Proposal for a Council Regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sodium cyclamate originating in the People's Republic of China and Indonesia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009,
Date: 2010-05-06
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: China, Indonesia, anti-dumping duty, food additive, import, originating product

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION  

Brussels, 6.5.2010 
COM(2010)222 final 

2010/0120 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sodium cyclamate originating in 
the People's Republic of China and Indonesia following an expiry review pursuant to 
Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009, 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

Grounds for and objectives of the proposal 

This  proposal  concerns  the  application  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1225/20091  of  30 
November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the 

European  Community,  ('the  basic  Regulation')  in  the  proceeding  concerning  imports  of 

sodium cyclamate originating in the People's Republic of China and Indonesia. 

General context 

This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation and is 

the  result  of  an  investigation  which  was  carried  out  in  line  with  the  substantive  and 

procedural requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. 

Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

Council Regulation (EC) No 435/2004 of 8 March 2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 

duties  and  collecting  definitively  the  provisional  duty  imposed  on  imports  of  sodium 

cyclamate originating in the People's Republic of China and Indonesia. 

Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union 

Not applicable. 

2. 

RESULTS  OF  CONSULTATIONS  WITH  THE  INTERESTED  PARTIES  AND 
ASSESSMENT 

IMPACT 

Consultation of interested parties 

Interested parties concerned by the proceedings have had the possibility to defend their 

interests during the investigation in line with the provisions of the basic Regulation. 

Collection and use of expertise 

There was no need for external expertise. 

Impact assessment 

1 

OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p.51. 

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This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation. 

The  basic  Regulation  does  not  foresee  a  general  impact  assessment  but  contains  an 

exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed. 

3. 

LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

Summary of the proposed action 

The  request  for  the  expiry  review  was  lodged  on  11  December  2008  by  "Productos 

Aditivos  S.A.",  the  sole  producer  in  the  EU  representing  100  %  of  the  Union 

production of the product concerned. 

Having  determined  that  sufficient  evidence  existed  for  the  initiation  of  the  expiry 
reviews, the Commission initiated the case on 10 March 20092. 

The  investigation  showed  that  there  is  a  likelihood  of  continuation  or  recurrence  of 

dumping and injury and it is therefore proposed to impose anti-dumping measures for a 

further period of five years. 

It  is  proposed  that  the  Council  adopts  the  attached  proposal  for  a  Regulation,  which 

should  be  published  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Union  at  the  earliest 

convenience. 

Legal basis 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1225/2009  of  30  November  2009  on  protection  against 

dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community,  and  in 

particular article 9(4) and 11(2) thereof.  

Subsidiarity principle 

The  proposal  falls  under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Union.  The  subsidiarity 
principle therefore does not apply. 

Proportionality principle 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons: 

2 

OJ C 56, 10.3.2009, p. 42. 

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The form of action is described in the basic Regulation and leaves no scope for national 

decision. 

An  indication  of  how  financial  and  administrative  burden  falling  upon  the  Union, 

national governments, regional and local authorities, economic operators and citizens is 

minimized and proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable. 

Choice of instruments 

Proposed instruments: Council Regulation. 

Other  means  would  not  be  adequate  because  the  basic  Regulation  does  not  foresee 

alternative options. 

4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATION 

The proposal has no implication for the Union budget. 

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2010/0120 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sodium cyclamate originating in 
the People's Republic of China and Indonesia following an expiry review pursuant to 
Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009, 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 

Having  regard  to  the  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1225/2009  of  30  November  2009  on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community3, 
('the basic Regulation'), and in particular Articles 9 and 11(2), 

Having  regard  to  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  Commission  after  consulting  the  Advisory 
Committee, 

Whereas: 

A. 

1. 

(1) 

PROCEDURE 

Measures in force 

By Regulation (EC) No 435/20044 of 8 March 2004, the Council imposed, following 
an  anti-dumping  investigation  ('the  original  investigation'),  a  definitive  anti-dumping 
duty  on  imports  of  sodium  cyclamate  originating  in  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
('China') and Indonesia ('the countries concerned'). 

2. 

Present investigation 

2.1. 

Request for review 

(2) 

(3) 

A  request  for  an  expiry  review  was  lodged  on  11  December  2008  by  Productos 
Aditivos S.A., the sole Union producer of sodium cyclamate. 

The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely 
to result in a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury to the Union industry.  

2.2. 

Initiation 

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4 

OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p.51 
OJ L 72, 11.3.2004, p. 1. 

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(4) 

Having determined, after consulting the Advisory Committee, that sufficient evidence 
existed for the initiation of an expiry review, the Commission initiated an investigation 
pursuant  to  Article  11(2)  if  the  basic  Regulation  on  10  March  2009  by  a  notice 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union5 ('the notice of initiation').  

2.3. 

Investigation period 

(5) 

3. 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

The investigation of likelihood or recurrence of dumping and injury covered the period 
from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008 ('review investigation period' or 'RIP') The 
examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of a likelihood of a continuation 
or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2005 to the end of the RIP 
('period considered').  

Parties concerned by this investigation 

The  Commission  officially  advised  the  applicant  Union  producer,  known  importers, 
suppliers  and  users,  the  known  exporting  producers  in  China  and  Indonesia  and  the 
authorities of the countries concerned of the initiation of the expiry review. 

Interested parties were given an opportunity to make their views known in writing and 
to  request  a  hearing  within  the  time  limits  set  in  the  notice  of  initiation,  but  no  one 
submitted such a request to the European Commission. 

The Commission sent questionnaires to all know exporting producers in China and in 
Indonesia. Two companies from China, both belonging to the Hong Kong-based group 
Rainbow  Rich  Industrial  Ltd.,  and  two  companies  from  Indonesia  indicated  their 
willingness to cooperate and replied to the dumping questionnaire. 

Two additional Chinese producers, Fang Da Food Additive (Shenzhen) Limited, and 
Fang  Da  Food  Additive  (Yan  Quan)  Limited,  made  themselves  known.  The  original 
investigation found that those companies were not dumping in the Union market. As a 
consequence,  Fang  Da  Food  Additive  (Shenzhen)  and  Fang  Da  Food  Additive  (Yan 
Quan) are not subject to the present expiry review. 

4. 

Verification of information received 

(10)  The Commission sought and verified all the information it deemed necessary for the 
purpose  of  the  determination  of  the  continuation  or  likelihood  of  recurrence  of 
dumping  and  injury  and  of  the  Union  interest.  Verification  visits  were  carried  out  at 
the premises of the following companies: 

4.1. 

Exporting producers in the People's Republic of China: 

– 

– 

– 

Golden Time Enterprises (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd., Shenzhen 

Jintian Enterprises (Nanjing) Co., Ltd., Nanjing 

and the related company Rainbow Rich Industrial Ltd. (Hong Kong) 

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OJ C 56, 10.3.2009, p. 42. 

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4.2. 

Exporting producers in Indonesia: 

– 

– 

PT Golden Sari (Chemical Industry), Bandar Lampung 

PT Tunggak Waru Semi, Solo 

4.3. 

Union industry producer 

– 

 Productos Aditivos S.A., Spain 

4.4. 

Unrelated importer/trader 

– 

Beneo Palatinit GmbH, Germany 

4.5. 

User 

– 

Schweppes International Ltd., The Netherlands 

5. 

Disclosure  

(11)  All  parties  were  informed  of  the  essential  facts  and  considerations  on  the  basis  of 
which it was intended to recommend the imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports 
of sodium cyclamate originating from China and Indonesia. 

(12) 

In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  basic  Regulation,  parties  were  granted  a 
period in which they could make representation subsequent to this disclosure. 

(13)  The  oral  and  written  comments  submitted  by  the  parties  were  considered  and,  when 

appropriate, the definitive findings have been modified accordingly. 

B. 

1. 

PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 

Product concerned 

(14)  The  product  concerned  by  this  review  is  the  same  as  the  one  in  the  original 
investigation,  i.e.  sodium  cyclamate  ('SC')  originating  in  China  and  Indonesia  ('the 
product concerned'), currently falling within CN code ex 2929 90 00. 

(15)  As  established  in  the  original  investigation  and  confirmed  in  the  current  review, 
sodium  cyclamate  is  a  commodity  product  used  as  a  food  additive,  permitted  in  the 
European  Union  and  in  many  other  countries  as  a  sweetener  for  low-caloric  and 
dietetic food and beverages. It is widely used as an additive by the food industry, as 
well  as  by  the  producers  of  low  caloric  and  dietetic  table-top  sweeteners.  Small 
volumes are also used by the pharmaceutical industry. 

2. 

Like product 

(16)  As in the original investigation, it was shown that the product concerned produced in 
China  and  Indonesia  and  sold  to  the  Union  is  identical  in  terms  of  physical  and 
chemical characteristics and uses to the product produced and sold by the applicant on 
the  Union  market,  or  to  the  one  produced  and  sold  on  the  domestic  market  in 

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Indonesia,  which  also  served  as  an  analogue  country  for  the  purpose  of  establishing 
the normal value with respect of China.  

(17)  Consequently, all these products are considered to be like products within the meaning 

of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. 

C. 

1. 

(18) 

(19) 

LIKELIHOOD OF A CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF DUMPING 

Preliminary remarks 

In  accordance  with  Article  11(2)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  it  was  examined  whether 
dumping  was  currently  taking  place  and,  if  so,  whether  or  not  the  expiry  of  the 
measures  would  be  likely  to  lead  to  a  continuation  or  recurrence  of  dumping.  It  is 
recalled  that  in  the  context  of  investigations  under  this  article,  market  economy 
treatment ('MET') is not reconsidered. 

In  accordance  with  Article  11(9)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  the  same  general 
methodology  was  used  as  in  the  original  investigation,  provided  that  circumstances 
have not changed. In order to establish the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of 
dumping, in accordance with standard practice, sampling of transactions was done by 
taking  data  from  four  months, each  being  the last  of  one  quarter, of  the  RIP.  The 
outcome was verified by also analysing some other transactions. No operator protested 
against this approach. 

(20)  Data from Eurostat database showed that during RIP, between 3,000 and 5,000 tons of 
product  concerned  were  imported  to  the  Union.  Among  them,  more  than  90%  came 
from  China  and  the  rest  from  Indonesia.  Practically  no  imports  have  been  registered 
from other countries. 

2. 

Dumping of imports during the investigation period 

2.1. 

People's Republic of China 

2.1.1.  Analogue country 

(21)  Except for companies that were granted MET in the original investigation, the normal 
value  for  China  was  established  in  accordance  with  Article  2(7)(a)  of  the  basic 
Regulation.  

(22) 

In  the  previous  investigation  Indonesia  was  used  as  an  appropriate  market  economy 
country for the purpose of establishing normal value in respect of China. 

(23)  This choice has been proposed by the European Commission in the notice of initiation, 

and no interested party has opposed this choice within the time limits.  

(24)  Prices  in  Indonesia  have  been  considered  a  reasonable  surrogate  for  prices  in  China 
because  Indonesia  has  a  competitive  domestic  market,  with  increasing  imports  from 
China  and  where  at  least  six  producers  are operating.  In  addition,  it  appears  that  the 
product  under  investigation  is  produced  only  in  the  Union,  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  and  Indonesia.  No  evidence  to  the  contrary  has  been  presented  in  the  current 
investigation. 

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(25)  Therefore,  Indonesia  has  been  used  as  analogue  market  economy  country  for  the 

purpose of the present review. 

2.1.2.  Cooperating Chinese exporting producers 

2.1.2.1.  Preliminary remarks 

(26)  As  set  in  recital  (8),  two  producers  belonging  to  the  same  Hong  Kong-based  group, 
"Rainbow Rich Industries", cooperated in this review. They represent more than half 
of the exports to the Union during the RIP. Not taking into account the production and 
sales  volumes  of  the  companies  not  subject  to  the  proceedings,  the  cooperating 
producers represented more than three-quarters of total Chinese production and almost 
half  of  its  capacity.  The  representativity  in  terms  of  exports  to  the  Union  was  more 
than  80%.  Given  this  level  of  cooperation,  detailed  information  obtained  from  the 
cooperating  exporters  was  used  as  a  source  for  the  assessment  of  the  likelihood  of 
continuation or recurrence of injurious dumping from China.  

(27)  One  of  the  cooperators,  Golden  Time  Enterprises  (Shenzhen),  exported  significant 
quantities  to  the  Union  during  RIP,  while  the  sister  company,  Jintian  Enterprises 
(Nanjing), was not exporting to the EU since the imposition of the measures. The data 
gathered  during  the  on-spot  verification  visit  of  the  company  that  did  not  export, 
Jintian  Enterprises  (Nanjing),  did  however  allow  for  a  more  detailed  insight  into  the 
Chinese  domestic  market,  where  the  company  holds  a  significant  part  of  the  market 
share and of the installed capacity. 

(28)  During the investigation, one Chinese company alleged that regular meetings are held 
between  major  domestic  producers  to  fix  a  reference  price  for  the  Chinese  domestic 
market. Given the dominant position of those producers, this arrangement appears to 
successfully keep Chinese domestic prices at a relatively high level. 

2.1.2.2.  Normal value  

(29)  The  normal  value  for  Golden  Time  Enterprises  (Shenzhen)  was  calculated  as  the 
weighted average price of all domestic sales made during the RIP, paid or payable by 
independent customers, of the type in question. 

2.1.2.3.  Export price 

(30)  The export price to the Union of Golden Time Enterprises (Shenzhen) was the price 
actually paid or payable for the product when sold for export to the EU, duly adjusted.  

2.1.2.4.  Price comparison  

(31)  The weighted average normal value was compared with the weighted average export 
price  for  each  type  of  the  product  concerned,  on  an  ex-works  basis  and  at  the  same 
level  of  trade.  In  accordance  with  Article  2(10)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  and  for  the 
purpose of ensuring a fair comparison, differences in factors which were claimed and 
demonstrated  to  affect  price  and  price  comparability  were  taken  into  account. 
Adjustments  were  made  for  ocean  and  domestic  freight,  insurance,  credit,  handling 
and packaging costs. 

2.1.2.5.  Dumping margin 

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(32) 

In  accordance  with  Article  2(11)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  the  dumping  margin  was 
established  per  product  type  on  the  basis  of  a  comparison  of  the  weighted  average 
normal value with the weighted average export prices at the same level of trade. This 
comparison showed the existence of dumping during the RIP at a significantly higher 
level  than  in  the  original  investigation.  The  weighted  average  dumping  margin 
expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  CIF  value  at  the  Union  frontier  was  over  30%  for 
Golden Time Enterprises. 

2.1.3.  Other Chinese exporting producers 

2.1.3.1.  Preliminary remarks 

(33)  The residual imports from China accounted for less than 5% of the consumption in the 

Union. 

(34)  The  Commission  based  its  conclusions  about  the  remaining  Chinese  exporting 
producers  on  the  data  collected  from  the  investigation  and  on  official  Eurostat 
statistics. 

2.1.3.2.  Normal value 

(35)  Normal value for non-cooperating Chinese exporters was established as the weighted 
average domestic sales prices of the cooperating Indonesian producers to independent 
customers. 

2.1.3.3.  Export price 

(36)  The export price for non-cooperating Chinese exporters was determined on the basis 
of facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. In the absence 
of  other  more  reliable  information,  this  was  done  by  reference  to  the  average  CIF 
Union border import price obtained from the Eurostat import statistics during the RIP. 

2.1.3.4.  Price comparison  

(37)  The  weighted  average  export  price  found  for  the  remaining  Chinese  exporters  was 
compared  with  the  weighted  average  normal  value  of  the  verified  Indonesian 
producers, on an ex-works basis and at the same level of trade.  

(38) 

In  order  to  ensure  a  fair  comparison  between  normal  value  and  export  price,  due 
allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences affecting the price and 
price  comparability  in  accordance  with  Article  2(10)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  In  this 
respect,  adjustments  were  made  for  ocean  and  domestic  freight,  insurance,  handling 
and packaging costs. In the absence of more reliable information, the adjustments were 
based on verified costs of the Chinese cooperating exporter. 

2.1.3.5.  Dumping margin 

(39)  The  dumping  margin  was  calculated  as  the  amount  by  which  the  normal  value,  as 
calculated in recital (35) exceeded the export price, as established in recital (36). The 
results so obtained point to a clear continuation of dumping practices over the period 
of validity of the measures, with a dumping margin of over 5%. 

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2.1.4.  Conclusions on dumping from China 

(40) 

In view of the above, it is concluded that dumping has continued from China during 
the period of application of measures. 

2.2. 

Indonesia 

2.2.1.  Preliminary remarks 

(41)  As set out in recital (8), two producers cooperated in this review, PT Golden Sari and 
PT Tunggak Waru Semi. Their representativity in terms of exports to the Union was 
between 40% and 60% during RIP6. 

(42)  The  data  collected  by  the  Commission  revealed  that  there  are  at  least  four  more 
producers  of  the  product  concerned  in  Indonesia.  According  to  those  data,  the 
cooperating producers accounted for circa one-third of total Indonesian production and 
capacity. Therefore, the cooperation from Indonesia in this review has been low.  

(43) 

In view of the above, and according to Article 18 of the Basic Regulation, information 
on  domestic  prices,  export  prices  to  other  countries,  production  and  capacity  in 
Indonesia for the non-cooperating Indonesian exporting producers has been based on 
best  facts  available,  including  the  complaint  and  publicly  available  information.  The 
relevant Indonesian  authorities  were notified of the application of Article 18 and the 
reasons  thereof.  No  comments  were  submitted  by  the  Indonesian  authorities  in  this 
respect. 

(44)  Among the two co-operators, only one, PT Golden Sari, exported to the Union during 
the  RIP.  While  a  dumping  margin  could  not  be  established  for  PT  Tunggak  Waru 
Semi,  since  this  company  did  not  export  to  the  Union  in  the  RIP,  its  data  was 
nevertheless  used  to  obtain  information,  inter  alia,  on  production,  capacities  and 
exports  to  third  markets  allowing  for  a  more  detailed  insight  into  the  Indonesian 
domestic and export markets. 

2.2.2.  Cooperating Indonesian exporting producers 

2.2.2.1.  Normal value  

(45)  The normal value was calculated for PT Golden Sari as the weighted average price of 
all domestic sales made during the RIP, paid or payable by independent customers, of 
the type in question.  

2.2.2.2.  Export price 

(46)  The  export  price  for  PT  Golden  Sari  was  established  on  the  basis  of  export  prices 
actually paid or payable during the RIP to independent customers in the Union. 

2.2.2.3.  Price comparison  

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a range, for reasons of confidentiality.  

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(47)  The weighted average normal value was compared with the weighted average export 
price into the Union of the product concerned, on an ex-works basis and at the same 
level of trade. 

(48) 

In  order  to  ensure  a  fair  comparison  between  normal  value  and  export  price,  due 
allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences affecting the price and 
price  comparability  in  accordance  with  Article  2(10)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  In  this 
respect,  adjustments were made  for international  freight,  insurance,  domestic  freight, 
packaging and credit costs. 

2.2.2.4.  Dumping margin 

(49)  The  result  of  the  comparison  of  normal  value  and  export  price  showed  that  no 

dumping had taken place in the RIP from company PT Golden Sari. 

2.2.3.  Other Indonesian exporting producers 

2.2.3.1.  Preliminary remarks 

(50)  As mentioned above in recital (43), due to the low level of cooperation for Indonesia, 
the dumping margin of non-cooperating exporters was determined in accordance with 
Article 18 of the basic Regulation, i.e. on the basis of facts available. 

2.2.3.2.  Normal value 

(51)  The  normal  value  was  calculated  as  the  weighted  average  normal  value  which  has 

been calculated for the two cooperating producers. 

2.2.3.3.  Export price 

(52) 

In the absence of other more reliable information, the export price for non-cooperating 
Indonesian  exporters  was  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  average  CIF  Union  border 
import price obtained from the Eurostat import statistics during the RIP.  

2.2.3.4.  Price comparison  

(53)  The  weighted  average  export  price  into  the  Union  for  Indonesia  thus  obtained,  was 
compared at ex-works level to the weighted average normal value established for the 
cooperating Indonesian producers 

(54) 

In  order  to  ensure  a  fair  comparison  between  normal  value  and  export  price,  due 
allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences affecting the price and 
price  comparability  in  accordance  with  Article  2(10)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  In  this 
respect,  adjustments were made  for international  freight,  insurance,  domestic  freight, 
handling, packaging and credit costs. 

2.2.3.5.  Dumping margin 

(55)  The  comparison  of  normal  value  and  export  price  as  established  above,  showed  the 
existence of dumping. The dumping margin found, as a percentage of the CIF Union-
frontier import price, was close to 30%. 

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2.2.4.  Conclusions on dumping from Indonesia 

(56) 

In view of the above, it is concluded that dumping has continued for a significant part 
of Indonesian producers during the period of application of the measures. 

3. 

Development of imports should measures be repealed 

(57) 

(58) 

In  accordance  with  Article  11(2)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  it  was  examined  whether 
dumping  would  be  likely  to  recur  upon  a  possible  expiry  of  the  measures  in  force 
against China and Indonesia. 

In order to establish whether dumping would be likely to recur, should the measures 
be repealed, the Commission examined the available information on the circumstances 
of  the  exporters  and  market  conditions.  The  analysis  was  primarily  based  on 
information  provided  in  the  questionnaire  replies  of  the  cooperating  producers  and 
verified during the on-spot verification visits. Other sources of information have also 
been used, such as Eurostat imports statistics and official export and market statistics 
from the countries concerned. 

3.1. 

China 

3.1.1.  Preliminary remarks 

(59)  As set in recital (26), the cooperating producers represented more than three quarters 
of  Chinese  production  during  RIP.  Since  the  level  of  cooperation  is  high,  it  was 
determined that reliable information on exports of the product concerned to the Union 
during  the  RIP  could  be  gathered  directly  from  the  exporting  producer.  More 
generally, data concerning the Chinese domestic market has been gathered from both 
verified producers.  

(60) 

It is recalled that the investigation showed that dumping from the Chinese companies 
concerned  by  this  review  has  continued  at  a  level  which  is  considerably  higher  than 
that established in the original investigation. 

3.1.2.  Unused capacity and stocks  

(61)  According to the data collected by the Commission during the investigation, the freely 
available production capacity of the companies concerned by this review in China is 
many times the size of the Union market. The investigation has shown that domestic 
consumption  in  China  is  not  likely  to  absorb  to  any  significant  extent  this  extra 
capacity.  

(62)  One  Chinese  producer  argued  that  it  had  the  intention  to  considerably  reduce  its 
production  capacity  after  the  RIP.  However,  no  tangible  evidence  in  this  regard  was 
provided.  Even  if  this  could  theoretically  lead  to  a  decrease  in  Chinese  capacity,  it 
would nevertheless create an incentive to the rest of Chinese producers to increase the 
utilisation of their freely available capacity in order to fill the gap that would arise in 
China's exports. 

(63)  Furthermore, the ability of other third country markets to absorb significant additional 
volumes  of  Chinese  imports  is  limited.  To  start  with,  several  large  countries  do  not 
import the product concerned for regulatory reasons (inter alia the United States, India, 

EN 

13 

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Japan,  Mexico,  South  Korea,  the  entire  Middle  East).  In  addition,  according  to 
information  gathered  during  the  investigation,  the  remaining  sizeable  markets  for 
sodium  cyclamate  (South  America,  South  Africa  and  Asia)  are  not  likely  to  grow 
significantly  in  the  coming  years.  Therefore,  the  Union  market  would  remain  a  key 
outlet  for  the  product,  attractive  not  only  because  of  its  size,  but  also  due  to  the 
existence  of  well  known,  well  established  distribution  channels  for  importing  the 
product.  

(64) 

It  was  finally  considered  whether  the  excess  capacity  could  be  channelled  into  the 
manufacturing  of  other  products  within  the  companies  involved.  This  would  not, 
however, be likely as the verified producers do not manufacture any other product in 
significant quantities and there is no evidence that other Chinese producers of sodium 
cyclamate could easily switch to other products. 

(65)  The foregoing point to a likely continuation of large export volumes from China to the 

Union, should the measures be repealed. 

3.1.3.  Relationship between prices in the Union and prices in the Chinese domestic market  

(66)  The  Commission  found  that  the  high  volumes  of  imports  from  China  were  made  at 
prices  in  the  Union  that  were  lower  than  the  prices  in  the  Chinese  domestic  market. 
The  sale  prices  of  those  imports,  given  their  level  and  market  share  of  the  Chinese 
dumped imports, must be considered as the reference price in the Union: other Chinese 
exporters wishing to enter the market in significant quantities would in all likelihood 
align themselves to these low prices—engaging in dumping.  

3.1.4.  Relationship  between  export  prices  to  third  countries  and  prices  in  the  Chinese 

domestic market  

(67)  The  Commission  compared  verified  Chinese  export  prices  to  third  countries  with 
verified  Chinese  domestic  price,  to  further  examine  the  price  behaviour  of  Chinese 
exporters in case the measures would be terminated. 

(68) 

It  was  found  that  export  prices  to  third  countries  were  consistently  lower  than  the 
domestic  prices  and  in  line  with  export  prices  to  the  EU,  underlining  a  pattern  of 
dumping behaviour which appears to be structural in this sector in China. 

3.1.5.  Relationship between export prices to third countries and the price level in the Union 

(69)  The  Commission  compared  the  Chinese  export  prices  to  third  countries  with  prices 
prevailing in the Union, so as to establish whether there would be an incentive to shift 
exports to the Union in case of termination of measures.  

(70)  Chinese export prices to third countries were generally in line with the price level in 
the  Union.  This  confirms  that  Chinese  exporters  are  not  likely  to  shift  exports  away 
from the EU to other markets.  

3.1.6.  Conclusions on China 

(71)  The  assessment  of  the  above-mentioned  factors  showed  that  the  exporters  concerned 
by  the  review  have  continued  to  export  very  significant  volumes  of  the  product 
concerned to the Union, at dumped prices. Chinese exports to other third countries are 

EN 

14 

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also  made  at  dumped  prices,  underlining  a  structural  pattern  of  dumping  behaviour. 
Chinese domestic prices are high and there are no indications that they will decrease in 
the foreseeable future. Given the large freely available capacity of Chinese exporters, 
the  lack  of  other  sizeable  outlets  for  such  capacity,  and  the  attractiveness  of  the  EU 
market, there is therefore an incentive for Chinese exporting producers to direct even 
larger volumes at dumped prices to the Union market, should measures be repealed.  

(72)  Having considered the data and information above, it is concluded that dumping from 

China is likely to continue or recur if the measures were allowed to lapse. 

3.2. 

Indonesia 

3.2.1.  Preliminary remarks 

(73)  As explained in recital (42), the cooperating producers  represented a minority of the 
Indonesian production and capacity and therefore Article 18 has been applied. 

(74) 

It  is  also  recalled  that  the  investigation  concluded  that  dumping  from  Indonesia  has 
continued in the RIP for the non-cooperating producers. 

3.2.2.  Unused capacity and stocks 

(75)  During  the  review,  it  was  established  that  the  total  freely  available  capacity  in 
Indonesia  is  more  than  three  fourths  of  the  size  of  the  Union  market.  Even  if  the 
cooperating  exporter  were  to  be  excluded,  the  remaining  free  capacity  would  still 
account  for  almost  half  of  the  Union  market. Official  Indonesian statistics  show  that 
Indonesian  producers  appear  to  be  losing  market  shares  to  the  aggressive  pricing 
policy of Chinese competitors, both in the domestic and the international market. It is, 
therefore, likely that Indonesia's freely available capacity will grow even further in the 
near future. 

(76) 

It  was  examined  whether  the  total  freely  available  capacity  in  Indonesia  could  be 
absorbed  by sales to third countries, but  as concluded in  recital  (63), third countries' 
markets are not foreseen to significantly absorb the excess capacity at hand. It was also 
examined  whether  the  excess  capacity  could  be  absorbed  by  sales  in  the  domestic 
market.  However,  as  said  before,  according  to  Indonesian  official  data,  the  market 
share of Indonesian producers in the domestic market is shrinking under the pressure 
of Chinese imports. Finally, the possibility of a switch of production to other similar 
products  was  considered;  for  the  same  reason  as  explained  in  recital  (64),  it  is  not 
likely that excess capacity could be utilised in such a way.  

(77) 

In  conclusion,  the  large  (and  increasing)  available  capacity  in  Indonesia  would,  to  a 
significant extent, be directed towards the Union should measures be repealed. 

3.2.3.  Relationship  between  prices  in  the  Union  and  prices  in  the  Indonesian  domestic 

market  

(78)  The prices in the Indonesian domestic market are higher than the prices in the Union 
market,  notwithstanding  the  increasing  pressure  exerted  by  Chinese  exports  in  the 
Indonesian  market.  Given  the  low  price  levels  of  Chinese  imports  in  the  Union  for 
such a rather homogeneous product, those prices would be the reference price to which 
Indonesian  exporters  would  in  all  likelihood  align  themselves  to—thus  engaging  in 

EN 

15 

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dumping,  should  the  measures  lapse.  This  consideration  is  applicable  to  both 
cooperating and non-cooperating exporters.  

(79) 

If measures were to lapse only for Indonesia and not for China, this would render the 
Union market even more attractive for Indonesian producers from a price perspective. 
Indeed,  without  anti-dumping  duties,  they  would  be  able  to  increase  their  prices  to 
take advantage of the anti-dumping duty still payable by Chinese exporters. It should 
be added that under the similar scenario as regards price levels and price differentials 
of Chinese and Indonesian exporters witnessed in the original investigation, the latter 
exported significant volumes to the EU. 

(80)  Finally,  it  should  also  be  noted  that  Indonesian  exports  to  the  EU  have  consistently 
decreased after the imposition of the measures which would reinforce the conclusion 
that Indonesian exporters are not able or willing to sell significant quantities in the EU 
market at non-dumped prices. 

3.2.4.  Relationship  between  export  prices  to  third  countries  and  prices  in  the  Indonesian 

domestic market  

(81)  As  regards  the  cooperating  exporting  producers,  their  verified  export  prices  to  third 

countries have been found to be higher than Indonesian domestic prices. 

(82)  As for non-cooperating exporters, it was not possible to obtain individual data during 
the  investigation.  Available  official  Indonesian  statistics  on  average  export  prices  of 
all  Indonesian  exports  appear  to  be  inaccurate  in  absolute  terms,  overstating  export 
prices  by  very  significant  amounts.  Nonetheless,  from  the  same  statistics  it  can  be 
inferred that export prices to third countries appear to be lower than export prices to 
the Union. This would indicate that, for at least a significant part of Indonesian exports 
to  third  countries,  these  would  also  be  dumped.  In  any  event,  Indonesian  export 
statistics point to a sharp decrease of exported volumes, underlining that, at the current 
price levels, Indonesian exporters are suffering from Chinese competition. 

3.2.5.  Relationship between export prices to third countries and prices in the Union  

(83)  For  the  cooperating  producer,  export  prices  to  third  countries  were  found  to  be 
generally  higher  than  price  levels  in  the  Union.  However,  regarding  the  rest  of 
Indonesian  producers,  the  available  official  Indonesian  statistics  suggest  an  opposed 
picture.  This  indicates  that  for  a  significant  part  of  Indonesian  exporters,  dumping 
would exist also when exporting to third countries.  

(84)  This price differential between export prices to the Union and export prices to the rest 
of  the  world  underlines  the  Indonesian  exporters'  incentive  to  divert  exports  to  the 
Union. This conclusion is reinforced were measures on imports originating in the PRC 
allowed to lapse.  

3.2.6.  Conclusions on Indonesia  

(85)  The assessment of the above-mentioned factors showed that Indonesian exports have 
to a significant extent been made at dumped prices in the Union and in third country 
markets, underlining a structural pattern of dumping behaviour. Given the large freely 
available capacity of Indonesian exporters, the lack of other sizeable outlets for such 
capacity,  and  the  attractiveness  of  the  EU  market,  there  is  therefore  an  incentive  for 

EN 

16 

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Indonesian exporting producers to direct large volumes at dumped prices to the Union 
market, should measures be repealed.  

(86)  Having considered the data and information above, it is concluded that that dumping 

from Indonesia is likely to continue or recur if the measures were allowed to lapse. 

4. 

Comments following disclosure 

(87)  The Indonesian authorities did not provide any reaction within the specified time limit 
to  the  notification  that  Article  18  may  be  applied  to  the  non-cooperating  producers. 
However,  following  disclosure,  the  Indonesian  authorities  as  well  as  one  of  the 
Indonesian  cooperating  producers  claimed  that  the  two  cooperating  Indonesian 
producers  represent  a  considerable  segment  of  the  Indonesian  industry.  The  parties 
claimed that as a result, the degree of cooperation of Indonesia should be considered as 
being  significant  and  Article  18  should  not  be  applied.  Furthermore,  the  above-
mentioned parties have claimed that since several Indonesian producers did not export 
to  the  Union  during  RIP,  they  were  not  in  a  position  to  cooperate.  Finally,  it  was 
claimed that, since one of the cooperating producers represents an extremely large part 
of  Indonesian  exports,  those  cooperating  producers  should  be  considered  as  being 
representative  thereof  and  the  fact  that  dumping  was  not  found  for  this  company 
should lead to the lapse of measures for Indonesia. 

(88) 

It should be clarified that Article 18 has not been applied to the cooperating producers, 
whose data have been fully taken into consideration during the investigation. As to the 
application of Article 18 to the rest of the Indonesian producers, it follows that, in the 
absence  of  information  from  these  parties,  the  Commission  services  have  no  choice 
but to rely on the best facts available. It should be recalled that in order to assess the 
likelihood  of  continuation  and  /  or  recurrence  of  dumping  in  expiry  reviews,  the 
Commission services have also to assess elements concerning the state of the totality 
of the exporting country's industry, such as domestic capacity, production and prices, 
exports to third countries. 

(89)  As the Indonesian producing companies which did not cooperate represent a large part 
of  the  Indonesian  industry  in  terms  of  exports  to  the  Union  as  well  as  in  terms  of 
production and exports to third countries, the Commission confirms the application of 
Article 18 with reference to the non-cooperating Indonesian producers as set in recital 
(43). 

(90)  As for the request to lift measures on Indonesian exports, it should be noted that the 
Indonesian  authorities  did  not  provide  data  that  could  change  the  Commission's 
conclusion  on  the  representativity  of  the  cooperating  exporter,  which  corresponds  to 
between  40%  and  60%  of  the  total  Indonesian  exports  during  RIP,  as  set  in  recital 
(41).  Therefore,  the  cooperating  exporter  found  not  to  be  dumping  could  not  be 
considered  as  being  representative  of  the  entire  Indonesian  exports.  The  rest  of 
Indonesian exports have been made at dumped prices, as set in recital (55). Therefore, 
the  conclusion  that  dumping  continued  from  that  part  of  Indonesian  exports  is 
confirmed. Furthermore, the lack continuation of dumping is not, per se, a sufficient 
reason  to  discontinue  anti-dumping  measures,  if  the  likelihood  of  recurrence  is 
established, as it is the case in the present expiry review. To conclude, the request to 
discontinue  measures  on  the  basis  of  the  lack  of  dumping  from  the  cooperating 
Indonesian exporter could not be accepted. 

EN 

17 

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(91)  The Indonesian authorities and one Indonesian cooperating producer have also asked 
that  the  figures  of  total  Indonesian  exports  to  the  Union  be  fully  disclosed.  It  is 
however  recalled  that  the  indexation  of  those  data  (see  note  to  recital  (41))  was 
necessary  to  protect  the  Indonesian  exporting  producer  from  disclosure  of  business 
sensitive  data.  The  small  size  of  the  market  and  the  limited  number  of  interested 
parties justify the indexation of those figures. In sum, there is good cause to maintain 
confidentiality and the request to disclose the figures of total Indonesian exports to the 
Union can therefore not be accepted. 

5. 

Conclusion on the likelihood of a continuation and/or recurrence of dumping 

(92)  On the basis of the above, it is concluded that dumping from both counties concerned 

by this review is likely to continue, should measures be repealed. 

D. 

1. 

SITUATION ON THE UNION MARKET 

Definition of the Union Industry  

(93)  Sodium  cyclamate  is  manufactured  in  the  Union  only  by  the  applicant  producer, 
Productos Aditivos S.A. This company was therefore deemed to constitute the Union 
industry within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.  

2. 

Union consumption 

(94)  Data  on  Union  consumption  was  based  on  the  cumulated  volumes  of  imports  of  the 
product concerned into the Union based on Eurostat statistics and on the total verified 
sales of the Union industry on the Union market. Taking into account that these data 
are  derived  from  two  sources  and  that  sales  by  the  applicant  should  be  kept 
confidential, the development of consumption is reported below in indexes. 

(95)  Union consumption of SC ranged between 5.000 and 7.000 tonnes during the period 
considered.  It  increased  by  6%  between  2005  and  2006  and  by  15  %  between  2006 
and 2007. It dropped by 18 % between 2007 and the RIP.  

Table 1  

UNION CONSUMPTION 

2005 

2006 

2007  

2008 (RIP) 

INDEX 

100 

106  

122  

103 

3. 

Imports from the countries concerned 

3.1. 

Cumulation 

(96)  The Commission considered whether the effects of dumped imports from the countries 
concerned  should  be  assessed  cumulatively,  on  the  basis  of  the  criteria  set  out  in 
Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation. This Article provides that the effects of imports 
from  two  or  more  countries  simultaneously  subject  to  anti-dumping  investigations 
shall be assessed cumulatively only if it is determined that (a) the margin of dumping 
established  in  relation  to  the  imports  from  each  country  is  more  than  de  minimis  as 

EN 

18 

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defined in Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation and that the volume of imports of each 
country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports 
is appropriate in the light of the conditions of competition between imported products 
and the conditions of competition between the imported products and the like Union 
product.  

(97) 

In this  respect,  it  was firstly  found  that the dumping margins established for each of 
the  countries  concerned  were  more  than  de  minimis.  In  addition,  the  volume  of  the 
dumped imports from each of those countries was not negligible in the sense of Article 
5(7)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  Indeed,  the  import  volume  represented  for  China  and 
Indonesia around 50 % of the Union consumption during the RIP. In calculating the 
import volume, non-dumped imports have been excluded. 

(98)  The investigation further showed that the conditions of competition both between the 
dumped  imports  and  between  the  dumped  imports  and  the  like  Union  product  were 
similar. It was found that, irrespective of their origin, sodium cyclamate produced/sold 
by the countries concerned and the one produced/sold by the Union industry compete 
against  each  other  since  they  are  alike  in  terms  of  their  basic  characteristics,  largely 
interchangeable from the user's point of view and distributed via the same distribution 
channels. The prices relating to imports from China subject to measures and dumped 
imports from Indonesia were also in the same range of magnitude. In addition, when 
comparing  the  prices  at  the  same  level  of  trade,  these  prices  were  found  to  undercut 
the Union industry's prices. 

(99) 

In the light of the above, it was considered that all the criteria set out in Article 3(4) of 
the basic Regulation were met regarding imports from China subject to measures and 
dumped imports from Indonesia and that the effect of these imports should be assessed 
cumulatively. 

3.2. 

Volume and market share of dumped imports 

(100)  The evolution of dumped imports from China and Indonesia and their market shares 

during the period considered was as follows: 

Table 2 

Total dumped imports 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 (RIP) 

Index 

100  

109 

198  

195  

Table 3 

Market  share  of  dumped 
imports 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 (RIP) 

Index 

100 

103 

161 

189 

(101)  Volumes of dumped imports as well as market share of dumped imports have nearly 

doubled during the period considered. 

EN 

19 

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3.3. 

Price evolution and price behaviour of the imports of the product concerned 

3.3.1.  Evolution of prices 

(102)  The  average  price  of  dumped  imports  from  the  countries  concerned  developed  as 

follows over the period under consideration: 

Table 4 

Average  prices  of  dumped 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 (RIP) 

imports 

Index 

100  

103 

104 

99 

(103)  Table 4 was sourced from the available statistical data, including Eurostat. The general 
trend  of  the  import  prices  into  the  Union  shows  an  increase  until  2007  and  then  a 
decrease in the RIP below the 2005 level.  

3.3.2.  Price undercutting 

(104)  For the determination of price undercutting, the Commission based its analysis on the 
information submitted in the course of the investigation by the cooperating exporting 
producer  in  China.  For  other  companies  from  both  China  and  Indonesia  that  did  not 
cooperate  with  the  case,  price  undercutting  was  established  by  reference  to  Eurostat 
data. 

(105)  The  approach  to  calculate  the  price  undercutting  follows  that  of  the  original 
investigation.  The  import  prices,  including  the  anti-dumping  duties,  of  the  exporting 
producer  were  compared  to  the  Union  industry  prices,  on  the  basis  of  weighted 
averages  for  the  same  product  qualities  during  the  RIP.  The  Union  industry  prices 
were adjusted to an ex-works level and compared to CIF Union border import prices, 
adding anti-dumping and customs duties. This price comparison was made at the same 
level  of  trade,  duly  adjusted  where  necessary,  and  after  deduction  of  rebates  and 
discounts.  

Table 5 

Price Undercutting 

2008 (RIP) 

China: 

- Golden Time 

- Other companies 

Indonesia: 

21.6% 

3.2% 

- Other companies 

18.7% 

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4. 

Imports from other countries 

Imports from other third countries were negligible (less than 50 tons yearly) during 
the period considered and therefore could not have had any impact on the situation of 
the Union industry. 

5. 

Economic situation of the Union Industry 

(106)  Pursuant  to  Article  3(5)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  the  Commission  examined  all 
relevant  economic  factors  and  indices  having  a  bearing  on  the  state  of  the  Union 
industry from 2005 to the RIP. 

(107)  In order to respect confidential business information, it has been necessary to present 

information concerning the Union Industry in indexed form. 

5.1. 

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation 

(108)  The  production  of  the  Union  industry  decreased  by  13%  from  2005  to  the  RIP.  As 
production  capacity  remained  unchanged  during  the  same  period,  the  capacity 
utilisation decreased by 10% in line with the development in production. 

Table 6 

In Indexes 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 (RIP) 

Production capacity  

Production volume 

Capacity utilisation  

100  

100  

100  

100  

106  

106  

100 

88  

88  

100  

87  

87  

5.2. 

Sales in the Union 

(109)  The data in table 7 indicates a clear decrease in sales volumes of the Union industry. 
This  situation  is  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  the  overall  consumption,  as  shown  in 
Table  1,  increased  by  3  %  over  the  same  period.  The  market  share  of  the  Union 
industry  dropped  significantly  between  2005  and  the  RIP.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the 
continuously  increasing  market  shares  (see  recital  (100))  of  cumulated  dumped 
imports  from  China  and  Indonesia  throughout  the  period  considered.  The  Union 
industry  did  increase  its  unit  selling  prices  against  a  background  of  falling  volumes. 
On balance, despite the increase in unit prices the Union industry still generated losses 
on its sodium cyclamate sales in the RIP.  

Table 7 

In Indexes 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 (RIP) 

Volume of sales 

Market share 

EN 

100  

100 

21 

93  

88 

81  

66 

72  

70 

   EN 

 
Unit selling prices  

100  

100  

108  

123  

5.3. 

Stocks 

(110)  The stock level of the Union producer fluctuated significantly between 2005 and the 

RIP, dropping nearly by half over the period considered. 

Table 8 

Index 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 (RIP) 

Stock (tonnes) 

100  

113  

29  

53  

5.4. 

Profitability 

(111)  Despite  an  overall  slight  improvement,  Union  industry's  profitability  remained 

consistently negative throughout the period considered. 

5.5. 

Employment, productivity and wages 

(112)  Employment  of  the  Union  industry  decreased  by  19%  during  the  period  under 
consideration. The productivity per employee (established on the basis of the number 
of  tonnes  produced  divided  by  the  number  of  employees)  increased.  The  average 
employment cost per employee increased by 5 % over the period considered. 

Table 9 

In indexes 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 (RIP) 

Employment 

100  

88  

91  

81  

Employment cost per 

employee 

Productivity (per 

employee)  

100  

99  

81  

105  

100  

121  

97  

107  

5.6. 

Investments, return on investment  

(113)  During  the  period  considered,  investments  declined  by  almost  half,  mirroring  the 
overall  negative  state  of  the  Union  producer.  The  level  of  the  return  on  investment 
expressed  as  the  relation  between  the  net  profit  of  the  sole  Union  producer  and  the 
gross book value of its fixed assets mirrors the profitability trend. It sharply declined 
by almost 80% over the period considered. 

Table 10 

In indexes 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 (RIP) 

EN 

22 

   EN 

 
Investment  

Return on Investment  

100  

100  

44  

54  

7  

20  

53  

21 

5.7. 

Cash flow and ability to raise capital 

(114)  The Union industry's cash flow could only be assessed in relation to the total activity 
of  the  Union  industry.  It  remained  slightly  positive  in  2005  but  deteriorated  in  the 
subsequent  period  and  became  negative  in  the  rest  of  the  period  considered.  It  also 
became  more  difficult  for  the  Union  industry  to  raise  capital  because  of  the  losses 
suffered during the period considered. 

5.8.  Magnitude of dumping 

(115)  Dumping from both countries concerned continued during the RIP, with the exception 
of  the  cooperating  Indonesian  exporting  producer.  Given  the  total  volume  exported 
and the prices of the dumped imports from the countries concerned, this impact cannot 
be considered negligible. 

5.9. 

Recovery from past dumping 

(116)  Anti-dumping measures against imports of sodium cyclamate originating in China and 
Indonesia were imposed in March 2004. In this period only a partial recovery of the 
situation of the Union producers has been observed as detailed above. 

5.10.  Conclusion on injury 

(117)  The presence of low-priced imports from China and Indonesia significantly increased 
on  the  Union  market.  Some  injury  indicators  for  the  Union  industry  show  signs  of 
recovery while others indicate a negative development. 

(118)  Taking into account the overall worsening situation of the only Union producer as well 
as  the  magnitude  of  dumped  imported  volumes  from  China  and  Indonesia  and  the 
significant  price  undercutting  found,  it  is  considered  that  the  Union  industry  has 
suffered material injury. 

6. 

Impact  of  dumped  imports  from  the  countries  concerned  and  impact  of  other 
factors 

6.1. 

Impact of the dumped imports from the countries concerned 

(119)  As explained above (recital (100) , the cumulated volume and market share of dumped 
imports  from  the  countries  concerned  have  almost  doubled  in  the  period  considered. 
Significant  price  undercutting  was  also  found  for  both  countries  concerned.  Taking 
into account the clear coincidence in time between the deterioration of the situation of 
the  Union  industry  and  the  significant  increase  of  cumulated  dumped  imports  from 
China and Indonesia, these imports have caused injury to the Union industry. Indeed, 
dumped imports from China and Indonesia have increased their penetration of the EU 
market  and  have  taken  over  significant  market  shares  previously  held  by  the  Union 
producer.  

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6.2. 

Impact of other factors  

(120)  The Commission analysed whether any other known factors than the dumped imports 
could  have  had  a  bearing  on  the  continued injury  suffered  by  the  Union  producer  in 
order to ensure that possible injury caused by any such factors was not attributed to the 
dumped imports. 

6.2.1. 

Impact of non-dumped imports from China and Indonesia 

(121)  The volume of non-dumped imports from China and Indonesia continuously decreased 
in  the  period  considered.  Corresponding  prices  of  these  imports  were  consistently 
higher than those of the dumped imports. On these grounds, the non-dumped imports 
from  China  and  Indonesia  have  not  contributed  to  the  injury  suffered  by  the  Union 
industry. 

6.2.2.  Performance on export markets 

(122)  Export sales of the Union's producer outside the EU represented less than 25% of its 
total sales. Contrary to sales in the Union, export sales profitability has improved over 
the period considered and therefore it could not have contributed to the injury suffered 
by the Union's industry. 

6.2.3.  Fluctuation of raw material prices 

(123)  Price  fluctuations  of  raw  materials of  SC  may  have  had  some  negative  effect  on  the 
performance of the Union industry. This factor however is not sufficient to break the 
causal  link  between  the  injury  suffered  and  the  dumped  imports.  The  latter  should 
have been affected by raw materials price changes in similar proportion as the costs of 
the Union producer, since they are closely linked to oil and urea prices.  

6.2.4.  Changes in consumption patterns 

(124)  Changes in consumption patterns with the emergence of new products on the market 
did not have a noticeable impact on consumption of SC. Indeed, it appears that there is 
no direct product substitution between SC and these new products. 

6.3. 

Conclusion 

(125)  On these grounds it is concluded that dumped imports from China and Indonesia have 
caused material injury to the Union industry and that no other factor broke this causal 
link. 

E. 

1. 

LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OF INJURY  

Impact  of  the  projected  volume  and  price  effects  on  the  state  of  the  Union 
industry in case of repeal of measures  

(126)  In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, imports from the countries 
currently being reviewed were assessed in order to establish if there was a likelihood 
of continuation of injury. 

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(127)  With regard to the likely effect on the Union industry of the expiry of the measures in 
force,  the  following  factors  were  considered  in  line  with  the  elements  summarised 
above in respect of the likelihood of continuation of dumping. 

1.1. 

China 

(128)  As  concluded  above  in  recitals  (40)  ,  exports  from  China  made  by  the  exporters 
concerned  by  this  review  continue  to  be  made  at  dumped  prices.  Chinese  exports  to 
other  third  countries  also  appear  to  be  dumped,  indicating  a  structural  pattern  of 
dumping behaviour. 

(129)  An  analysis  of  available  capacities  in  China  has  shown  that  the  freely  available 
production capacity of the companies concerned by the review in China is many times 
the  size  of  the  Union  market  (see  recital  (61)).  The  ability  of  other  third  country 
markets  to  absorb  significant  additional  volumes  of  Chinese  imports  is  also  limited 
(see  recital  (63)).  There  is  therefore  an  incentive  for  Chinese  exporting  producers  to 
direct large export volumes at dumped prices to the Union market, should measures be 
repealed (see recital (65)). 

(130)  The significant levels of dumping and undercutting observed indicate that the export 
volumes to the Union mentioned above would be made at dumped prices which would 
lie significantly below the prices and costs of the Union producer. 

(131)  The combined effect of such volumes and prices would as such be capable to lead to a 
deterioration  of  the  Union  industry’s  already  precarious  situation.  Such  a  scenario 
would  in  all  likelihood  lead  to  further  depressed  prices  and/or  lower  production  and 
sales by the Union industry. The financial position of the Union industry would further 
deteriorate,  leading  to  increased  injury.  Such  developments  may  likely  end  the 
existence of the only Union producer. 

1.2. 

Indonesia 

(132)  The investigation has  shown that dumping  from Indonesia has continued  in  the  RIP. 
The investigation has also shown that the total freely available capacity in Indonesia is 
more  than  three  fourths  of  the  size  of  the  Union  market  and  is  likely  to  grow  even 
further  in  the  near  future  (see  recital  (75)).  As  there  is  no  indication  that  other  third 
markets or the domestic market could absorb this excess capacity, this could cause an 
increase  of  exports  at  a  lower  price  to  the  European  Union,  should  measures  be 
allowed to lapse. 

(133)  As  in  the  case  of  China,  the  significant  level  of  dumping  and  undercutting  observed 
indicates  that  the  export  volumes  from  Indonesia  to  the  Union  would  be  made  at 
dumped prices which would significantly be below the prices and costs of the Union 
producer. Similarly, the combined effect of such volumes and prices would as such be 
capable  to  lead  to  a  further  deterioration  of  the  Union  producers’  already  precarious 
situation and would likely end of the existence of the only Union producer. As in the 
case  of  China,  Indonesian  exports  to  other  third  countries  also  appear  to  be 
indicatively  dumped  as  far  as  they  are  below  the  prices  relating  to  exports  to  the 
European Union, showing also a structural pattern of dumping behaviour. 

2. 

Conclusion on the likelihood of continuation of injury  

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(134)  The  Union  industry  has  been  suffering  from  the  effects  of  the  dumped  imports  for 

several years and is currently still in a precarious economic situation. 

(135)  As  established  above,  the  investigation  has  shown  that  the  injurious  situation  of  the 
Union  industry has  continued  in the  RIP.  The continuation of injury is, according to 
Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, in itself a strong indicator that injury is likely to 
continue in the future which would suggest that the measures should be maintained.  

(136)  The  findings  pertaining  to  imports  show  that  imports  of  large  volumes  at  dumped 
prices  are  likely  to  continue  and  that  price  pressure  is  likely  to  intensify  the 
competition between dumped imports and the Union-produced SC. The investigation 
has  not  identified  any  factors  that  would  break  the  strong  link  between  the  dumped 
imports and the injury the Union industry would suffer. 

(137)  Should measures be terminated, the situation of the Union industry would deteriorate 

and the very existence of the only Union producer would be jeopardized. 

(138)  Therefore,  it  is  concluded  that  there  is,  due  to  dumped  imports  from  China  and 

Indonesia, a clear likelihood of continuation of injury to the Union industry. 

F. 

1. 

UNION INTEREST 

Introduction 

(139)  Pursuant  to  Article  21  of  the  basic  Regulation,  it  was  examined  whether  the 
maintenance  of  the  existing  anti-dumping  measures  would  be  against  the  interest  of 
the  Union  as  a  whole.  The  determination  of  the  Union  interest  was  based  on  an 
appreciation  of  the  various  interests  involved,  i.e.  those  of  the  applicant  Union 
producer, of importers, of suppliers and users. 

2. 

Interest of the applicant Union producer 

(140)  As far as the only Union producer is concerned, it should be noted that its loss-making 
situation has resulted from its difficulties to compete with low-priced dumped imports, 
which held a significant market share already at the beginning of the period considered 
and  which  have  increased  their  market  share  considerably  during  the  period 
considered. 

(141)  It  is  considered  that  the  continuation  of  measures  would  benefit  the  Union  producer 
which should then at least be able to increase the volume and, perhaps, its sales prices 
thereby  generating  the  necessary  return  level  which  would  enable  it  to  continue  to 
invest  in  its  production  facilities.  By  contrast,  the  discontinuation  of  the  measures 
would  halt  recovery  and  lead  to  continuation  and  even  exacerbation  of  the  injury 
suffered by the Union producer. It would seriously threaten the viability of the Union 
producer and as a consequence, it may even cease to exist, thus reducing supply and 
competition on the market. 

3. 

Interest of importers 

(142)  A  questionnaire  was  sent  at  initiation  to  twenty  unrelated  importers.  Three  of  them 
replied that they were no longer active on the market of the product concerned. Two 

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other  importers  replied  to  the  questionnaire.  The  cooperating  unrelated  importers 
represented 7% of total imports concerned. 

(143)  The  investigation  found  that  having  a  diversity  of  sodium  cyclamate  suppliers  is 
essential.  Importers  have  to  rely  on  both  Asian  and  European  sources  of  supply 
because of quality and food security reasons. 

4. 

Interest of users 

(144)  On initiation, a questionnaire was sent to thirteen potential users but only two of them 

replied to the Commission.  

(145)  The main users of the product concerned in the Union are in the food, beverage and 
pharmaceutical  industries.  The  demand  for  the  product  concerned  is  therefore 
dependent upon the situation of these industries. 

(146)  The  users  that  came  forward  showed  robust  profit  margins  on  downstream  products 
using  SC.  Indeed,  the  effect  of  the  anti-dumping  duties  on  their  total  costs  was  so 
minimal  (less  than  1%)  that  they  were  not  disproportionally  affected  by  the  existing 
measures. 

5. 

Interest of suppliers 

(147)  A questionnaire was sent to eight potential suppliers but none of them replied to the 
Commission.  From  available  information,  it  appears  that  their  SC  business-related 
portfolio  is  rather  negligible.  In  any  event,  further  deterioration  of  the  sole  Union 
producer may have some negative, even though limited, knock-on effects on the sole 
producer's  suppliers  of  raw  materials.  On  these  grounds  it  is  not  unreasonable  to 
assume that the measures would also benefit the supplier industry as they would help 
keeping in place one of their customers. 

6. 

Conclusion on Union interest  

(148)  Taking  into  account  all  of  the  above  factors,  it  is  concluded  that  there  are  no 

compelling reasons against the imposition of anti-dumping measures. 

G 

DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 

(149)  In view of the conclusions reached above, the measures in force applicable to imports 

of the product concerned originating in China and Indonesia should be maintained,  

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

1.  A  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  is  hereby  imposed  on  imports  of  sodium  cyclamate, 
currently falling within CN code ex 2929 90 00 (TARIC code 2929 90 00 10), originating in 
the People's Republic of China and Indonesia. 

2. The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty for the products described in paragraph 1 and 
produced by the companies below shall be as follows: 

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Country 

Company 

The 
People's 
Republic 
of China: 

Fang  Da  Food  Additive  (Shen  Zhen) 

Limited, Gong Le Industrial Estate, Xixian 

County,  Bao  An,  Shenzhen,  518102, 

People's Republic of China 

Fang  Da  Food  Additive  (Yang  Quan) 

Limited, Da Lian Dong Lu, Economic and 

Technology  Zone,  Yangquan  City,  Shanxi 

045000, People's Republic of China  

Golden  Time  Enterprise  (Shenzhen)  Co. 

Ltd.,  Shanglilang,  Cha  Shan  Industrial 

Rate of duty 

TARIC 

(EUR per 

addition

kilogramme) 

al code 

0 

A471 

0 

A472 

Area,  Buji  Town,  Shenzhen  City, 

0,11 

A473 

Guangdong Province, People's Republic of 

China 

All other companies 

0,26 

A999 

Indonesia 

PT.  Golden  Sari  (Chemical  Industry), 

Mitra Bahari Blok D1-D2, Jalan Pakin No. 

0,24 

A502 

1, Sunda Kelapa, Jakarta 14440, Indonesia. 

All other companies 

0,27 

A999 

3. In cases where goods have been damaged before entry into free circulation and, therefore, 
the price actually  paid or  payable is apportioned for the determination of the customs value 
pursuant to Article 145 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying 
down  provisions  for  the  implementation  of  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2913/92 
establishing the Community Customs Code7, the amount of anti-dumping duty, calculated on 
the  basis  of  paragraph  2  above,  shall  be  reduced  by  a  percentage  which  corresponds  to  the 
apportioning of the price actually paid or payable. 

4. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. 

7 

OJ L 253, 11.10.1993, p. 1. 

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This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day  following  that  of  its  publication  in  the 
Official Journal of the European Union. 

Article 2 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels, […] 

For the Council 
The President 
[…] 

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