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Date: 2010-05-20
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Ukraine, anti-dumping duty, anti-dumping legislation, chemical salt, import (EU), originating product

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Brussels, 20.5.2010 
COM(2010)244 final 

2010/0130 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Ukraine following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1225/2009 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

Grounds for and objectives of the proposal 

This  proposal  concerns  the  application  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1225/2009  of 
30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members 
of the European Community (codified version), repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 
384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not 
members  of  the  European  Community,  (‘the  basic  Regulation’)  in  the  expiry  review 
proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Ukraine. 

General context 

This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation and 
is the result of an investigation which was carried out in line with the substantive and 
procedural requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. 

Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  132/2001  imposing  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  of 
EUR 33,25 per tonne on imports of ammonium nitrate falling within CN codes 3102 30 
90 and 3102 40 90 originating in Ukraine. 

Council Regulation (EC) No 945/2005, by which, following an interim review limited 
in scope to the definition of the product concerned, the wording ‘ammonium nitrate’ in 
the  original  Regulation  was  replaced  by  ‘solid  fertilizers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate 
content exceeding 80% by weight’. 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  442/2007  of  19  April  2007  imposing  a  definitive  anti-
dumping  duty  on  imports  of  ammonium  nitrate  originating  in  Ukraine  following  an 
expiry review pursuant to article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 

Consistency with other policies and objectives of the UNION 

Not applicable. 

CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Consultation of interested parties 

Interested  parties  concerned  by  the  proceeding  have  already  had  the  possibility  to 
defend their interests during the investigation, in line with the provisions of the basic 
Regulation. 

Collection and use of expertise 

There was no need for external expertise. 

Impact assessment 

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This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation. 

The  basic  Regulation  does  not  foresee  a  general  impact  assessment  but  contains  an 
exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed. 

LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

Summary of the proposed action 

On  23  April  2009,  the  Commission  initiated  an  expiry  review  of  the  anti-dumping 
measures  in  force  in  respect  of  imports  of  ammonium  nitrate  ('AN')  originating  in 
Ukraine. 

The  purpose  of  this  investigation  was  to  examine  whether  there  is  continuation  or 
recurrence  of  dumping  regarding  imports  of  AN  originating  in  Ukraine,  thereby 
causing a continuation or recurrence of injury to the Union industry. 

The investigation showed that imports of AN originating in Ukraine were dumped, and 
a likelihood of continuation of dumping as well as a likelihood of recurrence of injury 
was  established.  However,  the  investigation  also  showed  that  the  price  of  gas  in 
Ukraine showed an increasing trend during the review investigation period ('RIP') and 
even  if  it  was  on  average  40%  below  international  market  prices,  it  reached 
international  levels  in  the  end  of  the  RIP.  Based  on  data  available  it  is  however 
uncertain whether the trend observed in gas prices can be considered as lasting.  

It is therefore concluded that anti-dumping measures have to be maintained on imports 
from Ukraine.  

In  view  of  the  findings  of  the  investigation  it  is  therefore  proposed  that  the  Council 
adopts the attached proposal for a Regulation which should be published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union by 22 July 2010 at the latest. 

Legal basis 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1225/2009  of  30  November  2009  on  protection  against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community.  

Subsidiarity principle 

The  proposal  falls  under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Union.  The  subsidiarity 
principle therefore does not apply. 

Proportionality principle 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons. 

The form of action is described in the above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves no 
scope for national decision. 

Indication of how financial and administrative burden falling upon the Union, national 
governments,  regional  and  local  authorities,  economic  operators  and  citizens  is 

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minimized and proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable. 

Choice of instruments 

Proposed instruments: regulation. 

Other  means  would  not  be  adequate  because  the  basic  Regulation  does  not  foresee 
alternative options. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATION 

The proposal has no implication for the budget of the European Union. 

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2010/0130 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Ukraine following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1225/2009 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning the European Union, 

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community1 repealing 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  no  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against  dumped 
imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community2  (the  'basic  Regulation'), 
and in particular Article 11(2) thereof, 

Having  regard  to  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  Commission  after  consulting  the  Advisory 
Committee, 

Whereas: 

1. 

(1) 

(2) 

A. 

PROCEDURE 

Measures in force 

On  22  January  2001  the  Council  imposed,  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  132/20013,  a 
definitive  anti-dumping  duty  ('the  existing  measures')  of  EUR  33,25  per  tonne  on 
imports of ammonium nitrate ('AN') falling within CN codes 3102 30 90 and 3102 40 
90 and originating, inter alia, in Ukraine. The investigation that led to these measures 
will be referred to as ‘the original investigation’. 

On  17  May  2004,  following  a  partial  interim  review,  by  Regulation  (EC)  No 
993/20044  the  Council  exempted  from  the  anti-dumping  duties  imposed  by  Council 
Regulation (EC) No 132/2001 imports to the Union of the product concerned produced 
by  companies  from  which  undertakings  would  be  accepted  by  the  Commission.  By 
Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  1001/20045,  as  last  amended  by  Commission 
Regulation  (EC)  No  1996/20046,  undertakings  were  accepted  for  a  period  until  20 

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3 
4 
5 
6 

OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p.51. 
OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p.1. 
OJ L 23, 25.1.2001, p.1. 
OJ L 182, 19.5.2004, p.28. 
OJ L 183, 20.5.2004, p.13 
OJ L 344, 20.11.2004, p.24 

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(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

2. 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

May  2005.  The  purpose  of  these  undertakings  was  to  take  account  of  certain 
consequences of the enlargement of the European Union to 25 Member States. 

By Regulation (EC) No 945/20057, following an interim review limited in scope to the 
definition  of  the  product  concerned,  the  Council  decided  that  the  definition  of  the 
product concerned should be clarified and that the measures in force should apply to 
the  product  concerned  when  incorporated  in  other  fertilizers,  in  proportion  to  their 
content of ammonium nitrate, together with other marginal substances and nutrients.  

By Regulation (EC) No 442/20078, following an expiry review, the Council decided to 
prolong  the  existing  measures,  as  clarified  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  945/2005,  for  a 
period of two years. 

By Regulation (EC) No 661/20089, following an expiry review, the Council imposed 
definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of AN originating in Russia.  

By  Regulation  (EC)  No  662/200810,  the  Council  amended  Regulation  (EC)  No 
442/2007 by accepting a price undertaking offered by one exporting producer. 

Request for a review 

On  22  January  2009,  a  request  for  an  expiry review  pursuant  to  Article  11(2)  of  the 
basic Regulation was lodged following the publication of a notice of impending expiry 
on  17  October  200811.  This  request  was  lodged  by  the  European  Fertilizer 
Manufacturers  Association  (EFMA)  (‘the  applicant’)  on  behalf  of  producers 
representing  a  major  proportion,  in  this  case  more  than  50  %  of  the  total  Union 
production of AN. 

The  applicant  alleged  and  provided  sufficient  prima  facie  evidence  that  there  is  a 
likelihood  of  recurrence  of  dumping  and  injury  to  the  Union  industry  with  regard  to 
imports of AN originating in Ukraine ('the country concerned'). 

Having determined, after consulting the Advisory Committee, that sufficient evidence 
existed for the initiation of an expiry review, the Commission announced on 23 April 
2009,  by  a  notice  of  initiation  published  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the  European 
Union12,  the  initiation  of  an  expiry  review  pursuant  to  Article  11(2)  of  the  basic 
Regulation. 

3. 

Investigation 

3.1. 

Investigation period 

(10)  The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 
April 2008 to 31 March 2009 ('review investigation period' or ‘RIP’). The examination 

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12 

OJ L 160, 23.6.2005, p.1 
OJ L 106, 24.4.2007, p.1 
OJ L 185, 12.7.2008, p.1 
OJ L 185, 12.7.2008, p.35 
OJ C 264, 17.10.2008, p.16 
OJ C 94, 23.4.2009, p.15 

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of the trends relevant for the assessment of a likelihood of a continuation or recurrence 
of injury covered the period from 2005 to the end of the RIP ('period considered'). 

3.2. 

Parties concerned by the investigation 

(11)  The  Commission  officially  advised  the  exporting  producers,  importers  and  users 
known  to  be  concerned  and  their  associations,  the  representatives  of  the  exporting 
country, the applicant and the Union producers of the initiation of the expiry review. 
Interested  parties  were  given  the  opportunity  to  make  their  views  known  in  writing 
and to request a hearing within the time limit set out in the notice of initiation. 

(12)  All interested parties, who so requested and showed that there were particular reasons 

why they should be heard, were granted a hearing. 

(13) 

In view of the large number of Union producers and of importers in the Union, it was 
considered  appropriate,  in  conformity  with  Article  17  of  the  basic  Regulation,  to 
examine  whether  sampling  should  be  used.  In  order  to  enable  the  Commission  to 
decide whether sampling would indeed be necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the 
above  parties  were  requested,  pursuant  to  Article  17(2)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  to 
make  themselves  known  within  15  days  of  the  initiation  of  the  investigation  and  to 
provide the Commission with the information requested in the notice of initiation. 

(14)  After  examination  of  the  information  submitted,  and  given  that  twelve  Union 
producers  indicated  their  willingness  to  cooperate,  it  was  decided  that  sampling  was 
necessary  with  regard  to  Union  producers.  No  importers  came  forward  by  providing 
the information requested in the notice of initiation.  

(15)  Twelve  Union  producers  accounting  for  around  80%  of  the  total  Union  production 
during  the  RIP,  properly  completed  the  sampling  form  within  the  deadline  and 
formally  agreed  to  co-operate  further  in  the  investigation.  On  that  basis,  the 
Commission  selected  in  accordance  with  Article  17  of  the  basic  Regulation,  a 
representative  sample  based  on  the  largest  representative  volume  of  production  and 
sales  of  AN  in  the  Union  which  can  reasonably  be  investigated  within  the  time 
available.  Five  Union  producers  accounting  for  57%  of  the  total  production  of  the 
Union industry during the RIP were selected in the sample.  

(16) 

In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the parties concerned were 
consulted on the sample chosen and raised no objection thereto.  

(17)  Questionnaires  were  sent  to  the  five  sampled  Union  producers  and  to  all  known 

exporting producers in the country concerned.  

(18)  Replies  to  the  questionnaires  were  received  from  the  five  sampled  Union  producers 

and three exporting producers in the country concerned. 

(19)  The  Commission  sought  and  verified  all  the  information  it  deemed  necessary  for  a 
determination of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and resulting 
injury and of the Union interest. Verification visits were carried out at the premises of 
the following companies: 

(a) 

Exporting producers in Ukraine: 

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- CJSC Severodonetsk Azot Association, Severodonetsk  

- JSC Concern Stirol, Gorlovka 

- OJSC Rivneazot, Rivne 

(b) 

Union producers: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

GrowHow UK Limited, UK, 

GPN, Paris, France, 

Zaklady Azotowe Pulawi SA, Poland, 

Yara SA, Brussels, Belgium, 

Achema, Jonavos, Lithuania. 

B. 

PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 

1. 

Product concerned 

(20)  The product concerned is solid fertilizers with an ammonium nitrate content exceeding 
80% by weight originating in Ukraine, currently falling within CN codes 3102 30 90, 
3102 40 90, ex 3102 29 00, ex 3102 60 00, ex 3102 90 00, ex 3105 10 00, ex 3105 20 
10, ex 3105 51 00, ex 3105 59 00 and ex 3105 90 91. AN is a solid nitrogen fertiliser 
commonly used in agriculture. It is manufactured from ammonia and nitric acid, and 
its nitrogen content exceeds 28% by weight in prilled or granular form. 

(21) 

It should be noted that the scope of the product concerned was clarified in Regulation 
(EC) No 945/200513.  

2. 

Like product 

(22)  As  established  in  the  original  investigation,  this  review  investigation  confirmed  that 
AN is a pure commodity product, and its quality and basic physical characteristics are 
identical  whatever  the  country  of  origin.  The  product  concerned  and  the  products 
manufactured  and  sold  by  the  exporting  producers  on  their  domestic  market  and  to 
third countries, as well as those manufactured and sold by the Union producers on the 
Union  market  have  thus  been  found  to  have  the  same  basic  physical  and  chemical 
characteristics  and  essentially  the  same  uses  and  are  therefore  considered  to  be  like 
products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. 

C. 

LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF DUMPING 

1. 

General 

(23)  Co-operation was obtained from three Ukrainian exporting producers. A fourth known 

exporting producer did not co-operate in the investigation.  

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See footnote 6 

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(24)  The  comparison  of  the  export  volume  of  the  three  co-operating  exporting  producers 
with the total volume of exports to the Union from Ukraine showed that the three co-
operating exporting producers accounted for more than 90% of all Union imports from 
Ukraine during the RIP. The level of co-operation was therefore considered to be high.  

(25)  Total import volumes of the product concerned from Ukraine were low, representing a 
market share of 1,1 % in the RIP when compared to the Union market at a whole.  

2. 

Dumping of imports during the RIP 

2.1 

Normal value 

(26) 

(27) 

It  is  recalled  that  in  the  previous  expiry  review  Ukraine  was  not  yet  considered  a 
market economy country and therefore the normal value was based on data obtained 
from a co-operating producer in the USA, the analogue country. 

In  the  present  review  normal  value  was  based  on  data  obtained  and  verified  at  the 
premises  of  the  three  co-operating  exporting  producers  in  Ukraine.  The  Commission 
examined whether their domestic sales could be considered as having been made in the 
ordinary course of trade pursuant to Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation. To this end 
the cost of production of the product produced and sold on the domestic market by the 
co-operating exporting producers were examined.  

(28)  As regards gas costs, it was found that Ukraine was importing the majority of the gas 
consumed in the production of AN from Russia. All data available and verified during 
the  investigation  indicated  that  Ukraine  imported  natural  gas  from  Russia  at  a  price 
which  was  during  the  RIP  around  40%  below  the  price  of  natural  gas  from  Russia 
when exported to the Union. However, it was found that in the last quarter of the RIP 
the prices were similar. 

(29) 

(30) 

It  was  found  that  apart  from  one  product  type  exported  by  one  producer,  domestic 
sales  were  made  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade  during  the  RIP.  Normal  value  was 
therefore established either based on the price paid or payable on the domestic market 
in Ukraine by unrelated customers pursuant to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation or 
based on constructed normal value for the product type not sold in the ordinary course 
of  trade.  In  accordance  with  Article  2(3)  of  the  basic  Regulation  normal  value  was 
constructed  by  adding  to  the  manufacturing  costs  of  the  exported  type  a  reasonable 
amount  of  selling,  general  and  administrative  expenses  (SG&A)  and  a  reasonable 
margin  of  profit.  These  amounts  for  SG&A  and  profit  were  based  on  actual  data 
pertaining to production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the like product, 
by the concerned producer.  

It should be noted that the normal value was determined without an adjustment for the 
gas costs borne by the Ukrainian exporting producers in accordance with Article 2(5) 
of the basic Regulation. This was because, as shown below in recitals (32) to (34), the 
use of the unadjusted domestic costs and prices of the Ukrainian exporting producers 
in spite of the apparently distorted gas prices already clearly shows that dumping took 
place  during  the  RIP.  As  a  consequence,  and  given  the  fact  that  the  purpose  of  an 
expiry review is to determine whether dumping would be likely to continue or recur 
should  measures  be  repealed  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  currently  applicable 
measures should be maintained or repealed, it was considered that it was not necessary 

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to  examine  whether  an  adjustment  under  Article  2(5)  of  the  Basic  Regulation  was 
justified in this case. 

2.2. 

Export price 

(31) 

In  accordance  with  Article  2(8)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  the  export  price  was 
established by reference to the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned 
when sold for export to the Community. All sales of the three cooperating exporting 
producers were made directly to independent customers in the Union. 

2.3. 

Comparison 

(32)  The  normal  value  and  export  price  were  compared  on  an  ex-works  basis.  For  the 
purpose of ensuring a fair comparison, due allowance in the form of adjustments was 
made for the differences affecting price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) 
of  the  basic  Regulation.  Accordingly,  adjustments  were  made  for  differences  in 
transport, handling, loading and ancillary costs, insurance, commissions and packing, 
where applicable and supported by verified evidence. 

2.4. 

Dumping margin 

(33)  The  dumping  margin  was  established  on  the  basis  of  a  comparison  of  the  weighted 
average  normal  value  with  a  weighted  average  export  price,  in  accordance  with 
Articles 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.  

(34)  On a country-wide basis a weighted average dumping margin of 6-7% was established 

for the three cooperating exporting producers concerned. 

3. 

Development of imports should measures be repealed 

3.1 

Spare capacity and attractiveness of the Union market 

(35) 

In  the  RIP,  domestic  sales  of  the  three  co-operating  exporting  producers  represented 
on average 46% of their production capacity.  

(36)  Though  the  three  co-operating  exporting  producers  sold  a  big  proportion  of  their 
production  on  the  domestic  market,  they  were  also  dependent  on  exports  to  third 
countries.  In  the  RIP  they  had  a  spare  capacity  corresponding  to  around  6%  of  the 
Union consumption.  

(37)  Based  on  information  in  the  review  request  regarding  the  fourth  known  Ukrainian 
producer  which  did  not  co-operate  in  the  investigation,  the  total  spare  capacity  in 
Ukraine  during  the  RIP  was  estimated  to  amount  to  around  9%  of  the  Union 
consumption.  

(38)  Certain  Ukrainian  cooperating  exporting  producers  claimed 

they  were 
increasingly  losing  market  share  on  their  domestic  market  to  the  benefit  of  Russian 
producers which can offer very low prices due to the much lower gas costs in Russia. 
It  therefore  appeared  unlikely  that  the  Ukrainian  domestic  market  could  absorb  the 
spare  production  capacity  and  therefore  any  increase  in  production  is  likely  to  be 
exported.  

that 

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(39)  The  three  co-operating  companies  exported  AN  to  many  other  third  countries  on 
several continents during the RIP. However, it should be noted that certain traditional 
third country markets are closed to Ukrainian exports either because of anti-dumping 
measures in force (e.g. USA with anti-dumping measures of more than 100%) and/or 
because of safety restrictions (e.g. the People's Republic of China, Australia). In any 
event,  the  Union  is  the  biggest,  most  attractive  and  at  the  same  time  geographically 
closest export market. Its attractiveness is additionally boosted by logistics advantages 
resulting from low rail tariffs in Ukraine.  

(40) 

In  view  of  the  above,  it  cannot  be  excluded  that  a  large  part  of  the  spare  capacity 
available in Ukraine could be used to increase exports to the Union in the absence of 
anti-dumping measures. 

3.2. Prices in different export markets 

(41)  An analysis of export sales of the three co-operating Ukrainian exporting producers to 
third  countries  showed  that  during  the  RIP  export  prices  to  third  countries,  when 
established on a CIF level using the international freight rates provided in the request 
for a review, were up to 25% lower than the prevailing market price in the Union.  

(42)  On  that  basis,  it  therefore  appeared  that  there  would  be  an  incentive  for  Ukrainian 
exports to third countries to be shifted to the Union, should measures be repealed. The 
higher prices in the Union market would allow Ukrainian exporters to achieve better 
profit margins. 

(43)  Based on the figures provided by the three co-operating exporting producers, it could 
also  be  established  that  on  a  country-wide  level  exports  from  Ukraine  to  other  third 
countries were made at dumped prices during the RIP.  

3.3. Conclusion of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping 

(44) 

In  view  of  the  findings  described  above,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  exports  from 
Ukraine  are  still  being  dumped  and  that  there  is  a  likelihood  of  continuation  of 
dumping in the Union market in case the current anti-dumping measures are removed. 
Indeed,  taking  into  account  the  existing  spare  capacity  in  Ukraine  and  the 
attractiveness  of  the  Union  market,  there  appears  to  be  an  incentive  for  Ukrainian 
exporting producers to i) increase their exports to the Union market and ii) shift AN 
exports  from  other  third  country  markets  to  the  Union  market  at  dumped  prices,  at 
least as far as two exporting producers are concerned.  

(45)  Furthermore,  the  weighted  average  export  prices  of  the  co-operating  exporting 
producers  to  third  country  markets  were  found  to  be  significantly  lower  than  the 
prevailing price level in the Union. This reinforces the likelihood of increased exports 
from Ukraine to the Union at dumped prices, should measures be allowed to lapse.  

D. 

DEFINITION OF THE UNION INDUSTRY 

(46)  Within  the  Union,  the  like  product  is  manufactured  by  16  companies  or  group  of 
companies  whose  output  constitutes  the  total  Union  production  of  the  like  product 
within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.  

(47)  Twelve Union producers co-operated with the investigation:  

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– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

– 

Achema AB (Lithuania), 

Agropolychim JSC (Bulgaria), 

Azomures (Romania), 

BASF AG (Germany), 

Fertiberia SA (Spain), 

GPN SA (France), 

GrowHow UK Ltd (United Kingdom), 

Neochim PLC (Bulgaria), 

Nitrogénművek Rt (Hungary), 

Yara (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands), 

Zaklady Azotowe PULAWY SA (Poland), 

Zaklady Azotowe Tarnowie-Moscicach (Poland). 

(48)  Given that these twelve Union producers accounted for around 80% of the total Union 
production  during  the  RIP,  it  is  considered  that  they  constitute  the  Union  industry 
within the meaning of Article 4(1) and Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. They will 
be referred to as the ‘Union industry’. 

(49)  As indicated in recitals (14) and (15) above, the selection of the sample of five Union 
producers  was  made  on  the  basis  of  these  twelve  producers.  All  sampled  producers 
cooperated  and  sent  questionnaire  replies  within  the  deadlines.  In  addition,  the 
remaining  seven  co-operating  producers  duly  provided  certain  general  data  for  the 
injury analysis. 

E. 

SITUATION ON THE UNION MARKET 

1. 

Consumption in the Union market 

(50)  The apparent Union consumption was established on the basis of the sales volumes of 
the  Union  industry  on  the  Union  market,  the  sales  volumes  of  the  other  Union 
producers  on  the  Union  market,  Eurostat  data  for  all  Union  imports  and  the 
information of the questionnaire responses of the co-operating companies as far as the 
imports of the product concerned from Ukraine are concerned. Given the enlargement 
of the Union to 27 Member States in 2007, for the sake of clarity and consistency of 
the  analysis,  all  injury  indicators  were  established  on  the  basis  of  the  EU-27  market 
throughout the period considered. 

(51)  Between 2005 and the RIP, Union consumption decreased by 10%.  

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

EN 

12 

   EN 

 
Total Union 
consumption in tonnes  7 861 796 

6 983 467

8 023 633

7 638 439 

7 054 327 

Index (2005=100) 

100 

89 

102 

97 

90 

2. 

Volume, market share and prices of imports from Ukraine 

(52)  The volumes, market shares and average prices of the imports from Ukraine developed 
as  set  out  in  the  table  below.  The  quantity  and  price  trends  were  based  on  the 
information  obtained  from  the  questionnaire  responses  of  the  co-operating  exporting 
producers, import statistics (Eurostat) and Ukrainian export statistics. 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

Volume of imports (tonnes) 

76 867 

42 912 

29 420 

48 232 

75 582 

Market share 

Prices of imports 
(EUR/tonne) 

Index (2005=100) 

1% 

0,6% 

0,4% 

0,6% 

1,1% 

123 

100 

139 

113 

145 

118 

259 

211 

230 

187 

(53)  The volume of imports from Ukraine decreased consistently until 2007 but reached in 
the  RIP  almost  the  same  level  as  in  2005.  The  Ukrainian  market  share  increased 
slightly from 1% in 2005 to 1,1% in the RIP. The unit prices evolved positively from 
123 to 230 EUR/tonne over the period considered. This increase in the RIP has to be 
seen in line with the worldwide evolution of price and in also the price of the main raw 
material.  

(54)  For  the  purpose  of  calculating  the  level  of  price  undercutting  during  the  RIP,  Union 
industry’s ex-works prices to unrelated customers were compared with the CIF Union 
frontier  import  prices  of  the  co-operating  exporting  producers  in  the  country 
concerned,  duly  adjusted  in  order  to  reflect  a  landed  price.  On  that  basis,  the 
comparison  showed  that  imports  from  Ukraine  were  undercutting  the  prices  of  the 
Union industry by 22,5% on average during the RIP. An undercutting margin of 11% 
was  still  found  to  exist  from  Ukrainian  exporters  when  the  anti-dumping  duty  was 
added on top of their prices to the Union.  

3. 

Imports from other countries  

(55)  The  volume  of  imports  from  other  third  countries  during  the  period  considered  are 
shown  in  the  table  below.  The  following  quantity  and  price  trends  are  based  on 
Eurostat. 

EN 

13 

   EN 

 
 
2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

Volume of imports from Russia (tonnes) 

328 972  217 539 

35 852 

136 984 

184 170 

Market share 

4,2% 

3,1% 

0,4% 

1,8% 

2,6% 

Prices of imports from Russia (EUR/tonne) 

122 

124 

144 

275 

235 

Volume of imports from Georgia (tonnes) 

153 844 

85 870 

88 622 

214 879 

222 912 

Market share 

2,0% 

1,2% 

1,1% 

2,8% 

3,2% 

Prices of imports from Georgia 
(EUR/tonne) 

Volume of imports from Kazakhstan 
(tonnes) 

Market share 

Prices of imports from Kazakhstan 
(EUR/tonne) 

Volume of imports from all other countries 
(tonnes) 

Market share 

164 

177 

174 

325 

304 

0 

4 845 

112 239 

81 410 

100 761 

0% 

0,1% 

1,4% 

1,1% 

1,4% 

0 

147 

151 

255 

242 

65 253 

118 927 

99 380 

109 755 

91 785 

0,8% 

1,7% 

1,2% 

1,4% 

1,3% 

Prices of imports from all other countries 
(EUR/tonne) 

190 

170 

240 

242 

265 

(56) 

 There  was  a  significant  price  increase  in  the  Union  market  from  all  third  countries 
which  occurred  in  2008  and  the  RIP.  It  appeared  that,  apart  from  Russia,  all  the 
countries  mentioned  in  the  table  above  increased  their  export  volumes  to  the  Union 
during  the  period  considered.  In  the  case  of  Russian  imports,  they  are  subject  to  an 
anti-dumping  fix  duty  of  EUR  47,07  per  tonne  and  were  imported,  as  the  Ukrainian 
imports, at the lowest price compared to all other exporting countries.  

4. 

Economic situation of the Union industry  

(57)  Pursuant  to  Article  3(5)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  the  Commission  examined  all 
relevant  economic  factors  and  indices  having  a  bearing  on  the  state  of  the  Union 
industry.  

4.1 

Preliminary remarks 

(58)  Since  recourse  was  made  to  sampling  for  the  investigation  of  injury,  certain  injury 
indicators  such  as  production,  production  capacity,  sales,  market  share,  productivity 
and employment were analysed for the Union industry as a whole ('Union' in the tables 
below). Other injury indicators relating to the performances of individual companies, 
such as prices, stocks, costs of production, profitability, wages, investments, return on 

EN 

14 

   EN 

 
investment,  cash  flow,  ability  to  raise  capital  were  examined  on  the  basis  of 
information collected at the level of the sampled Union producers ('S.P.' in the tables 
below). 

4.2. 

Data relating to the Union industry as a whole 

(a) Production 

(59)  The  Union  industry’s  production  decreased  by  18%  between  2005  and  the  RIP,  i.e. 
from a level of around 7 million tonnes in 2005 to a level of around 5,8 million tonnes 
in the RIP. As regards the production for captive use, it remained modest during the 
period considered  and did not affect the situation of the Union industry in particular 
during the RIP. 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

Union production 
(tonnes) 

Index (2005 = 100) 

Union production used 
for captive transfers 

7 133 844 

6 359 967 

7 146 911  6 454 234 

5 843 181 

100 

89 

100 

90 

82 

210 437 

176 413 

185 223 

138 733 

119 053 

As % of total production 

2,9% 

2,8% 

2,6% 

2,1% 

2,0% 

(b) Capacity and capacity utilisation rates 

(60)  Production capacity remained by and large stable throughout the period considered. In 
line with the decrease in production, the resulting capacity utilisation decreased, from 
a level of 55% in 2005 to a level of 45% in the RIP. As already noted in the original 
investigation,  capacity  utilisation  for  AN  can  be  affected  by  the  production  of  other 
products  which  can  be  produced  on  the  same  production  equipment.  Therefore  the 
trend  in  the  capacity  utilisation  is  less  relevant  for  the  assessment  of  the  economic 
situation of the Union industry. 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

 Union capacity (tonnes)  13 059 281  12 824 281  12 820 594  13 069 317  13 077 281 

Union capacity 
utilisation 

(c) Sales volume  

55% 

50% 

56% 

49% 

45% 

(61)  Sales by the Union industry on the Union market decreased by 14% between 2005 and 
the RIP. This development has to be seen against the background of a shrinking Union 
consumption in the same period.  

2005 

2003 

2004 

2008 

RIP 

EN 

15 

   EN 

 
 
 
Union sales volume (tonnes) 
to unrelated parties 

5 365 834  4 756 093  5 495 037

5 157 788  4 605 629

Index (2005 = 100) 

100 

89 

102 

96 

86 

Union sales volume to 
unrelated parties in third 
countries (tonnes) 

887 056 

727 176 

637 408 

559 393 

548 090 

Index (2005 = 100) 

100 

82 

72 

63 

62 

(d) Market share 

(62)  The market share held by the Union industry remained stable from 2005 to 2008 but 

decreased by three percentage points between 2008 and the RIP.  

Union market share  

Index (2005 = 100) 

(e) Employment 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

68% 

100 

68% 

100 

68% 

68% 

65% 

100 

100 

96 

(63)  The  level  of  employment  of  the  Union  industry  decreased  by  8%  between  2005  and 

the RIP. 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

Union employment product 
concerned 

3 627 

3 578 

3 458 

3 494 

3 354 

Index (2005 = 100) 

100 

99 

95 

96 

92 

(f) Productivity  

(64)  During the period considered, the average output per person employed by the Union 
industry decreased by 11%. This is explained by the fact that the relative decrease in 
output bypassed the relative decrease in employment. 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

Union productivity (tonnes 
per employee) 

1 967 

1 778 

2 067 

1 847 

1 742 

Index (2005 = 100) 

100 

90 

105 

94 

89 

(g) Magnitude of dumping margin  

(65)  As concerns the magnitude of the actual margin of dumping, given the currently small 
volume  of  imports  from  Ukraine,  this  impact  is  considered  not  to  be  significant  and 
the indicator not relevant for the injury analysis. 

EN 

16 

   EN 

 
 
 
4.3. 

Data relating to the sampled Union producers 

(a) Sales prices and factors affecting domestic prices 

(66)  The sampled Union industry producers' average net sales price increased substantially 
in  2008  and  the  RIP  reflecting  the  prevailing  favourable  international  market 
conditions of AN during that period. 

S.P. Unit price (EUR/tonne) 

Index (2005 = 100) 

(b) Stocks  

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

165 

100 

182 

110 

189 

115 

309 

187 

315 

191 

(67)  The level of closing stocks of the Union industry decreased by 26% from 2005 to the 
RIP.  A  sharp  increase  registered  in  2006  was  due  to  steep  decrease  in  sales  volume 
between 2005 and 2006. 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

S.P. Closing stocks (tonnes) 

276 569 

489 535 

345 137 

252 072 

203 579 

Index (2005 = 100) 

100 

177 

125 

91 

74 

(c) Wages  

(68)  Between 2005 and the RIP, the average wage per employee increased by 6%, as the 
table  below  shows.  In  the  light  of  the  inflation  rate  and  the  overall  reduced 
employment, this increase of wages is considered to be moderate. 

S.P. Average labour cost per 
employee (000 EUR) 

Index (2005 = 100) 

(d) Investments  

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

40,4 

100 

41,2 

102 

43,3 

107 

45,0 

111 

43,0 

106 

(69)  The  annual  investments  in  the  like  product  made  by  the  five  sampled  producers 
developed  positively  during  the  period  considered  and  increased  by  70%.  These 
investments related mainly to the modernisation of certain machinery. This shows that 
the Union industry is continuously willing to improve its competitiveness.  

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

S.P. Net investments (000 
EUR) 

46 668 

52 191 

64 319 

73 948 

79 379 

EN 

17 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
Index (2005 = 100) 

100 

112 

138 

158 

170 

(e) Profitability and return on investments 

(70)  Profitability of the sampled producers improved significantly notably since 2006, as it 
reached  the  level  of  28,1%  on  turnover  during  the  RIP.  The  return  on  investments 
(ROI), expressed as the profit in percent of the net book value of investments, broadly 
followed the positive trend in profitability over the period considered. 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

S.P. Profitability of EC sales 
to unrelated customers (% of 
net sales) 

9,2% 

7,9% 

14,9% 

25,3% 

28,1% 

Index (2005 = 100) 

100 

85 

162 

274 

304 

S.P. ROI (profit in % of net 
book value of investment) 

35,2% 

25,8% 

41,1% 

109,1% 

114,1% 

Index (2005 = 100) 

100 

73 

117 

310 

324 

(f) Cash flow and ability to raise capital  

(71)  Cash-flow has increased significantly during the period considered and is in line with 

the development of the overall profitability during that period. 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

RIP 

S.P. Cash flow (000 EUR) 

84 567 

52 182 

188 535 

373 843 

386 721 

Index (2005 = 100) 

100 

63 

223 

442 

457 

(72)  The  investigation  did  not  reveal  any  difficulties  encountered  by  the  sampled  Union 
producers in raising capital. In this respect, it should be noted that as several of these 
companies  are  part  of  large  groups,  they  finance  their  activities  within  the  group  to 
which they belong either through cash-pooling schemes or through intra-group loans 
granted by the mother companies.  

5. 

Conclusion 

(73)  Between  2005  and  the  RIP,  most  injury  indicators  developed  positively:  unit  sales 
prices  and  profitability  improved  substantially,  the  latter  reaching  a  level  of  28,1% 
during the RIP. Investments, return on investment and cash-flow evolved positively as 
well.  

EN 

18 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
(74)  Although  production  and  sales  volumes  decreased  considerably  over  the  period 
considered this has to be seen against a shrinking Union market in the order of minus 
10%.  

(75)  Overall, the situation of the Union industry has improved significantly as compared to 
its  situation  prior  to  the  imposition  of  the  anti-dumping  measures  on  imports  of  AN 
from the country concerned in 2001. 

F. 

LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY 

1. 

General 

(76) 

In  the  context  of  the  likelihood  of  recurrence  of  injury,  two  main  parameters  were 
analyzed: (i) the likely export volumes and prices of the country concerned and (ii) the 
likely effect of projected volumes and prices from the country concerned on the Union 
industry.  

2. 

Likely export volumes and prices of the country concerned 

(77)  There  is  a  known  spare  capacity  of  around  650  thousand  tonnes  available  for  the 
cooperating Ukrainian producers, representing 9% of the Union market, as mentioned 
in recital (37) above. This surplus of capacity indicates that Ukrainian producers have 
the  possibility  to  quickly  increase  their  current  production  and  thus  their  exports  of 
AN.  

(78)  Moreover,  given  the  relatively  small  size  of  their  domestic  market,  Ukrainian 
producers are heavily depending on exports to third countries. As explained in recital 
(41) above, these exports were made at prices substantially lower than the prevailing 
market price in the Union.  

(79)  Based  on  the  above  facts  and  considerations,  the  Union  market  would  appear  to  be 
attractive for the Ukrainian exporting producers in terms of prices as compared to all 
other export markets. It can thus reasonably be expected that a considerable part of the 
volumes  exported  to  third  countries  would  be  directed  toward  the  Union  market, 
should  the  measures  be  allowed  to  lapse.  The  proximity  of  the  Union  market,  as 
compared to other export markets, would also render the Union market more attractive 
and  would  therefore  increase  the  likelihood  of  a  re-direction  of  current  exports  by 
Ukrainian producers from third countries to the Union. 

(80)  Given  the  currently  weak  market  position  of  Ukrainian  products  in  the  Union,  the 
Ukrainian exporters would need to gain market share or broaden their customer base 
and  are  likely  to  manage  this  by  offering  AN  at  dumped  prices  as  was  established 
during the RIP.  

(81)  On  the  basis  of  the  above,  it  is  therefore  likely  that  significant  volumes  of  AN 
produced  in  Ukraine  would  be  redirected  to  the  Union  market  at  dumped  prices 
substantially undercutting Union industry’s prices, if measure are allowed to lapse. 

3. 

Impact on the Union industry of the projected export volumes and price effects 
in case of repeal of measures  

EN 

19 

   EN 

(82)  The  investigation  has  shown  that  AN  is  a  commodity  product  for  which  prices  can 
significantly be affected by the presence of low-priced imports undercutting the Union 
industry's  prices.  In  other  words,  the  Union  market  for  AN  is  a  relatively  volatile 
market.  The  favourable  worldwide  market  conditions  for  AN  prevailing  during  the 
period considered played an important role in keeping the prices at a high level and the 
applicable  anti-dumping  measures  reduced  the  possibility  of  price  distortion  in  the 
Union  market.  During  that  period,  there  was  a  tight  balance  between  the  supply  and 
the  demand  which  resulted  in  higher  prices  for  all  nitrogen  fertilisers,  which  are 
commodity products. AN is also a commodity product whose pricing is influenced by 
numerous factors, such as the gas price, which has a considerable impact on the supply 
because  it  is  the  most  important  cost  element,  the  weather  conditions,  the  crops  and 
grain stock levels, which overall result in a reduced or increased demand for fertilisers.  

(83)  With particular regard to the Union market, it can be expected that the demand for AN 
will  increase  slightly  from  the  level  observed  in  the  RIP.  Given  that  the  prices 
practiced  by  the  Ukrainians  were  significantly  undercutting  the  prices  of  the  Union 
industry,  the  likely  increase  in  import  volumes  from  Ukraine  would  force  the  Union 
industry either to lower significantly its prices, thereby its profits, or to lose significant 
market  share  and  thus  revenues,  or  both.  The  successful  restructuring  process  of  the 
Union  industry  could  probably  only  partially  counterbalance  such  a  likely  price 
depression  and  the  whole  recovery  process  would  be  put  in  danger.  Therefore,  a 
deterioration of the Union industry's overall economic situation is likely to result from 
the repeal of the measures.  

4. 

Conclusion on likelihood of recurrence of injury 

(84)  The  above  facts  and  considerations  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  should  the  current 
measures be allowed to lapse, exports from the country concerned would likely occur 
in significant volumes and at dumped prices undercutting the Union industry’s prices. 
This would in all likelihood have the effect of introducing a price-depressive trend on 
the market, with an expected negative impact on the economic situation of the Union 
industry.  This  would,  in  particular,  impede  the  financial  recovery  that  was  achieved 
during the period considered, leading to a recurrence of injury. 

1. 

Introduction 

G. 

UNION INTEREST 

(85) 

(86) 

(87) 

It was examined whether compelling reasons existed that could lead to the conclusion 
that  it  is  not  in  the  Union  interest  to  renew  the  anti-dumping  measures  in  force.  For 
this purpose, and in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the impact of 
the  renewal  of  the  measures  on  all  parties  involved  in  this  proceeding  and  the 
consequences  of  the  expiry  of  the  measures  were  considered  on  the  basis  of  all 
evidence submitted.  

In  order  to  assess  the  impact  of  the  possible  maintenance  of  measures,  all  interested 
parties  were  given  the  opportunity  to  make  their  views  known  pursuant  to  Article 
21(2) of the basic Regulation.  

It should be recalled that, in the original investigation, the adoption of measures was 
considered  not  to  be  contrary  to  the  interest  of  the  Union.  Furthermore,  the  fact  that 
the present investigation is a review, thus analysing a situation in which anti-dumping 

EN 

20 

   EN 

measures  have  already  been  in  place,  allows  the  assessment  of  any  undue  negative 
impact on the parties concerned by the current anti-dumping measures. 

2. 

Interest of the Union industry 

(88)  The Union industry has proven to be a structurally viable industry. This was confirmed 
by the positive development of its economic situation observed after the imposition of 
anti-dumping measures in 2001. In particular, the Union industry improved its profit 
situation between 2005 and the RIP considerably and restructured itself successfully. 

(89) 

It  can  thus  reasonably  be  expected  that  the  Union  industry  will  continue  to  benefit 
from  the  measures  currently  imposed  and  further  recover  by  maintaining  and 
stabilising  its  profitability.  Should  the  measures  not  be  maintained,  it  is  likely  that 
increased  imports  at  dumped  prices  from  the  country  concerned  will  occur,  thereby 
causing  injury  to  the  Union  industry  by  exerting  a  downward  pressure  on  the  sales 
prices which will negatively affect its currently positive financial situation. 

3. 

Interest of importers  

(90)  As  mentioned  in  recital  (14)  above,  no  importer  indicated  its  willingness  to  be 
included in the sample and to provide the basic information required in the sampling 
form. It is recalled that in previous investigations it was found that the impact of the 
imposition of measures would not be significant because, as a rule, importers do not 
only deal in AN but also, to a significant extent, in other fertilisers. The lifting of anti-
dumping measures on other fertilisers can only reinforce the foregoing. In that context, 
anti-dumping  measures  applicable  on  imports  of  urea  originating  in  Russia  and  in 
Belarus,  Croatia,  Libya  and  Ukraine  were  lifted  in  August  2007  and  March  2008 
respectively14.  However,  in  the  absence  of  cooperation  of  importers  and  thus  of  any 
conclusive evidence allowing to assess any significant negative consequences, it was 
concluded that there are no compelling reasons against the maintenance of the current 
anti-dumping measures.  

(91)  There  is  no  reliable  information  available  indicating  that  the  maintenance  of  the 

measures will have a significant negative effect on importers or traders. 

4. 

Interest of users 

(92)  The  users  of  AN  in  the  Union  are  farmers.  In  the  original  investigation,  it  was 
concluded that given the small incidence of AN on the farmers activity, any increase in 
these costs was unlikely to have a significant adverse effect on them.  

(93)  Within  the  present  investigation  two  farmer  associations  submitted  comments 
advocating  for  the  termination  of  the  measures.  They  mainly  claimed  that  the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy  reform  of  2003  reduced  the  use  of  market  intervention 
mechanism and broke the link between Union support and production. Consequently 
this  process  of  liberalisation  forced  the  Union  farmers  to  operate  at  world  market 
conditions. Only the free choice of AN suppliers could prevent prices of farm products 
to increase substantially.  

14 

OJ L 198, 31.7.2007, p.4 and OJ L 75, 18.3.2008, p. 33. 

EN 

21 

   EN 

                                                 
(94)  However,  the  possible  continuation  of  the  current  anti-dumping  measures  will  not 
prevent  users  to  choose  freely  their  AN  suppliers,  but  it  will  maintain  a  fair  level 
playing  field  in  the  Union  market  where  effective  competition  will  be  enhanced. 
Therefore, based on the above, it can be concluded that the  continuation  of the anti-
dumping  measures  against  Ukraine  will  not  have  significant  adverse  effects  on  the 
users of the product concerned.  

5. 

Conclusion on Union interest 

(95)  Given  the  above,  it  is  concluded  that  there  are  no  compelling  reasons  against  the 

maintenance of the current anti-dumping measures. 

H. 

ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 

(96)  All  parties  were  informed  of  the  essential  facts  and  considerations  on  the  basis  of 
which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. They 
were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure. The 
comments made were taken duly into consideration where warranted. 

(97) 

It  follows  from  the  above  that,  as  provided  for  by  Article  11(2)  of  the  basic 
Regulation,  the  anti-dumping  measures  applicable  to  imports  of  AN  originating  in 
Ukraine  should  be  maintained.  It  is  recalled  that  these  measures  consist  of  specific 
duties. 

(98)  As  indicated  in  recital  (28),  the  Ukrainian  import  prices  for  natural  gas  have  shown 
convergence with gas prices prevailing on the Union market in the last quarter of the 
RIP.  Therefore,  the  potentially  injurious  effects  of  dumping  may  be  affected  by  the 
impact on  export  prices  of the production costs increases caused by the evolution of 
domestic  gas  prices  should  the  latter  prove  to  be  of  lasting  nature.  Therefore,  it  is 
considered prudent to limit the maintenance of the measures to two years, 

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

1. 
A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of solid fertilisers with 
an  ammonium  nitrate  content  exceeding  80%  by  weight,  currently  falling  within  CN  codes 
3102 30 90, 3102 40 90, ex 3102 29 00, ex 3102 60 00, ex 3102 90 00, ex 3105 10 00, ex 
3105 20 10, ex 3105 51 00, ex 3105 59 00 and ex 3105 90 91, and originating in Ukraine. 

The  rate  of  anti-dumping  duty  shall  be  a  fixed  amount  of  euro  per  tonne  as  shown 

2. 
below: 

Product description 

CN code 

Ammonium nitrate other than in aqueous solutions 

3102 30 90 

Mixtures  of  ammonium  nitrate  with  calcium 
inorganic  non-fertilising 
carbonate  or  other 

3102 40 90 

TARIC 
code 

Amount of 
duty (Euro 
per tonne) 

- 

- 

33,25 

33,25 

EN 

22 

   EN 

substances,  with  a  nitrogen  content  exceeding  28% 
by weight 

Double  salts  and  mixtures  of  ammonium  sulphate 
and  ammonium  nitrate  -  Solid  fertilisers  with  an 
ammonium  nitrate  content  exceeding  80%  by 
weight 

Double  salts  and  mixtures  of  calcium  nitrate  and 
ammonium  nitrate  -  Solid  fertilisers  with  an 
ammonium  nitrate  content  exceeding  80%  by 
weight 

3102 29 00 

10 

33,25 

3102 60 00 

10 

33,25 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding 80% by weight 

3102 90 00 

10 

33,25 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding 80% by weight, with no phosphorus and 
no potassium content 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content  evaluated  as  P2O5  and/or  a  potassium 
content evaluated as K2O of less than 3% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content  evaluated  as  P2O5  and/or  a  potassium 
content evaluated as K2O of 3% by weight or more 
but less than 6% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content  evaluated  as  P2O5  and/or  a  potassium 
content evaluated as K2O of 6% by weight or more 
but less than 9% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content  evaluated  as  P2O5  and/or  a  potassium 
content evaluated as K2O of 9% by weight or more 
but not exceeding 12% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content evaluated as P2O5 and a potassium content 
evaluated as K2O of less than 3% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content evaluated as P2O5 and a potassium content 

3105 10 00 

10 

33,25 

3105 10 00 

20 

32,25 

3105 10 00 

30 

31,25 

3105 10 00 

40 

30,26 

3105 10 00 

50 

29,26 

3105 20 10 

30 

32,25 

3105 20 10 

40 

31,25 

EN 

23 

   EN 

evaluated as K2O of 3% by weight or more but less 
than 6% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content evaluated as P2O5 and a potassium content 
evaluated as K2O of 6% by weight or more but less 
than 9% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content evaluated as P2O5 and a potassium content 
evaluated as K2O of 9% by weight or more but not 
exceeding 12% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content  evaluated  as  P2O5  of  less  than  3%  by 
weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content evaluated as P2O5 of 3% by weight or more 
but less than 6% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80  %  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content  evaluated  as  P2O5  of  6  %  by  weight  or 
more but less than 9% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content evaluated as P2O5 of 9% by weight or more 
but not exceeding 10,40% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content  evaluated  as  P2O5  of  less  than  3%  by 
weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content evaluated as P2O5 of 3% by weight or more 
but less than 6% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content evaluated as P2O5 of 6% by weight or more 
but less than 9% by weight 

3105 20 10 

50 

30,26 

3105 20 10 

60 

29,26 

3105 51 00 

10 

32,25 

3105 51 00 

20 

31,25 

3105 51 00 

30 

30,26 

3105 51 00 

40 

29,79 

3105 59 00 

10 

32,25 

3105 59 00 

20 

31,25 

3105 59 00 

30 

30,26 

EN 

24 

   EN 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding  80%  by  weight,  and  a  phosphorus 
content evaluated as P2O5 of 9% by weight or more 
but not exceeding 10,40% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding 80% by weight, and a potassium content 
evaluated as K2O of less than 3% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding 80% by weight, and a potassium content 
evaluated as K2O of 3% by weight or more but less 
than 6% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an  ammonium  nitrate  content 
exceeding 80% by weight, and a potassium content 
evaluated as K2O of 6% by weight or more but less 
than 9% by weight 

Solid  fertilisers  with  an ammonium  nitrate content 
exceeding 80% by weight, and a potassium content 
evaluated as K2O of 9% by weight or more but not 
exceeding 12% by weight 

3105 59 00 

40 

29,79 

3105 90 91 

30 

32,25 

3105 90 91 

40 

31,25 

3105 90 91 

50 

30,26 

3105 90 91 

60 

29,26 

3. 
In  cases  where  goods  have  been  damaged  before  entry  into  free  circulation  and, 
therefore,  the  price  actually  paid  or  payable  is  apportioned  for  the  determination  of  the 
customs  value  pursuant  to  Article  145  of  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2454/9315,  the 
amount  of  anti-dumping  duty,  calculated  on  the  amounts  set  above,  shall  be  reduced  by  a 
percentage which corresponds to the apportioning of the price actually paid or payable.  

Unless  otherwise  specified,  the  provisions  in  force  concerning  customs  duties  shall 

4. 
apply. 

This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day  following  that  of  its  publication  in  the 
Official Journal of the European Union. It shall be in force for a period of two years.  

Article 2 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels,  

For the Council 
The President 

15 

OJ L 253, 11.10.1993, p. 40 

EN 

25 

   EN