Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 May 2010 on an amendment to the rules securing the continuation of office of the President of Narodowy Bank Polski (CON/2010/37)
Date: 2010-05-07
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Poland, board of directors, central bank, national law

EN 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 7 May 2010 

on an amendment to the rules securing the continuation of office of the President of Narodowy 

Bank Polski 

(CON/2010/37) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  3  May  2010  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  Marshal  of  the  Polish 

Parliament for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski (hereinafter the 
‘draft law’)1. 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 

29 June 1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national  authorities  regarding  draft 
legislative provisions2, as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP). In accordance with the 

first  sentence  of  Article  17.5  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  European  Central  Bank,  the  Governing 

Council has adopted this opinion. 

1.  

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  Under Article 10(1) of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski (hereinafter the ‘Law on NBP’)3, in the 

event  of  absence,  the  President  of  NBP  is  substituted  by  the  Vice-President  –  First  Deputy 

President of NBP (hereinafter the ‘Vice-President’). This provision is currently the only provision 
in Polish law securing the continuity of office of the NBP President4. 

1.2  According to the explanatory memorandum to the draft law5, the smooth performance and transfer 

of the duties of NBP’s decision-making bodies following the expiry of the term of office of NBP’s 

President, as well as the continuity of the operations of NBP, are essential for the financial security 

of the State and the stability of its monetary policy. The draft law aims to clarify the current rules 

securing the continuity of the office of the NBP President by adding a new Article 9a according to 

1  
2  
3  
4  

5 

Published on the website of the Polish Parliament at www.sejm.gov.pl, parliamentary print No 3008. 
OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 
Law of 29 August 1997 on Narodowy Bank Polski (consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U.) of 2005 No 1, Item 2). 
Article  10(1)  does  not  specify  the  nature  of  the  absence  or  the  scope  of  duties  and  powers  conferred  upon  the  Vice-
President  as  regards  his  participation  in  certain  decision-making  bodies  of  NBP.  While  this  lack  of  full  clarity  was 
provisionally remedied in practice, the draft law aims to provide legal certainty to this end. 
See explanatory memorandum to the draft law, p. 1. 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
which: (i) following the expiry of the whole of the 6-year term of office of the NBP President6, the 

NBP  President  remains  in  office  until  a  newly  appointed  President  takes  up  his  duties;  and 

(ii) following the termination of the term of office of the NBP President due to death, resignation or 
dismissal7,  the  duties  of  the  NBP  President  are  performed  by  the  Vice-President  until  a  newly 

appointed NBP President takes up his duties.  

2. 

ECB comments 

2.1  The  continuity  of  the  office  of  the  Governor  or  President  of  a  national  central  bank  raises  two 

issues  for  central  bank  independence.  First,  there  is  the  issue  of  institutional  independence.  The 

statutes  of  national  central  banks  have  to  provide  clear  rules  on  who  will  take  over  the  office  of 

Governor or President in the event of the expiry of the term of office of the existing Governor or 

President by passage of time or due to death, resignation or dismissal so as to avoid any external 

interference.  Second,  there  is  the  issue  of  personal  independence.  It  must  be  ensured  that  any 

person  who  takes  over  the  duties  of  the  Governor  or  President  on  an  interim  basis  until  a  newly 

appointed  Governor  or  President  takes  up  his  duties  benefits  from  the  same  rules  on  security  of 

tenure of office and grounds for dismissal as any member of the decision-making bodies of national 

central banks involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. 

2.2  The ECB welcomes the draft law as it improves legal certainty by securing continuity of the office 

of  the  NBP  President  and  removes  ambiguities  in  the  existing  provisions.  As  regards  personal 

independence,  the  ECB  notes  that,  when  performing  the  duties  of  the  President  under  proposed 

Article 9a(2), the Vice-President benefits from the same safeguards as are normally applicable to 

the members of decision-making bodies of national central banks. 

2.3  As regards the institutional independence, in relation to the expiry of the 6-year term of office or 

termination of the office under Article 9(4)(2-4) of the Law on NBP, the national authorities should 

ensure that a successor is appointed within a reasonable time following such expiry or termination. 

2.4 

In addition, the ECB notes that, for reasons of legal clarity, the Law on NBP as amended by the 

draft  law  would  benefit  from  a  clarification  of  the  relationship  between  the  current  wording  of 

Article 10(1) and the proposed Article 9a.    

6  
7 

Ground for the expiry of the NBP President’s term of office provided for under Article 9(4)(1) of the Law on NBP. 
Grounds for termination of the term of office of the NBP President provided for under Article 9(4)(2-4) of the Law on 
NBP. 

2 

 
 
                                                 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 May 2010. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Jean-Claude TRICHET 

3