Commission staff working document - Accompanying document to the Commission's proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a long-term plan for the anchovy stock in the Bay of Biscay and the fisheries exploiting that stock : impact assessment COM(2009)399 final SEC(2009)1077
Date: 2009-07-29
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: France, Spain, authorised catch, catch of fish, catch quota, common fisheries policy, fishing area, fishing regulations, fishing rights, gulf

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 29.7.2009 
SEC(2009) 1076 final 

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Accompanying document to the 

Commission's proposal for a 

COUNCIL REGULATION 

establishing a long-term plan for the anchovy stock in the Bay of Biscay and the fisheries 

exploiting that stock 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

COM(2009)399 final 
SEC(2009)1077 

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Preface: Changes to the working document following the IA Board's opinion ......................... 4 

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 4 

1.  Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties .................................................... 6 

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

Organisation and Timing ............................................................................................. 6 

Consultation and expertise ........................................................................................... 6 

Dissemination of scientific advice and the results of consultations with stakeholders 8 

2.  Problem Definition............................................................................................................. 8 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

2.4. 

Issue requiring action ................................................................................................... 8 

Underlying driving forces .......................................................................................... 10 

Industry/market management considerations............................................................. 11 

Effect on the sector..................................................................................................... 12 

2.4.1. 

Identification of the sectors affected .......................................................................... 12 

2.4.2.  Fleet characteristics.................................................................................................... 12 

2.4.3.  Evolution of the sector ............................................................................................... 13 

2.4.4.  Situation of the fleets before and after the closure..................................................... 15 

2.4.5.  Legal basis for Community action ............................................................................. 17 

2.4.6.  Necessity and subsidiarity.......................................................................................... 18 

3.  Objectives......................................................................................................................... 18 

3.1. 

3.2. 

General objectives...................................................................................................... 18 

Subsidiary objectives ................................................................................................. 18 

4.  Policy Options .................................................................................................................. 19 

4.1. 

4.2. 

Option 1 - No policy change ...................................................................................... 19 

Option 2 - Long-term plan with three sub-options..................................................... 19 

4.2.1.  Rule A – Harvesting a constant proportion above an escapement Biomass (SSB) 

level ............................................................................................................................ 20 

4.2.2.  Rule B – Harvesting a constant proportion of the Biomass SSB............................... 20 

4.2.3.  Rule C – Harvesting a constant short term risk of 15% for Low R ........................... 20 

4.3. 

Complementary implementation elements for anchovy management ....................... 20 

4.3.1. 

Incorporating autumn survey of juvenile abundance into anchovy stock assessment20 

5.  Analysis of Impacts.......................................................................................................... 21 

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5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

5.4. 

Environmental impacts .............................................................................................. 21 

Socio-economic impacts ............................................................................................ 23 

Impacts on international relations .............................................................................. 26 

Impact summary......................................................................................................... 27 

6.  Comparing the Options .................................................................................................... 29 

6.1. 

Should a long-term plan be implemented?................................................................. 29 

6.2.  Which sub-option of the long-term plan (Option 2) should be retained? .................. 31 

6.3. 

Should an autumn survey of juvenile abundance be incorporated into anchovy stock 
assessment? ................................................................................................................ 34 

7.  Monitoring and Evaluation............................................................................................... 34 

ANNEX 1 – General information about anchovy stock, fishery and fleet .............................. 36 

ANNEX 2 – Harvest Control Rules tested............................................................................... 39 

ANNEX 3 – Summary of scientific and stakeholder advice.................................................... 53 

Glossary.................................................................................................................................... 55 

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PREFACE: CHANGES TO THE WORKING DOCUMENT FOLLOWING THE IA BOARD'S OPINION 

This final version of the Impact Assessment report takes into account the opinion given by the 
Commission's Impact Assessment Board on 4th March, 2009. In particular: 

–  the  scientific  background  of  the  proposal  and  its  repercussions  on  the  problem  definition 

and objectives have been redrafted to make the report more user friendly; 

–  the  use  of  economic  instruments  has  been  moved  to  the  problem  section  and  different 
operational elements and implementation measures, as well as the reasons for choosing the 
Harvest Control Rule based management system have been better explained; 

–  the explanation on how the recommended risk levels of the long-term plan would comply 
with  the  precautionary  approach  has  been  given  and  the  differences  between  the  sub-
options and reasons for selecting the preferred option have been made clearer;  

–  the  information  on  the  anchovy  fleets  and  the  processing  industry  since  the  ban  was 

introduced has been provided and clarity to the discussion of impacts has been added. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The  Impact  Assessment  concerns  a  draft  proposal  that  would  set  long-term  management 
objectives  and  implementing  methods  concerning  a  fishery  for  anchovy  (Engraulis 
encrasicolus) in the Bay of Biscay. This short-lived pelagic species is of great socioeconomic 
importance  for  a  number  of  ports  and  fishermen  on  the  Cantabrian  Coast  of  Spain  and  the 
French Atlantic Coast. 

The scope of the proposal is of medium importance, covering up to 50 million EUR in terms 
of  catch  value.  Approximately  300  vessels  and  some  3000  at-sea  jobs  and  about  16,000 
tonnes  of  fish  catch  for  human  consumption  were  involved  in  fishing  for  anchovy  in  2004 
before  the  fishery  was  closed.  These  figures  illustrate  the  effect  of  the  proposal,  which  is 
intended to deliver stability and sustainability to the fishery. Two fleets operating in the area 
are Spanish purse seiners and French purse seiners and pelagic trawlers.   

The  stock  is  susceptible  to  large  inter-annual  fluctuations  in  abundance  caused  mainly  by 
variations in recruitment, driven by environmental factors. Recruitment of young fish into the 
fishery  has  been  very  low  since  2001.  Recruitment  of  the  2004  year  class  was  particularly 
low, which resulted in a decline of the stock and led to the closure of the fishery in the second 
half of 2005. The fishery has remained closed ever since.  

The  proposal  covers  the  conditions  for  re-opening  the  fishery,  and  its  subsequent 
management, as a function of the size of the stock. It is intended by DG MARE as a further 
step in steering decision-making under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) towards a long-

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term framework that is compatible with international obligations and with the CFP objectives 
themselves. In spring 2009 the fishery is closed following scientific advice that estimates the 
stock's biomass as being below limit values (Blim). Only when the fishery is safe to re-open, 
could a long-term plan be applicable to determine the rates of fishing that can take the stock 
from  recovery  to  maximum  sustainable  yield.  It  is,  however,  important  to  stress  that  the 
proposal assessed in this report does not aim at achieving a high level of biomass but rather at 
finding the best way to manage the risk of the fishery needing to be closed again. 

The  impact  assessment  has  been  preceded  by  thorough  scientific  evaluation  by  relevant 
scientific and Stakeholder Committees.  

Under  the  CFP  several  operational  elements  can  be  considered  in  achieving  a  sustainable 
management of a fishery. These are: 

•  setting a fixed TAC; 

• 

• 

• 

introducing  technical  measures,  including  time/area  closures  to  protect  mature  fish 
(spawners) and/or juvenile fish; 

introducing provisions on capacity and effort to adapt them to catch possibilities; 

incorporating economic instruments, i.e. market measures; 

•  encouraging a better cooperation between interested parties. 

Due to specific needs of this short-lived species and given the fact the fishery has been closed 
for a number of years, putting a management plan in place was selected as the most feasible 
alternative to the current annual decision-making system. Effort control on pelagic species is 
ineffective and therefore a harvest rate based management approach to setting the TAC was 
selected  as  preferable  in  managing  anchovy  to  an  effort  limiting  regime.  Complementary 
measures, like those described above, can be used to further improve the plan but they will 
not  be  discussed  in  this  report.  In  order  to  include  different  components  and  to  take  into 
account  both  technical  and  capacity  issues  in  the  fishery,  two  main  options  and  three 
additional sub-options have been tested: 

•  Option 1 – No policy change; 

•  Option 2 – Long-term plan with 3 alternative sub-options; 

2.1. Rule A - a strategy with relatively higher TAC levels but higher collapse risks; 

2.2. Rule B - a strategy with relatively lower TAC levels and lower collapse risks; 

2.3. Rule C - a strategy being a compromise between options A and B. 

Further analysis indicated that a system based on a TAC set mid-year according to the June 
scientific advice, with a harvest rule establishing the annual TAC level automatically would 
be the preferred management option for the stock. The system would also include provisions 
on a closure when biomass is below a certain threshold. 

Details of consultation processes, options and impacts are provided. 

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Lead DG: DG MARE 

Other involved services: DG ENV 

Agenda planning reference: 2008/MARE/021 

1. 

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

Organisation and Timing 

1.1. 
This impact assessment concerns a proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a long-term 
plan for the stock of anchovy in the Bay of Biscay3 and the fisheries exploiting that stock. Its 
development  is  foreseen  in  Agenda  Planning  (MARE/2008/021)  and  in  the  2008  Annual 
Management  Plan  of  the  Directorate-General  of  Maritime  Affairs  and  Fisheries  under  the 
specific  objective  "Conservation  and  Management  of  Fish  Resources"  (to  propose  and 
negotiate  measures,  including  multi-annual  management  plans,  for  the  conservation  and 
management  of  Community  fish  stocks,  joint  stocks  and  stocks  partly  occurring  in 
international  waters,  with  a  view  to  ensuring  the  exploitation  of  fish  stocks  at  maximum 
sustainable  yield  levels,  taking  into  account  broader  environmental,  economic  and  social 
concerns and making the best use of harvested fish resources, especially by avoiding wasteful 
discard practices). 

The reform of the Common Fisheries Policy set the basis in 2002 for implementing long-term 
plans  rather  than  a  short-term  approach  based  on  openly  negotiable  annual  decisions. 
Management  of  resources  based  on  long-term  plans  is  best  geared  to  ensure  that  the 
exploitation  of  living  aquatic  resources  provides  sustainable  economic,  environmental  and 
social conditions.  
The  adoption  of  a  proposal  concerning  a  management  plan  for  anchovy  is  one  of  the  main 
outputs for 2008 that was planned in respect of the foregoing objective. The adoption of the 
proposal is foreseen in the first quarter of 2009. 
DG  MARE  has  discussed  this  legislative  initiative  with  DG  ENV,  as  the  associated  service 
primarily  concerned.  Much  progress  has  been  achieved  through  these  consultations, 
particularly during the summer/autumn months of 2008. The outcome of these discussions has 
provided  the  essential  elements  for  the  inter-service  dialogue  and  steering  work  under  the 
formal impact assessment procedure reported here. The draft report has been endorsed by the 
group. 

1.2. 

Consultation and expertise  

The Commission has  sought advice for the adoption of management measures  for  the stock 
from relevant scientific organisations. The impact assessment is prepared by DG MARE on 
the  basis  of  scientific  advice  concerning  long-term  management,  including  environmental, 
social  and  economic  analyses  of  the  possible  scenarios.  Consultation  with  stakeholders  has 
taken place with the relevant representative body, namely the South Western Waters Regional 

3 Reference is made to the stock of anchovy distributed in EC waters of ICES Subarea VIII. 

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Advisory Council (SWWRAC)4. This process started in 1999, was then set aside before being 
taken up again in 2007. 

As  early  as  in  1999  the  Commission  requested  the  Scientific,  Technical  and  Economic 
Committee  for  Fisheries  (STECF)  to  produce  an  extended  risk  analysis  for  the  stock  of 
anchovy  taking  into  account  the  scientific  analysis  carried  out  by  ICES5  in  respect  of  this 
stock. STECF's risk analysis showed, under different multi-annual management strategies, the 
consequences on the sustainability of the resource expressed in terms of risk of collapse and 
on  the  total  annual  yield.  The  evaluations  included  a  test  which  looked  at  how  the  fishery 
operates under different factors in order to simulate different responses of the fleet to resource 
availability  and  assess  its  robustness  (for  example,  whether  the  capacity  of  the  fleet  is 
adequate to benefit from, or show resilience to, fluctuations in the recruitment of young fish 
into  the  fishery).  On  that  basis,  the  Commission  sought  to  promote  the  idea  of  a  long-term 
management for the stock among stakeholders. The latter, however, rejected this approach at 
that point in time, preferring to stick to year-to-year management decisions.  

Given  the  poor  situation  of  the  stock,  the  Commission  decided  to  push  for  the  long  term 
approach once again in 2007. In November of that year, DG MARE produced a consultation 
document  setting  out  the  possible  elements  of  a  Commission  proposal.  That  document  was 
then  discussed  with  Member  States,  the  scientific  community  and  SWWRAC.  All 
recommendations that the SWWRAC produced in this framework were thoroughly analyzed 
before  being  incorporated  into  the  Commission's  long-term  management  plan  proposal  for 
anchovy.  

Accordingly, STECF provided the necessary scientific basis for the proposal. Two scientific 
meetings  took  place  in 2008  with  the  aim  to  update  the  advice  on  management  provided  in 
1999.  Assuming  the  stock's  recovery  as  a  work  hypothesis,  they  were  to  evaluate  the 
economic  impact  for  the  fishing  sector  concerned  stemming  from  high  risk-high  yield  and 
low-risk  lower  yield  strategies,  as  well  as  social  impacts.  The  first  meeting  of  the  specific 
working group took place on 14-18 April in Hamburg and reported to STECF Spring plenary 
(Report  STECF/SGBRE-08-016).  Managing  pelagic  species  by  effort  control  is  generally 
considered  ineffective.  A  management  plan  based  on  harvest  rate  approach  to  setting  TAC 
was therefore considered by scientists as an alternative worth pursuing. The group evaluated 
two basic harvest control rules (HCR) and set the basis for an economic evaluation of the two 
management approach scenarios (in terms of the returns of the fisheries to the sector). Given 

4 This body has been established as the main body to provide the Commission with feedback and input regarding 
the implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy in respect of south-western waters fish stocks. The 
SWW  RAC  advises  the  Commission  on  a  consensus  basis  between  the  fisheries  sector  and  the  civil 
society  organisations  that  compose  its  membership.  The  Commission  has  a  permanent  advisory 
committee in place (ACFA, the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture) dealing with cross-
cutting issues. It was not consulted on this plan since the proposal concerns a specific regional issue for 
which SWW RAC is competent. 

5 ICES stands for International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Since 1999 this international organisation 
is  the  main  provider  of  independent  scientific  advice  to  the  Commission  for  the  development  and 
implementation  of  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy.  ICES  collates  the  expertise  of  fisheries  scientists 
mostly working in the national fisheries laboratories of Member States and provides a systematic and 
standardised advice to the European Community and to Member States. 

6STECF/SGBRE-08-01  Working  Group  Report  On  Long-term  Management  of  Bay  of  Biscay  Anchovy 
https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/docs?p_p_id=20&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col
_id=column-1&p_p_col_count=2&_20_struts_action=%2Fdocument_library%2Fview&_20_folderId=40341  

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paucity  of  data  and  shortage  of  time,  the  economic  evaluation  performed  was  considered 
preliminary.  A  second  STECF  group  met  in  San  Sebastian,  Spain  on  2–6  June,  2008.  The 
group carried out further socio-economic evaluation of the management plan7.  

On  its  part,  the  SWWRAC  delivered  its  views  and  recommendations  on  a  management 
approach for anchovy by letter in July 20088, indicating 

•  a  general  support  for  regulating  the  exploitation  rate  of  the  stock  and  putting  a 

management plan based on a harvesting rule in place; 

•  a  preference  for  establishing  such  plan  according  to  the  scenario  which  consists  of 
catching  a  constant  proportion  of  the  stock  spawning  biomass  (Rule  B,  details  in 
Annex 2), with a maximum TAC9 of 33,000 t and an exploitation rate of 0.4. 

The  RAC  also  commented  on  the  possible  measures  to  further  complement  the  plan, 
indicating:  

•  need for strict and rigorous control of the fishery, whereby Member States concerned 
would  implement  a  weekly  catch  reporting  system  to  be  integrated  into  a  control 
programme developed and coordinated by the European Fisheries Control Agency.  
•  scrutiny  reservation  on  the  issue  of  adapting  fishing  effort  to  catch  possibilities  was 
also expressed. The RAC hopes to be involved in drawing up adjustment plans with 
the Member States concerned. 

Moreover, the SWWRAC suggested that it is possible that the anchovy biomass could have 
entered  a  phase  of  natural  decline  owing  not  to  the  effects  of  fishing,  but  rather  to  a 
combination  of  environmental  factors.  They  suggested  that  if  this  assumption  was  to  prove 
true, it would be better to conceptualise management of the fishery under a scenario in which 
high levels of biomass and a high level of recruitment are exceptional events. Such a scenario 
would  necessarily  imply  new  work  for  the  scientists  and  would  certainly  have  direct 
consequences for management of the anchovy fishery.  

1.3. 

Dissemination of scientific advice and the results of consultations with 
stakeholders 

The  scientific  advice  from  ICES10  and  from  STECF11  and  the  recommendations  from  the 
SWWRAC12  are  available  on  the  websites  of  the  respective  committees.  Moreover,  brief 
summaries of STECF and RAC recommendations are given in Annex 3. 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1. 

Issue requiring action 

Since 1999, ICES and STECF have been regularly advising the Commission that restrictions 
in anchovy fishing were needed in light of the precautionary approach. The Council, however, 

7 www.ccr-s.eu/EN/download.asp?../Upload/EN/Agenda/DocsAnnexes/Report_2nd_STECF_Anchovy_Meeting.pdf  
8 http://www.ccr-s.eu/EN/avis.asp?id=17#bottom  
9 Total Allowable Catch. 
10 http://www.ices.dk/committe/acom/comwork/report/2008/2008/ane-bisc.pdf  
11 https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  
12 http://www.ccr-s.eu  

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chose not to follow this scientific  advice and decided on non-restrictive annual TACs. As a 
result the spawning biomass of the stock has gradually decreased, and with it, the ability of 
the resource to renew itself. This process led to the fishery's collapse in 2005, when the lowest 
ever  levels  of  catches  were  recorded.  The  fishery  has  been  closed  ever  since,  which  has 
afforded  the  stock  some  space  to  breathe.  However,  current  levels  are  still  weak  and 
recruitment13  of  individuals  into  the  fishery  is  strongly  dependent  on  environmental 
conditions.  

The  graphs  below  illustrate  a  general  decreasing  trend  in  terms  of  catches,  recruitment, 
spawning stock biomass (SSB) and harvest rate levels for the stock of anchovy in the Bay of 
Biscay: 

Catches in tonnes 

Recruitment in tonnes 

Spawning stock biomass (SSB) in tonnes 

Harvest rates (Catch/SSB) 

13  Recruitment  is  the  process  by  which  fish  enter  the  exploitable  stock  and  become  susceptible  to  fishing 

(age/growth related). 

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Source: ICES - From top left to bottom right posterior median (solid line) and 95% credible intervals (dotted lines) for the recruitment series (in tonnes), the 
spawning stock biomass and the harvest rates (Catch/SSB). The horizontal solid lines in the SSB graph correspond to the biological reference points Blim 
(21,000 tonnes) and Bpa (33,000 tonnes).  

The graphs above illustrate the manner in which short-term management has led the stock to 
minimum  levels  and  imposed  the  closure  of  the  fishery.  They  demonstrate  that  the 
management  based  on  annual  TAC  is  not  adequate  to  conserve  this  short-lived  stock  at 
exploitable levels. Anchovy is a species with a short lifespan and a high natural mortality of 
1.2 (which means that average life expectancy of an anchovy is just 1.2 years). It is therefore 
susceptible to considerable fluctuations. A season of low recruitment will produce a high risk 
of a fall in the stock's spawning biomass to very low levels. This risk can be mitigated, but 
only  if  the  rule  is  to  establish  the  fishing  possibilities  as  a  set  harvesting  proportion  of  the 
stock.  The  rapid  dynamics  of  this  short-lived  stock  impose  well-defined  criteria  to  fix  the 
formula under which the harvest rate can be determined so that the stock is rebuilt to MSY in 
the long-term. 

Latest  surveys  indicate  that  since  2006  recruitment  has  shown  a  slightly  increasing  trend, 
however  in  2007  it  was  still  among  the  lowest  of  the  historical  series  together  with  1989, 
2002, 2005 and 2006. 

2.2. 

Underlying driving forces 

The main long-term drivers of the fisheries management system are the biological limitations 
on the productivity of the stock. Reducing the stock size to a low level can (while maintaining 
high catches for a short period) lower the productive potential of the stock in the longer term 
or  even  cause  the  stock  to  collapse.  In  contrast,  in  short-term  perspectives  it  can  often  be 
economic  and  social  pressures  which  predominate  and  lead  to  decisions  on  fishing 
opportunities that can ultimately become unsustainable.  

The point at which precautionary action must be taken to safeguard a fish stock is defined by 
limit  reference  points.  For  the  stock  of  anchovy  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay  ICES  estimated  two 
important biomass target levels: 

•  The minimum acceptable stock biomass (Blim), was set at 21,000 t. If the biomass falls 
below  this  level,  the  stock  is  in  danger  of  a  reduced  reproductivity  or  even  a  stock 
collapse.  

•  The  precautionary  biomass  level  (Bpa)  set  for  the  stock  at  33,000  t.  This  target  level 

tells us where ideally we would like the stock levels to be. 

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Based  on  the  most  recent  estimates  of  anchovy  biomass  levels  (SSB),  ICES  classifies  the 
stock as being at risk of reduced reproductive capacity. SSB in 2008 was estimated to have a 
23%  probability  of  being  below  safe  target  levels  for  the  stock  (Blim,=21,000  t).  Low 
recruitment since 2002 and almost complete recruitment failure of the 2004 year class are the 
primary causes of the low stock size. The recruitment at age 1 in 2008 was lower than in 2006 
and 2007, and was the second lowest in the time-series. Anchovy is a short-lived species, with 
the fishable stock consisting primarily of one-year-old fish. The estimate of recruitment at age 
1 is, therefore, a key factor in determining a TAC. 

ICES  recommends  that  the  fishery  should  remain  closed  until  the  stock  condition  has 
improved. The stock condition can be re-evaluated when estimates of the 2009 SSB and 2008 
year  class  are  available  based  on  the  spring  2009  acoustic  and  egg  surveys.  This  implies  a 
closure of the fishery until at least June 2009. Once the fishery re-opens, an effective regime 
based on long-term targets and principles of sustainability should be put in place.  

2.3. 

Industry/market management considerations 

In  the  context  of  seeking  ways  to  achieve  improved  management  of  fish  stocks,  the  use  of 
economic  instruments  should  be  considered  as  a  necessary  corollary  of  stock  management. 
Under  some  conditions,  such  instruments  may  actually  become  the  cornerstone  of  the 
management  system  itself.  It  is  recognised  that  economic  instruments  can  increase  the 
efficiency  and  cost-effectiveness  of  environmental  management,  create  incentives  for 
investment and generate financial resources for preserving biodiversity.  

If  well  designed  and  used  within  the  right  policy  and  enforcement  framework,  economic 
instruments such as fiscal instruments and charges, financial assistance or the introduction of 
property rights and liability systems can increase returns to activities that conserve valuable 
biological  diversity  while  discouraging  behaviour  that  is  detrimental  to  species  and 
ecosystems.  

However,  in  this  particular  case,  an  approach  to  managing  what  represents  an  essentially 
fragile  if  not  volatile  fish  stock  based  solely  on  this  kind  of  instrument  would  not  seem 
appropriate.  This  is  a  stock  that  needs  a  robust  management  regarding  its  harvest.  Market 
forces alone,  in  a  context  where  third-country imports are easily available to the processing 
and canning sector, are not guaranteed to provide the economic resilience that the harvesting 
fleets  require.  In  addition,  the  current  scope  of  measures  taken  under  the  CFP  is  limited  in 
terms of the means of intervention available to the EU legislator to have a direct influence of 
the  evolution  of  the  markets  and  the  actual  returns  of  the  fleets,  focusing  instead  on  fleet 
capacity  adjustments  through  medium  term-programmes  with  the  support  of  structural 
funding available in the framework of the European Fisheries Fund (EFF)14 .  

To sum up, the use of economic instruments like fiscal incentives, trade protection measures 
and  others  could  not  by  itself  purport  to  ensure  an  adequate  implementation  of  the  Policy's 
management  principles.  Not  least  due  to  the  sharing  of  responsibilities  between  the 
Community (policy development and general regulatory framework) and the Member States 
(implementation,  enforcement  vis-à-vis  individuals),  the  system  is  not  geared  to  ensure  the 
CFP  objectives  in  respect  of  the  stocks  and  the  fishermen  that  exploit  them  through  these 
instruments  alone.  The  Council  is  required  to  fix  annually  the  fishing  opportunities  for  this 
stock, even if it is as presently, to fix them at zero. TACs and quotas are thus the result of the 

14 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l66004.htm  

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CFP's  core  business  and  cannot  be  dispensed  with  except  where  the  Council  should  take  a 
specific decision not to regulate this fishery. In such conditions, however, the system results 
in no limits to the freedom to fish.  

2.4. 

Effect on the sector 

2.4.1. 

Identification of the sectors affected 

Presently the fishery is closed. Usually two fleets operate on anchovy in the Bay of Biscay: 
Spanish  purse  seiners  and  a  French  fleet  of  both  purse  seiners  and  pelagic  trawlers.  The 
national fleets targeting anchovy are spatially and temporally well separated. The pattern of 
each fishery is considered well established. In general (1992-2004), most of Spanish landings 
(85 %) are usually caught in divisions VIIIc and VIIIb in spring, while 35 % of the French 
landings  are  caught  in  divisions  VIIIb  in  the  first  half  of  the  year  and  65%  in  summer  and 
autumn in division VIIIa.  

Figure 1 - Distribution of anchovy in the Bay of Biscay 

(approximate area of distribution marked in black) 

Spain owns 90% of the fishing rights on anchovy and the remaining 10% belongs to France. 
However, under several bilateral agreements concluded since 1991 between France and Spain, 
part of the Spanish quota has been transferred to France. Because of this and other political 
arrangements  the  actual  catches  of  both  countries  have  been  quite  similar  and  since  the 
beginning  of  the  90’s  the  percentage  of  catches  by  country  has  been  almost  equal  (=  50%)  
(Figure 2)  

2.4.2.  Fleet characteristics 

Spanish purse seine fleet  

The Spanish fleet is composed of purse seiners (about 200 vessels) that operate at the south-
eastern corner of the Bay of Biscay (in Divisions VIIIc and b), mainly in spring, when usually 
more  than  80%  of  the  Spanish  annual  catches  take  place.  This  fleet  is  composed  of  vessels 

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from different Autonomous Communities of the North of Spain (Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria 
and Basque Country). However, most of the anchovy catches made by this fleet (about 90%) 
are  landed  in  Basque  Country  ports  due  to  their  proximity  to  the  anchovy  fishing  grounds. 
The bulk of this fleet switches to tuna fisheries during summer and then uses small anchovies 
as  live  bait.  These  catches  are  not  landed  but  the  observations  collected  from  logbooks  and 
fisherman interviews (up to 1999) indicate that they are supposed to be less than 5 % of the 
total Spanish catches. The Spanish fleet has not been active in subarea VIIIa since 2002.  

French pelagic trawlers 

The French anchovy fishery is mainly conducted by pair trawlers (72 vessels in 2004). The 
fishery  normally  starts  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  in  the  centre  of  the  Bay  of  Biscay. 
Progressively,  the  fishery  moves  south  (generally  in  April).  After  a  voluntary  break  of  the 
pelagic fishery (bilateral agreement) in April and May, the fishery moves back north, and may 
reach  the  northern  part  of  VIIIa  in  August  or  September.  Later,  the  fishery  returns  to  the 
centre of the bay. The major fishing areas are the north of the VIIIb in the first half of the year 
and VIIIa, mainly, during the second half. The French pelagic fleet does not fish in area VIIIc. 

A specific characteristic of this fishery is its variability, meaning that many pelagic trawlers 
can catch a small amount of anchovy at least once a year. Therefore, the number of vessels 
that  fish  anchovy  with  a  pelagic  trawl  can  be  very  variable.  A  threshold  of  50  tons  is  the 
consensus criterion to distinguish vessels that target anchovy from those that enter this fishery 
occasionally on an opportunistic basis. 

French purse seiners 

French  purse  seiners  (24  vessels  in  2004)  target  mainly  sardine  and  catch  anchovy  on  an 
opportunistic basis. They operate around their home harbour, in coastal waters. Some French 
purse seiners located in the Basque country fish mainly in spring in VIIIb and the ones from 
Brittany fish occasionally for anchovy during autumn in the north of the Bay of Biscay.  

2.4.3.  Evolution of the sector 

Figure 2 - Historical evolution of the anchovy fishery since 1960 

France

Spain

s
e
n
n
o
T

90 000

80 000

70 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

20 000

10 000

0

0
6
9
1

2
6
9
1

4
6
9
1

6
6
9
1

8
6
9
1

0
7
9
1

2
7
9
1

4
7
9
1

6
7
9
1

8
7
9
1

0
8
9
1

2
8
9
1

4
8
9
1

6
8
9
1

8
8
9
1

0
9
9
1

2
9
9
1

4
9
9
1

6
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

0
0
0
2

2
0
0
2

4
0
0
2

6
0
0
2

EN 

13 

   EN 

 
 
 
Source: STECF 

The  stock  of  anchovy  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay  has  followed  a  downward  trend  since  1999.  In 
2005, spawning stock biomass and recruitment hit critical levels and the fishery was closed. 
As a result, catches and harvest rate levels followed the similar pattern.  

The  volume  of  landings  has  followed  a  decreasing  trend  from  37,000  tonnes  in  2000  to 
16,000 tonnes in 2004. During the same period the price increased with the effect of a relative 
constant  landing  value  of  around  50  million  Euros.  Apart  from  2000  and  2001,  the  French 
pelagic  trawlers  and  purse  seines  accounted  for  the  biggest  share  of  the  landing  value.  The 
largest difference is evident in 2003 when the French landings amounted to 71 % of the total 
value of anchovy (Figure 2 and Table 2). 

Table 2 - Anchovy landings and value 

Year 

Spain 

2000 

2001 

2002 

2003 

2004 

Landings (tons)  

19230 

23052 

6519 

3002 

7580 

Value (1000 E) 

30768 

36883 

19557 

14109 

23725 

France 

Landings (tons)  

17765 

17097 

10988 

7593 

8781 

Value (1000 E) 

28424 

27355 

32964 

35687 

27485 

Total  

Landings (tons)  

36995 

40149 

17507 

10595 

16361 

Value (1000 E) 

59192 

64238 

52521 

49796 

51210 

Source: ICES. Average yearly prices 

The market for anchovy is mainly concentrated in the Basque country. Even though the TAC 
is split between France and Spain, approximately 95 % of the French landings are sold on the 
Basque market. The Basque market is therefore considered to be representative of the whole 
market for anchovy.  

The  effect  of  decreasing  volume  of  landings  on  the  average  price  of  anchovy  is  clearly 
evident.  In  2005  the  collapse  of  the  anchovy  fishery  determined  the  highest  prices  per  kg 
(Figure 3). 
Figure 3 - Anchovy landings in Bay of Biscay: quantity, constant value and price 

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14 

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Value

Quantity

Price

s
o
r
u
E

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M
n

i

l

e
u
a
V
d
n
a

s
n
o
t

0
0
0
1

n

i

i

s
g
n
d
n
a
L

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

)
6
0
0
2
:
0
0
1

e
s
a
b
(

e
c
i
r
p

t
n
a
t
s
n
o
c

e
g
a
r
e
v
A

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Source: STECF 

As regards the processing industry, in the absence of a supply of anchovies from a local fleet, 
the  sector  relies  on  imports  from  Europe  (Croatia,  Italy)  and  other  non-European  countries 
(Peru, Chile, and China). Good supply and availability of fish from those countries means that 
the sector does not appear to be negatively affected by the closure of the fishery. 

2.4.4. 

Situation of the fleets before and after the closure 

Spain 
In spring, the economic value of the total landings of purse seines was historically linked to 
anchovy  landings,  with  other  species  like  sardines  and  horse  mackerel  representing  lower 
economic  value.  A  decreasing  trend  in  total  landings  value  can  be  seen  in  the  period  2000-
2005 (Figure 4). In 2005 the collapse of the anchovy fishery determined the lowest value of 
landings. 

Figure 4 - Historical evolution of total landings and value of landings (data comprises 
landings from Cantabrian and Basque purse seines in spring seasons of the period 2000-
2005) 

Landings and value of the Cantabrian and Basque pelagic fishery: 
Spring seasons 2000-2005

e
0
0
0
1
,

s
n
o
t

50000
45000
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0

Tons

Thousand €

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

EN 

15 

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Source: IEO & AZTI`s CAFE Project database (EU contract no 022644). 

The above graph illustrates the downward trend in the economic performance of the fleet in 
recent years, even before the closure of the fishery as of 2006. However, it was observed that 
on  average,  the  loss  of  gross  revenues  caused  by  the  closure  of  the  anchovy  fishery  was 
partially  covered  by  a  raise  of  the  gross  revenues  made  from  other  species  (i.e.  bonito) 
targeted by the fleet. Between 2007 and 2008 the situation in the fleet worsened resulting in 
some  loss  of  vessels  particularly  in  the  Basque  Country  of  Spain,  largely  due  to  the  very 
strong increase of the fuel costs.  

France 

Panels,  defined  as  constant  sets  of  vessels  operating  each  year  from  2000  to  2006  in  the 
anchovy fishery, were examined taking into consideration their average degree of dependence 
of vessels on anchovy (defined as the percentage of anchovy gross revenues in the total gross 
revenues over the 2000-2004 period). 19 and 66 vessels belonging to the active purse-seiners 
and trawlers fleets respectively were selected in 2007. These vessels landed 66% and 93% of 
the anchovy total landings per categories (according to the gear used to harvest anchovy and 
their length size) over the 2000-2004 period respectively. As shown on Figure 5, the total of 
the landings of these two categories represents between 72% and 82% of the French landings. 

Figure  5  -  Percentage  of  panel  landings  and  fleet  landings  relative  to  the  total  French 
anchovy landings 

Purse-seiners [11-17[m active

Trawlers [14-25[m active

Total panel / total anchovy landings

s
g
n
d
n
a

i

l

f
o
e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
P

100%

95%

90%

85%

80%

75%

70%

65%

60%

55%

50%

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Source: DPMA-Ifremer 

The catches of anchovy compared to the total catches for both fleets were estimated according 
to different degrees of dependence on anchovy. The main trend observed was a decrease in 
the  total  gross  revenues  for  pelagic  trawlers  and  purse  seiners  from  2002.  A  part  of  this 
decrease was due to the very low level of gross revenues made on anchovy (no catches for the 

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purse seiners from 2004). The general trend observed15 was that on average, the loss of gross 
revenues  due  to  the  anchovy  closure  was  partially  covered  by  a  raise  of  the  gross  revenues 
made from the fleets' other species (i.e. sea bass, albacore, horse mackerel).  

The evolution of average gross revenues per vessel varied according on their dependence on 
anchovy  expressed  in  shares  of  the  gross  revenue.  These  dependency  levels  were:  less  than 
1/3, between 1/3 and 2/3 and more than 2/3, respectively. For the active French trawlers with 
a dependence on anchovy representing more than 1/3 of the landings in value, the reduction in 
gross revenues in 2005 and 2006 compared to 2000 is around 25%. The decrease in value is 
more  significant  if  compared  to  2003  levels  when  it  rises  up  to  40%.  For  vessels  with  a 
dependence on anchovy representing less than 1/3, the gross revenues did not decrease over 
the 2005-2006 period. The gross revenue tends to be homogenized for the whole fleet in 2005 
and  2006  with  a  decrease  of  the  vessel  highly  dependent  on  anchovy.  The  total  decrease  is 
around 15% compared to 2000 and 25% while comparing to 2003.  

For French purse seiners, no vessel was dependent on anchovy at a level higher than 2/3 of 
the  total  gross  revenues  on  the  period  2000-2004.  The  mean  gross  revenues  per  vessel  are 
quite different depending on the degree of dependence on anchovy. In that respect, there is a 
clear difference between the fleets operating in the Basque fishery in the first part of the year 
and a southern Brittany fishery conducted mainly in the second semester. A decrease in mean 
gross revenues can be identified between the period 2002 and 2006 but looking at the index, 
none  of  these  categories  faced  a  critical  drop  in  gross  revenues  after  the  anchovy  closure 
compared  to  2000.  The  drop  is  significant  in  2005  and  2006  compared  to  the  period  2002-
2004, especially for the less than 1/3 dependant vessels.  

As regards landings composition evolution expressed in terms of gross revenue for the most 
important  species  it  was  evaluated  by  the  STECF  anchovy  group  according  to  fleets  and 
degree of dependence to anchovy. The most dependant trawlers fleets partially compensated 
the  decline  in  anchovy  landings  by  a  significant  increase  in  sea  bass  landings  and  to  a  less 
extent  by  albacore  and  other  species.  The  same  trends  on  sea  bass  can  be  seen  for  the  less 
dependant  vessels  (less  than  1/3  of  anchovy  landings  over  the  2000-2004  period).  For  the 
purse-seiners,  especially  the  less  dependant  vessels,  the  targeting  of  other  species  is  less 
evident as no significant increase in other species landings was identified. 

The years 2007 and 2008 registered a reduction in the number of pair trawlers (particularly in 
Saint Gilles Croix de Ville), largely due to the very strong increase of the fuel costs. 

2.4.5.  Legal basis for Community action 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2371/2002  of  20  December  2002  on  the  Conservation  and 
Sustainable  Exploitation  of  Fisheries  Resources  under  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy16 
provides  for  the  establishment  of  recovery  plans  for  stocks  outside  safe  biological  limits 
(Article  5)  and  for  management  plans  for  fisheries  exploiting  stocks  within  safe  biological 
limits (Article 6).  

15 Refer to report section 2.3.1, figures 2.1.33 – 2.1.3.5. 
16OJ L 358, 21.12.2002, pp. 59-80. 

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2.4.6.  Necessity and subsidiarity 

The proposal would fall under the exclusive competence of the Community and therefore the 
subsidiarity principle would not apply.  

With  regard  to  necessity,  this  proposal  concerns  the  annual  setting  of  TAC  for  a  fish  stock 
that is shared between two Member States, Spain and France, according to a fixed allocation. 
It is not possible for Member States to manage this issue by independent or devolved action. 
Fisheries management is an exclusive Community responsibility and therefore, it is necessary 
that this management action be implemented in Community legislation. 

3.  OBJECTIVES 

3.1. 

General objectives 

The  closure  of  the  fishery  presently  in  force  aims  at  protecting  the  remaining  stock  until  a 
strong year class, or possibly a series of them, recruits to the stock. The recommendation of a 
closure  consistently  made  by  STECF  since  2005  has  implied  in  practice  not  allowing  any 
catches until the stock recovers to levels above the limit Biomass (Blim) of 21,000 t.  

The  Commission  intends  to  make  a  proposal  for  a  long-term  plan  for  the  anchovy  to  be 
implemented  when  the  stock  recovers  to  safe  biological  limits.  The  objective  would  be  to 
establish the management framework for this stock, and fix targets so as to reach exploitation 
at high yields consistent with maximum sustainable yield (MSY). 

Policy coherence concerning sustainability objectives should be maintained. The plan should 
conform  to  the  objectives  of  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy,  as  set  out  in  Article  2  of 
Regulation  (EC)  No  2371/2002.  In  addition,  such  plan  should  contribute  to  the  aims  of  the 
Implementation  Plan  agreed  by  the  World  Summit  on  Sustainable  Development  at 
Johannesburg  in  2002,  especially  in  respect  of  exploiting  fish  stocks  according  to  their 
maximum  sustainable  yield17.  This  political  objective  has  been  the  subject  of  a  separate 
Commission Communication (Implementing sustainability in EU fisheries through maximum 
sustainable  yield  (COM  (2006)  final)  and  accompanying  working  document  (SEC(2006) 
868)18.  

3.2. 

Subsidiary objectives 

As an ancillary objective the Commission should aim to establish, for the sector concerned, 
predictability for the annual legislative decisions on total allowable catch for the stock, and to 
provide stability to such decision-making. This objective is linked to the general objective of 
economic and social sustainability under the CFP.  

Moreover the Commission should ensure that the decision-making on fishing possibilities for 
anchovy is based on best possible biological assessment of the stock. Such assessment would 
allow  for  a  good  forecast  of  the  abundance  of  the  fishery  and  therefore  contribute  to  the 
general objective. Both operational objectives are considered realistic.  

17 www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm 
18 www.cc.cec/home/dgserv/sg/sgvista/i/sgv2/repo/repo.cfm?institution=COMM&doc_to_browse=SEC/2006/0868 

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4. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

In order to effectively pursue the above objectives, the following options have been analysed 
and considered by DG MARE: 

4.1. 

Option 1 - No policy change 

This  option  implies  keeping  the  current  system  as  it  stands,  without  defined  management 
objectives, targets of criteria. Anchovy in the Bay of Biscay has been traditionally managed 
through annual TACs fixed by the Council of Ministers in December for the following year. 
Since  1989,  the  stock  is  annually  assessed  by  ICES,  based  on  direct  surveying  of  the 
population conducted by Spain and France. Since 2005, the annual TAC includes a revision 
clause in July, after the spring surveys and the provision of scientific advice provided in June. 
This system allows for an in-year revision in order to tune-up catches for the second half of 
the  year  after  the  spring  assessment;  however  it  does  not  follow  the  defined  longer  term 
management  objectives.  Moreover,  under  present  conditions,  there  is  no  legal  framework 
establishing  guidelines  or  restrictions  on  the  annual  setting  of  fishing  opportunities 
concerning this stock and the risk of the stock being fished out again remains very high.  

4.2. 

Option 2 - Long-term plan with three sub-options 

This option involves setting annual TAC decisions by the Council under a precise discipline 
whereby the TAC levels are calculated according to a fixed formula, taking into account the 
state  of  the  stock  through  its  biological  indicators.  DG  MARE  agrees  with  scientific  advice 
and stakeholders that in order to re-open the fishery, an establishment of a consistent, long-
term strategy based on an appropriate harvesting rule should be considered.  

Management  through  the  establishment  of  TACs  was  selected  by  scientists  at  STECF  for 
evaluation, as for pelagic species such systems have proven much preferable to regimes based 
on fishing effort limits (e.g. limiting the number of days a vessel is authorised to spend on the 
grounds).  Moreover,  a  TAC  based  system  would  be  embodied  in  the  current  management 
regime, and is thought to offer the best means to regulate fishing mortality.  

Based  on  the  above,  the  STECF  working  group  on  anchovy  management  considered  the 
implications for the stock and the fishery of two main strategies: 

•  A strategy with relatively higher TAC levels but higher collapse risks and; 
•  A strategy with relatively lower TAC levels and less frequent collapse risks. 

According  to  these  strategies  two  basic  harvest  control  rules  (HCR),  Rules  A  and  B,  were 
evaluated  with  respect  to  what  proportion  of  the  available  stock  could  be  harvested.  Third 
HCR (Rule C) was then added by stakeholders as a compromise between the first two rules.  

The anchovy group evaluated the impact of all three HCRs by simulation of the sustainability 
of the stock, catches, economic balance and social impact. The approach followed was such 
that,  as  far  as  evaluation  of  MSY  is  concerned,  catches  of  around  23,000  tonnes  are 
sustainable in the long-term. The socio-economic analysis was performed taking into account 
the  biological  uncertainty  resulting  from  the  stochastic  10-year  projections  of  the  stock  and 
fishery. All rules were tested for harvest rates (γ values) in range between 0 and 1 (in steps of 
0.1). They were also tested against the following constraints: 

•  with and without a TAC ceiling (TACmax) of 33,000 tonnes, which is the historically 

fixed level of TAC set to this fishery; and 

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•  with  and  without  a  minimum  guaranteed  TAC  (TACmin)  of  7,000  tonnes,  which 
corresponds  to  the  smallest  catch  that  allows  the  fishery  to  remain  economically 
viable, as identified by the SWWRAC. 

The following sub-option alternatives of a long-term plan were tested: 

4.2.1.  Rule A – Harvesting a constant proportion above an escapement Biomass (SSB) level  

The  first  rule  was  based  on  catching  a  constant  proportion  (γ  values)  above  an  escapement 
stock  spawning  biomass  level  (i.e.  anything  above  33,000  t),  according  to  a  given  formula 
(details, Annex 2). This strategy implies relatively higher TAC levels but also higher risks of 
stock and fishery collapse.  

4.2.2.  Rule B – Harvesting a constant proportion of the Biomass SSB 

The second rule was based on catching a constant proportion (γ values) of the stock spawning 
biomass,  which  is  all  fish  old  enough  to  reproduce,  according  to  a  given  formula  (details, 
Annex  2).  This  strategy  implies  relatively  lower  TAC  levels  and  less  frequent  risk  of  stock 
and fishery collapse. 

In both cases TAC is applied from subsequent July to June next year. The biological reference 
points Blim and Bpa correspond to 21,000 and 33,000 tones respectively. 

4.2.3.  Rule C – Harvesting a constant short term risk of 15% for Low R 

A  third  possible  rule  identified  by  stakeholders  was  based  on  a  constant  short-term  risk  of 
15% for low recruitment of new individuals to the stock (formula details, Annex 2). 

This rule was proposed by the SWW RAC at a March 2008 meeting. It was seen at the time, 
as a compromise between short term risk and the harvest interests of the fleet. This rule can be 
considered a special case of rule A, where the threshold is 26,500 tonnes and the harvest rate  
γ = 0.766. Given the Sector interest, this rule was evaluated separately. 

4.3. 

Complementary implementation elements for anchovy management  

4.3.1. 

Incorporating autumn survey of juvenile abundance into anchovy stock assessment 

Since 1989, the stock is annually assessed by the International Council for the Exploration of 
the Sea (ICES), based on direct surveying of the population conducted by Spain and France. 
Current ICES assessment covers the period from 1987 onwards. 

The  scientific  monitoring  of  the  population  is  based  on  two  annual  surveys  carried  out  in 
spring on the spawning stock, namely, the Daily Egg Production Method (since 1987 with a 
gap  in  1993)  and  the  Acoustics  surveys  (regularly  since  1989,  although  some  surveys  were 
also  conducted  in  1983,  1984  and  some  in  the  seventies).  Both  surveys  provide  spawning 
biomass  and  population  at  age  estimates.  The  surveys  have  shown  pronounced  inter-annual 
variability of biomass according to the pulse of recruitments, since one year old anchovies can 
conform up to more than 75% of the spawning population. This has served to assess the level 
of  the  population  during  the  major  spring  fishery  and  therefore  to  assess  the  level  of 
exploitation.  However,  it  has  also  showed  that  invariantly,  the  fishable  anchovy  stock 
predominantly consists of one-year-old fish with few exceptions in some years when 2 year 
old  fish  predominate.  Accordingly,  the  estimate  of  recruitment  at  age  1  is  a  key  factor  in 
determining a TAC for the next year. 

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Since  2005,  the  annual  fishing  opportunities  regulation  includes  a  revision  clause  of  the 
anchovy  TAC  that  applies  in  July,  after  the  spring  surveys  and  the  provision  of  scientific 
advice in June. The system thus allows for an in-year revision in order to tune-up catches for 
the  second  half  of  the  year  after  the  spring  assessment.  This  system,  however,  lacks  an 
estimation  of  juvenile  numbers  during  the  autumn  which  would  allow  for  a  forecast  of  the 
abundance of the fishery during the first semester (winter-spring) of the following year.  

The lack of a recruitment index before it enters the fishery has prevented ICES for all these 
years to produce projections of the population and catches for the anchovy fishery in the Bay 
of  Biscay  on  which  to  base  its  advice.  To  overcome  this  situation  several  environmental 
recruitment  indices  have  been  explored  and  various  acoustic  surveys  on  juveniles  in 
September-October  have  been  started.  The  former  are  not  used  by  ICES  given  their  poor 
forecasting  power,  whereas  the  later  (mainly  JUVENA)  is  still  too  short  and  it  is  being 
currently tested about its predictive performance for the incoming recruitment.  

5.  ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 

5.1. 

Environmental impacts 

Anchovy's short-lived life cycle identifies it as a species that can provide an indicator of the 
productivity  of  its  medium;  it  flourishes  on  productive,  upwelling  areas  where  plankton 
abounds.  Anchovy  is  a  prey  species  for  other  pelagic  and  demersal  species,  as  well  as  for 
cetaceans  and  birds.  It  is  also  a  major  source  of  food  for  ecologically  and  economically 
important predatory species such as tunas. Although the management considerations applied 
to  this  stock  are  quite  focused  on  the  species  alone  (since  it  is  caught  in  a  single-species 
fishery), anchovy's management is heavily dependent on environmental factors. The impact of 
the  stock's  status  and  evolution  on  the  rest  of  the  food  chain  and  the  status  of  the  pelagic 
habitat  as  such  are  not  analysed  here.  The  following  paragraphs  are  presented  in  the 
understanding  that  all  environmental  impacts  must  be  approached  with  precautionary 
principles  in  mind,  whereby  a  healthy  stock  will  be  a  contributor  to  a  healthy  larger 
environment, but the discussion emphasises the analysis of the options' potential impacts on 
the stock. 

Option 1 - No policy change 

This  report  has  already  described  how  the  current  system  of  annual  TAC  decisions  has 
resulted in harvesting rates that are too high and led to the depletion of the anchovy stock in 
the  Bay  of  Biscay.  Short-term  economic  considerations  result  in  setting  aside  the 
precautionary  approach  that  must  apply  to  compensate  uncertainty  in  the  assessment. 
Accordingly,  the  stock  is  overfished,  the  spawning  stock  biomass  falls  well  below 
precautionary levels and the stock collapses, entailing the fishery's closure.  

In  2000  an  STECF  group  evaluated  long-term  management  approaches  for  anchovy19  and 
indicated  that  under  the  current  harvesting  behaviour  the  risk  that  the  stock  biomass  would 
fall  under  safe  limits  was  of  the  order  of  72%  to  100%  (probability  of  falling  under  Blim  at 
least once in 20 years). The report was based on the assumption that the current management 

19 Report of the Meeting to provide the Commission with scientific background in order to define a management 
strategy  for  the  stock  of  anchovy  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay  (ICES  Sub-area  VIII)  held  in  Brussels,  21-25 
February 2000. 

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regime would continue, whereby an initial TAC is set on 1 January, and an in-year adjustment 
is made according to the results of the surveys available on 1 May.  

In the absence of timely management decisions that reflect the state of the anchovy stock, the 
risk  that  the  stock  will  decline  to  below  the  limit  biomass  value  has  been  validated  by 
experience.  

Option 2 - Long-term plan  

Bringing  stocks  under  long-term  plans  approach  remains  at  the  core  of  the  Commission's 
policy.  Implementing  such  a  plan  would  offer  better  protection  to  this  vulnerable  stock  and 
bring catches in line with MSY. The basic feature of this option is to establish a harvest rule 
which determines the annual TAC automatically. In December, a provisional TAC would be 
set according to the chosen formula, then a mid-year revision according to the June scientific 
advice would further fine tune the TAC. 

Two population models were implemented to test the HCRs under the three formulas tested. 
The biomass model that forms the basis for ICES advice was implemented as the base case.  
The  analysis  was  based  on  the  probability  of  stock  biomass  falling  below  Blim  and  the 
probability of having to close the fishery within a ten years simulation model.  

Performance of rules A and B (see annex 3 for formulas) 

In  summary,  the  evaluation  made  by  STECF  of  the  possible  harvest  control  rules  for  this 
fishery showed that rules A and B behave in a closely similar way in terms of management 
results  for  the  stock.  In  both  cases,  there  is  a  direct  correlation  between  catch  levels  and 
biological risk for the stock. Setting limits to the extent to which TACs may change from one 
year to the other carries different levels of risk since these constraints limit the response of the 
system to a change in stock status (where the scientific advice would plead for a 25% TAC 
cut,  but  the  TAC  constraint  would  only  authorise  a  maximum  cut  of  15%,  for  example).  In 
this  sense,  both  rules  performed  similarly.  Setting  a  minimum  guaranteed  TAC  (of  7,000  t) 
increased the risks of fishery closure, whereas imposing a maximum TAC – in any event –of 
33,000 tonnes results in lower catches, lower catch variability and lower probability of SSB 
falling below Blim than the case where no ceiling was imposed (see Fig. AB.1, Annex 2).  

Performance of Rule C 

The essential difference in this rule compared to the previous two is the inclusion of a 15% 
risk factor for low recruitment. When running scenarios for various recruitment levels for the 
stock,  this  rule  proved  less  efficient  to  maintain  adequate  exploitation  levels  when 
environmental factors play against the productivity of the stock. In simple terms, the rule does 
not provide sufficient guarantees when recruitment is poor that the harvesting is sustainable or 
can  lead  to  recovery  when  needed.  If  a  low  recruitment  scenario  persists  over  a  number  of 
years, then catches would be on average less than 10,000 t while the associated risk of closure 
would be higher than 10%. Due to the high environmental risk associated with this scenario, 
Rule C was discarded at this stage. 

The  following  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  looking  at  the  environmental  impact  of  the 
tested sub-options: 
•  The higher the exploitation rate the higher the catch, its variability and associated risk. 
•  Setting  a  maximum  TAC  reduces  maximum  attainable  catch  and  decreases  inter-annual 

variability in TACs (figure A.1 and B.1, Annex 2).  

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•  For a given harvest rate a TAC ceiling of 33,000 t reduces catches, their variability and 
the  associated  risks.  Setting  a  minimum  TAC  of  7,000  t  does  not  alter  mean  catch  or 
associated risk but increases the probability of closures. 

•  For  the  same  risk  level,  expected  catches  are  higher  for  the  options  where  there  is  no 

upper TAC constraint (figure AB.1, Annex 2).  

•  Both rules A & B imply similar risk at equal mean annual catch (figure AB.2, Annex 2). 

However, Rule B may result in higher stability in TACs. 

Moreover,  the  difference  in  estimated  risk  between  models  used  in  assessment  suggests  a 
need  for  some  flexibility  in  the  interpretation  of  the  test  results.  Levels  of  less  than  5%  are 
normally  considered  precautionary.  However,  given  the  uncertainty  in  the  estimates  of  risk, 
that  threshold  should  not  be  considered  an  absolute,  but  rather  a  region  around  which  the 
specific  situation  of  the  stock  and  the  trends  in  its  evolution  should  be  considered  when 
determining appropriate harvest levels. Due to the above, risks at and slightly above 5% are 
considered acceptable by STECF for this particular stock. 

5.2. 

Socio-economic impacts 

Option 1 - No policy change 

Table  below  summarises  the  economic  figures  describing  the  current  situation  in  socio-
economic terms. The figures correspond to year 2004, before the closure of fishery, and relate 
to the three fleets involved in the Bay of Biscay anchovy fishery (i.e. Spanish purse seiners 
(SPS), French purse seiners (FPS) and French pelagic trawlers (FPT)). These were the basis 
for the socio-economic Status Quo. 

Table 3 - Socio-Economic Status Quo (2004) 

SPS 

FPS 

FPT 

TOTAL 

Price of Anchovy /per ton 

2,391 

Catches (tons) 

7,580 

1,756 

7,025 

16,361 

Income per fleet (000 €) 

18,123.28 

4,198.96 

16,795.84 

39,118.08 

Costs/ton  harvested  (ex. 
capital cost, 000 €) 

Profits  from  fishing  (000 
€) 

8,409.10 

1,948.29 

14,351.66 

24,709.06 

9,714.18 

2,250.66 

2,444.174 

14,409.029 

Number of vessels 

211 

Number  of  fishermen  in 
fishery 

2,954 

Source: STECF anchovy working group 

31 

186 

54 

313 

296 

3,453 

Putting  aside  the  fact  that  the  fishery  remains  closed  for  the  time  being,  this  zero  option 
merely  purports  to  continue  managing  this  fishery  on  a  contingent  basis  year  after  year.  In 
these conditions, the fleet's economy cannot be adequately adapted to the trends of the stock. 
There is no predictability, except to assess a high risk of overfishing as decisions are taken on 
a short-term basis, thus leading to persistent or frequent closures. With a system like that in 

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place,  the  business  objectives  of  the  operators  cannot  be  adequately  programmed  and 
economies of scale cannot be implemented, nor a healthy integration between the harvesting 
and transformation sectors. 

Option 2 - Long-term plan  

Option 2 aims at ensuring long-term stability and profitability in the sector, with less risk of 
stock collapse and smaller TAC fluctuations between years.  It is worth highlighting that this 
sector achieves good returns when they fish less (Figure 1.2, Annex 2) and the fact that the 
reduction in earnings happens much slower than reduction in catch quantity. 

It is not possible to forecast economic impacts in absolute terms. Market prices for anchovy 
can fluctuate widely in response to variations in demand. However, the plan should, by setting 
well  defined  long-term  targets  and  contributing  to  the  stability  of  anchovy  supplies,  also 
contribute to the stability of the anchovy fishing industry and its markets.  

For Rule A: If no upper TAC ceiling is imposed, risks between 5 - 10% of the stock falling 
below  Blim,  which  indicates  low  biomass  and  serious  risk  to  stock's  reproductive  capacity, 
correspond to harvest rates γ =  0.4 to 0.5 (with average catches between 19,000 and 22,000 t). 
When an upper TAC ceiling of 33,000 tonnes is imposed, similar risks are calculated if γ  lies 
between 0.5 and 0.7, with average catches lower than 19,200 t. Thus, a wider range of harvest 
rates is available, but lower catches are to be expected if the ceiling is imposed.  

For Rule B: The risk of the stock falling to low biomass levels lies between 5 and 10% in the 
absence of an upper TAC ceiling, when harvest rates are around γ =0.3. Average catches are 
then estimated at around 19,500 t. Where the upper TAC ceiling of 33,000 t applies, similar 
risks are estimated, with catch levels around 17,200 t.  

The approach followed by scientists incorporated in the risk analysis not only the returns from 
the  anchovy  harvest,  but  the  overall  activity  of  the  fleet.  To  do  so,  one  estimate  of  returns 
from anchovy and other for the “rest” of the species was made. The estimate has been made 
by fleet and by semester (4 production function for each fleet). 

The  STECF  anchovy  working  group  attempted  a  socio-economic  evaluation  of  different 
management strategies. To do so, results obtained from the biological side were analyzed in 
terms  of  the  overall  performance  of  the  fishery,  as  well  as  the  performance  of  each  of  the 
fleets involved in it. The parameters used in the analysis are described in Table 1.2, Annex 1. 

The group also looked at the relationship between prices for anchovy and the set TAC levels 
for the stock. The analysis showed that the maximum value was obtained at a TAC level of 
32,000 tonnes (Figure 1.2, Annex 1). 

Detailed socio-economic impact assessment of the sub-options tested shows that: 

•  Overall  discounted  gross  revenue  is  maximized  when  the  harvest  rate  is  increased. 
This is clearly so when a maximum TAC of 33,000 tonnes is set. This maximum TAC 
allows a better overall result compared to the cases where there is not such maximum. 
•  The highest overall discounted cash flow is maximized for low harvest rates but this 
could be a consequence of the “optimistic” expected availability of other species and 
that the price for them was kept constant. This “optimistic” assumption is especially 
important  for  Spain,  given  that  it  has  not  been  possible  to  estimate  a  production 
function  of  other  species  by  semester,  which  makes  that  the  alternatives  in  the  first 
semester are over estimated. 

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•  The  highest  overall  discounted  cash  flow  decreases  with  the  harvest  rate,  but  this 
decrease is less pronounced when a maximum TAC of 33,000 tonnes is applied (see 
Annex 2). 

•  The economic risk is much lower when a TAC ceiling of 33,000 tonnes is applied, and 

also the risk increase is less marked in these two cases. 

•  The social indicator reflects the relationship between the average wage observed in the 
member  state  concerned  and  those  observed  in  the  fleets.  Given  that  the  capacity  in 
this  fishery  in  terms  of  number  of  vessels  that  operate  in  it  is  taken  as  fixed,  the 
indicator  only  reflects  the  social  consequences  in  this  scenario.  If  the  number  of 
vessels changes, the social consequences may also be different. 

•  Social  consequences  are  not  taking  into  consideration  employment  other  than 
employment as crew on-board. Employment directly or indirectly linked to the fishing 
activity was not taken into account. 

•  Deterministic  and  stochastic  runs  perform  similarly  in  terms  of  income,  even  if  the 
price  function  may  apply  to  values  outside  the  observed  range  of  TAC  used  for  its 
estimation. This is especially true when there is no maximum TAC.  

•  Cost parameters as well as production function for anchovy and other species has been 
estimated, but further work should be done on this basis to refine the estimations. 
•  Evolution of cost is a key factor in the economic performance of the fleets, but even if 
in  the  simulations  we  have  tried  to  use  the  last  available  data,  they  have  remained 
constant for simulation purposes. 

•  There are factors which could not be considered in this analysis but are likely to have 
influence  in  the  economic  performance  of  the  HCR.  Anchovy  processing  industry 
(which  represents  the  most  important  demand  for  these  fleets)  could  change  their 
purchasing  patterns  as  they  have  done  while  the  fishery  was  closed,  changing 
dramatically the price function structure. 

•  The  processing  industry  is  asking  for  a  well  supplied  market  (high  TAC)  and  low 
prices. In that sense low TACs create a risk to the fleets of loosing their buyers. But 
high  TACs  also  increase  the  risk  of  closing  the  fishery,  and  this  discontinuity  in  the 
supply could also result in the processing industry turning to other markets. 

•  The  effect  of  the  allocation  method  of  TAC  into  quota  by  countries  on  the  national 
fleets  was  tested.  Obviously  the  higher  the  allocation  to  Spain  the  lower  the 
probability of negative cash flow for Spain and the higher for France. However, this is 
not  an  entirely  straightforward  conclusion,  given  the  effect  of  other  species  on  the 
economy of the fishery which can counter the effects of these changes.  

The  model  assumption  that  the  total  TAC  will  always  be  caught  is  probably  unrealistic.  It 
would  be  more  appropriate  to  take  into  account  the  economic  incentives  for  vessels  to 
reallocate effort between species. However, to achieve this aim, a full feedback bio-economic 
model,  which  takes  into  account  both  the  economic  behaviour  of  vessels  and  the  biological 
consequences, is required. It should be noted that, at present, such a model is unavailable. 

Since the management plan would not introduce new procedures, an administrative burden for 
both the sector and national administrations, is likely to remain unchanged. The proposal has 
therefore  no  implication  for  the  Community  budget.  Moreover,  a  long-term  plan  with  clear 
sustainability  criteria  may  allow  the  fishery,  if  effectively  implemented,  to  qualify  for 
certification  under  independent  "eco-label"  criteria.  This  could  be  helpful  in  product 
marketing terms, and in improving the perception of the sector as a responsible industry. 

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5.3. 

Impacts on international relations 

The  stock  is  distributed  almost  wholly  within  EC  waters  and  is  not  subject  to  unregulated 
exploitation by third-country vessels. Catches and fish stock management will not be affected 
by such third-country activities.  

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5.4. 

Impact summary 

Option 1 – no policy change 

Option 3 - long-term plan 

Positive impacts 

Greater 
making. 

flexibility 

in 

decision-

Decision-making  constrained  to  result  in 
attainment  of  sustainability  objectives. 
Increased TAC stability. 

Negative impacts 

Long-term  sustainability  not  assured 
as an objective. 

Direct impacts 

Unknown,  but  likely  to  result  in 
higher-risk management approaches. 

Indirect impacts 

Economic impacts 

social 

economic, 

and 
Negative 
environmental 
to 
possible  reduction  of  stocks'  biomass 
to  unsafe  levels  leading  to  reduced 
fishing opportunities in the long-term. 

impacts 

due 

Short-term: No change in catches and 
profits. 

Long-term: Possible negative impacts 
due to increased risk of fishing above 
safe  levels  which  may  again  lead  to 
closing the fishery. This would result 
in  loss  of  profitability  of  the  fishing 
industry. 

Short-term: No change. 

Social impacts 

Environmental 
impacts 

Long-term:  Possible  stock  collapse 
following  TAC  allocations  based  on 
ad  hoc  decisions  resulting  in  cuts  in 
employment in the sector. 

Short-term  Continued  management 
based  on  short-term  interests  may 
finish  off  a  stock  which  is  such 
vulnerable  state.  It  may  not  recover 

allow 

TAC  variation  constrains  may  in  some 
circumstances,  not 
sufficiently 
rigorous measures to be adopted, in others, 
will  not  allow 
reap 
the 
full/immediate  benefit  from  a  surge  in  the 
stock. 

industry 

to 

Reduction  in  estimated  risks  of  closure. 
Existence  of  a  predictable  management 
regime  with  identified  targets  allows  the 
industry  to  adapt  its  strategies  to  become 
profitable.  

Longer-term  approaches 
in  harvesting 
strategies  spread  stability  in  associated 
processing  sector,  with  economic  and 
social gains. 

Short-term: If the plan applies, it will be on 
a  re-opened  fishery  for  a  stock  that  is  in  a 
recovery  phase.  Initial  gains  will  be  small 
and will need to be kept low throughout the 
recovery  phase.  Increases  will  likely  be 
gradual. However, the operation of the plan 
may reactivate investments. 

the 

Long-term:  Achieving  the  targets  means 
to  Maximum 
stock 
rebuilding 
sustainable  yield,  ie  the  level  at  which  the 
industry is the most profitable and the stock 
in the healthiest state. 

Short-term:  No  change  expected  during 
stock recovery phase. 

creation 

Job 
can  be 

Long-term: 
stable 
employment 
from 
profitable  fishing  activities  if  the  stock  is 
managed according to MSY. 

and 
expected 

Short-term:  Positive 
the 
conservation  of  species  due  to  improved 
decision making on management.  

impact  on 

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in  South 
(the  anchoveta 
America,  which  collapsed  in  the  70s 
took about 20 years to come back).  

stocks 

Long-term:  Even  if  the  stock  did  not 
collapse  completely,  this  short-term 
approach carries an inherent high risk 
that the stock biomass will fall below 
safe  levels  again,  thus  adverse  effect 
on biodiversity. 

Long-term:  Improved  management  of  the 
stock leading to improved state of the stock 
benefiting biodiversity. 

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6.  COMPARING THE OPTIONS 

6.1. 

Should a long-term plan be implemented? 

Various  options  have  been  considered  internally  by  scientific  agencies.  The  resulting 
scientific advice, and stakeholder contributions agreed that implementing a long-term strategy 
based  on  a  harvesting  rule  according  to  a  formula  that  depends  on  survey  results  and  is 
arithmetically calculated seems the best solution for anchovy. A similar approach was taken 
for sandeel in the North Sea in 2005, and there are also precedents in capelin management. 
Rule  B,  which  implies  harvesting  a  constant  proportion  of  the  anchovy  biomass,  has  been 
selected  as  appropriate  and  beneficial  by  both  DG  MARE  and  stakeholders.  This  rule  is 
consistent with the objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy and the Johannesburg World 
Summit  on  Sustainable  Development  to  rebuild  fish  stocks  to  MSY  by  2015.  In  any  event, 
long-term  plans  must  be  regularly  reviewed  and  if  appropriate  revised  in  light  of  an 
assessment  of  their  effectiveness  and  in  light  of  the  evolution  of  the  scientific  knowledge 
relevant for the management of the fishery in question. 

The  choice  to  implement  such  a  plan  can  be  compared  with  continuing  under  present 
conditions. 

Comparing Option 1 and Option 2 

Option 1: No policy change - annual ad-hoc decision making 

Qualitative description 

Quantitative description 

Economic impact 

Short-term  costs  to  relevant 
enterprises 

Long-term  costs  to  relevant 
enterprises 

Social impact 

Environmental impact 

Unknown, 
predictable. 
not 
Likely  pressure  to  set  fishing 
opportunities  above  sustainable 
levels.  

predictable. 
not 
Unknown, 
to  set 
Likely 
that  pressure 
fishing  opportunities 
above 
sustainable  levels  can  result  in 
below 
depletion 
stock 
maximum 
sustainable  yield 
levels.  

Ad  hoc  decisions  affecting 
entire  catches  from  the  stock 
affect  the  resilience  of  the 
fishing  companies  by  forcing 
them 
contingency 
to 
management. 

Ad  hoc  decisions  affecting 
long-term  productivity  of  the 
whole  stock,  i.e.  up  to  ca. 
50M€/yr. 

Unknown, 
Flexibility 
decision-making level. 

not 
is 

predictable. 
retained  at  a 

set 

No 
long-term 
management  targets  lead  to 
high  risks  with  regards  to 
employment  and  profitability 
in a sector. 

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predictable. 
not 
Unknown, 
Pressures to increase catches in 
the  short  term  tend  to  lead  to 
stock depletions. 

TAC decisions under the CFP 
have been taken on average at 
about  40%  above  sustainable 
levels.  

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Option 2: Implementation of long-term plan 

Qualitative description 

Quantitative description 

Economic impact 

Short-term  costs  to  relevant 
enterprises 

Long-term  costs  to  relevant 
enterprises 

Social impact 

Environmental impact 

impacts  can  be 
Short-term 
mitigated by a limit on changes 
to TACs so long as stock levels 
remain good.  

Long-term costs should be kept 
at  a  low  level  by  maintaining 
stocks  and  catches  at  high  and 
stable levels. 

Not  quantified,  but  should  be 
low. 

By  exploiting  the  stock  at 
maximum  sustainable  yield, 
costs  should  be  low  and  the 
economic  resource  rent  kept 
at  a  high 
to 
current values. 

level,  close 

The 
long-term  plan  should 
minimise short-term disruptions 
and  ensure  high  and  stable 
incomes  and  employment  for 
the long-term. 

Maintenance  of  employment 
and 
to 
incomes  at  close 
current  levels  (in  proportion 
to a Bay of Biscay stock). 

The  plan  should  lead  to  safe 
and near-optimal exploitation of 
the  stock,  with  a  small  risk  of 
stock  collapse  and  including 
precautionary elements. 

with 

Exploitation  of  the  stock  in 
conformity 
the 
precautionary  approach  and 
MSY 
the 
Johannesburg Implementation 
Plan. 

objectives 

in 

DG  MARE  considers  that  retaining  an  annual  decision-making  system  unconstrained  by 
considerations  of  sustainability  would  be  a  high-risk  approach  for  the  sector  in  the  longer 
term.  It  is  consistent  with  the  precautionary  approach  to  implement  a  sound  management 
practice in advance to ensure that once the stock has recovered, the conditions will not change 
for the worse again (in this fish stock, or in others nearby). Therefore DG MARE considers 
the implementation of a long-term plan to be desirable. 

6.2.  Which sub-option of the long-term plan (Option 2) should be retained? 

In  order  to  evaluate  different  harvest  control  rules  for  risks  between  0.05  and  0.1,  an 
assessment with two scenarios was carried out: 

1) scenario with a maximum TAC ceiling (TACmax) at 33,000 t; and  

2) scenario without  a maximum TAC ceiling. 

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Rule A 

Rule B 

TAC max of 33,000t 

No TACmin 

With TACmin 

7,000 t 

No TACmin 

With TACmin 

7,000 t 

Harvest rate 

0.5 – 0.7 

0.5 – 0.7 

0.3-0.4 

0.3 – 0.4 

P(SSB < Blim) 

0.06 - 0.10 

0.05 - 0.08 

0.07-0.10 

0.06 - 0.098 

P(closure) 

0.08 – 0.11 

0.24 

0.08-0.11 

0.18 – 0.21 

Catch 

17,700 – 19,400  17,200 – 19,400 

17,400-19,100 

17,000 -19,200 

Variation in Catch 

11,000 – 11,700  11,800 – 12,400 

9,600-10,600 

10,000 – 11,200 

Optimum 
harvest 
rate (HR) for income 

Optimum  HR 
cash flow 

for 

0.6-1 

0.6-1 

0.4-1 

0.4-1 

0.1-0.3 

0.1-0.3 

0.1-0.2 

0.1-0.2 

Rule A 

Rule B 

No TAC max 

No TACmin 

With TACmin 

No TACmin 

With TACmin 

Harvest rate 

0.4 – 0.5 

P(SSB < Blim) 

0.05 - 0.08 

P(closure) 

0.07 – 0.10 

7,000 t 

0.5 

0.08 

0.29 

0.3 

0.06 

0.08 

7,000 t 

0.3 

0.06 

0.19 

Catch 

19,000 – 22,500 

21,700 

19,000- 19,400 

19,200 

Variation in Catch 

18,000 – 22,500 

23,700-23,400 

14,800 

15,100- 5,400 

Optimum HR for GR 

0.4-0.5-0.6 

0.4-0.5-0.6 

0.4-0.5-0.6 

0.4-0.5-0.6 

Optimum  HR 
cash flow 

for 

0.1-0.3 

0.1-0.3 

0.1-0.2 

0.1-0.2 

Rule A: Risks between 5% than 10% for the stock to fall below Blim in any year of the 10 
years  projected  population  were  found  for  harvest  rates  of  around  0.4  and  0.5  for  cases 
without  a  maximum  TAC  ceiling.  For  those  cases  the  average  catches  were  estimated  at 

EN 

32 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
between  18,500  and  22,000  t.  The  similar  risks are found for harvest rates between 0.5 and 
0.7  for  cases  with  33,000  t  maximum  TAC  ceiling.  These  cases  come  with  average  catches 
estimated at lower than 19,200 t).  

Rule B: Risks between 5% than 10% for the stock to fall below Blim in any year of the 10 
years  projected  population  were  found  at  harvest  rate  of  around  0.3,  with  average  catches 
around  19,500  t  for  those  cases  without  maximum  TAC  ceiling,  while  catches  are  around 
17,500 t for those cases with maximum TAC ceiling of 33,000 t. 

A  comparison  of  Rule  A  and  B  shows  that  both  rules  imply  quite  similar  biological  risk  at 
equal mean annual catch. However, Rule B is likely to result in more stability in TACs and 
therefore was selected by both stakeholders and DG MARE as a preferred option.  

As a general rule, ICES and STECF seek management to keep fish stocks above Bpa, which 
according  to  their  definition  corresponds  to  reduce  the  probability  of  a  stock  falling  below 
Blim below 5%. Given high annual variability and low recruitment of the stock of anchovy, 
the  scientists  believe  that  this  target  cannot  be  achieved  for  this  particular  stock  and 
recommend  that  risk  of  stock  biomass  falling  to  unsafe  levels  of  or  slightly  above  5%  is 
acceptable.  A  harvest  rate  of  0.4  as  suggested  by  SWWRAC,  which  would  generate  risks 
reaching  10%  and  above,  was  considered  by  DG  MARE  not  precautionary  enough  for  the 
stock.  The  scientific  evaluation  (details  Annex  2)  indicates  that  applying  Rule  B  with 
maximum  TAC  set  at  33,000  t  and  harvest  rate  of  0.3  would  keep  risk  of  stock  biomass 
falling below unsafe levels (SSB below Blim) and the danger of a fishery closure below the 
recommended 10%. The Rule is believed to ensure an average annual catch of around 17,200 
t which would guarantee a viable and stable income for the sector in a long-term.   

Rule A 

Rule B 

Economic impact 

Short-term  costs  to  relevant 
enterprises 

Comparable  average  annual 
catch  likely  above  levels  from 
2004. 

average 

annual 
Comparable 
catch  likely  above  levels  from 
2004. 

Long-term  costs  to  relevant 
enterprises 

TAC 

fluctuations 
Higher 
between  years  causing  variable 
profitability in the sector. 

Lower TAC fluctuations between 
years 
constant 
resulting 
profitability for the sector. 

in 

Social impact 

Short-term: No negative impact 
on  employment.  New  rules  are 
clear and easy to follow. 

Higher 

Long-term: 
TAC 
fluctuations  leading  to  possible 
in  employment  and 
changes 
greater uncertainty in the sector. 

Short-term:  No  negative  impact 
on  employment.  New  rules  are 
clear and easy to follow. 

Long-term: 
fluctuations 
employment in the sector. 

Lower 
assuring 

TAC 
stable 

Similar  risk  of  stock  collapse  Similar risk of stock collapse and 

Environmental impact 

EN 

33 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
and closure of fishery. 

closure of fishery. 

Should an autumn survey of juvenile abundance be incorporated into anchovy stock 

assessment? 

DG  MARE  supports  the  views  expressed  by  the  SWWRAC  and  believes  that  the  results  of 
the  autumn  recruitment  survey  should  be  incorporated  into  the  decision-making  process  to 
ensure  that  TAC  set  in  early  winter  takes  into  account  the  natural  mortality  exerted  on  the 
newly recruits during the rest of the season and thus, can predict the available biomass for the 
next  year.  The  proposal  for  a  long-term  plan  would  set  the  rule  whereby  fishing  would  be 
permitted from July of year N to June of the year N+1 depending on the biomass available in 
June,  which  is  estimated  following  the  spring  scientific  research  trips.  Once  the  JUVENA 
survey  of  juvenile  fish  commences,  the  TAC  would  once  again  be  set  every  year,  for  a 
calendar year (from January to December).  

7.  MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The indicators of successful operation of this plan are that: 

Biologically 

•  Stock  biomass  is  maintained  at  a  level  that  allows  its  sustainable  exploitation  (SSB 
above  Blim  with  low  risk  of  it  falling  below  that  level),  on  the  basis  of  scientific 
advice;  

•  Stock  is  managed  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  MSY  aiming  at  a  long-term 

stability of resources.  

Socio-economically  

•  Catch  levels,  as  measured  by  ICES  and  STECF,  remain  close  to  the  target  values 
established in the plan, while aiming at stability and profitability for the fishing sector; 
•  TACs  and  quotas  established  according  to  the  plan  are  respected  and  area-

misreporting is eliminated; 

•  Discarding and misreporting do not increase in a period of increased stock abundance 

and is taken into account in the TAC-setting process. 

Further evaluation criteria: are that: 

•  Uncertainties and bias in the fishery and biological system remain within the bounds 

of those tested; and 

•  Assumptions made in the simulation testing phase are still valid. 

A  harvest  control  rule-based  system  designed  in  such  a  way  and  applied  rigorously  should 
safeguard against stock depletion. However as simulations are based on past stock dynamics, 
and cannot guarantee future developments, it is a normal condition of most management plans 
that harvest rates be re-evaluated on a regular basis. Moreover, the proposed plan would set a 
minimum spawning biomass level based on scientific advice from STECF and ICES, below 
which  the  fishery  should  remain  closed.  An  evaluation  clause  would  be  included  in  the 
proposal to ensure that this value can be amended, if appropriate in the light of new scientific 
information and advice. 

EN 

34 

   EN 

 
 
The  indicators  should  be  monitored  annually  in  order  to  detect  any  deficiencies  in  the 
operation of the plan. At three-yearly intervals, a comprehensive review of the plan should be 
implemented. 

The monitoring arrangements concerning the state of the stock are common for this and other 
stocks  in  the  area.  Collection  of  scientific  data  as  regards  landings  and  survey  data  from 
research vessels are co-funded by the European Community. Data are collected, analysed and 
evaluated by the ICES and formal advice is provided by STECF. 

Should advice from STECF and ICES indicate that the plan is not reaching its objectives, a 
review process would be initiated by DG MARE. 

The  proposal  would  interlink  with  the  provisions  of  the  new  Control  Regulation,  which  is 
planned to be adopted by the Commission later this year.  

The  fishery  would  be  subject  to  cross-national  coordination  of  inspection  activities 
established by the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA). Regional control measures 
established by the Member States concerned, i.e. a weekly catch reporting system, should be 
integrated  into  a  control  programme  coordinated  by  the  Agency.  Additionally,  inspectors 
from DG MARE will follow-up and review the implementation of fisheries control measures 
by  the  relevant  Member  States.  Any  detected  overshooting  of  the  TAC  and  subsequent 
remedial action would be subject to the general provisions applicable in this case, including 
deductions  from  next  year's  TAC.  The  problem  of  discards  in  the  fishery  will  be  subject  to 
provisions of the new Discards Regulation; DG MARE is currently working on.  

EN 

35 

   EN 

 
 
ANNEX 1 – GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT ANCHOVY STOCK, FISHERY AND FLEET 

Table 1.1 - Biological reference points for anchovy in Bay of Biscay 

Current  biological  reference  points  for  the  stock  were  defined  by  ICES  ACFM  in  October 
2003 and have been unchanged ever since:  

Type 

Value 

Technical basis 

Blim 
Bpa 
Flim 
Fpa 

Fy 

Precautionary 
approach 

Targets 

Source: STECF 2008 

21 000 t 
33 000 t 
- 
1.0–1.2     

- 

Blim: Bloss = 21 000 t (1989 SSB) 
Bpa = Bloss x exp(1.645σ) 
Not defined. 
Fpa: = F for 50% spawning potential ratio, i.e. the F at which the 
SSB/R  is  half  of  what  it  would  have  been  in  the  absence  of 
fishing. 
Not defined. 

Figure 1.1 - Diagram representing the annual TAC allocation process by Country and 
Semester 

C

Spain

France

1st Semester

2nd Semester

1st Semester

2nd Semester

NAME 
r 
E  
POR_MS_1 
Fuel Cost 
Bait Cost 
Ice Cost 
Food Cost 

Table 1.2 - Economic model: parameter estimates 

Comments 
Discount rate 
Maximum time per year 
Percentage of the anchovy quota by fleet 
Fuel Expenditure in a by year and vessel 
Bait Expenditure in a by year and vessel 
Ice Expenditure in a by year and vessel 
Food Expenditure in a by year and vessel 

SPS 
0,05 
1 
1 
82000 
0 
0 
0 

FPT 
0,05 
1 

FPS 
0,05 
1 
0,058113357  0,941886643
22539,43073  98478,29681
0 
0 
0 

0 
0 
0 

EN 

36 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gear Expenditure in a by year and vessel 
SS Expenditure in a by year and vessel 

Gear Cost 
SS Cost 
Other Variable Costs  Other Expenditure in a by year and vessel 
Landing Cost 
Fixed Costs 

% of Income 
Fixed Costs 

6046 
35867 
20689 
0,025 
56753 

0 
0 

0 
0 
9431,266669  11194,12629
0,061548167  0,051355711
73101,28468  121511,7238

qa1 

αa1 

βa1 

γa1 

qa2 

αa2 

βa2 

γa2 

NB1 

NB2 

ko 

α0 

γ0 

P0 

FTE 

W 

E1 

Vessel Share 
% Quota by fleet 

SSV 

SSC 

k01 
k02 
P01 
P02 

Source: STECF  

Catchability first semester anchovy 

0,0024505  0,0008672 

0,0026516 

Elasticity of Number of vessels Sem1 

Elasticity of SSB Sem1 

Elasticity of Time to anchovy Sem1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Catchability second semester anchovy 

0,0038713  0,005077 

0,008321 

Elasticity of Number of vessels Sem2 

Elasticity of SSB Sem2 

Elasticity of Time to anchovy Sem2 

Number of vessels sem 1 

Number of vessels sem 2 

1 

1 

1 

200 

200 

1 

1 

1 

31 

31 

Catchability other species 

253,11 

NA 

Elasticity  Number of vessels others 

Elasticity of Time to others 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

71 

71 

NA 

1 

1 

Price of other species 

2,35 

NA 

NA 

Average Full time employmet 

13 

5,886027507  5,554762189

Alternative wage 

19802 

20600 

20600 

Maximum Time Semester 1 (months) 

% of RTBS 
Percentage of the MS Quota by fleet 
SS  Paid  by  the  vessel  in  Ä  by  year  and 
vessel 
SS  Paid  by  the  vessel  in  Ä  by  year  and 
vessel 
Catchability “other species” 1st sem 
Catchability “other specie” 2nd sem 
Price of “other species” 1st sem 
Price of “other species” 2nd sem 

0,5 

0,5 
1 

0 

0 

NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 

0,5 

0,5 

0,499550603  0,518781068
0,101527086  0,898472914

22310,42551  21054,79593

19982,47262  18857,86011

281,745 
704,406 
0,98 
0,61 

271,221 
293,877 
2 
2,18 

EN 

37 

   EN 

 
Figure 1.2 - Estimated prices and the corresponding value of the TAC 

Based  on  data  from  France  and  Spain,  an  annual  price  for  anchovy  according  to  fishing 
semester for the international fishery, as estimated by STECF working group is as follows: 

TAC and expected prices for Sem 1 & 2 

1st Semester
2nd Semester

5
1

0
1

5

g
k
/
e
c
i
r

P

Value of the TAC 

31932

0
0
0
0
7

0
0
0
0
6

0
0
0
0
5

0
0
0
0
4

0
0
0
0
3

0
0
0
0
2

0
0
0
0
1

0

)
s
o
r
u
E
0
0
0
1
(

C
A
T

f
o

l

e
u
a
V

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

TAC (1000 tonnes)

TAC (1000 tonnes)

Source: STECF  

The highest catch value was at TAC levels of around 23,000 tonnes. 

EN 

38 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2 – HARVEST CONTROL RULES TESTED 

The following Harvest Control Rules (HCR) were tested by the anchovy working group: 

Rule A: constant proportion above an escapement Biomass (SSB) level  

TAC

y

=

⎧
⎪
⎨
(
γ
⎪⎩

0

ˆ
BSS

−

B

lim

)

y

1
−

 if

 if

ˆ
BSS
ˆ
BSS

≤

>

B

lim

B

lim

1
y-

1
y-

Example of Harvest Control Rules

Gamma= 0.1 to 1 TAC capped

50,000

45,000

40,000

35,000

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

h
c
t
a
C

0

0

0
0
0
6

0
0
0
2
1

0
0
0
8
1

0
0
0
4
2

0
0
0
0
3

0
0
0
2
4

0
0
0
0
0
0
6
6
3
6
Spawning Biomass

0
0
0
8
4

0
0
0
4
5

0
0
0
0
6

0
0
0
2
7

0
0
0
8
7

0
0
0
4
8

0
0
0
0
9

0
0
0
6
9

EN 

39 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rule B - Harvesting a constant proportion of the Biomass SSB 

TAC

y

=

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪⎪
γ
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

0

 if

ˆ
BSS

≤

B

lim

1
y-

ˆ
BSS

(

y

(

B

pa

1
−
−

−

B

B

lim

lim
)

)

ˆ
BSS

y

1
−

 if

B

lim

ˆ
BSS

<

<

B

pa

1
y-

γ

ˆ
BSS

y

1
−

 if

ˆ
BSS

≥

B

pa

1
y-

EN 

40 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example of Harvest Control Rules

Exploitations= 0.1. to 1

50,000

45,000

40,000

35,000

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

h
c
t
a
C

0

0

0
0
0
6

0
0
0
2
1

0
0
0
8
1

0
0
0
4
2

0
0
0
0
3

0
0
0
2
4

0
0
0
0
0
0
6
6
3
6
Spawning Biomass

0
0
0
0
6

0
0
0
4
5

0
0
0
8
4

0
0
0
2
7

0
0
0
8
7

0
0
0
4
8

0
0
0
0
9

0
0
0
6
9

Rule C: Fishermen election: Constant short term risk of 15% for Low R 

TAC

y

=

⎧
⎪
⎨
.0
⎪⎩

0

766

(

ˆ
BSS

y

1
−

−

26500

)

 if

 if

ˆ
BSS
ˆ
BSS

≤

26500

>

26500

1
y-

1
y-

EN 

41 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rule C: Short term risk of 15% for a Low Recruitment

45000

40000

35000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

h
c
t
a
C

0
0

4000

Short Term Risk 15%

Fitting capped to a max
TAC of 33000 t

8000

12000

16000

20000

24000

28000

32000

36000

40000

48000

44000
52000
60000
Spawning Biomass

56000

64000

68000

72000

76000

80000

84000

88000

92000

96000

1E+05

EN 

42 

   EN 

 
 
 
Tables of performance statistics for the different harvest control rules (HCR) and by population models 

Table A.1 - Summary results of the performance of Harvest Control Rule A 

EN 

43 

EN 

 
  
HCR

Allocat  % 
Spain

SR

HR

TACmax

TACmin

Median 
SSBlast

P(SSB<Blim)

P(SSB<Blim 
once)

P(closure)

P(closure 
once)

Average 
catch

Average sd 
catch

Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A
Rule A

cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte

ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000

no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000

81911
70772
61088
55529
48509
44332
39955
35967
32033
28303
80266
70658
64181
60222
56348
53779
49222
47626
47818
45672
84366
73316
63224
56574
48899
43466
38374
37158
31354
27677
80138
72941
65856
61434
56776
56767
53738
48437
47285
47769

0.009
0.017
0.029
0.052
0.082
0.137
0.174
0.236
0.293
0.331
0.010
0.013
0.026
0.043
0.058
0.075
0.093
0.113
0.132
0.141
0.008
0.007
0.021
0.040
0.075
0.131
0.172
0.224
0.274
0.337
0.007
0.010
0.019
0.032
0.049
0.066
0.083
0.107
0.119
0.143

Source: STECF  

EN 

0.021
0.029
0.047
0.066
0.102
0.146
0.179
0.230
0.278
0.315
0.023
0.029
0.042
0.060
0.073
0.087
0.104
0.122
0.138
0.146
0.635
0.377
0.302
0.289
0.292
0.323
0.346
0.368
0.391
0.435
0.627
0.372
0.296
0.262
0.247
0.242
0.246
0.241
0.242
0.242

0.157
0.205
0.303
0.402
0.552
0.698
0.765
0.854
0.913
0.935
0.173
0.216
0.293
0.371
0.432
0.500
0.552
0.627
0.640
0.657
0.999
0.961
0.942
0.922
0.928
0.942
0.967
0.980
0.980
0.987
1.000
0.967
0.926
0.893
0.880
0.877
0.881
0.879
0.848
0.857

6762
12049
16057
18998
22230
23193
24845
24265
24592
24854
6416
11313
14294
16241
17684
18747
19106
19675
20242
20896
4622
10960
15537
18850
21733
22743
23819
24249
24954
24701
4599
10347
13480
15718
17250
18333
18907
19591
20040
20437

5081
9929
14640
18075
22847
25740
28996
30160
31107
32952
4745
7935
9617
10563
11032
11532
11625
11829
11945
11865
6339
11224
15585
19285
23680
26451
28816
30606
32187
34065
6052
9331
10729
11462
11822
12051
12414
12487
12351
12481  

0.055
0.115
0.186
0.293
0.446
0.631
0.722
0.819
0.890
0.932
0.068
0.090
0.178
0.252
0.337
0.422
0.475
0.546
0.580
0.614
0.057
0.055
0.134
0.246
0.406
0.603
0.710
0.819
0.862
0.925
0.052
0.070
0.123
0.211
0.295
0.378
0.454
0.535
0.553
0.618

44 

EN 

 
  
Figure  A.1  -  Performance  statistics  for  Rule  A  (probability  of  SSB  falling  below  Blim, 
probability of closing the fishery, the average catch and average sd in catch) depending on 
the harvest rate in the biomass model (using BBM) with the Ricker SR model. 

(Solid, dashed, dotted and dot-dashed lines represent the case without any restriction on the 
TAC, with a maximum TAC restriction of 33,000t, with a minimum viable TAC of 7000t and 
with  a  maximum  TAC  restriction  of  33,000t  and  a  minimum  viable  TAC  of  7000t 
respectively). 

)
e
r
u
s
o
c
(
P

l

0
.
1

8
.
0

6
.
0

4
.
0

2
.
0

0
.
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Harvest rate

Harvest rate

0
0
0
5
3

0
0
0
5
2

0
0
0
5
1

0
0
0
5

h
c
t
a
C
d
S

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Harvest rate

Harvest rate

)
m

i
l

B
<
B
S
S
(
P

h
c
t
a
C
e
g
a
r
e
v
A

0
.
1

8
.
0

6
.
0

4
.
0

2
.
0

0
.
0

0
0
0
0
2

0
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
5

Source: STECF  

EN 

45 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
Table B.1 - Summary results of the performance of Harvest Control Rule B 

Allocat  % 

HCR

SR

HR

TACmax

TACmin

Spain

Median 

SSBlast

P(SSB<Blim 

P(closure 

Average 

Average sd 

P(SSB<Blim)

P(closure)

once)

once)

catch

catch

Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B
Rule B

cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte

ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000
33000

no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000
7000

74742
66586
52052
46756
36970
32361
26132
22891
20482
16997
79634
64231
56043
49525
47530
43325
40997
37040
39843
36248
79209
66498
54622
45459
37439
32910
27644
24286
19245
20094
83760
68240
57626
52933
44863
40147
41276
38213
34291
35121

0.017
0.033
0.068
0.124
0.206
0.263
0.353
0.438
0.493
0.544
0.013
0.033
0.063
0.107
0.145
0.172
0.204
0.236
0.242
0.268
0.008
0.023
0.061
0.108
0.202
0.276
0.356
0.420
0.493
0.533
0.007
0.022
0.060
0.093
0.138
0.181
0.203
0.244
0.244
0.267

0.033
0.047
0.081
0.134
0.205
0.255
0.331
0.403
0.451
0.497
0.026
0.048
0.078
0.117
0.156
0.172
0.194
0.228
0.234
0.252
0.479
0.188
0.196
0.227
0.300
0.350
0.411
0.466
0.512
0.546
0.479
0.187
0.182
0.211
0.241
0.264
0.274
0.297
0.286
0.306

0.217
0.297
0.461
0.666
0.820
0.880
0.948
0.986
0.993
0.997
0.192
0.300
0.462
0.584
0.677
0.709
0.748
0.797
0.807
0.822
0.994
0.779
0.790
0.854
0.940
0.961
0.984
0.995
0.998
0.998
0.992
0.782
0.750
0.825
0.857
0.857
0.881
0.877
0.872
0.887

8145
14791
19423
22681
24106
25718
25600
25024
24775
23850
8339
13961
17218
19164
20384
21423
21629
21352
21582
21345
6551
14219
19204
22947
24029
25283
25790
24771
24628
24151
6480
13524
17268
19191
19877
20596
21069
20935
21515
21164

5132
10115
14776
19557
22717
26215
28724
31364
32497
33112
5047
7995
9503
10574
11309
11745
12220
12665
12792
12973
6911
10553
15429
19962
23085
26622
29732
31354
32537
33630
6681
8626
10121
11224
11661
12284
12799
12923
12908
13291 Source: STECF  

0.109
0.188
0.373
0.586
0.774
0.854
0.952
0.977
0.991
0.996
0.090
0.191
0.360
0.516
0.607
0.668
0.738
0.769
0.776
0.800
0.054
0.156
0.343
0.531
0.761
0.891
0.946
0.973
0.989
0.990
0.048
0.145
0.334
0.488
0.624
0.690
0.743
0.792
0.775
0.803

46 

EN 

EN 

 
  
Figure  B.1  -  Performance  statistics  for  Rule  B  (probability  of  SSB  falling  below  Blim, 
probability of closing the fishery, the average catch and average sd in catch) depending on 
the harvest rate in the biomass model (using BBM) with the Ricker SR model. 

(Solid, dashed, dotted and dot-dashed lines represent the case without any restriction on the 
TAC, with a maximum TAC restriction of 33,000t, with a minimum viable TAC of 7000t and 
with a maximum TAC restriction of 33,000t and a minimum viable TAC of 7000t respectively) 

)
e
r
u
s
o
c
(

l

P

0
.
1

8
.
0

6
.
0

4
.
0

2
.
0

0
.
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Harvest rate

Harvest rate

h
c
t
a
C
d
S

0
0
0
5
2

0
0
0
5
1

0
0
0
5

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Harvest rate

Harvest rate

0
.
1

8
.
0

6
.
0

4
.
0

2
.
0

0
.
0

0
0
0
5
2

0
0
0
0
2

0
0
0
5
1

0
0
0
0
1

)
m

i
l

B
<
B
S
S
(
P

h
c
t
a
C
e
g
a
r
e
v
A

Source: STECF  

EN 

47 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure AB.1 - Catches versus Risks for both HCR A and B according to the different TAC 
constraints 

Rule B

Rule A

no TACmax, no TACmin
TACmax, no TACmin
no TACmax, TACmin
TACmax, TACmin

i

)
m
Bl
<
B
S
S
(
P

4
.
0

3
.
0

2
.
0

1
.
0

0
.
0

i

)
m
Bl
<
B
S
S
(
P

4
.
0

3
.
0

2
.
0

1
.
0

0
.
0

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Average Catch

Average Catch

In terms of risks, if a target level of catches was selected by managers above 15,000 t, setting 
a maximum TAC implies higher risks than the cases when no maximum TAC is set. This is 
true for both (A and B) Harvest Control Rules.  

EN 

48 

   EN 

 
 
 
Figure AB.2 - Comparison of the Performance of Rule A (solid line) and Rule B (dashed 
line) 

(for  the  biomass  model  with  the  Ricker  SR  model  and  no  minimum  or  maximum  TAC 
constraint (SSB is the median SSB at the end of the period) 

0
0
0
0
8

0
0
0
0
6

0
0
0
0
4

0
0
0
0
2

0
0
0
5
2

0
0
0
0
2

0
0
0
5
1

0
0
0
0
1

.

5
0

4
0

.

3
0

.

2
0

.

1
0

.

B
S
S

h
c
t
a
C
e
g
a
r
e
v
A

)
e
r
u
s
o
c
(
P

l

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Harvest Rate

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Harvest Rate

i
l

)
m
B
<
B
S
S
(
P

h
c
t
a
C
d
S

i
l

)
m
B
<
B
S
S
(
P

5
.
0

4
.
0

3
.
0

2
.
0

1
.
0

0
.
0

0
0
0
0
3

0
0
0
5
2

0
0
0
0
2

0
0
0
5
1

0
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
5

4
0

.

3
0

.

.

2
0

1
0

.

0
0

.

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Harvest Rate

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Harvest Rate

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Harvest Rate

Average Catch

Source: STECF  

EN 

49 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
Table C.1 - Summary results of the performance of Harvest Control Rule C 

HCR

Allocat

SR

TACmax TACmin

Median 
SSBlast

P(SSB<Blim)

P(SSB<Blim 
once)

P(closure)

P(closure 
once)

Average 
catch

Average sd 
catch

Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C
Rule C

cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
cte
var
var
var
var
var
var
var
var
var
var
var
var

ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
qhstk
qhstk
qhstk
qhstk
low
low
low
low
ricker
ricker
ricker
ricker
qhstk
qhstk
qhstk
qhstk
low
low
low
low

no
33000
no
33000
no
33000
no
33000
no
33000
no
33000
no
33000
no
33000
no
33000
no
33000
no
33000
no
33000

no
no
7000
7000
no
no
7000
7000
no
no
7000
7000
no
no
7000
7000
no
no
7000
7000
no
no
7000
7000

41354
53456
40920
52095
39992
53692
42098
53954
25907
25778
26892
26369
38423
53563
42540
55220
41660
53276
42881
54539
25202
26134
26753
26816

Source: STECF  

EN 

0.257
0.164
0.398
0.279
0.258
0.157
0.379
0.272
0.517
0.517
0.786
0.776
0.264
0.159
0.397
0.274
0.254
0.164
0.396
0.274
0.527
0.526
0.783
0.781

0.894
0.741
0.984
0.922
0.896
0.714
0.980
0.892
0.999
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.904
0.714
0.989
0.917
0.880
0.722
0.982
0.898
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

24240
18586
24145
18471
23755
18708
25292
18858
3533
3519
2843
2945
23450
18418
23684
18629
24510
18604
23873
18761
3515
3486
2918
2912

31089
12376
31691
12873
29981
12355
32124
12626
5429
5336
5570
5718
30079
12191
30418
12950
30556
12187
30746
12749
5448
5401
5771
5699

0.160
0.076
0.164
0.063
0.167
0.071
0.143
0.065
0.255
0.254
0.240
0.225
0.169
0.075
0.157
0.070
0.167
0.077
0.154
0.067
0.269
0.266
0.230
0.233

0.676
0.418
0.667
0.363
0.672
0.382
0.610
0.367
0.903
0.920
0.873
0.872
0.702
0.398
0.658
0.364
0.671
0.408
0.627
0.356
0.922
0.905
0.867
0.861

50 

EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detailed summary of scientific assessment carried out by the Anchovy Working Group: 

The performance of each rule was tested for values between 0 and 1 by steps of 0.1. For each 
of  the  strategies  outlined,  the  HCR  with  and  without  a  ceiling  equal  to  33,000  tonnes,  (the 
historically fixed level of TAC set to this fishery) and, with and without a minimum TAC as 
corresponding to the smallest catch that allows the fishery to remain economically viable (at 
7,000 tonnes, as pointed out by the SWW RAC), were constructed. 

In  the  fishery  model,  the  simulation  was  performed  using  two  operating  models:  an  age- 
structured and a two-stage biomass fishery model. The model was conditioned on the results 
from the stock assessment corresponding to ICES advice 2007. An age-structured model used 
for verification, was based on a seasonal multi-fleet integrated catch at age assessment as the 
one  used  in  ICES  2005.  This  model  was  updated  up  to  2007  in  order  to  provide  starting 
conditions for the current simulations. 

Catches were allocated to countries on a half-year basis, as shown in Figure 1.1 (Annex 1). 
The allocation was based on the mean fraction of the catch taken by each Country during the 
period 1992-2004 (constant allocation). However, some other possible allocations were tested, 
90% (Sp)-10% (Fr) to 60% (Sp)-40% (Fr). Furthermore a likely projection of the allocation of 
catches to countries (variable allocation relative to the TAC level) was subject to discussion at 
the pelagic committee of the SWW RAC. 

The socio-economic impact of the options was evaluated by means of algorithms developed 
during  the  meeting.  It  performed  a  stochastic  socio-economic  analysis  considering  the 
biological  outcome  as  an  input.  It  was  based  on  estimations  of  production  functions  for 
anchovy by semester and by fleet, considering the SSB of anchovy, the number of vessels in 
the fishery of anchovy and the time devoted to it. A production function for the rest of target 
species was also estimated, in this case without considering any SSB. 

A price function for anchovy, based on French and Spanish data was also estimated. Price for 
other species was considered as fixed. The time of data series used came from 2000-2005, and 
2000-2006, respectively. 

The indicators presented were: 

•  Biological  risk  measured  in  terms  of  number  of  the  likelihood  of  SSB  being  below 

Blim. 

•  The number of years in which the fishery should be closed. 
•  The total expected match of anchovy. 
•  The variation of this catch. 
•  The Gross revenue obtained from anchovy (discounted 5%) for each fleet. 
•  Gross Cash Flow (discounted 5%) for each fleet. 
•  Economic risk as the likelihood of having a negative cash flow. 
•  A social indicator as the relative wage to the average of the country by FTE. 

As regards the management calendar for the plan in Option 2, the approach that the harvest 
control rules define the allowable catches from July to June according to the biomass levels 
estimates from surveys in May of the first year has been adopted (please see the graph below).  

EN 

51 

   EN 

 
8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

Recruitment
acoustic surveys

SSB surveys

DEPM & Acoustic

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12

The plan would contain provisions for periodic reviews such that policy amendments can be 
introduced  if  further  developments  warrant  this.  Periodic  reviews  are  a  standard  feature  of 
Community long-term plans. 

EN 

52 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3 – SUMMARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND STAKEHOLDER ADVICE   

Scientific and stakeholder bodies consulted 

The  Commission  requested  the  Scientific,  Technical  and  Economic  Committee  for  Fisheries 
(STECF) to provide scientific advice on the long-term management of anchovy. Two meetings 
were  organised  for  an  ad  hoc  group;  the  first  one  took  place  in  Hamburg  14th  to  18th  April 
2008, and the second one in San Sebastian 2nd to 6th June 2008. STECF expressed its opinion 
at the plenary meeting of 2nd to 4th July, 2008.  

Advice  was  also  sought  from  the  South  Western  Waters  Regional  Advisory  Council  (SWW 
RAC).  This  body  was  established  by  the  European  Community  to  allow  representatives  of 
catching  and  processing  industry  sectors,  environmental  non-governmental  organisations, 
recreational  fishermen  and  various  other  interest  groups  to  provide  advice  to  the  European 
Commission  on  Common  Fisheries  Policy  in  respect  of  south-western  waters  fish  stocks. 
SWWRAC delivered its views and recommendations on a management approach for anchovy 
by letter in July 2008.  

Advice received and used 

•  Summary of recommendations received from STECF 

STECF advised that there were substantial benefits in moving from the current system based 
on ad hoc annual measures into a long-term plan. It provided the results of different harvest 
control rules through a risk analysis under the following scenarios of exploitation:  

Option A: Harvesting a constant proportion above an escapement Biomass (SSB) level; 

Option B: Harvesting a constant proportion of the Biomass SSB level; 

Option C: Harvesting a constant short term risk of 15% for low recruitments scenarios. 

The  probability  of  having  stock  biomass  falling  below  Blim  and  the  probability  of  having  to 
close the fishery within the ten years simulation model is the basis for the analysis.  

The full advice from STECF is publicly available on its website (fishnet.jrc.it/web/stecf). 

•  Summary of recommendations from SWWRAC 

The SWW RAC agreed with a need to have a long-term plan to manage anchovy in the Bay of 
Biscay. The RAC also selected Option B as a preferred harvest control rule for setting TAC. 
The stakeholders, however, opted for the higher exploitation factor (gamma) of 0.4 instead of 
the 0.3 suggested in the Commission proposal. This rate would significantly increase the level 

EN 

53 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
 
of risks in terms on probability of the stock falling below Blim and a fishery closure. 

The advice from SWW RAC is publicly available on its website (www.ccr-s.eu). 

The  Commission  proposal  for  the  long-term  plan  is  based  on  the  advice  received  by  both 
bodies. 

EN 

54 

   EN 

 
 
 
 
GLOSSARY 

B 

biomass–  the  total  weight  of  living  matter,  either  by  species  or  all  species  combined.  Also 
referred to as the standing stock. 

Blim – see limit reference points. 

Bmsy – the spawning stock biomass (SSB) necessary to support a fishery that would produce 
the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). 

Bpa – see limit reference points. 

by-catch – the catch of non-target species and undersized fish of the target species. By-catch 
of commercial species may be retained or discarded along with non-commercial by-catch. 

C 

catch (C) – the total quantity of fish that is retained by fishing gear and brought onto the deck 
or fishing station, ie landings plus discards. 

CFP  –  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy  of  the  European  Union  (as  revised  in:  Council 
Regulation 3760/92). It provides the framework for the management of the EU fishery sector, 
including all marine fisheries within 200 miles of member states’baselines. 

collapsed  stock  –  the  decline  in  spawning  stock  biomass  (SSB),  through  sustained  fishing 
pressure  or  natural  causes,  to  the  point  where  it  no  longer  generates  sufficient  recruits  to 
support a fishery. 

D 

depleted stock – the decline in spawning stock biomass (SSB) to a level that is approaching, 
or is below, the lowest historic record but has not necessarily reached the point of collapse. 
(See also limit reference points and safe biological limits.) 

discards  –  any  fish,  or  other  living  matter  caught  when  fishing,  that  is  not  retained  but 
returned to the sea – alive or dead. 

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E 

effort (f) – the total quantity of fishing gear in use for a specific period of time. Effort can be 
expressed  in  a  multitude  of  ways:  days  away  from  port,  hours  trawling,  length  of  drift  net, 
number of hooks used, and so on. At its most basic, it is the total number of boats engaged in 
a fishery and/or the number of days they were fishing. 

environmentally sustainable fisheries – fisheries that safeguard the requirements of all animals 
and plants within an ecosystem or habitat and do not cause irreversible  or other significant, 
long-term  change  to  the  environment  or  the  communities  of  species  that  live  within  that 
environment. 

exploitation pattern - the distribution of fishing mortality over the age composition of the fish 
population, determined by the type of fishing gear, area and seasonal distribution of fishing, 
and  the  growth  and  migration  of  the  fish.  The  pattern  can  be  changed  by  modifications  to 
fishing gear, for example, increasing mesh or hook size, or by changing the ratio of harvest by 
gears exploiting the fish (e.g., gill net, trawl, hook and line, etc.).  

F 

F – formally, the instantaneous rate of fishing mortality (the natural logarithm of the change 
in  abundance  due  to  fishing  per  unit  of  time),  but  more  simply,  the  proportion  of  the 
population killed each year by fishing. 

A  generalised  yield-per-recruit  (YPR)  curve 
showing  the  point  at  which  the  fishing 
mortality  rate  (F) 
the 
maximum  sustainable  yield  (Fmsy)  and  the 
point  at  which  the  slope  of  the  curve  is 
approximately  10%  the  slope  of  F=0,  ie  F 
0.1.  

is  equivalent 

to 

fish stock – scientifically, a population of a species of fish that is isolated from other stocks of 
the  same  species  and  does  not  interbreed  with  them  and  can,  therefore,  be  managed 
independently of other stocks (cf gene pool). However, in EU legislation the term ‘stock’ is 
used  to  mean  a  species  of  fish  living  in  a  defined  sea  area,  the  two  are  not  always 
synonymous. 

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fishery conservation – the conservation and sustainable use of exploited fish stocks. It is the 
principal  objective  of  UK  and  EU  fisheries  legislation;  fishery  management  is  the  primary 
method through which the objective is pursued. 

fishing effort – see effort. 

fishing mortality rate – see F.  

Flim – see limit reference points. 

FMSY – the level of fishing mortality (F) that corresponds to the peak value on a dome-shaped 
yield-per-recruit curve and the value that will produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) 
from a fish stock. 

Fpa – see limit reference points. 

H 

HCR  —  harvest  control  rule  describes  how  harvest  is  intended  to  be  controlled  by 
management in relation to the state of some indicator of stock status. For example, a harvest 
control  rule  can  describe  the  various  values  of  fishing  mortality  which  will  be  aimed  at  for 
various values of the stock abundance. It formalizes and summarizes a management strategy. 
Constant catch and constant fishing mortality are two types of simple harvest control rules. 

I 

ICES – the International Council for encourages research into commercial the Exploration of 
the  Sea,  an  fish  stocks,  their  biology  and  all  factors  independent  scientific  advisory  body 
(natural and man made) that may founded in 1902. It is funded by 19 affect their abundance. 
It does not member states’ governments from undertake research in its own right but around 
the North Atlantic (including has a secretariat (in Copenhagen) to Canada and the USA) and 
Baltic  Sea.  It  facilitate  and  co-ordinate  collaboration,  including  fishery  stock  assessments, 
between  member  states.  Work  is  carried  out  through  numerous  working  groups  convened 
under  the  remit  of  one  or  more  standing  committees:  Advisory  Committee  of  Fisheries 
Management  (ACFM),  Advisory  Committee  for  the  Marine  Environment  (ACME),  Baltic 
Committee,  Fisheries  Technology  Committee,  Living  Resources  Committee,  Mariculture 
Committee,  Marine  Habitat  Committee,  Oceanography  Committee,  Resource  Management 
Committee. 

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J 

juvenile  –  an  immature  fish,  ie  one  that  has  not  reached  sexual  maturity  (but  could  still  be 
larger than the minimum landing size – MLS). 

L 

landings  –  that  part  of  the  catch  which  is  put  ashore.  Frequently,  landings  provide  the  only 
record of total catch; ie the landings plus discards. 

limit reference points – are biological or fishery management indicators that define the point 
at which precautionary action must be taken to safeguard a fish stock. In order for stocks and 
fisheries exploiting them to be within safe biological limits, there should be a high probability 
that: 1 – the spawning stock biomass (SSB = B) is above the threshold where recruitment is 
impaired; 2 - the fishing mortality (F) is below that which will drive the spawning stock to the 
biomass  threshold,  a  condition  that  must  be  avoided.  Thus:  Blim  =  minimum  acceptable 
biomass  Flim  =  maximum  acceptable  fishing  mortality  (lim  stands  for  ‘limit’).  The  certainty 
with which these points can be identified varies with the quality of assessment data available. 
Therefore,  ICES  has  also  identified  precautionary  reference  points  that  identify  higher 
biomass thresholds than Blim and lower fishing mortality thresholds than Flim: 

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Bpa = precautionary minimum biomass  

Fpa  =  precautionary  maximum  fishing  mortality  (pa  stands  for  precautionary 
approach). 

In many instances, the value for Bpa will be the same as the value previously identified 
as  the  minimum  biologically  acceptable  limit  –  MBAL.  In  circumstances  where  the 
relationship between the exploited stock and the spawning stock is not clear, as is the 
case  with  some  of  the  deep-water  species  of  fish,  limit  reference  points  may  be 
expressed with respect to the ‘unexploited stock’: 

M 

MSY - Maximum Sustainable Yield: the largest average catch that can bet taken continuously 
from  a  stock  under  existing  environmental  conditions.  (For  species  with  fluctuating 
recruitment,  the  maximum  might  be  obtained  by  taking  fewer  fish  in  some  years  than  in 
others). Also known as maximum equilibrium catch. 

mixed  fishery  –  a  fishery  that  takes  multi-species  catches.  Pelagic  fisheries  tend  to  take 
relatively  ‘clean’  single  species  catches  whereas  multi-species  catches  are  more  frequent  in 
demersal fisheries.  

monitoring  –  the  regular  and  systematic  collection  of  environmental  and  biological  data  by 
agreed methods and to agreed standards. Monitoring provides information on current status, 
trends  and  compliance  with  respect  to  declared  standards  and  objectives.  (See  also 
surveillance.)  

mortality – the death of organisms through natural causes (M), eg predation, or fishing (F) etc. 
It is usually expressed as an instantaneous rate: the natural logarithm (with sign changed) of 
the ratio of number of animals surviving to the end of the year and the number at the start of 
the year. 

O 

over-fishing – any fishery where the total fishing effort is greater than is required to meet or 
match  a  specific  management  objective,  eg  maximum  sustainable  yield  (MSY).  (See  also 
growth overfishing and recruitment overfishing.) 

P 

precautionary  approach  –  a  decision  to  take  avoiding  action  based  on  the  possibility  of 
significant environmental damage, even before there is conclusive evidence that damage will 
occur. This approach requires fishery managers to pay due regard to the uncertainties of stock 

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assessment  and  management.  They  must  implement  the  appropriate  precautionary  action  if 
limit reference points are reached. 

R 

recruitment – a process by which fish enter the exploitable stock and become susceptible to 
fishing (age/growth related). 

S 

SSB – spawning stock biomass is the total weight of all sexually mature fish in a population 
or stock. It is the sexually mature part of an exploited population upon which the future 
survival of the stock, and its fishery, depends. 

STECF  –  the  Scientific,  Technical  and  Economic  Committee  on  Fisheries  of  the  EC,  DG 
Fisheries.  Unlike  ICES  working  groups  and  ACFM  which  only  consider  stock  assessments 
and management from a scientific perspective, the STEFC is expected to consider the socio- 
economic implications of modifying or varying scientific, including ICES’ advice. 

stock biomass – the total weight of all fish of all ages in a given population or stock. 

sustainability – meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.  

sustainable fisheries – fisheries with an annual catch, including discards, that does not exceed 
the surplus production of the stock (ie annual growth plus recruitment less the annual natural 
mortality  –  M).  Fisheries  can  be  sustainable  at  levels  of  stock  significantly  below  the  stock 
that  would  support  MSY  or  MEY  but  only  if  managers  pay  full  regard  to  limit  reference 
points. (See also environmentally sustainable fisheries.) 

T 

TAC – total allowable catch, the quantity of fish that can be taken from each stock each year. 
The figure is agreed by the Fisheries Council of Ministers each December for the following 
year. EU member states are allocated a fixed proportion of the TAC as their national quota. 
(See also relative stability and track record.)  

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