Proposal for a Council Regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96
Date: 2010-01-29
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: China, anti-dumping duty, anti-dumping legislation, import, office supplies, originating product

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION  

Brussels, 29.1.2010 
COM(2010)16 final 

2010/0008 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms 
originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to 
Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1) CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

•  Grounds for and objectives of the proposal 

This  proposal  concerns  the  application  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  1225/2009  of  30 
November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of 
the  European  Community  (codified  version),  repealing  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not 
members  of  the  European  Community,  ('the  basic  Regulation')  in  the  expiry  review 
proceeding  concerning  imports  of  certain  ring  binders  mechanisms  originating  in  the 
People's Republic of China (‘PRC’). 

•  General context 

This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation and 
is the result of an investigation which was carried out in line with the substantive and 
procedural requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. 

•  Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

Council Regulation (EC) No 2074/2004 of 29 November 2004 (OJ L 359, 4.12.2004). 

•  Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union 

Not applicable. 

2) CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

•  Consultation of interested parties 

Interested  parties  concerned  by  the  proceeding  have  already  had  the  possibility  to 
defend their interests during the investigation, in line with the provisions of the basic 
Regulation. 

•  Collection and use of expertise 

There was no need for external expertise. 

•  Impact assessment 

This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation. 

The basic Regulation does not foresee a general impact assessment but the requirement 
that  the  measures  should  not  be  contrary  to  the  “Union  interest”  means  that  the 
assessment  of  the  wider  impact  of  the  measures  forms  an  integral  part  of  the 
investigation. 

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3) LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

•  Summary of the proposed action 

On 5 December 2008, the Commission announced by a notice (‘notice of initiation’), 
published  in  the  Official  Journal  Of  the  European  Union,  the  initiation  of  an  expiry 
review  of  the  anti-dumping  measures  in  force  on  imports  of  certain  ring  binder 
mechanisms originating in the PRC. 

The  expiry  review  was  initiated  following  a  request  lodged  on  4  September  2008  by 
one Union producer representing a major proportion of the total Union production of 
ring binder mechanisms. 

The measure currently in force is a definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  2074/2004  on  the  imports  into  the  Community  of  certain  ring 
binder mechanisms originating in the PRC. 

The  enclosed  Commission  proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  contains  the  expiry 
review conclusions regarding dumping, injury and Union interest.  

Member  States  were  consulted  during  the  Anti-Dumping  Committee  of  13  January 
2010.  

It  is  proposed  that  the  Council  adopt  the  attached  proposal  for  a  Regulation  which 
should be published in the Official Journal of the European Union by 4 March 2010 at 
the latest. 

•  Legal basis 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. 

•  Subsidiarity principle 

The  proposal  falls  under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  European  Union.  The 
subsidiarity principle therefore does not apply. 

•  Proportionality principle 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reason(s). 

The form of action is described in the above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves no 
scope for national decision. 

Indication  of  how  financial  and  administrative  burden  falling  upon  the  European 
Union,  national  governments,  regional  and  local  authorities,  economic  operators  and 
citizens  is  minimized  and  proportionate  to  the  objective  of  the  proposal  is  not 
applicable, but the basic Regulation limits the level of the duties that may be imposed 
to that necessary to redress the injury caused by the dumping found. 

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•  Choice of instruments 

Proposed instruments: Regulation. 

Other means would not be adequate for the following reason(s). 

The above-mentioned basic Regulation does not foresee alternative options. 

4) BUDGETARY IMPLICATION 

The proposal has no implication for the budget of the European Union. 

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2010/0008 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms 
originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to 
Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 

Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  (EC)  1225/2009  of  30  November  2009  on  protection 
against dumped imports from countries not  members  of  the European  Community (codified 
version)1, repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (the ‘basic 
Regulation’)2 and in particular Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) 1225/2009, 

Having  regard  to  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  Commission  after  having  consulted  the 
Advisory Committee, 

Whereas: 

A. PROCEDURE 

1. 

Measures in force 

(1) 

(2) 

By Regulation (EC) No 119/973, the Council imposed definitive anti-dumping duties 
ranging  from  32,5  %  to  39,4  %  on  imports  of  certain  ring  binder  mechanisms 
(‘RBMs’)  originating  in  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (PRC).  These  rates  of  duty 
were applicable to RBMs other than those with 17 or 23 rings, while RBMs with 17 
and  23  rings  were  subject  to  a  duty  equal  to  the  difference  between  the  minimum 
import  price  (MIP  of  EUR  325  per  1  000  pieces  and  the  free-at-Union-frontier  not 
cleared through customs price whenever the latter was lower than the MIP). 

By  Regulation  (EC)  No  2100/20004,  the  Council  amended  and  increased  the  above 
mentioned duties for certain RBMs other than those with 17 or 23 rings, following a 
review  investigation  pursuant  to  Article  12  of  the  basic  Regulation.  The  amended 
duties ranged from 51,2 % to 78,8 %. 

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OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51. 
OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1. 
OJ L 22, 24.1.1997, p. 1. 
OJ L 250, 5.10.2000, p. 1. 

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(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

Following  a  request  by  two  Union  producers  an  expiry  review  pursuant  to  Article 
11(2) of the basic Regulation was initiated in January 20025 and, by Regulation (EC) 
No  2074/20046  the  Council  extended  the  existing  anti-dumping  measures  for  four 
years. 

Following  an  anti-circumvention  investigation  pursuant  to  Article  13  of  the  basic 
Regulation,  by  Regulation  (EC)  No  1208/20047,  the  Council  extended  the  definitive 
anti-dumping measures to imports of certain RBMs consigned from Vietnam, whether 
declared as originating in Vietnam or not. 

Following  an  anti-circumvention  investigation  pursuant  to  Article  13  of  the  basic 
Regulation, by Regulation (EC) No 33/20068, the Council extended the definitive anti-
dumping  measures  to  imports  of  certain  RBMs  consigned  from  Lao  People's 
Democratic  Republic,  whether  declared  as  originating  in  Lao  People's  Democratic 
Republic or not. 

Finally, in August 2008, by Regulation (EC) No 818/20089, the Council extended the 
scope of the measures to certain slightly modified RBMs since it was established that 
measures were circumvented. 

2. 

Request for a review 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

Following  the  publication  of  a  notice  of  impending  expiry  of  the  anti-dumping 
measures in force on imports of certain RBMs originating in the PRC10, the European 
Commission  ('the  Commission')  received,  on  4  September  2008,  a  request  to  review 
these measures pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. 

The request was lodged by the Union producer Ring Alliance Ringbuchtechnik GmbH 
('the  applicant')  representing  a  major  proportion,  in  this  case  more  than  50%,  of  the 
total  Union  production  of  ring  binder  mechanisms.  The  request  was  based  on  the 
grounds  that  the  expiry  of  measures  would  be  likely  to  result  in  a  continuation  or 
recurrence of dumping and injury to the Union industry. 

Having determined, after consulting the Advisory Committee, that sufficient evidence 
existed for the initiation of a review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, 
the Commission initiated a review11. 

3. 

Investigation 

(a)  Procedure 

(10)  The  Commission  officially  advised  the  exporting  producers,  importers  and  users 
known  to  be  concerned,  the  representatives  of  the  exporting  country,  the  applicant 
Union  producer  and  the  other  known  Union  producer  of  the  initiation  of  the  expiry 

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OJ C 21, 24.1.2002, p.25. 
OJ L 359, 4.12.2004, p. 11. 
OJ L 232, 1.7.2004, p. 1. 
OJ L 7, 12.1.2006, p. 1. 
OJ L 221, 19.8.2008, p. 1. 
OJ C 146, 12.6.2008, p. 33. 
OJ C 310, 5.12.2008, p. 15. 

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review.  Interested  parties  were  given  the  opportunity  to  make  their  views  known  in 
writing and to request a hearing within the time limit set out in the notice of initiation. 

(11)  All parties who so requested within the above time limit and  who demonstrated that 
there were particular reasons why they should be heard were granted the opportunity 
to be heard. 

(12)  Questionnaires were sent to all the parties that were officially advised of the initiation 
of the review and to those who requested a questionnaire within the time limit set out 
in  the  notice  of  initiation.  In  addition,  one  producer  in  Thailand  (the  envisaged 
analogue country) was contacted and received a questionnaire. 

(13)  Replies to the questionnaires were received from one exporting producer in the PRC 
who  did  not  export  RBMs  to  the  European  Union  ('EU')  and  its  related  company  in 
Thailand, the applicant Union producer, three unrelated importers and one user related 
to the complainant. The other Union producer did not cooperate in this investigation 
and one unrelated importer only submitted comments. 

(14)  All  parties  concerned  were  informed  of  the  essential  facts  and  considerations  on  the 
basis  of  which  it  was  intended  to  recommend  the  imposition  of  definitive  anti-
dumping  duties.  They  were  granted  a  period  within  which  to  make  representations 
subsequent  to  disclosure.  The  comments  of  the  parties  were  considered  and,  where 
appropriate, the findings have been modified accordingly. 

(b) 

Interested parties and verification visits 

(15)  The Commission's services sought and verified all the information deemed necessary 
for  the  purpose  of  determination  of  the  likelihood  of  a  continuation  or  recurrence  of 
dumping and injury and of the EU interest. Verification visits were carried out at the 
premises of the following companies: 

(i)  Applicant Union producer 

– 

Ring Alliance Ringbuchtechnik GmbH, Vienna, Austria. 

(ii)  Producer in the exporting country 

–  Wah Hing Stationery Manufactory Ltd (WHS), Guangzhou and its 
related company Wah Hing Stationery Manufactory Ltd ('WHS') in 
Hong Kong, PRC. 

(iii)  Unrelated importer in the EU 

– 

Giardini S.r.l., Settimo Milanese, Italy. 

(c) 

Investigation period 

(16)  The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 
October  2007  to  30  September  2008  (‘review  investigation  period’  or  ‘RIP’).  The 
examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or 
recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2005 up to the end of the RIP 
(‘period considered’). 

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B. PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 

1. 

Product concerned 

(17)  The  product  concerned  is  the  same  as  defined  in  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
2074/2004  as  amended  by  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  818/2008  i.e.  certain  ring 
binder mechanisms consisting of two steel sheets or wires with at least four half-rings 
made of steel wire fixed on them and which are kept together by a steel cover. They 
can be opened either by pulling the half rings or with a small steel trigger mechanism 
fixed  to  the  ring  binder  mechanism.  The  rings  can  have  different  shapes,  the  most 
common  ones  being  round  and  D-shaped  ('the  product  concerned').  RBMs  are 
currently  falling  within  CN  code  ex  83  05  10  00.  Lever-arch  mechanisms  ('LAM') 
classified  within  the  same  CN  code  are  not  included  in  the  scope  of  the  product 
concerned. 

(18)  RBMs are used to make paper, cardboard and plastic-coated office files, presentation 

and other bound files. 

(19)  A large number of different types of RBMs were sold in the EU during the RIP. The 
differences between these types were determined by the width of the base, the type of 
mechanism,  the  number  of  rings,  the  opening  system,  the  nominal  paper  holding 
capacity,  the  ring  diameter,  the  shape  of  the  rings,  the  length  and  the  ring  spacing. 
Given the fact that all types have the same basic physical and technical characteristics 
and,  within  certain  ranges,  are  interchangeable,  it  was  established  that  all  RBMs 
constitute one single product for the purpose of the present proceeding. 

2. 

Like product 

(20) 

(21) 

It  was  also  found  that  there  was  no  difference  in  the  basic  physical  and  technical 
characteristics and uses between RBMs produced in the PRC and RBMs produced by 
the Union industry and sold on the EU market. 

It was therefore concluded that RBMs originating in the PRC and RBMs produced and 
sold  by  the  Union  industry  on  the  EU  market  were  all  like  products  within  the 
meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. 

C. LIKELIHOOD OF A CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF DUMPING 

(22) 

In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, it was examined whether the 
expiry of the existing measures would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence 
of dumping. 

1. 

Preliminary remarks 

(23)  No Chinese producer exporting RBMs to the EU cooperated with the investigation. Of 
the four Chinese companies named in the request, only one cooperated, as well as its 
related company based in Thailand. The three other exporting companies did not reply 
to  the  questionnaire.  The  sole  Chinese  co-operating  producer  did  not  export  the 
product concerned to the EU but performed exports of the product concerned to other 
third  country  markets.  In  the  absence  of  cooperation  of  any  Chinese  exporting 
producer of the RBMs to the EU during the RIP, findings with regard to dumping had 
to  be  based  on  information  available  to  the  Commission  from  other  sources  in 

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accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  18  of  the  basic  Regulation.  In  this  case  it 
was  considered  that  the  most  reasonable  and  appropriate  information  was  the 
information  given  by  Eurostat  in  relation  to  exports.  Where  practical  and  with  due 
regard  to  the  time  limits  of  the  investigation,  this  information  was  checked  by 
reference  to  information  from  the  sole  Chinese  producer  that  cooperated  with  the 
present  investigation  but  did  not  export  RBMs  to  the  EU  and  to  the  Chinese  export 
statistics. Nevertheless, account taken of the fact that no company specific data  with 
respect  to  quantities  and  volumes  exists  from  the  Chinese  exporting  producers  the 
Eurostat statistics are still considered the only available proxy of the Chinese exports 
to the EU, even if the absolute level of prices given by Eurostat seems quite high as 
compared  to  import  prices  reported  by  Chinese  export  statistics  and  Eurostat  figures 
given for other third countries. 

2. 

Continuation of dumping 

(a)  Analogue country 

(24)  Since  the  PRC  is  an  economy  in  transition  and  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, normal value had to be determined on the basis 
of the price or constructed normal value obtained in an appropriate market economy 
third country (the ‘analogue country’), or the price from the analogue country to other 
countries,  including  the  Union,  or  where  those  are  not  possible  on  any  other 
reasonable basis, including the price actually paid or payable in the Union for the like 
product, duly adjusted if necessary to include a reasonable profit margin. 

(25) 

In the previous investigation, India was chosen as analogue country. In this respect it 
is noted that the Commission informed the sole Indian producer that co-operated in the 
previous investigation on the initiation of the current proceeding but the relevant party 
refused  to  co-operate.  In  the  expiry  review  request,  Thailand  was  suggested  as 
analogue  country  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  normal  value.  This  choice  was 
contested  by  certain  parties  involved  with  the  proceeding  who  claimed  that  India 
should have been used as an appropriate analogue country. 

(26)  With  respect  to  Thailand  one  Thai  producer  agreed  to  co-operate.  Therefore  the 
Commission  examined  the  possibility  of  using  data  obtained  from  Thailand  for  the 
purpose of establishing normal value for PRC. With this regard it should be noted that 
there  were  no  domestic  sales  of  the  product  concerned  in  Thailand.  Therefore,  any 
determination  of  normal  value  in  Thailand  would  have  to  be  made  on  the  basis  of 
Article 2(6)(c). 

(27)  Moreover,  the  comparison  of  the  level  of  the  average  export  price  of  the  product 
concerned when exported from Thailand and the average export price of the product 
concerned from PRC as provided by Eurostat showed that Chinese prices were higher 
than Thai prices. In this regard it should be noted that there is a significant range of 
different product types that are covered by the product concerned and prices can vary 
depending on the product type. Due to absence of cooperation by the PRC exporting 
producers,  the  exact  composition  of  their  export  sales  to  the  EU  could  not  be 
established  and  compared  to  the  product  mix  of  the  Thai  exporting  producers. 
Consequently, since there were no indications that the significant difference in export 
prices can be attributed to any other factor, it was concluded that there is a difference 
in  product  mix  of  RBMs  exported  to  the  EU  by  the  Chinese  and  the  Thai  exporting 

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producers. In effect, based on the differences in export prices for Thailand and PRC to 
the European Union, it was concluded, using the best data available, that the exports 
from PRC cover rather more expensive, elaborated product types and that also for this 
reason it would not be appropriate to use data from Thailand for establishing normal 
value for PRC. 

(28)  Furthermore,  the  Thai  company  was  related  to  the  sole  co-operating  Chinese  RBMs 
producer. The Commission investigated whether the fact that the two companies were 
related could have an impact on the determination of normal value. In this respect it is 
recalled  that  previous  investigations  (namely  two  anti-circumvention  investigations) 
have  revealed  that  the  Thai  company  was  established  as  a  business  response  of  a 
Chinese  producer  to  the  imposition  of  anti-dumping  measures  to  the  product 
concerned. The same conclusion is confirmed by the present investigation as explained 
in  detail  under  recital  (38).  Account  taken  of  this  well  established  link  between  the 
Chinese  and  the  Thai  producer  it  was  considered  appropriate  not  to  use  the 
information submitted by the sole company that co-operated in the proposed analogue 
country.  Therefore,  account  taken  of  all  the  above  factors  and  in  accordance  with 
Article  2(7)(a)  of  the  basic  Regulation,  Thailand  was  not  considered  to  be  an 
appropriate analogue country for establishing normal value. 

(29)  Account taken of the facts described above with respect to Thailand, the lack of any 
co-operation from the previously used analogue country (India) as well as the fact that 
no  Chinese  company  that  exported  RBMs  to  the  EU  co-operated  with  the 
investigation,  it  was  considered  appropriate  to  base  the  normal  value  on  any  other 
reasonable  basis,  i.e.  the  prices  actually  paid  or  payable  in  the  Union  for  the  like 
product. 

(b)  Normal value 

(30) 

In  view  of  the  facts  described  above,  it  was  decided  to  base  the  determination  for 
normal value on the Union industry prices in line with the provisions of Article 2(7)(a) 
of the basic Regulation, i.e. on the basis of prices actually paid or payable in the Union 
for the like product. Normal value was thus calculated on the basis of data verified at 
the premises of the applicant Union producer. The domestic sales of this producer of 
the  like  product  were  found  to  be  representative  compared  to  the  product  concerned 
exported  to  the  EU  from  PRC.  As  the  sales  prices  of  the  Union  industry  were  loss-
making,  they  had  to  be  duly  adjusted  to  include  a  reasonable  profit  margin,  as 
provided for under Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation. In this respect a reasonable 
profit margin of 5% was used which is considered reasonable for this type of business 
activities. 

(c)  Export price 

(31) 

In  accordance  with  Article  18  of  the  basic  Regulation,  and  in  the  absence  of 
cooperation  from  Chinese  exporting  producers,  the  export  price  was  calculated  by 
using Eurostat data. 

(d)  Comparison 

(32)  The comparison between normal value and export price was made on ex-factory basis. 
For the purpose of ensuring fair comparison between normal value and export price, 

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due  adjustments  were  made  for  differences  affecting  prices  and  price  comparison  in 
accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made where 
necessary, for differences in transport, insurance and other transport related costs. 

(e)  Dumping margin 

(33)  Account  taken  of  the  above  and  of  the  absence  of  any  other  reliable  information  for 
China  country-wide  dumping  margin,  based  on  a  weighted  average-to-average 
comparison and expressed as a percentage of the CIF EU frontier price duty unpaid, 
was calculated and found to be 20,7 %. 

(f)  Conclusion on dumping 

(34)  The  investigation  has  established  the  existence  of  dumping  during  the  RIP.  This 
conclusion was based (i) on the one hand on export prices as established from Eurostat 
for the reasons explained under recital (23) and (ii) on the other hand on normal value 
determined on the basis of Union industry prices in line with the provisions of Article 
2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation for the reasons explained under recitals (24) to (29). 

3. 

Recurrence of dumping 

(35)  Further to the analysis of the existence of dumping during the RIP, the likelihood of 
the  recurrence  of  dumping  was  investigated.  In  the  absence  of  cooperation  from 
Chinese exporting producers except for one company that had exports only to non EU 
countries, and given the lack of publicly available information, the conclusions below 
rely  mainly  on  the  facts  available  in  accordance  with  Article  18  of  the  basic 
Regulation,  namely  Eurostat  data,  data  from  the  sole  cooperating  company,  Chinese 
statistics and the review request. 

(36) 

In  this  respect,  the  following  elements  were  analysed:  (a)  the  spare  capacity  and 
behaviour in terms of volumes and prices of the exporting Chinese producers and (b) 
the EU market attractiveness for Chinese exporters in terms of prices and volume. 

(a)  Spare capacity and behaviour of the exporting Chinese producers 

(37) 

It  is  worth  recalling  that,  in  the  absence  of  co-operation  from  exporting  producers 
other than WHS, no information concerning production in the PRC, spare production 
capacity  and  sales  on  the  Chinese  market  was  available,  except  for  the  co-operating 
producer. 

(38)  The sole Chinese co-operating producer had reduced its own production capacity from 
2005  to  the  RIP  significantly  (the  precise  figure  cannot  be  disclosed  for  reasons  of 
confidentiality). However, this Chinese producer is able to expand again its production 
capacity. Indeed this reduced capacity production could be restored without delay and 
effort  given  that  the  producer  still  owns  an  empty  industrial  plant  close  to  the 
operational  one.  In  that  site  the  Chinese  producer  could  re-establish  in  a  short  time 
period,  i.e.  within  six  months,  a  production  line  for  RBMs  using  existing  equipment 
that currently cater other production needs but could be readapted in order to increase 
its overall RBMs production. In this respect it should be noted also that this Chinese 
producer has no domestic sales and no obvious plans to start domestic sales in the near 
future.  Consequently,  this  producer  might  quickly  increase  production  and  direct  it 
towards  any  export markets (including the EU  market  to  which  it  does  not  currently 

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sell) if measures are allowed to expire. The company also confirmed that if the anti-
dumping measures were repealed, they would close down the production site of their 
related Thai company and would repatriate all the production of RBMs to China. The 
co-operating company did not maintain a high level of investments something which is 
easily  explained  account  taken  of  the  existence  of  its  related  Thai  company,  the  low 
level of investment generally needed for this type of manufacturing activity and of the 
short period of time needed to shift machinery into the production of RBMs. 

(39)  With respect to the non-cooperating Chinese producers, it is concluded that there are 
still spare capacities in the PRC. This is based on the fact that overall Chinese exports 
have  decreased  and  there  is  no  information  showing  that  capacity  in  the  PRC  has 
declined. Furthermore, it is noted that there is a short lead time in the adaptability of 
machinery  and  overall  versatility  of  equipments  in  the  RBMs  industry  so  that 
capacities  could  be  restored  easily  in  order  to  follow  developments  in  the  RBMs 
market. 

(40)  With  regard  to  exports  sales  to  third  countries  of  the  sole  Chinese  co-operating 
producer  it  only  provided  partial  information  suggesting  that  its  sales  increased  by 
some 10% from 2006 to the RIP. During the same period its average export price to 
third countries increased by 0.7%. 

(41)  With regard to the development of the overall Chinese exports to other countries the 
available Chinese statistics were consulted in order to establish volumes and prices of 
Chinese  exports.  These  data  confirms  that  there  was  a  significant  decrease  in  RBMs 
from  China  in  the  period  between  2004  and  the  RIP.  According  to  the  Chinese 
statistics,  the  volume  of  RBMs  exported  in  2004  was  198  million  pieces,  which 
decreased to 89 million pieces during the RIP. The average selling price on the other 
hand, decreased sharply during the period 2004 to 2007, only to reach levels slightly 
less than the 2004 during the RIP. The fact that volumes of Chinese exports of RBMs 
represented during the RIP only 45% of their 2004 level while the average export price 
was  during  the  RIP  7%  lower  than  its  2004  level  confirms  that  there  is  a  strong 
incentive to all Chinese producers, either co-operating or not with the investigation, to 
return  to  their  previously  achieved  export  performances  account  taken  of  their 
available capacities and the tendency observed in the last years for an increase in the 
export  prices.  In  these  circumstances,  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  if  the  anti-
dumping  measures  were  allowed  to  expire,  the  EU  market  would  become  a  very 
attractive  target  for  all  Chinese  producers,  who  would  then  aim  to  export  to  the  EU 
market in considerable quantities. 

(b)  Attractiveness of the EU market 

(42)  Before  the  imposition  of  anti-dumping  duties,  the  EU  was  for  PRC  the  second  most 
significant  export  market  for  RBMs  in  terms  of  overall  volume.  PRC's  market  share 
has  constantly  decreased  after  anti-dumping  measures  were  imposed,  extended 
following  two  circumvention  investigations  and  reviewed  in  2008  to  enlarge  their 
scope.  Market  shares  remained  substantially  stable  during  the  period  considered  and 
only slightly decreased to 3,2% (-0,4%) during the RIP. However, the size of the EU 
market,  second  only  to  the  USA,  and  the  consequent  demand  makes  the  EU  an 
important  target  when  comparing  it  with  other  Chinese  exporting  markets.  The  past 
Chinese  presence  in  the  EU  market  and  the  importance  of  the  market  can  be 

EN 

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considered as a clear indication that Chinese producers would in the future attempt to 
regain market shares in the EU. 

(43)  Furthermore, there are clear indications that parties in China follow closely the present 
investigation and consider the possibility to start exporting to the EU. In this respect it 
is  noted  that  following  the  initiation  of  the  proceeding  the  Commission  received 
queries from a Chinese producer, not mentioned in the request for the expiry review, 
stating that the company was established in 2005, that it produces RBMs and plans to 
export  RMBs  to  the  EU  as  from  2009.  This  company  considered  initially  the 
possibility  to  co-operate  with  the  proceeding  but  did  not  submit  the  relevant 
questionnaire reply. The above confirms that the EU remains for Chinese producers an 
attractive market even with the existing anti-dumping measures and thus if measures 
are allowed to expire their incentive to start, increase or recommence exporting to the 
EU would be significantly reinforced. 

(44)  The  historic  importance  and  attractiveness  of  the  EU  as  a  RBMs  market  is  also 
confirmed  by  the  persistent  past  attempts  to  circumvent  or  absorb  the  current  anti-
dumping measures. Indeed, since anti-dumping measures were imposed against PRC, 
there  have  been  continuous  attempts  to  circumvent  and  absorb  them  by  Chinese 
exporters in order to access the EU market. It  is recalled that present measures have 
been  increased  in  2000  as  a  result  of  an  anti-absorption  procedure,  extended  to 
Vietnam  and  Laos  in  2004  and  2006  respectively  as  a  result  of  the  existence  of 
circumvention practices and amended in 2008 with respect to the definition of product 
concerned  also  as  a  result  of  circumvention  practices  by  means  of  slight  product 
modification. 

(45)  As to prices, according to the Chinese statistics,  the  average  Chinese  export  price  to 
third  country  markets  is  higher  than  the  average  Chinese  export  price  to  the  EU  but 
still significantly below the average price of Indian and Thai prices on the EU market, 
i.e.  their  potential  direct  competitors.  The  relevant  Chinese  export  data  suggests  that 
Chinese  producers  have  an  already  well  established  position  in  most  of  the  other 
markets contrary to their current EU performance. It is thus clear that the EU market 
would be a financially attractive option for the Chinese exporters because they could 
sell at higher prices in the EU without jeopardizing their sales to the rest of the world 
and still undercut their main competitors in the EU by selling at dumped prices. 

(c)  Trade defence measures applied by third countries 

(46)  No third countries apply trade defence measures to imports of RBMs originating in the 

PRC. 

4. 

Conclusion 

(47)  The  investigation has  shown  that both the co-operating exporting producer and most 
likely also the other Chinese exporting producers have considerable spare capacity in 
view  of  the  significant  decrease  in  their  exports  from  2004  to  the  RIP.  It  has  also 
shown  that  there  is  a  constant  interest  by  Chinese  parties to  enter  in  the  EU  market. 
Moreover,  the  sole  co-operating  producer  could  easily  shift  its  production  capacity 
from Thailand back to China if anti-dumping measures were repealed. 

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(48) 

In  view  of  the  spare  capacities  of  the  Chinese  producers  and  the  versatility  of  their 
machinery  and  equipment  it  is  likely  that  imports  from  the  PRC  to  the  EU  market 
could  resume  in  significant  quantities  if  the  anti-dumping  measures  were  allowed  to 
expire.  The  EU  market  is  currently  the  only  one  in  the  world  where  anti-dumping 
measures exist and the facts established suggest that Chinese exporters would certainly 
aim to regain at the soonest possible time their past market shares by taking advantage 
of  the  necessary  capacity  adaptability.  The  above  conclusion  is  strengthened  by  the 
fact  that  they  could  afford  to  sell  at  prices  that  are  lower  than  those  of  all  their 
competitors  in  the  EU  market  and  have  already  demonstrated  that  they  did  so  in  the 
RIP. 

(49)  Based on all these findings and events, it is likely that in the event of resumption of 
exports  by  Chinese  exporters  to  the  EU,  these  exports  would  be  priced  below  the 
normal  value.  Consequently,  it  is  determined  that,  should  the  existing  measures  be 
repealed, the dumping from China will be likely to recur. 

D. DEFINITION OF THE UNION INDUSTRY 

(50)  During the RIP RBMs were manufactured in the EU by the following producers: 

– 

– 

Ring Alliance Ringbuchtechnik GmbH, Wien, Austria 

Industria Meccanica Lombarda srl, Offanengo, Italy. 

(51)  The  first  producer  is  the  applicant  and  cooperated  in  the  investigation.  The  other 
(smaller) Union producer did not cooperate. The investigation has established that the 
applicant  represented  more  than  50%  of  the  total  Union  production  of  RBM  in  the 
RIP. It is therefore considered that this producer represents the Union industry within 
the meaning of Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of the basic Regulation. It is hereinafter referred 
to  as  the  ‘Union  industry’.  The  applicant  and  its  subsidiaries  is  not  related  to  the 
Chinese exporting producers. 

(52) 

It should be noted that in the past, the Union industry was originally composed of two 
different producers (Koloman Handler – Austria and Robert Krause – Germany) that 
went bankrupt and taken over by an Austrian group. The companies were subject to a 
significant  restructuring  and  the  current  structure  'Ring  Alliance  Ringbuchtechnik 
GmbH'  was  created  in  2003,  i.e.  about  two  years  before  the  period  considered.  The 
head offices are located in Austria while production takes place in Hungary. 

E. SITUATION ON THE EU MARKET 

1. 

Consumption on the EU market 

(53)  The  questionnaire  replies  of  the  co-operating  Union  producer  were  used  to  establish 
the Union industry’s sales of RBM on the EU market. Other information available was 
also used to calculate the sales of the Union producer not included in the definition of 
the Union industry 

(54)  Data  concerning  import  volumes  were  obtained  from  Eurostat  statistics,  with  the 
exception of imports from Thailand which were obtained from replies to questionnaire 
received  in  the  framework  of  the  parallel  anti-dumping  proceeding  concerning  that 
country. 

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(55)  On  this  basis,  the  EU  consumption  of  RBMs  declined  by  4%  over  the  period 
considered from around 170-180 million pieces in 2005 to 165-175 million pieces in 
the RIP.12 

2. 

Imports from the country concerned 

(a) 

Import volume and market share  

Import volume 

Market share(%) 

2005 

2006 

2007 

RIP 

100

7,0%

49

41 

43

3,8%

3,2% 

3,2%

(56) 

In order to establish total import volumes of the product concerned from the PRC, it 
was  considered  appropriate  to  include  imports  from  those  countries  to  which  the 
current  anti-dumping  measures  had  been  extended  pursuant  to  Article  13(3)  of  the 
basic  Regulation,  i.e.  Vietnam  and  Laos  (see  recital  4  and  5  above).  Indeed,  it  was 
considered  that  imports  from  these  countries  were  in  fact  products  originating  in  the 
PRC.  On  this  basis,  it  was  established  that  total  imported  volume  of  RBM  from  the 
PRC  decreased  by  more  than  50%  during  the  period  considered.  The  market  share 
decreased  to  the  same  extent  during  this  period.  It  should,  however,  be  noted  those 
figure include consigned imports from Laos only in 2005, and they represented half of 
the  imports  in  that  year.  Note  that  the  anti-circumvention  investigation  concerning 
imports of RBM consigned from Laos was opened in April 2005. 

(57)  The PRC market share dropped form 7.0% to 3.8% in 2006 and has remained stable 
since  then  (around  3%).  It  is  noted  that,  in  the  framework  of  the  previous  expiry 
review, the PRC's market shares decreased from 14.8% in 1998 to 1.9% in 2001, i.e. 
the  market  share  of  Chinese  RBM  is  now  higher  than  at  the  end  of  the  period 
examined for the previous expiry review. 

(b)  Price of the imports of the product concerned / undercutting 

(58)  Out of the three co-operating importers only one imported RBM from the PRC during 
the RIP. These imports were very small as compared to overall imports from PRC and 
consisted  of  mechanisms  with  17  and  23  rings  subject  to  a  minimum  import  price. 
These  could  therefore  not  have  been  used  as  a  representative  basis.  According  to 
Eurostat  statistics,  import  prices  of  RBM  originating  in  the  PRC  decreased  by  5% 
during the period considered and Chinese prices undercut the Union industry's prices 
by around 10% (not taking into account the anti-dumping duties). The absolute level 
of prices given by Eurostat, however, seems quite high as compared to import prices 
reported  by  Chinese  export  statistics  and  Eurostat  figures  given  for  other  third 
countries. As pointed out above, it is likely that, should measures be repealed, Chinese 
export prices would have to align to their foreign competitors (Thailand, India) and on 
that basis the undercutting rate would be much more significant. 

12 

Only ranges are given in order to protect confidentiality of sole Complainant.  

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(c) 

Imports from other third countries 

India 

Thailand 

Hong Kong 

Others 

2005 

2006 

2007 

RIP 

52,9% 

48,3% 

44,9% 

43,3% 

11,5% 

12,2% 

0,2% 

1,2% 

0,0% 

2,7% 

7,9% 

5,1% 

4,4% 

13,0% 

4,9% 

1,7% 

(59)  As  to  imports  from  other  third  countries,  imports  of  RBMs  originating  in  India  are 
decreasing  while  imports  of  RBMs  originating  in  Thailand  have  slightly  increased 
during the RIP when they are higher as compared to previous years. As well as other 
countries,  Hong  Kong is exporting  the RBMs to the EU  but no  representations were 
made in this respect and no further information is available.  

3. 

Economic situation of the Union industry13 

(a)  Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation 

Production 

Production capacity 

2005 

2006 

2007 

100 

100 

102 

91 

118 

100 

Capacity utilisation (%) 

59% 

66% 

70% 

RIP 

119 

103 

68% 

(60)  During the period considered the production increased by almost 20% while capacity 
remained relatively stable. As a result capacity utilisation followed a trend similar to 
production, increasing by 9 percentage points.  

(61)  The  level  of  the  capacity  utilisation  during  the  RIP  was  however  below  the  level  it 
reached  in  2001,  i.e.  the  investigation  period  of  the  previous  expiry  review.  The 
capacity utilisation rate then was between 70% and 75%. 

(b)  Stocks 

Closing stock 

100 

95 

119 

2005 

2006 

2007 

RIP 

143 

(62) 

In  the  period  considered  the  Union  industry's  stocks  increased  overall  by  43%.  A 
significant part  of the RBM production consists of standard products,  and  the  Union 
industry therefore has to maintain a certain level of stock in order to be in a position to 
swiftly satisfy the  demand of  its customers. Any increase of  the closing  stock  above 
the  average  level  indicates  difficulties  to  sell  the  products  (domestically  and  on  the 
export  market).  The  seasonality  of  the  sales  should  also  be  taken  into  account:  sales 
are more important during the last quarter of the year, corresponding to the beginning 
of the school season. 

13 

Data  is  given  in  index  numbers  (1998  =  100)  or  in  a  range  whenever  it  is  necessary  to  preserve 
confidentiality. 

EN 

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(c) 

Sales volume, market share and growth 

Sales volume 

Market shares 

2005 

2006 

2007 

100 

113 

118 

RIP 

123 

24,4% 

30,2% 

31,5% 

31,1% 

(63)  The  Union  industry's  sales  on  the  EU  market  increased  by  23%  over  the  period 
considered and market shares developed from 24.4% to 31.1%, i.e. a raise of almost 7 
percentage  points.  This  increase  of  market  shares  indicates  that  the  Union  industry's 
growth was above the development of the consumption. 

(64)  The  absolute  level  of  market  share  remained  however  below  its  2001  level,  the 

previous investigation period, when it reached around 40%  

(d)  Sales prices and costs 

Sales prices 

2005

100

2006

2007 

88

88 

RIP

88

(65)  The  Union  industry's  weighted  average  selling  price  decreased  by  12%  during  the 
period  considered.  It  should  be  noted  that  in  the  last  years  the  raw  material  prices 
(steel) followed an increasing trend worldwide, and that steel represents around 40% 
of the total unit cost. Sales prices were loss making from 2006 onwards. 

(e)  Profitability, return on investments, cash-flow 

Profitability 

Return on net assets 

Cash-flow 

2005 

2006 

2007 

100 

100 

100 

-646 

-72 

56 

-62 

-103 

42 

RIP 

-115 

-53 

-131 

(66)  The Union industry was still profitable in 2005, but the situation seriously deteriorated 
the next year due to circumvention practices which lead to an extension of measures in 
2006 and of the product definition in 2008. Although profitability however improved 
in 2007, the Union industry was still unable to reach break even point and was making 
losses during the RIP. During the RIP, losses were small.  

(67)  The  cash-flow  and  return  on  net  assets  largely  followed  the  same  trend.  With  such 
financial  situation  the  applicant  representing  the  Union  industry  would  undoubtedly 
face difficulties to raise capital outside the group. 

(f) 

Investments and ability to raise capital 

Investments (€) 

100 

190 

85 

2005 

2006 

2007 

RIP 

80 

(68)  Even  if  investments  followed  a  decreasing  trend,  i.e.  20%  during  the  period 
considered,  the  Union  industry  however  maintained  a  certain  level  of  investments  in 
order to remain competitive. Those investments consisted of new machinery in order 
to improve the production process and to increase competitiveness. 

EN 

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(69)  As stated in recital (66), given the weak financial situation of Union industry it can be 
concluded  that  its  ability  to  raise  capital  from  independent  sources  was  seriously 
affected. 

(i)  Employment, productivity and wages 

Employment 

Productivity 

Overall wages 

Wages 

2005 

2006 

2007 

RIP 

100 

100 

100 

100 

94 

109 

102 

109 

105 

113 

107 

102 

104 

114 

111 

106 

(70)  During  the  period  considered  employment  (full-time  units)  increased  by  4%  and 
productivity,  measured  in  thousand  of  pieces  produced  per  employee  during  the 
period,  improved  by  14%;  overall  labour  costs  increased  by  11%,  which  is  largely 
explained  by  the  increase  of  the  employment  figures;  the  average  wage  increase  per 
employee remained more limited. 

(j)  Magnitude of the actual margin of dumping 

(71)  On the basis of the best facts available, the investigation has established the existence 

of dumping during the RIP of 20,7%, which is quite substantial. 

4. 

Conclusion 

(72)  The  Union  industry  has  restructured  and  benefited  to  a  certain  extent  from  the 
imposition  of  measures  against  dumped  imports.  Its  economic  situation  has  indeed 
improved  in  the  last  years:  production,  sales,  market  share  and  employment  show 
positive trends. 

(73)  Despite  the  above-mentioned  positive  development,  the  industry  could  however  not 
fully  recover  from  the  injury  previously  suffered.  This  is  mainly  evidenced  by  the 
financial indicators: profitability, cash flow and return on net assets are still showing 
signs of injury. The industry could also not yet reach the level of sales and production 
it reached in the past. This should also been seen in the light of the fact that during part 
of the period examined, measures were also undermined by circumventing practices as 
described above. 

(74)  Even  though  there  was  an  improvement  of  the  economic  situation  of  the  Union 
industry, it thus remained in a precarious situation during the period considered. 

F. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF INJURY 

(75)  The  Union  industry  restructured  its  activities  and  benefited  from  the  anti-dumping 
measures. However, although those measures were imposed for the first time in 1997, 
they  were  only  fully  effective  when  the  effects  of  absorption  and  circumvention 
practices  were  offset.  Even  though  the  situation  of  the  Union  industry  improved,  it 
remains fragile and vulnerable. 

EN 

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(76)  Under such circumstances it is appropriate to carry out an analysis of the likelihood of 
recurrence  of  material  injury  in  order  to  examine  whether  -  should  the  measures  be 
repealed  –  projected  developments  in  terms  of  volumes  and  prices  of  imports 
originating in the PRC would further deteriorate the situation of the industry and cause 
material injury. 

1. 

Impact of the projected increase in dumped imports on the Union industry 

(77) 

(78) 

It  is  recalled  that  there  is  significant  spare  capacity  in  China  and  that  production  of 
RBM could easily be increased to a large extent. This is based on the above findings 
that the sole co-operating Chinese producer could easily restore its currently reduced 
production  capacity  and  even  close  down  its  production  site  in  Thailand  in  order  to 
repatriate production to China. Furthermore other non-cooperating Chinese producers 
have  significant  spare  capacity  or  could  easily  restore  such  capacity  given  the  short 
lead  time  in  adaptability  of  machinery  and  the  overall  versatility  of  equipments 
necessary to produce RBM. 

It  was  established  that  any  increase  of  RBM  production  in  PRC  would  more  than 
likely be massively exported to the EU if measures were repealed. This is based on the 
fact  that  the  EU  market  remains  significant  in  terms  of  size  and  was  historically  an 
important  market  for  Chinese  exporters  who  would  certainly  try  to  regain  their  lost 
market  shares.  The  attractiveness  of  the  EU  market  for  Chinese  exporters  was  also 
clearly  evidenced  by  the  numerous  attempts  to  avoid  the  anti-dumping  measures  in 
place. Measures were indeed absorbed, circumvented via third countries and even via 
slight modification of the products. 

(79)  Finally, it is established that the conditions of any future increase of RBM imports in 
the  EU  would  have  serious  negative  consequences  on  the  situation  of  the  Union 
industry. As mentioned above, if measures were repealed, the import volume of RBM 
from  PRC  is  expected  to  be  important.  Furthermore,  those  imports  would  most 
probably  exert  a  significant  price  pressure  on  the  EU  market,  thus  on  the  Union 
industry,  as  suggested  by  the  analysis  of  the  level  of  prices  on  the  EU  and  third 
country markets. Indeed, according to Eurostat, the current Chinese prices do undercut 
EU  prices  by  around  10%  (excluding  anti-dumping  duties),  and  they  are  currently 
much  higher  than  the  average  price  of  China's  potential  competitors  (India  and 
Thailand) on the EU market. In case measures were repealed and Chinese producers 
would be in a position to export all types of RBM without any AD duties in the EU, it 
is  more  than  likely  that  they  would,  at  least  to  a  certain  extent,  align  their  prices  to 
their competitor's. This is also confirmed by the (low) level of the Chinese prices on 
third country market, according to China's export statistics. Without any measures, the 
EU market would thus become very attractive for Chinese exporters. 

2. 

Conclusion on the likelihood of recurrence of injury 

(80)  On the basis of the above, it is likely that the expiry of the anti-dumping measures on 
imports of RBM originating in the PRC would result in a sharp increase in the volume 
of imports into the EU at very low prices, and that this would depress the overall level 
of  prices  on  the  EU  market.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  bulk  of  the  products  on  the 
RBM market is highly standardised and the price is thus the main decisive factor. 

EN 

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(81)  Given the already precarious situation of the Union industry, a substantial increase of 
imports  from  the  PRC  at  dumped  prices  combined  with  a  substantial  price 
undercutting  would  undoubtedly  have  serious  consequences  on  its  situation.  This 
would  cause  material  injury  and  thus  annihilate  the  efforts  made  by  the  industry  to 
restructure. 

G. UNION INTEREST 

1. 

Introduction 

(82) 

(83) 

It was examined whether compelling reasons existed that could lead to the conclusion 
that  it  is  not  in  the  Union  interest  to  renew  the  anti-dumping  measures  in  force.  For 
this purpose, and in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the impact of 
the  renewal  of  the  measures  on  all  parties  involved  in  this  proceeding  and  the 
consequences  of  the  expiry  of  the  measures  were  considered  on  the  basis  of  all 
evidence submitted. 

In  order  to  assess  the  impact  of  the  possible  maintenance  of  measures,  all  interested 
parties  were  given  the  opportunity  to  make  their  views  known  pursuant  to 
Article 21(2)  of  the  basic  Regulation.  As  already  mentioned,  only  the  co-operating 
Union  producers  and  three  unrelated  importers  replied  to  the  questionnaire.  One 
unrelated  importer  and  one  user  also  made  comments,  without  replying  to  the 
questionnaire. 

2. 

Interest of the Union industry 

(84)  The Union industry consisted of two producers when the first anti-dumping complaint 
was  lodged  in  1995:  Koloman  Handler  GmbH,  an  Austrian  company,  and  Robert 
Krause GmbH & Co, a German company. Those two companies were present on the 
EU  market  for  a  long  time  but  they  were  subject  to  significant  financial  difficulties, 
amongst other things because of unfair traded imports. 

(85)  Their economic situation was so bad that they both had to file for bankruptcies. While 
Robert Krause GmbH filed for bankruptcy in 1998 and its successor company had to 
do  the  same  in  2002,  Koloman  Hander  became  insolvent  in  2001.  Both  companies 
were  taken  over  by  another  company,  SX  Bürowaren  Produktions-  und  Handels 
GmbH,  which  in  turn  was  acquired  by  Ring  Alliance  Ringbuchtechnik  GmbH,  the 
Complainant in this review. 

(86)  Since then the activity has been restructured in order to better compete worldwide, but 

especially on the core market of the Complainant, i.e. the EU market. 

(87)  The acquisition of Bensons, a well-established trader of RBMs with companies located 
in the Netherlands, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the USA, clearly showed the 
will of the Union industry to enhance its access to the market on a world-wide basis 
and the seriousness of its restructuring efforts. 

(88)  The  efforts  of  the  Complainant  have  been  successful,  at  least  partly,  as  can  be  seen 
from  the  analysis  of  the  economic  situation  of  the  company.  In  the  last  years, 
production, sales volume and market share increased as well as employment. 

EN 

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(89)  The efforts undertaken by the industry in order to improve its situation have however 
been  undermined  given  that  the  effects  of  the  measures  against  unfair  imports  have 
been  diluted  by  absorption  and  circumvention  practices.  As  a  consequence,  despite 
significant  improvement,  the  situation  of  the  industry  remains  fragile,  as  it  is 
evidenced by the development of the financial indicators. 

(90)  Therefore, the industry is still vulnerable to the effects of any increased imports from 
the PRC at low and dumped prices. It is obvious that, should the measures be repealed, 
the  industry  would  again  face  serious  difficulties  which  may  lead  to  its  definitive 
disappearance.  Through  its  restructuring  efforts  the  Union  industry  proved  it  is  a 
viable  industry  which  is  still  in  a  position  to  supply  an  important  share  of  the  EU 
market,  but  it  needs  additional  and  efficient  protection  against  dumped  imports  in 
order to reach a solid and healthy situation. 

(91)  On this basis it is concluded that it would be in the interest of the Union industry to 

maintain the measures for another five year period. 

3. 

Interests of importers 

(92)  Four  unrelated  importers  participated  to  this  investigation  but  only  three  of  them 
provided  a  questionnaire  reply.  However,  they  did  not  import  RBMs  from  PRC 
anymore,  except  for  one  which  imported  only  mechanisms  with  17  and  23  rings 
subject to a minimum import price. While two of them opposed the investigation and 
contested  the  10  year  long  anti-dumping  measures  in  force,  the  third  one  was  rather 
neutral and stated that he was not affected by the current measures. 

(93)  The  importers  mainly  complained  about  the  limited  sources  of  supply  on  the  EU 
market given the magnitude of the anti-dumping measures against imports from PRC 
and given the important market share of the Union industry as well as the fact that it 
also  owns  an  important  distributor  of  RBMs  on  the  EU  market  which  allegedly  has 
some kind of exclusivity for RBM originating in India. 

(94) 

(95) 

In this respect it should be noted that there are currently various sources of supply on 
the  EU  market,  either  from  the  Union  industry,  the  other  Union  producer  or  from 
sources other than the PRC such as Thailand. 

In  addition,  even  though  it  is  true  that  the  level  of  the  current  measures  is  relatively 
high, it should be recalled that measures were increased as a result of an investigation 
that  showed  that  measures  were  absorbed  by  Chinese  exporters.  The  current  level  is 
therefore fully justified. 

(96)  Since  measures  have  been  imposed  and  their  level  increased,  the  imports  from  the 
PRC  have  significantly  dropped  and  only  accounted  for  a  minor  portion  of  the  EU 
market  during  the  RIP.  Importers  have  however  adjusted  to  the  situation  and  have 
changed  sources  of  supply.  Even  if  it  is  acknowledged  that  without  measures  they 
would have a wider source of supply, because importers currently do not import RBM 
originating in the PRC, the maintenance of the measures would not cause any adverse 
effect on the economic situation of those importers. 

(97)  On  this  basis  it  is  concluded  that  maintaining  the  measures  in  place  would  not 

materially affect importers. 

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4. 

Interests of users 

(98)  The only user which replied to the questionnaire provided arguments in favour of the 
extension  of  measures,  arguing  that  the  EU  produced  RBMs  are  of  a  much  better 
quality than those imported in the PRC. 

(99)  Another user made some comments but did not provide any evidence to substantiate 
them.  This  suggests  that,  although  measures  have  been  in  place,  users  were  not 
significantly  affected  by  these  measures.  The  situation  of  users  is  thus  unlikely  to 
deteriorate as a result of the maintenance of anti-dumping measures. 

5. 

Interests of upstream industry 

(100)  Suppliers of steel wire and steel strip sell a negligible percentage of their production to 
the Union industry and, as such, are not affected by  the outcome of  this proceeding. 
None of them made itself known as an interested party. 

6. 

Competition and trade distorting effects 

(101)  With  respect  to  the  effects  of  possible  expiry  of  the  measures  on  competition  in  the 
EU, it should be noted that there are only a few producers of RBM world-wide, which 
are mostly Chinese or controlled by Chinese exporting producers. The disappearance 
of the remaining few producers not controlled by Chinese companies would thus have 
negative effects on competition in the EU. 

7. 

Conclusion on Union interest 

(102)  Taking into account the above factors and considerations, it is concluded that there are 
no compelling reasons against the maintenance of the current anti-dumping measures. 

H. DISCLOSURE AND ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 

(103)  All  parties  were  informed  of  the  essential  facts  and  considerations  on  the  basis  of 
which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. They 
were also granted a period to submit comments and claims subsequent to disclosure. 
Relevant representations submitted were analysed but have not lead to the alteration of 
the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was decided to maintain 
the current anti-dumping measures. 

(104)  It  follows  from  the  above  that,  as  provided  for  by  Article  11(2)  of  the  basic 
Regulation,  the  anti-dumping  measures  applicable  to  imports  of  certain  ring  binder 
mechanisms  originating  in  the  People’s  Republic  of  China,  imposed  by  Regulation 
(EC) No 2074/2004 of 29 November 2004, should be renewed. 

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

1. 

A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of certain ring binder 
mechanisms  currently  falling  within  CN  code  ex  8305  10  00  originating  in  the 
People’s Republic of China.  

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2. 

3. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

For  the  purpose  of  this  Article,  ring  binder  mechanisms  shall  consist  of  two  steel 
sheets  or  wires  with  at  least  four  half-rings  made  of  steel  wire  fixed  on  them  and 
which are kept together by a steel cover. They can  be opened  either by pulling the 
half  rings  or  with  a  small  steel  trigger  mechanism  fixed  to  the  ring  binder 
mechanism.  

The  rate  of  the  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  applicable  to  the  net,  free-at-Union-
frontier price, before duty, shall be as follows: 

(a) 

for mechanisms with 17 and 23 rings (TARIC codes 8305 10 00 11, 8305 10 
00 13, 8305 10 00 19 and 8305 10 00 34), the amount of duty shall be equal to 
the difference between the minimum import price of EUR 325 per 1000 pieces 
and the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty; 

(b) 

for mechanisms other than those with 17 or 23 rings (TARIC codes 8305 10 00 
21, 8305 10 00 23, 8305 10 00 29 and 8305 10 00 35 ) 

Rate of duty 

TARIC 
code 

additional 

People’s Republic of 
China: 

–  World  Wide 
Mfg, 
Stationery 
Hong 
Kong, 
People’s Republic of 
China 

51.2% 

8934 

– 
all 
companies 

other 

78.8% 

8900 

Article 2 

A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of certain ring binder 
mechanisms  currently  falling  within  CN  code  ex  8305  10  00  consigned  from 
Vietnam whether declared as originating in Vietnam or not (TARIC codes 8305 10 
00 11 and 8305 10 00 21);  

A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of certain ring binder 
mechanisms currently falling within CN code ex 8305 10 00 consigned from the Lao 
People's  Democratic  Republic  whether  declared  as  originating  in  the  Lao  People's 
Democratic Republic or not (TARIC codes 8305 10 00 13 and 8305 10 00 23). 

For  the  purpose  of  this  Article,  ring-binder  mechanisms  shall  consist  of  two 
rectangular steel sheets or wires with at least four half-rings made of steel wire fixed 
on  it  and  which  are  kept  together  by  a  steel  cover.  They  can  be  opened  either  by 
pulling the half-rings or with a small steel-made trigger mechanism fixed to the ring-
binder mechanism. 

EN 

23 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
4. 

The  rate  of  the  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  applicable  to  the  net,  free-at-Union-
frontier price, before duty, shall be as follows: 

(a) 

for mechanisms with 17 and 23 rings (TARIC codes 8305 10 00 21, and 8305 
10  00  23),  the  amount  of  duty  shall  be  equal  to  the  difference  between  the 
minimum import price of EUR 325 per 1000 pieces and the net, free-at-Union-
frontier price, before duty; 

(b) 

for mechanisms other than those with 17 or 23 rings (TARIC codes 8305 10 00 
11, and 8305 10 00 13) the amount of duty shall be 78,8%. 

Article 3 

Unless  otherwise  specified,  the  provisions  in  force  concerning  customs  duties  shall 
apply. 

Article 4 

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union. 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels 

For the Council 
The President 

EN 

24 

   EN