Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 682/2007 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand
Date: 2009-08-19
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Thailand, anti-dumping duty, import, maize, originating product, preserved product

EN 

EN 

   EN 

 
 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 19.8.2009 
COM(2009) 430 final 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

amending Regulation (EC) No 682/2007 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand  

EN 

   EN 

 
 
 
  
 
 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

Grounds for and objectives of the proposal 

This  proposal  concerns  the  application  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of 
22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of 
the European Community, as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2117/2005 of 
21  December  2005  (‘the  basic  Regulation’)  in  the  proceeding  concerning  imports  of 
certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand. 

General context 

This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation and 
is  the  result  of  an  investigation  which  was  carried  out  in  line  with  the  substantive  and 
procedural requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. 

Existing provisions in the area of the proposal 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  682/2007  imposing  definitive  anti-dumping  duties  on 
imports  of  certain  prepared  or  preserved  sweetcorn  in  kernels  originating  in  Thailand. 
Regulation (EC) No 954/2008 amended Regulation (EC) No 682/2007 with regard to the 
duty imposed on one company and on 'all other companies'. 

Commission  Decision  (2007/424/EC)  accepting  undertakings  offered  by  two  Thai 
producers. 

Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union 

Not applicable. 

CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Consultation of interested parties 

Interested parties concerned by the proceeding have had the possibility to defend their 
interests during the investigation, in line with the provisions of the basic Regulation. 

Collection and use of expertise 

There was no need for external expertise. 

Impact assessment 

This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation. 

The  basic  Regulation  does  not  foresee  a  general  impact  assessment  but  contains  an 
exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed. 

LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL 

Summary of the proposed action 

On 16 September 2008, the Commission initiated a partial interim review of the anti-
dumping  measures  in  force  in  respect  of  imports  of  certain  prepared  or  preserved 

EN 

2 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand. The review was limited in scope to the 
examination  of  the  form  of  the  measure  and  in  particular  to  the  examination  of  the 
acceptability and workability of undertakings offered by certain exporting producers 
in Thailand. 

The  attached  proposal  to  amend  Regulation  (EC)  No  682/2007  is  based  on  the 
definitive findings which revealed that price undertakings are not an appropriate form 
of the measures. 

It  is  therefore  proposed  that  the  Council  adopts  the  attached  proposal  for  a 
Regulation which should be published in the Official Journal of the European Union 
by 15 December 2009 at the latest. 

Legal basis 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against 
dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Community,  as  last 
amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2117/2005 of 21 December 2005.  

Subsidiarity principle 

The  proposal  falls  under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Community.  The 
subsidiarity principle therefore does not apply. 

Proportionality principle 

The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons. 

The form of action is described in the above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves 
no scope for national decision. 

Indication of how financial and administrative burden falling upon the Community, 
national governments, regional and local authorities, economic operators and citizens 
is minimized and proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable. 

Choice of instruments 

Proposed instruments: Regulation. 

Other means would not be adequate because the basic Regulation does not provide 
for alternative options. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATION 

The proposal has no implication for the Community budget. 

EN 

3 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

amending Regulation (EC) No 682/2007 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand  

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 

Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community1 (‘the basic 
Regulation’) and in particular Articles 8 and 11(3) thereof, 

Having  regard  to  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  Commission  after  consulting  the  Advisory 
Committee, 

Whereas: 

1.  Measures in force  

A. 

PROCEDURE 

(1) 

(2) 

Following  an  investigation  (the  'original  investigation'),  the  Council,  by  Regulation 
(EC) No 682/20072 (‘the original Regulation’), imposed definitive anti-dumping duties 
on  imports  of  certain  prepared  or  preserved  sweetcorn  in  kernels  falling  within  CN 
codes  ex  2001  90  30  and  ex  2005  80  00  and  originating  in  Thailand.  The  measures 
took  the  form  of  an  ad  valorem  duty.  Regulation  (EC)  No  954/20083  amended 
Regulation (EC) No 682/2007 with regard to the rate of duty imposed on one company 
and  on  'all  other  companies'.  The  duty  rates  thus  range  between  3,1  %  and  14,3%. 
Imports  from  two  Thai  exporting  producers,  namely  Malee  Sampran  Public  Co  Ltd 
(Malee)  and  Sun  Sweet  Co  Ltd  (Sun  Sweet)  from  whom  undertakings  had  been 
accepted  by  Commission  Decision  2007/424/EC4  and  which  fulfilled  the  conditions 
set out in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 682/2007, were exempted from the duty.  

2.  Grounds for a review  

At  the  time  of  imposition  of  definitive  measures,  the  Council  exceptionally  allowed 
cooperating  exporting  producers  who  were  not  able  to  submit  a  sufficiently 
substantiated  undertaking  offer  within  the  deadline  set  in  Article  8(2)  of  the  basic 
Regulation to complete their offer within 10 calendar days from entry into force of the 
definitive  Regulation  (EC)  No  682/2007.  Ten  further  undertaking  offers  were 
completed within this deadline. The two undertaking offers accepted as well as those 
ten further offers include fixed minimum import prices. 

1 
2 
3 
4 

OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1.  
OJ L 159, 20.6.2007, p. 14.  
OJ L 260, 30.9.2008, p.1 
OJ L 159, 20.6.2007, p. 42. 

EN 

4 

   EN 

 
 
                                                 
(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

Upon  disclosure  of  the  ten  further  offers,  the  Community  industry  opposed  the 
acceptance of price undertakings by stating that fixed minimum import prices were no 
longer  an  effective  form  of  the  measure  because  of  increasing  prices  of  the  product 
concerned  (as  defined  in  recital  (16)  below)  as  well  as  of  its  main  raw  material  and 
inputs. 

In order to reassess the appropriateness of undertakings as an effective form of anti-
dumping measures, the Commission deemed it necessary to reassess the acceptability 
and workability of the undertakings offered and of those accepted. 

3. 

Investigation  

Having determined, after consulting the Advisory Committee, that sufficient evidence 
existed for the initiation of a partial interim review, the Commission announced on 16 
September  2008,  by  a  notice  of  initiation  published  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the 
European Union5, the initiation of a partial interim review in accordance with Article 
11(3) of the basic Regulation. 

The  review  was  limited  in  scope  to  the  examination  of  the  form  of  the  measure 
applicable  to  the  two  Thai  exporting  producers  from  whom  undertakings  had  been 
accepted and the ten Thai exporting producers with pending undertaking offers. 

The Commission officially advised the exporting producers, the representatives of the 
exporting  country  and  the  Community  producers  and  their  association  as  well  as 
importers of the initiation of the partial interim review. Interested parties were given 
the opportunity to make their views known in writing and to request a hearing within 
the time limit set in the notice of initiation. 

In  order  to  obtain  the  information  deemed  necessary  for  the  investigation,  the 
Commission sent questionnaires to the twelve exporting producers concerned as well 
as  to  the  Community  producers.  The  Community  producers  and  seven  out  of  the 
twelve Thai companies replied to the questionnaire.  

Five Thai companies with pending undertaking offers did not reply at all to this review 
questionnaire and were considered as not cooperating within the meaning of Article 18 
of  the  basic  Regulation.  The  information  submitted  by  one  Thai  company  had  to  be 
disregarded due to incompleteness of the confidential questionnaire reply. In addition, 
this  company  did  not  provide  a  meaningful  non-confidential  version  of  the 
questionnaire  reply.  The  company  argued  that  due  to  significant  structural  changes 
within the company including a name change it was difficult to react efficiently to the 
questionnaire.  Another  Thai  company  also  refused  to  provide  a  meaningful  non-
confidential  version  of  the  questionnaire  reply.  The  companies  concerned  were 
informed  about  the  proposed  application  of  Article  18  of  the  basic  Regulation  and 
were  given  the  opportunity  to  comment.  The  latter  company  claimed  that  it  was 
impossible  for  them  to  furnish  a  meaningful  non-confidential  reply  of  their  data 
submitted due to the sensitivity of the information contained. It is noted that whereas 
this argument is acceptable for parts of the questionnaire dealing with the companies' 
costs and prices, this argument cannot be accepted for other parts of the questionnaire 
such  as  operating  statistics,  general  information  etc.  The  first  company  submitted 
further  confidential  information.  However, even  considering  that  the  company  might 
be in a phase of restructuring, basic information has to be given in order to allow for 

5 

OJ C 237, 16.9.2008, p. 18. 

EN 

5 

   EN 

 
                                                 
an  assessment  of  the  situation  of  the  company.  Despite  the  additional  information 
submitted at a later stage, this minimum requirement was not met, given that no details 
about  certain  cost  items  were  given.  Moreover,  no  meaningful  non-confidential 
version of the reply was provided. 

(10) 

It  was  thus  considered  that  no  decisive  arguments  were  submitted  to  reverse  the 
decision to apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation. 

(11)  All other producing companies cooperated by replying to the questionnaire.  

(12)  Several  other  interested  parties  submitted  comments.  One  importer  stated  that  the 
imposition  of  measures  was  not  justified  due  to  the  absence  of  dumping  during  the 
original  IP  (as  defined  below  in  recital  (17))  and  should  therefore  be  withdrawn.  In 
this regard it should be recalled that the original investigation established that injurious 
dumping  was  taking  place.  Moreover,  this  review  focuses  on  the  appropriateness  of 
undertakings as an effective form of anti-dumping measures, and any claims regarding 
the findings of the original investigation other than the form of the measures cannot be 
taken  into  account.  The  comment  therefore  had  to  be  rejected.  Another  importer 
submitted  a  formal  request  for  suspension  of  the  measures.  This  request  is  being 
assessed outside the current review investigation. 

(13)  Verification visits were carried out at the premises of the following companies: 

(14) 

(a) 

Exporting producers in Thailand 

– 

Lampang Food Products Co., Ltd., Bangkok, 

–  Malee Sampran Public Co., Ltd., Bangkok,  

– 

– 

River Kwai International Food Industry Co., Ltd., Bangkok, and 

Sun Sweet Co., Ltd., Chingmai; 

(b)  Community Producers  

– 

– 

Bonduelle Conserve International, Lille-Villeneuve d'Ascq, France 

Conserve Italia SCA, San Lazzaro di Savena, Italy. 

(15)  The  investigation  covered  the  period  from  01  July  2007  to  30  June  2008  (‘review 

investigation period’ or ‘RIP’).  

4. 

Product concerned 

(16)  The product concerned is sweetcorn (Zea mays var. saccharata) in kernels, prepared 
or preserved by vinegar or acetic acid, not frozen, currently falling within CN code ex 
2001  90  30,  and  sweetcorn  (Zea  mays  var.  saccharata)  in  kernels,  prepared  or 
preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, not frozen, other than products of 
heading  2006,  currently  falling  within  CN  code  ex  2005  80  00,  originating  in 
Thailand. 

1. Evolution of sales prices of the product concerned  

C. 

FINDINGS 

(17)  As a first step, the price developments of the product concerned were examined for the 
period beginning with the original investigation period, i.e. from 01 January 2005 to 
31 December 2005 ('original IP') and ending with the RIP. Data for the remainder of 
2008 was looked at to cross-check conclusions.  

EN 

6 

   EN 

 
(18)  The analysis showed a clear upward trend of import prices of the product concerned 
from Thailand since the original IP, in particular since the end of 2006. Despite a price 
decrease  during  the  RIP,  prices  remain  significantly  above  the  price  level  of  the 
original IP. Data available for 2008 point to yet another increase. 

Table 1: Import prices for imports from Thailand into the EU by quarter 

Index, 
Q1/2005 = 100 
Original IP 
Index 

2006 
Index 

2007 
Index 

RIP 
Index 

2008 
Index 

Q1 

656 
100 

719 
110 

830 
127 

814 
124 

763 
116 

Q2 

669 
102 

705 
107 

798 
122 

773 
118 

740 
113 

Q3 

723 
110 

715 
109 

814 
124 

763 
116 

768 
117 

Q4 

699 
107 

747 
114 

773 
118 

740 
113 

811 
124 

Source: Eurostat 

(19)  The overall evolution of the average import prices of the product concerned reported 
by Eurostat was corroborated by the analysis of the verified sales prices to the EU of a 
representative can size (12 oz) by the Thai companies. Indeed, as shown in the table 
below, the same trend as in Eurostat could be observed for this can size. 

(20)  Furthermore,  an  analysis  of  the  Thai  prices  for  the  representative  can  size, 
demonstrated an even higher price fluctuation since the original IP. Sales prices varied 
by more than 30% in the period between the first quarter of 2005 and the last quarter 
of the RIP. Data available for the second half of 2008 confirm this evolution. 

Table 2: Thai sales prices to the EU (Euro/t - can size12 oz – indexed) 

Index,  
Q1/2005 = 100 
Original IP 

2006 
2007 
RIP  
2008 

Q1 

100 

118 
129 
123 
109 

Q2 

105 

119 
133 
116 
112 

Q3 

106 

118 
123 
109 
121 

Source: Investigation 

Q4 

115 

123 
116 
112 
122 

(21) 

In view of the significant price variation of the product concerned since the original IP 
it has to be concluded that price undertakings with fixed minimum import prices are 
no longer suitable. 

2. Possible indexation of the minimum import prices  

(22)  Although  the  pending  undertaking  offers  and  the  accepted  undertaking  offers 
exclusively  contain  fixed  minimum  prices,  it  was  also  examined  whether  the  two 
undertakings  in  force  and  the  ten  pending  undertaking  offers  could  exceptionally  be 
maintained,  or  respectively  accepted,  through  an  indexation  of  the  minimum  import 
prices. 

EN 

7 

   EN 

 
(23) 

It  therefore  had  to  be  established  whether  there  is  a  correlation  between  the  price 
evolution of the sales prices of the product concerned and the purchase prices of the 
main raw material/inputs used in the production process and, should that be the case, 
whether  they  represent  a  significant  part  of  the  total  cost  of  production  and  whether 
there is publicly available price information for those components. 

(24)  The two main components are sweetcorn and cans, representing each between 30 and 

40% of the cost of production of the product concerned. 

a) Indexation on the evolution of purchase prices of sweetcorn  

(25)  As can be seen from the table below, average purchase prices of sweetcorn in Thailand 
and in the EU increased significantly compared to the original IP. Prices at the end of 
the  RIP  were  significantly  higher  than  during  the  original  IP.  Data  available  for  the 
second half of 2008 confirm the price increase. 

(26) 

It  is  also  evident  that,  other  than  in  the  EU,  purchase  prices  in  Thailand  show  an 
increasing  volatility  within  a  given  year,  in  particular  since  the  end  of  2006.  The 
difference between the lowest and the highest price in Thailand varied by almost 40% 
in the period between the original IP and the RIP. Data available for end of 2008 point 
to an even higher volatility. 

Table 3: Purchase prices of sweetcorn by quarter in EURO (indexed)  

  Index, 
  Q1/2005 = 100

Original IP (2005)

2006

2007

RIP

2008

Q1

100
100

121
99

138
114

125
114

130
160

Q2

100
100

116
99

124
114

132
114

117
160

Q3

101
100

118
99

125
114

130
160

127
160

Q4

117
100

132
99

132
114

117
160

161
160

Thailand
EU

Thailand
EU

Thailand
EU

Thailand
EU

Thailand
EU

Source: Investigation 

(27)  Even though it was found that both, sales prices of the product concerned as well as 
purchase prices of sweetcorn showed an increasing volatility since the original IP, no 
consistent  and  stable  correlation  between  both  prices  could  be  established.  Although 
between the beginning of 2005 and the end of 2006, it could be argued that the price 
evolution  of  sweetcorn  is  somewhat  reflected  in  the  price  evolution  of  the  product 
concerned, this is no longer the case since 2007. Indeed, purchase prices of sweetcorn 
decrease while sales prices of the product concerned increase and vice versa.  

Table 4: Correlation between sales prices of the product concerned and purchase prices of sweetcorn  

EN 

8 

   EN 

 
 
160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Sales prices product concerned vs purchase prices sw eet corn in Thailand 
indexed, Q1 2005 = 100  

Purchase
prices
sw eet corn
TH (in Euro)

Sales prices
canned
sw eet corn
(TH EXW in
Euro)

1
Q
-
5
0
0
2

2
Q
-
5
0
0
2

3
Q
-
5
0
0
2

4
Q
-
5
0
0
2

1
Q
-
6
0
0
2

2
Q
-
6
0
0
2

3
Q
-
6
0
0
2

4
Q
-
6
0
0
2

1
Q
-
7
0
0
2

2
Q
-
7
0
0
2

3
Q
-
7
0
0
2

4
Q
-
7
0
0
2

1
Q
-
8
0
0
2

2
Q
-
8
0
0
2

3
Q
-
8
0
0
2

4
Q
-
8
0
0
2

(28)  Moreover, the analysis showed that there is no homogeneity in evolution of sweetcorn 
prices  world-wide.  As  can  be  seen  in  table  3  above,  prices  in  Thailand  and  in  the 
Community evolve differently.  

(29)  Due to the absence of a correlation between sales prices of the product concerned and 
purchase prices of sweetcorn as well as in light of the divergent evolution of sweetcorn 
prices  in  Thailand  and  in  the  Community,  it  is  evident  that  an  indexation  of  the 
minimum import price on the price of sweetcorn is not feasible. 

(30)  Moreover,  and  of  equal  importance  is  that  that  there  is  no  publicly  available 
information  on  prices  of  sweetcorn.  The  above  data  could  only  be  obtained  in  the 
framework  of  a  review.  An  indexation  of  the  minimum  price  would  therefore  be 
impossible, even if a correlation had been established. 

b) Indexation on the evolution of purchase prices of cans 

(31)  The cost of cans, the other main input, represents a part of the total cost of production 
that is not significant enough to permit an indexation on can prices alone. In any case, 
the  investigation  has  shown  that  can  prices  remained  stable  between  the  original  IP 
and  the  review  IP,  i.e.  no  correlation  whatsoever  with  the  prices  of  the  product 
concerned  could  be  established.  It  is  therefore  noted  that  main  pre-conditions  for 
indexation, as outlined in recital 23, are not met. The possibility to index the minimum 
import  prices  to  the  evolution  of  the  prices  for  cans  was  therefore  not  considered 
further. 

(32) 

In  view  of  all  the  elements  listed  above,  the  investigation  therefore  confirmed  that 
there  is  no  possibility  to  index  the  minimum  import  prices  in  order  to  address  the 
fluctuating prices of the product concerned. 

3. Individual reasons not to accept pending undertaking offers  

(33)  Five  out  of  the  ten  companies  with  pending  undertaking  offers  did  not  reply  to  the 
questionnaire  and  have  therefore  been  considered  as  non-cooperating  in  accordance 
with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. For reasons of general policy, non-cooperation 
should  not  be  rewarded  and  thus  the  pending  undertaking  offers  of  those  companies 
cannot be accepted. 

EN 

9 

   EN 

 
 
(34) 

It was also found that another company absorbed the anti-dumping duties, at least with 
regard to certain transactions. Such practice negatively affects the relationship of trust 
which forms the basis for acceptance of price undertakings. The undertaking offer of 
this company is therefore not acceptable. 

(35)  Another company established a related company outside Thailand which produces the 
product concerned. The company offered to include this subsidiary in the undertaking 
offer.  However,  the  existence  of  such  a  subsidiary  constitutes  a  high  risk  of  cross-
compensation. The undertaking offer of this company therefore also has to be rejected.  

(36)  Another  company  ceased  production  of  the  product  concerned  and  leased  the 
production facilities to a newly established related company. The undertaking offer of 
this company therefore also has to be rejected. 

4. Individual reasons for withdrawal of an undertaking  

(37)  The verification at the premises of one of the companies with an existing undertaking 
revealed a number of breaches as detailed in Commission Decision [INSERT].  

D. 

CONCLUSIONS 

(38)  On  the  basis  of  the  above  facts  and  considerations  it  is  considered  that  price 
undertakings  with  fixed  minimum  import  prices  are  no  longer  appropriate  to 
counteract the injurious effect of dumping and that there is no possibility of indexing 
the minimum import prices in order to address the problem. In these circumstances the 
undertaking  offers  should  be  rejected  and  the  accepted  undertakings  should  be 
withdrawn. 

(39)  Moreover, eight out of the ten pending undertaking offers should be rejected due to the 

individual reasons outlined above.  

(40) 

(41) 

In addition, one of the two existing price undertakings should also be withdrawn due 
to non-compliance with the undertaking. 

It  was  therefore  concluded  that  the  review  investigation  limited  to  the  form  of  the 
measure  should  be  terminated,  that  the  undertaking  offers  in  question  should  not  be 
accepted and that the existing undertakings should be withdrawn. 

(42)  All  parties  were  informed  of  the  essential  facts  and  considerations  on  the  basis  of 
which the decision to reject the pending undertaking offers and withdraw the existing 
undertakings was made and were given the opportunity to comment.  

(43)  Some  parties  argued  that  an  undertaking  cannot  be  withdrawn  if  all  clauses  of  the 
undertaking  have  been  respected.  Instead,  the  company  should  be  given  the 
opportunity  to  revise  its  minimum  import  prices  in  accordance  with  the  market 
evolution.  

(44) 

In response to this argument it has to be underlined that the existing undertakings have 
first and foremost to be withdrawn, just like the pending undertaking offers have to be 
rejected, for general reasons of practicability. As outlined above, the review has shown 
that sweetcorn is no longer suitable for a price undertaking, regardless of whether or 
not individual companies complied with the provisions of the undertaking or whether 
they are willing to revise the minimum import prices. In any case, in view of the price 
volatility  established  during  the  review,  a  revision  of  the  minimum  import  prices 
would  only  be  feasible  by  introducing  an  indexation  formula.  But,  the  review  has 
shown that there is no basis for it.  

EN 

10 

   EN 

 
(45)  One company contested that their purchase prices of sweet corn and their sales prices 
of  the  product  concerned  showed  an  increasing  volatility  and  upward  trend  between 
the  original  IP  and  the  RIP  and  claimed  that  the  increase  in  their  sales  prices  of  the 
product  concerned  was  only  caused  by  the  minimum  import  price.  It  was  therefore 
argued that there are no reasons to withdraw the acceptance of their price undertaking.  

(46)  However, data provided by the company do not corroborate the claim. The purchase 
prices  of  sweetcorn  did  show  an  increasing  trend  although  slightly  less  than  the 
average. On the other hand, their sales prices of the product concerned during the RIP 
were  significantly  above  the  relevant  minimum  import  price  and  showed  a  further 
increasing trend in the second half of 2008.  

(47)  Some parties argued further that the rejection of the pending price undertaking offers 
and the withdrawal of the existing price undertakings is not in line with Article 15 of 
the  WTO  Anti-Dumping  Agreement  which  obliges  WTO  members  to  give  regard  to 
the special situation of developing countries. In response to this submission it has to be 
stressed  that  the  Commission  actively  considered,  with  an  open  mind,  all  possible 
options,  including  indexation  of  the  fixed  minimum  import  prices,  in  order  to 
overcome  the  practicability  problems  of  the  undertakings.  Thus,  possibilities  of 
constructive  remedies  have  been  explored  in  this  case.  However,  the  findings  of  the 
investigation as set out in recitals (22)-(32) did not give any leeway in this regard. 

(48)  Other  parties  requested  formal  suspension  of  the  measures  as  a  result  of  the  review 
findings. As already outlined in recital (12), such a request is being assessed outside 
the current review investigation, 

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

1.  Article 1(3) of Regulation (EC) No 682/2007, as last amended by Regulation 
(EC) No 954/2008, shall be deleted. 

2.  Article 1(4) of Regulation (EC) No 682/2007, as last amended by Regulation 
(EC) No 954/2008, shall be renumbered as Article 1(3). 

3.  Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 682/2007, as last amended by Regulation (EC) 
No 954/2008, shall be deleted. 

4.  Articles  3  and  4  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  682/2007,  as  last  amended  by 
Regulation (EC) No 954/2008, shall be renumbered as Articles 2 and 3 respectively. 

5.  Annex  II  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  682/2007,  as  last  amended  by  Regulation 
(EC) No 954/2008, shall be deleted. 

Article 2 

The  partial  interim  review  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  682/2007  as  last  amended  by 
Regulation  (EC)  No  954/2008  is  hereby  terminated  with  the  non-acceptance  of  the 
undertaking offers. 

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union. 

Article 3 

EN 

11 

   EN 

 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Brussels,  

For the Council 
The President 
[…] 

EN 

12 

   EN