purpose of the draft measure / 
Justification of the use of Article 5 of the 
Access Directive (0653 RO/2009/1003) 

YES 

No comments 

EN 

58 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
SI 

SI/2005/0258 
SI/2007/0690

YES 

8 

YES 

YES 

YES 

ES 

ES/2005/0250 
ES/2008/0818

YES 

28 

YES 

YES for 
TESAU 

YES for 
TESAU 

SE/2004/0050

Cost-orientation  

LRIC methodology for Telekom 
Slovenije (TS) and FAC-HCA 
methodology for T-2 

(effective until December 
2008). 

Other ANOs obliged to 
introduce prices based on a 
glide path towards cost-
oriented price of TS 

Cost-orientation for TESAU 

(TD FAC). 

Reasonable prices for ANOs. 
30% mark up above TESAU’s 
local level rates.  

Cost-orientation for 
TeliaSonera (LRIC) 

SE 

SE/2009/0967

YES 

26 

YES 

YES 

YES 

SE/2009/1017 

Obligation on ANOs to charge 
fair and reasonable prices ; 
reciprocal FTRs (i.e. symmetry 
because non-discrimination) 

YES 

YES for TS 

Need for a European approach 

YES for 
TESAU 

Asymmetry and the proposed cost 
calculation methodology 

Need for a coherent European approach 

Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of remedies (i.e. need to 
notify revision of costing methodologies) 

The proposed cost methodology (i.e. 
includes non-traffic related costs) 

(SE/2009/1017) 

EN 

59 

EN 

 
  
 
 
UK/2003/0003 

UK/2004/0045 
UK/2004/0072 

UK/2004/0122 
UK/2005/0165 

UK 

YES196 

5 

UK/2005/0217 
UK/2005/0218 
UK/2007/0585 
UK/2007/0649 
UK/2008/0769 
UK/2009/0898 

YES for KCOM 
and BT 

YES for 
KCOM and 
BT 

YES for 
KCOM and 
BT 

All other ANOs 
required to 
provide access 
on fair and 
reasonable 
terms 

Cost orientation for BT and 
KCOM where charges set on 
the basis of LRIC plus an 
appropriate mark-up for costs 
which are common across 
products, and for recovery of 
the cost of capital. Uses FAC-
CCA data to provide a proxy 
for the LRIC+ model. 

NO 

Appropriateness of the proposed costing 
methodology and need for a coherent 
European approach 

GI 

GI/2007/0717

GI/2009/0976

YES 

2 

YES  

for Gibtelecom

YES  

YES for 
Gibtelecom 

Cost-orientation (non 
specified) for Gibtelecom 

Fair and reasonable prices 
for CTS 

Lack of details concerning price control 
and cost accounting obligations; 

YES for 
Gibtelecom 

Need for a coherent European 
approach (GI/2007/0717) 

Non imposition of an access obligation; 

Need for ex ante price control and 
efficient termination rates(GI/2009/0976) 

196   Ofcom’s proposed market definition for call termination differs from market 3 as defined in the Recommendation in that it splits out local-tandem conveyance / transit. 
Local-tandem conveyance and transit (LTC/LTT) includes the conveyance of traffic between the local exchanges that provide call origination and termination service 
and the tandem layer of the network. Ofcom finds however that once BT has completed its migration to its NGN network, LTC/LTT is no longer a relevant market 
since the NGN network does not include separate local and tandem layers to which communications providers can interconnect for the routing of voice traffic. Ofcom 
considers therefore that the three-criteria test is no longer met for this market. 

EN 

60 

EN 

 
  
 
 
                                                 
Market 4: Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access (including shared or fully unbundled access) at a fixed location 

Member 
State 

Related cases

Market 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation 

Number of 
SMP 
operators 

Remedies imposed 

Comments / no comment 

Access 

Non-
discrimination 

Trans-
parency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Accounting 
separation 

AT/2004/0098 

AT/2005/0318 

AT/2006/0537 

197

AT

AT/2007/0682 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FL-LRIC  

YES 

No comments 

AT/2007/0795 

AT/2008/0835 

AT/2009/0871 

197 

In  case  AT/2008/0835,  the  Austrian  NRA  has  already  notified  the  market  definition  for  its  third  round  market  review.  The  Commission  commented  on  the  NRA's 
approach which consisted in notifying the market definition including the three criteria test in advance of the full market analysis and the proposed remedies. 

EN 

61 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
198

BE

BE/2007/0735 
BE/2008/0801

BE/2009/0949

BE/2010/1033 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Bottom-up methodology 
reflecting the costs of an 
efficient operator. 

Margin squeeze test. 

BG 

NOT YET NOTIFIED 

Promotion of investment on 
infrastructure in relation to wholesale 
unbundled access (including shared 
access) to the local loop and competition 
at the retail level 

(BE/2007/0735 and BE/2009/0949 ) 

Access to fibre infrastructure 

YES 

(BE/2007/0735 and BE/2009/0949 ) 

Timeframe for the market review and 
efficient enforcement of regulatory 
obligations 

(BE/2007/0735) 

The exact scope of wholesale services 
susceptible to ex-ante regulation 

(BE/2008/0801) 

198  

The decision of the Belgian NRA on Markets 11 and 12 (Cases BE/2007/0735 and BE/2007/0736) was annulled by the Belgian Court of Appeal on 7 May 2009 due to 
insufficient motivation. A new decision aiming at remedying the referred lack of motivation was adopted and notified to the Commission under Cases BE/2009/0949 
and BE/2009/0950. 

EN 

62 

EN 

 
  
 
                                                 
YES 

CY 

CY/2006/0331 

CY/2009/0869 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Bottom-up LRIC. Results 
reconciled with hybrid model 
based on FDC and LRIC 
models. 

YES 

Margin squeeze test. 

Reinforcing regulatory oversight 

Exclusion of fibre from the relevant 
market 

Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 

CZ/2006/0340 

CZ/2008/0773 

CZ 

CZ/2008/0828 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

LRIC. Covers co-location 
services. 

YES 

No comments 

CZ/2009/0933
199

DK/2005/0176

DK/2007/0683

DK/2008/0860

DK/2009/0984

DK 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

LRAIC 

FAHC model applied 
transitionally to certain less 
closely related services and 
for the 2009 price caps for 
“best effort” local loops, 
backhaul sections and 
migration. 

YES 

Exclusion of fibre from the market 

Regulation of “best effort” local loops 

Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 

199   Case withdrawn by the NRA. 

EN 

63 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
EE/2007/0577 

EE 

EE/2009/0942 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

HC- FDC 

FI* 

** 

FI/2003/0030 

FI/2006/0547 

FI/2008/0839 

YES 

YES 

32 

YES 

YES 

Up to operator to choose its 
own cost accounting 
methodology. Ficora can 
issue mandatory regulations 
concerning cost accounting 
systems. 

Obligation not applicable to 
fibre loops. 

Inclusion of access support services in 
the wholesale (physical) network 
infrastructure access market definition 

Obligations with regard to fibre loops in 
the wholesale (physical) infrastructure 
access market 

Pricing of installation charges 

Obligations with regard to fibre loops 

YES 

YES 

Only on 9 
SMP 
operators  

(i) No cost orientation obligation 

(ii) Migration from copper to fibre local 
loops and access to passive 
infrastructure 

FR/2005/0174 

FR  

FR/2005/0301 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FR/2008/0780 

Cost oriented prices. 

Access to the civil works 
infrastructure to be 
determined at a later stage. 

YES 

Market Definition 

Inclusion of civil works infrastructure in 
the wholesale physical network 
infrastructure access market 

Remedies 

Access to terminating segment of the 
access network 

Recommendation on NGA 

EN 

64 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DE/2004/0119

DE** 

DE/2005/0150

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Ex ante price control based 
on the costs of the efficient 
provision of services. 

NO 

Access to ducts leading to the street 
cabinet 

Access at the MDF to the new 
infrastructure 

DE/2007/0646

EL/2006/0353 

EL 

EL/2008/0751 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

LRAIC 

YES 

EL/2009/0934 

Access to unlit fibre 

Collocation in and at the street cabinet 

Exclusion of fibre from the market 
definition 

HU** 

HU/2005/0185

HU/2007/0731

YES 

Operating 
area of 
Magyar 
Telekom 

1 

Operating 
area of 
Invitel 

Operating 
area of 
Hungarotel 

Operating 
area of 
Monortel 

YES 

YES 

YES 

LRIC 

YES 

No comments 

EN 

65 

EN 

 
  
 
YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

IE 

IE/2004/0046 

 IE/2009/0875 

IE/2009/0918 

IE/2009/0923 

IE/2009/0924 

IE/2009/0969 

IT/2005/0244 

IT/2007/0613 

Market definition 

(IE/2009/0875) 

Prohibition of margin 
squeeze. 

LRIC for current generation 
LLU. Further consultation on 
NGA-based services. 

Obligations 
concerning 
accounting 
separation 
to be 
subject to 
further 
consultation

Further consultation planned by 
ComReg 

(IE/2009/0875) 

Remedies imposed in the context of 
next-generation access (NGA) 
development and the need for a 
consistent European approach 

(IE/2009/0875) 

Need for an overall analysis of markets 4 
and 5 (IE/2009/0875) 

Lack of notification of the remedies 

(IT/2009/0891) 

Modification of the undertakings 

(IT/2009/0988) 

IT 

IT/2009/0867 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

BU- LRIC model. Network 
cap mechanism (IPC-X).  

YES 

Implementation and monitoring of the 
undertakings of Telecom Italia 

IT/2009/0891 

IT/2009/0988 

(IT/2009/0988) 

The Supervisory Board and OTA Italia 

(IT/2009/0988) 

Reasonable pricing for access to civil 
infrastructure and dark fibre 

EN 

66 

EN 

 
  
(IT/2009/0988) 

Lack of fibre unbundling obligation under 
a forward-looking market analysis 

(IT/2009/0988) 

Migration process in a NGA context 

(IT/2009/0988) 

Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 

(IT/2009/0988) 

Notification requirements as to the price 
control obligation 

(IT/2009/0988) 

LV 

LV/2006/0539 

LT/2009/0995 

YES 

LT 

LT/2006/0391 

YES 

LU 

LU/2006/0509 

YES 

MT 

MT/2006/0549

YES 

1 

1 

1 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FDC-CCA  

YES 

No comments 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FDC 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-oriented prices 
calculated on the basis of the 
costs of an efficient operator. 

YES 

YES 

No comments 

Details of the proposed price control 
obligation 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FAC-HCA 

YES 

No comments 

EN 

67 

EN 

 
  
NL 

NL/2005/0280 

NL/2007/0630 

NL/2008/0793 

NL/2008/0826 

NL/2009/0868 

NL/2009/0906 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-oriented prices. EDC 
for copper LLU and FTTO. 
DCF/IRR for FTTH. 

NO 

(to be 
withdrawn) 

Recommendation on NGA 

(NL/2008/0826) 

(NL/2009/0906) 

Parameters for the cost model 

Recommendation on NGA and further 
consultations on the price regulation in 
the market for LLU 

(NL/2009/0868) 

PL 

PL/2006/0418 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

PT 

PT/2004/0117 

PT/2008/0850 

PT/2009/0956 

PT/2009/1012 

NO 

(Cable 
included) 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FL LRIC 

 Until an auditor confirms the 
accuracy of the calculations, 
the SMP operator will set 
appropriate charges based 
on costs incurred. The NRA 
will control such costs using 
comparison with competitive 
markets or other methods, 
such as “retail minus”, 
“bottom up” or best current 
practice. 

ANACOM uses the 
information provided by the 
SMP operator's cost 
accounting model, which is 
FDHC. ANACOM also uses 
other price references and 
international benchmarks. 

YES 

Price control before approval of LRIC 
cost calculation 

Inclusion of cable in market 4 on the 
basis of indirect constraints 

YES 

(PT/2008/0850) 

Regulation of fibre in market 4 and 5 

(PT/2008/0850) 

EN 

68 

EN 

 
  
 
NOT YET NOTIFIED 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation 

YES 

RO 

SK 

SK/2004/0107

SK/2009/0929
200

SI/2005/0142 

SI/2005/0181 

SI/2006/0519 

Implementation of the proposed cost 
orientation obligation 

National public consultation 

Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 

(SI/2009/0957) 

Imposition of a different price control 
methodology without a new market 
analysis 

SI 

SI/2009/0957 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

LRIC+ 

YES 

(SI/2009/0981) 

SI/2009/0981 

SI/2009/1010 

Parameters of the cost model 

(SI/2009/0981) 

Effective implementation of the glide-
path towards cost-orientation for 
Greenfield optical fibres 

(SI/2009/1010) 

200   Case withdrawn by the NRA. 

EN 

69 

EN 

 
  
 
   
                                                 
ES/2006/0368 

ES 

ES/2008/0804 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

YES 

ES/2009/0961 

Exclusion of FTTH from the market for 
wholesale network infrastructure access 
at a fixed location 

(ES/2008/0804) 

Reference offer and price control 
obligation as regards access to the 
physical network infrastructure 

(ES/2008/0804) 

Economic viability of access to ducts in 
Spain 

(ES/2008/0804) 

Recommendation on NGA networks 

(ES/2008/0804) 

Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of remedies under the EU 
consultation procedure 

SE 

SE/2004/0084 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

SE/2009/1018 

LRIC 

(mark-up LRIC for shared 
access) 

YES 

(SE/2009/1018) 

Need to carry out a new review of the 
LLU market 

(SE/2009/1018) 

EN 

70 

EN 

 
  
 
 
UK/2004/0094

UK/2004/0123

UK/2007/0585

UK** 

UK/2007/0649

UK/2007/0741

UK/2008/0854

UK/2009/0901

GI 

GI/2007/0718 

YES 

UK 

(excluding 
Hull area) 

NO 

1 

(Cable 
included) 

Hull area 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FAC-CCA 

YES 

Product market definition, including both 
copper loop-based and cable-based 
wholesale local accesses 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FAC-CCA 

NO 

1 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-oriented prices. 

Details on the cost 
accounting model to be 
determined at a later stage. 

YES 

Lack of details concerning price control 
and cost accounting obligations 

* Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 

** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets or geographic differentiation 

*** Geographic differentiation of remedies 

**** Market not included in the Recommendation 

EN 

71 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
Market 5: Wholesale broadband access 

Member 
State 

Related cases 

Market 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation 

Number 
of SMP 
operators

Remedies imposed 

Comments / no comment 

Access 

Non-
discrimination 

Trans-
parency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Accounting 
separation 

Area 1 

Area 1 

Market Definition 

201

AT

*** 

AT/2005/0312 
202

AT/2008/0757

AT/2009/0970 

NO 

(Cable 
included) 

1 

Area 2 

Area 2 

Area 2 

Area 2 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Retail minus 

TO BE DEREGULATED 

YES 

(i)  Strength of indirect constraint from 

vertically integrated competitors 

Area 2 

YES 

(ii)  Geographic market definition 

SMP assessment and future possible 
constraints 

Sustainability of competition from 
alternative providers 

201  

In case AT/2009/0970 the Austrian NRA has already notified the market definition for its third round market review. The Commission issued a letter of serious doubts 
following which the Austrian NRA revised the draft measure. The serious doubts were withdrawn. 

202   On  17  December  2008,  the  Austrian  Administrative  Court  (Verwaltungsgerichtshof)  annulled  the  NRA's  decision  concerning  case  AT/2008/0757.  The  remedies 
currently applied are the ones notified under case AT/2005/0312, i.e. access, non-discrimination, reference offer, price-control based on “retail minus”, cost accounting, 
accounting separation. 

EN 

72 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
203

BE

BE/2007/0736 

BE/2008/0801 

BE/2009/0950 

BE/2010/1033 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-oriented prices on the 
basis of the costs of an 
efficient operator. 

VDSL and VDSL2, access 
price on the basis of 
reasonable costs with an 
eviction test. 

Margin squeeze test. 

Promotion of investment on 
infrastructure in relation to wholesale 
unbundled access (including shared 
access) to the local loop and competition 
at the retail level 

(BE/2007/0736 and BE/2009/0949) 

YES 

Timeframe for the market review and 
efficient enforcement of regulatory 
obligations 

(BE/2007/0736) 

The exact scope of wholesale services 
susceptible to ex-ante regulation 

(BE/2008/0801) 

BG 

CY 

CY/2006/033
2 

CY/2009/087
0 

YES 

NOT YET NOTIFIED 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

LRIC in conjunction with a 
margin squeeze model. 

YES 

Exclusion of fibre from the relevant 
market 

Reinforcing regulatory oversight 

Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 

203   The decision of the Belgian NRA on Markets 11 and 12 (Cases BE/2007/0735 and BE/2007/0736) was annulled by the Belgian Court of Appeal on 7 May 2009 due to 
insufficient motivation. A new decision aiming at remedying the referred lack of motivation was adopted and notified to the Commission under Cases BE/2009/0949 
and BE/2009/0950. 

EN 

73 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

YES 

Market definition 

SMP assessment 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

LRAIC for copper based 
access and collocation. 

The price control of cable 
access is based on FAHC 
but only effective upon a 
reasonable request for 
access. 

ECPR for access at the 
national and local level and 
FDHC at the DSLAM level. 
ECPR provides for a result 
equivalent to retail minus. 

Inclusion of cable in the wholesale 
broadband access market 

The scope of the access obligation 

YES 

Regulation of fibre 

Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 

YES 

Inclusion of cable infrastructure in the 
WBA market definition 

32 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

NO 

Inclusion of cable access in the market 
definition 

Absence of any price regulation 

Definition of geographic sub-markets for 
possible de-regulation in the future 

CZ 

CZ/2006/0449 

CZ/2008/0797 

DK/2005/0182
204 

DK/2005/0209 

NO 

DK 

DK/2008/0862 

DK/2009/0984 

(Cable 
included) 

EE 

EE/2006/0522 

EE/2009/0943 

NO 

(Cable 
included) 

FI/2004/0062 

FI/2006/0548 

FI/2008/0848
205

NO 

(Geo. Diff./ 
Cable 
included) 

FI** 

FI/ 2009/0900 

204   Case withdrawn by the NRA. 

205   Case withdrawn by the NRA. 

EN 

74 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
FR 

FR/2005/0175

FR/2008/0781

NO 

(Cable 
included) 

1 

YES 

Bitstrea
m 
access 
on fibre 
is not 
mandat
ed. 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

YES 

Obligation 
also 
applicable 
to fibre 
connections

Market Definition 

(i) Inclusion of cable in the wholesale 
broadband access market 

(ii) Inclusion of fibre in the wholesale 
broadband access market 

(iii) Geographic market definition of the 
wholesale broadband access market 

Remedies 

Recommendation on NGA 

DE** 

**** 

EN 

DE/2005/0260

NO 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

DE/2006/0457

DE/2007/0576

DE/2009/0908

(2 markets: 
handover at 
(i) ATM-
level and (ii 
IP-level) ) 

For IP bitstream access, 
tariffs are subject to prior 
approval by BNetza. 
According to German law, 
price control should be 
carried out by means of cost-
orientation to efficient 
cost/benchmarking. 

For  ATM  bitstream  access, 
ex post price control. 

75 

YES 

Need to base any prior exclusion of 
products from the wholesale broadband 
access markets on a proper 
substitutability test (DE/2005/0260) 

Imposition of remedies (DE/2005/0260) 

Scope of access obligation 
(DE/2006/0457) 

Stand alone bitstream access 
(DE/2006/0457) 

Effective price regulation 
(DE/2006/0457) 

EN 

Notification of remedies concerning 
ATM bitstream to be submitted without 

 
  
 
 
 
 
(DE/2007/0576) 

Stand alone bitstream access 
(DE/2007/0576) 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Price caps on the basis of 
the costs of an efficient 
service provider. 

YES 

Notification and adoption of remedies 

DE/2007/0639

NO 

DE/2007/0702

(Wholesale 
broadband 
conveyance 
markets) 

Regional 
broadban
d 
conveyan
ce market 

1 

Supra-
regional 
conveyan
ce market 

0 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

EL 

EL/2006/0372 

EL/2007/0658 

EL/2008/0751 

EL/2009/0935 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

LRAIC 

YES 

(DE/2007/0639) 

Implementation of bitstream remedies 

(DE/2007/0639 and DE/2007/0702) 

Exclusion of fibre from the market 
definitions 

The scope of the non-discrimination 
obligation I market 5 

EN 

76 

EN 

 
  
 
 
HU** 

HU/2005/0186

HU/2006/3632 
HU/2007/0732

NO 

(Geo. Diff.) 

Operating 
area of 
Magyar 
Telekom 
1 

Operating 
area of 
Invitel 
1 

Operating 
area of 
Hungarote
l 
1 

Operating 
area of 
Monortel 
1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

No comments 

Retail minus for the national 
bitstream. 

TD-LRIC for the local 
bitstream.  

IE 

IE/2004/0093 

IE/2005/0313 

IE/2008/0852 

IE/2009/0919 

NO 

(Cable 
included) 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Retail minus.  

For the definition of the “minus”, Eircom’s 
costs and revenues will be used as the 
basis for establishing the costs and 
revenues of a similarly efficient operator. 
For the assessment of margins, DCF 
methodology will be carried over a 5-year 
period.  

The margin squeeze test shall be applied on 
a product-by-product basis, with separate 
control for each wholesale and retail product 
pair. The “minus” margin will be reviewed 
annually. (IE/2005/0313) 

The inclusion of self-supply by cable 
operators and FWA operators in the 
relevant product market 

(IE/2004/0093)  

Further consultation planned by 
ComReg 

(IE/2004/0093)  

EN 

77 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
IT/2005/0253 

IT/2007/0609 

IT 

IT/2007/0614 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

BU- LRIC model. Network 
cap mechanism (IPC-X).  

YES 

IT/2009/0892 

IT/2009/0989 

LV 

LV/2006/0540 

YES 

LT 

LT/2005/0267 

YES 

1 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FDC-CCA 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FDC 

YES 

YES 

Geographic market definition of the 
wholesale broadband access market 
(IT/2009/0892) 

Inclusion of Wireless Local Loops 
(WLL) into the market definition 
(IT/2009/0892) 

Lack of notification of the remedies 
(IT/2009/0892) 

Modification of the undertakings 
(IT/2009/0988) 

Implementation and monitoring of the 
undertakings of Telecom Italia 
(IT/2009/0988) 

The Supervisory Board and OTA Italia 
(IT/2009/0988) 

Migration process in a NGA context 
(IT/2009/0988) 

Remedies  imposed  in  the  context  of 
NGA  development  and  need  for  a 
consistent 
approach 
European 
(IT/2009/0988) 

Notification requirements as to the price 
control obligation 

(IT/2009/0988) 

No comments 

No comments 

EN 

78 

EN 

 
  
LU 

LU/2006/0510

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Retail-minus based on the 
avoided costs of the 
incumbent.  

Access obligation 

YES 

Stand alone bitstream access 

Price control obligation 

MT 

MT/2007/0563
206

NO 

MT/2008/0803

(Cable 
included) 

NL** 

NL/2005/0281 

NL/2008/0827

NO 

(Segmentat
ion/Cable 
included) 

0 

TO BE WITHDRAWN AS FROM 1.07.2009. 

Monitoring market developments 

YES 

Copper 
only 

YES 

Copper only 

YES 

NO 

NO 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

NO 

Low 
Quality 

1 

High 
Quality 

1 

Inclusion of cable in market 5 on the 
basis of indirect constraints 

Regulatory treatment of fibre in the low 
quality WBA market 

Effectiveness of currently envisaged 
margin squeeze test 

Recommendation on NGA 

PL 

PL/2006/0472 

NO 

(Cable 
included) 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FL-LRIC. Until auditor 
confirms accuracy of 
calculations, TP is obliged to 
set appropriate charges 
based on costs incurred and 
the NRA intends to control 
them on the basis of the 
retail minus method, where 
the wholesale price will be 
calculated as the lowest TP 
retail price minus the 
avoidable cost of the service. 

YES 

Defining the scope of the obligations 
imposed 

206   Case withdrawn by the NRA. 

EN 

79 

EN 

 
  
 
 
                                                 
PT** 

PT/2004/0118 

PT/2008/0851 

NO 

(Geo. Diff./ 
Cable 
included) 

"NC" 
areas 

1 

"C" areas 

0 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation for naked 
ADSL. 

YES 

Retail minus.  

To be 
phased 
out 
after a 
transito
ry 
period 
of 12 
months 

To be phased 
out after a 
transitory 
period of 12 
months 

To be 
phased 
out after 
a 
transitor
y period 
of 12 
months 

To be withdrawn immediately 

To be 
phased out 
after a 
transitory 
period of 12 
months 

RO 

NOT YET NOTIFIED 

SK 

SK/2006/0465

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Retail minus 

YES 

Inclusion of self-supply in market 5 on 
the basis of indirect constraints 

Monitoring of trend towards effective 
competition 

Regulation of fibre in market 4 and 5 

Defining the scope of the access 
obligation imposed 

Market definition for WBA 

(SI/2009/0958) 

SI/2006/0346 

SI/2007/0664 

SI 

SI/2009/0958 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

SI/2009/0982 

SI/2009/1010 

Retail minus. 

Prohibition of margin 
squeeze. 

Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 
(SI/2009/0958) 

YES 

Imposition of a different price control 
methodology without a new market 
analysis (SI/2009/0981) 

Parameters of the cost model 
(SI/2009/0981) 

EN 

80 

EN 

 
  
 
 
ES 

ES/2006/0370
ES/2007/0626 

YES 

1 

Only for speeds up to 30Mb/s 

Regulation of bitstream offers only up to 
30 Mb/s 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

YES 

ES/2008/0805

SE 

SE/2004/0083

NO 

(Cable 
included) 

UK** 

UK/2003/0032  

UK/2003/0033 

UK/2003/0034

UK/2007/0585

UK/2007/0649

UK/2007/0733

UK/2008/0769

UK/2009/0901

NO 

(Geo. Diff./ 
Cable 
included) 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Retail minus. 

YES 

Market 1 

1 (BT) 

Market 2 

1 (BT) 

Market 3 

No 

Hull area 

1 
(Kingston 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

NO 

YES 

YES 

Any existing obligation to be phased out within a transitional period of 1 year 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

YES 

Cable-TV networks as alternative 
infrastructure for the provision of 
wholesale bitstream access 

Strength of indirect constraint from 
vertically integrated competitors 

Geographic market definition and 
Ofcom’s definition of sub-national 
markets 

Monitoring of trend towards effective 
competition 

Sustainability of competition from 
alternative providers 

EN 

81 

EN 

 
  
 
GI 

GI/2007/0719 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-oriented prices. 

Details on the cost 
accounting model to be 
determined at a later stage. 

YES 

Broad regulation of wholesale 
broadband access 

* Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 

** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets or geographic differentiation 

*** Geographic differentiation of remedies 

**** Market not included in the Recommendation 

EN 

82 

EN 

 
  
 
 
Market 6: Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines 

Member 
State 

Related cases

Market 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation 

Number of 
SMP 
operators 

Remedies imposed 

Comments / no comment 

Access 

Non-
discrimination 

Trans-
parency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Accounting 
separation 

AT/2004/0100

AT/2006/0508

AT/2008/0836

AT/2009/0932

BE/2006/0552 

BE/2009/0882 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-oriented access prices 
according to efficient service 
provision cost; 

Price control by dispute 
settlement before the NRA 

YES 

Geographical delineation of the market for 
terminating segments of leased lines with 
high bandwidth 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Bottom up LRIC 

NO 

Cost accounting for wholesale terminating 
segments of leased lines 

NOT YET NOTIFIED 

In  cases  AT/2008/0836  and  AT/2009/0932  the  Austrian  NRA  notified  only  the  market  definition  for  its  third  round  market  review,  which  defines  geographic 
submarkets.  

The Commission commented on the NRA's approach of applying geographical differentiation in the market segment of leased lines with high bandwidth. 

83 

EN 

AT207 

BE 

BG 

207  

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
CY 

CY/2006/0482 

YES 

CZ 

CZ/2006/0450 

YES 

DK 

DK/2005/0245 

YES 

EE 

EE/2007/0643 

YES 

1 

1 

1 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Retail minus and later (once 
implemented) bottom up LRIC

YES 

No comments 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation obligation 

YES 

No comments 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Modified historic costs 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

A price cap 

YES 

Conditions of competition in low and high 
bandwidth terminating segments, and 
scope of remedies 

Price control, implementation of the cost-
accounting system 

FI 

FI/2004/0080 

FI/2009/0986 

YES 

31 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Non-discriminatory prices 

NO 

No comments 

FR 

FR/2006/0416 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

The prohibition of predatory 
prices for all services; 

A cost orientation obligation 
for selected products 

YES 

Remedies for terminating segments of 
leased lines 

DE/2006/0480 

DE 

DE/2007/0677 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Ex-post price control 

NO 

No comments 

DE/2007/0687 

EL 

EL/2006/0422 

NO** 

HU 

HU/2005/0168 

HU/2007/0738 

YES 

1 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FDC and later (once 
implemented) LRIC/CC 

YES 

No comments 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Retail minus 

YES 

No comments  

EN 

84 

EN 

 
  
 
IE/2005/0139 

IE/2008/0791 

IE/2009/0920 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

PPC: Cost orientation (FL-
LRIC) 

WLL: retail minus 

YES 

Remedies concerning WLL products; 

Further consultation planned by ComReg 

IE 

IT 

IT/2005/0272 

IT/2009/1000 

YES 

LV 

LV/2007/0572 

YES 

LT 

LT/2006/0430 

YES 

LU 

LU/2006/0561 

NO** 

MT  MT/2006/0374 

YES 

NL 

NL/2005/0282 

NL/2008/0823 

NO** 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Network cap mechanism 

YES 

Removal of regulatory 
obligations 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES (not specified) 

YES 

No comments 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FDC or "best practice" 
approach 

YES 

No comments 

YES 

YES 

YES 

FDC methodology 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Fully allocated historic costs 

YES 

Lack of sufficient evidence for not 
separating the markets for terminating 
and trunk segments of leased lines 

The inclusion of international lines in the 
wholesale and retail market definitions 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Wholesale price cap 

NO 

Scope of the access obligation 

EN 

85 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
PL/2006/0516 

PL 

PL/2007/0667 

NO** 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Charges based on costs 
incurred 

YES 

No comments 

PL/2008/0771 

PT 

PT/2005/0156 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

RO 

The cost-orientation obligation 
upon PTC’s costs and 
European benchmark practices

NOT YET NOTIFIED 

YES 

No comments 

SK 

SK/2006/0386 

NO** 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

The method of fully allocated 
historical costs and a price cap

YES 

Inclusion of optical and wireless networks 
in the market for wholesale terminating 
segments of leased lines; 

Parallel imposition of cost orientation 
obligation and price cap 

SI/2005/0219 

SI 

SI/2005/0305 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

SI/2008/0767 

ES 

ES/2006/0458 

ES/2009/0930 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

SE 

SE/2005/0200 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

By 1 June 2009 glide path 
based on benchmarking, 

FAC CCA as from 1 June 2009

FDC based on current costs 
for traditional interfaces and a 
retail minus for Ethernet 
interfaces 

Fully distributed costs taking 
into account both historic and 
current costs 

YES 

No comments 

YES 

Limitation of the scope of the remedies in 
the market of terminating leased lines to 
services based on traditional interfaces 

YES 

Market share data 

EN 

86 

EN 

 
  
 
 
UK/2003/0037 

UK/2003/0038 

UK/2008/0747 

NO** 

UK 

UK/2008/0787 

(Geo. Diff.) 

UK/2008/0858 

UK/2008/0859 

2 

YES 

YES 

YES 

RPI (Retail Price Index)-X for 
BT; 

Conditional cost orientation for 
KCOM 

Geographic segmentation of the markets 

NO 

Re-notification of the draft measure; 

Timeframe of the validity of charge 
control; 

GI 

GI/2007/0720 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

To be specified at the later 
stage 

YES 

Specification of the cost-orientation 
obligation 

*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 

** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets or geographic differentiation 

EN 

87 

EN 

 
  
 
Market 7: Voice call termination on individual mobile networks 

Member 
State 

Related cases

Market 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation 

Number of 
SMP 
operators 

Remedies imposed 

Comments / no comment 

Access 

Non-
discriminat
ion 

Trans-
parency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Cost-orientation 

Accounting 
separation 

AT 

AT/2004/0099 
AT/2004/0238 
AT/2005/0256 
AT/2004/0317 
AT/2006/0538 
AT/2007/0680 
AT/2008/0837208
AT/2009/0885 
AT/2009/0910

YES 

4 

YES 

YES 

YES 

 (LRAIC-model including 
mark-up for overheads). 
Uses lowest-cost operator 
as the benchmark for an 
efficient operator. 
Implementation of 
Recommendation on 
Termination Rates foreseen 
for next market review in 
2011. 

NO 

Cost model of an efficient operator and 
need for a coherent EU approach.  
(Importance of LRIC models using 
forward-looking costs of an efficient 
operator and only those costs which 
vary in response to the wholesale 
termination traffic). 

208  

In  case  AT/2008/0837  the  Austrian  NRA  already  notified  the  market  definition  for  its  third  round  market  review.  The  Commission  reminded  the  NRA  that  any 
notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon the effective delineation of the relevant market concerned at the time of that notification. 

EN 

88 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
BE 

BE/2006/0433  
BE/2007/0665

YES 

3 

YES 

BG 

BG/2009/0866

YES 

4 

YES 

YES  

(Internal 
non-
discriminati
on 
obligation 
for 
Belgacom 
Mobile  an
Mobistar). 

YES 

Cost-orientation  

(TD-LRIC model). 

YES 

Need for a coherent European 
approach. 

(for Belgacom 
Mobile and 
Mobistar). 

Internal non-discrimination obligation 

(BE/2007/0665) 

YES (for 
Mobiltel, 
Cosmo 
Bulgaria 
Mobile and 
BTC's GSM 
and UMTS 
network) 

YES (less 
detailed for 
BTC's NMT/

CDMA 
network)  

Cost-orientation for Mobiltel 
and Cosmo Bulgaria Mobile
and reciprocity for BTC.  

Future accounting 
methodology will follow 
Recommendation. Interim 
glide path based on 
benchmarking. 

Further consultations planned by CRC 

YES (for 
Mobiltel and 
Cosmo 
Bulgaria 
Mobile) 

Cost of an efficient operator and need 
for a coherent European approach. 
(Need to reduce termination rates to the 
cost faced by an efficient operator as 
soon as possible). 

Implementation of symmetry for fixed-
to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile calls. 

CY 

CY/2006/0334 
CY/2009/0874

YES 

2 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation for CYTA 

(LRIC-CCA model) 

Max MTR for MTN 
corresponds to CYTA's 
cost-oriented termination 
fee with additional 
percentage caps allowed 
in the next 3 years. 

YES  

(subject to a 
€50 million 
annual 
turnover 
threshold for 
MTN) 

Price control imposed on MTN and level 
of asymmetry. 

Need for a coherent European approach. 

EN 

89 

EN 

 
  
CZ 

CZ/2006/0359 
CZ/2007/0661 
CZ/2008/0841

CZ/2009/0959

YES 

4 

YES 

Only for TO2,
T-Mobile, 
Vodafone 

YES 

YES 

Only for TO2, T-Mobile, 
Vodafone; 

Cost orientation 

FAC-HCA based on the 
lowest - cost operator 

(CZ/2009/0959) 

YES 

Only for TO2, 
T-Mobile, 
Vodafone 

Need to (i) impose the access and price 
control obligations also on MobilKom, 
(ii) to notify further planned individual 
decisions (on SMP and remedies) 

DK/2005/0204 
DK/2008/0752 
DK/2008/0765 
DK/2008/0785

DK 

DK/2009/1013

DK/2009/1014

DK/2009/0945 

YES  

(incl. MVNO) 

5 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

 (LRAIC model (generic 
hybrid model incl. TD data) 
for TDC, Sonofon/Telenor 
and Telia; transitory 
benchmark period for Hi3G; 
best practice approach for 
Barablu) 

Level of MTRs imposed on Hi3G and 
asymmetry of MTRs in Denmark. 

(DK/2008/0765) 

Symmetric termination rates based on 
the costs of an efficient operator 

(DK/2008/0785) 

Need for coherent European approach 

NO 

(DK/2008/0785, DK/2008/0765, 
DK/2008/0752, DK/2009/1014, 
DK/2009/0945) 

Need to phase out asymmetry for the 
MNVO Barablu (DK/2009/1013) 

Asymmetry allowed for HI3G 

Need to carry out a new market review 
(DK/2009/0945) 

EN 

90 

EN 

 
  
 
EE 

EE/2006/0342 
EE/2009/0883

YES 

(incl. MVNO) 

4 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Benchmarking against ERG 
MTR Snapshot 

NO 

FI 

FI/2003/0031 
FI/2006/0403 
FI/2008/0778 

YES  

(incl. MVNO) 

5 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Rates commercially 
negotiated. Cost orientation 
and non-discrimination as 
ex post control.  

(Ålands Mobiltelefon and 
TDC subject to non-
discriminatory pricing only).  

(not for Ålands 
Mobiltelefon 
and TDC) 

YES  

(FI/2008/0778/ FI/2006/0403) 

Imposition of current price control 
mechanism and the need to set new 
glide-paths based on cost-oriented 
mobile termination rates. 

Need for a notification of the final draft 
access prices to the Commission. 

Asymmetrical application of certain 
remedies. (FI/2003/0031) 

Price differentiation of termination rates 
according to the origin of the call. 
(Absence of remedies for calls 
originating in a fixed network in Finland 
without CS or CPS) 

Termination rates proportioned to costs. 
(Not clear that commercial negotiations 
would lead to termination rates 
proportionate to costs) 

(FI/2008/0778/ FI/2006/0403) 

Need for coherent European approach. 

(FI/2008/0778) 

EN 

91 

EN 

 
  
 
 
FR 

FR/2004/0120 
FR/2005/0275 
FR/2006/0461

FR/2007/0104 
FR/2007/0592 
FR/2007/0596

FR/2007/0669

FR/2007/0708 
FR/2008/0812 
FR/2009/0927

YES* 

3 in mainland
France. 

8 in French 
overseas 
territories 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation towards 
LRIC for 3 mainland MNOs.

Cost-orientation on 2 
overseas operators (Orange 
Caraïbe and SRR).  

YES 

Obligation not to charge 
excessive prices for 6 other 
overseas operators. 

DE 

DE/2005/0249 
DE/2006/0421 
DE/2008/0813 
DE/2009/0939 
DE/2009/0947 

YES 

(incl. MVNOs) 

6 

YES for 4 
MNOs –  

T-Mobile, 
Vodafone 
D2, E-Plus 

and O2 

Cost orientation for 4 MNOs 
(ex-ante tariff authorization 
procedure). 

YES 

YES 

NO 

Ex-post price control for 2 
MVNOs (Vistream and 
Ring). 

EL 

EL/2004/0078 
EL/2005/0178  
EL/2006/0392 
EL/2008/0786

YES 

3 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

BU LRIC model based on 
average efficient operator 

YES 

Asymmetry in MTRs and need for a 
coherent European approach.  

(FR/2009/0927, FR/2008/0812) 

Need for coherent European approach. 
(DE/2008/0813) 

Need for transparency and coherence 
in notification of MTRs to the 
Commission. (DE/2008/0813, 
DE/2009/0947) 

Need to impose a cost orientation 
obligation (on MVNOs). (DE/2009/0947) 

Non-imposition of an access obligation 
(on MVNOs). (DE/2009/0947) 

Cost model of an efficient operator and 
need for a coherent European 
approach. 

(Importance of LRIC models using 
current costs of an efficient operator 
and not historical costs. Relevant costs 
are those additional (traffic-related) 
costs involved in providing the service). 

EN 

92 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
HU 

HU/2004/0101 
HU/2006/0478 
HU/2008/0829

YES 

3 

YES 

YES 

YES 

IE 

IE/2004/0073 
IE/2005/0216 
IE/2008/0746 

YES 

4 

YES (for 
Vodafone, 
O2 and 
Meteor) 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation based on 
BU-LRIC model which 
considers an all-traffic 
increment and includes 
both coverage and 
capacity costs. 

Cost-oriented prices for 
Vodafone and O2 and 
benchmarking for Meteor 
and H3G. 

To be consulted on at time 
of notification. Indicated 
that MTRs may be 
established through 
combination of BU LRIC 
model and benchmarking. 

Appropriateness of the proposed 
costing methodology and need for a 
coherent European approach 

YES 

(Importance of LRIC models using 
current costs of an efficient operator 
and not historical costs. Relevant costs 
are those additional (traffic-related) 
costs involved in providing the service). 

(for 

YES 
Vodafone 
and O2) 

Price control obligation to be imposed 
on H3G (glide path to be introduced 
without delay). 

Price control set up (clarify 
benchmarking approach). 

Need for coherent European approach. 

IT 

IT/2005/0316  
IT/2007/0659 
IT/2008/0779 

IT/2008/0802 

YES 

4 

YES 

YES 

YES 

TD FL-LRIC approach 

NO 

Appropriateness of the proposed 
costing methodology (Importance of 
LRIC models using current costs; bring 
MTRs to cost of an efficient operator as 
soon as possible). 

Asymmetry in MTRs of the Italian 
MNOs 

Need for coherent European approach. 

EN 

93 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LV 

LV/2006/0464 
LV/2007/0574

YES 

4 

YES (for 
Latvijas 
Mobiliais 
Telefons and 
Tele2) 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation (for Latvijas 
Mobiliais Telefons and 
Tele2) 

NO (for Telekom Baltija and 
BITE Latvija) 

(for 

YES 
Latvijas 
Mobiliais 
Telefons 
and Tele2) 

Effective cost accounting methodology. 

(Take into account costs of an efficient 
operator e.g. FL-LRIC). 

(LV/2006/0464) 

Asymmetry in mobile termination rates. 
(Take into account necessity to become 
efficient over time and need for 
coherent European approach). 

(LV/2007/0574) 

LT 

LT/2005/0189

LT/2009/0990

YES 

3 

YES 

YES 

YES 

LU 

LU/2005/0321

YES 

3 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

FL-LRAIC model from 2007.

Adjust the access obligation 

(During transitional period: 
requirement not to apply 
worse conditions). 

BU-LRAIC as from 2009; 
glide path towards LRIC 
(CCA) 

Price control based on 
international benchmarks. 
Ultimate target reference 
prices to be consulted 
upon. Transitionally apply 
a 6% 

reduction every six months.

NO 

Transparency in the notification of 
remedies 

Set LRIC/CCA based prices before 
31/12/2012 (LT/2009/0990) 

Timely implementation of price control 
obligation. 

NO 

Price control based on comparison with 
other countries (appropriate basis for 
comparison only if reflect cost 
orientation). 

Level of reductions (achieve a cost 
oriented level as quickly as possible). 

EN 

94 

EN 

 
  
 
 
MT 

MT/2006/0214 
MT/2008/0790 
MT/2009/0926

YES 

3 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NL 

NL/2005/0215 
NL/2006/0420 
NL/2007/0634

YES 

(incl. MVNO) 

5 

YES 

YES 

YES 

PL/2006/0379 
PL/2008/0794 
PL/2008/0855

PL/2009/0904

YES 

PL 

5 

YES 

YES 

YES 

PL/2009/0991

(incl. MVNO) 

PL/2009/0996

PL/2009/1021

Price control based on 
international benchmarks 

Pegged to the change in 
the average MTRs in the 
27 EU Member States. 
Change to Maltese MTRs 
limited to 10% per annum. 

Cost-orientation based on 
BU LRIC. OPTA considers 
welfare analysis justifies 
imposition of maximum 
MTRs above BU LRIC 
level. 

Charges based on costs 
incurred for Polkomtel, PT 
Cyfrowa and PTK 
potentially verified with 
benchmarking or other 
methods. 

Obligation not to charge 
excessive prices for 
Cyfrowy Polsat (CP) and 
P4. Obliged to decrease 
existing MTRs in 
proportion to glide-path 
set for 3 other MNOs in 
2007. 

YES 

Imposition of the price control 
mechanism and the need for efficient 
cost-oriented MTRs (benchmark 
countries using cost methodologies 
designed to set efficient MTRs) 

Need for notification of the proposed 
access prices to the Commission. 

NO 

Determination of maximum MTR on the 
basis of a welfare analysis (depends 
largely on parameters chosen; need for 
coherent European approach). 

Need for regulating termination rates 
reflecting efficient costs. 
(PL/2009/0991) 

Need for transparency and coherence 
in the notification of remedies under the 
EU consultation procedure. 
(PL/2009/0904) 

NO 

Price control to be imposed on CP and 
P4 (transition to cost orientation must 
not be unreasonably long); 

Asymmetry in MTRs of CP and P4 and 
need for a coherent European 
approach (PL/2009/0996) 

Avoid amendment of remedies through 
a dispute settlement procedure and 
impose price control on P4 
(PL/2009/0996) 

EN 

95 

EN 

 
  
 
 
PT 

PT/2004/0129 
PT/2007/0707

YES 

3 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Price control based on 
benchmarking. Cost 
methodologies and cost-
oriented prices to be 
defined following further 
consultation. 

RO 

RO/2009/0878

YES 

5 

YES 

YES 

YES 

(RCS & 
RDS 
exempt 
from 
obligation 
to publish 
reference 
offer) 

Cost-oriented tariffs to be 
defined in future by BU 
LRIC model reflecting 
costs of efficient operator. 

Sets interim glide path 
based on LRIC plus 
common and joint costs 
for Vodafone and Orange 
Romania. Delayed 
reciprocity for other 3 
operators. 

Further consultations planned by 
Anacom. 

(PT/2004/0129) 

YES 

Imposition of different price control 
methodology without a new market 
analysis. (Anacom invited to re-
consider reintroduction of asymmetry). 

Need for a coherent European 
approach. 

(PT/2007/0707) 

Asymmetry of mobile termination rates 
and the cost of an efficient operator. 

NO 

(Importance of introducing cost 
orientation for all operators as soon as 
possible). 

Further consultations planned by ANC. 

EN 

96 

EN 

 
  
 
SK 

SK/2005/0136 
SK/2009/0902

SK/2009/0955

YES 

3 

YES 

YES 

YES 

SI 

SI/2005/0276 
SI/2007/0591 
SI/2009/0946 

YES 

4 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Urgent need for price regulation. 

Appropriateness of the proposed 
costing methodology and need for a 

coherent European approach. 

(Importance of LRIC models 

YES 

using current costs of an efficient 
operator. Asymmetries should not 
remain in force for too long). 

(SK/2009/0902) 

Need for efficient cost-based 
termination rates for all operators 

(SK/2009/0955) 

Proposed non-discrimination obligation. 

NO 

Cost of an efficient operator. 

Cost-orientation based on a 
FAHC model supplemented 
by international 
benchmarking in transition 
from system of no cost 
orientation to implementation 
of a LRIC model.  

Cost-orientation 

BU FL-LRIC approach 
(reconciled with TD data) 
which 

calculates the avoidable cost 
of off-net call termination 
services 

BU-LRIC level to be reached 
by all operators in 2013. 

EN 

97 

EN 

 
  
 
for  TME, 
Cost-orientation 
Vodafone 
and  Orange
based  on  TD  FAC  model 
using  CCA.    Started  work 
on BU LRIC. 

4 MNOs 

YES 

YES 

9 full MVNOs

YES 

NO 

(incl. MVNOs) 

Xfera required to set 
reasonable prices. Existing 
margin of 48.82% (above  

YES (for 
TME, 
Vodafone 
and Orange) 

ES 

ES/2005/0251 
ES/2006/0471 
ES/2007/0654 

ES/2007/0654 
ES/2007/0706 
ES/2008/0819 
ES/2009/0937

Cost orientation obligation and cost 
accounting methodology for calculating 
MTRs 

Asymmetry allowed for Xfera 

(ES/2009/0937) 

Need for a coherent European 
approach. 

(ES/2008/0819). 

Notification of amendments to price 
control obligations. 

YES 

Need for coherent European approach. 

Need to carry out a new market review. 

(SE/2009/0941) 

MTRs of the larger 
operators) to be reduced by 
50% over next 2 years. 

Full MVNOs required to set 
reasonable prices, equal to 
MTRs of the host MNOs. 

Cost-orientation for 
TeliaSonera, Tele2 and 
Vodafone based on LRIC 
(incl. common costs due to 
requirement in law) of 
highest cost operator. 

Obligation of fair and 
reasonable prices for H3G 
but set at symmetric level to 
other 3 MNOs. 

SE 

SE/2004/0052 
SE/2009/0941

YES 

4 

YES 

YES 

YES 

EN 

98 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
  
UK 

UK/2003/0040 
UK/2004/0087 
UK/2005/0199 
UK/2006/0348 
UK/2006/0498

UK/2006/0499 
UK/2007/0617

UK/2008/0759

YES 

5 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation based on 
BU-LRIC 

NO 

3G spectrum costs.  

(Important that LRIC models use 
current costs and not historical costs 
which risk overestimating the 
appropriate costs considerably). 

(UK/2006/0498) 

Monitoring of MNOs’ compliance with 
SMP conditions by Ofcom. 

(UK/2008/0759) 

Non-imposition of an access obligation 
on the market for wholesale call 
termination. 

(GI/2007/0723,GI/2009/0977) 

GI 

GI/2007/0723 

GI/2009/0977 

YES* 

1 

NO 

YES 

NO 

Price control based on 
benchmarking and 
estimation of reasonable 
prices 

NO 

Need for price-control obligation and for 
a coherent European approach. 

(GI/2007/0723,GI/2009/0977) 

Need for efficient rates for all operators 

GI/2009/0977 

* Identification of separate relevant markets for wholesale SMS termination on an individual mobile network (not listed in the Recommendation on relevant markets) 

EN 

99 

EN 

 
  
 
 
TABLE OVERVIEW OTHER MARKETS (OUTSIDE THE RECOMMENDATION ON RELEVANT MARKETS) 

Former markets 3-6209 (Recommendation 2003): Fixed retail calls markets 

Related cases

Member 
State 

Market 
definition in 
line with 2003
Recom-
mendation 

3 Criteria 
test/ 

Remedies imposed 

Number of 
SMP 

operators  CS CPS 

Non-
discrimination 

Trans-
parency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Accounting 
separation 

Comments / no comment 

AT/2004/0124; 
AT/2004/0125; 
AT/2004/0126; 
AT/2006/0127; 
AT/2007/0581; 
AT/2007/0582;  
AT/2007/0583; 
AT/2007/0584; 
AT/2009/0880; 
AT/2009/0881 

Former 
market 3: 3 
criteria test 
not fulfilled 

YES 

Former 
market 4: 
no SMP  

YES (in 
retail 
access 
market) 

Former 
market 5 
and 6: 1 
SMP 

NO 

NO 

Cost orientation (in former 
market 5 and 6) 

YES 

3 criteria test and efficiency of wholesale 
regulation in former market 5 and 6 

Former market 3: Publicly available local and/or national telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential customers. 
Former market 4:  Publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential customers. 
Former market 5: Publicly available local and/or national telephone ser vices provided at a fixed location for non-residential customers. 
Former market 6: Publicly available international telephone services at a fixed location for non-residential customers. 

100 

EN 

AT 

209 

EN 

 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
Former 
markets 4 
and 6: no 
SMP 

BE 

BE/2006/0435, 
BE/2006/0436, 
BE/2006/0437; 
BE/2006/0438; 
BE/2007/0640; 
BE/2008/0798;  
BE/2008/0799 

YES 

Former 
market 3 
and 5: 1 
SMP 

YES (in 
retail 
access 
market) 

NO 

YES (in 
markets 
3 and 5) 

Prohibition of excessive 
pricing and predatory pricing 
(in markets 3 and 5) 

NO 

3 Criteria test and efficiency of wholesale 
regulation in former markets 3 and 5;  
hand-over of mobile termination 
reductions 

BG 

BG/2009/0812 

YES 

1 SMP  in 
former 
markets 3-6 

YES (in 
retail 
access 
market) 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation FDC CC 

YES 

3 Criteria test and efficiency of wholesale 
regulation 

CY 

CZ 

CY/2006/0487; 
CY/2006/0488; 
CY/2006/0489; 
CY/2006/0490 

CZ/2006/0350; 
CZ/2006/0444; 
CZ/2006/445; 
CZ/2006/0446; 
CZ/2008/0796; 
CZ/2008/0840; 
CZ/2008/0857 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation based on FDC

YES 

No comment 

YES 

3 Criteria 
not fulfilled 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comment 

EN 

101 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DE/2005/0308; 
DE/2005/0309; 
DE/2005/0310; 
DE/2006/0311; 
DE/2006/0402; 
DE/2007/0628;  
DE/2007/0709; 
DE/2008/0846; 
DE/2007/0847; 
DE/2009/0895 

YES  

DK/2005/0208; 
DK/2005/0194; 
DK/2005/0268; 
DK/2006/0269 

Exclusion of 
IP telephony 

Former 
markets 3 
and 5: 3 
Criteria not 
fulfilled 

Former 
markets 4 
and 6: No 
SMP  

1 SMP in 
former 
markets 3 
and 4; no 
SMP in 
markets 5 
and 6 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comment 

YES  

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Exclusion of IP telephony; monitoring of 
markets  

EE/2007/0615; 
EE/2007/0616; 
EE/2007/0635; 
EE/2007/0636 

YES 

No SMP 

YES   

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Efficiency of wholesale regulation; 
availability of CS CPS 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EN 

102 

EN 

 
  
 
FI 

FR 

EL 

HU 

YES 

Former 
markets 3 
and 5:  SMP

Former 
markets 4 
and 6: No 
SMP 

YES 

NO 

YES (in 
markets 3 
and 5) 

NO 

NO 

Efficiency of wholesale regulation (related 
to former markets 3 and 5) 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

YES 

No comment 

FI/2003/0022; 
FI/2003/0025; 
FI/2003/0024; 
FI/2003/0027 ; 
FI/2005/0201; 
FI/2005/0202 

FR/2005/0223; 
FR/2005/0224; 
FR/2005/0225; 
FR/2005/0226; 
FR/2007/0648 

EL/2006/0503; 
EL/2006/0505; 
EL/2006/0556; 
EL/2006/0557; 
EL/2008/0751 

YES 

Former 
markets 3 
and 5: 1 
SMP 

Former 
market 4 
and 6: No 
SMP 

HU/2004/0132; 
HU/2004/0133; 
HU/2004/0134; 
HU/2004/0135; 
HU/2007/0602; 
HU/2007/0603;  
HU/2007/0604; 
HU/2007/0605 

YES 

4 (related to 
network 
coverage) 

YES 

YES (in former 
markets 3 and 
5) 

YES (in 
former 
markets 3 
and 5) 

Price cap and regulation of 
retention fee, based on FDC 
CCA( in former markets 3 and 
5) 

YES (in 
former 
markets 3 
and 5) 

No comments 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Efficiency of wholesale regulation 

EN 

103 

EN 

 
  
 
IE/2005/0160; 
IE/2005/0161; 
IE/2005/0162; 
IE/2005/0163; 
IE/2007/0697; 
IE/2007/0698; 
IE/2007/0699; 
IE/2007/0700 

YES 

3 criteria not 
fulfilled 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

IT/2006/0398; 
IT/2006/0399; 
IT/2006/0407; 
IT/2006/0408; 
IT/2009/0951; 
IT/2009/952 

YES 

Former 
markets 3 
and 5: 1 
SMP 

Former 
markets 4 
nd 6: 3 
criteria not 
fulfilled 

YES 

YES (in former 
markets 3 and 
5) 

YES (in 
former 
markets 3 
and 5) 

Price cap (in former markets 3 
and 5) 

YES (in 
former 
markets 3 
and 5) 

Prohibition of retail price differentiation 
according to the destination of calls 

LV/2006/0567; 
LV/2006/0568; 
LV/2006/0569; 
LV/2006/0570 

LT/2006/0425; 
LT/2006/0426; 
LT/2006/0427; 
LT/2006/0428; 
LT/2008/0763; 
LT/2008/0764 

YES 

1 

YES 

NO 

NO 

YES 

NO 

Lack of details concerning price 
regulation; Lack of imposition of 
accounting separation 

YES 

1 

YES 

NO 

NO 

YES 

YES 

Efficiency of wholesale regulation 

IE 

IT 

LV 

LT 

EN 

104 

EN 

 
  
 
 
LU 

MT 

NL 

LU/2006/0532; 
LU/2006/0533; 
LU/2006/0534; 
LU/2006/0535 

MT/2006/0396; 
MT/2006/0397; 
MT/2006/0514; 
MT/2006/0515; 
MT/2009/0884 

NL/2005/0287; 
NL/2005/0288; 
NL/2005/0289; 
NL/2005/0290; 
NL/2005/0291; 
NL/2005/0292;  
NL/2005/0293; 
NL/2005/0294; 
NL/2005/0295; 
NL/2005/0296; 
NL/2008/0821 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Reasonable prices 

YES 

No comments 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Market definition; fulfilment of the second 
criterion of the 3 criteria test 

YES 

3 Criteria 
test not 
fulfilled 

Combined 
retail access 
and calls 
markets 

Combined 
access and 
calls market 
for 
residential: 
No SMP 

Combined 
access and 
calls market 
for non-
residential: 
3 criteria not 
fulfilled 

PL 

PL/2006/0528; 
PL/2006/0529; 
PL/2006/0530; 
PL/2006/531 

Exclusion of 
certain calls 
from the 
market 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

Second Phase: Exclusion of calls over 
certain numbers 

 (Case PL/2006/0528);  

monitoring; motivation 

EN 

105 

EN 

 
  
 
PT 

PT/2004/0055; 
PT/2004/0056; 
PT/2004/0057; 
PT/2004/0058; 
PT/2004/0059; 
PT/2004/0091 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES (in market 3 and 4 only); 
cost orientation for retention for 
fixed-to-mobile calls 

YES 

No comment 

RO 

RO/2009/1004 

Yes 

3 criteria not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comment 

ES 

SI 

SK 

SE 

ES/2005/0326; 
ES/2005/0327; 
ES/2005/0328; 
ES/2005/0329; 
ES/2008/0817 

SI/2005/0264; 
SI/2005/0265; 
SI/2005/0298; 
SI/2005/0299; 
SI/2009/0893 

SK/2006/0344; 
SK/2006/0345; 
SK/2006/0347; 
SK/2006/0349 

SE/2005/0195; 
SE/2005/0196; 
SE/2005/0197; 
SE/2005/0198 

YES 

No SMP 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

YES 

3 criteria not 
fulfilled 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

YES 

1 SMP 

YES 

YES 

NO 

YES (prohibition of 
unreasonably low pricing and 
bundling) 

NO 

No comments 

No comments 

YES 

3 criteria not 
fulfilled; no 
SMP 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

EN 

106 

EN 

 
  
 
UK 

UK/2003/0007; 
UK/2003/0008; 
UK/2003/0045; 
UK/2007/0585; 
UK/2007/0649; 
UK/2008/0769;  
UK/2009/0899 

YES 

No SMP 
(with the 
exception of 
Hull area) 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

EN 

107 

EN 

 
  
 
 
Former market 7 (Recommendation 2003): Minimum set of leased lines 

Member 
State 

Related cases

Market 
definition 
in line 
with 2003 
Recom-
mendatio
n 

3 
Criteria 
test/ 
Number 
of SMP 
operato
rs 

AT/2004/0079; 
AT/2006/0507; 
AT/2008/0836 

inclusion 
of n* 64 
kbit/s to 
n*2048 
kbit/s) 

BE/2006/0551; 
BE/2007/0640 

YES 

1 

1 

AT 

BE 

BG 

Remedies imposed 

Comments / no comment 

Supply  of 
minimum 
set 

Non-
discrimina
tion 

Trans-
parency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Accounting 
separation 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Prospective market analysis and efficiency of 
wholesale regulation 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

Efficiency of wholesale regulation 

CY 

CY/2006/0484 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NOT NOTIFIED 

Cost-orientation 
based on LRIC 

YES 

No comments 

CZ 

CZ/2006/0447; 
CZ/2009/0872 

YES 

3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

DK 

DK/2005/0177;

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

No comments 

EN 

108 

EN 

 
  
 
 
EE 

EE/2007/0642 

YES 

3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled 
and no 
SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

EL 

FI 

EL/2006/0491; 
EL/2008/0751 

YES 

1 

NO 

YES 

YES 

Transition from 
FDC CCA to    
LRIC-CCA 

YES 

No comments 

FI/2004/0079; 

FI/2009/0985 

YES 

3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

FR 

FR/2006/0415 

Inclusion 
of higher 
bandwidth 
and 
separate 
market for 
alternative 
interfaces 

1 

NO 

YES 

YES for 
minimum 
set 

Cost-orientation for 
minimum set cost 
orientation;: cost 
accounting to be 
defined later on;  

NO for 
higher 
bandwidth 

Other than 
minimum set: 
prohibition of 
predatory pricing; 

YES 

Inclusion of higher bandwidth in market 

DE 

HU 

IE 

EN 

DE/2006/479; 
DE/2007/619 

DE/2009/1009 

HU/2005/0167; 
HU/2007/0737 

YES 

3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

YES 

1 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Efficiency of wholesale regulation 

IE/2005/0137; 
IE/2008/0791 

YES 

3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

109 

EN 

 
  
IT 

IT/2005/0315 
(withdrawn); 
IT/2006/0371 

IT/2009/0988 

YES 

3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

LV 

LV/2007/0571 

YES 

LT 

LT/2006/0429 

YES 

LU 

LU/2006/0559 

YES 

1 

1 

1 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

YES 

NO 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

NO 

No comments 

NO 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 
based on FDC 

Cost-orientation 
based on FDC 

YES 

NO 

No comments 

No comments 

MT 

MT/2006/0373 

Inclusion 
of 
internation
al retail 
leased 
lines 

NL 

NL/2005/0279; 
NL/2009/0824 

YES 

PL 

PL/2006/0550 

YES 

PT 

PT/2005/0155 

YES 

RO 

EN 

1 

NO 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation 
based on FDC-HC 

YES 

No comments 

3 
criteria 
test not 
fulfilled 

1 

1 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Prohibition of 
excessive high and 
excessive low 
prices based on  
FL-FDC 

YES 

Efficiency of wholesale regulation 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

No comments 

NOT NOTIFIED 

110 

EN 

 
  
SK 

SK/2006/0463 

SK/2009/1008 

YES 

SI 

SI/2005/0240; 
SI/208/0768 

YES 

ES 

ES/2006/0352; 
ES/2009/0931 

YES 

3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

3 
criteria 
test not 
fulfilled 

3 
criteria 
test not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

SE 

SE/2004/0048 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

No comments 

UK 

UK/2003/0035; 
UK/2004/0045; 
UK/2004/0077; 
UK/2004/0123; 
UK/2005/0217; 
UK/2005/0218; 
UK/2007/0649; 
UK/2008/0749; 
UK/2009/0938 

Including 
higher 
bandwidth 

2 

YES (on 
BT only) 

YES (on 
BT only)

YES (on BT 
only); 

Obligation 
for Standard 
offer 
withdrawn 

YES, (on BT only) 
conditional to 
breach of voluntary 
price undertaking  

YES (on BT only)

Need to carry out new market analysis 

EN 

111 

EN 

 
  
Former market 10 (Recommendation 2003): Transit services in the fixed pubic telephone network  

Member 
State 

Related cases 

AT/2004/0090 
AT/2006/0590 
AT/2009/0936 

BE/2006/0441 
BE/2008/0750 

AT 

BE 

BG 

Three 
criteria test/

Market 
definition in
line with 
Recommen
dation 2003 

Remedies imposed 

Number of 
SMP 

operators  Access 

Non-
discrimination 

Trans-
parency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Accounting 
separation 

Comments / no comment 

YES 

3 criteria 
test not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments (/AT/2009/0936) 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

No comments 

NOT NOTIFIED 

CY 

CY/2006/0475 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation based on 
LRIC 

YES 

No comments 

CZ 

CZ/2006/0448 

YES 

No SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

DK 

EE 

DK/2005/0525 
DK/2007/0692 

EE/2007/0599 
(withdrawn); 
EE/2007/0670 

YES 

No SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

YES 

NO SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Additional information to be included  

NO 

NO 

No comments 

No comments 

EN 

112 

EN 

 
  
 
 
FI 

FR  

DE 

EL 

HU 

IE 

FI/2004/0075 
FI/2007/0705 

FR/2005/0229 
FR/2007/0652 

DE/2005/0145 
DE/2005/0255 
DE/2008/0845 
DE/2009/0887 
DE/2009/888 

EL/2006/0495 
EL/2008/0751 

HU/2005/0153 
HU/2007/0728 

YES 

No SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation except for 
intra-territorial transit 

NO 

YES 

No comments 

No comments 

YES 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation based on 
LRAIC- CC 

YES 

No comments 

YES 

No SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

IE/2005/0192 
IE/2007/0673 
IE/2007/0674 
IE/2009/0921 

Definition 
of an 
additional 
market for 
internatio
nal transit 

1 SMP in 
national 
transit 
market; 
No SMP 
in 
internation
al transit 
market 

YES  

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation based on 
LRIC 

YES 

Need to monitor replicability 

IT 

IT/2006/0385 
IT/2007/0695 

YES 

No SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

LV 

LV/2006/0367 

YES 

LT 

LT/2006/0319 

YES 

1 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation based on 
FL-LRAIC 

NO 

YES 

NO 

YES 

YES 

No comments 

No comments 

No comments 

EN 

113 

EN 

 
  
 
LU 

LU/2006/0542 

YES 

MT 

MT/2006/0389 

YES 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

YES 

No SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

No comments 

No comments 

Yes 

No SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

PT 

PT/2005/0154 

YES 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

RO 

RO/2009/1005 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

LRAIC 

SK/2006/0470; 
SK/2009/0954 

YES 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

SI/2005/0274; 
SI/2007/0691 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation based on 
LRIC 

ES/2006/0404 
ES/2009/'0962 

YES 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

YES 

NO 

YES 

NO 

Arguments for 3 criteria to be further 
developped 

Monitoring SMP 

No comments 

No comments 

No comment 

NL 

PL 

NL/2005/0285; 
NL/2007/0744; 
NL/2008/0793; 
NL/2008/0800 

PL/2007/0686; 
PL/2008/0766 
(withdrawn); 
PL/2008/0788; 
PL/2007/0745;  
PL/2008/0831 

SK 

SI 

ES 

EN 

114 

EN 

 
  
 
SE 

SE/2004/0051 

SE/2009/0968  

YES 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

UK 

UK/2003/0006; 
UK/2003/0015s; 

UK/2004/0045; 
UK/2004/0064; 
UK/2004/0071s; 
UK/2004/0088; 
UK/2004/0122; 
UK/2005/0164s 
UK/2005/0166; 
UK/2005/0170s; 
UK/2005/0180;  
UK/2005/300; 
UK/2007/0585;  
UK/2007/0649  
UK/2008/0769; 
UK/2009/0898 

YES 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled; 
no SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comment 

EN 

115 

EN 

 
  
 
Former market 14 (Recommendation 2003): Trunk leased lines 

Member 
State 

Related cases

Market 
definition 
in line 
with 2003 
Recom-
mendatio
n 

3 
Criteria 
test/ 
Number 
of SMP 
operato
rs 

Remedies imposed 

Comments / no comment 

Access 

Non-
discrimina
tion 

Trans-
parency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Accounting 
separation 

AT 

AT/2004/074; 
AT/2006/0467 

YES 

No SMP

NO 

NO 

NO 

BE 

BE/2006/0553 

YES 

No SMP

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

BG 

NOT NOTIFIED 

CY 

CY/2006/0483 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

CZ 

CZ/2006/0451 

YES 

No SMP

NO 

NO 

NO 

DK 

DK/2007/0586; 
DK/2007/0725 

YES 

No SMP

NO 

NO 

NO 

EE 

EE/2007/0644 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

EN 

Cost-orientation 
based on LRIC; 
transitionally retail 
minus 

NO 

NO 

Price cap;  
accounting system 
to be developed by 
SMP operator 

116 

NO 

NO 

YES 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

No comments 

No comments 

No comments 

No comments 

YES 

NRA to develop cost accounting 

EN 

 
  
 
 
EL 

EL/2006/0423; 
EL/2008/0751 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation 
based on LRIC 
CCA 

YES 

No comments 

FI 

FI/2004/0081 

YES 

No SMP

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

FR 

FR/2006/0417 

Inclusion 
of inter-
territorial 
trunk 
leased 
lines 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

prohibition of 
excessive and 
predatory pricing;  
cost orientation for 
specific lines  

DE/2006/0481 
(withdrawn); 
DE/2007/0678; 
DE/2007/0688 

HU/2005/0169;  
HU/2007/0739 

YES 

No SMP

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

YES 

No SMP

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

YES 

No comments 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

No comments 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

DE 

HU 

IE 

IT 

IE/2005/0140; 
IE/2008/0791 

YES 

IT/2005/0273 

IT/2009/999 

YES 

3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled 
and no 
SMP 

E 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

LV 

LV/2007/0573 

YES 

No SMP

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

No comments 

EN 

117 

EN 

 
  
LT 

LT/2006/0431 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation 
based on FDC 
checked against  
EU benchmark 

YES 

No comments 

LU 

LU/2006/0562 

Trunk and 
terminatin
g in same 
market 

MT 

MT/2006/0375 

YES 

1 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 
based on FDC 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NL 

NL/2005/0283 

YES 

No SMP

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

YES 

YES 

NO 

Need to justify lack of separation of trunk and 
terminating segment 

No comments 

No comments 

PL 

PL/2007/0668; 
(withdraw in 
Phase II);  
PL/2008/0772 
(withdrawn in 
Phase II); 
PL/2008/0856 

PL/2009/0971 

Market 
defined 
line per 
line  

3 
criteria 
and 
SMP on 
part of 
lines 

YES for 
SMP lines 

YES for 
SMP lines 

YES for 
SMP lines 

Cost orientation 
based on costs 
incurred for SMP 
lines 

YES for SMP 
lines 

No for 
other lines 

No for 
other lines 

No for 
other lines 

No for other lines 

No for other lines 

Market delineation route per route; need for 
geographic market delineation; lack of 
evidence  from market share based analysis; 
need to withdraw regulation on competitive 
routes 

PT 

PT/2005/0157 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

No comments 

RO 

SK 

SK/2006/0414 
(withdrawn); 
SK/2007/0675 
(withdrawn); 
SK/2009/0879 

NOT NOTIFIED 

YES 

No SMP

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

EN 

118 

EN 

 
  
 
SI 

SI/2005/0220 
(withdrawn); 
SI/2005/0362 

YES 

No SMP

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

ES 

ES/2006/0459; 
ES/2009/922 

Inclusion 
of 
undersea 
cables 

3 
Criteria 
fulfilled 
and 
SMP 
only for 
10 
underse
a cable 

for 

in 

NO 
trunk 
leased 
lines 
general 

for 

in 

NO 
trunk 
leased 
lines 
general 

for 

in 

NO 
trunk 
leased 
lines 
general 

NO for trunk leased 
lines in general 

NO for trunk 
leased lines in 
general 

YES (for 
10 
undersea 
cables) 

YES (for 
10 
undersea 
cables) 

YES (for 
10 
undersea 
cables) 

Reasonable prices 
for 10 undersea 
cables 

SE 

SE/2005/0341 

YES 

No SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

UK 

UK/2003/0039; 
UK/2008/0748; 
UK/2008/0859; 
UK/2009/0901 

YES (no 
market 
defined for 
Hull area) 

1  

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Need to detail price control; need to monitor 
each of the undersea cable routes  

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

Need to carry out the 3 criteria test; Low 
market share and time-frame of charge control 

EN 

119 

EN 

 
  
Former Market 15 (Recommendation 2003) : Mobile access and call origination 

Member 
State 

Related cases

Market 
definiti
on in 
line 
with 
2003 
Recom
mendat
ion 

3 Criteria 
test/ 
Number 
of SMP 
operators  Access 

Remedies imposed 

Non-
discriminatio
n 

Trans-
parency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Accounting 
separation 

Comments / no comment 

AT 

AT/2004/0063 

YES 

BE 

BE/2007/0610 

YES 

BG 

CY 

CY/2006/0333
CY/2009/0877 

YES 

CZ 

CZ/2006/0405 

YES 

DK 

DK/2005/0243
DK/2008/0863 

YES 

EE 

EE/2007/0651 

YES 

EL 

EL/2006/0492 

YES 

0 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Need to monitor the market 

No comments  

NOT NOTIFIED 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

YES 

No comments 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments  

No comments  

No comments  

No comments  

EN 

120 

EN 

 
  
 
 
FI 

FR 

FI/2004/0082 

FR/2005/0179 
(withdrawn) 

DE 

DE/2007/0627 

YES 

1 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Veto: Need to consider  market dynamics 

NOT NOTIFIED 

Splitting  
the 
market; 
exclusio
n of 
VAS 

0 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Splitting of market; exclusion of conveyance to 
VAS; proportionality of licence obligations  

HU 

HU/2004/0108 
HU/2007/0594 

YES 

0 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

IE 

IE/2004/0121 

YES 

2 (joint 
SMP), 
annulled 
by Panel 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

IT 

IT/2005/0259; 
IT/2007/0575 
(withdrawn); 
IT/2008/0861 

YES 

0 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Analysis based on retail market; fringe 
competitors; need to notify implementing 
measures 

Second Phase: Definition of markets per 
network for call origination to value added 
services (IT/2007/0575)  

No comments (IT/2008/0861) 

LV 

LV/2006/0545 

YES 

LT 

LT/2006/0406 

YES 

LU 

LU/2005/0320 
(withdrawn); 
LU/2006/0369 

YES 

0 

0 

0 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

No comments 

No comments 

EN 

121 

EN 

 
  
 
 
GI 

GI/2007/0722 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

YES 

Need to monitor the market 

MT 

MT/2006/0443 

YES 

2 (joint 
SMP) 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation on 
request 

NL 

NL/2005/0242 

YES 

PL/2006/0378 
(withdrawn); 
PL/2008/0756 

YES 

0 

0 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NOT NOTIFIED 

NOT NOTIFIED 

YES 

NO 

NO 

Competitive conditions at retail level; existence 
of pent-up demand; retaliation mechanism; 
market entry of a third MNO; Need to review 
the market. 

No comments 

No comments 

YES 

0 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Need to monitor the market; absence of 
analysis of wholesale market 

YES 

1 

YES 

YES 

NO 

reasonable 
prices 

ES/2005/0330 

YES 

3 (joint SMP) 

YES 

SE/2005/0203 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

0 

0 

NO 

NO 

UK 

UK/2003/0001 

YES 

EN 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Yes 

NO 

NO 

122 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Second phase: Insufficient evidence for joint 
dominance (SI/2008/0806);  

Comment: Three criteria test and SMP; 
Monitoring market developments; need to 
notify price control (SI/2009/0913) 

Competitive conditions at retail level 

No comments  

Comment on reliance on retail market and 
market shares; on international benchmark for 
concentration 

EN 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SK 

SI 

ES 

SE 

SK/2005/0248 
(withdrawn); 
SK/2006/0442 

SI/2005/0230; 
SI/2008/0806 
(withdrawn in 
phase II); 
SI/2009/913 

 
  
Former market 18 (Recommendation 2003): Broadcasting transmission services to deliver broadcast content to end users  

Market 
definition in
line with 
2003 
Recommen
dation 

Three 
criteria test/ 
Number of 
SMP 
operators 

Market 
split 

1 SMP for  
terrestrial 
transmissi
on 

Member 
State 

Related cases 

AT/2003/0002; 
AT/2003/0018; 
AT/2005/0318; 
AT/2006/0360; 
AT/2009/0896 

BE/2006/0578 
(withdrawn) 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CY/2006/0497 

Market 
split 

CZ 

CZ/2006/0453; 
CZ/2009/0907 

Market 
split 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

Remedies imposed 

Comments / no comment 

Access 

Non-
discrimin
ation 

Transpar
ency 

Price control /  

cost accounting 

Accounting 
separation 

Terrestrial 

YES 

YES 

FDC HC based on costs of 
operator 

y 

Need to delineate market at the time of 
market analysis 

NOT NOTIFIED 

                               NOT NOTIFIED 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

No comments 

EN 

123 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
DK 

DK/2007/0618 

EE 

EE/2007/0666 

Market 
split 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

Market 
split 

1 SMP for  
terrestrial 
transmissi
on 

FI 

FI/2004/0076; 
FI/2008/0789 

Market 
split 

1 SMP 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Market delineation 

Terrestrial: 
access to 
masts and 
signal 
transmission 

TV: Access 
to antenna 
and capacity 
sharing for 
terrestrial 
digital 

Radio: 
Access to 
antenna and 
capacity 
sharing for 
terrestrial 
analogue  

YES 

YES 

Prohibition of excessive 
pricing based on cost 
accounting system decided 
by operator 

YES 

Scope of the access obligation; need to 
monitor cost accounting  

NO 

YES (for 
access 
to 
antenna 
only) 

YES (for access to digital TV 
only) 

NO (for other than digital TV) 

YES (for 
access to 
digital TV 
only) 

NO (for 
other than 
digital TV) 

Lack of further obligations for access to 
antenna sites 

EN 

124 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
FR  

FR/2006/0335; 
FR/2008/0758; 
FR/2009/0914 

Market 
split 

three 
criteria 
only 
fulfilled for 
transmissi
on of 
digital 
television; 
1 SMP 

Digital TV 
only: access 
to buildings, 
masts and 
broadcasting 
channel 
multiplexes
210

YES 

YES 

Cost orientation for access to 
the 78 non-replicable sites; 
HCA CC  

Prohibition of excessive 
pricing for access to the 
other than the non-replicable 
sites 

YES 

Need to monitor the list of sites; need to 
notified withdrawal/adding of antenna  
sites of one of the lists 

DE 

DE/2006/0469, 
DE/2007/0606; 
DE/2009/0940  

Market 
split 

3 SMP 
(cable) 

Signal 
delivery - 
only if 
downstream 
operator 
connects less 
than 500 
homes 

YES 

feeding 
content into 
platform 

NO 

YES 

Ex post price control: 
prohibition of abusive pricing 

EL 

EL/2007/0684 

Market 
split 

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

HU 

HU/2007/0734 

Market 
split 

1  

To terrestrial 
transmission 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation based on 
choice of operator between 
ceiling plus glide path or 
FDC 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

No comments 

Constraints on SMP from emerging 
markets211 

210   

211  

EN 

I.e.,  access  to  digital  television  only  for  upstream  services,  i.e.,  services  offered  to  other  broadcasting  transmission  providers;  no  access  obligation  to  downstream 
transmission services offered to broadcasters. 

See also Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC and SEC (2007)1483 p. 17. 

125 

EN 

 
  
 
 
                                                 
IE 

IE/2004/0042, 
IE/2004/0114 

Market 
split 

IT 

IT/2006/0424;  
IT/2007/0729 

Market 
split 

LV 

LV/2007/0694 

Market 
split 

LT/2006/0376, 
LT/2006/0468 

LT/2009/1022 

Terrestrial 
analogue 
and 
digital/radi
o/broadca
sting = 7 
markets 

1 SMP 
terrestrial 
trans-
mission  

2 SMP 
terrestrial 
trans-
mission  

3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled 

3 Criteria 
test and 
SMP 
fulfilled for 
7 defined 
markets;  

2 SMP 
operators 

NO 

YES 

YES 

NO 

YES 

No comments 

To terrestrial 
television 
transmission 

YES 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

No comments 

YES 

YES 

YES 

Restricted to certain 
terrestrial analogue radio 
and TV transmission: Cost-
orientation with glide path, 
based on  FDC  

YES 

monitor market developments; intra-
platform competition; exclusive rights 
for LRTC and TEO 

MT/2006/0564 
(withdrawn); 
MT/2008/0810 

Market 
split 

3 criteria 
test not 
fulfilled 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

No comments 

NOT NOTIFIED 

LT 

LU 

MT 

EN 

126 

EN 

 
  
NL 

NL/2005/0246 
(cable); 
NL/2005/0270,  
NL/2005/0277, 
NL/2006/0410 
(terrestrial); 
NL/2008/0849 
(terrestrial); 
NL/2009/0873 
(cable);  

NL/2009/1007;  

NL/2009/1015 

Market 
split 

3  criteria 
test not 
fulfilled for 
terrestrial;
4 SMP 
operators 
for cable 
transmissi
on  

Analogue 
and digital 
cable 
transmission 

YES 
(for 
cable) 

YES (for 
cable) 

Cost-orientation (for cable) 
based on cost accounting, 
and in the absence of cost-
accounting, based on retail 
minus 

NO 

Market delineation for 
access/transmission; three criteria test 
for cable; outhpasing of analogue 

PL 

PL/2006/0455 

Market 
split 

1 SMP 
terrestrial 

Analogue 
and digital, 
TV and 
212
radio

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation based on 
FL-LRIC  

YES 

PT 

PT/2007/0655 

RO 

RO/2009/0876 

SK 

SK/2006/0456 

Market 
split 

Market 
split 

Market 
split 

1 

1 

1 

Digital TV 

YES 

YES 

YES 

YES 

NO 

NO 

Cost-orientation based on 
FDC -HC   

Analogue 
terrestrial TV 
and Radio 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation based on 
FDC-HC 

YES 

NO 

YES 

Exclusion of cable from analysis; too 
narrow remedies; possibility to 
differentiate remedies between national 
and local transmission services; 
absence of timing for cost accounting 

monitoring competition from emerging 
platforms 

examination of infringements due to 
exclusive rights 

Exclusion of other than analogue 
terrestrial from the market 

212   Access obligation imposed only in relation to other transmission services operators due to restrictions on scope of remedy imposed by law. 

EN 

127 

EN 

 
  
 
  
                                                 
SI 

SI/2006/0476; 
SI/2007/0730   

Market 
split 

1 

Digital and 
analogue 
terrestrial TV 
and Radio 

YES 

YES 

For digital: Cost orientation 
based on FAC HCA; until 
implementation: reasonable 
prices 

For analogue: NO 

YES for 
digital 

NO for 
analogue 

Consider competitive constraints from 
emerging platforms; clarification of 
reasonable pricing 

ES 

ES/2006/0252; 
ES/2009/0905 

Market 
split 

1 

Terrestrial 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation; prohibition 
of price squeeze, predatory 
pricing 

NO 

monitoring effectiveness of access 
obligation (collocation); monitoring 2nd 
criteria due to market entry at regional 
level 

SE 

SE/2005/0188, 
SE/2005/0266, 

SE/2009/0975 

Market 
split 

Three 
criteria 
test 
fulfilled for 
free to air 
terrestrial 
TV; 

 1 SMP 

UK 

UK/2004/0111 

Market 
split 

2 

Analogue 
and digital 
terrestrial 
free to air TV; 

To masts and 
antennas for 
terrestrial  

NO 

NO 

Cost-orientation based on 
FDC-HC 

YES 

No comments 

YES 

YES 

Cost-orientation 

NO 

Exclusion of satellite 

EN 

128 

EN 

 
  
 
EN 

129 

   EN