Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region’ COM(2009) 248 final
Date: 2010-01-20
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: Baltic Sea, anti-discriminatory measure, cooperation policy, energy policy, environmental protection, regional integration, regional policy








C_2010339EN.01002901.xml










14.12.2010   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 339/29





Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region’
COM(2009) 248 final
(2010/C 339/07)
Rapporteur: Mr SMYTH

On 10 June 2009, the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 262 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region

COM(2009) 248 final.
The Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 8 January 2010.
At its 459th plenary session, held on 20 and 21 January 2010 (meeting of 20 January 2010), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 198 votes to 1 with 4 abstentions.
1.   Conclusions
1.1   The EESC supports the aims embodied in the four pillars of the Baltic Sea Strategy, to make the region a prosperous place, a safe and secure place, an environmentally sustainable place and an attractive and accessible place.
1.2   The EESC recognises the comprehensive consultation process that preceded the finalisation of the Strategy and the role played in the process by the social partners and stakeholders. The EESC re-states its call for the establishment of a Baltic Sea Civil Society Forum that would help to embed civil society in the evolution of the Strategy.
1.3   The Strategy has laudable aims and objectives in tackling a set of complex structural issues in the Baltic but it nonetheless faces a number of challenges that have to be overcome for it to prove effective. These challenges relate to its value adding potential, the governance arrangements, the cohesion of the EU and the external effectiveness of the Strategy.
1.4   The governance arrangements for the Baltic Sea Strategy are also the subject of some critical comment. The Strategy encompasses the remit of 21 Directorates General as well as 8 Member States plus Russia. When these are combined with the 4 pillars, 15 priority actions and numerous horizontal actions, there are complex governance structures at the heart of the Strategy which might make it unworkable. The EESC believes that greater effort should be made to simplify the governance and administration arrangements for the Strategy.
1.5   This opinion re-iterates the proposal to establish within the EESC an ad hoc Baltic Sea Region observatory or study group so that the entire EESC can participate effectively in the inevitable development and evolution of the Strategy.
1.6   One of the main challenges for the Strategy is the external dimension especially because of the key role that Russia plays in the Baltic Sea area. Russia’s role in the implementation of the Strategy is to be handled by the Northern Dimension arrangements. There is uncertainty about whether these arrangements are sufficient to ensure Russia’s effective participation in the strategic actions.
1.7   The EESC endorses the view that the Strategy is not only a document: above all it is a process. This means that the Strategy is implemented over time. It has already been successful in bringing all the Member States and the stakeholders, together with the EU Institutions, to agree on a limited list of key actions and projects and to agree on the need to implement them. The EESC hopes that the enthusiasm which was engendered during the preparation of the Strategy will continue and contribute to an effective and timely implementation that can be revised during implementation.
2.   Background to the Strategy
2.1   The origins of the Baltic Sea Strategy are well established. It has long been recognised that the Baltic Sea region has suffered from a range of severe environmental, economic development and infrastructural weaknesses that are interrelated and interdependent. In November 2006, the European Parliament adopted a resolution to draw up a Baltic Sea Strategy. This Strategy for the designated Baltic Sea macro-region was adopted by the Commission on 10 June 2009 and was submitted to the European Council on 19 June 2009. It was a high priority for the Swedish Presidency and was adopted by the General Affairs Council on 26 October 2009 in Luxembourg.
2.2   The comprehensive Strategy marks a new departure in European Union territorial cooperation policy. The Commission’s view is that the Strategy is the first truly integrated approach to be adopted for Member States facing the same set of challenges. There are currently thirteen areas for transnational cooperation, which together cover all areas of the EU (in addition there are some fifty cross-border cooperation schemes). The Baltic Sea Strategy embodies the relatively novel concept of macro-regional cooperation, that is, the more effective coordination and use of financial resources and prevailing cooperation initiatives across the Baltic region. In terms of its geographical spread, the Strategy embraces EU Member States - Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - together with Norway and Russia.
2.3   This opinion sets out to assess the proposed Baltic Sea Strategy and its Action Plan from the perspective of organised civil society. The opinion builds upon the analysis set out in the recently adopted EESC opinions ‘Baltic Sea Region: the role of organised civil society in improving regional cooperation and identifying a regional strategy’ (1) and ‘Macro-regional cooperation: Rolling out the Baltic Sea Strategy to other macro-regions in Europe’ (2). The process that led to the development of the Strategy is unprecedented. The Commission's view is that if the Baltic Sea Strategy is valid and workable in the Baltic, a similar approach may be applicable to other macro-regions such as the Danube Region, the Alpine region and the Mediterranean.
3.   Strategy in Outline
3.1   The Commission undertook a comprehensive set of consultations throughout 2008. These consultative conferences were spread geographically across the macro-region and culminated in February 2009 in Rostock. They were themed around the four pillars upon which the Baltic Sea Strategy is built to make the Baltic Sea Region






—


an environmentally sustainable place;










—


a prosperous place;










—


an accessible and attractive place;










—


a safe and secure place.




3.2   The Strategy is accompanied by an Action Plan which comprises 15 priority areas across the four pillars. Each priority area is to be coordinated by at least one Baltic Member State and they are expected to work on its implementation together with all relevant stakeholders.
3.3   The Baltic Sea Strategy and its proposed actions are to be funded from existing resources primarily the Structural funds (EUR 55 billion between 2007-13), funding from each Baltic Sea state, private financing as well as funding from financial institutions such as the EIB, NIB and the EBRD.
3.4   There are significant differences to be found between the European Parliament resolution and the Commission communication (3)
 (4). The Commission takes an internal EU perspective of the Council whereas the Parliament resolution refers to a ‘Baltic Sea Strategy for the Northern Dimension’. The Parliament resolution calls on the Commission to present a proposal for a Strategy ‘in order to reinforce the internal pillar of the Northern Dimension’ (5). The Parliament clearly links the Baltic Sea Strategy to the Northern Dimension framework, whereas the Council and the Commission make a distinction between the Strategy and the external aspects of cooperation.
3.5   There are important differences of view regarding the appropriate governance structure. The Commission’s strategy centres upon the coordination of existing initiatives, continuously reviewing progress and maintaining momentum of the Action Plan. The Commission’s approach is to keep institutional mechanisms to a minimum with no additional funding for the Baltic Sea Strategy. The Parliament proposes to hold an annual Baltic Sea summit before the summer European Council and to expand regional organisational bodies inside and outside the EU system, in part by proposing an own budget line for the Strategy. The EESC has already voiced its support for a separate budget for the Strategy. It would appear that the Parliament wishes to see a more ambitious policy development than the Commission. As if to underline the evolving nature of the Strategy, on 22 October 2009, the Parliament adopted an amendment of EUR 20 million to the 2010 Budget for the coordination and for some pilot projects of the Strategy.
3.6   Aside from these differences of approach, the Strategy itself emerged from a comprehensive set of consultations of stakeholders in the macro-region. The Strategy is innovative as it will operate on a transnational governance structure and hence it goes beyond the scope of traditional EU regional policies. This new governance structure sits between the nation state and the supranational community.
3.7   The concept of the Baltic Sea Strategy is described by the Commission as ‘a work in progress’. Defining individual aspects of the Baltic Sea Region is necessarily imprecise because the geographies change depending on the question being addressed. The approach taken in designing the Baltic Sea Strategy is to start by defining the problems and issues and letting these define the geography of the macro-region. By any objective measure, the four pillars of the Strategy and the ensuing Action Plan represent a serious attempt to produce a better coordinated development framework for such a diverse area as the Baltic Sea region and thus to try to promote territorial cohesion. Table 1 below sets out the priority areas of the Action Plan under each of the pillars of the Strategy.
3.8   Implicit in the Commission’s thinking is that an integrated approach is necessary to ensure sustainable development in the region. The issues addressed in the Strategy are complex and interrelated while existing cooperation schemes have not been effectively coordinated.
4.   Challenges and Key Questions
4.1   There is a great deal at stake on the successful implementation of the Baltic Sea Strategy. The Commission has stated on a number of occasions that the Strategy could become a template for other macro-regions in the EU. The Strategy has laudable aims and objectives in tackling a set of such complex structural issues in the Baltic but it nonetheless faces a number of challenges that have to be overcome for it to prove effective. These challenges relate to its value-adding potential, the governance arrangements, the cohesion of the EU and the external effectiveness of the Strategy.
4.2   In terms of adding value, the risk is that the Strategy encompasses a very ambitious set of actions to satisfy the majority of Baltic stakeholders; it may prove to be undeliverable. There is an argument for trying to keep the Strategy more simple and to concentrate efforts on a smaller but strategically vital set of objectives. Progress has been made by HELCOM in its Baltic Sea Action Plan in terms of fish stocks and the general environment. In spite of these improvements, the Baltic Sea Strategy should continue to generate positive improvements in fisheries and the wider environment.
4.3   The governance arrangements for the Baltic Sea Strategy are also the subject of some critical comment. Table 1 illustrates a paradox, namely that those Member States in most need of the Strategy are the least involved in its implementation. In addition the Commission has struggled to balance a complex of actions with a complex of Directorates General and a range of Member States. Experience to date with the implementation of the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities has been relatively slow and the Baltic Sea Strategy is arguably even more complex (6).
4.4   The success of any EU policy such as the Baltic Sea Strategy will be measured in terms of practical results which must be visible and tangible for the citizens. The Strategy also challenges the very notion of Community cohesion. As argued earlier the Commission has ‘upped the ante’ in terms of macro-regional cooperation. Although the severity of the environmental, infrastructure-related and other challenges facing the Baltic are all too familiar to citizens of Baltic Member States it remains a major challenge to explain the seriousness of the situation in the Baltic Sea to the rest of the Union. In this regard the assistance of organised civil society is critical. The EESC has already put forward a proposal to establish a ‘Baltic Sea Civil Society Forum’ and has indicated its readiness to begin preparing the groundwork for such a Forum. In addition the Committee has proposed the formation, within the EESC, of an ad hoc Baltic Sea Region observatory or study group so that the entire EESC can participate effectively in the evolution of the Strategy.
4.5   One of the main challenges for the Strategy is the external dimension; especially because of the key role that Russia plays, it is a key stakeholder in the Baltic Sea (BS) area. Russia has hitherto expressed interest in the Strategy since it would benefit from its successful implementation. At present Russia’s role in the Strategy is to be handled by the Northern Dimension arrangements and presumably these are to be aligned with the Strategy. It is worth noting that three out of the four pillars of the Strategy – environmental protection, attractiveness and accessibility, and safety and security – are essentially transnational in character and so there is a case for having some mechanisms within the Strategy for linking the internal and external interactions, especially at an operational level. Furthermore the external dimension of the Strategy could perhaps be even broader in its scope by, for instance, embracing Belarus, which has an impact on environmental protection and the attractiveness and accessibility of the Baltic Sea Region.
4.6   There is a view that it will be more straightforward to secure the involvement of Russia in the implementation of the Strategy through direct bilateral cooperation with the EU on a ‘partnership of equals’ basis with the EU (7). If this view is correct, then it is legitimate to ask whether the Northern Dimension, as currently suggested, is the appropriate mechanism for ensuring Russia’s commitment to the Strategy.
5.   Analysis of the Strategy
5.1   There are a number of points of contention in the Strategy which need to be monitored closely. Firstly, the Action Plan contains specific proposals to correct deficiencies in energy networks and connectivity in the Baltic Sea Region. There are some concerns that these may not be sufficient given the urgency of the need to achieve greater network integration. The Strategy should not just seek to integrate and link up the currently separate national energy markets of the BS area but should work towards EU-wide solidarity for energy. The EU needs Russian energy and therefore needs to build the infrastructure to bring gas, oil and electricity into Europe. This is necessary to guarantee the stability of supply of energy to Europe. Greater cooperation on energy is also needed from non-Member States. The Nordstream project is not dealt with in the Strategy. While this is an obvious omission, the Commission point out that the Nordstream project is a very divisive issue and that the Baltic Sea Region Strategy required unanimity to be adopted.
5.2   The Action Plan sets out proposals to improve internal and external sea, road and rail transport links. The Road infrastructure needs serious attention because it is either seriously deficient or missing altogether. What used to be the periphery of the Soviet Union could then become much more an integrated part of the European heartland. The Baltic Sea region is in urgent need of a commensurate full network of road infrastructure. The current TEN corridors need to be reviewed and adapted to the new reality of a more cohesive Union, for example the train and road corridors from Helsinki to Vienna/Slovenia.
5.3   There is no mention of the strategic importance of the large rivers in the Baltic macro-region; this deficiency should be addressed. In this context it is interesting to note that a Danube Region Strategy is now in preparation. Consultations on the Baltic Sea Strategy were widespread and extensive but they were organised on something of an ad-hoc basis. For the Danube Region Strategy, the EESC should seek to become involved in a more structured manner. The Commission has indicated that a window of opportunity exists for such an engagement from February to summer 2010. The EESC has already proposed in both REX/262 and ECO/251 the establishment of a Baltic Civil Society Forum and this should now be developed into a practical proposal. This proposal has the support of many MEPs and the Parliament is currently preparing an opinion on the Baltic Sea Region Strategy.
5.4   The complexity of the challenges implied in the Baltic Sea Region Strategy has already been acknowledged. It is understood that the unit in the Commission that is responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the Strategy may become under-resourced in the period ahead. The EESC and the Parliament both support a strengthening of the unit. There is a danger that the unit will be deeply absorbed in the administrative challenges of spending the EUR 20 million voted by the Parliament for partners outside the EU (budget line 4). The EESC emphasises that both the European Commission and the Member States responsible for given actions in the plan need to have at their disposal adequate administrative capacity to fulfil their obligations.
5.5   Concerns were expressed about the relative weight given to the issue of fishing and fisheries. It is acknowledged that much is being done, particularly by HELCOM and the early results are encouraging. It is essential that this progress is maintained and in particular efforts should be raised to stimulate responsible consumption.
5.6   Concerns were expressed about the level of emphasis in the Strategy on science, technology, research and innovation. The EESC is not fully convinced that dispersal of the so called knowledge triangle (education, research and innovation) between two different pillars of the Strategy and between three Member States responsible for coordinating them is the ideal solution. The EESC underlines that the Strategy should strengthen the interaction and the links between different elements of knowledge triangle.
5.7   In terms of Priority Action 6 – the removal of barriers to the internal market in the Baltic Sea Region – the EESC fully supports this part of the Strategy. Particular attention should be paid to SMEs which predominate in the economies of the Baltic Sea region. The EESC also supports the advance of the Decent Work agenda. Greater social dialogue around the Baltic Sea area should be encouraged to capture some of the positive spillover effects resulting from the outworking of collaboration in the Strategy, particularly in terms of enhanced energy cooperation and integration.
5.8   Of particular concern is the ongoing and structural decline in the region of the shipbuilding and related sectors, with its negative impact on economic and social cohesion. The Committee firmly believes that the Baltic Sea Strategy should be extended to address this specific issue.

Brussels, 20 January 2010.


The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Mario SEPI




(1)  OJ C 277, 17.11.2009, p. 42.

(2)  OJ C 318, 23.12.2009, p. 6.

(3)  European Parliament (2006) ‘Resolution on a Baltic Sea Strategy for the Northern Dimension’, Strasbourg, 16 November 2006, A6-0367/2006.

(4)  The Baltic Sea Strategy and Action Plan can be found at:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/baltic/documents_en.htm.

(5)  The Northern Dimension is an arrangement under which the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland can implement policies in agreed areas of cooperation.

(6)  Charter signed on 24 May 2007 under the German Council Presidency during an informal meeting of EU Ministers responsible for Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion. This intergovernmental charter makes two main recommendations, namely to make greater use of an integrated urban development policy and to grant special attention to deprived neighbourhoods.

(7)  See for instance ‘Commitment of the Social Partners and other civil society organisations: What role can civil society and local actors play?’ a presentation by Uno Aldegren, member of the Committee of the Regions at ‘The Baltic Sea Region: The Best Place to Work and Do Business’, a conference organised by the EESC and the European Commission Representation in Finland, Helsinki 22-23 October 2009.


ANNEX
Table 1
Pillars and priority areas of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region







Pillar/priority areas


Coordinating countries


Number of actions





Pillar 1: To make the Baltic Sea an environmentally sustainable place











1)


To reduce nutrient inputs to the sea to acceptable levels






Poland/Finland


5










2)


To preserve natural zones and biodiversity, including fisheries






Germany


2










3)


To reduce the use and impact of hazardous substances






Sweden


3










4)


To become a model region for clean shipping






Denmark


2










5)


To mitigate and adapt to climate change






Denmark


3





Pillar II: To make the Baltic Sea region prosperous place











6)


To remove hindrances to the internal market in the Baltic Sea






Estonia


6










7)


To exploit the full potential of the region in research and innovation






Sweden/Poland


2










8)


Implementing the Small Business Act: to promote entrepreneurship, strengthen SMEs and increase the efficient use of human resources






Denmark


9










9)


To reinforce sustainability of agriculture, forestry and fisheries






Finland


7





Pillar III: to make the Baltic Sea region an accessible and attractive place











10)


To improve the access to, and efficiency and security of the energy markets






Latvia/Denmark


3










11)


To improve internal and external transport links






Lithuania/Sweden


 










12)


To maintain and reinforce attractiveness of the Baltic Sea region in particular through education, tourism and health






Tourism: Germany
(Mecklenburg -Vorpommern)
Health: Northern Dimension
Partnership on Public Health
Education: Germany


10





Pillar IV: To make the Baltic region a safe and secure place











13)


To become a leading region in maritime safety and security






Finland/Denmark


 










14)


To reinforce protection from major emergencies at sea and on land






Denmark


2










15)


To decrease the volume of, and harm done by, cross border crime






Finland


3





Horizontal Actions



European Commission


10





Source: Adapted from R. Bengtsson ‘An EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region’